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crs_R44373 | crs_R44373_0 | Introduction
The "child nutrition programs" (National School Lunch Program and certain other institutional food service programs) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) were last reauthorized in 2010. Some of the authorities created or extended in that last reauthorization law (Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 [ P.L. 111-296 ]) expired on September 30, 2015, but the vast majority of operations and activities continue because appropriations laws continued funding. Although the formal legislative process must begin anew with the new Congress, 114 th Congress child nutrition reauthorization issues, proposals, and controversies may still influence policymaking in the new Congress; thus, background on these child nutrition reauthorization proposals may remain of interest. Current Status of Program Operations
The "child nutrition programs" (National School Lunch Program [NSLP] and certain other institutional food service programs) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) are primarily authorized by two statutes, the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. Also, many of the programs' authorizations of appropriations are permanent; these include NSLP, the School Breakfast Program (SBP), and the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP). In 2016, both committees of jurisdiction—the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce—completed reauthorization legislation: S. 3136 and H.R. 5003 , respectively. On January 20, 2016, by a unanimous voice vote, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry voted to report its WIC and child nutrition reauthorization proposal. On April 20, 2016, Representative Todd Rokita, chairman of the Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, introduced the Improving Child Nutrition and Education Act of 2016 ( H.R. On May 18, 2016, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up H.R. The committee approved the bill, 20 to 14, largely along partisan lines. However, the House committee's proposal (§109) included a demonstration project for up to three states to receive a block grant in place of the open-ended funding (though still mandatory and appropriated). The Senate committee's proposal included a number of provisions that would have or could have affected the current nutrition standards regulations and their implementation:
Change whole grains and sodium meal standards. Following related testimony in multiple 114 th Congress committee hearings, as well as the introduction of a number of freestanding proposals, the Senate and House committees' proposals would have piloted or expanded a number of alternatives for feeding low-income children during the summer months. Summer EBT (Electronic Benefit Transfer)34
Both proposals addressed the provision of benefits via EBT to children that are eligible for free and reduced-price school meals over the summer months. 113-79 ), the fruit and vegetable snacks served through this program must be fresh—not frozen, dried, or canned. Eligibility and Certification of Participants
Only the Senate committee's proposal would have made changes to child eligibility and the certification period for infants:
Child eligibility. Both committees' proposals did include similar changes to the calculation of income in the WIC program:
Income eligibility calculation. Changes to competitive bidding for infant formula and infant foods. Transition to EBT. For certain policies that were in the House committee's proposal but not the Senate committee's proposal, CBO estimated (in outlays over the 10-year budget window of FY2017-FY2026) that, if enacted,
the block grant demonstration project ("State Administration of Child Nutrition Programs") would not have affect ed direct spending as no states are expected to participate; increases to the threshold for CEP participation would have resulted in 6,500 schools no longer participating in CEP, fewer students in those schools participating at free and paid meal rates, and a reduc tion of direct spending by approximately $1.6 billion; and increases to SBP reimbursements would have increase d direct spending by $801 million. In some of the areas where both proposals would have amended policy, CBO estimates (in outlays over the 10-year budget window of FY2017-FY2026) the following for the House committee's proposal, if enacted:
changes to school meals' application verification requirements would have reduce d direct spending by $261 million; discretionary funding for school meals equipment grants would have increased participation in the school meals programs, increasing direct spending by $42 million; changes to the provision of summer meals (including streamlining with CACFP, off-site consumption, and demonstration projects) would have increase d direct spending by $929 million; increases to the Farm to School Grant Program's mandatory funding would have increase d direct spending by $49 million; and changes to CACFP (all changes in §108) would have reduce d direct spending by $33 million. | The "child nutrition programs" (National School Lunch Program [NSLP] and certain other institutional food service programs) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) were last reauthorized by the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. 111-296). Some of the authorities created or extended in the last reauthorization law expired on September 30, 2015, but the vast majority of operations and activities continue because appropriations laws continued funding.
In the 114th Congress, both committees of jurisdiction—the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce—completed markups of reauthorization legislation but did not complete reauthorization. (At the final adjournment of a Congress, all legislation that has not yet been sent to the President dies. When the new Congress convenes, the formal legislative process must begin anew.)
Legislative activity in the 114th Congress, though historical, may provide helpful background for the 115th Congress. On January 20, 2016, by a unanimous voice vote, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry voted to report its WIC and child nutrition reauthorization proposal, the Improving Child Nutrition Integrity and Access Act of 2016 (later introduced as S. 3136). On May 18, 2016, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up its reauthorization proposal, the Improving Child Nutrition and Education Act of 2016 (H.R. 5003). The committee approved the bill, 20 to 14, largely along partisan lines.
While both proposals would have extended authorities and included many of the same policies, the House committee's proposal would have made three major policy changes to the school meals programs that are not in the Senate committee's proposal: (1) a demonstration project for up to three states to receive a block grant in lieu of funding from a number of open-ended child nutrition programs, (2) a higher threshold for school participation in the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP), and (3) increased reimbursement rates for the School Breakfast Program.
In other school meal policies, both proposals included different changes to school meal nutrition standards, including whole grain and sodium requirements. The proposals would both have revamped the current law procedures for the verification of household applications for free and reduced-price school meals.
The Senate and House committees' proposals would have piloted or expanded a number of alternatives for feeding low-income children during the summer months through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP). Proposals would have streamlined SFSP with afterschool meals and snacks and created off-site alternatives to the congregate feeding site model. Both proposals included a continuation of the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) pilot, although the Senate committee would have expanded it and made it permanent.
The proposals are similar in their policy changes for the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP) and the Farm to School Grant Program.
Both proposals would have expanded the types of snacks served through the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program. They would each have expanded offerings beyond fresh to frozen, dried, and canned, although the Senate committee's proposal would have done so in a more limited way.
Both proposals included a number of changes to Special Supplemental Nutrition program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) policy. Only the Senate committee would have raised the age of child eligibility and increased infant certification periods. Both proposed changes to income eligibility calculation, WIC-eligible foods policy, integrity of benefit redemption, transition to EBT, and competitive bidding for infant formula and foods.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the Senate committee's proposal would have increased the deficit by $1.1 billion over 10 years (FY2016-FY2025) and that the House committee's proposal would have reduced the deficit by $67 million over 10 years (FY2017-FY2026). |
crs_R44422 | crs_R44422_0 | I n the spring of 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a set of challenges alleging that the contraceptive coverage regulations under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) violate the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Following oral arguments in which the eight sitting Justices appeared to be evenly divided, the Court unanimously declined to declare an answer in the set of seven consolidated cases, each brought by nonprofit religious entities with objections to the provision and use of contraceptives as well as to the process by which their objections may be accommodated under ACA regulations that require employers to provide contraceptive coverage in group health plans. The question at issue is whether the accommodation process—requiring employers with religious objections to inform the government of their objection and third-party insurers to provide required coverage to the employer's employees—would impose a substantial burden on religious exercise in violation of RFRA. The Court's consideration of these cases (consolidated under the case name Zubik v. Burwell and referred to collectively throughout this report as "the nonprofit challenges") followed its landmark 2014 decision, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , and presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify the meaning of substantial burden on religious exercise under RFRA. However, the Court's disposition of the case provided no decision on the merits, instead vacating and remanding each of the cases to the respective federal appellate courts for reconsideration after allowing time for the parties to reach a compromise that would accommodate the employers' religious objections and the government's interest in ensuring contraceptive coverage for female employees. This report examines the current parameters on governmental restrictions on religious exercise. It discusses the history of federal protection offered under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and RFRA, and notes parallel protections available at the state level. It analyzes the current interpretations of RFRA as applied to the contraceptive coverage requirement of the ACA, including discussion of Hobby Lobby and a review of the lower courts' interpretations of the nonprofit challenges. Finally, the report highlights a range of issue areas of interest to Congress that may be affected by the Court's interpretation of RFRA. Hobby Lobby: Who May Claim Protection Under RFRA? In addition to the Court's clarification of the scope of "persons" eligible for protection under RFRA as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court's analysis of the substantive protections of RFRA has been cited to support interpretations of "substantial burdens" in later cases (discussed in the following section of this report). Circuits) with instructions to reconsider the cases after giving the parties an opportunity to "arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners' religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women ... 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" Given Congress's primary authority in statutory law, there are a number of issues it may consider in the wake of a future decision on the meaning of substantial burden , including what impact the decision may have on a wide range of legislative issues. Because RFRA applies to all federal actions, and because state religious freedom laws may rely on related opinions for guidance in interpreting their own similar laws, both federal and state issues may be affected. However, as discussed earlier, a number of states have adopted state versions of RFRA, many of which include language similar to the federal RFRA that is at issue in the nonprofit challenges. | In the spring of 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a set of challenges alleging that the contraceptive coverage regulations under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) violate the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Following oral arguments in which the eight sitting Justices appeared to be evenly divided, the Court unanimously declined to declare an answer in the set of seven consolidated cases, each brought by nonprofit religious entities with objections to the provision and use of contraceptives as well as to the process by which their objections may be accommodated under ACA regulations that require employers to provide contraceptive coverage in group health plans. The question at issue is whether the accommodation process—requiring employers with religious objections to inform the government of their objection and third-party insurers to provide required coverage to the employer's employees—would impose a substantial burden on religious exercise in violation of RFRA.
The Court's consideration of these cases (consolidated under the case name Zubik v. Burwell and referred to collectively throughout this report as "the nonprofit challenges") followed its landmark 2014 decision, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., which has had ongoing implications for a number of legal and legislative issues. Hobby Lobby expanded the scope of entities recognized as eligible for protection under RFRA, but left open a number of other questions about how far RFRA's protection may extend, including what governmental actions might constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise prohibited under RFRA. Federal courts have been divided on the standard for recognizing a substantial burden in many cases, particularly in challenges to the ACA regulations.
Providing no decision on the merits, the Court vacated the appellate court decisions in each of the seven cases and remanded those cases to the respective federal circuit courts with instructions to reconsider the cases after giving the parties an opportunity to "arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners' religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women ... 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" The Court's action effectively means that the legal debate over RFRA's protections will continue to be litigated and could be expected to return to the Court in a later term, which could be of interest related to the Senate's consideration of a nomination to fill the current vacancy on the Court.
A decision regarding what might constitute a substantial burden could have significant implications on RFRA claims not only related to the contraceptive coverage requirement, but also for a range of other issues being litigated in courts and considered in legislatures, both on the federal and state level. RFRA applies to all federal actions, unless specifically exempted by Congress, meaning that the impacts of its interpretation may affect a broad number of legislative issues. Additionally, a number of states have enacted state versions, the interpretation of which may be influenced by the Court's decisions. For example, organizations with religious objections to same-sex relationships have sought protection under RFRA for requirements to serve same-sex couples, including service by public accommodations; participation of religious providers in social service programs; and admission programs in religious institutions of higher education.
This report examines the current parameters on governmental restrictions on religious exercise. It discusses the history of federal protection offered under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and RFRA, and notes parallel protections available at the state level. It analyzes the current interpretations of RFRA as applied to the contraceptive coverage requirement of the ACA, including discussion of Hobby Lobby and a review of the lower courts' interpretations of the nonprofit challenges. Finally, the report highlights a range of issue areas of interest to Congress that may be affected by the interpretation of RFRA. |
crs_R42601 | crs_R42601_0 | Policy Overview1
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has the world's largest number of Internet users, estimated at 500 million people, including an estimated 300 million people with accounts on Twitter-like microblogging sites. Despite government efforts to limit the flow of information, Chinese Internet users are able to access unprecedented amounts of information, and the web has served as a lifeline for political dissidents, social activists, and civil society actors. However, the Internet has proven to be less of a catalyst for democratic change in China than many foreign observers had initially expected or hoped. The development of the Internet and its use in China have raised U.S. congressional concerns, including those related to human rights, trade and investment, and cybersecurity. Congressional interest in the Internet in China is linked to human rights in a number of ways. These include the use of the Internet as a U.S. policy tool for promoting freedom of expression and other rights in China; the use of the Internet by political dissidents in the PRC and the political repression that such use often provokes; and the role of U.S. Internet companies in both spreading freedom in China and cooperating with PRC censorship and social control efforts. According to some analysts, counter-censorship technology has proven to have a vital, but limited, impact on the promotion of freedom and democracy in the PRC. They have advocated a broader approach or the development of a more comprehensive and robust mix of tools and education for "cyber dissidents" and online activists in China and elsewhere, including the following: software and training to help dissidents and civil society actors communicate securely through evading surveillance, detecting spyware, and guarding against cyberattacks; archiving and disseminating information that censors have removed from the Internet; developing means of maintaining Internet access when the government has shut it down entirely; and providing training in online communication, organization, and advocacy. In response to criticism, some U.S. ICT companies have argued that they must abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate, and that they are not actively cooperating or collaborating with the PRC government or tailoring their products to suit PRC censorship requirements. NetFreedom Taskforce
Since it was created in 2006 as the "Global Internet Freedom Taskforce" (GIFT), the NetFreedom Taskforce has coordinated State Department policy and outreach concerning Internet freedom. Internet Freedom Promotion Activities
During the early 2000s, U.S. Internet freedom efforts focused largely on censorship circumvention, particularly in China and Iran, with an important but limited impact. Focusing Internet freedom efforts on priority countries such as China and Iran has led some to question whether the United States considers Internet freedom a global principle or merely a selective tool of U.S. foreign policy. Programs now include a range of activities: censorship circumvention technology, privacy protection and online security (including secure e-mail and text communications), educating civil society groups in effective uses of the Internet, and developing ICT-based organizational and advocacy skills. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which oversees U.S. international broadcasters including Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), has been at the forefront of using counter-censorship or circumvention software for international Internet programming. During the 2000s, the BBG spent approximately $2 million annually to help enable Internet users in China and other Internet-restricting countries to access its websites via proxy servers. In recent years, funding has increased. U.S. congressional committees and commissions have held hearings on the Internet and China, including the roles of U.S. Internet companies in China's censorship regime, cybersecurity, free trade in Internet services, and intellectual property rights (see below). Since its introduction, various versions of the bill have sought the following: to establish an Office of Global Internet Freedom (OGIF); to require the Administration to submit an annual report on "Internet-restricting countries" and U.S. efforts to counter such interference; and to prevent U.S. companies from cooperating with governments that engage in censorship and other human rights abuses. The most recent version of the bill ( H.R. Congress may attempt to find common ground between the Global Online Freedom Act and the Global Network Initiative, both of which attempt to promote human rights standards for ICT companies related to free expression and user privacy, company due diligence, and transparency. | The People's Republic of China (PRC) has the world's largest number of Internet users, estimated at 500 million people. Despite government efforts to limit the flow of online news, Chinese Internet users are able to access unprecedented amounts of information, and political activists have utilized the web as a vital communications tool. In recent years, Twitter-like microblogging has surged, resulting in dramatic cases of dissident communication and public comment on sensitive political issues. However, the web has proven to be less of a democratic catalyst in China than many observers had hoped. The PRC government has one of the most rigorous Internet censorship systems, which relies heavily upon cooperation between the government and private Internet companies. Some U.S. policy makers have been especially critical of the compliance of some U.S. Internet communications and technology (ICT) companies with China's censorship and policing activities.
The development of the Internet and its use in China have raised U.S. congressional concerns, including those related to human rights, trade and investment, and cybersecurity. The link between the Internet and human rights, a pillar of U.S. foreign policy toward China, is the main focus of this report. Congressional interest in the Internet in China is tied to human rights concerns in a number of ways. These include the following:
The use of the Internet as a U.S. policy tool for promoting freedom of expression and other rights in China, The use of the Internet by political dissidents in the PRC, and the political repression that such use often provokes, The role of U.S. Internet companies in both spreading freedom in China and complying with PRC censorship and social control efforts, and The development of U.S. Internet freedom policies globally.
Since 2006, congressional committees and commissions have held nine hearings on Internet freedom and related issues, with a large emphasis on China. In response to criticism, in 2008, Yahoo!, Microsoft, Google, and other parties founded the Global Network Initiative, a set of guidelines that promotes awareness, due diligence, and transparency regarding the activities of ICT companies and their impacts on human rights, particularly in countries where governments frequently violate the rights of Internet users to freedom of expression and privacy. In the 112th Congress, the Global Online Freedom Act (H.R. 3605) would require U.S. companies to disclose any censorship or surveillance technology that they provide to Internet-restricting countries. It also would bar U.S. companies from selling technology that could be used for the purposes of censorship or surveillance in such countries.
For over a decade, the United States government has sought to promote global Internet freedom, particularly in China and Iran. In 2006, the Bush Administration established the Global Internet Freedom Task Force, which was renamed the NetFreedom Task Force under the Obama Administration. Congress provided $95 million for global Internet freedom programs between 2008 and 2012. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has spent approximately $2 million annually during the past decade to help enable Internet users in China and other Internet-restricting countries to access its websites, such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia.
Some experts argue that support for counter-censorship technology, which has long dominated the U.S. effort to promote global Internet freedom, has had an important but limited impact. Obstacles to Internet freedom in China and elsewhere include not only censorship but also the following: advances in government capabilities to monitor and attack online dissident activity; tight restrictions on social networking; and the lack of popular pressure for greater Internet freedom. As part of a broadening policy approach, the U.S. government has sponsored a widening range of Internet freedom programs, including censorship circumvention technology; privacy protection and online security; training civil society groups in effective uses of the web for communications, organizational, and advocacy purposes; and spreading awareness of Internet freedom. |
crs_RL30029 | crs_RL30029_0 | African History: An Overview
Human history is believed to have begun in Africa, probably in the eastern and southern part of the continent,as human ancestors evolved into the species homosapiens , perhaps 200,000 years ago, and began peopling the sub-Saharan region. Pre-colonial Society
There is wide agreement among Africanists that loyalties to large ethnic groups, such as "the Yoruba" in present-day Nigeria or "the Tutsi" of east Africa, werelargely absent in pre-colonial Africa, even though they are a dominant feature of African politics today. For a number of years, U.S. Navy ships were stationed off the African coast to participatein efforts to halt the trade, but with limitedsuccess. (16)
The Atlantic slave trade was conducted by European traders based on the West African coast. (21) It seems certain that warfare relatedto the slave trade, the loss of millions of people in their most productive years, and the psychological damage toindividuals resulting from political instability andfear of capture, weakened Africa and left it ill-prepared to cope with the onset of direct European colonization. The development of Africa's indigenous political entities was halted by the European scramblefor Africa, which began in competition over the Niger and Congo River basins in the 1870s. (29) Britain and Germany had come to favor recognition of Leopold's IAC as a means of thwarting thegrowth of French influence in west and central Africa. (39)
End of Colonialism. Southern Africa. (42) Oppositionto white minority rule had existed for decades, but in 1948, the National Party (NP), representing conservative,nationalistic Afrikaners, came to power and imposed an institutionalized system of racial segregation known asapartheid (apart-ness). Universal-suffrage elections were held in April 1994, and Mandela became President in May of that year. Independent Africa
In the first years of the 1960s, the future for western and eastern Africa seemed quite bright. Independent Africa confronted a major population challenge as well. This competitive Cold War involvement, critics maintain, tended tostrengthen governments on both sides that wereanti-democratic and following inefficient, state-oriented economic policies, often marked by considerablecorruption. (48)
The 1990s
In the later 1980s and early 1990s, as the colonial era fell farther into the past and the Cold War waned, scholars began to focus on characteristics of the Africanstate and African societies to explain the continent's difficulties. These developments brought favorable reactions froma number of analysts. (55)
Sub-Saharan Africa's AIDS epidemic continues to intensify. U.S. Policy
The Clinton Administration's policy toward Africa had a decidedly Afro-optimist tone. In July 1999, theAdministration launched a major new effort against the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and worldwide, known asthe LIFE (Leadership and Investment in Fightingan Epidemic) Initiative. Nonetheless, Africa's many other conflicts were a source of frustrationto Administration policymakers, since theyundermined efforts to promote economic growth and political reform. Principal Congressional Actions
As noted at the beginning of this report, Congress has dealt with a wide range of issues related to Africa. 105-385 ) to promoteAfrican food security through U.S. assistance programsand other measures. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act ( P.L. Congress passed a large emergency supplemental appropriation for African famine relief ( P.L. The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912 . Reader, John. Congo (Formerly Zaire) , by [author name scrubbed]. | Congress has dealt repeatedly with issues related to sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1950s. This report provides basic background on Africa and its history, U.S.policy, and congressional involvement, for the general congressional reader.
The modern human species is believed to have emerged in Africa approximately 200,000 years ago. Perhaps 2,500 years ago, the Bantu people began to expandfrom a West African base, gradually spreading a complex agricultural system over much of the continent. Africanists generally agree that loyalties to large ethnicgroups, a key factor in African politics today, were largely absent in pre-colonial Africa.
The Atlantic slave trade, which began about 1450 and lasted 400 years, removed millions of people in their most productive years from Africa and left thecontinent ill-prepared to cope with the European "scramble for Africa." From the 1870s through the early twentiethcentury, nearly the entire sub-Saharan regionwas divided among the European powers. The Europeans built a basic economic infrastructure; but imposed abureaucratic system of government andstrengthened traditional chiefs and other "big men" to help them rule. These patterns deepened divisions in Africansocieties and strengthened anti-democraticpatterns of government.
After World War II, African nationalists organized political parties and began to demand independence. By the early 1960s, independence had come to most ofeastern and western Africa, but white minority rule persisted in southern Africa, ending only in 1994, whenuniversal-suffrage elections were held in South Africa.
In the first years of the 1960s, there were high hopes that the end of colonialism would bring rapid economic growth. Instead, Africa confronted a number ofproblems, including inefficient, state-centered economic systems; frequent military coups; ethnic strife; andcorruption. The Cold War contributed to Africa'sdifficulties, flooding the continent with arms and strengthening a number of repressive regimes that had superpowerbacking. French policy also tended to bolster authoritarian governments in former French colonies.
In the early 1990s, hopes for Africa's future revived following widespread political and economic reforms and the end of the Cold War. Later in the decade,however, the pace of reforms slowed and central Africa fell into an era of violent conflict. "Afro-pessimists" believethat these developments have gravelydamaged Africa's prospects, but others argue that they are temporary problems masking an underlying "AfricanRenaissance." The Clinton Administration sidedwith the "Afro-optimists," despite frustrations over the war in Congo (formerly Zaire) and other problems.
The 106th Congress passed legislation to strengthen U.S.-African economic ties and to boost spending to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and worldwide. Previous Congresses acted on a number of African issues, including African food security, apartheid in SouthAfrica, and covert U.S. involvement in Angola. |
crs_R40091 | crs_R40091_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of selected campaign finance policy issues that have received recent legislative attention, or have otherwise been prominent, and which could receive attention during the 111 th Congress. Specifically, the report emphasizes nine issues: (1) bundling; (2) campaign travel aboard private aircraft; (3) electronic filing of Senate campaign finance reports; (4) the Federal Election Commission (FEC); (5) hybrid political advertising; (6) joint fundraising committees; (7) public financing of presidential campaigns; (8) 527 organizations; and (9) the related topic of restricting campaign activity among certain state election officials. However Congress decides to proceed, the debate will likely be shaped by questions of (1) amounts and sources of money; (2) transparency; and (3) scope of regulation. As the final section of this report discusses, these factors unify the seemingly disparate policy issues discussed in the report and are common themes in the debate over campaign finance policy. 3093 , the relevant provision was an amendment sponsored by Representative Pence); A Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, hearing on automated political telephone calls; Senate Rules and Administration Committee hearings on public financing of congressional campaigns ( S. 1285 , Durbin); coordinated party expenditures ( S. 1091 , Corker); electronic filing of Senate campaign finance reports ( S. 223 , Feingold); FEC nominations; and automated political telephone calls ( S. 2624 , Feinstein). Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Shaping Debate for the Second Session
Perhaps the most prominent policy concern for the second session of the 111 th Congress has been developments surrounding a recent Supreme Court ruling. On January 21, 2010, the Court issued a 5-4 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission . Thus far, most congressional attention responding to the ruling has focused on the DISCLOSE Act ( H.R. 5175 ; S. 3295 ; S. 3628 ). On a related note, on July 29, 2010, the Committee on Financial Services ordered reported H.R. 4790 . The bill would require additional disclosure of political expenditures to corporate shareholders and is designed as a partial response to Citizens United . Other Emerging Campaign Finance Policy Issues
Some of the issues considered during the 110 th Congress might be—or have been—addressed again during the 111 th Congress. The following discussion provides additional detail about selected issues that may continue to be on the legislative or oversight agenda. On March 25, 2009, the House Committee on Administration reported H.R. The bill would permit candidates to designate to the FEC an individual to direct campaign spending following the candidate's death. On April 22, 2009, H.R. Questions about the commission's structure and effectiveness have long been a topic of debate. President Obama withdrew the nomination in August 2010. The issue has received renewed attention in recent Congresses. The first bill introduced, H.R. Three other bills, H.R. The Committee on House Administration held a July 28, 2009, hearing on H.R. 1826 . 6116 , introduced in September 2010, is apparently intended to supersede H.R. 1826 . The committee ordered H.R. 6116 reported on September 23, 2010. 6116 , H.R. Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns 76
Perhaps the most prominent campaign finance issue during the 2008 election cycle was the status of the presidential public financing system. Two bills to revamp the presidential public financing system were introduced in late July 2010. Neither H.R. 6061 (Price, NC) nor S. 3681 (Feingold) have been the subject of additional action. In the 111 th Congress, Representative Cole has H.R. 2992 introduced legislation to repeal public financing for presidential nominating conventions. As passed by the House (296-129) on September 29, 2010, H.R. As noted above, H.R. Senate prerogative may also be a concern. Other recent issues may also be considered from a transparency perspective. | This report provides an overview of selected campaign finance policy issues that may receive, or have received, attention during the 111th Congress. Congress continues to consider the Supreme Court's January 21, 2010, ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The decision has shaped much of the legislative debate on campaign finance issues during the second session of the 111th Congress. Thus far, most congressional attention responding to the ruling has focused on the DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175; S. 3295; S. 3628). H.R. 5175 passed the House on June 29, 2010. On a related note, on July 29, 2010, the Committee on Financial Services ordered reported H.R. 4790. The bill would require additional disclosure of political expenditures to corporate shareholders and is designed as a partial response to Citizens United.
Other than attention to Citizens United, four aspects of campaign finance policy have been subject to major actions thus far during the 111th Congress. First, in April 2009, the House passed legislation (H.R. 749) concerning authority to disburse campaign funds after a candidate's death. Second, on June 10, 2009, the Committee on House Administration favorably reported H.R. 512 (Davis, CA). The bill would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to restrict certain state election officials from involvement in others' campaigns. Third, on July 28, 2009, the Committee on House Administration held a hearing on H.R. 1826, a bill that would publicly finance House campaigns. The committee ordered reported a successor bill, H.R. 6116, on September 23, 2010. Finally, the Senate considered the nomination of John J. Sullivan to be a member of the Federal Election Commission for much of the 111th Congress. However, the President withdrew the nomination on August 5, 2010.
Questions about the health of the presidential public financing system were especially prominent during the 2008 election cycle. Two bills to revamp the presidential public financing system were introduced in late July 2010. Neither H.R. 6061 nor S. 3681 have been the subject of additional action. Also in the 111th Congress, Representative Cole has introduced legislation (H.R. 2992) to repeal public financing for presidential nominating conventions. Legislation on public financing of congressional campaigns was introduced in early 2009 (H.R. 158, H.R. 1826, H.R. 2056, S. 751, and S. 752). H.R. 6116, apparently intended to supersede H.R. 1826, was introduced in September 2010 and, as noted above, was ordered reported.
Recent election cycles also witnessed new or expanded techniques for raising and spending money, such as bundling, joint fundraising committees, and hybrid advertising. Remaining issues from the 110th Congress, such as electronic filing of Senate campaign finance reports (S. 482 and S. 1858 in the 111th Congress), may also receive renewed scrutiny. Other issues, such as 527 organizations, may also be addressed. Congressional oversight of the FEC could also be on the legislative agenda.
Some of the issues discussed in this report have only recently received substantial attention. Others have long been controversial. All appear likely to remain prominent policy issues. Whether Congress decides to pursue these or other campaign finance issues, common questions about the role of money in politics, transparency, and the need for additional regulation are likely to shape the debate.
The text of this report was last updated November 3, 2010. It will not be updated but remains relevant for historical reference. For more recent discussion, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41635 | crs_R41635_0 | In February of 2009, Congress passed new legislation that provides renewable energy projects with an alternative option for realizing the value of federal tax benefits: a grant in lieu of tax credits (Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 )). The Section 1603 grant program was initially enacted on a temporary basis, and was scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. Congress extended the program for one year, through 2011, in the Tax Relief, Unemployment Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ). Understanding how different renewable energy markets have responded to the grant option may provide some insight regarding the potential implications for the renewable energy market of letting the Section 1603 grant program expire as scheduled at the end of 2011. As noted above, absent congressional action, the Section 1603 grant program is scheduled to expire at the end of 2011. One option is to further extend the Section 1603 grant program. As of October 24, 2011, grant awards had been made to 3,801 recipients with a total grant award value of $9.2 billion. Approximately $7.2 billion in grants have been awarded to 205 recipients. Wind capacity additions in 2010 were approximately 5 GW, roughly half the 2009 level. Therefore some wind projects, prior to Section 1603 availability, would essentially monetize the PTC and depreciation tax benefits, at a discount, through a tax equity investor (a definition and description of tax equity is provided in this report under the section heading " Section 1603 and the Renewable Energy Tax Equity Market ") and use the cash proceeds to cover capital and installation costs. Solar Electricity
The solar electricity marketplace (photovoltaic, solar thermal, etc.) Calendar year 2011 is expected to be another record year for the industry with forecasts predicting approximately 1,700 MW of new installations. While the "value" of the 30% ITC and the Section 1603 cash grant, in theory, should be equal, in practice the cash grant will likely be perceived as being more valuable than the ITC for the following reasons:
No transaction costs: Realization of investment tax credits may require the project to monetize incentives at a discount to a tax equity investor and also demands personnel time and professional fees to complete the investment transaction. The number of projects that have received awards in the "other technologies" category is relatively small compared to wind and solar electricity. Section 1603 and the Renewable Energy Tax Equity Market
The Section 1603 cash grant program was created as an alternative mechanism for renewable energy projects to realize federal tax incentives. An estimated $6.1 billion of "tax equity" went to various projects with approximately $5 billion dedicated to wind. Compared to tax incentives, the Section 1603 grants, or grants generally, may be a more efficient subsidy. Finally, there have been a number of benefits associated with the Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits that could be achieved through modifications to the existing PTC and ITC. Several issues arise in considering an extension of the Section 1603 grant program. The first option Congress may want to consider is modifying existing tax incentives to allow for some of the indirect benefits that are afforded by the Section 1603 grant. Furthermore, the Section 1603 grant program was motivated by difficult economic conditions that resulted in less tax equity investment capacity available for renewable energy projects to realize the value of ITC and PTC incentives. Section 1603 grants may be a more economically efficient mechanism than tax credits for delivering benefits to the renewable energy sector. | Congress created the Section 1603 grant program as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). This program, administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, provides cash grant incentives for renewable energy projects. Initially, the Section 1603 grant program was scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. A one-year extension was enacted as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) at an estimated cost of $3 billion. Absent congressional action, the Section 1603 grant program will expire at the end of 2011.
As of December 6, 2010, grants totaling approximately $5.6 billion had been awarded to 1,495 entities, since Section 1603 became law in February 2009. Wind has received approximately 84% of the grant award value, while solar electric represents approximately 75% of entities that have received grant awards. "Other" technologies (qualifying energy property not represented by wind or solar electricity) have also received grant awards, although the value and number of awards represented by this category is relatively small compared to wind and solar electricity.
Prior to the availability of Section 1603 grants, qualifying renewable energy projects were federally supported primarily through the production tax credit (PTC) or investment tax credit (ITC). It has been common industry practice for renewable energy developers to partner with tax-equity investors, where the tax-equity investors offer cash in exchange for project ownership, project cash flows, tax credits, and depreciation benefits. The Section 1603 grant program was motivated by difficult economic conditions and the perceived lack of tax-equity capacity to support renewable energy projects. Analysis of the tax equity marketplace reveals fluctuations in the dollar volume, number of participants, and required rates of return between 2007 and 2010.
Market response, since Section 1603 was established, has been mixed. The solar industry had a record year of installations in 2010 (887 Megawatts) and is forecasting another record year in 2011 (approximately 1,700 Megawatts). In 2010, the wind industry experienced a 50% decline compared to 2009 (approximately 5 Gigawatts installed in 2010 compared to 10 Gigwatts installed in 2009). Wind industry forecasts for 2011 are approximately 7,000 Megawatts. It is important to note, however, that many factors influence annual renewable energy installations, the cash grant being just one.
If Congress considers additional extensions to or modifications of the Section 1603 grant program, economic and cost factors may also be taken into account. Grants, as opposed to tax credit, may be a more efficient mechanism for delivering public funds to the renewable energy sector. As is the case with most tax or subsidy programs, however, there are concerns that grants may be going to projects that would have moved forward without added federal incentives.
Finally, this report presents various policy options Congress may want to consider regarding the Section 1603 grant and related tax credits for renewable energy. The first option presented is to allow the grant program to expire. Even if the grant program were to expire, tax incentives would remain available. A second option is to extend the Section 1603 grant program. An extension of the grant program may be considered alongside an extension of the PTC for wind, which is set to expire at the end of 2012. A modification to the ITC and PTC, which could potentially enhance the benefits associated with the existing tax incentives, is presented as a third option. |
crs_R43424 | crs_R43424_0 | This overview explains only the most common ways legislation is considered on the House floor, and it describes the types of propositions most likely to be voted on and the opportunities for legislative debate most frequently available to and used by Members. This method has evolved as a way for measures that enjoy widespread support to be quickly processed by the House. Members cannot offer amendments from the floor. The motion to suspend the rules is debatable for 40 minutes. The majority party Member making the motion controls 20 minutes of the time, and another Member, typically the minority party committee leader, controls the other 20 minutes of time. Voting on Motions to Suspend the Rules
When debate has concluded, a single vote is held on the question of suspending the rules and passing the measure with any amendment that might have been included in the motion. Many suspension bills are passed by voice vote. A special rule is a procedural proposal reported by the Committee on Rules (in the form of a House resolution) that sets the terms for debating and amending a measure. Under this method of proceeding, the House first approves a special rule and then it considers a bill under the terms of that rule. This is the second most common method, after suspension of the rules, used to consider bills. Special rules allow the House to customize procedures for considering each bill. At the end of an hour, the Rules Committee majority floor manager will "move the previous question," and the House votes on the motion. If Members of the House are allowed, under the terms of the special rule, to offer amendments to the bill, then the first step in the process is for the Speaker to declare the House "resolved into Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union." The so-called Committee of the Whole is a parliamentary device designed to allow more efficient consideration of legislation than is available in the House in its different forms. After general debate on the bill, there might be an opportunity to offer amendments to it, although this depends on the special rule. As noted, closed rules do not allow amendments to be offered from the floor. Under an open rule, in contrast, Members can offer any amendment that does not violate a House rule, including statutory provisions that the House has designated to function as House rules, such as the Budget Act. More commonly in the contemporary House, amendments are offered under a structured rule. Before the House votes on final passage of a measure considered pursuant to a special rule, there is typically a record vote on a motion to recommit. In its most common form, the motion to recommit is made with instructions, which is effectively a last opportunity for a Member of the minority party to offer an amendment to the bill. Reaching Agreement with the Senate
Passage of a measure through the House is a crucial stage of the legislative process, but a bill or joint resolution must pass both the House and the Senate in precisely the same form before it can be sent to the President. Conference Committee
Historically, the House has resolved its differences with the Senate on major legislation through conference committees, or panels of Representatives and Senators from the committees of jurisdiction who meet to negotiate a compromise version of the bill. The resulting recommended legislation—the conference report—must be approved by both the House and Senate. Amendments Between the Houses
Sometimes, the House and Senate resolve their differences not through conference committee, but through amendments between the houses, or what is popularly known as "ping pong." In this process, the House and Senate shuttle a measure back and forth between them, each proposing alternatives in the form of amendments until they both agree to the same text. | This brief overview explains the most common ways legislation is considered on the House floor, and it describes the types of questions most likely to be voted on and the opportunities for legislative debate that are most frequently used by Members.
The most common method used to consider bills and resolutions in the House is suspension of the rules. This method has evolved as a way for measures that enjoy widespread support to be quickly processed by the House. A motion to suspend the rules and pass a bill is debatable for 40 minutes. The Member making the motion controls 20 minutes of the time, and another Member controls the other 20 minutes of time. When debate has concluded, a single vote is held on the question of suspending the rules and passing the measure. Members cannot offer amendments from the floor, but an amendment might be included in the motion. A two-thirds vote is required to pass a measure under suspension. Many suspension motions are passed by voice vote.
Most major bills, however, are considered through a multi-stage process involving the Committee on Rules. Special rules are House resolutions reported by the Committee on Rules that set the terms for debating and amending measures. Through special rules, the House majority can customize floor procedures for considering each bill. The House first approves a special rule and then considers the bill under the terms of that rule. After an hour of debate on a special rule, a Member typically moves the previous question, a motion that proposes to end consideration of a matter. The previous question is almost invariably agreed to, and the House then votes on approving the special rule.
When a measure is considered under the terms of a special rule, there is first a period for general debate on the bill. After general debate, there might be an opportunity to offer amendments to the bill, but it depends on the special rule. A closed rule is one that does not allow amendments to be offered from the floor. Under an open rule, in contrast, Members can offer any amendment that does not violate a House rule, including statutory provisions that the House has designated to function as House rules, such as the Budget Act. More commonly today, amendments are offered under rules that allow specific amendments identified in the report of the Rules Committee accompanying the special rule. If several amendments will be considered, the rule provides that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole, a parliamentary device designed to allow more efficient consideration of legislation than provided when the House meets in other forms. Before the House votes on final passage of a measure, it rises from sitting as Committee of the Whole and returns to sitting as the House. There is then typically a record vote on a motion to recommit. In its most common form today, the motion to recommit is made with instructions, which is effectively a last opportunity for a minority party Member to offer an amendment.
A bill or joint resolution must pass both the House and the Senate in precisely the same form before it can be sent to the President. Historically, the House has resolved its differences with the Senate on major legislation through conference committees (panels of Representatives and Senators from the committees of jurisdiction who meet to negotiate a compromise version of the bill). The resulting recommended legislation—the conference report—must be approved by both the House and Senate and cannot be amended. Sometimes, the House and Senate resolve their differences not through conference committee, but through amendments between the houses. In this process, the chambers shuttle a measure back and forth until they both agree to the same text. |
crs_R42391 | crs_R42391_0 | Congress has generally broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process (i.e., the process whereby agencies obtain supplies and services from the private sector). One of the many ways in which Congress has exercised this authority is by enacting measures intended to promote contracting and subcontracting with "small businesses" by federal agencies. Among other things, these measures (1) declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars are awarded to small businesses; (2) establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; (3) require or authorize agencies to conduct competitions in which only small businesses may compete (i.e., set-asides), or make noncompetitive awards to them in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other businesses; and (4) task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and officers of the procuring agencies with reviewing and helping to restructure proposed procurements so as to maximize opportunities for small business participation. Small business contracting and subcontracting are complicated topics, in part, because numerous statutes—implemented by multiple agencies and subject to interpretation by multiple judicial and other tribunals—require or authorize particular actions by federal agencies. The Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, is key among these authorities. The SBA has promulgated regulations implementing the Small Business Act. Further, these statutes and regulations are regularly subject to interpretation by various judicial and other tribunals, including SBA's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), for eligibility for small business contracting programs, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), for certain other questions that do not involve such eligibility. A companion report, CRS Report R43573, Federal Contracting and Subcontracting with Small Businesses: Legislation in the 113 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], describes measures that Members of the 113 th Congress have enacted or proposed in response to particular issues pertaining to small business contracting and subcontracting. Responsibilities of Other Agencies
Unlike the provisions discussed above, which pertain solely to SBA, other provisions of the Small Business Act apply government-wide and authorize or require actions by other federal agencies. Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act also requires agencies to incorporate terms in their prime contracts pertaining to subcontracting with small businesses. While Titles 10 and 41 do not authorize agencies to set aside contracts for small businesses, or make sole-source awards to them in circumstances when sole-source awards could not be made to other firms, agencies may still "favor" small businesses in certain procurements conducted under their authority by using small-business status as an evaluation factor in negotiated procurements. Other Statutes
Other notable agency-specific statutes pertaining to contracting and subcontracting with small businesses (1) establish the mentor-protégé program of the Department of Defense, which differs from the mentor-protégé programs under the Small Business Act by focusing upon small business subcontractors and suppliers, not prime contractors; (2) set goals for the percentage of contract and subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses that exceed the government-wide goals in the Small Business Act; and (3) authorize agencies to take particular actions which would otherwise not be in accordance with federal "competition requirements" in order to promote contracting with small businesses. SBA regulations, which implement the Small Business Act, generally apply. | Congress has generally broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process (i.e., the process whereby agencies obtain supplies and services from the private sector). One of the many ways in which Congress has exercised this authority is by enacting measures intended to promote contracting and subcontracting with "small businesses" by federal agencies. Among other things, these measures (1) declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars are awarded to small businesses; (2) establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; (3) require or authorize agencies to conduct competitions in which only small businesses may compete (i.e., set-asides), or make noncompetitive awards to them in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other businesses; and (4) task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and officers of the procuring agencies with reviewing and helping to restructure proposed procurements so as to maximize opportunities for small business participation.
Small business contracting and subcontracting are complicated topics, in part, because numerous statutes—implemented by multiple agencies and subject to interpretation by multiple judicial and other tribunals—require or authorize particular actions by federal agencies. The Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, is key among these authorities. This act establishes the SBA, defines "small business," and tasks SBA with specific responsibilities intended to promote contracting with small businesses. SBA has promulgated regulations implementing the Small Business Act, and its Office of Hearings and Appeals regularly issues decisions regarding firms' size and status (e.g., woman-owned, service-disabled veteran-owned).
Other provisions of the Small Business Act apply government-wide and authorize or require actions by agencies other than SBA. Among other things, these provisions (1) authorize agencies to set aside contracts for small businesses and make sole-source awards to small businesses in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other firms; (2) require agencies to incorporate terms in their prime contracts promoting subcontracting with small businesses; and (3) prohibit agencies from "bundling" or "consolidating" their requirements into contracts that are unsuitable for performance by small businesses. SBA regulations implement these provisions of the Small Business Act, but so does the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which sometimes addresses topics that are not addressed in the SBA regulations. These and other provisions of the act, along with their implementing regulations, are regularly subject to interpretation by the federal courts and the Government Accountability Office.
However, other legal authorities, beyond the Small Business Act, also authorize or govern contracting and subcontracting with small businesses. Among other things, these provisions (1) permit agencies to use firms' size and status as evaluation factors in negotiated procurements; (2) grant agencies additional authority, beyond that in the Small Business Act, to set aside contracts for small businesses or make noncompetitive awards to them; (3) establish mentor-protégé programs that are distinct from the SBA mentor-protégé program; and (4) set goals for the percentage of contract and subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses that exceed the government-wide goals provided in the Small Business Act.
A companion report, CRS Report R43573, Federal Contracting and Subcontracting with Small Businesses: Legislation in the 113th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], describes and analyzes recently enacted and introduced measures. |
crs_RS22940 | crs_RS22940_0 | Introduction
Companies holding licenses issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) are in a unique position when they seek to combine. In the United States, when most corporations plan to merge, the proposal is reviewed by only one of two federal agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (which agency reviews the merger proposal depends on the outcome of a process known as "clearance"). Companies holding FCC licenses, on the other hand, must obtain approval from two federal agencies in order to consummate a merger: the DOJ and the FCC. Though both agencies analyze the potential effects on competition a proposed merger may have, their processes differ, sometimes substantially. This report will focus on the FCC's authority to approve mergers and its process for reviewing these proposed transactions. Proposed mergers that are reviewed under the Communications Act are held to a higher standard when examining their potential competitive effects than the same proposed transaction would be under the antitrust laws. Commission License Transfer Review Process and the Public Interest Standard
When attempting to receive approval for the transfer of relevant licenses in the context of a merger, the merging companies must submit an application for the transfer of all relevant licenses and certifications to the Commission. If the Commission's analysis suggests that the parties have shown that the merger, on balance, benefits the public interest, the Commission generally approves the transfer without condition. Negotiated Conditions on Telecommunications Mergers
The Commission finds its authority to negotiate and enforce voluntary conditions on license transfers under §303(r) of the Communications Act, which grants the Commission the authority to "prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with the law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions" of the act, and §214(c), which grants the Commission the power to place "such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require" on the certificates the agency issues pursuant to its license transfer review authority. | With the proposed merger between Comcast and NBC/Universal announced recently, Congress has expressed an interest in the process of merger reviews at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission). This report will explain the merger review process at the FCC, as well as highlight some of the difference between the FCC's process and the more traditional antitrust merger review conducted by agencies such as the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
Whenever companies holding licenses issued by the FCC wish to merge, the merging entities must obtain approval from two federal agencies: the DOJ and the FCC. The Commission and the DOJ do not follow precisely the same process or reasoning when examining the potential effects of proposed mergers. Though both agencies have the authority to proceed under the antitrust laws (as the DOJ must), the Commission generally chooses to examine proposed mergers under its Communications Act authority to grant license transfers. The act permits the Commission to grant the transfer only if the agency determines that the transaction would be in the public interest. The public interest standard is generally broader than the competition analysis authorized by the antitrust laws and conducted by the DOJ. Therefore, the Commission possesses greater latitude to examine other potential effects of a proposed merger beyond its possible effect on competition in the relevant market, and greater latitude when placing conditions upon the proposed transfer of a license than the DOJ may have when placing conditions upon the proposed merger that necessitates the license transfer. |
crs_R40424 | crs_R40424_0 | Background
The Senate biennial committee funding process applies to all Senate committees except Appropriations and Ethics, which have permanent authorizations for their staff and operating expenses. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration has jurisdiction over committee funding resolutions and issues regulations governing committee funding and staff. On February 28, 2017, the Senate adopted by unanimous consent S.Res. 62 , authorizing expenditures by Senate committees for the period March 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017, the period October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018, and for the period October 1, 2018, through February 28, 2019. Table 2 through Table 10 provide committee funding requests and authorizations for Senate committees in the 106 th through 114 th Congresses. | In the Senate a biennial funding process applies to all Senate committees except Appropriations and Ethics, which have permanent authorizations for their staff and operating expenses. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration has jurisdiction over committee funding resolutions and issues regulations governing committee funding and staff.
On February 28, 2017, the Senate adopted by unanimous consent S.Res. 62, authorizing expenditures by Senate committees for the period March 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017, the period October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018, and for the period October 1, 2018, through February 28, 2019.
This report, which provides committee funding requests and authorizations for Senate committees in the 106th through 115th Congresses, will be updated as warranted. For further information on the committee funding process, see CRS Report R43160, Senate Committee Funding: Description of Process and Analysis of Disbursements, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43482 | crs_R43482_0 | However, a delayed period of availability that begins after the start of the fiscal year, or even during a future fiscal year, may be provided for particular programs that are funded through the annual appropriations process. Advance appropriations become available for obligation starting at least one fiscal year after the budget year. Forward funding becomes available beginning late in the budget year and is carried into at least one following fiscal year. A dvance funding is funding for the following fiscal year that becomes available for obligation late in the budget year and would be in addition to the funds for that fiscal year. Although advance appropriations, forward funding, and advance funding are each discrete concepts, they tend to have some degree of variation in how they are implemented, including the interval in advance for which funds are provided and the duration of availability for those funds. Providing funds for a delayed period of availability may have budget process implications for Congress. Advance Appropriations
Advance appropriations is a form of budget authority that becomes available one or more fiscal years after the budget year covered by the appropriations act. Recent Funding Practices27
Advance appropriations are typically enacted at an interval of one fiscal year prior to when such appropriations become available. Adjustments to Funding in the Budget Year
For accounts that receive advance appropriations, the amount of budget authority that will be available once the fiscal year commences is sometimes adjusted in subsequent appropriations acts. Under current practice, this period of availability is used only for programs that are funded by discretionary spending. Recent Funding Practices42
Forward funds tend to become available at an interval that starts on July 1. This allows for only the portion of the program that requires summer obligations to be funded in this manner, while the remaining aspects can be funded through regular annual or advance appropriations. The total amount of payments that are funded by these and similar accounts may be particularly sensitive to changes in eligible beneficiaries or difficult to predict more than a year in advance. In such instances, providing extra funds that become available late in the fiscal year might lessen or eliminate the potential for a funding shortfall and the need for separate supplemental appropriations. The second account, Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances (Employment and Training Administration—Department of Labor), which funds the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers program, is provided advance funds for about the last two weeks of the fiscal year:
For payments during fiscal year 2012 of trade adjustment benefit payments and allowances under part I of subchapter B of chapter 2 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974, and section 246 of that Act; and for training, employment and case management services, allowances for job search and relocation, and related State administrative expenses under part II of subchapter B of chapter 2 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974, including benefit payments, allowances, training, employment and case management services, and related State administration provided pursuant to section 231(a) of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011, $1,100,100,000, together with such amounts as may be necessary to be charged to the subsequent appropriation for payments for any period subsequent to September 15, 2012. Budget Process Implications
Using a delayed period of availability to fund a program may also have budget process implications. These implications derive from scorekeeping rules that govern the fiscal year to which such funds are attributed for the purposes of budget enforcement. The congressional budget resolution has also imposed various limits on advance appropriations for discretionary spending since FY2001. For FY2014 and FY2015, these limits were established in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. | Federal programs that are funded through the annual appropriations process in regular appropriations acts may typically obligate those funds during a period that starts at the beginning of that fiscal year. For certain programs, however, the period of availability for some or all of their funds may be delayed until after the start of the fiscal year or even until a future fiscal year. Three types of delayed periods of availability are discussed in this report: "advance appropriations," "forward funding," and "advance funding."
