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crs_RL34733 | crs_RL34733_0 | Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in effect since January 1994, plays a key role in the bilateral economic relationship between Mexico and the United States. The two countries are closely tied in bilateral trade and investment, and in areas of mutual interest such as migration, security, environmental, and health issues. NAFTA's effect on Mexico and the state of the Mexican economy have implications for the overall relationship between the United States and Mexico and for U.S. economic and political interests. On May 19, 2010, Mexican President Felipe Calderón met with President Barack Obama during an official state visit of the Mexican president to the United States. The two presidents expressed a commitment to increase cooperation in enhancing economic competitiveness and noted progress in the building of a Twenty-First Century border, which includes three new border crossings that are opening in 2010, initiation of three additional binational bridge projects, and significant modernization projects at existing border facilities. Bush with the idea of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). President Salinas de Gortari's motivations in pursuing an FTA with the United States were to increase economic growth by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI); boosting exports; creating industrial jobs; and giving the Mexican economy a growth stimulus. The Mexican economy had experienced many difficulties throughout most of the 1980s with a significant deepening of poverty. Mexico's intention in entering NAFTA was to increase export diversification by attracting FDI, which would help create jobs, increase wage rates, and reduce poverty. The state of the Mexican economy is important to the United States because of the close trade and investment ties between the two countries, and because of other social and political issues that could be affected by economic conditions, particularly poverty and how it relates to migration issues. Unilateral trade liberalization measures prior to NAFTA and the currency crisis of 1995 both affected economic growth, per capita GDP, and real wages in Mexico. Economic Effects
A number of studies have found that NAFTA has brought economic and social benefits to the Mexican economy as a whole, but the benefits have not been evenly distributed throughout the country. Business cycles in Mexico, the United States, and Canada have had higher levels of synchronicity since NAFTA, and NAFTA has reinforced the high sensitivity of Mexican economic sectors to economic developments in the United States. One of the main arguments in favor of NAFTA at the time it was being proposed by policymakers was that the agreement would improve economic conditions in Mexico and narrow the income gap between Mexico and the United States. U.S.-Mexico Trade
Mexico's trade with the United States has grown considerably since 1994. The effects of trade liberalization have varied widely among regions, and while trade liberalization may narrow income disparities over the long run with other countries, it may indirectly lead to larger disparities in income levels within a country. Studies have found that initial conditions in Mexico determined which Mexican states experienced stronger economic growth as a result of NAFTA. While some of the changes in the agricultural sector are a direct result of NAFTA, as Mexico faced increasing import competition from the United States, many of the changes are also attributable to Mexico's unilateral agricultural reform measures. The unilateral reforms in the agricultural sector make it difficult to separate those effects from the effects of NAFTA. | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in effect since January 1994, plays a very strong role in the bilateral economic relationship between Mexico and the United States. The two countries are also closely tied in areas not directly related to trade and investment such as security, environmental, migration, and health issues. The effects of NAFTA on Mexico and the Mexican economic situation have impacts on U.S. economic and political interests. A number of policymakers have raised the issue of revisiting NAFTA and renegotiating parts of the agreement. Some important factors in evaluating NAFTA include the effects of the agreement on Mexico and how these relate to U.S.-Mexico economic relations. In the 111th Congress, major issues of concern are related to U.S.-Mexico trade issues, economic conditions in Mexico, the effect of NAFTA on the United States and Mexico, and Mexican migrant workers in the United States.
In 1990, Mexico approached the United States with the idea of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). Mexico's main motivation in pursuing an FTA with the United States was to stabilize the Mexican economy and promote economic development by attracting foreign direct investment, increasing exports, and creating jobs. The Mexican economy had experienced many difficulties throughout most of the 1980s with a significant deepening of poverty. The expectation among supporters at the time was that NAFTA would improve investor confidence in Mexico, increase export diversification, create higher-skilled jobs, increase wage rates, and reduce poverty. It was expected that, over time, NAFTA would narrow the income differentials between Mexico and the United States and Canada.
The effects of NAFTA on the Mexican economy are difficult to isolate from other factors that affect the economy, such as economic cycles in the United States (Mexico's largest trading partner) and currency fluctuations. In addition, Mexico's unilateral trade liberalization measures of the 1980s and the currency crisis of 1995 both affected economic growth, per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and real wages. While NAFTA may have brought economic and social benefits to the Mexican economy as a whole, the benefits have not been evenly distributed throughout the country. The agricultural sector experienced a higher amount of worker displacement after NAFTA, in part because of increased competition from the United States but also because of Mexican domestic agricultural reforms. In terms of regional effects, initial conditions in Mexico appear to have determined which Mexican states experienced stronger economic growth as a result of NAFTA. Some economists argue that while trade liberalization may narrow income disparities over the long run with other countries, it may indirectly lead to larger disparities in income levels within a country.
Over the last decade, the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico has strengthened significantly and the two countries continue to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. President Barack Obama met with Mexican President Calderón in May 2010 during the Mexican president's official state visit to the United States. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to increasing cooperation in a wide range of issues, including enhancing mutual economic growth. A key component for their global competitiveness initiative is to create a border the for the Twenty-First Century that will expand and modernize border facilities for a secure and more efficient border. |
crs_RS22323 | crs_RS22323_0 | ISCI is the Iraqi faction with the longest and closest ties to Iran. Baqr Al Sadr was hung by Saddam Hussein in 1980 at the start of the Da'wa Party rebellion against Saddam's regime. Iranian Support to Armed Groups
Iran's arming and training of Shiite militias in Iraq added to U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran's nuclear program and Iran's broader regional influence, such as its aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian organization Hamas (which controls the Gaza Strip). U.S. officials feared that, by supplying armed groups in Iraq, Iran was seeking to develop a broad range of options that included: pressuring U.S. and British forces to leave Iraq; to bleed the United States militarily; and to be positioned to retaliate in Iraq should the United States take military action against Iran's nuclear program. In 2007, a press report said there are 150 Qods and intelligence personnel there, but some U.S. commanders who have served in southern Iraq said they believed that there were perhaps one or two Qods Force personnel in each Shiite province, attached to or interacting with pro-Iranian governors in those provinces. Since January 2008, the Treasury Department has taken action against suspected individual Iranian and pro-Iranian operatives in Iraq by designating them as a threat to stability in Iraq under a July 17, 2007, Executive Order 13438. However, Iran has always sought alternate channels to continue to influence policy in Iraq and protect its interests there, and influencing senior Iraqi political leaders has been a cornerstone of Iran's policy. In the end, Iran's concerns were attenuated by a provision in the final agreement (passed by Iraq's parliament on November 27, 2008, and in force as of January 1, 2009) that U.S. forces could not use Iraqi territory as a base for attacks on any other nation. Iranian Political Influence Following the January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
During 2009, Iran's political influence in Iraq was further jeopardized by widening political rifts among the pro-Iranian Shiite factions. ..." Still, the report also said that Iran "continues to pose a significant challenge to Iraq's long-term stability and political independence ..." and that "Iran continues to support Sadr's religious studies in Qom, Iran [where Sadr is believed to have been for at least a year]." Iranian Efforts to Influence the March 7, 2010, Iraqi Elections
Perhaps seeking to restore its influence, Iran set out to try to shape to Tehran's advantage the Iraq's 2010 national elections for the National Assembly, which chooses the next four year government. Some viewed it as an independent effort by elements of Iran's Revolutionary Guard to assert themselves in the Iran-Iraq border regions. | With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein's regime removed, Iran seeks, at a minimum, to ensure that Iraq can never again become a threat to Iran, whether or not there are U.S. forces present in Iraq. Some believe that Iran's intentions go far further—to try to harness Iraq to Iran's broader policy goals, such as defense against international criticism of and sanctions against Iran's nuclear program, and to enlist Iraq's help in suppressing Iranian dissidents located inside Iraq. Some believe Iran sees Iraq primarily as as providing lucrative investment opportunities and a growing market for Iranian products and contracts.
Iran has sought to achieve its goals in Iraq through several strategies: supporting pro-Iranian factions and armed militias; attempting to influence Iraqi political leaders and faction leaders; and building economic ties throughout Iraq. It is Iran's support for armed Shiite factions that most concerns U.S. officials. That Iranian activity continues to a threat to stability in Iraq, according to senior U.S. commanders, and positions Iran to pursue its interests in Iraq after U.S. forces leave Iraq by the end of 2011.
Many of Iraq's current leaders were in exile in Iran or materially supported by Iran during Saddam's rule, and see Iran as a mentor and an influential actor in Iraq. Even those who have longstanding ties to Iran have asserted themselves as nationalist defenders of Iraqi interests, but Iraq appears to be a clearly subordinate partner in the relationship. Perhaps resenting this relationship, many Iraqi citizens have appeared to reject parties and factions who accept preponderant Iranian influence in Iraq. This sentiment has caused Iran to suffer key setbacks in Iraq. The most pro-Iranian factions generally fared poorly in the January 31, 2009, provincial elections and again in the March 7, 2010, national elections for the National Assembly, which chooses the government. A political bloc that is decidedly against Iranian influence and which is supported by Iraq's Sunni Arabs won the most seats in the election, although no bloc has been able, to date, to build enough support among other blocs to assemble a government. Still, virtually all political blocs are consulting with Iran to try to gain its support for their inclusion in or dominance of any new government.
Also see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41978 | crs_R41978_0 | Introduction
In 2008 and 2009, collapsing world credit markets and a slowing global economy combined to create the weakest market in decades for production and sale of motor vehicles in the United States and other industrial countries. Both reorganized companies had sizable ownership stakes held by the U.S. government and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union's retiree healthcare trust. This left the government holding more than 900 million shares of common equity received in return for assistance from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Sales of stock made at lower prices result in losses being recorded by the Treasury. New GM's stock was offered in an initial public offering (IPO) in November 2010, with the U.S. government selling more than 412 million shares, thus reducing the government's ownership share to 32%. The U.S. government began selling its remaining 500 million shares of New GM stock in December 2012, with the announced plan of divesting its remaining shares by early 2014. The final sales of GM stock closed ahead of this 2014 deadline, in December 2013. As a result of the economic crisis, the Company was compelled to seek financial assistance from the federal government. Exceptional labor and retiree health care costs. Corporate culture. U.S. Government Assistance to the Motor Vehicle Industry
The initial U.S. government loans to assist the U.S. motor vehicle and motor vehicle financing industries were made by the George W. Bush Administration in December 2008 and January 2009. These tax savings are not counted as part of TARP support. Brands were shed. Elements of U.S. Government Ownership
In addition to its ownership of GM, the U.S. government acquired large common ownership stakes in Chrysler, GMAC/Ally Financial, Citigroup, and AIG through TARP funds and other assistance during the financial crisis. Exercising managerial control was not a stated goal of acquiring shareholdings in these companies. It sold the remaining shares in stages, ending with a final sale on December 9, 2013. Figure 1 shows the ownership structure of GM in 2009 when the new company emerged from bankruptcy and its structure after the Treasury sold the last of its stock in December 2013. Assessing the Cost of TARP Assistance for GM
As detailed in the Appendix , the U.S. government through TARP aided the combined Old GM and New GM with approximately $50.2 billion in loans in 2008-2009. After the bankruptcy process in 2009, the government held the following assets: (1) 60.8% of the equity in New GM, (2) $7.4 billion in loans aiding New GM, (3) $2.1 billion in preferred stock, and (4) nearly $1 billion in claims on the old GM in the bankruptcy process. In assessing the extent to which the government has recovered its investment, economists might also include a number of other factors, such as the cost to the government to borrow the funds that it then provided to GM, a premium to compensate the government for the riskiness of the loans, and the cost to the government of managing the assistance given. No complete cost estimate has been performed since the final sale of GM stock. | In 2008 and 2009, collapsing world credit markets and a slowing global economy combined to create the worst market in decades for production and sale of motor vehicles in the United States and other industrial countries. Concern about the economic impact of a possible collapse of large parts of the U.S. automobile industry led both the Bush Administration and Members of Congress to seek legislative avenues to assist the automakers. Ultimately, General Motors Corporation (Old GM) and its successor General Motors Company (New GM) together received more than $50 billion in federal assistance through the U.S. government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Using this assistance to restructure, GM closed plants, cut its hourly and salaried workforce, shed three brands, reduced debt, introduced new vehicles, and implemented changes to reduce retiree legacy costs.
In exchange for this financial support, the U.S. Treasury received 60.8% of the new company, with the rest of New GM held by the United Auto Workers (UAW) retiree health care trust fund, the governments of Canada and Ontario, and holders of Old GM's bonds. GM was not the only company that received TARP funds as a result of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. More than 700 institutions received support, with the U.S. government taking ownership stakes in five large companies: GM, Chrysler, GMAC (now called Ally Financial), AIG, and Citigroup. In general, ownership of private companies was not a goal of TARP, and the U.S. government has sought to reduce its ownership stakes when possible while maximizing the taxpayers' return from the assistance.
The federal government sold its shares in General Motors Co. in different ways over time, including (1) a large initial public offering (IPO) in late 2010, (2) sale of stock directly to GM in December 2012, and (3) ongoing sale of stock into the public market. For the U.S. government to have fully recouped the nominal value of its $50.2 billion assistance, the government would have had to receive an average price of more than $45 per share for its holdings. In reality, the government received between $27.50 and $38.32 per share as it sold stock between December 2010 and December 2013. GM stock reached its highest point since the 2010 IPO, nearly $42 a share, after the government finished selling its GM stock in December 2013.
Including both the sales of stock and principal recoupment, the government realized $11.2 billion in losses on the assistance for GM, which could be partially offset by $0.7 billion in net income for a final shortfall of $10.5 billion. With the final sale of stock, all of New GM's connections to TARP are complete. Restrictions arising from TARP participation, including a ban on New GM owning corporate jets, certain reporting requirements, and executive pay limits, have been eliminated. |
crs_R41711 | crs_R41711_0 | On the first day of the 112 th Congress, the House agreed to H.Res. 5 , which made several changes to House Rules affecting floor proceedings. 5 added a new paragraph to House Rule XII that prohibits a Member from introducing a bill or joint resolution unless it is accompanied by a statement citing "as specifically as practicable" powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to take the action proposed in the legislation. The new Rule further requires that the statements appear in the Congressional Record and be made available in electronic form. H.Res. The Clerk simply determines whether or not a statement is attached. It is a long-standing principle of House procedure that the question of constitutionality is disposed of when the House votes to consider the bill or when it votes to approve the bill. Three-day Availability Requirement for Unreported Measures
H.Res. 5 added a new clause 11 to House Rule XXI that prohibits unreported bills and joint resolutions from being considered on the House floor unless the measure has been available for at least three calendar days. Public Availability of Measures and Matters in Electronic Form
H.Res. It is not a requirement under the Rule that the measures be available in the designated location; instead, the new House Rule is meant to provide an additional means through which Members, congressional staff, and the general public can access these documents. What H.Res. 5 established was that, where existing House Rules require that a matter be "available to Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner," that requirement can be met by placing the document online on a publicly available website designated by the House Administration Committee. 5 also amended clause 6 of House Rule XVIII to allow the chair of the Committee of the Whole to reduce to two minutes the minimum time allowed for a vote that is cast in a series of postponed votes on amendments. Prior to this rules change, the minimum time required for a vote in such a series of amendment votes was five minutes. Use of Electronic Devices on the House Floor
H.Res. 5 modified clause 5 of Rule XVII to prohibit the use of a mobile electronic device on the floor "that impairs decorum." Prior to this change, the Rule explicitly prohibited the use of a "wireless telephone" or a "personal computer" on the floor. The change is not intended to lead to a more permissive policy regarding the use of electronic devices. 5 eliminated from the Rules the authority granted to the Delegates (representing American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and the Virgin Islands) and the Resident Commissioner (from Puerto Rico) to vote in and preside over the Committee of the Whole. Under the former Rule, if the votes cast by the Delegates and Resident Commissioner made a difference to the outcome of the vote on an amendment, then the Committee of the Whole would automatically rise, and another vote on the amendment would take place in the full House (where the Delegates and Resident Commissioner could not vote). | On the first day of the 112th Congress, the House agreed to H.Res. 5, which made six changes to House Rules affecting floor proceedings.
H.Res. 5 added a new paragraph to House Rule XII that prohibits a Member from introducing a bill or joint resolution unless it is accompanied by a statement citing "as specifically as practicable" powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to take the action proposed in the legislation. The new Rule further requires that the statements appear in the Congressional Record and be made available in electronic form. The content of the statement is not evaluated by the House or any House officer at the time of introduction; the House Clerk determines whether a statement is attached and, if it is not, then the bill cannot be introduced. It is a long-standing principle of House procedure that questions of constitutionality are disposed of when the House votes to consider the bill or when it votes to approve the bill.
H.Res. 5 added a new clause 11 to House Rule XXI that prohibits unreported bills and joint resolutions from being considered on the House floor unless the measure has been available for at least three calendar days; this is similar to an existing three-day availability requirement for reported bills. H.Res. 5 also added a clause to House Rule XXIX establishing that, where existing House Rules require that a matter be "available to Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner," that requirement can be met by placing the document online on a publicly available website designated by the House Administration Committee. The new House Rule is meant to provide an additional means through which Members, congressional staff, and the general public can access these documents. In addition to these formal rules changes, House practices have changed in the 112th Congress regarding the public availability of legislative text in electronic form prior to floor consideration.
H.Res. 5 amended clause 6 of House Rule XVIII to allow the chair of the Committee of the Whole to reduce to "not less than two minutes" the minimum time allowed for a vote that is cast in a series of postponed votes on amendments. Prior to this rules change, the minimum time required for a vote in such a series of amendment votes was five minutes.
H.Res. 5 modified clause 5 of Rule XVII to prohibit the use of a mobile electronic device on the floor "that impairs decorum." Prior to this change, the Rule explicitly prohibited the use of a "wireless telephone" or a "personal computer" on the floor. The change in language is not intended to lead to a more permissive policy regarding the use of electronic devices, but instead preserves existing policy while reflecting the evolving nature of technology and the possibility that some computing devices can be used unobtrusively.
H.Res. 5 eliminated from the Rules the authority granted to the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner to vote in and preside over the Committee of the Whole. Under the former Rule, they could vote in the Committee of the Whole, but if their votes made a difference to the outcome of the vote, then the Committee would automatically rise, and the determinative vote on the amendment would take place in the full House (where the Delegates and Resident Commissioner cannot vote). |
crs_R43363 | crs_R43363_0 | Social Security COLAs Under Current Law
Monthly Social Security payments for retired workers, disabled workers, and all other beneficiaries are generally increased annually by a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) that is based on the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). The CPI-W and Alternative Measures of Inflation
Inflation is generally measured by computing the increase in the cost of the goods that an average person purchases. The consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) is more broadly used than the CPI-W. BLS uses the same price data and methodology to compute the CPI-W and the CPI-U, but the CPI-U is based on the expenditures of about 87% of the population, whereas the CPI-W reflects expenditures of about 32% of the population. Persons aged 62 and older spend around twice as much of their direct outlays on health care as does the rest of the population, a difference that accounts for about half of the difference in the growth rates of the CPI-W and the Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans Aged 62 and Older (CPI-E), a price index for the elderly. Unlike the CPI-W (and the traditional CPI-U), the C-CPI-U fully accounts for substitution by consumers and effectively eliminates small-sample bias. The C-CPI-U tends to increase at a slower rate than the CPI-W. Several bills to set Social Security COLAs equal to growth in a CPI for the elderly have been introduced in the 114 th Congress, such as H.R. It then discusses the projected impact on Social Security's overall finances of a change in the COLA. As a result, poverty rates increase with age. Changing how the COLA is computed is one of the few recent Social Security proposals that would affect current beneficiaries. Proposals to Base the Social Security COLA on the C-CPI-U and Partially Offset the Resulting Benefit Reductions
The President's 2014 budget proposed basing the Social Security COLA on the C-CPI-U, but it would also shelter older beneficiaries from the full effect of that change. That proposal was not included in either of the two subsequent proposed budgets. In 2010, similar proposals were made by the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (chaired by former Senator Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, hereinafter the "Fiscal Commission") and the Bipartisan Policy Center (chaired by former Senator Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin). Other Options for COLA Changes
COLAs need not be linked directly to any measure of inflation. Other Federal Provisions Affected by the Social Security COLA Computation
Other Social Security Provisions Affected by the Social Security COLA Computation
The Social Security COLA affects other provisions of the Social Security program. | Monthly Social Security payments for retired workers, disabled workers, and all other beneficiaries are generally increased annually by a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), which is based on growth in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), a measure of inflation calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Several proposals would base the COLA on other measures of inflation produced by the BLS. Some would set the Social Security COLA equal to growth in the Chained CPI for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U), which is projected to reduce Social Security COLAs. Other proposals would use a measure of inflation experienced by older consumers, which is projected to increase benefits.
Proponents of using the C-CPI-U have included the 2010 National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (chaired by former Senator Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles) and the Bipartisan Policy Center's 2010 Debt Reduction Task Force (chaired by former Senator Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin). The President's 2014 budget (but not subsequent budgets) proposed using the C-CPI-U to compute COLAs for Social Security and in some other federal spending programs; it also proposed indexing the tax code to the C-CPI-U, which would increase federal revenues.
Proponents of basing the COLA on the C-CPI-U argue that it is a more accurate measure of changes in the cost of living because it more fully accounts for how consumers adjust their purchases as relative prices of various items change and, unlike the traditional CPI, does not have a statistical bias that increases measured inflation. Using the C-CPI-U to compute COLAs is projected to reduce overall Social Security outlays by the government, because the C-CPI-U tends to grow more slowly than does the CPI-W, which in turn would result in lower Social Security COLAs.
Other proposals would link the Social Security COLA to a measure of inflation that is based on purchasing patterns of the elderly, such as the BLS's Experimental Consumer Price Index for Americans Aged 62 and Older (CPI-E). The CPI-E grows faster than the CPI-W, on average, because a larger portion of spending by the elderly goes toward health care expenditures and other items whose prices tend to rise more rapidly. As a result, switching to such a measure is projected to result in larger COLAs and higher Social Security benefits.
This report explains how the Social Security COLA is computed under current law and explains some criticisms of using the CPI-W to compute COLAs. It discusses two alternative measures of inflation, the C-CPI-U and the CPI-E. The report then explains how using those alternative measures would affect different groups and how it would affect Social Security's finances. It concludes with a review of key recent proposals to change COLA computations and other possible changes to the COLA. |
crs_RL31057 | crs_RL31057_0 | Background
Electronic government (e-government) intersects many legislative issues, including privacy,digital divide (the lack of equal access to computers, whether due to a lack of financial resources ornecessary skills), public access to government information, service delivery, and informationsecurity. E-government solutions are prominently represented in efforts to improve the managementand efficiency of government information technology resources. To help policymakers discern e-government initiatives relative totheir applications to various issues, this report identifies and defines the principal e-governmentsectors and phases of development. This report also outlines some of the major issue opportunitiesand challenges associated with e-government. Some observers define e-governmentin terms of specific actions: using a government kiosk to receive job information, applying forSocial Security benefits through a web site, or creating shared databases for multiple agencies, asexamples. Other observers define e-government more generally as automating the delivery ofgovernment services. The Gartner Group describes e-governmentas "the continuous optimization of service delivery, constituency participation, and governance bytransforming internal and external relationships through technology, the Internet, and new media." (4) However, oneof the hallmarks of a federal system of governance is the emphasis on vertical divisions of power. In contrast, e-government initiatives utilize information technologies that emphasize a horizontal,or networked, model of communication and interaction. While e-government is designed, in part,to break down the barriers separating different agencies, it could also have a similar effect on theboundaries of federal governance. Sectors of E-Government
Although e-government encompasses a wide range of activities and actors, three distinct sectorscan be identified. These include government-to-government (G2G), government-to-business (G2B),and government-to-citizen (G2C). However, for a variety of technical,economic, and political reasons, it will take time for these initiatives to evolve into their fullpotential. Usingthis schema, there are four stages of evolution; presence, interaction, transaction, and transformation. Increased Citizen Participation. Improved National Information Infrastructure. Potential Challenges to E-Government
On the other hand, despite the potential opportunities for the implementation of e-government initiatives, there are a number of challenges that could prevent the realization of these anticipatedbenefits. Privacy. Disparities in Computer Access. Some of these responsibilities include: advising the Director of OMB on IRM resources and strategies; providing "overallleadership and direction on electronic government"; promoting the effective and innovative use ofinformation technology by agencies especially through multiagency collaborative projects;administering and distributing funds from the E-Government Fund (discussed in greater detailbelow); consulting with GSA "to promote electronic government and the efficient use of informationtechnologies by agencies"; leading activities on behalf of the Deputy Director of Management, whoserves as the Chair of the CIO Council; assisting the Director "in establishing policies which shallset the framework for information technology standards" to be developed by the National Institutefor Standards and Technology"; sponsoring an ongoing dialogue with federal, state, local, and triballeaders to encourage collaboration and enhance consultation on information technology bestpractices and innovation; promoting electronic procurement initiatives; and implementingaccessibility standards. | Electronic government (e-government) intersects many legislative issues, including privacy, digital divide (the lack of equal access to computers, whether due to a lack of financial resources ornecessary skills), public access to government information, service delivery, and informationsecurity. E-government solutions are prominently represented in efforts to improve the managementand efficiency of government information technology resources. To help policymakers discerne-government initiatives relative to their role in various issues, this report identifies and defines theprincipal e-government sectors and stages of development. It also outlines some of the opportunitiesand challenges associated with e-government.
Some observers define e-government in terms of specific actions such as using a kiosk to receive job information, or applying for Social Security benefits through a web site. Other observersdefine e-government more generally as automating the delivery of government services. Whileperceptions vary widely, one organization, The Gartner Group, summarizes e-government as "thecontinuous optimization of service delivery, constituency participation, and governance bytransforming internal and external relationships through technology, the Internet, and new media."
E-government initiatives could have implications for federalism. One of the hallmarks of a federal system of governance is the emphasis on vertical divisions of power. In contrast,e-government initiatives utilize information technologies that emphasize a horizontal, or networked,model of communication and interaction. While e-government is designed, in part, to dissolve thebarriers separating different agencies, it could also have a similar effect on the boundaries of federalgovernance.
Although e-government encompasses a wide range of activities and actors, three distinct sectors can be identified. These include government-to-government (G2G), government-to-business (G2B),and government-to-citizen (G2C). Each of these sectors represents a different combination ofmotivating forces and initiatives. However, some common goals include improving the efficiency,reliability, and quality of services for the respective constituency groups.
Due to a variety of technical, economic, and political reasons, e-government initiatives take time to evolve into their full potential. Consequently, one can divide e-government projects into fourstages of evolution: presence, interaction, transaction, and transformation. Each successive stagerepresents an augmented capability to provide information and services as interactive transactionsonline.
Finally, proponents and critics of e-government recognize that there are a variety of opportunities and challenges involved with the successful implementation of e-governmentinitiatives. Some of the potential opportunities include new services, increased citizen participationin government, and an enhanced national information infrastructure. Some of the potentialchallenges include information security and privacy, disparities in computer access, and managementand funding requirements. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43837 | crs_R43837_0 | Introduction
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been a controversial product of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). Is the CFPB as an institution structured appropriately so as to achieve the correct balance between independence on the one hand and transparency and accountability on the other? Congress has assessed these questions using a range of its authorities, including holding oversight hearings and providing advice and consent during the confirmation of the CFPB's director. This report focuses on Congress's exercise of another of its authorities—the consideration of legislation related to the CFPB. After providing an overview of the CFPB, the report examines some of the legislative proposals from the 113 th Congress that have seen committee or floor action and that respond to the two policy questions described above. Financial regulators generally have certain characteristics that increase their independence from the President or Congress, and that independence may make policymaking more technical and less political or partisan, for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce presidential and congressional influence, at least in the short term. Since the CFPB was established, some have argued that it has too much independence and not enough accountability. They point to structural issues, such as that the CFPB is headed by a single director rather than a board and that it is funded outside the traditional congressional appropriations process. Supporters of the CFPB highlight other aspects that they argue provide transparency and accountability, including the CFPB director's biannual testimony before Congress and the cap on the CFPB's funding. Some argued that the presence of enforcement attorneys created an adversarial dynamic between the CFPB and the financial institution. One of the long-standing issues in the regulation of consumer financial services is the perceived trade-off between protecting consumers and ensuring the providers of financial goods and services are not unduly burdened. If regulation intended to protect consumers increases the cost of providing a financial product, a company may reduce how much of that product it is willing to provide and to whom it is willing to provide it. Those who still receive the product may benefit from the enhanced disclosure or added legal protections of the regulation, but that benefit may come at the cost of a potentially higher price for the product. Some Members of Congress believe that, in its rulemaking, the CFPB has struck the appropriate balance between protecting consumers and ensuring that credit availability is not restricted due to overly burdensome regulations on financial institutions, especially small banks. Others counter that some of the CFPB's rules have imposed compliance costs on lenders of all sizes that will result in less credit available to consumers and restrict the types of products available to them. This section will evaluate CFPB-related legislation that would alter the contents of the CFPB's rulemaking. | The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has been a controversial product of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203; the Dodd-Frank Act). Some in Congress view the CFPB as an important protector of consumers and families against predatory financial actors. Others believe the CFPB is an institution not subject to sufficient accountability that imposes undue regulatory burdens on providers of financial services and limits credit available to households. This policy disagreement among Members of Congress has been on display during the controversy surrounding the confirmation of the CFPB's director, in oversight hearings, and in legislation that has been introduced.
This report focuses on selected legislation related to the CFPB that has seen committee or floor action during the 113th Congress. Most of these proposals address one of two main policy topics, the structure of the CFPB and the substance of the CFPB's rulemaking.
On the first policy question, many acknowledge that the structure of a government agency may affect the policies an agency creates. Financial regulators generally are structured in statute to have characteristics that increase their independence from the President or Congress, which may make policymaking related to these regulators more technical and less political or partisan, for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce presidential or congressional influence.
Since the CFPB was established, some have argued that it has too much independence and not enough accountability. Critics point to structural issues, such as the presence of a director rather than a board and funding that is outside the traditional congressional appropriations process. Supporters of the CFPB highlight other aspects that they argue provide transparency and accountability, including the CFPB director's biannual testimony before Congress and the cap on the CFPB's non-appropriated funding. Other structural characteristics, they argue, are important for ensuring that the CFPB is somewhat insulated from political pressures and can focus on the technical aspect of policymaking.
With regard to the second policy question, one of the long-standing issues in the regulation of consumer financial services is the perceived trade-off between protecting consumers and ensuring that the providers of financial goods and services are not unduly burdened. If regulation intended to protect consumers increases the cost of providing a financial product, a company may reduce how much of that product it is willing to provide and to whom it is willing to provide it. Those who still receive the product may benefit from the enhanced disclosure or added legal protections of the regulation, but that benefit may come at the cost of a potentially higher price for the product and reduced availability for others.
Some Members of Congress believe the CFPB has struck the appropriate balance in its rulemaking between protecting consumers and ensuring that credit availability is not restricted due to overly burdensome regulations on financial institutions, especially small banks. Others counter that some of the CFPB's rules have imposed compliance costs on lenders of all sizes that will result in less credit available to consumers and restrict the types of products available. An analysis of whether recent rulemaking has restricted the availability of credit is complicated by the effects of the financial crisis on the supply of and demand for credit, as well as the fact that many of the more significant CFPB rulemakings only took effect in early 2014. |
crs_RL30016 | crs_RL30016_0 | Under the Constitution and congressional practice, Members of Congress may have their services ended prior to the normal expiration of their constitutional terms of office by their resignation, death, or by action of the house of Congress in which they sit by way of an expulsion, or by a finding that a subsequent public office accepted by a Member is "incompatible" with congressional office and that the Member has consequently vacated his seat in Congress. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, individual states never possessed the original sovereign authority, and thus could not have "reserved" such power under the Tenth Amendment, to unilaterally change the terms, qualifications, and conditions of service of federal officials created in the Constitution. Even the dissenting opinion in the U.S. Expulsion
Members of Congress may be involuntarily removed from office before the normal expiration of their constitutional terms by an "expulsion" from the Senate (if a Senator) or from the House of Representatives (if a Representative) upon a formal vote on a resolution agreed to by two-thirds of the membership of the respective body who are present and voting. While there are no specific grounds for an expulsion expressed in the Constitution, expulsion actions in both the House and the Senate have generally concerned cases of perceived disloyalty to the United States Government, or the conviction of a criminal statutory offense which involved abuse of one's official position. Although such authority appears to be extensive as to the grounds, nature, timing, and the procedure for the expulsion of a Member, policy considerations, as opposed to questions of power or authority, may have generally restrained the Senate and the House in the exercise of their authority to expel. Such restraint has been particularly evident when the conduct complained of occurred prior to the time the Member was in Congress, or occurred in a prior Congress, when the electorate knew of the conduct and still elected or re-elected the Member. Constitutional History
The United States Constitution does not provide for or authorize the recall of United States officials such as United States Senators, Representatives to Congress, or the President or Vice President of the United States, and thus no United States Senator or Member of the House of Representatives has ever been recalled in the history of the United States. The recall of United States Senators or Representatives had been considered during the time of the drafting of the federal Constitution, but recall provisions were rejected and were not included in the final version of the Constitution sent to the states for ratification. This history indicates an understanding of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution that no right or power to recall a Senator or Representative from the United States Congress existed under the Constitution as ratified. Judicial Decisions
Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Although the Supreme Court has not needed to directly address the subject of recall of Members of Congress, other judicial decisions indicate that the right to remove a Member of Congress before the expiration of his or her constitutionally established term of office is one which resides within each house of Congress as expressly delegated in the expulsion clause of the United States Constitution, and not in the entire Congress as a whole (through the adoption of legislation), nor in the state legislatures through the enactment of recall provisions. 2." Term Limits case, who would have found under the Tenth Amendment a "reserved" authority in the states with respect to the "qualifications" of Members of Congress, explicitly conceded that no such authority exists in the states to "recall, which the Framers denied to the States when they specified the terms of Members of Congress." | Under the United States Constitution and congressional practice, Members of Congress may have their services ended prior to the normal expiration of their constitutionally established terms of office by their resignation or death, or by action of the house of Congress in which they are a Member by way of an "expulsion," or by a finding that in accepting a subsequent "incompatible" public office, the Member would be deemed to have vacated his congressional seat.
Under Article I, Section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution, a Member of Congress may be removed from office before the normal expiration of his or her constitutional term by an "expulsion" from the Senate (if a Senator) or from the House of Representatives (if a Representative) upon a formal vote on a resolution agreed to by two-thirds of the Members of that body present and voting. While there are no specific grounds for an expulsion expressed in the Constitution, expulsion actions in both the House and the Senate have generally concerned cases of perceived disloyalty to the United States, or the conviction of a criminal statutory offense which involved abuse of one's official position. Each house has broad authority as to the grounds, nature, timing, and procedure for an expulsion of a Member. However, policy considerations, as opposed to questions of authority, have appeared to restrain the Senate and House in the exercise of expulsion when it might be considered as infringing on the electoral process, such as when the electorate knew of the past misconduct under consideration and still elected or re-elected the Member.
As to removal by recall, the United States Constitution does not provide for nor authorize the recall of United States officers such as Senators, Representatives, or the President or Vice President, and thus no Member of Congress has ever been recalled in the history of the United States. The recall of Members was considered during the time of the drafting of the federal Constitution in 1787, but no such provisions were included in the final version sent to the states for ratification, and the specific drafting and ratifying debates indicate an express understanding of the framers and ratifiers that no right or power to recall a Senator or Representative in Congress exists under the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court has not needed to directly address the subject of recall of Members of Congress, other Supreme Court decisions, as well as the weight of other judicial and administrative decisions, rulings, and opinions, indicate that (1) the right to remove a Member of Congress before the expiration of his or her constitutionally established term of office is one which resides exclusively in each house of Congress as expressly delegated in the expulsion clause of the United States Constitution, and (2) the length and number of the terms of office for federal officials, established and agreed upon by the states in the Constitution creating that federal government, may not be unilaterally changed by an individual state, such as through the enactment of a recall provision or a term limitation for a United States Senator or Representative. Under Supreme Court constitutional interpretation, since individual states never had the original sovereign authority to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of service of federal officials agreed to and established in the Constitution, such a power could not be "reserved" under the Tenth Amendment. Even the dissenters in the Supreme Court decision on the Tenth Amendment and term limits, who would have found a "reserved" authority in the states regarding "qualifications" of Members of Congress, conceded that the exclusive authority to remove a sitting Member is delegated to each house in the expulsion clause of the Constitution, and that with respect to "a power of recall ... the Framers denied to the States [such power] when they specified the terms of Members of Congress."
This report has been and will be revised and updated as new decisional material or administrative opinions warrant. |
crs_R42669 | crs_R42669_0 | § 1385, is perhaps the most tangible expression of an American tradition, born in England and developed in the early years of our nation, that rebels against military involvement in civilian affairs. Congress in some cases specifically authorized the use of the armed forces to execute civilian laws in cases that did not amount to insurrection, including enforcement of embargoes and the neutrality laws. When the Act Does Not Apply
Constitutional Exceptions
The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply "in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution," 18 U.S.C. Statutory Exceptions—Generally
The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply where Congress has expressly authorized use of the military to execute the law. It may not be used in any way that could undermine the military capability of the United States; the civilian beneficiaries of military aid must pay for the assistance; and, under § 275, the Secretary of Defense must issue regulations to ensure that the authority of §§ 271 to 284 does not result in use of the armed forces to make arrests or conduct searches and seizures solely for the benefit of civilian law enforcement. Willfully Execute the Laws
The act is limited to "willful" misuse of the Army or Air Force. In this context, the tests used by most contemporary courts to determine whether military forces have been used improperly as police forces in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act were developed out of disturbances in 1973 at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota and inquire whether: (1) civilian law enforcement officials made a direct active use of military investigators to execute the law; (2) the use of the military pervaded the activities of the civilian officials; or (3) the military was used so as to subject citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature. Military Coverage
Navy and Marines
The Posse Comitatus Act proscribes use of the Army or the Air Force to execute the law. There seems every reason to consider the National Guard part of the Army or Air Force, for purposes of the Posse Comitatus Act, when in federal service. Consequences of Violation
Prosecution
The Posse Comitatus Act is a criminal statute under which there has apparently been only a couple of prosecutions. Compliance
The most significant impact of the Posse Comitatus Act is attributable to compliance by the armed forces. As administrative adoption of the act for the Navy and Marines demonstrates, the military has a long-standing practice of avoiding involvement in civilian affairs which it believes are contrary to the act, and which date back to military acceptance of civilian authority since the founding of the Republic. | The Posse Comitatus Act states that "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1385. It reflects an American tradition that bridles at military involvement in civilian affairs. Congress, however, has approved a number of instances where extraordinary circumstances warrant a departure from the general rule, particularly in cases where the armed forces provide civilian assistance without becoming directly involved in civilian law enforcement. However, a number of statutes, including the Insurrection Act, permit the military directly to execute federal law or provide assistance to states in the throes of insurrection where state officials are unable to execute the law.
Three tests have developed to determine when the Posse Comitatus Act is violated. Courts examine whether: (1) civilian law enforcement officials made a direct active use of military investigators to execute the law; (2) the use of the military pervaded the activities of the civilian officials; or (3) the military was used so as to subject citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature. The Act has apparently been used for only a couple of prosecutions, and it is more frequently invoked collaterally as a usually unsuccessful means to avoid jurisdiction or exclude evidence acquired with the assistance of the military. Less frequently, plaintiffs have sought relief in the form of civil damages for an alleged violation.
The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply where the Constitution expressly authorizes the use of the armed forces to execute the laws in such a role. Although the Constitution does not seem to provide such an express exception, military doctrine permits military commanders to exercise emergency authority and to take action to protect federal property.
Although the Posse Comitatus Act applies on its terms only to the Army and Air Force, Department of Defense regulations governing military assistance to civil authorities limit the roles of all of the armed services, including civilian personnel, to prevent their direct involvement in law enforcement activities. The National Guard is covered by the act only when acting in federal service.
