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crs_RS21283 | crs_RS21283_0 | For many years, the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information was circumscribed by administrative policies and statutory prohibitions. (2) Nevertheless, there had been no one place where theanalyticaleffort is centered; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was designed to remedy that perceived deficiencyas is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center announced by the President in his January 2003 State of the Unionaddress. Background
The Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), signed on November 25, 2002 established within DHS a Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) headed by an Under Secretary for Information Analysisand Infrastructure Protection (appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate) with anAssistant Secretary of Information Analysis (appointed by the President). Analytical Quality. It envisioned the DHS information analysis entity working closely with otherDHS offices, other federal agencies, state and local officials, and the private sector to devise strategies to protectU.S.vulnerabilities and to provide warning of specific attacks. | Legislation establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (P.L. 107-296) included provisions for an information analysis element within the new department. It did not transferto DHS existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies but envisioned an analytical office utilizingthe products of other agencies -- both unevaluated information and finished reports -- to provide warning ofterrorist attacks, assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for remedial actions at federal, state, and locallevels, and by the private sector. In January 2003, the Administration announced its intention to establish a newTerrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to undertake many of the tasks envisioned for the DHS informationalanalysis element, known as Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), but some Members ofCongress argue that TTIC cannot be a substitute for a DHS analytical effort. This report examines differentapproaches to improving the information analysis function and the sharing of information among federal agencies.It willbe updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_98-326 | crs_98-326_0 | Introduction
This is an outline of two federal statutes: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA authorizes the collection of information about the activities of foreign powers and their agents, whether those activities are criminal or not. The FISA provides a procedure for judicial review and authorization of electronic surveillance and other forms of information gathering for foreign intelligence purposes. In 1986, Congress enacted in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). ECPA consists of three parts: a revised Title III; the Stored Communications Act (SCA); and provisions governing the installation and use of pen registers as well as trap and trace devices. The first requires either unauthorized access or access in excess of authorization. As in the case of law enforcement wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, there is authority for interception and physical searches prior to approval in emergency situations. Overseas FISA Targets (Expires December 31, 2017)356
The 2008 FISA Amendments Act established a temporary set of three procedures which authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information by targeting an individual or entity thought to be overseas. The Second Circuit disagreed. FISA Reporting Requirements
Every 6 months, the Attorney General must report on the use of FISA authority. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Text)
Chapter 119 ("Title III")
18 U.S.C. (f) Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 of this title, or section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law involving a foreign electronic communications system, utilizing a means other than electronic surveillance as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted. Report to Administrative Office of the United States Courts and to Congress. Civil Liability. (2) An order issued under this section —
(A) shall specify—
(i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the investigation;
(ii) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied; and
(iii) the attributes of the communications to which the order applies, such as the number or other identifier, and, if known, the location of the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order;
(B) shall direct that—
(i) upon request of the applicant, the provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furnish any information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation and operation of the pen register or trap and trace device in such a manner as will protect its secrecy and produce a minimum amount of interference with the services that such provider, landlord, custodian, or other person is providing the person concerned;
(ii) such provider, landlord, custodian, or other person —
(I) shall not disclose the existence of the investigation or of the pen register or trap and trace device to any person unless or until ordered by the court; and
(II) shall maintain, under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to section 1805(b)(2)(C) of this title, any records concerning the pen register or trap and trace device or the aid furnished; and
(iii) the applicant shall compensate such provider, landlord, custodian, or other person for reasonable expenses incurred by such provider, landlord, custodian, or other person in providing such information, facilities, or technical assistance; and
(C) shall direct that, upon the request of the applicant, the provider of a wire or electronic communication service shall disclose to the Federal officer using the pen register or trap and trace device covered by the order —
(i) in the case of the customer or subscriber using the service covered by the order (for the period specified by the order) . Subchapter IV (Business Records/Tangible Items)
50 U.S.C. (a) Authorization . (B) Exception . —
(1) Authority . (C) Amendments . (5) Schedule . —
(A) Reauthorization of authorizations in effect . (4) Specifications. (b) Content . Reporting. | This report provides an overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). ECPA consists of three parts. The first, often referred to as Title III, outlaws wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, except as otherwise provided. The second, the Stored Communications Act, governs the privacy of, and government access to, the content of electronic communications and to related records. The third outlaws the use and installation of pen registers and of trap and trace devices, unless judicially approved for law enforcement or intelligence gathering purposes.
FISA consists of seven parts. The first, reminiscent of Title III, authorizes electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence investigations. The second authorizes physical searches in foreign intelligence cases. The third permits the use and installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices in the context of a foreign intelligence investigation. The fourth affords intelligence officials access to business records and other tangible items. The fifth directs the Attorney General to report to Congress on the specifics of the exercise of FISA authority. The sixth, scheduled to expire on December 31, 2017, permits the acquisition of the communications of targeted overseas individuals and entities. The seventh creates a safe harbor from civil liability for those who assist or have assisted in the collection of information relating to the activities of foreign powers and their agents.
This report includes the text of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as well as appendixes listing the citations to state statutes that correspond to various aspects of ECPA. The report is available in an abridged form without footnotes, attributions to authority, the text of ECPA or FISA, or appendixes found here as CRS Report 98-327, Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41733, Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by [author name scrubbed], replicates portions of this report. Related CRS reports include CRS Report R42725, Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015, by the same author. |
crs_R40502 | crs_R40502_0 | Introduction1
At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in November 2011, the leaders of the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam announced the broad outlines of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which the parties hope to complete in 2012. If enacted, the TPP would eliminate 11,000 tariff lines, and with 26 chapters under negotiation, potentially it could serve as a template for future trade pact among the APEC states. At the same venue, the leaders of Japan, Canada, and Mexico announced that they would seek consultations with partner countries with a view towards joining the negotiations. Malaysia was accepted as the ninth negotiating partner in October 2010, and the nine conducted a fourth round of negotiations in December 2010 in New Zealand. In this way, the TPP is viewed as a potential building block to a larger Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). Despite this, the relative importance of the United States as a trading partner for many Asian states is declining. Fear among some U.S. policy and trade analysts that the United States was running the risk of being marginalized by not responding to the proliferation of trade agreements that emerged in Asia in recent years appears to have been a key factor behind decisions to more fully engage Asian regional architectures including the TPP. However, other trade analysts view the increasing web of bilateral and regional trade agreements with suspicion. The potential participation of Vietnam in the negotiations may prove more controversial. Objectives and Interests
While trade with the current TPP nations represents a relatively small part of U.S. trade with Asia and the world (see Table 1 ), U.S. participation in the TPP could provide it with the critical mass necessary to expand to other countries. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's presence in and attention to the region, the U.S. decision to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and President Obama's announcement of U.S. interest to engage on the TPP and other multilateral groupings in Asia have all helped to positively reshape regional perceptions of the United States' posture in the region. Context with Other Regional Architectures18
There are several overlapping and potentially competing regional architectures in Asia having both economic and strategic aspects. They can be grouped into two categories, the first being those that are Asia-centric in approach and would exclude the United States, and the second being those that are trans-Pacific in nature and would include the United States and other Western Hemispheric nations. The first more Asia-centric group includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) + 3 and ASEAN + 6 groups. The ASEAN + 6 group is also known as the East Asia Summit (EAS). It includes ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea as well as India, Australia, and New Zealand. The 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group is the most comprehensive trans-Pacific group that includes the United States. While the United States has tried in the past to develop multilateral strategic groups, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), it has had more success in the strategic arena in Asia through its key bilateral treaty relationships with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Should this occur, U.S. negotiators may face pressure to revisit some of the bilateral provisions on sensitive agricultural products entered into with Australia, Chile, and Peru such as sugar, beef, and dairy products. The negotiations may benefit from the input of more parties initially, yet such inclusion may make the talks unwieldy. Other issues may involve New Zealand, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, or issues related to the implementation of FTAs that the United States currently has with Chile, Singapore, Australia, and Peru. | At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in November 2011, the leaders of the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam announced the broad outlines of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which the parties hope to complete in 2012. If enacted the TPP would eliminate 11,000 tariff lines among the parties and, with 26 chapters under negotiation, potentially it could serve as a template for future trade pact among the APEC states. At the same venue the leaders of Japan, Canada, and Mexico announced that they would seek consultations with partner countries with a view towards joining the negotiations. Nine rounds of negotiations have occurred since the beginning of 2010.
Other architectures, such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have both economic and strategic aspects. They can be grouped into two categories: (1) groupings that are Asia-centric in approach or origins and exclude the United States and (2) those that are trans-Pacific in nature and that include, or would include, the United States and other Western Hemispheric nations. The TPP is one vehicle that could be used to shape the U.S. agenda with the region. The United States, by signaling its intention to join the EAS and by working to elevate its relationship with ASEAN to a more strategic level, appears to be shaping regional architectures in a way that will be more inclusive and trans-Pacific in nature.
Asia is viewed as of vital importance to U.S. trade and security interests. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the Asia-Pacific region is a key driver of global economic growth and accounts for nearly 60% of global GDP and roughly 50% of international trade. Since 1990, Asia-Pacific goods trade has increased 300% while there has been a 400% increase in global investment in the region. The United States has pursued its regional trade interests both bilaterally and through multilateral groupings such as APEC, which has linked the Western Hemisphere with Asia. There appears to be a correlation between increasing intra-regional economic activity and increasing intra-regional political and diplomatic cooperation. Many observers view the more recent intra-Asian Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) plus three—China, Japan, South Korea—and the ASEAN plus six (also known as the East Asia Summit)—China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand—groups as having attracted more interest within the region in recent years. China's rapidly expanding economy and Japan's developed economy have made them attractive trading partners to many Asian nations. Until recently, many regional states also viewed the United States as having been distracted by events in Iraq and Afghanistan. This had led some to increasingly look to China and Japan as key partners. China may be shifting to a more assertive posture in the region, which may affect relations in the region. Secretary of State Clinton attended the East Asia Summit in Hanoi in October 2010 and President Obama attended the 2011 East Asia Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. U.S. participation in the TPP involves the negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with New Zealand, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The United States currently has FTAs in force with Chile, Singapore, Australia, and Peru, although these agreements may be reopened depending on the outcome of the negotiations. Bilateral negotiations with New Zealand may focus on agricultural goods such as beef and dairy products. The possible inclusion of Vietnam has proven controversial from the standpoint of certain U.S. industry groups, such as textiles and apparel, as well as those concerned with labor, human rights, and intellectual property issues. The involvement of Vietnam could add a higher level of difficulty, yet is illustrative of the challenges associated with developing a truly Asia-Pacific-wide trade grouping. All the potential parties may face complex negotiations in integrating the myriad FTAs that already exist between some TPP parties. |
crs_R41093 | crs_R41093_0 | Introduction
Foreign nationals (i.e., aliens) not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. Under current law, three departments—the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. DOS's Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is responsible for issuing visas, DHS's Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) is charged with approving immigrant petitions, DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operates the Visa Security Program in selected embassies abroad, and DHS's Customs and Border Protection Bureau (CBP) is tasked with inspecting all people who enter the United States. DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has a significant policy role through its adjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases. The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted to ignite an explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, refocused attention on the responsibilities of the Departments of State and Homeland Security for the visa process. He was traveling on a multi-year, multiple-entry tourist visa issued to him in June 2008. State Department officials have acknowledged that Abdulmutallab's father came into the Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 19, 2009, to express his concerns about his son, and that those officials at the Embassy in Abuja sent a cable to the National Counterterrorism Center. State Department officials maintain they had insufficient information to revoke his visa at that time. In the aftermath of the Abdulmutallab case, policymakers explored what went wrong and whether statutory and procedural revisions were needed. In §428, the Secretary of DHS is expressly tasked as follows:
...shall be vested exclusively with all authorities to issue regulations with respect to, administer, and enforce the provisions of such Act, and of all other immigration and nationality laws, relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting or refusal of visas, and shall have the authority to refuse visas in accordance with law and to develop programs of homeland security training for consular officers (in addition to consular training provided by the Secretary of State), which authorities shall be exercised through the Secretary of State, except that the Secretary shall not have authority to alter or reverse the decision of a consular officer to refuse a visa to an alien ... 107-296 ). Current Issues
Competing Interests
Some have expressed the view that DOS retains too much power and control over visa issuances. They maintain the Homeland Security Act intended DHS to be the lead department and that DOS was to merely administer the visa process. Proponents of DOS playing the lead role in visa issuances assert that only consular officers in the field have the country-specific knowledge to make decisions about whether an alien is admissible and that staffing approximately 250 diplomatic and consular posts around the world would stretch DHS beyond its capacity. The House Committee on the Judiciary has reported legislation ( H.R. 1741 ) that would give the Secretary of Homeland Security "exclusive authority to issue regulations, establish policy, and administer and enforce the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) 5005 , the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 5710 retained the language clarifying that—although DOS's Consular Affairs would continue to issue visas—the Secretary of DHS would issue regulations regarding visa issuances and would assign staff to consular posts abroad to advise, review, and conduct investigations. P.L. P.L. | Foreign nationals (i.e., aliens) not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted, with certain exceptions noted in law. The Departments of State (DOS) and Homeland Security (DHS) each play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. Although the DOS's Consular Affairs is responsible for issuing visas, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services (USCIS) in DHS approves immigrant petitions, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in DHS operates the Visa Security Program in selected embassies abroad, and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in DHS inspects all people who enter the United States. In addition, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has a significant policy role through its adjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases.
Although there was a discussion of assigning all visa issuance responsibilities to DHS when the department was being created, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) opted not to do so. Rather, P.L. 107-296 drew on compromise language stating that DHS issues regulations regarding visa issuances and assigns staff to consular posts abroad to advise, review, and conduct investigations, and that DOS's Consular Affairs continues to issue visas.
The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted to ignite an explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, refocused attention on the responsibilities of the Departments of State and Homeland Security for the visa process. He was traveling on a multi-year, multiple-entry tourist visa issued to him in June 2008. State Department officials have acknowledged that Abdulmutallab's father came into the Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 19, 2009, to express his concerns about his son, and that those officials at the Embassy in Abuja sent a cable to the National Counterterrorism Center. State Department officials maintain they had insufficient information to revoke his visa at that time. In the aftermath of the Abdulmutallab case, policymakers explored what went wrong and whether statutory and procedural revisions were needed.
Some have expressed the view that DOS has too much control over visas, maintaining that the Homeland Security Act intended DHS to be the lead department and DOS to merely administer the visa process. Proponents of DOS playing the principal role in visa issuances assert that only consular officers in the field have the country-specific knowledge to make decisions about whether an alien is admissible and that staffing 250 diplomatic and consular posts around the world would stretch DHS beyond its capacity. Whether the visa security roles and procedures are adequately funded may arise as the budget issues are considered.
The House Committee on the Judiciary has reported legislation (H.R. 1741) that would give the Secretary of Homeland Security "exclusive authority to issue regulations, establish policy, and administer and enforce the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) and all other immigration or nationality laws relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting and refusal of a visa."
This report will be updated as significant developments occur. |
crs_RL34507 | crs_RL34507_0 | Background
The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act) provides federal financial assistance to states and public and nonprofit agencies to support community-based delivery of services to persons with developmental disabilities (DD). The aim of the programs established by the DD Act is to help persons with DD maximize their work potential, facilitate their ability to live independently, and foster their integration into the community. The protection of the legal rights of individuals with DD is another major objective of the DD Act. Authorizations of appropriations for the DD Act programs expired at the end of FY2007, although Congress has continued to provide appropriations for the programs. Legislation to reauthorize the DD Act has not been introduced in the 111 th Congress. This report describes the major programs authorized under Title I of the DD Act. P&A programs provide information and referral services and investigate reported incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with DD. Projects of National Significance
This program funds grants or contracts to public nonprofit institutions to enhance the independence, productivity, and social inclusion of people with DD. Title II authorized competitive grants to help states strengthen their family support programs for families with a severely disabled family member. Title III authorized one scholarship program to provide vouchers for post-secondary education for direct support workers who assist individuals with DD as well as a grant program for the development, evaluation, and dissemination of a staff development curriculum. Recent Legislative Efforts
Legal Representation of Individuals with Developmental Disabilities
Legislation that directly related to the DD Act was considered, but not enacted, in the 110 th Congress. Appendix A. Allotments for State Councils on Developmental Disabilities and Protection and Advocacy Programs, FY2002 - FY2011 (est.) | The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (commonly known as the DD Act) provides federal financial assistance to states and public and nonprofit agencies to support community-based delivery of services to persons with developmental disabilities. The DD Act defines developmental disabilities (DD) as severe, life-long disabilities attributable to mental and/or physical impairment. The aim of the DD Act is to help individuals with DD maximize their potential through increased independence, productivity, inclusion, and integration into the community.
Title I of the DD Act authorizes appropriations for (1) State Councils on Developmental Disabilities (SCDDs) that are tasked with developing state-wide plans on delivering services to individuals with DD; (2) Protection and Advocacy (P&A) systems, which investigate reported incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with DD; (3) University Centers for Excellence in Developmental Disabilities (UCEDDs) that engage in applied research on DD; and (4) Projects of National Significance (PNS), which fund public nonprofits focused on enhancing the independence, productivity, and social inclusion of individuals with DD.
Title II of the DD Act authorizes competitive grants to help states strengthen their family support programs for families with a severely disabled family member. Title III of the DD Act authorizes one scholarship program to provide vouchers for post-secondary education for direct support workers who assist individuals with DD either through an institution of higher education or state agency. Title III also authorizes a grant program for the development, evaluation, and dissemination of a staff development curriculum.
Authorization of appropriations for the DD Act programs expired at the end of FY2007, although Congress has continued to provide appropriations for the programs. The 111th Congress has not considered legislation to reauthorize the DD Act. This report provides background and funding information on DD Act programs, discusses evaluation activities, and summarizes recent legislative efforts related to the DD Act. |
crs_R44779 | crs_R44779_0 | Introduction
Counternarcotics policy has been the defining issue in U.S.-Colombian relations since the 1980s because of Colombia's preeminence as a source country for illicit drugs. Over the past 17 years, the United States and Colombia have forged a close security partnership, initially through a strategy called Plan Colombia, which was first funded by the U.S. Congress in 2000. Between FY2000 and FY2016, Congress provided more than $10 billion of foreign assistance from the U.S. The lucrative drug trade in the 1990s had added new fuel to a multisided, decades-long internal armed conflict, featuring right-wing paramilitaries and a rural peasant-based insurgency. In February 2016, President Obama's Administration, anticipating a possible peace agreement between the government and the FARC, proposed a post-peace accord approach to U.S.-Colombian cooperation called Peace Colombia. In November 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC signed a historic peace accord that came on the heels of four years of formal peace talks and, 40 days earlier, the razor-thin defeat of an earlier peace accord in an October 2016 public referendum. The revised accord was approved by Colombia's Congress in late November 2016 (although some congressional opponents boycotted the final vote). During the protracted peace talks with the FARC, the Colombian government altered its approach to drug policy and announced a new strategy (see " Colombia's 2015 Counternarcotics Policy: A Shift in Approach? According to President Santos, the FARC-government peace accord had the potential to draw the once-powerful leftist guerrilla organization into the effort to counter illicit drug production and trafficking. One of the critical topics of the peace negotiations was the issue of controlling illegal crops and drug trafficking—a major source of FARC income. Although the Santos Administration's counternarcotics policy changed in 2015 (see " Colombia's 2015 Counternarcotics Policy: A Shift in Approach? Some observers point to the Santos government's adoption of "harm reduction" drug policy rhetoric, which promotes reform of traditional antidrug practices in ways that reduces human rights violations. On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution to combat illicit drug production. Despite its efforts, Colombia became the top producer of cocaine once more in 2014, and it remains one of three countries in the Andean region that produce nearly all of the world's supply of coca and cocaine, much of which is destined for the U.S. market. U.S. policymakers have expressed renewed concern over Colombia's drug production in the context of the historic peace accord with the FARC and changes to Colombia's counternarcotics strategy. Other factors that may have contributed to the large increases in coca bush cultivation in Colombia between 2014 and 2016 include the following:
the FARC incited farmers to increase coca planting in anticipation of benefits from the government, such as crop substitution programs and credits; total eradication (number of hectares sprayed) has declined and counter-eradication efforts have become more effective in recent years; the price of gold fluctuated—when gold prices increased, the FARC moved into illegal mining and encouraged coca farmers and others to engage in mining activities; however, when gold prices fell in 2013 and 2014, Colombian peasant farmers and the FARC reverted to more coca production; and cocaine demand ticked up in the U.S. and European market. Policymakers in Colombia and the United States may choose to assess if the government's revised counternarcotics strategy, with its focus on rural development to reduce dependence on drug cultivation, enhanced law enforcement to interdict drugs and combat organized crime groups, and the public health approach to address domestic drug use, can bring the surge in cocaine production under control. Policy Issues for Congress
Colombia's partnership with the United States broadened during the years of Plan Colombia and its successor programs from a primary emphasis on counternarcotics, although also with significant programs addressing humanitarian concerns, such as justice reform and human rights, to a wider set of concerns. As the Colombian government implements the peace accord with the FARC, whose insurgency was fueled by the drug trade, the U.S. Congress may consider how to evaluate the newer "post-Plan Colombia" counterdrug approach, including such issues as eradication of drug crops, alternative development, and interdiction. The final peace accord with the FARC, ratified in November 2016 by the Colombian Congress, returned aerial spraying to the government's antidrug armory. Will U.S. and Colombian drug control objectives continue to align? Funding Trends and U.S.-Colombian Counterdrug Cooperation
State Department Counternarcotics Foreign Assistance
According to the State Department, Colombia received an estimated $87.7 million in FY2016 for counternarcotics assistance. | Colombia is one of the largest producers of cocaine globally, and it also produces heroin bound for the United States. Counternarcotics policy has long been a key component of the U.S.-Colombian relationship, which some analysts have described as "driven by drugs." In recent years, Colombia revised its approach to counternarcotics policy, which may have implications for the U.S.-Colombian relationship going forward. On September 13, 2017, President Trump cited the recent spike in Colombia's cocaine production as the reason he was reserving the option to decertify Colombia as a cooperating partner in fighting illegal drugs, an unexpected development given the close counternarcotics partnership between the United States and Colombia.
U.S. concerns about illicit drug production and trafficking in Colombia arose in the 1970s and grew significantly when Colombia became the dominant producer of cocaine in the Andean region in the mid-to-late 1990s. The United States has worked closely with Colombia to eradicate drug crops and combat trafficking. Simultaneously, since 2000, the United States has forged a partnership with Colombia—perhaps its closest bilateral relationship in Latin America—centered on helping Colombia recover its stability following a decades-long internal conflict with insurgencies of left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries, whose longevity has been attributed, in part, to their role in the country's illicit drug trade. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion of bilateral foreign assistance to support a Colombian-written strategy known as Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In addition to counternarcotics, the United States helped support security and development programs designed to stabilize Colombia's security situation and strengthen its democracy.
A peace accord between the government of Colombia and the country's main leftist insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was signed in November 2016 after four years of formal peace talks. During protracted peace negotiations with the FARC, the Colombian government altered its approach to drug policy. A major change was the decision to end aerial spraying to eradicate coca crops, which had been a central—albeit controversial—feature of U.S.-Colombian counterdrug cooperation for more than two decades.
In addition, Colombia's counternarcotics policies also shifted in 2015 to a public health approach. The shift was influenced by broader hemispheric trends to reform traditional antidrug practices in ways that proponents claim can reduce human rights violations. On the supply side, Colombia's new drug policy gives significant attention to expanding alternative development and licit crop substitution while intensifying interdiction efforts. The revised drug policy approach promotes drug-use prevention and treatment for drug users. According to Colombian officials, the public health and prevention dimensions of the revised strategy will be led by Colombia's Health Ministry, in coordination with other agencies.
In November 2016, Colombia's Congress unanimously ratified the FARC-government peace accord, although some opponents boycotted that vote. The final accord was a revision following the narrow defeat of an earlier version of the accord in an October 2, 2016 referendum. The final peace agreement addresses important issues, such as illicit crop cultivation—a major source of FARC income—and rural development. According to President Juan Manuel Santos, the peace accord will draw former FARC members into efforts to counter illicit drug production and trafficking. In 2017, as Colombia began to implement the final peace accord and demobilize the FARC, the country is facing a large increase in cocaine production.
This report examines how Colombia's drug policies have evolved in light of Colombia's peace agreement with the FARC and its changing counternarcotics policy. It explores both policy and oversight concerns, such as
prospects for reducing coca and poppy cultivation under Colombia's new drug policy and the peace accord with the FARC; the role of Colombian drug trafficking organizations, including powerful criminal groups containing former paramilitaries, in a post-peace accord environment; U.S.-Colombian cooperation on counternarcotics and Colombia's future role in regional antidrug efforts; and shifts in U.S. government assistance to support Colombia's revised drug policy and how Colombia's new policy converges with traditional U.S. priorities.
For additional background, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses, by Liana W. Rosen; CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel. |
crs_R44579 | crs_R44579_0 | Introduction
Following incidents of terrorism or mass violence in the United States, jurisdictions and individuals may be eligible to receive various types of victim assistance both directly from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and indirectly from DOJ through their respective state victim assistance agencies or other programs. While circumstances in some terrorism or mass violence incidents may make a jurisdiction or organization eligible for assistance from other federal departments, this report focuses solely on assistance available from DOJ's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC). As authorized by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA), the OVC supports several federal programs that may assist victims of terrorism or mass violence. These programs are funded by the Crime Victims Fund (CVF)—an account within the U.S. Treasury that is not funded through traditional appropriations but largely through the collection of federal criminal fines. The Director of the OVC is authorized to set aside $50 million of CVF money in the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve, which funds OVC-administered programs that support victims of terrorism or mass violence. Grant programs include the victim assistance and victim compensation formula grant programs and the Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP). Other programs and operations directly assist victims, including the Victim Assistance Program at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), victim witness assistance at the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP) and the Victim Reunification Travel Program at the OVC, and various supplemental grants to and agreements with agencies and organizations that provide assistance to victims of terrorism or mass violence. Table A-2 includes all other activities funded by the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve from FY2014 through July 2016. | Following incidents of terrorism or mass violence in the United States, jurisdictions and individuals may be eligible to receive various types of victim assistance both directly from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and indirectly from DOJ through their respective state victim assistance agencies or other programs. While circumstances in some incidents may result in a jurisdiction's eligibility for assistance from other federal departments, such as Department of Education grants awarded to Newtown Public School District in recovery efforts from the Newtown, CT, elementary school shooting, this report focuses solely on assistance available from DOJ's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC)—the primary federal assistance available to victims of terrorism or mass violence.
As authorized by the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA, P.L. 98-473), the OVC supports several federal programs that may assist victims of terrorism or mass violence. Grant programs include the victim assistance and victim compensation formula grant programs and the Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program (AEAP). Other programs and operations directly assist victims, including the Victim Assistance Program at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), victim witness assistance at the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, the International Terrorism Victim Expense Reimbursement Program (ITVERP), the Victim Reunification Travel Program, and various supplemental grants to and agreements with agencies and organizations that provide assistance to victims of terrorism or mass violence.
These activities are funded by the Crime Victims Fund (CVF), an account within the U.S. Treasury that is not funded through traditional appropriations but largely through the collection of federal criminal fines. At the end of FY2015, the balance of the CVF was over $12 billion. The Director of the OVC is authorized to set aside $50 million of CVF money in the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve, which funds operations that support victims of terrorism and mass violence. From FY2014 through July 2016, the OVC has distributed $42.2 million toward activities funded by the Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve in response to incidents including, but not limited to, the Boston Marathon bombing, Newtown school shooting, and Charleston church shooting. |
crs_R44791 | crs_R44791_0 | Introduction
The funding authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), included in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. 115-63 ), is now set to expire on March 31, 2018. In addition to setting spending levels, FAA authorization acts typically set policy on a wide range of issues related to civil aviation. This report considers topics likely to arise as the 115 th Congress continues to debate FAA reauthorization. It does not attempt to be comprehensive. Many issues debated prior to passage of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 are not discussed unless further congressional consideration appears probable. Additional issues, not discussed in this report, may arise as Congress moves forward. Aviation Funding
Most FAA programs are financed through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), sometimes referred to as the Aviation Trust Fund. These overflight fees partially fund the Essential Air Service (EAS) program. In the longer term, however, the vitality of the AATF remains a concern, as reductions in general fund appropriations to FAA have increased the proportion of FAA funding that is derived from the trust fund. Participation in the APPP has been limited. Subsequently, Congress has limited the local share to not more than 20% of a tower's costs. During the 114 th Congress, the FAA reauthorization measure ( H.R. 2997 , S. 1405 ). The many proposals and bills on this subject put forth over the years have distinguished two main alternatives to continued operation of the air traffic control system by a federal agency:
corporatization , which, in this context, generally refers to establishing air traffic services as a wholly owned government corporation or quasi-governmental entity; and privatization , which would entail creating some form of private ownership and control of an air traffic services corporation. 4441 ) that would have transferred FAA's air traffic operations to a government-chartered private corporation. To further address safety concerns, P.L. Although a number of steps have been taken to implement these recommendations, an independent assessment of the progress made or the effectiveness of revised certification practices has not been made. 114-190 authorized FAA to enter in agreements to cover FAA official travel for circumstances where such travel is made to expedite the acceptance or validation of a relevant aircraft or parts certification or approval by the FAA of a foreign authority certificate or design approval and the travel is conducted at the request of and is approved by the entity seeking FAA approval and is paid in advance. 4441 also would have established a process for resolving technical issues at defined stages of the certification process in a timely manner. This raised the concern that communities with relatively low passenger levels would lose service as carriers shifted their operations to serve larger and often more profitable markets. Currently, large air carriers are subject to a maximum civil penalty of $27,500 per violation, under 49 U.S.C. One controversy involves some U.S. network airlines' and labor unions' opposition to the expansion of three fast-growing airlines based in the Persian Gulf region—Emirates Airline, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways. The other controversy concerns Norwegian Air International (NAI), an airline that is registered in Ireland. On December 2, 2016, DOT granted approval of NAI's application for a foreign air carrier permit to operate transatlantic flights to U.S. destinations. | Funding authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), included in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190), expired at the end of FY2017. A subsequent six-month extension (P.L. 115-63) is set to expire at the end of March 2018. Long-term FAA reauthorization measures (H.R. 2997 and S. 1405) are currently under consideration. In addition to setting spending levels, FAA authorization acts typically set policy on a wide range of issues related to civil aviation. This report considers prominent topics in the 115th Congress reauthorization debate.
Most FAA programs are financed through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), which is funded by a variety of taxes and fees on air transportation. The financial health of the AATF is generally good. However, airlines' unbundling of ancillary fees from airfares is adversely affecting AATF revenue, as only base airfares are subject to the ticket tax that is the largest source of revenue for the trust fund. Reductions in AATF revenue would leave FAA more reliant on appropriations from the general fund. Other major issues likely to arise during the reauthorization debate include the following:
Air traffic control privatization. Many commissions over the years have recommended moving responsibility for air traffic control from FAA, a government agency, to either an independent government-owned corporation or a private entity controlled by aviation stakeholders. Delays in implementing the satellite-based NextGen air traffic control system have renewed interest in this possibility, although Congress chose not to enact such proposals in 2016. Unmanned aerial vehicles. Large numbers of drones have come into use, and the numerous reports of near-collisions between drones and manned aircraft raise safety concerns. Additionally, Congress has not addressed privacy concerns related to government-operated, commercial, and recreational drones. Essential Airline Service (EAS). Congress has repeatedly attempted to limit the number of localities eligible to participate in this program to subsidize flights to communities that would otherwise lose all commercial airline service, as well as to limit the amount of subsidies per passenger. Few communities have been dropped from the program, and costs continue to rise. Foreign airlines. Some U.S. airlines and airline labor unions seek reconsideration of the recent U.S. approval of a foreign carrier permit for Norwegian Air International, an Ireland-based discount air carrier, to fly across the Atlantic. Some U.S. carriers also have called for renegotiation of U.S. air service agreements with Persian Gulf states amid claims that three fast-growing airlines based in that region are posing unfair competition to U.S. air carriers. Certification reform. FAA relies heavily on aircraft and aircraft parts manufacturers to provide technical expertise in the certification process. FAA oversight has been found to be inconsistent, raising questions regarding safety and efficiency. Equipment manufacturers have raised concerns that FAA's certification process makes it difficult to bring new products to market in a timely fashion and threatens their international competitiveness.
This report does not attempt to be comprehensive. Many issues debated prior to passage of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 are not discussed unless further congressional consideration appears probable. Additional issues, not discussed in this report, may arise as Congress moves forward with reauthorization. |
crs_R43190 | crs_R43190_0 | Introduction
Congress has been actively engaged in efforts to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ). As part of the reauthorization debate, Congress has focused on the federal role in education, particularly in the area of educational accountability, where federal efforts to hold states, local educational agencies (LEAs), and schools accountable for student achievement and teacher performance are under debate. In these discussions, issues related to the burden that complying with the statutory and regulatory reporting requirements associated with the ESEA have put on state educational agencies (SEAs), LEAs, and schools have been considered. This report was undertaken in response to concerns about state and local reporting burden having increased in recent years since the enactment of NCLB. It examines the hour and cost burden associated with complying with the ESEA statutory and regulatory reporting requirements associated with 16 information collection packages. Across all respondents (i.e., SEAs, LEAs, schools, and other entities), the estimated annualized state and local aggregate annual burden hours associated with responding to each of the 16 information collection packages examined ranged from 200 hours to 4.7 million hours, while the estimated annualized cost of responding ranged from $6,000 to $118.1 million. The average number of estimated annualized burden hours and estimated annualized cost burden is generally spread across numerous respondents, and the burden placed on an individual respondent for a given information collection package varies. Within information collections there can be substantial variation in the number of underlying reporting requirements or activities that are applicable to a given type of respondent. On average, the annualized burden for each of these activities ranges from 4.8 to 960 burden hours and from $120 to $24,000 per school. While some schools will not need to address any of the requirements, others may need to address one or two requirements. The overall number of estimated annualized burden hours for the information collection package prior to the enactment of the NCLB was about 564,000. Following the enactment of the NCLB, the estimated annualized burden hours associated with this information collection package peaked at 7.9 million hours (an increase in burden hours of almost 1,300%). While the hour and cost burdens associated with ESEA reporting requirements have clearly increased since the enactment of NCLB, it is important to highlight that the data collected and reported play an important role in supporting core components of the federal education policies enacted through NCLB. SEAs, LEAs, and schools use such data to gauge student performance and determine the progress schools are making in enhancing student academic achievement. Parents use these data to inform choices about their child's education, and ED uses these data to inform technical assistance efforts and monitor SEA work in a number of areas in which educational accountability is expected under the provisions of NCLB. Table 6 provides ED's estimate of the current annualized cost to the federal government for each information collection package. For a given type of respondent within a single information collection package, the respondent may not have to address every item on a given information collection package, and the cost of responding to the information collection package may vary by item (e.g., the hourly cost of responding to one item may be different than the cost of responding to another item). For example, for the "State Educational Agency, Local Educational Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA Title I, Part A" (accountability issues) information collection package, there are three types of activities or information that schools may need to address. State Educational Agency, Local Education Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA Title I, Part A: Accountability Issues
Of the 16 information collection packages examined in this report, the "State Educational Agency, Local Education Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA, Title I, Part A" (accountability issues) information collection package has the largest estimated number of annualized burden hours (4.7 million) and cost burden ($118.1 million). As of August 21, 2013, ED had approved ESEA flexibility package applications for 41 states and the District of Columbia as well as for a consortium of eight LEAs in California, and was reviewing applications from several other states. Changes in Burden over Time
Changes in the estimated annualized burden hours and cost burden associated with the "State Educational Agency, Local Education Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA, Title I, Part A" information collection package have been examined over time, beginning prior to the enactment of NCLB and continuing through the implementation of the ESEA flexibility package. Following the enactment of NCLB, the estimated number of annualized burden hours increased by over 350% to about 2.6 million hours. The most recent version of the information collection package includes an estimated decline of about 3.2 million (40%) annualized burden hours due to an adjustment in estimate. In the relevant information collection package, ED indicates that this decline is directly related to 43 SEAs having requested or indicated that they will request ESEA flexibility. Mirroring the increase in estimated annualized burden hours, the estimated annualized cost burden associated with the information collection package increased by almost 160% from the version of the information collection package that expired on October 31, 2006, to the version of the information collection package that expired on December 31, 2009 ( Table 8 ). The estimated annualized cost burden continued to increase, peaking at $169.4 million for the version of the information collection package that expired on April 30, 2012. As with the estimated annualized changes in burden hours, however, it is unknown whether the projected reduction in cost burden attributed to the ESEA flexibility package will be realized. Appendix C. Description of Statutory and Regulatory Requirements Associated with the Title I-A Accountability Issues Information Collection Package
In the Supporting Statement accompanying the State Educational Agency and Local Educational Agency and School Data Collection and Reporting under ESEA, Title I, Part A (accountability issues) information collection package, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) provides an accounting of the statutory and regulatory requirements associated with the information collection package and the related burden on state educational agencies (SEAs), local educational agencies (LEAs), and schools. | Congress has been actively engaged in efforts to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). It is anticipated that the 113th Congress may continue to work on ESEA reauthorization issues. As part of the reauthorization debate, Congress has focused on the federal role in education, particularly in the area of educational accountability, where federal efforts to hold states, local educational agencies (LEAs), and schools accountable for student achievement and teacher performance are being discussed. In these discussions, issues related to the burden that complying with the statutory and regulatory reporting requirements associated with the ESEA have put on state educational agencies (SEAs), LEAs, and schools have been considered.
While the burden hours and annualized costs (also referred to as cost burden) associated with ESEA reporting requirements have clearly increased since the enactment of NCLB, it is important to highlight that the data collected and reported play an important role in supporting core components of the federal education policies enacted through NCLB. SEAs, LEAs, and schools use such data to gauge student performance and determine the progress schools are making in enhancing student academic achievement. Parents use these data to inform choices about their child's education, and the U.S. Department of Education (ED) uses these data to inform technical assistance efforts and monitor SEA work in a number of areas in which educational accountability is expected under the provisions of NCLB.
This report was undertaken in response to concerns about state and local reporting burdens having increased in recent years since the enactment of NCLB. It examines the time and cost burden associated with complying with the ESEA statutory and regulatory reporting requirements associated with 16 information collection packages. For each information collection package, information is included on the purpose of the collection and data are provided on burden hours and cost burden as defined in the Paperwork Reduction Act. There is also a discussion of the current annualized cost to the federal government for each of the information collection packages. Finally, a more detailed analysis is provided for the information collection package that accounts for the largest number of the burden hours and largest cost burden of all the information collection packages examined. Currently, for respondents at the state and local levels, the overall annualized estimate of burden hours per information collection package ranges from 200 hours to 4.7 million hours and the estimated annualized cost associated with the information collection packages ranges from $6,000 to $118.1 million per information collection package.
Respondents to the 16 information collection packages include SEAs, LEAs, schools, parents, and other entities. The average number of estimated annualized burden hours and estimated annualized cost burden is generally spread across numerous respondents, and the burden placed on an individual respondent for a given information collection package varies. Within information collections there can be substantial variation in the number of underlying reporting requirements or activities that are applicable to a given type of respondent. For a given type of respondent within a single information collection package, the respondent may not have to address every item on a given information collection package, and the cost of responding to the information collection package may vary by item (e.g., the hourly cost of responding to one item may be different than the cost of responding to another item). For example, for the "State Educational Agency, Local Educational Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA Title I, Part A" (accountability issues) information collection package, there are three types of activities or information that schools may need to address. On average, the annualized burden for each of these requirements ranges from 4.8 to 960 burden hours and from $120 to $24,000 per school. While some schools will not need to address any of the requirements, others may need to address one or two requirements.
Of the information collection packages examined in this report, the "State Educational Agency, Local Education Agency, and School Data Collection and Reporting Under ESEA, Title I, Part A" information collection package, which focuses on Title I-A accountability requirements that are a core component of the federal education policy incorporated in NCLB, has the largest number of estimated annualized burden hours (4.7 million) and greatest estimated annualized costs ($118.1 million). The burden associated with this information collection package has increased substantially since the enactment of NCLB. For example, the overall number of estimated annualized burden hours for the information collection package prior to the enactment of NCLB was about 564,000 hours. Following the enactment of NCLB, the number of estimated annualized burden hours increased by over 350% to about 2.6 million hours. The number of estimated annualized burden hours associated with this package peaked at 7.9 million burden hours. The most recent version of the information collection package, however, includes an expected decline of about 3.2 million (40%) burden hours from the peak level. The changes over time in the estimated annualized cost associated with this package mirror those for the changes in burden hours, peaking at an estimated $169.4 million. The most recent version of the information collection package expects the estimated annualized cost to decrease $51.4 million (30.3%) from the peak level. ED indicated that the decline in burden hours and cost burden is directly related to 43 SEAs having requested or indicated that they will request the ESEA flexibility package being offered to states by the Administration, which provides waivers of several of the Title I-A accountability requirements included in current law. It is unknown whether the reductions in burden hours and cost burden attributed to the ESEA flexibility package will be realized. As of August 21, 2013, ED had approved ESEA flexibility packages for 41 states and the District of Columbia, as well as for a consortium of eight LEAs in California. |
crs_R43105 | crs_R43105_0 | The United States, Europe, and Transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Over the last two years, U.S. policymakers, many Members of Congress, and their European counterparts have struggled with how best to respond to the swift pace of change in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Almost immediately after the onset of the "Arab Spring," analysts on both sides of the Atlantic began calling for robust U.S.-European cooperation to help promote a more peaceful and prosperous MENA region. These experts argued that greater transatlantic cooperation, in particular between the United States and the European Union (EU), would enable both sides to leverage one another's strengths, ensure synergy in trade and development policies, and prevent a duplication of diplomatic and economic resources at a time when the United States and Europe are each facing their own political and economic challenges. Despite significant cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences, some commentators early on drew analogies with the way the United States and its West European allies worked together to support the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. In light of the sweeping changes, U.S. and European officials alike asserted their intentions to pursue policies in the MENA region that emphasized supporting democratic and economic reforms to a greater degree than before in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. At the same time, some observers have criticized U.S. and European responses to date as modest at best. For years, many Members of Congress have called for European allies and friends—both in NATO and the EU—to shoulder a greater degree of the burden in protecting shared interests and addressing common challenges, including many of those emanating from the greater Middle East. As events unfold in the region, potential U.S.-European policy differences—on issues ranging from how best to encourage Egypt's democratic progress and prevent state failure, to how to manage the role of Islamist parties, or what to do about the deteriorating situation in Syria—could arise and complicate the prospects for closer U.S.-European cooperation. Some U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress may also be cautious about working too closely with European governments or the EU if doing so might constrain U.S. policy choices toward the MENA countries or U.S. options in managing challenges elsewhere in the region. Furthermore, experts note that the United States and its European partners are limited in what they can or should do to influence events in the region. Past U.S. and European policies that emphasized stability and good relations with autocratic regimes may continue to taint public perceptions in the MENA countries. Others point out that too much Western involvement could be counterproductive if perceived as an attempt to protect U.S.-European interests at the expense of the aspirations of local populations, or if used by some MENA leaders to deflect blame for domestic and regional problems. The final section of the report describes the current status of U.S.-European efforts to coordinate political and economic policies toward the MENA region, including ongoing diplomatic contact and U.S.-European initiatives to promote a more coherent international response through institutions such as the G8, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund (especially with respect to Egypt). European policymakers have debated arming the Syrian rebels and possible military intervention, but many have remained reluctant to pursue either option. U.S. This office has responsibility for managing U.S. outreach and transition support for Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Nevertheless, these initiatives have been controversial among Members who worry about new spending commitments given U.S. fiscal constraints, and among those concerned about the eventual shape and political orientations of emerging regimes in the MENA region. Prospects for U.S.-EU Cooperation
The United States and its European partners share similar interests in ensuring that the changes underway in the Middle East and North Africa result in a more stable, secure, and prosperous region. Many analysts suggest that to date, U.S. and EU policies have been closely aligned on most issues regarding the changes underway in the MENA region. Despite such difficulties, U.S. and European leaders continue to press for an IMF-Egyptian loan agreement as soon as possible. Coordinated Debt Relief and Debt Swaps. U.S. Fourth, despite the emphasis in both the United States and the EU on increasing trade and investment opportunities as a way to promote economic development, some suggest that U.S. and EU commercial interests and businesses may be in competition in the MENA region. Many analysts worry that the political and economic difficulties facing many MENA countries in transition, combined with deeply problematic issues involving Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, could lead to a progressively worse regional situation in the years ahead. | U.S. and European Responses to Changes in the Middle East and North Africa
Over the last two years, many U.S. policymakers, Members of Congress, and their European counterparts have struggled with how best to respond to the wide range of challenges posed by the popular uprisings and political upheaval in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Almost immediately after the onset of the so-called "Arab Spring" in early 2011, U.S. and European leaders alike declared their intention to put greater emphasis than in the past on democratic reform and economic development in formulating their respective policies toward countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco. In Libya, the United States and many European allies participated in the NATO-led military intervention in support of rebel forces that ultimately toppled the Qadhafi regime. And as demonstrations in Syria escalated into a bloody civil war, the United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed sanctions, called for an end to the ruling Asad regime, and are considering greater material and financial support to the Syrian political and armed opposition.
Possibilities for U.S.-European Cooperation and Potential Obstacles
In light of the immense changes and what many have long viewed as common U.S. and European interests in the Middle East and North Africa, numerous analysts have advocated for significant U.S.-European cooperation to promote a more peaceful and prosperous MENA region. Such collaboration, they argued, would help prevent a wasteful duplication of Western diplomatic and economic resources amid competing domestic political priorities and financial constraints on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite notable cultural, historical, and geopolitical differences, some commentators early on drew analogies with the way the United States and its West European allies worked together to support the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, and hopes were high for a similar robust transatlantic effort in the MENA region.
As events in the MENA region have unfolded, U.S. and European policymakers have been in frequent contact with each other. Analysts suggest that U.S. and European policies have been closely aligned on most issues regarding the changes underway. There have been some U.S.-European efforts to promote a more coherent international response through institutions such as the G8, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund (especially with respect to reaching a financial assistance agreement for Egypt).
Nevertheless, many observers contend that so far, tangible joint or coordinated U.S.-European initiatives to encourage political transitions and economic opportunities in the MENA countries have been modest at best. Debate thus continues about the prospects for greater U.S.-European collaboration and the possible benefits of it for U.S. interests. Skeptics point out that both the United States and Europe are limited in what they can do to influence events in the region, and they worry that the political and economic difficulties facing many MENA countries in transition, combined with deeply problematic issues involving Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Syria, could lead to a progressively worse regional situation in the years ahead. Others are also concerned that more intensive Western involvement could be counterproductive if viewed in the region as an attempt to protect U.S.-European interests, or if used by some MENA leaders to deflect blame for domestic and regional problems.
Issues for Congress
Many Members of Congress have closely followed events in the MENA region. Congress has been and will be considering the appropriation of U.S. aid to the MENA countries. As such, some Members may be interested in ways to coordinate U.S. and European foreign assistance, debt relief, and trade and investment policies in order to maximize their effectiveness as well as to conserve U.S. political capital and economic assets in the years ahead. Members may also be interested in European responses to the transitions in the MENA region, and the degree of U.S.-European cooperation, as a test of whether Europe can be an effective partner for the United States in protecting shared global interests and addressing common challenges.
At the same time, many Members of Congress are concerned about the eventual political orientation of emerging regimes in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, and about the implications of regional change for Israel's security and U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Some Members may be apprehensive about working too closely with European governments or the EU if policy differences begin to emerge between the two sides, or if doing so might constrain future U.S. policy choices toward the MENA countries. Congress may also want to consider whether more robust U.S.-European cooperation in the MENA region could have implications for U.S. options in addressing challenges elsewhere in the greater Middle East (such as those related to Iran or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). |
crs_RL33552 | crs_RL33552_0 | Thus, there is continuing pressure to tighten air quality standards: a tightening of the standard for fine particles was finalized September 21, 2006. With this background in mind, the bulk of this report provides an overview of seven prominent air issues of interest in the 109 th Congress: revision of the particulate standards; multi-pollutant (or Clear Skies) legislation for electric power plants; mercury from power plants; New Source Review; the gasoline additives MTBE and ethanol; ozone nonattainment area deadlines; and the "conformity" of transportation and clean air planning. EPA's professional staff and the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), a group established by the Clean Air Act to provide independent scientific advice to the Administrator, had recommended stronger standards. CASAC's Views
The Administrator's decisions represent the first time in CASAC's nearly 30-year history that the promulgated standards fall outside of the range of the scientific panel's recommendations. It is the CASAC ' s consensus scientific opinion that the decision to retain without change the annual PM 2.5 standard does not provide an ' adequate margin of safety ... requisite to protect the public health ' (as required by the Clean Air Act) .... "
With regard to PM 10 , the letter stated that CASAC was "completely surprised" at the decision to revert to the use of PM 10 as the indicator for coarse particles, noting that the option of retaining the existing daily PM 10 standard was not discussed during the advisory process and that CASAC views this decision as "highly problematic." Clear Skies/Multi-Pollutant Legislation
A major focus of congressional attention in the first session of the 109 th Congress was whether to take action on the Clear Skies Act, a bill that would regulate multiple pollutants from coal-fired electric power plants. The bill would have significantly amended the Clean Air Act to establish a cap-and-trade system for emissions from electric power plants and other sources of air pollution, while eliminating or deferring numerous existing regulations affecting those sources. Under the Clean Air Act, they are not necessarily subject to stringent requirements. The key questions have been how stringent the caps should be, and whether carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) will be among the emissions subject to a cap. Although stalled for the previous three years, Clear Skies was set for early consideration in the 109 th Congress by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee; but the opposing sides were not able to reach a consensus and the bill failed on a tie vote on March 9, 2005. Immediately following the vote, on March 10, 2005, EPA announced that it would promulgate final regulations for utility emissions of SO 2 and NOx in 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia through its Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). In addition to the arguments over technology availability and cost, it is unclear whether EPA has legislative authority to establish a cap-and-trade program for mercury: many argue that the agency is required by the statute to impose MACT standards on each individual plant once it has decided to control mercury emissions. On September 13, however, the Senate rejected S.J.Res. 20 , 51-47, thus allowing the EPA rule to go forward. The New Source Review debate has occurred largely in the courts. MTBE and Ethanol
Congress acted on several Clean Air Act issues in H.R. 6 , the comprehensive energy bill that it passed and sent to the President July 29, 2005. The most significant of these issues dealt with ethanol and reformulated gasoline (RFG). 109-58 and H.R. Ozone Nonattainment Area Deadlines
Another Clean Air Act provision that was in the House-passed version of H.R. 6 dealt with the deadlines for attaining air quality standards. As enacted, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 does establish a demonstration project, however, to address the issue of upwind pollution. 3 ( P.L. 109-59 ), the transportation bill that the President signed August 10, 2005. | The courts and the executive branch have faced major decisions on clean air issues in 2006, with Congress playing a limited role. One focus has been the EPA Administrator's September 21, 2006 decision regarding air quality standards for fine particles. According to EPA and the consensus of the scientific community, current concentrations of fine particles cause tens of thousands of premature deaths annually. The Administrator's September 21 decision will strengthen the standards; according to the agency, it will reduce premature mortality by 1,200 - 13,000 persons annually. However, many are unhappy that the new standard will not be more stringent—for the first time ever, it falls outside of a range recommended by the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), an independent body established by the Clean Air Act to provide expert scientific advice. On September 29, the seven members of CASAC stated that the Administrator's decision does not provide an adequate margin of safety requisite to protect the public health.