Advance appropriations become available for obligation one or more fiscal years after the budget year covered by the appropriations act. Although advance appropriations are provided in order to manage specific planning concerns, they also have implications for the prevention of funding gaps and the avoidance of continuing appropriations for those programs. Advance appropriations are typically enacted at an interval of one fiscal year prior to when such appropriations become available. For accounts that receive advance appropriations, the amount of budget authority that will become available once the fiscal year commences is sometimes adjusted in subsequent appropriations acts through supplemental appropriations or rescissions.
Forward funding becomes available beginning late in the budget year and is carried into at least one following fiscal year. This period of availability's main implication is that it facilitates obligations during the summer months for programs that start their activities during the fall, particularly for the Department of Education and Department of Labor. Forward funds tend to become available at an interval that starts on July 1 and are available during at least two fiscal years. Typically, this schedule of availability is combined with annual or advance appropriations so that only the portions of the program that require summer obligations are funded in this manner.
Advance funding becomes available late in the budget year and is in addition to the funds for that entire fiscal year; any expenditure of the advance funds is charged to the following fiscal year's appropriation. This period of availability has tended to be used for accounts that fund mandatory payments to individuals. The aggregate amount of such payments may be particularly sensitive to changes in eligible beneficiaries or difficult to predict more than a year in advance. In such instances, providing extra funds that become available late in the fiscal year might lessen or eliminate the potential for a funding shortfall and the need for separate supplemental appropriations. In the two cases where advance funds are currently used, they are available only during the final weeks of the fiscal year.
Choosing a delayed period of availability when funding a program may have budget process implications due to the scorekeeping rules that govern the fiscal year to which such funds are attributed. The congressional budget resolution has also imposed various limits on advance appropriations for discretionary spending since FY2001. For FY2014, these limits were established in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. In certain circumstances, making funds available for a delayed period of availability may also violate House and Senate rules that prohibit unauthorized appropriations and other types of legislative provisions. |
crs_R43607 | crs_R43607_0 | In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act ( P.L. 108-276 ) to encourage the development of CBRN medical countermeasures. In response to perceived problems with Project BioShield countermeasure procurement, the 109 th Congress created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and the position of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA, P.L. 109-417 ). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ) provided $255 million for Project BioShield procurements to remain available until expended. The Project BioShield Act provides the federal government with authorities related to the development, acquisition, and use of medical countermeasures against CBRN attacks. Project BioShield creates a government-market guarantee by permitting the HHS Secretary to obligate funds to purchase countermeasures while they still need up to 10 more years of development. Another provision of the act establishes a process through which the HHS Secretary may temporarily allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. This authority is not limited to products acquired through Project BioShield. These allowances are known as emergency use authorizations (EUAs). The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 ( P.L. 108-90 ) appropriated $5.593 billion "to secure medical countermeasures against biological terror attacks" into the DHS "Biodefense Countermeasures" account. Of the $5.6 billion FY2004-FY2013 advance appropriation, Congress rescinded or transferred approximately $2.3 billion and HHS obligated the remaining approximately $3.3 billion for CBRN medical countermeasures. For FY2015, the President requests $415 million for Project BioShield acquisitions. Congress has also transferred funds from this account for various purposes. The HHS awarded Project BioShield contracts for 12 medical countermeasures against the CBRN threats anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, radiological and nuclear threat agents, and nerve agents. PAHPRA
The 113 th Congress reauthorized and modified key Project BioShield–related authorities through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA, P.L. This law extended the Project BioShield procurement program, changed some aspects of the countermeasure development and acquisition process, and modified some authorities relating to the use of unapproved countermeasures. The switch to annual appropriations may complicate HHS's long-term countermeasure development and acquisition planning. 113-5 ) allows the HHS Secretary to transfer up to $1.4 billion of FY2014 through FY2018 Project BioShield appropriations to BARDA for countermeasure advanced development. | In 2004, Congress passed the Project BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) to provide the federal government with new authorities related to the development, procurement, and use of medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents. However, the government still lacks countermeasures against many of the CBRN terrorism agents determined by the government to pose the greatest threat. Congress is likely to consider whether modifications of these authorities or new authorities would help address remaining gaps.
The authority generally referred to as Project BioShield allows the government to guarantee a market for CBRN medical countermeasures. Under this provision, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may obligate funds to purchase countermeasures that still need up to 10 more years of development. Since 2004, HHS has obligated approximately $3.309 billion to guarantee a government market for countermeasures against anthrax, smallpox, botulism, radiation, and nerve agents.
Another provision of the Project BioShield Act established a process through which the HHS Secretary may temporarily allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. The HHS has used this authority to allow the emergency use of unapproved products several times.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advance appropriated $5.593 billion to acquire CBRN countermeasures through Project BioShield between FY2004 and FY2013. Subsequent Congresses rescinded or transferred $2.291 billion, more than one-third, from this advance appropriation. The transfers from this account supported CBRN medical countermeasure advanced development, pandemic influenza preparedness and response, and basic biomedical research. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) provides $255 million for Project BioShield procurements to remain available until expended. For FY2015, the President requests $415 million.
Since passage of the Project BioShield Act, Congress has considered additional measures to further encourage countermeasure development. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417) created the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS and modified the Project BioShield procurement process. Among other duties, BARDA oversees all of HHS's Project BioShield procurements. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act (P.L. 113-5) authorized Project BioShield appropriations of $2.8 billion for FY2014 through FY2018 and modified some Project BioShield-related authorities.
The 113th Congress may also consider modifying the amount and manner by which it funds Project BioShield procurements. Additionally, Congress may consider whether HHS is optimally using its CBRN-related authorities to close remaining countermeasure gaps and appropriately planning for long-term costs associated with maintaining a countermeasure stockpile. |
crs_R41047 | crs_R41047_0 | Background
Exports of U.S. livestock and poultry products are important both to farmers and to the U.S. economy. In 2009, U.S. livestock and poultry exports were valued at more than $10 billion, accounting for about 12% of total global meat trade (estimated at nearly $87 billion in 2009). Most U.S. livestock and poultry producers are opposed to such restrictions because of concerns about animal welfare and food safety, as well as concerns about possible increases in production costs, among other reasons. 965 and S. 1211 (Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2011, PAMTA) seek to restrict the use of certain antimicrobial drugs for subtherapeutic or nontherapeutic purposes in food-producing animals. U.S. Policies in Selected Countries
Growing concerns about antimicrobial resistance have caused some U.S. trading partners and competitors, including the EU, New Zealand, and South Korea, to implement restrictions and prohibitions on the use of certain antimicrobials for subtherapeutic or nontherapeutic purposes in animal production. GAO concluded, however, that there was evidence that country restrictions on the use of these drugs could become an issue in the future and could affect U.S. export markets for livestock and poultry products. At issue is whether increased restrictions and prohibition on the use of certain drugs in animal feed in some countries, including the EU, New Zealand, and South Korea, could affect or may already be affecting international trade in livestock and poultry products from countries, such as the United States, that do not actively restrict the use of these drugs for growth promotion in animal production. At this time, it is not possible to provide a quantitative assessment of the potential trade implications of future restrictions on antimicrobial use in food animal production, for reasons outlined in the following sections. Instead, following is a discussion of two possible scenarios for the potential trade implications on U.S. livestock and poultry exports of tightened restrictions or prohibitions on the use of antimicrobial drugs in animal feed for growth promotion:
Scenario 1: Tightened restrictions or prohibitions in key U.S. export markets, without corresponding changes in the United States on the use of antimicrobials in animal feed for growth promotion. Scenario 2: Tightened restrictions or prohibitions in key U.S. export markets, with corresponding prohibitions in the United States on the use of antimicrobials in animal feed for growth promotion, which might increase meat exports from the United States. Such a scenario could result in lower U.S. meat exports and reduced U.S. market share in global markets, if U.S. producers continue to regularly use these drugs in animal feed. | Exports of U.S. livestock and poultry products are important both to farmers and to the U.S. economy. In 2009, U.S. livestock and poultry exports were valued at more than $10 billion, accounting for about 12% of total global meat trade (estimated at nearly $87 billion in 2009).
Growing concerns about antimicrobial resistance have caused some U.S. trading partners and competitors to implement restrictions and prohibitions on the use of certain antimicrobials for subtherapeutic or nontherapeutic purposes in animal production. Although antibiotic use in animals has not been a significant factor affecting U.S. trade in meat products to date, evidence suggests that country restrictions on the use of these drugs could become an issue in the future and could affect U.S. export markets for livestock and poultry products.
At issue is whether increased restrictions and prohibitions on the use of certain drugs in animal feed in some countries, including the European Union (EU), New Zealand, and South Korea, could affect or may already be affecting international trade in livestock and poultry products from countries, such as the United States, that do not actively restrict the use of these drugs for growth promotion in animal production.
In the United States, H.R. 965 and S. 1211 (Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2011, PAMTA), seek to restrict the use of certain antimicrobial drugs for subtherapeutic or nontherapeutic purposes in food-producing animals. Most U.S. livestock and poultry producers are opposed to such restrictions because of concerns about animal welfare and food safety, as well as concerns about possible increases in production costs, among other reasons.
Presently, it is not possible to precisely predict or to provide a quantitative assessment of the potential trade implications of future restrictions on antimicrobial use in food animal production. Given the number of market variables that would need to be evaluated, along with other trade issues facing U.S. meat exporters in global markets, it is difficult to precisely predict trade implications of possible future restrictions on antimicrobials in animal feed in selected countries. However, it is possible to examine the range of possible outcomes from two scenarios involving potential trade implications for U.S. livestock and poultry exports from tightened restrictions or prohibitions on the use of antimicrobial drugs in animal feed for growth promotion:
Scenario 1: Tightened restrictions or prohibitions in key U.S. export markets, without corresponding changes in the United States on the use of antimicrobials in animal feed for growth promotion. Scenario 2: Tightened restrictions or prohibitions in key U.S. export markets, with corresponding prohibitions in the United States on the use of antimicrobials in animal feed for growth promotion.
This report discusses the possible outcomes under these scenarios in terms of changes in U.S. livestock and poultry exports and changes in U.S. market share in global meat markets. |
crs_R40742 | crs_R40742_0 | Introduction
The House and the Senate approved H.Rept. 111-89 , the conference report to accompany S.Con.Res. 13 , the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2010, on April 29, 2009. The FY2010 budget resolution includes reconciliation instructions directing the Senate HELP Committee and the House Education and Labor Committee to report changes in laws within their jurisdictions to reduce the deficit by $1 billion for the period of FY2009 through FY2014. The instructions for the House specifically direct the Education and Labor Committee to report a bill that invests in education while reducing the deficit by $1 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period. On July 21, 2009, the House Education and Labor Committee marked up H.R. 3221 , the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009; and on July 27, 2009, the committee reported H.Rept. 3221 . On September 17, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3221 by a vote of 253 to 171. It would also establish several new non-HEA programs. The authority to make loans under the FFEL program would be terminated after June 2010. CBO estimates that this would reduce mandatory spending by $41.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $86.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. Mandatory funding for HEA programs serving Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority-Serving Institutions would be provided for FY2010 through FY2019. Mandatory funding would be provided to establish and fund three Modernization, Renovation, and Repair grant programs for school facilities. These savings would be large enough to achieve the $1 billion reduction in spending specified in S.Con.Res. 13 , and to offset increases in mandatory spending that would result from the other new or expanded education programs and benefits proposed under H.R. 3221 . Overall, CBO estimates that H.R. 3221 , as reported in H.Rept. 111-232 , would reduce mandatory spending by $13.3 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $7.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. CBO also estimates that enactment of the proposals reported in H.R. 3221 , if fully funded, would increase discretionary spending by $3.6 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $13.5 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. 3221 . 3221 . This report will be updated as warranted to track legislative developments. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Pell Grant Program
H.R. Federal Student Loan Reform
The Department of Education currently administers three major federal student loan programs that are authorized under Title IV of the HEA: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program. These programs are briefly described below. CBO projects that the termination of lending under the FFEL program and the shift to all federal student loans being made under the DL program would result in a reduction of $40.7 billion in mandatory spending over the period from FY2009 through FY2014, and $74.8 billion in mandatory spending over the period from FY2009 through FY2019. Federal Direct Perkins Loans
H.R. 3221 would amend Part E of Title VII of the HEA to establish the College Access and Completion Innovation Fund (CACIF).The fund would include the College Access Challenge Grant Program (CACG) that was enacted under the CCRAA in 2008, two other programs, and an evaluation. Additional Programs
In addition to making changes to the Higher Education Act, H.R. Early Learning Challenge Fund
H.R. The Secretary would be required to submit an annual report to the House Committee on Education and Labor, and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. American Graduation Initiative
H.R. | The House and the Senate approved H.Rept. 111-89, the conference report to accompany S.Con.Res. 13, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2010, on April 29, 2009. The FY2010 budget resolution includes reconciliation instructions directing the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) and the House Committee on Education and Labor to report changes in laws within their jurisdictions to reduce the deficit by $1 billion for the period of fiscal year (FY) 2009 through FY2014. The reconciliation instructions for the House specifically direct the Committee on Education and Labor to report a bill that invests in education while reducing the deficit by $1 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period.
On July 21, 2009, the House Committee on Education and Labor marked up H.R. 3221, the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009 (H.Rept. 111-232). On September 17, 2009, the House voted 253 to 171 to pass H.R. 3221.
H.R. 3221 would terminate authority under the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, as amended, to make loans under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program after June 2010. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that this would reduce mandatory or direct spending by $41.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $86.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. These savings would be large enough to achieve the $1 billion reduction in spending specified in S.Con.Res. 13, while offsetting increases in mandatory spending that would result from the expansion of several existing HEA programs, and the establishment and funding of several proposed new programs.
Overall, CBO estimates that H.R. 3221 (as reported in H.Rept. 111-232) would reduce mandatory spending by $13.3 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $7.8 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period. CBO also estimates that enactment of the proposals made in H.R. 3221, if fully funded, would increase discretionary spending by $3.6 billion over the FY2009-FY2014 period, and by $13.5 billion over the FY2009-FY2019 period.
In addition to terminating the authority to make loans under the FFEL program, H.R. 3221 would fund expansions of several existing HEA programs and benefits, including the Federal Pell Grant program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program, programs serving Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority-Serving Institutions, and the College Access Challenge Grant program, and would alter procedures for determining the eligibility of students for need-based federal student aid. H.R. 3221 also would establish several new programs under the HEA, including a new Federal Direct Perkins Loan offered through the DL program to replace the current Federal Perkins Loan program, and a College Access and Completion Innovation Fund.
Several major non-HEA programs would also be established and funded by H.R. 3221. These include a series of Modernization, Renovation, and Repair grant programs for school facilities, an Early Learning Challenge Fund to support early childhood education, and an American Graduation Initiative to support community colleges.
This report reviews and briefly describes the proposals contained in H.R. 3221 to amend programs authorized under HEA and to establish and fund additional new education programs. It will be updated as warranted to track legislative developments. |
crs_RL34337 | crs_RL34337_0 | After a few delays, China's new sovereign wealth fund—the China Investment Corporation (CIC)—officially started operations on September 29, 2007. Also, the conversion of the foreign exchange reserves into capital for the CIC may help "sterilize" some of the excess financial liquidity in China that is reportedly contributing to China's recent inflationary pressures. However, China's decision to create the CIC reawakened some concerns about the impact of SWFs on global financial markets and engendered new misgivings about China's involvement in international equity markets. According to one source, the CIC will have three major departments for its investment functions—1. Other people serving on the CIC's board of directors include:
Zhang Hongli, the CIC's Chief Operating Officer (COO) and past vice minister of finance; Fu Ziying, vice minister at the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM); Hu Xiaolian, deputy governor of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and Administrator of SAFE; Li Yong, vice minister of finance; Liu Shiyu, vice governor of the People's Bank of China; Wang Chunzheng, ex-vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); Liu Zhongli, currently chair of the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants; Zhang Xiaoqiang, vice chairman of NDRC; and Yu Erniu, the CIC's human resource director. In little over a year, CIC has either purchased or created several subsidiaries and investment companies, including the Central Huijin Investment Corporation (CHIC); China Jianyin Investment Company (CJIC); and Beijing Wonderful Investments, Ltd (BWIL). Then, in August 2008, it was reported that CIC's capital injection into ABC was to be reduced to $20 billion, to free up more funds for overseas investments. The CIC has made several other major direct investments since its establishment. The second major investment took place on December 19, 2007, when the CIC purchased "around 9.9%" of Morgan Stanley, one of the largest U.S. investment banks. The CIC has also reportedly invested some of its capital in money market funds. Some government officials, as well as members of the public, have been critical of the CIC's investment performance. Investment Strategy
Prior to the creation of the CIC, Chinese officials were already making statements indicating that its investment strategy would be to maximize the rate of return on its investments. State Administration of Foreign Exchange
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange, or SAFE, reports directly to China's State Council and the PBOC. Multilateral Responses to SWFs
Misgivings about the potential impact of the CIC and other SWFs on financial markets and local economies are fostering calls for multilateral organizations to develop greater monitoring procedures and regulations of SWF investments. These have included:
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing, "Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government Investments in the U.S.: Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications," November 14, 2007; Joint Economic Committee hearing, "Do Sovereign Wealth Funds Make the U.S. Economy Stronger or Pose National Security Risks?," February 13, 2008; House Financial Services Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology, and the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises hearing, "Foreign Government Investment in the U.S. Economy and Financial Sector," March 5, 2008; and House Financial Services Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology hearing, Sovereign Wealth Funds: New Challenges from a Changing Landscape," September 10, 2008. However, there have been suggestions that the recent changes do not adequately protect the United States from economic risks posed by SWFs. Among the regulatory changes being suggested are:
Requirements that any SWF interested in investing in the United States publicly release audited financial statements that follow international accounting standards on a regular basis; Restrictions on the percentage of a U.S. company an SWF may own—other nations have such limits; for example, Hong Kong authorities have said they may withdraw the authority of Standard Chartered Bank to issue Hong Kong currency if the share of its stock owned by a Singaporean SWF exceeds 20%; Restrictions on the type of investment SWFs may make in U.S. companies—alternatives include restricting SWFs to the purchase of nonvoting shares, banning SWFs from negotiating a seat on the company's board of directors or representation in the company's senior management; and Changes in U.S. tax code—under current U.S. law, the profits of SWFs are generally tax-exempt; it has been suggested that the tax-exemption for SWFs be eliminated or restricted. | China established its major sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) on September 29, 2007—six months after it first announced its intention to create such a fund. Financed with $200 billion in initial capital, the CIC is one of the largest sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the world.
The creation of CIC was somewhat controversial in China. Both the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) reportedly wanted the CIC under their authority. In the end, the CIC reports directly to China's ruling State Council. However, as part of the interagency struggle, it was decided that the CIC would have to make significant purchases in several state-owned banks, as well as purchase the Central Huijin Investment Corporation (CHIC) from the PBOC.
Although some of the CIC's initial investments were apparently political in nature, the CIC's top management have repeatedly asserted that future investments will be commercially based. The CIC and its subsidiaries have made several investments, including the purchase of 9.9% of the U.S. financial firm, Morgan Stanley, on December 19, 2007. Meanwhile other government-owned entities in China—including the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)—have started to act like sovereign wealth funds and have been making sizable overseas investments.
According to top Chinese officials, the CIC was created to improve the rate of return on China's foreign exchange reserves and to prevent the nation's excess financial liquidity from contributing to domestic inflation. Depending on its performance, the CIC may be allocated more of China's growing stock of foreign exchange reserves in the future. However, its first-year results have raised questions about its investment strategy and calls for administrative reforms for CIC.
A number of experts in international finance have expressed some concern about the recent growth in SWFs and China's creation of the CIC. Analysts have cautioned that major shifts in SWF investments could potentially disrupt global financial markets and harm the U.S. economy. Other experts are less concerned about SWFs and the CIC, and welcome their participation in international investment markets. China has responded by maintaining that the CIC will prove to be a source of market stability. China has also stated that it has no intention of using its SWF to disrupt the U.S. economy or global financial markets.
There have been calls for greater oversight and regulation of the activities of SWFs. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in consultation with many of the leading SWFs, has developed a set of voluntary "Generally Accepted Principles and Practices" (GAPP) for the operation of SWFs. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has drafted policy guidelines for countries that are recipients of SWF investments. Some international financial experts have suggested elements to be included in such guidelines, including standards for transparency, governance, and reciprocity. Other experts have suggested that the United States should review its current laws and regulations governing foreign investments in the United States, and possibly implement special procedures or restrictions on proposed investments by SWFs. These include financial reporting requirements, limits on SWF ownership of U.S. companies, restrictions on the types of equity investments SWFs can make in U.S. companies, and special tax provisions for SWFs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL34222 | crs_RL34222_0 | Ohio also moved up its primary to the first Tuesday in March, resulting in a crowded schedule of 16 primaries and caucuses that spanned the country and vastly increased the number of delegates to be selected. National party changes after the 2000 election led to an earlier start in 2004, the most front-loaded calendar to date in terms of the number of primaries. In 2006, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) again revised its rules for the 2008 primary schedule, creating a calendar with the earliest start and the most front-loaded ever; 23 states held contests on February 5, the opening date for the window. With the approval of two new exceptions to the DNC rule for holding primaries and caucuses during the specified "window," the Nevada caucus was scheduled for January 19, five days after the Iowa caucus, followed by the New Hampshire primary on January 22, with the South Carolina (and Florida) primary a week later. Because the Florida and Michigan Democratic Parties relied on the January primary results to apportion delegates, the national Democratic Party on May 31, 2008, reduced the vote of both delegations by 50%, with each delegate having a half vote. In the end, the Credentials Committee of the Democratic National Convention restored full voting rights for the Michigan and Florida delegations the day before the convention began. The Republican party's rules committee approved a plan that would impose a new system for choosing national convention delegates, known as the Ohio Plan, for the 2012 election. As the result of a revision to Rule 15 of The Rules of the Republican Party , delegate selection events cannot be held before the first Tuesday in March, with an exception for Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, which can hold their events on or after February 1 (regardless, Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina scheduled January events for 2012). The four states that are exempt from the timing rule are also exempt from this requirement. The final recommendation addressed a number of caucus-related issues from 2008: (1) complaints that the caucus process is unfair to students, the elderly, shift workers, and members of the military who may not have the time or ability to attend an event that lasts several hours and for which there is no absentee voting; (2) states that recently switched to a caucus process because state funding for a primary was not available were, at times, challenged to run a complicated, multi-tiered event and could benefit from peer input; and (3) adequate preparation is critical to ensure a smooth process, including site selection, participant education, and results reporting. Republican rules permit Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada to begin on or after February 1, but the Florida move introduced uncertainty over what Iowa and New Hampshire would do with respect to primary and caucus dates. The Iowa caucuses were scheduled for January 3. Republican rules specify that Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada may not hold contests prior to February 1 of the election year. Just days after Florida's announcement, South Carolina Republicans announced that the party would hold its primary on January 21, and Nevada Republicans announced on October 5, 2011, that party caucuses would be held on January 14. Whether the changes adopted for this cycle are retained will depend on how the parties view the nominating contest once it has concluded. The regional order would rotate every four years. Legislative Considerations
No bills have been introduced in the 112 th Congress to alter the presidential nominating process. Even more in doubt is the extent to which such changes would alleviate broader complaints about the presidential nominating process—low turnout, the negative perception of the media's role in the process, the influence of organized interest groups and ideological voters, the high cost of campaigns, and the reluctance of some potential candidates to enter the contest. | After a period of uncertainty over the presidential nominating calendar for 2012, the early states again settled on January dates for primaries and caucuses. Iowa held its caucuses on January 3 and New Hampshire held its primary on January 10. These two states, along with South Carolina and Nevada, are exempt from Republican national party rules that do not permit delegate selection contests prior to the first Tuesday in March, but specify that these contests may not be held before February 1. Officials in Florida announced that the state would hold a January 31, 2012, primary, in violation of party rules, which prompted South Carolina and Nevada to schedule unsanctioned events as well. South Carolina scheduled its primary on January 21; Nevada Republicans originally scheduled party caucuses for January 14, but changed the date to February 4. States that violate the rules risk losing half their delegates, as a number of states already have.
Every four years, the presidential nominating process generates complaints and proposed modifications, often directed at the seemingly haphazard and fast-paced calendar of primaries and caucuses. The rapid pace of primaries and caucuses that characterized the 2000 and 2004 cycles continued in 2008, despite national party efforts to reverse front-loading.
The Democratic Party approved changes to its calendar rules in July 2006, when the party's Rules and Bylaws Committee extended an exemption to Nevada and South Carolina (Iowa and New Hampshire were previously exempted) from the designated period for holding delegate selection events; and the committee proposed sanctions for any violations. With the exception of these four states, Democratic party delegate selection rules dictate that the first determining step in choosing national convention delegates could not begin until February 5, 2008. The Rules and Bylaws Committee of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) stripped Florida of its national convention delegates on August 25, 2007, because the legislature scheduled the 2008 presidential primary for January 29, a date that conflicted with party rules. Michigan Democrats also forfeited their national convention delegates by scheduling a January 15 primary. In the end, the DNC decided on May 31, 2008, to seat full delegations for each state with a half vote for each of the delegates, thereby reducing each delegation's vote by 50% at the convention. On the day before the convention, the Credentials Committee restored full voting rights for both state delegations.
For the 2012 election, the two national parties agreed to a calendar format that would limit most state contests until after the first Tuesday in March, with exceptions for Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada. The cooperation to reduce front-loading was unprecedented and resulted in fewer early events and a more even distribution of contests thereafter.
Front-loading is only the most recent among a list of complaints about the nominating system, which has resisted wholesale change despite criticism from voters, the candidates, and the press. After several decades of debate, observers are divided on the best approach to reform. The lack of consensus for reworking the primary system is due partly to its complex design, which frustrates pursuit of a simple, obvious solution, and partly to the political parties pursuing their own variable interests on their delegate selection rules. The states further complicate the process by independently scheduling primary election dates. Congress, political commentators, academics, and others have offered various reform proposals over the years, but many important dimensions of reform depend on the parties' willingness to change the system for choosing delegates to their national conventions. No bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress to revise the nominating process. |
crs_R43682 | crs_R43682_0 | Introduction
The last new refinery to open in the United States finished construction in 1976. Since the mid-1980s, though, some 150 or more refineries closed. However, the refineries that remained open expanded their operational capacity to keep up with the increasing demand for refined petroleum products. Current U.S. refining capacity (roughly 18 million barrels per day) appears to satisfy if not exceed demand as the increasing export of refined petroleum products would seem to suggest. Thus far, the industry has managed to negotiate regulatory hurdles in expanding refinery capacity, an option preferred over new construction and driven by the economy of scale. In general, new entrants into refining may find steep competition with existing operators. Small refineries do face many of the same economic, market, and environmental factors that affect large refineries, but they may also benefit from exemptions in complying with certain federal regulations. The increasingly available light sweet crude oils produced from unconventional shale resources, like North Dakota's Bakken formation and the Texas Eagle Ford formation, are changing U.S. refining prospects and have revitalized some refinery operations that formerly depended on imported light crude oil. Small business opportunities in refining may strongly depend on a number of factors, including regional demand for refined products, available crude oil supplies, regional price differences, and unique state environmental regulations, among others. In addition, some fuels are easier to produce than others are. While evaluating opportunities would exceed the scope of this report, some key factors have emerged as of late. The availability of light sweet crude oil in the mid-continent region (North Dakota, Colorado) presents some opportunities for constructing a small topping or hydroskimming refinery. A greater opportunity may lie in installing condensate splitter and stabilizer plants to handle the excess condensate production in North Dakota now being flared, or in Texas. These projects range from splitting and stabilization plants for processing crude oil condensate to "teapot" or mini-refineries. This new refinery, with a capacity of 20,000 b/d, is a direct result of the expansion of oil production in the Bakken fields. The quality of very light sweet crude oil supplies is in one sense very high. However, larger and more complex refineries have positioned themselves to take advantage of lower quality heavy sour crude. Environmental Permitting and Regulatory Requirements
As with any industrial facility involving potential air emissions, water use, and waste generation, certain environmental permitting and regulatory requirements apply to the construction and operation of refineries. The specific requirements, and the degree of difficulty or ease in meeting them, will depend not only on the nature of the project, but perhaps more importantly on the location of the project. In light of the restrictions on exporting U.S.-produced crude oil and condensate, Congress may consider whether the definition of a refinery includes similar processes that produce product streams based on their physical properties. Congress may also wish to assess whether small business enterprises face unique challenges to entering refining, or unique opportunities now that the United States has become a net exporter of refined petroleum products. | The last refinery constructed in the United States opened in 1977. Since the mid-1980s, some 150 have closed as part of an industry-wide consolidation. Over the same time, the remaining refineries expanded their operational capacity by 23% to keep up with increasing demand. Current U.S. refining capacity appears to satisfy if not exceed demand as the increasing export of refined petroleum products would seem to suggest. Notwithstanding the current surplus capacity, opportunities for new refineries appear to have emerged as the result of the rise in production of U.S. light-sweet crude oil from unconventional resources such as North Dakota's Bakken and Texas' Eagle Ford formations. These new resources have revitalized some refinery operations that formerly depended on imported light crude oil, thereby making the smaller refineries more competitive with large refineries that process more widely available heavy-sour crude oil. Rising domestic crude oil production has not only led U.S. refineries to export their petroleum products, but has led some oil producers to attempt to bypass refining and export crude oil condensates directly. However, Department of Commerce regulations currently restrict crude oil exports. Whether condensates fall under a refined product classification or crude oil remains an unresolved issue, and one that Congress may choose to take up. Congress may also consider whether small businesses face inherent disadvantages in entering an industry dominated by large complex refinery operators.
While some arguments remain for new refinery construction, some argue that economic and regulatory barriers hinder new construction. Small refining enterprises may suffer certain economic disadvantages in an industry driven by the economy of scale. Furthermore, opportunities may depend on geographic location, regional markets, and source of crude oil. The barriers from regulatory requirements remain less clear. Export restrictions certainly affect potential product markets that could support new refining capacity. Whether these markets would spur new refinery construction is a separate question.
The history of refinery expansions suggests that environmental requirements do not generally pose a significant barrier to refinery construction, but local challenges vary (e.g., locations with currently unhealthy air quality). Small refineries face many of the same economic, market, and environmental factors that affect large refineries, but they may also benefit from exemptions in complying with certain federal regulations. As with any industrial facility involving potential air emissions, water use, and waste generation, certain environmental permitting and regulatory requirements apply to the construction and operation of refineries. The specific requirements, and the degree of difficulty or ease in meeting them, will depend not only on the nature of the project, but perhaps more importantly on the location of the project.
Small business opportunities in refining may strongly depend on a number of factors, including regional demand for refined products, available crude oil supplies, and unique regional environmental regulations, among others. A "small business" in the oil refining business is defined differently in different statutes. In addition, some fuels are easier to produce than others are. While evaluating opportunities is beyond the scope of this report, some key opportunities have recently emerged. Perhaps the most discussed potential opportunity for constructing a small topping or hydroskimming refinery is in the mid-continent region (North Dakota, Colorado) to process these new sources of light sweet crude. Other opportunities may lie in installing condensate splitter and stabilizer plants to handle North Dakota and Texas expanding production of light sweet crude oil and condensate. |
crs_R43299 | crs_R43299_0 | Congressional engagement has included humanitarian and other assistance to address economic problems in the 1990s, as well as remediation support in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Through appropriations, hearings, and other legislation and oversight, Congress has strongly supported the goals of the 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, which pledges boosted U.S. defense and security, trade, energy, and democratization cooperation with Georgia. Among these U.S. interests, NATO and the United States have received significant troop support from Georgia for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Georgia serves as a land, sea, and air route for the transit of personnel and cargoes to and from Afghanistan along the "Northern Distribution Network." Georgia's strategic location astride east-west and north-south trade and transit routes also is exemplified by its role as part of the "Southern Corridor" for gas and oil pipelines from the Caspian region to European and other international markets. Georgia's October 27, 2013, presidential election—won by Georgia Dream (GD) party coalition candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili—occurred one year after a highly contentious legislative election resulted in a shift of power from the ruling United National Movement (UNM) party, led by President Mikheil Saakashvili, to the (then-opposition) GD, led by businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili. The other major campaign event was Ivanishvili's pledge to step down as prime minister soon after the election of the new president. Implications for U.S. Interests
On October 28, 2013, the U.S. State Department praised the Georgian presidential election as generally democratic and expressing the will of the people, and as demonstrating Georgia's continuing commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. The State Department called for all Georgian political forces to work together to ensure Georgia's political stability and stated that the United States looked forward to building upon the strong bilateral strategic partnership and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. In his victory speech on October 28, Margvelashvili reaffirmed Georgia's Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, including the pursuit of Georgia's membership in NATO and the EU. At the same time, he reiterated that GD would continue to pursue the normalization of ties with Russia. Successive U.S. Congresses have endorsed close U.S.-Georgia ties and have supported Georgia's continued sovereignty and independence. | This report discusses Georgia's October 27, 2013, presidential election and its implications for U.S. interests. The election took place one year after a legislative election that witnessed the mostly peaceful shift of legislative and ministerial power from the ruling party, the United National Movement (UNM), to the Georgia Dream (GD) coalition bloc. The newly elected president, Giorgi Margvelashvili of the GD, will have fewer powers under recently approved constitutional changes.
Most observers have viewed the 2013 presidential election as marking Georgia's further progress in democratization, including a peaceful shift of presidential power from UNM head Mikheil Saakashvili to GD official Margvelashvili. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns over ongoing tensions between the UNM and GD, as well as Prime Minister and GD head Bidzini Ivanishvili's announcement on November 2, 2013, that he will step down as the premier.
In his victory speech on October 28, Margvelashvili reaffirmed Georgia's Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, including the pursuit of Georgia's future membership in NATO and the EU. At the same time, he reiterated that GD would continue to pursue the normalization of ties with Russia.
On October 28, 2013, the U.S. State Department praised the Georgian presidential election as generally democratic and expressing the will of the people, and as demonstrating Georgia's continuing commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. The State Department called for all Georgian political forces to work together to ensure Georgia's political stability and stated that the United States looked forward to building upon the strong bilateral strategic partnership and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Successive U.S. Congresses have endorsed close U.S.-Georgia ties and have supported Georgia's continued sovereignty and independence. Congressional engagement has included humanitarian and other assistance to address economic problems in the 1990s and remediation support in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. Through appropriations, hearings, and other legislation and oversight, Congress has strongly supported the goals of the 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, which pledges boosted U.S. defense and security, trade, energy, and democratization cooperation with Georgia. Among U.S. interests, NATO and the United States have received significant troop support from Georgia for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Georgia serves as a land, sea, and air route for the transit of personnel and cargoes to and from Afghanistan along the "Northern Distribution Network." Georgia's strategic location astride east-west and north-south trade and transit routes also is exemplified by its role as part of the "Southern Corridor" for gas and oil pipelines from the Caspian region to European and other international markets. |
crs_R43954 | crs_R43954_0 | The federal government plays a role in the management of sex offenders. In a law enforcement capacity, it enforces federal laws involving sexual abuse, online predatory offenses, or other related federal crimes. In addition, Congress has enacted legislation that encourages the development of state sex offender registries, urges states to punish recalcitrant sex offenders, and induces state and local law enforcement to make certain information on sex offenders public, and has taken other steps involving the registration of sex offenders and notification of the community. Federal legislation affecting sex offender policy has largely centered on sex offender registration and notification, and therefore they are the focus of this report. Congress has attempted to standardize sex offender registration and notification laws through legislation, most recently through the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), a major component of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (Adam Walsh Act; P.L. 109-248 ) enacted in 2006. It also created a three-tier classification system for sex offenders based solely on the crime of conviction. To date, 17 states, 3 territories, and many American Indian tribes have been found to have "substantially implemented SORNA," while other states have publicly objected to the requirements of SORNA. Role of the Federal Government
While sex offense investigations and sex offender management are primarily state and local criminal justice issues, the federal government plays a significant role in sex offender registration and notification as well as other sex offender management issues not discussed in this report. The federal government (1) sets requirements and baseline standards for states for sex offender registration and notification, (2) provides assistance to states via grants and law enforcement support in tracking down noncompliant offenders, (3) maintains a public national website that provides information on registered sex offenders, (4) maintains a national sex offender registry for assisting law enforcement, and (5) receives and transmits information on the international travel of sex offenders. SORNA stated that jurisdictions that fail to comply with its requirements risk having their annual JAG funds reduced by 10%. While several noncompliant states have chosen to lose 10% of their JAG funds, the majority of noncompliant states have applied to have these funds reallocated and used solely for the purpose of implementing SORNA. Select Issues for Congress
Congress may decide to address a number of issues currently associated with sex offender registration and notification in the United States. These issues include notification of offenders' international travel, issues with registration of sex offenders in the military, states' noncompliance with requirements of SORNA, and the effectiveness of SORNA. | The federal government plays a role in the management of sex offenders. In a law enforcement capacity, it enforces federal laws involving sexual abuse, online predatory offenses, or other related federal crimes. In addition, Congress has enacted legislation that encourages the development of state sex offender registries, urges states to punish recalcitrant sex offenders, and induces state and local law enforcement to make certain information on sex offenders public, and has taken other steps involving the registration of sex offenders and notification of the community. Federal legislation affecting sex offender policy has largely centered on sex offender registration and notification, and therefore they are the focus of this report.
All states have sex offender registration and notification laws; however, these laws vary widely. Congress has attempted to standardize these laws through legislation, most recently through the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), a major component of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (Adam Walsh Act; P.L. 109-248) enacted in 2006. Among other things, SORNA created a three-tier classification system for sex offenders based solely on the crime of conviction. To date, 17 states, 3 territories, and many American Indian tribes have been found to have "substantially implemented SORNA." SORNA stated that jurisdictions that fail to comply with its requirements risk having their annual Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) funds reduced by 10%. While several noncompliant states have chosen to lose 10% of their JAG funds, the majority of noncompliant states have applied to have these funds reallocated and used solely for the purpose of implementing SORNA.
Sex offenses and sex offender management are primarily state and local criminal justice issues; however, the federal government plays a role in sex offender registration and notification as well as other sex offender management issues not discussed in this report. The federal government (1) sets minimum requirements and baseline standards for states for sex offender registration and notification, (2) provides assistance to states via grants and law enforcement support in tracking down noncompliant offenders, (3) maintains a public national website that provides information on registered sex offenders, (4) maintains a national sex offender registry for assisting law enforcement, and (5) receives and transmits information on the international travel of sex offenders.
In recent years, several issues with sex offender registration and notification in the United States have been raised by state governments, the media, and academics alike. Congress may decide to address a number of these issues that fall under federal jurisdiction. Issues include notification of offenders' international travel, issues with registration of sex offenders in the military, states' noncompliance with requirements of SORNA, and the effectiveness of SORNA. |
crs_RS22266 | crs_RS22266_0 | Recognizing the risk that a standing army could pose to individual civil liberties and the sovereignty retained by the several states, but also cognizant of the need to provide for the defense of the nation against foreign and domestic threats, the framers of the Constitution incorporated a system of checks and balances to divide the control of the military between the President and Congress and to share the control of the militia with the states. This report summarizes the constitutional and statutory authorities and limitations relevant to the employment of the armed forces to provide disaster relief and law enforcement assistance. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. In the event of a disaster that results in the wide-scale deterioration of civil law and order, the authority to employ active duty troops to perform law enforcement functions must be found elsewhere. The Stafford Act does not authorize the use of federal military forces to maintain law and order. If the state's National Guard units are called into federal service to respond to an emergency or a major disaster, their role is restricted to the disaster relief operations authorized under the Stafford Act. | Natural disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy, raise questions concerning the President's legal authority to send active duty military forces into a disaster area and the permissible functions the military can perform to protect life and property and maintain order. The Stafford Act authorizes the use of the military for disaster relief operations at the request of the state governor, but it does not authorize the use of the military to perform law enforcement functions, which is ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. However, the President may invoke other authorities to use federal troops to aid in the execution of the law, including the Insurrection Act. This report summarizes the possible constitutional and statutory authorities and constraints relevant to the use of armed forces, including National Guard units in federal service, to provide assistance to states when a natural disaster impedes the operation of state and local police. |
crs_R40726 | crs_R40726_0 | Introduction
The United States is recovering from a broad recession that is considered the longest-lasting economic downturn since World War II. Various indicators of economic strength, such as the unemployment rate and foreclosures, reached their worst showings in decades during the recession and the following months. The current state of the economy has continued to spark debate concerning whether economic factors can affect crime. This report examines the relationships between selected variables of economic strength and crime. It then reviews the existing literature in the field analyzing various data sets that examine whether the unemployment rate and foreclosures can be related to increases in the national crime rate. Further, conclusions drawn about the relationship between national crime rates and economic variables may not be able to be generalized to the relationship between the economy and crime in all states and localities around the country. Specifically, during the most recent economic downturn, many referred to the unemployment rate and the proportion of home foreclosures as proxies for economic health. Overview of the Literature
A number of studies analyzing the relationship between unemployment and crime rates tend to find small statistically significant correlations between unemployment and the property crime rate but not between unemployment and the violent crime rate. For one, the effects of the unemployment rate on the property crime rate may better explain property crime trends during some time periods than during others. The lack of conclusive evidence for a strong, or even significant, correlation between the two suggests that the unemployment rate may have an indirect relationship with the property crime rate. A number of studies have shown a relationship between physical signs of disorder in a neighborhood and increasing crime. Property crime rates did not appear to be as closely linked to foreclosures as were violent crime rates. Another study identified by CRS from the 1990s examined the relationship between foreclosures and crime—specifically, the impact of crime on foreclosures rather than the impact of foreclosures on crime. Other Economic Indicators
While much research on the relationship between economic variables and crime rates has focused on macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and home foreclosures, some research suggests that other economic variables could fluctuate more strongly with crime rates and could thus serve as better proxies for evaluating the relationship between the economy and crime. These results suggest that crime rates—the property crime rate, in particular—may be linked to the economy, but that researchers may not see the relationship by studying traditional macroeconomic factors such as unemployment. It does not appear that recessions—as measured by macroeconomic variables such as the unemployment rate or home foreclosures—can be definitively linked to increases in crime rates. As mentioned earlier, the CRS review did find limited evidence of some correlation between crime and microeconomic indicators such as consumer sentiment. Number of Law Enforcement Officers and Crime Rates
If crime rates do in fact increase during times of economic decline or instability (something that the literature and data are inconclusive about), policy makers may be interested in what measures can be taken to address such increases in specific localities that may be related to the economic decline. | The United States is currently recovering from a broad recession that is considered the longest-lasting economic downturn since World War II. Various indicators of economic strength, such as the unemployment rate and foreclosures, reached their worst showings in decades during the recession and the following months. The state of the economy has generated debate concerning whether economic factors can affect crime. This report examines research on how selected economic variables may or may not be related to crime rates.
There are multiple macroeconomic indicators, such as the consumer price index or real earnings, that can serve as estimates of economic strength. Specifically, during the most recent economic downturn, many referred to the unemployment rate and the proportion of home foreclosures as proxies for economic health. Therefore, most of the discussion in this report utilizes unemployment and foreclosure data in discussing the relationship between the economy and crime.
A number of studies have analyzed the link between the unemployment rate and crime rates (with a greater focus on property crime), some theorizing that in times of economic turmoil, people may turn to illicit rather than licit means of income. However, a review by CRS found a lack of consensus concerning whether the unemployment rate has any correlation with the property crime rate. A number of studies analyzed by CRS that did find a correlation between the unemployment rate and the property crime rate generally examined time periods during which the unemployment and property crime rates moved in tandem. Conversely, some studies that used longer time-horizons tended to find no direct link between the unemployment rate and the property crime rate.
The link between foreclosures and crime rates has not been reviewed as comprehensively by social scientists as other broader macroeconomic variables—namely, unemployment. Most of the literature in the field focuses on whether abandoned houses can be linked to increases in crime rather than looking at the particular role that foreclosures may play. The literature reviewed suggests that there is some correlation between abandoned houses and the property crime rate (but not, however, the violent crime rate). With respect to the relationship between foreclosures and crime rates, some of the studies found that foreclosures did have an impact on the violent crime rate (but not the property crime rate). However, the limited number of studies examining the relationship between foreclosure rates and crime rates complicates any attempt to draw firm conclusions.
While much research on the relationship between economic variables and crime rates has focused on macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and home foreclosures, some research suggests that other economic variables, such as gross domestic product (GDP) or gross state product (GSP), as well as consumer sentiment, could fluctuate more closely with crime rates and could thus serve as better proxies for evaluating the relationship between the economy and crime.
Policy makers continue to be concerned with potential impacts—such as increased crime—that the economic climate may have on the nation. As a result, some have suggested that focus should be placed on increasing the resources of state and local police departments (i.e., increasing the number of police officers). In addressing this concern, however, Congress may opt to consider whether economic downturns can be linked to crime rates. |
crs_RS20458 | crs_RS20458_0 | Theplancalled for holding a referendum of the registered voters of Vieques to determine the future of DON activities on the island. Calderon introduced the bill and the Puerto Rican Legislature passed it on April 23. The committee directs the Secretary to provide this report no later than March 1, 2003. (page311)
Closures of Vieques Range and Roosevelt Roads. On March 31, 2004, as directed by Section 8132 of the FY2004 defenseappropriations act ( P.L. 108-87 / H.R. 2658 ), the Navy closed the supporting Roosevelt Roads naval station onmainland Puerto Rico. Section 8132 of the FY2004 defense appropriations act ( H.R. | This report discusses the controversy leading up to the closure of the U.S. navaltraining range on the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, Congress' legislation directing the closure, and the potential impactof theclosure on military training and readiness. For a discussion of post-closure environmental cleanup issues atVieques,see CRS Report RL32533(pdf). (1) On April 30, 2003,the Department of the Navy (DON) closed its training range on Vieques. On March 31, 2004, as directed by Section 8132 of the FY2004 defense appropriations act (P.L. 108-87/H.R. 2658), the Navy closed the supporting Roosevelt Roads naval station on mainland Puerto Rico. This CRS report will beupdated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21771 | crs_RS21771_0 | (2) These materials in turn are exported or sold todomestic manufacturers of a wide range of industrial and consumer goods such as livestock feed and pet food, soaps,pharmaceuticals, lubricants, plastics, personal care products, and even crayons (also see Table 1 on page 6). These actions arelikely to cause changes in renderers' business practices, costs, and product values. The Rendering Process. If animal byproducts have fewer market outlets, new questions may ariseabout how todispose of them safely and who should pay. Therefore, U.S.officials believe thatregulation of feed ingredients is the single most effective method for controlling BSE. Downers and Dead Animals. Landfill could lead to disease transmission." | Renderers convert dead animals and animal byproducts into ingredients for a widerangeof industrial and consumer goods, such as animal feed, soaps, candles, pharmaceuticals, and personal care products. U.S. regulatoryactions to bolster safeguards against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) could portendsignificant changesin renderers' business practices, the value of their products, and, consequently, the balance sheets of animalproducers and processors. Also, if animal byproducts have fewer market outlets, questions arise about how to dispose of them safely. Thisreport, which willnot be updated, describes the industry and discusses several industry-related issues that have arisen in the108th Congress. (1) |
crs_RS22669 | crs_RS22669_0 | Background
Section 103(a) of the Patent Act provides one of the statutory bars for patentability of inventions: a patent claim will be considered invalid if "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." In the landmark 1966 case Graham v. John Deere Co . of Kansas City, the Supreme Court established an analytic framework for courts to determine "nonobviousness." Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. In such a situation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) had developed an approach in which an invention would be considered obvious only if there was an explicit or implicit "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" that would lead a person of ordinary skill to combine multiple prior art references to produce an invention. KSR International Co. also manufactures an adjustable pedal assembly. On April 30, 2007, the Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit's judgment, holding that the TSM test for obviousness was incompatible with § 103 and Supreme Court precedents. In addition, he believed that the TSM test hindered the ability of courts and patent examiners to rely upon "common sense." | The Patent Act provides protection for processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter that are useful, novel, and nonobvious. Of these three statutory requirements, the nonobviousness of an invention is often the most difficult to establish. To help courts and patent examiners make the determination, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit developed a test called "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" (TSM). This test provided that a patent claim is only proved obvious if the prior art, the nature of the problem to be solved, or the knowledge of those skilled in the art, reveals some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (550 U.S. ___ , No. 04-1350, decided April 30, 2007), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the TSM test, if it is applied by district courts and patent examiners as the sole means to determine the obviousness of an invention, is contrary to Section 103 of the Patent Act and to Supreme Court precedents that call for an expansive and flexible inquiry, including Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). |
crs_R45038 | crs_R45038_0 | T he United States has initiated renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. The Administration's agriculture-related objectives in the renegotiation include a contentious proposal to establish trade remedies for perishable and seasonal products. The proposal would establish separate domestic provisions for seasonal products such as fruits and vegetables in anti-dumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD) proceedings, making it easier to initiate a trade remedy case against (mostly Mexican) exports to the United States. The proposal responds to complaints by some fruit and vegetable producers, mostly in Southeastern states, who claim to be adversely affected by import competition from Mexico. Other reports indicate that the proposal seeks to modify U.S. AD/CVD laws by allowing growers to bring an injury case by domestic region and draw on seasonal data. This differs from current law, which requires that an injury case be supported by a majority (at least 50%) of the domestic industry, whereas USTRs seasonal proposal would allow regional groups representing less than 50% of nationwide seasonal growers to initiate an injury. This would make it easier for a group of regional producers to initiate trade remedy cases even if the majority of producers within the industry, or in other regions, do not support initiating an injury case. Also, under current law, three years of annual data are necessary to prove injury, whereas the proposal would allow for the use of seasonal data to prove injury. Produce Imports from Mexico
Trends in U.S. Imports
Mexico's production of some fruits and vegetables—tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, squash, berries, and melons—has increased sharply in recent years. In large part, Mexico's increased production and export supplies are attributable to its investment in large-scale greenhouse production facilities and other types of technological innovations, among other factors. Support for Mexico's Protected Agriculture28
The Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (FFVA) claims that Mexico's investment in its greenhouse production has been supported by government subsidies that should be addressed through higher CVDs on U.S. imports of some products. Concerns have mostly centered on U.S. imports of tomatoes, peppers, strawberries, raspberries, and blueberries. In addition, FFVA also claims that Mexico's fruit and vegetable imports are sold to the United States at prices below the cost of production and alternatively could be countered by imposing higher AD duties. Support and Opposition for a Seasonal Provision
The perishable and seasonal provisions in USTR's NAFTA objectives have divided the U.S. fruit and vegetable industry, and opinions are split between producers in some Southeastern states and producers in other states, such as California. Opinions in Congress are also divided. Some in Congress support USTR's seasonal proposal, claiming that it is necessary to address perceived unfair trading practices by Mexican exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables. Others in Congress oppose including the proposal, contending that seasonal production complements rather than competes with U.S. growing seasons. They also worry that it could open the door to an "uncontrolled proliferation of regional, seasonal, perishable remedies against U.S. Mexican trade officials do not support seasonal proposals, nor do they support limiting access for some products. Other reports indicate that Mexico is considering retaliation by including its own list of protected products in response to the U.S. proposal. Such a list could include certain grain and pork products and other types of limitations to protect Mexican products in certain production areas. The U.S. food and agriculture industries have much at stake in the current NAFTA renegotiations. Canada and Mexico are the United States' two largest trading partners, accounting for 28% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports and 39% of its imports in 2016. Under NAFTA, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico have increased sharply, rising from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016. | The United States has initiated renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. Among the Administration's agriculture-related objectives in the renegotiation is a proposal to establish new rules for seasonal and perishable products, such as fruits and vegetables, which would establish a separate domestic industry provision for perishable and seasonal products in anti-dumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD) proceedings. This could protect certain U.S. seasonal fruit and vegetable products by making it easier to initiate trade remedy cases against (mostly Mexican) exports to the United States and responds to complaints by some fruit and vegetable producers, mostly in Southeastern U.S. states, who claim to be adversely affected by import competition from Mexico.