The most significant impact of the Posse Comitatus Act is attributable to compliance by the armed forces. As administrative adoption of the act for the Navy and Marines demonstrates, the military has a long-standing practice of avoiding involvement in civilian affairs which it believes are contrary to the Act.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report R42659, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, in which the authorities for the statements made here may be found. |
crs_R41866 | crs_R41866_0 | Introduction
Executive orders requiring agencies to impose certain conditions on federal contractors as terms of their contracts have raised questions about presidential authority to issue such orders. These orders typically cite the President's constitutional authority, as well as his authority pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA). FPASA authorizes the President to prescribe any policies or directives that he considers necessary to promote "economy" or "efficiency" in federal procurement. For example, there have been legal challenges to orders (1) encouraging agencies to require the use of project labor agreements on large-scale construction projects; (2) requiring that certain contracts include provisions obligating contractors to post notices informing employees of their rights not to be required "to join a union or to pay mandatory dues for costs unrelated to representational activities"; and (3) directing departments and agencies to require their contractors to use E-Verify to check the work authorization of their employees. These challenges have alleged, among other things, that the orders were beyond the President's authority, under FPASA or otherwise. A 2011 draft executive order that would have directed departments to require contractors to "disclose certain political contributions and expenditures" raised similar and additional questions as to whether it would have been within the President's authority, as it resembled legislation that was considered, but not enacted, by the 111 th Congress. It also surveys key cases challenging executive orders pertaining to federal contractors, which typically were issued under the authority granted to the President under the FPASA. In finding the challenged regulations invalid, the Court articulated what has become the prevailing test of the validity of presidential actions under the FPASA, requiring that there be a "nexus" between the challenged executive branch action and congressionally delegated authority to promote economy and efficiency in federal procurement. Rather, the court held that a "reasonably close nexus" exists so long as the "President's explanation for how an Executive Order promotes efficiency and economy [is] reasonable and rational." However, this authority is not unlimited, and particular applications of presidential authority under FPASA have been found to be beyond what Congress contemplated when it granted the President authority to prescribe policies and directives that promote economy and efficiency in federal procurement. In the event that Congress sought to enlarge or cabin presidential exercises of authority over federal contractors, Congress could amend FPASA to clarify congressional intent to grant the President broader authority over procurement, or limit his authority to more narrow "housekeeping" aspects of procurement. Congress also could pass legislation directed at particular requirements of contracting executive orders. For example, the 112 th Congress enacted legislation that seeks to forestall implementation of any executive orders requiring disclosure of contractors' political contributions and expenditures. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 ( P.L. 112-81 , §823) prohibited the heads of defense agencies from requiring contractors to submit "political information" related to the contractor, a subcontractor, or any partner, officer, director, or employee thereof, as part of the solicitation or during the course of contract performance. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 , §743) similarly barred the use of appropriated funds to "recommend or require" persons submitting offers for federal contracts to disclose political contributions or expenditures. | Executive orders requiring agencies to impose certain conditions on federal contractors as terms of their contracts have raised questions about presidential authority to issue such orders. Such executive orders typically cite the President's constitutional authority, as well as his authority pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA). FPASA authorizes the President to prescribe any policies or directives that he considers necessary to promote "economy" or "efficiency" in federal procurement.
There have been legal challenges to orders (1) encouraging agencies to require the use of project labor agreements; (2) requiring that contracts include provisions obligating contractors to post notices informing employees of their rights not to be required to join a union or pay dues; and (3) directing departments to require contractors to use E-Verify to check the work authorization of their employees. These challenges have alleged, among other things, that the orders were beyond the President's authority, under FPASA or otherwise. A 2011 draft executive order that would have directed departments to require contractors to "disclose certain political contributions and expenditures" raised similar and additional questions, as it resembled legislation that was considered, but not enacted, by the 111th Congress.
The outcome of legal challenges to particular executive orders pertaining to federal contractors generally depends upon the authority under which the order was issued and whether the order is consistent with or conflicts with other statutes. Courts will generally uphold orders issued under the authority of FPASA so long as the requisite nexus exists between the challenged executive branch actions and FPASA's goals of economy and efficiency in procurement. Such a nexus may be present when there is an "attenuated link" between the requirements and economy and efficiency, or when the President offers a "reasonable and rational" explanation for how the executive order at issue relates to economy and efficiency in procurement. However, particular applications of presidential authority under the FPASA have been found to be beyond what Congress contemplated when it granted the President authority to prescribe policies and directives that promote economy and efficiency in federal procurement.
Some courts and commentators also have suggested that Presidents have inherent constitutional authority over procurement. A President's reliance on his constitutional authority, as opposed to the congressional grant of authority under the FPASA, is more likely to raise separation of powers questions.
In the event that Congress seeks to enlarge or cabin presidential exercises of authority over federal contractors, Congress could amend FPASA to clarify its intent to grant the President broader authority over procurement, or limit presidential authority to more narrow "housekeeping" aspects of procurement. Congress also could pass legislation directed at particular requirements of executive orders on federal contractors. For example, the 112th Congress enacted legislation that seeks to forestall implementation of any executive order requiring disclosure of contractors' political contributions and expenditures. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81, §823) prohibited the heads of defense agencies from requiring contractors to submit "political information" related to the contractor, a subcontractor, or any partner, officer, director, or employee thereof, as part of the solicitation or during contract performance. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74, §743) similarly barred the use of appropriated funds to "recommend or require" persons submitting offers for federal contracts to disclose political contributions or expenditures. |
crs_R40567 | crs_R40567_0 | In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate negotiators agreed on a compromise amendment to the Senate-passed version of the bill, which would appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget (covering all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. (See " War Costs and Issues ," below.) The total authorization, which is $14.9 million higher than the Obama Administration requested, includes $550.2 billion for the so-called "base budget"—all DOD activities other than combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—and $130.0 billion for "overseas contingency operations," including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees each had added to the versions of the authorization bill they reported to their respective chambers authorization to continue production of the F-22 and to continue development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The conference report on the authorization bill would terminate the F-22 but would allow the alternate engine program to continue. The compromise version—which is, in effect, the equivalent of a conference report version—would appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs. The House passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 by a vote of 395-34. Overview of the Administration's FY2010 Request
The President's FY2010 request of $533.7 billion for the DOD base budget is $20.4 billion higher than the total of $513.3 billion the Obama Administration cites as the total appropriated for the DOD base budget in the regular FY2009 appropriations process. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the bill ( S. 1390 ) on July 2 and the Senate passed the bill July 23. 3326 on July 24 and House passed it on July 30.The Senate Appropriations committee reported its amended version of the bill on September 10 and the Senate passed the bill September 6 by a vote of 93-7. 3326 that would appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs. The Senate passed it December 19 by a vote of 88-10 and the President signed the bill later on December 19 ( P.L. Extensions of Special War-Related Authorities
The authorization conference report also extends several war-related authorities and associated reporting requirements created since the 9/11 attacks, including:
a one-year extension of the Commanders' Emergency Response Progam requiring 15-day advance notifications for expenditures, setting a $1.3 billion cap on the program, and allowing funds to be used to reintegrate individuals renouncing violence into Afghan society in section 1222 (a program similar to the Sons of Iraq or Concerned Local Citizens groups in Iraq); a one-year extension (and a $1.6 billion cap) on coalition support funds with an expansion in the types of logistical support that can be provided to nations aiding U.S. military operations to include specialized training, supplies, and equipment as requested by the Administration; Section 1223 of the conference report continues to require 15-day advance notifications of specific expenditures and quarterly reports on the program; this authority appears similar to that in the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund; an expansion and modification of reporting requirements in Section 1202 for DOD support for special operations support to foreign nations; an extension in Section 1203 of reporting requirement for foreign-assistance related programs carried out by DOD; a requirement in Section 1204 for a report by March 1, 2010 on the relationship between DOD authorities to train, equip and build the capacity of foreign nations compared to Foreign Assistance Act authorities; and a limitation in Section 1206 of funds that can be used to build the capacity of foreign military forces to $75 million in FY2010 and $75 million in FY2011. Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 111-288 ) was filed on October 7, 2009 and was adopted by the House on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The Senate adopted the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and the President signed it into law ( P.L. 111-84 ) on October 28. The conference report authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related activities of other federal agencies. The House version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill, H.R. 111-35 ), which would have authorized $551.1 billion for the DOD base budget and related Energy Department programs, $864.8 million more than the President requested. H.R. 2990 ) the House passed June 24 by a vote of 404-0. 2647 . 111-118). 3326 also would have added to the budget request funds to continue production of the F-22 fighter, which the Obama Administration—like the preceding Bush Administration—had decided to terminate. | For the Department of Defense (DOD) in FY2010, the Administration requested a total of $663.8 billion in discretionary budget authority. This includes $533.8 billion for the so-called "base budget"—all DOD activities other than combat operations—and $130.0 billion for "overseas contingency operations," including operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Administration also requested $75.9 billion in supplemental DOD appropriations for FY2009 to cover war costs. The Administration's DOD request, made public May 7, 2009, incorporated Defense Secretary Robert Gates's April 6 recommendations to curtail funding for several major weapons programs focused on conventional warfare.
The FY2010 national defense authorization bills drafted by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees generally supported this shift in policy, which the Obama Administration's budget request reflected. However, both committees added to their respective bills authorization to continue production of the Air Force's F-22 fighter and to continue development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The Obama Administration warned that a bill that continued either program would be vetoed. On June 25, the House passed by a vote of 389-22 its version of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2647, which would authorize a total of $534.0 billion for the DOD base budget and $129.3 billion for war costs. The bill also would authorize $16.5 billion for defense-related nuclear activities of the Department of Energy, which was $83.3 million more than requested. On July 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the authorization bill, S. 1390, which would authorize $534.6 billion for the DOD base budget, $129.3 billion for war costs, and $16.4 billion for the Energy Department. The Senate passed the bill on July 23 by a vote of 87-7 after adopting several amendments, including two that would, in effect, end production of the F-22 and terminate the F-35 alternate engine programs, as the Administration had requested.
The conference report on the authorization bill authorizes a total of $680.2 billion for military activities of DOD and defense-related activities of other federal agencies, which is $14.9 million more than the Obama Administration requested. The conference report, which terminates the F-22 but continues the alternate engine program, was adopted by the House on October 8 by a vote of 281-146. The Senate adopted the conference report October 22 by a vote of 68-29 and President Obama signed the bill (P.L. 111-84) on October 28.
The House passed its version of the FY2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326) on July 30, by a vote of 400-30. The bill would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget (covering all accounts except military construction) and $128.2 billion for FY2010 war costs.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported September 10 an amended version of H.R. 3326 which would appropriate $497.6 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs. The Senate passed the bill October 6 by a vote of 93-7.
In lieu of a conference report on the FY2010 defense appropriations bill, House and Senate negotiators agreed on an amendment to the Senate-passed version of H.R. 3326 that would appropriate $497.7 billion for the DOD base budget and $128.2 billion for war costs.
The House passed that compromise version of the bill December 16 (395-34); the Senate passed it December 19 (88-10). The President signed the bill December 19 (P.L. 111-118). |
crs_R40992 | crs_R40992_0 | The Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-383 ) states, "Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong. This will remain equally true after June 30, 1997." On March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ) appropriated not less than $17 million for "the promotion of democracy in the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan …"
In addition, China's stance on Hong Kong's democratization may also signal its intentions regarding political reforms on the Mainland and its preferred path to reunification with Taiwan. Under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the city's quasi-constitution, the "ultimate aim" is the selection of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and the members of its Legislative Council (Legco) by "universal suffrage." Since then, there has been an active and vibrant debate over if and when Hong Kong will establish a fully democratic election system. On June 24 and 25, 2010, Hong Kong made the first significant changes in its election system since the 1997 Handover. Legco passed a motion on June 24 that expanded the size of the selection committee for the Chief Executive from 800 to 1,200 members starting with the 2012 election. These two motions—which only days before looked destined to be defeated—were passed because of a last-minute agreement between Hong Kong's pro-universal suffrage Democratic Party and representatives of China's central government. Tung was succeeded by his Chief Secretary for Administration, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen. On November 18, 2009, the Hong Kong government released its Consultation Document regarding the 2012 elections. The Legco by-election was held on May 16, 2010. On June 7, 2010, Stephen Lam, Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, submitted two motions to Legco. Chief Executive Tsang set the date for Legco's vote on the two motions for June 23, 2010. It was reported that all 23 of the pro-democracy members of Legco pledged to vote against the motions, unless significant changes are made in election reforms recommended in the Consultative Document. On December 10, 2010, Chief Executive Tsang submitted two bills – one to amend the ordinance and regulations governing the selection of the Chief Executive, and another to amend the ordinances and regulations governing the election of the Legco members. Its main provisions are:
The addition of five geographical constituency seats in Legco to be allocated among the five current districts so that no district has fewer than five seats or more than nine seats; The redesignation of the current District Council functional constituency as the "District Council (first) functional constituency," and the creation of a new functional constituency to be known as "District Council (second) functional constituency"; The allocation of the five new functional constituency seats to the "District Council (second) functional constituency"; The eligible voters for the five "District Council (second) functional constituency" seats will consist of all persons who are registered as electors for geographical constituencies, but are not registered as electors for any of the other functional constituencies; The restriction of nominees to District Council (first) and District Council (second) functional constituency seats to elected members of the District Councils; The restriction of nominators for (called "subscribers" in Hong Kong) District Council (first) and District Council (second) functional constituency seats to elected members of the District Councils; The requirement that nominees for the District Council (second) functional constituency seats be nominated by at least 15 elected District Council members; and The limitation of campaign expenses for the District Council (second) functional constituency to HK$6 million (approximately US$770,000). Another important factor will be how the Chinese government responds to the proposed legislation. Given that Hong Kong is an executive-led government, the 2017 Chief Executive election may be more crucial, especially given that the transition to universal suffrage for Legco elections is conditional upon the achievement of universal suffrage in the Chief Executive election. Motion on Election of Chief Executive
Draft Motion to be Put by the HKSAR Government to the Legislative Council Concerning the Amendment to the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Pursuant to Article 7 of Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China of 6 April 2004, and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2012 and on Issues relating to Universal Suffrage of 29 December 2007, the "(Draft) Amendment to Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" appended to this Motion is hereby endorsed by this Council by a two-thirds majority of all Members. | Support for the democratization of Hong Kong has been an element of U.S. foreign policy for over 17 years. The Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383) states, "Support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States foreign policy. As such, it naturally applies to United States policy toward Hong Kong. This will remain equally true after June 30, 1997" (the date of Hong Kong's reversion to China). The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8) provides at least $17 million for "the promotion of democracy in the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan …"
The democratization of Hong Kong is also enshrined in the Basic Law, Hong Kong's quasi-constitution that was passed by China's National People's Congress (NPC) prior to China's resumption of sovereignty over the ex-British colony on July 1, 1997. The Basic Law stipulates that the "ultimate aim" is the selection of Hong Kong's Chief Executive and the members of its Legislative Council (Legco) by "universal suffrage." However, it does not designate a specific date by which this goal is to be achieved.
On November 18, 2009, Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen released the long-awaited "consultation document" on possible reforms for the city's elections to be held in 2012. The document was immediately met by sharp criticism from representatives of Hong Kong's "pro-democracy" parties. Five Legco members resigned on January 21, 2010, as a form of protest, forcing a by-election on May 16, 2010. The five incumbents were re-elected.
On June 7, 2010, Chief Executive Tsang submitted two motions to Legco increasing the size of the Election Committee (EC) for Chief Executive to 1,200 members and adding 10 new seats to Legco—five elected by geographical districts and five elected by "functional constituencies."
Initially, the pan-democratic Legco members announced they would vote against the motions. However, a last-minute agreement between the pro-universal suffrage Democratic Party and the Chinese government led to a split among the pan-democrats, a coalition of parties that support a more rapid transition to universal suffrage. Legco passed both motions—one on June 24; the second on June 25—the first significant changes in Hong Kong's political system since the Handover on July 1, 1997.
To implement the election changes, Legco will need to pass enabling ordinances detailing how to carry out the election reforms. On December 10, 2010, Chief Executive Tsang submitted two bills to amend Hong Kong's election laws. The bill governing the election of the Chief Executive specifies how the additional EC members are to be allocated and sets the nomination threshold at 150 EC members. The bill governing the 10 new Legco seats will allow the Electoral Affairs Commission to determine how to allocate the five geographical seats (based on population projections) and establishes a "District Council (second) functional constituency" to elect the other five new Legco members. Under the new law, every Hong Kong voter will be able to vote for at least one functional constituency member of Legco.
The 2012 election reforms are important to Hong Kong's democratization for two reasons. First, they are an indication of the Hong Kong government's willingness to press for democratic reforms. Second, the Chief Executive and Legco selected in 2012 will have the power to implement universal suffrage for the Chief Executive election in 2017 and the Legco election in 2020, if they so choose. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R43815 | crs_R43815_0 | Residential Furnaces
Furnaces are the most common type of residential central heating equipment in the nation. EISA Authorizes DOE to Set Regional Standards
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. This provision marked the first time that Congress authorized DOE to set regional efficiency standards—in order to account for geographic differences in heating or cooling needs . (emphasis added) Thus, Section 306 authorized DOE to make a technical standard for manufacturers (the base national "minimum standard") and a higher regional "installation standard." All other previous DOE energy efficiency standards for consumer products—whether set by statute or by regulation—only created national technical standards for manufacturers. In another departure from past practice, Section 308 of the law specified that DOE could employ a "direct final rule" process to implement new regional standards. That process differed from the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process that had been used for all previous DOE rulemakings for efficiency standards. In late 2009—after months of negotiations—the two groups signed a consensus agreement to set new standards for residential furnaces and other EISA-identified products. The discussion in this section, and in those that follow, focuses mainly on efficiency standards policy design and issues for natural gas furnaces, but much of the discussion would also apply to issues for the other equipment. Estimated Energy Savings
The DFR specified that:
Pursuant to EPCA, any new or amended energy conservation standard that DOE prescribes for certain products, such as the residential furnaces (furnaces) and residential central air conditioners and central air conditioning heat pumps (air conditioners and heat pumps) that are the subject of this rulemaking, shall be designed to 'achieve the maximum improvement in energy efficiency ... which the Secretary determines is technologically feasible and economically justified.' Also, the new focus on the point of installation had the effect of moving the standard down the equipment distribution supply chain. This, in turn, accelerated the timing of the effect of a regional standard on distributors and installers (contractors) relative to a standard that only affects manufacturers:
Regional standards also differ from a base national standard with respect to the compliance date of the standard for a particular product. By the time DOE confirmed the direct final rule at the end of October 2011, the lead time for compliance with the furnace standards had been further compressed to 18 months . Three main industry issues were raised through this public comment process. In January 2013, DOE and the APGA reached agreement on a settlement and filed a joint motion asking the court to vacate the portion of the DFR that established regional efficiency standards for residential natural gas furnaces and remand the dispute to DOE for a traditional notice and comment period prior to issuance of a final rule. The new unaddressed complexity ultimately led to court challenges and additional time delays. Further, DOE may not adopt a standard that would not result in "significant conservation of energy." For furnace distributors and contractors, DOE anticipated that the regional standards would present two new challenges:
Based on the ... interviews and its own preliminary market assessment, DOE believes there are two main ways in which regional standards could impact furnace distributors and contractors. Key Issues for Public Comment
The RAP noted that DOE wanted to receive public comment on a variety of key issues, including:
The consensus agreement; The combining of multiple equipment standards into a single rulemaking that covered residential central air conditioners, heat pumps, residential furnaces, and furnace fans; DOE's proposed definitions of regions, for the analysis of regional standards; and The viability of the regional standard enforcement mechanisms presented in the RAP , other mechanisms DOE should consider, and the extent to which these mechanisms would result in additional financial burdens to consumers, manufacturers, contractors, distributors, dealers, and installers. | This report reviews the background, regulatory framework, and policy issues that have shaped the debate over regional energy efficiency standards for residential natural gas furnaces. Those furnaces are the most common type of home heating appliance. While the scope of the report is limited to that one type of furnace, much of the discussion also applies to standards for other furnaces and to standards for residential central air conditioners and heat pumps.
A 1987 statutory congressional directive set gas furnace standards for 1992 and directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to consider raising the standards in 1994 and 2007. DOE's responses were challenged in court twice (2005, 2007). The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) authorized DOE to set new standards for residential natural gas furnaces and certain other equipment. EISA Section 306 empowered DOE to set both a "technical" standard for manufacturers (a base national standard) and a regional "installation" standard for distributors and contractors. The regional standard concept aims to address geographic differences in heating needs. This law marked the first time that Congress authorized DOE to set regional standards.
All other previous DOE energy efficiency standards for consumer products—whether set by law or by DOE rule—had only created a national technical standard for manufacturers. In that case, the compliance date served as a deadline only for manufacturers to have retooled their production lines, so that new equipment would comply with the new energy efficiency criteria. As the inventory of "old" equipment became exhausted, the "new" equipment from manufacturers would gradually replace it in the supply chain. Ultimately, the equipment distributors and residential installers at the end of the supply chain would have only the new equipment available to them.
In contrast, the DOE-proposed regional gas furnace standard would have set the same compliance date for both manufacturers and installers. This would effectively move the scheduled implementation date down the supply chain from manufacturers, and thereby accelerate the change-over requirement date and shorten the "sell-through" adjustment period for furnace distributors and contractors.
In another departure from past practice, EISA Section 308 specified that DOE could employ a direct final rule (DFR) process to implement the new regional standards. This is another policy innovation that had not been used previously in the appliance standard-making process. The DFR process—which relies upon a preliminary consensus agreement among industry and energy efficiency groups—differs from the "traditional" notice-and-comment process that had been used in all previous DOE rulemakings for consumer product energy efficiency standards.
The two innovations—regional standards and the DFR process—led to new uncertainties and implementation design issues which, in late 2011, prompted an industry court challenge. In April 2014, the court adopted a negotiated settlement that directs DOE to reformulate the gas furnace rulemaking and directs that standards for air conditioners and heat pumps begin in 2015 and 2016. The final rule for gas furnaces had been set for May 2013—but the new, revised rule is not expected to take effect before 2021 or 2022. In October 2014, gas industry groups raised the issue of separating gas furnace product classes in the revised rulemaking. One report suggests that the court-adopted settlement which directs DOE to "reformulate" the residential gas furnace standard could influence the development of several other energy efficiency standards processes that are underway. |
crs_RL32411 | crs_RL32411_0 | Introduction
This report provides background information and discusses possible oversight issues for Congress regarding DOD's strategy for implementing a network centric approach to warfare, otherwise known as Network Centric Operations (NCO). Others argue that technology may be dictating military strategy, and point out that the military's extreme reliance on high technology may also present a new vulnerability that adversaries may exploit. Still others pose questions about (1) the interoperability of information systems for joint and coalition forces, (2) a shortage of available bandwidth to support Net Centric Operations, and (3) possible unexpected outcomes when organizations rely on data-dependent systems. Therefore, military operations are now characterized by greater complexity. In operations in Afghanistan and in urban warfare in Iraq, NCO has reportedly reduced fratricide among friendly forces. Others question whether information itself may be overrated as a useful military asset (See Appendix C , "Perverse Consequences of Data-Dependent Systems"). Overconfidence about the Effectiveness of NCO
Proponents of NCO say that shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization and enhances speed of command, which increasing mission effectiveness. This shift in policy is intended to promote more widespread information sharing and collaboration. Technology Transfer Threat to U.S. Net Centric Advantages
Electronic technologies are critical to the operation of modern, complex systems for communications and weaponry, and much of the technology for U.S. military data networking reportedly comes from Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products. Operational Experiences
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) might be more accurately characterized as a transitional rather than transformational operation because NCO technology was not fully deployed in all units during OIF, and some systems proved not to be user-friendly. Key Military Programs
The following are key DOD programs related to NCO. Several observers have argued that DOD plans stress only the rewards of information without including adequate analysis of the risks associated with possible over-reliance on data-driven systems. Has DOD developed adequate joint doctrine for NCO? Do training exercises involve coalition partners with complimentary NCO capabilities? This report will be updated as events warrant. Appendix A. By 2008, DOD is planning to convert digital military communications to use the newer Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) as the standard for all transmission through the Global Information Grid (GIG), and for all systems that are part of the Defense Information System Network (DISN) that will interoperate with the GIG. Changing Views on Metcalfe's Law of Networks
Differing interpretations of what is known as "Metcalfe's Law" may lead to different priorities for acquisition and deployment of NCO technologies, systems, and equipment. | Network Centric Operations (also known as Network Centric Warfare) is a key component of DOD planning for transformation of the military. Network Centric Operations (NCO) relies on computer equipment and networked communications technology to provide a shared awareness of the battle space for U.S. forces. Proponents say that a shared awareness increases synergy for command and control, resulting in superior decision-making, and the ability to coordinate complex military operations over long distances for an overwhelming war-fighting advantage. NCO technology saw limited deployment in Afghanistan and, more recently, increased deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Several DOD key programs are now underway for deployment throughout all services.
Congress may be concerned with oversight of the DOD organization and the individual services as they transform through NCO programs that are intended to promote a management style and culture with joint objectives. Oversight may involve a review of service efforts to improve interoperability of computer and communications systems, and may also involve questions from some observers about whether DOD has given adequate attention to possible unintended outcomes resulting from over-reliance on high technology. Updates may also be required on emerging threats that may be directed against increasingly complex military equipment.
This report describes technologies that support NCO, and includes (1) questions about possible vulnerabilities associated with NCO; (2) a description of electronic weapons, and other technologies that could be used as asymmetric countermeasures against NCO systems; (3) descriptions of several key military programs for implementing NCO; (4) a list of other nations with NCO capabilities; and, (5) a description of experiences using NCO systems in recent operations involving joint and coalition forces. The final section raises policy issues for NCO that involve planning, network interoperability, acquisition strategies, offshore outsourcing, technology transfer, asymmetric threats, coalition operations, and U.S. military doctrine.
Appendices to this report give more information about the global network conversion to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), views on Metcalfe's Law of Networks, and possible perverse consequences of data-dependent systems.
This report will be updated to accommodate significant changes. |
crs_RS20803 | crs_RS20803_0 | These flows are the prime mover behind exchange rates and global flows of goods and services. This international expansion of business activity and overseas presence, however, often leads to a clash of cultures and values. These and other differences have spurred nations and international organizations to adopt various approaches in order to promote international rules on foreign investment. In addition, citizen and consumer groups opposed the proposed agreement, in part because they viewed it as too favorable to multinational corporations, and because of their concerns regarding what they believed would be the social, economic, and political impact of the agreement. G-20 Investment Measures
During the early stages of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, national leaders, generally political heads of state, met as the Group of Twenty, or G-20, to address the crisis and to develop a reform agenda. At the G-20 meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico, on June 19, 2012, the G-20 leaders indicated that they had grown "concerned about rising instances of protectionism around the world," and that they viewed regional and global "value chains" as relevant to world trade and recognized "their role in fostering economic growth, employment and development" and the need to enhance the participation of developing countries in value chains. Corporate and Industry-Specific Codes of Conduct
A broad range of factors are influencing firms to adopt codes of conduct. Issues for Congress
Governments, corporations, and the public generally support the concept of corporate codes of conduct. | The U.S. economy has grown increasingly interconnected with other economies around the world, a phenomenon often referred to as globalization. As U.S. businesses expand globally, however, various groups across the social and economic spectrum have expressed their concerns over the economic, social, and political impact of this activity. Over the past 20 years, multinational corporations and nations have adopted voluntary, legally enforceable, and industry-specific codes of conduct, often referred to broadly as corporate social responsibility (CSR), to address many of these concerns. Recent events, primarily the 2008-2009 financial crisis and related work by major international organizations, spurred Congress and governments in Europe to increase their regulation of financial firms. Indeed, the growing presence and influence of multinational corporations in the production of goods and services and in international trade through value chains has prodded governments to adopt measures that enhance the benefits of such activities through codes of conduct. Congress will continue playing a pivotal role in addressing the various issues regarding internationally applied corporate codes of conduct. |
crs_RL34071 | crs_RL34071_0 | During the last 10 years, there have been modest changes in Hong Kong's political situation and more significant changes in its economy. These political and economic changes have had an impact on Hong Kong's social and cultural identity. First, Hong Kong is a major entrepôt in Asia, especially for trade with China. 102-383 ). The act commits the United States to treating the HKSAR as a separate entity from the rest of China in a variety of political, economic, trade and other areas so long as the HKSAR remains "sufficiently autonomous" to warrant special treatment. The freedoms of speech and assembly appear to have been largely respected by the Chinese and HKSAR governments, but there is concern about self-censorship by some in the Hong Kong media. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which began almost concurrently with the Handover, had a ripple effect on Hong Kong, resulting in a major asset value realignment, commodity price and wage deflation, and a decline in the city's gross domestic product (GDP). These social and cultural changes have raised the issue of a "Hong Kong identity" that is distinct and separable from a "Chinese identity." The politicization of the Hong Kong population in part can be attributed to an increase in their opportunities to be involved in political activities, such as elections. In particular, there have been three high profile cases where the Chinese government has made decisions on the meaning of the Basic Law that were seen by some as eroding the independence of Hong Kong's courts and the legal protections provided by the Basic Law itself. "The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement," or CEPA, provides Hong Kong companies preferential access to the markets of the Chinese mainland. However, as will be described later in this report, there is an underlying uncertainty expressed by some Hong Kong residents about the HKSAR's relationship with the Chinese mainland. By negotiating a free trade agreement with China, Hong Kong has bolstered its competitive advantage on the Chinese mainland. Hong Kong's trade in services with China has also increased substantially since the Handover. However, there are elements in the current economic trends that could portend the eventual integration of Hong Kong into the Chinese mainland economy in the long run. Section 103 states that the United States "should seek to maintain and expand economic and trade relations with Hong Kong and should continue to treat Hong Kong as a separate territory in economic and trade matters ... " The section also grants Hong Kong "most favored nation status" (now referred to as "normal trade relations" status), provides for the free exchange between the U.S. and Hong Kong dollars, allows for continued trade of "sensitive technologies" under U.S. export controls, and calls for the negotiation of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Hong Kong and the United States, "in consultation with the Government of the People's Republic of China." Disappearing Middle Class
Along with the decline in its "ex-pat" population, there is a perception that Hong Kong may be losing its "middle class." By and large, the provisions of the U.S.- Hong Kong Policy Act are being met, and Hong Kong is fulfilling its obligations to the United States under the existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. Civil Liberties
Outward indications seem to support the view that the civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong remain relatively unchanged since the Handover. At present, the only issue that clearly raised concerns about civil liberties in Hong Kong—the Article 23 proposals—is on hold until Chief Executive Tsang or the Chinese government decide to press the matter again with Legco and the people of Hong Kong. Anonymous Hong Kong business consultant
Anonymous Hong Kong Customs official
Anonymous Hong Kong physician
Anonymous Hong Kong retiree
Fred Armentrout, Communications Director, American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong
Nicholas Chan Chun Tak, Senior Administrative Officer, Central Planning Unit, Hong Kong Government
Philip Chan Kwan Yee, Research Director, Central Planning Unit, Hong Kong Government
Watson Chan Li Wah, Research Department, Legislative Council
Michael Degolyer, Professor of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University
Michael Enright, Professor of Business Administration, University of Hong Kong
He Dong, Head of Economic Research Division, Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Anthony Hutchinson, Director of Public Affairs, U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong
Linda Lai Wai Ming, Deputy Secretary, Hong Kong Department of Commerce, Industry, and Technology
Emily Lau Wai Hing, Member of the Legislative Council
Alan Leong Kah Kit, Member of the Legislative Council
Leung Kwok Hung, Member of the Legislative Council
Nancy W. Leou, Consul, Economic/Political Section, U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong
Edward Leung Hoi Kwok, Chief Economist, Hong Kong Trade Development Council
Amelia Luk Siu Ping, S. P., Deputy Law Officer, Hong Kong Department of Justice
Jack Maisano, President, American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong
Julie Mu Fee Man, Assistant Director of Community Relations, Independent Commission Against Corruption
Ng Chun Hung, Professor of Sociology, University of Hong Kong
James Tang T. H., Professor of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong
Cherry Tse Kit Ching Ling, Permanent Secretary, Hong Kong Department of Constitutional Affairs
David Webb, Economist
Pansy Yau Lai Ping, Assistant Chief Economist, Hong Kong Trade Development Council
Yeung Yue Man, Director of Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong | In the 10 years that have passed since the reversion of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty, much has changed and little has changed.
On the political front, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has selected its first Chief Executive, only to have him step down and be replaced in a process not without some controversy. Meanwhile, belated changes by the British in the makeup of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (Legco) were initially undone, but subsequent changes in the Legco selection process have brought things back nearly full circle to where they stood prior to the Handover. There is also unease about the independence of Hong Kong's judicial system and the protection provided by Hong Kong's Basic Law in light of decisions made by the Chinese government.
Similarly, the civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong remain largely intact. In part, this can be attributed to the increased politicization of the people of Hong Kong. The freedom of the press in Hong Kong is still strong, but also faces challenges—both on the legal front and from allegations of self-censorship on the part of the media owners reluctant to antagonize the People's Republic of China. Yet, even with these challenges, many Hong Kong residents do not appear to perceive a decline in their civil liberties since 1997.
Economically, Hong Kong is still a major international financial center and a leading gateway into China. However, Hong Kong's economic interaction with the Chinese mainland has grown deeper and broader over the last 10 years than was expected, increasing the city's economic connections with China. This closer tie to the mainland is being bolstered by the signing of a free trade agreement in 2003, called the "Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement," or CEPA, between China and Hong Kong. Current economic and trade dynamics have raised concerns that Hong Kong's relationship with China will shift in the long run from one of synergy to full integration, possibly undermining the HKSAR's "high degree of autonomy."
Recent social and cultural trends appear to reflect some apprehension about the long-term implications of current economic and political trends. There has been a decline in Hong Kong's expatriate ("ex-pat") community, including U.S. nationals. Also, there is a perception that Hong Kong's "middle class" is disappearing. Underlying many of these social and cultural trends is a redefinition of Hong Kong by its residents, indicating a closer identification with China.
At present, few of these long-term trends have had a significant effect on Hong Kong's political or economic situation and its relations with the United States. Under the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-383), the United States treats Hong Kong as a separate entity in a variety of political and economic areas so long as the HKSAR remains "sufficiently autonomous" from China. While Hong Kong government continues to fulfill its obligations to the United States under existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, there are still some minor issues that might warrant action by Congress. This report will be revised as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RS22022 | crs_RS22022_0 | D isaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits are available only to those individuals who have become unemployed as a direct result of a declared major disaster and who are not eligible for regular Unemployment Compensation (UC). First created in 1970 through P.L. 91-606, DUA benefits are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (the Stafford Act), which authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration after state and local government resources have been overwhelmed by a natural catastrophe or, "regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States" (42 U.S.C. 5122(2)). DUA Financing
DUA benefits are funded through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). First, an individual generally must have no entitlement to UC benefits. (c) Unemployment is a direct result of the major disaster. DUA beneficiaries (because they are not entitled to regular UC or have exhausted their entitlement to UC) are not eligible to receive Extended Benefits (EB). 115-254 , the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, was signed into law on October 5, 2018. Among its many provisions, it retroactively extended DUA for an additional 26 weeks for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as a direct result of the 2017 Hurricane Irma or Hurricane Maria disasters. (This created a total potential entitlement to DUA of up to 52 weeks for some individuals.) | Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits are available only to those individuals who have become unemployed as a direct result of a declared major disaster and are not eligible for regular Unemployment Compensation (UC). First created in 1970 through P.L. 91-606, DUA benefits are authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (the Stafford Act), which authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration after state and local government resources have been overwhelmed by a natural catastrophe or, "regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States" (42 U.S.C. §5122(2)).
The DUA program provides income support to individuals who become unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster and who have no remaining entitlement for regular UC benefits. DUA is funded through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL) through each state's UC agency. DUA beneficiaries (because they are not entitled to regular UC) are not eligible to receive Extended Benefits (EB).
On October 5, 2018, P.L. 115-254, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, was signed into law. Among its many provisions, it temporarily extends the duration of DUA for an additional 26 weeks (up to 52 weeks total) for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands as a direct result of the 2017 Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria disasters.
This report contains information on how to ascertain if an individual is eligible for DUA benefits. For information on how unemployment and employment programs respond to disasters, see CRS Report R45182, Unemployment and Employment Programs Available to Workers Affected by Disasters. |
crs_R42091 | crs_R42091_0 | It appears that market concerns over proprietary trading losses related to European sovereign debt in the fall of 2011 ultimately sparked both customer withdrawals and, separately, demands that MF Global post additional margin to cover risks from the firm's trading positions. These sudden, pronounced demands for liquidity, which the firm could not meet, led to the misuse of customer funds and drove the firm into bankruptcy, according to the investigation by the bankruptcy trustee. On Monday, October 31, 2011, MF Global filed for bankruptcy. Subsequent to the bankruptcy, a $1.6 billion shortfall in customer funds was identified by the bankruptcy trustee. This consisted of a $900 million shortfall for domestic U.S. accounts trading both commodities and securities and a $700 million shortfall related to trading by customers on foreign exchanges. As of June 4, 2013, the bankruptcy trustee announced that U.S. futures customers had received 89% of their missing funds, and that he anticipated that figure should reach 94% once certain legal agreements were acted upon. However, for futures customers overseas, or who had had accounts set up in which to trade on foreign exchanges, the figure was significantly lower, with only 18% of their missing funds returned as of June 4, 2013. After investigations into the failure and the missing customer funds by the two bankruptcy trustees, the CFTC, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Department of Justice, no criminal charges have been filed against MF Global or any of its officers. However, the CFTC on June 27, 2013, filed a civil lawsuit naming as defendants MF Global Inc., the futures commission merchant; MF Global Holdings Ltd., the parent holding company; the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jon Corzine; and the former Assistant Treasurer Edith O'Brien. There are numerous other private lawsuits against the firm, its directors, and officers still pending. In addition, broker-dealers must belong to the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), which provides an insurance scheme whereby customers of failed broker-dealers may receive up to $500,000 from the SIPC fund. There is no analog to SIPC in futures markets regulated by the CFTC. The shortfall of segregated customer funds is a rare event and represents a breakdown of the system. Enforcement of Segregation Rules
Any shortfall in segregated accounts violates the CEA and CFTC regulations. Proposals for Change
The MF Global failure raised questions about whether enforcement mechanisms for segregation of futures market customer funds were reliable—particularly in times of unusual stress. It also provided an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory cooperation during a rapid failure of a large, complex financial institution. It prompted certain policy questions, including is the enforcement of segregation requirements for futures customers' accounts sufficient for unusual market conditions, such as a run? Should some type of SIPC-like insurance, such as is offered for customers of securities broker-dealers, be contemplated for futures customers, or would costs be too great? In response to the MF Global and Peregrine failures, the CFTC on November 14, 2012, proposed a rule aimed at increasing disclosure requirements for futures brokers to give customers greater accounting for their funds. Figure A-2 details the trustees assigned to handle the bankruptcy proceedings. | On October 31, 2011, MF Global, a large brokerage firm registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a broker-dealer and with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a futures commission merchant (FCM), filed for bankruptcy, marking the eighth-largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. Based on the subsequent investigation by the bankruptcy trustee, it appears that the firm failed as a result of a "run on the bank" by customers seeking withdrawals, combined with increased margin calls on the firm's proprietary trading positions related to distressed European debt, which the firm could not meet.
Normally, brokerage customers are protected from brokerage failure. On the securities side, investors may receive up to $500,000 from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) if the failed brokerage's assets are insufficient to meet customer claims. In futures markets, there is no insurance scheme comparable to SIPC, but customers are supposed to be protected by strict segregation rules: customer funds entrusted to FCMs are required to be kept in separate accounts and the FCM is not allowed to use them for its own purposes.
In the MF Global case, however, about $1.6 billion in customer funds were found to be missing after the bankruptcy. This consisted of about a $900 million shortfall for domestic U.S. accounts at MF Global trading securities and commodities and a $700 million shortfall related to trading by customers on foreign exchanges. The CFTC, SEC, Justice Department, and the bankruptcy trustee investigated to locate the missing funds and determine causes of the loss. During the investigation, the bankruptcy trustee found that customer funds had been wired to various banks and trading partners of MF Global to meet overdrafts and collateral calls. As of June 2013, the trustee announced that 89% of U.S. futures customers' funds had been located and returned. The trustee anticipated that figure would reach 94% once certain legal agreements were acted upon. However, for futures customers overseas, or who had had accounts set up in which to trade on foreign exchanges, the figure was significantly lower, with only 18% of their missing funds returned as of June 4, 2013, albeit with an ultimate expected return rate of 84%-91%, according to the trustee.
Violation of segregation rules can be subject to civil and criminal penalties. The CFTC launched a civil lawsuit for monetary penalties in June 2013 against the firm and its former CEO, Jon Corzine, and former Assistant Treasurer, Edith O'Brien. Numerous private lawsuits have also been commenced, and some have been settled. However, no criminal charges have been filed.
The MF Global failure raised questions about whether enforcement mechanisms for segregation of futures market customer funds were reliable—particularly in times of unusual stress. It also provided an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory cooperation during a rapid failure of a large, complex financial institution. It prompted a number of policy questions: is the enforcement of segregation requirements for futures customers' accounts sufficient for unusual market conditions, such as a run? Should some type of SIPC-like insurance, such as is offered for customers of securities broker-dealers, be contemplated for futures customers or would costs be too great? The CFTC on November 14, 2012, proposed a rule aimed at increasing disclosure requirements for futures brokers to give customers greater accounting for their funds.