In 2005, Congress acted on several Clean Air Act (CAA) issues in legislation that it passed and sent to the President. The most significant of these issues, dealing with ethanol and reformulated gasoline (RFG), were addressed in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6 (P.L. 109-58). Congress also amended the Clean Air Act in H.R. 3 (P.L. 109-59), the transportation bill that the President signed August 10, 2005. H.R. 3 modified the requirement that state and local transportation planners demonstrate conformity between their transportation plans and the timely achievement of air quality standards.
Other Clean Air Act amendments have stalled. A bill that would have established a cap-and-trade program for emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury from coal-fired electric power plants (S. 131) was among the first items on the agenda of the 109th Congress: entitled the Clear Skies Act, the bill was scheduled for markup by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee March 9, 2005. But the committee failed to approve it on a 9-9 tie vote, in large part because of complaints that the bill would weaken existing Clean Air Act requirements. Another issue in the debate was whether to cap emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) in addition to the other three pollutants. With Clear Skies stalled, EPA finalized the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which will cap emissions of SO2 and NOx from power plants in 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia and establish a cap-and-trade system through regulation.
A deadline for mercury regulations helped drive the Clear Skies debate: EPA faced a judicial deadline of March 15, 2005, to promulgate standards for power plant mercury emissions. The agency met this deadline, but the specific regulations have been widely criticized. A resolution to "disapprove" (overturn) the regulations under the Congressional Review Act (S.J.Res. 20) was defeated on a vote of 51-47, September 13, 2005, but the courts have yet to rule on challenges filed by 15 states and other groups. Whether to modify other requirements of the Clean Air Act (New Source Review, deadlines for nonattainment areas, and provisions dealing with interstate air pollution) have also been contentious issues. |
crs_R45138 | crs_R45138_0 | This section discusses the extent to which these circumstances affected the FY2018 and FY2019 funding levels published in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) budget request materials and the HHS Budget in Brief (BIB), which are the primary data sources for this report. For the FY2019 budget submission, OMB and HHS materials dealt with this increase to the spending limits differently. Overview of the FY2019 HHS Budget Request
Under the budget request, HHS would spend an estimated $1.216 trillion in outlays in FY2019 (see Table 1 ). This is $48 billion more than the FY2018 estimate (based on the annualized CR and current services mandatory spending) and about $113 billion (+10%) more than FY2017 actual. Historical estimates by OMB indicate that HHS has accounted for at least 20% of all federal outlays in each year since FY1995. Most recently, HHS is estimated to have accounted for 28% of all federal outlays in FY2017. As this figure shows, mandatory spending typically accounts for the vast majority of the HHS budget. In fact, two programs—Medicare and Medicaid—are expected to account for 86% of all estimated HHS spending in FY2019. Medicare and Medicaid are "entitlement" programs, meaning the federal government is required to make mandatory payments to individuals, states, or other entities based on criteria established in authorizing law. This figure also shows that discretionary spending accounts for about 8% of FY2019 HHS outlays in the President's request. Although discretionary spending represents a relatively small share of total HHS spending, the department nevertheless receives more discretionary money than most federal departments. According to OMB data, HHS accounted for 7.2% of all discretionary budget authority in FY2017. Budgetary Resources versus Appropriations
Readers should be aware that the HHS budget includes a broader set of budgetary resources than the amounts provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. A table of relevant CRS key policy staff is included at the end of the report. Following the conventions of the FY2019 HHS BIB, ATSDR's budget request is included in the CDC totals shown in this report. | This report provides information about the FY2019 budget request for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The report begins by reviewing the department's mission and structure. Next, the report offers a brief explanation of the conventions used for the FY2018 estimates and FY2019 request levels in the budget documents released by the HHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The report also discusses the concept of the HHS budget as a whole, in comparison to how funding is provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. The report concludes with a breakdown of the HHS request by agency, along with additional HHS resources that provide further information on the request. A table of CRS key policy staff is included at the end of the report.
Historically, HHS has been one of the larger federal departments in terms of budgetary resources. Estimates by OMB indicate that HHS has accounted for at least 20% of all federal outlays in each year since FY1995. Most recently, HHS is estimated to have accounted for 28% of all federal outlays in FY2017.
Under the FY2019 President's budget proposal, HHS would spend an estimated $1.2 trillion in FY2019. This is $48 billion more than FY2018 estimated spending levels and about $113 billion (+10%) more than FY2017 actual spending levels. Final FY2018 appropriations were not enacted prior to the release of the FY2019 President's budget request. As a result, the FY2018 estimates in FY2019 President's budget materials (and this report) are based on annualized amounts provided in an FY2018 continuing resolution, plus current services estimates for mandatory spending.
Mandatory spending typically accounts for the majority of the HHS budget. Two programs—Medicare and Medicaid—are expected to account for 86% of all estimated HHS spending in FY2019, according to the President's request. Medicare and Medicaid are "entitlement" programs, meaning the federal government is required to make mandatory payments to individuals, states, or other entities based on criteria established in authorizing law.
Discretionary spending accounts for about 8% of HHS outlays in the FY2019 President's request. Although discretionary spending represents a relatively small share of total HHS spending, the department nevertheless receives more discretionary money than most federal departments. According to OMB data, HHS accounted for 7% of all discretionary budget authority in FY2017. |
crs_RL33769 | crs_RL33769_0 | For example, it can be viewed according to the situation on the ground—scale and intensity of population dislocation, destruction of social networks/community and infrastructure, insecurity of civilians and noncombatants, and human rights abuses; by the complexity of the response needed to address these problems; or by the multi-causal factors that may have contributed to the escalation of conflict in the first place. Overview of the U.S. Key relief-related policy issues likely to be of concern in the 114 th Congress include budget priorities, levels of funding, sources of other support available worldwide, and the ways in which operational assistance is delivered. Congress has consistently supported humanitarian efforts as a means of responding to natural disasters (such as floods and earthquakes) and man-made crises (such as war) in the short term, mitigating humanitarian impacts, and promoting a U.S. presence. The legislation governing humanitarian or disaster assistance leaves the decision on the type of assistance required to the President. USAID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense provide humanitarian assistance and cover a mix of these activities as described below. United States Agency for International Development
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), provides non-food humanitarian assistance during international crises and disasters and can respond immediately with relief materials and personnel, many of whom are often already in the field. OFDA was established in 1964 to coordinate U.S. government emergency assistance in what had previously been an ad hoc U.S. response to international disasters. Funding for USAID/OFDA is authorized and appropriated in annual Foreign Operations legislation. The President has the authority to set the terms and conditions of the aid provided. One of the components of FFPA is Title II, Emergency and Private Assistance, which provides for the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to meet emergency and nonemergency food needs in foreign countries. Department of State
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) deals with problems of refugees worldwide, conflict victims, and populations of concern to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), often including internally displaced persons (IDPs). Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides support to stabilize emergency situations, including the transport and provision of food, shelter and supplies, logistical support, search and rescue, medical evacuations, and refugee assistance. The incremental costs for all DOD humanitarian assistance for both natural and man-made disasters are funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account in annual DOD appropriations. U.S. Humanitarian Assistance: Role of Congress and Current Funding Levels
Congressional Role
Congress plays a key role in funding U.S. humanitarian assistance. The global humanitarian accounts (MRA, ERMA, IDA, and P.L. Congress is also generally supportive of supplemental appropriations that reimburse agencies for their expenditures, either to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have been used to provide assistance. The United States remains a major contributor to relief efforts in international crises and disaster situations. FY2016 Budget Request
The Administration's FY2016 budget request for global humanitarian accounts totals $5.6 billion. The request also includes $50 million for ERMA to enable the President to provide humanitarian assistance for unexpected and urgent refugee and migration needs worldwide, and $1.4 billion for the Food for Peace program. Competing Aid and Budget Priorities
Finding the resources to sustain U.S. funding or pledges to humanitarian crises may be difficult in light of domestic budget constraints. Regardless, it is clear that as crises proliferate, the level and sources of U.S. humanitarian assistance will inevitably have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself, but on broader foreign policy goals. | The majority of humanitarian emergencies worldwide stem from natural disasters or from conflicts. Congress has consistently supported humanitarian efforts as a means of saving lives, promoting stability, and furthering U.S. foreign policy objectives. Intervention results in varying amounts of relief and recovery assistance and can have an important impact not only on the relief operation itself but on broader foreign policy issues. In the 114th Congress, international humanitarian and refugee assistance is expected to continue to have a strong measure of bipartisan interest, with key policy issues focused on budget priorities, levels and types of funding, the sources of other support available worldwide, and the ways in which operational assistance is delivered.
Factors that may impact decision-making include the type of humanitarian assistance required, the impact of conflict and refugee flows on stability in the region in question, and the role of neighboring countries in contributing to the relief effort. Examples of issues likely to remain of congressional interest include competing aid and budget priorities, reimbursing U.S. government agencies for their expenditures (to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have been used to provide assistance), and civilian and military coordination, including the evolving role of the Department of Defense in humanitarian assistance. Other priorities may include an examination of the disparity between numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees worldwide and the available funding for these groups; physical access to and protection of refugees and other vulnerable populations in addition to the protection of human rights; programs to address gender based violence; and the creation of durable solutions for displaced populations.
The President can provide emergency humanitarian assistance through several sources whose funding is authorized and appropriated by Congress. These are funds currently appropriated to the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) through the International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDA) account; U.S. Department of Agriculture food aid programs under Title II of the Food for Peace Act; the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) through the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) accounts; and funds appropriated to the Department of Defense, Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account.
In addition, the President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel to respond to disasters and provide space-available transportation on military aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and equipment in response to a disaster. Finally, the President can request other government agencies to assist within their capabilities. In FY2015, estimated funding for global humanitarian accounts is $6.4 billion. The Administration's FY2016 budget request for global humanitarian accounts is $5.6 billion, but the decrease assumes carryover balances from FY2015 will be available to meet projected needs for humanitarian responses.
This report examines U.S. humanitarian assistance in international crises and disaster situations. It considers the sources and types of U.S. government aid, the response mechanisms of key U.S. agencies and departments, and possible issues for Congress—including competing aid and budget priorities, burdensharing and donor-fatigue, the transparency and efficacy of U.S. humanitarian assistance, consequences of such assistance, and potential links to broader U.S. foreign policy goals. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42757 | crs_R42757_0 | NPS generally receives appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. This report examines trends in the agency's discretionary appropriations over the past decade (FY2009-FY2018) and related issues and congressional actions. It also discusses changes in the size of the National Park System, numbers of recreational visits to the parks, and NPS staffing levels during that period. Excluding supplementals, NPS's FY2018 appropriations were 26.8% higher than FY2009 appropriations in nominal dollars and 10.5% higher in inflation-adjusted dollars. In either case, the main trend was decline in the first part of the decade and increase in the second part. Individual NPS Accounts
During the decade, NPS's appropriations were primarily organized in five accounts that cover basic park operations (Operation of the National Park System, or ONPS, account); construction and repair of infrastructure (Construction account); assistance to state, local, tribal, and private land managers (National Recreation and Preservation account); grants to states and localities for historic preservation (Historic Preservation Fund); and land acquisition by both NPS and the states (Land Acquisition and State Assistance account). With supplemental appropriations excluded, the FY2009 funding was less ($2.132 billion), and by this measure funding for the account increased over the decade in real terms, by 1.3% in inflation-adjusted dollars. Construction Account
The second-largest NPS account, titled Construction, funds new construction projects as well as repairs and improvements to existing facilities, among other activities. Appropriations to the account for the first and last years of the decade (FY2009 and FY2018), along with the appropriation for FY2013, were considerably higher than construction appropriations in intervening years, in all three cases owing to supplemental appropriations related to economic stimulus (FY2009) or hurricane recovery (FY2013 and FY2018). The NR&P account was not affected by supplemental funding during the decade. The account also received some supplemental funding as part of the economic stimulus package in FY2009. With supplementals included, the FY2018 appropriation was 52.4% higher in inflation-adjusted dollars than the FY2009 appropriation, and the account represented 2.6% of the total NPS appropriation in FY2009 and 4.2% in FY2018. Both parts of the account—the funds for NPS land acquisition and for assistance to states—grew over the decade, but growth in the NPS portion was smaller (+9.8% in inflation-adjusted dollars) than in the state portion (+468.6%). Centennial Challenge
The Centennial Challenge account was funded during certain years of the decade (FY2010 and FY2015-FY2018). Conclusion
NPS's appropriations fluctuated over the past decade, and supplemental appropriations notably increased the totals in FY2009, FY2013, and FY2018. Counting the supplementals, the total NPS discretionary appropriation for FY2018 was 5.6% higher than FY2009 in nominal dollars but 8.0% lower in inflation-adjusted dollars. The funding changes took place in the context of a park system of relatively stable size and a staffing level that hovered around 20,000. Although park acreage grew only slightly, 26 units were added to the system during the decade. Visits to the parks generally were higher in the second half of the decade than the first and peaked in 2016 at approximately 331 million visits. | The National Park Service (NPS) generally receives appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. This report examines trends in NPS appropriations over the past decade (FY2009-FY2018), as well as changes during the decade in the size of the National Park System, numbers of recreational visits to the parks, and NPS staffing levels.
NPS's appropriations fluctuated during the decade, mainly declining in the first part of the decade and then increasing during the second part. In the first and last years of the decade (FY2009 and FY2018), as well as in one intervening year (FY2013), appropriations totals were notably increased by supplemental funding. In FY2009, supplemental appropriations for economic stimulus affected NPS accounts for park operations, construction, and historic preservation; in FY2013 and FY2018, supplemental funding for hurricane recovery affected the accounts for construction and historic preservation. With the supplemental appropriations included, the total discretionary appropriation for FY2018 represented an increase (+5.6%) in nominal dollars over the FY2009 total but a decrease (-8.0%) in inflation-adjusted dollars. Excluding supplementals, NPS appropriations increased between FY2009 and FY2018 by 26.8% in nominal dollars and 10.5% in inflation-adjusted dollars.
During this period, NPS's discretionary appropriations were organized primarily in five accounts. A sixth account (Centennial Challenge) was funded only in certain years. Regular appropriations fluctuated over the decade for all the accounts, and the extent to which an account increased or decreased also was affected by supplemental appropriations. With supplementals included, two accounts received more funding in FY2018 than in FY2009 in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, including one account that funds federal land acquisition and outdoor recreation assistance to states and one that provides grants to states and tribes for historic preservation activities. Three other accounts received less funding in FY2018 than in FY2009 in inflation-adjusted dollars—including NPS's largest account, which funds basic park operations, as well as the account that funds construction and major repairs and the account for NPS assistance to nonfederal entities. Excluding supplementals, funding still grew in real terms for the land acquisition and historic preservation accounts, but it also grew for the operations and construction accounts, declining only for assistance to nonfederal entities. The operations and construction accounts are partially used to address NPS's deferred maintenance backlog, which has grown throughout the decade.
The funding changes took place in the context of relative stability in the size of the National Park System, which was about 85 million acres throughout the decade, with slight growth (+0.8%). The total consisted of roughly 80 million acres of federal land, with the remainder nonfederal. Although system acreage remained relatively stable, 26 new units were added to the system during the decade. NPS staffing levels hovered around 20,000 and were highest in the first part of the decade, stemming partly from the economic stimulus measures in FY2009. Visits to the parks increased over the decade, peaking at approximately 331 million visits in 2016. |
crs_R41495 | crs_R41495_0 | The NEI is a strategy for doubling U.S. exports by 2014 in order to help generate 2 million new jobs in the United States through increased coordination and funding of federal export promotion activities; greater financing for U.S. exporters; increased government advocacy on behalf of U.S. exporters; and negotiation of new trade agreements and stronger enforcement of existing U.S. trade agreements. With the increased focus on export promotion efforts, some Members of Congress have placed greater priority on understanding the functions, coordination, and budgets of federal government agencies involved in export promotion. Such an understanding may support increased congressional oversight of U.S. export promotion policy and related legislative activity. This report provides an overview of the federal agencies that participate in U.S. export promotion efforts and the issues that they raise for Congress. Export Promotion Services and Activities
The federal government conducts a wide variety of services that contribute to export promotion. Key agencies that offer direct export assistance include the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Commerce, Department of State, Small Business Administration (SBA), and Trade and Development Agency (TDA). Related to exports also is the role of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in financing and insuring U.S. private investment for projects overseas. The TPCC is comprised of 20 member agencies, including the 9 agencies discussed above: USDA, the Department of Commerce, the Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, SBA, the Department of State, TDA, USTR, and the Department of the Treasury. The TPCC releases an annual report entitled the National Export Strategy , discussed below. Economic Rationales For and Against Federal Export Promotion
A starting point for congressional debates on export promotion often is the economic rationales for and against the involvement of U.S. government agencies in promoting U.S. exports. Interagency coordination by the TPCC inherently is complicated by the fact that multiple agencies are involved in export promotion. Some policymakers welcome the concerted effort to coordinate export promotion at the federal level through the creation of the Export Promotion Cabinet under the NEI. Funding for Export Promotion Activities by Federal Agencies
Congress has an ongoing interest in the level of U.S. government spending on export promotion activities by federal agencies, and the extent to which such spending is effective and efficient. There has been renewed interest on the part of the Obama Administration and Congress in reorganizing the trade policy functions of the federal government in order to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. export promotion efforts, improve U.S. trade policy coordination, avoid duplication of functions and activities, and for other reasons. The Administration also has created new coordinating bodies, such as the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center and the Interagency Task Force on Commercial Advocacy. 2988 would have required the Secretary of Commerce to establish a public directory for foreign buyers to identify U.S. manufacturers and service providers prepared to export clean and efficient energy and environmental products and services; required the Secretary of Commerce to establish a governmental database on foreign sales opportunities in such products and services; required the Secretary of Commerce to monitor and evaluate U.S. export promotion activities with respect to such products and services; and required the GAO to submit reports to Congress comparing the effectiveness of U.S. export promotion activities in this area with those of other major trade competitors. | This report provides an overview of the federal government agencies that participate in U.S. export promotion efforts and the issues that they raise for Congress. The recent global economic downturn has renewed congressional debate over the role of the federal government in promoting exports. This debate has been heightened with the Obama Administration's efforts to double U.S. exports under the National Export Initiative (NEI) and policy debates about possible reorganization of federal trade-related agencies. Some Members of Congress have placed greater priority on understanding the functions, coordination, and budgets of federal agencies involved in export promotion. Such an understanding may support increased congressional oversight of export promotion policy and related legislative activity.
Federal government agencies perform a wide variety of functions that contribute to export promotion, including providing information, counseling, and export assistance services; funding feasibility studies; financing and insuring U.S. trade; conducting government-to-government advocacy; and negotiating new trade agreements and enforcing existing ones.
Approximately 20 federal government agencies are involved in supporting U.S. exports directly or indirectly. Nine key agencies with programs or activity directly related to export promotion are the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Commerce, Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Small Business Administration (SBA), Department of State, Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and Department of the Treasury. The USDA has the largest level of export promotion funding, followed by Commerce. Some agencies charge fees for their services.
Coordination of export promotion activities is conducted through interagency bodies. In 1992, Congress attempted to enhance coordination of U.S. export promotion policy by creating the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), an interagency task force chaired by the Department of Commerce. The TPCC releases the National Export Strategy (NES), an annual report that serves as an effort to guide federal export promotion policy, goals, and activity. Executive Order 13534, issued in March 2010, formalized the NEI and established the Export Promotion Cabinet, a higher level coordinating body that is to work with the TPCC to make the NEI operational.
The export promotion activities of federal government agencies raise a number of issues for Congress; among the most prominent are the following:
The economic arguments for and against the involvement of the U.S. government in promoting exports in the context of issues such as market failures and foreign governments' support for their national exports; The effectiveness of interagency export promotion coordination through the TPCC and the Export Promotion Cabinet; The level of U.S. government spending on export promotion; its adequacy and efficiency of use; and The extent to which the export promotion activities conducted by federal government agencies may be similar or overlapping, and could be reorganized. |
crs_RL34565 | crs_RL34565_0 | Introduction
There is growing momentum among many national security practitioners and scholars, across the political spectrum, broadly in favor of reforming the interagency system to encourage a more effective application of all elements of national power. One subset of these interagency reform discussions has focused on the cultivation of a community of national security professionals (NSPs) from all relevant departments and agencies. According to proponents, NSPs, through some combination of shared education and training, and rotational tours of duty in other agencies, would gain a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies. Such recommendations are not new, but they were given a new sense of urgency by operational experiences at home and abroad over the last 10 years—from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the responses to Hurricane Katrina—which suggested insufficiencies in the ability of the U.S. government to integrate and apply the various components of its efforts. In 2007, in response to growing concerns, the Bush Administration launched the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program, based on an Executive Order (E.O.) This report focuses on issues that Members of Congress may wish to consider in crafting or providing oversight for NSP initiatives. For context, it also describes key early proposals; the experiences of the NSPD program to date; current U.S. government strategic guidance; and significant congressional initiatives. As established by the E.O. 13434, the original NSPD program focused on three "pillars": education, training, and rotational service in other agencies. These pillars broadly echoed the basic planks of the military's Joint Qualification System. It also called for increased opportunities for interagency rotational assignments both to and from other U.S. government agencies. To scope the program, the INSPEAD bill defined participation in the system primarily by position. Issues for Congress
In weighing the merits of draft legislation and outside proposals aimed at fostering an interagency community of national security professionals, Members of Congress may wish to consider the following issues. Purpose of the Program
One of the most fundamental questions concerning any existing or proposed NSP initiative is the basic purpose of the effort. The 2011 revision of the NSPD program drew a distinction from the outset between individuals and billets, by asking participating agencies to identify both individuals and positions for participation in its Emergency Management pilot effort. | There is a growing consensus among many practitioners and scholars, across the political spectrum, broadly in favor of reforming the U.S. government interagency system to encourage a more effective application of all elements of national power. The reform debates have included proposals and initiatives to establish and foster an interagency community of national security professionals (NSPs) from all relevant departments and agencies. According to proponents, NSPs, through participating in activities that might include shared educational and training opportunities, and rotational tours in other agencies, would gain a better understanding of the mandates, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies. They would become better prepared to plan national security missions with counterparts from other agencies and to execute those missions at home and abroad, and eventually become better able to oversee their own agencies' efforts from leadership positions.
Such recommendations are not new, but real-world events over the past decade— the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S. government responses to natural disasters at home, including Hurricane Katrina—gave the debates a greater sense of urgency by underscoring room for improvement in the ability of the U.S. government to integrate the various components of its efforts.
Congressional interest has emerged in both houses, on both sides of the aisle, and from multiple committees. That interest was manifested in part by the introduction of NSP-related legislation in the 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses.
In the executive branch, in 2007, the Bush Administration launched the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program, based on the three pillars of education, training, and rotational service. The program included an oversight structure and participation by multiple agencies, including many not traditionally focused on national security. In 2011, the Obama Administration reinvigorated the NSPD program, giving it a streamlined new emphasis on accomplishing missions, and adopting Emergency Management as the initial focus area.
This report focuses primarily on analyzing key issues that Members of Congress may wish to consider in evaluating existing or proposed NSP initiatives, including the fundamental purpose; the concept of integration; the scope of participation; practical modalities for making the program work; the role of centralized oversight; incentive structures for individuals and agencies; recruiting; and congressional oversight. For context, the report also describes early NSP proposals; U.S. government strategic guidance; the experiences of the NSPD program to date; and significant congressional initiatives. It makes illustrative use of the military's Joint Qualification System, perhaps the closest U.S. government analogue. |
crs_RL34588 | crs_RL34588_0 | Background and Analysis
Having progressed on a steady path since the late 1970s on multiple global economic and political endeavors, the robust international engagement of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2000 caught many by surprise and prompted spirited American disagreement and debate over the PRC's foreign policy motivations and objectives. The fact that much of this international engagement has expanded while the United States has been preoccupied with its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan also has brought about a period of American introspection. As a result, Congress and other U.S. policymakers are focusing attention on the critical implications China's increasing international engagement could have for U.S. economic and strategic interests. China's policy direction is that much harder to predict when some of these key policy objectives are seen to clash, and experience suggests that abrupt shifts in policy, shifts which remain unexplained in many cases, still occur with a fair degree of regularity in the PRC system. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where China is most active, access to energy resources and raw commodities to fuel China's domestic growth plays a dominant role in Beijing's activities. To this end, PRC leaders have sought to reassure other countries that China's economic development is an opportunity for, rather than threat to, its neighbors. Increasing International Stature and Competing with U.S. These include
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, where China has been a full member since 1991 (the United States is also a member) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) —established in 1994, where China is increasing its participation (the United States has been criticized in recent years when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice skipped some ARF meetings, instead sending lower-level officials) Forum for East Asia and Latin American Cooperation (FOCALAE) —established in 2001, where China is a full member (the United States is not a member) Organization of American States (OAS )—where China was invited to be a permanent observer in 2004 (the United States is a full member)
Through New Multilateral Institutions
Finally, China has sought to devise new multilateral organizations to support its own interests and expand its international influence. Many concerned observers focus on the competitive strengths that PRC soft power has in relation to the United States, pointing out that the PRC international approach is particularly strong in areas where the U.S. political system and U.S. values make it less competitive. And the unrestricted nature of PRC investments resonates with many foreign governments. Unlike U.S. corporations investing overseas, who lack this close government patronage and in addition must answer to their shareholders, PRC state-owned companies have the luxury of being able to take a longer-term, strategic view—one more closely integrated with national priorities—without having to demonstrate short-term profits. Other projections tend to minimize or overlook other limitations and complications that confront China's overseas activities. The Complications of an International Presence
Even with a "win-win" strategy, acquiring and maintaining an enhanced international presence brings with it certain complications. Whichever of the above policy directions the PRC is traveling and whatever its ultimate intentions, its international engagement and growing economic clout pose demanding challenges and questions for U.S. policymakers. | Since the late 1990s, China's robust international engagement has caught many by surprise and prompted growing American debate over the PRC's motivations and objectives. This international engagement has expanded while the United States has been preoccupied with its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress and other U.S. policymakers are becoming increasingly concerned that China's expanded international engagement could have its "soft power" projection and affect U.S. economic and strategic interests.
Experience suggests that abrupt, unexplained shifts in policy occur with some regularity in the PRC system. Still, it is possible to point to some fundamental objectives that appear to be motivating Beijing's foreign policy. These include an imperative to promote and enhance China's economic development, particularly its voracious need for energy resources and raw materials to sustain its double-digit annual growth; an effort to separate the island of Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty, from its 23 remaining official relationships; and a desire to increase China's international stature and compete more successfully with perceived U.S. supremacy. To achieve these ends, China in recent years has crafted a multitude of bilateral agreements and partnerships, joined and become more active in existing multilateral organizations, and become a founding member of new multilateral institutions in which the United States is not a member.
Of alarm to some, China's policy approach has several competitive "soft power" advantages over the United States. The "unrestricted" nature of Beijing's overseas loans and investments is attractive to foreign governments wanting swifter, more efficient, and less intrusive solutions to their development problems than western lenders will offer. And Beijing's large state-owned companies, with deep pockets and no shareholders to answer to, can afford short-term losses in pursuit of longer-term, more strategic gains.
But China's approach also has structural limitations in areas where the United States is strong. Beijing's foreign development policy operates from a much narrower base, with China's "win-win" approach tackling easy issues first and postponing difficult issues, perhaps indefinitely. Acquiring and maintaining an international presence also brings certain complications that are new to the PRC, including multiple opportunities for international misunderstanding, resentment, and cultural backlash. Finally, unlike the United States, China lacks the advantage of a substantial private-sector investment presence overseas.
Whatever policy options the United States adopts, China's growing international political and economic clout poses demanding challenges and questions for U.S. policymakers. This report will be updated periodically as events warrant. |
crs_RS21482 | crs_RS21482_0 | Introduction
The Paris Club is the major forum where creditor countries renegotiate official sector debts. A Paris Club 'treatment' refers to either a reduction and/or renegotiation of a developing country's Paris Club debts. The Paris Club does not exist as a formal institution. Non-HIPC countries are assessed on a case-by-case basis. The procedure for budgeting and accounting for any U.S. debt relief is based on the method used to value U.S. loans and guarantees provided in the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. Since passage of the act, U.S. government agencies are required to value U.S. loans, such as bilateral debt owed to the United States, on a net present value basis rather than at their face value, and an appropriation by Congress of the estimated amount of debt relief is required in advance of any debt relief taking place. | The Paris Club is a voluntary, informal group of creditor nations who meet approximately 10 times per year to provide debt relief to developing countries. Members of the Paris Club agree to renegotiate and/or reduce official debt owed to them on a case-by-case basis.
The United States is a key Paris Club Member and Congress has an active role in both Paris Club operations and U.S. policy regarding debt relief overall. The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 stipulates that Congress must be involved in any official foreign country debt relief and notified of any debt reduction and debt renegotiation. |
crs_R44630 | crs_R44630_0 | T he United States is party to 14 international free trade agreements (FTAs) with 20 countries. These agreements impose a wide variety of international obligations on the United States and its trading partners. Such obligations address import tariffs, as well as potential nontariff trade barriers in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and services trade. A country that is party to an FTA and that maintains laws, regulations, or practices that violate one of these obligations may be subject to trade retaliation (e.g., increased tariffs imposed by other FTA parties on its exports) or may have to pay a fine or monetary compensation to an FTA partner or injured investor. During the past decade, some have suggested that the United States should attempt to renegotiate—and possibly withdraw from—the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Such statements have prompted congressional interest in domestic and international legal issues pertaining to U.S. termination of, or withdrawal from, an FTA. U.S. FTAs have historically been approved as congressional-executive agreements by a majority vote of each house of Congress rather than as treaties ratified by the President after having received the "advice and consent" of a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate. FTAs are not self-executing agreements (i.e., implementing legislation is required to provide U.S. bodies with the domestic legal authority necessary to enforce and comply with the agreements' provisions). Are FTAs Legally Binding Agreements Under International Law? Article 54 states that "termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty.... " As discussed below, all U.S. FTAs that have entered into force as of the date of this report contain provisions allowing for a party's withdrawal from, or termination of, the FTA upon advance notice to the other parties. Questions have arisen regarding whether the President can unilaterally withdraw the United States from such agreements without the consent of Congress. The Constitution does not specifically address withdrawal from treaties or congressional-executive agreements. In some cases, the United States has withdrawn from international legal agreements pursuant to the joint action of the political branches. However, some commentators and the Supreme Court have suggested that the President possesses exclusive constitutional authority to communicate with foreign powers. As a practical matter, the President's communication of a notice of termination of an FTA to trade partners in accordance with the FTA's terms appears sufficient to release the United States from its international obligations from the effective date of withdrawal onward in accordance with the terms of withdrawal provisions in existing FTAs and the rules for withdrawal from treaties in the Vienna Convention. Can Congress Prevent the President from Withdrawing from an FTA? Could Congress Force the President to Withdraw from an FTA? One option would be for Congress to enact a statute (possibly over a presidential veto) that would repeal its approval and implementation in domestic law of an FTA. If the implementing law was not repealed upon termination of, or U.S. withdrawal from, the FTA, on the other hand, then the President might rely on certain provisions in that law to adjust tariff rates to what they had been before the FTA. The President cannot make laws, and thus repeal of federal statutory provisions implementing U.S. FTA obligations requires action from Congress. Broadly speaking, if the President identified a federal regulation, order, or practice that implements FTA obligations, the President might be able to rely on constitutional or statutory authorities to repeal or limit the effect of the measure. Such actions by the President or an executive branch agency could potentially be subject to judicial review on various grounds, including that an agency has exceeded its statutory authority or failed to enforce the law. | The United States is party to 14 international free trade agreements (FTAs) with 20 countries. These agreements impose a wide variety of international obligations on the United States and its trading partners. Such obligations address import tariffs, as well as potential nontariff trade barriers. A country that is party to an FTA and that maintains laws, regulations, or practices that violate one of these obligations may be subject to trade retaliation (e.g., other FTA parties may increase tariffs on the country's exports) or may have to pay a fine or monetary compensation to an FTA partner or injured investor. During the past decade, some have suggested that the United States should attempt to renegotiate—and possibly withdraw from—the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Such statements have prompted congressional interest in domestic and international legal issues pertaining to U.S. termination of, or withdrawal from, an FTA.
U.S. FTAs have historically been approved as congressional-executive agreements by a majority vote of each house of Congress rather than as treaties ratified by the President after Senate approval by a two-thirds majority vote. FTAs are not self-executing agreements. Thus, legislation is required to provide U.S. bodies with domestic legal authority necessary to enforce and comply with the agreements' provisions. FTAs are legally binding agreements under international law.
All U.S. FTAs that have entered into force as of the date of this report contain provisions allowing for a party's withdrawal from, or termination of, the FTA upon advance notice to the other parties. Questions have arisen regarding whether the President can unilaterally withdraw the United States from such agreements without the consent of Congress. The Constitution does not specifically address withdrawal from treaties or congressional-executive agreements. In some cases, the United States has withdrawn from international legal agreements pursuant to the joint action of the political branches. However, the weight of judicial and scholarly opinion suggests that the President possesses the exclusive constitutional authority to communicate with foreign powers, and such authority might provide the President with a constitutional basis for withdrawing from at least some types of international agreements. The agreement's subject matter, however, might be relevant to a legal analysis. As a practical matter, the President's communication of a notice of withdrawal from an FTA to trade partners in accordance with the FTA's terms would likely release the United States from its international obligations from the effective date of withdrawal onward as provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United States has not ratified but considers to reflect, in many aspects, customary international law. Congress may thus find it difficult to prevent the President from terminating or withdrawing from an FTA. On the other hand, if Congress wanted to pressure the President to withdraw, it could enact a statute (over any presidential veto) that would repeal its approval and implementation in domestic law of an FTA.
Even in the event that the President could properly withdraw from an FTA unilaterally, the President cannot make laws, and thus repeal of federal statutory provisions implementing U.S. FTA obligations requires congressional action. Congress has enacted provisions that appear to delegate to the President authority to repeal some provisions of federal statutory law implementing FTA obligations upon termination of, or U.S. withdrawal from, the agreement. However, the President might not be able to exercise this authority if a court struck down such provisions as unconstitutional or Congress amended or repealed them. Although the President cannot repeal other statutory provisions implementing FTA obligations without further congressional action, if the President identified a federal regulation, order, or practice that implemented FTA obligations, the President may be able to rely on constitutional or statutory authority to repeal or limit the effect of the measure. Such actions by the President may be subject to judicial review. |
crs_R40467 | crs_R40467_0 | Background
This report analyzes the language contained in § 1607 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), which provides that federal funds can be made available to a state by the federal government either after certification by a governor that such money will be requested and spent or after the adoption of a concurrent resolution by a state legislature. Under this interpretation, it does not appear likely that § 1607 was intended to significantly reallocate powers between a state legislature and a state executive branch. Thus, once either a governor's certification or the legislature's acceptance is made, § 1607 would have little or no apparent effect on the remaining power of a governor, state or local official to choose whether or not to seek and administer these funds. Any interpretation of this language which did provide authority to a state legislature, by concurrent resolution, to direct the acceptance and spending of federal monies would likely raise Tenth Amendment issues. Consequently, such an interpretation would be disfavored. | This report analyzes the language contained in §1607 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act or ARRA; P.L. 111-5), which provides that federal funds can be made available to a state by the federal government either after certification by a governor that such money will be requested and spent or after the adoption of a concurrent resolution by a state legislature. Although the language of § 1607 is arguably ambiguous, it does not appear likely that it would have the effect of significantly reallocating power between a state legislature and a state executive branch. Thus, once either a governor's certification or the legislature's acceptance has been made, § 1607 would have little or no apparent effect on the power of a governor, state or local official to choose whether or not to seek and administer these funds. Any interpretation of this language which did provide authority to a state legislature, by concurrent resolution, to direct the acceptance and spending of federal monies by state or local officials, would be likely to raise Tenth Amendment issues. Consequently, such an interpretation would be disfavored. |
crs_RS21686 | crs_RS21686_0 | Background
Since FY2001, Congress has conditioned part of U.S. aid to Serbia after a certain date of the year on a presidential certification that Serbia has met three conditions: they are cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY); ending support for separate Bosnian Serb institutions; and protecting minority rights and the rule of law, including the release of political prisoners. Serbian cooperation then decreased significantly. On May 31, 2006, the Administration, in compliance with the certification provision in the FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill, suspended $7 million in U.S. aid to Serbia, due to its failure to cooperate with the ICTY. More important, however, may be the impact of international efforts to determine the status of Serbia's Kosovo province. The United States and its key European allies are likely to recognize Kosovo's independence in early 2008. The Serbian government and parliament have threatened to sharply downgrade relations with any country that does so. Therefore, if the United States and its allies were to recognize Kosovo, Serbia cooperation with the ICTY might cease and Serbia's prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration would suffer a serious blow, at least for a time. | Since FY2001, Congress has conditioned U.S. aid to Serbia on a presidential certification that Serbia has met certain conditions, including cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The second session of the 110th Congress may consider similar certification provisions in the FY2009 foreign aid legislation. Supporters of aid conditionality say such provisions may have spurred Serbia's cooperation with the Tribunal. Serbian cooperation with the ICTY may also be affected by the status of Serbia's Kosovo province. The Serbian government and parliament have threatened to sharply downgrade relations with any country that recognizes Kosovo's independence. If the United States and most European Union countries recognize Kosovo, as they are expected to do in early 2008, Serbia cooperation with the ICTY might cease, at least for a time. This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information on Serbia, see CRS Report RS22601, Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43040 | crs_R43040_0 | Questions about the scope and efficacy of the background checks required during certain firearm purchases have gained prominence following recent mass shootings. These background checks are intended to identify whether potential purchasers are prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms due to one or more "prohibiting factors," such as a prior felony conviction or a prior involuntary commitment for mental health reasons. Operationally, such background checks primarily use information contained within the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and a particular focus of the debate in Congress has been whether the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule or state privacy laws are an obstacle to the population of NICS with prohibiting mental health records. On January 7, 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a proposed rule that would clarify the existing regulations related to those who would qualify as "adjudicated as a mental defective" and who have been "committed to a mental institution" for purposes of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Prohibiting Mental Health Factors Under the Gun Control Act of 1968
Under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) , as amended, certain categories of persons are prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, and receiving firearms and ammunition. It is important to note that despite references to "mental illness" in the definition, neither a diagnosis of a mental illness nor treatment for a mental illness appears, by itself, to qualify a person as "adjudicated as a mental defective." Rather, an individual's "adjudication as a mental defective" relies upon a determination or decision by "a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority." The use of the term "institution" suggests that the definition of "committed to a mental institution" may apply only to inpatient settings. However, at least one federal court has held that the Supreme Court's recent recognition of an individual right to possess a firearm in District of Columbia v. Heller , suggests that some emergency hospitalization or commitment procedures should not be included within the meaning of "involuntary commitment" for purposes of the GCA. DOJ Proposal to Amend "Adjudicated as a Mental Defective" and "Committed to a Mental Institution"
On January 7, 2014, DOJ issued a notice of its proposed rule to amend the definitions of "adjudicated as a mental defective" and "committed to a mental institution." NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (NIAA)
In 2007, Congress passed the NICS Improvement Amendments Act (NIAA), which authorizes the Attorney General to make additional grants to states to improve electronic access to records as well as to incentivize states to turn over records of persons who would be prohibited from possessing or receiving firearms under 18 U.S.C. Both DOJ and state officials told GAO that a variety of technological, coordination, and legal (i.e., privacy) challenges limit the states' ability to report mental health records. It should also be noted that both types of entities—courts and health care providers—may also be subject to state health privacy laws that may be more protective of individually identifiable health information than the HIPAA Privacy Rule and other state-level requirements and policies. Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule currently allows disclosure of information where state law expressly requires disclosure of records to NICS, some state officials have reported that they view state health privacy laws and the HIPAA Privacy Rule as potential obstacles to NICS reporting. | Questions about the scope and efficacy of the background checks required during certain firearm purchases have gained prominence following recent mass shootings. These background checks are intended to identify whether potential purchasers are prohibited from purchasing or possessing firearms due to one or more "prohibiting factors," such as a prior felony conviction or a prior involuntary commitment for mental health reasons. Operationally, such background checks primarily use information contained within the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) and a particular focus of the debate in Congress has been whether federal privacy standards promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (i.e., the HIPAA Privacy Rule) or state privacy laws are an obstacle to the submission of mental health records to NICS.
Under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), as amended, persons adjudicated to be mentally defective or who have been committed to a mental institution are prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, and receiving firearms and ammunition. Neither a diagnosis of a mental illness nor treatment for a mental illness is sufficient to qualify a person as "adjudicated as a mental defective." Rather, an individual's "adjudication as a mental defective" relies upon a determination or decision by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority. The definition of "committed to a mental institution" may apply only to inpatient settings. At least one federal court has held that the Supreme Court's recent recognition of an individual right to possess a firearm suggests that some emergency hospitalization or commitment procedures, that may not have as many procedural safeguards as formal commitment, should not be included within the meaning of "involuntary commitment" for purposes of the GCA. In 2007, Congress passed the NICS Improvement Amendments Act (NIAA), which authorizes the Attorney General to make additional grants to states to improve electronic access to records as well as to incentivize states to turn over records of persons who would be prohibited from possessing or receiving firearms.
In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that a variety of technological, coordination, and legal (i.e., privacy) challenges limit the states' ability to report mental health records to NICS. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, which applies to most health care providers, regulates the use or disclosure of protected health information, and it has been perceived as a potential obstacle to sharing information with NICS, especially in states that do not expressly require disclosure of such records to NICS. Moreover, courts and health care providers that generate such prohibiting mental health records may also be subject to state health privacy laws that may be more restrictive than the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
In February 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced its intention to amend the HIPAA Privacy Rule to remove any potential impediments to state reporting of some mental health records to NICS, and on January 7, 2014, HHS issued its proposed rule that would modify the HIPAA Privacy Rule. The Department of Justice (DOJ) also issued a proposed rule that would clarify the terms "adjudicated as a mental defective" and "committed to a mental institution." |
crs_R43989 | crs_R43989_0 | Introduction
In the United States, it is generally taken for granted that the electricity needed to power the U.S. economy is available on demand and will always be available to power our machines and devices. However, in recent years, new threats have materialized as new vulnerabilities have come to light, and a number of major concerns have emerged about the resilience and security of the nation's electric power system. In particular, the cybersecurity of the electricity grid has been a focus of recent efforts to protect the integrity of the electric power system. But as the grid is modernized, the new "intelligent" technologies replacing them use advanced two-way communications and other digital advantages that likely will be optimized by Internet connectivity. While these advances will improve the efficiency and performance of the grid, they also potentially increase the vulnerability of the grid to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity is today, and will continue to be, a major issue and focus area for the electric power sector. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
One IC system used to control remote operations of the power grid is the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Over time, modification of SCADA systems has resulted in connection of many of these older, legacy systems to the Internet. The Grid Is Experiencing Cyber Intrusions
The increasing frequency of cyber intrusions on industrial control systems of critical infrastructure is a trend of concern to the electric utility industry. The National Security Agency reported that it has seen intrusions into IC systems by entities with the apparent technical capability "to take down control systems that operate U.S. power grids, water systems and other critical infrastructure." These intrusions, while they have not manifested in cyberattacks capable of inhibiting or disrupting electric system operations, still have reportedly occurred with CIP mandatory standards in place. Currently, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) serves as the ERO. Toward a Focus on Security and Not Just Compliance
The current iteration of NERC's standards is CIP Version 5, which appears to be moving utility companies toward an active consideration of system security needs rather than just compliance with the standards. Because many cybersecurity actions are reactive to the last threat discovered, some experts say that mitigation of cyber threats requires a focus on attackers, not the attacks. But they are also another potential point of access to the grid by a cyberattacker. Liability from a Potential Major Cyber Event
As businesses involved in a commercial enterprise, utilities are aware that they may be vulnerable from a liability standpoint. Even with mandatory standards, the six failure scenario domains identified by NESCO illustrate the continuing potential vulnerability of the grid to cyber and physical attacks, or a combination of both. However, the advice of several initiatives and observers is essentially for electric utilities to embrace cybersecurity as part of their strategic business planning and operations. Whether electric utilities can make the investment financially (and recruit staff) for such a mission is also an issue. 85 among other actions would direct DHS to (1) work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and other state and local authorities to take proactive steps to manage risk and strengthen the security and resilience of the nation's critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks; (2) establish terrorism prevention policy to engage with international partners to strengthen the security and resilience of domestic critical infrastructure and critical infrastructure located outside of the United States; (3) establish a task force to conduct research into the best means to address the security and resilience of critical infrastructure in an integrated, holistic manner to reflect critical infrastructure's interconnectedness and interdependency; (4) establish the Strategic Research Imperatives Program to lead DHS's federal civilian agency approach to strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience; and (5) make available research findings and guidance to federal civilian agencies for the identification, prioritization, assessment, remediation, and security of their internal critical infrastructure to assist in the prevention, mediation, and recovery from terrorism events. | In the United States, it is generally taken for granted that the electricity needed to power the U.S. economy is available on demand and will always be available to power our machines and devices. However, in recent years, new threats have materialized as new vulnerabilities have come to light, and a number of major concerns have emerged about the resilience and security of the nation's electric power system. In particular, the cybersecurity of the electricity grid has been a focus of recent efforts to protect the integrity of the electric power system.
The increasing frequency of cyber intrusions on industrial control (IC) systems of critical infrastructure continues to be a concern to the electric power sector. Power production and flows on the nation's electricity grid are controlled remotely by a number of IC technologies. The National Security Agency (NSA) reported that it has seen intrusions into IC systems by entities with the apparent technical capability "to take down control systems that operate U.S. power grids, water systems and other critical infrastructure."
As the grid is modernized and the Smart Grid is deployed, new intelligent technologies utilizing two-way communications and other digital advantages are being optimized by Internet connectivity. Modernization of many IC systems (in particular, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition [SCADA] system) also has resulted in connections to the Internet. While these advances will improve the efficiency and performance of the grid, they also will increase its vulnerability to potential cyberattacks. Black Energy, Havex, and Sandworm are all recent examples of malware targeting SCADA systems. New devices (like smart meters) and increasing points of access (such as renewable electricity facilities) introduce new additional areas through which a potential cyberattack may be launched at the grid.
Many cybersecurity actions are reactive to the last threat discovered. While intrusion detection is a priority, some experts say that mitigation of cyber threats requires a focus on attackers, not the attacks. Cybersecurity strategies may shift from figuring out whether a system has been compromised to an understanding of who authored the malicious software and why. Although malware intrusions may not have resulted in a significant disruption of grid operations so far, they still have been possible even with mandatory standards in place. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC's) current set of standards, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Version 5, is moving toward active consideration of bulk electric system security needs rather than just compliance with minimum standards.
Electric utilities emphasize the need for timely information sharing and advocate for liability protection from potential damages resulting from a major cyber event. Some observers argue that it is the responsibility of electric utilities to embrace security as part of their strategic business planning and operations. The National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization has identified six failure scenario domains intended to assist utility cybersecurity efforts. These scenarios also illustrate the continuing vulnerability of the grid to potential cyber and physical attacks, or a combination of both.
This report highlights several areas for congressional consideration to improve grid cybersecurity. One issue is whether electric utilities have the resources to make the financial investment and recruit staff to reduce vulnerabilities. Another issue is that NERC CIP standards do not apply to all points of grid connection to the distribution system, and these connections still may represent cyber vulnerabilities. The adequacy of current standards where they do apply is also an issue. |
crs_98-323 | crs_98-323_0 | The Clean Water Act (CWA) prescribes performance levels to be attained by municipal sewage treatment plants in order to prevent the discharge of harmful quantities of waste into surface waters, and to ensure that residual sewage sludge meets environmental quality standards. Federal Aid for Wastewater Treatment
In addition to prescribing municipal treatment requirements, the CWA authorizes the principal federal program to aid wastewater treatment plant construction. State and local governments provide the majority of needed funds. Legislative Activity
Authorizations for SRF capitalization grants expired in FY1994, making this an issue of congressional interest. Although interest in meeting the nation's water infrastructure needs is strong and likely to continue, policy makers will balance proposals to assist local communities with policies to achieve greater fiscal discipline. | The Clean Water Act prescribes performance levels to be attained by municipal sewage treatment plants in order to prevent the discharge of harmful wastes into surface waters. The act also provides financial assistance so that communities can construct treatment facilities to comply with the law. The availability of funding for this purpose continues to be a major concern of states and local governments.