Mexico's production of some fruits and vegetables—tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, berries, and melons—has increased sharply in recent years, in large part due to Mexico's investment in large-scale greenhouse production facilities and other types of technological innovations. Some claim that this investment is supported by government subsidies and should be addressed through higher countervailing duties (CVD) on U.S. imports of these products. They also claim that these imports are sold to the United States at prices below the cost of production and alternatively could be countered by higher anti-dumping (AD) duties. Concerns have mostly focused on U.S. imports of tomatoes, peppers, and berries.
The Administration's seasonal proposal is among the more contentious of the agricultural proposals reportedly considered by U.S. negotiators. The proposal would likely require changes to U.S. AD/CVD laws by allowing growers to bring an injury case by domestic region and draw on seasonal data. Under current law, an injury case must be supported by a majority (at least 50%) of the domestic industry. The Administration's proposal could reportedly allow regional groups—representing less than 50% of producer nationwide—to initiate an injury, even if the majority of producers within the industry, or in other regions, do not support initiating an injury case. Also, under current law, three years of annual data is necessary to prove injury, whereas the proposal would allow for the use of seasonal data to prove injury.
The seasonal proposal has divided the U.S. fruit and vegetable industry, and opinions are split between producers in some Southeastern states and producers in other states, such as California. Opinions in Congress are also divided. Some in Congress support the seasonal proposal, claiming that such a change is necessary to address perceived unfair trading practices by Mexican exporters of fresh fruits and vegetables. Others in Congress oppose including the proposal, contending that seasonal production complements rather than competes with U.S. growing seasons. They also worry that this change could open the door to retaliation by U.S. trading partners and to the imposition of similar regional and seasonal remedies against U.S. exports.
Mexican trade officials also do not support including a seasonal AVD/CVD proposal as part of the NAFTA renegotiations, nor do they support limiting access for some products. Some reports indicate that Mexico is considering retaliation by including its own list of protected products in response to the U.S. proposal. Such a list could include certain grain and pork products and other types of limitations to protect Mexican products in certain production areas.
The U.S. food and agriculture industries have much at stake in the current NAFTA renegotiations. Canada and Mexico are the United States' two largest trading partners, accounting for 28% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports and 39% of its imports in 2016. Under NAFTA, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico has increased sharply, rising from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016. |
crs_RL33600 | crs_RL33600_0 | In contrast, Iran, according to the Department of State, remained the primary state sponsor of terrorism in 2005 and has been actively conducting a longstanding nuclear development program, raising concerns in the international community that Iran's nuclear ambitions extend well beyond nuclear research, with direct implications for a host of ongoing terrorist activities. The Threat of Terrorism
Increasingly, international terrorism is recognized as a threat to U.S. foreign, as well as domestic, security. A growing number of analysts expresses concern that radical Islamist groups seek to exploit economic and political tensions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, Jordan, Pakistan, and other countries. Furthermore, reports are ongoing of cross-national links among different terrorist organizations. Of utmost concern to policymakers is the specter of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the means to make them. It continues to list Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism. As in any long-term campaign, international cooperation and capacity-building programs, such as the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), are seen as having a central role in combating terrorism. U.S. Policy Response
Framework
Past Administrations have employed a range of measures to combat international terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to protective security measures, economic sanctions, covert action, and military force. The possibility of covert provisioning of weapons, financing, and logistical support remains open, and detecting such transfers would require significantly increased deployment of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement assets in countries and zones where terrorists operate. U.S. Policy Tools to Combat International Terrorism
Diplomacy/Constructive Engagement
Use of diplomacy to help create a global anti-terror coalition is a central component of the Bush Administration response to September 11 events. Causing a financial blow to the U.S. and the West seems to be a major goal of Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. The well-funded charitable activities and publicity efforts of terrorist or extremist groups appear to have led to broadened acceptance of extremist views in target populations. To the extent that the U.S. and other Western countries fail to effectively address this "cold war of ideology," a growing proportion of the world's Moslem youth may grow up embracing extremist views which could ultimately lead to increased terrorism. | This report examines international terrorist actions, threats, U.S. policies and responses. It reviews the nation's use of tools at its disposal to combat terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to physical security enhancement, economic sanctions, covert action, and military force.
A modern trend in terrorism appears to be toward loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists. Increasingly, radical Islamist groups, or groups using religion as a pretext, pose a serious threat to U.S. interests and to friendly regimes. Of concern as well is the growing political participation of extremist Islamist parties in foreign nations. Also noteworthy is the apparent growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organizations, which may involve combinations of military training, funding, technology transfer, or political advice.
Looming over the entire issue of international terrorism is the specter of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iran, seen as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, has been secretly conducting—and now openly seeks—uranium enrichment, and North Korea has both admitted to having a clandestine program for uranium enrichment and claimed to have nuclear weapons. Indications have also surfaced that Al Qaeda has attempted to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
U.S. policy toward international terrorism contains a significant military component, reflected in U.S. operations in Afghanistan, deployment of U.S. forces elsewhere for specific missions, and, according to the Administration and its supporters, the war in Iraq. Issues of interest to the 110th Congress include whether the Administration is providing sufficient information about the long-term goals and costs of its diverse strategy and whether military force is an optimally effective anti-terrorism instrument when compared with other methods such as intelligence-enhanced law enforcement and pro-active public diplomacy.
Increasingly, a wide range of well-funded charitable and publicity activities of radical Islamist groups has led to broadened acceptance of extremist views in target populations. To the extent that nations fail to effectively address this "cold war of ideology," a growing proportion of the world's Moslem youth may grow up embracing extremist views that could ultimately lead to increased terrorism.
As terrorism is a global phenomenon, a major challenge facing policymakers is how to maximize international cooperation and support without unduly compromising important U.S. national security interests and options. Other significant policy challenges include (1) how to minimize the economic and civil liberties costs of an enhanced/tightened security environment, and (2) how to combat incitement to terrorism, especially in instances where such activity is state sponsored or countenanced. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42605 | crs_R42605_0 | President Obama submitted a detailed FY2013 budget proposal to Congress on February 13, 2012. 112 ), based on a proposal by Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, which the full House passed on March 29. Several Members of the Senate have offered budget proposals, including a resolution by Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad that is based on recommendations of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (also known as the Simpson-Bowles Commission). Although the House and Senate have not agreed on a concurrent resolution on the FY2013 budget, the FY2013 appropriations process is underway in both chambers. In response to the reconciliation instructions in H.Con.Res. Specifically, the figure shows that human resources spending accounted for 5.6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in FY1962 and rose to a peak of 16.6% in FY2010. As a share of GDP, human resources spending dropped slightly in FY2011, to 16.1%. Fueling growth over the long term are several factors, including the continuing effects of the baby boom generation's retirement and increased enrollment in Medicare and Social Security, certain program design features such as wage indexing in Social Security (which allows initial monthly benefits to replace a constant proportion of pre-retirement earnings and keep pace with rising living standards), medical cost inflation in excess of general inflation, and new spending attributable to implementation of the ACA of 2010. On the other hand, cost-mitigating factors in the first part of the decade include the assumed economic recovery, lower spending for programs that respond automatically to economic conditions such as Unemployment Insurance and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and the expiration of all stimulus funding provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. With no change in current law, CBO projects that spending for income security as a share of GDP will contract over the next decade, as will spending for the two smallest functions—education, training, employment, and social services (Function 500); and veterans benefits and services (Function 700). CBO estimates that real spending for Medicaid equaled 15% of human resources spending in FY2012 and projects this will increase to 22% of human resources spending in FY2022. Three Proposals
Figure 4 compares total estimated outlays for the human resources superfunction, as a share of GDP, under the CBO current law baseline, President Obama's proposed budget (as re-estimated by CBO), the House budget resolution, and the Conrad/Fiscal Commission resolution, from FY2012 through FY2022. The House budget resolution assumes gradually decreasing spending for human resources as a share of GDP, although it also would rise slightly at the end of the decade. This compares with 16.1% under the Administration's budget, 16% under the Conrad/Fiscal Commission resolution, and 14% under the House resolution. Mandatory spending in this function includes student financial assistance, some training and employment services, and Social Services Block Grants. Under CBO's current law baseline, the President's proposed budget, and the Conrad/Fiscal Commission resolution, Medicaid spending will climb sharply over the 10-year period, primarily due to the expansion of Medicaid eligibility under the ACA (which, as noted above, could be affected by the Supreme Court's June 28 decision). All of the expected growth in human resources spending will be in health care (Medicaid and Medicare) and Social Security. Policymakers are engaged in a high-level debate over short- and long-term strategies to sustain the recovery and further stimulate the economy, reduce the federal deficit, and stabilize the national debt, and hold different points of view about the optimal size and composition of federal spending and revenues. By contrast, the House budget would result in significantly lower spending for human resources programs throughout the 10-year period. | Debate is occurring on short- and long-term efforts to boost the economy, reduce the deficit, and stabilize the debt; this debate includes proposals to alter the overall size and composition of federal spending and revenues. "Human resources" programs account for the majority of federal outlays (67% in FY2011) and would be affected by these proposals. Six categories comprise the human resources "superfunction": education, training, employment, and social services; health (largely Medicaid); Medicare; income security; Social Security; and veterans programs.
President Obama submitted a detailed FY2013 budget proposal to Congress in February. The House subsequently passed an FY2013 budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 112), based on a proposal by Budget Committee Chairman Ryan. Several proposals have been offered by Members of the Senate, including a resolution by Budget Committee Chairman Conrad that is based on recommendations of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (Simpson-Bowles Commission). Although the House and Senate have not agreed on a budget resolution, the FY2013 appropriations process is underway. The House has also passed a reconciliation bill (H.R. 5652) intended to replace an automatic budget reduction (i.e., "sequestration") scheduled to occur on January 2, 2013, under provisions of the Budget Control Act of 2011.
Spending for human resources peaked in FY2010 at 16.6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), will have dropped to 15.5% in FY2012. This decline reflects the assumed economic recovery, lower spending for programs that respond automatically to economic conditions (e.g., Unemployment Insurance, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), and expiration of funding under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. CBO projects that human resources spending will rise again as a share of GDP and reach 16.1% in FY2022, due to continuing effects of the baby boom's retirement and enrollment in Medicare and Social Security, real growth in Social Security benefits, medical cost inflation, and spending under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. (Note that CBO's baseline does not yet reflect any potential impact of the Supreme Court's June 28 decision on the ACA.)
Reflecting these trends, all projected growth in human resources spending will occur in three categories: health (i.e., Medicaid), Medicare, and Social Security. CBO estimates that spending for income security (which includes Unemployment Insurance, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and selected low-income, retirement, and disability programs) will contract as a share of GDP over the next decade, as will the two smallest human resources categories (i.e., education, training, employment, and social services; and veterans benefits and services).
Both the Administration and Conrad/Fiscal Commission budgets assume human resources spending over the next 10 years at levels close to the CBO current law baseline, although the President requests increased spending in the initial years for economic stimulus. The House resolution assumes gradually decreasing spending for human resources as a share of GDP, but also assumes that spending would rise slightly at the end of the decade. As noted above, CBO projects human resources spending will equal 16.1% of GDP in FY2022 with no change in policy. This compares with 16.1% under the Administration proposal, 16% under the Conrad/Fiscal Commission resolution, and 14% under the House resolution. The most significant reductions from the CBO baseline assumed by the House would occur in three categories: education, training, employment, and social services; Medicaid (which would be converted into a block grant); and income security. The House also assumes conversion of Medicare into a "premium support" program starting in FY2023, which is beyond the budget resolution's 10-year window. |
crs_RL33044 | crs_RL33044_0 | Introduction
Japan's trade policy has historically centered on multilateral negotiations and dispute resolution mechanisms. Over the past five years, Japan has shifted course somewhat by pursuing negotiations in the WTO but by also seeking free trade agreements (FTAs) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with mostly Asian countries. An FTA is an agreement between two countries or regional groupings to eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers, while an EPA goes further by also attempting to facilitate the free movement of people and capital among the partners to an agreement. Non-members find their exports discriminated against. The pursuit of FTAs is occurring worldwide with nearly 300 estimated to be currently in effect. The United States has an extensive FTA program and agenda, and has FTAs in effect with two Asian-Pacific countries—Singapore and Australia. Europe has been pursuing a similar course for years. Now Japan is trying to catch up. But it has considerable interest in whether Japan's policy evolves in a manner that is supportive of U.S. interests in Asia—which include promoting a stable balance of power and insuring that U.S. trade and investment interests are not discriminated against in the region. These range from increasing Japan's bargaining power in WTO negotiations to helping Japan better compete with China for influence in Asia. The FTA will eliminate or reduce tariffs on industrial goods by 2015. In addition, after concluding agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, Japan hopes to expand those agreements (including the one with Singapore) to ASEAN as a whole. Challenges to Advancing FTA/EPA Negotiations
Japan's ability to promote its economic interests through an aggressive FTA/EPA program is constrained by protection of its agricultural sector and rigid immigration policies. Many in Japan believe that support for agricultural protection will disappear over time. Interests
Japan's FTA program, assuming the current defensive course persists, may have varied effects on U.S. interests. On the one hand, it is likely to provide a positive, yet small, boost to increasing Japan's role in the economics and political economy of East Asia. It is also likely to be favorable to bilateral trade ties as other Asian trading partners, instead of the United States, pressure Japan to open its agricultural market further. On the other hand, lack of a meaningful agricultural reform program bodes poorly for positive support from Japan in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round. There are also concerns that a defensive and weak FTA program pursued by Japan could allow China to play a more dominant role in the Asian economy—perhaps even creating an exclusionary Asian trading bloc. This assessment is not likely to be altered by the estimated weak impact of Japan's FTA program on growth. Beijing has concluded a partial FTA with ASEAN ahead of Japan and South Korea. | Japan's trade policy historically has centered on multilateral negotiations and dispute settlement mechanisms. Over the past five years, however, Japan has shifted course somewhat by seeking free trade agreements (FTAs) with a number of countries, mostly in Asia. An FTA is an agreement between two countries or regional groupings to eliminate or reduce tariffs and other barriers on trade in goods and services. Non-members find their exports discriminated against.
The pursuit of FTAs is occurring worldwide. The U.S. has an aggressive program and has FTAs in place with two Asian-Pacific countries—Singapore and Australia—and is negotiating one with Thailand. Europe has been pursuing a similar course for years. China and 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began implementing a partial FTA this year. Now Japan is trying to catch up.
By freeing up trade in goods and services, Japan hopes to energize its economy, as well as to better compete with China for influence in Asia—objectives that seem to support U.S. interests. However, Japan's FTA program to date has not been robust enough to have much impact. Constrained by domestic pressures to continue protection of its agricultural sector, the FTA agreements Japan now has implemented with Singapore and Mexico and is scheduled to implement next year with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand are unlikely to have a significant impact on Japan's economy. Agreements with larger countries where the commercial stakes are greater, such as South Korea, Australia, and China, are either stalled or being shied away from.
Agriculture is Japan's biggest constraint on moving forward on FTAs. While some progress is being made in cutting tariffs on food items that serve small markets, highly protected rice and beef markets are not being offered for liberalization. Moreover, in the absence of a substantial farm reform program that would make liberalization of these products easier, many Japanese decision-makers hope protectionist pressures will go away over time with an aging farmer population that is shrinking and increasingly part-time.
Japan's FTA program, assuming the current cautious and defensive course persists, is likely to have varied effects on U.S. interests. On the one hand, it is likely to provide a positive, yet small, boost to increasing Japan's role in the economics and political economy of East Asia. It is also likely to be favorable to bilateral trade ties as other Asian trading partners (instead of just the United States) pressure Japan to open its agricultural market further. On the other hand, the absence of a meaningful agricultural reform bodes poorly for support from Japan in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round. There are also concerns that a defensive and weak FTA program could allow China to play a more dominant role in the Asian economy through its own FTA program—perhaps even creating a exclusionary Asian trading bloc. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44354 | crs_R44354_0 | Introduction
"Services" refers to a range of economic activities that involve the sale and delivery of an intangible product, such as audiovisual, construction, and computer and related services; energy; express delivery; e-commerce; financial, accounting, and legal services; retail and wholesaling; transportation; telecommunications; and travel. For many countries, including the United States, trade in services is a large and growing component of their overall trade. The 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and subsequent annexes, established basic rules for global trade in services. The purpose of the ongoing Trade in Services (TiSA) negotiations is to build on those rules by further increasing liberalization among the 23 negotiating parties, including the United States and European Union (EU), to open markets to foreign service providers and enhance rules governing services trade. Congress also has a direct role in overseeing the ongoing TiSA negotiations, including in the context of the U.S. trade negotiating objectives on services it set under the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation passed in June 2015 ( P.L. Services accounted for 78% of U.S. private sector gross domestic product (GDP) and for 91.8 million (82%) private sector employees in 2015. These non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are often in the form of government regulations. The United States has a long history in tackling trade barriers in services in multiple forums, most recently in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). If the parties reach agreement on TiSA while TPA is in effect, and if the Administration meets certain statutory requirements and timelines, TPA allows Congress to consider the required implementing bill under expedited ("fast track") procedures. The GATS provides the foundation or floor on which rules in other agreements on services are based, including in U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Trade in services has been included in subsequent U.S. bilateral and regional FTAs, including in the TPP. Services and services trade have evolved significantly since GATS went into effect in 1995. Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations
Largely because of the lack of progress in the WTO Doha Round, a group of 23 WTO members are engaged in discussions on a potential sector-specific, plurilateral agreement to liberalize trade in services. Negotiations on a Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) were launched in April 2013, initially led by Australia and the United States. The 23 TiSA participants account for about 70% of world trade in services (see Figure 1 ). Twelve of the Group of 20 (G-20) members are participating in TiSA, but some key major emerging markets in the G-20 are not currently parties to the TiSA negotiations, including Brazil, China, and India. China's interest has generated differences among TiSA participants. Supporting this argument is the concept that the agreement overall is reportedly being structured so that it can be "multi-lateralized" in the future and incorporated into the WTO. On the other hand, participants may be able to update TiSA as a stand-alone agreement similar to the current negotiation. Key Provisions and Negotiating Issues
The structure of the agreement, while still under negotiation, is expected to include four parts:
A core text that incorporates and builds on key provisions of the GATS and includes horizontal provisions that would apply to all parts of the agreement; Commitments on market access and national treatment with each party's schedule and list of exceptions or non-conforming measures; Specific sectoral regulatory annexes; and Institutional provisions that set the ground rules for how TiSA would function, addressing issues such as amending the agreement in the future or how new members could join. Transparency. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Negotiators are also considering whether to implement a rotating secretariat position. Issues for Congress
The outlook and timeline for the ongoing TiSA negotiations remain uncertain, as participants are tackling difficult and complex issues. How would TiSA fit with other existing and potential U.S. FTAs, such as the proposed TPP and T-TIP? Should the United States pursue regulatory cooperation efforts in addition to trade agreements in specific service areas such as cross-border data flows where cultural and legal differences and changes in technology limit what can be achieved in trade agreements? | Congress has broad interest in trade in services, which are a large and growing component of the U.S. economy. It also has a direct interest in establishing trade negotiating objectives and potential consideration of a future Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). Services account for 78% of U.S. private sector gross domestic product (GDP), 82% of private sector employees in 2015, and an increasing portion of U.S. international trade. "Services" refer to a growing range of economic activities, such as audiovisual, construction, and computer and related services; energy; express delivery; e-commerce; financial, legal, and accounting services; retail and wholesaling; transportation; telecommunications; and travel. Services include end-use products, such as legal services and financial products. Many services, such as distribution or transportation services, also facilitate other parts of the economy, helping goods move through global supply chains.
To open foreign markets to U.S. businesses and address trade barriers to services, which may be in the form of government regulations, the United States has engaged in multiple trade agreement negotiations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides the foundation or floor on which rules in other agreements on services are based, including in U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Trade in services is addressed in U.S. bilateral and regional FTAs, including the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), concluded in October 2015. However, ongoing negotiation efforts to update GATS are stalled, even as technology and services trade have evolved significantly since GATS went into effect in 1995. To address these issues, 23 parties are engaged in discussions on a potential sector-specific, plurilateral agreement to further liberalize trade in services.
Negotiations on a proposed Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) were launched in April 2013, with the United States and Australia initially at the lead. TiSA participants account for about 70% of world trade in services and include the European Union, in addition to the United States and Australia. Some key major emerging markets, including Brazil, China, and India, are not currently parties to the TiSA negotiations, though China has indicated an interest in joining. While TiSA negotiations are occurring outside of the WTO, the agreement is reportedly being structured so that it can be potentially "multi-lateralized" in the future and incorporated into the GATS, making it applicable to all WTO members.
The final structure and sectors to be covered in TiSA remain under negotiation, but some key issues have emerged. For the United States, significant interests include expanding market access beyond the current GATS commitments, building disciplines on transparency, setting common rules for cross-border data flows and digital trade, and ensuring fair competition with state-owned enterprises. TiSA participants have conducted 21 negotiating rounds through 2016, and aim to complete negotiations in 2017 but no new rounds are scheduled. The outlook and timeline for the ongoing TiSA negotiations remains uncertain, as participants are tackling difficult and complex issues such as regulatory processes and digital trade frameworks. The new U.S. administration position on TiSA is unclear.
TiSA is one of several trade agreements that may be considered by Congress in the near future. Congress passed, and the President signed into law, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation in June 2015 which expires on July 1, 2018, with a possible extension to July 1, 2021. As part of TPA, Congress established principal trade negotiating objectives for services. If agreement on TiSA is reached while TPA is in effect, and if certain statutory requirements are met, TPA would provide for expedited legislative consideration of legislation to implement a final TiSA. Congress may opt to exercise oversight on the progress of the ongoing TiSA negotiations and consider a number of related factors such as comparisons with other agreements. |
crs_RL31787 | crs_RL31787_0 | Department of Defense (DOD) officials now consider cyberspace to be a domain for warfare, similar to air, space, land, and sea. Each service has organizations with IO and EW responsibilities: (1) the Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) is the Navy's central operational authority for space, information technology requirements, network and information operations in support of naval forces afloat and ashore; (2) the Army Reserve Information Operations Command has responsibility for conducting information operations, the U.S. Army IO Proponent is responsible for developing requirements for IO doctrine and training, and the Army Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Directorate provides testing services for Electronic Warfare; and finally, (3) the Air Force has created what was to have been a major Cyber Command, but will now be a Numbered Air Force (NAF), the 24 th Air Force to the Air Force Space Command, with responsibility for its portion of cyberwarfare, electronic warfare, and protection of U.S. critical infrastructure networks that support telecommunications systems, utilities, and transportation. This report describes current adversary threats in the information environment and DOD capabilities for conducting military information operations, gives the current state of federal cybersecurity efforts, and provides an overview of related policy issues. Internet messages by terrorist groups have become increasingly sophisticated through use of a cadre of Internet specialists who operate computer servers worldwide. USSTRATCOM gives most of the daily defense and operational activity to the National Security Agency. This situation is known to our potential adversaries. Appendix B. DOD Information Operations Core Capabilities
In Joint Publication 3-13, DOD identifies five core capabilities, or "pillars," for conduct of information operations: (1) Psychological Operations, (2) Military Deception, (3) Operations Security, (4) Computer Network Operations, and (5) Electronic Warfare. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)
CNE is an area of IO that is not yet clearly defined within DOD. Domination of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
DOD now emphasizes maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, including the capability to disrupt all current and future communication systems, sensors, and weapons systems. Also, at reduced power, electromagnetic non-kinetic weapons can also be used as a non-lethal method for crowd control. | This report describes the emerging areas of information operations, cybersecurity, and cyberwar in the context of U.S. national security. It also notes related policy issues of potential interest to Congress.
For military planners, the control of information is critical to military success, and communications networks and computers are of vital operational importance. The use of technology to both control and disrupt the flow of information has been generally referred to by several names: information warfare, electronic warfare, cyberwar, netwar, and Information Operations (IO). Currently, IO activities are grouped by the Department of Defense (DOD) into five core capabilities: (1) Psychological Operations, (2) Military Deception, (3) Operational Security, (4) Computer Network Operations, and (5) Electronic Warfare.
Current U.S. military doctrine for IO now places increased emphasis on Psychological Operations, Computer Network Operations, and Electronic Warfare, which includes use of non-kinetic electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, and non-lethal weapons for crowd control. However, as high technology is increasingly incorporated into military functions, the boundaries between all five IO core capabilities are becoming blurred. DOD also acknowledges the existence of a cyber domain, which is similar to air, land, and sea. This new domain is the realm where military functions occur that involve manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Control of the spectrum is essential to military success across all other domains. Definitions and examples of the overlapping categories of IO activity are contained in the appendixes.
This report will be updated to accommodate significant changes. |
crs_R42670 | crs_R42670_0 | Introduction
Presidential claims of a right to preserve the confidentiality of information and documents in the face of legislative demands have figured prominently, though intermittently, in executive-congressional relations since at least 1792, when President Washington discussed with his Cabinet how to respond to a congressional inquiry into the military debacle that befell General St. Clair's expedition. Few such interbranch disputes over access to information have reached the courts for substantive resolution; the vast majority achieve resolution through political negotiation and accommodation. In fact, it was not until the Watergate-related lawsuits in the 1970s seeking access to President Nixon's tapes that the existence of a presidential confidentiality privilege was judicially established as a necessary derivative of the President's status in the U.S. constitutional scheme of separated powers. In total, there have been only four cases dealing with executive privilege in the context of information access disputes between Congress and the executive, and only two of those resulted in decisions on the merits. The Nixon era cases initially established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege. Under those precedents, the privilege, which is constitutionally rooted, could be invoked by the President when asked to produce documents or other materials or information that reflect presidential decision making and deliberations that he believes should remain confidential. If the President does so, the materials become presumptively privileged. The privilege, however, is qualified, not absolute, and can be overcome by an adequate showing of need. Finally, while reviewing courts have expressed reluctance in balancing executive privilege claims against a congressional demand for information, they have acknowledged they will do so if the political branches have tried in good faith but failed to reach an accommodation. The unanimous panel in In re Sealed Case ( Espy ), and the subsequent reaffirmation of the Espy principles in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice , addressed many of these unresolved questions, albeit in a noncongressional context, in a manner that may alter the future legal playing field in resolving such disputes. Two recent disputes between Congress and the executive branch relate directly to the application of executive privilege in the congressional oversight context. Many significant issues remained unresolved, including whether the President has to have actually seen or been familiar with the disputed matter; whether the presidential privilege encompasses documents and information developed by, or in the possession of, officers and employees in the departments and agencies of the executive branch outside the Executive Office of the President; whether the privilege encompasses all communications in which the President may be interested or if it is confined to a particular type of presidential decision making; and precisely what kind of demonstration of need can overcome the privilege and justify the release of privileged materials. | Presidential claims of a right to preserve the confidentiality of information and documents in the face of legislative demands have figured prominently, though intermittently, in executive-congressional relations since at least 1792. Few such interbranch disputes over access to information have reached the courts for substantive resolution. The vast majority of these disputes are resolved through political negotiation and accommodation. In fact, it was not until the Watergate-related lawsuits in the 1970s seeking access to President Nixon's tapes that the existence of a presidential confidentiality privilege was judicially established as a necessary derivative of the President's status in our constitutional scheme of separated powers. There have been only four cases involving information access disputes between Congress and the executive, and two of these resulted in decisions on the merits. The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege. Under those precedents, the privilege, which is constitutionally rooted, could be invoked by the President when asked to produce documents or other materials or information that reflect presidential decision making and deliberations that he believes should remain confidential. If the President asserts the privilege, the materials become presumptively privileged. The privilege, however, is qualified, not absolute, and can be overcome by an adequate showing of need. Finally, while reviewing courts have expressed reluctance in balancing executive privilege claims against a congressional demand for information, they have acknowledged they will do so if the political branches have tried, in good faith, but failed to reach an accommodation.
Supreme Court decisions have left considerable gaps in the law of presidential privilege. Among the more significant issues left open include whether the President must have actually seen or been familiar with the disputed matter; whether the presidential privilege encompasses documents and information developed by, or in the possession of, officers and employees in the departments and agencies of the executive branch, outside of the Executive Office of the President; whether the privilege encompasses all communications with respect to which the President may be interested or is confined to presidential decision making and, if so, whether it is limited to a particular type of presidential decision making; and precisely what kind of demonstration of need must be shown to overcome the privilege and compel disclosure of the materials. The District of Columbia Circuit's 1997 ruling in In re Sealed Case (Espy), and its 2004 decision in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice, addressed many of these questions in a manner that may alter the future legal playing field in resolving such disputes. Moreover, two recent disputes between the executive branch and Congress over the removal of U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush Administration and the Department of Justice's response to a congressional investigation into Operation Fast and Furious may provide further insight into the scope of executive privilege in the congressional oversight context. |
crs_RL30406 | crs_RL30406_0 | 4 in the 107th. Is theproblem one of excessive demand for, and consumption of, energy? Should federal taxsubsidies for oil and gas and other fossil fuels be increased to stimulate exploration and supply toaddress our energy problems or would budgetary resources be better used to reduce energy demandby providing tax incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy? Purpose of the Report
This report provides background on the theory and application of tax policy as it relates tothe energy sector, particularly with respect to the theory of market failure in the energy sector andthe possible policy remedies. Such an income tax would be neutral; i.e., it would not distort resourceallocation, the optimal allocation that would otherwise result in a competitivemarket. The presence of externalities does not alter the economicargument that competitive mineral producers should be taxed under the same incometax rules as the competitive non-mineral producers, but it does suggest either aseparate energy tax (in the case of a negative production externality, whereproduction and use of energy generates costs) or an energy tax subsidy (in the caseof a positive production externality, where the firm's competitive free market outputgenerates benefits to third parties). (18)
One economically efficient policy to correct for these distortions wouldimpose a tax (or tariff) on imported petroleum based on the per-barrel estimate ofthese costs (the so-called oil import "premium"). The problem of vulnerability to embargoes and price shocks, which relatesto dependence on imported oil from the Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC) and other unstable foreign countries, is distinct from the problemof import dependence, and might be better addressed in a policy of stockpiling oil asis being done with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The Economic Justification for Tax Subsidies asan Industrial Policy. There is no purely economic justification,either on efficiency or stabilization grounds, for using tax subsidies as an industrialor employment policy to help a distressed industry -- including the conventionalfossil fuels industry and the alternative fuels industry. In general, economic theory and empirical evidence refute the proposition thatcompetitive markets lead to excessive exploitation of mineral resources. These market failures may lead to Under investment in conservation measuresin rental housing and provide the economic rationale for Internal Revenue Code(IRC) §136, which allows the value of any energy conservation subsidy provided byelectric utilities to households to be excluded from gross income. There are other types of market failures in energy use that may suggest eitherminimum efficiency standards or government-provided information such as energyefficiency labels. Finally, although capital markets are generally competitive and efficient, low-income consumers may have difficulty acquiring loans for conservation investments,even when such investments are profitable (the present value of the energyexpenditure savings is greater than the capital costs). Over the longer term, thesupply of these alternatives would tend to increase as depletion of conventionalenergy raises its real price. Several energy taxes wereproposed at that time:
an increase in the excise taxes on gasoline, diesel, and othermotor fuels;
a sizeable tax on imported oil (in addition to the customs dutiesthat are already imposed on imported petroleum);
a tax on both imported and domestically produced crude oil;and
a broadly-based or general energy tax on all or most types ofenergy consumption, either based on the heat content of the fuel (Btu tax), the carboncontent of the fuel (the carbon tax), or on the sales price (the ad valorem energy tax). Thus, they can be a very powerful energy and economic policy instrument. | This report provides background on the theory and application of tax policy as it relates tothe energy sector, particularly with respect to the theory of market failure in the energy sector andsuggested policy remedies.
Economic theory suggests that producers of energy-related minerals be taxed no differentlythan non-mineral producers: Exploration and development costs and other investments in a deposit(including geological and geophysical costs and delay rentals) should be capitalized. In general,competitive mineral producers subject to a pure income tax would not exploit resources as fast(compared with the rate of exploitation under the present system of subsidies). Over the longer term,depletion of fossil fuels and mineral resources leads to higher real energy prices, which wouldeventually promote the optimal amount of investment in energy efficiency and alternative fuelssupply.
Under principles of neutrality of tax policy, there is no purely economic rationale for energytaxes or tax subsidies to (1) raise revenues; (2) conserve energy (with one exception); (3) promotealternative fuels; (4) compensate for any extra market risk; or (5) promote, as an industrial policy,specific industries such as the fossil fuels industry. However, even under a pure income tax,economic efficiency suggests a system of energy taxes (in addition to the income taxes) to correctfor any environmental externalities caused by the production, importation, and use of each fuel, andenergy taxes in the form of user charges for benefits received, such as the highway trust fund. In thecase of energy conservation, market failures in the use of energy in rental housing provide anefficiency rationale for the current gross income exclusion for conservation subsidies provided byelectric utilities. There are other market failures in energy use that suggest efficiency standards,energy labeling, or government-provided information, but not necessarily tax subsidies.
Tax subsidies for domestic oil production tend to stimulate domestic supply of petroleum andreduce demand for petroleum imports. This may enhance national and economic security in the shortrun, but it might damage national and economic security in the long run as domestic energy resourcesare depleted faster than they otherwise would be. The economically efficient policy to reduce importdependence would impose a tax (or tariff) on imported petroleum based on the per-barrel estimateof these costs (the so-called oil import "premium"). The problem of vulnerability to embargoes andprice shocks, which relates to dependence on imported oil from the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC) and other potentially unstable or unfriendly foreign countries, is moreeffectively addressed in a policy of stockpiling oil, as is being done with the Strategic PetroleumReserve.
In terms of environmental protection and management, energy taxes can be a cost-effectiveand efficient market-based instrument, and they are economically superior to the command andcontrol approach. In sum, energy taxes are generally distortional (except to correct for externalities,or when imposed as user fees for benefits received) and regressive, and may have adversemacroeconomic consequences, particularly sizeable taxes on energy production or oil imports. |
crs_RS21337 | crs_RS21337_0 | The Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. §§13, 13a, 13b, 21a) was enacted in 1936 with the specific purpose of creating and maintaining a market atmosphere in which small business could compete effectively, at least in the purchase of commodities, with its larger rivals. The Act applies only to the sale of goods ( i.e., it does not apply to the sale of services) and only where each sale is of goods purchased for resale within the United States ( i.e., it does not prohibit price differentials between goods sold for resale within the United States and those sold for export.) Defenses
Among the affirmative defenses permitted to refute the Robinson-Patman illegality of differential pricing is the so-called "meeting competition" defense, which has at least two levels: a defendant may assert (and must prove) that the lower price charged to a favored buyer was selected in order to permit the seller to meet that of a competing seller (primary line competition); or he may assert (and must prove) that the challenged price was necessary in order to enable his buyer to meet the competition of one of the buyer's competitors (secondary line competition). A seller may not, however, knowingly "beat" the prices of a competitor. In addition, the 1938 Nonprofit Institutions Act (15 U.S.C. The Court relied largely on the "for their own use" language to hold that purchases made by a nonprofit hospital are not all necessarily exempt from price discrimination prohibitions, only those made in order to able to meet the needs of the hospital ( e.g., dispensing to inpatients, outpatients treated in the hospital, emergency room use) and those of staff physicians, medical and nursing students, and their dependents: "The Congress surely did not intend to give the hospital a blank check" Although the Court included within permissible uses by the hospital, "genuine take home prescription[s], intended, for a limited and reasonable time, as a continuation of, or supplement to, the treatment that was administered at the hospital to the patient who needed, and now continues to need, that treatment," it specifically excluded from the Robinson-Patman exemption embodied in the Nonprofit Institutions Act "the refill for the hospital's former patient." Further, a number of courts have specifically held that health maintenance organizations, such as HPs, are charitable institutions for tax purposes. . . . | The Robinson-Patman Act (hereinafter, R-P), 15 U.S.C. § § 13, 13a, 13b, 21a, makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, to knowingly sell goods "in commerce," for use or sale within the United States, at differing prices to contemporaneous buyers of those goods. Enacted during the Depression at the behest of small grocers who feared the buying power of large and growing chain grocers, it is the exception to the notion that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors in that it generally prohibits precisely the kind of price differentiation which would normally be thought to result from vigorous competition . Allegations of R-P violations may be defended by asserting and proving either that the differing prices reflect only the cost of the seller's manufacture or delivery (the "cost justification" defense); or, that the seller is attempting either (1) to meet the competition of another seller, or (2) enable his buyer to meet the competition of a competitor of the buyer ("meeting competition" defense). In addition, there is also a broad exception to the prohibition against price discrimination when one of the sales is made to any of certain entities listed in the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c, and the goods are purchased for the institution's "own use"; nonprofits may not, however, take advantage of their privileged Robinson-Patman status to purchase commodities at favorable prices in order to compete commercially with entities not so entitled. Further, lower courts have found that health maintenance organizations (HMOs) qualify as organizations entitled to take advantage of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, on the theory that they perform services that traditionally have been considered as "charitable," although the Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule on the status of HMOs.
The "in commerce" language of Robinson-Patman has been held to mean that the interstate commerce requirement is satisfied only when at least one of the two (or more) sales is made "in the stream of commerce"—i.e., across state lines.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41902 | crs_R41902_0 | Others, however, doubt that supply and demand conditions justified an 80% price plunge and argue that financial speculators had created artificially high prices. Economists and market regulators have not reached a consensus as to the causes of oil price movements in recent years. One econometric analysis that incorporated oil supply and energy demand effects concluded that speculation did not explain increases in oil prices in the 2003-2008 period, although the study suggested that speculation may have played some role in previous oil price spikes. This report provides background on futures and options markets for crude oil and presents data analysis of a possible relationship between market activities of speculative traders and oil prices. The data presented in this report cannot explain causes of oil price movements, but are intended to provide a context for evaluating arguments about the impact of speculation. Conversely, a short contract requires the holder to sell at today's price, and gains value if prices fall, because the holder may sell at above the market price. For example, a long contract in effect provides insurance to an oil refinery against an increase in the price of crude oil; if prices rise, the firm will pay more for oil on the physical (or "spot") market, but appreciation in the futures position offsets the price increase. Most trading on the futures exchanges is short-term. The Commitments of Traders (COT) report published by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) shows the open interest in futures and options on futures, broken down by several classes of market participant, distinguishing between commercial hedgers and speculators. Other Reportables. These may be hedgers or speculators. While the total level of open interest appears to be more stable than the price of oil, the aggregate figures mask significant fluctuations in the size of positions held by different classes of traders. Is the relationship the same for different classes of traders? While changes in long and short positions of swap dealers and producer/merchant hedgers are not correlated with price changes when considered individually, controlling for changes in short positions does produce positive correlations between long positions and prices for swap dealers and producer/merchants, as well as for money managers. These statistical relationships are discussed further in the Appendix . To use the terminology of a classic study on hedging and speculation, are money managers driving the price of oil, or are they hitchhikers along for the ride? An alternative explanation is that money managers do trade on fundamental information and that they are more adept than others at identifying information that is going to move prices. If money managers are consistent in their ability to identify new and relevant information that will affect prices (and trade on that information before others do), one result would be the observed correlation. Money managers might also profit by following price trends. Other market participants may have longer investment time horizons or be less sensitive to price changes. Trading with this time horizon would be captured by the weekly COT reports, and may be more typical of money managers than other traders in oil futures and options. Money managers may follow prices in other ways. Certain hedge funds trading in oil markets might thus bootstrap information gleaned from trades of specialist traders who lack the financial resources to take full advantage of their informational advantages. Some contend that hedge funds and other sophisticated traders have used advantages in trade execution to benefit from slow-footed rivals. That is, when prices are rising, or expected to rise, long hedgers such as airlines or utilities would appear to have greater incentives to hedge the risk of further price rises, while short hedgers, such as oil companies, might be expected to reduce their hedging position to reap the full benefits of higher prices. | Dramatic swings in crude oil prices have led Congress to examine the functioning of the markets where prices are set. A particular concern is that financial speculators may at times drive prices above the level justified by supply and demand. Most oil speculators produce no commercial quantities of oil and take no deliveries; rather, they trade financial contracts whose value is linked to the price of oil. These derivative contracts—futures, options, and swaps—allow speculators to profit if they can forecast price trends or exploit new arbitrage opportunities. Derivatives also permit oil companies, airlines, utilities, and other energy-consuming or energy-producing firms to reduce or "hedge" price risk by locking in today's price for transactions that will occur in the future. Hedgers and speculators trade on regulated futures exchanges in a continuous auction market. Prices set there serve as benchmarks for many physical oil transactions.
Some contend that oil speculators do not always trade on fundamental information related to supply and demand, but are nonetheless able to drive up prices by flooding the market with cash and overwhelming the influence of commercial hedgers who actually deal in physical oil. On the other hand, most empirical studies suggest that speculation does not generally increase price volatility, although the occasional emergence of speculative "bubbles," when market prices may diverge significantly from fundamental values, is well known. Neither economists nor regulators have reached a consensus as to the causes of oil price movements in recent years—some point to the fundamentals (where both demand and supply are inelastic in the short run, and questions exist about the capacity to meet growing global demand in the long run), while others focus on financial markets. Both are possible sources of price volatility.
This report examines the relationship between the price of oil and the positions of various classes of traders in crude oil futures and options. Position data come from the Commitments of Traders report, published weekly by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). A statistically significant correlation is evident between changes in positions held by "money managers" (a category of speculators that includes hedge funds) and the price of oil. In other words, during weeks when money managers have been net buyers of oil futures and options (or increased the size of their long positions), the price has tended to rise. Price falls, conversely, have tended to coincide with reductions in money managers' long positions. This statistical relationship is weaker for other classes of speculators and for commercial hedgers.
There are several possible explanations for why money managers' trades might be more closely linked to prices. Money managers might identify information that will affect prices (and trade on that information) more quickly or accurately than other market participants. Other traders might copy the trades of certain hedge funds viewed as market leaders, driving prices further in the same direction. In this way, money managers' trades could move the price, even though their positions account for a relatively small share of the total market.
Causation could also run in the opposite direction—perhaps on average money managers chase price trends rather than set them. Other traders whose positions appear in the Commitments of Traders data, such as commercial hedgers or swap dealers, may be less price-sensitive than hedge funds and react more slowly to price changes. Data presented in this report cannot explain causes of oil price movements, but are intended to provide a context for evaluating arguments about the impact of speculation. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41114 | crs_R41114_0 | Introduction
Health-related issues before Congress have refocused attention on legislative efforts to provide both new as well as lower-cost pharmaceuticals for the marketplace. P.L. 98-417 , the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act), made several significant changes to the patent laws as they apply to pharmaceutical products in an attempt to balance the need for innovative new drugs and the availability of less expensive generic products. Twenty-five years later, effects of the act on the pharmaceutical industry may have implications for current congressional efforts to facilitate the development of new, inventive products while reducing costs to consumers. The Hatch-Waxman Act established several practices intended to facilitate the marketing of generic drugs while permitting brand name companies to recover a portion of their intellectual property rights lost during the pharmaceutical approval process. Implementation
Many experts agree that the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act has had a significant effect on the availability of generic substitutes for brand name drugs. Prior to the law, 35% of top-selling drugs had generic competitors after patent expiration; now almost all do. The Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) points out that of 12,751 drugs listed in the Orange Book, 10,072 have generic substitutes available to consumers. Concurrently, the time to market for these generic products has decreased substantially. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), prior to passage of the act in 1984, the average time between the expiration of a brand name patent and the availability of a generic was three years. Today, upon FDA approval a generic may be introduced immediately after patents on the innovator drug expire, as companies are permitted to undertake clinical testing during the time period associated patents are in force. In cases where the generic manufacturer is the patent holder, a substitute drug may be brought to market before the patent expires. Industry funding for pharmaceutical research and development has grown significantly since passage of the act in 1984. In the absence of the research, development, and testing performed by the brand name pharmaceutical companies, generic drugs would not exist. The provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act permit the generic industry to rely on information generated and financed by the brand name companies to obtain approval for their product by the FDA. However, the pharmaceutical industry today differs from what it was in the early 1980s. The number of clinical trials necessary to file a new drug application has doubled since 1980 and the number of participants in these trials has tripled. Thus, the rate of return from investment in a new drug has dropped by 12% over this time period. While the original legislation was amended in 2003 to address what were perceived as loopholes in the process, concerns still remain whether or not the balance achieved by the act remains appropriate over 25 years later. | Congressional interest in health-related issues has refocused attention on legislative efforts to provide both new as well as lower-cost pharmaceuticals for the marketplace. P.L. 98-417, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act), made significant changes to the patent laws as they apply to pharmaceutical products in an attempt to balance the need for innovative new drugs and the availability of less expensive generic products. The act created several practices intended to facilitate the marketing of generic drugs while permitting brand name companies to recover a portion of their intellectual property rights lost during the pharmaceutical approval process. Twenty-five years later, the impact of the act on the pharmaceutical industry may have implications for current congressional efforts to facilitate the development of new, inventive products while reducing costs to consumers.
Prior to the implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 35% of top-selling drugs had generic competitors after patent expiration; now almost all do. The Generic Pharmaceutical Association points out that of 12,751 drugs listed in the Orange Book, 10,072 have generic substitutes available to consumers. Concurrently, the time to market for these generic products has decreased substantially. According to the Congressional Budget Office, in 1984 the average time between the expiration of a patent on a brand name drug and the availability of a generic was three years. Today, upon FDA approval a generic may be introduced immediately after patents on the innovator drug expire as companies are permitted to undertake clinical testing during the time period associated patents are in force. In cases where the generic manufacturer is the patent holder, a substitute drug may be brought to market before the patent expires.
Industry support for pharmaceutical research and development has grown since the passage of the legislation although some recent figures indicate reduced R&D spending by several companies. In the absence of the research, development, and testing performed by the brand name pharmaceutical companies, generic drugs would not exist. The provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act permit the generic industry to rely on information generated and financed by the brand name companies to obtain approval for their product by the FDA. However, the pharmaceutical industry today differs significantly from what it was in the early 1980s when the legislation was enacted. The cost of developing a drug has doubled, as has the number of clinical trials necessary to file a new drug application. The number of participants required for these trials has tripled. As the rate of return on investments in a new drug declined 12%, manufacturers often spend R&D dollars on developing improved versions of, or new delivery methods for an existing product.