This report provides information about MF Global's failure, the rules for handling of customer funds, the enforcement of those rules, the bankruptcy proceeding, related policy issues and reform proposals to ensure greater protections for futures customers. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22802 | crs_RS22802_0 | Currently U.S. persons are exempt from carrying passports when returning from Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Current U.S. Passport Requirements and Costs2
On January 31, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security again tightened travel regulations with border states by requiring that all U.S. and Canadian citizens, 19 or older, present both a government-issued proof of identity (such as a driver's license) and proof of citizenship (such as a birth certificate) to cross a border by land or sea into the United States. For Americans and Canadians under the age of 18, only proof of citizenship (such as a birth certificate) is necessary. Since January 23, 2007, all people, including children, traveling by air between the United States and Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean have been required to present a passport or other valid travel document to enter the United States. Most Recent Passport Requirement Changes
The Department of State fully implemented the final phase of passport requirements for travelers entering the United States by land and sea on June 1, 2009. U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 16, however, are allowed to present an original or copy of their birth certificate or other proof of citizenship. Groups of U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 19, when traveling in church, school, or social groups, or sports teams, and when entering under adult supervision, also can present birth certificates or other proof of citizenship, rather than a passport. Prior to 2007, standard passport wait times had been four to six weeks, but this lengthened to three or four months that year from the time of application to receipt of the passport. | Prior to 2007, little or no documentation was required to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, or the Caribbean. In December 2004, with the 9/11 Commission recommending tighter borders to help prevent another terrorist attack, Congress passed the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which now requires passports for anyone entering the United States. As of mid-2009, approximately 30% of American citizens hold a passport.
After the January 2007 implementation of phase I of the new passport regulations (requiring passports when entering by air ), the Department of State was deluged with passport applications. The time necessary to get a passport expanded from the typical four to six weeks to several months, ruining many Americans' travel plans.
On January 31, 2008, another change occurred. Government-issued proof of identity and citizenship documents are required to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Caribbean, according to the Department of Homeland Security. People under the age of 18, however, are allowed to present only proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate.
Phase II, implemented on June 1, 2009, adds to the existing requirements that travelers have passports for all land and sea crossings. U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 16, however, are allowed to present an original or copy of their birth certificate or other proof of citizenship. Groups of U.S. or Canadian children under the age of 19, when traveling in church or school groups, social groups, or sports teams, and when entering under adult supervision, also can present birth certificates or other proof of citizenship, rather than a passport. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34193 | crs_RL34193_0 | Introduction
In May of 2013, news broke that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had subpoenaed telephone toll records for numerous telephone lines, including some personal telephone lines, of reporters at the Associated Press (AP). The DOJ had issued these subpoenas and obtained the toll record information prior to notifying the AP The AP and many other news organizations have responded critically, noting that the DOJ's decision not to negotiate with the AP regarding the release of the records deprived AP of the ability to attempt to quash the subpoena in federal court. Some in the media argue this action enabled the DOJ to evade judicial review of its subpoenas. In defending its decision to issue the subpoenas, the DOJ argued that it had complied with its own internal guidelines regarding obtaining information from news media in the course of a criminal investigation, which allowed the agency to circumvent a requirement to negotiate with the affected news media entities if negotiations would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation. When controversies surrounding the government gaining access to reporters' confidential information arise, news media and other journalists often respond by arguing that journalists should receive special protection from government investigation and interference because the First Amendment's protections of a free press are of paramount importance in a free society. The circumstances surrounding the DOJ subpoenas of AP toll records have drawn attention to the issue again in 2013. Current Federal Law and Recent Developments
The Supreme Court has written only one opinion on the subject of journalists' privilege: Branzburg v. Hayes , in which the Court decided three cases. In Branzburg , however, the Court held that the First Amendment did not provide even a qualified privilege for journalists to refuse "to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries." The only situation it mentioned in which the First Amendment would allow a reporter to refuse to testify was in the case of "grand jury investigations ... instituted or conducted other than in good faith.... Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no justification." Powell's opinion leaves it uncertain whether the First Amendment provides a qualified privilege for journalists to refuse to testify before grand juries. Wyoming is the state without either a statutory or common-law privilege. Nonetheless, this incident, not unlike the case of Judith Miller in 2005, appears to have revived the debate over whether Congress should enact a federal statutory shield law for reporters. Congressional Response in the 113th Congress
Those supporting the enactment of a federal shield law argue that the controversy surrounding the subpoena of the AP toll records would have been avoided had there been a federal statute in place. H.R. Under the Senate's version of the Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, like the House version, the privilege would apply in cases arising under federal law in which a "Federal entity" seeks disclosure of "protected information" from a "covered person." | In May of 2013, news broke that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had subpoenaed telephone toll records for numerous telephone lines, including some personal telephone lines, of reporters at the Associated Press (AP). The DOJ had issued these subpoenas and obtained the toll record information prior to notifying the AP The AP and many other news organizations have responded critically, noting that the DOJ's failure to negotiate with the AP regarding the release of the records deprived AP of the ability to attempt to quash the subpoena in federal court. The media argues this action enabled the DOJ to evade judicial review of its subpoenas. In defending its decision to issue the subpoenas, the DOJ argued that it had complied with its own internal guidelines regarding obtaining information from news media in the course of a criminal investigation, which allowed the agency to circumvent a requirement to negotiate with the affected news media entities if negotiations would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation.
When controversies surrounding the government gaining access to reporters' confidential information arise, news media and other journalists often respond by arguing that journalists should receive special protection from government investigation and interference because the First Amendment's protections of a free press are of paramount importance in a free society. The circumstances surrounding the DOJ subpoenas of AP toll records have been no different.
The Supreme Court has only decided one case related to a constitutional privilege allowing journalists to refuse to divulge confidential information to the government. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-680 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not provide even a qualified privilege for journalists to refuse "to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries." The only situation it mentioned in which the First Amendment would allow a reporter to refuse to testify was in the case of harassment or grand jury investigations instituted in bad faith. Nonetheless, a concurrence by Justice Powell that has been followed by a number of federal circuits suggested that there may be a qualified privilege for journalists in grand jury investigations.
Despite the fact that there may be either limited or no constitutional protection for journalists, statutory and common law protections do exist. Though many states do have either judicially created or statutory "shield laws" in place, there is no federal statutory shield law. It has been argued that if there had been a federal shield law in place at the time the controversial AP toll record subpoenas were issued, many of the issues raised by the incident could have been avoided. The Obama Administration announced a renewed interest in enacting a federal statute that would grant a qualified evidentiary privilege to reporters. New versions of the Free Flow of Information Act, which has been debated by a number of Congresses in the past, have already been introduced in the House (H.R. 1962) and Senate (S. 987). This report will provide an overview of the constitutional status of a journalist's privilege under the First Amendment; a description of two recent cases in which the government sought confidential information from the press (the Judith Miller case, and the recent AP case); and an analysis of the current proposals for enacting a federal shield law. |
crs_R43839 | crs_R43839_0 | S tates and localities can have significant interest in the manner and extent to which federal officials enforce provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) regarding the exclusion and removal of unauthorized aliens. In some cases, such states or localities have also sued to compel federal officials to enforce the immigration laws, or to compensate them for costs associated with unauthorized migration. Litigation in the Mid-1990s
In the mid-1990s, six states which were then home to over half the unauthorized aliens in the United States —Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas—each challenged the federal government's "fail[ure] to control illegal immigration." Limitations on standing—or who is a proper party to seek judicial relief from a federal court—were noted in some cases. However, even when standing was assumed, the states' constitutional and statutory claims failed, as discussed below. The states cited a number of provisions in support of these claims, including
Section 103(a)(5) of the INA, which at that time tasked the Attorney General with the "duty to control and guard the boundaries and borders of the United States against the illegal entry of aliens" ; the former Section 1252(a)(2)(A) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code , which called for the Attorney General to take any alien convicted of an aggravated felony into custody upon the alien's release from state custody or supervision; the former Section 1252(c) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code , which established a six-month period following the issuance of a final order of removal for federal officials to effectuate the alien's departure from the United States; the former Section 1252( l ) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code , which directed the Attorney General to begin deportation proceedings for aliens convicted of deportable offenses "as expeditiously as possible after the date of conviction"; Section 276 of the INA, which establishes criminal penalties for "illegal reentry" (i.e., unlawfully re-entering the United States after having been removed); and Section 1365 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code , which provides for the reimbursement of costs incurred by the states for the imprisonment of unauthorized aliens or Cuban nationals who have been convicted of felonies. However, all the states' claims were seen to involve matters that were committed to agency discretion as a matter of law and, thus, not reviewable by the courts. It should also be noted that, in three of the six cases, the appellate court expressly rejected the suggestion that federal officials' alleged failure to enforce the immigration laws could be seen as an "abdication" of their statutory responsibilities. 1070 Litigation
In 2011, over a decade after the mid-1990s litigation, Arizona asserted counterclaims challenging the federal government's alleged failure to enforce the immigration laws in the litigation over Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (commonly known as "S.B. Arizona had adopted S.B. 1070 on the grounds that it was preempted by federal law. The court also viewed the Domestic Violence Clause as implicating nonjusticiable political questions. The reviewing federal district court then found that Arizona's various statutory claims involved actions that were committed to agency discretion by law and, thus, were not subject to review by the courts. Mississippi's Claims in Crane v. Napolitano
One year later, in 2012, Mississippi raised similar claims about federal officials' alleged failure to enforce the immigration laws when it joined a challenge brought by some U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents to the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. United States v. Texas and the Challenge to DAPA and the DACA Expansion
Most recently, in December 2014, over 25 states or state officials filed suit challenging the Obama Administration's announcement that it is expanding the DACA program to cover additional aliens who had been brought to the United States as children, and creating a DACA-like program for unauthorized aliens who are the parents of U.S. citizens or LPRs (commonly known as DAPA). In particular, the states assert that these new programs violate the Take Care Clause and separation of powers principles of the Constitution, federal immigration law, and substantive and procedural requirements of the APA. It also imposed a preliminary nationwide ban on the implementation of these programs after finding that the states are likely to prevail on the merits of their argument that the memorandum establishing the programs constitutes a substantive rule, but was issued without compliance with the notice-and-comment procedures required for such rules under the APA. However, an evenly divided Supreme Court ultimately issued a decision that, consistent with recent practice, affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision without any opinion or indication of the Justices' voting alignment. Fifth Circuit Goes Beyond the District Court in Addressing Substantive Issues
The majority went beyond the district court's ruling, however, in finding that DAPA and the DACA expansion violate the APA substantively, as well as procedurally, because they are "not in accordance with the law" and "in excess of statutory ... authority." | States and localities can have significant interest in the manner and extent to which federal officials enforce provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) regarding the exclusion and removal of unauthorized aliens. Depending upon the jurisdiction's specific concerns, this interest can be expressed in various ways, from the adoption of "sanctuary" policies limiting the jurisdiction's cooperation in federal enforcement efforts to the enactment of measures to deter unauthorized aliens from entering or remaining within the jurisdiction. In some cases, states or localities have also sued to compel federal officials to enforce the INA and other relevant laws.
In the mid-1990s, six states which were then home to over half the unauthorized aliens in the United States—Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Texas—each filed suit alleging that federal officials' failure to check unauthorized migration violated the Guarantee and Invasion Clauses of the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment, and provisions of the INA. Concerns regarding standing—or who is a proper party to seek relief from a federal court—were sometimes noted. However, even when standing was assumed, the constitutional claims were seen to involve nonjusticiable "political questions," or failed on their merits. The states' statutory claims were similarly seen to involve matters committed to agency discretion by law and, thus, not reviewable by the courts. In three cases, the courts also noted that federal officials' alleged failure to control unauthorized migration did not constitute a reviewable "abdication" of their statutory duties.
Over a decade later, in 2011, Arizona asserted counterclaims challenging the federal government's alleged failure to stop unauthorized migration in the litigation over Arizona's S.B. 1070 measure. Although the court presumed that Arizona had standing, it rejected Arizona's claims regarding violations of the Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses, Tenth Amendment, and immigration laws. Some claims were seen as precluded or otherwise settled by the earlier litigation. Others were found to involve nonjusticiable political questions, or otherwise failed. The court also rejected the argument that federal officials had abdicated their statutory duties.
Subsequently, in 2012, Mississippi, along with some U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, challenged the Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative on the grounds that it runs afoul of the Take Care Clause, separation of powers, INA, and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The ICE agents initially prevailed in their claim that DACA is contrary to the INA, although their case was ultimately dismissed on other grounds. However, Mississippi was found to lack standing because it could not show that aliens granted deferred action would have been removed had the Executive not implemented DACA.
Most recently, in December 2014, over 25 states or state officials filed suit challenging the Administration's expansion of DACA and the creation of a DACA-like program for aliens who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents (known as DAPA). The states allege that these programs run afoul of the Take Care Clause and separation of powers principles of the Constitution, the INA, and substantive and procedural requirements of the APA. After finding that the states have standing, and that DAPA and the DACA expansion are judicially reviewable, a federal district court imposed a preliminary nationwide ban on the implementation of these programs in February 2015, on the grounds that the states are likely to prevail in their argument that the programs run afoul of the APA's procedural requirements. Subsequently, in November 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding as to the procedural violation of the APA, and also found for the states on their claim that DAPA and the DACA expansion substantively violate the APA because these programs are "not in accordance with law" and "in excess of statutory ... authority." The Supreme Court granted review, but the Justices ultimately split evenly, four votes to four votes. Consistent with recent practice in cases with such splits, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision without issuing an opinion. |
crs_R43986 | crs_R43986_0 | The Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy, or ARPA-E, was established to "overcome the long-term and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy technologies" ( P.L. 110-69 , §5012). This budget and appropriations tracking report summarizes the Administration's FY2016 budget request for ARPA-E and tracks legislative action on FY2016 appropriations. This table will be updated to include FY2016 Senate-passed amounts, as well as final enacted appropriations, when those numbers become available. ARPA-E: An Overview
Patterned after the widely lauded Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—which played a key role in the development of critical technologies such as satellite navigation and the Internet—ARPA-E was established by the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. FY2016 Budget Request and Appropriations
The Obama Administration has requested $325 million for ARPA-E in FY2016, a $45 million (16%) increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $280 million. As passed by the House on May 1, 2015, the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2028 ) would provide $280 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. 2028 , as passed by the House. The "Statement of Administration Policy" cites insufficient funding for ARPA-E as one of several reasons behind the Administration's opposition. As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 2028 would provide $291 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. Congress has funded ARPA-E at approximately $280 million since FY2012—with the exception of FY2013, when the process commonly known as sequestration (as well as enacted rescissions) reduced the agency's funding level to about $250 million. | The Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy, or ARPA-E, was established within the Department of Energy to "overcome the long-term and high-risk technological barriers in the development of energy technologies" (P.L. 110-69, §5012). Patterned after the widely lauded Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—which played a key role in the development of critical technologies such as satellite navigation and the Internet—ARPA-E has supported more than 400 energy technology research projects since Congress first funded it in FY2009.
This budget and appropriations tracking report describes selected major items from the Administration's FY2016 budget request for ARPA-E and tracks legislative action on FY2016 appropriations to the agency. It also provides selected historical funding data. This report has been updated to include House-passed amounts for FY2016. It will be updated to include FY2016 Senate-passed amounts and final enacted FY2016 appropriations.
Overall, the Obama Administration has requested $325 million for ARPA-E in FY2016, a $45 million (16%) increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $280 million. The House-passed Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2028) would provide $280 million to ARPA-E in FY2016. The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a "Statement of Administration Policy" opposing the House-passed version of H.R. 2028. OMB cited a number of factors in its decision to oppose H.R. 2028 as passed by the House, including insufficient funding levels for ARPA-E. As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 2028 would provide $291 million to ARPA-E in FY2016.
With the exception of FY2013—when ARPA-E was subject to reductions as a result of certain rescissions and under the process commonly known as sequestration—Congress has funded ARPA-E at about $280 million since FY2012. |
crs_RL33226 | crs_RL33226_0 | Overview
Since FY1989, Congress has appropriated just under $271 billion (constant 2008 dollars) for disaster assistance in 34 appropriations measures, primarily supplemental appropriations acts, after significant catastrophes occurred in the United States. The median annual funding during the 20-year period FY1989 through the present was $2.7 billion; the mean annual funding was $12 billion ($241 billion/20)—both in current dollars. In FY2001 and FY2002, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance exceeded $26 billion, most of which went toward recovery following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In FY2005 and FY2006, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck in 2005, supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance have reached an all-time high. 110-116 , signed into law on November 13, 2007, provided a total of $6.355 billion for continued recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and for other declared major disasters or emergencies. The majority of the funding (just over $8.8 billion) in the law is for disasters occurring in 2008 which included Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, wildfires, and flooding. Other funding in the law includes $135 million for wildfire suppression, and a $100 million direct appropriation for the American Red Cross for reimbursement of disaster relief and recovery expenditures associated with emergencies and disasters that have also taken place in 2008. This report provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since 1989 after significant catastrophes. Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma
In response to the widespread destruction caused by three catastrophic hurricanes at the end of the summer of 2005, the 109 th Congress enacted four emergency supplemental appropriations bills. After Hurricanes Rita and Wilma struck, the 109 th Congress enacted two other supplementals; the costs of both were offset by rescissions. 109-148 ) rescinded roughly $34 billion in funds previously appropriated (almost 70% of which was taken from funds previously appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security) and appropriated $29 billion to other accounts primarily to pay for the restoration of federal facilities damaged by the hurricanes. The sixth supplemental measure enacted as part of P.L. Table 2 provides information on the appropriations made in the six supplementals enacted after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Another supplemental, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 was passed three months later on September 30, 2008 ( P.L. 110-329 ). The amount provided in the statute for disaster relief as a result of the 2005 hurricane season is roughly $1.3 billion. | This report provides summary information on emergency supplemental appropriations enacted after major disasters since 1989. During the 20-year span from FY1989 through the present, Congress appropriated almost $271 billion in constant 2008 dollars. Most of the appropriations were preceded by a presidential request for supplemental funding.
In 2008 a number of major natural disasters took place including Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, the California wildfires, and the Midwest floods. To date however, the most costly disasters occurred in the summer of 2005 when Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma made landfall in Gulf Coast states. Since Hurricane Katrina struck in August of 2005, more than $151 billion has been appropriated for supplemental disaster funding, most of it needed for the recovery from the 2005 hurricanes. Portions of the appropriations were offset by rescinding more than $34 billion in previously appropriated funds, explained in the section titled "Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma."
Prior to FY2005 and the hurricanes, only the terrorist attacks of 2001 led to supplemental appropriations legislation that exceeded $20 billion. Congress appropriated a total of more than $26 billion for disaster assistance in response to the attacks. Other supplemental appropriations legislation enacted after catastrophic disasters (or several significant disasters that occurred in short time intervals) range from almost $366 million in FY2001 before the terrorist attacks (largely due to the Nisqually earthquake in the summer of 2001) to more than $12 billion for the Midwest floods of 1993 and the Northridge earthquake of 1994.
At times, the supplementals enacted by Congress have included only disaster funding. The supplementals enacted after Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, in addition to the first two enacted after Hurricane Katrina, serve as examples. On other occasions, however, disaster funding has been part of larger pieces of legislation that appropriated funds for purposes other than disaster assistance.
The most recent supplemental disaster assistance appropriation occurred on September 30, 2008 when the President signed into law H.R. 2638, the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. The statute, P.L. 110-329, provides $21.3 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for relief and recovery from hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42879 | crs_R42879_0 | Introduction
The useful properties of thousands of chemicals provide a wide range of benefits to American consumers and bolster the U.S. economy. These benefits occasionally come with a price, however, as exposure to certain substances, such as lead, pesticides, or asbestos, may lead to adverse effects on human health or the environment. Concerns about the effects of chemicals, as well as regulation of chemicals by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), continue to emerge, prompting additional congressional consideration. This report briefly describes selected legislative issues related to chemical production, processing, distribution, and use (including past use)—activities that generally are regulated under chemical laws implemented by EPA. For example,
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) directs EPA to regulate industrial chemical processes and interstate commerce in bulk chemicals; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) mandates regulation of the sale and use of chemicals intended to control pests in agriculture and other applications; and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) addresses regulation of hazardous chemicals in storage or routinely or accidentally released to the environment. Key issues include
the adequacy of TSCA for regulating potentially hazardous chemicals; whether to expand information disclosure requirements under various laws; how to safeguard the integrity of scientific advice; overlapping statutory requirements for control of pesticides applied to surface water; whether to provide authority to implement international treaties; and regulation of contractors working in older homes that contain lead-based paint. Other critics of TSCA have proposed amending the statute to provide EPA with more specific authority to manage chemical risks. Still others would prefer a very targeted approach to TSCA reform, which would leave most of the statute intact. In the 113 th Congress, H.R. 1921 , the FRAC Act, and Section 301 of S. 332 would require a person conducting hydraulic fracturing operations to disclose to the state (or to the EPA Administrator if he or she has primary enforcement responsibility in such state) the chemicals intended for use in underground injections before the commencement of such operations and the chemicals actually used after the end of such operations, and would require a state or the Administrator to make such disclosure available to the public. H.R. The proposed amendment would require that "the scientific and technical points of view represented on and the functions to be performed by the Board are fairly balanced among the members of the Board." Many criticize IRIS, however, for being scientifically out of date and incomplete. 112-74 , which directed EPA to "incorporate, as appropriate" the NRC recommendations into the IRIS risk assessment process. In addition, EPA was required to include documentation describing how those recommendations were addressed in draft assessments released in FY2012, and to contract with the National Academies to conduct up to three reviews of IRIS assessments that EPA proposed to make final, including an assessment of inorganic arsenic. Overlapping Authorities for Pesticide Discharges to Water
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) requires EPA to regulate the sale and use of pesticides in the United States through registration and labeling and to restrict usage of pesticides as necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on people and the environment, taking into account the costs and benefits of various pesticide uses. The 113 th Congress may continue to examine apparent overlapping jurisdiction between provisions of FIFRA and the Clean Water Act (CWA). In spite of EPA's general permit in response to the 2009 court ruling, Congress has considered legislation to affirm that a CWA permit is not required for use of FIFRA-approved pesticides. In the 112 th Congress, the House passed H.R. The Senate Agriculture Committee approved the bill without amendment in June 2011. Language identical to H.R. 872 is included in the 2013 farm bill legislation ( H.R. 1947 ) approved by the House Agriculture Committee. 935 , S. 175 , and S. 802 ). International Treaties
Some older pesticides are persistent organic pollutants (POPs) that are global contaminants of concern to many nations. S. 696 in the 113 th Congress would add a new section to TSCA authorizing actions that would allow U.S. implementation of the three international agreements. A bill introduced in the 113 th Congress, H.R. 1282 , would extend the categories of eligible grant recipients to include families living in all housing, including efficiency apartments, and to streamline paperwork requirements, making it easier to apply for a grant. | The useful properties of chemicals provide many benefits to consumers and bolster the U.S. economy, but these benefits may come with a price, as exposure to certain chemicals can lead to adverse effects on human health or the environment. This report briefly describes selected issues related to regulation of chemicals in commerce by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that are of potential interest to the 113th Congress.
Concerns about the complexity, cost, and delays in regulating chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) have prompted proposals (such as S. 1009 in the 113th Congress) to amend the 1976 statute. Some would provide EPA with specific authority and mandates to ensure adequate management of chemical risks. Others would amend particular provisions, leaving most of the law intact. TSCA reform is a high priority for some in the 113th Congress.
Another issue is whether to expand or restrict EPA's authority to require disclosure of chemical information under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) or TSCA. Bills in the 113th Congress, H.R. 1921, the FRAC Act, and Section 301 of S. 332 would require oil and gas producers to disclose identities of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing. Other administrative and legislative initiatives also would mandate more public disclosure.
The integrity of scientific advice provided to EPA may be another salient issue. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the composition of EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB). H.R. 1422 would require a rebalancing of "the scientific and technical points of view represented." EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) has been criticized by some for being out of date and incomplete, while the process of conducting chemical risk assessments is said to be slow. The National Research Council (NRC) made recommendations to improve IRIS reports in 2011, and Congress directed EPA to "incorporate, as appropriate," NRC recommendations and to contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct several reviews of IRIS assessments, including one for inorganic arsenic.
Pesticides issues generally are resolved under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which directs EPA to regulate the sale and use of pesticides through registration of products. The 112th Congress was interested in apparent overlap between FIFRA and the Clean Water Act (CWA). At issue is whether FIFRA is sufficient alone to ensure protection of water quality or whether certain pesticide applications require a CWA permit. In response to a court order, EPA issued a general permit requiring applicators to minimize pesticide discharges to waters. House-passed H.R. 872 in the 112th Congress would have exempted aerial pesticide application activities from water permit requirements. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry approved the bill in June 2011. Language identical to H.R. 872 is included in the 2013 farm bill legislation (H.R. 1947) approved by the House Agriculture Committee, as well as in H.R. 935, S. 175, and S. 802.
Another issue of potential interest is whether to amend both TSCA and FIFRA to accommodate certain international agreements intended to reduce production and use of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) globally. In the 113th Congress, S. 696 would add a new section to TSCA, authorizing actions allowing U.S. implementation of the three international agreements.
Finally, as it considers appropriations, Congress may actively consider what amount of federal grant money should be made available to address lead-based paint hazards in older homes. H.R. 1282 would streamline paperwork requirements, making it easier for people to apply for a grant. |
crs_R44016 | crs_R44016_0 | Since the open skies initiative was unveiled in 1992, the United States has reached 114 open skies agreements governing international air passenger and air freight services. There are currently two debates related to open skies agreements. In one case, representatives of three major U.S. airlines—American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines—and airline labor unions allege that three carriers based in the Persian Gulf region have received subsidies and government support that contravene Article 11 of the U.S.-United Arab Emirates (UAE) open skies agreement and identical language in the U.S.-Qatar agreement. Three fast-growing air carriers in the Persian Gulf region are involved in the controversy: Emirates Airline, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways. They have asked the Administration to freeze the number of flights Persian Gulf carriers operate to the United States and to renegotiate the open skies accords with Qatar and the UAE, or even annul the agreements if no terms can be reached within a fair-competition framework. A similar debate was initiated in Europe in late 2014 by Lufthansa Group and Air France-KLM, and by labor groups such as the European Cockpit Association (ECA). On December 3, 2013, Norwegian Air Shuttle submitted an application for NAI, which is registered in Ireland, to operate transatlantic flights to U.S. destinations. Opponents, including labor groups, some airlines, and many Members of Congress, allege that NAI violates Article 17 bis of the U.S.-EU open skies agreement, which states that "opportunities created by the Agreement are not intended to undermine labour standards.... " They contend that NAI's practices, which include hiring crew in Asia via employment agencies and using an Irish Air Operator's Certificate instead of a Norwegian one, would create precedent for using low-wage crew members from third countries aboard flights to the United States and violate the U.S.-EU open skies agreement. On the other side of the argument, several former U.S. secretaries of transportation, as well as EU officials and the Irish Aviation Authority, say the application is valid under the terms of the U.S.-EU open skies agreement and would encourage competition and bring lower fares. 113-235 ), Congress adopted two provisions related to the NAI issue. | "Open skies" agreements are a form of international civil air service agreement that facilitates international aviation in a deregulated environment. They eliminate government involvement in airline decisionmaking about international routes, capacity, and prices. Since 1992, the United States has reached 114 open skies agreements governing international air passenger and air freight services.
There are two ongoing controversies that are related to open skies agreements. One controversy involves some U.S. network airlines' and labor unions' opposition to the expansion of three fast-growing airlines based in the Persian Gulf region—Emirates Airline, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways. The U.S. carriers allege the subsidies and support that these three Persian Gulf carriers purportedly receive from their government owners contravene fair competitive practices requirements of their home countries' open skies agreements with the United States. The U.S. carriers have urged the Administration to freeze the number of flights Gulf carriers operate to the United States and to renegotiate the open skies accords with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Similar protests have occurred in Europe, initiated by Lufthansa Group and Air France-KLM, and organized labor.
The other controversy concerns Norwegian Air International (NAI), an airline that is registered in Ireland and plans to operate transatlantic flights to U.S. destinations. NAI's application has met strong opposition from labor groups and some airlines that allege that NAI violates a provision of the U.S.-EU open skies agreement that governs labor standards. They contend that NAI's plan would create precedent for using low-wage crew members from third countries aboard flights to the United States. However, several former U.S. secretaries of transportation and Irish and European Union (EU) officials, as well as some U.S. consumer advocates and travel industry groups, maintain that the NAI application is valid under the terms of the open skies agreement and would encourage competition and bring lower fares.
This report addresses some of the most frequently asked questions related to these two on-going controversies. |
crs_R40054 | crs_R40054_0 | U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon
The United States and Lebanon have historically enjoyed a good relationship due in part to cultural and religious ties; the democratic character of the state; a large Lebanese American community in the United States; and the pro-western orientation of Lebanon, particularly during the Cold War. Current U.S. policy toward Lebanon centers on containing Iran's sphere of influence while maintaining security and stability in the Levant. As regional actors like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria compete for influence in the region, Lebanon has become the staging ground for a proxy war that exacerbates historic sectarian tensions and holds hostage the functions of state institutions. Large-scale fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in mid-2006 complicated U.S. policy toward Lebanon. Hezbollah has maintained its role in the government and continued to expand its influence in Lebanese politics. Recent U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
In recent years, the United States has increased its economic and military assistance to Lebanon. Current Issues in U.S.-Lebanon Relations
Hezbollah7
Syrian and Iranian backing of Hezbollah, an organization that has committed terrorist acts against U.S. personnel and facilities and has sworn to eliminate Israel, is perhaps the greatest obstacle to U.S. efforts to bolster the pro-Western forces in Lebanon. For additional information, see " Security Assistance ," below. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
The United States has long provided foreign assistance to Lebanon, but following the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a significant increase in foreign assistance. Since then, U.S. assistance has been designed to strengthen the institutions of the state to implement UNSCR 1701 and to create alternatives to extremism, reduce the influence and appeal of Hezbollah and other extremist groups and create the political space necessary to allow the government to tackle the range of challenges it faces—from improving fiscal responsibility and environmental resource management to securing its borders and extending the control of the legitimate security forces over the entire territory of the state. The Lebanese government operates under a confessional system and government positions are distributed by religion. Syrian and Israeli Incursions
Both Syria and Israel sent troops into Lebanon during the civil war. Parliamentary Elections of 2005
As Syrian troops departed from Lebanon under U.S. and international pressure, Lebanon prepared to hold parliamentary elections without overt Syrian interference for the first time since 1972. For more information, see " Special Tribunal for Lebanon ," above. On November 9, 2009, minister-designate Saad Hariri announced that consensus had been reached and that a cabinet had been formed. | Lebanon is a religiously diverse country transitioning toward independence and democratic consolidation after a ruinous civil war and the subsequent Syrian and Israeli occupations. The United States and Lebanon have historically enjoyed a good relationship due in part to cultural and religious ties; the democratic character of the state; a large Lebanese American community in the United States; and the pro-western orientation of Lebanon, particularly during the Cold War. Current policy priorities of the United States include strengthening the weak democratic institutions of the state, limiting the influence of Iran, Syria, and others in Lebanon's political process, and countering threats from Hezbollah and other militant groups in Lebanon.
Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a significant increase in U.S. assistance to Lebanon. Since 2006, U.S. assistance to Lebanon has topped $1 billion total over three years, including for the first time U.S. security assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) of Lebanon.
Several key issues in U.S.-Lebanon relations could potentially affect future U.S. assistance to Lebanon. The scope and influence of foreign actors, primarily Syria and Iran; unresolved territorial disputes; concerns about extremist groups operating in Lebanon; and potential indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are among the challenges facing the Lebanese government and U.S. objectives in Lebanon.
On November 9, 2009, five months after the parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Hariri announced that consensus had been reached and a cabinet had been formed. Since then, Hariri has faced the challenging task of governing in an environment where sectarian tensions, political jockeying, and external actors penetrate deeply and often paralyze the day-to-day functions of government. The United States has thrown its support behind the Hariri government in an effort to build state institutions in an attempt to counter those destabilizing forces.
Current U.S. policy toward Lebanon centers on containing Iran's sphere of influence while maintaining security and stability in the Levant. As regional actors like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria continue to compete for influence in the region, Lebanon has become the staging ground for a proxy war that exacerbates historic sectarian tensions and holds hostage the functions of state institutions.
This report provides an overview of Lebanese politics, recent events in Lebanon, and current issues in U.S.-Lebanon relations. For additional information, see CRS Report R40485, U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31309 | crs_RL31309_0 | The President signed it intolaw February 20, 2003 -- 5 months into the budget year. The consolidated funding package included a 0.65%across-the-board rescission. Although the House never passed a CJS appropriation forFY2003, on January 8th Congressman Frank Wolf, Chairmanof the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, introduced H.R. 108-7 ) on February 20, 2003, it contains $44,773.7 million for Commerce, Justice, State,Judiciary and Related Agencies. The total CJS Senate level amounted to $44,939.6 million. 247 ) set total CJS appropriations at $44,352.9 million. Congress enacted its FY2002 CJS appropriation( P.L. As seen in the table below, funding increased, in current dollars, for the Department of Justice by$2,658 million (12.6%); for the Department ofCommerce by $651 million (12.6%); for the Judiciary by $465 million (10.9%); and for the Department of Stateby $1,049 million (15.9%). FY2003 Appropriation
President Bush's FY2003 budget request for new budget authority totaled $44,019 million for Commerce, Justice, State, Judiciary, and Related Agency mandatoryand discretionary spending, slightly above the FY2002 enacted level including the enacted supplementals. Improved information/communication technology. The Judiciary:
Whether to increase the hourly rate of pay to court-appointed "panel attorneys" representing indigent defendants in federal criminalcases. Legislative Status
On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted the FY2003 budget request for appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciaryand related agencies. No other congressional action occurred on the CJSappropriation during the 107th Congress. In the108th Congress, the Senate passed an omnibus budget package ( H.J.Res. Table 3. Department of Justice Accounts. The omnibusappropriations bill provided a total of $65.6 million, which was $5.3 million below the President's request, but $3million more than the FY2002 amount. The Conference trimmed thisamount to $67.7 million. The Senate recommended $100.2 million, a $3.1 million reduction from the President's FY2003 request. 2 (amended), its version of FY2003 CJS Appropriations. of Commerce. The FY2003 appropriations bill ( H.Rept. Court Security. (25)
Earlier, in July 2002, the Senate Appropriations Committee had recommended, and provided $8 million in funding for, a 4.1% cost-of-living increase in thesalaries of lower federal court judges and Supreme Court justices ( S. 2778 , Sec. Introduced, and referred to Judiciary Committee, January 23, 2001. FY2003 Funding Issues
The Administration's FY2003 budget request for the Department of State and international broadcasting totaled $8.1 billion, 3.5% above the FY2002 enactedlevel of $7.9 billion ($8.16 billion including supplementals). The enacted levels were those of the House andthe Administration. Congress passed theHouse level in the omnibus budget bill. The Senate level was enacted by Congress. Department of State and International Broadcasting (millions of dollars)
a Figures do not include across-the-board rescissions. Committeereported bill to the Senate ( S.Rept. 107-218 ). Legislationpassed by the 107th Congress ( H.R. 107-204 )authorized FY2003 appropriations of $776.0 million. | The Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJS) appropriations for FY2003 were completed by Congress andsigned ( P.L. 108-7 ) by the President on February 20, 2003, five months into the budget year. The enacted CJSappropriation provides $44,773.7 million in newbudget authority (before applying an across-the-board rescission of 0.65%).
President Bush sent the FY2003 budget request to Congress on February 4, 2002 seeking a total budget authority level for CJS appropriations of $44,019.0 million-- a mandatory level of $649.3 million and a discretionary level of $43,369.7 million. The major components ofthe Administration's FY2003 CJS requestincluded: Department of Justice -- $22,800.3 million; Department of Commerce -- $5,638.5 million; the Judiciary-- $5,241.6 million; and Department of State-- $8,139.2 million. The 107th Congress Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its CJSappropriations bill ( S. 2778 ; S.Rept. 107-218 ) July24, 2002. No House CJS bill was introduced by the 107th Congress. Congress passed a series ofcontinuing resolutions keeping the government running throughFebruary 20, 2003.
In the 108th Congress, the Senate passed an omnibus budget bill ( H.J.Res. 2 ) on January 23, 2003. It set CJS totals at $44,939.6 million. Congressman Frank Wolf, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State,introduced a CJS bill ( H.R. 247 ) onJanuary 8, 2003, to provide a House version of funding for the conference. No other action occurred on that bill. Its CJS totals were $44,352.9 million. Following are some key CJS issues for the FY2003 budget:
Department of Justice. The FY2003 request was $22.8 billion, nearly $1 million below the FY2002 enacted level. The total enacted level, before anacross-the-board rescission, is $23,988.3 million.
Department of Commerce. The FY2003 request was $5,638.5 million, almost 3% below the FY2002 funding level. The decline was largely due to reducedfunding for science and technology. The enacted level, before rescissions, is $5,774.8 million.
The Judiciary . The FY2003 request emphasized court security, an increase in hourly pay to court-appointed attorneys representing indigent defendants in federalcriminal cases, and cost-of-living salary increases for judges and justices.
Department of State and broadcasting . The FY2003 request was more than $8,139.2 million, similar to the FY2002 enacted level, including supplementals. TheDepartment stressed its three top priorities from the previous year: additional hiring; embassy security; andtechnology improvements worldwide. The enactedFY2003 level is $7,900.7 million, before applying the rescissions. |
crs_RL34351 | crs_RL34351_0 | On December 17, 2007, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) announced the establishment of a single panel to hear both cases against U.S. farm programs. Then, in late April 2008, Brazil and Canada informally agreed to postpone proceeding with their case pending the U.S. offer to substantially cut domestic agricultural subsidies as part of the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations. Should a panel be formed, it would then have six months to rule on this case. Finally, the report briefly discusses the implications of the case and the potential role of Congress. In January 2007, Canada requested consultations with the United States to discuss three specific charges against U.S. farm programs: (1) U.S. farm support resulted in serious prejudice against Canadian corn producers, (2) U.S. domestic support exceeded its WTO commitments; and (3) U.S. export credit guarantee programs contained implicit WTO-illegal subsidies. Canada's first allegation in its WTO case built upon previous trade complaints against the United States initiated by Canadian corn producers starting in 2005, while the latter two allegations were based on a previous WTO ruling in a case (WTO case DS267) brought by Brazil against the U.S. cotton program. However, in June 2007, Canada requested that the establishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel to hear its case against U.S. farm programs be included on the agenda of the next meeting of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Origins of Brazil's WTO Case
Brazil—which has already won a series of WTO dispute settlement rulings against U.S. cotton programs —introduced its new challenge against U.S. farm programs on July 11, 2007, when it requested consultations with the United States to discuss the same two charges against U.S. farm programs as in Canada's case (DS357). In their requests, Brazil and Canada asked for a single panel to be established to consider both cases jointly. The postponement was thought to be provisional and based on success in achieving further disciplines on domestic support measures in the current Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations. It is not clear how long the postponement will persist. If resumed, the first order of business will be the formation of a panel. The claim that the United States has exceeded its total spending limits hinges largely on a previous ruling from the U.S.-Brazil cotton case in which a WTO panel found that U.S. payments made under the Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) and Direct Payment (DP) programs do not qualify for the WTO's green box exemption category because of their prohibition on planting fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on covered program acreage. Furthermore, Canada and Brazil argue that several other U.S. program payments were incorrectly notified as exempt from the U.S. AMS limit. Canada and Brazil charge that, when PFC, DP, and CCP payments for all covered crops—wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland cotton, rice, soybeans, and other oilseeds—as well as the additional program outlays that were excluded from U.S. notifications are included in the U.S.'s amber box, then the total outlays would exceed the spending commitment in each of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005. Export Credit Guarantees Are WTO-Illegal Export Subsidies
Canada and Brazil argue that the U.S. export credit guarantee program operates as a WTO-illegal export subsidy. In the U.S.-Brazil cotton case (DS267), a WTO panel found that U.S. export credit guarantees effectively function as export subsidies because the financial benefits returned by these programs failed to cover their long-run operating costs. Should any eventual changes in U.S. farm policy be needed to comply with a WTO ruling, Congress likely would be called upon to address this issue (including adjustment, if not full removal, of the planting restriction on base acres receiving direct payments). | In 2007, Brazil and Canada, independently of each other, requested consultations with the United States under the auspices of the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Dispute Settlement process concerning similar grievances regarding U.S. domestic agricultural support programs and the U.S. export credit guarantee program. After consultations failed to resolve their concerns, both countries (again acting independently) requested the establishment of a WTO panel to rule on their complaints. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, on December 17, 2007, established a single panel to consider both cases. In late April 2008, Brazil and Canada informally agreed to postpone proceeding with their joint World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement case challenging certain U.S. agricultural subsidies. At the time of the postponement, the three parties involved in the dispute had been unable to agree on panel membership.