This report provides background on municipal wastewater treatment issues, federal treatment requirements and funding, and recent legislative activity. Meeting the nation's wastewater infrastructure needs efficiently and effectively is likely to remain an issue of considerable interest to policy makers. |
crs_R41229 | crs_R41229_0 | Justice Stevens's position on the death penalty has transformed during his tenure on the Court. Although Stevens initially supported the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with adequately protective state enacted guidelines, over the next 35 years the Justice has voted to narrow the application of the death penalty as he has become more skeptical of the punishment's underlying rationale and the states' ability to protect the rights of capital defendants. In 2008, Justice Stevens questioned the continuing constitutionality of the death penalty in his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees . | Justice Stevens's position on the death penalty has undergone a thorough transformation during his tenure on the Court. Although Stevens initially supported the imposition of the death penalty in accordance with adequately protective state enacted guidelines, over the next 35 years the Justice has voted to narrow the application of the death penalty as he has become more skeptical of the punishment's underlying rationale and the states' ability to protect the rights of capital defendants. In 2008, Justice Stevens's death penalty jurisprudence may have culminated with his concurring opinion in Baze v. Rees, in which the Justice unequivocally expressed his ultimate conclusion that the death penalty is itself unconstitutional. |
crs_R44986 | crs_R44986_0 | Introduction
Most of the provisions in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322 ), enacted on December 16, 2016, relate to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. However, the WIIN Act also includes a subtitle (Subtitle J, §§4001-4013) with the potential to affect western water infrastructure owned by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation; an agency in the Department of the Interior). Three sections in Subtitle J (§4007, §4009, and §4011) made alterations that would apply throughout Reclamation's service area, the 17 states west of the Mississippi River. The remaining sections of Subtitle J include provisions specific to the Central Valley Project (CVP), a multipurpose water-conveyance system in California operated by Reclamation. Most of Subtitle J's provisions were derived from bills that received consideration in the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses. Due to the scarcity of water in the West and the importance of federal water infrastructure to the region, western water issues are regularly of interest to many lawmakers. This report discusses selected provisions that were enacted under Subtitle J of the WIIN Act. It provides background information and context related to selected drought- and water-related provisions, summarizes the changes authorized in the WIIN Act, and discusses issues and questions that may be of interest to Congress. WIIN Act Drivers: California Drought, Endangered Species Act Restrictions
A number of factors created the impetus for the consideration and enactment of Subtitle J of the WIIN Act. California Water Provisions
A number of provisions in the bill addressed drought in California and the operations of the Central Valley Project. Specifically, Section 4004(a) states that the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior shall ensure that any public water agency with contracts for water with CVP and SWP has the following opportunities upon request:
Have the opportunity to submit to and discuss information with FWS and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for consideration in the development of a biological assessment; Be informed of the schedule for preparing a biological assessment; Be informed of the schedule for preparing a BiOp; Receive a copy of any draft BiOp and have an opportunity to review and comment on the BiOp; Have the opportunity to confer with FWS or NOAA and the applicant about any reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) prior to them being identified; and Be informed of how each component of the RPAs will contribute to conserving species and the scientific justification supporting the RPAs. 111-11 ; 42 U.S.C. Under this section, most of the act's changes are to expire after five years. The Obama Administration released a signing statement on the WIIN Act, most of which focused on the drought provisions under Subtitle J. In addition to overseeing the implementation of the bill's provisions, Congress also may consider their amendment, extension, or repeal. According to Reclamation, the relatively wet hydrology that followed enactment of the WIIN Act has largely limited opportunities to implement some of the act's operational authorities since the bill's passage. At the same time, some federal operational changes pursuant to the WIIN Act reportedly were proposed but deemed incompatible with state requirements. However, some changes authorized under the act have been implemented. Congress has appropriated funding authorized for Reclamation (both for the CVP and for other projects) under the WIIN Act. CRS estimates that from FY2017 to FY2019, Congress appropriated approximately $576 million for Reclamation projects and programs authorized under the WIIN Act. Some of these authorities have met their appropriations ceilings; thus, they may be proposed for extension or amendment. | Most of the provisions in the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322), enacted on December 16, 2016, relate to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. However, the WIIN Act also includes a subtitle (Title II, Subtitle J, §§4001-4013) with the potential to affect western water infrastructure owned by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation; part of the Department of the Interior). Three sections in Subtitle J (§4007, §4009, and §4011) made alterations that would apply throughout Reclamation's service area, the 17 states to the west of the Mississippi River. Most of the remaining sections of this subtitle include provisions specific to the Central Valley Project (CVP), a multipurpose water-conveyance system in California operated by Reclamation. Most of Subtitle J's provisions were derived from bills that received consideration in the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses.
Although most parts of the WIIN Act had broad stakeholder support when enacted, some of Subtitle J's provisions were (and continue to be) debated. Particularly controversial provisions include those related to implementation of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544) as it relates to endangered salmon and threatened Delta smelt and to California water infrastructure, as well as authorities that alter Reclamation's approach to water resources project development. The controversy of these provisions was evidenced by President Obama's signing statement accompanying the bill, which focused on the Obama Administration's interpretation of Subtitle J, particularly the act's environmental provisions.
The WIIN Act was debated and enacted at a time when California was enduring severe drought. However, by most metrics, the drought in California ended with the wet winter of 2016-2017, which occurred after enactment of the WIIN Act. Regardless of hydrologic status, most of the WIIN Act's drought provisions are to remain in effect until five years after its enactment, or December 2021.
Due to the scarcity of water in the West and the importance of federal water infrastructure to the region, western water issues are regularly of interest to lawmakers. In addition to overseeing the implementation of CVP operational provisions in the WIIN Act, Congress also may consider their amendment, extension, or repeal. According to Reclamation, the relatively wet hydrology that followed enactment of the WIIN Act has largely limited opportunities to implement some of the act's operational authorities, and some federal operational changes pursuant to the WIIN Act reportedly were proposed but deemed incompatible with state requirements. However, some of the operational changes authorized under the act have been implemented. Congress also has appropriated funding authorized for Reclamation (both for the CVP and for other projects) under the bill. CRS estimates that from FY2017 to FY2019, Congress appropriated a total of approximately $575 million for Reclamation projects and programs authorized under the WIIN Act. Some of the bill's authorities have met their appropriations ceilings, prompting some in Congress to propose an increase in the ceiling and potentially an extension in authorizations for appropriations and other activities. Extensions have been proposed for many of the act's other authorities that expire at the end of 2021.
This report discusses selected provisions enacted under Subtitle J of the WIIN Act. It provides background and context related to selected drought- and water-related provisions, summarizes the changes authorized in the WIIN Act, and discusses issues and questions that Congress may consider. For additional background on the CVP, see CRS Report R45342, Central Valley Project: Issues and Legislation, by Charles V. Stern and Pervaze A. Sheikh. |
crs_R40132 | crs_R40132_0 | Overview
The State of the Union address is a communication between the President and Congress in which the chief executive reports on the current conditions of the United States and provides policy proposals for the upcoming legislative year. The State of the Union address originates in the Constitution. As part of the system of checks and balances, Article II, Section 3, clause 1 requires that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." In recent decades, the President has expanded his State of the Union audience, addressing the speech to both the nation and Members of Congress. Over time, the State of the Union address has evolved considerably. The format and delivery of the speech has changed, and its length has fluctuated widely. Technology has also influenced the delivery of the address, with the advent of radio, television, and the Internet playing significant roles in the transformation. Tradition and Ceremony
The State of the Union address is a speech steeped in tradition and ceremony. Recurring Themes
In addition to a common rhetorical sequence, State of the Union addresses also exhibit recurring thematic elements. Through attention to both past and future, Presidents can use the State of the Union address to develop their own definition of the national identity. Legislative Success and Policy Proposals
Given the powerful spotlight the State of the Union address provides for the President in his legislative role, are proposals mentioned in the speech actually enacted in the subsequent year? The opposition response is usually broadcast immediately after the completion of the President's State of the Union address. The Opposition's Agenda
The political party not occupying the White House uses the opposition response to outline its policy agenda. | The State of the Union address is a communication between the President and Congress in which the chief executive reports on the current conditions of the United States and provides policy proposals for the upcoming legislative year. Formerly known as the "Annual Message," the State of the Union address originates in the Constitution. As part of the system of checks and balances, Article II, Section 3, clause 1 mandates that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." In recent decades, the President has expanded his State of the Union audience, addressing the speech to both the nation and Members of Congress.
Over time, the State of the Union address has evolved considerably. The format and delivery of the speech have changed, and its length has fluctuated widely. Technology has also influenced the delivery of the address, with the advent of radio, television, and the Internet playing significant roles in the transformation.
Although each President uses the State of the Union address to outline his Administration's policy agenda, most incorporate similar rhetorical sequences and ceremonial traditions. Bipartisanship, attention to both the past and the future, and optimism are recurring themes in State of the Union addresses.
The legislative success rate of policy proposals mentioned in State of the Union addresses varies widely. Addresses given after a President's election or reelection tend to produce higher rates of legislative success. Presidents can also use the State of the Union address to increase media attention for a particular issue.
Immediately following the State of the Union address, the political party not occupying the White House provides an opposition response. The response, usually much shorter than the State of the Union, outlines the opposition party's policy agenda and serves as an official rejoinder to the proposals outlined by the President. |
crs_R43841 | crs_R43841_0 | Congress also considered legislation to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), certain U.S. trade preference programs, and the commercial operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as legislation to approve governance reforms at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Additionally, Congress continued oversight of ongoing U.S. trade agreements and negotiations, and of U.S. economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and other countries. Approaches to intellectual property rights (IPR), digital trade, and investment in U.S. trade negotiations, agreements, and programs also are expanding policy issues. The Role of Congress in International Trade and Finance
The U.S. Constitution assigns express authority over foreign trade to Congress. Since the passage of the Tariff Act of 1930, Congress has delegated certain trade authority to the executive branch. These include such areas as U.S. trade agreement negotiations, tariffs and nontariff barriers, trade remedy laws, import and export policies, economic sanctions, and the trade policy functions of the federal government. It has authority over bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the level of U.S. financial commitments to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank, and to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). TPA allows implementing bills for specific trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative procedures—limited debate, no amendments, and an up or down vote—provided the President observes certain statutory obligations in negotiating trade agreements. The latest grant of authority expires on July 1, 2021, provided that neither chamber introduces and passes an extension disapproval resolution by July 1, 2018. These efforts include:
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). WTO Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). Such activities may support Administration initiatives and programs on trade. Export Controls and Sanctions
Congress has authorized the President to control the export of various items for national security, foreign policy, and economic reasons. Congress influences all aspects of these international investment issues. The 114th Congress responded to concerns about currency manipulation through Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and customs legislation. In engaging on these issues, Congress may wish to:
consider potential implementing legislation for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which could prompt a vigorous debate on a number of trade issues encompassed in the proposed agreement; conduct oversight of ongoing U.S. trade negotiations, including on a potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the European Union (EU), a potential international plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations; conduct oversight and take possible legislative action concerning a range of other trade issues, including U.S. trade relations with China and other major economies as well as U.S. export and import policies and programs; and monitor the remaining implications of the Eurozone and Greek debt crisis, the financial markets, international financial institutions and U.S. funding levels, and other countries' exchange rate policies, among other international finance issues. | The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to approve trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover such areas as U.S. trade negotiations, U.S. trade and economic relations with specific regions and countries, international institutions focused on trade, tariff and nontariff barriers, worker dislocation due to trade liberalization, trade remedy laws, import and export policies, international investment, economic sanctions, and other trade-related functions of the federal government. Congress also has authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. government.
To date, the 114th Congress has passed legislation that:
renews Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to July 1, 2021 (subject to passage of an extension disapproval resolution in 2018), allowing implementing legislation for trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative procedures, provided that certain statutory requirements are met; reauthorizes Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) through June 30, 2021, the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) through September 30, 2019, and several U.S. trade preference programs on a multi-year basis; funds an increase in the U.S. quota at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and authorizes the executive branch to vote in favor of IMF governance reforms; and reauthorizes the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
Congress continued its oversight of the Administration's ongoing trade agreements and negotiations, and maintained economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, Russia, and other countries, among other actions. Members also introduced a range of legislation on international trade and finance issues.
Congress may revisit these issues and address new ones. Among the more potentially prominent issues are:
possible consideration of legislation to implement the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA); oversight of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA negotiations with the European Union (EU); possible action on a miscellaneous tariff bill (MTB); U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, currency issues, and market access liberalization; international finance and investment issues, including ongoing implications of the Eurozone and Greek debt crisis, oversight of international financial institutions (IFIs), treatment of "currency manipulation," the creation of development and infrastructure banks by emerging economies, and U.S. negotiations on new bilateral investment treaties (BITs), notably with China and India; oversight of World Trade Organization (WTO) and other negotiations, including the completed WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and expansion of the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA), as well as a potential WTO plurilateral Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) and a separate potential plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA); review of the President's export control reform initiative and possible renewal of the Export Control Act (EAA); and review of sanctions on Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and other countries. |
crs_R45128 | crs_R45128_0 | Status of FY2018 Agriculture Appropriations
Congress passed the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act on March 23, 2018 ( H.R. 1625 ). Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had reported Agriculture appropriations bills for FY2018 ( H.R. 3268 , S. 1603 ). The House also had passed a consolidated bill that included agriculture ( H.R. The full Senate did not consider the Agriculture appropriations bill on the floor. New, higher budget caps in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ) facilitated the final appropriation. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services. The bill includes mandatory and discretionary spending, but the discretionary amounts are the primary focus during the bill's development. Within the discretionary total, the largest discretionary spending items are for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); rural development; agricultural research; FDA; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance program salaries and loans; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs ( Figure 2 ). The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, and other food and nutrition act programs), child nutrition (school lunch and related programs), crop insurance, and farm commodity and conservation programs paid through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). As the beginning of the fiscal year neared without many floor-passed appropriations bills, the House passed on September 14, 2017, an eight-bill consolidated appropriation ( H.R. 3354 ) with Agriculture as Division B. The discretionary total of the Agriculture portion (Division A) is $23.3 billion, an increase of $2.1 billion above the enacted amount in FY2017 (+10%, on a comparable basis that includes CFTC; Table 2 ). The appropriations also carry nearly $123 billion of mandatory spending, though that total is largely determined in separate authorizing laws. Thus, the overall total of the enacted FY2018 Agriculture appropriation is about $146 billion ( Figure 2 ). Compared to FY2017, the enacted appropriation increases spending primarily through an extra $1.38 billion in General Provisions, for programs that receive funding elsewhere in the appropriation. The General Provisions also provide an extra $116 million for Food for Peace foreign food aid, and $94 million for opioid enforcement and surveillance at FDA ( Table 3 ). It also increases the base amount for Food for Peace by $134 million to $1.6 billion. Unlike the practice from more than the past decade, the FY2018 Agriculture appropriation does not impose as many changes to mandatory program spending (CHIMPS), such as to the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), Fresh Fruit and Vegetable program, or rescissions to the Rural Development cushion of credit account or to Section 32. Action on Agriculture Appropriations | The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill.
The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; FDA; rural development; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance programs; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation.
Congress passed the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act on March 23, 2018 (H.R. 1625). The discretionary total of the FY2018 Agriculture appropriation (Division A) is $23.3 billion. This is an increase of $2.1 billion above the amount enacted in FY2017 (+10%). The appropriations also carry nearly $123 billion of mandatory spending, though that amount is largely determined in separate authorizing laws. Thus, the overall total of the enacted FY2018 Agriculture appropriation is about $146 billion.
Compared to FY2017, the enacted appropriation increases spending primarily through an extra $1.38 billion in General Provisions, including an additional $500 million for rural water programs, $600 million for rural broadband, $116 million for Food for Peace foreign food aid, and $94 million for opioid enforcement and surveillance.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act also increases regular funding for agricultural research by $138 million, and Food for Peace by $134 million. Unlike the past decade, the FY2018 Agriculture appropriation does not include as many changes to mandatory program spending (CHIMPS), such as to the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP).
Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported Agriculture appropriations bills in July 2017 (H.R. 3268, S. 1603). As the beginning of the fiscal year approached, the House passed a consolidated bill in September 2017 that included an agriculture appropriation (Division B of H.R. 3354). The full Senate did not consider an agriculture appropriations bill on the floor.
The government continued to operate for the first six months of the fiscal year under continuing resolutions (CRs). The last CR, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), also enacted supplemental appropriations that included agricultural assistance, amended certain farm bill statutes, and passed new, higher budget caps that facilitated the final appropriation. |
crs_R42788 | crs_R42788_0 | Introduction
An estate tax is a tax levied on the assets left behind by a decedent. The federal government and many state governments levy estate taxes or some type of tax on the transfer of assets at death. Under current law, the estate tax is scheduled to revert to the pre-2001 structure on January 1, 2013, with a $1 million exemption and top rate of 55%. In contrast, the federal estate tax currently allows for a significantly higher exemption amount, $5.12 million, and a significantly lower top rate of 35%. The Administration's FY2013 budget proposes a middle ground between those options with a $3.5 million exemption and top rate of 45%. This report provides an overview of the federal estate tax since 2001, highlighting recent trends in federal and state estate tax revenue. The report will be updated as legislative events warrant. Three alternatives are examined for this report: (1) revert to the pre-2001 law, (2) extend the 2012 law, and (3) return to the 2009 law as proposed in the Administration's FY2013 budget proposal (see Table 1 for a summary of the proposals). For example, the federal estate tax could be repealed. If the federal estate tax were repealed, repeal of state estate taxes would likely follow. This option would most likely be considered in the context of broader tax reform and is beyond the scope of this report. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
As noted above, the federal estate tax is scheduled to revert to the pre-2001 structure absent congressional action. 107-16 ). This example will use 2012 law except for the treatment of state death taxes paid ("death" taxes because the credit could also be used for inheritance and succession taxes). First, most state estate taxes are linked directly or indirectly to the federal estate tax law. The dollar-for-dollar federal credit for state death taxes meant that the state estate tax did not add any additional estate tax burden, as it offset some part of federal liability. The change to the deduction under EGTRRA meant that state estate taxes would impose an additional burden on decedent estates. A recent report by the Minnesota House Research Department identified 14 states (and DC) with an estate tax, 6 states with an inheritance tax, 2 states with both an estate tax and an inheritance tax, and 2 with a stand-alone gift tax. This provision created the equivalent of a revenue sharing arrangement between the federal government and the states as most states structured their taxes to match exactly the federal credit. Reversion to the pre-2001 law and the return of the credit for state death taxes, however, would not make the estate tax more progressive when compared with the President's budget proposal or extension of the 2012 law. In contrast, a deduction for state estate taxes, which would accompany both extension of the 2012 law and the Administration's budget proposal based on 2009 law, increases the tax burden and thus the economic efficiency loss arising from state estate taxes. Which course of action Congress will choose is uncertain and the impact on the states unclear. Coordination with states would likely reduce administrative and compliance costs of the estate tax, increase the progressivity of the code generally, and possibly increase the economic efficiency of state estate taxes. | An estate tax is a tax levied on the assets left behind by a decedent. The federal government and many state governments levy estate taxes or some type of tax on the transfer of assets at death. In 2012, the federal estate tax allows for a $5.12 million exclusion and a top rate of 35%. The federal estate tax is scheduled to revert to the pre-2001 structure on January 1, 2013, with a $1 million exclusion and top rate of 55%. The Administration's FY2013 budget proposes a federal estate tax with a $3.5 million exemption and top rate of 45% for 2013. Many states also levy estate or inheritance taxes (or both) that are linked to federal law. If the federal estate tax is allowed to revert to pre-2001 law, state and federal estate tax revenue will increase significantly by imposing a greater tax burden on estates than would an extension of 2012 law or the President's FY2013 budget proposal. The percentage increase in state estate tax revenue would likely be greater than the percentage increase in federal estate taxes under a return to pre-2001 law. The principal cause is the return of the federal credit for state death taxes when the tax changes originally enacted by the Economic Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act in 2001 (EGTRRA, P.L. 107-16) expire.
Before EGTRRA, all 50 states and the District of Columbia imposed an estate tax where state estate taxes were linked directly to the federal credit for state death taxes paid ("death" taxes because the credit could also be used for inheritance and succession taxes). The dollar-for-dollar credit meant that state taxes were not an additional burden, creating the equivalent of a revenue sharing arrangement between the federal government and the states as most states structured their taxes to match exactly the federal credit. EGTRRA gradually replaced the federal credit with a deduction. Because of this change to a deduction, state estate and inheritance taxes were no longer offset on a dollar-for-dollar basis and, as a result, imposed an additional burden on estates and heirs. States were then lobbied for relief from this additional estate tax burden. As a result, by 2012, just 16 states and the District of Columbia imposed an estate tax and 8 states imposed an inheritance tax (2 states levied both).
As Congress considers the future of the federal estate tax, questions concerning the coordination of the tax with the states have arisen. This report examines the interaction of federal and state estate taxes under three policy alternatives: (1) extend the 2012 law, (2) revert to the pre-2001 law, and (3) return to the 2009 law as proposed in the Administration's FY2013 budget proposal. A fourth option, repeal of the federal estate tax, has also been proposed. If the federal estate tax were repealed, repeal of most remaining state estate taxes would likely follow. This option, however, would most likely be considered in the context of broader tax reform and is beyond the scope of this report.
Which course of action Congress will choose is uncertain and the impact on the states is unclear. What is more certain is that coordination with states would likely reduce administrative and compliance costs of the estate tax, increase the progressivity of the code generally, and possibly increase the economic efficiency of state estate taxes.
This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_RL33797 | crs_RL33797_0 | Reconciling these interests has led to the development of a broadcast video flag to combat unauthorized redistribution of content broadcast through digital television signals. In November 2003, the FCC published a Report and Order that required all digital devices capable of receiving digital broadcast over the air, and sold after July 1, 2005, to incorporate a standard content-protection technology that would recognize the broadcast video flag and limit redistribution when the flag is recognized. Legal Challenges to the Broadcast Video Flag
In October of 2004, the American Library Association (ALA), Association of Research Libraries, American Association of Law Libraries (AALL), Medical Libraries Association, and others petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the FCC's Report and Order. On May 6, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the ALA's petition for review and reversed and vacated the Commission's order requiring DTV reception equipment to be manufactured with the capability to prevent unauthorized redistributions of digital content. In American Library Association v. Federal Communications Commission , the court of appeals determined that the FCC lacked the authority "to regulate apparatus that can receive television broadcasts when those apparatus are not engaged in the process of receiving a broadcast transmission." Broadcast Video Flag Legislation Introduced in the 109th Congress
In response to the American Library Association decision, two bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress that would have expressly granted statutory authority to the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934 to implement the FCC's Report and Order In the Matter of Digital Broadcast Content Protection . These legislative proposals represent approaches that may be taken in the 110 th Congress for authorizing a broadcast video flag system. The Digital Content Protection Act of 2006 was introduced by Senator Ted Stevens in the 109 th Congress as part of two bills, S. 2686 and H.R. 5252 (as reported in the Senate). Hearings on the broadcast flag held by the 109 th Congress revealed that educators and librarians who use digital materials in education are concerned that a broadcast video flag regime could frustrate the utilization of digital television in distance education. | In November 2003, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a rule that required all digital devices capable of receiving digital television (DTV) broadcasts over the air, and sold after July 1, 2005, to incorporate technology that would recognize and abide by the broadcast video flag, a content-protection signal that broadcasters may choose to embed into a digital broadcast transmission as a way to prevent unauthorized redistribution of DTV content. However, in October 2004, the American Library Association and eight organizations representing a large number of libraries and consumers filed a lawsuit that challenged the power of the FCC to promulgate such a rule. In May 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in American Library Association v. Federal Communications Commission that the FCC had exceeded the scope of its delegated authority in imposing the broadcast flag regime, and the court thus reversed and vacated the FCC's broadcast flag order.
Parties holding a copyright interest in content transmitted through DTV broadcasts, in particular broadcasters and television program creators, remain concerned about the unauthorized distribution and reproduction of copyrighted DTV content and thus continue to advocate the adoption of a broadcast video flag. However, several consumer, educational, and technology groups raise objections to the broadcast flag because, in their view, it would place technological, financial, and regulatory burdens that may stifle innovation, limit the consumer's ability to use DTV broadcasts in accordance with the Copyright Act's "fair use" principles, and possibly frustrate the use of digital television content by educators and librarians in distance education programs.
This report provides a brief explanation of the broadcast video flag and its relationship to digital television and summarizes the American Library Association judicial opinion. The report also examines a legislative proposal introduced in the 109 th Congress, the Digital Content Protection Act of 2006, which appeared as portions of two bills, S. 2686 and H.R. 5252 (as reported in the Senate), that would have expressly granted statutory authority to the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934 to promulgate regulations implementing a broadcast video flag system. Although not enacted, these bills represent approaches to authorizing the broadcast video flag system that may be of interest to the 110 th Congress. |
crs_R43709 | crs_R43709_0 | 113-235 ( H.R. The act included 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills. 113-235 ( H.R. 83 ) provided a total of $8.14 billion for EPA in Title II of Division F—Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015. No regular Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bills for FY2015 were passed by the House or Senate appropriations committees prior to the end of the fiscal year. This report briefly summarizes actions on the FY2015 appropriations for EPA and presents a breakout of the FY2015 enacted appropriations for the agency by each of the nine appropriations accounts and by selected programs and activities within those accounts that received more prominent attention in the congressional debate. The discussions and tables presented in this report compare the FY2015 enacted appropriations for EPA to FY2015 levels proposed in the President's FY2015 budget request, the House committee reported bill and Senate subcommittee draft, and the FY2014 enacted appropriations. 113-551 ) on July 15, 2014. Title II of the chairman's draft would have provided a total of $8.18 billion for EPA, $699.3 million (9.3%) more than the $7.48 billion in the House committee reported bill for FY2015, $292.1 million (3.7%) more than the FY2015 request of $7.89 billion but $17.9 million (0.2%) less than the FY2014 enacted level of $8.20 billion. 5171 as reported included a number of provisions (Title IV General Provisions) proposed by the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies and an additional amendment adopted during full-committee markup that would have restricted or prohibited the use of FY2015 funds by EPA for implementing or proceeding with a number of regulatory actions. A subset of the provisions in the House committee reported bill, several of which were similar to those included in recent fiscal years' appropriations, were retained in P.L. Funding for EPA under the CR was subject to the authority and conditions provided in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2014 (Division G, P.L. P.L. 113-235 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, enacted December 16, 2014, established final funding levels for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2015. The FY2015 enacted appropriations included both decreases and increases compared to the amounts proposed for 2015 and the 2014 enacted levels for individual programs and activities funded within each of the EPA appropriations accounts not specified in the bill itself but identified in the explanatory statement as reported in the Congressional Record . The following sections highlight funding issues associated with certain accounts and program activities that have been prominent in the debate on EPA's FY2015 appropriations. Key Funding Issues
Concerns regarding EPA's FY2015 funding focused particularly on prioritization and adequacy of funding for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects; categorical grants to assist states in implementing federal pollution control laws; implementation of air quality and climate change regulations, research, and related activities; and federal financial assistance for environmental cleanup of Superfund and Brownfields sites. The general provisions in Title IV of Division F of P.L. 113-235 included provisions restricting the use of funds for certain EPA actions similar to those contained in previous recent appropriations but incorporated only a subset of those included in H.R. P.L. P.L. 113-235 included a total of $1.09 billion for the Superfund account for FY2015 (prior to transfers to other EPA accounts), the same as the FY2014 enacted appropriations and slightly higher than the Senate subcommittee chairman's draft but $67.8 million (5.9%) below the $1.16 billion total proposed in the President's FY2015 request and in H.R. | Enacted on December 16, 2014, Title II of Division F of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235; H.R. 83) provided $8.14 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2015. The act appropriated funding for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2015, for 11 of the 12 regular appropriations acts, including "Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies," under which EPA is funded. Total discretionary appropriations available in FY2015 for all federal departments and agencies were based on a cap of $1.014 trillion set in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67, Division A). No regular appropriations acts for FY2015—including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies—were enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year. Instead, EPA and other federal departments and agencies operated under a series of continuing resolutions prior to the enactment of P.L. 113-235.
The total FY2015 enacted appropriations of $8.14 billion for EPA was a $249.9 million (3.2%) increase above the President's FY2015 request of $7.89 billion but $60.1 million (0.7%) below the FY2014 enacted appropriations of $8.20 billion. The July 15, 2014, House Appropriations Committee–reported bill H.R. 5171, for the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies would have provided $7.48 billion for EPA for FY2015. The chairman of the Senate Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee recommendations for FY2015 in the form of a draft bill on August 1, 2014, would have provided a total of $8.18 billion for EPA.
There were both increases and decreases across the individual program activities funded within the nine EPA appropriations accounts when comparing the FY2015 enacted appropriations with those proposed for FY2015 and the FY2014 enacted levels. Considerable attention during the debate and hearings on EPA's appropriations for FY2015 focused on federal financial assistance to states for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, various categorical grants to states to support general implementation and enforcement of federal environmental programs as delegated to the states, funding for the agency's implementation and research support for air pollution control requirements, EPA actions to address climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, and funding for environmental cleanup.
In addition to funding for specific programs and activities, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions received attention during hearings on FY2015 appropriations for EPA—similar to the debate regarding appropriations for the agency for recent fiscal years. The general provisions in Title IV of Division F of P.L. 113-235 included provisions restricting the use of funds for certain EPA actions similar to those contained in previous recent appropriations but only a subset of those included in the House committee reported bill, H.R. 5171. Provisions retained in P.L. 113-235 address EPA air quality regulation of livestock operations and reporting requirements for manure systems, use of U.S. iron and steel for drinking water infrastructure projects, and EPA regulation of lead in ammunition and fishing tackle.
This CRS report provides an overview of funding levels for EPA accounts and certain program activities specified in P.L. 113-235 compared to H.R. 5171 as reported, the Senate subcommittee chairman's draft, the President's FY2015 request, and FY2014 enacted appropriations. The report also highlights issues associated with a subset of accounts and programs that were prominent in the debate on EPA's FY2015 appropriations during the 113th Congress. |
crs_R40717 | crs_R40717_0 | The NRC report described why a national approach is needed, identified challenges to creating a national cadastre, and offered specific recommendations for achieving its vision: a distributed system of land parcel data housed with the appropriate data stewards but accessible through a web-based interface. An example of a direct responsibility is that of the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which is steward of federal land parcel data. Why a National Land Parcel Database? Current Status
The federal government's efforts to coordinate its geospatial activities, through the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) and the development of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI), include a strong emphasis on land parcel data. Within the FGDC, BLM is assigned the role of lead agency coordinating land parcel data for federal lands. According to BLM, it is responsible for performing cadastral surveys on all federal and Indian lands: "Cadastral surveys are the foundation for all land title records in the United States and provide federal and tribal land managers with information necessary for the management of their lands." Despite the BLM role as steward of federal land parcel data and coordinator for cadastral data under FGDC, NRC found that a coordinated approach to federally managed parcel data did not exist. Coordinating all land parcel data, the bulk of which is produced for local and regional needs, remains even more of a challenge. NGAC observed that the federal government's need for land parcel data is missing an arrangement for acquiring the detailed property-related data necessary to make decisions during times of emergency. In addition to emergency response related to natural disasters, other perceived or identified needs for a national land parcel database at the federal level include responding to the home mortgage foreclosure crisis, dealing with wildland fires, and managing extractive energy resources on federal lands. Payments in Lieu of Taxes36
The Department of the Interior administers the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program (PILT), which compensates local governments for losses to their property tax bases due to the presence of federally owned land. Administrative and Legislative Options
Executive Order 12906 and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-16 created the FGDC and instigated efforts to create the NSDI, which includes cadastral data as one of the seven fundamental themes. The National Geospatial Advisory Committee (NGAC) recommended this action, and further recommended a Geographic Information Officer within each department or agency with responsibility under FGDC. NGAC also recommended a geospatial leadership and coordination function in the Executive Office of the President, which would elevate the profile of the geospatial enterprise within the Administration and presumably signal a higher priority for coordinating geospatial activities in the federal government. The Obama Administration issued a memorandum on November 10, 2010, that was intended to provide supplemental guidance to the implementation of OMB Circular A-16. The supplemental guidance, if followed, could address some of the some of the issues raised in the NRC report about a national land parcel database, particularly regarding data sharing, coordination, and funding. Legislative Options
Legislation in the 112th Congress
On April 15, 2011, Representative Kind introduced the Federal Land Asset Inventory Reform Act of 2011 ( H.R. Two new positions should be established: a federal land parcel coordinator and a national land parcel coordinator. The first would be responsible for federal lands and property; the second would coordinate parcel data from all sources, both public and private. | The federal government's efforts to coordinate its geospatial activities, through the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) and the development of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI), include a strong emphasis on land parcel data. Land parcel databases (or cadastres) describe the rights, interests, and value of property. Ownership of land parcels is an important part of the legal, financial, and real estate system of a society. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is assigned the role of lead agency coordinating land parcel data for federal lands, and is responsible for performing cadastral surveys on all federal and Indian lands. According to BLM, "Cadastral surveys are the foundation for all land title records in the United States and provide federal and tribal land managers with information necessary for the management of their lands."
Although BLM is steward of federal land parcel data and coordinator for cadastral data under the FGDC, a 2007 National Research Council (NRC) report found that a coordinated approach to federally managed parcel data did not exist. Legislation that would address some of the issues for creating a national cadastre (H.R. 1620, the Federal Land Asset Inventory Reform Act of 2011) was introduced in the 112th Congress. Similar legislation was introduced in the 111th Congress but was not enacted. Coordinating all land parcel data, including that produced for local and regional needs on non-federal lands, remains a challenge.
Why a national land parcel database? The National Geospatial Advisory Committee (NGAC) observed that the federal government's land parcel data is missing an arrangement for acquiring the detailed property-related data necessary to make decisions during times of emergency, such as a natural disaster. In addition to emergency response to disasters, other possible needs for a national land parcel database include responding to the home mortgage foreclosure crisis, dealing with wildfires, managing energy resources on federal lands, and dealing with the effects of climate change. Some individual federal programs could benefit from improved estimates of the number of acres of federal land, such as the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, which requires a precise tally of federal acres within counties in order to calculate federal payments to local governments.
Administrative options have also been proposed to achieve the vision for a land parcel database described in the 2007 NRC report: a distributed system of land parcel data housed with the appropriate data stewards but accessible through a web-based interface. Some recommend that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Interior take a stronger hand in enforcing the requirements of OMB Circular A-16 and Executive Order 12906, which created the FGDC and instigated efforts to create the NSDI. NGAC also recommended a Geographic Information Officer within each federal department or agency, and a geospatial leadership and coordination function in the Executive Office of the President. The Obama Administration issued supplementary guidance to Circular A-16 on November 10, 2010, that could address some of the same of the issues raised in the NRC report, particularly regarding data sharing, coordination, and funding.
The NRC recommended both a federal land parcel coordinator and a national land parcel coordinator. The first would be responsible for federal lands and property; the second would coordinate parcel data from all sources, both public and private lands. A truly national land parcel cadastre would likely require strong partnerships between the federal government and state and local governments. |
crs_R44030 | crs_R44030_0 | As required by the Home Rule Act, the city council must approve a budget within 56 days after receiving a budget proposal from the mayor. The President's FY2016 Budget Request
On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration released its detailed budget request for FY2016. The Administration's proposed budget included $760 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia, including court services, offender supervision and public defender services, which is $80 million more than the District's FY2015 appropriation of $680 million. This included
$274.4 million in support of court operations; $49.9 million for Defender Services; $244.7 million for the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, an independent federal agency responsible for the District's pretrial services, adult probation, and parole supervision functions; $1.9 million for the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council; $40.9 million for the public defender's office; and $565,000 to cover costs associated with investigating judicial misconduct complaints and recommending candidates to the President for vacancies to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Superior Court. The FY2016 budget request included $13.0 billion in total operating expenditures, including enterprise funds, and $1.1 billion in capital outlays. The proposed amendment, if approved by Congress, would have directed the mayor to submit to the President for transmittal to Congress that portion of the budget with respect to special federal payments for its review and approval. In addition, the Council's budget request for FY2016 included provisions intended to advance the principles of home rule. 2995
On July 9, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee approved the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2014, H.R. The bill included $678.0 million in special federal payments to the District. 2 995 would have restricted the use of both District and federal funds for abortion service, except in cases of rape or incest, and where the life of the pregnant woman would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Senate Committee Bill, S. 1910
On July 30, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1 910 , its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2016, with an accompanying report ( S. Rept. As reported, the bill recommended $688.7 million in special federal payments to the District. 114-113)
On September 30, 2015, unable to reach agreement on FY2016 appropriations for the District of Columbia before October 1, 2015, the beginning of 2016 fiscal year, Congress passed and the President signed P.L. 114-53 , an act providing for continuing appropriations from October 1, 2015, to December 11, 2015. The act included a provision that allowed the District to expend local funds for activities and programs included in the District's FY2015 appropriations act at a rate as outlined in the District of Columbia Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21–99). Congress passed two additional continuing resolutions (CRs) that extended the period covered. 114-100 expired on December 22, 2015. On December 18, 2015, Congress approved and the President signed into law P.L. 114-113 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, providing appropriations for the District of Columbia and other programs and activities for the remainder of FY2016. The act included $729.843 million in special federal payments to the District. The mayor's budget request proposal did not include an abortion services provisions. As passed by the House, the bill would
1. repeal the District's Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012 (D.C. Law 19-321); 2. amend the District's Home Rule Act to declare that nothing in it is to be construed as creating a continuing appropriation of the District's General Fund; 3. require federal and District funds be subjected annually to the federal appropriations process; and 4. amend the District of Columbia Code to include provisions that would prohibit the District government from amending, modifying, or repealing provisions in any law, regulation, procedure, or practice relating to the respective roles of the Congress, the President, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Government Accountability Office in the preparation, review, submission, examination, authorization, and appropriation of the budget of the District of Columbia. | On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration released its budget request for FY2016. The Administration's proposed budget included $474 million in special federal payments to the District of Columbia government. An additional $286 million was requested for the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA) and the Public Defender Service, two federally chartered, independent agencies that work exclusively on behalf of the District criminal justice system. The combined budget requests totaled $760 million in special federal payments.
On April 2, 2015, the mayor of the District of Columbia, Muriel Bowser, submitted her proposed budget request for FY2016 to the District of Columbia Council for approval. The budget request included $474 million in special federal payments, $12.9 billion in total operating expenditures and $1.2 billion in capital outlays. The mayor's budget request did not include funding for Court Services and Offender Supervision and the Public Defender Service, which are submitted under a different account. The Council, pursuant to the requirements of the Home Rule Act, had 56 days to review, amend, and approve the District's budget. The approved budget, comprising special federal payments, local sourced operating expenses, and general provisions, was submitted to the President by the mayor on July 8, 2015, for transmittal to Congress for its review and approval.
The mayor's budget request also included provisions that would have granted the District significant autonomy over its budgetary and legislative affairs. Specifically, the act called for the repeal of portions of the District's code governing congressional review of all acts passed by the District of Columbia Council, including referendum and initiatives. The inclusion of budget autonomy provisions in the mayor's request was part of an ongoing campaign by District officials to assert the principle of home rule. The issue of budget autonomy is currently being reviewed by the D.C. Court of Appeals based on a challenge to a 2012 voter-approved referendum amending the city's home rule charter.
On July 9, 2015, the House Appropriations Committee approved the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2016, H.R. 2995. The bill recommended $678.0 million in special federal payments to the District. On July 30, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1910, its version of the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act for FY2016. As reported, the bill recommended $688.7 million in special federal payments to the District.
On September 30, 2015, unable to reach agreement on FY2016 appropriations for the District of Columbia before the beginning of 2016 fiscal year, Congress passed and the President signed P.L. 114-53, an act providing for continuing appropriations from October 1, 2015, to December 11, 2015. The act included a provision that allowed the District to expend local funds for activities and programs included in the District's FY2015 appropriations act at a rate as outlined in the District of Columbia Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21–99). Congress passed two additional continuing resolutions (CRs) that extended the period covered to December 22, 2015.
On December 18, 2015, Congress approved and the President signed into law P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, providing appropriations for the District of Columbia and other programs and activities for the remainder of FY2016. The act included $729.8 million in special federal payments for the District of Columbia. It also included provisions that restrict the use of both District and federal funds for abortion service, except in cases of rape or incest, and where the life of the pregnant woman would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. The act also continued to prohibit the use of federal funds for a needle exchange program. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31634 | crs_RL31634_0 | The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-191 , HIPAA) provided for changes in the health insurance market and imposed certain federal requirements on health insurance plans offered by public and private employers. It guaranteed the availability and renewability of health insurance coverage for certain employees and individuals, and limited the use of preexisting condition restrictions. The Act established federal standards for insurers, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and employer plans, including those who self-insure. However, it allowed states and sometimes insurers substantial state flexibility for compliance with the federal requirements. HIPAA also included tax provisions relating to health insurance. It permitted a limited number of small businesses and self-employed individuals to contribute to tax-advantaged medical savings accounts (MSAs) established in conjunction with high-deductible health insurance plans. It increased the deduction for health insurance that self-employed taxpayers may claim. In addition, it allowed long-term care expenses to be treated like deductible medical expenses and clarified the tax treatment of long-term care insurance. The Act raised the tax deduction for health insurance premiums paid by the self-employed. Finally, the Act included administrative simplification and privacy provisions instructing the Secretary of HHS to issue standards addressing the electronic transmission of health information and the privacy of personally identifiable medical information. Additional federal protections have been added since the passage of HIPAA. The protections required plans that cover newborn delivery to allow for a minimum two-day hospital stay under certain conditions, required plans that offer mental health services to offer them subject to similar limitations as other health benefits, and required plans that cover mastectomy to also cover reconstructive surgery. Does HIPAA help individuals who are uninsured? What is a preexisting medical condition limitation period? How do people take full advantage of the portability provisions of the Act? States have the choice of either enforcing the HIPAA individual market guarantees, referred to as the "federal fallback", or they may establish an "acceptable alternative state mechanism". Do the requirements of the Act apply to association-sponsored group health plans? What regulations have been promulgated to define HIPAA? COBRA Continuation Coverage
How does COBRA continuation coverage29 interact with HIPAA? Other Provisions
In addition to the insurance provisions discussed above, HIPAA includes other provisions affecting health care. | The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-191), provided for changes in the health insurance market. It guaranteed the availability and renewability of health insurance coverage for certain employees and individuals, and limited the use of preexisting condition restrictions. The Act created federal standards for insurers, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and employer-provided health plans, including those that self-insure. It permitted, however, substantial state flexibility for compliance with the requirements on insurers.
HIPAA also included tax provisions relating to health insurance. It permitted a limited number of small businesses and self-employed individuals to contribute to tax-advantaged medical savings accounts (MSAs) established in conjunction with high-deductible health insurance plans. It increased the deduction for health insurance that self-employed taxpayers may claim. In addition, it allowed long-term care expenses to be treated like deductible medical expenses and clarified the tax treatment of long-term care insurance.
Finally, the Act included administrative simplification and privacy provisions instructing the Secretary of HHS to issue standards addressing the electronic transmission of health information and the privacy of personally identifiable medical information.
Since the passage of HIPAA, there have been subsequent amendments. In 1996, new provisions required group health plans and insurers to cover minimum hospital stays for maternity care and for a limited period, to provide parity in certain mental health benefits. Parity was later extended for one year. In 1998, a provision was passed requiring health plans that cover mastectomy to also offer reconstructive breast surgery. Amendments have also increased the tax deduction for premiums paid by self-employed taxpayers.
The Act, as amended, continues to generate numerous questions. What kinds of policies does it cover? Does it help people who are currently uninsured? Does it help people with preexisting medical conditions? How does it affect health insurance premiums? How do its requirements interact with the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) continuation coverage? Answers to those questions, as well as other commonly asked questions, are provided, as well as descriptions of each of the major sections of HIPAA.
Some of the answers provided may not be definitive. This is because, in some cases, final regulations have not yet been promulgated. Other regulations, such as those defining the administrative simplification provisions, remain under development. In addition, the answers to many questions about the requirements on the individual health insurance market depend upon particular state responses to the Act. For some provisions, states were allowed the choice of implementing the HIPAA requirements ("the federal fallback") or establishing acceptable alternative mechanisms. |
crs_R42108 | crs_R42108_0 | Openness is fundamental to representative government. Yet the congressional process is replete with activities and actions that are private and not observable by the public. How to distinguish what might be viewed as reasonable legislative secrecy from impractical transparency is a topic that arouses disagreement on Capitol Hill and elsewhere. Why? Because lawmaking is critical to the governance of the nation. The two are not "either/or" constructs; they overlap constantly during the various policymaking stages. The objectives of this report, then, are four-fold: first, to outline briefly the historical and inherent tension between secrecy and transparency in the congressional process; second, to review several common and recurring secrecy/transparency issues that emerged again with the 2011 formation of the Joint Select Deficit Reduction Committee; third, to identify various lawmaking stages that typically include closed door proceedings; and fourth, to close with several summary observations. | Openness is fundamental to representative government. Yet the congressional process is replete with activities and actions that are private and not observable by the public. How to distinguish reasonable legislative secrecy from impractical transparency is a topic that produces disagreement on Capitol Hill and elsewhere. Why? Because lawmaking is critical to the governance of the nation. Scores of people in the attentive public want to observe and learn about congressional proceedings.
Yet secrecy is an ever-present part of much legislative policymaking; however, secrecy and transparency are not "either/or" constructs. They overlap constantly during the various policymaking stages. The objectives of this report are four-fold:
first, to outline briefly the historical and inherent tension between secrecy and transparency in the congressional process; second, to review several common and recurring secrecy/transparency issues that emerged again with the 2011 formation of the Joint Select Deficit Reduction Committee; third, to identify various lawmaking stages typically imbued with closed door activities; and fourth, to close with several summary observations.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40189 | crs_R40189_0 | Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases—that is, in cases involving illegal searches or seizures. Overview of the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a right "of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." For example, under the general rule, a police officer may not arrest a person unless a judicial magistrate has issued a warrant, based on evidence establishing sufficient probable cause, for that person's arrest. In the Fourth Amendment context, the exclusionary rule requires a trial court to forbid the prosecution's use of evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure. In other cases, the Court has characterized the rule as a "judicially created remedy ... rather than a personal constitutional right." In Leon , the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police officers act with "objectively reasonable reliance" on a search warrant later found to be invalid. On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to apply the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, because it found that the officers' search pursuant to a warrant that failed to list property to be searched was not a "reasonable" mistake. Because the Court limited its opinion in Hudson to knock and announce violations, it was unclear after that case whether the Court would extend the good-faith exception to more serious police errors, such as those involving warrants or warrant exceptions. Herring v. United States
In Herring v. United States , a 2009 case, the Supreme Court for the first time applied the good-faith exception in a case involving police error regarding a warrant. The disagreement in the case centered on whether the exclusionary rule should apply to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the violation. Quoting Hudson v. Michigan , the Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is a "'last resort'" rather than a "necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation." In addition to broadening the good-faith exception, the Herring decision appears to further the trend toward interpreting the exclusionary rule as lacking constitutional status. | The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides a right against "unreasonable searches and seizures." To deter the federal and state governments from violating this right, courts have developed an "exclusionary rule," which requires that evidence obtained as a result of an invalid search or seizure be excluded from use at trial.
The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule in several cases since the late 1970s. In United States v. Leon, the Court created the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The good-faith exception applies when officers conduct a search or seizure with "objectively reasonable reliance" on, for example, a warrant that is not obviously invalid but that a judicial magistrate should not have signed.
Until a 2006 case, Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court had applied the good-faith exception only in cases in which the error creating the constitutional violation was caused by judicial or legislative actors, rather than by the police themselves. In Hudson, the Court applied the exception to a case in which police officers had violated the "knock and announce" rule by entering a home without waiting a sufficient period of time.
In Herring v. United States, a 2009 decision, the Supreme Court for the first time applied the good-faith exception to bar application of the exclusionary rule in a case involving police error regarding a warrant. A police officer in the case mistakenly identified an arrest warrant for the defendant. The Court held that evidence discovered after the subsequent arrest was admissible at trial because the officer's error was not "deliberate" and the officers involved were not "culpable."
In future cases, courts will apply the Herring "deliberate and culpable" test to determine whether to admit evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure which is unconstitutional as a consequence of police error. A second impact of the Herring decision is a weaker constitutional footing for the exclusionary rule. Whereas judicially-created remedies have gained "constitutional status" in the context of some other constitutional rights, it appears that the exclusionary rule lacks such a grounding under the Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. |
crs_RL32357 | crs_RL32357_0 | Summary
To summarize, the Director of OMB is authorized to oversee the development of, and ensure compliance with, policies, principles, standards and guidelines governing the security of all federal computer systems, except for national security computer systems. Introduction
This report provides a short summary of selected federal laws, executive orders, and presidential directives, currently in force, that govern computer security. In general, the federal government does not regulate the security of non-government computer systems (other than those used by contractors for the federal government). However, the federal government does require certain information held on non-government systems to be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure. Another role the federal government plays in computer systems security is to investigate and prosecute federal computer crimes. The federal government also offers assistance to state and local law enforcement entities in their investigation and prosecution of computer activities made illegal at the state level. 104-106 , Division E), the Federal Information Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. FISMA authorizes the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop security standards and guidelines for systems used by the federal government. It authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to choose which of these standards and guidelines to promulgate. The roles and responsibilities for securing national security systems are outlined in National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42) , signed July 5, 1990 by President George H. W. Bush. NSD-42 establishes the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee, now called the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS). Among the authorities granted the National Manager are: examine U.S. Government national security systems and evaluate their vulnerability to foreign interception and exploitation; conduct, approve, or endorse research and development of security techniques and equipment; review and approve all security related standards, techniques, systems, and equipment for national security systems; assess the overall security posture of and disseminate information on threats to and vulnerabilities of national security systems; operate a central technical center to evaluate and certify national security systems; prescribe minimum standards, methods, and procedures for protecting national security systems; annually review and assess the national security systems programs and budgets of department and agencies, individually and in the aggregate, and recommend alternatives to the Executive Agent; and, enter into agreements for the procurement of technical security materials and equipment and their provision to executive departments and agencies, and when appropriate, to government contractors and foreign governments. To date, this includes financial information and medical information. There is also a federal requirement that certain firms that register with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) must include in the financial reports an assessment of their internal financial controls. Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( P.L. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 , ( P.L. Besides these privacy-oriented rules, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ( P.L. 63, the Bush Administration's Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. Research and Development and Developing Information Security Expertise
The federal government has a number of programs aimed at developing computer security expertise. While inheriting the NCS and its responsibilities in the area of the NCS and telecommunications, the primary role of the Department of Homeland Security is to work with the private sector, state and local governments, and the public to protect the nation's information infrastructure (i.e. Issues
However, at least three issues have arisen concerning these roles and responsibilities: 1) the role the federal government in regulating the nation's privately owned and operated critical information infrastructure; 2) the relative roles of the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency in setting policy and standards for computer and telecommunication systems handling critical infrastructure information; and, 3) the relative roles of the National Cyber Security Division and the National Communication System in setting policy and standards for dealing with the private sector. | This report provides a short summary of selected federal laws, executive orders, and presidential directives, currently in force, that govern computer security. The report focuses on the major roles and responsibilities assigned various federal agencies in the area of computer security. This report will not be updated.
One major area of federal activity in computer security deals with securing federal computer systems. The roles and responsibilities for securing federal computer systems are split between national security systems and all other federal systems. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 authorizes the Director of the Office and Management and Budget to oversee the development of, and compliance with, security standards and guidelines, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce. These authorities, however, do not apply to computer systems considered to be national security systems. The roles and responsibilities for securing national security systems are established by National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42). NSD-42 establishes what is now called the Committee on National Security Systems, which it authorizes to develop, and require compliance with, standards and guidelines for national security systems.
In general, the federal government does not regulate the security of non-government computer systems. However, the federal government does require certain information held on non-government systems to be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure, primarily out of privacy considerations. To date, this has been limited to financial information (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) and medical information (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996). A number of regulatory agencies have authority for developing and enforcing standards for financial information. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has authority to develop and enforce standards for medical information. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires certain companies to certify the accuracy of their internal financial controls. The Security Exchange Commission has authority to develop standards and enforce these regulations.
Although it currently has a limited role in securing the nation's overall information infrastructure, the federal government does, through the Department of Homeland Security, work with and encourage the private sector, state and local government, academia, and the general public to protect the nation's information infrastructure. This role is authorized in a generic sense for all critical infrastructure by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. It is also reinforced more specifically in Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7 and the National Strategy for Securing Cyberspace. To date, these activities are voluntary for non-federal entities.