Many experts agree that the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act has had a significant effect on the availability of generic substitutes for brand name drugs. Yet, congressional concerns remain whether or not the balance inherent in the act remains appropriate over 25 years later. |
crs_R41328 | crs_R41328_0 | The federal budget consists of four basic fund groups—the general fund, special funds, revolving funds, and trust funds. The first three are often referred to as the federal funds group. Trust funds are an accounting mechanism that records revenues, offsetting receipts, or collections earmarked for the purpose of the specific fund. Trust funds generally share three common features: (1) they are established for programs serving long-term purposes, (2) monies are used for a single purpose, and (3) users are charged to finance the trust fund. About 40% of all federal outlays were through trust funds and about 37% of all federal receipts came to trust funds in fiscal year (FY) 2012. The Office of Management and Budget tracks approximately 120 trust funds and trust fund aggregates. A federal trust fund often represents a long-term commitment to use specific funds for a certain purpose. It has been argued that the creation of a trust fund is one way for Congress to politically "commit" future Congresses to fund a specific program or "to make long-term promises stick." Most trust fund based programs have permanent budget authority and all monies in the trust fund are available for obligation. Some trust funds, however, are authorized to borrow from the general fund. The trust funds surplus (i.e., revenues in excess of outgo) in FY2012 amounted to $89.9 billion. This surplus is mostly invested in government obligations and transferred to the general fund to pay for other spending. By law, all trust funds except the Railroad Retirement fund must invest balances in government obligations. The Railroad Retirement fund is allowed to invest its balance in equities. The government securities held by trust funds are part of federal debt that is subject to the statutory federal debt limit. At the end of FY2012, the trust funds held $4,388.5 billion in government securities. The federal funds deficit for FY2012 was $1,176.8 billion, but because of the trust funds surplus, the unified federal budget deficit (what is widely reported in the press) was $1,087.0 billion. Trust fund receipts come from a variety of sources. Almost all trust funds receive monies from current or future beneficiaries. Most trust funds receive general revenues through direct payments or interest payments. In addition, some trust funds receive payments from other trust funds. Status of Largest Trust Funds
The FY2012 income, outgo, and balances of the 13 largest trust funds are reported in Table 2 . The list represents those trust funds with balances in excess of $10 billion and account for over 99% of the balances of all trust funds. The mixed evidence seems to support the claim that trust fund surpluses reduce the federal government deficit and increase public saving. This becomes important at the time when trust funds need to redeem the Treasury obligations held by the trust fund to cover outgo. The Treasury obligations in the trust fund are claims on the government and the government will have to find real resources (by raising revenue, decreasing spending, or issuing more debt) to cover these claims when the obligations are redeemed. | The federal budget consists of four basic fund groups—the general fund, special funds, revolving funds, and trust funds. The first three are often referred to as the federal funds group. Trust funds are an accounting mechanism that records revenues, offsetting receipts, or collections earmarked for the purpose of the specific fund. Trust funds generally share three common features: (1) they are established for programs serving long-term purposes, (2) monies are used for a single purpose, and (3) users are charged to finance the trust fund. About 40% of all federal outlays were through trust funds and about 37% of all federal receipts came to trust funds in fiscal year (FY) 2012.
A federal trust fund often represents a long-term commitment to use specific funds for a certain purpose. It has been argued that the creation of a trust fund is one way for Congress to "commit" future Congresses to fund a specific program or "to make long-term promises stick." Dedicated revenues are used to fund the program and the revenues usually come from the beneficiaries of the program.
The Office of Management and Budget tracks approximately 120 trust funds and trust fund aggregates. The 13 largest trust funds account for nearly all (over 99%) of the income to, outgo from, and balances of all trust funds.
Trust fund receipts come from a variety of sources. Almost all trust funds receive monies from current or future beneficiaries. Most trust funds receive general revenues in terms of direct payments or interest payments. In addition, some trust funds receive payments from other trust funds. Most trust fund programs have permanent budget authority and all monies in the trust fund are available for obligation. The outgo of a trust fund is comprised of payments made to the public or to another trust fund.
Cumulatively, trust fund surpluses (i.e., revenues in excess of outgo) in FY2012 amounted to $89.9 billion. This surplus is mostly invested in government obligations and transferred to the general fund to pay for other spending. By law, all trust funds except the Railroad Retirement fund must invest balances in government obligations. The Railroad Retirement fund is allowed to invest its balance in equities. The government securities held by trust funds are part of federal debt that is subject to the statutory federal debt limit. At the end of FY2012, the trust funds held $4,388.5 billion in government securities. The federal funds deficit for FY2012 was $1,176.8 billion, but because of the trust fund surplus, the unified federal budget deficit (what is widely reported in the press) was $1,087.0 billion.
Some observers have argued that trust fund programs increase the federal deficit and reduce national saving. There is evidence, however, to support the claim that trust fund surpluses reduce the federal government deficit and increase public saving. This becomes important when a trust fund's revenues are less than its outgo and the Treasury securities held by the trust fund need to be redeemed to cover outgo. The Treasury securities in the trust fund are claims on the government and the government will need to find real resources (by raising revenue, decreasing spending, or issuing more debt) to cover these claims when the obligations are redeemed. |
crs_RL32272 | crs_RL32272_0 | Background
Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andother security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region (with a population variously estimatedat less than one-half to one million) in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the regionby early 2000. (1) Theconflict has ebbed and flowed since then and has resulted in thousands of military and civiliancasualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. (7)
Since the 2002 Moscow theater siege, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocallyopposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government inChechnya. This has permitted the disengagement and withdrawal of thousands of Russian troopsfrom the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts,constitutes the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to wind down the Chechnyaconflict. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federalcontrol and include rebuilding assistance and elections. The assassination of the Chechen presidentin May 2004, and the attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004 have raised questions aboutwhether Chechenization and pacification are succeeding. He also presumably enjoyed automatic support from the 23,000-30,000 permanentlydeployed Russian troops in the region. (28)
Implications for Chechnya and Russia
The Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen governments have hailed elections in Chechnya asmarking an emergent peace and rule of law in the republic. Interests
A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia has been that Russiantroops are using excessive and indiscriminate force in quelling separatism in Chechnya andotherwise are committing serious human rights abuses. (44)
On other issues, several analysts have discerned shifts in Administration policy in recentyears, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater siege in late 2002 and stepped-upterrorist bombings throughout Russia in 2003 and 2004. Thereappeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peace talks withseparatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it was battling terrorism in Chechnya, andsome hope that elections and rebuilding efforts in Chechnya could contribute to a "politicalsettlement." (52)
Some Administration officials have raised concerns that problematic elections in Chechnyaare emblematic of a Russia less interested in adopting Western democratic and human rights"values," and that such slippage could ultimately harm bilateral relations. Even after September 11, 2001 --when the Administration's focus was on forging an international anti-terrorist coalition that includedRussia -- Congress retained a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cut some aidto Russia unless the President determined that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were givenfull access to Chechnya. Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 ) retains this provision. (63)
Issues for the second Session of the 109th Congress include weighing the benefits of Russiansupport for U.S.-backed anti-terrorism efforts against continuing a ban on some aid to Russia. | Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andsecurity forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forcesoccupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military andcivilian casualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin's rise to powerand continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute thisconflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and apresidential election in March 2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to theregion.
After Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, thePutin administration appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicatedto establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. This pro-Moscow government has used itsown forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawalof most Russian troops from the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with relatedpacification efforts, has constituted the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to winddown the fighting. Pacification efforts have aimed to gain the support or acquiescence of thepopulation to federal control and have included rebuilding assistance and elections. Theassassination of a pro-Moscow Chechen leader in May 2004, the attack on a school in the town ofBeslan, Russia, in September 2004, by Chechen terrorists, and widening of conflict to other areasof Russia's North Caucasus have raised questions about whether Chechenization and pacification aresucceeding.
A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia is that Russian troopsuse excessive and indiscriminate force to quell separatism in Chechnya and commit serious humanrights abuses. Several analysts have discerned a decrease in Bush Administration criticism ofRussian policy in Chechnya, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater hostage crisisand stepped-up terrorist bombings and armed attacks throughout Russia in recent years. U.S.concerns before the Iraq conflict with gaining Russia's support also may have contributed to theshifts. There appeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peacetalks with "moderate" separatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it primarily was battlingterrorism in Chechnya, and some hope that elections and rebuilding in Chechnya could contributeto a "political settlement." But some in the Administration also argue that Russia is showingdeclining interest in the adoption of Western democratic and human rights "values," and that suchslippage could ultimately harm bilateral relations.
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 )retains a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cuts some aid to Russia unless thePresident determines that Russia is not hampering access to Chechnya by non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). One issue for the second Session of the 109th Congress is whether tocontinue this ban in FY2007 legislation. |
crs_RS21516 | crs_RS21516_0 | RS21516 -- Iraq's Agriculture: Background and Status
May 13, 2003
Footnotes
1. "Agricultural PolicyIssues and Challenges in Iraq" Short- and Medium-term Options," from Iraq's Economic Predicament ,Kamil Mahdi, Editor. (back) FAOSTAT, Food and AgriculturalOrganization, United Nations, http://apps.fao.org/
Note: A hectare equals about 2.47 acres. "Iraq CropProduction." (back) FAOSTAT, FAO, U.N.
5. This reported new irrigated area could be a "euphemistic"reclassification of the government program of draining the southeast marshlands. (back) FAOSTAT, FAO, U.N.
11. Iraq's Participation in U.S. 14. (back) United Nations, Office of the IraqProgram -- Oil for Food; "About the Program: In Brief." Note: during 1960-69 annual cereal production per capita averaged 249 kilograms, this fell to 177 in the 1970s, and130 in the 1980s, but had regained ground to 155 kilograms during the1990-94 period. | Iraq's agricultural sector represents a small, but vital component of Iraq's economy.Over the past several decades agriculture's role in the economy has been heavily influenced by Iraq'sinvolvement in military conflicts, particularly the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War, and by varyingdegrees of government efforts to promote and/or control agricultural production. In the mid-1980s, agricultureaccounted for only about 14% of the national GDP. After the imposition of U.N. sanctions and the Iraqigovernment's non-compliance with a proposed U.N. Oil-for-Food program in 1991, agriculture's share of GDP isestimatedto have risen to 35% by 1992. (1)
Rapid population growth during the past three decades, coupled with limited arable land and a generalstagnation in agricultural productivity, has steadily increased dependence on imports to meet domestic food needssince themid-1960s. By 1980 Iraq was importing about half of its food supply. By 2002, between 80% and 100% of manybasic staples -- wheat, rice, sugar, vegetable oil, and protein meals -- were imported.
This report will be updated if events warrant. |
crs_RL31102 | crs_RL31102_0 | Background
Congress has authorized student loan repayments for highly qualified General Schedule (GS) and non-GS (including Foreign Service) employees in the executive branch. Repayments also are authorized for employees in the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Government Printing Office (GPO), the Library of Congress, and the U.S. Capitol Police. In the executive branch, and in GAO, GPO, and the Library of Congress, the repayments may be up to $10,000 annually and up to $60,000 in the aggregate. At the time that student loan repayments were authorized by Congress, the issues of the attractiveness of government service to and the large amount of student loan indebtedness of new graduates were of particular interest. The legislative history, statutory authority, status of executive and legislative branch implementation, issues for consideration, and oversight of student loan repayments are examined in the next sections of the report. Other programs, such as the Perkins Loan Program in the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 101-510 . 106-398 . Regulations to implement the broadened student loan repayment program established by the law were proposed by OPM on March 16, 2001, and finalized on July 31, 2001. 107-68 , enacted on November 12, 2001, authorized Senate employing offices to establish a program for Senate employees and authorized appropriations to fund the program. 108-7 also granted authority to the U.S. Capitol Police to establish a student loan repayment program as part of an educational and tuition reimbursement assistance program for employee career development. 108-123 and P.L. 108-136 were published on April 20, 2004. 108-123 and P.L. Proposed Changes to the Regulations
OPM published proposed regulations to revise the rules governing student loan repayments in the Federal Register on January 9, 2007. Among the changes under consideration are the following:
agencies would need to document just the actions taken in approving a student loan repayment; student loan repayments could not be used "to recruit an individual from outside the agency who is currently employed in the Federal service"; a job candidate who will be receiving a student loan repayment could sign the service agreement before he or she begins serving in the position; agency plans for student loan repayments could specify "that only student loans made within a certain time-frame are eligible for repayment"; the full gross amount of the repayment (before taxes) would "count toward the benefit cap"; the service agreement could address the possibility that it could be modified to provide additional repayments because of contingencies or other conditions that would be stated in the agreement; by mutual agreement between the agency and the employee, a service agreement could be modified to provide additional repayments for additional service, thereby removing the need for a new service agreement; periods during which an employee is "not in a pay status would not count toward completion of the required service period"; service agreements would include a provision stating whether an employee would need to repay a student loan repayment if he or she transferred to a different agency during the service period; service agreements would have to expressly state that a violation of a condition would result in the employee's loss of eligibility for a repayment; when a service agreement is modified to provide additional repayments for additional service, reimbursement, if the employee failed to complete the additional service period, would cover just the repayments received during that additional period; agencies would have to retain records of student loan repayments for at least three years after the employee's required service period ends; and agencies would be required to report to OPM by March 31of each year on student loan repayments made during the previous calendar (rather than fiscal) year. According to OPM, 28 executive branch agencies made repayments to 4,171 employees at a total cost of $26,663,897 in FY2005. From FY2004 to FY2005, the number of recipients increased by 55.6% and the cost of repayments increased by 77.4% in the executive branch. 2647 ) provided the Senate and CBO with authority to establish student loan repayment programs. Under P.L. House of Representatives
Under the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 ( P.L. 3338 ) authorized the U.S. Capitol Police to establish a student loan repayment program similar to those established under P.L. Among these issues are how the program will be funded, the length of the service agreement between the agency and the employee, the criteria for eligibility, and the kinds of program data to be collected. The FY2002 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. Records and Reports
P.L. | Under a law enacted in 1990 (P.L. 101-510) and amended in 2000 (P.L. 106-398) and 2003 (P.L. 108-123 and P.L. 108-136), federal agencies may repay portions of the student loans of highly qualified General Schedule (GS) and non-GS (including Foreign Service) employees they seek to recruit and retain. Eligible employees must sign at least a three-year service agreement to remain with their agencies. In return, these employees may receive loan repayments of up to $10,000 per year and up to $60,000 in total from an agency. Various student loans specified in law and authorized by the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Public Health Service Act may be repaid. Concerns about the attractiveness of government service to, and the large amount of student loan indebtedness of, new graduates along with the possibility of a significant number of retirements from the federal government in the next several years underlie student loan repayment programs. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) published final regulations to implement the original law on January 11, 2001, and final regulations to implement the amendments to the law on July 31, 2001, and April 20, 2004. Executive branch agencies are considering and implementing student loan repayment programs. OPM reported to Congress in May 2006 that 28 executive branch agencies made repayments to 4,171 employees at a cost of some $26.664 million in FY2005. The number of recipients increased by 55.6% and the cost of repayments increased by 77.4% from FY2004 to FY2005.
In the legislative branch, the Government Accountability Office (GAO, formerly the General Accounting Office), the Government Printing Office (GPO), and the Library of Congress also have authority under the laws stated above to establish student loan repayment programs. Enacted in the 107th Congress, P.L. 107-68 authorized the Senate and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to institute programs, and P.L. 107-117 authorized the U.S. Capitol Police to establish one. Under the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7), enacted in the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives has authority to establish a program for its employees, and additional authority was granted to the U.S. Capitol Police to establish a program and to provide tuition reimbursement for employees' ongoing career development education. To date, the Senate, the House, the U.S. Capitol Police, CBO, GAO, GPO, and the Library (not including the Congressional Research Service) have implemented repayment programs.
In both the executive and legislative branches, questions of how to fund the programs, what the required period of service should be, the criteria for repayment eligibility, and the kinds of program data to be collected will likely continue to be considered as repayment programs are implemented. OPM published proposed changes to the regulations governing repayments in the Federal Register on January 9, 2007. S. 1047, to exempt repayments from income tax, is pending in the Senate. The legislative history, statutory authority, status of executive and legislative branch implementation, issues for consideration, and oversight of student loan repayment programs are discussed in this report, which will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42792 | crs_R42792_0 | Introduction
Foster care is a temporary living arrangement for children who cannot remain safely in their own homes. Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, states, territories, and tribes who meet those requirements are entitled to claim partial federal reimbursement for the cost of providing foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance to children who meet federal eligibility criteria. The Title IV-E program, as it is commonly called, provides support for monthly payments on behalf of eligible children, as well as funds for related case management activities, training, data collection, and other costs of program administration. In FY2011, states (including the 50 states and the District of Columbia) spent $12.4 billion under the Title IV-E program, and received federal reimbursement of $6.7 billion, or 54% of that spending. At the federal level, the Title IV-E program is administered by the Children's Bureau, an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Administration on Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF). Roughly two-thirds of the Title IV-E dollars spent in FY2011 supported provision of foster care. Title IV-E Supports Children in Foster Care, Adoption, and Kinship Guardianship
The Title IV-E program funds foster care maintenance payments to provide direct financial assistance for children who are placed in foster care for their safety. These are primarily focused on ensuring the safety, permanence, and well-being of children in foster care. Although Title IV-E administrative plan requirements mostly address meeting the needs of children while they are in foster care, those requirements are meaningful to other children served under the program because most children who receive Title IV-E adoption assistance, and all of those who receive Title IV-E kinship guardianship assistance, were previously in foster care. Spending for maintenance payments represented just 29% of all Title IV-E foster care spending for FY2011 while spending for general foster care administrative purposes under the Title IV-E program represented close to half of the total (46%). Title IV-E Foster Care Maintenance Payments
Federal support is available to states for 50%–83% of the cost of providing foster care maintenance payments to eligible children in foster care. Case Planning and Case Management
More than half of all state and federal Title IV-E foster care administrative spending in FY2011 (53%, or $2.0 billion in FY2011) was for child-specific case planning and management activities. In FY2006, Title IV-E foster care administrative costs comprised 55% of all Title IV-E foster care spending, compared to 35% for Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments. The increased number of children adopted from foster care helped to drive significant growth in the number of children who receive Title IV-E adoption assistance. As of FY1997, there were about 146,400 children receiving Title IV-E adoption assistance on an average monthly basis. Membership in a sibling group, or having a diagnosed medical condition or physical, social or emotional disability, represents the primary factor or condition identified for a little more than half of all children determined to have special needs. Under provisions of Title IV-E, any child who is eligible for Title IV-E adoption assistance payments is also eligible for Medicaid. Sibling of a Child Who Is Eligible for Title IV-E Kinship Guardianship Assistance
A state may, but is not required to, provide Title IV-E kinship guardianship assistance to a sibling of a child who is eligible for that assistance, provided the sibling is placed with the same relative guardian as the eligible child and both the relative guardian and the Title IV-E agency agree that this joint placement is appropriate for the siblings. The agreement must, at a minimum, stipulate that it will remain in effect without regard to the state in which the relative guardian lives and must specify: (1) the amount of, and manner in which, the kinship guardianship assistance payments will be made on the child's behalf, including the manner in which the amount may, in consultation with the relative guardian, be adjusted periodically based on the circumstances of the relative and the needs of the child; and (2) the additional services and assistance the child and relative will be eligible for under the agreement, including the procedure the relative guardian may use to apply for additional services as needed; and (3) that the state will pay all non-recurring expenses associated with obtaining legal guardianship of the child, or $2,000 of those expenses, whichever is less. | Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, states, territories, and tribes are entitled to claim partial federal reimbursement for the cost of providing foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance to children who meet federal eligibility criteria. The Title IV-E program, as it is commonly called, provides support for monthly payments on behalf of eligible children, as well as funds for related case management activities, training, data collection, and other costs of program administration. In FY2011, states (including the 50 states and the District of Columbia) spent $12.4 billion under the Title IV-E program and received federal reimbursement of $6.7 billion, or 54% of that spending. At the federal level, the Title IV-E program is administered by the Children's Bureau, an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
More than two-thirds of all Title IV-E spending supports provision of foster care, which is a temporary living arrangement for children who cannot remain safely in their own homes. Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments are subsidies provided to foster caregivers to support the daily living costs of eligible children. Title IV-E program administration primarily supports caseworker and agency efforts to ensure the safety and well-being of each child in foster care and to plan for, and achieve, permanency for them via family reunification, adoption, or legal guardianship. Just 29% of the $8.3 billion in total (state and federal) Title IV-E foster care spending for FY2011 was used for maintenance payments, while close to half (46%) of those Title IV-E foster care dollars supported program administration (primarily for case planning and case management).
Close to one-third of all Title IV-E spending (state and federal) supports children in permanent adoption or guardianship placements. Title IV-E adoption assistance payments are monthly subsidies provided for eligible adopted children (most of whom were previously in foster care), for whom the state determined they could not be returned home and that there was a condition or factor that precluded their adoption without assistance (e.g., age, medical condition, or membership in a sibling group). Kinship guardianship assistance payments are ongoing subsidies for eligible children placed with a legal relative guardian, for whom returning home from foster care is not possible or appropriate and for whom the agency also determines adoption is not appropriate. In FY2011, more than 80% of the total spending for Title IV-E adoption assistance ($4.0 billion) and Title IV-E kinship guardianship assistance ($51 million) supported ongoing subsidies for eligible children.
States receiving Title IV-E funding are required to provide foster care and adoption assistance to eligible children. They may also choose to provide kinship guardianship assistance to all eligible children. Federal eligibility for all types of Title IV-E assistance is limited by age. Additional criteria vary by the kind of assistance but often require children to have been removed from low income households. Each month during FY2011, an average of 168,400 children received a Title IV-E foster care maintenance payment and 413,800 received Title IV-E adoption assistance. On a national basis, children who received Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments comprise less than half of all children in foster care and about one-quarter of those receiving ongoing adoption subsidies.
The number of children in foster care overall, as well as the number of those children receiving Title IV-E foster care support has been in decline for most of the past decade; the amount of money spent for Title IV-E foster care is also declining. During most of the same time period, however, the number of children receiving Title IV-E adoption assistance and the amount of spending for Title IV-E adoption assistance grew rapidly. Although representing a small part of the program now, both the number of children assisted via Title IV-E kinship guardianship assistance and the amount of spending for that purpose are expected to increase. |
crs_R40968 | crs_R40968_0 | Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.R. Since virtually all states regulate the insurance industry, the effect is to immunize "the business of insurance" generally from application of the federal antitrust laws. Each of two, identical, stand-alone bills introduced in the 111 th Congress— H.R. 3596 , S. 1681 (each titled the Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2009)—would apply only to issuers of health insurance and medical malpractice insurance. Notwithstanding any provision in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, those entities would be prohibited from engaging "in any form of price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations in connection with the conduct of the business of providing" such insurance. Hearings were held in the House Judiciary Committee on October 8, 2009, and in the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 14, 2009; H.R. 3596 was reported on October 21, 2009 with an amendment to permit the collection, compilation or dissemination of historical loss data, or the performance of actuarial services to the extent that those activities do "not involve a restraint of trade." S. 1681 remains in the Senate Judiciary Committee; whether it might ultimately contain a provision concerning information sharing is unknown; its substance was not inserted in the Senate health care reform bill passed on December 24, 2009. Section 262 of H.R. There is also, as in H.R. The provision defines, in language similar to that inserted in H.R. 3596 as reported, the information-sharing terms, "historical loss data" and "loss development factor." H.R. 4626
Introduced on February 22, 2010, and passed by the House on February 24, 2010, this measure (Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act) is unlike H.R. 3596 and S. 1681 and more like Section 262 in that it does specifically amend McCarran-Ferguson: "nothing contained in this Act [i.e., McCarran-Ferguson Act] shall modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to the business of health insurance." But it is limited to "the business of health insurance" and does not address the business of medical malpractice insurance. The uniformity of policy forms, however, also may reduce consumer choice. Further industry cooperation, both through the advisory organizations and other state-created mechanisms, occurs in state residual market mechanisms and state guaranty funds. The Bills' "Safe Harbor" for Information Sharing
At least some of the information sharing that occurs in much of the industry would purportedly be immunized by both H.R. 3596 as reported, and section 262 of H.R. 3962 . Effect of State Action Exemption
Notwithstanding any limitation imposed at the federal level on the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption available to health and medical malpractice insurers, any activity that the subject insurance companies currently (or might in the future) undertake—including joint ratemaking or certain information sharing—might nevertheless remain legally permissible. The "state action" doctrine in antitrust law immunizes from the federal antitrust laws: (1) all actions of state public entities and (2) those of private entities that are legislatively mandated or authorized and are "actively supervised" by the states. 4626 , or section 262 of H.R. In the event that any insurer practices are determined to be violations of the antitrust laws, the issue in the absence of (some or all) McCarran-Ferguson immunity, likely would be whether and to what extent existing state mandates or authorizations, while adequate to meet the requirements of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, would be adequate to meet the more rigorous requirements of the antitrust "state action" doctrine. Inasmuch as "state action" immunity is available only if a state "clearly articulates" a state policy that mandates or contemplates anticompetitive conduct, and engages in the "active supervision" of any private activity that occurs in response to that articulation, it is at least questionable whether a general scheme of insurance regulation would be sufficiently specific to allow successful invocation of "state action." | Narrowing or eliminating the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption for the "business of insurance" has been pursued for many years in many Congresses, and in the 111th Congress, there have been at least four measures—three stand-alone bills, and a provision in the House health care reform bill. Unlike prior legislation to eliminate the entire exemption—currently applicable generally to the extent such business is regulated by state law—however, three of the current measures (H.R. 3596, S. 1681, and section 262 of H.R. 3962 (the House-passed health care reform bill)) are applicable only to the provision of health and medical malpractice insurance; H.R. 4626, as introduced, and as passed by the House on February 24, 2010, is applicable only to health insurance. Two of the stand-alone bills, H.R. 3596 and S. 1681, would prohibit issuers of such insurance from engaging in "price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations in connection with the conduct of the business of providing" health or medical malpractice insurance. H.R. 4626, like Section 262 of H.R. 3962, does not specify particular, prohibited activities, mandating instead that nothing in McCarran-Ferguson shall prevent the application of the antitrust laws to the business of health [or medical malpractice] insurance.
H.R. 3596 as voted out of the House Judiciary Committee on October 21, 2009, was amended to permit the sharing of historical loss data or the "perform[ance of] actuarial services" if doing so "does not involve a restraint of trade." H.R. 4626 contains no information-sharing provisions. Hearings have been held on S. 1681, but the bill remains in the Senate Judiciary Committee; whether it will ultimately be amended to contain a provision concerning information sharing is unknown, as is the likelihood that its substance will be inserted in a final health care reform bill. Section 262 of H.R. 3962 contains language similar to the information-sharing provision in H.R. 3596, including a section to define several of the terms used. There is not currently any provision addressing McCarran-Ferguson in the Senate health care reform bill (H.R. 3590), passed on December 24, 2009. Due largely to the importance of information sharing to insurers, the insurance industry has cooperated in the past in a variety of ways, including sharing loss information, jointly developing policy forms and rates, operating residual market mechanisms, and participating in state guaranty funds. Some forms of cooperation, including publication of mandatory advisory rates, have already been curtailed because of antitrust concerns.
Passage of any of the measures is likely to precipitate litigation to define the scope of the prohibition and/or any remaining exemption. The precise impact on the affected portion of the insurance industry will depend critically, therefore, on future court decisions.
Notwithstanding any limitation imposed at the federal level on the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption available to health and medical malpractice insurers, however, any activity that the subject insurance companies currently (or might in the future) undertake—including joint ratemaking or certain information sharing—may nevertheless remain legally permissible. The "state action" doctrine in antitrust law immunizes from the federal antitrust laws: (1) all actions of state (but not necessarily, municipal) public entities and (2) those of private entities that are "clearly articulated" and legislatively (or otherwise) mandated or authorized and are "actively supervised" by the states. Currently, all states regulate the insurance industry. The "state action" issue, then, is whether and to what extent existing state mandates or authorizations, while adequate to meet the requirements of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, would be adequate to meet the requirements of the antitrust "state action" doctrine, which dictates both that there be a "clear articulation" of state policy, and that a state engage in "active supervision" of the private activity that occurs in response to that articulation. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R42834 | crs_R42834_0 | Introduction
The United States maintains approximately 285 diplomatic facilities worldwide. Attacks on such facilities, and on U.S. diplomatic personnel, are not infrequent. U.S. These events, along with recent attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen, and Turkey, have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission. Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered approach to security including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional, U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities, U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard detachments. The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has led some observers to question the deployment of personnel in high-threat environments. The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in the high-risk environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of State's capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). This report provides background information on the authorities, regulations, and procedures in place at the Department of State regarding diplomatic security. The United States is a state party to these conventions. U.S. The Attack in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012
Embassy Security and the Benghazi Attack70
Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel (Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty) were killed in an attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound (SMC) and Annex in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. More information on the State Department's actions in response to the Benghazi attack is available in CRS Report R43195, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives , by [author name scrubbed]. Funding Data and Recent-Year Funding Observations
Within the Department of State budget, virtually all of the embassy and diplomatic security funding is within five subaccounts: Worldwide Security Protection (WSP), within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) account; Worldwide Security Upgrades within the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account; Diplomatic Security (DS); Counterterrorism within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account (D&CP); and Diplomatic Security within the Border Security Program (BSP). | The United States maintains about 285 diplomatic facilities worldwide. Attacks on such facilities, and on U.S. diplomatic personnel, are not infrequent. The deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012, along with attacks that week on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, drew renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission. Congress plays a key role in shaping the response to these challenges, such as by providing resources for diplomatic security and examining security breaches overseas.
The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has focused particular scrutiny on the deployment of diplomatic personnel in high-threat environments. The Department of State currently maintains a presence in locations faced with security conditions that previously would likely have led State to evacuate personnel and close the post.
Under reciprocal treaty obligations, host nations are obligated to provide security for the diplomatic facilities of sending states. However, instances in which host nations have been unable or not fully committed to fulfilling this responsibility have sometimes left U.S. facilities vulnerable, especially in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. facilities therefore employ a layered approach to security including not only the measures taken by a host country, but also additional, U.S.-coordinated measures, to include armed Diplomatic Security agents, hardened facilities, U.S.-trained and/or contracted local security guards, and sometimes U.S. Marine Security Guard detachments.
The rapid growth in the number of U.S. civilians deployed in the high-risk environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan spurred significant investment in recent years in the Department of State's capacity to provide security in dangerous areas through its Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). However, it simultaneously placed unprecedented burdens on DS's capability to carry out this mission successfully in these and other challenging locations.
Most of the funding for the protection of U.S. missions abroad is provided through the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) component of the State Department's Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP) account and through the Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) component of the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM) account. The total security funding requested for FY2015 is about $4.76 billion.
This report provides background information on the organization, practice, and funding of U.S. diplomatic security efforts. It also provides summary information on the September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, as well as on the subsequent Accountability Review Board. More information on congressional and State Department actions in response to the Benghazi attack is available in CRS Report R43195, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43689 | crs_R43689_0 | 113-76 , H.R. 3547 ) appropriated funding for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2014, for all of the 12 regular appropriations acts. The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations act, which includes funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is contained in Division G of the act. Title II of Division G provided $8.20 billion for EPA for FY2014, $47.0 million (0.6%) more than the President's FY2014 request of $8.15 billion, and $298.9 million (3.8%) above the FY2013 enacted appropriation of $7.90 billion (post-sequestration and rescission) provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ) as presented by EPA in its FY2013 Operating Plan. The FY2014 enacted appropriations were a $278.4 million (3.3%) decrease below the total FY2013 appropriations of $8.48 billion for EPA, when accounting for the $577.3 million (post-sequestration) in supplemental funds provided in the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. Congress considered FY2014 discretionary appropriations for federal departments and agencies, including EPA, under the parameters of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ). No regular FY2014 appropriations bill for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was introduced in the House or Senate prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. The House Appropriations Committee began markup of an FY2014 Interior appropriations bill on July 31, 2013, but the markup was suspended and not concluded. On August 1, 2013, the leaders of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft FY2014 Interior appropriations bill with an accompanying explanatory statement intended to serve as a starting point for the Senate debate. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills were enacted prior to the start of FY2014. Enacted on October 17, 2013, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-46 on January 17, 2014, funding federal departments and agencies for the full fiscal year. The following sections of this CRS report present the levels of FY2014 enacted appropriations for EPA by the nine statutory appropriations accounts that fund the agency, with a breakout within these accounts for selected programs and activities that have received more prominent attention in the congressional debate. The discussions and tables presented in this report compare the FY2014 enacted appropriations for these accounts, programs, and activities to the President's FY2014 budget request and the FY2013 enacted appropriations (post-sequestration and rescission), including $577.3 million in supplemental funds provided for four EPA accounts in the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. These supplemental funds were dedicated to water infrastructure, cleanup, and other recovery efforts in areas of states affected by Hurricane Sandy in late October 2012. 113-6 . EPA FY2014 Appropriations by Account
Table 1 presents the levels of FY2014 enacted appropriations for EPA provided in P.L. Selected EPA Programs and Activities
Considerable attention during the debate and hearings on the EPA's appropriations for FY2014 focused on federal financial assistance to states for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, various categorical grants to states to support general implementation and enforcement of federal environmental programs as delegated to the states, funding for implementation and research support for air pollution control requirements, climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, and funding for environmental cleanup. The following sections of this report discuss the levels of FY2014 appropriations for selected EPA programs and activities within the above areas that received prominent attention in the congressional debate leading to the enactment of P.L. 113-76 . P.L. Although generally not included in P.L. 113-76 contained a number of directives regarding EPA. P.L. P.L. 113-2 . 113-2 . | Enacted on January 17, 2014, Title II of Division G of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, H.R. 3547) provided $8.20 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2014. The act appropriated funding for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2014, for all of the 12 regular appropriations acts, including EPA within Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. Total discretionary appropriations available in FY2014 for all federal departments and agencies were based on a cap of $1.012 trillion set in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67). The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this spending level in FY2014 would not trigger sequestration under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240). Unlike FY2013, the FY2014 appropriations therefore were not reduced through sequestration.
The total FY2014 enacted appropriations of $8.20 billion for EPA were $47.0 million (0.6%) more than the President's FY2014 request of $8.15 billion, and $298.9 million (3.8%) above the FY2013 enacted appropriations of $7.90 billion (post-sequestration and rescission) provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6) as reported by EPA in its FY2013 Operating Plan. The FY2014 enacted appropriations are a $278.4 million (3.3%) decrease compared to the total FY2013 appropriations of $8.48 billion for EPA, when accounting for the $577.3 million (post-sequestration) in supplemental funds provided in the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-2). These supplemental funds were dedicated to water infrastructure, cleanup, and other recovery efforts in areas of states affected by Hurricane Sandy in late October 2012.
No regular FY2014 appropriations bill for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was introduced in the House or Senate prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. On July 31, 2013, the House Appropriations Committee began, but did not conclude, markup of an FY2014 Interior appropriations bill. On August 1, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft FY2014 Interior appropriations bill with an accompanying explanatory statement to serve as a starting point for debate in the Senate. No regular appropriations bills for FY2014 were enacted prior to the beginning of that fiscal year. Following a temporary lapse in funding through October 16, 2013, EPA and other federal departments and agencies operated under two continuing resolutions (P.L. 113-46 and P.L. 113-73) prior to the enactment of P.L. 113-76 to fund the full fiscal year.
Considerable attention during the debate and hearings on the EPA's appropriations for FY2014 focused on federal financial assistance to states for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, various categorical grants to states to support general implementation and enforcement of federal environmental programs as delegated to the states, funding for implementation and research support for air pollution control requirements, climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, and funding for environmental cleanup.
In addition to funding for specific programs and activities, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions received attention during hearings on FY2014 appropriations for EPA, similar to the debate regarding appropriations for the agency for recent fiscal years. Although a number of provisions to prohibit or restrict the use of FY2014 appropriations for certain EPA actions were considered in the House Appropriations Committee markup, most of these provisions were not included in the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee draft, the partial-fiscal year continuing resolutions noted above, or P.L. 113-76 that provided funding for the full fiscal year.
This report summarizes actions on FY2014 appropriations for EPA and presents a breakout of the FY2014 enacted appropriations for the agency by each of the nine appropriations accounts and by selected programs and activities within those accounts that received more prominent attention in the congressional debate. The discussions and tables presented in this report compare the FY2014 enacted appropriations for EPA to the President's FY2014 budget request, and the FY2013 enacted appropriations (post-sequestration and rescission), including funding provided in P.L. 113-6 and the disaster relief supplemental funds provided P.L. 113-2. |
crs_RL33783 | crs_RL33783_0 | Appointments During the 108th Congress
During the 108 th Congress, the President submitted to the Senate 166 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 166 nominations, 120 were confirmed; eight were withdrawn; one was returned to the President at the end of the first session; and 37 were returned to him at the end of the second session of the 108 th Congress. President Bush made a total of 18 recess appointments to the departments during this time. Of those 18, three were made during the recess between the first and second sessions of the 108 th Congress ( intersession recess appointments). The remaining 15 were made during recesses within the first or second session of the 108 th Congress ( intrasession recess appointments). These counts exclude days during August recesses and between sessions of Congress. The 31 days during the August 2003 recess, the 41 days between the first and second sessions of the 108 th Congress, and the 46 days during the August 2004 recess were subtracted from the "days to confirm" for those nominations that spanned one or more of these recesses. It identifies the agency involved and the dates of nomination and confirmation. | During the 108th Congress, the President submitted to the Senate 166 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 166 nominations, 120 were confirmed; eight were withdrawn; one was returned to the President at the end of the first session; and 37 were returned to him at the end of the second session of the 108th Congress. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 98 days elapsed between the time of the nomination and the nomination's receipt and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 83. These statistics do not include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its August recesses and between sessions of Congress.
President Bush made a total of 18 recess appointments to the departments during this time. Of those 18, three were made during the recess between the first and second sessions of the 108th Congress (intersession recess appointments). The remaining 15 were made during recesses within the first or second session of the 108th Congress (intrasession recess appointments).
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the "Plum Book" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_RS21987 | crs_RS21987_0 | Prior to the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343 ), government policy protected customers of depository institutions—banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions—in full for accounts up to $100,000 and up to $250,000 for retirement accounts. Since then, Congress and the President enacted the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (HFSTHA; P.L. 111-22 ), extending both the EESA increases and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) $30 billion borrowing authority from the U.S. Treasury to as much as $500 billion until 2013. Major Features of Customer Protection Systems
This report provides a summary of the major features of financial institutions' customer protection systems, reflecting safety-net provisions legislated over time, usually in reaction to specific financial collapses. The cleanup of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, required appropriated funds plus a new deposit insurance fund and regulator. The troubled pension benefit arrangement remains mainly in user fee mode. Likewise, state insurance company guaranty and federally sponsored securities investor protection arrangements follow the mutual model. However, in the current financial crisis, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) has joined the FDIC in accepting an increased line of credit from the U.S. Treasury to resolve failing corporate credit unions and restoring the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). The second part of the FDIC's TLG program is to guarantee 100% of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts held in insured depository institutions until December 31, 2009. | After the onset of the current financial crisis and economic contraction, the 111th Congress increased some of the long-standing provisions that protect account holders from risk. Specifically, provisions in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) and the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (HFSTHA; P.L. 111-22) increased account holders' protection. Both laws raised the maximum deposit account insurance to $250,000, and the HFSTHA extended the higher level of risk protection until 2013.
Lawmakers have long recognized the importance of protecting some forms of financial savings from risk. Such provisions apply to deposits in banks and thrift institutions and credit union "shares." Remedial and other safety net features also cover insurance contracts, certain securities accounts, and even defined-benefit pensions. Questions over how to fund and guarantee Social Security, along with the troubles of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, have renewed interest in these arrangements.
This report portrays the salient features and legislation of account protection provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), state insurance guaranty funds, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. It provides a discussion of the FDIC's Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLG) , which extends unlimited temporary deposit guarantees to certain depositors and debt held in insured depository institutions. Overall, the report provides a summary of the major federal risk protections for account holders.
This report will be updated as appropriate. |
crs_R44189 | crs_R44189_0 | Introduction and FY2016 Appropriations
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to firearms and explosives commerce. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, and criminal cases involving the diversion of alcohol and tobacco from legal channels of commerce. Congress funds the ATF through an annual appropriation in the Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS), and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, because it is a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ). As Ta b le 1 shows, for FY2016, Congress appropriated $1.24 billion for ATF in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ). This amount represents a 3.4% increase over the agency's FY2015 appropriations, but 1.7% ($21.2 million) less than the Administration's request. As shown in Table 2 , the Administration requested $1.261 billion for ATF for FY2016, an increase of 5.3%. This proposed net increase of $63.4 million over ATF's FY2015 appropriation included $8.1 million to "address deficiencies in Investigative Support Services." These deficiencies, according to ATF, are the result of increased application workloads under the National Firearms Act (NFA) of 1934 and increased firearms trace requests under the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968. It also included $30.2 million for "staffing restoration" and $25.1 million in other "base adjustments." For FY2012, Congress included futurity language in four of those provisos that appears to be intended to make them permanent law. | The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to firearms and explosives commerce. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, and criminal cases involving the diversion of alcohol and tobacco from legal channels of commerce. Congress funds the ATF through an annual appropriation in the Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS), and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, because it is a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ). For FY2016, Congress appropriated $1.24 billion for ATF in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). This amount represents a 3.4% increase over the agency's FY2015 appropriations, but 1.7% less than the Administration's request.
For FY2016, by comparison, the Administration requested $1.261 billion for ATF, an increase of 5.3%. This proposed net increase of $63.4 million over ATF's FY2015 appropriation included $8.1 million to "address deficiencies in Investigative Support Services." These deficiencies, according to ATF, are the result of increased application workloads—principally for suppressors—under the National Firearms Act (NFA) of 1934 and increased firearms trace requests under the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968. It also includes $30.2 million for "staffing restoration" and $25.1 million in other "base adjustments."
This report includes an Appendix that provides a legislative history for several ATF funding limitations related to gun control, most of which included "futurity" language that appears to be intended to make them permanent law. |
crs_R41801 | crs_R41801_0 | The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA; P.L. 95-454 , 92 Stat. 1111). Congress created the SES to provide a government-wide, mobile corps of managers within federal agencies. The SES, comprising mostly career appointees who are chosen through a merit staffing process, is the link between the politically appointed heads of agencies and the career civil servants within those agencies. The creators of the SES envisioned a cadre of high-level managers in the government who would provide leadership for agencies across administrations and ensure productivity and efficiency within the government. The CSRA incentivized good performance among senior executives by basing their compensation on their performance. However, some organizations and individuals have called for changes to the current SES. This report provides a history and background of the SES, examines the central features of the SES, and discusses some areas that SES reform advocates have identified as needing improvement. SES Pay
There have been several changes to the pay structure of the SES. In 2004, however, the pay system for senior executives was changed dramatically. Advocates for SES reform argue that changes could improve the efficiency and the management of government programs and the government workforce. Later in the 112 th Congress, two bills were introduced that would make significant and sweeping changes to the SES. The Senior Executive Service Reform Act, S. 2249 , was introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka on March 28, 2012. If enacted, S. 2249 would make adjustments to the SES pay system, reduce the ratio of noncareer to career senior executives, establish an SES Resource Office in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and require agencies to enhance professional development opportunities for senior executives. Representative Jim Moran introduced H.R. 6042 , also titled the Senior Executive Service Reform Act, on June 27, 2012. H.R. 6042 proposed similar changes to those proposed in the Senate bill, and would also require agencies to evaluate the skills and qualifications necessary for each SES position when it becomes vacant. In addition, H.R. 6042 would require agencies to establish an objective for holding executives accountable for addressing employee satisfaction. | The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA; P.L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111). Congress created the SES to provide a government-wide, mobile corps of managers within federal agencies. The SES, comprising mostly career appointees who are chosen through a merit staffing process, is the link between the politically appointed heads of agencies and the career civil servants within those agencies. The creators of the SES envisioned it as a cadre of high-level managers in the government who would provide leadership for agencies across administrations and ensure productivity and efficiency within the government. The CSRA incentivized good performance among senior executives by basing their compensation on their performance.
Over the three decades of the SES's operation, various ideas and suggestions have been offered as to how it may be improved. Although a few statutory changes have been implemented since its creation, many argue that the current state of the SES calls for more comprehensive reforms. The most recent change made to the SES was a revision of its pay system enacted in 2004. Advocates for additional changes to the SES argue that further changes would improve the efficiency and the management of government programs and the government workforce. Some of the changes they call for include improvement in recruiting efforts, more opportunities for onboard training and career development of senior executives, and further changes to the current pay structure.
In the 112th Congress, two bills were introduced that would make significant and sweeping changes to the SES. The Senior Executive Service Reform Act, S. 2249, was introduced by Senator Daniel Akaka on March 28, 2012. If enacted, S. 2249 would make adjustments to the SES pay system, reduce the ratio of noncareer to career senior executives, establish an SES Resource Office in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and require agencies to enhance professional development opportunities for senior executives. Representative Jim Moran introduced H.R. 6042, also titled the Senior Executive Service Reform Act, on June 27, 2012. H.R. 6042 proposed similar changes to those proposed in the Senate bill, and would also require agencies to evaluate the skills and qualifications necessary for each SES position when it becomes vacant. In addition, H.R. 6042 would require agencies to establish an objective for holding executives accountable for addressing employee satisfaction.
This report provides a history and background of the SES, examines the central features of the SES, and discusses some areas in which advocates for SES reform have called for change. |
crs_R43830 | crs_R43830_0 | Introduction
Federal criminal civil rights laws impose criminal penalties for the deprivation of certain federal rights, privileges, or immunities. While some of these laws require a discriminatory motivation, others—such as those regarding human trafficking, conspiracy against rights, and deprivation of rights under "color of law —do not. Federal Statutes
Conspiracy Against Rights—18 U.S.C. §242
Federal civil rights prosecutions against state actors (e.g., law enforcement) are usually conducted pursuant to 18 U.S.C §242, which makes it a crime for "any person acting under color of any law, statute, ordinance regulation, or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S."
There are four elements to establish offenses under this section: (1) the victim must have been an inhabitant of a U.S. state, district, or territory when the alleged violation occurred; (2) defendant acted under color of any law; (3) the defendant's conduct deprived the victim of some right secured or protected by the U.S. Constitution; and (4) the defendant acted willfully, that is, with specific intent to violate the protected constitutional right. Federally Protected Activities—18 U.S.C. Damage to Religious Property—18 U.S.C. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances—18 U.S.C. Hate Crime Acts—18 U.S.C. Criminal Interference With Right to Fair Housing—42 U.S.C. The offense is punishable by a range of imprisonment up to a life term, depending upon the circumstances of the crime and the resulting injury, if any. | Federal criminal civil rights laws impose criminal penalties for deprivation of certain federal rights, privileges, or immunities. These laws prohibit hate crimes based on race, color, religion, or national origin; the burning of places of worship; violence against health care providers; and the transport of persons (particularly women and children) for the purpose of enslavement or forced labor. Some of these laws require a discriminatory motivation while others, such as human trafficking, do not. Some cover offenders acting "under color of any law."
The Federal Bureau of Investigation investigates alleged violations. Punishments can range from a fine to lifetime imprisonment; in some cases the death penalty may be imposed, depending upon the circumstances and the resulting injury, if any.
This report provides a brief summary of selected federal criminal civil right statutes:
Conspiracy Against Rights—18 U.S.C. §241 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law—18 U.S.C. §242 Federally Protected Activities—18 U.S.C. §245 Damage to Religious Property—18 U.S.C. §247 Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances—18 U.S.C. §248 Hate Crime Acts—18 U.S.C. §249 Criminal Interference With Right to Fair Housing—42 U.S.C. §3631 |
crs_R40812 | crs_R40812_0 | As crime rates continued to increase throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the federal government increased its involvement in domestic crime control efforts. Over a 10-year period (1984-1994), Congress enacted five major anti-crime bills and increased appropriations for federal assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. Within the past several years, however, some federal assistance to state and local law enforcement has declined, and the FBI has refocused its resources on countering terrorism as federal law enforcement efforts since September 11, 2001 (9/11), have focused primarily on protecting the nation against terrorist attacks. However, as the violent crime rate increased in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and some questioned the ability of state and local law enforcement to combat the growing problem with limited resources at their disposal, the federal government began to take a more direct role in crime control. Despite the declining crime rates, Congress has continued to debate measures that may further decrease both violent and non-violent crime as well as provide assistance to state and local criminal justice systems. Gangs14
Similarly to hate crimes, gang crimes may be classified as both violent crimes and property crimes. Combating Fraud and Theft
Policy makers have been concerned with the prevalence and types of fraud committed across the country. With respect to sentencing, several issues confronted the 111 th Congress. State and Local Justice Assistance
Department of Justice (DOJ) grant programs and appropriations is a perennial issue of oversight and legislation for Congress. Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)67
The COPS program was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. | States and localities have traditionally been responsible for preventing and controlling domestic crime. As crime rates continued to increase throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the federal government increased its involvement in crime control efforts. Over a period of 10 years (1984-1994), Congress passed five major anti-crime bills and increased appropriations for federal assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, federal law enforcement efforts have been focused on countering terrorism and maintaining homeland security. Amid these efforts, however, Congress has continued to address many traditional crime-related issues.
After peaking in the early 1990s, violent and property crime rates have generally tended to decrease. Despite this decline, policy makers have remained concerned with combating the various types of crime that still exist around the country.