The postponement was thought to be provisional based on success in achieving further disciplines on domestic support in the current Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations. However, the Doha Round negotiations failed to complete an agreement in 2009. As of early 2010 there are no prospects for revival of Doha Round negotiations. Nor have Brazil and Canada given any indication that they will revive their pursuit of their joint case. It is not clear how long the postponement will persist. If resumed, the first order of business will be the formation of a panel.
The joint case combines two separate but similar cases: DS357, brought by Canada, and DS365, brought by Brazil. Both cases make two charges against U.S. farm programs—first, that the United States has exceeded its annual WTO commitment levels for total aggregate measurement of support (AMS) for agriculture in each of the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005, and second, that the U.S. export credit guarantee program for agricultural commodities operates as a WTO-illegal export subsidy. Both charges stem, in large part, from a previous negative ruling against U.S. farm programs in a case (DS267) brought by Brazil against the U.S. cotton program. In that case, a WTO panel ruled (the ruling subsequently was upheld by a WTO Appellate Body), first, that direct payments made under U.S. farm programs do not qualify for green box exemption status because of a restriction prohibiting the planting of fruits, vegetables, or wild rice on payment acres; and second, that the U.S. export credit guarantee program operates as a prohibited export subsidy program because the financial benefits returned by these programs failed to cover their long-run operating costs. As a result of the ruling, U.S. export credit guarantees became subject to previously scheduled export subsidy commitments. For more information, see CRS Report RL32571, Brazil's WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program, by [author name scrubbed].
Canada and Brazil claim that, since they fail to qualify for inclusion in the green box, U.S. direct payments should be added to its AMS when calculating total domestic support. In addition, they also charge that the United States has improperly notified several of its farm support programs as exempt from the AMS limit, while several other programs were improperly excluded from U.S. notifications. Canada and Brazil claim that when all of the outlays from these allegedly misnotified programs are included, then the U.S. AMS total exceeds its WTO commitment level.
Should a panel be formed and eventually rule on this case, any changes in U.S. farm policy needed to comply with a WTO ruling against the United States would likely involve action by Congress to produce new legislation.This report provides background and details, as well as the current status of the two WTO dispute settlement cases. In addition, it discusses the role of Congress in responding to developments. |
crs_R42787 | crs_R42787_0 | Among the many policy responses, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) established the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) on October 14, 2008, to strengthen confidence and to encourage liquidity in the banking system. TLGP had two parts: a Debt Guarantee Program (DGP) and a Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) program. The TAG program currently provides unlimited deposit insurance for $1.4 trillion in noninterest-bearing transaction accounts (NIBTAs). NIBTAs are frequently used by businesses and local governments as a cash management tool, often for payroll transactions, but any depositor whose account meets the eligibility criteria receives unlimited deposit insurance coverage. In spite of a loss of confidence in other parts of the financial system, the insured banking sector saw few bank runs during the financial panic. The establishment of TAG, in addition to the existing deposit insurance and other measures taken by regulators, may have bolstered depositors' confidence in banks as reliable counterparties. Deposit insurance can potentially create moral hazard by neutralizing market mechanisms that penalize the banking system for taking on additional risk. The TAG program established by the FDIC expired on December 31, 2010, and was replaced on the same day by the TAG program as established by Section 343 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. On December 31, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act's change to the definition of insured deposit became effective; all eligible NIBTAs were covered, increasing the amount of deposits insured by TAG to approximately $1.4 trillion (on December 31, 2010, there was a one-day overlap of the original FDIC TAG program and the Dodd-Frank TAG program, as illustrated below in Figure 2 ). The Dodd-Frank Act's changes to the definition of insured deposits are temporary and due to expire on January 1, 2013; the unlimited deposit insurance for NIBTAs expires on that date and returns to the FDIC's $250,000 standard maximum deposit insurance amount. Though the FDIC established TAG in 2008, changes to the FDIC's authority made by the Dodd-Frank Act may prevent the FDIC from having the option of extending TAG. An extension of TAG, therefore, may require congressional action. On November 26, 2012, Senator Harry Reid introduced S. 3637 , a bill to temporarily extend the TAG program for two years. If TAG expires, the options available to depositors can be simplified to two general choices: (1) depositors could leave some or all of their money in the traditional, insured banking sector or (2) they could move some or all of their money out of the traditional banking sector. Uninsured Deposits at Safer or Larger, More Interconnected Banks
Some depositors may attempt to recapture the safety they would lose if TAG expires by shifting their deposits to safer banks, which for some may mean to one of the largest or most interconnected banks. The expiration of TAG may increase the concentration of deposits in the largest banks. As shown in Figure 4 , money market funds are the second-most popular individual form of short-term investment according to a survey of financial professionals and will be the focus of this section. Potential Impacts If TAG Is Extended
Some have raised concerns about what effect an extension of TAG would have on the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). Second, bank regulators examine banks and attempt to prevent them from acting in a way that could put insured deposits at risk. | The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) initial Transaction Account Guarantee (TAG) program provided unlimited deposit insurance for noninterest-bearing transaction accounts (NIBTAs). A NIBTA is an account in which interest is neither accrued nor paid and the depositor is permitted to make withdrawals at will. NIBTAs are frequently used by businesses, local governments, and other entities as a cash management tool, often for payroll transactions. In spite of a loss of confidence in other parts of the financial system, the insured banking sector saw few bank runs during the financial crisis. The establishment of TAG in addition to the existing deposit insurance may have helped bolster depositors' confidence in banks as reliable counterparties and prevented them from suddenly withdrawing their deposits.
The second TAG program, which was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), was a temporary extension of the original program with some changes. This TAG program is set to expire on December 31, 2012. If the program expires, the $1.4 trillion currently insured by TAG in NIBTAs would no longer have unlimited deposit insurance but would have the $250,000 standard maximum deposit insurance amount. Changes to the FDIC's authority made by the Dodd-Frank Act make it unlikely that the FDIC could act to extend the program under its own authority. An extension may require congressional action.
Opinions are divided on the merits of extending the program. Underlying the divergent policy views are contrasting opinions about the state of the economic recovery and the role of the government in guaranteeing bank liabilities and in determining the size of the traditional banking system.
If the TAG program expires, depositors could keep their deposits in the traditional banking system, or they may decide to transfer some or all of their deposits to nonbank investment options. TAG deposits that remain in the banking system may migrate to the largest or most interconnected banks if large depositors view these as safer, or TAG deposits could move away from the largest banks in response to changes made by the Dodd-Frank Act. TAG deposits that go to nonbanks may flow to money market funds, which are often cited as one of the most popular short-term investment options. A decrease in deposits could affect the liquidity position of a given bank—the ability of the bank to meet its liabilities—but the overall liquidity of the banking system has increased since 2008.
If the TAG program is extended, the resulting risk exposure could put additional strain on the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund. In addition, a TAG extension could increase moral hazard by neutralizing market mechanisms that penalize the banking system for taking on additional risk. A TAG extension could take multiple forms, ranging from a permanent extension to a temporary, voluntary extension with a short phase-out period.
On November 26, 2012, Senator Harry Reid introduced S. 3637, a bill to temporarily extend the TAG program for two years. |
crs_RL33189 | crs_RL33189_0 | Analysis suggests that splitting the Ninth Circuit would have different effects on each of these six areas, as is summarized at the end of this report. Splitting the Ninth Circuit: Recent Legislative Proposals
The debate over whether to split the current Ninth Circuit into two or more circuits has been before Congress for decades. Late in 2005, the Federal Judgeship and Administrative Efficiency Act of 2005 ( H.R. During conference negotiations, language splitting the Ninth Circuit into proposed new Ninth and Twelfth Circuits was dropped from the budget reconciliation bill. In the Senate, three bills ( S. 1296 , S. 1301 , and S. 1845 ) proposing to split the Ninth Circuit were the subject of an October 2005 Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts hearing. Most recently in the House, on February 8, 2006, H.R. 4093 was reported by the Judiciary Committee and placed on the Union Calendar. H.R. Splitting the Ninth Circuit: Current Debates and Analysis
The debate over splitting the Ninth Circuit generally focuses on six areas: (1) geography and population, (2) judgeships and caseloads, (3) how quickly the circuit disposes of cases, (4) cost of splitting the circuit, (5) en banc procedures, and (6) the circuit's rulings. Because there is no universally accepted definition of "efficiency" in the current debate over splitting the Ninth Circuit, this report discusses various Ninth Circuit outputs, such as caseloads and how quickly the circuit disposes of cases, but does not address the Ninth Circuit's efficiency per se. Estimated Caseloads Among Bills Introduced During the 109th Congress
As Figure 6 shows, the seven bills introduced in the 109 th Congress to split the Ninth Circuit would produce somewhat different caseload results, both compared with caseloads for the current Ninth Circuit, and for a new Ninth Circuit compared with proposed Twelfth or Thirteenth Circuits. Five of the bills produce a new Ninth Circuit, for the year ending June 30, 2005, that is each somewhat higher (based on authorized judgeships) than the caseload of the current Ninth Circuit during the same period. Opponents of a split argue that the current Ninth Circuit functions well given its heavy caseload, and that its judges and large, experienced staff are essential in doing so. (By contrast, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is supporting S. 1845 , which would split the circuit.) Judicial Conference "agreed not to take a position" on bills proposing to split the Ninth, but also stated that "consideration of splitting the Ninth Circuit should be independently based on the circuit split issue alone and not driven by possible linkage of that issue to a judgeship bill," an apparent reference to the judgeship provisions contained in H.R. 4093 . Analysis of the latest available estimates (for the year ending June 30, 2005) suggests that under six of seven bills introduced during the 109 th Congress, caseloads (i.e., filed appeals per authorized judgeship) in proposed Twelfth or Thirteenth Circuits would have been lower than caseloads in a new Ninth Circuit (as shown in Figure 6 ), although two bills ( H.R. One bill ( H.R. 3125 ) would have produced a higher estimated caseload in a Twelfth Circuit than in a new Ninth Circuit. Supporters of a split reject that argument, saying that their efforts to split the circuit are based on administrative concerns. 4241 from H.R. The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on S. 1845 on September 20, 2006. | Proposals to split the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have been before Congress for decades. Proponents of a split generally argue that the current Ninth Circuit is overburdened, and that creating two or more new circuits with reduced geography, population, and caseloads would improve judicial administration. Opponents of a split reject those claims, saying that the current Ninth Circuit functions well and that the court is a model of innovation. Opponents of a split also suggest that efforts to divide the circuit represent an attack on judicial independence, a claim supporters of a split deny.
In November 2005, the House of Representatives passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( H.R. 4241 ), which, among many other provisions, contained language splitting the current Ninth Circuit into a new Ninth Circuit and a Twelfth Circuit. During December 2005 House-Senate conference negotiations, language splitting the Ninth Circuit was dropped from the budget reconciliation package. Seven bills proposing to split the Ninth Circuit ( H.R. 211 , H.R. 212 , H.R. 3125 , H.R. 4093 , S. 1296 , S. 1301 , and S. 1845 ) remained under consideration. Most recently in the House, on February 8, 2006, H.R. 4093 was reported by the Judiciary Committee and placed on the Union Calendar. On the Senate side, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing on S. 1845 on September 20, 2006.
This report provides information and analysis on the debate concerning proposals to split the Ninth Circuit. The debate over splitting the Ninth Circuit generally focuses on six areas: (1) geography and population, (2) judgeships and caseloads, (3) how quickly the circuit disposes of cases, (4) cost of splitting the circuit, (5) en banc procedures, and (6) the circuit's rulings. Splitting the Ninth Circuit would have different effects in each of these six areas.
Caseload is particularly prominent in the debate over splitting the Ninth Circuit. Proponents of a split suggest that reduced caseloads would improve judicial administration. Opponents suggest that if a split occurred, judges in a new Ninth Circuit would have higher caseloads than their counterparts in proposed Twelfth or Thirteenth Circuits. Analysis of the most recently available estimates from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts suggests that if the current Ninth Circuit had been reorganized in 2005, five of seven bills introduced in the 109 th Congress splitting the circuit would have yielded somewhat higher caseloads (based on authorized judgeships) in a new Ninth Circuit than in the current Ninth Circuit during the same time period. Six of the bills would have yielded higher caseloads in a new Ninth Circuit than in proposed Twelfth or Thirteenth Circuits. By contrast, one bill ( H.R. 3125 ) would have yielded a higher caseload in a Twelfth Circuit than a new Ninth Circuit. Caseload estimates can vary by source and methodology. Other factorsâsuch as how quickly the circuit disposes of cases and complexity of casesâcould also affect caseload considerations.
Neither chamber of the 109 th Congress passed legislation related to splitting the Ninth Circuit. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42144 | crs_R42144_0 | Introduction
On December 21, 2011, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced final standards for mercury and other air toxics emissions from electric generating units (EGUs). The rule, commonly referred to as the "Utility MACT" or the "Mercury and Air Toxics Standards" (MATS), has been a long time in the making: Congress authorized the standards in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and EPA made a preliminary determination and began developing actual standards in 2000. The rule is among the most expensive rules that EPA has ever promulgated: EPA estimates the annualized cost at $9.6 billion in 2015. Industry estimates have been higher, although most analyses were conducted before EPA proposed or promulgated the final rule. Industry and environmental groups have been keenly interested in both the substance of the rule and the schedule for its implementation, and the House has already passed legislation ( H.R. 2401 ) that would change both. This report describes the rule and its potential impact. The report begins with a background section that describes the statutory authority and history of the rule's development before discussing the specifics of the rule, its estimated costs and benefits, and legislation related to it that has been considered in the 112 th Congress. All previous sources of mercury subject to emission standards had been required to meet plant-specific MACT standards. EPA estimates that the total annualized costs for compliance by oil-fired units will be $56 million (less than 0.1% of the rule's cost), and that there will be no change in oil-fired capacity as a result of the rule. In this respect, the standards reflect the statute's requirement that existing sources of HAPs should meet standards based on the current emissions of the best performing similar sources. EPA is also developing other rules for electric generating units, affecting air emissions, cooling water intake, and the management of coal combustion residuals, leading some stakeholders and policy-makers to question whether the cumulative impacts of these rules will have harmful impacts on electric generation capacity. The average consumer will see an increase of 3.1% ($3-$4 per month) in the cost of electricity in 2015 due to the rule, according to EPA, falling to less than 1% by 2030. As shown in Figure 1 , electricity prices have declined by about 20% since the early 1980s, after adjusting for inflation. This is not complicated or new technology. Benefits
The benefits of the rule are estimated by EPA at $37 billion to $90 billion annually—4 to 9 times as great as the costs—due primarily to the avoidance of up to 11,000 premature deaths each year. It is likely to affect older coal-fired plants that have not yet installed current pollution control technology. Companies that rely on nuclear power or natural gas for most of their power, and have fewer coal-fired plants, and companies that have already invested in controls due to state requirements or other federal regulations, generally support the rule. The NERC data suggest that ERCOT may experience reliability problems, but the emission standards will play a minor role. In New England, NERC reports conflicting information. Many in industry argue that three or four years is not enough time to complete installation of the required pollution control equipment, and as a result that the reliability of the nation's electric power supply could be harmed by the rule while construction is ongoing, even if ultimately the industry will have sufficient generating capacity. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned it. | On December 21, 2011, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced final standards aimed at reducing mercury and other air toxics emissions from electric generating units (EGUs) by about 90%. The rule, commonly referred to as the "Utility MACT" or the "Mercury and Air Toxics Standards" (MATS), has been more than a decade in the making (Congress authorized the standards in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments), and it is among the most expensive rules that EPA has ever promulgated. EPA estimates the annualized cost at $9.6 billion in 2015. Industry estimates have been higher.
The benefits are also large, according to EPA, ranging from $37 billion to $90 billion annually. The benefits mostly reflect the monetized value of avoiding up to 11,000 premature deaths annually.
The rule's costs will fall primarily on older coal-fired units that do not have state-of-the art pollution controls. EPA says that this is a minority of coal-fired plants and an even smaller share of all electric generation: the agency estimates that 56% of coal-fired units have already installed equipment that can be used to meet the standards. In addition, about 55% of the nation's electricity supply comes from natural gas, nuclear, and renewable sources that are not subject to the rule's requirements.
This report describes the rule and its potential impact. The report discusses previous EPA efforts to regulate utility mercury emissions, the court decision overturning those regulations, the specifics of the new rule, its estimated costs and benefits, the impact of the rule on electric reliability, and legislation related to it that has been or may be considered in the 112th Congress.
Industry and environmental groups have been keenly interested in both the substance of the rule and the schedule for its implementation, and the House has already passed legislation (H.R. 2401) that would change both. A particular issue has been whether the standards will lead to retirement of a significant number of electric generating units, with negative effects on the reliability of the power supply. EPA and many other analysts maintain that this will not be the case.
To address this question, this report reviews industry data on planning reserve margins and potential retirement of units that do not currently meet the standards. Based on these data, it appears that, although the rule may lead to the retirement or derating of some facilities, almost all of the capacity reductions will occur in areas that have substantial reserve margins. Two areas that may have difficulty meeting reserve margins, Texas and New England, will experience few plant retirements and deratings, according to industry data. Furthermore, to address the reliability concerns expressed by industry, the final rule includes provisions aimed at providing additional time for compliance if it is needed to install pollution controls or add new capacity to ensure reliability in specific areas. As a result, it is unlikely that electric reliability will be harmed by the rule.
Another potential concern, given the rule's cost, is what impact it may have on the price of electricity. EPA estimates that the average price of electricity nationally will increase by 3.1% by 2015, as a result of the rule. Electricity prices have declined more than 20% in real terms since 1980. The impact of price changes would be relatively small compared to this downward trend, and well within the normal range of historical price fluctuations. |
crs_R41606 | crs_R41606_0 | Comparable attributes of state law are beyond the scope of this report. Pretrial
Federal and State Prosecution: Double Jeopardy
If probable cause exists to believe that Mr. Loughner committed the offenses charged, he may be prosecuted under state or federal law or both. Ordinarily, federal crimes of violence are also crimes under the laws of the state in which they occur. The decision to seek the death penalty rests ultimately with the Attorney General. The court in the Jared Loughner prosecution granted the government's motion for a psychiatric examination to determine the defendant's competence to stand trial. For purposes of the federal victim rights statute, a victim is "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a federal offense," and includes "[i]n the case of a crime victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardians of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime's estate, family members, or any other persons appointed as suitable by the court." The statute affords victims the right to "reasonable, accurate, and timely" notice of, and generally not to be excluded from, any public judicial proceedings involving the offense. Victims enjoy a reasonable right to confer with prosecutors. First, in a murder case, the jury must determine whether the defendant acted with the intent necessary to qualify for imposition of the death penalty. Noncapital Sentencing
In a capital case when the jury finds the defendant eligible for the death penalty but fails to unanimously recommend the death penalty, the court sentences the defendant to "life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence." When the prosecution elects not to seek the death penalty and when the defendant is convicted of a noncapital offense, the court sentences the defendant, without benefit of a jury. A sentencing court, with reasonable justification, may sentence a defendant outside the applicable Guideline recommended sentencing range. | Jared Lee Loughner was arrested for the attempted murder of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, the murder of United States District Court Judge John Roll, and the murder or attempted murder of several federal employees. The arrest brings several features of federal law to the fore.
Federal crimes of violence are usually violations of the law of the state where they occur; an offender may be tried in either federal or state court or both. Ordinarily, federal crimes must be tried where they occur, but in extraordinary cases a defendant's motion for a change of venue may be granted. In capital cases, the decision to seek the death penalty rests with the Attorney General. Should a defendant elect to assert an insanity defense, he must provide pretrial notification. In the face of that notice, the court may order an examination to determine the defendant's competence to stand trial. Federal law affords victims, including families of the deceased or incapacitated, the right to confer with prosecutors, and to attend the trial and other public judicial proceedings.
Defendants, convicted of a murder for which the prosecution seeks the death penalty, are entitled to a jury determination of whether they acted with the intent necessary to qualify for the death penalty and whether the balance of aggravating and any mitigating factors are sufficient to warrant the jury's recommendation that the defendant be put to death. Defendants, convicted of attempted murder or some other noncapital offense, are sentenced by the court without the benefit of a jury. Sentencing in such cases begins with the federal Sentencing Guidelines, from whose recommendations a sentencing court may depart only with reasonable justification.
Comparable provisions of state law are beyond the scope of this report. |
crs_R45033 | crs_R45033_0 | Introduction
Faced with the accelerated pace of North Korea's nuclear and missile testing programs and continued threats against the United States and U.S. allies, U.S. policymakers have several options. One is an aggressive negotiation strategy. This report summarizes past formal nuclear and missile negotiations between the United States and North Korea, also known by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and highlights some of the lessons and implications that can be drawn from these efforts, particularly on the questions of utility, timing, scope, and goals of negotiating with the DPRK. In early March 2018, South Korea's National Security Advisor announced that President Trump had decided to accept DPRK leader Kim Jong-un's offer to meet to have an "open-ended dialogue" with the United States to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Congress has tools to influence whether and how intensely the Administration pursues negotiations with North Korea, including oversight hearings, resolutions expressing congressional sentiment, restrictions on the use of funds for negotiations and the required diplomatic team through the appropriations process, and legislation that attaches or relaxes conditions and requirements for implementation of agreements. Congress has influenced past U.S.-DPRK talks and in several cases affected the implementation of the negotiated agreements. Congress's role has been particularly significant in negotiations over the provision of U.S. energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea through the appropriations process. The United States and North Korea have engaged in four major sets of formal negotiations: talks that resulted in the bilateral Agreed Framework (in place from 1994 until 2002), bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). In general, the formula for these negotiations involved North Korea halting or dismantling its nuclear or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic incentives. The Agreed Framework also provided for U.S. energy assistance to North Korea and improvements in economic relations, such as easing of U.S. sanctions. North Korea renewed its commitment to a missile testing moratorium in September 2002, in advance of a high-level visit to Pyongyang by U.S. diplomats. If the Trump-Kim summit is held, many details remain unclear, including its timing, location, and agenda. If the Trump-Kim summit is held and leads to negotiations, at least three features of the current situation differ from the previous rounds of diplomacy that were held between 1994-2002. First, Pyongyang may feel it is now in a better negotiating position because of the improvements it has shown in its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Second, international sanctions against North Korea, buttressed by many countries' unilateral restrictions, have become much more onerous. By some estimates, over 75% of North Korea's former exports, as well as many of its imports, have been banned since 2017. Third, President Trump has talked openly about launching a preventive military attack against North Korea. Although Trump's talk of an attack may have persuaded North Korea to ask for talks and convinced China to vote for expanded international sanctions, they also may push the South Korean government—in an effort to avoid war—to pursue engagement with North Korea even at the expense of Seoul-Washington relations. | This report summarizes past nuclear and missile negotiations between the United States and North Korea, also known by its formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and highlights some of the lessons and implications from these efforts. Some analysts have suggested that, in response to the accelerated pace of North Korea's nuclear and missile testing programs and its continued threats against the United States and U.S. allies, the United States might engage in an aggressive negotiation strategy with Pyongyang. In March 2018, President Trump agreed to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. According to a high-level South Korean government delegation that brokered the agreement, Kim said that he was willing to discuss denuclearization and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations, and that he would refrain from testing while dialogue continues. Many details remain unclear, including the timing, location, and agenda of the summit and the extent to which Kim's conception of denuclearization matches the U.S. conception.
Previously, the United States has engaged in four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea: the bilateral Agreed Framework (1994-2002), the bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), the multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). In general, the formula for these negotiations has been for North Korea to halt, and in some cases disable, its nuclear or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic incentives.
At least three features of the current situation differ from the previous rounds of diplomacy. First, Pyongyang may feel it is now in a better negotiating position because of advances in its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Second, international sanctions against North Korea, buttressed by many countries' unilateral restrictions, have become much more onerous. By some estimates, over 75% of North Korea's former exports, as well as many of its imports, have been banned since 2017. Third, President Trump has talked openly about launching a preventive military attack against North Korea. Although Trump's talk of an attack may have persuaded North Korea to ask for talks and convinced China to vote for expanded international sanctions, they also may push the South Korean government—in an effort to avoid war—to pursue engagement with North Korea even at the expense of Seoul-Washington relations.
Congress possesses a number of tools to influence how the Administration pursues negotiations with North Korea, including oversight hearings, resolutions expressing congressional sentiment, restrictions on the use of funds for negotiations and the required diplomatic team through the appropriations process, and legislation that attaches or relaxes conditions and requirements for implementation of agreements. Past Congresses have influenced U.S.-DPRK talks and in several cases affected the implementation of the negotiated agreements. Congress's role has been particularly significant in negotiations over the provision of U.S. energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea through the appropriations process.
Other CRS products related to North Korea include
CRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery CRS In Focus IF10467, Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mark E. Manyin CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack CRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis CRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis CRS Report R44912, North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief, by Emma Chanlett-Avery et al. CRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth and Mary Beth D. Nikitin |
crs_R44140 | crs_R44140_0 | Introduction
For decades, executive permission in the form of a Presidential Permit has been required for the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of certain facilities that cross the United States' borders with Canada and Mexico. The constitutional basis for the President's cross-border permitting authority was examined in a prior CRS report. However, questions remain about the manner in which this authority is exercised among the agencies to which it has been delegated. In particular, some Members of Congress and affected stakeholders seek greater clarity about how Presidential Permit applications are reviewed for various kinds of cross-border energy projects, including the degree to which there may be differences or similarities among the various agency approaches to evaluating environmental impacts of proposed projects and in determining whether they serve the national or public interest. With few exceptions, requests for Presidential Permits for cross-border pipelines or electric transmission lines have involved projects extending a relatively short distance into a U.S. border state before connecting to some existing facility (e.g., a refinery in Texas or a power plant in Arizona). The Trump Administration issued a Presidential Permit for that project on March 23, 2017. Given the issues that arose in the wake of TransCanada's application for the Keystone XL pipeline, Congress may again propose legislation intended to expedite approval of future applications for Presidential Permits. This report focusses on the Presidential Permit review processes for cross-border energy infrastructure as implemented by these agencies:
The Department of State for pipelines and similar facilities that transport liquids such as petroleum, petroleum products, and other hazardous liquids; The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for natural gas pipelines and associated facilities; and The Department of Energy (DOE) for electricity transmission lines and associated facilities. The State Department makes its permitting decisions primarily in accordance with directives in Executive Order (E.O.) 11423, as amended by E.O. 13337. FERC and DOE make permitting decisions in accordance with E.O. 10485, as amended by E.O. 12038. Broadly speaking, each executive order requires the respective agency to do the following:
gather necessary project-specific information from the applicant; seek input from specific outside federal agencies; and decide whether to seek input from additional local, state, tribal, or federal agencies or from members of the public. Under the applicable executive order, each agency is required to issue a Presidential Permit if, after evaluating all relevant project information, the agency determines that the project would "serve the national interest" (pursuant to E.O. 13337) or be "consistent with the public interest" (pursuant to E.O. Each agency authorized to issue Presidential Permits informs its decisionmaking regarding such permits using information gathered in accordance with its procedures implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). In 2015, the State Department under the Obama Administration did deny TransCanada's application for a Presidential Permit, finding that the pipeline would not meet the national interest. Each agency evaluates project-specific impacts that are reasonably foreseeable. More specifically, apart from environmental considerations identified during the NEPA process, the State Department has identified the following as issues it has considered in past decisions:
the impacts the proposal would have on the diversity of supply and security of transport pathways for crude oil imported to the United States; the impact of a cross-border facility on the relations with the country to which it connects; the stability of various foreign suppliers of crude oil and the ability of the United States to work with those countries to meet overall environmental and energy security goals; the impact of the proposal on broader foreign policy objectives, including a comprehensive strategy to address climate change, bilateral relations with neighboring countries, and energy security; the potential economic benefits to the United States of constructing and operating the proposed project; and the relationship between the proposed project and goals to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and to increase use of alternative and renewable energy sources. The three cross-border pipelines that have required preparation of an EIS are TransCanada's Keystone and Keystone XL pipelines and Enbridge Energy's Alberta Clipper. Therefore, the scope of environmental review has been limited by the footprint of the projects. 10485. Action Related to the Keystone XL Permit Application
In recent years, largely within the context of the Obama Administration's consideration of the Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL pipeline project, Congress has acted on numerous occasions to influence the State Department permitting process or to assert direct congressional authority over permit approval through new legislation. On March 23, 2017, the State Department issued a final Record of Decision and National Interest Determination (ROD/NID) documenting the State Department's determination that the project would serve the national interest. | Executive permission in the form of a Presidential Permit has long been required for the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of certain facilities that cross the United States borders with Canada and Mexico. The constitutional basis for the President's cross-border permitting authority has been addressed by the courts, but questions remain about the manner in which this authority is exercised among the agencies to which it has been delegated. In particular, some Members of Congress and affected stakeholders seek greater clarity about how Presidential Permit applications are reviewed for various kinds of cross-border energy projects.
Agency Authorities and Decisionmaking
Congress has shown particular interest in the Presidential Permit review processes for cross-border energy infrastructure as implemented by
The Department of State for pipelines that transport petroleum, petroleum products, and other hazardous liquids; The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for natural gas pipelines; and The Department of Energy (DOE) for electricity transmission lines.
The State Department makes its permitting decisions primarily in accordance with directives in Executive Order 11423 (E.O.), as amended by E.O. 13337. FERC and DOE make permitting decisions in accordance with E.O. 10485, as amended by E.O. 12038. Broadly speaking, each executive order requires the respective agency to
gather necessary project-specific information from the applicant; seek input from specific outside federal agencies; and decide whether to seek input from additional local, state, tribal, or federal agencies or from members of the public.
Under the applicable executive order, each agency is required to issue a Presidential Permit if, after evaluating all relevant project information, the agency determines that the project would "serve the national interest" (pursuant to E.O. 13337) or be "consistent with the public interest" (pursuant to E.O. 10485). For the most part, agencies gather, evaluate, and consider project-related information within the framework of conducting an environmental review. Such reviews are generally conducted in accordance with each agency's process for complying with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
In documenting compliance with NEPA, each agency evaluates the direct and indirect effects, including any cumulative impacts, of issuing the permit. To do so, each agency generally looks at the effect of constructing the entire project, not just the portions that would cross the border (i.e., the action for which the Presidential Permit is required). Historically, evaluating impacts of the entire project would not necessarily involve a complex or particularly time-consuming review. With few exceptions, past applications for Presidential Permits have been for pipelines or transmission lines that extend a relatively short distance into a U.S. border state. Recently, however, several pipeline projects—Enbridge Energy's Alberta Clipper and TransCanada's Keystone and Keystone XL pipeline—have involved projects that are hundreds of miles long and cross multiple states. It was the larger scope of such projects that, in part, resulted in increased national attention to the most recent proposal, the Keystone XL pipeline. In 2015, the State Department under President Obama denied TransCanada's application for a Presidential Permit for the project, finding that it did not serve the national interest. However, a new permit application was approved on March 23, 2017, when the State Department, under the Trump Administration, found that the project did serve the national interest.
Issues for Congress
From 2011 through 2015, as the State Department considered permit applications for the Keystone XL pipeline project, Congress proposed a number of bills intended to affect the State Department's decisionmaking process. Although a permit has been issued for that project, Congress may again consider legislative options to expedite agency decisions on future permit applications. Congress may choose to address issues that arose during the Keystone XL permitting process. For example, during the review, some stakeholders questioned the scope of the NEPA review—some were concerned that it was too broad, others that it was too narrow. Some also argued there was uncertainty over criteria the State Department used to determine whether the project would serve the national interest. Congress could potentially clarify these issues through legislation aimed at defining federal agency roles in authorizing cross-border projects. |
crs_RS22185 | crs_RS22185_0 | More recently, Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) have been developed to help low-income families build financial capital. From the participant's viewpoint, IDAs operate much like retirement 401(k) plans: the participant makes contributions, which are matched (at varying rates) by the program. Congress has continued the AFI program absent an authorization. AFI is funded at $19 million for FY2014. In addition, TANF provides specific authority and rules for states to operate IDA programs. Many of the rules for the TANF IDA are similar to the rules under the AFI Act: contributions are to be matched through a nonprofit organization or a state and local government (though there are no limits to matching rates or amounts); withdrawals may be made for educational expenses, purchase of a first home, or starting a business; and the IDA is not to be considered when determining the financial eligibility status of a recipient applying for or receiving federal aid. Individual Development Accounts: Policies to Build Savings and Assets for the Poor. | Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are savings accounts to help low-income families and persons save for specified purposes, usually education, purchase of a home, or to start a business. IDA programs match an individual's contributions, much like retirement 401(k) accounts. The Assets For Independence (AFI) Act, enacted by Congress in 1998, specifically authorizes IDA demonstration programs. Authorization for the AFI program expired at the end of FY2003, though Congress continued to appropriate money for the program. AFI is funded at $19.026 million for FY2014. |
crs_RL32307 | crs_RL32307_0 | Most Recent Developments
The Bush Administration's FY2005 budget request, released February 2, 2004, budgetedEnergy and Water Development Programs at $27.94 billion, compared to $27.26 billion appropriatedfor the same programs for FY2004. On June 16 the House Appropriations Committee reported itsbill with $27.99 billion, and the House passed it June 25. Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil worksprojects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of theInterior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE),and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). The BushAdministration's request was $27.938 billion for these programs for FY2005,compared with $27.253 billion appropriated for FY2004. The Administration asked for $970 million for FY2005 for the Department of the Interior programs included in the Energy and Water Development bill -- theBureau of Reclamation and the Central Utah Project. Key Policy Issues -- Corps of Engineers
Funding Level. 4818 ( P.L.108-447 ) appropriates 14% more than the request. Everglades. CALFED. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship. Reflects distribution of a rescission from P.L. 108-199 ) on January 23, 2004. Figures for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) for the outyearshave changed from this budget document, as discussed below. In the Senate, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee didnot report a bill to the full committee, so that committee did not report a bill to theSenate. Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) and Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI). As a part of the compromise discussed earlier, the omnibus bill eliminated funds forRNEP and ACI. (5) Pit Campaign Support Activities at Nevada Test Site: NNSA plans to conduct certain experiments at Nevada Test Site to support W88 pitcertification. Nuclear Testing and Test Readiness. Funding for these programs in FY2004 was $1.3198 billion. The omnibus bill, H.R. Of the amount in H.R.4818 ( P.L. 108-137 ). The Administration's proposed spending increase was intended primarily to pay for designing a national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, andfor developing a national waste transportation program. Federally Supported Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Programs, by the Resources, Science and Industry Division. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau ofReclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independentagencies. The Bush Administration requested $27.94 billion for these programs for FY2005,compared with $27.26 billion appropriated for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-137 , and rescissions included in P.L. 108-199 ). On June 16 the House Appropriations Committee reported out its bill( H.R. 4614 ) with $27.99 billion, and the bill passed the House on June 25. The Senatedid not report out a separate Energy and Water Appropriations bill, and funding for these programsof $28.49 billion was included as Division C of the omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act( H.R. 4818 , P.L. 108-447 ).
Key issues involving these programs included:
funding and progress of major water/ecosystem restoration initiatives such as Florida Everglades and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED);
funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada;
funding for developing a new nuclear warhead, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and for a "Modern Pit Facility" to build nuclear weapons components;and
plans to reduce the time necessary to prepare the Nevada Test Site to resume nuclear weapons testing.
Funding for the Yucca Mountain project was a major issue that prevented passage of a stand-alone bill, and the possibility of a year-long continuing resolution for Energy and Waterprograms was widely discussed. However, appropriators agreed in the omnibus bill to fund theproject at the same level as in FY2004. Part of the funding for Yucca Mountain came from thecontroversial Nuclear Earth Penetrator and pit facility and the upgrading of the Nevada Test Site,which were cut from the budget.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry; FDT= Foreign Affairs, Defense,and Trade. |
crs_RS22845 | crs_RS22845_0 | The forcible seizure of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s continues to be a pivotal issue in the ongoing Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. U.S. interest in the abductions issue is driven by its needs for Japan's diplomatic and economic assistance in the negotiations, as well as concerns that friction in the U.S.-Japan relationship will damage one of the United States' most important alliances in the world. Unconfirmed reports from North Korean defectors emerged that Japanese nationals were held by North Korea, but the mainstream media largely ignored them. Japanese officials have expressed alarm that the United States may remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Abductions Issue and Regional Relations
Since the Six-Party talks began, Tokyo's focus on the abductions issue has isolated it from the other parties, particularly China and South Korea. | The admission by North Korea in 2002 that it abducted several Japanese nationals—most of them nearly 30 years ago—continues to affect significantly the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. This report provides background information on the abductee issue, summarizes its effect on Japanese politics, analyzes its impact on U.S.-Japan relations, and assesses its regional implications. Congress has indicated considerable interest in the abductions issue. The North Korean Human Rights Act (P.L. 108-333) includes a sense of the Congress that non-humanitarian aid be contingent on North Korean progress in accounting for the Japanese abductees. A House hearing in April 2006 focused on North Korea's abductions of foreign citizens, with testimony from former abductees and their relatives. Some Members of Congress have sponsored legislation (S.Res. 399 and H.R. 3650) that support Japan's call for settlement of the abductions controversy before North Korea is removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41684 | crs_R41684_0 | Recent oil spills led some Members of the 112 th Congress to express an increased level of interest in oil spill legislation. This report identifies legislation that addresses oil spill-related issues. For this report, oil spill-related issues include oil spill policy matters that concern prevention, preparedness, response, liability and compensation, and Gulf of Mexico restoration. In the context of this report, oil spill issues do not generally include matters pertaining to offshore leasing and drilling. The 112 th Congress enacted two statutes with oil spill-related provisions. First, on January 3, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-90 (the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011), which includes, among other provisions, the following:
increases the maximum amount of civil penalties for violations of safety requirements; authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to require the installation of automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly constructed transmission pipelines; directs the Secretary of Transportation to submit a report analyzing leak detection systems and issues involved in requiring them. Based on this analysis (and after a review period by Congress), the Secretary of Transportation may issue leak detection requirements; and requires the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to review whether current regulations are sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting "diluted bitumen," and analyze whether such oil presents an increased risk of release. Second, on July 6, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21). That act included a subtitle referred to as the RESTORE Act. RESTORE Act—Summary
The RESTORE Act establishes the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund in the General Treasury. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill provide the revenues for the fund. Amounts in the fund will be available for expenditure without further appropriation. Funding Distribution and Authorized Uses
The act distributes monies from the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund to various entities through multiple processes. All of the funds—not counting authorized administrative activities—would support activities in one or more of the five Gulf of Mexico states. 5. 11. 30%—Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council
The act distributes 30% of its trust fund monies to a newly created Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council. In general, the criteria involve a measure of shoreline impact; oiled shoreline distance from the Deepwater Horizon rig; and coastal population. To receive funding, each state must submit a plan for approval to the Council. State plans must document how funding will support one or more of the 11 categories listed above. | Recent oil spills, including the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, generated an increased level of interest in oil spill legislation during the 112th Congress. This report identifies enacted and proposed legislation from the 112th Congress that pertains to oil spill-related issues. For this report, oil spill-related issues include oil spill policy matters that concern prevention, preparedness, response, liability and compensation, and Gulf of Mexico restoration. In the context of this report, oil spill issues do not generally include matters pertaining to offshore leasing and drilling.
The 112th Congress enacted two statutes that contain oil spill-related provisions. On January 3, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-90 (the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011), which
increases civil penalties for violating safety requirements and requires automatic and remote-controlled shutoff valves on newly constructed transmission pipelines; directs the Department of Transportation to analyze leak detection systems, and after a review by Congress, issue requirements based on this analysis; and requires the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to review whether current regulations are sufficient to regulate pipelines transmitting "diluted bitumen," and analyze whether such oil presents an increased risk of release.
On July 6, 2012, the President signed P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21), which includes a subtitle referred to as the RESTORE Act. The RESTORE Act establishes the Gulf Coast Restoration Fund in the General Treasury. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill will provide the revenues for the fund. Amounts in the fund will be available for expenditure without further appropriation.