Other roles established for the federal government include: investigation and prosecution of federal computer crimes; assisting state and local law enforcement entities in their investigation and prosecutions; and, developing the nation's expertise in information security. |
crs_R40489 | crs_R40489_0 | Introduction
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates the Nation's largest health care delivery system with about 222,000 employees supporting its mission. It is also the largest provider of health care education and training for medical residents and other health care trainees in the United States. In FY2008, VHA provided medical care to approximately 5.6 million unique patients and spent approximately $43.5 billion for medical care and research. A coalition of veterans' service organizations (VSOs) has been calling on Congress to provide VHA with a budget which is "sufficient, timely, and predictable." They have asserted that VHA has underestimated its budget in the past. Congress has generally not enacted the VA budget by the beginning of the fiscal year. According VSOs, these delays in the enactment of the budget have exacerbated operational challenges—such as delaying capital expenditures, delaying recruitment, restricting acquisitions, limiting maintenance—faced by VHA network directors. To mitigate these issues, VSO's have proposed that Congress change the funding process for VHA to an advance appropriation. In the 111 th Congress, the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 ( H.R. 1016 and a companion version S. 423 ) has been introduced. Under H.R. 1016 and S. 423 , the following accounts that fund VHA—medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities (see description of these accounts below)—would be funded as an advance appropriation beginning with FY2011. The funding would be under a discretionary budget authority, and the legislation calls for a study by the Comptroller General (that is, the Government Accountability Office) on the adequacy and accuracy of the budget projections based on VHA's Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (see a discussion of the model below). Usually, an appropriations act makes budget authority available beginning on October 1 of the fiscal year (FY) for which the appropriations act is passed ("budget year"). However, there are three types of appropriations that don't follow this pattern. An advance appropriation means appropriation of new budget authority that becomes available one or more fiscal years beyond the fiscal year for which the appropriations act was passed (that is beyond the budget year). Under the current scoring guidelines, new budget authority for an advance appropriation is scored in the fiscal year in which the funds become available for obligation. Advance Appropriation-Related Issues for Congress
There are two broad issues related to advance funding for some accounts of VHA. Budget Enforcement Issue
An advance appropriation mechanism may not be able to insulate a program from budget enforcement and competition with other programs. | The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates the Nation's largest health care delivery system, with about 222,000 employees supporting its mission. It is also the largest provider of health care education and training for medical residents and other health care trainees in the United States. In FY2008, VHA provided medical care to approximately 5.6 million unique patients and spent approximately $43.5 billion for medical care and research.
A coalition of veterans' service organizations (VSOs) has been calling on Congress to provide VHA with a budget which is "sufficient, timely, and predictable." These organizations have asserted that VHA has underestimated its budget in the past. Moreover, VSOs contend that Congress has not enacted the VA budget by the beginning of the fiscal year. According to these organizations the delays in the enactment of the budget have exacerbated operational challenges—such as, differing capital expenditures, delaying recruitment, restricting acquisitions, limiting maintenance—faced by VHA network directors. To mitigate these issues VSO's have proposed that Congress change the funding process for VHA to an advance appropriation.
In general, an appropriations act makes budget authority available beginning on October 1 of the fiscal year (FY) for which the appropriations act is passed ("budget year"). However, there are some types of appropriations that don't follow this pattern; among them are advance appropriations. An advance appropriation means appropriation of new budget authority that becomes available one or more fiscal years beyond the fiscal year for which the appropriations act was passed (that is, beyond the budget year). Under the current scoring guidelines (estimating the budgetary effects of pending legislation and comparing them to the budget resolution or to any limits that may be set in law), new budget authority for an advance appropriation is scored in the fiscal year in which the funds become available for obligation.
In the 111th Congress, the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (H.R. 1016 and a companion version S. 423) has been introduced. Under H.R. 1016 and S. 423, the following accounts that fund VHA—medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities—would be funded as an advance appropriation beginning with FY2011. The funding would be under a discretionary budget authority, and the legislation calls for a study by the Comptroller General (of the Government Accountability Office) on the adequacy and accuracy of the budget projections based on VHA's Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM).
There are two broad sets of issues related to advance funding for some accounts of VHA: budget enforcement issues and implementation issues. Among budget enforcement issues a key issue is that an advance appropriation mechanism may not be able to insulate a program from budget enforcement and competition with other programs. Among implementation issues a key issue is that funding VHA under an advance appropriation, based on the EHCPM, could create budget shortfalls if there are unanticipated developments affecting the EHCPM.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33010 | crs_RL33010_0 | While developments in the Middle East and Europe will continue to demand the attention of the United States and others, the potential for conflict in the Indo-Pacific region positions Australia in an increasingly strategic corner of the globe. The Trump Administration and Australia
The U.S.-Australia relationship began on a difficult note under President Trump, who described his first call with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, one of his first as President, as "the worst call by far," according to media reports. Ours is a formal alliance, and the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 is the cornerstone of our longstanding relationship. The two sides reaffirmed the "strong state of bilateral defense and security cooperation ... bolstered by more than a decade of operations together" in Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently through the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State. Australia is one of those countries. In response to a question related to the Japanese foreign minister's proposal for a new strategic dialogue between India, the United States, Japan, and Australia, U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells stated,
The quadrilateral that the Japanese foreign minister discussed would be building on what has been a very productive trilateral that we have with India and Japan, and if you look at the largest military exercise that we do, Malabar, Japan is a part of that exercise. In discussing the Force Posture Agreement, which has a 25-year time frame, the 2014 AUSMIN Joint Communiqué stated that it "demonstrates the United States' strong commitment to the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions." The Head of State is the ruling monarch of the United Kingdom, who is represented by the Governor General in Australia. The Liberal-National Party Coalition and the Labor Party are the two main political forces in Australia. Since the 2016 election, Labor Party Leader Bill Shorten has strengthened his political position. His electorate voted "Yes" in favor of same-sex marriage. At the outbreak of World War II, the Territory of New Guinea was a League of Nations Mandate of Australia while the Territory of Papua was under the direct authority of the Commonwealth of Australia. Former Prime Minister John Howard invoked the ANZUS alliance to come to the assistance of the United States by sending Australian troops to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australia and the United States also share a deep and broad-based intelligence relationship. Australia's Strategic Outlook
The shift in the geostrategic dynamics of Asia and relative decline of U.S. power brought on by the rise of China is leading Australia to explore multilateral as well as other bilateral security relationships. While the United States remains Australia's key strategic partner, Australia maintains other traditional security relationships, such as with New Zealand and the nations of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Australia, under the United Nations, played a key role in assisting Timor-Leste to become an independent nation. It has been reported that as many as 200 Indonesians are believed to have joined IS forces in Syria and Iraq. Australia has particular concern with terrorism in Indonesia due to past attacks against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 as well as attacks which killed Australians in Bali, Indonesia, in 2002 and 2005. China
Australia's political leadership does not see Australia's economic relationship with China, which has been its largest trading partner since 2009, and its strategic relationship with the United States as incompatible. Other former government officials, such as Australia's former Ambassador to China Stephen FitzGerald have also come out in opposition to Australia's very close relationship with the United States and more supportive of close relations with China. There is also unease in some policy circles in Australia with China's increasingly assertive posture in the region. In the view of one Australian observer, Abe's address was a strategic landmark "which illuminates how Japan and Australia are leading the creation of a regional coalition to hedge against China, with—but also without—the United States." Australia has led peace-keeping efforts in the region, including in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, indicating Australia's resolve to promote stability in the South Pacific. There is concern that dozens of Australians, and others from Southeast Asia, who have gone to fight with the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq may lead to future threats to Australia and Australians abroad. In November 2017, Australia, along with the other members of the Trans Pacific Partnership TPP-11 group, agreed to "core elements" as they continue to work towards a new free trade agreement. President Trump withdrew from the TPP agreement in January 2017. | The Commonwealth of Australia and the United States enjoy a close alliance relationship. Australia shares many cultural traditions and values with the United States and has been a treaty ally since the signing of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty in 1951. Australia made major contributions to the allied cause in the First and Second World Wars, and the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Australia is also a close intelligence partner through the "Five Eyes" group of nations. U.S. Marines are conducting rotational deployments in northern Australia. This initiative and others demonstrate the closeness of the relationship. A traditional cornerstone of Australia's strategic outlook is the view that the United States is Australia's most important strategic partner and is a key source of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Australian decision-makers have also believed that Australia does not have to choose between the United States and China. Some former Australian political leaders and former government officials, as well as media reports, have expressed concern about where Australia's relationship with the United States may be headed under the Trump Administration.
While Australia has a complex array of international relations, its geopolitical context is to a large extent defined by its economic relationship with China and its strategic relationship with the United States. Australia's political leadership generally believes it can have constructive trade relations with China while maintaining its close strategic alliance relationship with the United States. However, shifts in the geostrategic dynamics of Asia are leading regional states such as Australia to hedge, increasingly with other Asian states, against the relative decline of U.S. engagement in the region. This is one interpretation of what is behind the recent strengthening of ties between Australia and Japan, India, and other states in Asia. Australia also plays a key role in promoting regional stability in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and has led peacekeeping efforts in the Asia-Pacific, including in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands.
Under the former Liberal Party government of John Howard, Australia invoked the ANZUS treaty to offer assistance to the United States after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in which 22 Australians were among those killed. Australia was one of the first countries to commit troops to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Terrorist attacks on Australians in Indonesia in the 2000s also led Australia to share many of the United States' concerns in the struggle against Islamist militancy in Southeast Asia and beyond. Australia is part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State (IS). There are continuing concerns in Australia about domestic Islamist terrorist threats, including from "lone wolf" attacks. Dozens of Australian citizens are believed to have gone to the Middle East to fight for the Islamic State.
Australia's trade relationship with China has been a key source of economic growth. However, there is an ongoing debate in Australia on where the Australian economy is headed, as China's economic growth slows. Australia, which has free trade agreements with the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China, was part of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, from which President Trump withdrew the United States in January 2017.
Australia currently has a coalition government led by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull of the Liberal Party. The domestic political scene in Australia has been dominated by controversy surrounding the dual-citizenship of Members of Parliament (MPs) and the gay marriage plebescite. Two Liberal-National Coalition Members, former Deputy Prime Minister and National Party Leader Barnaby Joyce and Liberal MP John Alexander, have had to resign due to the dual-citizenship controversy. They seek reelection in by-elections in December 2017. In November 2017, approximately 62% of Australians responding to a mail-in survey voted "Yes" in support of same-sex marriage, which opens the way for implementing legislation in parliament. |
crs_R40479 | crs_R40479_0 | Bosnian Croat nationalists threatened to secede if Bosnia remained in Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serb leaders warned that international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina would lead to civil war. A U.N.-appointed Office of the High Representative (OHR), created by the Dayton accords, oversees civilian peace implementation efforts. Indeed, some observers believe that RS President Milorad Dodik's strategy has been to obstruct the functioning of Bosnian institutions so much that the Bosniaks, Croats, and the international community will eventually agree to let the Republika Srpska become independent. The other entity within Bosnia, the Federation, has also been plagued with political divisions. The PIC has agreed to close OHR after five objectives have been met. The move appeared to be part of some countries' efforts to try to consolidate and strengthen the role of the EU in Bosnia and limit that of the OHR. In June 2011, OHR lifted almost all the bans from holding office that previous High Representatives had imposed on Bosnian politicians for violations of the Dayton Peace Accords. Possible NATO and EU Membership for Bosnia
As direct control has declined, the international community encourages reform in Bosnia by providing aid, advice, and the eventual prospect of joining NATO and the EU. In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers agreed to permit Bosnia to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, a key stepping-stone to membership for NATO aspirants. However, the ministers stressed that NATO will not accept Bosnia's Annual National Plan under the program until the entities agree to the registration of defense installations as the property of the central government. Although it has called for Bosnia to solve the Sejdic-Finci problem and develop an effective coordination mechanism among its levels of government, the EU has not made deeper constitutional reforms to improve the effectiveness of Bosnia's governing institutions a condition for EU membership candidacy. However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in recent years. The Obama Administration has touted the close working relationship it has maintained with the EU on Bosnia as a key success of its policy. According to the USAID "Greenbook," the United States provided just under $2 billion in aid to Bosnia between FY1993 and FY2010. U.S. aid to Bosnia has continued to decline in recent years, but less sharply than U.S. aid to other countries in the region. For FY2013, the Administration has requested $28.556 million in aid for political and economic reforms from the Economic Support Fund account, $6.735 million in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (INCLE), $4.5 million in FMF, $1 million in IMET aid, and $4.75 million in NADR funding. The United States and other Western countries may feel that they owe the Bosniaks a lingering moral debt, due to the perceived indecision and tardiness of the international community in averting or ending the 1992-1995 war, in which the Bosniaks were the main victims. | In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community's efforts over the past 17 years to stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina are failing. Milorad Dodik, president of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous "entities" within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to make Bosnia's central government more effective. He has repeatedly asserted the RS's right to secede from Bosnia, although he has so far refrained from trying to make this threat a reality. Some ethnic Croat leaders in Bosnia have called for more autonomy for Croats within Bosnia, perhaps threatening a further fragmentation of the country.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. It has the power to fire Bosnian officials and impose laws, if need be, to enforce the Dayton Accords. However, the international community has proved unwilling in recent years to back the High Representative in using these powers boldly, fearing a backlash among Bosnian Serb leaders. As a result, OHR has become increasingly ineffective, according to many observers. The international community has vowed to close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of five objectives and two conditions.
The EU's main inducement to enlist the cooperation of Bosnian leaders—the prospect of eventual EU membership—has so far proved insufficient. The prospect of NATO membership has also had little effect. In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers agreed to permit Bosnia to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, a key stepping-stone to membership for NATO. However, the ministers stressed that NATO will not accept Bosnia's Annual National Plan under the program until the entities agree to the registration of defense installations as the property of the central government. Dodik has rejected doing so for installations on RS territory.
The U.S. political role in the country appears to have declined in recent years as the EU role has increased. The Obama Administration has stressed the importance of maintaining a close partnership with the EU in dealing with Bosnia. Like the EU, the United States has urged Bosnian politicians to agree among themselves to constitutional and other reforms to make Bosnia's government institutions more effective and better coordinated, so that the country can become a better candidate for eventual NATO and EU membership.
The United States provided just over $2 billion in aid to Bosnia from the country's independence through FY2012. Aid to Bosnia has declined in recent years. For FY2013, the Administration requested $28.556 million in aid for political and economic reforms in Bosnia from the Economic Support Fund, $6.735 million in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (INCLE), $4.5 million in FMF, $1 million in IMET aid, and $4.75 million in NADR funding. |
crs_R40909 | crs_R40909_0 | Political and Economic Situation
On November 29, 2009, Senator José "Pepe" Mujica of the ruling center-left Broad Front (FA) coalition was elected president of Uruguay in a second-round runoff vote. In legislative elections held concurrently with the October 25, 2009, first-round vote, the FA retained its majorities in both houses of the Uruguayan Congress. The new legislature and President are to be inaugurated to their respective five-year terms on February 15 and March 1, 2010. Mujica will replace popular incumbent President Tabaré Vázquez, who was constitutionally ineligible to run for a second consecutive term. By winning the presidency and securing FA majorities in both houses of the Uruguayan Congress, Vázquez ended 170 years of political domination by the National (PN) and Colorado (PC) parties and ushered in the country's first left-leaning government. Throughout his term, President Vázquez has followed the moderate social democratic paths of the left-of-center governments of Brazil and Chile, advancing market-oriented economic policies while instituting social welfare programs intended to reduce poverty and inequality. The Vázquez Administration's economic and social welfare policies, along with the recent boom in commodity prices—which significantly affect Uruguay's primarily agricultural economy —have contributed to several years of strong economic growth and considerable reductions in poverty. Human Rights
Vázquez and the FA have done much to address Uruguay's dictatorship-era (1973-1985) human rights violations, which had been largely ignored by other administrations. Mujica defeated former President Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-1995) of the center-right PN, 53% to 43%. U.S.-Uruguay Relations
Uruguay enjoys friendly relations with the United States, though it traditionally has had closer ties to Europe (the origin of the vast majority of the population) and its South American neighbors. Ties between Uruguay and the United States have increased in recent years, especially since the administration of Jorge Batlle (2000-2005), which closely aligned itself with the United States. Likewise, the Vázquez Administration has sought to strengthen ties with the United States in order to diversify its trade relations and reduce its economic reliance on Argentina and Brazil, which played a significant role in the country's 1999-2002 recession. The joint commission has provided the means for ongoing U.S.-Uruguay trade discussions, which led to the signing of a bilateral investment treaty in October 2004 and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in January 2007. On September 14, 2009, the ATPDEA Expansion and Extension Act of 2009 ( S. 1665 , Lugar) was introduced in the Senate. Among other provisions, the bill would amend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210 ) to provide unilateral trade preferences to Uruguay. Under the bill, certain Uruguayan products, such as wool-based textiles, would be eligible to receive duty-free or reduced tariff treatment until December 31, 2012. | On November 29, 2009, Senator José "Pepe" Mujica of the ruling center-left Broad Front coalition was elected president of Uruguay, a relatively economically developed and politically stable South American country of 3.5 million people. Mujica, a former leader of the leftist Tupamaro urban guerilla movement that fought against the Uruguayan government in the 1960s and 1970s, defeated former President Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-1995) of the center-right National Party in the country's sixth consecutive democratic election since its 12-year dictatorship ended in 1985. Mujica was forced to contest a runoff after he failed to win an absolute majority of the vote in the October 2009 first-round election. In legislative elections held concurrently with the first-round vote, the Broad Front retained its majorities in both houses of the Uruguayan Congress. The new legislature and President are to be inaugurated to their respective five-year terms on February 15 and March 1, 2010.
Mujica will replace popular incumbent President Tabaré Vázquez, who was constitutionally ineligible to run for a second consecutive term. Vázquez's 2004 victory ended 170 years of political domination by the National and Colorado parties. Throughout his term, Vázquez has followed the moderate social democratic paths of the left-of-center governments of Brazil and Chile, advancing market-oriented economic policies while instituting social welfare programs intended to reduce poverty and inequality. The Vázquez Administration's policies appear to have been reasonably successful, as they—along with a boom in global commodity prices—have contributed to several years of strong economic growth and considerable reductions in poverty. Beyond economic and social welfare policy, Vázquez has done much to address Uruguay's dictatorship-era human rights violations and expand rights to the country's homosexual population.
Uruguay has enjoyed friendly relations with the United States since its transition back to democracy, though it traditionally has had closer ties to Europe and its South American neighbors, Argentina and Brazil. Commercial ties between Uruguay and the United States have expanded substantially in recent years, with the countries signing a bilateral investment treaty in 2004 and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in January 2007. The United States and Uruguay have also cooperated on military matters, with both countries playing significant roles in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Relations are likely to remain close in the coming years as the Obama Administration and President-elect Mujica have announced their mutual desire to further strengthen bilateral ties.
On September 14, 2009, the ATPDEA Expansion and Extension Act of 2009 (S. 1665, Lugar) was introduced in the Senate. Among other provisions, the bill would amend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210) to provide unilateral trade preferences to Uruguay. Under the bill, certain Uruguayan products, such as wool-based textiles, would be eligible to receive duty-free or reduced tariff treatment until December 31, 2012.
This report examines recent political and economic developments in Uruguay as well as issues in U.S.-Uruguayan relations. |
crs_R41463 | crs_R41463_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). It also specifies, for the 110 th Congress (January 2007-January 2009), all nominations to full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions that have such positions (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Election Assistance Commission). Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of the end of the 110 th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. Three distinct stages mark the appointment process: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. Positions on most boards and commissions, however, are not covered by this act. Appointments During the 110th Congress
During the 110 th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted nominations to the Senate for 74 of the 152 full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other boards and commissions. (Most of the remaining positions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 88 nominations were submitted for these positions, of which 46 were confirmed, 15 were withdrawn, and 27 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions because the President submitted multiple nominations for some positions. In some cases, for example, the President submitted one nomination for the end of a term in progress and a second nomination of the same person to the same position for the succeeding term. In other cases, the President submitted a second nomination after his first choice failed to be confirmed. The President also submitted an "extra" nomination of the one individual to whom he had given a recess appointment in order to comply with a law affecting the payment of that appointee (see " Recess Appointments ," above). At the end of the Congress, 15 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 22 vacancies among the 152 positions. These changes may reduce the comparability of statistics provided in this report with those provided in earlier reports. More information on this change in methodology is available in Appendix D .
Organization of the Report
Board and Commission Profiles
Each of the 34 board or commission profiles following the narrative portion of this report is organized into three parts: a paragraph discussing the body's organizational structure, a table identifying its membership as of the end of the 110 th Congress, and a table listing nominations and appointments to its positions during the 110 th Congress. The organizational sections discuss the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. All five members are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and serve four-year terms. Appendix B. Senate Recesses and Presidential Recess Appointments
Appendix C. Board/Commission Abbreviations
Appendix D. Change in Methodology from Previous Tracking Reports
The calculations of nomination-to-confirmation intervals provided in this report counted all the days within the interval, including those during summer recesses and between sessions of the Senate. The inclusion of all days differs from the methodology used in similar CRS reports for previous Congresses. | The President makes appointments, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to some 152 full-time leadership positions on 34 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. This appointment process consists of three distinct stages: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. These advice and consent positions can also temporarily be filled by the President alone through a recess appointment. Membership positions on this set of collegial bodies often have fixed terms, and incumbents are often protected from arbitrary removal by the President. The enabling statutes for most of these boards and commissions require political party balance in their membership.
During the 110th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted nominations to the Senate for 74 of these 152 positions. (Most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 88 nominations were submitted, of which 46 were confirmed, 15 were withdrawn, and 27 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions because the President submitted multiple nominations for some positions. In some cases the President submitted one nomination for the end of a term in progress and a second nomination of the same person to the same position for the succeeding term. In other cases, the President submitted a second nomination after his first choice failed to be confirmed. President Bush made one recess appointment to a board covered by this report during the 110th Congress, and he submitted an "extra" nomination of that individual in order to comply with a law affecting the payment of that appointee. At the end of the 110th Congress, 15 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 22 vacancies among the 152 positions.
This report specifies, for the 110th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of the end of the 110th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. The organizational section discusses the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. Membership and appointment activity are provided in tabular form. The report also includes tables summarizing the collective appointment activity for all 34 bodies, and identifying Senate recesses during the 110th Congress.
The calculations of nomination-to-confirmation intervals provided in this report counted all the days within the interval, including those during summer recesses and between sessions of the Senate. The inclusion of all days differs from the methodology used in similar CRS reports for previous Congresses. The new methodology takes into consideration changes in Senate adjournment practices and is consistent with published research in this area. This change may reduce the comparability of statistics in this report with those of the earlier research.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 edition of United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (more commonly known as the "Plum Book").
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31011 | crs_RL31011_0 | Key Policy Staff
Most Recent Developments
On December 20, 2001, Congress cleared for the President's signature a$15.35 billion Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 ( H.R. President Bush signed the measure on January 10, 2002 ( P.L. 107-115 ). This marks one of the few occasionswhen Congress has approved more spending for Foreign Operations than sought bythe Administration. The amount is about $400 million, or 2.7% higher than forFY2001 (excluding the $1.1 billion for Foreign Operations programs allocated fromthe terrorism emergency supplemental measure; P.L. Highlights of theenacted bill include: $779 million for the Export-Import Bank, nearly $100 millionmore than requested; $475 million for HIV/AIDS, up from the $429 million proposal;and $625 million for the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative, a cut of $106 millionfrom the request. Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislativevehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistancebudget and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. The amended Foreign Operations FY2002 request stands at$15.167 billion, an amount 1.5% higher than enacted FY2001 appropriations. (3) Incontrast, foreign policy resources for State Department, U.N. assessed contributions,and other non-foreign aid activities in the Commerce, Justice, and State Departmentsappropriation bill would increase by 13.2% from FY2001 in nominal terms. Although the overall FY2002 Foreign Operations proposed increase was relatively small -- $224 million, or 1.5% -- some activities funded in FY2001 eitherdid not need new appropriations or would require smaller resources in FY2002,thereby freeing up funds for other initiatives. After revising the FY2001 base amount to reflect these reduced fundingrequirements that did not alter current policy, the request represented a somewhathigher increase for Foreign Operations -- $698 million, or 4.8% more, in nominalterms. The FY2002 Foreign Operations request set most accounts at or near FY2001 funding levels, while largely concentrating proposals to increase spending in a fewareas:
Disaster aid would grow by 22% to $200 million. Likewise, the budget submission recommended cutting appropriations significantly in two accounts, only the first of which represented a policy shift:
Export-Import Bank funds would drop by 24.5% to $687 million. 107-38 . Leading Foreign Aid Recipients Proposed for FY2002
Except in one area, the FY2002 budget requested few changes in the list of top U.S. foreign aid recipients. Israel, Egypt, and Jordan remained, as they have for anumber of years, the leading recipients. Due to the Administration's AndeanCounterdrug Initiative, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia would be among the leading 12recipients of U.S. aid. U.S. As enacted, the $15.35 billion appropriation is roughly midway between levels passed earlier by the House ($15.17 billion) and the Senate ($15.52 billion), and $178million higher than requested by the President. 2506 and $20 million from the FY2001appropriation. Family Planning and Abortion Restrictions. Andean Counterdrug Initiative. Debt Reduction: Initiatives for the Most Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking generally. It contains the largest share -- over two-thirds -- of total U.S. internationalaffairs spending.
President Bush requested $15.167 billion for FY2002 Foreign Operations, an amount 1.5% higher than enacted FY2001 appropriations. By comparison, foreign policy resources proposed forState Department, U.N. contributions, and other non-foreign aid activities would increase by 13.2%from FY2001, in nominal terms. Although the overall FY2002 Foreign Operations proposedincrease was relatively small -- $224 million -- some activities funded in FY2001 would either notneed new appropriations or would require smaller resources in FY2002, thereby freeing up funds forother initiatives. After adjusting the FY2001 base amount to reflect these reduced fundingrequirements that did not alter current policy, the request represented a higher increase for ForeignOperations -- $698 million, or 4.8% more, in nominal terms.
The FY2002 Foreign Operations request set most accounts at or near FY2001 funding levels, while largely concentrating proposals to increase spending in a few areas -- disaster aid, globalhealth, international narcotics control, and contributions to the World Bank and other internationalfinancial institutions. Likewise, the budget submission recommended cutting appropriationssignificantly in two accounts -- debt reduction resources for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country(HIPC) initiative and the Export-Import Bank - but only the latter represented a policy shift.
Except in one area, the FY2002 budget request represented few changes in the list of top U.S. foreign aid recipients. Israel, Egypt, and Jordan remained the leading recipients. The mostsignificant change was the increase in aid for Latin American drug producing nations. Under theAdministration's Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia would be among theleading 10 recipients of U.S. aid.
Following nearly six months of debate, Congress cleared for the President on December 20, 2001, a $15.35 billion Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 ( P.L. 107-115 ; H.R. 2506 ). The measure is roughly midway between levels passed earlier by the House($15.17 billion) and the Senate ($15.52 billion), and $178 million higher than requested by thePresident. This marks one of the few occasions when Congress has approved more spending forForeign Operations than sought by the Administration. The amount is about $400 million, or 2.7%higher than for FY2001 (excluding the $1.1 billion for Foreign Operations programs allocated fromthe terrorism emergency supplemental measure; P.L. 107-38 ). Highlights of the bill include: $779million for the Export-Import Bank, nearly $100 million more than requested; $475 million forHIV/AIDS, up from the $429 million proposal; and $625 million for the Andean CounternarcoticsInitiative, a cut of $106 million from the request. The enacted measure drops Senate-passedlanguage overturning the President's international family planning restrictions, but approved fundinglevels for population aid and UNFPA near the higher Senate-passed amounts. |
crs_R43128 | crs_R43128_0 | Oil spills involving oil-sands-derived crude oils have generated interest from policymakers and a variety of stakeholders. Several oil spills, including both the 2010 Enbridge pipeline spill in Michigan and the 2013 ExxonMobil pipeline spill in Arkansas, involved this material. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) provides an immediate source of federal funding to respond to oil spills in a timely manner. The monies from the OSLTF can be used to respond to a wide variety of oil types, including oil-sands-derived crude oils. The OSLTF is financed primarily by a per-barrel tax on domestic crude oil and imported crude oil and petroleum products. In 2017, the tax increased from 8 cents to 9 cents per barrel. The Obama Administration's budget proposals in recent years called for statutory changes that would have subjected oil sands to the per-barrel tax. In 2005, the United States imported approximately 217 million barrels of oil-sands-derived crude oils from Canada. In 2015, that figure increased to 587 million barrels, accounting for approximately 22% of crude oil imports from all nations. Uses of the Fund
Pursuant to OPA Section 1012, the trust fund may be used for several specific purposes:
Payment of removal costs, including monitoring removal actions, by federal authorities or state officials; Payment of the costs incurred by the federal and state trustees of natural resources for assessing the injuries to natural resources caused by an oil spill and developing and implementing the plans to restore or replace the injured natural resources; Payment of removal costs related to a discharge from a foreign offshore unit; Payment of parties' claims for uncompensated removal costs and for uncompensated damages; Payment of federal administrative and operational costs, including research and development; and Payment of loans to provide interim assistance to fishermen and aquaculture claimants impacted by an oil spill. Until 2008, the OSLTF tax provisions (26 U.S.C. The 2011 IRS interpretation is based on language from a 1980 House Committee on Ways and Means report leading to the passage of CERCLA, which stated that "the term crude oil does not include synthetic petroleum, e.g., shale oil, liquids from coal, tar sands, or biomass, or refined oil." Implications of the Different Scopes
Based on the statutory definitions above and the committee report language, oil-sands-derived crude oil likely meets the OPA definition of "oil" but would not meet the definition of crude oil in the context of the OSLTF excise tax. This difference raises several issues. Perhaps the foremost issue is one of equity. Policymakers may consider whether there is a rationale for exempting certain types of crude oils from the excise tax. At present, it is unclear to what degree importers of oil-sands-derived crude oils are paying the OSLTF excise tax. Assuming most importers are not paying the OSLTF excise tax for imported oil sands, the difference in scope could lead to situations in which expenditures from the trust fund are used to clean up spilled oil that was not subject to the tax supporting the trust fund. The OSLTF arguably plays a backup role in terms of response funding during many oil spills. Although the trust fund is available to support oil spill cleanup efforts, the responsible party for an oil spill often provides the primary source of response (i.e., cleanup) funding. Thus, the financial impact to the trust fund could be minimal if the majority of its payments are reimbursed by the responsible parties. Therefore, if a party's liability limit remains valid, the OSLTF could effectively pay—up to a per-incident cap of $1 billion—for response costs and applicable damages above a responsible party's liability limit. Over the last five fiscal years, this tax has generated, on average, $493 million per year. §§4611-4612) to explicitly include oil-sands-derived crude oils, the tax revenue supporting the OSLTF would likely increase. The below estimate assumes that 100% of the imports of Canadian oil sands crude oils are currently not contributing to the excise tax. Section 5 of S. 953 would permanently extend the per-barrel financing rate and amend the definition of crude oil to include "any bitumen or bituminous mixture, and any oil derived from a bitumen or bituminous mixture." 114th Congress
Several Members proposed legislation that would have specifically included oil-sands-derived crude oils within the scope of the per-barrel tax. | In 2005, the United States imported approximately 217 million barrels of oil-sands-derived crude oils from Canada. In 2015, that figure increased to 587 million barrels, accounting for approximately 22% of crude oil imports from all nations. Pipeline oil spills, including the 2010 Enbridge spill in Michigan and the 2013 ExxonMobil spill in Arkansas, involved this material and generated interest from policymakers and a variety of stakeholders.
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) provides an immediate source of federal funding to respond to oil spills in a timely manner. Monies from the OSLTF can be used to respond to a wide variety of oil types, including oil-sands-derived crude oils. The OSLTF is primarily financed by a 9-cents-per-barrel tax on domestic crude oil and imported crude oil and petroleum products (up from 8 cents per barrel in 2016). In the context of the per-barrel OSLTF tax provision, a 1980 House committee report stated that "the term crude oil does not include synthetic petroleum, e.g., shale oil, liquids from coal, tar sands, or biomass, or refined oil."
Based on that statement, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) concluded that oil-sands-derived crude oils are not subject to the OSLTF excise tax. This determination raises several issues. Perhaps the foremost issue is one of equity. Policymakers may consider whether there is a rationale for exempting certain types of crude oils from the excise tax. At present, it is unclear to what degree importers of oil-sands-derived crude oils are paying the OSLTF excise tax.
The different contexts for "oil" could lead to situations in which expenditures from the trust fund are used to clean up oil that was not subject to the tax. However, the OSLTF arguably plays a backup role in terms of response funding during many oil spills. The responsible party for an oil spill often provides the primary source of response (i.e., cleanup) funding, and the federal government may recover costs or damages paid from the OSLTF. Thus, the financial impact to the trust fund could be minimal if the majority of its payments are reimbursed by the responsible parties. Nonetheless, the liability of responsible parties may be limited under certain conditions. In those situations, the OSLTF could effectively pay—up to a per-incident cap of $1 billion—for response costs and applicable damages above the liability limit.
In the 114th Congress, Members offered several legislative proposals that would have specifically included oil-sands-derived crude oils within the scope of the per-barrel tax. In general, the proposals would have modified the definition of "crude oil" in the OSLTF tax authority (26 U.S.C. §4612) to include oil-sands-derived crude oil, often described in the amendments as "any bitumen or bituminous mixture, any oil derived from a bitumen or bituminous mixture."
In addition, recent budget proposals from the Obama Administration called for statutory changes that would subject oil sands to the per-barrel tax.
If Congress were to explicitly include oil-sands-derived crude oils within the scope of the per-barrel OSLTF tax, the revenue supporting the OSLTF would likely increase. Over the last five fiscal years, this tax has generated, on average, about $500 million per year. Based on import data of Canadian oil-sands-derived crude oil, the tax would have increased by approximately $47 million in 2016, assuming that 100% of the imports of Canadian oil sands crude oils are currently not paying the tax. |
crs_R42001 | crs_R42001_0 | There is no generally applicable federal attempt statute. In fact, it is not a federal crime to attempt to commit most federal offenses. More often, Congress has outlawed the attempt to commit a particular crime, such as attempted murder, or the attempt to commit one of a particular block of crimes, such as the attempt to violate the controlled substance laws. In those instances, the statute simply outlaws attempt, sets the penalties, and implicitly delegates to the courts the task of developing the federal law of attempt on a case by case basis. In doing so, it rarely did more than outlaw an attempt to commit a particular substantive crime and set its punishment. The Model Penal Code defined attempt as the intent required of the predicate offense coupled with a substantial step: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime, if acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he ... purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime." Some states recognize an abandonment or renunciation defense; the federal courts do not. Most federal attempt crimes carry the same penalties as the substantive offense. May a defendant be charged with attempting to attempt an offense? The Double Jeopardy Clause ordinarily precludes conviction for both the substantive offense and the attempt to commit it. When attempt is a federal crime, the cases suggest that a defendant may be punished for aiding and abetting the attempt and that a defendant may be punished by attempting to aid and abet the substantive offense. | It is not a crime to attempt to commit most federal offenses. Unlike state law, federal law has no generally applicable crime of attempt. Congress, however, has outlawed the attempt to commit a substantial number of federal crimes on an individual basis. In doing so, it has proscribed the attempt, set its punishment, and left to the federal courts the task of further developing the law in the area.
The courts have identified two elements in the crime of attempt: an intent to commit the underlying substantive offense and some substantial step towards that end. The point at which a step may be substantial is not easily discerned; but it seems that the more serious and reprehensible the substantive offense, the less substantial the step need be. Ordinarily, the federal courts accept neither impossibility nor abandonment as an effective defense to a charge of attempt. Attempt and the substantive offense carry the same penalties in most instances.
A defendant may not be convicted of both the substantive offense and the attempt to commit it. Commission of the substantive offense, however, is neither a prerequisite for, nor a defense against, an attempt conviction.
Whether a defendant may be guilty of an attempt to attempt to commit a federal offense is often a matter of statutory construction. Attempts to conspire and attempts to aid and abet generally present less perplexing questions.
This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R42002, Attempt: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, attributions, citations to authority, or appendix found here. |
crs_RL30975 | crs_RL30975_0 | A United Nations TransitionalAuthority inEast Timor (UNTAET) was established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 on October 25, 1999, to assistin thetransition to independence. UNTAET Functions and Staffing
UNTAET's mandate has both a military and civilian component. U.N. officials had talked of independence by the end of 2001, butstatementsin June 2001 suggested that independence might be postponed until an indigenous East Timorese administrationisfunctioning fully. The composition East TimoreseinWest Timor include East Timorese who want to return to East Timor, but it also includes East Timorese who are Indonesian civil servants and members of the Indonesian military. A likely emerging issue is the status of displaced East Timorese in Indonesia in East Timor's forthcoming elections inpreparation for independence. Most of these people legally would be eligible to vote, but it is unlikely thatIndonesianauthorities and the militia groups would allow the United Nations to conduct elections in the camps in West Timor. U.S. Humanitarian Assistance
Since the advent of the UNTAET, U.S. assistance to East Timor has included both disaster assistance to thedisplaced andto the refugees in West Timor as well as reconstruction and development assistance in East Timor. It has received pledges of over $167.4 million for the 2000-2002 period. The BushAdministration requested $10 million for bilateral assistance for FY2002. Continuing Threats from Indonesia
With the withdrawal of the Indonesian military (TNI) from East Timor in October 1999, the East Timoresemilitia groupsalso withdrew across the border into West Timor. There they regrouped. A spokesman for the U.N. peacekeeping force stated in September 2000 that tenwell-armedmilitia groups, of 5 to 30 men each, had infiltrated. Attempts to Prosecute TNI and Militia Members
As international observers saw firsthand the killings and destruction in East Timor caused by the TNI-backedEastTimorese militia in September 1999, demands arose for prosecution of militia leaders and Indonesian militaryofficersinvolved in instigating the violence. One issue will be future levels of U.S. economic aid. U.N. policy toward East Timor when the current United Nations administration ends and East Timor becomesindependent. Instructions to the Bush Administration call for U.S. support for aid to East Timor frominternationalfinancial institutions, the establishment of Peace Corps programs in East Timor, and the initiation of U.S. trade andinvestment promotion programs for East Timor (General System of Preferences, Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation,and Export-Import Bank programs). | A United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in October 1999 following the entranceof U.N.-sponsored international peacekeepers into East Timor. These measures came in response toIndonesian-instigatedviolence against East Timorese who had voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia in a referendumofAugust 30, 1999. UNTAET's mandate is broad. It is to help East Timor recover from the violence throughhumanitarianaid and reconstruction of facilities that were damaged or destroyed. It is to help East Timor establish a functioninggovernment, which will take over from the United Nations when East Timor formally becomes independent. Independenceis estimated for the end of 2001, but recent statements by U.N. officials suggest that it could be postponed. TheUnitedNations also has been involved in Indonesian West Timor in assisting about 240,000 displaced East Timorese whofled orwere forcibly transported to West Timor during the violence.
The U.N. operations are financed through assessments on all member nations and voluntary contributions from governments. Current funding levels are to cover the period 2000-2002. The U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentprovided $29 million in FY2000 and $25 million in FY2001 in bilateral assistance. U.S. aid is helping to establishajudicial system, train civil servants, assist local radio and television programming, educate voters, and assist thecoffeeindustry (East Timor's main export). The Bush Administration requested $10 million for FY2002, but Congressalreadyhas indicated that $25 million may be appropriated.
East Timor faces a continuing threat from Indonesia. East Timorese militia groups, who committed much of the violencein September 1999, regrouped in West Timor after the establishment of UNTAET. They controlled the campshousingdisplaced East Timorese, preventing many from returning home. In August 2000, militia members murdered U.N.workersin the camps. The militia rearmed with assistance from the Indonesian military, and they infiltrated back into EastTimor. The Indonesian military also has resisted attempts to bring to trial military officers and militia leaders responsiblefor theviolence of September 1999.
The United States faces several policy issues: levels of future aid to East Timor, the U.S. role in assisting an indigenousEast Timorese military force, and influencing Indonesian policy toward East Timor. |
crs_RL33669 | crs_RL33669_0 | On the same day, Senator McConnell, for himself and Senator Frist, introduced S. 3929 , the Terrorist Tracking, Identification and Prosecution Act of 2006, Title II of which is the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006. These were among a series of bills introduced in the 109 th Congress addressing the authorization, review, and oversight of electronic surveillance programs designed to acquire foreign intelligence or to provide information to assist in detecting and preventing international terrorist threats to the United States. Three related bills have been introduced to date in the 110 th Congress: H.R. 11 , S. 187 , and S. 139 . The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, P.L. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." The Attorney General stated that, in light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that, under these circumstances, the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. S. 3931 and Title II of S. 3929 would create a new Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. , to address electronic surveillance programs. In addition, the measures would amend other provisions of FISA dealing with electronic surveillance without a warrant pursuant to an Attorney General certification, applications for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders authorizing electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, the contents of such orders, emergency electronic surveillance under FISA, limitations on liability for those who aid the federal government in connection with electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, and applicable congressional oversight. The bills would repeal the current wartime authorities for electronic surveillance without a warrant following a congressional declaration of war. Changes would be made to the FISA definitions of "electronic surveillance" and "agent of a foreign power," among others. Other provisions would modify the criminal provisions of FISA and the exclusivity clause 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). Still other provisions amend FISA to address those who engage in the development or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to accommodate the international movements of targets of electronic surveillance under FISA. This report will discuss the substantive provisions of the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006 and their impact on existing law. 9 of S. 3931 , Sec. | In the wake of disclosures related to the National Security Agency's Terrorism Surveillance Program (TSP), congressional attention has been focused on issues regarding authorization, review, and oversight of electronic surveillance programs designed to acquire foreign intelligence information or to address international terrorism. A number of legislative approaches were considered in the 109th Congress, and three related bills have been introduced to date in the 110th Congress: H.R. 11, S. 187, and S. 139. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." In light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," he stated that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires.
Among the foreign intelligence surveillance bills introduced in the 109th Congress were S. 3931, the Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006, and S. 3929, the Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006, Title II of which parallels S. 3931. The bills would create a new Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., to address electronic surveillance programs. In addition, the measures would amend other provisions of FISA dealing with electronic surveillance without a warrant pursuant to an Attorney General certification, applications for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders authorizing electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, the contents of such orders, emergency electronic surveillance under FISA, limitations on liability for those who aid the federal government in connection with electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, and applicable congressional oversight. The bills would repeal the current wartime authorities for electronic surveillance without a warrant following a congressional declaration of war. Changes would be made to the FISA definitions of "electronic surveillance" and "agent of a foreign power," among others. Other provisions would modify the criminal provisions of FISA and the exclusivity clause 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). Still other provisions amend FISA to address those who engage in the development or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to accommodate the international movements of targets of electronic surveillance under FISA. This report discusses the provisions of S. 3931 and Title II of S. 3929, and notes the changes to existing law that these measures would make if enacted. The 110th Congress may choose to consider similar or different legislative approaches to these issues, or to forego legislation in light of the FISC orders and the anticipated termination of the TSP, while continuing congressional oversight. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33001 | crs_RL33001_0 | Since the September 11 th attacks, the extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President Bush in late 2001. Since 2005, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that "China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism" after "a good start," in his policy speech that called on China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers. Uighur People in Xinjiang and "Terrorist" Organizations
Questions concern the U.S. stance on the PRC's policy toward the Uighur ("wee-ger") people in the northwestern Xinjiang region that links them to what the PRC calls vaguely "East Turkistan terrorist organizations." Congress has concerns about the human rights of Uighurs. Thus, one question has concerned whether ETIM has been linked to Al Qaeda . However, the Congress increasingly has expressed concerns about PRC repression of Uighurs along with concern for Tibetans, including concern about the imprisonment of the relatives of Rebiya Kadeer, a Uighur businesswoman who was detained in the PRC in 1999-2005 and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 after she gained freedom in the United States. On July 8, 2010, Norway arrested three men whom authorities had under surveillance for over a year as suspects in a plot planned by Al Qaeda's network to commit terrorism, also in the United States and United Kingdom. The United States then detained the Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay military prison, Cuba, in 2002. However, the Departments of State and Defense have aggressively approached more than 100 countries to accept the Uighur detainees at Guantanamo, and continue to seek a country that would accept transfer of the Uighurs. Then, suddenly, Bermuda accepted four of them on the next day. The five Uighurs remaining at Guantanamo had been taken into custody in Pakistan, after they fled the bombings in Afghanistan in late 2001. 2701 (Reyes), the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010, with Section 351 to require an unclassified summary of intelligence on any threats posed by the Uighurs who were detained at Guantanamo. On February 26, 2010, the House passed H.R. Sanctions on Exports of Arms and Security Equipment
There has been congressional oversight of sanctions banning arms sales and export of crime control equipment to China. The bill became P.L. Shanghai Cooperation Organization and U.S. Military Operations
China increased its influence in international counterterrorism cooperation through a Central Asian group. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, China's influence expanded in the SCO along with increased international attention to terrorism. U.S. armed forces were deployed at bases in Uzbekistan until 2005 and have maintained an airbase in Kyrgyzstan, raising China's suspicions about U.S. military deployments in Central Asia and a perceived U.S. encirclement campaign. The Obama Administration also has proposed to China that it contribute counter-narcotics and humanitarian assistance to stabilize Afghanistan, in addition to PRC economic investments which benefit from the security provided by the United States and other countries. Meanwhile, India's concerns heightened about China's increased influence in Central and South Asia. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress in March 2009 that China's weapons supplied to Iran were then transferred to terrorist organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. troops fought. | After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests.
The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize—even if it did not transform—the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001. China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has not fought in the U.S.-led counterterrorism coalition. The Bush Administration designated the PRC-targeted "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" (ETIM) as a terrorist organization in August 2002, reportedly allowed PRC interrogators access to Uighur detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002, and held a summit in Texas in October 2002.
Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that "China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism" after "a good start," in his policy speech that called on China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers.
Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China and a number of policy options. U.S. policy has addressed law-enforcement and intelligence ties; oppressed Uighur (Uyghur) people in western Xinjiang whom China claims to be linked to "terrorists"; detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; Olympic security in August 2008; sanctions that ban exports of arms and security equipment; weapons nonproliferation; port security; military-to-military contacts; China's influence and support in Central Asia through the SCO; and China's arms transfers to Iran. Also, Congress has concerns about suspected PRC harassment of Uighurs and others in the United States, the President's efforts to transfer the Uighurs detained at Guantanamo, and efforts to seek China's counterterrorism cooperation (with U.S. assessments of mixed implications). The United States detained 22 Uighurs and rejected China's demand to take them while seeking a third country to accept them. In 2006, Albania accepted five of them. In June 2009, Bermuda accepted four. In November 2009, Palau accepted six. In February 2010, Switzerland accepted two Uighurs. The five Uighurs remaining in detention had been taken into custody in Pakistan. On February 26, 2010, the House passed H.R. 2701 (Reyes), with Section 351 which would require an unclassified summary of intelligence on any threats posed by the Uighurs who were detained at Guantanamo. Other relevant bills in the 111th Congress include: H.R. 2346 (P.L. 111-32); H.Res. 417 (Baldwin); H.Res. 624 (Delahunt); H.Res. 774 (Hastings); H.Res. 953 (McGovern); H.R. 2294 (Boehner); S.Res. 155 (Brown); and S. 1054 (Inouye). The Obama Administration has proposed that China increase contributions and coordination in investments and assistance to help stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan. With concerns about military operations in Central Asia, the United States also has concerns about dealing with China in its northwestern region of Xinjiang. On July 8, 2010, Norway arrested three men reportedly connected with the Turkistan Islamic Party (another name for ETIM) and Al Qaeda. |
crs_R42510 | crs_R42510_0 | Due to their special properties of magnetism, luminescence, and strength, rare earths are widely used in high-technology and clean energy products, as well as in military weapon systems. The Chinese government has made the development of its rare earth resources a top priority since the 1980s. Government support for the rare earth industry, low labor costs, and lax environmental standards enabled China to become the world's dominant producer of rare earths, estimated to be the source of over 97% of the global supply. China's rare earth policies have raised concerns among many in Congress because rare earths are important to a number of U.S. industries, including high technology (such as advanced electronics and medical equipment) and green technology (such as hybrid cars and wind turbines). In addition, U.S. defense industries rely on rare earths for a variety of weapon systems. Members have also expressed concerns that China's virtual monopoly of rare earths may impact U.S. economic and security interests because it makes many U.S. commercial and defense industries vulnerable to supply shortages and higher prices as a result of future Chinese restrictions that could occur for economic, as well as political, reasons. Several bills have been introduced in Congress to address these concerns, including H.R. It examines the level of U.S. rare earth trade with China, how Chinese policies have affected rare earth prices for U.S. firms, possible motivations behind China's restrictions of rare earth exports, and how the United States and other major users of rare earths have responded, including a WTO dispute settlement case brought by the United States, Japan, and the EU in March 2012 against China over its rare earths restrictions. However, efforts by the Chinese government in 2010 to further tighten its control over the production and export of rare earths appear to have created global shortages of many types of rare earths and sharply raised prices. The petition sought to address a number of China's policies and practices affecting trade and investment in green technologies. A USTR factsheet on the dispute listed hybrid and conventional vehicles, advanced electronics, wind turbines, energy efficient lighting, steel, oil and gas, chemicals, and medical equipment as U.S. industries affected by China's export restrictions. Many analysts speculate that the United States and other major users of rare earths (such as the EU and Japan) were waiting to see how the WTO would rule on the raw materials case before proceeding, noting that many of the export restrictions raised by the United States in the raw materials WTO case (such as export duties and quotas) are similar to those that are imposed by China on raw earths, as well as in regards to the arguments China has made to justify such restrictions (e.g., concerns over pollution and conservation of exhaustible natural resources). The report further states that DOE's strategy for addressing critical materials challenges is based on three pillars, including (1) the development of diversified global rare earth supply chains (including mining, extraction, processing, and manufacturing in the United States and abroad) in order to reduce supply risks that occur from China's position as the dominant producer of rare earth supplies; (2) the development of substitutes, including through government-sponsored research; and (3) recycling, reuse, and more efficient use of rare earths. Implications of the WTO Case on Rare Earths
To many observers, China's rare earth restrictions are representative of a series of government interventionist policies that have been implemented in recent years that attempt to pick winners and losers in the marketplace, often occurring, it is argued, at the expense of the economic interests of other countries. Such critics contend that China's policy to sharply limit rare earth exports is intended to make Chinese domestic firms the dominant producer and supplier of global renewable energy products and/or to induce foreign firms to move production to China and to transfer technology to Chinese firms as the price for a reliable supply of rare earths. | Over the past few years, the Chinese government has implemented a number of policies to tighten its control over the production and export of "rare earths"—a unique group of 17 metal elements on the periodic table that exhibit a range of special properties, such as magnetism, luminescence, and strength. Rare earths are important to a number of high technology industries, including renewable energy and various defense systems.
China's position as the world's dominant producer and supplier of rare earths (97% of total output) and its policies to limit exports have raised concerns among many in Congress, especially given the importance of rare earths to a variety of U.S. commercial industries (e.g., hybrid and conventional autos, oil and gas, energy-efficient lighting, advanced electronics, chemicals, and medical equipment), as well as to U.S. defense industries that produce various weapon systems. Many are concerned that rising rare earth prices could undermine the global competitiveness of many U.S. firms (lowering their production and employment), impede technological innovation, and raise prices for U.S. consumers. Others are concerned that China's virtual monopoly over rare earths could be used as leverage against major rare earth importers, such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU).