This report aggregates various issues surrounding federal crime control into five broad themes: violent crime control, combating fraud and theft, drug control, sentencing reform, and state and local justice assistance. Within these themes, the report examines more specific issues that confronted the 111th Congress. Issues discussed under the umbrella of violent crime control include hate crimes, gangs, and gun control. Issues related to the federal government's efforts to combat fraud and theft include identity theft and organized retail crime. A perennial drug control issue discussed is that of drug trafficking. Congress also considered sentencing reform issues such as disparities in crack and powder cocaine sentencing as well as early prison release. With respect to state and local justice assistance, issues regarding the adequacy of federal assistance grants to state and local law enforcement—via the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program—and the proposal of a new witness protection grant program as well as juvenile justice are discussed. |
crs_R41079 | crs_R41079_0 | Introduction
A fundamental objective of congressional oversight is to hold executive officials accountable for the implementation of delegated authority. This objective is especially important given the huge expansion of executive influence in the modern era. If the Founding Fathers returned to observe their handiwork, they would likely be surprised by such developments as the creation of a "presidential branch" of government (the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and the like) and the establishment of so many federal departments and agencies. From three departments in 1789 (State, Treasury, and War, renamed Defense in 1947), a dozen more have been added to the cabinet. The newest creation, in 2002, is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Formed from the merger of 22 separate executive branch units, it employees roughly 180,000 people. Hence the importance of Congress exercising its implicit constitutional prerogative to check the delegated authority that it grants to federal departments and agencies. The goals of this report, then, are essentially six-fold: (1) highlight several reasons for the expansion of the role and reach of government; (2) discuss a few definitions of oversight; (3) spotlight three essential purposes of oversight; (4) comment upon a few oversight laws and rules; (5) review several important oversight techniques; and (6) identify several incentives and disincentives to the conduct of congressional oversight. The report concludes with summary observations. | A fundamental objective of congressional oversight is to hold executive officials accountable for the implementation of delegated authority. This objective is especially important given the huge expansion of executive influence in the modern era. If the Founding Fathers returned to observe their handiwork, they would likely be surprised by such developments as the creation of a "presidential branch" of government (the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and the like) and the establishment of so many federal departments and agencies. From three departments in 1789 (State, Treasury, and War, renamed Defense in 1947), a dozen more have been added to the cabinet. The newest creation in 2002, is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Formed from the merger of 22 separate executive branch units, it employs roughly 180,000 people.
Clearly, given the role and scope of the federal establishment, the importance of Congress's review function looms large in checking and monitoring the delegated authority that it grants to federal departments and agencies. The goals of this report, then, are essentially six-fold: (1) highlight several reasons for the expansion of the federal government; (2) discuss a few definitions of oversight; (3) spotlight three essential purposes of oversight; (4) comment upon a few oversight laws and rules; (5) review several important oversight techniques; and (6) identify several incentives and disincentives to the conduct of congressional oversight. The report concludes with summary observations. |
crs_R44746 | crs_R44746_0 | This includes during the summer months, when youth labor force activity tends to be higher than other times of the year. One potential policy option for addressing youth employment is providing support for summer job programs, which are generally administered by cities with funding from both the public and private sectors. The current federal workforce law, the Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128 ), was enacted in 2014 and shifted summer employment from being an optional to a mandatory activity under the Youth Activities program. This program provides funding to localities across the United States for youth job training and employment activities. Other recent federal programs and initiatives have sought to expand employment opportunities for youth during the summer months. This report provides information about summer youth employment, including for those youth who are low-income and face challenges with securing employment. The E/P ratio was 64.1% in July 1996 and 53.2% in July 2016. The research literature has not fully explored the labor force participation of low-income youth during the summer. A survey of 40 cities found that nearly 116,000 youth were placed in such jobs in 2015. There is scant information about how localities fund their summer employment programs. The rationale for these programs may include the following:
providing income to youth and their families; encouraging youth to develop "soft skills" and professional skills that can help them navigate their environments and work well with others; improving the academic outcomes and prospects for employment of youth in the future; deterring youth from activities that could lead to them getting in trouble or being harmed; and providing greater economic opportunities to youth in areas with few employment prospects. Recent Federal Efforts
Federal workforce laws since 1964 have included summer job training and employment activities. The Workforce Investment Act (WIA, P.L. Approximately 18,000 to 20,000 eligible youth annually participated in summer employment activities under the WIA Youth Activities program in recent years. In light of changes to workforce law with regard to summer employment opportunities, recent federal initiatives have sought to bolster the summer employment prospects for young people, as summarized in Table 1 . The initiative supports 11 communities in developing and expanding work opportunities for youth during the summer. The 11 communities that received Summer Jobs and Beyond funding are pursuing projects that include providing in-school youth who are refugees with summer jobs and academic support; providing courses and summer jobs in health care, information technology (IT), and manufacturing and infrastructure; and providing employment-related services to eligible Native American youth with limited work experience, among other activities. Engaging Multiple Sectors
Beyond using federal programs to expand summer employment opportunities, the executive branch has created partnerships with the private, nonprofit, and other sectors for this purpose. Considerations for Congress
In considering whether to further support localities in their efforts to expand summer employment, Congress may want to examine the efficacy of summer employment programs and promising approaches to serving young people in these programs. Thus, summer jobs may not necessarily lead to changes in behavior or may have unintended consequences. Evaluations of the One Summer Plus (OSP) program in Chicago and the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) in New York City indicate that summer jobs can reduce violent crime committed by youth participants, reduce the probability of incarceration or death, or improve academic outcomes. P rogram design encompasses many elements, including (1) recruiting employers and worksites to provide the maximum number of job opportunities; (2) matching young people with opportunities that are well aligned with their abilities and skills; (3) preparing young people to succeed with professional training and financial literacy skills; (4) supporting youth and supervisors, such as having staff that provide coaching at the worksite; and (5) ensuring that youth connect to other opportunities in the community, such as year-round employment and programs to prepare youth for employment the following summer. Monthly Labor Force Trends for Youth
Appendix B. | Labor force activity for youth ages 16 to 24 has been in decline since the late 1990s. This trend has been consistent even during the summer months, when youth are most likely to be engaged in work. Labor force data from the month of July highlight changes in summer employment over time. For example, the employment rate—known as the employment to population (E/P) ratio—for youth was 64.1% in July 1996 and 53.2% in July 2016. Congress has long been concerned about ensuring that young people have productive pathways to adulthood, particularly for those youth who are low-income and have barriers to employment. One possible policy lever for improving youth employment prospects is providing jobs and supportive activities during the summer months.
Generally, cities and other local jurisdictions carry out summer employment programs in which youth are placed in jobs or are otherwise participating in activities to facilitate their eventual entry into the workforce. Summer employment may serve multiple policy goals, including supporting low-income youth and their families, encouraging youth to develop "soft skills" that can help them navigate their environments and work well with others, and deterring youth from activities that could lead to them getting in trouble or being harmed. Data are limited on the number of youth engaged in summer employment. A survey of 40 cities reported that nearly 116,000 youth had summer jobs in 2015. This represents a small portion of the approximately 20 million youth ages 16 to 24 in the U.S. labor force during the summer.
Localities fund summer employment activities with public and private dollars. Federal workforce laws since 1964 have authorized funding to local governments for their summer employment activities, primarily for low-income youth with barriers to employment; however, the laws' provisions about summer employment have shifted over time. The existing federal workforce law, the Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act (WIOA, P.L. 113-128), was enacted in 2014 and made summer employment an optional activity under the Youth Activities program. This program provides the major federal support for youth employment and job training activities throughout the United States. The Workforce Investment Act (WIA, P.L. 105-220) and other prior laws required localities to use Youth Activities funding for summer youth employment.
Other recent federal efforts have sought to bolster the summer employment prospects for young people. Under the Summer Jobs and Beyond grant, the Department of Labor provided $21 million in FY2016 for 11 communities to expand work opportunities for youth during the summer. The executive branch has also encouraged other federal programs, including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, to provide employment to eligible youth during the summer. Separately, the Obama Administration forged partnerships with the private and nonprofit sectors to expand summer jobs. For example, the My Brother's Keeper initiative has engaged the private sector in providing job and other opportunities for young men of color.
Summer youth employment is short in duration and can range in intensity for youth participants. Therefore, it may not necessarily lead to changes in behavior or employment outcomes. In considering whether to further support localities in expanding summer employment, Congress may want to examine the efficacy of existing summer employment programs and promising approaches to serving young people in these programs. A small number of rigorously evaluated summer job programs show promise on selected youth outcomes, including programs in Chicago and New York City. A recent study has identified features of high-quality summer employment programs. Such features include a focus on recruiting and supporting youth and employers, a well-trained staff that coordinates with employers and other partners, and technologies to administer the program and facilitate communication with stakeholders. |
crs_R41631 | crs_R41631_0 | In the near term, most expect that the majority of the BBD quota (and a significant portion of the larger advanced biofuel quota) will be met using biodiesel produced from soybean oil, although biodiesel from other feedstocks, as well as other biomass-based substitutes (e.g., synthetic diesel from cellulosic feedstocks or algae), could play a larger role in the future. However, the absence of this incentive for most of 2010, along with high soybean oil prices, caused 2010 biodiesel production to drop significantly—to the point that 2010 production is expected to be below that needed to meet the RFS mandate. RINs may be used by fuel suppliers to meet their obligations, banked for the next calendar year, or traded to other entities. As BBD RINs have become scarce, their price has increased dramatically (by an order of magnitude over the past year). Analysis of the financial market for RINs may serve as a useful method for evaluating the overall market for BBD fuels. At some point, the value of the RINs may increase enough to bring idled production capacity back online or to spur new capacity development, especially if BBD producers expect RIN prices to stay high in the future. This report discusses the current market for BBD fuels and their corresponding RINs under the RFS. It examines the role that the RIN market may play as an economic incentive for the production of biodiesel and other BBD fuels in the future. Lessons learned from the BBD quota and the associated RIN market may provide insights into the future RIN markets for other advanced biofuels and perhaps for the RFS as a whole. The RFS mandates the use of BBD substitutes. Since that time, BBD tax credits have been expanded to include credits for the production of renewable diesel and a Small Agri-Biodiesel Producer Credit. However, these fuels are currently significantly more expensive to produce than biodiesel from soybean oil. Some fuels may be used to meet different obligations simultaneously. 1 and/or no. Despite a growing RFS mandate, the expiration of the tax incentives at the end of 2009 led to a drop in production from 2009 to 2010. As seen in Figure 1 , after the expiration of the tax credit, production declined from 2009 to 2010. Potential Policy Options
The markets for biomass-based diesel fuel and for RINs under the RFS raise many issues. | The market for biomass-based diesel (BBD) fuel, most notably biodiesel, has expanded rapidly since 2004, largely driven by federal policies, especially tax credits and a mandate for their use under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). Most expect that the majority of the BBD fuel quota in the RFS will be met using biodiesel produced from soybean oil. Biodiesel from other feedstocks, and other biomass-based substitutes (e.g., synthetic diesel from cellulosic feedstocks or algae) could play a larger role in the future, although currently these other alternatives are prohibitively expensive to produce in sufficient quantities.
Biodiesel production remains expensive relative to conventional petroleum-based diesel (even with tax credits), largely due to the reliance on soybean oil (a relatively expensive commodity) as a feedstock. Biodiesel and other BBD fuel production remains dependent on both tax incentives and the RFS mandates, as evidenced by a drop in production from 2009 to 2010. The expiration of the BBD tax credits after 2009 more than counteracted the increase in the RFS mandate from 2009 to 2010. Whether enough biodiesel production capacity will come online in 2011 to meet an even larger mandate remains to be seen.
The absence of the tax incentive for most of 2010, along with high soybean oil prices, caused 2010 biodiesel production to drop significantly—to the point that 2010 production may be below that needed to meet the RFS mandate. Any shortfall in supply for the 2010 BBD mandate may be met using credits generated in 2011, leading to even tighter markets going forward. These credits—referred to as RINs (Renewable Identification Numbers)—may be used by fuel suppliers to meet their obligations, banked for the next calendar year, or traded to other entities. In this way, analysis of the financial market for RINs may serve as a useful method for evaluating the overall market for BBD fuels. As BBD RINs become scarce, their price has increased dramatically (by nearly an order of magnitude over the past year). At some point, the value of the RINs may increase enough to bring idled production capacity back online or promote an increase in new capacity development and/or imports, especially if BBD producers expect RIN prices to stay high in the future.
This report discusses the current market for BBD fuels and their corresponding RINs under the RFS. It examines the role that the RIN market may play as an economic incentive for the production of biodiesel and other BBD fuels in the future. Lessons learned from the experience with the BBD quota and the associated RIN market may provide insights into the future RIN markets for other advanced biofuels and perhaps for the RFS as a whole. |
crs_R42606 | crs_R42606_0 | It does so because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. They assert that broad dissemination of such research results increases the likelihood that a highly contagious form of the virus will be introduced, either accidently or deliberately, into the human population. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. In addition, the controversy surrounding the decision to publish these experiments has demonstrated flaws in the existing mechanisms to identify and balance the potential public benefits and security trade-offs. This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns. Case Study: H5N1 Influenza Research
The ongoing controversy regarding the appropriateness of funding research on (and publishing the results of) H5N1 influenza transmissibility serves as a case study for the broader challenges of balancing the potential benefits and potential harms from such research. The two groups submitted manuscripts to different scholarly journals. Balancing Potential Benefits and Harms
Policymakers and stakeholders face difficult calculations when trying to balance the potential benefits of this research against potential harms. The U.K. magazine Nature agreed to consider other stakeholder recommendations prior to publication. Department of Health and Human Services
The HHS charters and oversees the NSABB and adopted both sets of NSABB recommendations. However, the current controversy highlights the flaws in the current processes to identify and mitigate potential security risks associated with performing some research. However, some of the risk mitigation steps in this policy, including the use of prepublication manuscript review and the possibility of limiting distribution of research results, raise additional issues, such as compliance with export control regulations, that likely complicate implementation of this policy. Publishing Dual-Use Research Results
The federal government generally supports the open publication of unclassified, federally funded research results. Limited Access to Research Results
In order to address the security challenges presented by the H5N1 influenza manuscripts, the NSABB recommended that the government develop a mechanism to provide controlled access to sensitive scientific information:
the Board also recognizes that research findings will likely emerge in the very near future that should not be widely disseminated because of a high risk of misuse but that nevertheless should be made available to certain researchers and public health officials around the world who have a legitimate need to know. Once fully implemented, the new policies may not identify all government-sponsored life science research with potentially significant national security concerns. The "United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern" would establish institutional review and oversight requirements for certain categories of federally funded life sciences research. Congress could decide to wait to act until agencies complete implementation before determining whether the new policies adequately address the challenges highlighted by the recent H5N1 influenza manuscripts. Dual-use issues cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. | The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, science, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from such "dual-use," i.e., potentially beneficial and also potentially harmful, research while mitigating its potential risks.
The issue of balancing scientific publication with security concerns has a long historical context, but the current consideration began in late 2011, when two groups of U.S. government-funded scientists submitted papers to academic journals detailing genetic modifications that increase the transmissibility of a deadly influenza strain. Although these research results may improve pandemic influenza preparedness and response, they may also increase the probability that a highly contagious and deadly influenza strain will be introduced, either accidently or deliberately, into the human population. Stakeholders, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the World Health Organization, journal publishers, and scientists, debated whether the possible benefits of publication outweighed the potential harms. The editors of the scientific journals decided to publish modified versions of both papers.
The controversy surrounding the publication of these influenza experiments revealed weaknesses in the existing federal mechanisms to identify and balance potential benefits of life science research and security trade-offs. Responding to these cases, the Administration released new government-wide policies to address some of these flaws. These new policies establish roles for federal funding agencies, institutions, and scientists to regularly review life science research portfolios and develop methods to mitigate security risks.
It is not clear whether the 113th Congress will agree with the Administration that the new policies sufficiently address all of the dual-use issues brought to light by this recent controversy. Congress could decide to allow the new policies to be fully implemented before evaluating them. Alternatively, Congress could require agencies to implement new, different processes to identify potential research of concern prior to funding; require federal prepublication review of all potential research of concern to establish appropriate limits on the distribution of the research results; require federal licensing of researchers permitted to conduct such experiments and access results; and limit such research to the most safe and secure laboratories. All of these options might, however, reduce the number and quality of research studies undertaken.
This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options that may improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns. |
crs_RL31013 | crs_RL31013_0 | Most Recent Developments
On December 21, 2001, President Bush signed into law the District of ColumbiaAppropriations Act for FY2002, P.L. 107-96 (formerly H.R. The House onDecember 6, 2001 and the Senate on December 7, 2001 approved the conference reportaccompanying H.R. 2944 , after resolving significant differences in the generalprovisions of their respective versions of the act. 107-96 appropriates $408 million in specialfederal payments and approves the District's $7.1 billion total budget, including $5.3 billion ingeneral operating funds. The act includes $12.6 million in special federal payments for securityplanning, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September11, 2001. On June 19, 2001, the city council held a public hearing on the Independence of the Chief Financial Officer Establishment Act of 2001, B14-0254. Public Benefits Corporation
During the past year, city leaders and Congress have attempted to address problems and controversies surrounding the Public Benefits Corporation (PBC), D.C.General Hospital, and the restructuring of the city's health care delivery system foruninsured residents of the city. Congress has held hearings to explore the future role of the CFO and the Authorityfollowing the end of the control period. The act requires the mayor to report to Congress, within 45 days of the passage of the act, on the specific authority necessary to carry out certain responsibilitiestransferred to the CFO in a non-control year and certain responsibilities relating tothe transition of responsibilities under the District of Columbia FinancialResponsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995. FY2002: District's Budget Request
On May 25, 2001, District officials transmitted the city's $5.3 billion budget for FY2002 to Congress for review and approval. The city's budget included a $150million reserve fund mandated by the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of1999, P.L. In addition, the House bill included $16 million for emergency planning.The House Appropriations Committee originally recommended that the funds beused for costs associated with security for a World Bank and International MonetaryFund meeting that was scheduled for the end of September 2001, but was postponedbecause of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World TradeCenter. The act allocates approximately 85% of the $408 million in specialfederal payments for court, prisons, and offender supervision-related activities,including $24 million for a new Family Court Division. The prohibition on the use of federal and District funds for a needle exchange program was first approved by Congress as Section 170 of the District of ColumbiaAppropriations Act for FY1999, P.L. The prohibition on the use of District and federal funds is included in the House, Senate, and conference versions of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act forFY2002, P.L. 107-96 includes a provision lifting the congressional prohibition on the use of District funds to implement the Helath Care Benefits Expansion Act. | On December 21, 2001, President Bush signed into law the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2002, P.L. 107-96 (formerly H.R. 2944 ). Two weeks earlier, the House onDecember 6, 2001, and the Senate on December 7, 2001, approved the conference reportaccompanying H.R. 2944 , after resolving significant differences in the generalprovisions of their respective versions of the act. The act, which appropriates $408 million in specialfederal payments, includes $16 million for reimbursement to the District for the cost of providingsecurity for a cancelled World Bank and International Monetary Fund meeting, and for securityplanning in the wake of the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. In addition, the act approves the city's $5.3 billion operating budget for the current fiscal year. Theact lifts the ban on the use of District funds for a domestic partners health insurance act approvedby the city council and signed by the mayor in 1992. Congress has maintained the prohibition onthe use of federal and District funds for needle exchange programs, rejecting a Senate provision thatwould have lifted the prohibition on the use of District funds for such activities. The act lifts therestriction on the location of such activities near public and charter schools. The act, as passed byCongress, requires the District of Columbia public schools to submit to Congress a report thatidentifies all judgments against the DC public schools under the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act.
The District's FY2002 budget request was submitted to Congress on May 25, 2001. The city budget request included $199 million in federal payments to the District of Columbia. The city'sbudget proposal included $5.3 billion in general operating fund expenditures, and $611 million inenterprise funds. The budget also included $78 million in funding for the newly created Health CareSafety Net Administration, which replaced the city's discredited Public Benefits Corporation.
Earlier in 2001, House and Senate District of Columbia Appropriations Subcommittees held hearings that focused on child and family services, and proposed reforms of the family division ofthe District of Columbia Superior Court. P.L. 107-96 includes $24 million for a new Family CourtDivision of the District's Superior Court, including $500,000 for the Child and Family ServicesAgency. The committees also held hearings on the courts, corrections, the fiscal condition of thecity, and the future role of the Chief Financial Officer.
On April 30, 2001, the control board, which was created by Congress to address the city's fiscal and governance problems, approved a resolution that abolished the Public Benefits Corporation andtransferred responsibility for the administration of health care services to the Health Care Safety NetAdministration. The Authority also awarded a contract for health care services to Greater SoutheastCommunity Hospital and the Health Care Alliance.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: G&F = Government and Finance Division; DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division |
crs_RS22696 | crs_RS22696_0 | Moreover, since the SEC could exercise no regulatory supervision over the application of the Exchange rules that permitted or required wire-service termination, there was no potential for conflict between the securities regulatory scheme and enforcement of the antitrust laws. From a Securities Law Perspective
The Securities and Exchange Commission administers a comprehensive body of securities regulation statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing13
Credit Suisse gave the Court the opportunity—not exercised since 1981 —to reiterate and apply its previously stated standards for granting implied antitrust immunity. An antitrust suit (originally a class action) was filed by a group of IPO purchasers against the underwriters of those issues (10 major investment banks) alleging conspiracy, price fixing-related, and tying violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. At first glance, this system of agreement by the issuer and all of the major underwriters of size and pricing of the offering does appear, in fact, to be antitrust-violative price manipulation. We believe it fair to conclude that, where conduct at the core or the marketing of new securities is at issue; where securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible from the forbidden; where the threat to antitrust lawsuits, through error and disincentive, could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an antitrust lawsuit would threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets. Given (1) Congress's expressed concern that securities markets become and remain stable, (2) the continued oversight and actions of a single expert regulatory agency versus the probability of diverse and possibly conflicting decisions by nonexpert judges in the event of securities/antitrust lawsuits, and (3) the likelihood of conflict between the mandates of antitrust law and allowable activities under the securities laws, the Court found that "the securities laws are 'clearly incompatible' with the application of the antitrust laws." Accordingly, implied immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws is accorded to participants in securities markets. Justice Thomas's dissent found fault with the Court's assertion that the securities acts were silent on whether the antitrust laws should be applicable to entities in the securities industry. He noted that both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 state, in "savings clauses," that their remedies "shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity":
Therefore, both statutes explicitly save the very remedies the Court holds to be impliedly precluded. | In Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, the Supreme Court examined whether entities in a heavily regulated industry are necessarily entitled to immunity from prosecution under the federal antitrust laws simply by virtue of their regulated status. The Court had previously ruled that, absent a specific congressional mandate, such immunity may be granted only by findings either of "clear repugnance" between the regulatory scheme and enforcement of the antitrust laws, or sufficiently pervasive regulation of an industry as would be disrupted by application of the antitrust laws; the Credit Suisse opinion reaffirms that reasoning. A class of securities investors alleged that they had paid artificially inflated prices for certain securities because of purportedly antitrust-violative actions taken by the underwriters of some initial public offerings (IPOs). The challenged practices included the formation of syndicates; requiring purchasers of IPOs to make future purchases ("laddering"); and requiring purchasers to buy other, less desirable securities ("tying"). In response, defendants/appellants asserted that they were immune to prosecution under the antitrust laws because of the pervasive regulation of the securities industry by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which administers a comprehensive system of regulation including major parts of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC, they argued, should be the sole arbiter of the validity of their actions, notwithstanding that Congress had not expressly so provided in the applicable legislation. Although the district court, which agreed with the underwriters, dismissed the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed after a lengthy discussion of Supreme Court case law in the area. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, accepting the "pervasive regulation of the securities industry" argument. Specifically, it found that the conduct at issue was "at the core of marketing new securities," noted that "securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible from the forbidden," and concluded, therefore, "that the securities laws are 'clearly incompatible with the application of the antitrust laws in this context." This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44002 | crs_R44002_0 | The two methods of accounting that businesses can use for this purpose are respectively known as cash and accrual basis of accounting. Under cash basis accounting, revenue and expenses generally are recognized and recorded when cash is actually paid or received. Under accrual basis accounting, revenue is recorded when it is earned and expenses are reported when they are incurred, regardless of when payments are actually made or received. Although the cash basis method is simpler and perhaps less administratively burdensome, it may result in a less accurate measure of economic income and allow for a deferral of tax liability. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) considers cash accounting a departure from "normal income tax law." Legislation has been proposed that would change the tax accounting requirements for businesses. Similar discussions on cash and accrual accounting were held prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86; P.L. 99-514 ). This report provides a brief explanation of cash and accrual accounting, and it reviews relevant legislative history surrounding TRA86. On the one hand, the cash method of accounting is simpler. As a general rule, the following businesses were prohibited from using the cash method: (1) Subchapter C corporations with average gross receipts over $5 million; (2) partnerships that had a subchapter C corporation with average gross receipts over $5 million as a partner; (3) tax shelters; and (4) businesses that had average gross receipts in excess of $1 million that carried inventory. Recent Legislative Proposals
The proposals to change the method of accounting for tax purposes predate the 1986 tax reform and continue to be a policy consideration for Congress and the executive branch. Since TRA86, there have been other proposals to modify the tax code as it relates to cash accounting. Several bills introduced in the 113 th Congress, including the Small Business Accounting and Tax Simplification Act ( H.R. 947 ), the Start-up Jobs and Innovation Act ( S. 1658 ), and the Small Business Tax Certainty and Growth Act ( S. 1085 ), would have expanded the use of cash basis accounting by raising the average gross receipts limit to $10 million from $5 million. 1 would have restricted cash accounting for some businesses. It would have required certain partnerships, S corporations, and PSCs that currently use the cash method to use the accrual method if their average gross receipts exceed $10 million. The President's budget proposal differs from the congressional proposals by increasing the average gross receipts limit to $25 million instead of $10 million. One general option is to expand the number of businesses allowed to use cash accounting by either including all businesses regardless of legal structure or increasing the average gross receipts threshold. According to Table 1 increasing the threshold to $10 million would allow 96% of C corporations to use cash accounting. 2 in the 110 th Congress and H.R. Limit Cash Accounting or Require Accrual Accounting
Alternatively, Congress could eliminate cash accounting for all businesses or restrict the use of cash accounting for certain types of businesses based on legal structure. One provision of the Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. | Two methods of accounting are generally available to businesses: cash basis and accrual basis accounting. Under cash basis accounting, revenue and expenses are recognized and recorded when cash is actually paid or received. Under accrual basis accounting, revenue is recorded when it is earned and expenses are reported when they are incurred, regardless of when payment is actually made or received. On the one hand, the cash basis method is simpler and arguably less administratively burdensome on businesses. On the other hand, cash accounting may result in a less accurate measure of economic income and allow for a deferral of tax liability. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) considers cash accounting a departure from "normal income tax law" and thus classifies it as a tax expenditure.
Current tax law requires that most companies with average gross receipts in excess of $5 million use the accrual basis of accounting. Some companies are allowed to use either the cash or accrual basis methods of accounting for tax purposes. Examples of companies that may be excepted from using accrual basis tax accounting regardless of total average gross receipts include sole proprietors and certain qualified Personal Service Corporations (PSCs) in such fields as health, law, engineering, accounting, performing arts, and consulting firms, as well as farms that are not corporations or do not have a corporate partner.
Some Members of Congress and the Administration have put forth proposals that would expand the number of firms allowed to use cash accounting by increasing the average gross receipts limit test. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1) introduced in the 113th Congress would have expanded cash accounting by increasing the average gross receipts limit test to $10 million, but it would have also restricted the use of cash accounting for certain other firms. Although allowed to use cash accounting under current law, certain partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and PSCs with average gross receipts in excess of $10 million would not have been allowed to use cash accounting under the provisions of H.R. 1. Also introduced in the 113th Congress, the Small Business Accounting and Tax Simplification Act (H.R. 947), Start-up Jobs and Innovation Act (S. 1658), and Small Business Tax Certainty and Growth Act (S. 1085) would have all allowed certain firms with average gross receipts of $10 million or less to use cash accounting. Similarly, S. 341 introduced in the 114th Congress would raise the average gross receipts test limit to $10 million. The President's FY2016 budget proposal also calls for expansion of cash accounting by changing the threshold from $5 million to $25 million.
This report provides a brief explanation of cash and accrual accounting. It then examines the legislative history surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514), which set most of the current policies related to cash accounting for tax purposes. It also discusses recent policy proposals to change accounting requirements for tax purposes. The report concludes by discussing a number of policy considerations Congress may find useful. |
crs_R43573 | crs_R43573_0 | C ongress has generally broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process (i.e., the process whereby agencies acquire supplies and services from other entities for the agency's direct benefit or use). One of the many ways in which Congress has exercised this authority is by enacting measures that encourage agencies to contract and subcontract with "small businesses." For purposes of federal procurement law, the term small business generally denotes a business that (1) is independently owned and operated, (2) is not dominant in its field of operations, and (3) has fewer employees or annual receipts than the standard that the Small Business Administration (SBA) has established for the industry in which the business operates. In exercising its authority over procurement, Congress has declared a policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars is awarded to small businesses. It has also required the executive branch to establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the amount of contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses that equal or exceed specified percentages of federal procurement spending (e.g., 3% to Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses). Congress has similarly required or authorized agencies to conduct set-asides , or competitions in which only small businesses may compete, as well as to make noncompetitive or "sole-source" awards to small businesses in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other businesses. In addition, the SBA and officers of the procuring agencies are tasked with reviewing and restructuring proposed procurements to maximize opportunities for small business participation. Congress periodically amends the statutes governing contracting and subcontracting with small businesses to better achieve its declared policy of ensuring that small businesses receive a "fair proportion" of federal procurement spending. The 111 th and 112 th Congresses, in particular, made numerous changes. These Congresses enacted legislation ( P.L. 111-240 , P.L. 112-239 ) that addresses, among other things, (1) the standards under which business size is determined; (2) goals for contracting and subcontracting with small businesses; (3) prime contractors' obligations in subcontracting with small businesses; (4) SBA guarantees of small businesses' performance and payment bonds; (5) "bundling" and "consolidation" of agency requirements into contracts unsuitable for performance by small businesses; (6) set-asides for women-owned small businesses; and (7) mentor-protégé programs for small business contractors. Compared to the 111 th and 112 th Congresses, the 113 th Congress enacted relatively few measures addressing small business contracting, perhaps because the amendments made to the various laws governing small business contracting by its predecessors were still being implemented and assessed. Legislation Enacted by the 113th Congress
Building on the work of its predecessors, the 113 th Congress addressed the government-wide and agency-specific goals for contracting and subcontracting with small businesses. Such legislation was intended to promote subcontracting with small businesses, as were other measures introduced in the 113 th Congress. | Congress has generally broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process (i.e., the process whereby agencies acquire supplies and services from other entities for the agency's direct benefit or use). One of the many ways in which Congress has exercised this authority is by enacting measures that encourage agencies to contract and subcontract with "small businesses." For purposes of federal procurement law, the term small business generally denotes a business that (1) is independently owned and operated, (2) is not dominant in its field of operations, and (3) has fewer employees or annual receipts than the standards that the Small Business Administration (SBA) has established for the industries in which the business operates.
In exercising its authority over procurement, Congress has declared a policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars is awarded to small businesses. It has also required the executive branch to establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses that equal or exceed specified percentages of federal procurement spending (e.g., 3% for Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses). Congress has similarly required or authorized agencies to conduct set-asides, or competitions in which only small businesses may compete, as well as to make noncompetitive or "sole-source" awards to small businesses in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other businesses. In addition, the SBA and officers of the procuring agencies are tasked with reviewing and restructuring proposed procurements to maximize opportunities for small business participation.
Congress periodically amends the statutes governing contracting and subcontracting with small businesses to further its declared policy of ensuring that small businesses receive a "fair proportion" of federal procurement spending. The 111th and 112th Congresses, in particular, made numerous changes to such statutes. These Congresses enacted legislation (P.L. 111-240, P.L. 112-239) that addresses, among other things, (1) the standards under which business size is determined; (2) goals for contracting and subcontracting with small businesses; (3) prime contractors' obligations in subcontracting with small businesses; (4) SBA guarantees of small businesses' performance and payment bonds; (5) "bundling" and "consolidation" of agency requirements into contracts unsuitable for performance by small businesses; (6) set-asides for women-owned small businesses; and (7) mentor-protégé programs for small business contractors.
Compared to the 111th and 112th Congresses, the 113th Congress enacted relatively few measures addressing small business contracting, perhaps because the amendments made by its predecessors were still being implemented and assessed. Among other things, the primary measures enacted by the 113th Congress (P.L. 113-66, P.L. 113-291) made certain modifications to the legal requirements regarding the use of reverse auctions; sole-source awards to women-owned small businesses; reporting on "bundled" or "consolidated" contracts; reporting on goals for contracting and subcontracting with small businesses; and prime contractors' obligations as to subcontracting with small businesses. Other measures introduced or, in a few cases, enacted in the 113th Congress addressed other topics. |
crs_RL34501 | crs_RL34501_0 | It is possible that similar legislation will be considered in the 111 th Congress. Activities Currently Proscribed
INA § 274 proscribes several types of activities that can be characterized as alien smuggling. Knowledge of legal status is irrelevant. In the 110 th Congress, several legislative proposals addressing alien smuggling saw legislative action or received significant congressional interest. S. 2366 / S. 2368 (the SAVE Act); House-passed H.R. 2399 , its companion bill S. 2463 ; and House-passed H.R. 2830 all contained similar language and would have amended both the INA and Title 18 of the U.S. Code. These bills would have significantly altered the wording and structure of INA § 274, expanding its scope. They also would have added alien smuggling provisions in § 2237 of Title 18, enhancing sentencing for disobeying federal officials on the high seas while engaging in alien smuggling. | The primary statutory provision proscribing alien smuggling is § 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). INA § 274 proscribes a broad spectrum of activities that would aid aliens to enter and live within the United States without proper legal status. In the 110th Congress, several legislative proposals were introduced to modify the penalties for alien smuggling, some of which saw legislative action or received significant congressional interest. S. 2366/S. 2368 (the SAVE Act); House-passed H.R. 2399, its companion bill S. 2463; and House-passed H.R. 2830 all contained similar language and would have amended both the INA and Title 18 of the U.S. Code. These bills would have significantly altered the wording and structure of INA § 274, expanding its scope. They also would have added alien smuggling provisions in § 2237 of Title 18, enhancing sentencing for disobeying federal officials on the high seas while engaging in alien smuggling. It is possible that similar legislation will be considered in the 111th Congress. |
crs_RL34261 | crs_RL34261_0 | Russia's Oil and Gas Industries and Russian Foreign Policy
Russian oil and natural gas industries are very important players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Another key trend has been the concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government in the past decade. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an authoritarian political system under the tight control of President Vladimir Putin, a former officer of the Soviet KGB intelligence service. The global economic crisis hurt Russia's energy firms, Russia's economy, and Russia's international clout, as energy prices tumbled. Russia has tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of European countries. Russia needs these assets to transport energy supplies to Western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where energy infrastructure was sold to non-Russian firms, Russia cut off energy supplies to the facilities. Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices. It is not clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is always the primary explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions have been raised about the timing of such moves. The pursuit of multiple pipelines can also be portrayed as a business decision, although some analysts disagree about its wisdom. Many countries of central and eastern Europe are concerned that Russia may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or force them to make foreign policy concessions. Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries, Russia is able to manipulate the internal political situation by favoring certain local businessmen with participation in local business ventures of Gazprom or other Russian energy firms. U.S. Policy
The United States has criticized what it has viewed as Russian efforts to use its energy supplies as a political weapon. U.S. "Pipeline Diplomacy"
The United States has urged European countries to diversify their energy, supplies, reducing their dependence on Russia. The United States has strongly advocated the building of multiple pipelines to supply energy from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. Congressional Response
Members of Congress have expressed concern about the impact of Russian energy dependency on the countries of central and eastern Europe. Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to concerns about Russian energy policy. | The Russian oil and natural gas industries are key players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Another trend has been the concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an authoritarian political system, in which former intelligence officers play key roles.
Russian firms have tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of European countries. They need these assets to transport energy supplies to lucrative western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where assets were sold to non-Russian firms, Russian firms cut off energy supplies to the facilities. Russia has also tried to build new pipelines to circumvent infrastructure that it does not control. Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices.
It is not completely clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is the primary explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions have been raised about the timing of such moves. Even the pursuit of multiple pipelines can be portrayed as a business decision. On the other hand, many countries of the region are concerned that Russia may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or to force them to make foreign policy concessions. Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries, Russian energy firms are able to manipulate the internal political situation by favoring certain local businessmen and politicians. However, the current global economic crisis has hurt Russia's energy firms and Russia's international clout, as energy prices have tumbled.
Bush Administration officials repeatedly criticized what they viewed as Russian efforts to use its energy supplies as a political weapon. The Obama Administration, like its predecessor, has urged European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy, but has said the United States is trying to cooperate with Moscow on the issue. The United States has strongly advocated the building of multiple pipelines from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the impact on European countries of their dependence on Russian energy. In the 111th Congress, committees have held hearings that have touched on the issue. Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to worrisome aspects of Russian energy policy. |
crs_RL32480 | crs_RL32480_0 | Introduction
Congress has broad plenary authority to determine classes of aliens who may be admitted into the United States and the grounds for which they may be removed. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, certain conduct may either disqualify an alien from entering the United States or provide grounds for his or her removal. Prominently included among this conduct is criminal activity. This report discusses the potential immigration consequences of criminal activity. Notably, being in the United States without legal permission—i.e., being an "illegal alien"—is not a crime in and of itself. Most crimes included under these grounds are not specifically mentioned, but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies . In addition, certain criminal conduct precludes a finding of good moral character under the INA, thereby preventing an alien from becoming either a naturalized U.S. citizen or a candidate for certain types of relief. Pursuant to INA § 101(f), an alien is barred from being found to have good moral character if, during the period for which character is required to be established, the alien
commits certain acts related to prostitution or another commercialized vice; knowingly encourages, induces, assists, abets, or aids any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law, except in limited circumstances; commits a crime of moral turpitude, unless the alien committed only one crime and either (1) the crime was committed while the alien was a minor and the crime (as well as the alien's release from any imprisonment for the crime) occurred at least five years prior to the pertinent application or (2) the maximum possible penalty for the crime did not exceed one year's imprisonment and the sentence imposed did not exceed six months; violates a federal, state, or foreign law or regulation relating to a controlled substance, other than a single offense of possessing 30 grams or less of marijuana; commits two or more offenses for which the aggregate sentence imposed was at least five years; gives false information in attempting to receive a benefit under the INA; has an income principally derived from illegal gambling activities; commits at least two gambling offenses for which the alien is convicted; is in criminal confinement for at least 180 days; or has at any time been convicted of an aggravated felony. P.L. Voluntary Departure
Through a grant of voluntary departure, an otherwise deportable alien may depart the United States without the stigma and legal consequences that would attach to a compulsory removal order. 110 - 257 , providing certain relief from inadmissibility to members of the African National Congress; P.L. 110 - 340 , making persons who have engaged in the recruitment of child soldiers in violation of federal law inadmissible, deportable and ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal; and P.L. 110 - 457 , modifying the grounds for inadmissibility and removal related to human trafficking. It is possible that proposals will be introduced in the 111 th Congress to further modify the immigration consequences of criminal activity. | Congress has broad plenary authority to determine classes of aliens who may be admitted into the United States and the grounds for which they may be removed. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, certain conduct may either disqualify an alien from entering the United States ("inadmissibility") or provide grounds for his or her removal/deportation. Prominently included among this conduct is criminal activity. "Criminal activity" comprises acts violative of federal, state, or, in many cases, foreign criminal law. It does not cover violations of the INA that are not crimes—most notably, being in the United States without legal permission. Thus, the term "illegal alien"—an alien without legal status—is not synonymous with "criminal alien."
Most crimes affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the INA, but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies. In addition, certain criminal conduct precludes a finding of good moral character under the INA, which is a requirement for naturalization and certain types of immigration relief.
In certain circumstances, grounds for inadmissibility or deportation may be waived. In some cases, aliens facing removal may be allowed to remain in the United States—for example, when they are granted discretionary or mandatory relief from removal for humanitarian reasons, such as through asylum, withholding of removal, or cancellation of removal. Aliens facing removal may also be permitted to depart the United States voluntarily, and thereby avoid the potential stigma and legal consequences of forced removal. Criminal conduct may affect an alien's eligibility for either voluntary departure or discretionary relief from removal. Additionally, criminal conduct is a key disqualifying factor under the character requirement for naturalization.
Several legislative proposals were made during the 110th Congress that contained provisions modifying the immigration consequences of criminal activity. Enacted legislation modifying the immigration consequences of criminal activity included P.L. 110-257, providing certain relief from inadmissibility to members of the African National Congress; P.L. 110-340, making persons who have engaged in the recruitment of child soldiers in violation of federal law inadmissible, deportable and ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal; and P.L. 110-457, modifying the grounds for inadmissibility and removal related to human trafficking. |
crs_R43180 | crs_R43180_0 | On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a national "Climate Action Plan" to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. During his speech, the President made reference to the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline and stated that an evaluation of the pipeline's impact on climate change would factor into the State Department's national interest determination:
Allowing the Keystone pipeline to be built requires a finding that doing so would be in our nation's interest. The State Department, in its March 2013 Draft Environmental Impact Statement ( DEIS ) for the Keystone XL Pipeline, has produced one such assessment. It reports both "direct" GHG emissions from the construction and operation of the proposed pipeline as well as "indirect" emissions attributed to the production and use of the oil sands crudes that would be transported through the proposed pipeline. Based on its review of the available GHG emissions assessments, as well as an analysis of North American crude oil transport infrastructure and global crude oil markets , the State Department finds the following:
Approval or denial of the proposed Project is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the rate of development in the oil sands, or on the amount of heavy crude oil refined in the Gulf Coast area. In summary, the DEIS reports that the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline "would be responsible for incremental GHG emissions in the range of 0.07 ... 5.30 MMTCO 2 e annually," and places these numbers in context by noting U.S. GHG emissions totaled 6,822 MMTCO 2 e in 2010 (excluding emissions/removals from land use, land-use change, and forestry), and global CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion totaled 30,326 MMCO 2 e. The incremental pipeline emissions would represent an increase of 0.001%-0.08% over the total domestic GHG inventory for the United States in 2010 and would be equivalent, at most, to the annual GHG emissions from the energy used in a little over 1 million passenger vehicles or the annual CO 2 emissions from the energy used in a little over a quarter million homes in the United States. The State Department has chosen a WTW assessment for the DEIS. 3. Based on future cost saving assumptions which the State Department projects for rail transport, the DEIS concludes "that the incremental increase in cost of rail compared to pipeline transport is $5 per barrel." Determining the effects that the incremental cost of rail transport may have on oil sands production. They argue that while many of the decisions that may affect the development of the oil sands will be made by the market and the national and provincial governments of Canada, the choice of whether or not to approve the permit for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline is an opportunity for the U.S. government to signal its future direction. On January 31, 2014, the State Department released the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Keystone XL Pipeline, which contained revised analysis and estimates. For a detailed review of these findings see CRS Report R43415, Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Final Environmental Impact Statement , by [author name scrubbed] . | On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a national "Climate Action Plan" to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. During his speech, the President made reference to the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline and stated that an evaluation of the project's impacts on climate change would factor into the U.S. State Department's national interest determination. The State Department, in the March 2013 Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Keystone XL Pipeline, reports estimates for both the direct (i.e., operational) and indirect (i.e., associated with crude oil production and use) GHG emissions that would be attributable to the proposed project. The DEIS finds that "the proposed Project would be responsible for incremental GHG emissions in the range of 0.07 ... 5.3 [million metric tons of CO2 equivalent] annually." These emissions would represent an increase of 0.001%-0.08% over the domestic GHG emissions totals of 6,822 MMTCO2e in 2010. The State Department bases its findings on the following conclusions: (1) approval or denial of the proposed pipeline is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the rate of development in the oil sands, or on the amount of heavy crude oil refined in the Gulf Coast area in the long term, (2) denial of the proposed pipeline is offset entirely by the expansion of new rail and pipeline infrastructure in North America in the long term, and (3) the cumulative impact of the proposed pipeline would be the additional oil sands production that would become economical given the marginal cost savings afforded by the project over non-pipeline transport.
Many industry stakeholders, the Canadian and Albertan governments, and proponents of the proposed pipeline have generally supported the State Department's findings. They contend that the demand for the oil sands resource, as well as the economic incentives for producers and the Canadian governments, is too significant to dampen production. However, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), among other stakeholders, has questioned several of the conclusions put forth by the DEIS and recommended that the State Department revisit the analysis. Opponents of the project argue that the Keystone XL Pipeline may have greater impacts than projected in the DEIS if certain State Department assumptions were to differ, including projections for global crude oil markets, rail transport costs, new project costs, refinery inputs, and carbon pricing policies. Members of Congress remain divided on the merits of the proposed project, as many have expressed support for the potential energy security and economic benefits, while others have expressed reservations about its potential environmental impacts. Though Congress, to date, has had no direct role in permitting the pipeline's construction, it may have oversight stemming from federal environmental statutes that govern the review. Further, Congress may seek to influence the State Department's permitting process or to assert direct congressional authority over approval through new legislation.
On January 31, 2014, the State Department released the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Keystone XL Pipeline, which contained revised analysis and estimates. For a detailed review of these findings, see CRS Report R43415, Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45288 | crs_R45288_0 | DOD's child development program (CDP) is one of these family-oriented initiatives and is part of a broader set of community and family support programs. DOD considers childcare services a quality-of-life benefit and DOD officials have indicated that the primary reason for providing childcare services is to enhance force readiness. Some within DOD and military family advocacy groups have tied childcare benefits to improved recruitment, morale, and retention of military personnel. Military servicemembers are, on average, younger than the civilian population, and have fewer children. Child Development Centers (CDCs) . Critics of accreditation have argued that the requirements impose unnecessary time and resource burdens on childcare staff. Congress first appropriated funds for the construction of new childcare facilities in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1982. The services used this authority to add over 9,000 childcare spaces through additions and renovations to existing facilities. Those who advocate specifically for DOD-sponsored childcare services point to expansion of family-friendly benefits among private sector employers and suggest that these benefits help to make DOD a more attractive employer. Currently DOD's CDP includes a mix of direct provision of on-installation care, training, support and oversight of privatized care (FCCs), government employees in government-owned facilities (CDCs), subsidies to military families for off-installation privatized care (e.g., fee assistance programs), and provision of localized information about private childcare providers and resources. Fee Assistance
There are some potential benefits to the fee assistance program in comparison to the DOD-run care facilities. | The Department of Defense (DOD) operates the largest employer-sponsored childcare program in the United States, serving approximately 200,000 children of uniformed servicemembers and DOD civilians, and employing over 23,000 childcare workers, at an annual cost of over $800 million. DOD's child development program (CDP) includes a combination of accredited, installation-based, government-run, full-time pre-school and school-aged care in Child Development Centers (CDCs) and subsidized care in Family Care Centers (FCCs) or through private providers under the Fee Assistance program.
Childcare services are part of a broader set of quality of life benefits that make up the total compensation package for military personnel and certain DOD civilians. The Department has argued that these childcare benefits help support their recruiting, retention, and readiness goals and that there is generally a high level of satisfaction among servicemembers who use DOD childcare services. Moreover, military family advocacy groups have largely supported existing childcare benefits and have also called for expanding awareness of, access to, operating hours for, and improving or enhancing other aspects of military childcare services.
While there has been broad support for DOD's CDP since its inception, the questions of what benefits should be provided to military servicemembers and their families, how these benefits should be structured, and what resources should be directed to these benefits are issues for Congress when considering the annual defense budget authorization and appropriation. |
crs_RL33461 | crs_RL33461_0 | An additional $47.7 million was requested for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in FY201 9 (up from $30 million in FY2018) to resume its licensing process for Yucca Mountain. After deciding to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository project, the Obama Administration established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC) to develop a new nuclear waste policy. 3053 , H.Rept. Private-Sector Waste Storage Sites
An NRC license application for a spent fuel storage facility in New Mexico was filed March 30, 2017, by Holtec International, a manufacturer of spent fuel storage systems. It is similar to bills ( H.R. In planning to restart the Yucca Mountain program, the Trump Administration announced in its FY2019 budget request (and the FY2018 request) that DOE would conduct a new cost assessment for determining the level of the nuclear waste fee, based on previous cost estimates for Yucca Mountain. 97-425 ), as amended in 1987, requires DOE to focus on Yucca Mountain, NV, as the site of a deep underground repository for spent nuclear fuel and other highly radioactive waste. DOE submitted a license application for the repository to NRC on June 3, 2008, and projected that the repository could begin receiving waste in 2020, about 22 years later than the 1998 goal established by NWPA. However, the Obama Administration made a policy decision that the Yucca Mountain repository should not be opened, largely because of Nevada's continuing opposition, although it requested FY2010 funding to continue the NRC licensing process. The Trump Administration's proposal to restart the Yucca Mountain project in FY2019 would provide funding for a Yucca Mountain program office, legal and technical support for the Yucca Mountain license application to NRC, and the management of millions of documents supporting the application. The nuclear power industry has supported completion of NRC's licensing review of Yucca Mountain along with the pursuit of alternative storage and disposal facilities. 5895 ), the House included $100 million above the Administration's Yucca Mountain funding request, while no funds were provided by the Senate. 3053 ), which passed the House on May 10, 2018, would satisfy a major condition for licensing the Yucca Mountain repository by withdrawing the repository site from use under public lands laws and placing it solely under DOE's control. It would also authorize DOE to store spent fuel at an NRC-licensed interim storage facility owned by a nonfederal entity. Another major provision would increase the capacity limit on the Yucca Mountain repository from 70,000 to 110,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, in comparison with the 80,000 metric tons stored at U.S. nuclear plants at the end of 2017. 4442 ) on November 17, 2017, to authorize DOE to store spent fuel from nuclear plants at privately owned consolidated storage facilities. H.R. Spent Nuclear Fuel
Current Program and Proposed Policy Changes
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 established a system for selecting a geologic repository for the permanent disposal of up to 70,000 metric tons (77,000 tons) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) was created to carry out the program. Interim storage facilities are especially needed so that waste can be removed from shutdown reactor sites, the commission said. However, WCS subsequently formed a joint venture with Orano USA called Waste Control Partners, which submitted a renewed application for the Texas facility on June 11, 2018. Concluding Discussion
Disposal of radioactive waste will be a key issue in the continuing nuclear power debate. The "consent based" nuclear waste siting process recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission, and which would be authorized by the Senate Appropriations Committee's FY2018 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill and other legislation, has attracted serious interest from localities in New Mexico and Texas. Reports on current nuclear waste issues. The Road to Yucca Mountain: The Development of Radioactive Waste Policy in the United States. | Management of civilian radioactive waste has posed difficult issues for Congress since the beginning of the nuclear power industry in the 1950s. Federal policy is based on the premise that nuclear waste can be disposed of safely, but proposed storage and disposal facilities have frequently been challenged on safety, health, and environmental grounds. Although civilian radioactive waste encompasses a wide range of materials, most of the current debate focuses on highly radioactive spent fuel from nuclear power plants. The United States currently has no permanent disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel or other highly radioactive waste.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) calls for disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep geologic repository. NWPA established the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management in the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop such a repository, which would be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Amendments to NWPA in 1987 restricted DOE's repository site studies to Yucca Mountain in Nevada. DOE submitted a license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to NRC on June 3, 2008. The State of Nevada strongly opposes the Yucca Mountain project, citing excessive water infiltration, earthquakes, volcanoes, human intrusion, and other technical issues.