The RESTORE Act distributes monies to various entities through multiple processes:
35% divided equally among the five Gulf of Mexico states to be applied toward one or more of 11 designated activities; 30% provided to a newly created Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council to finance ecosystem restoration activities in the Gulf Coast region; 30% disbursed by the Council to the five Gulf states, based on specific criteria: shoreline impact; oiled shoreline distance from the Deepwater Horizon rig; and coastal population. Each state must submit a plan for approval, documenting how funding will support one or more of the 11 designated activities; and 5% to support marine research and related purposes. |
crs_R41164 | crs_R41164_0 | Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) provided $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant and loan programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The NTIA grant program is called the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program (BTOP). The RUS broadband grant and loan program is called the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP). This report focuses on the distribution of ARRA broadband funding. Awards
As of October 1, 2010, all BTOP and BIP award announcements were complete. In total, NTIA and RUS announced awards for 553 projects, constituting $7.5 billion in federal funding. This included 233 BTOP projects (totaling $3.9 billion) and 320 BIP projects (totaling $3.6 billion). Of the $7.5 billion total announced, $6.2 billion was grant funding, and $1.3 billion was loan funding. Of all broadband infrastructure funding, about half (51%) was awarded to middle mile projects (includes Comprehensive Community Initiative and public safety grants), and 49% was awarded to last mile projects (includes satellite grants). Breakdown by Type of Technology
Deployment of broadband infrastructure can encompass a number of different types of technologies, including fiber, wireless, cable modem, DSL, satellite, and others. The 112 th Congress is likely to provide oversight on NTIA and RUS efforts to monitor the funded projects. In the longer term, the FCC's National Broadband Plan has recommended an expansion of federal funding for broadband deployment in unserved areas. To the extent that Congress may consider whether broadband grant and loan programs should be continued, modified, reduced, expanded, or eliminated, the funding patterns and trends that emerged during rounds one and two, as well as the ultimate successes and failures of funded BTOP and BIP projects, could provide insights into whether and how such programs might be addressed, and how these or similar programs might be fashioned within the context of a national broadband policy. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant and loan programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The NTIA grant program is called the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program (BTOP). The RUS broadband grant and loan program is called the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP).
As of October 1, 2010, all BTOP and BIP award announcements were complete. In total, NTIA and RUS announced awards for 553 projects, constituting $7.5 billion in federal funding. This included 233 BTOP projects (totaling $3.9 billion) and 320 BIP projects (totaling $3.6 billion). Of the $7.5 billion total announced, $6.2 billion was grant funding, and $1.3 billion was loan funding.
This report focuses on the distribution of ARRA broadband funding with respect to project category, broadband infrastructure technology deployed, and state-by-state distribution. Of all broadband infrastructure funding, about half was awarded to middle mile projects and half was awarded to last mile projects. Deployment of broadband infrastructure can encompass a number of different types of technologies, including fiber, wireless, cable modem, DSL, satellite, and others. Projects involving fiber accounted for about two-thirds of all infrastructure projects.
The 112th Congress is likely to provide oversight on NTIA and RUS efforts to monitor the funded projects. In the longer term, the FCC's National Broadband Plan has recommended an expansion of federal funding for broadband deployment in unserved areas. To the extent that Congress may consider whether broadband grant and loan programs should be continued, modified, reduced, expanded, or eliminated, the funding patterns and trends that emerged during rounds one and two, as well as the ultimate successes and failures of funded BTOP and BIP projects, could provide insights into whether and how such programs might be addressed, and how these or similar programs might be fashioned within the context of a national broadband policy. |
crs_R45236 | crs_R45236_0 | This report describes changes in violent crime since 1960, with a focus on changes in the violent crime rates since 2014, especially in large cities. The analysis suggests three broad points: (1) after nearly two decades of decreasing crime rates, violent crime rates in the United States increased from 2014 to 2015, and again from 2015 to 2016, (2) violent crime rates, even after accounting for the recent increases, remain near historical lows, and (3) while there were increases in violent crime (particularly homicides) in some cities, these increases are not indicative of a sweeping national crime wave. National Trends in Violent Crime and Homicide
The most recent crime data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from its Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program indicate that after many years of nearly uninterrupted declines, the national rates for violent crime and homicide increased from 2014 to 2016. In contrast, the homicide rate increased 11% from 2014 to 2015 and 8% from 2015 to 2016. From 2014 to 2015, violent crime rates
increased 4% in cities of 1 million or more people, which was similar to but slightly greater than the increase in the national violent crime rate (3%); decreased (-4% and -1%, respectively) in cities of 500,000-999,999 people and 250,000-499,999 people; increased in some smaller cities, but at a rate that was slightly less than the national rate (2% for cities of 100,000-249,999 people and 1% for cities of 50,000-99,999 people); and increased by 5% in cities of fewer than 50,000 people, which was greater than the increase in the national crime rate. In nearly half of the 48 largest cities in the United States for which violent crime and homicide data were available, violent crime rates increased from 2014 to 2015 or from 2015 to 2016 (see Figure 7 ). In summary, data on violent crime and homicide rates, with a focus on the 48 largest U.S. cities for which data were available, suggest that while recent increases in violent crime and homicide rates are cause for concern in many large cities, the country as a whole is not in the midst of a sweeping national violent crime wave. There were some cities that experienced increases in violent crime and homicide from 2014 to 2015 and again from 2015 to 2016, but in many other large cities, violent crime and/or homicide rates only increased in one of those years, or they decreased in both. The Ferguson effect is one of the more widely discussed and controversial explanations for the recent increases in violent crime in some cities. There is a small but growing body of research on whether the Ferguson effect has contributed to increasing violent crime rates. The Johns Hopkins study did find some evidence of a potential Ferguson effect in the arrest data. In addition, a post-Ferguson decrease in arrests might not be a detriment to Baltimore communities if the decrease did not result in an increase in crime and the reduction was in arrests that generate tensions between minority communities and the police. Along these lines, policymakers could consider providing more funding to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. Policymakers could also consider providing additional funding to discretionary grant programs such as the Community Oriented Policing Services' (COPS) hiring program, the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation program, or Project Safe Neighborhoods. In addition, Congress could consider authorizing and appropriating funding for a new grant program that supports investment in evidence-based policing strategies or crime prevention program, such as "hot-spots" policing." The National Public Safety Partnership
Congress might also consider providing resources to help DOJ expand the National Public Safety Partnership (PSP). | Media accounts of increasing violent crime rates, especially homicides, in some cities raise broad concerns about decreasing levels of public safety.
This report provides an analysis of changes in violent crime since 1960, with a focus on changes from 2014 to 2016 in violent crime and homicide rates in the 48 largest cities in the United States for which violent crime and homicide data were submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting Program. The results of the analysis suggest the following:
At the national level, violent crime and homicide rates increased from 2014 to 2015 and again from 2015 to 2016, but both rates remain near historical lows. Violent crime and homicide rates for the 48 largest cities in the United States with available data generally followed national-level trends, with some exceptions. For example, violent crime rates in cities of 500,000-999,999 people and 250,000-499,999 people decreased from 2014 to 2015, and the homicide rate in small cities of 50,000-99,999 people decreased from 2015 to 2016. Some of the largest cities in the United States saw increases in violent crime rates, homicide rates, or both from 2014 to 2015 and/or 2015 to 2016. For some of these cities, violent crime or homicide rates were the highest they have been in the past 20 years. Recent increases in violent crime and homicide in large cities have received a great deal of attention, but in smaller communities violent crime and homicide rates also increased from 2014 to 2015 and again from 2015 to 2016, although not as much as in the largest cities.
The "Ferguson effect" is one of the more widely discussed, and controversial, explanations for the recent increases in violent crime. It refers to the assertion that crime has increased recently because police are avoiding proactive policing tactics out of fear of repercussions for the use of aggressive tactics. There is a small but growing body of literature on the Ferguson effect, and the evidence is mixed. For example, recent research conducted by a Johns Hopkins University sociologist found some evidence of a post-Ferguson decrease in arrests and a post-Ferguson increase in crime in Baltimore. However, the research did not reveal a causal link between the decreasing arrests and increasing crime. Additionally, studies of the Ferguson effect have generally focused on a single state or specific cities, which make the results of these studies non-generalizable to other jurisdictions.
Policymakers might consider various options to assist cities that have seen an increase in violent crime and homicide rates. These include providing additional assistance to local governments through existing grant programs such as the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant, Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation, and Community Oriented Policing Services' hiring programs; authorizing and appropriating funding for a new grant program that would provide assistance to local governments to implement evidence-based violent crime prevention programs; or providing additional resources to allow the Department of Justice to expand its National Public Safety Partnership. |
crs_RS22684 | crs_RS22684_0 | Factors that argue for a transfer include potential benefits to U.S. industry, contribution to the defense of allied countries, and promoting U.S. interoperability with those countries. Factors that argue against a particular arms transfer include the likelihood of technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability. It is unclear whether the United States and Japan could agree on the capabilities to be offered in the export variant of the F-22. Israel, for example, has reportedly expressed interest in the F-22. The sale could complicate the U.S. effort to manage its relationship with China. | Japan has expressed interest in purchasing the F-22A Raptor aircraft from the United States. Although the export of the plane is now prohibited by U.S. law, Congress has recently and may again consider repealing this ban. Arguments for the sale include potential benefits to U.S. industry, contribution to the defense of Japan and the region, and promotion of U.S. interoperability with the Japanese military. Arguments against the transfer include concerns about technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R42502 | crs_R42502_0 | Introduction
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to recover oil and natural gas from underground low permeability rock formations. The technique has been the subject of controversy because of the potential effects that hydraulic fracturing and related oil and gas production activities may have on the environment and health. Actions that fit within a categorical exclusion (CE) undergo a relatively low level of review because these are actions that an agency has found do not have a significant effect on the environment. An environmental assessment (EA) provides a more comprehensive level of review and may be prepared when an agency wishes to determine whether an action requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). An EIS is the most comprehensive NEPA document; it requires, among other things, that the agency explain how the proposed action will affect the environment; what unavoidable adverse environmental effects will result; and what alternatives to the proposed action exist. This report provides an overview of three situations in which parties have argued that agencies do not need to conduct a comprehensive environmental review of hydraulic fracturing under NEPA. The court held that BLM unreasonably relied on an environmental analysis that (1) assumed only one exploratory well would be drilled on the leased acres when it was reasonably foreseeable that more wells would be drilled, and (2) did not contain a detailed assessment of the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC): Proposed Regulations on Natural Gas Development
In May 2011, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman brought a federal lawsuit on behalf of the state of New York alleging that five federal agencies and their officers were in violation of NEPA. New York alleged that the approval of the DRBC regulations was a major federal action requiring at least one of the defendants to prepare an EIS. In September 2012, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendants' motions to dismiss New York's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rural Development has issued an administrative notice stating that the existence of drilling leases on a property will not prevent the agency from using a categorical exclusion (CE) to exempt these loans from further NEPA review, at least in ordinary circumstances. On March 18, 2012, a news article appeared suggesting that Rural Development was reconsidering the use of a CE for loans made for the purchase of homes on properties leased for drilling. NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental consequences of the actions they propose to take by preparing a NEPA document. In March 2013, a federal district court in California held that BLM had violated NEPA and the APA when it prepared an EA and FONSI for a lease sale in the Monterey Shale. | Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to recover oil and natural gas from underground low permeability rock formations. This process involves pumping fluids under high pressure into the formations to crack them, releasing oil and gas into the well. The technique has been the subject of controversy due to some of its potential effects on the environment.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to consider the potential environmental consequences of the actions they propose to take by preparing one of three NEPA documents. Actions that fit within a categorical exclusion (CE) undergo a relatively low level of review because these are actions that an agency has found do not have a significant effect on the environment. A CE may not be used when extraordinary circumstances occur. An environmental assessment (EA) provides a more comprehensive level of review and may be prepared when an agency wishes to determine whether an action requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). An EIS is the most comprehensive NEPA document; it requires, among other things, that the agency explain how the proposed action will affect the environment; what unavoidable adverse effects will result; and what alternatives to the proposed action exist.
This report provides an overview of three situations in which parties have argued that agencies do not need to conduct a comprehensive environmental review of hydraulic fracturing under NEPA. In March 2013, a federal district court in California held that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had violated NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when it prepared an EA and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for a lease sale in the Monterey Shale. The court held that BLM could not rely on an analysis that (1) assumed that only one exploratory well would be drilled on the leased acres, and (2) did not contain a detailed assessment of the impact of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling on the environment.
In 2011, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a complaint on behalf of the state of New York alleging that the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) and five federal agencies were in violation of NEPA. New York sought an injunction compelling the defendants to prepare an EIS before the defendants adopted regulations that would allow natural gas development in the basin. In September 2012, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendants' motions to dismiss New York's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On March 21, 2012, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Development agency reaffirmed its use of a CE to exempt from further NEPA review the loans it makes for the purchase of single-family homes on properties leased for drilling. The agency stated that, by itself, the existence of a drilling lease on a property is not an extraordinary circumstance that will prevent the agency from using a CE for a loan. |
crs_R43301 | crs_R43301_0 | Background on the American Job Center System
Many federally funded programs to assist unemployed workers are coordinated through state- and locally run Ame rican Job Centers (AJCs; also known as One-Stop Career Centers). The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014 (WIOA; P.L. It emphasizes eligibility requirements and the scope of benefits and services available to individuals. Unemployment insurance provides weekly cash payments to workers who have involuntarily lost a job, have a demonstrated work history, and meet other requirements. G rant programs with national scope support employment and training services and have a presence in every state. Other partner programs are mandatory AJC partners but may not typically provide benefits to individuals or may have a primary purpose other than placing individual jobseekers in employment. Some federally funded programs with employment and training components are not required partners with AJCs and therefore are not discussed in this report. As such, the group of programs included in this report may vary from other reviews of federal employment training programs and should not be considered exhaustive. The specifics of regular UC benefits are determined by each state. Individuals who exhaust UC benefits may be eligible for additional weeks of UI benefits through the permanent EB program, depending on worker eligibility, state law, and economic conditions in the state. In most states, regular UC benefits are available for up to 26 weeks. Employment and Training Programs
The AJC network co-locates and coordinates federally funded employment and training programs. Unlike UI, funding levels for employment and training programs are capped by statute or appropriation level. Grants with National Scope
The largest portion of AJC funding is from a group of grants that have a presence in all states. This report divides these partner programs with national scope into three groups:
Programs available to all jobseekers , which have no eligibility criteria; Programs targeted by circumstances of job loss , which provide services to workers whose job loss and work history meet certain conditions; and Programs targeted by jobseeker characteristics , which provide services to workers based on their personal characteristics (such as veteran status or disability) rather than their work history or reason for unemployment. Once a group is certified, individual workers may receive benefits through the AJC system. Competitive Grant Programs
Several competitive grant programs are mandatory AJC partners. In some cases, CSBG funds may support employment and training activities. Postsecondary activities supported under this act are a mandatory AJC partner. | Many federally funded programs that assist unemployed workers are co-located and coordinated through state and locally run American Job Centers (AJCs; also known as One-Stop Career Centers). The specific set of benefits and services available to a worker through the AJC network varies by the worker's characteristics and reason for unemployment.
Unemployment insurance (UI) is a federal-state system and mandatory AJC partner. UI benefits are available to workers who have involuntarily lost their jobs and have demonstrated a required level of labor force attachment. UI provides weekly cash payments to replace a portion of the eligible workers' earnings, up to a statewide maximum. Eligibility and benefit levels vary by state, though most states offer up to 26 weeks of state-financed UI benefits through each state's Unemployment Compensation (UC) program. Certain economic conditions may extend the duration of UI benefits through the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program.
To assist workers in obtaining employment, AJCs coordinate a number of programs that provide career services and training benefits. These efforts include both broadly available programs and targeted programs. Unlike UI benefits, which are mandatory entitlements, these employment and training programs are subject to funding caps. The primary AJC partner programs can generally be characterized as follows:
Grants with a national scope support employment and training activities in all states. The activities supported by each grant vary. Some programs are available to all jobseekers while others limit eligibility based on a jobseeker's reason for unemployment or personal characteristics. Competitive grants support more targeted employment and training services. These grants may not have a presence in all states. Other partner programs are mandatory AJC partners that indirectly support employment and training activities or support employment and training activities among other functions.
This report is limited to mandatory AJC partners under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014. Some federally funded programs with employment and training components are not AJC partners and some AJC partners have primary purposes other than employment. As such, the group of programs discussed in this report may vary from other reviews of federal workforce programs and should not be considered conclusive nor exhaustive. |
crs_97-746 | crs_97-746_0 | The increased presence of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs and in the scientific workforce has been and continues to be of concern to some in the scientific community. Enrollment of U.S. citizens in graduate science and engineering programs has not kept pace with that of foreign students in those programs. In addition to the number of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs, a significant number of university faculty in the scientific disciplines are foreign, and foreign doctorates are employed in large numbers by industry. Few will dispute that U.S. universities and industry have chosen foreign talent to fill many positions. Foreign scientists and engineers serve the needs of industry at the doctorate level and also have been found to serve in major roles at the masters level. Not surprisingly, there are charges that U.S. workers are adversely affected by the entry of foreign scientists and engineers, who reportedly accept lower wages than U.S. citizens would accept in order to enter or remain in the United States. Participation Rates in Science and Engineering
NSF data reveal that in 2006, the foreign student population earned approximately 36.2% of the doctorate degrees in the sciences and approximately 63.6% of the doctorate degrees in engineering. In 2006, foreign students on temporary resident visas earned 32.0% of the doctorates in the sciences, and 58.6% of the doctorates in engineering. The participation rates in 2005 were 30.8% and 58.4%, respectively. In 2006, permanent resident status students earned 4.2% of the doctorates in both the sciences and engineering, a slight change from the 2005 levels of 3.8% in the sciences and 4.4% in engineering. Many in the scientific community maintain that in order to compete with countries that are rapidly expanding their scientific and technological capabilities, the United States needs to bring in those whose skills will benefit society and will enable us to compete in the new-technology-based global economy. And there are those who contend that the underlying concern of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs is not necessarily that there are too many foreign-born students, but that there are not enough native-born students entering the scientific and technical disciplines. The academic community is concerned that the more stringent requirements of foreign students may have a continued impact on enrollments in colleges and universities. The bill would also amend H-1B visa employer application requirements by lengthening U.S. worker displacement protection and prohibiting employer position announcements that specify positions solely to, or that gives priority to, H-1B immigrants. In addition, bills have been introduced in the 111 th Congress that are directed at attracting foreign students in the scientific and technical disciplines while maintaining the interests of American scientists. H.R. H.R. 1791 , Stopping Trained in America Ph.D.s from Leaving the Economy Act (STAPLE), would direct numerical limitations on immigrants who have been awarded a doctorate degree in the scientific disciplines from a U.S. institution and who have an offer of employment from a U.S. employer in a degree-related field. | The increased presence of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs and in the scientific workforce has been and continues to be of concern to some in the scientific community. Enrollment of U.S. citizens in graduate science and engineering programs has not kept pace with that of foreign students in those programs. In addition to the number of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs, a significant number of university faculty in the scientific disciplines are foreign, and foreign doctorates are employed in large numbers by industry.
Few will dispute that U.S. universities and industry have chosen foreign talent to fill many positions. Foreign scientists and engineers serve the needs of industry at the doctorate level and also have been found to serve in major roles at the masters level. However, there are charges that U.S. workers are adversely affected by the entry of foreign scientists and engineers, who reportedly accept lower wages than U.S. citizens would accept in order to enter or remain in the United States.
NSF data reveal that in 2006, the foreign student population earned approximately 36.2% of the doctorate degrees in the sciences and approximately 63.6% of the doctorate degrees in engineering. In 2006, foreign students on temporary resident visas earned 32.0% of the doctorates in the sciences, and 58.6% of the doctorates in engineering. The participation rates in 2005 were 30.8% and 58.4%, respectively. In 2006, permanent resident status students earned 4.2% of the doctorates in both the sciences and in engineering, a slight change from the 2005 levels of 3.8% in the sciences and 4.4% in engineering.
Many in the scientific community maintain that in order to compete with countries that are rapidly expanding their scientific and technological capabilities, the country needs to bring to the United States those whose skills will benefit society and will enable us to compete in the new-technology based global economy. The academic community is concerned that the more stringent visa requirements for foreign students may have a continued impact on enrollments in colleges and universities. There are those who believe that the underlying problem of foreign students in graduate science and engineering programs is not necessarily that there are too many foreign-born students, but that there are not enough native-born students pursuing scientific and technical disciplines.
Legislation has been introduced in the 111th Congress to attract foreign students in the scientific and technical disciplines and to maintain the interests of American scientists. H.R. 4321, Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America's Security and Prosperity Act, would, among other things, amend H-1B visa employer application requirements by lengthening U.S. worker protection and prohibiting employer position announcements that specify positions solely to, or give priority to, H-1B visa holders. H.R. 1791, Stopping Trained in America Ph.D.s from Leaving the Economy Act (STAPLE), would place numerical limitations on immigrants who have been awarded a doctorate degree in the scientific disciplines from a U.S. institution and who have an offer of employment from a U.S. employer in a degree-related field. |
crs_R43558 | crs_R43558_0 | Overview
Boko Haram, a violent Islamist insurgent group originally based in northeast Nigeria, continues to wage a deadly campaign in Nigeria and neighboring countries in the Lake Chad Basin region. A State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization since November 2013, the group drew widespread international attention for its April 2014 abduction of almost 300 schoolgirls as well as its subsequent pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS) in March 2015. More than 15,000 people are estimated to have been killed in Boko Haram violence—including more than 6,500 in 2015 alone—and the conflict has caused a humanitarian emergency around Lake Chad, displacing more than 2.4 million people and cutting off humanitarian access to thousands. Many observers assess that Nigeria's new head of state, Muhammadu Buhari, has taken a more proactive approach toward countering Boko Haram than his predecessor, President Goodluck Jonathan, who was widely criticized for what has been described as a mismanaged and heavy-handed response to Boko Haram. In 2015, after pledging allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the group sought to rebrand itself as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). At that time the group's activities were limited in scope and contained within several highly impoverished states in Nigeria's predominately Muslim northeast. By U.N. estimates, more than 9.2 million people in the region are in need of humanitarian assistance and almost 3 million are severely food insecure. Nigeria's former President Goodluck Jonathan was widely criticized during his last year in office for his administration's response to the Boko Haram crisis, which some observers described as ineffective, insufficient, and marred by high-level corruption within the security sector. Boko Haram has expanded its operations into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—since early 2014, these countries have increasingly been subject to attacks by the group. The State Department has designated five individuals linked to Boko Haram as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), including Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, and in 2013 it issued a $7 million reward for information on the location of Shekau through its Rewards for Justice program. In view of the growing impact Boko Haram has had on neighboring Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, U.S. officials have increasingly sought to support programs to improve counterterrorism coordination between Nigeria and its neighbors, and to improve each country's capacity to contain the group. U.S. security assistance to the Lake Chad Basin countries has increased significantly in recent years—all four countries benefit from a $40 million Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) program that began in FY2014, and the region is a focal area for the Administration's new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). In total, Boko Haram-related counterterrorism assistance has totaled more than $400 million to date. Counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria's military has been comparatively small, based on human rights and other policy concerns, although the Obama Administration has expressed its intent to increase cooperation. In October 2015, Administration officials announced that the United States would send as many as 300 U.S. troops, along with surveillance drones, to Cameroon to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations in the region. Nigerian officials have acknowledged some abuses by security forces in the context of the fight against Boko Haram, but few security personnel have been prosecuted. 433 and H.Res. 573 (113 th Congress), condemning Boko Haram's attacks on civilian targets and expressing support for the Nigerian people and the families of the girls abducted from Chibok, for efforts to hold the group accountable, and for U.S. offers to assist in the search for the girls ; H.R. 2027 (114 th Congress), directing the President to develop and submit to Congress a regional strategy to guide U.S. support for multilateral efforts to eliminate the threat of Boko Haram and enforce the rule of law and ensure humanitarian access in Boko Haram-affected areas; and S. 1632 (114 th Congress), requiring the Department of Defense and the Department of State to jointly develop a regional strategy to address the threat posed by Boko Haram. | Boko Haram, a violent Nigerian Islamist movement, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years, drawing on narratives of religious exclusivism, victimization, and vengeance for state abuses to elicit sympathizers and recruits. The group's April 2014 abduction of almost 300 schoolgirls drew particular international attention, including from the Obama Administration and Members of Congress. Boko Haram's high death toll and its pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL or ISIS) in March 2015 have further raised the concern of U.S. policymakers. The group has sought to rebrand itself as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), though it remains more popularly known by its original nickname. The State Department has named several individuals linked to Boko Haram, including its leader, Abubakar Shekau, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists; the group was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the State Department in November 2013.
More than 15,000 people are estimated to have been killed by Boko Haram, including more than 6,500 in 2015 alone, making it one of world's deadliest terrorist groups. By U.N. estimates, roughly 2.4 million people have been displaced by Boko Haram-related violence in the Lake Chad Basin region, where approximately 9.2 million are in need of humanitarian aid. Boko Haram has focused on a wide range of targets, but civilians in Nigeria's impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. Since 2014, Boko Haram has also staged attacks in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger with increasing frequency.
Nigeria has struggled to respond to the growing threat posed by Boko Haram. Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was widely criticized for his administration's response to the crisis, which some observers described as ineffective, heavy-handed, and marred by high-level corruption in the security sector. Some observers suggest Nigeria's new head of state, Muhammadu Buhari, has taken a more proactive approach than his predecessor toward countering the group, including by directing new military leadership to conduct more strategically-focused operations and undertaking measures to address security sector corruption. Nonetheless, concerns over the Nigerian response—in particular, over reported human rights abuses by security forces—continue to constrain some donor support and collaboration.
In view of the growing impact Boko Haram has had on neighboring Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, U.S. officials have increasingly sought to support programs to improve counterterrorism coordination between Nigeria and its neighbors, and to improve each country's capacity to contain the group. U.S. security assistance to the Lake Chad Basin countries has increased significantly in recent years—all four countries benefit from a $40 million Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) program that began in FY2014, and the region is a focal area for the Administration's new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). In total, Boko Haram-related counterterrorism assistance to the region has totaled more than $400 million to date, though support for Nigeria's military has been constrained by human rights and policy concerns. In October 2015, the Obama Administration announced the deployment of up to 300 U.S. troops, along with surveillance drones, to Cameroon to assist in regional counter-Boko Haram effort.
Boko Haram has attracted increasing attention from Members of Congress. Relevant legislation includes S.Res. 433 and H.Res. 573 ("Condemning the abduction of female students by armed militants from the terrorist group known as Boko Haram") in the 113th Congress; and H.Res. 46 ("Condemning the recent terrorist attacks in Nigeria that resulted in the deaths of over 2,000 innocent persons"); H.R. 2027 ("Boko Haram Disarmament and Northeast Nigeria Recovery Act of 2015"); and S. 1632 ("To require a regional strategy to address the threat posed by Boko Haram") in the 114th Congress. |
crs_R45024 | crs_R45024_0 | Introduction
Three need-based student financial aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA)—Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program, the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program—are collectively referred to as the "campus-based" programs. These programs are considered campus-based because federal funds are awarded directly to institutions of higher education (IHEs) that administer the programs and provide institutional funds to match the federal funds they receive for them. The campus-based programs' authorizations of appropriations, along with many other provisions under the HEA, expired at the end of FY2015. The FSEOG and FWS programs have continued to be funded through annual appropriation bills, most recently through the Continuing Appropriations Act 2018 ( P.L. 115-56 ), which extended funding for the programs through December 8, 2017. The Perkins Loan program was amended and extended through FY2017 under the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (Extension Act; P.L. 114-105 ). The Extension Act prohibits future appropriations for the Perkins Loan program and prohibits an automatic extension of it under the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA; P.L. The campus-based programs are among the oldest of the federal financial aid programs. As federal aid has largely transitioned to a system that allows for "portability" in receipt of student aid, meaning that most forms of aid are made available to students at whichever participating institution a student chooses to attend, the campus-based programs have come to play a relatively smaller role in the federal student aid effort. As lawmakers consider reauthorization of the HEA, several issues related to the campus-based programs may be considered. These include the extent to which the campus-based programs provide types of aid to students that are not provided via other postsecondary aid programs, whether the current formula for allocating funds to institutions is optimal, and the potential role of the campus-based aid programs in a redesigned federal aid system. Provisions specific to each program, such as requirements for community service under FWS and terms and conditions of Perkins Loans, are also likely to be considered. However, Section 422 of GEPA automatically extended the programs' authorizations through FY2015. | Three need-based student financial aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA)—Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program, the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program—are collectively referred to as the "campus-based" programs. These programs are considered campus-based because federal funds are awarded directly to institutions of higher education (IHEs) that administer the programs and provide institutional funds to match the federal funds they receive for them.
The campus-based programs are among the oldest of the federal student financial aid programs. As federal aid has largely transitioned to a system that allows for "portability" in receipt of student aid, meaning that most forms of aid are made available to students at whichever participating institution a student chooses to attend, the campus-based programs have come to play a relatively smaller role in the federal student aid effort.
The campus-based programs' authorizations of appropriations, along with many other provisions under the HEA, were set to expire at the end of FY2014, and were automatically extended through FY2015 under Section 422 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA). The FSEOG and FWS programs have continued to be funded through annual appropriation bills, most recently through the Continuing Appropriations Act 2018 (P.L. 115-56), which extended the programs through December 8, 2017. The Perkins Loan program was amended and extended through FY2017 under the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (Extension Act; P.L. 114-105). The Extension Act prohibits future appropriations for the Perkins Loan program and prohibits an automatic extension of it under GEPA.
During consideration of reauthorization of the HEA, several issues related to the campus-based programs may be considered. These include the extent to which the campus-based programs provide types of aid to students that are not provided via other postsecondary aid programs, whether the current formula for allocating funds to institutions is optimal, and the potential role of the campus-based aid programs in a redesigned federal aid system. Provisions specific to each program, such as requirements for community service under FWS and terms and conditions of Perkins Loans, are also likely to be considered. |
crs_RL33577 | crs_RL33577_0 | At the microeconomic level, imports of specific products can generate trade friction and pressures from constituent interests for the government to shield U.S. producers from foreign competition, provide adjustment assistance, open foreign markets, or assist U.S. industries to become more competitive. This report provides an overview of the current status, trends, and forecasts for U.S. import and export flows as well as certain trade balances. For the year 2011, U.S. merchandise exports to the world rose 16%, U.S. merchandise imports also rose 16%, and the U.S. trade deficit rose 15%, from $645 billion in 2010 to $738 billion in 2011. Because imports are greater than exports, exports must increase at a greater percentage than imports to maintain the current trade balance. As the world is recovering from the great recession countries are vying to capture the increase in global trade by keeping the value of their currencies low, particularly China. In 2009, the U.S. deficit in merchandise trade dropped by more than one-third, relative to 2008, to $506 billion, as the U.S. recession caused imports to decline faster than exports. Trade in Goods
Exports of goods of $1,497 billion in 2011 increased by $208 billion or 16% over the $1,289 billion in 2010. Imports of goods of $2,236 billion increased by $302 billion or 16% over 2010. The impact of the global financial crisis on U.S. goods trade and the slow recovery can be seen in both Figure 2 and Table 1 . This trend continued until exports of goods began to increase in May 2009 and imports began to increase in June. In 2011, exports of goods and services of $2,103 billion and imports of $2,663 billion resulted in a deficit of $560 billion. In 2011 the annual trade deficit on goods and services amounted to approximately 3.7% of U.S. GDP (U.S. GDP was $15,076 billion in 2011), up from 3.4% in 2010 but down from 4.8% in 2008, 5.1% in 2007, and 5.8% in 2006. The Trade Deficit and the Dollar
Overall U.S. trade deficits reflect a shortage of savings in the domestic economy and a reliance on capital imports to finance that shortfall. Merchandise exports in 2011 totaled $1,480 billion, while imports reached $2,208 billion (Census basis). In 2011, the U.S. deficit on current account rose to $466 billion from $442 billion in 2010. The U.S. current account deficit decreased from 2007 through 2009, which largely reflected the decline in the trade deficit during the financial crisis, though due to an increase in investment income receipts from abroad the current account deficit began declining earlier than the merchandise trade deficit. In 2011 the U.S. trade deficit with China increased by 8%, with Japan 5%, and fell (became less negative) with Mexico by 3%. In 2011, the United States had a large investment income surplus with the European Union and Canada, but large investment income deficits with China and Japan. Inflows of capital to compensate for the U.S. trade deficit and a low U.S. savings rate help to maintain the value of the dollar, but interest paid and other income that accrues to that capital is often repatriated to the home countries. For example, although the United States has an overall deficit in energy trade, it has a small trade surplus in coal. | The global financial crisis and the U.S. recession, during the 19 months from December 2007 through June 2009, caused the U.S. trade deficit to decrease, or lessen, from August 2008 through May 2009. Since then it has begun to increase again as recovery has commenced. The financial crisis caused U.S. imports to drop faster than U.S. exports, but that trend has reversed as U.S. demand for imports recovers.
Exports of goods of $1,497 billion in 2011 increased from 2010 by $209 billion or 16%, while imports of goods of $2,236 billion in 2011 increased by $302 billion, also 16%, over 2010. Though both exports and imports increased by 16%, this led to an increase in the overall merchandise trade deficit (i.e., the trade balance became more negative) for 2011 of $93 billion or 15% over 2010. Because imports are greater than exports, exports must increase at a greater percentage than imports to maintain the current trade balance.
In 2011, the trade deficit in goods reached $738 billion on a balance of payments (BoP) basis, still lower than the previous peak of $836 billion in 2006, but greater than the deficits in 2009 and 2010 of $506 billion and $645 billion. The 2011 U.S. deficit on merchandise trade (Census basis) with China was $295.4 billion, with the European Union (EU27) was $99.9 billion, with Canada was $34.5 billion, with Japan was $63.2 billion, and with Mexico was $64.5 billion. With the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), the trade balance moved from a deficit of $5.5 billion in 2007 to surpluses increasing from $2.2 billion in 2008 to $15.4 billion in 2011.
Related to the goods trade balance is the balance on the current account, which includes merchandise and services trade plus investment income and unilateral transfers. The deficit on the current account grew in 2011 to $466 billion from $442 billion in 2010. This smaller increase in the current account deficit ($24 billion), as compared to the increase in the goods trade deficit ($93 billion), reflects an increase in the U.S. surplus in both services trade and investment income.
Trade deficits are a concern for Congress because they may generate trade friction and pressures for the government to do more to open foreign markets, to shield U.S. producers from foreign competition, or to assist U.S. industries to become more competitive. Overall U.S. trade deficits reflect excess spending (a shortage of savings) in the domestic economy and a reliance on capital imports to finance that shortfall. Capital inflows serve to offset the outflow of dollars used to pay for imports. Movements in the exchange rate help to balance trade. The rising trade deficit (when not matched by capital inflows) places downward pressure on the value of the dollar, which, in turn, helps to shrink the deficit by making U.S. exports cheaper and imports more expensive. However, interventions in foreign exchange markets by countries such as China and South Korea can keep the value of their currencies from rising too fast, thus keeping the dollar strong and imports cheaper.
Areas to watch in 2012 in international trade include the energy and transportation sectors. In energy, unconventional oil and gas production are increasing U.S. domestic supply, reducing imports, and increasing exports. In transportation, U.S. automakers appear to be exporting well to growth markets such as China.
Note: This report is current through U.S. Department of Commerce annual data revisions, published June 8, 2012, and Bureau of Economic Analysis revisions published June 14, 2012. |
crs_R44147 | crs_R44147_0 | T he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) includes a 40% excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health insurance coverage, often referred to as the Cadillac tax . If a tax is owed, it is levied on the entity providing the coverage (e.g., the health insurance issuer or the employer). Under the ACA, the excise tax was to go into effect in 2018; however, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (CAA of 2016; P.L. 114-113 ) delays implementation until 2020. This report provides an overview of the excise tax. The information in this report is based on statute and two notices issued by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Excise Tax on High-Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage
Many employers offer health insurance plans and other health-related benefits (e.g., health care flexible spending accounts, or FSAs). Beginning in 2020, a 40% excise tax is to be assessed on the aggregate cost of an employee's applicable coverage that exceeds a dollar limit during a taxable period. The entity responsible for paying the excise tax to the IRS is the coverage provider. The terms applicable coverage, dollar limit, and coverage provider are defined and described in more detail below. The Department of the Treasury has not yet issued the 2020 limits, but the Congressional Research Service estimates they will be about $10,800 for single coverage and $29,100 for non-single coverage. In general, the employer is responsible for calculating the aggregate amount of applicable coverage that is in excess of the threshold and determining each coverage provider's applicable share of the tax. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) includes a 40% excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health coverage. This excise tax is often called the Cadillac tax. Under the ACA, the excise tax was to be implemented beginning in 2018; however, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-113) delays implementation until 2020.
The excise tax applies to the aggregate cost of an employee's applicable coverage that exceeds a dollar limit. Applicable coverage includes, but is not limited to, the employer's and the employee's contribution to health insurance premiums and certain contributions to tax-advantaged health accounts (e.g., health care flexible spending accounts, or FSAs).
In 2020, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates the dollar limits will be about $10,800 for single coverage and $29,100 for non-single (e.g., family) coverage. The dollar limits may be adjusted based on growth in health insurance premiums and characteristics of an employer's workforce. Additionally, the dollar limits are to be adjusted for inflation in subsequent years.
The entity providing the coverage, the coverage provider, is responsible for paying its share of the excise tax. A coverage provider may be an employer, a health insurer, or another entity that sponsors the coverage. The employer is responsible for calculating the amount of tax owed by each coverage provider (if any).
All of this information is covered in more detail in this report, which provides an overview of how the excise tax is to be implemented. The information in the report is based on statute and guidance issued by the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. |
crs_R42664 | crs_R42664_0 | A separatist rebellion launched in late 2011 by members of the northern-based minority ethnic Tuareg community, known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), aggravated intra-military and political tensions in the country. In March 2012, junior military officers overthrew a democratically elected government in a coup, a month ahead of scheduled national elections. Islamist extremist groups, who had initially fought alongside the separatists, took advantage of the ensuing chaos to expand their presence in Mali's vast, Saharan north. It has suffered from internal divisions, military interference, and limited popular legitimacy. France launched military operations in northern Mali on January 11, 2013, after Islamist fighters—following months of stalemate—suddenly advanced toward the south and defeated Malian military forces in the central town of Konna. France's decision marked an abrupt, major shift in international responses to the situation in Mali, as policymakers had previously emphasized that any solution in Mali had to be African-led. Since then, French forces have made rapid gains in reclaiming cities and towns in the north. Thousands of African troops have deployed to Mali under the U.N.-authorized African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), but their capacity to counter an insurgency or prevent terrorist attacks is likely to be limited. The U.N. Security Council is currently considering options for transitioning AFISMA into a fully U.N.-conducted operation. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign aid and defense funding, and conducts oversight of U.S. policies and programs. U.S. security assistance to Malian forces has been suspended in line with congressionally mandated restrictions triggered by the coup (see "U.S. Policy"). Looking ahead, Congress may weigh the authorities, available funding, and policies related to ongoing U.S. support for French and regional military deployments to Mali, and whether unilateral U.S. action is required, justified, or wise. Congress may seek to assess previous U.S. security engagement in Mali and the region, and explore options for future U.S. aid and policy initiatives. The United States is also the leading bilateral donor of humanitarian aid to Mali and the Sahel region in response to the ongoing regional food security emergency. Context and Current Issues
Mali's instability stems from both internal and external factors. Assessing AQIM and Associated Groups
AQIM, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), has seized opportunities from the past two years of instability in North Africa and in Mali to increase its regional influence and, possibly, its capacity. Grassroots movements advocating conservative Islamic practices have also gained momentum in Mali (including in the south), having been active in the region for decades. The AU has requested that the Security Council authorize a U.N. "peace enforcement" operation "within the framework of action-oriented assistance to the Malian government." Questions remain as to whether a U.N. stabilization operation can be effectively deployed in the midst of ongoing counterterrorism operations, and in a volatile and dangerous security environment. Humanitarian Conditions
Insecurity in Mali has aggravated a regional food security emergency. The United States is the largest bilateral humanitarian donor to the region. As noted above, the United States has provided support for French and African military operations, bolstered U.S. surveillance capacities in the region, and provided new aid to neighboring states to repel insurgent infiltration, while reportedly debating direct U.S. targeted strikes on terrorist targets. These debates appear set to continue amid ongoing examination by Congress of the legal and policy environment for U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Mali and the Sahel. What are the implications for international policymakers of coup leader Capt. | For the past 18 months, Mali has been mired in overlapping security, political, and humanitarian crises. A separatist rebellion launched in 2011 aggravated intra-military and political tensions in the country. In March 2012, junior military officers—led by a former participant in U.S. training programs—carried out a coup that overthrew a democratically elected government. Islamist extremist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, took advantage of the ensuing chaos to expand their presence in Mali's vast, Saharan north. In the capital, Bamako, located in the south, the interim government formed in the wake of the coup has faced internal divisions, military interference, limited popular legitimacy, and economic constraints. Mali's crises have been driven by both internal and external factors, including a surge in regional arms and combatant flows from Libya. In turn, insecurity in Mali has displaced nearly half a million people and exacerbated poor regional humanitarian conditions.
On January 11, 2013, France launched military operations in Mali, following a request from the Malian government for help in repelling a sudden insurgent advance toward the south. This marked a sudden and major shift in international responses, as regional and Western policymakers had previously emphasized that any solution in Mali had to be African-led. French forces have made rapid gains in the north, but whether these can be sustained remains to be seen. African militaries also have begun deploying to Mali under the U.N.-authorized African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Some—notably those from Chad—may be prepared for desert counterinsurgency, but nearly all suffer from severe capacity shortfalls. France has expressed a desire to begin withdrawing troops in April, while the U.N. Security Council is currently considering options for transitioning AFISMA into a fully U.N.-conducted operation. Whether a U.N. operation can be successful, and in what conditions, is under discussion.