To many observers, China's rare earth policies are part of a complex web of Chinese government industrial policies that seek to promote the development of domestic industries deemed essential to economic modernization. In the late 1980s, the United States was the global leader in rare earth production. However, preferential policies by the Chinese government and lax environmental standards there quickly enabled China to become a dominant, low-cost producer of rare earths by the late 1990s. Many analysts contend that China's recent actions to consolidate its rare earth production and restrict exports are intended to promote the development of domestic downstream industries, especially those engaged in high technology and green technology industries, by ensuring their access to adequate and low-cost supplies of rare earths. It is further argued that China's rare earth export policies are intended to induce foreign rare earth users to move their operations to China, and subsequently, to transfer technology to Chinese firms. China denies that its rare earth policies are political, discriminatory, or protectionist, but rather, are intended to address environmental concerns in China and to better manage and conserve limited resources.
On March 13, 2012, the United States, Japan, and the EU jointly initiated a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement case against China's restrictive policies on rare earths and two other minerals. This case was brought shortly after the United States largely prevailed in a similar WTO case brought against China over its export restrictions on nine raw materials. The Obama Administration has also sought to devise strategies to deal with rare earth shortages, including the development of a diversified global rare earth supply chain, the development of alternative materials, and more efficient use of rare earth, including recycling. A number of bills have been introduced in Congress that seek to address U.S. rare earths shortages. A major issue for Congress raised by the rare earths dispute is whether U.S. trade policy can effectively respond to China's industrial policies that may negatively impact U.S. economic interests, either through the WTO or other means.
This report examines the economic and trade implications of China's rare earth policies for the United States. |
crs_R43650 | crs_R43650_0 | In 2006, the 109 th Congress passed legislation providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. Subsequent Congresses have extended the termination date of this authority to October 4, 2014. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, incorporates much of the language in the existing statutory authority. Consequently, its authorities would generally encompass the existing authorities, and its implementation by DHS may retain a similar regulatory structure. Indeed, the bill expressly would allow DHS to use existing CFATS regulations to implement its provisions. In contrast with the existing statute, H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , as amended). Another key difference between H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, and the existing statute is the absence of a statutory termination date. The statutory authority would be permanent, though H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, contains additional legislative language that would add to the Secretary's responsibilities. For example, H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, would require certain outreach to chemical facilities, assistance to regulated small chemical facilities, and reporting by DHS and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on program performance. 4007 , as passed by the House, would modify the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security in various areas. The Secretary's existing discretion to establish criteria for risk-based performance standards would be maintained. 4007 , as passed by the House, would limit the Secretary's discretion when it expressly requires DHS to accept alternative security programs with respect to site security plans, mandate specific approaches with respect to personnel surety, and restrict the Secretary's ability to require covered chemical facilities to submit information to DHS about personnel at the facility. Finally, H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, would expand the discretion of the Secretary by no longer limiting application of the statutory authority to high-risk facilities. Some experts might argue that modifying the Secretary's discretion might lead to a less efficient regulatory program. Other experts might argue that the Secretary's discretion might need further modification in order to reflect congressional intent. Subsection 2(a) would create a new title, Title XXI, called Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, in the Homeland Security Act. The current statutory authority contains no comparable provision. Other Provisions of Section 2, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program
Subsection 2(b) of H.R. 109-295 , Section 550. H.R. 4007 , as passed by the House, lacks a statutory termination date and would provide a permanent statutory authorization. It also provides a three-year authorization of appropriations through FY2017. H.R. H.R. | The 109th Congress provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with statutory authority to regulate chemical facilities for security purposes through Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295). This statutory authority contains a termination date, after which the statutory authority expires. The current termination date is October 4, 2014.
Subsequent Congresses have attempted to provide a new authorization for the current statutory authority, which DHS implements through the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). In the 113th Congress, several bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate. One, H.R. 4007, has passed the House.
H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, incorporates much of the language in the existing statute. Consequently, its authorities would generally encompass the existing authorities, and its implementation by DHS may retain a similar regulatory structure. Indeed, the bill expressly would allow DHS to use existing CFATS regulations to implement its provisions.
Unlike the existing statute, H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, as amended). It would create a new title, Title XXI, called Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. Another key difference between H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, and the existing statute is the absence of a termination date for the statutory authority. The statutory authority would be permanent, though H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, includes a limited three-year authorization of appropriations.
Other provisions in H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would add to the Secretary's responsibilities. For example, H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would require certain outreach to chemical facilities, assistance to regulated small chemical facilities, and reporting by DHS and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on program performance.
Finally, H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would modify the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security in various areas. The Secretary's existing discretion to establish criteria for risk-based performance standards would be maintained. H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would limit the Secretary's discretion when it expressly requires DHS to accept alternative security programs with respect to site security plans, mandate specific approaches with respect to personnel surety, and restrict the Secretary's ability to require covered chemical facilities to submit information to DHS about personnel entering the facility. H.R. 4007, as passed by the House, would expand the discretion of the Secretary by no longer limiting application of the statutory authority to high-risk facilities. Some experts might argue that modifying the Secretary's discretion might lead to a less efficient regulatory program. Other experts might argue that the Secretary's discretion might need further modification in order to reflect congressional intent. |
crs_R40945 | crs_R40945_0 | The Extent of Global Food Insecurity
The combination of food and economic crises has pushed the number of food-insecure or hungry people worldwide to historic levels—more than 1 billion people are undernourished, according to estimates by the United Nations (U.N.) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In addition, the U.N. Secretary General reports that the proportion of hungry people in the world rose in 2008 as a result of global food and economic crises. According to U.N. estimates, the proportion of hungry people in the world dropped from about 20% in the early 1990s to about 16% in the middle of the following decade. President Obama signaled early that alleviating global hunger is a top priority of his Administration. The summit food security declaration commits the G8 and other participants at the summit to five principles for a food security initiative:
support for comprehensive strategies, investment through country-owned plans, stronger coordination among donors, leveraging effective multilateral institutions, and sustained commitments. The fullest expression of the U.S. food security initiative is the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative Consultation Document , issued by the Department of State on September 28, 2009. Based on the notion that agricultural development has been a key driver of economic growth and poverty reduction in almost every industrialized nation in the world, U.S. assistance for agriculture has been a component of U.S. foreign aid since the 1960s. The United States' ODA for agriculture peaked at about 20% in 1980 and declined to about 5% by 2007. Congress plays a central role in funding and overseeing U.S. agricultural development and food security assistance, which are administered by several U.S. agencies and international organizations. Most development assistance programs are authorized by either the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-191, as amended) or one of three food aid laws: Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480), Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949; and the Food for Progress Act of 1985. Congress typically influences development assistance programs through the appropriations process, most notably through congressional earmarks. Key bilateral and multilateral institutions that deliver agricultural development assistance are discussed below. USAID funds agricultural development assistance through three separate budget accounts authorized by Congress:
Development Assistance . The need for interagency coordination in the provision of agricultural development and food security assistance has been widely discussed. The largest component of U.S. food security assistance in the budget continues to be P.L. The funds called for in congressional appropriations measures could be considered as parts of the U.S. pledge. Legislative Proposals in the 111th Congress
A number of bills related to global agricultural development and food security assistance have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. Both bills establish a U.S. The coordinator would be charged with developing and implementing a comprehensive government-wide strategy to address global hunger and food security and to ensure that the strategy (1) contributes to achieving the Millennium Development Goal of reducing global hunger by half not later than 2015 and to advancing the United Nations Comprehensive Framework for Action with respect to global hunger and food security; and (2) is integrated into any review or development of a federal strategy for global development. | The combination of food and economic crises has pushed the number of food-insecure or hungry people worldwide to historic levels—more than 1 billion people are undernourished, according to estimates by the United Nations (U.N.) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In addition, the U.N. Secretary General reports that the proportion of hungry people in the world rose in 2008 as a result of global food and economic crises. The rise in the proportion of hungry people threatens achievement of the U.N.'s Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of reducing the proportion of hungry people in the world by half by 2015.
In his inaugural address, President Obama signaled that alleviating global hunger would be a top priority of his Administration. The Department of State has taken the lead in developing a U.S. global food security strategy that focuses on agricultural and rural development, based on five principles: support for comprehensive strategies; investment through country-owned plans; stronger coordination among donors; leveraging effective multilateral institutions; and sustained commitments. The G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, and the FAO-sponsored World Food Summit in Rome have all endorsed the Administration's food security concept and pledged financial support for a global effort. World leaders stress that humanitarian food assistance (along with other social and safety net protections) would continue to be an important component of a global food security strategy.
Congress plays a central role in funding and overseeing agricultural development programs, which are administered by several U.S. agencies and international organizations. Most development assistance programs are authorized by either the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-191, as amended) or any of three food aid laws: Title II of the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480); Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949; and the Food for Progress Act of 1985. Congress typically influences development assistance programs through the appropriations process, most notably through congressional earmarks. The United States also works through multilateral institutions to deliver agricultural development assistance.
Agricultural development has been a component of the United States' foreign aid program, but U.S. funding for such assistance has declined from about 20% of U.S. official development assistance (ODA) in 1980 to around 5% in 2007. As U.S. support for agricultural development has declined, so has the capacity of the United States to provide such assistance, according to critics of U.S. aid programs. The involvement of several U.S. government agencies in providing agricultural development aid has focused attention on the issue of interagency coordination. The involvement of other multilateral and bilateral donors also suggests a need for coordination among donors in the provision of food security assistance. The Administration has called for a substantial increase in agricultural development assistance, and the international community also has pledged substantial support for a global food security initiative. Skeptics, however, question whether the funds pledged will actually be committed.
Bills that would authorize and fund aspects of the food security initiative have been introduced in the 111th Congress. These include bills to increase support for agricultural development assistance as well as food security safety net assistance. Proposed legislation to broadly revise the authorizing statute for U.S. foreign assistance would be relevant to the global food security initiative as well. |
crs_RL34050 | crs_RL34050_0 | Introduction
The Missing and Exploited Children's (MEC) program—administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—seeks to prevent cases of missing and sexually exploited children and to support communities in responding to such cases. The program is composed of activities that are authorized under multiple laws, and includes the following components:
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) is a nonprofit organization in Alexandria, VA, that serves as a resource center for law enforcement agencies working on cases of missing and exploited children, the families of child victims, and the public more broadly. The Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force program funds state and local law enforcement units in investigating online child sexual exploitation. Beginning in the late 1970s, highly publicized cases of children who were abducted, sexually abused, and sometimes murdered prompted policymakers and child advocates to declare a missing children problem. Witnesses testified that as many as 1.8 million children were missing. The Missing Children Act of 1982 ( P.L. Two years later, the Missing Children's Assistance Act ( P.L. 98-473 ) was enacted. It directed OJJDP to lead federal efforts to recover missing children and establish a national resource center on missing children. NCMEC has served as the resource center since 1984. The Missing Children's Assistance Act has been amended multiple times to further specify the responsibilities of OJJDP and NCMEC in responding to missing and exploited children. Current funding authorization under the Missing Children's Assistance Act is $40 million for each of FY2014 through FY2018. Demographics of Missing and Exploited Children
Overview
Children who go missing—as well as children who are not missing—may be sexually exploited. The National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence, conducted by the University of New Hampshire with support from OJJDP, examined the incidence and prevalence of children's exposure to violence in 2008. The study found that 1 in 16 (6.1%) surveyed children and youth were sexually victimized in the past year and nearly 1 in 10 (9.8%) were sexually victimized at some point over their lifetimes. The FY2017 appropriation for the MEC program was $72.5 million. Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force
ICAC Task Forces37
The ICAC Task Force program is authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-401 ), as amended. AMBER Alert Program
AMBER (America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response) Alert systems are state-administered communication systems to inform the public about children who are abducted. The PROTECT Act ( P.L. 108-21 provided that the Attorney General appoint an AMBER Alert coordinator to (1) work with states to encourage the development of additional regional and local AMBER Alert plans; (2) serve as the regional coordinator for abducted children throughout the AMBER Alert network; (3) create voluntary standards for the issuance of alerts, including minimum standards that address the special needs of the child (such as health care needs), and limit the alerts to a geographic area most likely to facilitate the abduction of the child, without interfering with the current system of voluntary coordination between local broadcasters and law enforcement; (4) submit a report to Congress by March 1, 2005, on the activities of the coordinator and the effectiveness and status of the AMBER plans of each state that has implemented one; and (5) consult with the FBI and cooperate with the Federal Communications Commission in implementing the program. Grant Programs and Technical Assistance
The MEC program provides funding to support other activities related to missing and exploited children, including training and technical assistance for public and private nonprofit organizations. The Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984, as Amended | Beginning in the late 1970s, highly publicized cases of children who were abducted, sexually abused, and sometimes murdered prompted policymakers and child advocates to declare a missing children problem. At that time, about 1.8 million children annually were reported to the police as missing. More recent data indicate that the number and rate at which children go missing has declined. A survey from 2013 provides the most recent and comprehensive information on missing children. The data show that about 238,000 children (3.1 per 1,000 children) were reported to law enforcement by their caretakers that year as missing due to a family or nonfamily abduction; running away or being forced to leave home; becoming lost or injured; or for benign reasons, such as a miscommunication about schedules.
As a policy issue, missing children are often included in discussions of sexual victimization. Children who go missing—as well as children who are not missing—may be sexually exploited. A study that examined the prevalence of children's exposure to violence in 2008 found that 1 in 16 (6.1%) surveyed children were sexually victimized in the past year and nearly 1 in 10 (9.8%) were sexually victimized at some point over their lifetimes.
Recognizing the need for greater federal coordination of local and state efforts to recover missing and exploited children, Congress passed the Missing Children's Assistance Act (P.L. 98-473) in 1984. The act directed the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to establish a national resource center for missing and exploited children, among other related activities. The Missing Children's Assistance Act has been amended multiple times, most recently in 2013 (P.L. 113-38).
Activities authorized under the Missing Children's Assistance Act and selected other laws are collectively referred to as the Missing and Exploited Children's (MEC) program. The program includes the following components:
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC): Since 1984, NCMEC has served as the national resource center and has carried out many of the objectives of the Missing Children's Assistance Act in collaboration with OJJDP. The Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force program: This program assists state and local enforcement cyber units in investigating online child sexual exploitation. It was authorized under the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-401), as amended. Training and technical assistance for state AMBER (America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response) Alert systems: AMBER Alerts publicly broadcast bulletins in the most serious child abduction cases. The AMBER Alert program is authorized under the PROTECT Act (P.L. 108-21). Other initiatives: These include training and technical assistance on investigating and preventing child victimization. They also include support to membership-based nonprofit missing and exploited children's organizations. These initiatives are authorized by the Missing Children's Assistance Act.
FY2017 appropriations to DOJ for the MEC program were $72.5 million, of which $28.3 million was for NCMEC, $27.6 million was for the ICAC Task Force program, $2.4 million was for the AMBER Alert program, and $4.2 million was for other initiatives. The remaining amount was allocated for other DOJ activities. |
crs_R42126 | crs_R42126_0 | North Korea's Stability
One notable feature of official U.S. and South Korean reactions to Kim Jong-il's death is the extent to which both governments have publicly stated their desire for North Korea to remain stable. It is likely that that cohesive tendencies will predominate in the short run, as members of the ruling elite rally around Kim Jong-un, as has been seen by members of the ruling elite paying their respects to the new ruler in the days since his father's death. Moreover, ruling North Korea today is far more complex than is was during the country's last leadership transition in 1994, upon the death of Kim Jong-il's father, the country's founder and "Great Leader" Kim il-Sung. Among Kim Jong-un's most important supporters are believed to his aunt and uncle (Kim Jong-il's sister and her husband), Kim Kyong-hui and Jang Song Taek. Along these lines, it is possible that in the weeks and months to come, the Kim Jong-un regime will seek to continue the "softer" approach Kim Jong-il took for most of 2011, including the apparent food aid and nuclear agreements with the United States. The legitimacy and longevity of Kim Jong-un's reign is likely to be tied to his regime's ability to continue funneling money and gifts to the elite families. Implications and Options for the United States
Traditionally, the United States has had a number of goals with respect to North Korea, including limiting if not curtailing North Korea's ability to sell its nuclear and long-range missile technology, rolling back or containing its nuclear and missile programs, detering an attack on South Korea, and improving the lives of the average North Korean people. Many believe it is likely that the country's new leadership will continue along this path, since the leaders were already in positions of influence while these policies were formulated. Engagement could serve as a way to at least slow nuclear weapon and missile development in North Korea, even if the ultimate goal of denuclearization is not fulfilled in the near future. In essence, the approach has had four main components:
keeping the door open to Six-Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program but refusing to re-start them without a North Korean assurance that it would take "irreversible steps" to denuclearize; insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks must be preceded by North-South Korean talks on denuclearization and improvements in North-South Korean relations; gradually attempting to alter China's strategic assessment of North Korea; and responding to Pyongyang's provocations by tightening sanctions against North Korean entities, conducting a series of military exercises, and expanding cooperation with Japan. Looking farther ahead, after the initial mourning period has ended in on December 29, the Obama Administration will have an opportunity to test the new leadership's intentions, by virtue of U.S.-North Korea proposed agreements that were in various stages of negotiation. However, over the years, China reportedly has resisted repeated U.S. and South Korean attempts to discreetly discuss North Korea contingency plans, even over issues such as coordinating a response to a natural disaster or a nuclear accident. It is unclear whether Kim Jong-il's death will change this situation. Three possible opportunities for high-level dialogue could present themselves in the coming weeks. Then, in January 2012, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping is to visit Washington, DC, for a trip that also was previously scheduled. Xi is widely expected to be chosen as China's top leader over the coming year. The Government hopes North Korea will soon restore stability so that both Koreas will be able to work together for the sake of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing, 19 Dec (Xinhua) - The CPC Central Committee, the National People's Congress [NPC] Standing Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission [CMC] sent a message of condolences to the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] , the WPK Central Military Commission, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] National Defense Commission, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, and the DPRK Cabinet ON 19 December to express deep condolences over the death of Comrade Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the WPK, chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army [KPA]. | North Korea represents one of the United States' biggest foreign policy challenges due to its production and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, the threat of attacks against South Korea, its record of human rights abuses, and the possibility that its internal problems could destabilize Northeast Asia. The North Korean government's December 19, 2011, announcement of the death of the country's "Dear Leader," Kim Jong-il, has the potential to be a watershed moment in the history of the Korean Peninsula and the region. Ever since the death of his father, the "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung, in 1994, Kim Jong-il had sat at the apex of a highly centralized, brutal regime. During his tenure, his regime subjected North Korea's people to profound impoverishment and massive food shortages, developed nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and sold technology related to both programs abroad.
The effect of Kim Jong-il's death on North Korea's stability is uncertain. Many experts doubt that his anointed successor, his third son Kim Jong-un, will over the course of time be able to maintain effective control over his country due to his relative inexperience and the mounting internal and external pressures confronting North Korea. Yet, the North Korean regime under the elder Kim proved to be remarkably resilient, and many of the forces that held it together will continue to operate even if the young Kim himself remains weak. A key to the Kim Jong-un regime's stability will be its ability to continue obtaining and distributing funds, mostly from external sources. Of particular importance will be China's willingness to provide commercial, financial, and other support for the regime. Over the years, China reportedly has resisted repeated U.S. and South Korean attempts to discuss North Korea contingency plans. It is unclear whether Kim Jong-il's death will change this situation, though there have been calls to redouble outreach to Beijing. A possible opportunity for high-level dialogue could come in January 2012, when Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visits Washington, DC. Xi is widely expected to be chosen as China's top leader over the coming year.
Very little is known about the inner workings of the North Korean elite, as evidenced by the U.S. and South Korean intelligence services apparent surprise at the announcement of Kim Jong-il's death. Even less is known about Kim Jong-un, who is believed to be in his late 20s and to have attended primary school in Switzerland in the 1990s. Kim Jong-un was being groomed to be the successor since his father's August 2008 stroke that put a spotlight on the succession question.
In the days after the announcement, U.S. and South Korean officials issued statements that expressed support for the North Korean people, hope that the new leadership will continue recent diplomatic initiatives with Washington and Seoul, and a desire for a smooth transition in Pyongyang. (For the text of these statements as well as a joint message from several Chinese state and communist party organs, see the Appendix . U.S. and South Korean influence over events in North Korea is widely believed to be limited. In the coming weeks, the Obama Administration will be confronted with a decision of whether to persist with two proposed new agreements that reportedly were in the process of being concluded with the Kim Jong-il government in mid-December: a resumption of U.S. food assistance, and in return, a reported agreement by North Korea to shut down key sites of its nuclear program and open them to international monitoring. Members of Congress will have the opportunity to support or oppose these moves, as well as to propose new pressure and engagement tactics of their own. |
crs_98-871 | crs_98-871_0 | Background
An important aspect of U.S. efforts to improve economic competitiveness is the existence of a capable scientific and technological workforce. Concern has been expressed about the future ability of the U.S. science and engineering base to generate the technological advances needed to maintain economic growth. Some discussions have centered on the quality of science and mathematics undergraduate education and training. Other discussions have focused on the scientific knowledge of those students entering other disciplines. Even students pursuing nonscientific and nonmathematical specialties will require basic knowledge of scientific and technological applications and mathematical reasoning in order to adapt to constant changes in the labor market. However, several indicators of the performance of U.S. students in science and mathematics education at the precollege level reveal a mixed picture of successes and shortcomings. This report will be updated as events warrant. Precollege Science and Mathematics Concerns
Precollege (K-12) science and mathematics instruction has an important relationship to the future supply of U.S. scientific and technological personnel. Several reports on the state of precollege education, especially international comparisons, have revealed that U.S. students do not perform at the level of their international counterparts. A September 2006 report on the future of higher education states that while our colleges and universities have much to applaud for in their achievements, there are areas where improvements are needed. As higher education has evolved, it simultaneously has had to respond to the impact of globalization, rapidly evolving technologies, the changing needs of a knowledge economy, and an increasingly diverse and aging population. In the 21 st century, a larger proportion of the U.S. population will be composed of minorities—blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans, with the fastest growing minority group being Hispanics. As a group, these minorities traditionally have been underrepresented in the science and engineering disciplines compared to their fraction of the total population. Data for 2006 reveal that while blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans/Alaskan Natives as a whole comprise more than 29.5% of the population, and earn, as a whole, 16.0% of the bachelor degrees, 11.3% of the masters degrees, and 8.5% of the doctorate degrees in science and engineering. Legislation during the 111 th Congress includes H.R. 1709 , STEM Education Coordination Act of 2009. This bill would establish a committee under the National Science and Technology Council with the responsibility of coordinating STEM activities and programs for all federal agencies. In addition, the committee would provide a description for the role of each agency in supporting programs and activities designed to achieve the objectives. 461 , 10,000 Trained by 2010 Act, would authorize funding for competitive grants to generate innovative approaches in the health care information fields. The bill would establish or improve undergraduate and master's degree health care information programs, attract students to such programs, and provide students with discipline-related experiences in the private sector or at the federal level. H.R. | An important aspect of U.S. efforts to maintain and improve economic competitiveness is the existence of a capable scientific and technological workforce. A major concern of the 111th Congress may be regarding the future ability of the U.S. science and engineering base to generate the technological advances needed to maintain economic growth. Discussions have centered on the quality of science and mathematics education and training and on the scientific knowledge of those students entering other disciplines. Even students pursuing nonscientific and nonmathematical specialities are likely to require basic knowledge of scientific and technological applications for effective participation in the workforce. Charges are being made that many students complete high school scientifically and technologically illiterate.
Precollege science and mathematics instruction has an important relationship to the future supply of U.S. scientific and technological personnel and to the general scientific literacy of the nation. However, several published reports indicate important shortcomings in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education (STEM) and achievement of U.S. students at the precollege level. Some findings in the reports revealed that many science and mathematics teachers do not have a major in the discipline being taught; and that U.S. students, themselves, on international measures, perform less well than their international counterparts.
A September 2006 report on the future of higher education states that while our colleges and universities have much to applaud for in their achievements, there are some areas where reforms are needed. As higher education has evolved, it simultaneously has had to respond to the impact of globalization, rapidly evolving technologies, the changing needs of a knowledge economy, and a population that is increasingly older and more diverse.
In the 21st century, a larger proportion of the U.S. population will be composed of certain minorities—blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans. As a group, these minorities have traditionally been underrepresented in the science and engineering disciplines compared to their proportion of the total population. A report of the National Science Foundation (NSF) reveals that blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans as a whole comprise more that 25% of the population and earn, as a whole, 16.2% of the bachelor degrees, 10.7% of the masters degrees, and 5.4% of the doctorate degrees in science and engineering.
Legislation introduced during the 111th Congress in support of science and mathematics education includes H.R. 1709, STEM Education Coordination Act of 2009. This bill would establish a committee under the National Science and Technology Council with the responsibility of coordinating STEM activities and programs for all federal agencies. The committee would provide a description for the role of each agency in supporting programs and activities designed to achieve annual and long-term objectives. H.R. 461, 10,000 Trained by 2010 Act, would authorize funding for competitive grants to generate innovative approaches in the health care information fields. The bill would establish or improve undergraduate and master's degree health care information programs, attract students to such programs, and provide students with discipline-related experiences at the federal level or in the private sector.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43291 | crs_R43291_0 | Services have also become a significant component of U.S. international trade, accounting for $752.4 billion of U.S. exports in 2016. As such, it is an increasingly important component of U.S. trade policy and of global trade in general. Rapid advances in information technology and the related growth of global value chains are making an expanding range of services tradable across national borders. A number of economists have argued that foreign government barriers prevent U.S. trade in services from expanding to its full potential. Under the Trump Administration, the United States may continue to engage in trade negotiations on multilateral, plurilateral, bilateral, and regional agreements with one goal being to lower these barriers. This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. international trade in services, including the types and volumes of traded services. The report also examines emerging issues and current and potential trade agreements, including renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). To address this complexity, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have adopted a system of classifying four modes of delivery for services to measure trade in services and to classify government measures that affect trade in services in international agreements (see Figure 1 ). For cross-border trade, in 2016, services accounted for 34.1% of the $2,208 billion total in U.S. exports (of goods and services) and 18.6% of the $2,713 billion in total U.S. imports. Conventional trade data are not measured on a value-added basis and do not attribute any portion of the traded value of manufactured and agricultural products to services inputs, such as research and development, design, transportation costs, and finance. Trade by Type of Service
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis divides services into nine categories:
Maintenance and repair; Transport; Travel (for all purposes including tourism, education); Insurance; Financial; Charges for the use of intellectual property (IP) (e.g., patents, trademarks, franchise fees); Telecommunications, computer, and information; Other business services (e.g., research and development, accounting, engineering); and Government goods and services. The United States is a major exporter and importer of services in global markets. The GATS
binds each member to its commitments once it has made them, that is, a member country may not impose less favorable treatment than that to which it has committed; provides market access by prohibiting member-country governments from placing limits on suppliers of services from other member countries regarding the number of foreign service suppliers, the total value of service transactions or assets, the number of transactions or value of output, the type of legal entity or joint venture through which services may be supplied, and the share of foreign capital or total value of foreign direct investment; requires that member governments accord service suppliers from other member countries national treatment , that is, a foreign service or service provider may not be treated any less favorably than a domestic provider of the service; and allows members to negotiate further reductions in barriers to trade in services. Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) 57
Largely because of the lack of progress in the WTO, negotiations on a proposed Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) were launched in April 2013 to achieve a sector-specific, plurilateral agreement to liberalize trade in services. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 70
Discussions to renegotiate NAFTA with Canada and Mexico began on August 16, 2017. U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)74
On March 15, 2012, the U.S.-South Korean FTA (KORUS FTA) entered into force. In addition to its KORUS commitments, South Korea has also committed to opening up its legal services market to foreign law firms in its free trade agreements with the EU, the UK, Australia, and Canada. The outlook for the ongoing negotiations remains uncertain, as participants in each negotiation deal with difficult and complex issues. Potential policy issues for Congress and negotiators to address include the following:
To what extent are U.S. positions on trade in services in the renegotiation of NAFTA, potential renegotiation of KORUS, TiSA, and T-TIP negotiations consistent with U.S. trade negotiating objectives on services as defined in the TPA legislation? How might Congress work with the Administration in relation to these pending negotiations? | Trade in "services" refers to a wide and growing range of economic activities. These activities include transport, tourism, financial services, use of intellectual property, telecommunications and information services, government services, maintenance, and other professional services from accounting to legal services. Compared to goods, the types and volume of services that can be traded are limited by factors such as the requirement for direct buyer-provider contact, and other unique characteristics such as the reusability of services (e.g., professional consulting) for which traditional value measures do not account. In addition to services as independent exports, manufactured and agricultural products incorporate and depend on services, such as research and development or shipping of intermediate or final goods. As services account for 82% of U.S. private sector jobs, U.S. trade in services, both services as exports and as inputs to other exported products, can have a broad impact across the U.S. economy.
Rapid advances in information technology and the related growth of global value chains have expanded both the level and the range of services tradable across national borders. As a result, services have become a priority in U.S. trade policy, and a significant part of U.S. trade flows and of global trade in general, accounting for $752.4 billion in U.S. exports. As the United States is the world's largest exporter and importer of services (15% and 10% of the global total in 2016), the Administration's discussions on potential and existing trade agreements that include services are significant.
A number of economists argue that "behind the border" barriers imposed by foreign governments prevent U.S. trade in services from expanding to its full potential. The United States continues to negotiate trade agreements to lower these barriers. It was a leading force in concluding the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, and in past U.S. free trade agreements, all of which contain significant provisions on market access and rules for liberalizing trade in services. Trade agreements involving trade in services currently under discussion include the following.
Renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. Review of the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). Potential continued negotiation of the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), a plurilateral agreement outside of the WTO with 22 other countries, or of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) free trade agreement with the European Union (EU). Potential new and updated bilateral free trade agreements with other partners.
In each case, participants have difficult issues to address and the outlook for progress is uncertain. For each agreement, Congress may consider legislation to implement agreements potentially concluded in the future.
Congress and U.S. trade negotiators face additional issues, including how to balance the need for effective regulations of services with the objective of opening markets for U.S. exports and trade in services; ensuring adequate and accurate data to measure trade in services to inform trade policy; and determining whether further international cooperation efforts are needed to improve the regulatory environment for services trade beyond initial market access. This report provides background information and analysis on these and other emerging issues related to U.S. international trade in services. In addition, it examines existing and potential trade agreements as they relate to services trade. |
crs_R40698 | crs_R40698_0 | The use of Gang of Four notifications pre-dates the establishment of the congressional intelligence committees in the mid-1970s. Congress conditioned these two reporting requirements on the need to protect from unauthorized disclosure classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. However, it is recognized that in extremely rare circumstances a need to preserve essential secrecy may result in a decision not to impart certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs to the oversight committees in order to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods. [emphasis added]
In 1991, Congress adopted new but similar language with regard to the protection of sources and methods, adding in statute the phrase "other exceptionally sensitive matters." The report language stated that the added phrase:
is intended to refer to other extremely sensitive categories of classified information such as information concerning the operational details of military deployments, and extraordinarily sensitive diplomatic contacts , which the intelligence committees do not routinely require to satisfy their responsibilities. Henceforth, the intelligence committees' leadership, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, were to be provided prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs if the President determined that limited access to such programs was essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests. A principal difference is that the Gang of Four notification procedure is not based in statute, as previously mentioned, but rather is a more informal notification process that generally has been accepted by the leadership of the intelligence committees over time. Another distinction between the two notification procedures, at least since 1980 when the Gang of Eight procedure was first adopted in statute, is that Gang of Four notifications generally are limited to non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally but not exclusively intelligence collection programs viewed by the intelligence community as being particularly sensitive. Gang of Eight notifications, by contrast, are statutorily limited to particularly sensitive covert action programs. Notwithstanding these distinctions, there arguably is no provision in statute that restricts whether and how the chairmen and ranking Members of the intelligence committees share with committee members information pertaining to intelligence activities that the executive branch has provided only to the committee leadership, either through Gang of Four or Gang of Eight notifications. | "Gang of Four" intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs that the intelligence community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees.
Gang of Four notifications are not based in statute but have constituted a practice generally accepted by the leadership of the intelligence committees, and that is employed when the intelligence community believes a particular intelligence activity to be of such sensitivity that a restricted notification is warranted in order to reduce the risk of disclosure, inadvertent or otherwise. Intelligence activities viewed as being less sensitive typically are briefed to the full membership of each committee.
In either case—whether a given briefing about non-covert action intelligence activities is limited to the Gang of Four, or provided to the full membership of the intelligence committees—the current statute conditions the provision of any such information on the need to protect from unauthorized disclosure classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.
Congress has said that its intent in this regard is that in extremely rare circumstances a need to preserve essential secrecy may result in a decision not to impart certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs to the intelligence oversight committees in order to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods. With regard to the phrase "other exceptionally sensitive matters," Congress has said its intent in using this phrase is to refer to other extremely sensitive categories of classified information such as information concerning the operational details of military deployment and extraordinarily sensitive diplomatic contacts, which the intelligence committees do not routinely require to satisfy their responsibilities.
This report reviews the history of the Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the "Gang of Eight" notification procedure. The "Gang of Eight" procedure is statutorily based and provides that the chairmen and ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders—rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees—are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests. |
crs_R44724 | crs_R44724_0 | It ended the cash assistance program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. The reduction of the number of families with children receiving cash assistance since the mid-1990s is perhaps the signature indicator used to propose that the 1996 welfare reform law was successful in reducing welfare dependency. In 1995, an estimated 17.6 million people received AFDC cash benefits at some time during the year. In 2012, 5.6 million people received TANF at some point in the year. Note that this is not a result of the 1996 welfare reform law. The size of the TANF cash assistance caseload is determined by both the size of the population eligible for assistance and the rate at which families "take up" that assistance. Post Welfare Reform: Caseload Trends
Table 1 shows the cash assistance caseload and selected indicators of child poverty and work among single mothers for selected years, 1995 to 2012. The period from 1995 to 2000 saw rapid declines in the cash assistance caseload. The Rate of Receipt of TANF Cash among Eligible Persons
Was the caseload decline the result of stricter rules governing eligibility for TANF cash, or was it the result of a decline in the rate of take-up of benefits? In 1995, 82% of those eligible for AFDC received benefits. Table 2 shows selected characteristics of adults who were eligible for but did not receive cash assistance from AFDC in 1995 and TANF in 2000, 2007, and 2012. Thus, adults who were eligible for cash assistance but not receiving it were relatively disadvantaged based on the measures shown on the table, and became more so (more like those who traditionally received cash assistance) over the 1995 to 2012 period
Child Poverty
In 1995, there were 15.2 million children (21.6% of all children) living in families with pre-assistance money income below the poverty line; in 2012, the number stood at 15.8 million, which was again 21.6% of all children. The share of poor children in families actually receiving TANF fell faster than the share of poor children eligible for TANF cash. However, the rise in the number of children living in families with pre-TANF income in deep poverty over the 2000 to 2012 period did not fully offset the 1995 to 2000 decline; there were an estimated 1 million fewer children in families with pre-TANF income in deep poverty in 2012 than there were in 1995. Still, as shown in Table 4 , the decline in the percentage of children in TANF-eligible families who actually received benefits meant that an increasing number of children in deep poverty were in families without cash assistance. In 1995, the number of children in deep poverty who were eligible but not receiving cash assistance was 0.5 million. This number increased to 1.7 million in 2000, 2.1 million in 2007, and 3.1 million in 2012. However, the refundable tax credits have their limitations. Employment among single mothers increased. Child poverty increased, but the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance continued to decline. The drafters of the 1996 welfare reform law wanted TANF to be "temporary and provisional." However, TANF assistance was increasingly forgone or otherwise not received by those eligible for it, even amongst the poorest of families. TANF has a number of structural features that give states the incentive to have policies that seek to reduce caseloads, including the following:
Funding through a fixed block grant that provides each state a set amount of federal dollars each year, and the ability to use those funds on a wide range of benefits and services. TANF could be altered to lessen some of the incentives that states have to reduce caseloads. For example, states could be required to meet work participation standards through engaging recipients in work or activities, rather than permitting states to meet their standard either partially or fully through caseload reduction. Policymakers might also look outside of TANF, to altering existing programs. Alternatively, policymakers could look at different forms of aid, such as unconditional children's allowances or subsidized jobs, to provide ongoing support for needy families with children. | The reduction of the number of families with children receiving cash assistance since the mid-1990s is perhaps the signature indicator used to propose that the 1996 welfare reform law was successful in reducing welfare dependency. The law ended the cash assistance program for needy families with children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. TANF is a broad-based block grant that helps fund state cash assistance programs for needy families with children, but it also funds a wide range of benefits and services addressing both the effects and root causes of child poverty.
The cash assistance caseload declined particularly rapidly in the years immediately following enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law. In 1995, an estimated 17.6 million people received AFDC cash at some time during the year; by 2000, the number of people receiving cash assistance had declined to 7.9 million. The period from 1995 to 2000 also saw declines in child poverty and increased work among single mothers (who had headed most AFDC families). Following 2000, child poverty increased and work among single mothers declined somewhat. However, the cash assistance caseload continued to decline, reaching 5.7 million people in 2007 and increasing only slightly in response to the recent recession to 5.8 million people in 2012.
The decline in the cash assistance caseload generally resulted from fewer eligible people taking up TANF benefits. In 1995, 82% of those eligible for AFDC received assistance. The share of those eligible for TANF who received it fell to 47% in 2000, 34% in 2007, and 28% in 2012. While there were almost 12 million fewer individuals who received TANF in 2012 than received AFDC in 1995, the size of the population estimated as eligible to receive TANF in 2012 was 1.4 million persons lower than the population eligible for AFDC in 1995 (20.2 million versus 21.6 million).
Most of those eligible but not receiving AFDC or TANF were poor, with some in deep poverty (family incomes less than half the poverty threshold). Over the 1995 to 2012 period, an increasing number of adults who failed to take up benefits were non-workers and had no other workers in their families. The decline in the share of people eligible for cash assistance also meant that TANF had a smaller impact in ameliorating poverty—particularly among children in deep poverty—than did AFDC. In 2012, there were 3.1 million children in deep poverty that met TANF eligibility criteria but did not receive TANF assistance. The comparable number of children in deep poverty eligible for but not receiving AFDC in 1995 was 0.5 million. In 2012, TANF reduced the rate of deep poverty among children from 9.5% to 8.4%. In 1995, AFDC reduced the rate of deep poverty among children from 11.3% to 6.5%.
This analysis raises several policy questions, the key one being whether caseload reduction per se is an indicator of the success of welfare reform. The drafters of the 1996 welfare reform law wanted TANF to be "temporary and provisional." However, TANF assistance was increasingly forgone or otherwise not received by those eligible for it, even amongst the poorest of families. While low-income families receive other government benefits such as food assistance and (if they have earners) refundable tax credits, these benefits do not provide ongoing cash assistance to meet basic needs. TANF has a number of structural features that give states the incentive to have policies that seek to reduce caseloads. For example, its "work participation standards" can be met partially or wholly through caseload reduction rather than through engaging recipients in work or activities. TANF could be altered to lessen some of the incentives that states have to reduce caseloads. Policymakers might also look outside of TANF, to altering some existing programs or providing different forms of aid to provide ongoing support for needy families with children. |
crs_RL33779 | crs_RL33779_0 | The most common cause of species' decline is habitat loss or alteration. ESA has been among the most contentious environmental laws, because of its strict substantive provisions, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. In the 109 th Congress, there were several unsuccessful attempts to enact comprehensive legislation that would have reauthorized the ESA. Consequently, congressional efforts in the 110 th Congress focused on addressing specific controversial features of ESA and on oversight of concerns such as the science used for making decisions and designation of critical habitat. 93-205 , as amended; 16 U.S.C. A stated purpose of ESA is to protect the ecosystems of which listed species are a part. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) may be listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools, including penalties and citizen suits, are available to aid species recovery and protect habitat. Several legislative proposals were introduced in the 110 th Congress to address illegal wildlife trade. 110-132 reauthorized the African Elephant Conservation Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of 1994 through FY2012, and P.L. 110-133 reauthorized the Asian Elephant Conservation Act through FY2012. Issues in the 110th Congress
ESA reauthorization has been on the legislative agenda since the funding authorization expired in 1992, and bills have been introduced in each subsequent Congress to address various aspects of endangered species protection. 110-246 , the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, amended the Internal Revenue Code to permit the deduction of expenditures for endangered species recovery. In the 110 th Congress, provisions in S. 317 , S. 1177 , and S. 1554 would have amended the Clean Air Act to provide funding for programs and projects conserving habitat for endangered species and species of conservation concern that are vulnerable to the impact of climate change. 110-296 , Part I), would have allocated funds to the FWS endangered species programs and to related funds to assist species adaptation to climate change. This provision was not retained in P.L. The species was listed as threatened under ESA in 1993 and, in recent years, species abundance has declined to the lowest ever observed. Additional Legislative Initiatives
The 110 th Congress enacted P.L. Division A of P.L. | The 110th Congress took limited action to oversee implementation and funding of the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543) and to consider proposals to amend the act. Major issues in recent years have included the role of science in decision-making, consultation requirements for federal agencies, critical habitat (CH) designation and procedures, protection by and incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection of listed species, among others. In addition, many have advocated enacting as law some ESA regulations promulgated during the Clinton Administration.
ESA has been one of the more contentious environmental laws. This may stem from its strict substantive provisions, which can affect the use of both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline. ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues. The most common cause of species listing is habitat loss.
The authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. In the 109th Congress, several proposals would have reauthorized and extensively amended ESA, but none were enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th Congress to reauthorize the ESA.
In the 110th Congress, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246, included a provision amending the Internal Revenue Code to permit the deduction of expenditures for endangered species recovery. On species of international concern, the 110th Congress enacted P.L. 110-132, reauthorizing the African Elephant Conservation Act and the Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of 1994 through FY2012, and P.L. 110-133, reauthorizing the Asian Elephant Conservation Act through FY2012. A number of bills introduced in both the House and Senate to address global climate change included provisions that would have allocated funds to the FWS endangered species program and to related funds to assist species adaptation to climate change.
This report identifies and discusses oversight issues and legislation introduced in the 110th Congress to address specific concerns related to how ESA is implemented and how endangered species are managed. |
crs_R41203 | crs_R41203_0 | Introduction
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16 ), among other tax cuts, provided for a gradual reduction in the estate tax. Under EGTRRA, the estate tax exemption rose from $675,000 in 2001 to $3.5 million in 2009, and the top tax rate fell from 55% to 45%. As with other provisions of EGTRRA, the tax revisions expire in 2011, returning the tax provisions to their pre-EGTRRA levels. The exemption would revert to $1 million (a value that had already been scheduled for pre-EGTRRA law) and the rate to 55% (with some graduated rates). President Obama proposed a permanent extension of the 2009 rules (a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% tax rate), and the House provided for that permanent extension on December 3, 2009 ( H.R. 4154 ). One of these proposals, to reform the Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT), is included in H.R. 4849 . An election can be made for 2010 to apply either 2010 or 2011 rules. Under the rules for 2011 and 2012, a spouse can inherit any unused exemption. At the same time, the gift tax is tax exclusive (the tax is imposed on the gift net of the tax) whereas the estate tax is tax inclusive (the tax is applied to the estate inclusive of the tax). As indicated earlier, the exemption in 2009 was $3.5 million, the exemption is scheduled at $5 million for 2011 and 2012, and in 2013 the estate tax will revert to an exemption of $1 million, absent a change in the statute. The level of the exemption affects not only the revenue but the number of estates that are subject to the tax. At the same time, there are proposals, including those in President Obama's budget, to restrict practices considered as abuses. Thus, the cost of keeping the 2009 rules in place retroactively to 2010, with a $3.5 million exemption and a 45% tax rate, would be compared to no estate tax in 2010; therefore there would be a revenue gain compared to no estate tax. In 2011, the scheduled rules ($1 million exemption, 55% rate) are estimated to produce a liability of $34.4 billion; the $3.5 million exemption, 45% rate a revenue of $18.2 billion, and the $5 million exemption/35% rate a revenue of $11.4 billion. With the $1 million exemption, about half of the estates subject to tax have assets of under $2 million and almost 80% have assets of under $3.5 million, and these estates would be eliminated from estate tax coverage with either the $3.5 million or the $5 million exemption. Most distributional analyses of taxes are reported relative to income. Evidence on the effect of the tax on small business suggests that the taxable business estates are a small share of all taxable estates and a small share of estates of all business decedents. These returns account for 0.2% and 0.4% of returns paying estate tax. Regardless of the data source used, the evidence suggests two important characteristics of businesses and the estate tax: businesses pay a small fraction of the estate tax and a tiny fraction of total estates of businesses and farmers are liable for the tax. Nevertheless, according to a recent CRS study, the effect on overall charitable giving is likely to be small: moving from the $1 million exemption with a 55% tax rate to the $3.5 million exemption with a 45% tax rate would be projected to lower charitable giving by 1%; moving to the $5 million exemption with a 35% rate would be projected to reduce giving by 2%. These include portability of the spousal exemption, changing the rules on certain trusts, restricting minority discounts, and conforming definitions of fair market value for estates and heirs. A provision in the Administration's budget proposals would require this value to be the same and is projected to raise $3 billion over 10 years. For the $3.5 million exemption, 45% rate effective in 2009, 96% of the tax falls on the top quintile of the income distribution, 72% falls in the top 1%, and 42% in the top 0.1%. Effects on savings are uncertain in direction but likely small. | The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16), among other tax cuts, provided for a gradual reduction and elimination of the estate tax. Under EGTRRA, the estate tax exemption rose from $675,000 in 2001 to $3.5 million in 2009, and the rate fell from 55% to 45%. In 2010, the estate tax was eliminated. The estate tax changes, however, were scheduled to sunset in 2011, when the exemption would have become $1 million (as scheduled in pre-EGTRRA law) and the tax rate would return to 55%.
There was general agreement that some sort of estate tax would be retained. A proposal to make the 2009 rules ($3.5 million exemption and 45% rate) permanent was included in President Obama's 2010 and 2011 budget outlines and was passed by the House in December 2009 (H.R. 4154). Senate Democratic leaders supported the plan to enact the 2009 rules permanently (and make them retroactive to 2010). The Senate Republican leadership proposed a $5 million exemption and 35% rate. This latter provision was adopted for a two-year period, through 2012. At that point the exemption will revert to the pre-EGTRRA law. For estates of decedents in 2010, either the 2010 or 2011 rules can be elected. Spouses can inherit unused exemptions.
With any of the exemption levels, few estates are affected by the tax. In 2011, the shares of estates taxed are projected by one study to be 1.76%, 0.25%, and 0.14% for the exemption levels of $1 million, $3.5 million, and $5 million, respectively. These numbers would grow to 3%, 0.46%, and 0.23% by 2019. The revenue yield in 2011 is projected to be $34.4 billion, $18.2 billion, and $11.4 billion for the $1 million exemption/55% rate, $3.5 million exemption/45% rate, and the $5 million exemption/35% rate. The estate tax accounts for a small share of revenue.
The estate tax is a highly progressive tax; it not only applies to the largest estates, but within the distribution of estates a large share is concentrated in the over $20 million estate level: 72% for the $5 million/35% rate. Because of exclusions, the effective tax rates are smaller than the statutory rate, with an average of 14% for the $5 million exemption/35% rate. When distributed with respect to income, 96% falls in the top quintile of the income distribution, 72% in the top 1%, and 42% in the top 0.1%, under the $3.5 million exemption/45% rate.
Although concerns have been raised about the effects of the tax on small businesses and farmers, estimates indicate that the share of estate taxes paid by small business estates under the proposed revisions would be small (16% to 18%) and the share of estates of small business owners taxed is small (about 0.2% of decedents with at least 50% of their assets in businesses). Evidence suggests that the number of returns with inadequate liquid assets to pay the estate tax is negligible.
Other effects are likely small. The effects on savings are uncertain but likely small relative to the economy because the tax is small. Moving to either the $3.5 million plan or the $5 million plan would be projected to decrease charitable contributions by a small amount: 1% to 2%. Recent evidence suggests that the costs of administration and compliance are around 7% of revenues.
Structural reforms that might be considered are inheritance of spousal exemptions, and some reforms directed at abuses. A provision to restrict Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATS), which can be used to virtually eliminate estate tax by providing an annuity with a remainder, is contained in H.R. 4849. Other provisions in President Obama's budget outline include restricting discounts for estates left to family partnerships and conforming fair market value for purposes of the estate tax and future capital gains realizations for heirs. |
crs_R42752 | crs_R42752_0 | For each waterbody or segment, states are required to set a total maximum daily load (TMDL) of pollutants at a level that ensures that applicable water quality standards can be attained and maintained. A TMDL is both a planning process for attaining water quality standards and a quantitative assessment of problems, pollution sources, and pollutant reductions needed to restore and protect a river, stream, or lake. Environmentalists see implementation of Section 303(d) as important both to achieving the overall goals and objectives of the act and to pressuring EPA and states to address nonpoint and other sources that are responsible for many water quality impairments nationwide but have not been well controlled. The final rule built on the existing regulatory program and added details, specific requirements, and deadlines requiring states to implement plans to clean up polluted waters. Developing even these relatively straightforward TMDLs presented substantial technical and scientific challenges, but the national program has by now become a core element of overall efforts to protect and restore water quality. At the same time, the 303(d) program has evolved, and especially during the last decade, EPA and states have addressed more complex issues, including TMDLs for less-traditional causes of impairment, TMDLs involving both point and nonpoint sources, and multi-jurisdictional TMDLs. Under Section 303(d)(2) of the CWA, upon disapproval of a TMDL, EPA must establish a new TMDL to implement applicable water quality standards, and EPA has begun a new phosphorus TMDL for the impaired Vermont segments in Lake Champlain. A central feature of the overall strategy is EPA's establishment of a TMDL for Chesapeake Bay, which was necessitated because the Bay states' previous restoration efforts were insufficient to attain water quality standards. It addresses all segments of the Bay and its tidal tributaries that are impaired from discharges of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment, with a goal of having TMDL implementation measures in place by 2025. Detailed plans identifying specific reductions are to be developed by the seven jurisdictions located in the Chesapeake Bay watershed in Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs). The Chesapeake Bay TMDL has a number of novel elements. EPA's TMDL and the overall federal Bay restoration strategy under the executive order are controversial with a number of groups that are concerned about the likely mandatory nature of many of EPA's and states' upcoming actions. That said, when a TMDL is developed, implementation is a huge gap in the program for several reasons. First, as noted previously, CWA Section 303(d) requires development of a TMDL for impaired waters but does not require implementation. States' strategies for implementation vary widely. Second, a number of barriers to TMDL implementation can be identified. The most prominent hindrance is funding. At the same time, several factors that seem to aid effective implementation also can be identified. The TMDL program is in a period of transition. Many states are emerging from earlier consent decree mandates and are increasingly addressing new challenges—for example, more complex and resource-intensive TMDLs, larger scale impairments, and nonpoint sources. Other than recent oversight hearings on the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, Congress has not shown active interest in the TMDL program for more than a decade. Some stakeholders, especially states, believe that several issues present Congress with an opportunity to examine the TMDL provisions of the CWA. | Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires states to identify waters that are impaired by pollution, even after application of pollution controls. For those waters, states must establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) of pollutants to ensure that water quality standards can be attained. A TMDL is both a quantitative assessment of pollution sources and pollutant reductions needed to restore and protect U.S. waters and a planning process for attaining water quality standards. Implementation of Section 303(d) was dormant until states and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were prodded by lawsuits. The program has been controversial, in part because of requirements and costs faced by states, as well as industries, cities, farmers, and others who may be required to use new pollution controls to meet TMDL requirements.