Licensing and design work for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository was halted under the Obama Administration, which cited continued opposition from Nevada. To develop an alternative nuclear waste policy, the Obama Administration established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which in 2012 recommended a "consent based" process for siting nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities.
The Trump Administration included funds to restart Yucca Mountain licensing in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget submissions to Congress. The FY2018 Yucca Mountain funding request was not enacted. For FY2019, the House voted to provide $100 million above the Administration's request for Yucca Mountain, while the Senate zeroed it out (H.R. 5895).
Although no funding has been appropriated for Yucca Mountain activities since FY2010, a federal appeals court on August 13, 2013, ordered NRC to continue the licensing process with previously appropriated funds. The NRC staff completed its safety evaluation report on Yucca Mountain on January 29, 2015, concluding that the repository would meet NRC standards after specific additional actions were taken, such as acquisition of land and water rights.
A bill to provide the necessary land controls for the planned Yucca Mountain repository (H.R. 3053, H.Rept. 115-355) passed the House on May 10, 2018. In addition, the House-passed bill would authorize DOE to store commercial waste from nuclear power plants at a nonfederal interim storage facility. It would also increase the capacity limit on the Yucca Mountain repository from 70,000 to 110,000 metric tons, in comparison with the approximately 80,000 metric tons currently stored at U.S. nuclear plants.
Nonfederal interim storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel are being proposed in New Mexico and Texas. An NRC license application for the New Mexico facility was filed March 30, 2017. Developers of the proposed Texas storage site filed a license application in 2016, subsequently withdrew it because of rising costs, and then submitted a renewed application with an additional partner on June 11, 2018. Interim storage proponents contend that DOE could fulfill its disposal obligations under NWPA by taking title to spent fuel at nuclear plant sites and storing it at private facilities until a permanent underground repository could be opened.
NWPA required DOE to begin removing spent fuel from reactor sites by January 31, 1998. Because that deadline was missed, nuclear utilities have sued DOE to recover the additional storage costs they have incurred, with damage payment so far totaling $6.9 billion. |
crs_R45264 | crs_R45264_0 | I n 2017, three hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—caused extensive damage to several states within the continental United States and to the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) and Puerto Rico. 115-25 , the Weather Research and Forecasting Act of 2017, which provides direction to NOAA and NWS on a range of weather-related activities, including hurricanes. The broad aim of the legislation is to improve weather forecasts and warnings, and Section 104 of Title 1 of P.L. 115-25 specifically aims to improve hurricane forecasting. At the April 12, 2018, hearing, the acting Administrator for NOAA stated that NOAA would continue to follow guidelines outlined in P.L. 115-25 to improve the agency's hurricane predictions. Congress likely will continue to conduct oversight and consider legislation regarding the federal effort to improve hurricane forecasting, especially in response to active and destructive hurricane seasons, such as the one 2017. Forecasting Hurricanes: Role of the National Hurricane Center
The National Hurricane Center (NHC), part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Weather Service (NWS), is responsible for forecasting tropical cyclones, including hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The NHC provides estimates of the path or track of a tropical cyclone, the intensity, and the size and structure of the storm, as well as predictions of storm surge, rainfall, and even tornadoes. Depending on the status of the tropical cyclone, this information may be used to create a hurricane watch or a hurricane warning and public advisories, which are issued on an increasingly frequent basis if a storm strengthens and approaches the U.S. coastline. The ability to forecast hurricane tracks has improved steadily since the 1960s ( Figure 1 ), increasing the likelihood of more accurately predicting landfall location. Better instruments aboard weather satellites, such as the GOES series and the polar-orbiting weather satellites, have contributed to those improvements, as have more sophisticated hurricane forecast models and vastly improved computing capabilities. Until the last decade, hurricane intensity forecasts had improved in smaller increments than hurricane track forecasts (see Figure 2 ). (Superstorm Sandy, for example, produced a storm surge that inundated the heavily populated coastline in New Jersey and New York to cause enormous damage, despite the storm itself being a relatively weak hurricane immediately prior to landfall.) Improvements and Challenges
Perhaps the biggest challenge for the NHC is how to improve the ability to predict hurricane intensity—basically, how strong a hurricane will become and when and where it will reach its maximum intensity (its highest sustained wind speeds). However, that measurement does not take into consideration the storm-surge or precipitation-caused flooding, both of which may be among the most dangerous elements of a hurricane. In general, forecasts of these hurricanes' tracks were better than the previous five-year average for track forecasts. However, forecasts of intensity were less accurate; some forecast errors for these hurricanes exceeded the previous five-year average for forecast errors. Hurricane Harvey
Hurricane Harvey was the first major hurricane to strike the continental United States since 2005, achieving category 4 strength before making landfall along the Texas coast on August 25, 2017, about 6 miles east of Rockport, Texas. According to the NHC, Harvey "was the most significant tropical cyclone rainfall event in United States history, both in scope and peak rainfall amounts, since reliable records began around the 1880s." Hurricane Irma
Hurricane Irma was the second major hurricane to strike the continental U.S. coast in 2017, making landfall in the Florida Keys near Cudjoe Key at category 4 strength on September 10 and striking southwest Florida near Marco Island later that day as a category 3 hurricane ( Figure 6 ). Irma's large wind field produced significant storm-surge flooding along the northeastern coast of Florida, even though the storm made landfall in southwestern Florida. It was the deadliest storm of 2017 and is widely regarded as the worst natural disaster to strike Puerto Rico on record. Puerto Rico was still recovering from damage caused by Hurricane Irma two weeks earlier when Maria made landfall. The outlook for 2018, initially issued on May 24, predicted 10-16 named storms, 5-9 hurricanes, and 1-4 major hurricanes. The CPC updated its outlook on August 9, predicting 9-13 named storms, 4-7 hurricanes, and 0-2 major hurricanes. At an April 12, 2018, hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the acting NOAA Administrator stated that forecasts for the 2017 hurricane season "were the best the NHC [National Hurricane Center] ever produced." | The National Hurricane Center (NHC), part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Weather Service (NWS), is responsible for forecasting hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The NHC provides estimates of the path of a storm (i.e., hurricane track), the intensity, and the size and structure of the storm, as well as predictions of storm surge, rainfall, and even tornadoes. Depending on the storm's status, this information may be used to create a hurricane watch or a hurricane warning and public advisories, which are issued on an increasingly frequent basis if a storm strengthens and approaches the U.S. coastline.
Three major hurricanes struck the continental United States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico in 2017, causing severe damage: Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Hurricane Harvey was the first major hurricane to strike the continental U.S. coast since 2005, achieving category 4 strength before making landfall along the Texas coast on August 25, 2017. According to the NHC, Harvey "was the most significant tropical cyclone rainfall event in United States history, both in scope and peak rainfall amounts, since reliable records began around the 1880s." Hurricane Irma was the second major hurricane to strike the continental U.S. coast in 2017, making landfall in the Florida Keys on September 10. Irma's large wind field produced significant storm-surge flooding along the northeastern coast of Florida, even though the storm made landfall in southwestern Florida. Puerto Rico was still recovering from damage caused by Hurricane Irma when Hurricane Maria made landfall on September 20. Maria was the deadliest storm of 2017 and is widely regarded as the worst natural disaster on record to strike Puerto Rico.
For the 2018 hurricane season, the Climate Prediction Center (CPC), within the NWS, predicted 10-16 named storms, 5-9 hurricanes, and 1-4 major hurricanes in its May 24, 2018 announcement. The August 9, 2018, update to the seasonal prediction lowered those estimates to 9-13 named storms, 4-7 hurricanes, and 0-2 major hurricanes. The updated forecast indicated a less active Atlantic hurricane season in 2018 compared to the May prediction.
In general, forecasts of the 2017 hurricanes' tracks were better than the previous five-year average for track forecasts. The ability to forecast hurricane tracks has improved steadily since the 1960s, increasing the likelihood of more accurately predicting landfall location. Better instruments aboard weather satellites, such as the GOES (geostationary) series and the polar-orbiting weather satellites, have contributed to these improvements, together with more sophisticated hurricane forecast models and vastly improved computing capabilities, among other factors.
These factors also have improved forecasts of hurricane intensity, but they have done so in smaller increments per decade compared to improvements in track forecasts (at least until the last decade). Forecasts of intensity for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria proved more difficult than forecasts of tracks; some errors in intensity forecasts for these hurricanes exceeded the previous five-year averages for forecast errors.
Indeed, perhaps the biggest challenge for the NHC is how to improve the ability to predict hurricane intensity. Furthermore, hurricane intensity itself is generally measured as highest sustained wind speeds, but that measurement does not take into consideration the storm-surge or precipitation-caused flooding, both of which may be among the most dangerous elements of a hurricane. Superstorm Sandy, for example, produced a storm surge that inundated the heavily populated coastline in New Jersey and New York to cause enormous damage.
On April 18, 2017, Congress enacted P.L. 115-25, the Weather Research and Forecasting Act of 2017, which provides direction to NOAA and NWS on a range of weather-related activities, including hurricanes. The legislation's broad aim is to improve weather forecasts and warnings, and Section 104 of Title 1 specifically aims to improve hurricane forecasting. At an April 12, 2018, hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the acting Administrator for NOAA stated that NOAA would continue to follow guidelines outlined in P.L. 115-25 to improve the agency's hurricane predictions. Congress likely will continue to oversee implementation of P.L. 115-25 and may consider other legislation regarding the federal effort to improve hurricane forecasting, especially in response to active and destructive hurricane seasons, such as the one in 2017. |
crs_RL33008 | crs_RL33008_0 | In a 5-4 decision in 1972, Furman v. Georgia , (2) the Supreme Court invalidated federal and state capital punishmentlaws which permitted wide discretion in the application of the death penalty. With one Justicecharacterizing the death penalty laws as "capricious," (3) the majority ruled that they constituted cruel and unusualpunishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the due process guarantees of the FourteenthAmendment based upon the inherent arbitrariness of their application particularly in the case ofracial minorities and the poor. These statutes were held to be unconstitutional. The discretion mustbe limited and directed in order to minimize the potential for arbitrary and capricious actions. Aggravating factors, established either as elements of the capital offense or as statutoryfactors to be found by the sentencing judge or jury, must be sufficiently clear and restricting. (11)
In Lockett v. Ohio , (12) the Supreme Court required many states to revise their deathpenalty statutes by ruling that the sentencing authority in capital cases must consider every possiblemitigating factor to the crime rather than limiting the mitigating factors that could be considered toa specific list. (16) However, the case was significant because the Court decided that the chronological age of a minoris a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered at sentencing. (34) On his initialappeal, Simmons could not argue that his youth prohibited his execution because the U.S.Supreme Court held in 1989 in Stanford v. Kentucky that there was no national consensusagainst the execution of young adults who were 16 or 17-years-of-age at the time of theircrimes and, as a result, executing juveniles was not considered "cruel and unusual"punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (54)
The Court included another reason for its elimination of the death penalty for juvenileoffenders: "Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment foroffenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the onlycountry in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile deathpenalty." (71)
The Court also decided against executing the mentally retarded based on the theorythat they are disadvantaged at trial because of their mental impairments. (137)
In the most recent Supreme Court decision on the issue of "ineffective assistance ofcounsel", the Court in Rompilla v. Beard , (138) followed a series of rulings, including Wiggins v.Smith (139) which faulted lawyers for failing to investigate defendants' records for mitigating evidencewhich "was the result of inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment," and may have madethe difference between a life or death sentence. (146)
In 2002, Thomas Miller-El asked the Supreme Court to enforce the rule of Batson prohibiting racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges in jury selection. (156) On appeal,Johnson raised the Batson claims and his conviction was set aside. The Supreme Court, divided (5-4), did not touch Thompson's death sentence butdecided that the Sixth Circuit's decision remanding the case for an ineffective assistance ofcounsel hearing was an abuse of discretion. The Court noted that with the policiesembodied in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in cases arising fromfederal habeas corpus review of a state conviction, the court's discretion under Rule 41 mustbe exercised "in a way that is consistent with the 'State's interest in the finality of convictionsthat have survived direct review within the state court system'" (201)
Retroactive Applications
The "...threshold question in every habeas case...." is whether the petitioner's claim isdefeated by the nonretroactivity of the rule he/she seeks to apply to his/her petition. | Executions declined through the 1950s and 1960s and ceased after 1967, pending definitiveSupreme Court decisions. This interval ended only after States altered their laws in response to the1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia , a 5-4 decision deciding that the death penalty,as imposed under existing law, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighthand Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. In Furman, the Court ruled that the deathpenalty was arbitrarily and capriciously applied under existing law based on the unlimited discretionaccorded to sentencing authorities in capital trials. In response, States began to revise their statutesto modify the discretion given to sentencing authorities. These statutes went untested until the Courtdecided Gregg v. Georgia in 1976 in which it found in a 7-2 decision, that the death penalty did notper se violate the Eighth Amendment. The Gregg decision allowed States to establish the deathpenalty under guidelines that excluded the arbitrariness of sentencing in capital cases. As a result,statutory safeguards were developed to make sentencing more just and fair. Some of the changesincluded (1) in death penalty cases, the determination of guilt or innocence must be decidedseparately from hearings in which sentences of life imprisonment or death are decided; (2) the courtmust consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in relationship to the crime and thedefendant; and (3) the death sentence must be subject to review by the highest State court of appealsto make sure that the penalty is in proportion to the seriousness or gravity of the offense and isimposed even-handedly under State law. Like the statutory safeguards, the capital cases decided bythe Court in the 2004-5 term also reflect its sentiment that if there is going to be a death penalty, theprocess must be fair.
The Supreme Court abolished the practice of executing mentally retarded persons in Atkinsv. Virginia and juveniles who commit a capital crime while under the age of 18 in Roper v. Simmons . The Court ruled that these executions were prohibited on Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusualpunishment" grounds. The Court expanded its doctrine on the "ineffective assistance of counsel"in setting aside the death sentence for the petitioner in Rompilla v. Beard because his lawyers failedto search files on his past convictions for mitigating evidence in spite of their conscientious effortswhich led them to believe that it would be a waste of time. However, the Court determined in Bellv. Thompson that the scheduling of an execution was reasonable and the actions of the Court ofAppeals were an abuse of discretion, although the case was remanded for an ineffective assistanceof counsel hearing by the Court of Appeals while acting upon an honest belief that its previous rulinghad been decided erroneously. Also, the Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke reflected anaffirmation of its condemnation of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. |
crs_R40516 | crs_R40516_0 | Competition in federal procurement contracting has long been of interest to Congress and the executive branch, in part because of the belief that increased competition among potential vendors results in lower prices for the government. President Obama issued a memorandum calling for increased competition in federal contracting on March 4, 2009, shortly after taking office, and his Administration has sought to reduce the number of "noncompetitive" contracts by various means, including by issuing guidance on "Increasing Competition and Structuring Contracts for Best Results" in October 2009. Subsequently, in 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD), which accounts for 60% to 70% of federal procurement spending per year, amended its regulations to require that contracting officers re-solicit agency requirements if a solicitation allowed fewer than 30 days for the receipt of proposals and resulted in only one bid or offer. Specifically, it addresses (1) what contracts are subject to competition requirements; (2) what constitutes full and open competition for government contracts; (3) what is meant by "full and open competition after exclusion of sources"; (4) the circumstances permitting agencies to award contracts on the basis of other than full and open competition; (5) the "special simplified procedures for small purchases"; and (6) the competition requirements for task order and delivery order (TO/DO) contracts. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, for example, establishes a "preference" for the procurement of commercial items, which generally may be acquired using simplified methods, as opposed to full and open competition. Contracts Subject to CICA
Any procurement contract not entered into through the use of procedures expressly authorized by a particular statute, such as those described above, is subject to CICA. CICA requires that these contracts be entered into after "full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures" unless certain circumstances exist that would permit agencies to use noncompetitive procedures. Sealed bids . Competitive Proposals . 3. Procurement of architectural or engineering services conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Brooks Act (40 U.S.C. 5. 6. 7. Circumstances Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition
By definition, under CICA, any procurement contract entered into without full and open competition is noncompetitive. "Special Simplified Procedures for Small Purchases"
In addition to authorizing the use of noncompetitive procedures in certain circumstances, CICA authorizes the use of "special simplified procedures" when agencies make "small purchases." Finally, FASA grants the Government Accountability Office (GAO) jurisdiction over protests alleging that the orders increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract. The NDAA '08 limits agencies' ability to use single-award TO/DO contracts by requiring that agency heads make the following determinations, in writing, before awarding a single-award TO/DO contract whose expected value would exceed $103 million, including options:
(i) the task or delivery orders expected under the contract are so integrally related that only a single source can reasonably perform the work;
(ii) the contract provides only for firm, fixed-price task or delivery orders for (I) products for which unit prices are established in the contract or (II) services for which prices are established in the contract for the specific tasks to be performed;
(iii) only one source is qualified and capable of performing the work at a reasonable price to the government; or
(iv) because of exceptional circumstances, it is necessary in the public interest to award the contract to a single source. The NDAA '08 also specifies what constitutes a "fair opportunity to be considered" in competitions for orders in excess of $5.5 million under multiple-award TO/DO contracts. Finally, the NDAA '08 granted GAO exclusive authority to hear protests alleging improprieties in agencies' award of task and delivery orders valued in excess of $10 million that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. It also extended GAO's jurisdiction over similar orders issued under civilian contracts through September 30, 2016. | Competition in federal procurement contracting has long been of interest to Congress and the executive branch, in part because of the belief that increased competition among potential vendors results in lower prices for the government. President Obama issued a memorandum calling for increased competition in federal contracting on March 4, 2009, shortly after taking office, and his Administration has sought to reduce the number of "noncompetitive" contracts by various means, including by issuing guidance on "Increasing Competition and Structuring Contracts for Best Results" in October 2009. Subsequently, in 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD), which accounts for 60% to 70% of federal procurement spending per year, amended its regulations to require that contracting officers re-solicit agency requirements if a solicitation allowed fewer than 30 days for the receipt of proposals and resulted in only one bid or offer. Further guidance was issued in 2014.
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 generally governs competition in federal procurement contracting. Any procurement contract not entered into through the use of procurement procedures expressly authorized by a particular statute is subject to CICA. CICA requires that contracts be entered into after "full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures" unless certain circumstances exist that would permit agencies to use noncompetitive procedures. Full and open competition can be obtained through the use of sealed bids, competitive proposals, or other procures defined as competitive under CICA (e.g., procurement of architectural or engineering services under the Brooks Act). Full and open competition under CICA also encompasses "full and open competition after exclusion of sources," such as results when agencies engage in dual sourcing or "set aside" acquisitions for small businesses (i.e., conduct competitions in which only small businesses may participate).
Any contract entered into without full and open competition is noncompetitive, but noncompetitive contracts can still be in compliance with CICA when circumstances permitting other than full and open competition exist. CICA recognizes seven such circumstances, including (1) single source for goods or services; (2) unusual and compelling urgency; (3) maintenance of the industrial base; (4) requirements of international agreements; (5) statutory authorization or acquisition of brand-name items for resale; (6) national security; and (7) contracts necessary in the public interest. CICA also allows agencies to use "special simplified procedures" when acquiring goods or services whose expected value is less than $150,000, or commercial goods or services whose expected value is less than $6.5 million ($12 million in certain circumstances).
Issuance of orders under task order and delivery order (TO/DO) contracts is not subject to CICA, although award of TO/DO contracts is. However, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 established a preference for multiple-award TO/DO contracts; required that agencies provide contractors "a fair opportunity" to compete for orders in excess of $3,000 under multiple-award contracts; and authorized the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to hear protests challenging the issuance of task or delivery orders that increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the underlying contract. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 further limited the use of single-award TO/DO contracts. It also specified what constitutes a "fair opportunity to be considered" for orders in excess of $5.5 million under multiple-award contracts and granted GAO exclusive jurisdiction to hear protests of orders valued in excess of $10 million that do not increase the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract. This jurisdiction is permanent as to protests of defense agency contracts (P.L. 112-239), but only lasts through September 30, 2016, for protests of civilian agency contracts (P.L. 112-81). |
crs_R44137 | crs_R44137_0 | While the Obama Administration expressed an intention to close the detention facilities at the naval station as early as its first month in office, the Administration maintains that it has no intention or plan to alter the status of the naval station itself. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: The 45 square miles of land on which the station sits have been leased from the Cuban government since the early years of the twentieth century. The naval station provides logistical support to the detention and military commission facilities located within its boundaries. While the principal reasons for the declaration of war by both Madrid and Washington centered on U.S. intervention in an ongoing indigenous revolution in the Spanish colony of Cuba—a precipitating event was the sinking of the battleship USS Maine by an explosion in Havana harbor in February—the war was fought on Cuban and Puerto Rican soil in the Caribbean and on Guam and in the Philippines in the Pacific. As bilateral relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961. The Cuban government cut off the supply of water to the naval station on February 6, 1964, and the naval station has remained self-sustaining in water and electrical power in the years since. The Naval Station's Role Changes
In the early 1990s, the naval station was used to house a sizeable number of Haitians and Cubans fleeing their countries by boat and seeking asylum. The migrant population gradually fell thereafter, with the last of the temporary population leaving by the end of January 1996. Joint Task Force-Guantanamo was created in November 2002 to operate the newly created detention facilities. The Legal Status of the Land Lease
As previously noted, the wording of Article III of the 1934 Treaty of Relations between the United States and Cuba provides that:
Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to the lease to the United States of America of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval station …., the stipulations of that agreement with regard to the naval station of Guantanamo shall continue in effect. The territorial limits of the naval station remain as they were in 1934, unless the United States abandons Guantanamo Bay (effectively ending the lease) or the two governments reach an agreement to modify its boundaries. A second question is whether the President has the authority to "abandon" the naval station without action by Congress. 4678 ) would prohibit any action:
[T]o modify, abrogate, or replace the stipulations, agreements, and commitments contained in the Guantanamo Lease Agreements, or to impair or abandon the jurisdiction and control of the United States over United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, unless specifically authorized or otherwise provided by—
(1) a statute that is enacted on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) a treaty that is ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; or
(3) a modification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba signed at Washington, DC, on May 29, 1934, that is ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. The House of Representatives subsequently passed this language in Section 1099B of S. 2943 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017. Moreover, it does not expressly prohibit the negotiation of lease modifications with the existing government of Cuba. There is no such requirement, however, for military installations located overseas. Consequently, it appears that there are no statutory prohibitions against closing an overseas military installation. 114-92 ) impose practical impediments to closing the naval station by restricting the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to the United States or to foreign countries. Casting the abandonment of Guantanamo Bay as a recognition of Cuba's sovereignty over the area and the end of a military occupation (the Castro government has regarded U.S. presence at Guantanamo to be an "illegal occupation" of its territory) could have implications related to the President's power to recognize foreign sovereigns and the territory they control, a power the Supreme Court has held belongs exclusively to the President. Section 1036 of the 2016 NDAA prohibits the use of Department of Defense funds for fiscal year 2016:
(1) to close or abandon United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba;
(2) to relinquish control of Guantanamo Bay to the Republic of Cuba; or
(3) to implement a material modification to the Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba signed at Washington, D.C. on May 29, 1934 that constructively closes United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay. Current sanctions in place against Cuba could make it difficult to give or sell any property to the government of Cuba. | This report briefly outlines the history of the establishment of the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during the first decade of the twentieth century, its changing relationship to the community around it, and its heightened importance with military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also explains in detail the legal status of the lease of the land on which the naval station stands, the statutory and treaty authorities granted to the President with regard to any potential closure of the naval station, and the second-order effects on such a closure that Cuba sanctions laws might have. A short list of additional readings ends the report.
At the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines transitioned to administration by the United States. Of these four territories, only Cuba quickly became an independent republic. As a condition of relinquishing administration, though, the Cuban government agreed to lease three parcels of land to the United States for use as naval or coaling stations. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was the sole installation established under that agreement. The two subsequent lease agreements, one signed in 1903 and a second in 1934, acknowledged Cuban sovereignty, but granted to the United States "complete jurisdiction and control over" the property so long as it remained occupied.
Relations between the naval station and its surrounding communities remained stable until the Cuban revolution of the late 1950s. As Cuban-American relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the 1959 Cuban revolution, the naval station found itself more and more isolated. When the Cuban government began shutting off the supply of potable water during the early 1960s, the United States took measures to render the naval station self-sufficient in both water supply and electrical power generation. It has remained so ever since.
The prominence of Naval Station Guantanamo Bay rose briefly during the Haitian refugee and Cuban migrant crises of the early 1990s. At one point in late 1994, the migrant population of the naval station approached 45,000. However, by the end of January 1996, the last of these temporary residents had departed.
The naval station's return to prominence arose due to the establishment of facilities to house a number of wartime detainees captured during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This practice began in early 2002 with the refurbishment of some of the property formerly used to house refugees. It later expanded to more substantial housing that is operated by Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, a tenant for which the naval station provides logistical support. Additional temporary facilities were eventually constructed on a disused naval station airfield for use by the military commissions created to try detainees.
The 1903 lease agreements between the governments of Cuba and the United States are controlled by the language of a 1934 treaty stipulating that the lease can only be modified or abrogated pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Cuba. The territorial limits of the naval station remain as they were in 1934, unless the United States abandons Guantanamo Bay or the two governments reach an agreement to modify its boundaries. While there appears to be no consensus on whether the President can modify the agreement alone, Congress is empowered to alter by statute the effect of the underlying 1934 treaty. There is no current law that would expressly prohibit the negotiation of lease modifications with the existing government of Cuba, but the House of Representatives passed a prohibition on carrying out such a modification without congressional approval as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2017 (H.R. 4909/S. 2943).
As for "abandoning" the naval station, it appears that there are no statutory prohibitions against closing an overseas military installation. Nevertheless, Congress has imposed practical impediments to closing the naval station by, for example, restricting the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to foreign countries and banning their transfer to the United States. The existence of various Cuba sanctions laws may also impede a closure of Naval Station Guantanamo Bay by making it difficult to give or sell any property to the government of Cuba.
For information on the Guantanamo detention facility, see CRS Report R41920, Detainee Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Bills, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R40139, Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] et al. For background on U.S. policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40512 | crs_R40512_0 | Background
Despite the severity of the recent financial crisis and recession, the U.S. economy was able to avoid falling into an even more damaging deflationary spiral. Since mid-2009, the economy has been on a path of economic recovery. However, the pace of economic growth during the recovery has been relatively slow and major economic weaknesses persist. In this economic environment, the risk of deflation, albeit reduced from what it was during the previous period of economic contraction, remains significant and could be a potential threat to achieving sustained economic recovery. Deflation is a decline in the overall level of prices. It is not unusual for prices to fall in a particular sector because of rising productivity, falling costs, or weak demand relative to the wider economy. Deflation occurs when price declines are so widespread and sustained that they cause a broad-based price index such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to steadily decline for more than several quarters. A continuous decline in the price level is more troublesome because in a weak or contracting economy it can lead to a damaging, self-reinforcing, downward spiral of prices and economic activity. However, there are also examples of relatively benign deflations when economic activity expanded despite a falling price level. For instance, from 1880 through 1896, the U.S. price level fell about 30%, but this coincided with a period of strong economic growth, with real GDP advancing 5.0% per year on average. Whether a deflation is on balance malign or benign most often will hinge on whether the force generating the falling price level is collapsing aggregate demand or accelerating aggregate supply. Both forces exert downward pressure on the price level but have opposite effects on the level of economic activity. First, if nominal prices of inputs, particularly wages, tend to fall slowly, a falling price level will increase the " real " cost of inputs , raising the unit cost of production. Third, a negative demand-shock deflation will increase the real debt burden of businesses and households that already hold debt. The burden rises as the price level falls because debtors will be repaying the loan principal with dollars of rising real value. The Role of Expectations
Economic agents' expectations about the future path of the price level will influence deflation's persistence and the difficulty of stopping it. The expectation of further deflation can create a self-reinforcing downward spiral that deepens and prolongs the fall of economic activity as households and businesses adjust their economic outlooks. To avoid that outcome, government would likely need to take policy actions that not only counter the current negative demand shock and constricted flow of credit to the economy, but also create the expectation among economic agents that the future price level will be higher than the current price level. In other words, government would need to convince economic agents to expect inflation rather than deflation. Policy Responses to Deflation
How can economic policy contain or mitigate the potentially large negative economy-wide effects of a deflation caused by a negative demand shock? Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy can support aggregate spending and exert upward pressure on the price level through an increase in the budget deficit. | Despite the severity of the recent financial crisis and recession, the U.S. economy has so far avoided falling into a deflationary spiral. Since mid-2009, the economy has been on a path of economic recovery. However, the pace of economic growth during the recovery has been relatively slow, and major economic weaknesses persist. In this economic environment, the risk of deflation remains significant and its occurrence could derail sustained economic recovery.
Deflation is a persistent decline in the overall level of prices. It is not unusual for prices to fall in a particular sector because of rising productivity, falling costs, or weak demand relative to the wider economy. In contrast, deflation occurs when price declines are so widespread and sustained that they cause a broad-based price index, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI), to decline for several quarters. Such a continuous decline in the price level is more troublesome, because in a weak or contracting economy it can lead to a damaging self-reinforcing downward spiral of prices and economic activity.
However, there are also examples of relatively benign deflations when economic activity expanded despite a falling price level. For instance, from 1880 through 1896, the U.S. price level fell about 30%, but this coincided with a period of strong economic growth. Whether a deflation is on balance malign or benign most often will hinge on whether the force generating the falling price level is collapsing aggregate demand or accelerating aggregate supply. Both forces exert downward pressure on the price level but have opposite effects on the level of economic activity.
Deflation can dampen economic activity through several channels. First, a falling price level will increase the real (inflation adjusted) cost of inputs, raising the unit cost of production. Second, when nominal interest rates are low, as they are now, deflation could increase real interest rates, dampening credit-supported economic activity. Third, deflation will increase the real debt burden of businesses and households that already hold debt because they will be repaying the loan principal with dollars of rising purchasing power.
The expectations of households and businesses about the future path of the price level will influence deflation's persistence and the difficulty of stabilizing the falling price level. The expectation of further deflation can in theory create a self-reinforcing downward spiral that deepens and prolongs the fall of economic activity as households and businesses adjust their economic outlooks. To avoid that outcome, government would likely need to take policy actions that not only counter the current negative demand shock and constricted flow of credit to the economy, but also create the expectation among economic agents that the future price level will be higher than the current price level; in other words, government would need to convince economic agents to expect inflation rather than deflation.
Economic policy can in theory contain or mitigate the negative effects of a deflation caused by a negative demand shock. The conventional macroeconomic policy tools of monetary and fiscal policies could be used to support current aggregate spending and exert upward pressure on the price level, although currently high deficits restrict fiscal space for movement and policy interest rates at zero pose a challenge for the monetary authority. |
crs_R44305 | crs_R44305_0 | — Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force
The U.S. Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious modernization program, driven primarily by the age of its curren t aircraft fleets. In FY2016, the four procurement programs (F-35A, KC-46, C-130, and RPA) account for 99% of the Air Force's aircraft acquisition budget; LRS-B is 5% of the Air Force overall research and development (R&D) budget, but 60% of the budget for Advanced Component Development & Prototypes. The current plan also includes no funding for the long-expected CVLSP helicopter replacement program. The major R&D programs offer a different picture. Raise the Topline (and/or the Aviation Modernization Share)
As noted, the BBA-mandated caps on defense spending end in FY2021. Canceling programs can lead to gaps in important capabilities. One also has to guess correctly which programs to reduce as the program delayed or deferred today may be exactly the one needed sooner should requirements, scenarios, adversary capabilities, or other factors change in the future. Noting that CRS does not endorse any particular option, some possible spending reductions or deferrals that Congress may consider include (but are not limited to) the following:
Pusharounds/Reductions in Other Programs and Activities
Aviation modernization is just one part of the overall Air Force budget. The different sources of funds impose various costs. Reducing personnel to fund modernization could challenge the Air Force's ability to carry out its full range of missions. Retard Program Growth Further
As noted earlier, the Air Force has already deferred some new starts to keep its modernization programs within a constrained topline. | The U.S. Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious aviation modernization program, driven primarily by the age of its current aircraft fleets. Four major programs are in procurement, with five more in research and development (R&D).
The need to replace several types of aircraft simultaneously poses challenges to future budgets, as the new programs compete with existing program commitments and normal program growth under a restricted service topline. The impending expiration of caps imposed by the Balanced Budget Act coincides with when modernization programs can be expected to experience the most growth, but does not necessarily offer sufficient relief to avoid program cuts or other funding approaches.
To meet its modernization requirements, the Air Force may need to revise that topline, defer or delay other programs (including possibly reducing the quantity of aircraft already in procurement), or find other sources of funding to carry all its plans to fruition. Some specific options may include (but are not limited to)
raising the Air Force topline (and/or the aviation modernization share); pusharounds or reductions in Air Force programs and activities other than modernization; reducing annual quantities of the F-35A; further retarding the growth of R&D programs; deferring the KC-Y follow-on tanker; funding the long-range strike bomber through a non-Air Force budget.
The report examines these options in further detail. |
crs_R42056 | crs_R42056_0 | Introduction
Prior to the recent financial crisis, mortgage underwriting standards were relaxed to the point where many borrowers could only repay their loans if the favorable financial conditions that existed at the time of origination remained intact. In other words, borrowers were able to obtain mortgage loans that relied upon interest rates not rising or the value of the underlying collateral (house prices) not declining. When market conditions changed, however, many mortgage loans became delinquent and went into default. The mortgage defaults often translated into large losses for both the borrowers and the financial industry. Rulemaking is now taking place to implement "ability to repay" and risk-retention standards as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ). Although some borrowers may qualify for loans when underwriting criteria are relaxed, which typically may occur at times when housing and macroeconomic conditions are more favorable for repayment, lenders may be reluctant to originate those that fail to comply with qualification standards that would reduce their exposures to legal risks. This report examines the developments associated with the implementation of mortgage lending reforms. The report begins with a summary of proposed ability to repay and risk-retention standards. Next, the report describes risky underwriting and financing practices that occurred prior to the mortgage crisis, followed by a discussion of how access to mortgage credit might be affected. Ability to Repay Standards and Qualified Mortgages
Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act; Section 1411 is entitled "Ability to Repay" and says,
In accordance with regulations prescribed by the (Federal Reserve) Board, no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments. The CFPB has re-opened the comment period to seek further comments on the litigation risks that could potentially arise from the new requirements. The comments, however, should be narrowly focused and based upon analysis that uses mortgage data from the portfolios of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are discussed in more detail below. The closing date for comments will be July 9, 2012. The proposed rule provides four methods in which a lender would be able to comply with the ability-to-repay standards. This section requires securitizers to retain "not less than 5 percent of the credit risk for any asset that is not a qualified residential mortgage…" The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Federal Reserve and other financial regulatory agencies to implement requirements to ensure that relevant parties involved in a securitization transaction retain "skin-in-the-game" or a requirement to ensure the sharing of potential losses. The proposed QM rules may discourage lenders from excessively relaxing lending standards even during economic boom periods, thus making loan repayment more resilient to sudden shifts in short-term economic and financial conditions. Disadvantaged or weaker borrowers, therefore, would face additional difficulties obtaining mortgage credit. | Prior to the recent financial crisis, mortgage underwriting standards were relaxed to the point where many borrowers could only repay their loans if favorable financial conditions that existed at the time of origination remained intact. In other words, borrowers obtained mortgage loans that relied upon interest rates not rising or the value of the underlying collateral (house prices) not declining. When market conditions changed, however, many mortgage loans became delinquent and went into default. The mortgage defaults often translated into large losses for both the borrowers and the financial industry.
After enactment of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), the Federal Reserve Board announced a proposed qualified mortgage (QM) rule that would establish "ability to repay" standards for mortgage lending. The Federal Reserve, along with other federal regulatory agencies, also jointly released a proposed risk retention or qualified residential mortgage (QRM) rule to require parties involved in a transaction in which mortgage originations are sold to retain "skin-in-the-game" or a minimum percentage of the credit risk of financial products, which would result in the sharing of any eventual losses. Adoption of ability to repay and risk-retention standards may discourage lenders from excessively relaxing lending standards even during economic boom periods, thus making loan repayment more resilient to sudden shifts in short-term economic and financial conditions.
The ability to repay and risk-retention standards, while designed to curtail the pre-crisis proliferation of risky lending practices, are likely to simultaneously reduce access to mortgage credit. Although ability-to-repay standards would encourage consistent underwriting at all times, some borrowers that benefit from lender flexibility during more favorable macroeconomic conditions are likely to face increased difficulty obtaining mortgage loans. Lenders may be reluctant to originate loans that are not in compliance with the ability-to-repay standards if this exposes them to increased legal risks. Likewise, risk-retention standards that translate into more stringent qualification requirements for borrowers are likely to increase barriers to homeownership for both creditworthy and disadvantaged borrowers.
The 112th Congress is overseeing the rulemaking stemming from the Dodd-Frank Act. This report examines the developments associated with the implementation of mortgage lending reforms. After summarizing the proposed ability to repay and risk-retention standards, a description of risky underwriting practices that occurred prior to the mortgage crisis is presented, followed by a discussion of possible effects on mortgage credit accessibility.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which will prescribe final regulations on QM rule, has re-opened the comment period to seek further comments on the litigation risks that could potentially arise from the new requirements. The comments, however, should be narrowly focused and based upon analysis that uses mortgage data provided by the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The closing date for comments will be July 9, 2012. |
crs_R43992 | crs_R43992_0 | Overview of the Congressional Review Act (CRA)
What Is the CRA? The Congressional Review Act (CRA) is an oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule issued by a federal agency. The CRA was enacted in 1996 as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA). Under the CRA, before a rule can take effect, an agency must submit the rule to Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Upon receipt of the rule by Congress, Members of Congress have a specified time period in which to submit and take action on a joint resolution disapproving the rule. If both houses pass the resolution, it is sent to the President for signature or veto. If the President were to veto the resolution, Congress could vote to override the veto. Agency Oversight
The CRA provides Congress with a method of conducting oversight of agency rulemaking. What Are Disadvantages of Using the CRA? To date, the CRA has been used to overturn one rule. What Is a Major Rule Under the CRA? Specifically, if the rule is major, the statute provides that it "shall take effect on the latest of"
60 days after the date that the rule is published in the Federal Register or received by Congress, whichever is later; if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval and the President vetoes it, the date on which either house of Congress votes and fails to override the veto or 30 session days after the date Congress received the veto, whichever is earlier; or the date the rule would have otherwise taken effect, if not for this provision of the CRA. The CRA does not specify when an agency must submit a rule. It is important to note that it is unlikely that an affected party would be able to challenge in court an agency's failure to submit a rule to Congress pursuant to the CRA, because the statute explicitly states that "no determination, finding, action, or omission under [the CRA] shall be subject to judicial review." Second, the agency may not reissue the rule in "substantially the same form" or issue a "new rule that is substantially the same" as the disapproved rule, "unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule." "), the CRA extends that required period for major rules, providing that major rules "shall take effect on the latest of" three dates:
60 days after the date that the rule is published in the Federal Register or submitted to Congress, whichever is later; if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval and the President vetoes it, the date on which either house of Congress votes and fails to override the veto or 30 session days after the date Congress received the veto, whichever is earlier; or the date the rule would have otherwise taken effect, unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted. As is currently the case under the CRA for a resolution of disapproval, the REINS Act provides a certain set of procedures under which a resolution of approval would be considered in each chamber. | The Congressional Review Act (CRA) is an oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule issued by a federal agency. The CRA was included as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), which was signed into law on March 29, 1996. The CRA requires agencies to report on their rulemaking activities to Congress and provides Congress with a special set of procedures under which to consider legislation to overturn those rules.
Under the CRA, before a rule can take effect, an agency must submit a report to each house of Congress and the Comptroller General containing a copy of the rule; a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule; and the proposed effective date of the rule. Upon receipt of the report in Congress, Members of Congress have specified time periods in which to submit and take action on a joint resolution of disapproval. If both houses pass the resolution, it is sent to the President for signature or veto. If the President were to veto the resolution, Congress could vote to override the veto.
If a joint resolution of disapproval is submitted within the CRA-specified deadline, passed by Congress, and signed by the President, the CRA states that the "rule shall not take effect (or continue)." That is, the rule would be deemed not to have had any effect at any time. Even provisions that had become effective would be retroactively negated.
Furthermore, if a joint resolution of disapproval were enacted, the CRA provides that a rule may not be issued in "substantially the same form" as the disapproved rule unless it is specifically authorized by a subsequent law. The CRA does not define what would constitute a rule that is "substantially the same" as a nullified rule. Additionally, the CRA prohibits judicial review of any "determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter."
This report discusses the most frequently asked questions received by the Congressional Research Service about the CRA. It addresses questions relating to the applicability of the act; the submission requirements with which agencies must comply; the procedural requirements that must be met in order to file and act upon a CRA joint resolution of disapproval; and the legal effect of a successful CRA joint resolution of disapproval. This report also discusses potential advantages and disadvantages of using the CRA to disapprove rules, as well as other options available to Congress to conduct oversight of agency rulemaking.
For further questions not addressed here, please contact one of the authors: [author name scrubbed] (questions regarding history of and agency compliance with the CRA); [author name scrubbed] (questions regarding congressional procedures and day counts under the CRA); or [author name scrubbed] (questions regarding legal issues under the CRA). |
crs_R41725 | crs_R41725_0 | Overview1
In the weeks prior to commencement of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the ongoing uprising in Libya against the government of Muammar al Qadhafi was the subject of domestic and international debate about potential international military intervention, including the proposed establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. This report provides an overview of military operations under U.S. command from March 19 to March 29, 2011, and the most recent developments with respect to the transfer of command of military operations from the United States to NATO on March 30. Recent Developments: Transfer from U.S. to NATO Command2
On March 27, 2011, after just over a week of coalition air operations under U.S. command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) announced that it would take over command and control of all ongoing military operations in Libya. On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, which, among other things,
demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians; authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) [Note: paragraph 9 establishes an arms embargo on Libya], to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory; establishes a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians; authorizes robust enforcement inspection measures for the arms embargo established by Resolution 1970, including measures to prevent the movement of mercenary forces to Libya; and calls on member states to enforce a ban on flights by any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies. U.S-Led Military Operations—Operation Odyssey Dawn15
Following passage of UNSCR 1973, on March 19, 2011, U.S. and allied forces established an initial no-fly zone over major cities and air bases near the Libyan coast, as shown in Figure 1 . Locklear serves jointly as Commander of U.S. This is the most controversial aspect of the new NATO mission. U.S. costs of continued enforcement of a no-fly zone might be quite limited, since Libyan air operations appear to have ceased. Toward the lower end of the spectrum are costs of the two no-fly zone operations in Iraq. Other Issues for Congress
Other questions Congress may address include:
What are the United States' strategic objectives in Libya? Has Operation Odyssey Dawn directly or indirectly helped the anti-Qadhafi forces? | This report provides an overview of military operations in Libya under U.S. command from March 19 to March 29, 2011, and the most recent developments with respect to the transfer of command of military operations from the United States to NATO on March 30.
The ongoing uprising in Libya against the government of Muammar al Qadhafi has been the subject of evolving domestic and international debate about potential international military intervention, including the proposed establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, establishing a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, authorizing robust enforcement measures for the arms embargo established by Resolution 1970, and authorizing member states "to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory."
In response, the United States established Operation Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. contribution to a multilateral military effort to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya. Military operations under Odyssey Dawn commenced on March 19, 2011. U.S. and coalition forces quickly established command of the air over Libya's major cities, destroying portions of the Libyan air defense network and attacking pro-Qadhafi forces deemed to pose a threat to civilian populations.
From the outset of operations, the Obama administration declared its intent to transfer command of operations over Libya to a coalition entity. On March 30, 2011, NATO assumed command of all aspects of coalition military operations.
Establishment of the initial no-fly zone over Libya went smoothly. One U.S. aircraft was lost due to mechanical malfunction, but the crew were rescued. Estimates of the cost of the initial operation range between $400 million and $1 billion.
U.S. participation in Operation Odyssey Dawn and NATO operations around Libya raises a number of questions for Congress, including the role of Congress in authorizing the use of force, the costs of the operation, the desired politico-strategic end state, the role of U.S. military forces in an operation under international command, and many others.
(A note on transliteration: The name of Muammar al Qadhafi is transliterated in many ways by various sources. This paper refers to him as Qadhafi except when quoting other documents, wherein his name is represented as it appears in the source.) |
crs_R40856 | crs_R40856_0 | A number of the appointments made by President Barack H. Obama to his Administration or by Cabinet Secretaries to their departments have been referred to, especially by the news media, as "czars." For some, the term is being used to convey an appointee's title (e.g., climate "czar") in shorthand. For others, it is used to convey a sense that power is being centralized in the White House or certain entities. When used in political science literature, the term generally refers to White House policy coordination or an intense focus by the appointee on an issue of great magnitude. Congress has noticed these appointments and in the 111 th Congress examined some of them. The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, for example, conducted hearings on the "czar" issue on October 6, 2009, and October 22, 2009, respectively. One issue of interest to Congress may be whether some of these appointments (particularly some of those to the White House Office), made outside of the advice and consent process of the Senate, circumvent the requirements of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. A second issue of interest may be whether the activities of such appointees are subject to oversight by, and accountable to, Congress. This report provides background information and selected views on the role of some of these appointees, provides legal analyses of the appointments clause and oversight by Congress of presidential advisors, and discusses options to enhance the accountability of such appointees to Congress. Outside Employment Limitations82
Executive Order and Regulations. | A number of the appointments made by President Barack H. Obama to his Administration or by Cabinet secretaries to their departments have been referred to, especially by the news media, as "czars." For some, the term is used to convey an appointee's title (e.g., climate "czar") in shorthand. For others, it is being used to convey a sense that power is being centralized in the White House or certain entities. When used in political science literature, the term generally refers to White House policy coordination or an intense focus by the appointee on an issue of great magnitude. Congress has noticed these appointments and in the 111th Congress examined some of them. The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, for example, conducted hearings on the "czar" issue on October 6, 2009, and October 22, 2009, respectively.
One issue of interest to Congress may be whether some of these appointments (particularly some of those to the White House Office), made outside of the advice and consent process of the Senate, circumvent the requirements of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. A second issue of interest may be whether the activities of such appointees are subject to oversight by Congress.