The United States has provided logistical and intelligence support to ongoing French operations in Mali, pledged $96 million in support for AFISMA, and provided new security assistance to neighboring states. U.S. policymakers have also reportedly debated the potential for unilateral action against terrorist actors in the region. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States is playing a key role in discussion of AFISMA's future status and funding. The Obama Administration also continues to call for Mali to organize national elections, and for reconciliation efforts to address political, ethnic, and regional cleavages.
Congress authorizes and appropriates funding for foreign aid and defense programs in Mali and the Sahel region, and may further shape U.S. policy through legislation and oversight activities. Direct U.S. assistance to the Malian security forces—along with several other types of foreign aid—has been suspended in line with congressionally mandated restrictions triggered by the coup. The aid restrictions do not affect humanitarian assistance, of which the United States is the leading bilateral donor in the region, or election support. Looking forward, Congress may consider issues related to U.S. support for international military operations in Mali; whether unilateral U.S. action is required or wise; and future U.S. aid to Mali and the region. Congress may also seek to assess the successes and failures of previous U.S. security engagements in Mali and the region, and consider the possible implications of the situation in Mali for U.S. counterterrorism and good governance efforts in Africa and beyond. See also CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40449 | crs_R40449_0 | Background
The United States and the European Union (EU) have engaged in a long-standing and acrimonious trade dispute over the EU's decision to ban hormone-treated meat, dating back to the early 1980s. Despite an ongoing series of dispute settlement proceedings and decisions by the World Trade Organization (WTO), there is continued disagreement between the United States and the EU on a range of legal and procedural issues, as well as the scientific evidence and consensus concerning the safety of hormone-treated beef. The EU claimed this action constituted an "escalation" of the dispute and was "more punitive" than current trade sanctions. In May 2009, following a series of negotiations, the United States and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which phased in certain changes over the next several years. As part of this MOU, the EU granted market access to U.S. exports of beef raised without the use of growth promotants, and the United States suspended its retaliatory tariffs for imported EU products under the dispute. However, in December 2016, USTR took steps to reinstate retaliatory tariffs on the list of EU products under the dispute given continued concerns about U.S. beef access to the EU market. This issue has also been raised in ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and the EU to establish a free trade area as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). To date, the EU continues to ban imports of hormone-treated meat and restricts most meat exports to the EU to a limited quantity of beef imports that are certified as produced without the use of hormones, beta agonists, and other growth promotants. Initially the ban covered meat and meat products from animals treated with six growth promotants that are approved for use and administered in the United States, including estradiol, testosterone, progesterone, zeranol, trenbolone acetate and melengestrol acetate. In 2003, the commission amended its policy to permanently ban one hormone—estradiol-17β—while provisionally banning the use of the five other hormones, as it continued to seek more complete scientific information. The United States continues to question whether the EU has conducted an adequate risk assessment to support its position, and maintains there is a clear worldwide scientific consensus supporting the safety to consumers of eating hormone-treated meat. To further complicate matters, in October 2008, the WTO issued a mixed ruling that allows the United States to continue its trade sanctions, but also allows the EU to maintain its ban. Earlier in 1996, both the United States and the EU had requested WTO consultations in an attempt to resolve the dispute. In January 2009, USTR announced changes to the list of EU products subject to increased tariffs under the dispute, adding countries and raising the tariff on select products. A 1997 WTO decision found that the EU's ban on imports of hormone-treated meat was inconsistent with the EU's WTO obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement since the EU had not conducted a risk assessment. In response, the EU commissioned 17 studies to address the scientific basis of the import ban on meat and meat products and animals treated with hormones for growth promotion purposes. Revised Retaliation List (January 2009)
Appendix C. "Reduced" Product List (March 2009)
Appendix D. Chronology of the U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute
1981-1988— The European Commission institutes a series of restrictions on livestock production (Directives 81/602, 88/146, and 88/299) limiting the use of natural hormones to therapeutic purposes, banning the use of synthetic hormones, and prohibiting imports of animals and meat from animals that have been administered with hormones. The EU delays implementing its ban until January 1, 1989. The United States institutes retaliatory tariffs (100% ad valorem ) on EU imports valued at $93 million, which remain in effect until May 1996, when the EU seeks a WTO panel against the U.S. action. The United States requests a WTO dispute settlement panel case against the EU, claiming the ban is inconsistent with the EU's WTO obligations. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announces its decision to impose a 100% ad valorem rate of duty on a specified list of products from certain EU member states, effective July 29. | The United States and the European Union (EU) have engaged in a long-standing and acrimonious trade dispute over the EU's decision to ban hormone-treated meat. Despite an ongoing series of dispute settlement proceedings and decisions by the World Trade Organization (WTO), there is continued disagreement between the United States and the EU on a range of legal and procedural issues, as well as the scientific evidence and consensus concerning the safety of hormone-treated beef. To date, the EU continues to ban imports of hormone-treated meat and restricts most meat exports to the European Union to a limited quantity of beef imports that are certified as produced without the use of hormones.
Starting in 1981, the EU adopted restrictions on livestock production limiting the use of natural hormones to therapeutic purposes, banning the use of synthetic hormones, and prohibiting imports of animals and meat from animals that have been administered the hormones. In 1989, the EU fully implemented its ban on imports of meat and meat products from animals treated with growth promotants. Initially the ban covered six growth promotants that are approved for use and administered in the United States. The EU amended its ban in 2003, permanently banning one hormone—estradiol-17β—while provisionally banning the use of the five other hormones.
As part of this dispute, the United States suspended trade concessions with the EU by imposing higher import tariffs on EU products. The first U.S. action in 1989 imposed retaliatory tariffs of 100% ad valorem duty on selected food products, and remained in effect until 1996. The second U.S. action in 1999 again imposed a 100% ad valorem duty on selected foods from EU countries.
Over the years, the United States and the EU have attempted to resolve this dispute through a series of WTO dispute consultations, settlement panels, arbitration proceedings, and formal appeals. One of the earlier WTO panel decisions in 1997 ruled against the EU on the grounds that the ban is inconsistent with the EU's WTO obligations under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement because the EU had not conducted a risk assessment. In response, the EU commissioned studies and reviews to address the scientific basis of its ban on hormone-treated meat. Following each of these reviews, the EU reaffirmed its position that there are possible risks to human health associated with hormone-treated meat, given the available scientific data. The EU claims it has complied with its WTO obligations and has challenged the United States for maintaining its prohibitive import tariffs on EU products. The United States disputes whether the EU has conducted an adequate risk assessment to support its position and maintains there is a clear worldwide scientific consensus supporting the safety to consumers of eating hormone-treated meat. In October 2008, the WTO issued a mixed ruling allowing the United States to continue its trade sanctions, but allowing the EU to maintain its ban.
In January 2009, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced its intent to make changes to the list of EU products subject to increased tariffs under the dispute, including changes to the EU countries and products affected, and higher tariffs on some products. The EU claimed this action constituted an "escalation" of the dispute. In May 2009, following a series of negotiations, the United States and the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which phased in certain changes over the next several years. As part of this MOU, the EU granted new market access to U.S. exports of beef raised without the use of growth promotants, and the United States suspended its retaliatory tariffs on certain EU products. However, in December 2016, USTR took steps to reinstate retaliatory tariffs on the list of EU products under the dispute given continued concerns about U.S. beef access to the EU market. This issue has also been raised in ongoing trade negotiations between the United States and the EU to establish a free trade area as part of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). |
crs_R40439 | crs_R40439_0 | Overview
Since 1945, seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have developed and currently deploy nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a low-yield nuclear explosive device in October 2006, announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test in May 2009, and announced a third test on February 12, 2013. Israel is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons, although it maintains a policy of ambiguity on this matter. This report describes the organizations controlling research and development (R&D) on nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that carry them) in these nations, and presents a brief history of the organizations controlling nuclear weapons R&D in the United States. It discusses whether these organizations are civilian or military, though in many nations the lines between civilian and military are blurred. This information may be of use to Members of Congress and their staff interested in nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters. United States
The U.S. program for research, development, and production of nuclear weapons began during World War II. Ever since, nuclear weapons R&D has been conducted by the AEC and its successor organizations, all of which have been under civilian control and separate from DOD. 179, the members of the council are the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy (who is also the Administrator of NNSA), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command. The FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239 , Section 3166, established the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, with an interim report due by July 2013 and a final report due by February 2014. While the legislation addressed the "nuclear security enterprise," the conference report made clear that the panel was "to address the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA." China
The research, development, and production of nuclear weapons in the People's Republic of China (PRC) appear to be under the control of the military, which is collectively called the People's Liberation Army (PLA). France
France's nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the French Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission ( Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux energies alternatives , or CEA). As is the case for other CEA directorates, DAM is not a part of the Ministry of Defense or any other government ministry. India
The organizations concerned with research and development for India's nuclear weapons all appear to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which was set up in 1954 under the direct charge of the Prime Minister. Israel's nuclear program is under civilian control. At that point, the IAEC reportedly assumed overall responsibility for Israel's nuclear weapons program. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un heads this body. At the top of the operational organization is North Korea's Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, a full-fledged cabinet ministry. Pakistan
The National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan's organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is Chairperson of the NCA. United Kingdom
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is responsible for the design, production, assembly, and maintenance of the UK's nuclear weapons, as well as decommissioning and disassembly. In 1993, AWE was made a government-owned, contractor-operated entity, and its management was contracted to the private consortium Hunting-BRAE. | Seven nations—China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—possess nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006, and announced that it had conducted a test in 2009 and another in 2013. Israel is widely thought to have nuclear weapons. As an aid to Congress in understanding nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters, this report describes which agency is responsible for research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that deliver them) in these nations and whether these agencies are civilian or military. It also traces the history of such agencies in the United States from 1942 to the present. This report will be updated annually, or more often as developments warrant.
In the United States, the Army managed the nuclear weapons program during World War II. Since 1946, weapons R&D has been managed by civilian agencies, at present by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy. Concerns about "the immediate and long-term issues associated with the NNSA," however, led Congress to establish the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 112-239.
China's nuclear weapons R&D is apparently under the direction of the military, collectively called the People's Liberation Army.
France's nuclear weapons R&D is supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which delegates the direction of these programs to the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission (CEA). However, as with NNSA in the United States, CEA is not a part of the Ministry of Defense. CEA also conducts nuclear programs in science and industry under the supervision of other ministries.
India's nuclear weapons R&D appears to be controlled by the Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the direct control of the Prime Minister.
Israel's nuclear program is under civilian control, but since Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it classifies information on such weapons, including organizations responsible for R&D. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission reportedly has overall responsibility for Israel's nuclear weapons program, and the Director General of that commission reports directly to the Prime Minister.
North Korea's Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the nuclear weapons program. Under it are nuclear-related organizations. Policy is decided by leader Kim Jong-un and other Communist Party and military leaders who advise him.
Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan's organizations involved in nuclear weapons R&D and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister is the chair of the NCA, and membership includes senior civilian and military leaders.
Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for nuclear weapons R&D and production. It is a civilian agency, though it has many links to the military.
In the United Kingdom, a private company, AWE Management Limited, manages and operates the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), a government-owned, contractor-operated entity. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is headed by a civilian, controls the operations, policy, and direction of AWE and can veto actions of the company. The MoD provides most of the funding for AWE.
This update revises the section on Israel. The balance of the report is updated to February 2013. |
crs_R42368 | crs_R42368_0 | Introduction
Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget may also include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. President Obama submitted his FY2013 budget to Congress on February 13, 2012. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) among other activities. With the Medicare physician payment adjustment, the estimated impact of the legislative proposals, and the estimated savings from program integrity investments ($0.6 billion), the President's budget estimates CMS's net outlays will be $829.4 billion in FY2013, which is an increase of $72.3 billion, or 9.5%, over the net outlays for FY2012. This report summarizes the President's budget estimates for each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. The explanations of the President's legislative proposals are grouped by the following program areas: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, and health insurance programs. At the end of each of these sections, there is a table summarizing the estimated costs or savings for each legislative proposal. Budget Summaries
For budgetary purposes, CMS is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, program integrity, state grants and demonstrations, health insurance programs, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), and program management. The budget includes a number of legislative proposals for Medicare. Legislative Proposals
The President's FY2013 budget contains a number of proposals that would impact the CMS budget. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending. | Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget may also include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. While the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law, such as Medicare benefits, such changes are generally included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2013 budget to Congress on February 13, 2012.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), among other activities. The President's budget estimates CMS's net mandatory and discretionary outlays will be $829.4 billion in FY2013, which is an increase of $72.3 billion, or 9.5%, over the net outlays for FY2012. This estimate includes a Medicare physician payment adjustment, the estimated impact of the legislative proposals, and the estimated savings from program integrity investments.
For budgetary purposes, CMS is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, program integrity, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance protections and programs, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, and program management. The President's FY2013 budget contains a number of legislative proposals that would affect the CMS budget. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending.
This report summarizes the President's budget estimates for each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. The explanations of the President's legislative proposals are grouped by the following program areas: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, and health insurance programs. At the end of each of these sections, there is a table summarizing the estimated costs or savings for each legislative proposal. |
crs_RL34721 | crs_RL34721_0 | The ESEA contains 45 separately authorized programs, plus approximately 20 specified sub-programs. The methods by which federal funds are provided to grantees under these programs fall into five general categories:
programs under which federal funds are allocated by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to states, as well as to all or most LEAs via one or more formulas specified in the ESEA (example: ESEA Title I, Part A, Education for the Disadvantaged); programs under which federal funds are allocated by ED to states via a statutory formula, while state educational agencies (SEAs) suballocate these funds either on a competitive or discretionary basis, or via a state-developed allocation formula consistent with general statutory guidance (example: ESEA Title IV, Part B, 21 st Century Community Learning Centers); programs under which federal funds are allocated by ED directly to LEAs via formulas specified in the ESEA (example: ESEA Title VIII, Impact Aid); programs under which federal funds are allocated by ED to state and/or local grantees on a competitive or discretionary basis (example: ESEA Title V, Part D, Subpart 6, Gifted and Talented Students); and programs under which federal funds are allocated by ED to a single eligible grantee specified in the ESEA (example: ESEA Title II, Part C, Subpart 2, National Writing Project). They take the form of mathematical equations through which ED, and possibly also SEAs, calculate specific grant amounts for each potential grantee meeting statutory eligibility criteria. They almost always include one or more population factors, but typically include a number of additional factors. This report will be updated infrequently, when major changes occur in ESEA program allocation formulas. As illustrated in Table 1 , the recipients of a majority of the funds under almost all ESEA formula grant programs are LEAs. Under most of these programs, grants are provided to LEAs via SEAs: that is, they are "state-administered formula grant" programs. Funds are allocated by ED directly to LEAs only under a limited number of ESEA programs. As listed in Table 3 , there are five ESEA programs under which grants are made, in part or in full, on the basis of LEA grants calculated under Title I, Part A. A few programs have only one, but not both of these fiscal accountability provisions. Eligibility Threshold. The Secretary may also reserve funds for research. Expenditure Factor. Population Factor. LEA Minimum Grant. Expenditure Factor. As seen in Table 13 , the share of public K-12 education revenues that is provided under ESEA programs varies substantially among the states, although ESEA funding constitutes only approximately one-tenth or less of total public K-12 education revenues in all cases except Puerto Rico. This variation results largely from 3 factors: the varying impact of "caps" placed on state minimums under the Title I-A allocation formulas; variations in school-age child poverty rates (a higher poverty rate is associated with higher grants per school-age child but, at least in the smallest states, lower grants per school-age child from a poor family); and the eligibility of Alaska for substantial funds under Titles VII and VIII. Thus, the smallest states receive approximately 1.7 times as much as the remaining states per school-age child, and approximately 2.2 times as much per school-age child from a poor family. First, the average grant per school-age child increases as the state average poverty rate rises, from $309 per child for low poverty states to $363 for states in the middle range to $445 for high poverty states, 1.44 times as much as for low poverty states. At the same time, an opposite trend is found in average grants per school-age child in a poor family. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) contains 45 separately authorized programs, plus approximately 20 specified sub-programs. The largest of these programs distribute funds by formulas that prescribe how funds are to be allocated among state educational agencies (SEAs) or local educational agencies (LEAs) nationwide. They take the form of mathematical equations through which the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and in many cases also SEAs, calculate grant amounts for each potential grantee meeting statutory eligibility criteria. They almost always include one or more population factors and may also include state or LEA minimum grant provisions, eligibility thresholds, expenditure factors, fiscal accountability provisions, and reservations of funds for a variety of purposes.
The recipients of a majority of the funds under almost all ESEA formula grant programs are LEAs. Under most of these programs, grants are provided to LEAs via SEAs: that is, they are "state-administered formula grant" programs. Funds are allocated by ED directly to LEAs only under a limited number of ESEA programs. The most influential ESEA allocation formulas are those under the Title I-A program, both because this is the largest ESEA program and because there are five ESEA programs under which grants are made, in part or in full, in proportion to grants calculated under Title I, Part A. As a result, a majority of ESEA funds are allocated under formulas in which the primary population factor is school-age children in poor families, and state expenditure factors are applied.
The share of all public K-12 education revenues that is provided under ESEA programs varies substantially among the states, although ESEA funding constitutes only approximately one-tenth or less of total public K-12 education revenues in all cases except Puerto Rico. The average ESEA program grant per school-age child (poor and non-poor) increases as the state average poverty rate rises, with the third of states having the highest poverty rates receiving 1.4 times as much as low poverty states. At the same time, an opposite trend is found in average ESEA grants per school-age child in a poor family, with low poverty states receiving 1.3 times as much as states with the highest poverty rates.
Most ESEA allocation formulas include state or LEA minimum grant provisions. As a result, states with the smallest school-age population receive approximately 1.7 times as much as the remaining states per school-age child, and approximately 2.2 times as much per school-age child from a poor family.
This report will be updated if substantial changes are made in one or more ESEA program allocation formulas. |
crs_RL33743 | crs_RL33743_0 | L egislation to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), formerly called fast track, was introduced as the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-2015) ( H.R. The legislation was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on April 22, 2015, and by the House Ways and Means Committee on April 23, 2015. 1314 (an unrelated revenue measure), and the legislation passed on May 22 by a vote of 62-37. In the House of Representatives, the measure was voted on under a procedure known as "division of the question," which requires separate votes on each component, but approval of both to pass. On June 12, TPA (Title I) passed by a vote of 219-211, but TAA (Title II) was defeated 126-302. On June 18, the House again voted on TPA, in an amendment identical to the Senate version attached to H.R. 2146 , an unrelated House bill. This amendment did not include TAA. This legislation passed the House by a vote of 218-206, and, subsequently, by the Senate on June 24. TPA is the process Congress has made available to the President to enable legislation to approve and implement certain international trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative procedures for limited periods, provided the President observes certain statutory obligations. On July 30, 2013, President Obama first publicly requested that Congress reauthorize TPA. He restated his request for TPA during his January 20, 2015, State of the Union address. Legislation to renew TPA was introduced in the 113 th Congress ( H.R. 3830 ) ( S. 1900 ), but it was not acted upon. The details of the legislation are likely to be subject to considerable debate, including the specific treatment of any related TAA program reauthorization. This report presents background and analysis on the development of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the expired authority, and a discussion of the issues that have arisen in the debate over TPA renewal. It also explores some of the policy options available to Congress. Four other trade negotiations in progress that could result in agreements that would likely require TPA to pass implementing legislation include (1) the multilateral Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO); (2) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); (3) the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); and (4) the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). TPA strikes a delicate balance by clarifying how Congress chooses to exercise its constitutional authority over a particular aspect of trade policy, while presumably giving the President additional negotiating leverage by effectively assuring U.S. trade partners that a final agreement will be given timely and unamended consideration by Congress. Over time, however, trade negotiations have become more complex. A Brief History of TPA
TPA is the product of many decades of debate, cooperation, and compromise between Congress and the executive branch. 93-618). Subsequent Renewals of Trade Agreements Authority
The expedited legislative procedures have not changed since first enacted in 1974. 3009 ; P.L. 1890 ). The Elements of TPA
Through TPA/fast track, in its various iterations, Congress has sought to achieve four major goals in the context of supporting trade negotiations: (1) to define trade policy priorities and to have those priorities reflected in trade agreement negotiating objectives; (2) to ensure that the executive branch adheres to these objectives by requiring periodic notification and consultation with Congress; (3) to define the terms, conditions, and procedures under which the President may enter into trade agreements and under which the respective implementing bills may be approved; and (4) to reaffirm Congress's overall constitutional authority over trade by placing limitations on the trade agreements authority. For this reason, trade negotiating objectives stand at the center of the congressional debate on TPA. The President must also conduct specific notifications and consultations before (and after) agreements are entered into (signed) , to include
1. notifying Congress in writing of his intention to enter into an agreement at least 90 calendar days prior to doing so; 2. consulting with House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, other relevant committees, and the CAGs with respect to the nature of the agreement, how it achieves the purposes defined in TPA, and any potential effects it may have on existing laws; 3. notifying the revenue committees at least 180 calendar days prior to entering into the agreement of any potential changes to U.S. trade remedy laws that may be required; 4. submitting private sector advisory committee reports to Congress, the President, and the USTR no later than 30 calendar days after notifying Congress of his intention to enter into an agreement; 5. providing the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) with trade agreement details at least 90 days before entering into an agreement; 6. presenting to Congress no later than 105 calendar days after the President enters into the agreement, the USITC report on the impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy; and 7. releasing the text of the agreement 60 days prior to entering into an agreement. They can be used to assuage a particular congressional concern. TPA has been a key element of this process. No TPA Renewal . Current Legislation43
In the 114 th Congress, legislation to renew TPA—the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2015—was signed by the President on June 29, 2015. | Legislation to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority ("TPA"), sometimes called "fast track," was signed by President Obama on June 29, 2015 (P.L. 114-26). It was introduced as the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-2015; H.R. 1890/S. 995) on April 16, 2015. The legislation was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on April 22, 2015, and by the House Ways and Means Committee the next day. TPA, as incorporated into H.R. 1314 by substitute amendment, passed the Senate on May 22 by a vote of 62-37. In the House of Representatives, the measure was voted on under a procedure known as "division of the question," which requires separate votes on each component, but approval of both to pass. On June 12, TPA (Title I) passed by a vote of 219-211, but Trade Adjustment Assistance (Title II) was defeated 126-302. A motion to reconsider that vote was laid by Speaker Boehner shortly after that vote. On June 18, the House again voted on TPA, in an amendment identical to the Senate version attached to H.R. 2146, an unrelated House bill. This amendment did not include Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). This legislation passed the House by a vote of 218-206, and the Senate by a vote of 60-38 on June 24, 2015.
TPA is the process Congress has made available to the President to enable legislation to approve and implement certain international trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative procedures for limited periods, provided the President observes certain statutory obligations. TPA defines how Congress has chosen to exercise its constitutional authority over a particular aspect of trade policy, while giving the President added leverage to negotiate trade agreements by effectively assuring U.S. trade partners that final agreements will be given timely and unamended consideration. On July 30, 2013, President Obama first publicly requested that Congress reauthorize TPA, and he reiterated his request for TPA in his January 20, 2015, State of the Union address. Legislation to renew TPA was introduced in the 113th Congress (H.R. 3830) (S. 1900), but it was not acted upon.
TPA reflects decades of debate, cooperation, and compromise between Congress and the executive branch in finding a pragmatic accommodation to the exercise of each branch's respective authorities over trade policy. The expedited legislative procedures have not changed since first codified in the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618). Congress, however, has required that the authority to use TPA be periodically reauthorized, and at times has chosen to revise trade negotiation objectives, the consultative mechanism, and presidential notification requirements. While early versions of fast track/TPA received bipartisan support, later renewal efforts have been more controversial, culminating in a more partisan vote on the 2002 TPA renewal. Future debates on TPA renewal may center on trade negotiation objectives, congressional oversight of trade negotiations, trade agreement enforcement, and clarifying the congressional authority over approval of reciprocal trade agreements and trade policy more generally, among others.
TPA renewal may become a more pressing issue in the 114th Congress because current trade negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) are in progress. Technically, TPA is not necessary to begin or even conclude trade negotiations, but it is widely understood to be a key element of defining congressional authority, and of passing trade agreement implementing legislation. Therefore, its renewal can be construed as signaling serious congressional support for moving ahead with trade negotiations. Addressing congressional concerns over the definition and operation of TPA may be a central part of the debate.
Although there appears to be support for renewal of TPA in Congress, the details of the legislation are likely to be subject to considerable debate, including the specific treatment of any related TAA program reauthorization. This report presents background and analysis on the development of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the expired authority, and a discussion of the issues that have arisen in the debate over TPA renewal. It also explores some of the policy options available to Congress. |
crs_RL31882 | crs_RL31882_0 | Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act (HEA) includes programs and provisions intended to improve the overall quality of the K-12 teacher preparation programs currently administered by higher education institutions, hold these programs accountable for the quality of their graduates, and strengthen recruitment of highly qualified individuals to teaching. 105-244 ) provides for three competitively awarded grants to improve K-12 teacher quality—state grants, partnership grants, and recruitment grants. Appropriated funds are to be divided as follows: 45% to state grants, 45% to partnership grants, and 10% to teacher recruitment grants. Partnership Grants
These one-time, five-year grants are awarded competitively to partnerships that must include at least three entities: a partner institution, a school of arts and sciences at a higher education institution, and a high need local educational agency (LEA). Teacher Recruitment Grants
These one-time, three-year grants are awarded competitively to states or eligible partnerships (meeting the eligibility criteria for the partnership grants). State Reports
States receiving funds under the HEA must prepare an annual report card for the Secretary of Education on the quality of teacher preparation including information on
the pass rate of graduates on all assessments used for teacher certification; waivers of certification requirements, particularly for teachers serving in high and low poverty school districts and in different subject areas; state teacher licensing assessments and requirements; state standards for initial certification; alignment of state teacher assessments with state standards and assessments for students; alternative routes to teacher certification and the pass rates of individuals following such routes; and criteria being used to assess the performance of teacher preparation programs. Low-Performing Teacher Preparation Programs
To continue receiving HEA funds, a state must establish procedures for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs and for providing them with technical assistance. An institution of higher education with a teacher education program that has lost state approval or funding because of its designation as low-performing is ineligible for professional development funding from ED, and cannot enroll any students receiving assistance under HEA Title IV (source of the major federal student aid programs) in its teacher preparation program. During the reauthorization process, the Congress may consider where the emphasis should be placed among these kinds of grants or the kinds of activities being supported. Teacher Preparation Program Accountability Issues
The general accountability provisions of Title II, Part A applicable to states and higher education institutions with teacher preparation programs have generated significant debate since their inception. | The Teacher Quality Enhancement Grants program (Title II, Part A of the Higher Education Act, or HEA) seeks to improve K-12 teacher preparation programs at higher education institutions. Title II Part A authorizes three types of competitively awarded grants—state grants, partnership grants, and recruitment grants—with the annual appropriation divided 45%, 45%, and 10% respectively among these kinds of grants.
State grants are one-time, three-year grants for such activities as holding teacher preparation programs accountable for the quality of their graduates or reforming teacher certification requirements. Partnership grants are one-time, five-year grants to partnerships that must include at least three entities: an institution with a high performing teacher preparation program, a school of arts and sciences, and a high need school district. Among required uses are teacher preparation program accountability and professional development. Recruitment grants are one-time, three-year grants to states or partnerships, supporting scholarships with a teaching service requirement or activities to recruit highly qualified teachers for high need districts and schools.
States receiving HEA funds must report annually on the quality of teacher preparation, including information on the pass rates of graduates on initial certification assessments. Higher education institutions enrolling HEA-aided students in their teacher preparation program must report annually detailing, among other things, the certification exam pass rates of graduates. States must establish procedures for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs. If states withdraw approval or funding due to this designation, the affected programs cannot enroll students receiving HEA Title IV federal student aid.
During the HEA reauthorization process, grant-related issues may include program effectiveness; mandated division of the annual appropriation when most states have received these one-time only grants; and the mix of kinds of grants and activities. Accountability issues may include inconsistency across states in standards for identifying low-performing teacher preparation programs; effectiveness of pass rate-based accountability for teacher preparation programs; reporting by states and institutions of 100% pass rates; and possible alternatives to the current framework.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42129 | crs_R42129_0 | Background
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the perception that the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market contributed to systemic risk, the Dodd-Frank Act ( P.L. 111-203 ) sought to remake the OTC market in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. In the Dodd-Frank Act, some of the crucial reforms included a requirement that swap contracts be cleared through a central counterparty regulated by one or more federal agencies. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract to cover potential losses, and they require subsequent deposits (called maintenance margin) to cover actual losses to the position. The intended effect of margin requirements is to eliminate the possibility that any firm can build up an uncapitalized exposure so large that default would have systemic consequences. While the clearing of derivatives helps to address systemic concerns, it also imposes the cost of posting margin on those who trade derivatives. Many nonfinancial firms complained during the debate over the Dodd-Frank Act that their use of derivatives posed no systemic threat and thus they should not be subjected to the cost of clearing these OTC derivatives. This particular debate came to be known as "the end user debate," as it referred to so-called "end users" of derivatives. As a result of these concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act in Section 723 includes a broad exemption from the clearing requirement for firms that are primarily nonfinancial in nature. Nevertheless, such firms have continued to be concerned that the act could impose indirect costs on them, or that the rulemaking process by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could do so. In addition, concern about derivatives has been fueled by sharp rises in commodity prices—particularly oil—in 2008 and early 2011. Such steep jumps, along with unexplained price volatility in a range of commodities, have fostered apprehension that financial speculation in derivatives might be creating such volatility in commodity prices. For instance, during the course of 2008 oil prices doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then fell by 80%, before rebounding again, while there was little actual interruption of physical supplies. In early 2011, there was again a run-up of about 20%, sending gasoline prices to near 2008 highs. Such severe fluctuations tend to anger consumers and thus are relevant for Congress. In the 112 th Congress, several bills, discussed below, address the impact of financial speculation and derivatives on spot commodity prices. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. Two other bills— H.R. H.R. S.Amdt. 814 to H.R. 2112 . Other Dodd-Frank Amendments
H.R. H.R. H.R. | In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, amid the perception that the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market contributed to systemic risk, the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) sought to remake the OTC market in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Reforms included a requirement that swap contracts be cleared through a clearinghouse regulated by one or more federal agencies. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash (called initial margin) at the time they open a contract to cover potential losses, and they require subsequent deposits (called maintenance margin) to cover actual losses to the position. The intended effect of margin requirements is to prevent firms from building up uncapitalized exposures so large that default would have systemic consequences.
While addressing systemic concerns, the clearing of derivatives also imposes the cost of posting margin on those trading derivatives. Many nonfinancial firms argued during the debate over the Dodd-Frank Act that their use of derivatives posed no systemic threat and thus they should not be subjected to the cost of clearing these OTC derivatives. This particular debate came to be known as "the end user debate." As a result of these concerns, the Dodd-Frank Act included a broad exemption from the clearing requirement for firms that are primarily nonfinancial in nature. Nevertheless, such firms have continued to be concerned that Dodd-Frank could impose indirect costs on them, or that the rulemaking process by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) could do so. As such, some legislation in the 112th Congress, such as H.R. 1610, S. 947, S.Amdt. 814 to H.R. 2112, S. 1650, H.R. 2779, and H.R. 2682, addresses potential indirect costs to "end users."
In addition, concern about derivatives has been fueled by sharp rises in commodity prices—particularly oil—in 2008 and early 2011. Such steep jumps, along with high price volatility in a range of commodities, have fostered apprehension that financial speculation in derivatives might be creating such volatility in commodity prices. For instance, during the course of 2008, oil prices doubled to more than $145 per barrel and then fell by 80% before rebounding, while there was little evidence suggesting disruption of physical supplies. In early 2011, there was again a run-up of about 20%, sending gasoline prices to near 2008 highs. Such severe fluctuations tend to anger consumers, and thus can become an issue for Congress. In the 112th Congress, a number of bills, such as H.R. 2328, S. 1200, H.R. 3006, S. 1598, H.R. 2003, H.R. 3313, and S. 1787 seek to address the impact financial speculation and derivatives may have on spot commodity prices. Other bills introduced in the 112th Congress aim to either tighten or loosen other aspects of derivatives regulation, in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, such as H.R. 2586, H.R. 3045, H.R. 3283, and H.R. 1573.
This report focuses primarily on legislation introduced in the 112th Congress. Additional background on how derivatives work, their role in the financial crisis, and the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on their regulation can be found in another CRS report cited below. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42122 | crs_R42122_0 | Thus far, legislation pertaining to algae-based biofuels has not been introduced in the 113 th Congress. Among its advantages, algae has higher biomass yields per acre of cultivation than other feedstocks, leading to larger oil yields. In addition, ABB production could potentially use carbon dioxide from the flue gas of stationary sources (e.g., power plants), if ABB facilities are co-located with such facilities. Algae and the Renewable Fuel Standard
Many ABB discussions involve its limited eligibility for the RFS2—a mandate requiring that the national fuel supply contain a minimum amount of fuel produced from renewable biomass—compared to other biomass feedstocks. Although ABB is eligible to participate in the RFS2, it does not qualify as an eligible feedstock under the cellulosic biofuel subcategory because it is not defined as cellulosic in the RFS2 regulations. The RFS2 is composed of two biofuel categories: unspecified biofuel and advanced biofuels (or non-corn starch ethanol; see Figure 1 ). The cellulosic biofuels subcategory is ultimately the largest component of the RFS2. Its carve-out is set at 0.5 billion gallons for 2012 (roughly 3% of the RFS2) and ramps up to 16 billion gallons in 2022 (roughly 44% of the RFS2). The biomass-based diesel carve-out of the advanced biofuel category (the portion that algae-based biofuels do qualify for) had a 2013 mandate of 1.28 billion gallons, and EPA proposes a 2014 and 2015 mandate for the same amount. The biomass-based diesel volume for 2016 to 2022 has not been set and will be determined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in future rulemaking, but is to be no less than 1 billion gallons. Even with an RFS2 mandate and tax credits, cellulosic biofuels have yet to meet the required mandate. EPA reports that very few facilities are consistently producing cellulosic biofuels for commercial sale. As a result, the EPA lowered the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 cellulosic biofuel mandates and proposes to lower the 2014 mandate. Some suggest that broadening the RFS2 to include algae as a cellulosic biofuel feedstock would boost production opportunities. Technical Background on Algae-Based Biofuel
Technology exists to convert algae (like any organic matter) into multiple forms of energy, including liquid fuels (e.g., diesel or jet fuel), electric power, and biogas. As a result, algae could potentially reuse CO 2 emitted as a waste product from stationary sources. Federal research and development funding for ABB has fluctuated over time. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the two agencies that have spent the most money on ABB. The ARRA funding was spent on three algae-related integrated biorefinery (IBR) projects cost-shared with industry, two of which are at pilot scale (Algenol, with DOE's cost-share of $25 million and nearly $34 million in non-federal funding to construct an integrated pilot-scale biorefinery with the capacity to produce more than 100,000 gallons of fuel ethanol per year; and Solazyme, with $22 million in DOE cost-share and close to $4 million in non-federal funding to build, operate, and optimize a pilot-scale integrated biorefinery with the capacity to produce 300,000 gallons of purified algal oil per year) and one at demo scale (Sapphire, with $50 million in DOE cost-share and roughly $85 million in non-federal funding to construct an integrated algal biorefinery with the capacity to produce 1,000,000 gallons of jet fuel and diesel per year). While Congress has created a policy that mandates the use of alternative fuels for transportation (e.g., RFS2) and set up tax credits that support alternative fuel production, much of the legislation and tax provisions for alternative transportation fuel is constrained to a set of feedstock types (e.g., cellulosic) and fuel types as defined in the statute (e.g., ethanol, biodiesel). For example, in the past the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ) amended both the cellulosic biofuel production tax credit and the cellulosic biofuel depreciation allowance to include algae-based biofuels. Both tax incentives expired at the end of 2013 and it is not known if the incentives will be extended. ABB advocates also assert that Congress could encourage the growth of the U.S. algae industry by providing tax parity with other biofuels, appropriating additional federal funds for algae-related programs, and modifying the RFS2 to be feedstock-neutral so that algae-based biofuels can be more broadly included. Congress did select certain feedstock types for biofuel production under the RFS2. In general, proposed legislation either would have expanded the cellulosic biofuels definition for the RFS2 to include algae by amending the Clean Air Act (codified as 42 U.S.C. ), and/or would have expanded the definition in the tax code for select tax incentives to incorporate algae—which Congress did with ATRA. H.R. The potential benefits of ABB include per-acre yields reported to be significantly larger than those for other biofuel feedstocks (e.g., soybean, jatropha), and the potential for algae to grow in water not traditionally used for other purposes. Federal support for ABB has occurred through general agency programs and specific projects. ABB is less developed than established biofuels industries such as corn-starch ethanol. | Congress continues to debate the federal role in biofuel research, biofuel tax incentives, and renewable fuel mandates. The debate touches on topics such as fuel imports and security, job creation, and environmental benefits, and is particularly significant for advanced biofuels, such as those produced by algae.
Congress established the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2), a mandate requiring that the national fuel supply contain a minimum amount of fuel produced from renewable biomass. The RFS2 is essentially composed of two biofuel mandates—one for unspecified biofuel, which is being met largely with corn-starch ethanol, and one for advanced biofuels (or non-corn starch ethanol), which may not be met in coming years due to a lack of production. Within the advanced biofuels category, the RFS2 requirements for the cellulosic biofuels subcategory (e.g., ethanol from switchgrass) have not been met for the last few years, which could cause alarm among those required to purchase fuel or credits to satisfy the mandate, as this subcategory is slated to ramp up from roughly 3% of the requirement in the standard in 2012 to roughly 44% of the standard in 2022. Limited cellulosic biofuel production has occurred to date. As a result, as allowed under the RFS2, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has lowered the required cellulosic biofuels volume for 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 and has proposed to do the same for 2014.
Currently, algae-based biofuel qualifies as an advanced biofuel under the RFS2, but not as a cellulosic biofuel. If algae were added as an eligible feedstock type under the RFS2 cellulosic biofuels mandate, and if an increase in production resulted, then a larger portion of the requirement might be achieved, although current production is minimal. Algae does qualify as a feedstock for the biomass-based diesel subcategory of the RFS2 advanced biofuel mandate. The RFS2 does not mandate rapid growth of biomass-based diesel, as it does for cellulosic biofuels.
Algae can be converted into various types of energy for transportation, including biodiesel, jet fuel, electric power, and ethanol. The potential advantages of algae-based biofuel over other biofuel pathways include higher biomass yields per acre of cultivation, little to no competition for arable land, use of a wide variety of water sources, the opportunity to use carbon dioxide from stationary sources, and the potential to produce "drop-in" ready-to-use fuels. Potential drawbacks include the anticipated cost of production, the amount of resources (e.g., water and land) required to produce the biofuel, and the lack of commercial-scale production facilities. Algae-based biofuel research and development are in their infancy, although work has been conducted in this area for decades. At present, published research efforts offer policymakers little guidance on what algae types or conversion methods could be the front-runner for commercial production, or on when and for which biofuel.
Congressional support for algae-based biofuel has consisted of congressionally directed projects and funding of programs and studies by the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD). Some algae industry advocates contend that Congress should encourage advances in algae-based biofuel production by extending the expiration date for eligible tax credits, appropriating additional federal funds for algae-related programs, and modifying the RFS2 to include algae in the cellulosic biofuels mandate, as was done recently for the cellulosic biofuels production tax credit. In contrast, some argue that Congress should reconsider its investment in biofuels because of the current federal budget crisis and the lack of any measurable progress in cellulosic biofuels production.
Thus far in the 113th Congress, legislation pertaining to algae-based biofuels has not been introduced. Proposed legislation in the 112th Congress would have either expanded the cellulosic biofuels definition for the RFS2 to include algae by amending the Clean Air Act, and/or expanded the definition in the tax code for select tax credits to incorporate algae (e.g., H.R. 1149, S. 1185). The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) amended both the cellulosic biofuel production tax credit and the cellulosic biofuel depreciation allowance to include algae-based biofuels. Both tax incentives expired at the end of 2013, and it is not known if they will be extended. |
crs_R40890 | crs_R40890_0 | Introduction
This report provides a summary and analysis of selected provisions of S. 1733 , the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act. The topics covered include electric power and incentives for the development of natural gas technologies. The report also compares those provisions with counterparts, if any, in H.R. 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act. Other aspects of S. 1733 and H.R. Electric Power Transmission and Related Technologies
Electric Power and Natural Gas Technologies
S. 1733
Subtitle H of Division A has two sections dealing with the use of low carbon emitting energy technologies. Section 181, Clean Energy and Accelerated Emission Reduction Program , directs the EPA administrator to "establish a program to promote dispatchable power generation projects that can accelerate the reduction of power sector carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions" (emphasis added). The term "dispatchable" is not defined in the bill, but would normally refer to power generating units that can be run at-will by system operators. Several features of Section 181 are unspecified or unclear. These include:
The total dollar amount and form of the incentives. Whether the emission reduction target varies for a project over time. Section 182 of Subtitle H, Advanced Natural Gas Technologies , would establish two programs for accelerating the deployment of advanced natural gas technologies. 2454
There are no directly comparable provisions in H.R. 2454 . Section 175 of Subtitle H of H.R. 2454 does provide for a government program to help develop and demonstrate high efficiency natural gas burning combustion turbines, for use in combined cycle power plants. 2454 contains several provisions relating to electric power transmission that have no counterparts in S. 1733 . For more detail see CRS Report R40643, Greenhouse Gas Legislation: Summary and Analysis of H.R. 2454 as Passed by the House of Representatives , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. 2454 deals with transmission planning and permitting. Smart Grid
H.R. Net Metering for Federal Agencies
Section 152 of Subtitle F of H.R. | This report provides a summary and analysis of selected provisions of the chairman's mark of S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act. The topics covered include electric power and incentives for the development of natural gas technologies. The report also compares those provisions with H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act.