Despite controversies, the TMDL program has become a core element of overall efforts to protect and restore water quality. States and EPA develop several thousand TMDLs annually, but many more need to be completed. The most recent information indicates that over 41,000 waterbodies do not meet water quality standards and need a TMDL to initiate corrective measures. The 303(d) program has evolved, and especially during the last decade, EPA and states have addressed more complex issues, including TMDLs involving both point (direct discharges) and nonpoint sources (diffuse discharges) such as stormwater; TMDLs for less-traditional causes of impairment such as climate change; TMDLs for pollutants such as mercury that involve coordination among water, air, and other environmental programs; and multi-jurisdictional TMDLs.
The largest multi-jurisdictional TMDL, for the Chesapeake Bay watershed, has drawn considerable attention. It was developed by EPA and was necessitated because previous largely voluntary restoration efforts by the Bay jurisdictions were insufficient to attain water quality standards. It addresses all segments of the Bay and its tidal tributaries that are impaired from discharges of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment, with a goal of having TMDL implementation measures in place by 2025. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL has a number of novel elements, including Watershed Implementation Plans in which the jurisdictions identify specific measures to achieve needed pollutant reductions, and biennial reports to the public on progress in implementation. The Bay TMDL has been controversial with a number of groups concerned about the costs of implementation and the likely mandatory nature of many of EPA's and states' actions. EPA's authority to develop the TMDL was upheld, after a legal challenge.
When a TMDL is developed, implementation is a major uncertainty. First, Section 303(d) does not require implementation, and states' strategies for implementation vary widely. Only a few have laws requiring implementation plans, while many others rely on less structured policies. Second, a number of barriers to implementation can be identified. The most prominent is insufficient funding, but technical impediments such as insufficient scientific data also are a challenge. At the same time, factors that may aid effective implementation include active involvement of stakeholders and governments, and adequate resources.
The TMDL program is in a period of transition and increasingly is addressing new challenges—more complex TMDLs, larger scale impairments, and nonpoint sources. Other than oversight hearings on the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, Congress has not shown active interest in the TMDL program for more than a decade. Some stakeholders, especially states, believe that several issues present Congress with an opportunity to examine the TMDL provisions of the CWA. |
crs_R40998 | crs_R40998_0 | However, ASPA and FPASA do not authorize agencies to set aside contracts for small businesses, or conduct procurements in which only small businesses, or specific types of small businesses, may compete. In other cases, agencies use negotiated procurements without evaluation factors focusing on firms' size. These limitations result from statutory and regulatory provisions prohibiting agencies from awarding prime contracts to small businesses unless the small business performs a certain percentage of the contract work itself, instead of subcontracting it. Washington-Harris Group's reference to the FAR appears to have been to Part 19.14, which requires, among other things, that a clause containing the limitations on subcontracting discussed in Table 2 (Clause 52.219-27) be incorporated in all solicitations. However, because contracts awarded under the general contracting authorities cannot be set aside for SDVOSBs while those awarded under the authority of the Small Business Act can be, and because the same limitations on subcontracting apply to other types of small businesses as apply to SDVOSBs, GAO's decision can arguably be construed to mean that limitations on subcontracting do not apply to any non-disaster and non-emergency "preference contract" awarded to any type of small business under the general contracting authorities. Effects of GAO's Decision
Some commentators have suggested that GAO's decision could result in agencies using more preference contracts and fewer set-asides . On the one hand, increased use of preference contracts could result in increased contracting with small businesses because agencies could award contracts to firms that would have lacked the capacity to perform the required percentage of the work on a set-aside contract. | This report discusses Washington-Harris Group, a protest filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) alleging, among other things, that an agency improperly awarded a "preference contract" to a service-disabled veteran-owned small business that proposed to subcontract a greater percentage of work on the contract than allowed under the Small Business Administration's limitations on subcontracting. GAO denied the protest, in part, because it found that limitations on subcontracting apply only to contracts "set aside" for small business, not to preference contracts. A preference contract is one awarded in an unrestricted competition in which firms' small-business status is an evaluation factor, while a set-aside is a procurement in which only small businesses may compete. Limitations on subcontracting are statutory and regulatory provisions that require small businesses to perform certain percentages of the work on federal prime contracts themselves, rather than subcontract it to other firms. GAO's decision appears to be a case of first impression and can arguably be construed to mean that existing limitations on subcontracting are inapplicable to non-disaster and non-emergency contracts awarded to any type of small business under the general contracting authorities. Commentators have suggested that the decision may result in increased use of preference contracts by federal agencies.
The federal government awarded $96.8 billion in prime contracts and subcontracts to small businesses in FY2009 through set-asides and other contracting vehicles. |
crs_R42546 | crs_R42546_0 | Nearly 20% of Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 and over who were hospitalized in 2005 were readmitted within 30 days following their initial hospital discharge. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) estimated that these readmissions cost $15 billion per year in hospital payments and that as much as two-thirds of these readmissions may be preventable. Changes that address hospital readmissions among Medicare's FFS beneficiaries, such as placing a greater emphasis on effective discharge planning, adoption of different care management programs, and payment reforms, may improve patient care and generate cost savings for the program. (Other factors associated with rehospitalizations and the effectiveness of hospital discharge planning are discussed in Appendix A .) QIOs are also providing technical assistance to candidates seeking to participate in the Community Care Transitions Program established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA as amended, P.L. 111-148 ). This report is intended to help Congress understand the complex issue of hospital readmissions and Medicare's ongoing and future activities to address those rehospitalizations. The report will then discuss Medicare's efforts to provide technical and financial assistance to hospitals' efforts to improve discharge procedures and manage patients' care transitions. Current Medicare Care Transition Initiatives
Prior to the enactment of ACA, from August 2008, through July 2011, during its 9 th SOW, QIOs in 14 states collaborated with providers in selected communities to identify the underlying causes of hospital readmissions in their communities and then develop different strategies to prevent those rehospitalizations. As part of the 10 th SOW which began August 1, 2011, QIOs will work to reduce readmissions 20% by 2013 which would prevent the rehospitalization of an estimated 1.6 million hospital patients, among other goals. CCTP may be continued or expanded if the Office of the Actuary (OACT) certifies that the expansion would reduce Medicare spending without reducing quality. Forthcoming Medicare Payment Initiatives to Address Readmissions
As well as establishing CCTP to assist certain high readmission hospitals with care transitions, ACA included several payment initiatives to encourage FFS providers, particularly hospitals, to work to minimize rehospitalizations, if not coordinate patient care across settings. This section will discuss the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP), the national pilot program included in ACA, and the national bundled payment pilot program established by the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Innovation (CMMI). CMS is implementing this program over two years. National Pilot Program of Payment Bundling
Under a bundled payment method, a single payment is made for a defined group of services rather than individual payments for each service. How should quality of care be measured? The three-year project starting in 2012 will encompass four different bundled payment models. Reducing these readmissions could reduce Medicare expenditures. As endorsed by NQF, Medicare's time frame for a readmission is 30 days. Each component of the formula is described in statute as follows:
Determine the excess readmissions ratio for the hospital defined as the risk-adjusted predicted readmissions divided by the risk-adjusted expected readmissions;
Determine the aggregate payments for excess readmissions for the hospital defined as the product of three components:
o The base operating DRG payments for the applicable conditions,
o The number of admissions for those conditions, and
o The hospital's excess readmissions ratio;
Determine the aggregate payment for all discharges for the hospital defined as the sum of base operating DRG payments for all discharges for all conditions in the hospital;
Determine the excess readmissions payment ratio defined as 1 minus the ratio of the aggregate payments for excess readmissions for the hospital to the aggregate payments for all discharges—which can be displayed as:
Determine the adjustment factor by using greater of the excess readmissions payment ratio or the floor adjustment factor (of 0.99 of the discharge payments in FY2013, 0.98 of the discharge in FY2014, 0.97 in FY2015 and in subsequent fiscal years (effectively limiting the adjustment to no more than a 1% reduction in FY2013, 2% in FY2014 and 3% thereafter);
Determine the adjustment to the hospital payments for excess readmissions by multiplying the base operating DRG payment amount for discharges from the hospital by the applicable adjustment factor. | Nearly 20% of Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 and over who were admitted to a hospital in 2005 were readmitted within 30 days following their initial discharge. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) estimated that these readmissions cost the Medicare program as much as $15 billion per year and that perhaps as much as two-thirds of these readmissions may be preventable. Many policymakers believe that different care transition programs coupled with payment reforms can constrain hospital readmissions among Medicare's fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries, could improve patient care, and may generate cost savings for the program. Hospital readmissions are associated with a number of factors and are not necessarily attributable to problems with the quality of patient care, but strong evidence indicates specific interventions to better manage care transitions at the time of hospital discharge could reduce readmissions for certain conditions.
Medicare is building on past work by Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs) to help providers identify the underlying causes of hospital readmissions in their communities and then develop different strategies to prevent those rehospitalizations. In their newest round of Medicare contracts, which began August 1, 2011, QIOs will work to reduce readmissions 20% by 2013 and provide technical assistance to participants in the Community Care Transitions Program (CCTP), a $500 million, five-year demonstration program established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA as amended, P.L. 111-148) to help participating hospitals improve discharge procedures and manage patients' care transitions more effectively. CCTP may be continued or expanded if the Office of the Actuary (OACT) certifies that the expansion would reduce Medicare spending without reducing quality. By mid-March 2012, 30 sites had been selected.
As well as establishing CCTP, ACA included several payment initiatives to encourage FFS providers, particularly hospitals, to work to minimize rehospitalizations and coordinate patient care across settings. Two initiatives in particular are discussed in this report, the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program (HRRP) and bundled payments. The HRRP will penalize an acute care hospital with higher than expected readmission rates by as much as 1% of its base payments starting in FY2013. Initially, the HRRP must use the three existing readmission measures that are endorsed by the National Quality Forum (NQF) and are included on Medicare's Hospital COMPARE website (where publically reported data can be used to assess hospital performance). Hospitals and industry advocates have expressed concerns about the existing measures and the effect of the readmission penalties on certain safety-net hospitals; issues that are likely to attract significant Congressional attention as the program's implementation date approaches. CMS is also exploring bundled payment methods where a single payment is made for a defined group of services rather than individual payments for each service. The national bundled payment pilot program established by the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Innovation (CMMI) is a three-year project starting in 2012 that will encompass four different bundled payment models. Changing these FFS financial incentives may be Medicare's most effective strategy for addressing hospital readmissions.
This report examines the complex issue of hospital readmissions along with Medicare's ongoing efforts and future activities to reduce unnecessary readmissions. |
crs_RS22624 | crs_RS22624_0 | Types of Terminations
ERISA provides for three types of single-employer plan terminations: standard, distress, and involuntary. Standard Termination
A standard termination occurs when a plan administrator decides to terminate a plan that has assets sufficient to meet its benefit liabilities. The PBGC's involvement in a standard termination is minimal, and its role is basically to confirm that the above requirements have been met. Distress Termination
A distress termination occurs when a plan administrator seeks to terminate a plan that does not have sufficient assets to cover all the benefits owed to plan participants and beneficiaries. If the criteria are met, the PBGC must then determine whether the plan's assets are sufficient to pay the benefits guaranteed by the PBGC and/or meet all benefit liabilities. Involuntary Termination
An involuntary termination occurs when the PBGC decides a plan should be terminated. The PBGC must initiate termination proceedings once it determines a plan does not have assets available to pay benefits currently due. The PBGC may seek to terminate a plan if
the plan has not met the minimum funding requirements or there has been notification from the Treasury Secretary that a notice of deficiency concerning the initial tax on a funding deficiency has been mailed; the plan will not be able to pay benefits when due; a distribution of at least $10,000 has been made to a participant who is a substantial owner of the sponsoring company and, immediately after the distribution, the plan has unfunded nonforfeitable benefits; or the long-run loss to the PBGC may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated. Employer Liability
Standard Termination
In a standard termination, the plan sponsor has no further liability to the PBGC or plan participants. The plan sponsor may be able to recapture any assets remaining after participants have received their share, which is known as a "reversion." Distress and Involuntary Terminations
In a distress termination and an involuntary termination, the plan sponsor and members of its controlled group are jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for, among other things, the amount that the benefit liabilities exceed plan assets, with interest, at termination. Enforcement and Penalties
The PBGC is broadly authorized to make any investigation it deems necessary to enforce ERISA and may assess a penalty against anyone who fails to provide a required notice or other material information. In addition, plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and sponsors who are adversely affected by an action of another (other than the PBGC) that violates the termination provisions may file suit in U.S. district court to enjoin the action or obtain other equitable relief. Employee organizations representing affected participants and beneficiaries are also able to file a claim, and the PBGC has the right to intervene in any action. | Questions may arise regarding the pensions of private-sector workers and how pension plans may be terminated, particularly in instances where a company experiences financial difficulties. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulates plan terminations and provides for three types of single-employer plan terminations—standard, distress, and involuntary—and imposes different responsibilities on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for each type.
A standard termination occurs when a plan administrator decides to terminate a plan that has assets sufficient to meet its benefit liabilities. The PBGC's involvement in a standard termination is minimal, with its role basically limited to confirming all legal requirements have been met. In a standard termination, the plan sponsor has no further liability to the PBGC or plan participants. The sponsor may be able to recapture any assets remaining after participants have received their share, although the reversion may be subject to tax.
A distress termination occurs when a plan administrator seeks to terminate a plan that does not have sufficient assets to cover all the benefits owed to plan participants and beneficiaries. The PBGC is responsible for ensuring that all criteria for termination have been met, as well as for determining whether the plan's assets are sufficient to pay the guaranteed benefits and/or meet all benefit liabilities. Meanwhile, the plan sponsor and members of its controlled group are jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for the amount that the benefit liabilities exceed plan assets, with interest, at termination.
An involuntary termination occurs when the PBGC decides a plan should be terminated. The agency must initiate termination proceedings once it determines a plan does not have assets available to pay benefits currently due. It may seek termination under certain circumstances, including the plan has not met the minimum funding requirements; the plan will not be able to pay benefits when due; or the long-run loss to the PBGC may be expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is not terminated. In an involuntary termination, the sponsor and controlled group are jointly and severally liable to the PBGC for the unfunded liabilities.
The PBGC is broadly authorized to make any investigation it deems necessary to enforce ERISA and may assess a penalty against anyone who fails to provide a required notice or other material information. In addition, plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and sponsors who are adversely affected by an action of another that violates the termination provisions may file suit in U.S. district court to enjoin the action or obtain other equitable relief. Employee organizations representing affected participants and beneficiaries are also able to file a claim, and the PBGC has the right to intervene in any action. |
crs_RS22440 | crs_RS22440_0 | Unemployment Compensation Benefit Eligibility for Former Military Personnel
Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX) provides income support to former active duty military personnel or reservists, who were recently released from active duty, while they search for work. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P.L. In general, based upon each state's law, only the amount of the benefit that is attributable to military service would be charged to the agency. After active duty, if the former servicemember is unemployed, the former servicemember would qualify for UCX benefits based on military service. Military service of business owners or employees may impact the tax rate that certain employers face. These states do not charge UC benefits to employer accounts when workers voluntarily quit their jobs to accompany a transferred military spouse. States may choose to create provisions that remove or limit these tax increases in certain situations. 114-92 . In addition to many other actions, the law altered certain conditions for individuals to receive UCX. In addition, the law doubled the number of days (from 90 to 180 continuous days) a reserve member of the Armed Forces would have to be on active duty to qualify for UCX. Two earlier proposals had similar provisions, but did not include exceptions to the prohibition of concurrent receipt. Section 535 of S. 1376 includes a provision that would prohibit the concurrent receipt of unemployment benefits for former military servicemembers (UCX) and Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance. | The Unemployment Compensation (UC) program contains several provisions relevant to current and former military service personnel and their families. The UC program does not provide benefits for military servicemembers on active duty. However, former active duty military personnel (and certain reservists) recently separated from active duty may be eligible for Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX).
Spouses of military service personnel who voluntarily quit a job to accompany their spouses on account of a military transfer may be eligible for UC benefits, based on the laws of the state where the civilian spouse was employed.
Military service of business owners, employees, and employees' spouses may impact the state unemployment tax rate that certain employers face. States may choose to create provisions that remove or limit these tax increases in certain situations.
In addition to many other actions, P.L. 114-92 alters certain requirements for individuals to receive UCX. The new law prohibits the concurrent receipt of UCX and Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance but does provide exceptions. In addition, the law doubles the number of days (from 90 to 180 continuous days) a reserve member of the Armed Forces would have to be on active duty to qualify for UCX.
Two proposals earlier in the 114th Congress, H.R. 1735 and S. 1376, had similar provisions, but did not include exceptions to the prohibition of concurrent receipt.
Individuals should contact their state's unemployment agency to obtain information on how to apply for and receive unemployment benefits based upon military service. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) maintains a website with links to each state's agency at http://www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/map.asp. |
crs_R41799 | crs_R41799_0 | The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions regarding the nature of the people's right to "keep and bear arms," as guaranteed in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has focused some interest in the extent to which firearms are protected from the reach of creditors under either federal or state laws. State laws that protect certain property from creditors' claims generally are designed to apply in non-bankruptcy contexts, but may also be used in bankruptcy. Federal law also protects certain property from creditors' claims in bankruptcy. Legislation introduced in the 112 th Congress, similar to legislation passed by the House in the 111 th Congress, would have allowed a specific federal exemption for firearms and would include firearms in the definition of household goods whose exemptions could be protected from impairment by liens. A number of states provide their own exemptions for firearms. Federal Exemptions Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
Section 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code addresses the extent to which an individual debtor may elect to exempt equity in certain property from becoming part of the bankruptcy estate. However, debtors in many states have no choice to make because their state law prohibits the use of the federal exemptions. The conditions for exempting firearms vary among the relevant states. Some states specify the number of firearms that may be exempted without regard to the value of the firearms. Other states limit the exemption to one firearm and further limit the claimed exemption by either the value of the firearm or the aggregate value of the statutorily exempt property in which the firearm is included. In these states, there is generally a limit to the value of each firearm. In most of the states, the exemption is not controlled by the way in which the firearm is used. Several states, however, exempt only guns that are for personal use. Only one state, Louisiana, requires that the exempted firearm be used for business purposes. 1181 , the Protecting Gun Owners in Bankruptcy Act of 2011, was introduced on March 17, 2011, in the 112 th Congress. The bill would have amended Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to add an exemption for the debtor's aggregate interest─up to a total value of $3,000—"in a single rifle, shotgun, or pistol or any combination thereof." Inclusion of firearms in the definition of household goods would not have increased the exemption available for firearms, but it would have allowed debtors to avoid liens that are nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests on those firearms, under Section 522(f)(1)(B), as they are currently able to avoid such liens on other household goods. | The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions regarding the nature of the people's right to "keep and bear arms," as guaranteed in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, has focused some interest on the extent to which firearms are protected from the reach of creditors under either federal or state laws. State laws protecting certain property from creditors' claims may be used both in and outside of the bankruptcy context. Federal law may also protect certain property from creditors' claims in bankruptcy.
Although a number of states have provisions explicitly shielding firearms from the claims of creditors, there is currently no such provision in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (title 11). In the 111th Congress, legislation was passed in the House (H.R. 5827) that would have provided an explicit federal exemption in bankruptcy for a debtor's aggregate interest, up to $3,000, "in a single rifle, shotgun, or pistol, or any combination thereof." The bill also included the means for protecting firearms by including them─subject to the same value and type restrictions─in the definition of "household goods" for which nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest liens could be avoided in bankruptcy. Similar legislation was introduced in the 112th Congress: the Protecting Gun Owners in Bankruptcy Act of 2011 (H.R. 1181).
The Bankruptcy Code generally provides two options for claiming exemptions in bankruptcy─either the exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. Section 522(d) or the exemptions available under state law. However, debtors may only choose to use the federal exemptions in Section 522(d) if their state specifically authorizes them to do so. Because the proposed federal exemption for firearms would be included in Section 522(d), debtors whose states do not authorize them to use the Section 522(d) exemptions would not benefit from the proposed change in exemptions. They might, however, benefit from the inclusion of firearms in the definition of household goods, because they could then have the option of freeing those firearms from liens that were based on a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest.
There is great variety in the extent of the protection from creditors the states provide for firearms. The majority of states provide no explicit protection. Among the 13 states that provide protection, the conditions for providing that protection vary. Some states limit the exemption by both the number and value of the firearms; some do not limit the number but may limit either the value of each firearm or the aggregate value of all. Other states specify the type of firearms that can be exempted. In most states that allow an exemption for firearms, the exemption is not dependent upon the way in which the firearm is used. Several states, however, exempt only guns that are for personal use, and one state requires that the firearm be used for business purposes. |
crs_RS21820 | crs_RS21820_0 | The U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer (head of the U.S.-led occupation authority, the CoalitionProvisionalAuthority or CPA), in consultation with Iraqis appointed to a 25-seat "Iraq Governing Council (IGC)," agreed toa plan that wouldlead to sovereignty for Iraq by June 30, 2004. The UnitedStates and United Nations intend that the interim government not make any long-term laws or decisions -- itsprimary function is torun the ministries and prepare for national elections. The following additional decisions or eventswere part of the handover: (4)
Bremer departed Iraq on June 28, 2004, right after the handover, and the CPA ceased to exist. U.S. four-star Gen. George Casey assumed command. Legal Issues of the Handover
A number of legal issues are likely to arise. The United States doesnot, however,retain any authority to interpret and enforce those laws. Status of Military Forces. | Amid ongoing insurgency, the United States handed sovereignty to an Iraqi interimgovernment on June 28. The Bush Administration maintains that the handover was a success and will begin atransition todemocracy and stability. Critics assert that the handover does not appear to have diminished the anti-U.S.insurgency, threateningthe transition roadmap developed by the United States and United Nations. Legal issues may arise regarding thevalidity of lawsissued during the occupation, as well as the status of U.S. troops in Iraq. See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq:U.S. Regime ChangeEfforts and Post-Saddam Governance. |
crs_RS22623 | crs_RS22623_0 | After tier I amounts are first paid, they increase annually with a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in the same manner as Social Security benefits. Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001
The Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001 ( P.L. The 2001 law increased initial annuities for the widow(er)s of qualifying railroad employees. The 2001 law added a supplemental guaranty amount , initially set at 50% of the employee's tier II amount, to the amounts provided under prior law. Since the COLA increase and the guaranty reduction are equal, the total amount of a widow(er)'s monthly annuity will not change for several years. Higher Widow and Widower Annuities After the 2001 Law
All widow(er)s who are eligible to receive the initial minimum amount provided by the 2001 law receive annuities that are greater than or equal to the annuities they would have received under prior law. For example, in 2012, her annuity would be $1,323 under both current law and prior law. | The Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-90) increased monthly annuities for many Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) widow and widower beneficiaries. The legislation added a guaranty amount—a temporary supplemental payment—to the initial annuities, making them greater than previously. However, the legislation also provided that the monthly annuities would not increase with annual cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) while guaranty amounts are paid, in effect keeping them constant for several years.
The rules for widow(er) annuities are a source of confusion among RRB beneficiaries. Many believe they are worse off after the 2001 law. However, all widow(er)s who are eligible to receive the initial minimum amount provided by the 2001 law receive an annuity that is greater than or equal to the annuity they would have received under the prior law. This report explains the provisions of the 2001 law that affect widow(er) annuities and provides an illustration of the annuities under both prior law and current law. The report will not be updated. |
crs_R42996 | crs_R42996_0 | Introduction
On January 25, 2013, the Senate approved two resolutions affecting the process for considering legislation and nominations. S.Res. 15 established two orders of the Senate that will apply only in the 113 th Congress. The impact of the changes, however, might be felt largely in negotiations about how or when to set aside the rules and standing orders with the consent of all Senators. Most motions to proceed are not subject to any time limit on debate, and therefore a cloture process and three-fifths support may be required to reach a vote. S.Res. 15 , Section 1, creates a special motion to proceed that could be approved by majority vote after four hours of debate. A bill brought before the Senate using this new motion would be subject to an alternative amendment process intended to encourage the consideration of at least four amendments, two from each party. These four amendments (here called "priority amendments") would be considered sequentially (not simultaneously), alternating by party, beginning with the minority and ending with the majority. Without cloture, the priority amendments are not subject to debate limitations, and offering and voting on all four would therefore most likely be arranged by unanimous consent. An amendment can be disposed of in the Senate through means of
a vote on the question of approving the amendment; the Senate could reach such a vote only if every Senator were willing to allow the vote to occur (or through cloture); a vote on tabling the amendment; a simple majority could, without debate, vote to table the amendment, and this would permanently and adversely dispose of the amendment; a successful point of order; if, in response to a point of order, the chair (or Senate) determined that the amendment violated a rule or other procedural authority, the amendment would fall; The withdrawal of the amendment by the sponsor. Possible Operation of S.Res. 15)
Brief Overview
The second standing order accelerates the consideration of some nominations when at least three-fifths of the Senate has agreed to invoke cloture on them. If this standing order was not in effect in the 113 th Congress, then after the Senate agreed to invoke cloture on a nomination, it could be considered for a maximum of 30 hours before the Senate would vote on confirmation. The standing order reduces this 30 hour period to 8 hours for most nominations, and to 2 hours for U.S. district court nominations. The standing order excludes some high-level executive and judicial nominations. 16 , made two changes to the standing rules. 16 created an expedited method by which three-fifths of the Senate can end debate on the question of taking up a bill (or other matter) at the initiative of a bipartisan group of 16 Senators, including both party leaders. The new paragraph in the rule provides that a cloture motion on a motion to proceed, signed by the majority and the minority leader as well as at least seven Senators affiliated with each party, will mature in one session day, instead of the two session days required for all other such cloture motions. Furthermore, if such a cloture motion is successful, then the motion to proceed will not be subject to debate, in contrast to being subject to a maximum of 30 hours of consideration post-cloture. 16 creates a motion to take the three steps necessary to authorize a conference committee with the House and expedites the cloture process on that motion. Prior to this rules change, it effectively required unanimous consent to arrange for a conference committee, principally because of the time that might be required to take each step separately in the face of opposition. If cloture is filed on the new motion to authorize a conference committee, the consolidated motion would be subject to two hours of debate, after which the Senate would vote on cloture. If cloture is invoked by three-fifths of the Senate, a simple majority could approve the motion to authorize a conference, and no further debate of the motion would be in order. S.Res. | On January 25, 2013, the Senate approved two resolutions affecting the process for considering legislation and nominations. S.Res. 15 established two standing orders of the Senate that will apply only in the 113th Congress; S.Res. 16 made two changes to the standing rules of the Senate.
Section 1 of S.Res. 15 creates a special motion to proceed that could be approved by majority vote after four hours of debate. (Most motions to proceed are not subject to any limit on debate, and therefore a cloture process and three-fifths support may be required to reach a vote.) A bill brought before the Senate using this motion would be subject to an alternative amendment process intended to encourage the consideration of at least four amendments, two from each party. The four amendments would be considered sequentially (not simultaneously), alternating by party, beginning with the minority. With cloture, the opportunity to offer all four amendments is guaranteed if they are filed by times specified in the standing order. Unlike standard amendments, a non-germane priority amendment could be considered post-cloture, but would require 60 votes for approval. Without cloture, the amendments are not subject to any debate limit, and considering all four would therefore likely require unanimous consent.
S.Res. 15 also accelerates the consideration of many nominations when at least three-fifths of the Senate has agreed to invoke cloture. If this standing order was not in effect, then after the Senate agreed to invoke cloture on a nomination, it could be considered for a maximum of 30 hours before the Senate would vote on confirmation. The standing order reduces this 30 hour period to 8 hours for many nominations, and to 2 hours for U.S. district court nominations. It excludes some major executive and judicial nominations.
S.Res. 16 amends Senate Rule XXII to provide an expedited method by which three-fifths of the Senate can end debate on the question of taking up a bill (or other matter) on the initiative of both party leaders and a bipartisan group of 14 other Senators. More specifically, a cloture motion on a motion to proceed, signed by the two floor leaders as well as at least seven Senators from each party, will mature in one session day, instead of two. If such a cloture motion is successful, then the motion to proceed will not be subject to further debate, instead of being subject to a maximum of 30 hours of post-cloture consideration.
Finally, S.Res. 16 creates a motion that will consolidate the three steps necessary to authorize a conference committee with the House, and expedites the cloture process on that motion. Prior to this rules change, it effectively required unanimous consent to arrange for a conference committee, principally because of the time that might be required to take each step separately in the face of opposition. Under this new provision of Senate Rule XXVIII, a compound motion can be made to authorize a conference. If cloture is filed on this new motion, it would be subject to two hours of debate, after which the Senate would vote on cloture. If cloture is invoked by three-fifths of the Senate, a simple majority could approve the motion to authorize a conference, and no further debate of the motion would be in order.
The Senate typically considers legislation and nominations under the terms of unanimous consent agreements, rather than by operating strictly in accordance with procedural authorities. The impact of procedural change is often realized not in identifiable actions on the Senate floor, but in negotiations about how or when to set aside the rules with the consent of all Senators. |
crs_R41127 | crs_R41127_0 | Overview
The 111 th Congress enacted the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. 111-148 ), to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. In the 109 th Congress, the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program were amended and extended under the Higher Education Reconciliation Act (HERA, part of P.L. Title II, Part A of the HCERA, entitled the SAFRA Act, contains several education-related provisions. The income-based repayment (IBR) plan is amended for new borrowers of DL program loans on or after July 1, 2014. Mandatory funding for HEA programs serving Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority-Serving Institutions is provided for FY2010 through FY2019. Title I, Part F of P.L. 111-152 contains an education provision that funds the Community College and Career Training Grant Program from FY2011 through FY2014. 111-152 . The legislative history describes the budget reconciliation process. 111-89 , the conference report to accompany S.Con.Res. The House Education and Labor Committee received two reconciliation instructions, each directing the committee to report changes in laws within its jurisdictions to reduce the deficit by $1 billion for the period of FY2009 through FY2014. H.R. On October 7, 2009, the Committee also submitted H.Rept. 3221 , as reconciliation instructions to the House Budget Committee. H.R. 3221 include the following. 4872 ) by packaging education-related reconciliation instructions submitted by the House Education and Labor Committee with health care-related reconciliation instructions submitted by both the House Committee on Ways and Means and the House Committee on Education and Labor. 4872 . H.R. 111-152 . Cost Estimate
According to the CBO estimate of the SAFRA Act dated March 20, 2010, terminating FFEL program lending and replacing it with increased lending under the DL program will reduce mandatory spending by $29 billion over the FY2010-FY2014 period, and by $61 billion over the FY2010-FY2019 period. Overall, the CBO estimates that the SAFRA Act will reduce mandatory spending by $5 billion over the FY2010-FY2014 period, and by $19 billion over the FY2010-FY2019 period. These estimated savings exceed the $1 billion reduction in spending specified in S.Con.Res. 13 . CBO projects that the termination of lending under the FFEL program and the shift to all HEA Title IV federal student loans (other than Perkins Loans) being made under the DL program will result in a reduction of $28.6 billion in mandatory spending over the period from FY2010 through FY2014, and of $61.0 billion in mandatory spending over the period from FY2010 through FY2019. Amendments to the Federal Pell Grant Program
The SAFRA Act changes the method by which future additional mandatory Pell Grant award amounts are determined and increases mandatory spending by providing permanent mandatory budget authority for the program beginning March 30, 2010. | The FY2010 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13) included two reconciliation instructions directing the House Committee on Education and Labor to report changes in laws within their jurisdictions to reduce the deficit by $1 billion each for the period of fiscal year (FY) 2009 through FY2014. The reconciliation instructions specifically noted that $1 billion of the reduction from the House Committee on Education and Labor should be related to education.
On October 7, 2009, in response to the FY2010 budget reconciliation instructions, the House Committee on Education and Labor submitted H.R. 3221 to the House Budget Committee as education-related reconciliation instructions. Certain provisions of H.R. 3221 were incorporated into H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA). On March 30, 2010, President Obama signed H.R. 4872 into law (P.L. 111-152).
The SAFRA Act, Title II, Part A of the law, terminates the authority under the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, as amended, to make loans under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program after June 2010. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this will reduce mandatory spending by $29 billion over the FY2010-FY2014 period, and by $61 billion over the FY2010-FY2019 period. These savings are sufficient to achieve the $1 billion reduction in spending specified in S.Con.Res. 13, while offsetting an increase in mandatory spending as a result of expanding other HEA programs.
A significant portion of the savings estimated to result from enactment of the SAFRA Act offsets additional mandatory appropriations for the Federal Pell Grant program. The SAFRA Act also makes the following changes to several HEA programs: the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program is amended to accommodate the termination of the FFEL program; and existing HEA programs for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority-Serving Institutions and the College Access Challenge Grant (CACG) program are extended with mandatory appropriations. The law also amends the income-based repayment (IBR) plan. Overall, CBO estimates that the SAFRA Act reduces mandatory spending by $5 billion over the FY2010-FY2014 period, and by $19 billion over the FY2010-FY2019 period.
Title I of the HCERA contains provisions regarding health coverage, Medicare, Medicaid, and various tax revenues. Title I, Part F amends and funds the Department of Labor's Community College and Career Training Grant Program (CCCT).
This report begins with a brief legislative history of the education-related provisions in P.L. 111-152. It then identifies and describes selected amendments made to the HEA and other laws by P.L. 111-152. |
crs_RL31144 | crs_RL31144_0 | It is with this approach in mind that this report integrates a discussionof Chile's economic growth and development with trade policy issues raised in both the United Statesand Chile. Table 1. It is currently courting other countries including Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore,and closing in on an agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), see AppendixD . Japan and Canada follow at adistance with 3% and 2%, respectively. Other Latin American countries had much slower growth of manufacturedexports. This is in keeping with general expectations from the outset of the negotiations thatrecognized the limited benefits that could be achieved by the FTA given Chile is already a relativelysmall open economy with a relatively small trade position with the United States. Because the changes are computed from relatively small bases on a dollarvalue basis, however, the effects on industry production are expected to be small. Chile has signed the Trade Related Intellectual PropertyRights (TRIPS), but its congress has yet to pass legislation implementing the provisions. This has led to a strong divergence of opinion, bothamong groups within the United States, and between developed and developing countries. The U.S.-Jordan bilateral FTA (theimplementing legislation was signed into law by President Bush on September 28, 2001 -- P.L.107-43 ) took labor and environmental provisions a step farther. One or more of these issues were raised inhearings before the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, as well as bothJudiciary Committees. The U.S.-Chile FTA in Brief
With implementation of the U.S.-Chile free trade agreement, Chile joined a select group ofonly five other countries that have an FTA with the United States (Canada, Mexico, Jordan, Israel,and Singapore). Market access was a critical provision, with duty-free access negotiated for allgoods traded between the two countries. When the agreement enters into force on January 1, 2004,fully 87% of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products will become duty-free immediately,with the rest receiving reduced tariff treatment over time. Some 75% of U.S. farm exports will enterChile duty-free within four years and duties on all goods will be fully phased out within 12 years. (26) Importantly, the chapteron trade remedies deals only with the safeguards provision, so there is no change to the antidumpingand countervailing duty options currently available to both countries under WTO rules. For Chile, 95% of its export products will gain immediate duty-free status and only 1.2% willfall into the longest 12-year phase-out period. Other achievements of importance to the United States include consolidating and stabilizingrules governing openness of services trade, telecommunications, intellectual property rights (IPR),e-commerce trade, and investment. These involve the treatment of labor and financial transfers in disputesettlement, and the temporary entry for business persons. There is a final point. (32)
Capital Controls
A second controversial provision in the agreement relates to capital controls. Title IV of S. 1416 / H.R. Appendix A. | On June 6, 2003, the United States and Chile signed a long anticipated bilateral free tradeagreement (FTA) in Miami, Florida, concluding a 14-round negotiation process that began onDecember 6, 2000. Following hearings before the House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, and bothJudiciary Committees, the House passed the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Implementation Act( H.R. 2738 ) by a vote of 270 to 156, followed by the Senate one week later, 66 to 31. President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on September 3, 2003 ( P.L. 108-77 ) and it willtake effect on January 1, 2004.
Chile has now joined a select group of only five other countries that have an FTA with theUnited States (Canada, Mexico, Jordan, Singapore, and Israel). Although many point to the potentialfor trade growth between the two countries, the significance of this FTA runs deeper: 1) it is the firstagreement with a South American country; 2) it is an agreement with one of the most open andreformed economies in Latin America; 3) it exemplifies how trade policy issues, including thosewith social and economic implications, can be resolved between a small developing country and alarge developed one; and, 4) it may prove to be a step toward completing the Free Trade Area of theAmericas.
The FTA allows increased market access, with 85% of bilateral trade in consumer andindustrial products eligible for duty-free treatment immediately, and other product tariff rates beingreduced over time. Some 75% of U.S. farm exports will enter Chile duty-free within four years andall duties will be fully phased out within 12 years after implementation of the agreement. For Chile,95% of its export products gain duty-free status immediately and only 1.2% fall into the longest12-year phase-out period. Other critical issues resolved included environment and labor provisions,more open government procurement rules, increased access for services trade, greater protection ofU.S. investment and intellectual property, and creation of a new e-commerce chapter. The traderemedies chapter is limited to safeguards so there is no change to the antidumping and countervailingduty options currently available to both countries.
The bilateral negotiation was a challenging exercise for both countries and although abroad-based agreement was struck, a few issues were controversial for many Members of Congress,as expressed at hearings in both the House and the Senate. Overall, because there are now multipleFTAs being contemplated, there was an overarching concern that provisions in the Chile FTA mightbecome a "template" for others that follow. In particular, attention turned to language governingdispute resolution treatment of labor provisions, and financial transfers (capital controls), as well asthe temporary entry for business persons. These and other issues are discussed in this report, whichprovides background and analysis on Chile's economy, trade relations, and the bilateral FTA. Because Congress has completed action on this FTA and it has become law, this is the final versionof the report. |
crs_RL34141 | crs_RL34141_0 | At issue is how the United States adjusts its diplomacy to address foreign policy demands for the 21 st Century. U.S. Diplomacy—Need for Change
Many foreign affairs experts believe that the international system is undergoing a momentous transition affecting its very nature. For indicators of this change, they point to the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War, the changing nature of the nation state on which the existing international system is based, the rise of new national power relationships, as well as the growth in the number and the role of non-state participants in the international arena. Transformational Diplomacy
On January 18, 2006, in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., Secretary Rice outlined her vision for diplomacy that she referred to as "transformational diplomacy." According to Secretary Rice, the objective of transformational diplomacy is to "work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system." Her proposal included moving people and positions from Washington, D.C., and Europe to "strategic countries;" it also created a new position of Director of Foreign Assistance and changed U.S. foreign policy emphasis away from relations among governments to one of supporting changes within countries. In 2007, the Administration sought legislative authority ( S. 613 / H.R. 1084 ) to authorize funding and personnel issues for some aspects of the plan. The world of transformational diplomacy is not easy. And how receptive will people in other countries be to the new U.S. initiatives? The following are examples of international reactions to the Administration's transformational diplomacy plan. Possible Considerations for Congress
Except for needed appropriations, congressional involvement in the implementation of the transformational diplomacy proposal appears to some observers to have been minimal. Changes were made under existing authorities, and no legislation or new authority was requested from Congress. As the proposal continues to be implemented, increased transformational diplomacy-related appropriations may be requested. Congress may also exercise its oversight responsibilities to monitor the effect that transformational diplomacy has on achieving foreign policy goals, maintaining a top quality Foreign Service, and providing the best possible representation around the world. Secretary Rice said that "Transforming our diplomacy and transforming the State Department is the work of a generation." | Many foreign affairs experts believe that the international system is undergoing a momentous transition affecting its very nature. Some, such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, compare the changes in the international system to those of a century ago. Secretary of State Rice relates the changes to the period following the Second World War and the start of the Cold War. At the same time, concerns are being raised about the need for major reform of the institutions and tools of American diplomacy to meet the coming challenges. At issue is how the United States adjusts its diplomacy to address foreign policy demands in the 21st Century.
On January 18, 2006, in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., Secretary Rice outlined her vision for diplomacy changes that she referred to as "transformational diplomacy" to meet this 21st Century world. The new diplomacy elevates democracy-promotion activities inside countries. According to Secretary Rice in her February 14, 2006 testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the objective of transformational diplomacy is: "to work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system." Secretary Rice's announcement included moving people and positions from Washington, D.C., and Europe to "strategic" countries; it also created a new position of Director of Foreign Assistance, modified the tools of diplomacy, and changed U.S. foreign policy emphasis away from relations among governments to one of supporting changes within countries.
Except for needed appropriations, Congressional involvement in the implementation of the transformational diplomacy proposal appears to some observers to have been minimal. Changes were made under existing authorities, and no legislation or new authority was requested from Congress. In 2007, the State Department sought legislative authority (S. 613/H.R. 1084) to authorize funding and personnel issues for some aspects of the plan. To date, Congress has not considered the legislation.
As the transformational diplomacy proposal continues to be implemented, increased transformational diplomacy-related appropriations may be requested. Congress may also exercise its oversight responsibilities to monitor the effect that transformational diplomacy has on achieving foreign policy goals, maintaining a top quality Foreign Service, and providing the best possible representation around the world.
This report provides an overview of Secretary of State Rice's transformational diplomacy plan. It examines the calls for reform of America's current diplomatic institutions, and the Administration's response—transformational diplomacy. The report also presents the concerns many experts have expressed regarding specific elements of this proposal, and a sample of reactions in other countries. Finally, the report discusses various issues that may be considered by Congress. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R44292 | crs_R44292_0 | Introduction
On December 19, 1995, the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) became law. Upon signing the LDA into law, President William Jefferson Clinton endorsed lobbying as a basic American right, while also providing context as to why such a law is necessary for a transparent and open government. Commenting on the disparity between the right of "ordinary Americans" to petition the government and the access that professional lobbyists can have to Members of Congress and executive branch decisionmakers, President Clinton identified a central question: how can individual citizens' rights be balanced against the desire to regulate and potentially control the access of special interests to government? This report provides a retrospective and prospective analysis of the LDA on its 20 th anniversary. This registration requires the public disclosure of certain lobbying activities. The four primary lobbying laws are
the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) of 1938; the Regulation of Lobbying Act (RLA) of 1946; the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995; and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007. HLOGA was primarily a response to changes in both practice and perception. Since at least 1999, that data has been available online. If individuals are choosing not to register under the LDA and they continue to engage in lobbying activities, the decline in the number of registered lobbyists and the number of disclosure forms filed provides possible but not conclusive evidence that the number of shadow lobbyists is increasing. Grassroots Lobbying
Grassroots lobbying is the attempt to persuade policymakers by influencing public opinion and motivating citizens to take action, often by asking them to contact their Representatives and Senators. Revolving Door
On a regular basis, federal employees leave the government for private sector employment, while the government also hires former private sector employees for government jobs. Most prominently, 18 U.S.C. In Congress, post-employment restrictions are applied by the House and Senate respectively. The might lead to the acknowledgement that the federal government and private sector can both benefit when employees move between sectors. These might include amending the definition of lobbying, changing disclosure thresholds for registered lobbyists, adjusting resources, and maintaining current lobbying standards. Instead of amending the LDA or FARA, Congress could continue to use existing law to require lobbyist registration and disclosure. An analysis of the four key lobbying laws enacted since 1946 and scholarly work on lobbying raised three issues that have the potential to cause shifts in lobbying practices and perception: shadow lobbying, grassroots lobbying, and the revolving door. Should Congress wish to address these issues, several options exist. Should Congress decide to make changes to the LDA, it will likely be the result of new changes in the practice or perception of lobbying. 2. | On December 19, 1995, President William Jefferson Clinton signed the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) into law (2 U.S.C. §1601, et seq.). In his comments when signing the law, President Clinton identified a central question that continues to be an issue for lobbying laws: how can individual citizens' rights be balanced against the desire to regulate and potentially control the access of special interests to government? As lobbying laws have been developed in the United States, the balance between the right of "ordinary Americans" to petition the government and the access that professional lobbyists can have to Members of Congress and executive branch decisionmakers has been at the forefront.
The four major federal lobbying laws—the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938, the Regulation of Lobbying Act (RLA) of 1946, the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995, and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007—were enacted in response to changes in practice or perception surrounding lobbying. In most cases, the enactment, repeal, or amendment of lobbying laws was a response to multiple contextual changes that provided a policy window in which change was possible.
This report provides an retrospective and prospective analysis of the LDA on its 20th anniversary, using research conducted and data collected by the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M capstone class over the 2014-2015 academic year. As the LDA turns 20, several issues, each already addressed to some extent in other statutes, have the potential to cause additional shifts in lobbying practices and perception. These include
Shadow lobbying—when an individual who is paid to engage public officials on behalf of clients does not register as a lobbyist. Shadow lobbying may raise questions about what practices and activities should trigger lobbyist registration requirements. Grassroots lobbying—attempts to persuade government decisionmakers and influence policy outcomes by shifting public opinion and motivating citizens to take action, often by contacting Representatives and Senators. Grassroots lobbying is generally unregulated, although legislation has been introduced in the past that would require grassroots lobbying activities be registered and disclosed. Revolving door—when federal employees leave the government for employment in the private sector or the government hires former private sector employees for government jobs. There are a number of post-employment restrictions that impose limits on federal employees moving to the private sector, or former lobbyists moving to the public sector. Analysis of whether current restrictions strike a suitable balance, are too restrictive, or too permissive, may be instructive.
As these issues evolve, Congress has many options available to potentially amend existing lobbying laws. These include options to
change the definition of lobbying; change disclosure thresholds for registered lobbyists; and adjust resources available for implementation and enforcement.
Additionally, Congress could choose not to amend existing lobbying laws and maintain current standards. |
crs_R41904 | crs_R41904_0 | It does not resolve the question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits the arrest of an individual—using the material witness statute as a subterfuge—without probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime. It does not resolve the question of whether the absolute and qualified immunity standards are the same for an Assistant United States Attorney as the Attorney General and all the supervisory attorneys in between. He then sued a line of federal officials from the FBI to the Attorney General, claiming a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and of the material witness statute:
Al-Kidd asserts three independent claims against Ashcroft. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suit for what they do in court. They enjoy qualified immunity for work they do as investigators. The federal material witness statute provides that
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title [relating to bail]. 18 U.S.C. An arrest warrant for a witness with evidence material to a federal criminal proceeding may be issued by federal or state judges or magistrates. Absolute Immunity
Prosecutorial officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil suit for their actions as officers of the court. Qualified Immunity
"Most public officials are entitled ... to qualified immunity" for acts committed in the performance of their duties. "The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights...."
Al-Kidd claimed that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by policy created and implemented by the Attorney General used the material witness statute as a pretext to arrest criminal suspects. The material witness statute requires probable cause to believe that an individual has evidence material in a judicial proceeding. The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a crime. The two are not the same. To use a material witness statute pretextually, in order to investigate or preemptively detain suspects without probable cause is to violate the Fourth Amendment." The Ninth Circuit, however, accepted al-Kidd's contention that the ordinary rules did not apply because use of the material witness statute did not deal with the ordinary type of probable cause upon which the Supreme Court's cases were predicated: probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. (2) Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity, because arrest under a valid material witness arrest warrant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment regardless of the prosecutor's motives. Whether for want of a Fourth Amendment violation or want of a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation, all of the Justices agreed that the Attorney General was entitled to qualified immunity. | Public officials cannot be sued personally for injuries resulting from the performance of their duties. They lose this qualified immunity when the injuries resulted from their violation of clearly established law. In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Supreme Court concluded that clearly established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence did not forbid the Attorney General from encouraging the use of the federal material witness statute as a pretext to detain and question a potential criminal suspect.
The Court left for another day several related issues. Does the material witness statute permit authorities to arrest, question, and detain an individual because he is criminal suspect rather than a witness? Is the material witness statute unconstitutional on its face? Does the Fourth Amendment permit recourse to the material witness statute in order to arrest, question, and detain an individual without probable cause to believe he has committed a crime? Does the absolute immunity that attends the performance of duties in a judicial environment apply? Are the absolute and qualified immunity standards the same for local prosecutors as for the Attorney General?