This report provides background information and selected views on the role of some of these appointees. Additionally, it discusses some of the constitutional concerns that have been raised about presidential advisors. These include, for example, the kinds of positions that qualify as the type that must be filled in accordance with the Appointments Clause, with a focus on examining a few existing positions established by statute, executive order, and regulation. The report also reviews certain congressional oversight processes and assesses the applicability of these processes to presidential advisors. Legislative and non-legislative options for congressional consideration are presented. |
crs_R42149 | crs_R42149_0 | Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD)
The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittee is charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. Status of the FY2012 THUD Appropriations Bill
Table 1 provides a timeline of legislative action on the FY2012 THUD appropriations bill, and Table 2 lists the total funding provided for each of the titles in the bill for FY2011 and the amount requested for that title for FY2012. Most of the programs and activities in the THUD bill are funded through regular annual appropriations , also referred to as discretionary appropriations. As shown in Figure 1 , when it comes to net discretionary budget authority (appropriations, less any offsets), the vast majority of funding allocated by the appropriations committee generally goes to HUD (over 74% in FY2011). Each dollar available to the subcommittee in rescissions and offsets serves to reduce the "cost" of providing another dollar in appropriations. The Obama Administration's FY2012 budget request reflected a reauthorization proposal for DOT surface transportation programs. This proposal would have front-loaded a large increase in funding in the first year of the Administration's proposed six-year surface transportation reauthorization plan, with funding levels for each of the subsequent five years lower than the total for FY2012. The President's FY2012 budget proposed to rename the fund the Transportation Trust Fund and to increase authorized expenditures from the fund to a total of $554 billion over the next six years by increasing the funding levels of existing surface transportation programs and by adding the Federal Railroad Administration and the Federal Transit Administration's New Starts transit construction program to the programs funded by the fund. The House draft stated that it provided funding from the Highway Trust Fund at a level that the revenues of the fund could support in FY2012; this represented a reduction in funding of 35% from FY2011 levels for the two largest accounts supported by the Highway Trust Fund (from $41.1 billion to $27.0 billion for the federal-aid highway program account, and from $8.3 billion to $5.2 billion for the transit formula and bus grant funding account). The Capital Investment Grants program received $2.0 billion in FY2010; in FY2011, it received $1.6 billion. The President's FY2012 budget requested a 14% reduction in the Operating Fund compared to the final FY2011 funding law. P.L. The Senate-passed FY2011 appropriations bill included $65 million for the NFMCP and $60 million for HUD's housing counseling program. 112-55 includes $80 million for the NFMCP and $45 million for HUD's program. | The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittee is charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. The HUD budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations provided by the subcommittee. However, when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget. Mandatory funding typically accounts for a little less than half of the bill total.
The President's FY2012 budget request for DOT reflected a reauthorization proposal for DOT surface transportation programs. This proposal would have front-loaded a large increase in funding in the first year of the Administration's proposed six-year surface transportation reauthorization plan, with funding levels for each of the subsequent five years lower than the total for FY2012. The President's FY2012 budget for HUD requested about a $2.5 billion increase in funding for HUD's programs and activities, to be partially offset by about a $1.6 billion increase in offsetting collections and receipts.
The House never introduced a formal FY2012 THUD appropriations bill. A draft bill, marked up by the THUD subcommittee, included significantly decreased funding for both HUD and DOT relative to FY2011. The Senate-passed FY2012 THUD appropriations bill provided increased funding for DOT relative to FY2011 but decreased funding for HUD relative to FY2011.
In the final FY2012 THUD appropriations law (Division C of P.L. 112-55, referred to as a "Minibus" because it included appropriations bills from two other subcommittees), Congress provided about $57 billion in discretionary funding for the programs and activities funded under the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies subcommittee. This total funding level is an increase over the FY2011 level of $55 billion. DOT received approximately the same level of new funding as it received in FY2011, while net budget authority for HUD decreased by about $3.7 billion from FY2011. The FY2012 DOT budget appears to be larger than it was in FY2011 because the FY2011 appropriations act included over $3 billion in rescissions to offset the DOT budget total, which had the effect of making the total look smaller without reducing the amount of funding available to the agency. DOT also received nearly $2 billion in emergency relief appropriations in FY2012, which counterbalanced a $2 billion reduction in highway funding. Most of the decrease in HUD's net budget authority is attributable to increases in the amount of offsetting collections available to offset the cost of the HUD budget, although total funding for programs and activities was reduced by about $1 billion. |
crs_R41249 | crs_R41249_0 | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as modified by P.L. 111-152 , the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010) contains a number of provisions that generally combine to expand the reach of federal mental health parity requirements as established by the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA) and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA). Background
Prior to 1996, health insurance coverage for mental illness had historically been less generous than that for other physical illnesses. Mental health parity is a response to this disparity in insurance coverage, and generally refers to the concept that health insurance coverage for mental health services should be offered on par with covered medical and surgical benefits. The ACA contains a number of provisions which, when considered together, achieve two key goals with respect to mental health parity: (1) they expand the reach of the applicability of the federal mental health parity requirements; and (2) they create a mandated benefit for the coverage of certain mental health and substance abuse disorder services (to be determined through rulemaking) in a number of specific financing arrangements. Federal Mental Health Parity Law Prior to the ACA
Two major mental health parity laws passed at the federal level prior to enactment of the ACA, and together establish the federal mental health parity requirements. These two laws are MHPA, which requires parity in annual and aggregate lifetime limits, and MHPAEA, which expands the federal parity requirements to include parity in treatment limitations, financial requirements, and in- and out-of-network covered benefits. Neither of these laws mandates the coverage of any specific mental health condition; rather, where an insurer chooses to cover both mental health and medical and surgical benefits, they are required to do so in compliance with these parity requirements. Specifically, the ACA expands the reach of federal mental health parity law to three main types of plans: qualified health plans (QHPs), as established by the ACA; Medicaid non-managed care benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans; and plans offered through the individual market. The ACA did not alter the applicability of parity requirements with respect to the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), but the application of federal mental health parity requirements to CHIP plans, as required in law prior to the ACA, is explained here in detail. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as modified by P.L. 111-152, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010) contains a number of provisions that generally combine to extend the reach of existing federal mental health parity requirements. Prior to 1996, health insurance coverage for mental illness had historically been less generous than that for other physical illnesses. Mental health parity is a response to this disparity in insurance coverage, and generally refers to the concept that health insurance coverage for mental health services should be offered on par with covered medical and surgical benefits.
Prior to enactment of the ACA, two major mental health parity laws had been passed at the federal level, and together created the federal mental health parity requirements. These two laws are the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA, P.L. 104-204), which requires parity in annual and aggregate lifetime limits, and the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA, P.L. 110-343), which expands parity requirements to treatment limitations, financial requirements (e.g., co-payments), and in- and out-of-network covered benefits. Neither of these laws mandates the coverage of any specific mental health condition; rather, where an insurer chooses to cover both mental health and medical and surgical benefits, they are required to do so in compliance with these parity requirements.
The ACA contains a number of provisions which, when considered together, achieve two key goals with respect to mental health parity: (1) they expand the reach of the applicability of the federal mental health parity requirements; and (2) they create a mandated benefit for the coverage of certain mental health and substance abuse disorder services (to be determined through rulemaking) in a number of specific financing arrangements. PPACA expands the reach of federal mental health parity requirements to three main types of health plans: qualified health plans as established by the ACA; Medicaid non-managed care benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans; and plans offered through the individual market. The ACA did not alter the federal mental health parity requirements with respect to CHIP plans, but the application of the requirements to CHIP plans, as required in law prior to the ACA, is explained here in detail. This report also analyzes the impact of the ACA on the existing small employer exemption under federal mental health parity law. |
crs_RL32743 | crs_RL32743_0 | The Agreed Framework Unravels
After the confrontation became public, the Agreed Framework quickly unraveled. In the interim, Japan and South Korea would provide heavy oil. Repercussions from hisadmission continued to affect Japan's role in dealing with North Korea. Role of Congress
In addition to the Member and staff delegations, Congress was engaged in issues concerningNorth Korea through a series of hearings on the six-party talks as well as on refugees and humanrights. 4011 , the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, in September 2004. The act( P.L. Other CRS Products on North Korea
CRS Issue Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations -- Issues for Congress
CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program
CRS Report RL31696 , North Korea: Economic Sanctions
CRS Report RS21834 , U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Fact Sheet
CRS Report RL31785 , U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy
CRS Report RL32493(pdf) , The North Korean Economy: Background and Policy Analysis
CRS Report RS21391 , North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal? Map of the Korean Peninsula | This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea fromOctober 2002 through December 31, 2004. The chronology includes significant meetings, events,and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis provides background on U.S. policy preceding October 2002 as well as anoverview of developments and dynamics among the major players in the North Korea nucleardispute: South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. Particular attention is paid to thedemise of the Agreed Framework, the ongoing six-party talks, China's prominent role in thenegotiations, inter-Korean relations, and the Japanese abductee issue. Also discussed is Congress'srole in dealing with North Korea, including the passage of the North Korea Human Rights Act ( P.L.108-333 ). This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41126 | crs_R41126_0 | Overview of Report
On December 24, 2009, the Senate passed health reform legislation (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, hereafter referred to as H.R. 3590 , or the Senate bill) that would, among other changes, make statutory changes affecting the regulation of and payment for certain types of private health insurance. On March 18, 2010, the House Rules Committee issued an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872 , the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010 (hereafter referred to as the reconciliation bill). This report is a companion report to the one that describes all the private health insurance provisions in H.R. 3590 , CRS Report R40942, Private Health Insurance Provisions in Senate-Passed H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act . Under the reconciliation bill, the prohibition of lifetime limits, prohibition on rescissions, and the requirement to provide coverage for dependent children up to age 26 would also apply to the grandfathered plans starting six months after enactment. There are also some amendments applicable specifically for grandfathered group health plans. For coverage of dependent children prior to 2014, the requirement would be limited to those adult children without an employer offer of coverage. The reconciliation bill would make certain changes to the calculation of the penalties imposed on persons who are not in compliance with the individual mandate, and would modify a rule regarding the exemption from the individual mandate. The reconciliation bill also would include full-time equivalents in the counting of full-time employees, and strike the employer fee based on extended waiting periods. The prohibition relating to preexisting conditions would be amended to apply to grandfathered group health plans. 3590 , some individuals enrolled in private health insurance through an exchange (beginning in 2014) would be eligible for premium credits, based on income. In addition to the Senate bill's requirements and limitations when reconciling taxpayers' advanced premium tax credits to levels ultimately reported on their actual tax returns, the reconciliation bill requires exchanges to provide to the Secretary of Health and Human Services the following: each enrollee's level and length of exchange coverage; the premium for the plan (excluding the premium and cost-sharing subsidies); the advanced payments for premium and cost-sharing subsidies; the name, address, and taxpayer ID number of each individual covered; "any information provided to the Exchange, including any change of circumstances, necessary to determine eligibility for, and the amount of, such credit"; and any "other similar information necessary to carry out this subsection and determine whether a taxpayer has received excess advance payments." | On March 23, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009, and the House on March 21, 2010. The new law will, among other changes, make statutory changes affecting the regulation of and payment for certain types of private health insurance.
On March 21, 2010, the House passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (hereafter referred to as the reconciliation bill). The reconciliation bill was written as making amendments to PPACA and is now before the Senate for consideration. On March 25, 2010, the bill passed the Senate with amendments and has been sent back to the House.
This report summarizes only the private health insurance provisions in the reconciliation bill and their impact on PPACA. For a description of all the private health insurance provisions in H.R. 3590, see CRS Report R40942, Private Health Insurance Provisions in Senate-Passed H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Among the changes that would be made by the reconciliation bill to PPACA are the following which, except for the first two, would apply beginning in 2014:
extend to grandfathered plans, starting for plan years six months after enactment, the prohibition of lifetime limits, prohibition on rescissions, limitations on excessive waiting periods, and a requirement to provide coverage for non-dependent children up to age 26; for coverage of adult dependent children prior to 2014, the requirement on grandfathered group health plans would be limited to adult children without an employer offer of coverage; make certain changes to the calculation of the penalties imposed on persons who are not in compliance with the individual mandate; modify a rule regarding the exemption from the individual mandate; make changes to how the employer penalties would be calculated; include full-time equivalents in the counting of full-time employees; strike the employer fee based on extended waiting periods; for grandfathered group health plans, prohibit pre-existing condition exclusions and restrict annual limits; increase premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies to certain low- and middle-income individuals enrolled in private coverage through an exchange; and alter how income is counted for purposes of determining eligibility for premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies. |
crs_RL33491 | crs_RL33491_0 | The creation of a new State Department position—Director of Foreign Assistance—has sparked congressional interest regarding the management of U.S. foreign aid programs, its possible impact on funding levels, and any possible future reform of foreign aid operations and account structure. The Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who serves concurrently as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is Randall Tobias, the former Global AIDS Coordinator. Charged with coordinating U.S. assistance programs, the DFA has authority over most State Department and USAID programs, and will provide "guidance" to other agencies that have foreign aid programs. Details of the restructuring have been unveiled in the form of a new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance. The restructuring raises a number of questions with regard to how Tobias will be able to coordinate aid programs spread throughout almost every government department. Executive officials have said that the current restructuring is a first step in a more thorough overhaul of U.S. foreign assistance. Transformational Development
Announced on January 19, 2006, the restructuring is part of Secretary Rice's "transformational development" initiative that seeks to use foreign assistance to transform recipient countries' economic development paths, with the goal of graduating countries from U.S. assistance. The centralized planning and budgeting operation is designed to provide coherence and coordination, and to reduce duplication among programs. The current proposal creates five categories of countries. Country teams would make recommendations on country-specific aid programs. Others fear that the Framework is focused on strategic objectives to the neglect of poverty alleviation, which they contend is the underlying cause for instability. They also contend that reaching short-term strategic goals will assist in long-term development. While the Director of Foreign Assistance has been granted authority over State Department and USAID aid programs, a number of other foreign aid agencies remain outside the scope of the Director's responsibility. | The creation of a new State Department position—Director of Foreign Assistance—has sparked congressional interest regarding the management, budgeting, and proposals for reform of U.S. foreign aid programs. Charged with coordinating U.S. assistance programs, the Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) will have authority over most State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs, although major foreign aid programs, such as the Millennium Challenge Account and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator will remain outside of his scope. The DFA is also tasked with providing "guidance" to other agencies that manage foreign aid activities. Some assistance programs are scattered throughout numerous domestic policy agencies and the Department of Defense.
The restructuring is part of Secretary Rice's "transformational development" initiative, that seeks to use foreign assistance to transform recipient countries' economic development paths, and to graduate countries from a dependence on aid. Details of the restructuring have been unveiled with the release of a new Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance. The Framework links strategic objectives with categories of countries that have shared characteristics or development challenges. Operational plans would design country-specific aid programs to meet those challenges. The FY2008 budget request has been developed by joint State Department and USAID teams to provide better coordination and coherence.
While the current restructuring requires no legislative action, it raises a number of questions with regard to the management of foreign aid programs, funding levels, and reform options that will confront the 110th Congress. Supporters argue that it is a long overdue reform of fragmented and uncoordinated assistance programs that will focus aid on strategic objectives and make programs more accountable. Some critics contend that its piecemeal approach will not result in comprehensive reform. Others fear that it will politicize aid programs, and put the focus on short-term objectives rather than long-term development. Administration officials have said that the current effort is the first step in a more thorough overhaul of U.S. foreign assistance.
[author name scrubbed], who retired from CRS in 2006, was an original co-author of this report.
This report will be updated. |
crs_RL34173 | crs_RL34173_0 | In this decision, the Court evaluated the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to amend wholesale electricity agreements pursuant to the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine. The decision has wide-reaching implications for FERC's authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA), and, by extension, its authority under the Natural Gas Act (NGA). What is the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine? Corp . and FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co ., the Court held that an electricity or natural gas contract, once approved by FERC, cannot be changed pursuant to a unilateral request of one of the parties absent a showing that such a change is in the public interest. The Doctrine in the Market-Based Rate Environment: FERC and Circuit Court Decisions in the Snohomish Matter
As described above, FERC's application of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine has evolved and some commentators might suggest that the Doctrine has become a less significant hurdle to FERC review/amendment of rate agreements in recent years. | In June of 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision that has important implications for the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to review wholesale electricity and natural gas contracts under what is known as the "Mobile-Sierra Doctrine." The Doctrine mandates that FERC will not abrogate contracts (including wholesale natural gas and power contracts as well as transmission agreements) between private parties absent a showing that a change is necessary in the public interest. This report reviews the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine and discusses a recent Supreme Court decision that evaluated the Doctrine and FERC's review role as set forth in the Federal Power Act in the context of market-based rates. |
crs_RL31542 | crs_RL31542_0 | Introduction
Analysis of the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, suggests various "lessonslearned" concerning public and private information infrastructures. This report considers these homeland securityissues in the context of critical information infrastructure protection and continuity of operations (COOP) planning. in the future. (44)
Augment Disaster Recovery Plans
In many respects, the September 11, 2001, attacks established a new standard for disasterrecovery plans - the complete destruction and loss of a building. These same businesses and agencies must now consider whether to augment their disaster recoveryplans to include the movement of people, the rapid acquisition of equipment and furniture, networkconnectivity, adequate workspace, and more. (50)
A corollary to this lesson learned is the need to ensure that recovery procedures are welldocumented and safeguarded. Backing Up Data and Backing Up Applications
A second lesson learned that is related to continuity and disaster planning and practices is theneed to have a comprehensive backup system that captures more than just an organization's datafiles. Organizations that saved only their raw data had tospend a significant amount of time re-creating their applications, organizing the data, andreestablishing user permissions to access the data. (58)
A corollary to the lessons learned regarding comprehensive data storage plans is the need to fully and regularly test backup sites and media. It can also be applied to the structureand location of an organization's operations. According to some industry experts, recovery sites should be located atleast 20-50 miles way from the primary data center. In addition, some observers suggest that humanresources should also be located in more than one spot to reduce the potential for losing a significantportion of one's workforce in a single event. (64)
Ensure the Ability to Communicate with Internal and External Constituencies
Another lesson learned related to decentralization is the need to ensure the ability to communicate with internal and external constituencies in the event of an emergency. (71)
Lessons Regarding Redundancy and Planning of Communications
The third category of lessons learned involves the institutionalization of redundancy ininformation infrastructures. (76)
Use of Generic Replaceable Technology
A related lesson that some organizations have cited as valuable to their ability to rebuild their systems quickly is the use of generic, replaceable technology. (80) Based on the experience ofSeptember 11, 2001, the ability to replace equipmentquickly with easy-to-find products that do not require significant customization is likely to be oneof the factors affecting organizations' future continuity and disaster recovery planning decisions. While not all-inclusive, they emphasize threegeneral approaches: the establishment and practice of comprehensive continuity and recovery plans,the decentralization of operations, and the development of system redundancies to eliminate singlepoints of weakness. | This report assesses the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on public and private information infrastructures in the context of critical infrastructure protection, continuity ofoperations (COOP) planning, and homeland security. Analysis of the effects of the terrorist attackssuggests various "lessons learned." These lessons support three general principles. The firstprinciple emphasizes the establishment and practice of comprehensive continuity and recovery plans. One lesson learned in this area is to augment disaster recovery plans . Businesses and agencies, whonow must consider the possibility of complete destruction and loss of a building, may need toaugment their disaster recovery plans to include the movement of people, the rapid acquisition ofequipment and furniture, network connectivity, adequate workspace, and more. A corollary to thislesson learned is the need to assure that recovery procedures are well documented and safeguardedso that they can be fully utilized when necessary. A second lesson is the need to back up data and applications . Without a comprehensive backup system that captures more than just anorganization's data files, a significant amount of time can be lost trying to re-create applications,organize data, and reestablish user access. A corollary to this lesson learned is the need to fully andregularly test backup sites and media to ensure their reliability and functionality.
The second principle focuses on the decentralization of operations and the effectiveness of distributed communications. The lesson of decentralizing operations can be applied to the structureand location of an organization's operations. Industry experts suggest recovery sites be located atleast 20-50 miles away form the primary work site. In addition, some observers suggest that humanresources should also be located in more than one place to reduce the potential for losing asignificant portion of one's workforce in a single event. Another lesson in this area is to ensure theability to communicate with internal and external constituencies . In the event of an emergency, thedemand for information skyrockets. An organization not only needs to communicate with employeesregarding actions and procedures, but also with the citizens and customers to whom it is responsiblefor providing goods and services.
The third principle involves the institutionalization of system redundancies to eliminate single points of weakness. In this context, the lesson of employing redundant service providers is appliedprimarily to telecommunications services. In the event a central switching station is disabled, havingmultiple providers using different infrastructures for access can reduce the possibility of anorganization losing its communications services and being unable to carry out its responsibilities. Another related lesson learned is the use of generic replaceable technology . In the event of acatastrophe, the ability to replace equipment quickly with easy-to-find products that do not requirecomprehensive customization, can contribute significantly to how quickly an organization'soperations can be functional again. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34020 | crs_RL34020_0 | Minimum fee. Private Negotiations
Following the issuance of the CRB decision, private negotiations between SoundExchange, the organization charged with collecting and distributing performance royalties, and both large and small webcasters were initiated in an attempt to reach a compromise royalty rate agreement that would serve as an alternative to the payment scheme provided by the CRB decision. On July 10, 2009, the federal court of appeals issued an opinion in the case that affirmed nearly all aspects of the "Webcaster II" royalty rate proceeding, although it vacated the $500 minimum annual fee per channel or station and remanded that portion of the determination for the CRB to reconsider. Instead, the 110 th Congress passed the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-435 ) that authorized SoundExchange to enter into settlement agreements with webcasters that effectively replace the CRB's decision. P.L. The purpose of the act was to provide statutory authority for SoundExchange to negotiate and enter into alternative royalty fee agreements with webcasters that would replace the rates established under the CRB's decision, while Congress was in recess for the November 2008 elections. Finally, the act declared that nothing in the WSA of 2008 (or any agreement entered into under it) shall be taken into account by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in its review of the May 1, 2007, determination of royalty rates by the Copyright Royalty Judges. Corporation for Public Broadcasting
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and SoundExchange announced on January 15, 2009, that they had reached a "comprehensive agreement" on the royalty rates to be paid for Internet streaming of sound recordings by approximately 450 public radio webcasters, including CPB-supported station websites, NPR, NPR members, National Federation of Community Broadcasters members, American Public Media, Public Radio Exchange, and Public Radio International. The agreement, which substitutes for the statutory rates determined by the CRB in May 2007, covers a royalty period from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2010. 111-36, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009
Although SoundExchange successfully negotiated new rates with certain categories of webcasters discussed above, SoundExchange did not reach agreements with all webcasters, including the largest commercial webcasters such as Pandora, Live365, and RealNetworks, prior to the February 15, 2009, sunset of SoundExchange's settlement authority under the WSA of 2008. "Pureplay" Webcasters
The first agreement was announced on July 7, 2009, and is available to certain "pureplay" commercial webcasters (those that derive nearly all of their revenue from the streaming of sound recordings) such as Pandora, AccuRadio, and Live365.com. Noncommercial Religious Broadcasters
The noncommercial religious broadcaster agreement governs the royalty period from 2006 to 2015. Sirius XM Radio
The agreement SoundExchange reached with Sirius XM applies not to performances of sound recordings transmitted by satellite, but rather to the streaming of Sirius programming over the Internet or to mobile phones using Internet technology. Copyright Royalty Board Proceedings to Determine Royalty Rates for 2011-2015 ("Webcaster III")
Although the past two years have been consumed with the reactions to the Copyright Royalty Board's May 2007 decision, time marches on, and the CRB announced on January 5, 2009, that it would begin the third proceeding ("Webcaster III") to determine the royalty rates for the statutory license covering Internet transmissions of sound recordings, applicable to the next royalty period that runs from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2015. Any webcaster that chooses not to opt-in to one of the settlement agreements described above may participate in this proceeding and would be bound by the rates and terms that the CRB shall determine. | Under the Copyright Act, Internet radio broadcasters, or "webcasters," that stream copyrighted music to their listeners are obliged to pay royalty fees to the sound recording copyright owners at statutory rates established by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB). However, some webcasters may also have the option of paying different royalty fees that are privately negotiated with SoundExchange, the entity that collects performance royalties on behalf of sound recording copyright owners and recording artists.
On March 9, 2007, the CRB announced statutory royalty rates for certain digital transmissions of sound recordings by webcasters for the royalty period January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2010. Several webcasters appealed the CRB's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellants argued that the rates were unreasonably high and that the absence of a cap on minimum fees paid per licensee was arbitrary and capricious. On July 10, 2009, the federal court of appeals issued a decision that upheld nearly all aspects of the CRB's determination of rates.
Two recent laws, the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 (WSA of 2008; P.L. 110-435) and the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 (WSA of 2009; P.L. 111-36), facilitated the ability of webcasters to enter into voluntary agreements with SoundExchange that provide alternative royalty rates that substitute for the statutory rates established under the CRB's decision. These agreements generally permit a webcaster to pay lower rates and may cover a longer royalty period. Pursuant to the WSA of 2008 and 2009, voluntarily negotiated royalty agreements were reached between SoundExchange and the following entities: the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (for the online streaming of public radio stations); the National Association of Broadcasters (for online simulcasts by FM and AM radio stations); a group of "small" webcasters; certain "pureplay" commercial webcasters (those that derive nearly all of their revenue from the streaming of sound recordings) such as Pandora, Live365.com, and AccuRadio; noncommercial educational webcasters (college-affiliated Internet radio stations); noncommercial religious broadcasters (that stream their AM/FM programming over the Internet); and Sirius XM (concerning Internet streaming of Sirius programming as opposed to its satellite-transmitted programming).
Although the above settlements cover the same royalty period as the CRB's determination (from 2006 through 2010), some rate agreements extend beyond that period, until the end of 2015. Thus, webcasters that are parties to extended agreements need not participate in the CRB proceedings to determine statutory royalty rates for the period 2011 to 2015, which were initiated in January 2009. Any webcaster that chooses not to opt-in to a settlement agreement with SoundExchange must instead comply with the applicable statutory rates and terms established by the CRB for the period 2006-2010, and will be subject to any new rates that the CRB determines for 2011-2015.
This report surveys the legislative history of this issue, the CRB's rate decision, and the congressional and public response. |
crs_RS22639 | crs_RS22639_0 | H.R. 1081 . Similar legislation may be introduced in the 111 th Congress. Currently, 15 U.S.C. The single exception to the blanket application of federal antitrust law to the "business of insurance," is, however, that both bills would have specified that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, "as it relates to areas other than unfair methods of competition" would continue to be applicable to the "business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." In addition, they would each have restored the authority of the Federal Trade Commission, pursuant to its 15 U.S.C. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the issue entitled "The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Immunity: Good for Consumers?" This possible consumer harm is one of the underlying reasons for the antitrust laws. Insurer cooperation and information sharing revolves around advisory organizations, also known as ratings bureaus. Further industry cooperation, both through the advisory organizations and other state-created mechanisms, occurs in state residual market mechanisms and state guaranty funds. If McCarran-Ferguson antitrust protection for "the business of insurance" is, in fact, curtailed or abolished, many lawsuits challenging some of these insurer practices as violations of the federal antitrust laws are likely. If all of the cited examples of cooperation were found to be in violation, it would necessitate major changes in the operation of insurers, particularly small insurers which do not have large pools of information from their own experience. It is also possible that many of the cooperative activities that insurers engage in would be found to be permissible under the "state action" doctrine. Similar provisions were included in, for example, S. 84 , introduced by Senator Metzenbaum in the 103 rd Congress to repeal McCarran-Ferguson's antitrust exemption. | Identical, bipartisan bills, S. 618 and H.R. 1081, that would have eliminated the antitrust exemption for the "business of insurance" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015), in force since 1945, were introduced in the 110th Congress, and similar legislation may be introduced in the 111th Congress. The impact of S. 618 and H.R. 1081, had they been enacted, is unclear. They would each have amended 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) to make the antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act "as it relates to unfair methods of competition" specifically applicable to such business. The FTC Act, "as it relates to areas other than unfair competition" (emphasis added) would, however, have continued to apply to the "business of insurance" "to the extent that [it] is not regulated by State law." Due largely to the importance of information sharing to insurers, the insurance industry in the past has cooperated in a variety of ways, including sharing loss information, jointly developing policy forms and rates, operating residual market mechanisms, and participating in state guaranty funds. Some forms of cooperation, particularly joint rate making and mandatory advisory rates, have already been curtailed because of antitrust concerns. Other forms of industry cooperation, however, might be considered illegal under federal antitrust laws if legislation such as S. 618 or H.R. 1081 were to be enacted. The precise impact of such bills on the insurance industry would depend critically on future court decisions.
The cooperation that insurance companies currently undertake might be judged legally permissible, however, even notwithstanding any deletion of the antitrust exemption for "the business of insurance," under the "state action" doctrine. That doctrine immunizes from the federal antitrust laws actions by public or private entities that are legislatively mandated or authorized by the states. Similarly, before this area of law were settled, however, it would arguably involve numerous lawsuits. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL30432 | crs_RL30432_0 | On November 3, 1999, the Justice Department filed seven lawsuits against electric utilities in the Midwest and South charging them with violations of the New Source Review (NSR) requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), alleging similar violations. Enacted as part of the 1977 CAA Amendments and modestly modified in the 1990 CAA Amendments, NSR is designed to ensure that newly constructed facilities, or substantially modified existing facilities, do not result in violation of applicable air quality standards. The suits represent a continuing effort by EPA to reduce pollution from existing sources, particularly coal-fired electric generating facilities. Why EPA's Enforcement Action?
" The CAA requires a preconstruction review of, and a permit for, almost any major modification of an air polluting source or any major new source. As an enforcement tool, NSR is attractive because of the remedial actions EPA can seek the court to impose on affected utilities. However, the primary substantive difficulty with NSR has been the definition of a major modification. In 1988, the EPA ruled that a life extension project by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) met the trigger for NSR because of the potential for increased emissions from the facilities after the project compared with actual emissions from the facilities before the project. After considerable litigation and congressional debate, EPA modified this "actual to potential" emissions trigger with respect to electric utilities in 1992. The new "test" to determine the applicability of NSR compares a facility's actual emissions before the modification with its projected actual emissions after the modification ("actual to future actual"). In announcing the NSR suits, the EPA Administrator states that "controlling the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from these plants could lead to an 85 to 95 percent reduction respectively in these pollutants." However, the CAA is a complex piece of legislation built up over time. In the case of SO 2 any reduction achieved under NSR would interact with reduction requirements under title IV – a SO 2 reduction program designed with different premises than NSR. The confusion is exacerbated by the interaction of NSR and title IV. EPA Offers Utilities Off-Ramp From NSR ' Highway to Hell '"
By seeking to enforce NSR requirements, EPA exploits an existing authority that holds the potential for reducing emissions. EPA clearly believes that some sources have been evading statutory requirements. However, according to some, the action appears to raise the classic enforcement issue: will the outcome be reduced emissions, or just costly litigation consuming agency and utility resources that might be more effectively invested in other pollution controlling activities? Also, many alternatives for addressing NSR issues would require new legislation amending the CAA, in order to bring consistency to the NSR provisions and to update the Clean Air Act's approach to regulation of the electric utility industry's environmental effect to reflect the knowledge gained by 30 years of CAA implementation. | On November 3, 1999, the Justice Department filed seven lawsuits against electric utilities in the Midwest and South charging them with violations of the New Source Review (NSR) requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), alleging similar violations. Through a "preconstruction" permitting process, NSR is designed to ensure that newly constructed facilities, or substantially modified existing facilities, do not result in violation of applicable air quality standards.
The suits represent a continuing effort by EPA to reduce pollution from existing sources, particularly coal-fired electric generating facilities. The primary pollutants of concern have been nitrogen oxides (NOx), and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The question the EPA lawsuits raise is whether the specified facilities have engaged in rehabilitation actions that represent "major modifications" of the plants, in which case the CAA would require the installation of best available pollution control equipment. The crucial definition of "major modification" derives from an EPA ruling that a life extension project by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) triggered NSR requirements. Since 1992, after considerable litigation and congressional debate, the "test" to determine the applicability of NSR compares whether a facility's projected actual emissions after the modification are more than its actual emissions before the modification. Utilities argue that the "modifications" that EPA cites in the suits were just routine maintenance, which do not trigger NSR.
NSR is an attractive enforcement tool because EPA can ask the court to impose substantial monetary penalties, and to require a violating source to install best available control technology. Thus EPA states that these facilities could be required to reduce their emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides by 85 to 95%.
Because the CAA is a complex piece of legislation built up over time, however, the reductions that might result from successful prosecution of the NSR suits may not be completely realized. In the case of SO2, any reduction achieved under NSR would interact with a cap on emissions set under title IV of the CAA; because of the system of tradable allowances established under title IV, reductions from NSR compliance might be shifted to unaffected facilities. The situation with respect to NOx is also confused, largely because of inconsistencies in EPA's new and existing source NOx regulations as a result of a partial remand of regulations by a court.
By seeking to enforce NSR requirements, EPA exploits an existing authority that holds the potential for reducing emissions. EPA clearly believes that some sources have been evading NSR requirements. However, the action appears to raise the classic enforcement issue: will the outcome be reduced emissions, or just costly litigation? The suits expose the complex interactions of NSR with other provisions of the CAA – complexities that might compromise air pollution reductions sought through the NSR suits. Knowledge gained through 30 years of CAA implementation suggests options for updating the Act's approach to regulating the utility industry's emissions; however, many of these require Congressional action to amend the Act. |
crs_RL33620 | crs_RL33620_0 | On March 26, 1991, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asunción, establishing the Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur—Mercosur) with the intention of strengthening sub-regional development and cooperation through economic integration. Since then, Mercosur has struggled to achieve deep economic integration, but has maintained a cooperative economic and political framework, which has also become an influential voice in determining the fate of the hemisphere's regional integration initiatives. In particular, the U.S. vision for hemispheric integration, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), has stalled largely because of opposition from within Mercosur. Venezuela's July 2006 signing of an accession agreement only reinforces Mercosur as the undisputed economic counterweight to the United States in the region and raises further doubts over the prospects for a hemispheric-wide trade agreement. Venezuela signed an accession agreement on July 4, 2006 (discussed in detail below), but has been reticent to take on all commitments of the customs union, especially the CET. From the outset, Mercosur struggled to reconcile a basic inconsistency of partial economic union: how to balance trade integration and equity of member benefits, while retaining some semblance of national control over trade, production, and consumption structure. It also turned to the Mercosur system for dispute settlement. These constraints limit prospects for deep continental integration. Mercosur's other negotiations have experienced mixed success. deeper integration). South-South agreements and expansion of associate membership to South American countries has progressed, but only as limited market access arrangements. It appears that Mercosur has opted to emphasize its expansion both in the region and with other developing countries over agreements with its largest developed country trade partners, looking to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the preferred alternative for achieving many of its trade policy goals. Nonetheless, U.S.-Mercosur commercial and economic ties are expanding and the United States is pursuing deeper bilateral trade relations with Uruguay that could provide new ideas for a broader integration commitment. The alternative may be for Mercosur and the United States to expand their mutually exclusive bilateral agreements, increasing the potential for overlapping trading systems, which few, if any, view as either economically or administratively optimal. | Mercosur is the Common Market of the South established by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 1991 to promote economic integration and political cooperation among the four countries. Since then, Mercosur has struggled to achieve deep economic integration, but has maintained a cooperative economic and political framework, which has also become an influential voice in determining the fate of the hemisphere's regional integration initiatives. In particular, the U.S. vision for hemispheric integration, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), has stalled largely because of opposition from within Mercosur, which in turn has focused on its own, albeit limited, expansion.
The Mercosur pact calls for an incremental path to a full integration, but after 15 years, only a limited customs union has been achieved. From the outset, Mercosur struggled to reconcile a basic inconsistency in a pact of partial economic union: how to achieve economic integration, while also ensuring that the benefits would be balanced among members and that each country would retain some control over its trade, production, and consumption structure. This delicate balance faced overcoming serious structural and policy asymmetries that became clear when Brazil and Argentina experienced financial crises and deep recessions. These economic setbacks disrupted trade flows among members, causing friction, the adoption of protectionist measures, and a retreat from the commitment to deeper economic integration.
For now, Mercosur has turned to expanding rather than deepening the agreement. Many South American countries have been added as "associate members" and Mercosur has reached out for other South-South arrangements in Africa and Asia – all limited agreements and unlikely paths to continental economic integration. Internal conflicts have highlighted Mercosur's institutional weaknesses and slowed the integration process. On July 4, 2006, Venezuela signed an accession agreement to become its first new full member, making Mercosur the undisputed economic counterweight to United States in the region, but raising questions about how Venezuela's membership may shift regional political and trade dynamics.
It appears that Mercosur has opted to emphasize its expansion both in the region and with other developing countries over agreements with its largest developed country trade partners, looking to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the preferred alternative for achieving many of its trade policy goals. Nonetheless, U.S.-Mercosur commercial and economic ties are expanding and the United States is pursuing deeper bilateral trade relations with Uruguay that could provide new ideas for a broader integration commitment. The alternative may be for Mercosur and the United States to expand their mutually exclusive bilateral agreements, increasing the potential for overlapping trading systems, which few, if any, view as either economically or administratively optimal. |
crs_R42613 | crs_R42613_0 | This report surveys existing law for legal issues that have arisen, or may arise in the future, on account of climate change and government responses thereto. I. Two of these doctrines, standing and political question, have posed daunting barriers for plaintiffs in climate change cases. How does he show, say, that a drought that destroyed his crops was caused by climate change—indeed, by climate change to which the defendant's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contributed? Mitigation—Reducing GHG Emissions
Proactive responses to climate change are usually grouped under one of two headings: mitigation and adaptation. In 2012, the D.C. In 2014, the Supreme Court handed down Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (UARG), answering no to the above question—that is, EPA's regulation of vehicle GHG emissions does not give EPA unqualified authority to apply PSD new source permitting and Title V operating permits to stationary source GHG emissions. Nor did UARG directly touch on the validity of EPA's current use of CAA section 111 in its effort to control GHG emissions from new and existing fossil-fuel-fired power plants. 3. The legal issues raised by climate change under these "little NEPAs" are beyond the scope of this report. Among the emerging legal issues associated with CCS technology are (1) who owns and controls the underground pore space where the CO 2 would be "sequestered" under many of the CCS facility concepts proposed, in particular is pore space part of the surface estate or mineral rights under traditional property law principles; (2) which federal and state agencies would permit and regulate CO 2 pipelines transporting the gas from the point of generation to the sequestration site under the existing framework for pipeline regulation; and (3) concerns over liability exposure that may hinder development of CCS technology. DCC issues have been raised in a variety of climate-change-related contexts. Liability After American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut
In American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut , the Supreme Court read the CAA to bar federal judges from imposing their own limits on GHG emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants, separate from those imposed by EPA under that act. Some issues in the vast universe of insurance-coverage litigation seem to be especially relevant to climate change. There, the Court held that GHG emissions are "air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act, raising the possibility that this ruling will be used to enlarge policy coverage to bring in damage traceable to GHG emissions. Research reveals only one climate-change-related international law action filed against the United States. Climate Change-Induced Water Shortages
A. These decisions resolved claims of Fifth Amendment takings of water rights and claims of government breach of water-supply contracts based on cutbacks in the amount of water delivered from federal water projects—as demanded by the Endangered Species Act and the Central Valley Improvement Act. But, it would appear, not otherwise. V. Sea Level Rise and Extreme Precipitation
A. Effect of Sea Level Rise on the Beachfront Owner's Property Line
Sea level rise generally causes the boundary between land and water to move landward. E. Failure to Take Preventive Measures
The scientific consensus that climate change will lead to further sea level rise raises the issue whether governments can be held liable for failing to act to avert the harmful impacts of such rise. Beach Issues
1. As a result, questions as to liability for harm to neighboring tracts may be raised more often. The Supreme Court, too, has turned its attention recently to beach renourishment projects. Arguably, however, the question remains open. The aim of such disinvestment would be to hold down repair and restoration costs as the result of floods and sea level rise, and to discourage new development in such areas or promote removal of existing development. Responding To and Rebuilding After Natural Disasters
A. Responding
Legal questions inevitably arise as to whether public and private actions taken in an emergency, climate-change-related or otherwise, are subject to the same legal requirements as when there is no emergency. | This report surveys existing law for legal issues that have arisen, or may arise in the future, on account of climate change and government responses thereto.
At the threshold of many climate-change-related lawsuits are two barriers—whether the plaintiff has standing to sue and whether the claim being made presents a political question. Both barriers have forced courts to apply amorphous standards in a new and complex context.
Efforts to mitigate climate change—i.e., reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—have spawned a host of legal issues. The Supreme Court resolved a big one in 2007: the Clean Air Act (CAA), it said, authorizes EPA to regulate GHG emissions. Most of EPA's subsequent efforts to carry out that authority have been sustained by the D.C. Circuit. In 2014, however, the Supreme Court held that EPA's regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles does not categorically bring GHG emissions from power plants and factories under the permitting sections of the Act. EPA's alternative track for regulating GHG emissions from such "stationary sources," standards of performance for new and existing sources, also raises issues. Still other mitigation issues are (1) the role of the Endangered Species Act in addressing climate change; (2) how climate change must be considered under the National Environmental Policy Act; (3) questions raised by carbon capture and sequestration; and (4) constitutional constraints on state actions to control GHG emissions.
Liability for harms allegedly caused by climate change has raised another crop of legal issues. The Supreme Court has held that the CAA bars federal judges from imposing their own limits on GHG emissions from power plants, suggesting that common law remedies will play little role in addressing climate change. Questions of insurance policy coverage are also likely to be litigated. Finally, the applicability of international law principles to climate change has yet to be resolved.
Water shortages thought to be induced by climate change likely will lead to litigation over the nature of water rights. Shortages have already prompted several lawsuits over whether cutbacks in water delivered from federal projects effect Fifth Amendment takings or breaches of contract.
Sea level rise and extreme precipitation linked to climate change raise questions as to (1) the effect of sea level rise on the beachfront owner's property line; (2) whether public beach access easements migrate with the landward movement of beaches; (3) design and operation of federal levees; and (4) government failure to take preventive measures against climate change harms.
Other adaptation responses to climate change raising legal issues, often property-rights related, are beach armoring (seawalls, bulkheads, etc.), beach renourishment, and "managed retreat" measures. Retreat measures seek to move existing development away from areas likely to be affected by floods and sea level rise, and to discourage new development there.
Natural disasters to which climate change contributes may prompt questions as to whether response actions taken in an emergency are subject to relaxed requirements and, similarly, as to the rebuilding of structures destroyed by such disasters just as they were before.
Finally, immigration and refugee law appear not to cover persons forced to relocate because of climate change impacts such as drought or sea level rise. |
crs_RL34121 | crs_RL34121_0 | Child welfare services are intended to prevent the abuse or neglect of children; to ensure that children have safe, permanent homes; and to promote the well-being of children and their families. It discusses FY2013 appropriations for those programs, including the effect of the automatic spending cuts, known as sequestration. Dedicated Child Welfare Funding by Purpose
By far, the largest share of dedicated federal child welfare funding (roughly 88% in recent years) is provided to states to assist them in supporting, or otherwise administering aid to, children who have been removed from their birth families primarily due to abuse or neglect. Foster Care, Adoption Assistance, and Kinship Guardianship Assistance
Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, funds are provided to support eligible children in foster care as well as those who leave foster care for permanent homes via adoption or guardianship. Accordingly, the share of funding needed to reimburse states for support of children in foster care has been in decline—although it still represents more than half of all federal dedicated child welfare funds—while the share provided to support children in permanent adoptive or guardianship homes has increased to nearly one-third of the total dedicated child welfare funding. Funds included in this category of child welfare spending are authorized under (1) Title IV-B of the Social Security Act (i.e., funding for Child Welfare, Research, Training and Demonstrations; Family Connection Grants; certain competitively awarded programs or grants included in the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program ; and the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being (NSCAW)); (2) Title IV-E of the Social Security Act (i.e., Adoption Incentives and Tribal technical assistance and IV-E Implementation grants); (3) the Victims of Child Abuse Act (i.e., Court-Appointed Special Advocates, Children's Advocacy Centers, and Child Abuse Training for Judges and Judicial Practitioner), as well as (4) additional acts authorizing funds for Adoption Opportunities and Abandoned Infants Assistance. Final FY2013 funding provided via P.L. By comparison, for FY2012 Congress provided $8.009 billion in funding for the child welfare programs discussed in this report, including $7.386 billion in mandatory funds and $623 million in discretionary program dollars. 112-74 ). The President's FY2013 budget included $250 million to provide financial incentives to states to improve the child welfare system and $2 million as part of early implementation of a policy to ensure that child support payments collected on behalf of children in foster care are used in the child's best interest. This funding was not provided in the final FY2013 funding measure ( P.L. Improve the Child Welfare System
As part of its FY2013 budget request, the Obama Administration sought additional annual mandatory funding authority of $2.5 billion across 10 years ($250 million in each of FY2013-FY2022) "for incentive payments to States that demonstrate real, meaningful improvements" on measures of child outcomes and service quality. Because this legislative proposal would end federal "cost recovery" of Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments, it was estimated to increase the federal cost of foster care by $2 million in FY2013—the first year proposed for implementation of this proposal—rising to roughly $34 million annually when the proposal is fully launched (total estimated 10-year federal cost to the Title IV-E program: $303 million). These proposals did not necessarily require congressional program authorization to be carried out. The Administration proposed FY2013 appropriations language that would cancel any of the appropriated Title V Abstinence Education funding for any state that did not submit an application to receive the funding (as of September 20, 2013) and would simultaneously re-appropriate these funds to HHS for support of "competitive contracts and grants to State and local governments to develop approaches to reduce pregnancy among youth in foster care and to fund age appropriate evidence-based programs that reduce pregnancy, behavioral risk factors underlying teen pregnancy, or other associated risk factors among youth in foster care and for the Federal costs associated with administering and evaluating such contracts and grants." 113-6 provides combined funding for each of these programs of $25 million after application of the March 1 sequestration order. Congress first authorized Title IV-E support for kinship guardianship assistance in FY2009. Although the number of children currently receiving this assistance remains small, it has grown from about 100 in FY2009 to 16,000 in FY2012. | Child welfare services are intended to prevent the abuse or neglect of children; ensure that children have safe, permanent homes; and promote the well-being of children and their families. The largest amount of federal child welfare funding is provided to states for assistance to children who have been removed from their homes (due primarily to abuse or neglect). In the past decade, the share of this support provided for children who remain in foster care has been on the decline, while the share provided for those who leave foster care for permanent homes (primarily via adoption) has increased. Congress first authorized Title IV-E support for kinship guardianship assistance in FY2009. Although the number of children receiving this assistance remains relatively small, it is growing.
Final FY2013 funding provided for child welfare programs was $7.868 billion (P.L. 113-6, and after application of the March 1 sequestration order). Final FY2012 funding provided for those same child welfare programs was $8.009 billion (P.L. 112-74).
Of the $141 million in reduced child welfare funding (compared to FY2012), about $55 million resulted from the automatic spending cuts, known as sequestration. Those cuts largely affected funding to states for child welfare-related services to children and their families, including the Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services program, the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program, Education and Training Vouchers (for youth who age out of foster care), grants under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), funding for Adoption Incentives, and several competitive grant programs supporting child welfare purposes. The remaining roughly $86 million difference in appropriated funding authority is tied to a change in the expected cost of the program that provides federal support for foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship (authorized under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act). That program is exempt from sequestration and receives mandatory funding to meet a part of all eligible foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance costs incurred by states.
The President's FY2013 budget sought $8.175 billion for the child welfare programs and related initiatives described in this report, including $250 million annually (beginning with FY2013) to provide incentives to states that improve their performance with regard to child outcomes and service quality. The Administration also sought legislative authority to end federal and state "cost recovery" of child support payments made on behalf of children in foster care and to instead require that these funds be spent in the child's best interest. This change to the Child Support Enforcement program was estimated to cost the federal treasury $2 million in FY2013, and a total of $303 million across 10 years.
As part of its FY2013 budget, the Administration also proposed continued funding of a national survey of well-being for children in foster care, sought increased research funds ($5 million in FY2013) for competitive grants to improve coordination between entities serving young victims of domestic sex trafficking, and proposed re-purposing certain previously appropriated funding that was expected to go unused (an estimated $12 million to $15 million in FY2013) for competitive grants to fund and evaluate programs to reduce pregnancy among youth in foster care. Congress did not authorize, fund, or otherwise enable any of these FY2013 proposals. Finally, the Administration sought to eliminate funding for three programs, authorized under the Victims of Child Abuse Act (Children's Advocacy Centers, Court Appointed Special Advocates, and Child Abuse Training for Judges and Judicial Practitioners). Congress did not follow this proposal, choosing instead to provide a combined $25 million for the programs. |
crs_R45407 | crs_R45407_0 | Current policy continues this approach through provisions in Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA, P.L. 89-329, as amended). Title II-A consists of two major components: (1) a competitive grant program that supports certain reforms in a small number of programs that prepare prospective teachers, and (2) reporting and accountability provisions that require states to track and report on the quality of all teacher preparation programs within their jurisdiction. The authorization of appropriations for Title II-A expired at the end of FY2011 and were extended for an additional fiscal year under the General Education Provisions Act. Along with many HEA programs whose authorizations have lapsed, Title II-A authorities have continued to be funded under a variety of appropriations legislation and continuing resolutions; most recently under P.L. 115-245 , which provides full-year FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Education (ED), among other agencies. Context
Historically, pre-service teacher preparation in the United States has mainly occurred at institutions of higher education (IHEs). HEA Title II, Part A
Title II-A of the HEA has two components: (1) a competitive grant program that provides funds to support the types of programs that Congress has identified as models to be replicated, and (2) reporting and accountability provisions that require the reporting of data on program characteristics, state standards for teacher licensing and certification, and information on the quality of teacher preparation. Teacher Quality Partnerships
Title II-A of the HEA authorizes the Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) program, which funds competitive grants to eligible partnerships involved in teacher preparation. The TQP program has received annual appropriations in recent years of about $42 million, which supports grants to about two dozen partnerships. Under these provisions, states and IHEs that operate teacher preparation programs are required to report information on the performance of their programs. States must do so as a condition for receiving HEA funds. Section 207 of the HEA further requires states to establish criteria to evaluate teacher preparation programs, report the results of these evaluations for traditional and alternative route programs, and identify programs determined to be low-performing or at risk of being classified as low-performing. Some of the issues that may receive consideration during this process include the following:
the appropriate role for the federal government to play in supporting innovations and reforms for teacher preparation programs; the optimal mix of TQP authorized activities such as support for clinical practice, induction, mentoring, and pre-service assessment; and the extent to which current reporting and accountability provisions encourage program quality. | Approximately 26,000 state-approved teacher preparation programs are in operation across the United States. Among these, about 70% are traditional teacher preparation programs—that is, they are contained within schools of education at institutions of higher education (IHEs). Of the remaining, alternative routes to teacher preparation, about two-thirds are based at an IHE and about one-third are operated independent of an IHE.