In S. 1733, Subtitle H of Division A has two sections dealing with the use of low carbon emitting energy technologies. Section 181, Clean Energy and Accelerated Emission Reduction Program, directs the EPA administrator to "establish a program to promote dispatchable power generation projects that can accelerate the reduction of power sector carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions" (emphasis added). The term "dispatchable" is not defined in the bill, but would normally refer to power generating units that can be run at-will by system operators, such as natural gas, nuclear, or coal units. Several features of Section 181 are unspecified or unclear, including the total dollar amount and form of the incentives, whether the emission reduction target for a specific project would change over time, and the deadline for making incentive awards. Section 182 of Subtitle H, Advanced Natural Gas Technologies, would establish two grant programs for accelerating the development of advanced natural gas technologies in the power generation, commercial, and residential sectors.
No parts of H.R. 2454 are directly comparable to sections 181 and 182 of S. 1733. Closest in intent is Section 175 of Subtitle H of H.R. 2454, which provides for a government program to help develop and demonstrate high efficiency natural gas burning combustion turbines, for use in combined cycle power plants.
H.R. 2454 has several provisions relating to electric power transmission that have no counterparts in S. 1733. These provisions of H.R. 2454 involve transmission planning and permitting; development and deployment of smart grid technologies; requirements for electric utilities to reduce peak demand; net metering for federal agencies; and incentives for transmission technology development. These elements of H.R. 2454 are summarized in this report and discussed in more detail in CRS Report R40643, Greenhouse Gas Legislation: Summary and Analysis of H.R. 2454 as Passed by the House of Representatives, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33145 | crs_RL33145_0 | Currently, there is no pandemic flu. In 1997 a new strain of avian flu jumped from poultry directly to humans in Hong Kong, causing several human deaths. It has since been reported in domestic poultry and/or wild birds in more than 50 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. Also since 2003, it has infected more than 270 people (and killed more than 160 deaths) in ten countries. If a flu pandemic were to occur in the next several years, the U.S. response would be affected by the limited availability of a vaccine (the best preventive measure for flu), as well as by limited availability of certain drugs used to treat severe flu infections, and by the general lack of surge capacity within our healthcare system. It also discusses WHO and U.S. preparedness plans and their context in broader emergency preparedness efforts. While reference is made when relevant to global preparedness efforts and to animal health impacts, this report focuses on U.S. domestic public health preparedness and response planning, and the projected impacts of an influenza pandemic on Americans. This report will be updated to reflect changing circumstances. The 1918 Spanish Flu (H1N1) pandemic is estimated to have killed more than 50 million people worldwide, and at least 675,000 in the United States. Global containment efforts continue. In addition to response efforts in the public health and medical sectors, a serious pandemic would trigger the National Response Plan (NRP), developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a blueprint for the coordination of federal agencies during an emergency. Described below are a number of preparedness and response plans to assist U.S. federal, state and local agencies in specific preparedness and response for a flu pandemic. Response and Containment: Actions to limit the spread of the outbreak and to mitigate the health, social and economic impacts of a pandemic. A serious flu pandemic would affect many sectors of society, not just the public health and medical communities. WHO monitors the spread of H5N1 avian flu and other novel flu viruses, and will make formal announcements of changes in pandemic threat status including, were it to occur, the onset of pandemic, defined as sustained human-to-human transmission of a novel flu virus. While HHS had been the lead federal agency for pandemic planning prior to 2005, the White House Homeland Security Council appears now to be the hub through which federal preparedness activities are coordinated. Emergency declarations pursuant to the Stafford Act were made in response to West Nile virus in 2000, so there is precedent for a presidential emergency declaration, (providing a lower level of federal assistance) in response to an infectious disease threat. The matter of presidential authority to declare a major disaster (providing a higher level of federal assistance) in response to an infectious disease threat generally, and a flu pandemic specifically, is less clear. However, the Administration view is that the President's authority to declare a major disaster pursuant to the Stafford Act could be applied to an influenza pandemic. But, because of continuous changes in the genes of flu viruses, vaccines must be "matched" to specific strains to provide good protection. Since a vaccine could not be mass produced against a pandemic flu strain until that strain emerged, planning assumes that a matched flu vaccine would not be available for initial global pandemic control. One means to increase domestic vaccine production capacity is to expand manufacturing infrastructure. | In 1997, a new avian influenza ("flu") virus emerged in Asia and jumped directly from birds to humans, killing six people. The virus has since spread to more than 50 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa, where it has killed millions of birds and infected more than 270 people, killing more than 160 of them. The virus bears some similarity to the deadly 1918 Spanish flu, which caused a global pandemic estimated to have killed more than 50 million people worldwide. The current spread of avian flu raises concerns about another human flu pandemic.
Global pandemic preparedness and response efforts are coordinated by the World Health Organization (WHO). Domestic preparedness efforts are led by the White House Homeland Security Council, with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) playing a major role. Domestic response efforts would be carried out under the all-hazards blueprint for a coordinated federal, state and local response laid out in the National Response Plan, overseen by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). HHS officials would have the lead in the public health and medical aspects of a response. The federal government has released several pandemic flu plans to govern federal, state, local and private preparedness activities.
There are concerns about how a domestic public health and medical response would be managed during a flu pandemic. There is precedent, under the Stafford Act, for the President to declare an infectious disease threat an emergency (which provides a lower level of assistance), but no similar precedent for a major disaster declaration (which provides a higher level of assistance). In any case, many of the needs likely to result from a flu pandemic could not be met with the types of assistance provided pursuant to the Stafford Act, even if a major disaster declaration applied.
Vaccination is the best flu prevention measure. But because of continuous changes in the genes of flu viruses, vaccines must be "matched" to specific strains to provide good protection. A pandemic flu strain would, by definition, be novel. Stockpiled vaccine would not match, so stockpiling in anticipation of a pandemic is of limited value. In addition, global and domestic capacity to produce flu vaccine is limited. The U.S. government, primarily through HHS, has launched an aggressive effort to expand domestic vaccine production capacity, and to develop technologies to support more rapid production of a matched vaccine at the onset of a pandemic.
Since matched vaccine would not be available at the outset of a flu pandemic that occurred within the next several years, planning efforts focus on measures to slow the spread of disease, and mitigate its effects. These include stockpiling of antiviral drugs to prevent or treat flu infection, planning for medical surge capacity, and continuity planning for businesses and utilities.
This report discusses pandemic flu in general, WHO and U.S. preparedness and response plans, and a number of relevant policy issues. The focus of this report is U.S. domestic public health preparedness and response planning, and the projected impacts of an influenza pandemic on Americans. This report will be updated to reflect changing circumstances. |
crs_RL32347 | crs_RL32347_0 | The United States has one type of nuclear earth penetrator, the B61-11 bomb, which wasaccepted into the stockpile in September 2001. (1) That weapon, though, according to an article by several scientistsfrom Los Alamos National Laboratory, "cannot survive delivery into certain types of terrain in whichsuch [hardened underground] facilities may be located." Accordingly,the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), whichis the Department of Energy (DOE) agency in charge of the U.S. nuclear weapons program,requested funds to study the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld said in May 2003 that RNEP "is a study. For FY2006, the Administration alsorequested $4.5 million for DOD to study linking RNEP to the B-2 bomber. The report, released in April 2005, had nine key conclusions: (1) many high-value buriedfacilities can be held at risk by nuclear but not conventional EPWs; (2) penetration to a depth of 3meters captures most effects of EPWs on buried targets; deeper penetration puts the weapon atgreater risk; (3) EPWs cannot penetrate deeply enough to contain nuclear weapon effects fully; (4)casualties from a nuclear weapon burst at shallow depth or on the surface are essentially the same;(5) detonating a nuclear weapon at shallow depth increases the energy transmitted to a buried target,permitting a reduction in yield by a factor of 15 to 25; (6) attacks using nuclear EPWs near urbanareas could produce thousands to over a million casualties, or hundreds to several hundred thousandfor attacks in rural areas; (7) a nuclear EPW could reduce civilian casualties in an urban area by afactor of 2 to 10 compared to a surface-burst weapon with 25 times the yield; (8) a nuclear weaponwould have to detonate within a chamber where chemical or biological agents were stored to destroythe agents; the same is true of nonnuclear "thermobaric" bombs, which generate high heat andpressure; and (9) in a nuclear attack on a chemical weapon facility, nuclear effects would probablykill many more civilians than would the released chemical agent, while a nuclear attack on abiological facility could kill similar numbers of civilians from nuclear effects and released biologicalagents, depending on weapon yield and amount of agent. Developments in the FY2005 Budget Cycle
The FY2005 Budget and Plan
Congress required NNSA -- and DOE before NNSA was created -- to provide a five-yearbudget projection (current year plus four out-years) in the National Defense Authorization Acts forFY1997 ( P.L. In the FY2005 request, the projectedfigures for RNEP were: FY2005 (request), $27.6 million; FY2006, $95.0 million; FY2007, $145.4million; FY2008, $128.4 million; and FY2009, $88.4 million, for a five-year total of $484.7million. All figures for FY2005-FY2009 are subject tocongressional approval, rejection, or modification. The manager emphasized that no decision had been made on whetheror not to proceed with those phases pending completion of the Phase 6.2/6.2A study. ForFY2005, the request was $27.6 million, and the appropriation zero, vs. $15.0 million originallyplanned, and for FY2006 the appropriation was zero for RNEP but $4.0 million for a relatedconventional penetrator study. Senator Domenici said:
I was surprised to see that the request -- that nearly $500million is provided for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator in the out year funding. Legislative Activity on RNEP, FY2005
The two defense authorization bills -- H.R. The committee bill provided no funds for RNEP. (35)
DOD also requested FY2006 funds for RNEP, included in the Air Force budget. (42)
Legislative Activity
The House Appropriations Committee recommended eliminating NNSA funds for RNEPfrom the Energy and Water Development Bill, H.R. The House Armed Services Committee recommended providing the DOD RNEP funds asrequested, but transferring the $4.0 million in NNSA funds to a separate program in DOD. (46) The House passed the bill, H.R. The House Appropriations Committee's FY2006 DOD Appropriations Bill, H.R. As a corollary, the staff continued, since the RNEP study wasnot funded but the $4.5 million was linked to the B-2, the committee intended that the latter sum beused to study integrating conventional earth penetrators with the B-2. (50) The House passed H.R.2863, 398-19, on June 20, with no change to the foregoing provisions. (51)
The Senate Armed Services Committee reported the defense authorization bill, S. 1042 , on May 17. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the energy and water bill, H.R. (55) On June30, the Senate rejected, 43-53, an amendment by Senator Feinstein to eliminate the $4.0 million fromthe bill. 109-275 ) provided no funds for RNEP. (58) The measure was signed into law ( P.L. And so, the study is that. It's not a commitment to goforward with a system, it's just to see if it's feasible. Developments in the FY2007 Budget Cycle
NNSA requested no funds for RNEP for FY2007. | Earth penetrator weapons, often called "bunker busters," burrow into the ground some tensof feet before detonating, greatly increasing their ability to destroy buried targets. The United Stateshas several types of conventional earth penetrators. The current U.S. nuclear earth penetrator, theB61-11 bomb, cannot penetrate certain types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities maybe located, so the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are studyinga more effective penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).
While Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in 2003 that RNEP was a study, NNSA's FY2005budget document showed a five-year total of $484.7 million if RNEP were to proceed beyond thestudy phase. NNSA said no decision had been made to proceed, and out-year figures were shownto meet congressionally-mandated budgeting requirements and were not a request. RNEP requestsare, of course, subject to congressional approval, rejection, or modification. The five-year figuresparked congressional debate. The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act contained the fullRNEP request, $27.6 million. The House and Senate both rejected amendments to that bill thatwould have eliminated RNEP funds. However, P.L. 108-447 , the FY2005 ConsolidatedAppropriations Act, appropriated no funds for RNEP. As a result, NNSA could not work on RNEPin FY2005.
The FY2006 RNEP request was $4.0 million for NNSA for studies, and $4.5 million for theDepartment of Defense (DOD) to study integrating RNEP onto the B-2 bomber. The House passedthe FY2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, H.R. 2419 , with noNNSA RNEP funds. The House passed the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 1815 , providing the requested DOD funds and transferring the NNSA funds toDOD. The House Appropriations Committee's mark of H.R. 2863 , the FY2006 DODAppropriations Bill, provided $4.0 million for a conventional (nonnuclear) penetrator study. Committee staff indicated that the bill included the $4.5 million for DOD, and that the committee'sintent was that DOD use the money to study integration of a conventional penetrator onto the B-2. The bill as passed by the House retained these provisions. The Senate Armed Services Committee'smark of S. 1042 , the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Bill, recommendedproviding the NNSA funds as requested but denying the DOD funds on grounds that the DODprogram should await completion of NNSA's feasibility study. The Senate provided $4.0 millionfor NNSA for RNEP in H.R. 2419, rejecting an amendment by Senator Feinstein to deletethe funds. The Senate Appropriations Committee's mark of H.R. 2863 recommendedeliminating DOD funds requested for RNEP. On October 25, Senator Domenici said that NNSA haddropped its RNEP request and planned to focus earth penetration on conventional weaponstechnology, so, he said, energy and water conferees agreed to drop funding for RNEP. H.R.1815 as signed into law ( P.L. 109-360 ) provided no funds for RNEP, but $4.0 million forDOD for a conventional penetrator study.
For FY2007, NNSA requested no funds for RNEP, and has closed out the project. Accordingly, this report will not be updated further. |
crs_R44790 | crs_R44790_0 | Protecting Privacy in an Evolving Health System
On January 18, 2017, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a final rule that amends the federal regulations responsible for safeguarding the privacy of patient records maintained by substance use disorder treatment programs across the country. According to the HHS Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), which administers Part 2, the changes in the final rule are intended "to better align [Part 2] with advances in the U.S. health care delivery system while retaining important privacy protections." Today, the health care system is embracing new models for delivering services—including accountable care organizations (ACOs) and patient-centered health homes—that rely on sharing patient information to coordinate and integrate care. Under Part 2, the disclosure of substance use disorder treatment records requires a patient's written consent, unless the type of disclosure falls under one of a handful of specific statutory exceptions. This contrasts with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, which permits clinicians to share patient information for treatment and payment purposes. Whereas the primary care facility is permitted under HIPAA to share the patient's information with the Part 2-covered alcohol and drug treatment program and any other health care facility providing care, the alcohol and drug treatment program generally needs the patient's consent under Part 2 to release information to another health care facility. Substance use disorder treatment programs typically are subject to both sets of regulations—Part 2 and the HIPAA Privacy Rule—unless there is a conflict between the two. In that case, the program must comply with the regulations that are more protective of patient privacy, which generally means following the requirements under Part 2. Although SAMHSA's primary goal was to modify Part 2 to facilitate the sharing of patients' Part 2 data with other providers participating in clinically integrated health care networks, the agency's rulemaking options were constrained by the underlying statutory language. Under the final rule, more options are available. A patient can now list any of the following in the "to whom" section of the consent form:
the name of an individual; the name of an entity (e.g., hospital, clinic, physician practice) that has a "treating provider relationship" with the patient; the name of an entity with which the patient does not have a treating provider relationship and which is a third-party payer; and/or the name of an entity with which the patient does not have a treating provider relationship and which is not a third-party payer (e.g., ACO, health information exchange, research institution), plus either the name(s) of specific individual participants; the name(s) of an entity participant(s) with which the patient has a treating provider relationship; or a general designation of individual or entity participants, or class of participants, with which the patient has a treating provider relationship (e.g., "all my past, present, and future treating providers"). Thus, a patient may now consent to disclose Part 2 data to an organization such as a health information exchange (HIE) that does not have a treating provider relationship with the patient, but which acts as an intermediary. Stakeholder Reaction Has Been Mixed
Groups that advocate for the privacy of individuals with substance use disorders generally are satisfied with the final rule because it retains Part 2's confidentiality protections. Representatives of the behavioral health provider and medical informatics communities support the final rule's general consent provisions that permit disclosure of Part 2 data to intermediaries such as HIEs and ACOs. They argue that these requirements are administratively and technologically burdensome and provide little if any additional privacy protections. In tandem with its Part 2 rulemaking activities, SAMHSA has worked closely with federal and nonfederal partners to develop HIT standards and applications that support the use and disclosure of information protected by Part 2. New Technologies Support Part 2 Data Exchange
To facilitate the electronic exchange of Part 2 data, each patient's consent preferences specifying the type of information that may be shared, and the individuals or entities with whom the information may be shared, must be carefully managed. Patient consent has to travel with the data in order to control access. In addition, a mechanism is required for segregating the data in a medical record to capture a patient's preferences. Data segmentation allows a patient's record to be broken down into multiple categories, allowing certain protected data elements to be removed (redacted) if a patient has not consented to their disclosure. Based on the DS4P standards, SAMHSA designed Consent2Share, an open-source online tool for data segmentation and consent management. Consent2Share integrates with existing EHR systems and HIE networks to manage the exchange of health information among providers. | On January 18, 2017, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a final rule to amend the federal regulations known as "Part 2" that protect the privacy of patient records maintained by alcohol and drug treatment programs across the country. Part 2 was developed in the 1970s to allay the concerns of individuals with substance use disorders who were afraid to get treatment for fear that their medical information would be released, leading to discrimination and even prosecution.
Health care providers participating in new health care delivery models such as accountable care organizations (ACOs), which rely on sharing medical information to coordinate and integrate patient care, complain that Part 2 restricts their ability to access important medical data.
Disclosure of Part 2 Data
Disclosure of Part 2-covered data generally requires a patient's written consent unless the type of disclosure falls under one of a handful of statutory exceptions. Consent is needed for a clinician to release patient information to another health care facility to improve the coordination of care. This requirement contrasts with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, which applies more broadly to medical information throughout the health care system, and which permits health care providers to share patient data with few restrictions.
Alcohol and drug treatment programs typically are subject to both Part 2 and the Privacy Rule unless there is a conflict between the two. In that case, the program must comply with the regulations that are more protective of privacy, which generally means following Part 2.
Changes in the Final Rule
The final rule was developed by the HHS Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). According to SAMHSA, the changes in the final rule are intended primarily to facilitate the sharing of Part 2 data among providers participating in clinically integrated health care networks that include addiction treatment programs.
The final rule introduced flexibility to the Part 2 consent process. It provided patients with more options for designating the types of individuals and entities that may receive protected information. A patient may now consent to disclose Part 2 data to an organization such as an ACO or health information exchange (HIE) that does not have a direct treatment relationship with the patient, but which acts as an intermediary. The intermediary may then disclose the information to some or all of the providers who treat the patient, pursuant to the patient's consent preferences.
Groups that advocate for the privacy of individuals with substance use disorders generally are satisfied with the final rule because it retains Part 2's core confidentiality protections. But the reaction of many health care provider organizations has been mixed. While applauding the changes that permit disclosure of Part 2 data to intermediaries such as ACOs and HIEs, providers are critical of other changes that they claim are administratively and technologically burdensome and provide little if any additional privacy protections.
Exchange of Part 2 Data
To facilitate the electronic exchange of Part 2 data, each patient's consent preferences specifying the type of information that may be shared, and the individuals or entities with whom the information may be shared, must be carefully managed. To control access, patient consent must travel with the data. In addition, the data in a medical record must be segregated to capture a patient's preferences. Data segmentation allows a patient's record to be separated into multiple categories, so that certain protected data elements can be removed (redacted) if a patient has not consented to their disclosure.
SAMHSA has worked with its federal and nonfederal partners to develop Consent2Share, an online tool for data segmentation and consent management. Consent2Share integrates with electronic health record systems and HIEs to support the exchange of Part 2 and other sensitive health data. |
crs_R40982 | crs_R40982_0 | 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also known as the Waxman-Markey bill) and S. 1733 , the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009 (also known as the Kerry-Boxer bill)) addressing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with concerns over global Climate Change. This report summarizes and compares provisions for green jobs training and worker adaptation assistance for climate change impacts. Under a two-part subtitle for "Green Jobs & Worker Transition" (Title IV Subtitle B of H.R. 2454 , and Title III, Subtitle A of S. 1733 ), essentially identical provisions are focused (in Part I) on the development of programs to provide training and education in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and (in Part II) on providing retraining and financial assistance for workers made redundant (or whose earnings have been substantially reduced) by climate change mitigation measures. Since the provisions in both bills are so similar, this report will focus on the provisions as discussed in S. 1733 . A "Chairman's Mark" of S. 1733 was released in October 2009. Any resulting modifications to applicable areas of the original Kerry-Boxer version are discussed in the report. Green jobs training provisions in Part 1 of both bills focuses on the development of training programs in renewable energy and energy efficiency. Part 2. Part 2 of the legislation focuses on assisting workers impacted by climate change mitigation measures. As such, if a group of workers can show how their current or prospective employment is impaired by such measures, then these workers may apply for climate change adjustment assistance. Assistance may include a monetary allowance while workers are retrained or otherwise seeking new jobs or seeking full employment if their work hours are reduced. The proposed legislation appears to be adaptable to the training needs of affected workers from various employment levels and backgrounds, as assistance may be provided for up to three years for eligible workers. The separate jobs retraining and assistance program envisioned by S. 1733 appears to be more comprehensive than existing workforce (such as at "One Stop Career Center") and Employee Retirement Income Security Act apprenticeship programs, perhaps raising issues of equity for unemployed workers not eligible for Climate Change Worker Adjustment Assistance. "Middle class careers" and "quality employment" are described as goals of the Green Construction careers demonstration project in Section 303. But over the longer term, higher paying, less transient jobs are more likely to come from positions in manufacturing companies rather than jobs in construction. Development of a competitive, domestic renewable energy industry which designs and produces the turbines, solar panels, and related parts and components is the likely source of these jobs, but may require a longer-term focus on the needs of future markets. More clarity may be sought with regard to the federal policies, oversight, and planning for the support or development of industries and businesses expected to absorb retrained workers. Growth in green industries and other sectors is assumed to provide future employment as companies look to climate change business opportunities. Coordination of government, education, and retraining providers and potential employers on one hand, and corresponding efforts to create or rebuild competitive industrial sectors on the other hand will likely be crucial if the desired economic growth and employment results are to be realized. | This report summarizes and compares provisions for green jobs training and worker adaptation assistance for climate change mitigation impacts in two recent bills: H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also known as the Waxman-Markey bill), and S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009 (also known as the Kerry-Boxer bill). Under a two-part subtitle for "Green Jobs & Worker Transition" (Title IV Subtitle B of H.R. 2454, and Title III, Subtitle A of S. 1733), essentially identical provisions are focused (in Part I) on the development of programs to provide training and education in energy efficiency and renewable energy, and (in Part II) on providing retraining and financial assistance for workers made redundant (or whose earnings have been substantially reduced) by climate change mitigation measures. Since the provisions in both bills are so similar, this report will focus on the provisions as discussed in S. 1733. A "Chairman's Mark" of S. 1733 was released in October 2009. Any resulting modifications to applicable areas of the original Kerry-Boxer version are discussed in the report.
The green jobs training provisions in Part 1 of S. 1733 focuses on the development of training programs in climate change mitigation, renewable energy and energy efficiency, the authorization of competitive grants to organizations and partnerships developed to provide relevant education, training, and an internet-based clearinghouse for general information on the programs and technologies.
Part 2 of S. 1733 focuses on assisting workers impacted by climate change mitigation measures. If a group of workers can show how their current or prospective employment is impaired by climate change mitigation measures, then these workers would apply for climate change adjustment assistance. Assistance would include a monetary allowance while workers are retrained or otherwise seeking new jobs or seeking full employment if their work hours are reduced. Assistance may be provided for up to three years for eligible workers. Workers receiving assistance under Part 2 would not be eligible for any other form of unemployment insurance.
The separate jobs retraining and assistance program envisioned by S. 1733 appears to be more comprehensive than existing workforce and apprenticeship programs, perhaps raising issues of equity for unemployed workers not eligible for Climate Change Worker Adjustment Assistance.
More clarity may be sought with regard to the federal policies, oversight, and planning for the support or development of industries and businesses expected to absorb retrained workers. Growth in green industries and other sectors is assumed to provide future employment as companies look to climate change business opportunities. Coordination of government, education and retraining providers and potential employers on one hand, and corresponding efforts to create or rebuild competitive industrial sectors on the other hand, will likely be crucial if the desired economic growth and employment results are to be realized.
"Middle class careers" and "quality employment" are described as goals of the Green Construction careers demonstration projects. But over the longer term, higher paying, less transient jobs are more likely to come from jobs in manufacturing companies rather than jobs in construction. Development of a competitive, domestic renewable energy industry which designs and produces the turbines, solar panels and related parts and components may provide these jobs, but may require a longer-term focus on the needs of future markets. |
crs_RL33939 | crs_RL33939_0 | Introduction
Unanimous consent agreements are special orders of the Senate that are agreed to without objection by the chamber's membership. Whereas the Senate Rules permit virtually unlimited debate, and very few restrictions on the right to offer amendments, these agreements usually limit time for debate and the right of Senators to offer amendments. Based on trust, and reached after often protracted negotiations, unanimous consent agreements are the equivalent of "binding contracts" that can only be changed or modified by unanimous consent. In the early 1900s, the Senate took modest steps to reduce some of the confusion associated with unanimous consent agreements, such as requiring these accords to be submitted in writing to the desk, read to the chamber, and "printed on the title page of the daily calendar of business as long as they were operative." First, could these agreements be changed or modified by another unanimous consent agreement? Two critical portions of the rule stipulate that (1) unanimous consent agreements are orders of the Senate, which means that the presiding officer is charged with enforcing their terms; and (2) the Senate, by unanimous consent, could change a unanimous consent agreement. The contemporary Senate regularly operates via the terms of unanimous consent agreements. | Unanimous consent agreements are fundamental to the operation of the Senate. The institution frequently dispenses with its formal rules and instead follows negotiated agreements submitted on the floor for lawmakers' unanimous approval. Once entered into, unanimous consent agreements can only be changed by unanimous consent. Their objectives are to waive Senate rules and to expedite floor action on measures or matters. Typically, these accords (sometimes called time-limitation agreements) restrict debate and structure chamber consideration of amendments.
Given their importance to chamber operations, it is worthwhile to understand the background, or origin, of unanimous consent agreements. The purpose of this report is to examine how and why these informal agreements became special orders of the Senate enforceable by the presiding officer. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. Further information on unanimous consent agreements can be found in CRS Report 98-225, Unanimous Consent Agreements in the Senate, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS20594, How Unanimous Consent Agreements Regulate Senate Floor Action, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report 98-310, Senate Unanimous Consent Agreements: Potential Effects on the Amendment Process, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40466 | crs_R40466_0 | H.R. 1586 and S. 651 would impose special taxing rules on bonuses paid to employees of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and certain entities that receive assistance from the federal government under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) ( P.L. Under H.R. S. 651 , rather than taxing the bonuses as income, would impose an excise tax on both the employee and entity. Both bills would apply to bonuses received on or after January 1, 2009, in taxable years ending on or after that date. 1586 was passed by the House on March 19, 2009, by a vote of 328 to 93. No legislative action has yet occurred with respect to S. 651 . Possible arguments include that the bills violate the equal protection and due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment, are takings for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, or violate the prohibitions against ex post facto legislation and bills of attainder. 1586 and S. 651 are not punishment for purposes of the ex post facto clause. The two main criteria which the courts look to in order to determine whether legislation is a bill of attainder are (1) whether specific individuals are affected by the statute (specificity prong), and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a punishment on those individuals (punishment prong). Under H.R. 1586 , the bonuses would be taxed as income to the employee at a rate of 90%. Thus, the question arises as to how these bills would be evaluated under the specificity prong of a bill of attainder analysis. H.R. The Court has also identified three types of legislation which would fulfill the "punishment" prong of the test: (1) where the burden is such as has "traditionally" been found to be punitive, (2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed cannot reasonably be said to further "non-punitive legislative purposes," and (3) where the legislative record evinces a "congressional intent to punish." As confiscation of property has been found to be a "traditional" punishment under the first of these categories, the closer that a tax rate gets to 100% on past income, the more likely that this might be seen by a court as rising to the level of punishment. Although the level of tax in both bills appears to be set high enough to deter a class of future bonuses from being granted, this regulatory purpose cannot be logically applied to situations where the bonuses have already been paid. Thus, the other remaining traditional purpose for taxation, the raising of revenue, appears to be the most logical remaining non-punitive regulatory purpose for the statute. A review of the legislative history established so far, however, would not seem to indicate that raising revenue was a primary purpose behind the proposed bills. Rather, the legislative history seems to contain comments that would indicate the existence of a congressional intent to punish those individuals receiving bonuses. Consequently, it would appear that while both of these bills may raise constitutional issues, H.R. 1586 would raise the most serious constitutional concerns. | There has been significant controversy about the constitutionality of the legislative proposals (H.R. 1586 and S. 651) to tax bonuses paid to employees of entities receiving assistance from the federal government under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Under H.R. 1586, the bonuses would be taxed as income to the employee at a rate of 90%. S. 651 would impose an excise tax equal to 35% of the bonus on both the employee and entity. Both bills would apply to bonuses received on or after January 1, 2009, in taxable years ending on or after that date. H.R. 1586 was passed by the House on March 19, 2009, by a vote of 328 to 93. No legislative action has yet been taken on S. 651.
This report analyzes the constitutionality of these bills. Specifically, it examines whether their retroactive application violates the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, rises to the level of a taking under the Fifth Amendment, or violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. It reaches the conclusion that while certain aspects of the proposed taxing schemes (particularly, the 90% rate in H.R. 1586 and statements in the legislative history targeting specific taxpayers) may raise concerns under the Fifth Amendment and ex post facto clause, the strongest arguments against their constitutionality seem to arise under the bill of attainder analysis.
The two main criteria that the courts will look to in order to determine whether legislation is a bill of attainder are (1) whether specific individuals are affected by the statute ("specificity" prong), and (2) whether the legislation inflicts a punishment on those individuals ("punishment" prong). The Supreme Court has identified three types of legislation which would fulfill the "punishment" prong of the test: (1) where the burden is such as has "traditionally" been found to be punitive, (2) where the type and severity of burdens imposed cannot reasonably be said to further "non-punitive legislative purposes," and (3) where the legislative record evinces a "congressional intent to punish."
Although the bills would apply both prospectively and retrospectively, they would both appear to meet the "specificity" prong. This is because each bill would apply, in part, to a specified group of people, identified by past conduct, who cannot meaningfully withdraw from that group. As to the "punishment" prong, confiscation of property has been found to be a "traditional" punishment. Thus, the closer that a tax rate gets to 100% on income already earned, the more likely that such a tax would be seen by a court as rising to the level of punishment. Also, the deterrence of granting or receiving future bonuses would not appear to be an applicable regulatory purpose where bonuses have already been paid. Thus, the most logical remaining non-punitive regulatory purpose for the statute would appear to be revenue raising. A review of the legislative history established so far, however, seems to indicate that raising revenue is not a primary purpose behind the proposed bills. Rather, the legislative history seems to contain comments that would indicate the existence of a congressional intent to punish those individuals receiving bonuses. Consequently, while both of these bills may raise constitutional issues, H.R. 1586 raises the most serious constitutional concerns. |
crs_R43980 | crs_R43980_0 | Introduction
The Islamic State, also known as ISIL or ISIS, has been described by senior U.S. officials as one of the best-funded terrorist organizations. In other cases, IS control over a set of resources is notable not solely for the revenue the group derives from it, but also for the extent to which it limits the ability of the Iraqi and Syrian governments to conduct trade, provide utility services, or feed its citizens. U.S. policy to counteract IS financing has concentrated on three primary areas: disrupting the group's main sources of funding, restricting its access to the international financial system, and imposing sanctions on its senior leadership and financial facilitators. To date, the Obama Administration has not requested new authorities from Congress specifically to counter IS financing. The Islamic State has encouraged followers to conduct lone-wolf attacks in Europe and the United States. For additional information on the Islamic State and the U.S. response, see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed] et al. As a result, official exports have fallen to zero, and Syria has become a net importer of petroleum products. The Turkish border region also is a conduit for the sale of illicit Iraqi oil, both by the Islamic State, which holds several small fields in Iraq, and by the Kurds. In January 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that coalition strikes had destroyed nearly 200 oil and gas facilities used by the Islamic State. It is difficult to assess which of the Islamic State's revenue streams is the largest, in part because of the limited financial details that are publicly available, the group's adaptation to shifting circumstances and opportunities, and the different ways that observers combine or disaggregate individual revenue streams when calculating their share of the group's overall income. The Islamic State requires individuals wishing to do business in its territory to pay a percentage of their earnings to the group. Policy Tools and Issues
In addition to military strikes against revenue-generating targets like oil facilities, as part of the Obama Administration's strategy to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State, the U.S. Department of the Treasury leads U.S. government efforts to apply financial measures that will undermine the group's finances. Oil Sales. Foreign Fighter Fundraising. Although the extent to which the Islamic State relies on banks remains unclear, observers suggest that efforts to restrict local banks from access to the international financial system may not affect the Islamic State's ability to leverage and exploit banks within IS-controlled territory. Replenishing battlefield resources, including equipment repairs and salaries for fighters, along with other costs associated with administering territory under its control, may ultimately stress its financial capabilities. Congressional Outlook
As the 114 th Congress continues to consider and evaluate U.S. policy responses to address the Islamic State, a focus of concern may center on whether U.S. counterterrorist financing tools are capable of diminishing IS sources of funds. Key questions may include whether current U.S. efforts are effective and sufficiently resourced, or require new legislative authorities, to respond to the Islamic State's ability to accumulate and distribute funds. | Countering the financial resources of the Islamic State, which has seized significant territory in Iraq and Syria and threatened to conduct attacks against the United States and its citizens, has become a significant national security priority for policymakers, including Members of Congress. By undermining the financial strength of the group, also known as ISIL or ISIS, policymakers seek to reduce its capability to conduct terrorist attacks, as well as to ultimately "degrade and ultimately destroy" the group. This effort includes a comprehensive look at how the group generates revenue.
While IS funding streams remain fluid, the group's largest revenue sources appear (based on open-source information) to include oil sales, taxation and extortion, and the sale of looted antiquities. Oil sales initially provided the majority of the group's revenue, but gradually declined as a percentage of overall IS profits due to an extensive campaign of airstrikes by the United States and coalition partners against oil and gas facilities used by the group.
U.S. officials have noted that the Islamic State's financial strength depends not only on its income but also on its expenses, and the extent to which it is able to devote its resources to military operations. U.S. officials have stated that the Islamic State's decision to hold and govern territory is a financial burden for the group, and thus a vulnerability that the United States could potentially exploit by diminishing the group's ability to generate and utilize revenue. If the Islamic State cannot afford the expenses associated with governing its territory, some argue that the resulting public backlash would undermine its ability to rule.
Along with military strikes, the United States, in cooperation with regional allies, has implemented a series of financial measures designed to block the Islamic State's access to the international financial system. Without such access, the Islamic State will likely struggle to fund external operations, including facilitating the movement of foreign fighters. However, significant challenges remain, as the Islamic State has thus far been able to limit its direct exposure to the international financial system by generating and spending money largely within territory under its control. U.S. efforts are centered on identifying new ways to target the group's finances by focusing both on the Islamic State and on others who conduct business with the group.
To date, the Administration has not requested new authorities specifically to counter IS financing. As the 114th Congress continues to consider and evaluate U.S. policy responses to address the Islamic State, a focus of concern may center on whether U.S. counterterrorist financing tools are capable of diminishing IS sources of funds. Key questions may include whether current U.S. efforts are effective, sufficiently resourced, or require new legislative authorities to respond to the financial threat that the Islamic State presents.
For additional information on the Islamic State and the U.S. response, see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al. |
gao_GAO-04-118 | gao_GAO-04-118_0 | NASA’s lack of a fully integrated financial management system has also hurt the agency’s ability to collect, maintain, and report the full cost of its projects and programs. Unlike NASA’s previous efforts to modernize its financial management system, IFMP does not rely on a single contractor. Reliability of IFMP’s Current Life-Cycle Cost Estimate Is Uncertain Owing to a Lack of Disciplined Processes
The reliability of the current life-cycle cost estimate—which has fluctuated since the initial estimate and is 14 percent greater than the previous estimate established in February 2002—is uncertain because disciplined cost-estimating processes required by NASA and recognized as best practices were not used in preparing the estimate. Specifically, IFMP’s life-cycle cost estimate did not include the full cost likely to be incurred during the life of the program. In cases where work breakdowns were used to prepare the estimate, the agency did not always provide a clear audit trail. However, until NASA uses more disciplined processes such as breakdowns of work in preparing the program’s cost estimate, the reliability of the life-cycle cost estimate will be uncertain and the program will have difficulty with controlling costs. For example, the life-cycle cost estimate does not include the following: the cost to operate and maintain the system beyond 2010; the cost of retiring the system; enterprise travel costs, which are provided monthly by the NASA centers; and the cost of nonleased NASA facilities for housing IFMP. Program Schedule May Be Optimistic
Although NASA guidance requires sufficient program schedule margins to manage risks, efforts to complete the integrated system as quickly as possible might have resulted in a schedule that is too compressed to accommodate program challenges, such as personnel shortages and uncertainties about software’s availability. E-Government initiatives are already affecting NASA’s planning for the payroll, procurement, and travel modules in the integrated system. Processes Insufficient to Ensure Adequate Funding Set Aside for Contingencies
In addition to the uncertain reliability of IFMP’s life-cycle cost estimates and optimistic schedules, NASA cannot ensure that the funding set aside for program contingencies is sufficient because the program did not consistently perform in-depth analyses of the potential cost impact of risks and unknowns specific to IFMP, as required by NASA guidance. Moreover, the program did not quantify the cost impact of identified risks, link its risks to funding reserves, or consistently set aside cost contingencies for these risks. The Budget Formulation module has already experienced shortfalls in its reserves, and project officials expressed concerns that the module’s functionality may have to be reduced. We found that the program established funding reserves on the basis of reserve levels set by other high-risk NASA programs, rather than on IFMP- specific risks as required by NASA guidance. Scope and Methodology
To assess the reliability of NASA’s methodology for preparing the current cost estimate for IFMP, we reviewed program and project-level documentation to obtain an understanding of NASA’s current cost estimate and its major components and the methodology used to develop the estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has struggled to implement a fully integrated financial management system. The lack of such a system has affected the agency's ability to control program costs, raising concerns about the management of its most costly programs, including the space shuttle program and the International Space Station. In April 2000 NASA initiated the Integrated Financial Management Program (IFMP)--its third effort to improve the agencywide management of its resources. Implementation is expected by fiscal year 2006 with an estimated life-cycle cost of nearly $1 billion. This report (1) assesses NASA's methodology for preparing the current life-cycle cost estimate for implementing IFMP, (2) determines whether NASA's current schedule is reasonable, and (3) evaluates NASA's processes for ensuring adequate cost contingencies.