Al-Kidd was arrested on a federal material witness warrant. Federal law permits the arrest of a witness when there is probable cause to believe that he has evidence material in a judicial proceeding and may be unavailable when his testimony is needed. Arrest of a criminal suspect requires probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime. Al-Kidd sued the Attorney General alleging that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Justice Department had created and implemented a policy of arresting terrorist suspects without criminal probable cause by using the material witness statute as a subterfuge. The Attorney General moved to dismiss on grounds of absolute and qualified official immunity. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for activities performed as officers of the court. They are entitled to no more than qualified immunity for activities performed as investigators. They are entitled to qualified immunity for the performance of their official duties, unless they violate a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that (1) prosecutors who use material witness warrants as an investigative tool are not entitled to absolute immunity; (2) prosecutors, who use such warrants without probable cause to believe the witness has committed a crime, violate the clearly established Fourth Amendment proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures; (3) prosecutors who do so are not entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the same is true of senior officials who direct such misconduct.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, resolved the matter narrowly. He observed that in most instances, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of an arrest is judged objectively. An otherwise reasonable arrest is ordinarily permissible regardless of the alleged motives of the arresting officers. Where there is probable cause for the arrest of a material witness, motive is irrelevant, and the arrest is reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards. Since the Attorney General thus did not instigate a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment as alleged, he was entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
Related reports include CRS Report R41903, Federal Material Witness Statute: A Legal Overview of 18 U.S.C. 3144, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42856 | crs_R42856_0 | Recent Developments
Political challenges facing Malawian President Joyce Banda have mounted in recent months, following a brief political honeymoon after she succeeded Bingu wa Mutharika, her predecessor, after he died in April 2012. These events followed socioeconomic protests and a civil service strike in early 2013. The protests were a reaction to cost-of-living inflation in the 30% range triggered by Banda's 2012 devaluation of the national currency, the kwacha , by 50%; a fuel price liberalization; and other policy decisions aimed at reversing various controversial policies pursued by Mutharika. Introduction
President Barack Obama's Administration and a number of Members of Congress welcomed President Banda's accession to power, primarily because she has sought to reverse a number of contentious decisions taken by her predecessor. Banda, Africa's second female president, has also won plaudits as an international advocate for women's rights; her tenure has been seen as a sign of increasing gender equality in a region where male leaders have predominated. Banda's anticipated White House meeting followed an August 2012 trip by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Malawi to discuss economic and political governance and reform and bilateral development cooperation projects. Banda also participated in two high-level USAID development conferences in 2012 in the United States, and in September 2012 addressed Members of Congress at a forum on U.S.-Malawian and broader U.S.-African ties. U.S. Relations and Congressional Role
U.S. bilateral engagement focuses primarily on the promotion of socioeconomic development and growth, democracy, and good governance. Such ties had been severely damaged during Mutharika's second term over concerns related to economic management, undemocratic governance trends, and his increasingly acrimonious stance toward donors. Several key donors reinstated aid that they had withdrawn or restricted during Mutharika's tenure, a welcome prospect for Malawi's flagging economy. Such donors included the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Banda: Succession and Administration
Banda took office after Mutharika died of a reported heart attack, on April 5, 2012, while serving an increasingly contentious second term; Banda was vice president at the time of his death and therefore succeeded him. Banda has also sought constructive ties and cooperation within Africa, although there have been some indications that the Banda government may pursue a foreign policy at odds with some of its African peers but potentially aligned with selected U.S. regional policy goals. Political Background
Malawi, a former British colony, is a small, poor, mostly agricultural developing country in southeastern Africa. Economy and Development22
Diverse challenges confront President Banda in managing the stumbling economy she inherited from Mutharika. In the long run, the devaluation is intended to bring parity to the official and black market currency exchange rates, and provide market incentives to spur greater domestic production and export of crops like tobacco and sugar. Sound economic policies. Key U.S. bilateral assistance goals in Malawi include increased food security and agricultural growth; poverty reduction; and stronger institutions to ensure effective social service delivery. State Department- and U.S. USAID-administered bilateral assistance to Malawi totaled over $172.6 million in FY2011 and stands at an estimated $166.7 million in FY2012. The Obama Administration has requested $145.8 million for FY2013. The recent arrests of key former opposition officials on charges of treason relating to efforts to prevent Banda from succeeding Mutharika have also sparked protests and energized ongoing acrimony between the opposition DPP and the Banda administration. Malawi's relations with donors also deteriorated due to a combination of factors. | President Barack Obama's Administration and a number of Members of Congress welcomed Malawian President Joyce Banda's accession to power, largely because she reversed a number of controversial decisions taken by her predecessor, Bingu wa Mutharika. Banda succeeded him after he died in early April 2012 while serving a contentious second term. Banda's status as Africa's second female president, an internationally recognized women's rights advocate, and a leader with socioeconomic development expertise has also attracted U.S. and other international support for her. There are some indications that Banda may pursue a foreign policy aligned with selected U.S. regional policy goals, and in March 2013, President Obama invited Banda to the White House to discuss democratic strengthening, trade, and investment. In August 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Malawi to discuss economic and governance reforms and to highlight U.S.-funded development projects. In September 2012 Banda addressed a gathering of Members of Congress at a forum on U.S.-Malawian and broader U.S.-African relations.
Malawi, a former British colony, is a small, poor southeastern African country that underwent a democratic transition from one-party rule in the early 1990s and has long relied on donor aid. Under Mutharika, however, Malawi's ties with donors had been damaged over concerns related to economic management, undemocratic governance trends, and Mutharika's acrimonious stance toward donors. Upon taking office, Banda—who had served as Mutharika's vice president and therefore succeeded him upon his death—initiated a series of economic and governance reforms, aimed at rescinding changes made under Mutharika. In response, most donors that had suspended aid under Mutharika reinstated it, a welcome prospect for Malawi's flagging economy. Such reinstated aid included a U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact.
Key donor-backed policy changes made by Banda have included a devaluation of the national currency, the kwacha, and efforts to repeal several controversial civil and political rights laws passed under Mutharika. She also set out a number of policies designed to spur socioeconomic development and growth, gender equality, and respect for human rights, and supported fiscal austerity measures, including budget cuts affecting the presidency. Banda faces interlinked economic and political challenges arising from her management of the faltering economy she inherited from Mutharika. Her decision to devalue the currency was intended to foster free-market processes in the long run in order to spur greater production for local and export markets and boost macroeconomic stability, among other ends. In the short run, however, it has sharply driven up inflation, including for fuel and food, sparking public protests and labor strikes. In addition, some donors have released aid funds more slowly than initially anticipated or have imposed new aid policy conditions. Banda also faces rifts within her own party and faltering parliamentary support. The recent arrest of several former Mutharika officials on treason charges related to a plot to prevent Banda's constitutional accession to the presidency has also caused controversy.
In addition to a $350 million, five-year MCC compact, the United States provides significant bilateral aid focused on food security and agricultural growth; poverty reduction; health and education; economic growth; and democracy and good governance. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered bilateral assistance to Malawi totaled over $173 million in FY2011; an estimated $167 million in FY2012; and $146 million in requested funds for FY2013. |
crs_RL31403 | crs_RL31403_0 | U.S. trade with the People's Republic of China (PRC) has raised several policy concerns. U.S. trade policy toward China is based upon the assumption that trade between the two countries has both economic and political benefits: (1) in general, trade with China benefits both sides and allows for a more efficient allocation of available resources; (2) the rapidly developing Chinese economy affords a rare opportunity for U.S. businesses to become part of a huge and rapidly expanding market; (3) China's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) compels the PRC to comply with international trading rules and spurs the development of market forces in the country; and (4) foreign trade and investment create a dependency on exports, imports, and foreign investment and other interaction with the outside world in China, which in turn strengthen its relations with the Western world, create centers of power outside the Chinese Communist Party, and foster economic and social pressures for democracy; (5) a country as significant as China—accounting for a quarter of the world's population, armed with nuclear weapons, and a member of the U.N. Security Council—cannot be ignored or isolated. The possible problems or challenges raised by the U.S. strategy of economic engagement with China include adjusting to economic competition in sectors where China has a comparative advantage, responding to PRC unfair trade practices, and the rise of an economically powerful China that is becoming more assertive in global affairs: (1) Imports from China may be entering in such increased quantities that they are a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to competing U.S. industries; (2) Imports from China may be dumped, subsidized, or unfairly aided by government entities in China, which still wield considerable influence in the economy; (3) According to some economists and many policymakers, the U.S. trade deficit with the PRC stems in large part from Beijing's policy of maintaining an undervalued currency; (4) China has a poor record of adopting or enforcing internationally recognized standards for working conditions and environmental regulation which, in addition to violating human rights and harming the environment, may provide PRC businesses with unfair competitive advantages; and (5) U.S. economic engagement with China arguably contributes to the legitimacy of the socialist government and the strengthening of China's military by facilitating general economic development. China's largest export market is the United States followed by the EU-25 and Japan. China now accounts for over 14% of U.S. imports (2005), up from 12% in 2003, 8% in 1999, and 3% in 1990, although this share still falls short of Japan's 18% in the early 1990s. China runs a trade surplus with the world's three major economic centers. Over the same period, the shares of the U.S. deficit in goods trade accounted for by Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) have decreased while the European Union's share has increased. Fourth, the data show that U.S. exports to China are growing faster than U.S. exports to other nations. In 2004, China replaced Germany and the United Kingdom to become the 4 th largest market for U.S. goods, moving up from 11 th place in 1999. The United States has incurred large trade deficits with China in some high value-added sectors as well. These sectors include office and data processing machines, telecommunications and sound equipment, and electrical machinery and appliances. Sixth, PRC data show much smaller bilateral trade deficits than those claimed by its trading partners. In 2005, the United States claimed it had incurred a $201 billion trade deficit with China, while China reported a trade surplus of only $114 billion with the United States. China and the Asia Pacific Region
While China is gaining manufacturing prowess and its trade surplus with the United States is spiraling, the country is purchasing heavily from neighboring trading partners. China has become a huge buyer of raw materials, agricultural commodities, industrial machinery, and electronic components from Southeast Asia, as well as an important source of foreign investment and second largest source of foreign tourists in the region. In other words, expanding imports from China have been offset by declining imports from other East Asian or Pacific Rim countries. While U.S. imports in all these categories have increased, the most dramatic percentage changes have been not in traditional labor-intensive industries but in sectors that encompass advanced technology, such as office and data processing machines (up 284% between 2000 and 2005), telecommunications and sound equipment (245%), and general industrial machinery (234%). In 2004, the Bush Administration imposed anti-dumping penalties on approximately 500 furniture manufacturers in China. It is not for portfolio investment on China's stock exchanges. Annual or utilized FDI from Japan and South Korea surpassed that of the United States in 2003. The United States remains the second largest source of cumulative FDI after Hong Kong. | As imports from the People's Republic of China (PRC) have surged in recent years, posing a threat to some U.S. industries and manufacturing employment, Congress has begun to focus on not only access to the Chinese market and intellectual property rights (IPO) protection, but also the mounting U.S. trade deficit with China as well as allegations that China is selling its products on the international market at below cost (dumping), engaging in "currency manipulation," and exploiting its workers for economic gain. Members of the 109th Congress introduced several bills that would impose trade sanctions on China for intervening in the currency market or for engaging in other acts of unfair trade, while the Bush Administration has imposed anti-dumping duties and safeguards against some PRC products and pressured China to further revalue its currency and remove non-tariff trade barriers.
China runs a trade surplus with the world's three major economic centers—the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Since 2000, the United States has incurred its largest bilateral trade deficit with China ($201 billion in 2005, a 25% rise over 2004). In 2003, China replaced Mexico as the second largest source of imports for the United States. China's share of U.S. imports was 14.6% in 2005, although this proportion still falls short of Japan's 18% of the early 1990s. The United States is China's largest overseas market and second largest source of foreign direct investment on a cumulative basis. U.S. exports to China have been growing rapidly as well, although from a low base. In 2004, China replaced Germany and the United Kingdom to become the fourth largest market for U.S. goods and remains the fastest growing major U.S. export market. China is purchasing heavily from its Asian trading partners—particularly precision machinery, electronic components, and raw materials for manufacturing. China is running trade deficits with Taiwan and South Korea and has become a major buyer of goods from Japan and Southeast Asia.
In the past decade, the most dramatic increases in U.S. imports from China have been not in labor-intensive sectors but in some advanced technology sectors, such as office and data processing machines, telecommunications and sound equipment, and electrical machinery and appliances. China's exports to the United States are taking market share from other Pacific Rim countries, particularly the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICS), which have moved most of their low-end production facilities to China.
This report provides a quantitative framework for policy considerations dealing with U.S. trade with China. It provides basic data and analysis of China's international trade with the United States and other countries. Since Chinese data differ considerably from those of its trading partners (because of how entrepot trade through Hong Kong is counted), data from both PRC sources and those of its trading partners are presented. Charts showing import trends by sector for the United States highlight China's growing market shares in many industries and also show import shares for Japan, Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This report will be updated bi-annually. |
crs_R44276 | crs_R44276_0 | However, in 2015 it appears IS strategy evolved to include pursuing terrorist attacks globally. Are Islamic State Affiliates Operating in Other Countries? What Types of Assistance Are Coalition Partners and Other Nations Contributing to Countering IS Activities? High-profile terrorist attacks attributed to the Islamic State organization in several countries are altering the terms of U.S. and allied policy debates about the threat posed by the group and current strategic approaches to defeating it. These proposals have included several types of authorizing and constraining provisions, including the following:
identifying legitimate targets of military force, including the Islamic State, associated forces of the Islamic State, and others; prohibiting long-term, large-scale use of U.S. armed forces; limiting geographic area of military operations; placing time limits on existing and new authority to use military force; repealing existing AUMFs or stating that new authority supersedes older authorities with regard to the Islamic State; and requiring regular reporting, certification of certain conditions, and consultation with Congress regarding the campaign against the Islamic State. He argued that the United States and its allies will have to deal with IS threats "for quite some time" and suggested that one potential motivation for the group's embrace of transnational terrorism as a tactic and strategic tool is its desire to signal continuing momentum in the face of limited progress and battlefield setbacks in Iraq and Syria since late 2014. On November 13, 2015, coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris left at least 129 people dead and over 350 injured at 6 locations throughout the city. U.S. Legal Considerations Relating to Threats from the Islamic State
What Legal Tools Are Available to Deter Travel by a Suspected Terrorist? The terrorist attacks in Paris last week, for which the Islamic State has claimed responsibility, have renewed concerns about terrorist travel. | In the wake of the deadly November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris, U.S. policymakers are faced with a wide range of strategy and operational considerations related to the activities of and threats emanating from the Islamic State (IS). A terrorist attack such as this prompts an examination of U.S. domestic security precautions; the role of allies and coalition partners; the appropriate military and diplomatic reactions; the safety and security of infrastructure and that of travelers; and numerous additional discrete issues that require the active involvement of dozens of federal, state, and local government agencies.
With the attacks in Beirut, over Egypt, and in Paris, the Islamic State has demonstrated a transnational capability that suggests its strategic objectives and tactics have evolved, gaining strength in some areas and losing capacity in others. The response to these attacks by the United States and other nations continues to evolve as the threat posed by IS changes.
This report poses frequently asked questions with answers excerpted from other CRS products. Each section contains references to the full reports in which the material appears.
This report will be updated as additional products become available and events warrant. |
crs_R41683 | crs_R41683_0 | Introduction
Recent unrest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has affected international energy markets and put upward pressure on oil prices. The unrest has contributed to higher prices by causing some supply reductions and giving rise to worries that unrest may spread to the region's larger energy producers. If any such unrest somehow disrupts Saudi oil production, it is difficult to predict how high oil prices may rise. Economically, higher oil prices have a negative impact on household budgets and national economic growth for countries that are major importers. The drag on economic growth via the trade deficit would be muted in such a scenario. As a result, there are limited short-term policy options, which Congress recognized in its justification for establishing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). However, debates have continued concerning the appropriateness of using the SPR and what qualifies as "severe." There are proposals to encourage more natural gas use in the transportation sector, but these proposals are long-term in nature. 94-163 , EPCA), establishing the SPR, authorizes a drawdown upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption"—an energy supply shortage that is likely to be of significant scope and duration and may cause major adverse impact on national safety or the national economy which results from an interruption in the supply of imported or domestic petroleum. Other Policy Options
The SPR was established at least in part because there are few other short-term options to mitigate the effect of severe oil market disruptions. Apart from the SPR, much of the policy debate stemming from the unrest in MENA and its impacts on oil markets has focused on options that take a long time to implement. Some Members of Congress and others cite the current unrest in MENA and the resulting increase in oil costs in backing proposals ranging from increasing support for domestic oil and gas production, and renewable energy, or mandating greater efficiency. For more information on political unrest in MENA, see the CRS Issue in Focus page on the Middle East and its associated reports. Israel
Oil Exports: Israel is not an exporter of oil. Besides being the largest exporter of oil, Saudi Arabia is the holder of most of the world's spare production capacity. | Political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has contributed to higher oil prices and added instability to energy markets. Supply disruptions and fears about the possible spread of unrest to major exporters have pushed prices higher. Even if the crisis abates, some risk premium may persist to the degree that market participants fear such an event could occur again.
Higher oil prices can negatively impact the economies of oil importing countries. The cost of oil is the primary determinant of gasoline prices and prices of other petroleum products; increased costs can be a burden on households and many businesses. Rising import costs for oil, natural gas and petroleum-based products can be a drag on economic growth by negatively affecting the trade balance. This may slow the current economic recovery, though it is not expected to derail it.
Many energy policy options to address vulnerability to disruptions and higher prices, such as what is taking place in MENA, are long-term in nature. It takes a long time for the energy sector to make material shifts, be they through renewables, efficiency, or increased domestic oil and gas production. Short-term energy policy options (as opposed to the broader national security and diplomatic issues) are limited. Oil exporters with spare production capacity, particularly Saudi Arabia, may make short-term decisions to try to moderate prices by adjusting production levels, but their ability and willingness to do so are often based on internal decisions. For more information on the political unrest in MENA, see the CRS Issue in Focus page on the Middle East and its associated reports.
Part of the U.S. energy policy debate around recent unrest has focused on whether it is appropriate to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The government holds the SPR to mitigate the impacts of a "severe energy supply interruption." Proponents of using the SPR point out that there is a disruption to oil production in Libya and the resulting price increase negatively impacts the U.S. economic recovery. Critics question whether this is the appropriate time to release oil from the SPR or whether it should be saved to guard against larger future disruptions, and emphasize that the SPR has not traditionally been viewed as a device to manipulate prices. |
crs_R41743 | crs_R41743_0 | Advocates of cutting corporate tax rates frequently make their argument based on the higher statutory rate observed in the United States as compared with the rest of the world. Sometimes the higher rate alone is used as an argument, and in other cases the arguments include claims that cutting corporate taxes would induce large investment flows into the United States, which would create jobs or expand the base enough to raise revenue. President Barack Obama has supported a rate cut if the revenue loss can be offset with corporate base broadening, while the Citizens for Tax Justice has urged a revenue raising reform and business leaders have urged setting deficit concerns aside. This report focuses on the global issue relating to tax rate differentials between the United States and other countries. The second section discusses policy implications, including the effect of a corporate rate cut on revenue, output, and national welfare; the possibility that a rate cut may induce reactions from other countries; and the outlook for and consequences of a revenue-neutral corporate tax reform. The effective rate is the same. Marginal tax rates are also significantly lower than the statutory rates: the U.S. rate is about half the statutory rate and the weighted OECD rate is about 60% of the statutory rate. (These types of taxes would not be relevant for profit shifting.) First, it is important when forming a composite rate for the rest of the world to weight the tax rates by output or some other measure of economic importance. Economic Effects of a U.S. Rate Cut
The previous analysis has shown that U.S. statutory corporate tax rates are about 10 percentage points higher than a weighted average of the OECD or the large countries that account for most of output (7 percentage points when including the production activities deduction). Effects on Revenue, Output, and National Welfare, Assuming No Tax Rate Changes by Other Countries or Offsetting Base Broadening in the United States
This section examines the effects of a corporate rate cut from 35% to 25% on revenues and international capital flows, and their effects on the U.S. economy (including feedback effects on revenues and effects on national welfare). For thinking about this effect, consider separately inbound capital (capital owned by foreigners and invested in the United States) and outbound capital (capital owned by U.S. persons and invested abroad). These estimates of profit shifting suggest that they amount to 14% to 20% of total corporate tax revenue, which would not be enough to offset the revenue loss even if profit shifting disappeared entirely. The U.S. rate fell from 39.2% to 39.1%. The observation of rate cuts in the rest of the world in the wake of the U.S. tax cut is not proof that countries will cut their rates again if the United States does, but it does provide some support for that expectation. (Much more revenue would be raised in the short run, but revenue neutrality based on a 10-year budget window would lead to a long-run loss, because slowing depreciation leads to much larger revenue gains in the short run compared with the long run.) A revenue neutral revision that cuts the rate in exchange for higher taxation of new investment would raise the marginal effective tax rate, because the rate reduction would apply to the return to existing capital. It would increase the cost of deferral by about 10%. In that case, the percentage point reductions are 5, 2.3, and 1.5, respectively, beginning at a 35%, 30%, and 25% corporate tax rate. Summing Up
This section has identified enough provisions to allow the corporate tax rate to be reduced to 25% without losing revenue over the long run (i.e., that do not depend on large short-run gains, such as those from reducing accelerated depreciation), but that would require going beyond corporate tax expenditures (which would account for only 5 percentage points) to business preferences associated with unincorporated businesses, foreign tax credit restrictions, or more fundamental reforms. | Advocates of cutting corporate tax rates frequently make their argument based on the higher statutory rate in the United States as compared with the rest of the world; they argue that cutting corporate taxes would induce large investment flows into the United States, which would create jobs or expand the taxable income base enough to raise revenue. President Barack Obama has supported a rate cut if the revenue loss can be offset with corporate base broadening. Others have urged on one hand, a revenue raising reform, and, on the other, setting deficit concerns aside.
Is the U.S. tax rate higher than the rest of the world, and what does that difference imply for tax policy? The answer depends, in part, on which tax rates are being compared. Although the U.S. statutory tax rate is higher, the average effective rate is about the same, and the marginal rate on new investment is only slightly higher. The statutory rate differential is relevant for international profit shifting; effective rates are more relevant for firms' investment levels. The 13.7 percentage point differential in statutory rates (a 39.2% rate for the United States compared with 25.5% in other countries), narrows to about 9 percentage points when tax rates in the rest of the world are weighted to reflect the size of countries' economies. (The OECD rates fell by slightly over one-half of a percentage point between 2010 and 2012.)
Regardless of tax differentials, could a U.S. rate cut lead to significant economic gains and revenue feedbacks? Because of the factors that constrain capital flows, estimates for a rate cut from 35% to 25% suggest a modest positive effect on wages and output: an eventual one-time increase of less than two-tenths of 1% of output. Most of this output gain is not an increase in national income because returns to capital imported from abroad belong to foreigners and the returns to U.S. investment abroad that comes back to the United States are already owned by U.S. firms.
The revenue cost of such a rate cut is estimated at between $1.2 trillion and $1.5 trillion over the next 10 years. Revenue feedback effects from increased investment inflows are estimated to reduce those revenue costs by 5%-6%. Reductions in profit shifting could have larger effects, but even if profit shifting disappeared entirely, it would not likely offset revenue losses. It seems unlikely that a rate cut to 25% would significantly reduce profit shifting given these transactions are relatively costless and largely constrained by laws, enforcement, and court decisions.
Both output gains and revenue offsets would be reduced if other countries responded to a U.S. rate cut by reducing their own taxes. Evidence suggests that the U.S. rate cut in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 triggered rate cuts in other countries.
It is difficult, although not impossible, to design a reform to lower the corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points that is revenue neutral in the long run. Standard tax expenditures do not appear adequate for this purpose. Eliminating one of the largest provisions, accelerated depreciation, gains much more revenue in the short run than in the long run, and a long-run revenue-neutral change would increase the cost of capital. Other revisions, such as restricting foreign tax credits and interest deductibility or increasing shareholder level taxes, may be required.
This report focuses on the global issues relating to tax rate differentials between the United States and other countries. It provides tax rate comparisons; discusses policy implications, including the effect of a corporate rate cut on revenue, output, and national welfare; and discusses the outlook for and consequences of a revenue neutral corporate tax reform. |
crs_RL33471 | crs_RL33471_0 | Introduction
The Library of Congress, as its name suggests, is a library dedicated to serving the United States Congress and its Members. It serves additionally as an unexcelled national library. The Library was located in the Capitol Building with the House of Representatives and the Senate until 1897, and its collections always have been available for use by Congress. Finally, in 1914, Senator Robert LaFollette and Representative John M. Nelson, both of Wisconsin, secured the inclusion in the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriations act of a provision directing the establishment of a special reference unit within the Library. The new department was charged with responding to congressional requests for information. For its first few decades it assisted Congress primarily by providing facts and publications and by transmitting research and analysis done largely by other government agencies, private organizations, and individual scholars. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 transformed the Legislative Reference Service into the Congressional Research Service (CRS). It also directed CRS to devote more of its efforts and increased resources to doing research and analysis that assists Congress in direct support of the legislative process. Today, CRS is joined by two other congressional support agencies. CRS offers research and analysis to Congress on all current and emerging issues of national policy. Congressional responses take the form of reports, memoranda, customized briefings, seminars, digitally recorded presentations, information obtained from automated databases, and consultations in person and by telephone. In all of their work, CRS analysts are governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship. | The Library of Congress, as its name suggests, is a library dedicated to serving the United States Congress and its Members. It serves additionally as an unexcelled national library. The Library was located in the Capitol Building with the House of Representatives and the Senate until 1897, and its collections always have been available for use by Congress.
Building upon a concept developed by the New York State Library and then the Wisconsin legislative reference department, Wisconsin's Senator Robert LaFollette and Representative John M. Nelson led an effort to direct the establishment of a special reference unit within the Library in 1914. Later known as the Legislative Reference Service, it was charged with responding to congressional requests for information. For more than 50 years, this department assisted Congress primarily by providing facts and publications and by transmitting research and analysis done largely by other government agencies, private organizations, and individual scholars. In 1970, Congress enacted a law transforming the Legislative Reference Service into the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and directing CRS to devote more of its efforts and increased resources to performing research and analysis that assists Congress in direct support of the legislative process.
Joined today by two other congressional support agencies, the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service offers research and analysis to Congress on all current and emerging issues of national policy. CRS analysts work exclusively for Congress, providing assistance in the form of reports, memoranda, customized briefings, seminars, digitally recorded presentations, information obtained from governmental and nongovernmental databases, and consultations in person and by telephone. This work is governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship. |
crs_R44397 | crs_R44397_0 | T he National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568) to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities. It has four mission directorates. The Science Mission Directorate manages robotic science missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mars rover Curiosity, and satellites for Earth science research. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts research and development on aircraft and aviation systems. The Space Technology Mission Directorate develops new technologies for use in future space missions, such as advanced propulsion and laser communications. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is responsible for human spaceflight activities, including the International Space Station and development efforts for future crewed spacecraft. In addition, NASA's Office of Education manages formal and informal education programs for school children, college and university students, and the general public. While Congress is generally supportive of most NASA programs, government-wide fiscal constraints make funding decisions challenging. Overview
The Administration has requested $19.025 billion for NASA in FY2017. This amount is 1.3% less than the FY2016 appropriation of $19.285 billion. The House bill would provide $19.508 billion. The Senate bill would provide $19.306 billion. Unusually, the FY2017 request includes $763 million in mandatory funds. The House and Senate bills include no mandatory funding. Science
The FY2017 request for the Science Mission Directorate is $5.601 billion, an increase of 0.2% from FY2016. Within this total, funding for Earth Science, Astrophysics, and Heliophysics would increase, while funding for Planetary Science and the James Webb Space Telescope would decrease. Aeronautics
The FY2017 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $790 million, an increase of 23.5% from FY2016. The request includes New Aviation Horizons (NAH), a new initiative of experimental aircraft and systems demonstrations. Space Technology
The FY2017 request for the Space Technology Mission Directorate is $827 million, an increase of 20.4% from FY2016. Human Exploration and Operations
The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) is funded by two appropriations accounts: Exploration and Space Operations. The FY2017 request for Exploration is $3.337 billion, a decrease of 17.2% from FY2016. The request for Space Operations is $5.076 billion, an increase of 0.9%. The increases for Exploration in the House and Senate bills, relative to the request, would fund the SLS at the FY2016 level (in the House bill) or higher (in the Senate bill). The House and Senate bills would again provide more than the request for Exploration Systems Development, but the Senate bill would provide the requested amount for Commercial Crew. Education
The FY2017 request for the Office of Education is $100 million, a decrease of 13.0% from FY2016. Programs of particular congressional interest include the National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program ($24 million), the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR, $9 million), and the Minority University Research Education Program (MUREP, $30 million). As shown in Table 1 , the House and Senate bills would both provide more than the request for the Office of Education: $115 million and $108 million, respectively. | The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568) to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities. It has four mission directorates. The Science Mission Directorate manages robotic science missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mars rover Curiosity, and satellites for Earth science research. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts research and development on aircraft and aviation systems. The Space Technology Mission Directorate develops technologies for use in future space missions, such as advanced propulsion and laser communications. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is responsible for human spaceflight activities, including the International Space Station and development efforts for future crewed spacecraft. In addition, NASA's Office of Education manages formal and informal education programs for school children, college and university students, and the general public.
While Congress is generally supportive of most NASA programs, government-wide fiscal constraints make funding decisions challenging. The Administration has requested $19.025 billion for NASA in FY2017. This amount is 1.3% less than the FY2016 appropriation of $19.285 billion. Unusually, the FY2017 request includes $763 million in mandatory funds. The House bill (H.R. 5393) would provide $19.508 billion. The Senate bill (S. 2837) would provide $19.306 billion. Neither bill includes mandatory funding.
The FY2017 request for the Science Mission Directorate is $5.601 billion, an increase of 0.2% from FY2016. Within this total, funding for Earth Science, Astrophysics, and Heliophysics would increase, while funding for Planetary Science and the James Webb Space Telescope would decrease. The House bill would provide $5.597 billion for Science, while the Senate bill would provide $5.395 billion. Within these totals, the bills differ considerably in their allocation of funding between Earth Science and Planetary Science.
The FY2017 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $790 million, an increase of 23.5% from FY2016. The request includes New Aviation Horizons (NAH), a new initiative of experimental aircraft and systems demonstrations. The House and Senate bills would provide $712 million and $601 million, respectively, for Aeronautics.
The FY2017 request for the Space Technology Mission Directorate is $827 million, an increase of 20.4% from FY2016. The House and Senate bills would provide $739 million and $687 million.
For the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, the FY2017 request for Exploration is $3.337 billion, a decrease of 17.2% from FY2016, while the request for Space Operations is $5.076 billion, an increase of 0.9%. The Exploration request includes $1.263 billion, a decrease of 35.2%, for Space Launch System launch vehicle development. Funding for the Commercial Crew program (formerly requested in Exploration) is combined with funding for operational cargo and crew transport to the International Space Station in a new Space Transportation item within Space Operations. The House bill would provide $4.183 billion for Exploration, including $2.000 billion for SLS development, and $4.890 billion for Space Operations. The Senate bill would provide $4.330 billion for Exploration, including $2.150 billion for the SLS, and $4.951 billion for Space Operations.
The FY2017 request for the Office of Education is $100 million, a decrease of 13.0% from FY2016. The House and Senate bills would provide $115 million and $108 million, respectively. The request would reduce funding for the National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program, the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research, and the Minority University Research Education Program. Both bills would fund these programs at their FY2016 levels. |
crs_R41688 | crs_R41688_0 | Introduction
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. These benefits and services include, among other things, hospital and medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. This report provides a preliminary analysis of the President's budget request for FY2012 for the programs administered by the VA. It should be noted that this not an exhaustive discussion of VA's budget request for FY2012. The FY2012 budget request for the VA is for approximately $132.1 billion in budget authority. In total the FY2012 budget request for VHA is $54.4 billion including medical care collections (see Table 1 ). Additionally, the Administration is proposing to set up a $953 million contingency fund that would provide additional funds up to $953 million to become available for obligation if the Administration determines that additional funds are required due to changes in economic conditions in 2012. 111-81 ), the President's budget is requesting $52.4 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care appropriations (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2013. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. These benefits and services include hospital and medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses.
This report provides a preliminary analysis of the President's budget request for FY2012 for the programs administered by the VA. For FY2012, the Administration is requesting approximately $132.1 billion for the VA. This amount includes approximately $62 billion in discretionary funds and approximately $70 billion in mandatory funding.
The FY2012 budget request for VA medical care programs is $51.3 billion, an increase of approximately $240 million over the FY2012 advance appropriations request of $50.6 billion that was included in the FY2011 budget request. The FY2013 request of advance appropriations is $52.5 billion, an increase of approximately $1.7 billion over the FY2012 budget request. The President's budget is proposing an establishment of a contingency fund of $953 million for VA medical care programs in FY2012. These contingency funds would become available for obligation if the Administration determines that additional costs would be incurred due to changes in economic conditions.
This report is not an exhaustive discussion of VA's budget request for FY2012. A full CRS report on FY2012 VA budget and appropriations issues is planned after initial congressional consideration of appropriations legislation. |
crs_R45080 | crs_R45080_0 | Introduction
In FY2017, the federal government obligated approximately $500 billion to procure goods and services. Federal procurement statutes and regulations—notably the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the government-wide regulation that generally applies to acquisitions by executive branch agencies—establish largely uniform policies and procedur es for how federal executive agencies acquire goods and services. The purpose of these standards is to guide the acquisition system "to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the [government], while maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling public policy objectives," such as the promotion of competition. In an effort to advance the transparency, fairness, and integrity of the procurement system, federal law provides mechanisms for contractors to "protest" (i.e., object to) contract awards and solicitations for failing to comply with federal law. Congress authorizes bid protests in three separate forums: (1) the procuring agency, (2) the Government Accountability Office (GAO), or (3) the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC). Background
Generally, a bid protest is a written objection to the conduct of a government agency in acquiring supplies and services for its direct use or benefit. Among other things, this conduct can include violations of law or regulation in the way in which an agency solicits offers for a contract, cancels such a solicitation, awards a contract, or cancels a contract. The three forums share some common features. For example, they each utilize the same definition of "interested party" to govern who may file a valid protest. However, as discussed in more detail below, the applicable legal procedures and available remedies vary considerably under each forum. Parties generally consider these distinctions when choosing the forum or forums in which to file a protest, and as a result, often begin a protest in one of the nonjudicial forums. These distinctions arguably seek to further Congress's desire to maintain balance between an efficient and timely, yet fair and transparent, procurement system. Generally, protests before the procuring agency and GAO tend to be resolved faster and less expensively than challenges before the COFC because they are subject to specific resolution timetables and less formal procedures. Additionally, parties that file a protest with either the procuring agency or GAO generally gain the benefit of an automatic stay that bars an agency from awarding or implementing a contract while a protest is pending. In contrast, while filing a protest with the COFC is frequently more time-consuming and expensive and does not trigger an automatic stay, protests before the COFC have the potential to result in legally binding and conclusive judicial decisions and orders. Procuring agency decisions and GAO bid protest recommendations, on the other hand, are not legally binding. Furthermore, interested parties that disagree with GAO or procuring agency decisions generally can still bring claims before the COFC, whereas the reverse route is generally not permitted. Another important distinction among the forums is that the scope of discovery is potentially broader in a protest before the COFC because the court generally reviews the entire administrative record of a procurement. In contrast, procuring agencies generally are not compelled to produce documents, and GAO typically reviews only those documents that are relevant to the particular protest. Furthermore, while GAO and the procuring agency are limited to a finite list of statutorily authorized remedies, the COFC may "award any relief that the court considers proper" with the exception of certain monetary relief. In light of the competing interests discussed above, some in Congress have expressed a need for procurement reform, generally, and bid protest procedural reform, specifically. In recent years, Congress has passed several provisions intended to address concerns with the bid protest process, which largely have been focused on increasing Congress's understanding of how legislative amendments to bid protest procedures could enhance the efficiency of the procurement process, discourage unwarranted protests, and generally improve procurement outcomes for the federal government. | In FY2017, the federal government obligated approximately $500 billion to procure goods and services. Federal procurement statutes and regulations—notably the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the government-wide regulation that generally applies to acquisitions by executive branch agencies—establish largely uniform policies and procedures for how federal executive agencies acquire goods and services. The purpose of these standards is to guide the acquisition system "to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the [government], while maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling public policy objectives," such as the promotion of competition. In an effort to advance the transparency, fairness, and integrity of the procurement system, federal law provides mechanisms for contractors to "protest" (i.e., object to) contract awards and solicitations for failing to comply with federal law.
Generally, a bid protest is a written objection to the conduct of a government agency in acquiring supplies and services for its direct use or benefit. Among other things, the challenged conduct can include violations of law or regulation in the way in which an agency solicits offers for a contract, cancels such a solicitation, awards a contract, or cancels a contract.
Congress authorizes bid protests in three separate forums: (1) the procuring agency, (2) the Government Accountability Office (GAO), or (3) the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC). The three forums share some common features. For example, they each utilize the same definition of "interested party" to govern who may file a valid protest. However, the applicable legal procedures and available remedies vary considerably under each forum. Parties generally consider these distinctions when choosing the forum or forums in which to file a protest. These distinctions arguably seek to further Congress's desire to maintain balance between an efficient and timely, yet fair and transparent, procurement system.
Generally, protests before the procuring agency and GAO tend to be resolved faster and less expensively than challenges before the COFC because they are subject to specific resolution timetables and less formal procedures. Additionally, parties that file a protest with either the procuring agency or GAO generally gain the benefit of an "automatic stay" that bars an agency from awarding or implementing a contract while a protest is pending. In contrast, while filing a protest with the COFC is frequently more time-consuming and expensive and does not trigger an automatic stay, protests before the COFC have the potential to result in legally binding and conclusive judicial decisions and orders. Procuring agency decisions and GAO bid protest recommendations, on the other hand, are not legally binding. Furthermore, interested parties that disagree with GAO or procuring agency decisions generally can still bring claims before the COFC, whereas the reverse route is generally not permitted.
Another important distinction among the forums is that the scope of discovery is potentially broader in a protest before the COFC because the court generally reviews the entire administrative record of a procurement. In contrast, neither GAO nor the procuring agency hearing a bid protest typically compels a procuring agency to produce documents, and GAO typically reviews only those documents that are relevant to the particular protest. Furthermore, while GAO and the procuring agency are limited to a finite list of statutorily authorized remedies, the COFC may "award any relief that the court considers proper" with the exception of certain monetary relief.
Some in Congress have expressed a need for procurement reform, generally, and bid protest procedural reform, specifically. In recent years, Congress has passed several provisions intended to address concerns with the bid protest process, such as Section 822 of the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which largely have been focused on increasing Congress's understanding of how legislative amendments to bid protest procedures could enhance the efficiency of the procurement process, discourage unwarranted protests, and generally improve procurement outcomes for the federal government. |
crs_R41439 | crs_R41439_0 | Health insurance agents and brokers, collectively called "producers" by insurance companies, assist consumers in choosing and enrolling into insurance products, generally sold in the individual and small group markets. Little is known about these costs in relation to premiums. Approximately 24 million Americans are expected to enroll in individual and small group qualified health plans (QHPs) offered through the health insurance exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , PPACA) as amended. Thus, there will be an incentive for insurance companies to cut back on the use of producers or reduce their commissions in order to rein in their administrative expenses. This report provides a brief background on the federal and state roles in regulating insurance producers and the potential impact of the relevant PPACA provisions on the use of producers by health insurance companies. Regulation Impacting Producers
State Regulation
With the exception of government sponsored insurance programs (e.g., Medicare Advantage) producer activity is generally regulated by the states. PPACA establishes a federal role in developing standards for producer activity in the exchanges by requiring that the Secretary promulgate procedures under which a state may allow producers to enroll individuals and employers in QHPs and assist eligible individuals in applying for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions for plans sold through an exchange. The MLR refers to the percentage of premium revenues spent on medical claims. | Health insurance agents and brokers, collectively called "producers" by insurance companies, assist consumers and small employers in choosing and enrolling in health insurance products. Producers are licensed and regulated by the states. Traditionally, the federal government has had no role in regulating producer activities outside of federal programs such as Medicare Advantage. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, PPACA), as amended, creates a limited federal role in developing standards for the use of producers in the health insurance exchanges, which are competitive regulated markets effective January 1, 2014. The additional regulation of producers and alternative health insurance information (e.g., the online insurance portal) and assistance services available to consumers may limit the traditional demand for producers' services.
PPACA also has a minimum medical loss ratio provision requiring plans to pay rebates to their members if a certain percentage of their premiums are not spent on medical costs. This provision may provide an incentive for health insurance companies to reduce their compensation to and/or utilization of producers as they seek to reduce their administrative costs in relation to their medical costs.
This report will be updated to reflect relevant legislative and regulatory activity. |
crs_RL34224 | crs_RL34224_0 | For federal policymakers, concerns focus on issues of affordability, access for low-income students, and whether federal student financial aid is keeping pace with rising prices. This report presents the current status and historical trends of college costs, with an emphasis on the prices students are ultimately charged at the varying types of institutions of higher education (IHEs) and how they pay for postsecondary education using student financial aid. College tuition and fees have been rising more rapidly than household income over the past three decades. In the 1976-1977 school year, the average price charged to students for tuition, fees, room, and board at four-year public and private institutions was $2,577; in 2005-2006, it was $17,447—a 577% increase. Historically, congressional involvement with issues of college costs and prices has focused on issues related to student access to postsecondary education. However, as Congress has considered the reauthorization of the HEA, attention has been given to additional actions that could be taken at the federal level to address college costs and prices. Actions considered have included creating price indices, providing incentives for controlling costs, making it easier for students to earn college credits, reducing regulatory burden, and increasing the availability of relevant public information. It is not clear which of these strategies would be most effective at addressing the issue of college costs or prices or whether some of these strategies would be more effective if implemented at the state or institutional level. As Congress continues to debate the reauthorization of the HEA, an expanded federal role regarding college costs and prices may be considered. This report begins by exploring three core concepts: college cost (what institutions spend), sticker price (what students are charged), and net price (what students actually pay)—defining each and presenting current and historical data. This exploration is followed by a discussion of various influences on costs and prices. The report concludes with an overview of relevant issues for reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA, P.L. 89-329 as amended by P.L. 105-244 ). Where data are available, this report considers all types of postsecondary education institutions: public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit. | The rising cost of attending U.S. colleges and universities is a growing concern, as most Americans believe that college is out of financial reach for qualified students. For federal policymakers, concerns focus on issues of affordability, access for low-income students, and whether federal student financial aid is keeping pace with rising prices. This report presents the current status and historical trends of college costs, with an emphasis on the prices undergraduate students are ultimately charged at the varying types of institutions of higher education and how they pay for postsecondary education using student financial aid.
College tuition and fees have been rising more rapidly than household income over the past two decades. In 2005-2006, the average price charged for tuition, fees, room, and board at four-year public and private institutions was $17,447—a 577% increase from 30 years ago. On the basis of the mean household income of a household in the bottom fifth of the population, the price of college in 2005 was 71.3% of their income.
Historically, congressional involvement with issues of college costs and prices has focused on issues related to student access to postsecondary education. However, as Congress has considered the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA), attention has been given to additional actions that could be taken at the federal level to address college costs and prices. Actions considered have included creating price indices, providing incentives for controlling costs, making it easier for students to earn college credits, reducing regulatory burden, and increasing the availability of relevant public information. It is not clear which of these strategies would be most effective at addressing the issue of college costs or prices, or whether some of these strategies would be more effective if implemented at the state or institutional level. As Congress continues to debate the reauthorization of the HEA, an expanded federal role regarding college costs and prices may be considered.
This report begins by exploring three core concepts: college cost (what institutions spend), sticker price (what students are charged), and net price (what students actually pay)—defining each and presenting current and historical data. This information is followed by a discussion of various influences on costs and prices. The report concludes with an overview of relevant issues for reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA, P.L. 89-329 as amended by P.L. 105-244). Where data are available, this report considers all types of postsecondary education institutions: public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit institutions. |
crs_RL32764 | crs_RL32764_0 | Introduction
The scientific, economic, and political questions surrounding climate change have long been with us. This report focuses instead on a relative newcomer: the legal debate. Though the first court decision related to climate change appeared 19 years ago, the quantity of such litigation has mushroomed in recent years. Representatives of some suing organizations and states acknowledge that a prime cause for this litigation surge is the inaction of Congress and the executive branch during the George W. Bush Administration with regard to mandatory constraints on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and their perception that litigation might help to prompt such action. The principal court cases, decided and pending, arise in eight contexts—a number that continues to grow. First and most important is the Clean Air Act (CAA). In April, 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The second context for climate change litigation is the federal wildlife statutes, raising the issue of whether statutes like the Endangered Species Act can be used to limit GHG emissions based on their contribution to climate-climate-related alterations of wildlife habitat. Fifth is common law tort theories such as nuisance and whether they be used successfully by state and private plaintiffs to force cutbacks in GHG emissions, or payment of damages? Seventh, chiefly with respect to coal-fired power plants, is state utilities laws. And eighth is whether general liability insurance policies cover harms and liabilities caused by climate change. One has ruled. As to the state of climate change science, the Court's focus on the policy reasons EPA gave as part of exercising its "judgment" obscures the fact that the agency's rejection of the petition stemmed in part from expressions of scientific uncertainty in a 2001 National Research Council report on the science of climate change. An appeal has been filed. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) cases involving climate change represent the oldest and most numerous category of climate change litigation. Three are on appeal, however. Federal Preemption
Stationary Sources of GHG Emissions
The question of whether federal law preempts state regulation of GHG emissions arises chiefly in connection with mobile sources. An appeal in this case is pending as well. In a string of 2007 decisions under the Clean Air Act, Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, foreign policy authority of the United States, and NEPA, courts have shown increased willingness to authorize or require government consideration of climate change. | The scientific, economic, and political questions surrounding climate change have long been with us. This report focuses instead on a relative newcomer: the legal debate. Though the first court decision related to climate change appeared 19 years ago, such litigation has proliferated in just the past six. Representatives of some suing organizations and states acknowledge that a prime cause for this litigation surge was inaction by Congress and the executive branch during the George W. Bush Administration with regard to mandatory constraints on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
The court cases, decided and pending, arise in eight contexts. The first is the Clean Air Act (CAA). In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that as to mobile sources of emissions (cars, trucks), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority under the act to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This decision puts pressure on EPA to move forward as well with regulation of GHGs from stationary sources (power plants, factories).
Second, litigation under wildlife statutes, particularly the Endangered Species Act, raises the possibility that the impacts of climate change on wildlife may constrain private activities that emit GHGs.
Third, energy statutes have been invoked. It has been held, for example, that under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the United States must monetize the benefits of reduced carbon emissions as part of setting light-truck fuel economy standards.
Fourth, various statutes requiring federal government analysis and information dissemination—the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Global Change Research Act (GCRA), and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)—have generated climate-change litigation. NEPA suits make up the most numerous subset of this category. Courts agree that if a plaintiff can establish standing, NEPA can be used to compel agency consideration of the climate change effects of its actions.
Fifth, common law tort theories such as nuisance have been invoked, not yet successfully, to force cutbacks in GHG emissions, or payment of damages. Several cases are on appeal.
Sixth are the preemption suits. These challenge state regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles as preempted by the federal corporate average fuel economy standards or federal authority over foreign policy. The two rulings thus far have rejected these challenges, but are on appeal. California's suit attacking EPA's denial of its request for a waiver of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act has now been stayed, pending EPA reconsideration of the denial.
Seventh, chiefly with respect to coal-fired power plants, are suits under state utilities laws.
And eighth, one case asks whether existing general liability insurance policies cover climate-change-related liability.
Finally, the report discusses international law aspects of a nation's contributions to climate change, and offers some overview comments. |
crs_R43337 | crs_R43337_0 | While public-private partnerships (PPPs) have long been used to manage real property, congressional interest in PPPs has recently increased due to the large number of underutilized and excess buildings owned by federal agencies, as well as sequestration and other spending constraints. There is no single, accepted definition of public-private partnership , and PPPs can be structured in many ways. However, for purposes of this report, a PPP is an agreement whereby a nonfederal entity acquires the right to use real property owned or controlled by a federal agency—typically through a long-term lease—in exchange for redeveloping or renovating that property (or other property). In many cases, the agency and the nonfederal entity share the net cash flow or savings that result from the agreement. The term real property is defined by the Federal Management Regulation as any interest in land, together with any fixtures thereon, under the control of a federal agency except: (1) the public domain; (2) lands reserved or dedicated for national forest or park purposes; (3) minerals in lands withdrawn or reserved from the public domain that are suitable for disposition under the public land mining and mineral leasing laws; (4) certain other lands withdrawn or reserved from the public domain; and (5) any crops designated for disposition by severance and removal from the land. It concludes with considerations for Congress, such as agencies' capabilities to enter into and oversee performance of these arguably complicated arrangements. Key Elements of a PPP
The process of forming a PPP typically begins when an agency identifies a property that could provide greater benefits to the government if redeveloped or renovated. The agency then works with a nonfederal partner to determine whether a redevelopment strategy would provide the agency with the benefits it seeks, and the nonfederal partner with financial returns sufficient to cover the risk of investing in the property. The redevelopment strategy and the method of financing are closely linked. The former refers specifically to the work that the nonfederal partner agrees to undertake, while the latter is a combination of the revenue generated from the improved space and, in some cases, savings realized by reduced operating costs. Financial benefits to the government may also include a division of property cash flows. However, several common redevelopment and financing structures can be identified. The agency enters a PPP under which a developer leases the property and constructs a new office building on the unused portion of the land. A developer builds the annex in exchange for several acres of excess property. This is largely because federal law is generally silent as to PPPs, per se , particularly PPPs for purposes of improving or disposing of federal real property. Instead, those agencies that have, to date, entered agreements that could be characterized as PPPs have done so under their authority (1) to lease, otherwise convey, or permit the use of federal real property; and (2) to enter procurement contracts. Few of these statutes apply government-wide, and those that do often apply only to specific properties, or for specific purposes. Considerations for Congress
In considering whether to expand federal agencies' ability to enter PPPs, or overseeing the use of existing PPP authorities, Congress may want to pay particular attention to certain topics, such as (1) the limited information currently available regarding agencies' PPP authorities and their use thereof; (2) the degree to which legal uncertainties may deter agency use, or public acceptance, of PPPs; (3) agencies' capabilities to enter and perform PPPs; (4) whether agencies should be required to develop business plans for their partnership activities; (5) whether agencies should be required to notify Congress, or obtain its approval, when entering into PPPs; (6) agencies' ability to retain and use net proceeds from PPP agreements; and (7) the interplay between PPPs and the current disposal process. However, because individual agencies have different authority to lease real property or take other actions in forming PPPs, there is often considerable variability in the types of PPPs they may enter. | While public-private partnerships (PPPs) have long been used to manage real property, congressional interest in PPPs has recently increased due to the large number of underutilized and excess buildings owned by federal agencies, as well as sequestration and other spending constraints. There is no single, accepted definition of public-private partnership, and PPPs can be structured in many ways. However, for purposes of this report, a PPP is an agreement whereby a nonfederal entity acquires the right to use a real property owned or controlled by a federal agency—typically through a long-term lease—in exchange for redeveloping or renovating that property (or other property). In many cases, the agency and the nonfederal entity share the net cash flow or savings that result from the agreement. The term real property is defined by the Federal Management Regulation as any interest in land under the control of a federal agency except the public domain; lands reserved or dedicated for national forest or park purposes; minerals in lands withdrawn or reserved from the public domain; other lands withdrawn or reserved from the public domain; and crops separated from the land.
The process of forming a PPP typically begins when a federal agency identifies real property that could provide greater benefits to the government if it were redeveloped or renovated. The agency then works with nonfederal partners to see if a redevelopment strategy could be devised that provides the agency with the benefits it seeks, and the nonfederal partner with financial returns sufficient to cover the risk of investing in the property. The redevelopment strategy and method of financing are closely linked. The former refers specifically to the work that the nonfederal partner agrees to undertake, while the latter is a combination of the revenue generated from the improved space and, in some cases, savings realized by reduced operating costs. Financial benefits to the government may also include a division of property cash flows. Two common redevelopment and financing structures entail (1) leasing property to a developer, which then constructs a new facility on the land and subleases the facility; and (2) giving a developer excess real property in exchange for the developer building a facility for the agency on other land that the agency owns.
Federal law is generally silent as to PPPs, per se, particularly PPPs for purposes of improving or disposing of federal real property. A number of states have laws that define public-private partnership, and expressly authorize one or more state agencies (often, the Department of Transportation) to enter PPPs in general or for specific purposes (e.g., toll roads). With certain narrow exceptions (e.g., P.L. 106-407), federal law has no comparable provisions. Instead, those agencies which have, to date, entered agreements that could be characterized as PPPs have typically done so under their authority (1) to lease, otherwise convey, or permit the use of federal real property; or (2) to enter procurement contracts, particularly energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs). While the authorities as to procurement contracts often apply to all executive branch agencies, those as to leases generally apply only to specific agencies and properties, and sometimes only to agreements entered into for specific purposes. Thus, there is considerable variability in the types of PPPs that agencies may enter, and some uncertainties as to the legal requirements to which such partnerships are subject.