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA, P.L. 89-329, as amended), includes financial support and accountability provisions intended to improve the quality of teacher preparation programs. Specifically, Title II, Part A of the HEA consists of two major components: (1) a competitive grant program intended to support a select group of programs that prepare teachers, and (2) reporting and accountability provisions intended to track and improve the quality of all teacher preparation programs.
Title II-A authorizes the Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) program, which provides grants to about two dozen partnerships of teacher preparation programs and local educational agencies. The TQP receives annual appropriations of about $42 million. Title II-A also requires states (as a condition for receiving HEA funds) to report information on the performance of their teacher preparation programs and identify programs determined to be low-performing or at risk of low performance. This information is compiled by the Department of Education (ED), which annually issues a report on the quality of teacher preparation in the United States.
The authorization of appropriations for Title II-A expired at the end of FY2011 and was extended for an additional fiscal year under the General Education Provisions Act. Along with many HEA programs whose authorizations have lapsed, Title II-A authorities were provided additional appropriations under a variety of appropriations legislation and continuing resolutions; most recently under P.L. 115-245, which provides full-year FY2019 appropriations for ED, among other agencies.
The 115th Congress has considered legislation to reauthorize the HEA, including provisions in Title II, but has yet to do so. These efforts may resume in the 116th Congress. Some of the issues that may arise during this process that relate to Title II include consideration of the following:
the appropriate role for the federal government to play in supporting innovations and reforms for teacher preparation programs; the optimal mix of TQP-authorized activities such as support for clinical practice, induction, mentoring, and pre-service assessment; and the extent to which current reporting and accountability provisions encourage program quality. |
crs_R44957 | crs_R44957_0 | Introduction
Businesses that are incorporated in foreign countries and conduct a large portion of their operations outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States may nevertheless cause injury to U.S. persons. For example, a foreign company might manufacture in its home country a machine that another company later distributes in the United States, ultimately resulting in an injury to a U.S. consumer. Although foreign companies may engage in actions or omissions that injure U.S. persons—or even foreign plaintiffs —such injured persons may face various procedural challenges in obtaining judicial relief from a foreign company defendant in U.S. courts. One potential obstacle to such civil lawsuits is the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the power of state courts to render judgments affecting the personal rights of defendants who do not reside within the state's territory. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give federal district courts power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the same extent that a state court in which the federal district court is located may assert that power, meaning the same limits on personal jurisdiction generally apply to federal courts. This report broadly traces the evolution of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction through more than a century of Supreme Court rulings. Current Doctrine
Although Pennoyer 's physical presence test informed the Supreme Court's jurisprudence related to jurisdiction for several decades, a significant expansion of the U.S. economy in the mid-20 th century altered that focus. Thus, the Supreme Court's opinions in International Shoe and subsequent cases have established a more flexible two-part test for determining when exercise of personal jurisdiction over each nonresident defendant sued by a plaintiff comports with due process: (1) the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state that demonstrate an intent to avail itself of the benefits and protections of state law; and (2) it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend the lawsuit in the forum. Over the years, the Supreme Court has offered three main justifications for the constitutional constraints on a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident persons and corporations. Reasonableness Test
Even if a nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum, the Supreme Court has, at times, considered whether a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would comport with due process by examining the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction. Issues for Congress
Recent Supreme Court rulings have limited the circumstances in which U.S. courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over certain corporate defendants. | Businesses that are incorporated in foreign countries and conduct a large portion of their operations outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States may nevertheless cause injury to U.S. persons. For example, a foreign company might manufacture in its home country a machine that another company later distributes in the United States, ultimately resulting in an injury to a U.S. consumer. Although foreign companies may engage in actions or omissions that injure U.S. persons, such injured persons may face various procedural challenges in obtaining judicial relief from a foreign company defendant in U.S. courts.
One potential obstacle to such civil lawsuits is the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the power of state courts to render judgments affecting the personal rights of defendants who do not reside within the state's territory. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give federal district courts power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the same extent that a state court in which the federal district court is located may assert that power, meaning the same limits on personal jurisdiction generally apply to federal courts. The Court has offered several justifications for the constitutional constraints on a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident persons and corporations, including concerns about state sovereignty and fairness to defendants.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence addressing the doctrine of personal jurisdiction spans a period of American history that has witnessed a significant expansion of interstate and global commerce, as well as major technological advancements in transportation and communication. These changes produced a fundamental shift in the Court's views concerning the doctrine. Although the Court initially considered the defendant's physical presence within the forum state to be the touchstone of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him or her, it later rejected strict adherence to this rule in favor of a more flexible standard that examines a nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state to determine whether those contacts make it reasonable to require him to respond to a lawsuit there. The Supreme Court's opinions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and subsequent cases have established a more flexible two-part test for determining when exercise of personal jurisdiction over each nonresident defendant sued by a plaintiff comports with due process: (1) the defendant must establish minimum contacts with the forum state that demonstrate an intent to avail itself of the benefits and protections of state law; and (2) it must be reasonable to require the defendant to defend the lawsuit in the forum.
Recent Supreme Court rulings have limited the circumstances in which U.S. courts may exercise personal jurisdiction. This report discusses the evolution of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction as elucidated by the Supreme Court in its opinions. It concludes by examining the implications of recent developments in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction for Congress, as well as options that Congress might have to address these developments. |
crs_R41218 | crs_R41218_0 | Overview
On an undisclosed date in 2010, Burma (Myanmar) is to hold its first national parliamentary elections since the ill-fated vote in 1990. The current ruling military junta—the State Development and Peace Council (SPDC)—is promoting the 2010 election as the fifth step in what it calls a seven-step roadmap to "disciplined democracy." The Constitutional Referendum of 2008
On February 9, 2008, the SPDC announced a national referendum on its draft constitution was to be held in May 2008. Despite the widespread destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis, the SPDC decided to not invoke the natural disaster provisions of the referendum law. On the basis of these official results, the SPDC declared that the new constitution had been ratified. The military junta released five laws on March 9, 2010, that will govern the conduct of the 2010 election. They are (1) a law establishing the Union Election Commission; (2) a law setting the conditions for registering political parties to participate in the election; (3) a law concerning the election of the members of the Pyithu Hluttaw ; (4) a law concerning the election of the members of the Amyotha Hluttaw ; and (5) a law concerning the election of members of the state or regional Hluttaws . No specific application deadline has been set for new political parties. Union Election Commission Law
As required by the constitution, the law creates the Union Election Commission, and gives it the authority to supervise the hluttaw elections and Burma's political parties. People who have lived overseas any time during the last 10 years cannot run for office, effectively eliminating the participation of Burma's leaders-in-exile. Comments also pointed to a perceived bias in the Political Parties Registration Law against opposition parties. There has also been criticism of the Union Election Commission Law and the people appointed to the commission. The day after the election laws were released, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley referred to the Political Parties Registration Law as "a step in the wrong direction." Crowley concluded by saying the law "makes a mockery of the democratic process and ensures that the upcoming elections will be devoid of credibility." The Obama Administration's Burma Policy
In September 2009, the Obama Administration announced a change in U.S. policy towards Burma after seven months of review, discussion, and consultation. The new element to the Obama policy is the willingness to engage in direct dialogue with the SPDC on how to promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and greater cooperation on international security issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation and counternarcotics efforts. Outside of the new willingness to engage in direct dialogue, the Obama policy is mostly a continuation of the policies of the two preceding administrations with the same goals—supporting "a unified, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its citizens." The existing U.S. sanctions on Burma—as stipulated in section 570 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997; Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003; the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008; and a series of executive orders —will remain in place "until we see concrete progress towards reform." Nine Senators sent a letter to President Obama on March 26, 2010, urging the imposition of additional economic sanctions on the SPDC in light of the "a set of profoundly troubling election laws." Steps Taken
The 111 th Congress has already taken steps to help achieve U.S. goals in Burma. One possible action would be to hold hearings on the situation in Burma. A fourth possible course of action, if the 111 th Congress determines that decreasing pressure on the SPDC is warranted, would be to remove or reduce some of the existing sanctions on Burma. | On an undisclosed date in 2010, Burma plans to hold its first parliamentary elections in 20 years. The elections are to be held under a new constitution, supposedly approved in a national referendum held in 2008 in the immediate aftermath of the widespread destruction caused by Cyclone Nargis. The official results of the constitutional referendum are widely seen as fraudulent, but despite significant domestic and international opposition, Burma's ruling military junta—the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)—has insisted on conducting the polls as part of what it calls a path to "disciplined democracy."
On March 9, 2010, the SPDC released five new laws for the pending parliamentary elections. Three of the laws are about the three main types of parliaments stipulated in the constitution—the two houses of the national parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) and the Regional or State parliaments. The fourth law—the Political Parties Registration Law—sets conditions for the registration and operation of political parties in Burma; the fifth law establishes a Union Election Commission to supervise the parliamentary elections and political parties.
The new laws were quickly subjected to sharp criticism, both domestically and overseas. In particular, the law on political parties was widely denounced for placing unreasonable restrictions on the participation of many opposition political leaders and Burma's Buddhist monks and nuns. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip J. Crowley said the Political Parties Registration Law "makes a mockery of the democratic process and ensures that the upcoming elections will be devoid of credibility." There have also been objections to the terms of the Union Election Commission Law and the 17 people subsequently appointed to the commission by the SPDC.
In late September 2009, the Obama Administration adopted a new policy on Burma. The policy keeps most of the elements of the Burma policies of the last two administrations in place, but adds a willingness to engage in direct dialogue with the SPDC on how to promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and greater cooperation on international security issues, such as counternarcotics efforts and nuclear nonproliferation. The Obama Administration accepts that little progress has been made during the seven months that the new policy has been in effect, but has indicated that it will remain in place for now.
There are signs of concern among Members of Congress about the dearth of progress in Burma towards democracy and greater respect for human rights. Nine Senators sent a letter to President Obama on March 26, 2010, urging the imposition of additional economic sanctions on the SPDC in light of "a set of profoundly troubling election laws." However, another Senator perceives "several substantive gestures" on the part of the SPDC, and suggests it is time to increase engagement with the Burmese government.
The 111th Congress has already taken action with respect to Burma, such as renewing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. If it were to determine that additional actions should be taken, there are several alternatives available. Among those alternatives are holding hearings or seminars on the political situation in Burma, pushing the Obama Administration to implement existing sanctions on Burma more vigorously, and adding or removing existing sanctions.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RS21360 | crs_RS21360_0 | Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. 107-296 was signed into law, the Select Committeeon Homeland Security was abolished, butnot before the new law included language in Section 1503 stating, "It is the sense of Congress that each House ofCongress should review its committeestructure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch by the establishment of theDepartment." The structure of the House and SenateAppropriations Committees have been changed to account for the creation of the new department. A number of proposals have been offered in the House and Senate to establish a new temporary select, permanentselect, or standing committee on homelandsecurity, to alter the appropriations process, or to make other changes in congressional structures dealing withhomeland security issues. With the 9/11 Commission'srecent recommendations and the September 30,2004, deadline for committee system reform proposals from the House Homeland Security Committee, some sayreforms are so vital that they should beadopted before Congress adjourns for the election. Retain Current Structure. Realign Committee Jurisdiction. Create a Joint Committee on Homeland Security. | The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that the House and Senateeach have a "permanent standingcommittee" as the principal committee for conducting oversight and review for homeland security. Earlier, pursuantto PL 107-296, the Homeland SecurityAct, a new Department of Homeland Security was established. Congress began discussions regarding theappropriate congressional structure to conductoversight and fund the new department. Section 1503 of the legislation states the sense of Congress that eachchamber should review its committee structure inlight of the reorganization of the executive branch, and the House, in the 108th Congress, establisheda Select Committee on Homeland Security with a mandateto report recommendations for changes in the House committee system by September 30, 2004.
Each chamber might decide to retain its current structure, make minor alterations to its current jurisdictionalalignment, make extensive jurisdictional changes,create a standing committee, re-establish the existing House select committee, or establish one or more new selectcommittees with revised authorities. Furtherchanges might also be made in the structure of the Appropriations Committees. This report addresses some of theseoptions and will be updated as eventswarrant. |
crs_R44943 | crs_R44943_0 | The term "patentable subject matter" refers to the requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 that an invention must consist of a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" in order to be patented. Most recently, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 stipulated that "no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism." The AIA also limited the availability of patents claiming tax avoidance strategies. The courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have historically understood the language of Section 101 to allow an expansive range of patentable subject matter. In particular, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held to be unpatentable. For many years, Section 101 was arguably a coarse filter that was rarely used to invalidate an issued patent or reject an application pending at the USPTO. This situation changed over the past decade due to a series of decisions issued by the Supreme Court of the United States. In each instance the Court concluded that the invention before it was unpatentable under Section 101. Since the Supreme Court issued its decisions, Section 101 has been more frequently invoked to invalidate issued patents and reject pending patent applications at the USPTO. Further, numerous patents granted by the USPTO under earlier standards would likely be held invalid if they were subject to scrutiny by the agency or the courts. Even if these requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility are met, an invention is not patentable unless it falls within at least one category of patentable subject matter. Under this reasoning, human genes consist of patentable subject matter. That test asks (1) whether the claim recites a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; and (2) if so, whether the claim includes additional, inventive elements that indicate the claim applies one of the three excluded subject matters, rather than being a fundamental concept per se . With regard to this second step, the Court will analyze a patent claim to determine if it preempts a field of activity. If a claim covers every practical application of a fundamental concept, then it cannot be patented under Section 101. In addition, the Court does not consider a claim's recitation of routine, nominal hardware—such as a general-purpose computer—to ameliorate concerns over Section 101 eligibility. If the current situation is deemed acceptable, then no action need be taken. As of the date this report was published, no bill has been introduced before Congress addressing the law of patentable subject since the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 2011. (b) Sole Exceptions to Subject Matter Eligibility .—A claimed invention is ineligible under subsection (a) only if the claimed invention as a whole exists in nature independent of and prior to any human activity, or can be performed solely in the human mind. Similarly, the ABA Section on Intellectual Property asserts that recent Supreme Court decisions "have injected ambiguity into the eligibility determination by requiring courts and the [USPTO] to apply criteria such as 'well known,' 'routine,' 'conventional or obvious,' factors that were previously relevant only to novelty and obviousness, in order to ignore limitations and render a claim patent ineligible and in effect have turned the gateway function of patent eligibility into a patentability test better left to the other statutory provisions.... " For its part, the IPO explains that the Supreme Court's analysis "is contrary to [c]ongressional intent, too restrictive, technologically incorrect, unsound from a policy standpoint, and bad law." | The term "patentable subject matter" refers to the requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 that an invention must consist of a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" in order to be patented. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011, P.L. 112-29, additionally stipulated that "no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism." The AIA also limited the availability of patents claiming tax avoidance strategies.
The courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have generally construed the language of Section 101 broadly. As a result, inventions from many different fields of human endeavor may be patented, so long as other statutory requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness are met. However, the courts recognize several implicit exceptions to the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter. In particular, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held to be unpatentable.
For many years, Section 101 was arguably used only infrequently to invalidate an issued patent or reject an application pending at the USPTO. This situation changed over the past decade due in large part to four decisions issued by the Supreme Court of the United States since 2010 addressing patentable subject matter. In each instance the Court concluded that the invention before it was unpatentable. The four cases were
Bilski v. Kappos, pertaining to a business method; Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, considering a method of medical diagnosis; Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, addressing human genes; and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, relating to computer software.
These decisions collectively hold that an invention is unpatentable if (1) it consists of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; and (2) does not include additional, inventive elements that indicate the claim applies one of the three excluded subject matters, rather than being a fundamental concept per se. With regard to this second step, the Court analyzes a patent claim to determine if it covers every practical application of a fundamental concept. Claims with this preemptive scope cannot be patented under Section 101. In addition, the Court does not consider a claim's recitation of routine, nominal hardware—such as a general-purpose computer—to ameliorate concerns over Section 101 eligibility.
Since the Supreme Court issued these decisions, Section 101 has been more frequently invoked to invalidate issued patents in the courts and in certain administrative patent revocation proceedings, and also to reject pending patent applications at the USPTO. Further, numerous patents granted by the USPTO under earlier standards would likely be held invalid if they were subject to scrutiny today.
If the current situation is deemed acceptable, then no action need be taken. However, several stakeholder groups have recommended legislative reforms to Section 101. In general, these proposals assert that an invention should be deemed patentable subject matter unless it exists in nature independently of human activity or it can be performed solely in the human mind. These proposals also state that whether an invention is implemented through conventional means is irrelevant to whether it is patentable subject matter or not. As of the date of publication of this report, legislation has yet to be introduced before Congress addressing reform of the law of patentable subject matter. |
crs_R40609 | crs_R40609_0 | Background
Efforts to establish a national voter registration system followed closely on the heels of passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. H.R. On May 20, 1993, President Clinton signed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 into law ( P.L. 103-31 [42 U.S.C. §1973gg et seq.]). ]), the so-called "motor-voter" law, required that, for federal elections, states must establish procedures so that eligible citizens may register to vote:
"(1) by application made simultaneously with an application for a motor vehicle driver's license ... ;
(2) by mail application ... ; and
(3) by application in person (A) at the appropriate registration site designated with respect to the residence of the applicant in accordance with state law; and (B) at a federal, state, or nongovernmental office designated under Section 7 (required for state agencies providing public assistance and agencies primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities)." 103-31 argued that by making it easier to register eligible citizens, the law would not only increase the number of persons who were registered to vote but also would encourage more voter turnout. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that there was very little evidence that voter turnout would increase even if voter registration increased. Even after being in effect for 18 years, however, there are few cost estimates for the NVRA. 107-252 ). However, proposals were suggested to amend the NVRA to make it easier to administer and prevent election fraud. Additionally, one bill, the Voter Empowerment Act of 2012 ( H.R. 289 [ H.R. 2115 [ H.R. Concluding Observations
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 has been the law of the land for over 20 years and has been in effect for 18 years. The courts have resolved many of the initial issues. A review of the FEC/EAC reports appears to indicate that the states have come to terms with the provisions, despite the fact that state election officials continue to advocate that the federal government should provide funding for the implementation of aspects of the act. There may still be some problems with implementation at the local levels and with the training of nonelection officials who are responsible under the NVRA for providing voter registration services. As noted above, some opponents would like to curtail parts of the NVRA; proponents, however, do not think the NVRA has gone far enough. H.R. The efforts culminated in the passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) ( P.L. HAVA addressed voter registration in four areas:
(1) it created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and transferred FEC's responsibilities with respect to NVRA to EAC (§201; §202; §209; §803), specifically with respect to the development and maintenance of the federal mail voter registration form (§303(b)(4)) and the biennial reports on the impact of the NVRA;
(2) it specified that each state "shall implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level that contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State and assigns a unique identifier to each legally registered voter in the State" (§303(a)(1)(A)) and "perform list maintenance with respect to the computerized list on a regular basis" in accordance with the provisions of NVRA (§303(a)(2));
(3) it required the use of the driver's license number or the last four digits of the social security number of the applicant on all voter registration applications (§303(a)(5)(A)), as well as requiring that the Social Security Administration develop relationships with the departments of motor vehicles in each state to assist in list verification (§303(a)(5)(B); and,
(4) it expanded the "fail safe voting" provisions of NVRA to provisional voting (§303(a)(5)(A)-(B)). 2318, [42 U.S.C.A. [42 U.S.C. | After the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §1973–1973aa-6), legislation had been urged for over two decades that would create a national voter registration system designed to make registration easier and more uniform from state to state. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA, P.L. 103-31, 107 Stat.77, [42 U.S.C. §1973gg et seq.]), the so-called "motor-voter" bill, was signed into law by President Clinton on May 20, 1993. It required states to establish voter registration procedures for federal elections so that eligible citizens might apply to register to vote (1) simultaneously while applying for a driver's license, (2) by mail, and (3) at selected state and local offices that serve the public. The law took effect on January 1, 1995, for most states.
Proponents argued that the NVRA would make it easier to register to vote, provide more-than-adequate measures to prevent voter fraud by making violations a federal offense, and cost states very little to implement, based on the experiences of states that previously used some form of "motor-voter" registration.
Opponents, on the other hand, argued that there was little evidence that increasing the number of persons on voter registration rolls would lead to higher voter turnout. By making it so easy to register, they believed the act would increase the likelihood of election fraud. Furthermore, according to opponents, implementation would be costly to the states, in terms both of dollars and other administrative costs.
The NVRA has been the law of the land for over 20 years and has been in effect for 18 years. Between 1992 and 2012, voter registration increased nationally by over seven percentage points. The courts have resolved many of the initial issues. A review of the required NVRA reports appears to indicate that the states have come to terms with the provisions, despite the fact that they would still like the federal government to provide funding for the implementation of aspects of the act. While amending parts of the NVRA in minor ways, the Help America Vote Act, passed in 2002, also created additional voter registration demands on the states (HAVA, P.L. 107-252 [42 U.S.C., Subchapter III, Part A., §15482(a), 15483]).
However, there are still some problems with implementation at the local levels and in some selected state agencies, as well as with the training of non-election officials who are responsible under the NVRA for providing voter registration services. Some would like to curtail parts of the NVRA. Some do not think the NVRA has gone far enough. Proposed legislation introduced in the 113th Congress to deal with various aspects of the voter registration process includes, among others, H.R. 12, H.R. 97, H.R. 280, H.R. 289, and H.R. 2115. This report provides an historical background for voter registration reform and the NVRA, a description of the major aspects of the act, a discussion of the implementation and post-implementation actions, and a catalog of subsequent efforts to amend or repeal the act. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33791 | crs_RL33791_0 | It continues to be an issue of discussion and, in some cases at the state level, has been introduced as a part of the general minimum wage structure. As amended through the years, the FLSA has become the primary federal statute dealing with wage rates for low-wage workers. In order to eliminate fluctuations in its real value, some have suggested that the federal minimum should be pegged to an outside economic variable: for example, to a component of the cost-of-living index or to some other relatively neutral series. The purpose of the boards was to increase the general standard and, then, to maintain the value of the minimum wage at a constant level or, at least, at a level in keeping with the cost-of-living. You have these variations in your industries. Ultimately, the bill was adopted (P.L. Others were equally firm. In the interim, he stated:
About all we can do is to make some tentative observations based upon a reading of our past experience, and to put in a reminder that for 40 years, the Fair Labor Standards Act has been of considerable benefit to many of the lowest paid in our society without having had any apparently harmful effects on the economy....
Galenson was "not a partisan of the general concept of wage indexing. However," he stated, "... One portion read:
(C) the economic consequences (if any) of authorizing an automatic increase in the rate prescribed in that Act [the FLSA] on the basis of an increase in an index of the earnings of a category of employees; ...
Perkins had been a Member since 1949 "when we increased the minimum wage from 40 to 75 cents. Few serious initiatives dealing with the minimum wage were considered during the Reagan years. Minimum wage was not then before the Congress. Two bills ( H.R. The authors stated two purposes for the Board. As reported from Conference, the Board would have been a congressional entity. There follow a series of speeches, in some measure redundant. Despite this accommodation to the President, the Review Board likely remained in the act. But, then, no new minimum wage legislation has been enacted as stand-alone legislation since 1989. The duties of the "Commission" would have been to study and make recommendations to Congress on:
A) means to restore the minimum wage to the level relative to the average hourly wage that existed when the Congress adjusted the minimum wage during the period 1950 through 1980; and,
(B) means to maintain such level with minimum disruption to the general economy through periodic adjustments to the minimum wage rate. The 110th Congress
In the 110 th Congress, Representative Al Green introduced a new version of his bill of the 109 th Congress: now, H.R. 4637 . Inflation may be yet another matter. Through the years, at least since the 1940s, indexation has been frequently discussed but, perhaps, not actually explored in its varied aspects. | Indexation of the minimum wage (linking the minimum wage to an outside economic variable) in a variety of forms has been a subject of discussion at least since the early years of the 20th century. When early proponents of a wage floor began to consider the matter as public policy within the United States, they established a series of state wage boards. These boards were given the authority to fix a reasonable rate below which most workers were not permitted to be paid. The powers of the boards varied from one state to the next and, where they were reasonably effective, there was the constant fear that the courts would intervene and overturn whatever authority the boards may have had.
The boards wrestled with a variety of methods for setting the minimum wage. Some made surveys of the cost-of-living for low-wage employees and tried to render a measure of equality between such costs (however defined) and income derived from work. But surveys proved difficult and, gradually, a reliance developed upon governmental agencies. It was not necessarily a neat fit, and questions remained.
In 1938, largely moving beyond the state boards, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA). The act established the federal minimum at 25 cents an hour for those relatively few workers actually covered. Since 1938, Congress has revisited the act in a sporadic fashion. The result, through the years, has been a series of gradual expansions of the act and some variation in wage rates—but, generally, since the 1960s, a downward spiral in the real value of the minimum wage has set in. During the Reagan era, no new increases were made, and only two (the 1989 and 1996 amendments) have been made in subsequent years.
At present, at least five states (Missouri, Montana, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington) index their state minimum wage standards. In several other states, the issue has recently been considered. In the 110th Congress, two bills dealing with indexation have been introduced: H.R. 4637 (Al Green) and S. 2514 (Clinton). The issue was not dealt with in the general minimum wage legislation (H.R. 2206, P.L. 110-28), enacted in early 2007.
Following a preliminary introduction of the topic, this report reviews the several relatively distinct periods during which indexation, in one form or another, was before the Congress. This report will be updated if conditions warrant. |
crs_R40171 | crs_R40171_0 | Due in part to the large investment losses in pension plans and other retirement accounts, in December of 2008, Congress unanimously enacted H.R. 7327 , the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 ("WRERA" or "the Act"). This report provides an overview of some of the key provisions of WRERA, in particular, the provisions relating to the funding of single and multiemployer plans, the temporary waiver for required minimum distributions, as well as certain technical corrections and other provisions that affect the two primary types of pension plans, defined benefit and defined contribution plans, as well as individual retirement accounts and annuities (IRAs). Technical Corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006
WRERA made several technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA). | In December of 2008, Congress unanimously enacted the Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA) (P.L. 110-458), which makes several technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-280) and contains provisions designed to help pension plans and plan participants weather the current economic downturn. This report highlights the provisions of WRERA relating to the economic crisis, such as the temporary waiver of required minimum distributions and provisions that temporarily relax certain pension plan funding requirements. This report also discusses certain technical corrections to the Pension Protection Act made by WRERA, and certain other notable provisions of the Act affecting retirement plans and benefits. |
crs_R41214 | crs_R41214_0 | 112-10 ) provides $4.54 billion for legislative branch activities for FY2011. From October 1, 2010, until the enactment of this legislation on April 11, 2011, the legislative branch operated on continuing resolutions. 111-242 (through December 3, 2010), P.L. 111-322 (through March 4, 2011), P.L. These include the following:
P.L. The FY2011 legislative branch budget request, which was submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010, contains $5.12 billion in new budget authority, an approximately 10% increase over the FY2010 enacted level. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch each held hearings during which the agency requests were examined. Previously, the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act provided $4.656 billion for FY2010 legislative branch operations, and the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act provided $4.4 billion. In FY2009, an additional $25 million was provided for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 111-32 , the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, also contained funding for the police radio system ($71.6 million) and Congressional Budget Office ($2 million). The FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. These entities, as they have appeared in the annual appropriations bill, are the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office; Architect of the Capitol, including the Capitol Visitor Center; Library of Congress, including the Congressional Research Service; Government Printing Office; Government Accountability Office; and Open World Leadership Program. 111-68 ) contained language (1) prohibiting the use of funds for the maintenance or care of private vehicles; (2) limiting funds provided in the act to FY2010 unless otherwise specified; (3) addressing the rate of compensation of staff; (4) making contracts for consulting services a matter of public record and available for public inspection, with certain exceptions; (5) providing funds for awards and settlements under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995; (6) addressing cost-sharing for the Legislative Branch Financial Managers Council (LBFMC); (7) providing for landscape maintenance by the Architect of the Capitol; (8) limiting transfers except as provided by law; and (9) prohibiting the use of funds to restrict guided tours of the Capitol led by House and Senate staff and interns, except for temporary suspensions with the direction or approval of the Capitol Police Board. P.L. P.L. P.L. 112-10. 111-212 provided an additional $12.96 million. P.L. Chief Phillip D. Morse discussed the salary miscalculation related to night differential pay and holiday and overtime pay, and the subcommittees noted that the Capitol Police inspector general would be examining the issue. P.L. P.L. P.L. P.L. P.L. | The legislative branch operated on continuing resolutions from October 1, 2010 (P.L. 111-242, P.L. 111-290, P.L. 111-317, P.L. 111-322, P.L. 112-4, and P.L. 112-6) until the enactment of P.L. 112-10 on April 11, 2011. P.L. 112-10 provides $4.54 billion for legislative branch activities.
The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office; Architect of the Capitol, including the Capitol Visitor Center; Library of Congress, including the Congressional Research Service; Government Printing Office; Government Accountability Office; and Open World Leadership Program.
Approximately $5.12 billion was requested for legislative branch operations in FY2011, an increase of 10% over the FY2010 level of $4.656 billion, which was provided in P.L. 111-68 (enacted October 1, 2009). The FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212) provided an additional $12.96 million for the Capitol Police.
The Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees both held hearings during which Members considered the legislative branch requests. Among issues that have been considered during hearings are the following:
the Capitol Police salary miscalculation related to night differential pay and holiday and overtime pay; the Capitol Police radio project, including timing and infrastructure support by the Architect of the Capitol; deferred maintenance issues around the Capitol Complex; technology assessments; staffing issues related to recruitment and retention, requests for additional full-time-equivalents (FTE), diversity, and space; and the potential impact of a flat budget on agency priorities and missions.
Previously, the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8, enacted on March 11, 2009) provided $4.4 billion for legislative branch activities. This represents an approximately 11% increase over the nearly $4 billion approved by Congress for FY2008. In FY2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $25 million for the Government Accountability Office. The FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32) provided $71.6 million for the new U.S. Capitol Police radio system and $2 million for the Congressional Budget Office. |
crs_RL32362 | crs_RL32362_0 | Mental Health and Substance Abuse Benefits UnderMedicaid. Currently, only a few states have suchwaivers under SCHIP. Scope of Mental Health And Substance Abuse Benefits for Children -- A Snapshot of Selected Medicaid and SCHIP Coverage Policies in FY2000
In this section, a description of the state survey data collection instruments andimplementation issues is provided, followed by important data caveats that affect interpretation ofthe survey findings presented in the subsequent section. For Medicaid, survey results were reported for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. As of June 2000, nearly all Medicaid and SCHIP programs covered inpatient and outpatientmental health services for children. Most Medicaid and SCHIP programs also covered inpatient detoxification and outpatientsubstance abuse services for children. Stateabbreviations are used in this table. Coverage of, and Limits for/Monitoring of OutpatientSubstance Abuse Services for Children Under Medicaid and SCHIP
(as of June, 2000)
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of benefits data collected in two 2000surveys, one for state Medicaid programs and the other for separate state SCHIP programs,conducted by the National Academy for State Health Policy under contract to CRS. In general, the types of limits placed on outpatient mental health services under SCHIP weresimiliar to those under Medicaid. In several cases (6 of 40), a single overall quantity limit foroutpatient mental health services, in combination with related benefits, was used. Outpatient Substance Abuse Services. As reported above, under SCHIP, most programs did not cover RTC services at all. Coverage policies and benefit limits described in state Medicaid plans are seldom absolute,especially for children, due to the medical necessity criterion, but also because of EPSDT. Unlike Medicaid, but consistent with federal statute, separate SCHIP programs are modeledafter private sector, commercial insurance products. In the CRS-sponsored survey, some of the benefits for which data on limits were collected(i.e., residential treatment centers) are commonly covered under Medicaid, but not routinely includedin commercial insurance products, and hence, SCHIP. SCHIP children have access to the same types of benefit packages available in theprivate sector as intended by Congress. Faced with declining revenues and increasing expenses, states proposed or implemented anumber of Medicaid cost containment strategies for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. (24) The majority of changeshave focused on prescription drug costs followed by reductions in provider reimbursement rates, andthe elimination or reduction in optional services and populations. Examples of such activities includeeliminating dental care for adults without children (under SCHIP waiver programs), reducingpayments for providers, capping enrollment and increasing beneficiary cost-sharing requirements. Definition of other terms (in alphabetical order) :
BHO -- behavioral health organization (also see PHP below)
CY -- calendar year
day treatment -- see partial hosp (below)
eval -- evaluation
FFS -- fee-for-service
ICF/MR -- intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded
IMDs -- institutions for mental disease
IP -- inpatient
MC -- managed care
MCO -- managed care organization
MD -- physician
med eval -- medical evaluation
med management -- medication management (e.g., monitoring use of prescribeddrugs to treat mental illness or substance abuse)
MH -- mental health
OP -- outpatient
PA -- prior authorization
partial hosp -- also called day treatment or partial care; is a structured environmentfor youth during the day that does not involve an overnight stay; may include anintegrated curriculum that includes education, counseling and family interventions;setting of care may be a hospital, school or clinic; may be a transitional service afterinpatient psychiatric or RTC care for youth who no longer require institutionalizationbut who are not ready to be placed back in the school system due to on-going needsfor extensive treatment and supervision. | About 18% of all U.S. adolescents received mental health treatment in 2000. Almost $7billion was spent for such services for teens in 1998. While many youth have used alcohol or otherillicit drugs, less than 2% received treatment for substance use in 2000. In 1997, costs for such carefor children under 18 totaled $604 million.
In this report, the availability of selected mental health and substance abuse services underMedicaid and SCHIP for low and moderate income children is explored. Under SCHIP, states mayprovide coverage by expanding Medicaid or creating a separate SCHIP program or both. Data fromtwo CRS-sponsored surveys, documenting general limits placed on such services as of June, 2000,are presented. For Medicaid, including Medicaid expansions under SCHIP, survey results werereported for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. For separate SCHIP programs, survey resultswere reported for all 41 programs operating in 33 states.
Nearly all Medicaid and SCHIP programs covered inpatient and outpatient mental healthservices for children, and most also covered inpatient detoxification and outpatient substance abusetreatment. Such benefits were more frequently unlimited under Medicaid than under SCHIP. Whilethe majority of Medicaid programs covered residential treatment centers, most SCHIP programs didnot. In many cases, expressing benefit limits as a simple quantity (e.g., days of care, admissions peryear, visits/hours per year) did not address the full scope of restrictions on coverage. Other meansof limiting benefits were also reported (e.g., use of prior authorization, thresholds specific tocondition/diagnosis, and treatment plan requirements). Under SCHIP, but not Medicaid, a singlequantity limit was often applied to two or more related benefits combined rather than separately foreach benefit category.
Coverage policies and benefit limits for children under Medicaid are seldom absolute in partbecause of special provisions in the law requiring that children receive all medically necessaryservices authorized in federal statute. This guarantee does not exist in SCHIP. Instead, SCHIPchildren have access to similar types of benefit packages available in the private sector.
Facing declining revenues and increased expenses, some states are implementing a numberof Medicaid cost containment strategies focused on reductions in provider payments, and reductionsin and/or elimination of optional services and populations, mostly affecting adults. Under SCHIP,some states are also capping enrollment and increasing beneficiary cost-sharing. While theseproposed strategies appear to leave mental health and substance abuse benefits for children largelyintact, they could effectively limit access to care.
Finally, this report also describes mental health parity and its application to Medicaid andSCHIP under current federal law, and related, pending legislation in the 108th Congress. |
crs_R43570 | crs_R43570_0 | Introduction
The security of federal government buildings and facilities affects not only the daily operations of the federal government but also the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the public. Federal building and facility security is decentralized and disparate in approach, as numerous federal entities are involved and some buildings or facilities are occupied by multiple federal agencies. The federal government is tasked with securing over 446,000 buildings or facilities daily. The September 2001 terrorist attacks, the September 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings, and the April 2014 Fort Hood shootings focused the federal government's attention on building security activities. This resulted in an increase in the security operations at federal facilities and more intense scrutiny of how the federal government secures and protects federal facilities, employees, and the visiting public. There has been congressional interest concerning federal facility security in past Congresses. On May 21, 2014, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a hearing on "Examining the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Facilities Secure?" and on December 17, 2013, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on "The Navy Yard Tragedy: Examining Physical Security for Federal Facilities." FPS federal facility security responsibility is limited to only 9,000 of the approximate 446,000 federal facilities. In addition to FPS, there are approximately 20 other federal law enforcement entities with federal facility security missions. This attention resulted in a number of frequently asked questions. This report answers several common questions regarding federal building and facility security. What is federal facility security? Who is responsible for federal facility security? The federal law enforcement entities responsible for facility security are
U.S. Department of Commerce's National Institute and Standards and Technology Police—Officers provide law enforcement and security services for NIST facilities; U.S. Department of Defense's Pentagon Force Protection Agency—Officers provide law enforcement and security services for the occupants, visitors, and infrastructure of the Pentagon, Navy Annex, and other assigned Pentagon facilities; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health, Division of Police—Officers provide law enforcement and security services for NIH facilities; U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency, Security Branch—Officers are responsible for the protection of FEMA facilities, personnel, resources, and information; U.S. Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Secret Service—Uniformed Division officers protect the White House complex and other presidential offices, the main Treasury building and annex, the President and Vice President and their families, and foreign diplomatic missions; The Federal Reserve Board Police—Officers provide law enforcement and security services for Federal Reserve facilities in Washington, DC; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Protective Services—Officers provide law enforcement and security services for NASA's 14 centers located throughout the United States; Smithsonian National Zoological Park Police—Officers provide security and law enforcement services for the Smithsonian Institution's 163-acre National Zoological Park in Washington, DC; Tennessee Valley Authority Police—Officers provide law enforcement and security services for TVA employees and properties, and users of TVA recreational facilities; U.S. Is there a national standard for federal facility security? What are the types of threats to federal facilities, employees, and the visiting public? How is threat information communicated among federal facility security stakeholders? What are the potential congressional issues associated with federal facility security? | The security of federal government buildings and facilities affects not only the daily operations of the federal government but also the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the public. Federal building and facility security is decentralized and disparate in approach, as numerous federal entities are involved and some buildings or facilities are occupied by multiple federal agencies. The federal government is tasked with securing over 446,000 buildings or facilities daily.
The September 2001 terrorist attacks, the September 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings, and the April 2014 Fort Hood shootings focused the federal government's attention on building security activities. This resulted in an increase in the security operations at federal facilities and more intense scrutiny of how the federal government secures and protects federal facilities, employees, and the visiting public.
This renewed attention has generated a number of frequently asked questions. This report answers several common questions regarding federal building and facility security, including
What is federal facility security? Who is responsible for federal facility security? Is there a national standard for federal facility security? What are the types of threats to federal facilities, employees, and the visiting public? How is threat information communicated among federal facility security stakeholders? What are the potential congressional issues associated with federal facility security?
There has been congressional interest concerning federal facility security in past Congresses. On May 21, 2014, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a hearing on "Examining the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Facilities Secure?" and on December 17, 2013, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on "The Navy Yard Tragedy: Examining Physical Security for Federal Facilities." Even though the majority of ongoing congressional interest in federal facility security has focused on the Federal Protective Service (FPS), FPS is only responsible for the security of 9,000 of the approximately 446,000 federal facilities. In addition to FPS, there are approximately 20 other federal law enforcement entities with federal facility security missions. Federal facility security is the responsibility of all branches of the government and all federal departments and agencies. |
crs_RL32136 | crs_RL32136_0 | All of the countries of the region are undertaking political and economic reforms and orienting their foreign policies toward Euro-Atlantic institutions. The countries of the region embarked on the privatization of their industries. U.S. Policy Concerns
Creating Self-Sustaining Stability in the Balkans
The main goal of the United States and the international community in the Balkans is to stabilize the region in a way that does not require direct intervention by NATO-led forces and international civilian officials, and puts it on a path toward integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. These goals have been given greater urgency by competing U.S. and international priorities that have emerged since September 11, 2001, such as the war on terrorism, and efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, which have placed strains on U.S. resources. Nevertheless, as the situation in the region has stabilized, the United States and its allies have withdrawn troops from the region. Currently, about 1,500 U.S. troops are deployed in Kosovo. In December 2004, the mission of SFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia, came to an end. No U.S. combat troops remain in Bosnia. However, Serbia's interest in NATO membership appears to have waned in the wake of the recognition of Kosovo's independence. However, the prestige and credibility that the United States has in the region may still be needed to exercise political leadership in resolving some of the most difficult issues, such as creating viable central government institutions in Bosnia and ensuring the region's stability, given continuing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. U.S. and International Aid in the Balkans
Since the end of the wars in the region, U.S. aid has gradually declined, in part due to a natural shift from humanitarian aid to technical assistance and partly due to a focus on assistance to other regions of the world. The War on Terrorism and the Balkans
Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the war on terrorism has been the United States' main foreign policy priority and has had an impact on U.S. policy in the Balkans. However, U.S. and European peacekeeping troops, aid, and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration helped to bring more stability to the region. Congress also played an important role in supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and pressing for the arrest and transfer of indictees. The end of the wars in the Balkans and the shift in U.S. priorities in the wake of the September 11 attacks have moved the Balkans to the periphery of congressional concerns, at least when compared to the situation in the 1990s. 171 , which calls for constitutional reform in Bosnia. It calls for the Administration to appoint a special envoy to the Balkans to assist reform efforts in Bosnia, as well as elsewhere in the region. H.R. 171 was passed by the House on May 12, 2009. | The United States, its allies, and local leaders have achieved substantial successes in the Balkans since the mid-1990s. The wars in the region have ended, and all of the countries are undertaking political and economic reforms at home and orienting their foreign policies toward Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, difficult challenges remain, including dealing with the impact of Kosovo's independence; fighting organized crime, corruption, and enforcing the rule of law; bringing war criminals to justice; and reforming the economies of the region.
The goal of the United States and the international community is to stabilize the Balkans in a way that is self-sustaining and does not require direct intervention by NATO-led forces and international civilian officials. The United States has reduced the costs of its commitments to the region, in part due to competing U.S. and international priorities, such as the war on terrorism, and efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, which have placed strains on U.S. resources. SFOR and KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, were reduced in size. In December 2004, SFOR's mission was concluded, and European Union troops took over peacekeeping duties in Bosnia. No U.S. combat troops remain in Bosnia. About 15,500 troops remain in Kosovo as part of KFOR, including 1,500 U.S. soldiers.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the war on terrorism has been the United States' main foreign policy priority, including in the Balkans. Before September 11, Al Qaeda supporters operated from Bosnia and Albania. However, the Bush Administration said that these countries and others in the region "actively supported" the war on terrorism, shutting down terrorist front organizations and seizing their assets. Although their efforts are hampered by the weakness of local government institutions, U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in the Balkans are aided by U.S. military and intelligence assets in the region, as well as a reservoir of good will among local Muslims of all ethnic groups.
Congress has played an important role in shaping U.S. Balkans policy. Some Members supported Clinton Administration efforts to intervene to stop the fighting in the region in the mid and late 1990s, while others were opposed. Members were leery of an open-ended commitment to the region and sought to contain these costs through adoption of benchmarks and limiting U.S. aid and troop levels to the region. The end of the wars in the Balkans and the shift in U.S. priorities in the wake of the September 11 attacks has moved the Balkans to the periphery of congressional concerns, at least when compared to the situation in the 1990s. However, Congress has continued to have an impact on such issues as Kosovo's status, conditioning some U.S. aid to Serbia on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and supporting NATO membership for the countries of the region. On May 12, 2009, the House passed H.R. 171, which calls on Bosnia to make constitutional reforms and on the Administration to appoint a special envoy to the Balkans. In late May 2009, Vice President Joe Biden will reportedly visit Kosovo, Bosnia, and Serbia to discuss the situation in the region. |
crs_RS21195 | crs_RS21195_0 | Background
Origin and Aims of EA/SD
DOD in 2001 adopted a new approach for developing new weapon systems, called evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD), as its preferred standard. EA/SD, which is referred to informally (though not entirely accurately) as spiral development, is an outgrowth of the defense acquisition reform movement of the 1990s, and is part of DOD's effort to make its acquisition system more responsive to rapid changes in threats, technology, and warfighter needs. Issues for Congress
EA/SD poses potential issues for Congress regarding DOD and congressional oversight of weapon acquisition programs. | The Department of Defense (DOD) in 2001 adopted a new approach for developing major weapon systems, called evolutionary acquisition with spiral development (EA/SD), as its preferred standard. EA/SD is intended to make DOD's acquisition system more responsive to rapid changes in military needs. EA/SD poses potentially important challenges for Congress in carrying out its legislative functions, particularly committing to and effectively overseeing DOD weapon acquisition programs. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32965 | crs_RL32965_0 | Congress has historically been very interested in the recruiting and retention of personnel in the nation's Armed Forces, as maintaining a fully manned and capable workforce is a key component of military readiness. Congress exercises a powerful influence on recruiting and retention goals through its establishment of personnel strength levels for each of the Active and Reserve Components. However, the future recruiting and retention environment is less clear. There are both "quantity" and "quality" goals for the enlisted force. Active Components
The recruiting data presented in Table 1 below show that all of the Active Components met their enlisted accession quantity goals in both FY2013 and FY2014. The two principal DOD quality benchmarks are the percentage of non-prior service enlistees who are high school diploma graduates (HSDG) and the percentage that score above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT Categories I-IIIA). In fact, over the past few years, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have experienced the highest recruit quality levels achieved since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. Of these individuals, 92% had high school diplomas (above the DOD benchmark of 90%) and 72% scored above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test or AFQT (well above the DOD benchmark of 60%). Army recruit quality in FY2011-FY2013 was nearly the same as FY2010. In FY2004, 97% of Marine Corps recruits were high school diploma graduates and 69% scored above average on the AFQT. Reserve Components
The recruiting data presented in Table 3 show the performance of the Reserve Components in meeting their enlisted accession quantity goals in FY2013 and FY2014. All of the Reserve Components met their quality goals in FY2013 and FY2014. It is unclear whether the recruiting shortfalls experienced by the Army Reserve are specific to that organization or portend broader recruiting issues, as occurred in the first half of the last decade when the Army Reserve and Army National Guard experienced recruiting problems two years before the active Army. Reserve Component recruiting has been generally strong in FY2009-FY2014, although the Army Reserve has experienced difficulties in meeting its quantity goals in the past several years, and both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are just above the DOD benchmark with regards to above-average AFQT. There were also declines in recruit quality during this period. This allowed it to slightly exceed its authorized end-strength by FY2007, and to significantly exceed its authorized end-strength in FY2008 and FY2009. In FY2003, two Reserve Components failed to meet one or both of its quality goals. Attrition rates measure the percentage of people who leave in a given year, rather than the number of people who stay. Reserve Component retention goals establish a maximum attrition rate or "ceiling" which should not be exceeded. They are stated in percentage terms and are not broken out by career phase. As a result, the services all reported excellent recruiting and retention results in the early 1990s. | Congress has historically been quite interested in recruiting and retention of personnel in the nation's Armed Forces, since maintaining a fully manned and capable workforce is a key component of military readiness. This report provides a brief overview of the recruiting and retention results for Active and Reserve Component enlisted personnel during FY2013 and FY2014.
Recruiting and Retention Metrics
Recruiting performance for enlisted personnel is principally measured in terms of meeting quantity and quality goals. Quantity goals are based on the projected need for new personnel each service must bring in over the course of the year to meet its congressionally authorized end-strength. There are two principal quality goals: at least 90% of new recruits should be high school diploma graduates and at least 60% should score above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Quality goals are only for recruits without any previous military service ("non-prior service"). Retention performance for enlisted personnel is principally measured by meeting one or more quantity goals. For the Active Components, quantity goals are based on career phase (for example, initial term, mid-career, and career) and are stated in numerical terms. For the Reserve Components, retention is tracked via overall attrition rates, which measure the ratio of people who leave in a given year. Reserve Component retention goals establish a maximum attrition rate or "ceiling" which should not be exceeded. They are stated in percentage terms and are not broken out by career phase.
Overview of FY2013 and FY2014 Results
In FY2013 and FY2014, all of the Active Components achieved their recruit quantity goals and recruit quality was high. Nearly all new recruits had high school diplomas, and about three-quarters scored above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Recruit quality in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in these years has been near the highest levels experienced since the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973; Army recruit quality, as measured by high school diploma graduates, has been quite high as well, although above-average scores on the AFQT are just slightly above the DOD benchmark. Retention has remained strong for most of the services, although the Navy experienced modest shortfalls in both years. Most of the Reserve Components met or exceeded their quantity goals while quality remained high. The Army National Guard was slightly below its quantity goals in both of these years, while the Army Reserve experienced more substantial shortfalls, contributing to a decline in its personnel strength. Recruit quality for the Reserve Components has been fairly strong, although above-average AFQT scores for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have hovered just slightly above the DOD benchmark of 60%. Several of the Reserve Components exceeded their attrition ceilings, although the margins were modest. The Army Reserve finished FY2014 about 3.3% below its authorized end-strength, indicating a need for stronger recruiting and retention in the future. It is unclear whether the recruiting shortfalls experienced by the Army Reserve are specific to that organization or portend broader recruiting difficulties to come. |
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