When contemplating expanded use of PPPs, Congress may wish to consider the limited information available about existing authorities that may permit landholding agencies to enter PPPs, and whether and how these authorities are currently being utilized. Congress may also wish to consider agencies' capabilities to enter into and oversee performance of these arguably complicated arrangements; agencies' authority to retain and use any net proceeds from PPPs; and the interplay between PPPs and current processes for disposing of excess property. |
crs_RL32961 | crs_RL32961_0 | VA carries out its veterans' programs nationwide through three administrations and the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for veterans' health care programs. The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) is responsible for compensation, pension, vocational rehabilitation, education assistance, home loan guaranty and insurance among other things. The National Cemetery Administration's (NCA) responsibilities include maintaining 120 national cemeteries in 39 states and Puerto Rico. Currently, VA health care services are generally available to all honorably discharged veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces who are enrolled in VA's health care system. Typically veterans are enrolled in priority enrollment groups based on service-connectedness and income (described later in this report). The second part of the report discusses major issues facing veterans' health care and provides a summary of major legislation enacted into law and bills that have been passed by either the House or Senate. Today, VA operates the nation's largest integrated health care system. ,
Unlike other federal health programs (such as Medicaid and Medicare), the VA is a direct service provider rather than a health insurer or payer for health care services. 104-262 , as it relates to the current priority enrollment groups. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) produced a new generation of war veterans. Among other things, Congress will continue to focus on attempting to ensure a "seamless transition" process for veterans moving from active duty into the VA health care system, improving mental health care services for veterans, funding the growing demand for veterans' health care services, and overseeing improvements to the effectiveness and efficiency of VA's provision of health care services. Among the mental health issues that could affect veterans, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has attracted the most attention. At present VA has discontinued this pilot program. Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES)
VA holds a substantial inventory of real property and facilities throughout the country. In October 2000, VA established the CARES program with the goal of evaluating the projected health care needs of veterans over the next 20 years and of realigning VA's infrastructure to better meet those needs. Priority Groups and Their Eligibility Criteria | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides services and benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. VA carries out its programs nationwide through three administrations and the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA). The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for veterans health care programs. The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) is responsible for providing compensation, pensions, and education assistance among other things. The National Cemetery Administration's (NCA) responsibilities include maintaining national veterans cemeteries.
VHA operates the nation's largest integrated health care system. Unlike other federal health programs, VHA is a direct service provider rather than a health insurer or payer for health care. VA health care services are generally available to all honorably discharged veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces who are enrolled in VA's health care system. VA has a priority enrollment system that places veterans in priority groups based on various criteria. Under the priority system VA decides each year whether its appropriations are adequate to serve all enrolled veterans. If not, VA could stop enrolling those in the lowest-priority groups.
Congress continues to grapple with a number of issues facing current veterans and new veterans returning from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). They include trying to ensure a seamless transition process for veterans moving from active duty into the VA health care system, and improving mental health care services such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) treatment programs for returning veterans.
In recent years, VA has made an effort to realign its capital assets, primarily buildings, to better serve veterans' needs. VA established the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) initiative to identify how well the geographic distribution of VA health care resources matches the projected needs of veterans. Given the tremendous interest in the implementation of the CARES initiative in the previous Congress, the 109th Congress would continue to monitor the CARES implementation.
Several veterans' health-care related bills have been passed by either the House or Senate. At present, these bills are pending action in the other chamber.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31664 | crs_RL31664_0 | This report describes the categories of beneficiaries eligible for survivor benefits under the military Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP), the formulas used in computing the income level (including the integration of SBP benefits with other federal benefits), and the costs of SBP participation incurred by the retiree and/or the beneficiary. The Survivor Benefit Plan was created by legislation enacted on September 21, 1972, and has been modified by later legislation. It was expected—and has largely been proven—that the SBP would be a significant improvement over the RSFPP, in terms of participation rates, costs to the retiree, and benefits for the survivors. Since the cost of coverage is computed on an actuarial basis, it is subject to change. Coverage for Military Members Retired from the Reserve Components
As with the Survivor Benefit Plan for active duty retirees, retirement eligible members of the reserves (Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Coast Guard Reserve) and National Guard (Army National Guard and Air National Guard) may elect to provide SBP protection for their survivors. This provision was made effective November 23, 2003. Many congressional constituents expressed confusion and dissatisfaction with these provisions. Survivor Benefit Plan and Veterans' Affairs Dependency and Indemnity Compensation
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) was established in 1956 by the Servicemen's and Veteran's Survivor Benefit Act. In 1891, Congress passed language prohibiting what it regarded as "dual compensation" for either past or current service and a disability pension. | The military Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) was created in 1972. Since its creation, it has been subjected to many legislative changes. This report describes the basic provisions of the military Survivor Benefit Plan and all relevant changes or modifications that have occurred.
Specifically, the military Survivor Benefit Plan is described and explained in terms of its eligibility provisions, costs, benefits, and its current or former integration with other federal programs (including Social Security and Department of Veterans Affairs Dependency and Indemnity Compensation) for members and retirees of active duty military service and the Reserve Components (both the reserves and National Guard). In addition, tables and work sheets are provided to assist the reader in computing the costs and benefits available under this program.
Nearly every Congress since 1972 has, in some way, modified the provisions of the military Survivor Benefit Plan. These modifications have had a significant effect on current and prospective participants and beneficiaries. In nearly every instance, these changes have made the SBP more generous. Furthermore, these modifications involve complex issues and processes, and are, therefore, a source of numerous requests for information from constituents to their congressional representatives. |
crs_RL31208 | crs_RL31208_0 | Introduction
The USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107-56, 15 Stat. Title III derives from H.R. Among the purposes of the legislation are: increasing the strength of U.S. measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Another aimis to provide a national mandate for subjecting to special scrutiny foreign jurisdictions, financialinstitutions operating outside the United States, and classes of international transactions or types ofaccounts that pose particular opportunities for criminal abuse. Another significant purpose of thelegislation is to ensure that all appropriate elements of the financial services industry are subject toappropriate requirements to report potential money laundering transactions to proper authorities. The legislation contains over forty separate sections, each of which is summarized in this report. Some of them are technical in the sense that they address criminal and civil judicial or administrativeproceedings; others enhance criminal penalties for various types of financial crimes. Among theprovisions that have garnered the most attention are those that affect financial institutions such assection 311' s grant of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to impose special measures onfinancial institutions upon finding a jurisdiction, class of transactions, or institution to be of "primarymoney laundering concern" that could include opening or maintaining accounts. In addition, thereare provisions that specifically address and specify increased due diligence for correspondentaccounts, payable-through accounts, and private banking accounts for non-U.S. persons as well asaccounts with off-shore or foreign shell banks. There are requirements and standards for increasedcooperation by financial institutions in responding to government requests for information and newrequirements for regulations mandating standards for identifying persons opening accounts. Thelegislation also requires financial institutions to institute anti-money laundering programs and theSecretary of the Treasury, within 3 months, to issue regulations setting minimum requirements. Since much of the legislation requires implementing regulations, the full impact will emerge over the course of time. Because many of its provisions impose requirements for studies and reports,Congress has indicated that it is prepared to conduct fine tuning should the need arise. 312.
International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act
SUBTITLE A-International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures
Special Measures. Prohibition on Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Shell Banks. SUBTITLE B-BANK Secrecy Act Amendments and Related Improvements
Amendments Relating to Reporting of Suspicious Activities. | Title III, of the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56 ( H.R. 3162 ), 115 Stat. 272 (2001), the "International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001,"contains three subtitles that deal with: International Counter Money Laundering and RelatedMeasures; Bank Secrecy Act Amendments and Related Improvements; and, Currency Crimes andProtection. It contains a list of 10 findings and 13 purposes, relating the scope of internationalmoney laundering to the financing of global terrorism and focusing on problems in the internationalbanking system that have facilitated money laundering. Among the purposes of the legislation are:increasing the strength of U.S. measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute international moneylaundering and the financing of terrorism, to provide a national mandate for subjecting to specialscrutiny foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside the United States, and classesof international transactions or types of accounts that pose particular opportunities for criminalabuse, and to ensure that all appropriate elements of the financial services industry are subject toappropriate requirements to report potential money laundering transactions to proper authorities.
The legislation contains over forty separate sections, each of which is summarized in this report. Some of them are technical in the sense that they address criminal and civil judicial or administrativeproceedings; others enhance criminal penalties for various types of financial crimes. Among theprovisions that have garnered the most attention are those that affect financial institutions such asthe grant of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to impose special measures, includingrequiring the closure of certain accounts with foreign banks. To impose these special measures, theSecretary must find that a jurisdiction, class of transactions, or institution is of "primary moneylaundering concern." In addition, there are provisions that specifically address and specify increaseddue diligence for correspondent accounts, payable-through accounts, and private banking accountsfor non-U.S. persons as well as accounts with off-shore or foreign shell banks. There arerequirements and standards for increased cooperation by financial institutions in responding togovernment requests for information and new requirements for regulations mandating standards foridentifying persons opening accounts. The legislation also requires financial institutions to instituteanti-money laundering programs, and the Secretary of the Treasury, within 3 months, to issueregulations setting minimum requirements.
Some of the provisions of the legislation went into effect with the President's signature. Some need no implementing regulations. Much of the legislation, however, requires implementingregulations. The full impact, therefore, will emerge over the course of time. By including manyrequirements for studies and reports, Congress has indicated that it is prepared to conduct fine tuningshould the need arise. |
crs_R42960 | crs_R42960_0 | Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies commonly procure patents on their innovative products and processes, such rights are not self-enforcing. If a brand-name drug company wishes to enforce its patents against generic competitors, it must pursue litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry. As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements call for the generic firm to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug. This compensation has been termed an "exclusion" or "exit" payment or, because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent proprietor to the accused infringer, a "reverse" payment." Since 2003, Congress has required that litigants notify federal antitrust authorities of their pharmaceutical patent settlements. To date, Congress has not stipulated substantive standards for assessing the validity of these agreements under the antitrust law, however. That determination was left to judicial application of general antitrust principles. Facing different factual patterns, some lower courts have concluded that a particular reverse payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation, while others had upheld the agreement. The June 17, 2013, decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. resolved this disagreement by holding that the legality of reverse payment settlements should be evaluated under the "rule of reason" approach. However, the Court declined to hold that such settlements should be presumptively illegal under a "quick look" analysis. The lower courts now face the potentially complex task of applying the rule of reason to reverse payment settlements going forward. The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act ( S. 214 ) would create a rebuttable presumption that certain reverse payment settlements were illegal. In addition, the FAIR Generics Act ( S. 504 ) would introduce reforms to the Hatch-Waxman Act that would reduce incentives for generic firms to settle with brand-name companies. In exchange, the NDA holder would agree to compensate the ANDA applicant, often with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. One possibility is to await further judicial developments. Another option is to regulate the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation in some manner. S. 27 includes a list of factors to be weighed by the courts in such circumstances. | Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies routinely procure patents on their innovative medications, such rights are not self-enforcing. Brand-name firms that wish to enforce their patents against generic competitors must therefore commence litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry.
As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements have called for the generic firm to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug for a period of time. In exchange, the brand-name drug company agrees to compensate the generic firm, often with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. Because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent owner to the accused infringer, this compensation has been termed a "reverse" payment.
Since 2003, Congress has required that litigants notify federal antitrust authorities of their pharmaceutical patent settlements. That legislation did not dictate substantive standards for assessing the validity of these agreements under the antitrust law, however. That determination was left to judicial application of general antitrust principles. Facing different factual patterns, some lower courts had concluded that a particular reverse payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation, while others have upheld the agreement.
The June 17, 2013, decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. resolved this disagreement by holding that the legality of reverse payment settlements should be evaluated under the "rule of reason" approach. However, the Court declined to hold that such settlements should be presumptively illegal under a "quick look" analysis. The lower courts now face the potentially complex task of applying the rule of reason to reverse payment settlements going forward.
Congress possesses a number of alternatives for addressing reverse payment settlements. One possibility is to await further judicial developments. Another option is to regulate the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation in some manner. In the 113th Congress, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 214) would establish a presumption of either legality or illegality under the antitrust laws, along with consideration of relevant factors to be weighed by the courts. Another proposal, the FAIR Generics Act (S. 504), would introduce reforms to the food and drug laws that would reduce incentives for generic firms to settle with brand-name companies. |
crs_R45252 | crs_R45252_0 | Introduction
In recent years, a number of observers have suggested that United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is generally more effective at acquisitions than the U.S. military departments, in part because of the perception that SOCOM has unique acquisition authorities. SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities when compared with other combatant commands. However, SOCOM's acquisition authority is more expansive. Section 164(c) grants SOCOM authority to
validate and establish priorities for requirements; ensure combat readiness; develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment and acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services; and ensure the interoperability of equipment and forces. 167), SOCOM has an Acquisition Executive who has the authority to
negotiate memoranda of agreement with the military departments to carry out the acquisition of equipment, material, and supplies; supervise the acquisition of equipment, material, supplies, and services; represent the command in discussions with the military departments regarding acquisition programs for which the command is a customer; and work with the military departments to ensure that the command is appropriately represented in any joint working group or integrated product team regarding acquisition programs for which the command is a customer. However, there are also significant differences, many of which relate to the size and scope of SOCOM and its authorities. SOCOM acquisition authority is restricted to Special Operations-specific items, while the military services have the authority to acquire any necessary goods and services. When SOCOM does exercise its authority, it adheres to the same oversight and documentation requirements as the services. There are no unique authorities granting SOCOM exemptions or waivers from acquisition requirements. The current SOCOM Acquisition Executive also reiterated this point when he reportedly stated that "[SOCOM's] ability to move relatively fast is a function of scale." Some analysts believe that these lower dollar thresholds allow SOCOM to operate below the radar, thus enabling a more nimble acquisition process and a culture that promotes "failing fast." In some instances SOCOM has fewer acquisition authorities than the military departments. | United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command responsible for training, doctrine, and equipping all special operations forces of the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. SOCOM has been granted acquisition authority by Congress to procure special operations forces-peculiar equipment and services.
There is a perception among some observers and officials that SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities that allow it to operate faster and more efficiently than the military departments.
SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities when compared with other combatant commands. However, SOCOM is generally held to the same statutory and regulatory acquisition requirements as the military departments and, in some instances, has less acquisition authority. There are no unique authorities granting SOCOM exemptions or waivers from acquisition requirements. But when it comes to acquisition, SOCOM is different than the military services.
SOCOM's acquisition performance is influenced by the size of the organization, focus of its acquisitions (which are limited to special operations-specific goods and services), and smaller size of its programs in terms of both scope of development and dollars. The current SOCOM Acquisition Executive reiterated these points when he reportedly stated that "[SOCOM's] ability to move relatively fast is a function of scale."
These factors allow SOCOM to maintain the majority of its procurement programs at Category III levels, thereby reducing the oversight and bureaucratic burden, and allowing critical Milestone Decision Authority to remain at lower levels within the Command. As a result, some observers have argued that the SOCOM acquisition process is often capable of executing faster (and failing faster), maintaining closer communication between leadership and users, being more nimble, and fostering a culture willing to assume more risk. |
crs_RS21270 | crs_RS21270_0 | Funding for Homeland Security R&D
Federal agency funding for homeland security R&D was requested at about $5.1 billion for FY2007, about the same amount as in FY2005 and FY2006. Creation of a Department of Homeland Security and Other Laws
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 109-295 , appropriated $1.0 billion, about 22% less than the estimated FY2006 level. This is the first reduction in the agency's R&D budget since DHS was created in 2002. 107-296 ). Oversight Issues
Controversial issues about DHS's R&D include preventing conflicts of interest in awarding R&D funds since many DHS S&T portfolio managers are hired from, and will return to, national laboratories which are among the contenders for DHS R&D contracts and awards' decisions, which according to GAO, are often undocumented (based on DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, December 2005, GAO-06-206); providing Congress with more detailed information regarding priority setting and R&D budgeting and spending (see H.Rept. | P.L. 107-296, the Homeland Security Act, consolidated some research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For FY2007, Congress appropriated an R&D budget (excluding management/procurement) totaling about $1.0 billion, about 22% less than FY2006, and representing the first decline in DHS's R&D funding since the inception of DHS in 2002. DHS is mandated to coordinate all federal agency homeland security R&D, which was requested at about $5.1 billion. During the 110th Congress, contentious policy issues relating to DHS's R&D are likely to include priority-setting, management, possible waste in research and technology programs, and improving program performance results. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL31726 | crs_RL31726_0 | Introduction
Conditions in the Region
Latin America made enormous strides over the past two decades in political development, with all countries but Cuba having regular free and fair elections for head of state. Despite this democratic progress, several nations faced considerable challenges that threatenedpolitical stability, including economic decline and rising poverty, violent guerrilla conflicts,autocratic leaders, drug trafficking, and increasing crime. U.S. Policy
Congressional attention to Latin America in the 108th Congress focused on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts in the Andean region, security cooperation with Latin America, andtrade issues, such as free trade agreements with Chile and Central American countries and theregional Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Congress maintained an active interest inneighboring Mexico, with a myriad of trade, migration, border and drug trafficking issuesdominating U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations. U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in the region continued to focus on the Administration's Andean Counterdrug Initiative (2) supporting Colombia andits neighbors with foreign assistance in theirstruggle against drug trafficking and drug-financed terrorist groups. U.S. officials maintained that the most effective and rapid means to stimulate economic development in Latin America is through trade, and they set the goal of strengthening trade linkageswith the region through the negotiation of numerous free trade agreements (FTAs):
On June 6, 2003, the United States and Chile signed a bilateral FTA that had been completed in December 2002. On August 5,2004, all seven countries signed the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free TradeAgreement (DR-CAFTA). The Peace Corps was active in manyLatin American and Caribbean nations. (For additional information,see CRS Report RL32160 , Caribbean Region: Issues in U.S. Relations .) Some observers, including many from Latin America, maintained that the Bush Administration did not pay enough attention to the region and to the problems of economic and political stability inseveral countries. U.S. policy was criticized for having returned to a policy of benign neglect as theAdministration focused its attention on such pressing problems as the global anti-terrorismcampaign, the war in Iraq, and homeland security. Others suggest that despite its attention to crises and issues worldwide, the United States maintained an active policy toward Latin America. They point to the momentum for free trade inthe region and to the assistance and support provided to Colombia and its neighbors as they combatdrug trafficking and terrorist groups in the Andean region. Panama Trade Agreement. Congress continued its high level of interest in Cuba in the 108th Congress with a variety of legislative initiatives regarding sanctions and human rights. FMF would continue to be prohibited. As noted above ( U.S.-Latin American Trade Relations ),Congress did not consider implementing legislation for the DR-CAFTA by the end of the 108thCongress. U.S. assistance to Panamahas increased in the past several years with the country receiving assistance under the BushAdministration's Andean Regional Initiative to help Colombia and its neighbors combat drugtrafficking. | The Latin American and Caribbean region has made enormous strides over the past two decades in political development, with all countries but Cuba having regular free and fair elections for headof state. But several nations have faced considerable challenges that have threatened politicalstability, including economic decline and rising poverty, violent guerrilla conflicts, drug trafficking,and increasing crime.
Bush Administration officials maintain that U.S. policy toward Latin America has three overarching goals: strengthening security; promoting democracy and good governance; andstimulating economic development. Some observers argue that the Administration has not beenpaying enough attention to the region and to instability in several countries. They maintain that theUnited States, faced with other pressing foreign policy problems like the war in Iraq and the globalanti-terrorist campaign, has fallen back to a policy of benign neglect of the region. In contrast, othersmaintain that the United States has an active policy toward Latin America and point to theconsiderable assistance and support provided to Colombia and its neighbors as they combat drugtrafficking and terrorist groups. They also point to the momentum toward free trade in the regionthrough negotiation of numerous free trade agreements, and to increased bilateral and regionalcooperation on security issues.
Congressional attention to Latin America in the 108th Congress continued to focus on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts in the Andean region, trade issues, and potentialthreats to democracy and stability. U.S. counter-narcotics efforts focused on continuation of theAndean Counterdrug Initiative supporting Colombia and its neighbors in their struggle against drugtrafficking and drug-financed terrorist groups. With regard to trade, Congress approvedimplementing legislation for a bilateral free trade agreement with Chile in July 2003; the UnitedStates signed a combined U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement(DR-CAFTA) on August 5, 2004, but Congress did not consider implementing legislation before theend of the 108th Congress. Congress also paid increased attention to economic, social, and politicaltensions in South America that threatened democratic order, particularly in the Andean region. Inthe Caribbean, Haiti's persistent poverty and political instability remained a congressional concern,as did assistance to Haiti and other Caribbean nations in the aftermath of devastating damageincurred by hurricanes and storms in 2004. Congress also continued to debate the appropriate U.S.policy approach to Cuba, the region's only holdout to democracy, as it did for the past several years. Finally, Congress maintained an active interest in neighboring Mexico, with a myriad of trade,migration, border and drug trafficking issues dominating bilateral relations.
This report examines issues in U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in the 108th Congress. It reflects final actions of the 108th Congress and will not be updated. For more detailsand discussion, see the listed CRS products after each section. |
crs_R42457 | crs_R42457_0 | Introduction
Congress established the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) to provide free public access to federal government information. The current structure of the FDLP program was established in 1962. Access to government information is provided through a network of depository libraries across the United States. In the past half-century, information creation, distribution, retention, and preservation has expanded from a tangible, paper-based process to include digital processes managed largely through computerized information technologies. The transition to digital information raises a number of issues that may be of interest to Congress. These concerns may be addressed in their own right, or in the context of user demand for FDLP information, for which there is no uniform metric over time, or comparatively among current FDLP institutions. The emergence of a predominantly digital FDLP may call into question the capacity of GPO to manage the program given its existing statutory authorities. Whereas GPO is the central point of distribution for tangible, printed FDLP materials—an activity that it continues—its responsibilities are more diverse, and may be less explicitly specified, regarding its distribution of digital information. In some instances, GPO carries out activities to distribute digital information that are similar to its actions regarding print materials. In others, GPO provides access to digital content that it does not produce or control. SuDocs has archiving and permanent retention authorities for tangible materials, which are exercised by the distribution of materials to depository libraries. At the same time, those authorities do not envision digital creation and distribution of government publications. At the same time, explicit digital distribution authorities that provide for online access to publications, including core legislative and regulatory products, do not directly address GPO's retention and preservation responsibilities for digital information. FDLP-Related Proposals and Actions
A number of efforts related to the program have been initiated by GPO and groups representing a number of libraries that participate in FDLP. These have included certain regional library activities; studies of the program by a private organization; proposals by a consortium of FDLP libraries to advance the consolidation, digitization, and cataloging of tangible collections; and a study of FDLP coordinated by GPO. Some of the issues may affect FDLP, and extend beyond the program to a variety of contexts related to the management of government information in tangible and digital forms, and include
Maintenance and availability of the FDLP tangible collection; Retention and preservation of born digital information; Access to FDLP resources; Authenticity and accuracy of digital material; Robustness of the FDLP Electronic Collection; and Cost of the FDLP and other government information distribution initiatives. | Congress established the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) to provide free public access to federal government information. The program's origins date to 1813; the current structure of the program was established in 1962 and is overseen by the Government Printing Office (GPO). Access to government information is provided through a network of depository libraries across the United States. In the past half-century, information creation, distribution, retention, and preservation has expanded from a tangible, paper-based process to include digital processes managed largely through computerized information technologies.
The transition to digital information raises a number of issues of possible interest to Congress. This report discusses those possible concerns as they affect FDLP. These issues, which are in some cases interrelated, may not only affect FDLP, but also extend beyond the program to a variety of contexts related to the management of government information in tangible and digital forms. Issues include the following: maintenance and availability of the FDLP tangible collection; retention and preservation of digital information; access to FDLP resources; authenticity and accuracy of digital material; robustness of the FDLP Electronic Collection; and the costs of FDLP and other government information distribution initiatives.
The emergence of a predominantly digital FDLP may call the capacity of the statutory authorities GPO exercises into question. Whereas GPO is the central point of distribution for tangible, printed FDLP materials, its responsibilities are more diverse, and may be less explicitly specified, regarding its distribution of digital information. In some instances, GPO carries out activities to distribute digital information that are similar to its actions regarding printed materials. In other instances, GPO provides access to digital content that it does not produce or control. The agency has archiving and permanent retention authorities for tangible materials, but those authorities do not envision digital creation and distribution of government publications. Digital distribution authorities provide for online access to publications, but are silent on GPO's retention and preservation responsibilities for digital information. These concerns may be addressed in their own right, or in the context of user demand for FDLP information, for which there is no uniform metric.
A number of efforts related to FDLP have been initiated by GPO and groups representing a number of libraries that participate in FDLP. These have included certain regional library activities; studies of the program by a private organization; proposals by a consortium of FDLP libraries to advance the consolidation, digitization, and cataloging of tangible collections; and a study of FDLP coordinated by GPO. |
crs_R44468 | crs_R44468_0 | Introduction
Agencies use guidance documents to set regulatory policy on a consistent basis. While "legislative rules" carry the force of law and are required to undergo the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), guidance documents are exempt from these constraints and can be issued more swiftly than legislative rules. The issuance of such guidance has not escaped criticism. Some have argued that agencies use guidance documents to effectively change the law or expand the scope of their delegated regulatory authorities. This report examines one type of guidance document of particular recent prominence—agency policy statements. Such rules have the force and effect of law....
Interpretative rule —rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers....
General Statements of Policy —statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power. Judicial review of challenges to agency policy statements thus often turns on whether the agency document is actually a legislative rule. However, while these analytical categories might seem relatively clear, distinguishing between the two in practice can be difficult. Courts often frame the inquiry as an examination of whether the agency has established a binding norm on the public or itself; a variety of heuristics are applied, however, ranging from a somewhat formalistic analysis of relevant legal consequences to a more functional focus on a statement's practical effects. Courts pay close attention to the particular language used in the document when making this determination. Reviewability of Policy Statements
The question of whether a given agency document is properly identified as a legislative rule or policy statement has a significant impact on a federal court's willingness to engage in judicial review of the agency action. Unlike legislative rules, which may be immediately reviewable once they are finalized (i.e., issued as a final rule), policy statements often cannot be challenged until the agency takes further action to implement or enforce the policy. The Supreme Court, however, has provided only limited guidance in determining whether and when policy statements are reviewable, and as a result, lower courts have not adopted a uniform approach to the reviewability question. Debate Concerning Potential Tension with Supreme Court Doctrine
One might argue that some of the tests to distinguish between policy statements and legislative rules impose procedures on agencies beyond what the APA requires. The Court has made clear that the APA provides the "maximum procedural requirements" that courts may impose on agencies. Judicial Deference to Agency Policy Statements
The weight that a reviewing court is willing to give to an agency's interpretation of the law is an important aspect of judicial review. Indeed, the level of deference accorded to an agency interpretation can control the outcome of a challenge to agency action. Interpretations reached through formal processes that have the force and effect of law are most likely to qualify for Chevron deference. In contrast, interpretations reached through informal processes, and which are neither binding nor precedential, are unlikely to be eligible for Chevron deference. Implications for Agencies and the Public
The applicable legal test governing agency use of policy statements, whether imposed by courts or Congress, has important implications for the executive branch and the public. | Agencies frequently use guidance documents to set regulatory policy. While "legislative rules" carry the force of law and are required to undergo the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), guidance documents are exempt from these constraints and can be issued more swiftly than legislative rules. The issuance of such guidance documents, however, has not escaped criticism. Some have argued that agencies use guidance documents to effectively change the law or expand the scope of their delegated regulatory authorities. This report focuses on agency use and judicial review of one type of guidance document: general statements of policy.
Judicial review of challenges to agency policy statements often turns on whether the agency document is actually a legislative rule. Pursuant to congressionally delegated authority, agencies promulgate legislative rules that carry the force and effect of law. General statements of policy are not legally binding; rather, they are issued in order to advise the public about the manner in which the agency intends to exercise its discretionary authority. While these analytical categories might seem relatively clear, distinguishing between the two in practice can be difficult. Courts often frame the inquiry as to whether the agency has established a binding norm on the public or itself, although a variety of heuristics are applied, ranging from a somewhat formalistic analysis of relevant legal consequences to a more functional focus on a statement's practical effects.
In addition, the question of whether a given agency document is properly identified as a legislative rule or policy statement has a significant impact on a federal court's willingness to engage in judicial review of the agency action. Unlike legislative rules, which may be immediately reviewable once they are finalized, policy statements often cannot be challenged until the agency takes further action to implement or enforce the policy. The Supreme Court, however, has provided only limited guidance in determining whether and when policy statements are reviewable, and as a result, lower courts have not adopted a uniform approach to the reviewability question.
In light of the difficulty in distinguishing between legislative rules and policy statements, questions have been raised concerning whether some judicial tests to make this determination are consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. The Court has made clear that the judiciary may not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond the text of the APA. The applicable legal test governing agency use of policy statements, whether imposed by courts or Congress, has important implications for the executive branch and the public. One approach might grant agencies flexibility to issue policy statements in order to increase public knowledge of agency priorities, but risks permitting agencies to effectively bind the public without going through notice and comment procedures. An alternative might be to require heightened procedures when agencies issue policy statements, but this approach risks less overall notice to the public about agency intentions.
Finally, although the relevant Supreme Court tests do not entirely preclude federal courts from deferring to an agency's statutory interpretation contained in statements of policy, such documents usually do not receive Chevron deference. The weight that a reviewing court is willing to give to an agency's interpretation of the law is an important aspect of judicial review. Indeed, the level of deference accorded to an agency interpretation can sometimes determine the outcome of a challenge to agency action. Interpretations reached through formal processes that have the force and effect of law are most likely to qualify for Chevron deference. In contrast, interpretations reached through informal processes, and which are neither binding nor precedential, are unlikely to be eligible for Chevron deference. |
crs_RL30498 | crs_RL30498_0 | In terms of the H-1B provisions, S. 1639 would increase the annual cap on H-1B visas to 115,000 (and potentially up to 180,000). It also draws on the labor market protections proposed in S. 1035 , the H-1B and L-1 Visa Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 2007. Other H-1B bills include S. 1038 / H.R. 1930 , H.R. 1758 , S. 31 , S. 1397 , S. 1092 , S. 1351 , H.R. 2538 , and H.R. 3194 . Immigration Policy for Professional Workers
Introduction
The economic prosperity of the 1990s fueled a drive to increase the levels of employment-based immigration. Both the Congress and the Federal Reserve Board then expressed concern that a scarcity of labor could curtail the pace of economic growth. A primary legislative response was to increase the supply of foreign temporary professional workers through FY2003. The FY2004 limit was reached in mid-February 2004, and the FY2005 limit was reached on October 1, 2004, the first day of the fiscal year. The inclusion of H-1B provisions in free trade agreements ( P.L. 108-77 and P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005, exempts up to 20,000 aliens holding a master's or higher degree from the cap on H-1B visas. Recent H-1B Capped Petitions
USCIS determined that approximately 119,193 of the H-1B petitions received on April 2 and 3, 2007 (the first days it was accepting petitions) were subject to the FY2008 cap of 65,000. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that the FY2007 H-1B cap had been reached. By FY2005, as Figure 2 illustrates, the trend reversed, and 45.3% of H-1B new arrivals were employed in computer-related fields. More than one-third (39.3%) have earned master's degrees. Another 17.1% have either professional degrees or doctorates. India was the leading country of origin for newly arriving H-1B workers, comprising almost half (49.0%) of all of the new arrivals in FY2005. In terms of overall H-1B new arrivals in FY2005, China followed with 9.16%, and Canada was third (3.6%). The median annual compensation of the newly arriving H-1B nonimmigrants dropped from $50,000 in FY2001 to $44,803 in FY2003, but climbed back to $50,000 in FY2005. Legislative Issues in the 110th Congress
Main Issues of Debate
Global Competition for Talent
Proponents of expanding H-1B admissions argue that H-1B workers are essential if the United States is to remain globally competitive and that employers should be free to hire the best people for the jobs. Effects on U.S. Labor Market
Those opposing any further increases assert that there is no compelling evidence of a labor shortage in these professional areas that cannot be met by newly graduating students and by retraining the existing U.S. work force. They argue that the education of U.S. students and training of U.S. workers should be prioritized. S. 1639 stalled in the Senate on June 28, 2007, when the key cloture vote failed. Although the 107 th Congress did not alter H-1B admission levels, it did include provisions that allow H-1B visa holders to remain in that status beyond the statutory time limits of their temporary visas if their employers had filed applications for them to become legal permanent residents. 108-77 and P.L. | The economic prosperity of the 1990s fueled a drive to increase the levels of employment-based immigration. Both the Congress and the Federal Reserve Board then expressed concern that a scarcity of labor could curtail the pace of economic growth. A primary response was to increase the supply of foreign temporary professional workers through FY2003. When the H-1B annual numerical limits reverted to 65,000 in FY2005, that limit was reached on the first day. The FY2006 limit was reached before the fiscal year began. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that the FY2008 H-1B cap was reached within the first two days it accepted petitions—April 2-3, 2007.
The 106th Congress temporarily raised the number of H-1B visas for three years. The 107th Congress enacted provisions that allow H-1B workers to remain if their employers petitioned for them to become legal permanent residents. A provision in P.L. 108-447 exempted up to 20,000 aliens holding a master's or higher degree from the cap on H-1B visas. It also established a fraud-prevention-and-detection fee on petitioners. Provisions on H-1B visas also were part of Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements (P.L. 108-77 and P.L. 108-78).
The median annual compensation of the newly arriving H-1B nonimmigrants dropped from $50,000 in FY2001 to $44,803 in FY2003, but climbed back to $50,000 in FY2005. Most H-1B new arrivals had earned a bachelor's degree or its equivalent (42.5%). More than one-third (39.3%) had master's degrees, and 17.1% had either professional degrees or doctorates. In FY2005, 45.3% of H-1B new arrivals were employed in computer-related fields, followed by educators (11.2%), architects, engineers and surveyors (11.1%), and administrative specializations (9.5%). India was the leading country of origin, comprising 49.0% of all new arrivals in FY2005. China followed with 9.16%, and Canada was third (3.6%).
Those opposing any further increases or easing of admissions requirements assert that there is no compelling evidence of a labor shortage in these professional areas that cannot be met by newly graduating students and retraining the existing U.S. work force. They argue further that the education of U.S. students and training of U.S. workers should be prioritized instead of fostering a reliance on foreign workers. Proponents of current H-1B levels assert that H-1B workers are essential if the United States is to remain globally competitive. Some proponents argue that employers should be free to hire the best people for the jobs, maintaining that market forces should regulate H-1B visas, not an arbitrary ceiling.
In the 110th Congress, the comprehensive immigration reform legislation (S. 1639) stalled in the Senate on June 28, 2007. S. 1639 would increase the annual cap to 115,000 (and potentially to 180,000 in future years). S. 1639 also draws on the labor market protections proposed in S. 1035, the H-1B and L-1 Visa Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 2007. Other H-1B bills include S. 1038/H.R. 1930, H.R. 1758, S. 31, S. 1397, S. 1092, S. 1351, H.R. 2538, and H.R. 3194. This report tracks legislative activity and will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43187 | crs_R43187_0 | Introduction
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides states, territories, and Indian tribes with federal grants for benefits and services intended to ameliorate the effects, and address the root causes, of child poverty. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law and is typically thought of as the federal program that helps states fund their cash assistance programs for needy families with children. Moreover, TANF is also most associated with the 1996 welfare reform policies imposing work requirements and time limits on families receiving assistance. These are families with children cared for by adults who are not themselves recipients of TANF: disabled parents receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI); immigrant parents who are ineligible for TANF assistance but have citizen children who are eligible; and nonparent relative caregivers, such as grandparents, aunts, and uncles. This report examines the TANF cash assistance caseload, focusing on how the composition and characteristics of families receiving assistance have changed over time. It also does not describe individuals and families who receive TANF benefits and services other than cash assistance. These debates culminated in a number of changes in providing aid to low-income families with children in the mid-1990s, creating a system of expanded aid to working families (e.g., increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit and funding for child care subsidies) and the creation of TANF, which established time limits and revamped work requirements for the cash assistance programs for needy families with children. Trends in Caseload Characteristics: FY1988 to FY2013
The increases in the cash assistance caseload from 1989 to 1994, and its decline thereafter, were also associated with changes in the character of the caseload. Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of the family cash assistance caseload for selected years: FY1988, FY1994, FY2001, FY2006, and FY2013. In FY2013, 38.1% of TANF assistance families had no adult recipient; in contrast, in FY1988 only 9.8% of all cash assistance families had no adult recipient. In that year, just over half (51.0%) of all families had only one child. In FY2013, the share of child recipients who were Hispanic was 36.3%, compared with 29.9% who were African American, and 25.8% who were non-Hispanic white. This reflects their growth as a share of all children in the general population and of all poor children. From FY1994 to FY2001, the cash welfare caseload declined rapidly, from 5.0 million families to 2.2 million families per month, a 56% decline. It was this group that was most closely identified with welfare dependency during the welfare reform debates of the 1980s and 1990s. This section will focus on the five major categories of TANF families: (1) families with an adult recipient who is not employed; (2) families with an adult recipient, employed; (3) "child-only" families with an SSI parent; (4) "child-only" families with a nonparent, relative caretaker; and (5) "child-only families" with an ineligible immigrant parent. However, there are some differences in family size among the different categories of families. Age of Children
The majority of TANF families have young children. However, the age of the youngest child in the family also varies by family category. These families often have pre-school children. Race and Ethnicity of Child Recipients
The majority of the TANF cash assistance caseload is composed of racial and ethnic minorities. The caseload is much smaller—1.7 million families in FY2013 versus 5.0 million families in FY1994. TANF Policies for "Nontraditional" Cash Assistance Families? Many of the "child-only" TANF assistance families are affected not only by TANF policy, but other social policies as well. The May 2013 GAO report said a potential option to better understand TANF's role in helping its "child-only" families would be to require states to provide additional information to the federal government about the status and needs of "child-only" families. Congress could also establish—or require states to establish—goals and performance measures related to the well-being of children in "child-only" families. | The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides states, territories, and Indian tribes with federal grants for benefits and services intended to ameliorate the effects, and address the root causes, of child poverty. It was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, and is most associated with policies such as time limits and work requirements that sought to address concerns about "welfare dependency" of single mothers who received cash assistance. This report examines the characteristics of the TANF cash assistance caseload in FY2013, and compares it with selected post-welfare reform years (FY2001 and FY2006) and pre-welfare reform years (FY1988 and FY1994). The size of the caseload first increased, from 3.7 million families per month in FY1988 to 5.0 million families per month in FY1994, and then declined to 2.2 million families in FY2001 and 1.7 million families in FY2013. Over this period, some of the characteristics of the TANF cash assistance caseload have remained fairly stable, and other characteristics have changed.
Most cash assistance families are small; 51.0% of all TANF cash assistance families in FY2013 had one child. Cash assistance families also frequently have young children; 56.6% in FY2013 had a pre-school-aged child. The majority of the cash assistance caseload has also been composed of racial and ethnic minorities. By FY2013, the largest racial/ethnic group of TANF cash assistance children was Hispanic. In that year, of all TANF assistance child recipients, 36.3% were Hispanic, 29.9% were African American, and 25.8% were non-Hispanic white. The growth in Hispanic children as a percent of all TANF assistance children is due entirely to their population growth—not an increase in the rate at which Hispanic children receive TANF.
Additionally, the majority of adult recipients today, as in the past, are women—specifically, single mothers. However, the share of the caseload comprised of families with an adult recipient has declined substantially in the post-welfare reform period. In FY2013, 38.1% of all families receiving TANF cash assistance represented "child-only" families, in which benefits are paid on behalf of the child in the family but the adult caretaker is ineligible for TANF. The three main components of the "child-only" caseload are (1) families with a disabled parent receiving federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI); (2) families with an ineligible, immigrant parent but with eligible citizen children; and (3) families with children being cared for by a nonparent relative, such as a grandparent, aunt, or uncle. Each of the three categories of families differs in their characteristics from TANF cash assistance families with an adult recipient; there are also differences in characteristics among families in the three major "child-only" categories.
TANF policies generally date back to the 1996 welfare law and the welfare reform debates of the 1980s and 1990s, and do not necessarily address the current composition of the cash assistance caseload. The major performance measure used to evaluate TANF is the work participation rate, a measure not relevant to TANF "child-only" families. Many of TANF's child-only families are affected by social policies other than TANF (i.e., federal disability, immigration, and child protection policies). However, these families are also affected by TANF, and there are currently no federal rules for assessing how TANF funds are used to improve their well-being. Options that have been raised include requiring states to provide more information to the federal government and public on benefits and services afforded to "child-only" families. Congress could also either establish performance goals and measures, or, alternatively, require states to establish such goals and measures for "child-only" families. |
crs_R41643 | crs_R41643_0 | Introduction
The United States has increasingly recognized tuberculosis (TB) as a critical global health issue. In FY2008, Congress significantly increased its funding for global TB, providing $163.1 million to USAID for its TB programs and directing the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) at the State Department to spend at least $150 million on joint HIV/TB programs. This report provides information on key components of the global TB epidemic and U.S. global TB efforts as the 112 th Congress considers how the United States should continue to respond to the challenge of TB around the world. Individuals infected with TB can have latent TB infection or active TB disease. It is estimated that each year an average of 9 million people are infected with active TB disease. Global TB mortality has fallen by more than one-third since 1990 levels. MDR-TB significantly challenges TB control efforts, as it is more difficult to cure and may lead to high TB-related death rates. Tuberculosis Prevention and Treatment
Treatment: TB is curable through short-term chemotherapy. 106-264 ). The act recommended that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the primary U.S. agency responsible for global TB programs, coordinate with WHO, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) toward the goal of controlling TB, and put forth the following targets for countries with USAID TB programs, to be met by December 31, 2010: detect at least 70% of infectious TB cases, and cure at least 85% of detected cases. 108-25 ). The act also prohibited U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund, see " Key Partners in the Response to Global Tuberculosis ") ( Table 2 ) from exceeding 33% of the total amount of funds contributed from all sources. Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Lantos-Hyde Act, P.L. 110-293 ). Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), Department of State: As the coordinator of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), OGAC is the lead for the U.S. response to HIV/TB co-infection. Funding for global TB efforts increased slowly from FY2004 through FY2007. Appropriation levels for global TB rose significantly in FY2008, partly in response to a global public health scare in May 2007 when a man known to be carrying a drug-resistant form of the disease was able to cross a number of international borders, putting dozens of individuals at risk of infection. Appropriation amounts increased each fiscal year from FY2008 to FY2010 and have fluctuated since ( Table 1 and Figure 3 ). Key Partners in the Response to Global Tuberculosis
The United States works with a range of partners to combat TB, including other national governments, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector. The Global Fund: The Global Fund was established in 2002 as a public-private partnership to provide significant financial support for global responses to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. Key Issues in Global Tuberculosis
The 112 th Congress will likely be faced with a number of issues regarding the U.S. response to global TB, including how much assistance to provide and how to best apportion global TB funds. TB is the leading cause of death for people with HIV, and TB control is significantly impeded in areas with high HIV prevalence. Multidrug-Resistant TB (MDR-TB) and Extensively Drug-Resistant TB (XDR-TB): Drug resistant forms of TB are threatening progress in TB control. Global health experts have debated how to best address the issue of drug resistant TB, including whether more funds should be used to specifically address MDR-TB, particularly in countries with limited resources. Research and Development: Many of the tools used for TB prevention, diagnosis, and treatment are antiquated and have limited success rates. | Tuberculosis (TB) is one of the most widespread infectious diseases in the world, infecting an average of 9 million people annually. Although TB is curable, more than 1 million TB-related deaths occur each year. Due in part to a growing global response to TB, progress has been made in combating the disease. Globally, new TB infection rates have begun to slowly decline and TB mortality rates have decreased significantly since 1990. At the same time, absolute numbers of people infected with TB, particularly in Asia and Africa, continue to rise. Congress has recognized TB as an important humanitarian issue and increasingly as a potential threat to global security. In its second session, the 112th Congress will likely debate the appropriate funding levels and optimum strategy for addressing the continued challenge of global TB.
Congress has enacted several key pieces of legislation related to the prevention, treatment, and care of people with TB around the world. These include the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-264); the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25); and the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-293). These acts have authorized funds to be used in the fight against global TB and have recommended priority areas for the use of these funds.
From FY2004 to FY2007, U.S. spending for global TB remained at around $90 million per fiscal year. TB received new attention as a critical issue in May 2007, when a man known to be carrying a drug-resistant form of the disease was able to cross several international borders, putting dozens of others at risk of infection. In response to this event and to growing recognition of the global threat posed by TB, congressional funding for global TB began to increase significantly in FY2008, when Congress provided $163.1 million to USAID for its TB programs and directed the State Department to spend at least $150 million of funds for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) on joint HIV/TB programs. Funding for global TB saw steady increases from FY2008 to FY2010 and has seen small fluctuations since.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. agency in global TB control and oversees bilateral programs in over 40 countries. The United States works closely with a range of multilateral partners in responding to global TB, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund), the largest external donor for TB. National governments play a critical role in responding to TB, and domestic government expenditures account for the majority of global TB funding.
Several key issues threaten global control of TB. First, HIV/TB co-infection, particularly in Africa, is a growing challenge. TB is the leading cause of death for people with HIV, and TB control is significantly impeded in areas with high HIV prevalence. Second, drug-resistant forms of TB, including multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB), are more difficult and expensive to treat, leading to greater TB-related mortality. Finally, the methods currently used for both TB diagnosis and treatment are antiquated and have varying degrees of success, particularly in the face of HIV/TB co-infection and drug-resistant TB. This report outlines basic facts related to global TB, including characteristics of the epidemic and U.S. legislation, programs, funding, and partnerships related to the global response to TB. The report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33999 | crs_RL33999_0 | 1585 , the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act, thus clearing the bill for the President, who had vetoed the original version of the bill on December 28. 4986 were provisions added to the later bill that would make retroactive to January 1, 2008 a 3.5% pay raise for military personnel and the reauthorization of various bonuses, including enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. 3222 , P.L. FY2008 Defense Funding Status
On November 13, the President signed into law the conference report on the FY2008 Defense Appropriations bill ( H.R. Neither the House-passed nor the Senate-passed versions of H.R. Overview of Administration FY2008 Budget Request
On February 5, 2007, the White House formally released to Congress its FY2008 federal budget request, which included $647.2 billion in new budget authority for national defense. In addition to $483.2 billion for the regular operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), the request includes $141.7 billion for continued military operations abroad, primarily to fund the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs of the Department of Energy, and $5.2 billion for defense-related activities of other agencies. On October 22, the Administration increased its war-costs request by an additional $42.3 billion, bringing the total to $189.3 billion. 21 . The House passed its bill on May 17, 2007, and the Senate began consideration of the bill on July 9, 2007 , pulled the bill from the floor after several days of debate over Iraq amendments, and resumed consideration of the bill on September 17. DOD is expected to request an additional $10 billion more for MRAPs. The bill also authorizes $1 billion for these purposes. Conference Report on H.R. On December 6, House and Senate negotiators filed the conference report on H.R. On December 28, Administration officials announced that the President would veto the bill because of the provision allowing the government of Iraq to be sued in U.S. courts for damages resulting from actions of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Defense Appropriations: Highlights of the House Bill
The FY2008 defense appropriations bill passed August 5 by the House would provide a total of $459.6 billion for the DOD base budget (excluding funds for military construction), a reduction of $3.55 billion from the corresponding portion of the President's budget request. Among the major reductions included in this total are:
$1.6 billion cut from the Army's $28.9 billion request for operations and maintenance on grounds that the service managed its budget for FY2007 in ways that, according to the Committee, inflated its FY2008 budget request by that amount, without providing Congress any justification for the increase; $1.2 billion, a 5% reduction in the amount requested for service contracts, a savings the committee said could be achieved by more alert Pentagon oversight; $630 million in the Navy and Air Force training budgets for units that had been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan; $510 million to reflect a Pentagon civilian payroll that was smaller than the budget assumed; $551 million trimmed from various budget accounts that had a track record of unspent funds at the end of a fiscal year; $300 million in the Marine Corps procurement budget that the Committee described as "excess to requirements;" $420 million to reduce the cash balance carried by the Army's revolving fund that is used to operate various maintenance and support activities. 3222 , the FY2008 defense appropriations bill, approved September 12 by the Senate Appropriations Committee, provided $448.7 billion in discretionary budget authority, a reduction of $3.5 billion from the President's request for programs falling within the scope of this bill. Defense Appropriations: Highlights of Senate Floor Action
The Senate passed by voice vote, October 4, its version of the FY2008 defense appropriations bill ( H.R. As passed, the bill provided $460.3 billion in discretionary budget authority for DOD and an additional $3 billion for operations of other federal agencies to secure the U.S.-Mexican border. Personnel Costs and Medical Care
The House and Senate versions of H.R. | The President's FY2008 federal budget request, released February 5, 2007, included $647.2 billion in new budget authority for national defense including $483.2 billion for the regular operations of the Department of Defense (DOD), $141.8 billion for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, $17.4 billion for the nuclear weapons and other defense-related programs of the Department of Energy, and $4.8 billion for defense-related activities of other agencies. On July 31, 2007, the President requested an additional $5.3 billion for war-fighting costs, and on October 22 he requested an additional $42.3 billion for that purpose, bringing his total request for FY2008 war costs to $189.3 billion and the total national defense request to $694.8 billion. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of the President's proposal as $696.4 billion.
The House passed on May 17 its version of the defense authorization bill, H.R. 1585, approving $1.2 billion more than the President's then-pending request. The Senate passed its version of the bill October 1. The conference report on the bill, authorizing $696.4 billion—$21 million less than the request—was adopted by the House on December 12 and by the Senate on December 14.
On December 28, the White House announced that the President would "pocket veto" the authorization bill—a procedure that would preclude efforts by Congress to override the veto. The President objected to a provision of the bill that would allow lawsuits in U.S. courts against the current Iraqi government for damages resulting from acts of the Saddam Hussein regime.
On January 16, the House passed H.R. 4986, a version of H.R. 1585 that was modified to allow the President to waive application to Iraq of the provision that he had cited as grounds for his veto. The new version of the bill also would make retroactive to January 1, 2008 a 3.5% pay raise for military personnel and the renewal of authorization for several types of bonuses, including enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses. The Senate passed the bill January 22. Reportedly, the President is expected to sign the bill.
The House passed its version of the FY2008 defense appropriations bill on August 5. The bill, H.R. 3222, provided $448.7 billion in discretionary budget authority for DOD's "base" budget, $3.6 billion less in discretionary budget authority than the $452.2 billion the President requested for operations within the scope of that legislation. The Senate version of H.R. 3222, passed by voice vote on October 4, 2007, provided $449.5 billion in discretionary DOD budget authority plus $3 billion to better protect U.S. borders. Each version of the bill also included $10.9 billion required by a permanent appropriation for military retirees' medical care.
House-Senate conferees on H.R. 3222 concluded on November 6 a conference report that would appropriate $448.7 billion plus $11.6 billion to acquire MRAPs. The House and Senate each adopted the conference report on November 8. On November 13, the President signed the appropriations bill into law (P.L. 110-116). This report will be updated as events warrant. |
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