What GAO Found
The uncertain reliability of cost estimates, optimistic schedules, and insufficient processes for ensuring adequate funding reserves have put NASA's latest financial management modernization effort at risk. Over the past several years, IFMP's life-cycle cost estimates have fluctuated, and NASA's current estimate is 14 percent greater than the previous estimate. The reliability of these estimates is uncertain because disciplined costestimating processes required by NASA and recognized as best practices were not used in preparing them. For example, IFMP's current life-cycle cost estimate did not include the full cost likely to be incurred during the life of the program, including certain operations costs and costs to retire the system. In addition, NASA did not consistently use breakdowns of work in preparing the cost estimate, as recommended by NASA guidance. In cases where work breakdowns were used, the agency did not always show the connection between the work breakdown estimates and the official program cost estimate. This has been a weakness since the inception. Although more than half of the IFMP modules have been implemented--including the Core Financial module, which is considered the backbone of IFMP--the system may not be fully implemented by the end of fiscal year 2006 as planned. Efforts to complete the integrated system as quickly as possible might have resulted in schedule margins that are insufficient to manage program challenges--such as personnel shortages, uncertainties about software availability, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) initiatives to implement electronic systems for agency business processes governmentwide. These OMB initiatives have put IFMP in a reactive mode and are already affecting planning for the payroll, procurement, and travel components of the integrated system, which could result in additional schedule delays and cost growth. Finally, reserve funding for IFMP contingencies may be insufficient, which is particularly problematic, given the program's unreliable cost estimates and optimistic schedule. One module--Budget Formulation--is already experiencing potential shortfalls in its reserves, and project officials expressed concerns that the module's functionality may have to be reduced. Yet the program continues to establish funding reserves based on reserve levels set by other high-risk NASA programs, such as NASA's space flight program--not on analyses of the potential cost impact of risks and unknowns specific to IFMP, as required by NASA guidance. Moreover, the program did not quantify the cost impact of high-criticality risks--also required by NASA--or link its risks to funding reserves to help IFMP develop realistic budget estimates. |
gao_GAO-16-79 | gao_GAO-16-79_0 | Sector-specific agencies (SSA) are federal departments or agencies with responsibility for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment. Federal Guidance Establishes Specific Roles and Responsibilities for Protecting the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure
Federal policy and public-private plans establish roles and responsibilities for federal agencies working with the private sector and other entities to enhance the cyber and physical security of public and private critical infrastructures. The SSAs and their private sector partners are to update their sector-specific plans based on DHS guidance to the sectors. Sector-Specific Agencies Determined That Cyber Risks Were Significant for Most Sectors
Sector-specific agencies determined the significance of cyber risk to the networks and industrial control systems for all 15 of the sectors in the scope of our review. Specifically, they determined that cyber risk was significant for 11 of 15 sectors. However, in July 2015, DHS officials stated that, as part of the updated sector planning process, they had recognized cyber risk as a high-priority concern for the sector. Sector-Specific Agencies Generally Performed Cyber Risk Mitigation Activities
Sector-specific agencies generally took actions to mitigate cyber risks and vulnerabilities for their respective sectors that address the Call to Action steps in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. While SSAs for 12 of the 15 sectors had not identified incentives to promote cybersecurity in their sectors, as called for by one of the Call to Action steps, all the SSAs have participated in a working group to identify appropriate incentives to encourage cybersecurity improvements across their respective sectors. In addition, SSAs for 3 of 15 sectors had not yet made significant progress in advancing cyber-based research and development within their sectors because it had not been an area of focus for their sector. DHS guidance for updating the sector-specific plans directs the SSAs to incorporate the NIPP’s actions to guide their cyber risk mitigation activities including cybersecurity-related actions to identify incentives and promote research and development. Specifically, as noted earlier, one of the NIPP Call to Action steps directs SSAs and their sector partners to identify high-level outcomes to facilitate evaluation of progress toward national goals and priorities, including securing critical infrastructure against cyber threats. However, SSAs for the other 12 sectors had not developed or reported performance metrics, although some had efforts under way to do so. For selected sectors, including financial services and water and wastewater systems, SSAs emphasized that they rely on their private sector partners to voluntarily share information and so are challenged in gathering the information needed to measure efforts. Until SSAs develop performance metrics and collect data to report on the progress of the sector-specific agencies’ efforts to enhance the sectors’ cybersecurity posture, they may be unable to adequately monitor the effectiveness of their cyber risk mitigation activities and document the resulting sector-wide cybersecurity progress. Most SSAs had identified the significance of cyber risk to their respective sectors as part of the 2010 sector-specific planning process with four sectors concluding that cyber risk was not significant at that time, but subsequently reconsidering the significance of cyber risks to their sectors. To their credit, SSAs are engaged in multiple public-private and cross sector collaboration mechanisms that facilitate the sharing of information, including cybersecurity-related information. However, most SSAs have not developed metrics to measure and improve the effectiveness of all their cyber risk mitigation activities and their sectors’ cybersecurity posture. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better monitor and provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk mitigation activities, we recommend that, informed by the sectors’ updated plans and in collaboration with sector stakeholders, the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, information technology, and nuclear sectors’ cybersecurity progress;
Secretary of the Treasury direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the financial services sector’s cybersecurity progress;
Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services (as co- SSAs) direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the food and agriculture sector’s cybersecurity progress;
Secretaries of Homeland Security and Transportation (as co-SSAs) direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the transportation systems sector’s cybersecurity progress; and
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency direct responsible officials to develop performance metrics to provide data and determine how to overcome challenges to monitoring the water and wastewater systems sector’s cybersecurity progress. III), DHS concurred with our two recommendations. The Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services did not comment on the recommendations made to them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which sector-specific agencies (SSA) have (1) identified the significance of cyber risks to their respective sectors’ networks and industrial control systems, (2) taken actions to mitigate cyber risks within their respective sectors, (3) collaborated across sectors to improve cybersecurity, and (4) established performance metrics to monitor improvements in their respective sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
U. S. critical infrastructures, such as financial institutions, commercial buildings, and energy production and transmission facilities, are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, vital to the nation's security, economy, and public health and safety. To secure these systems and assets, federal policy and the NIPP establish responsibilities for federal agencies designated as SSAs, including leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of their designated critical infrastructure sectors.
GAO's objectives were to determine the extent to which SSAs have (1) identified the significance of cyber risks to their respective sectors' networks and industrial control systems, (2) taken actions to mitigate cyber risks within their respective sectors, (3) collaborated across sectors to improve cybersecurity, and (4) established performance metrics to monitor improvements in their respective sectors. To conduct the review, GAO analyzed policy, plans, and other documentation and interviewed public and private sector officials for 8 of 9 SSAs with responsibility for 15 of 16 sectors.
What GAO Found
Sector-specific agencies (SSA) determined the significance of cyber risk to networks and industrial control systems for all 15 of the sectors in the scope of GAO's review. Specifically, they determined that cyber risk was significant for 11 of 15 sectors. Although the SSAs for the remaining four sectors had not determined cyber risks to be significant during their 2010 sector-specific planning process, they subsequently reconsidered the significance of cyber risks to the sector. For example, commercial facilities sector–specific agency officials stated that they recognized cyber risk as a high-priority concern for the sector as part of the updated sector planning process. SSAs and their sector partners are to include an overview of current and emerging cyber risks in their updated sector-specific plans for 2015.
SSAs generally took actions to mitigate cyber risks and vulnerabilities for their respective sectors. SSAs developed, implemented, or supported efforts to enhance cybersecurity and mitigate cyber risk with activities that aligned with a majority of actions called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). SSAs for 12 of the 15 sectors had not identified incentives to promote cybersecurity in their sectors as proposed in the NIPP; however, the SSAs are participating in a working group to identify appropriate incentives. In addition, SSAs for 3 of 15 sectors had not yet made significant progress in advancing cyber-based research and development within their sectors because it had not been an area of focus for their sector. Department of Homeland Security guidance for updating the sector-specific plans directs the SSAs to incorporate the NIPP's actions to guide their cyber risk mitigation activities, including cybersecurity-related actions to identify incentives and promote research and development.
All SSAs that GAO reviewed used multiple public-private and cross-sector collaboration mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of cybersecurity-related information. For example, the SSAs used councils of federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including coordinating councils and cybersecurity and industrial control system working groups, to coordinate with each other. In addition, SSAs participated in the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, a national center at the Department of Homeland Security, to receive and disseminate cyber-related information for public and private sector partners.
The Departments of Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services established performance metrics for their three sectors. However, the SSAs for the other 12 sectors had not developed metrics to measure and report on the effectiveness of all of their cyber risk mitigation activities or their sectors' cybersecurity posture. This was because, among other reasons, the SSAs rely on their private sector partners to voluntarily share information needed to measure efforts. The NIPP directs SSAs and their sector partners to identify high-level outcomes to facilitate progress towards national goals and priorities. Until SSAs develop performance metrics and collect data to report on the progress of their efforts to enhance the sectors' cybersecurity posture, they may be unable to adequately monitor the effectiveness of their cyber risk mitigation activities and document the resulting sector-wide cybersecurity progress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that certain SSAs collaborate with sector partners to develop performance metrics and determine how to overcome challenges to reporting the results of their cyber risk mitigation activities. Four of these agencies concurred with GAO's recommendation, while two agencies did not comment on the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-735T | gao_GAO-15-735T_0 | The TDIU Beneficiary Population and Benefit Costs Are Growing, Especially Among Older Veterans
As we reported in June 2015, in fiscal year 2013, 332,934 veterans received TDIU benefits, an increase of 22 percent since fiscal year 2009. Overall, TDIU beneficiaries make up a substantial portion (45 percent) of the group of all veterans who receive benefit payments at the 100 percent disability compensation rate. We estimated that, in fiscal year 2013, the TDIU benefit was a $5.2 billion supplemental payment above what beneficiaries would have received in the absence of TDIU benefits. VBA’s Benefit Decision-Making Procedures Do Not Ensure TDIU Decisions Are Well Supported
In our June 2015 report, we found that VBA’s guidance, quality assurance approach, and income verification procedures do not ensure that TDIU decisions are well supported. Thus, rating specialists lack a definitive source for TDIU benefit decision guidance. While we recognize that TDIU benefit decisions have an inherently subjective component, in June 2015, we recommended that VA identify other quality assurance approaches to comprehensively assess TDIU benefit claim decisions. Self-Reported income eligibility information is not verified: VBA requires TDIU claimants and beneficiaries to provide information on their employment earnings, but it places the benefits at risk of being awarded to ineligible veterans by not using third-party data sources to independently verify self-reported earnings. To begin receiving and remain eligible for TDIU benefits, veterans must meet certain income eligibility requirements. Options for Revising TDIU Eligibility Requirements
With regard to the options for revising TDIU eligibility requirements and the benefit structure, in our June 2015 report, we identified a number of options proposed by others as described in table 1. More specifically, six options focused on revising eligibility such as changing existing requirements in various ways, for example, setting age limits, lowering the disability rating requirement, or increasing the income threshold. A seventh option would affect the benefit structure by lowering—but not immediately eliminating—the TDIU benefit payments as beneficiaries earn income beyond the eligibility limit. In light of VA’s agreement with the committee’s recommendations, we subsequently recommended in our June 2015 report that VBA develop a plan to study (1) whether age should be considered when deciding if veterans are unemployable and (2) whether it is possible to disallow TDIU benefits for veterans whose vocational assessment indicated they would be employable after rehabilitation.recommendation and stated that Compensation Service initiated a review of TDIU policies and procedures in April 2015 including consideration of age and vocational assessments in claim decisions. Moreover, VA has the opportunity to benefit from the attention the TDIU benefit has received by various experts, including its own advisory committee. | Why GAO Did This Study
The population of veterans who receive these supplemental benefits has been growing. GAO was asked to testify on its recent review of VA’s management of these benefits. GAO issued a report in June 2015 that discussed the results of its review.
Like the June 2015 report, this statement (1) examined age-related trends in the population of TDIU beneficiaries and benefit payments; (2) assessed the procedures used for benefit decision-making; and (3) described suggested options for revising the benefit.
What GAO Found
The number of veterans receiving Total Disability Individual Unemployability (TDIU) benefits has been increasing, as has the total amount of benefit payments, especially among older veterans. VA generally provides TDIU benefits to disabled veterans who are unable to maintain employment with earnings above the federal poverty guidelines due to service-connected disabilities. To be eligible for TDIU benefits, a veteran must have a single service-connected disability rated at least 60 percent or multiple disabilities with a combined rating of at least 70 percent (with at least one disability rated at 40 percent or higher). In addition, the veteran must be unable to obtain or maintain “substantially gainful employment” as a result of these service-connected disabilities. In fiscal year 2013, over 330,000 veterans received this benefit, a 22 percent increase from fiscal year 2009, while the TDIU disability payments increased by 30 percent. GAO estimated that $5.2 billion was spent in fiscal year 2013 for the supplement. These trends occurred alongside GAO also found that VA’s procedures do not ensure that TDIU benefit decisions are well supported. Specifically, (1) VBA’s guidance for determining unemployability, and thus benefit eligibility, is incomplete and formatted and delivered inefficiently; (2) VBA’s quality assurance approach may not comprehensively assess TDIU benefit decisions; and (3) self-reported income eligibility information is not verified with third-party earnings data. GAO also identified seven options proposed by experts for revising TDIU eligibly requirements and the benefit structure. Six options focus on eligibility requirements, such as considering additional criteria when determining unemployability and applying an age cap of 65. A seventh option would affect the benefit structure by lowering—but not immediately eliminating—the TDIU benefit payments as beneficiaries earn income beyond the eligibility limit.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2015 report, GAO recommended that VA issued updated guidance to determine eligibility; identify a comprehensive quality assurance approach to assess benefit decisions; verify veterans’ self-reported income; and move forward on studies suggested by its advisory committee. VA concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-295 | gao_GAO-15-295_0 | 1). RSN is to provide RTT grantees one-on-one technical assistance that is tailored to the grantee’s RTT reform plans. RTT Spurred Reform amid Different Types of State and District Capacity Challenges
RTT Both Accelerated Reforms Already Under Way and Spurred New Reform Efforts
RTT accelerated reforms under way or spurred new reforms in all 19 states and in an estimated 81 percent of districts that were awarded RTT grants, according to states and districts we surveyed (see fig. 2 for district survey responses). States and Districts Faced Moderate but Different Capacity Challenges Implementing RTT
In our survey of states and districts that received RTT funds, we asked officials to identify capacity challenges they faced in implementing and sustaining RTT and the level of difficulty associated with each challenge identified. Overall, they rated this challenge as moderate; however, about one-quarter to one-third of RTT states reported that obtaining support from state legislatures, organizations that represent teachers and/or administrators, and district leaders was very or extremely challenging. Districts also reported particular difficulties with human capital capacity— the second greatest challenge they faced implementing RTT. 3). 4). Rural Districts Faced Greater Capacity Challenges Than Urban and Suburban Districts in Many of the Reform Areas
Rural school districts reported facing significantly greater challenges than urban districts in the standards and assessments and data systems core reform areas when implementing RTT, according to our survey results (see fig. also required to hold grantees accountable for meeting the commitments made in their approved RTT applications. Many RTT States Found Education’s Technical Assistance the Most Helpful Resource
States Found Technical Assistance Most Helpful in Building and Sustaining Capacity
According to our state survey, individualized technical assistance provided by Education program officers was the most helpful resource when building capacity to implement and sustain reform plans (see fig. Education officials noted that it was unlikely that the department would receive such a large amount of funding ($43 million) for technical assistance again. In addition, according to Federal Standards for Internal Control, policies and procedures help ensure that necessary actions are taken to address risks to achieving the entity’s objectives. Despite the large number of schools running a school-wide program, districts and schools may not be using the flexibilities to combine Title I funds with other federal funds to their fullest extent due, in part, to a lack of organizational capacity at the state and district levels. This toolkit, when finalized, may help states and districts better understand how to leverage their formula grants to sustain reform activities and help raise student achievement—a primary objective of education reform. Such guidance—when developed and fully implemented—may help auditors better understand funding flexibilities in existing formula grants and help states and districts fully leverage these flexibilities. Conclusions
As Education’s technical assistance contract for RSN comes to a close, and it develops new processes for technical assistance under the new Office of State Support, it has an opportunity to apply the technical assistance that RTT states reported as most helpful, such as individualized technical assistance and professional development, to other grant programs that the office oversees. Recommendations
To help ensure that states are better able to sustain RTT reforms and that Education can effectively support other grant programs managed by the Office of State Support, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct the Office of State Support to fully implement and incorporate into its coordinated technical assistance policies and procedures the types of support that would be useful in sustaining RTT reforms and providing effective support to grantees in other programs supporting education reform that the Office of State Support oversees. To help states address capacity challenges as they sustain comprehensive education reforms similar to RTT, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct the Office of State Support to take steps, such as: providing ongoing individualized technical assistance to states to help them target assistance to rural districts, particularly in the reform areas that were most challenging for rural districts; finalizing and disseminating guidance to be included in Education’s toolkit to help states leverage federal formula grants to sustain education reforms; and clarifying and improving understanding of how funding flexibilities in existing formula grants could be used to support education reform efforts to help states and the audit community address impediments to using formula grants in different ways. Education did not explicitly agree or disagree with our recommendations, but outlined steps to address many elements contained in them. We reviewed and analyzed existing literature on capacity issues and competitive grants in K-12 education using GAO’s prospective We examined the features of RTT, and evaluation synthesis approach.reviewed findings from published reports to identify capacity challenges. Expert Panel
To obtain information on lessons learned from RTT that could inform future education reform efforts, we convened a group of knowledgeable individuals for an expert panel. An external expert who conducted extensive research on K-12 education and federal policy vetted our initial list of panelists. Review of Laws, Regulations, and Guidance and Interviews with Officials
For all three objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance—including federal internal control standards and Education’s Handbook for the Discretionary Grant Process—and interviewed federal, state, and district officials and other experts regarding capacity to implement and sustain RTT reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Education created RTT under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. From 2010 through 2011, Education awarded $4 billion in competitive grant funds to 19 states to reform core areas of K-12 education. RTT states also committed to building capacity to implement and sustain reforms. GAO and others previously reported that capacity challenges had adversely affected RTT implementation and could hinder efforts to sustain the reforms. GAO was asked to further examine these challenges.
This report examines: (1) the effect of RTT on reform and capacity challenges states and districts faced, (2) how helpful Education's assistance was to states in building and sustaining capacity, and (3) lessons learned that could inform future reform efforts.
GAO surveyed all 19 RTT states and a generalizable sample of RTT districts; held an expert panel; reviewed RTT applications, progress reports, relevant federal laws and regulations, and literature; and interviewed officials from seven selected states and districts, chosen based on survey responses. GAO selected expert panelists based on research or experience with RTT, capacity issues, and federal grants.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education's (Education) Race to the Top (RTT) program encouraged states to reform their K-12 educational systems, but states and districts faced various capacity challenges in implementing the reforms. RTT accelerated education reforms underway and spurred new reforms in all 19 RTT states and in an estimated 81 percent of districts, according to GAO's surveys of RTT grantees and districts that received RTT funds. At the same time, states and districts noted various challenges to their capacity to successfully support, oversee, and implement these reform efforts. For example, about one-quarter to one-third of RTT states reported that their greatest challenges involved obtaining support from stakeholders such as teacher organizations. In contrast, districts primarily reported that their greatest challenges involved financial and human capital capacity, especially with competitive compensation and standards and assessments. Additionally, rural districts reported facing greater challenges than urban and suburban districts. Education is to assist grantees in achieving successful project outcomes according to its grants handbook, while holding them accountable for their RTT reform plans. Yet, GAO found no specific activities tailored to rural needs in areas grantees identified as most challenging. A better understanding of the capacity challenges rural districts face could help Education better target its technical assistance to districts that need it the most.
In response to GAO's survey, many RTT states reported that technical assistance from Education officials and its contractor was more helpful than other RTT resources, such as web-based materials. Ten states also reported they would benefit from additional support in areas such as training and professional development. Education created a new office to oversee and provide coordinated support to RTT and other programs, and intends to develop office-wide coordinated technical assistance policies. Federal internal control standards note that adequate policies help ensure that actions are taken to address risks to achieving an agency's objectives. However, Education has not determined the type or amount of technical assistance to be provided and its policies are still being developed. RTT's $43 million technical assistance contract ends in June 2015, which may create a gap in assistance to states. Unless Education focuses on technical assistance activities that states found most useful, it risks providing ineffective assistance to programs supporting these education reforms.
GAO's panel of RTT and grant experts identified key lessons learned, such as leveraging existing funding flexibilities under federal formula grants, to help address capacity needs and sustain reforms when RTT ends in September 2015. Districts and schools may not, however, be using these flexibilities to their fullest extent, in part because of uncertainty about what is allowed under federal requirements. Federal internal control standards state that information should be communicated in a form that enables an agency to achieve its objectives. Education lacks time frames for finalizing and disseminating new guidance for states to clarify federal formula grant flexibilities; and recognizes the need for, but has not developed guidance to help auditors better understand these flexibilities. Such guidance, when finalized, may help states and districts sustain education reforms, thereby raising student achievement – a primary objective of reform.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education incorporate into its coordinated policies technical assistance grantees found most useful, target assistance to rural districts, and issue guidance to help states and auditors with funding flexibilities. Education did not explicitly agree or disagree with GAO's recommendations, but outlined steps to address many aspects of them.
To view the e-supplements online, click: |
gao_GAO-08-180 | gao_GAO-08-180_0 | Tools Used to Identify and Track CBRN Materials
First responders have two primary tools in CBRN events: (1) equipment to identify CBRN materials in the atmosphere and (2) information from plume models and field measurements that track the atmospheric dispersion of CBRN materials. Second, according to DHS, chemical detection equipment is generally inadequate to provide information on the presence of chemical warfare agents at less than lethal but still potentially harmful levels. Current Radiological and Nuclear Detection Equipment First Responders Use Cannot Detect the Dispersion of Releases in the Atmosphere
While equipment first responders use for detecting radiological and nuclear materials can detect the presence of significant amounts of these materials, they cannot predict their dispersion in the atmosphere. Under the current BioWatch system, a threat agent is not identified until several hours to more than a day after the release of the agent, and the system does not determine how much material was released. One official said that first responders are purchasing biodetection equipment that is “junk” because there are no standards and testing programs. DHS has two programs in place to provide first responders with information about CBRN detection equipment. U.S. interagency studies, however, have concluded that these models have major limitations. First responders’ key questions are, What was released, when, where, and how much? Data Are Insufficient on How Exposure to CBRN Materials Affects Health
Significant gaps exist in first responders’ information for determining the effects of exposure to CBRN materials on heterogeneous urban populations. Scientific research on the effects of low-level exposure to CBRN material on civilian populations is severely lacking, especially for vulnerable populations such as elderly people, children, and individuals with compromised immune systems. Conclusions
Despite several initiatives and investments DHS and other agencies have undertaken since 2001, first responders do not have effective tools to respond to events involving the release of CBRN materials in urban areas. While DHS indicated it has missions to develop, independently test, and certify CB detection equipment for first responders’ use, its testing and certification are limited to equipment DHS is developing and does not extend to equipment developed by commercial manufacturers. While existing urban plume models have several limitations as a primary tool for tracking the release of CBRN materials in urban areas, the TOPOFF exercises demonstrated the larger problem of confusion among first responders about the timing, value, and limitations of plume models and other analyses following a CBRN event. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security reach agreement with DOD, DOE, EPA, and other agencies involved with developing, testing, and certifying CBRN detection equipment on which agency should have the missions and responsibilities to develop, independently test, and certify detection equipment that first responders can use to detect hazardous material releases in the atmosphere; ensure that manufacturers’ claims are independently tested and validated regarding whether their commercial off-the-shelf CBRN detection equipment can detect given hazardous material at specific sensitivities; refine IMAAC’s procedures by working with other federal, state, and local agencies to (1) develop common/joint IMAAC emergency response practices, including procedures for dealing with contradictory plume modeling information from other agencies during a CBRN event; (2) refine the concept of operations for chemical, biological, and radiological releases; and (3) delineate the type and scale of major CBRN incidents that would qualify for IMAAC assistance; and in conjunction with IMAAC, work with the federal plume modeling community to accelerate research and development to address plume model deficiencies in urban areas and improve federal modeling and assessment capabilities. However, DHS has adopted few performance standards for CBRN detection equipment. We also interviewed operations staff of the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) at LLNL. | Why GAO Did This Study
First responders are responsible for responding to terrorist-related and accidental releases of CBRN materials in urban areas. Two primary tools for identifying agents released and their dispersion and effect are equipment to detect and identify CBRN agents in the environment and plume models to track the dispersion of airborne releases of these agents. GAO reports on the limitations of the CBRN detection equipment, its performance standards and capabilities testing, plume models available for tracking urban dispersion of CBRN materials, and information for determining how exposure to CBRN materials affects urban populations. To assess the limitations of CBRN detection equipment and urban plume modeling for first responders' use, GAO met with and obtained data from agency officials and first responders in three states.
What GAO Found
While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies have taken steps to improve homeland defense, local first responders still do not have tools to accurately identify right away what, when, where, and how much chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials are released in U.S. urban areas, accidentally or by terrorists. Equipment local first responders use to detect radiological and nuclear material cannot predict the dispersion of these materials in the atmosphere. No agency has the mission to develop, certify, and test equipment first responders can use for detecting radiological materials in the atmosphere. According to DHS, chemical detectors are marginally able to detect an immediately dangerous concentration of chemical warfare agents. Handheld detection devices for biological agents are not reliable or effective. DHS's BioWatch program monitors air samples for biothreat agents in selected U.S. cities but does not provide first responders with real-time detection capability. Under the BioWatch system, a threat agent is identified within several hours to more than 1 day after it is released, and how much material is released cannot be determined. DHS has adopted few standards for CBRN detection equipment and has no independent testing program to validate whether it can detect CBRN agents at the specific sensitivities manufacturers claim. DHS has a mission to develop, test, and certify first responders' CB detection equipment, but its testing and certification cover equipment DHS develops, not what first responders buy. Interagency studies show that federal agencies' models to track the atmospheric release of CBRN materials have major limitations in urban areas. DHS's national TOPOFF exercises have demonstrated first responders' confusion over competing plume models' contradictory results. The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), created to coordinate modeling predictions, lacks procedures to resolve contradictory predictions. Evaluations and field testing of plume models developed for urban areas show variable predictions in urban environments. They are limited in obtaining accurate data on the characteristics and rate of CBRN material released. Data on population density, land use, and complex terrain are critical to first responders, but data on the effects of exposure to CBRN materials on urban populations have significant gaps. Scientific research is lacking on how low-level exposure to CBRN material affects civilian populations, especially elderly persons, children, and people whose immune systems are compromised. |
gao_RCED-98-97 | gao_RCED-98-97_0 | It may include provisions concerning the standards for the operation and maintenance of the gaming facility, the application of the tribe’s and the state’s laws and regulations that are related to the gaming activity, and the state’s assessment of the amounts necessary to defray the costs of regulating or overseeing the gaming activity. National Indian Gaming Commission
Organization, Staffing, and Funding
The National Indian Gaming Commission is headed by a Chairman and two associate commissioners. Reporting to the Chief of Staff are two primary oversight offices—the Office of Contracts and Audits with 3 staff and the Office of Enforcement with 16 staff, including 6 field investigators. The Commission’s revenue increased from $1.6 million in fiscal year 1991 to $3.8 million in fiscal year 1997. Expenditures have also increased in the last 7 years—from $1.2 million to $4.6 million. The Commission used prior years’ carryover balances to make up the difference. Later, the Commission focused on reviewing and/or approving various gaming reports and submissions for both bingo and casino gaming as well as on its monitoring activities. State Gaming Agencies
Much variety exists among the five state gaming agencies that we reviewed that regulate or oversee casino gaming; differences exist in their organization, staffing levels, and funding levels. They merely reflect differences in the scope and level of the state agencies’ responsibilities. Responsibilities
The level of staffing and funding that each state commits to gaming oversight or regulatory activities varied according to the responsibilities each state has for licensing, monitoring, and enforcement. This presence is possible, in part, because all of the state’s casinos are located in Atlantic City. Enforcement
The five states varied somewhat in their enforcement authority. Critical Regulatory Elements
In outlining their views on the elements critical to regulating gaming, the heads of the gaming agencies in all five states stressed the importance of ensuring the integrity of gaming. From their perspective, two critical elements emerge. All agree on the importance of accounting, administrative, and internal controls, such as audits of the financial statements, to assist the regulators and casinos in monitoring gaming operations. However, the major objectives of our review were to provide information on the Commission’s organization, staffing, funding, and responsibilities from 1991 to 1997 and similar information for five states’ gaming agencies. In addition, we obtained written comments on views of critical regulatory elements from the heads of the Arizona Department of Gaming, the Michigan Gaming Control Board, the Nevada Gaming Control Board, the New Jersey Casino Control Commission, the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement, and the Washington State Gambling Commission. We visited Indian casinos in Arizona, Nevada, Michigan, and Washington and non-Indian casinos in Nevada and New Jersey. Funding
The Commission’s revenue comes primarily from fees assessed on Indian bingo gaming revenues, federal appropriations, and cost reimbursements. The Commission’s more recent efforts have focused on ongoing responsibilities, such as processing fingerprint cards, the review and approval of new ordinances, management contracts, and background investigation reports for Indian bingo gaming and Indian casino gaming, as well as oversight and monitoring of Indian bingo and casino gaming. The Director said that these investigations are extremely useful in identifying and deterring organized crime influences within the industry. For the other two compacts, the Board monitors the Indian gaming operations as it does non-Indian operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the roles of the National Indian Gaming Commission and states in casino gaming regulation, focusing on: (1) information on the Commission's organization, staffing, funding, and responsibilities from 1991 through 1997; (2) similar information on state gaming agencies in Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, and Washington, as it relates to casino gaming; and (3) views of the heads of the gaming agencies from the five states on the elements critical to regulating gaming.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1991, the Commission's organization consisted of three commissioners and six other staff; (2) by 1997, the Commission's staffing had increased to 37 and included two oversight offices--the Office of Contracts and Audits and the Office of Enforcement; (3) funding for the Commission, which comes from fees assessed on Indian bingo operations, appropriations, or cost reimbursements, increased from $1.6 million in 1991 to $4.6 million in 1997; (4) expenditures were greater than revenue during the last 4 fiscal years, but the use of carryover balances from prior years sustained the Commission; (5) during the early 1990s, the Commission promulgated regulations for the Indian gaming; (6) later, it focused on its responsibilities to: (a) monitor gaming operations; and (b) review or approve various gaming reports and submissions for both bingo and casino gaming; (7) the gaming agencies in the five states GAO reviewed vary considerably in their organization, staffing, and funding for casino gaming, a situation that reflects the differences in the scope and level of the responsibilities that state agencies have; (8) in fiscal year 1997, Nevada and New Jersey, the two states that almost exclusively regulate non-Indian casino gaming, had the largest organizations, in part, because they regulate all or almost all of the casino gaming in their states; (9) New Jersey had a staff of about 700 and a budget of about $54 million to license, monitor, and enforce the gaming requirements for 12 non-Indian casinos in Atlantic City; (10) Nevada had a staff of about 400 and a budget of $22 million to regulate over 2,400 gaming operations; (11) Arizona, Michigan, and Washington had smaller organizations and shared responsibilities with the tribes; (12) although these three states oversee about the same number of Indian gaming operations, staffing and funding levels varied; (13) licensing, monitoring, and enforcement activities also differed in these three states; (14) in all five states, gaming operations fund each state's regulatory or oversight program; (15) the heads of the gaming agencies in all five states GAO visited cited the importance of ensuring the integrity of gaming and identified what they viewed as critical regulatory elements; and (16) from their perspective, the critical elements are: (a) the use of accounting, administrative, and internal controls to assist the regulators and casinos in monitoring gaming operations; and (b) the licensing process, because it helps to identify and deter organized crime. |
gao_GAO-01-205 | gao_GAO-01-205_0 | Concluding Observations
With the implementation of a prospective payment system, efforts to protect patients from potential underprovision of care and to hold HHAs accountable are essential. Instituting the collection and reporting of OASIS data is an important step in that direction. The use of OASIS data enhances consistency in the performance and documentation of patient assessments for home health services. As a result, information on patient outcomes will become available for the first time. Collecting such data is not without its costs. To varying degrees, the requirement to collect OASIS data on all home health patients increases the amount of staff time devoted to collecting and reporting patient assessment information. HHAs have been compensated for some of these costs through adjustments to their payment rates. Moreover, because PPS episode payment rates are based on historically high utilization levels, which have since declined, these rates should allow the completion of OASIS assessments. Protecting the privacy of home health care patients is also important. HCFA has made progress in this area by enhancing protections in the collection and transmission of the OASIS data. The effectiveness of these policies and procedures will depend on how well they are implemented. | What GAO Found
With the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) implementation of a prospective payment system, efforts to protect patients from potential underprovision of care and to hold home health agencies (HHA) accountable are essential. Instituting the collection and reporting of Outcome and Assessment Information Set (OASIS) data is an important step in that direction. The use of OASIS data enhances consistency in the performance and documentation of patient assessments for home health services. As a result, information on patient outcomes will become available for the first time. Collecting such data is not without its costs. To varying degrees, the requirement to collect OASIS data on all home health patients increases the amount of staff time devoted to collecting and reporting patient assessment information. HHAs have been compensated for some of these costs through adjustments made to their payment rates. Moreover, because prospective payment system episode payment rates are based on historically high utilization levels, which have since declined, these rates should allow the completion of OASIS assessments. Protecting the privacy of home health care patients is also important. HCFA has made progress in this area by enhancing protections in the collection and transmission of the OASIS data. The effectiveness of these policies and procedures will depend on how well they are implemented. |
gao_GAO-01-177 | gao_GAO-01-177_0 | FSIS, FDA, and State Agency Food Safety Expenditures Total Nearly $1.3 Billion
FSIS was responsible for food safety expenditures of $678 million in fiscal year 1998 and $712 million in fiscal year 1999, or about 55 percent of the nearly $1.3 billion fiscal year 1999 federal and state expenditures. The federal agencies’ expenditures reflect the regulatory approaches or inspection frequencies contained in the laws under which they operate. States Report Expenditures of About $300 Million Annually for Food Safety
State agriculture and health departments reported expenditures of about $292 million in fiscal year 1998 and $301 million in fiscal year 1999. Regarding FSIS and FDA, we obtained appropriations documentation showing the amount of funding provided to each agency. The Office of Deputy accounted for about 20 percent of total office expenditures. Appendix VII: Comments from the Food and Drug Administration
GAO’s Comments
1. | What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and the state agriculture and health departments spent about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 1999. FSIS and FDA spent about $1 billion, and the states reported spending about $300 million. The amounts and proportions of food safety expenditures for fiscal year 1998 were similar. Regarding the $1 billion in federal funds spent in fiscal year 1999, FSIS spent about 70 percent, overseeing about 20 percent of federally regulated foods; FDA spent about 30 percent, overseeing about 80 percent of federally regulated foods. These outlays reflect the regulatory approaches or inspection frequencies contained in the laws under which each agency operates. |
gao_GAO-10-815T | gao_GAO-10-815T_0 | Changes to State TANF Programs Contributed to a Long-Term Decline in Participation but Caseloads are Starting to Increase in Many States
In response to the creation of TANF, states implemented more work- focused welfare programs, and research shows that these changes—in concert with other policy changes and economic conditions—contributed to raising the incomes of single parent families so that fewer were eligible for cash assistance. Finally, the strong economy of the 1990s facilitated the move from welfare to work for many TANF recipients. According to our estimates, the vast majority—87 percent—of the caseload decline can be explained by the decline in eligible families participating in the program, in part because of changes to state welfare programs. Between December 2007 and September 2009, 37 states had increases in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance while 13 states had decreases. Most TANF Participants and Eligible Non- Recipients have Low Incomes, and A Small Subgroup Have Very Low Incomes
Research on how families are faring after welfare reform has shown that, like those who receive TANF cash assistance, families that have left welfare, either for work or for other reasons, tend to remain low income and most depend in part on other public benefits. As we noted in a 2005 report, most of the parents who left cash welfare found employment and some were better off than they were on welfare, but earnings were typically low and many worked in unstable, low-wage jobs with few benefits and advancement opportunities. Efforts to Measure States’ Engagement of TANF Recipients in Work Activities and to Monitor States’ Use of All TANF Funds Fall Short
Data on caseload trends, state policies, and how families are faring can provide important insight into how TANF programs are working. However, work participation rates—a key accountability feature of TANF, as currently measured and reported—do not appear to be achieving the intended purpose of encouraging states to engage specified proportions of TANF adults in work activities. In addition, as cash assistance caseloads fell, many states shifted their spending away from cash assistance toward work supports such as child care, highlighting information gaps at the federal level in how many families received TANF services and how states used federal and state MOE funds to meet TANF goals. States Used Flexibilities Allowed in Law to Engage a Smaller Share of Participants in Work Activities than Stated Goal
To promote TANF’s focus on work, HHS measures state performance by the proportion of TANF participants engaged in allowable work activities. While the dramatic decline in the TANF caseload following welfare reform and the increase in employment among single mothers has been cited as evidence for the program’s success, questions have been raised about its effect on families. A central feature of the TANF block grant is the flexibility it provides to states to design and implement welfare programs tailored to address their own circumstances, but this flexibility must be balanced with mechanisms to ensure state programs are held accountable for meeting program goals. Although the DRA changes to TANF work requirements were expected to strengthen the work participation rate as a performance measure and move more families toward self-sufficiency, the proportion of TANF recipients engaged in work activities remains unchanged. Lack of information on how states use these funds to aid families and to meet TANF goals hinders decision makers in considering the success of TANF and what trade offs might be involved in any changes to TANF when it is reauthorized. Related GAO Products
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Implications of Recent Legislative and Economic Changes for State Programs and Work Participation Rates, GAO-10-525. Poverty in America: Consequences for Individuals and the Economy. Welfare Reform: With TANF Flexibility, States Vary in How They Implement Work Requirements and Time Limits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, created in 1996, is one of the key federal funding streams provided to states to assist women and children in poverty. A critical aspect of TANF has been its focus on employment and self-sufficiency, and the primary means to measure state efforts in this area has been TANF's work participation rate requirements. Legislative changes in 2005 were generally expected to strengthen these work requirements. Given changes in the number of families participating in TANF over time and questions about whether the program is achieving its goals, this testimony draws on previous GAO work to focus on 1) key changes to state welfare programs made in response to TANF and other legislation and their effect on caseload trends; 2) how low-income single-parent families are faring; and 3) how recent developments in state programs and the economy may affect federal monitoring of TANF. To address these issues, in previous work conducted from November 2008 to May 2010, GAO analyzed state data reported to the Department of Health and Human Services; used microsimulation analyses; surveyed state TANF administrators in 50 states and the District of Columbia; interviewed officials in 21 states selected to represent a range of economic conditions and TANF policy decisions; conducted site visits to Florida, Ohio, and Oregon; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and research.
What GAO Found
Changes states made to their welfare programs as they implemented TANF contributed to a significant decline in program participation, but caseloads are starting to increase in many states. The strong economy of the 1990s, TANF's focus on work, and other factors contributed to increased family incomes and a decline in the number of families poor enough to be eligible for cash assistance. However, research shows that state policies--including TANF work requirements, time limits, and sanction and diversion policies--also contributed to the caseload decline, as fewer eligible families participated in the program. In recent years, states have varied in their response to changes in economic conditions, with caseloads rising in 37 states and falling in 13 states between December 2007 and September 2009, the latest data available when we did our work. Like TANF recipients, families who left TANF, as well as those who qualified for the program but who did not participate, had low incomes and continued to rely on other government supports. In the years following welfare reform, many of the parents who left cash assistance found employment, and some were better off than they were on welfare, but earnings were typically low and many worked in unstable, low-wage jobs with few benefits. Among eligible families who did not participate, a small subset did not work and had very low incomes. Efforts to measure states' engagement of TANF recipients in work activities and to monitor states' use of all TANF funds have been of limited use in ensuring accountability for meeting federal TANF goals, according to our analysis. Work participation rates--a key performance measure for TANF, as currently measured and reported, do not appear to be achieving the intended purpose of encouraging states to engage specified proportions of TANF recipients in work activities. In addition, states' decisions to shift their spending from cash assistance to other programs and work supports such as childcare have highlighted gaps in the information available at the federal level on how many families received TANF services and how states used funds to meet TANF goals. A central feature of the TANF block grant is the flexibility it provides to states to design and implement welfare programs tailored to address their own circumstances, but this flexibility must be balanced with mechanisms to ensure state programs are held accountable for meeting program goals. The limited usefulness of current measures of work participation and the lack of information on how states use funds to aid families and to meet TANF goals hinders decision makers in considering the success of TANF and what trade offs might be involved in any changes to TANF when it is reauthorized. |
gao_T-RCED-98-119 | gao_T-RCED-98-119_0 | DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have identified the following safety problems at its spent fuel storage basins:
The spent fuel, which is made of uranium and has been irradiated in a nuclear reactor, was not intended for long-term storage in water and is corroding and crumbling. Constructed in 1951, the basins are now well beyond their expected useful life of 20 years. They are seismically unsound, and at least one has leaked water directly to the surrounding soils. For example, from 1974 through 1979, about 15 million gallons of contaminated water leaked from one basin. In both incidents, it is likely that contamination reached the Columbia River. The existing storage poses risks of exposing workers, the public, and the environment to radioactive materials. The loss of water in the basins could also expose workers and the public to the airborne transmission of radioactive materials released from the corroded fuel and the sludge in the bottom of the basins. DOE believes that the dry storage of the spent fuel presents the best option for achieving these goals. The schedule has been revised twice since then, and in April 1998, the contractors proposed a new schedule that would begin the fuel’s retrieval in November 2000 and complete the project by December 2005. In a February 9, 1998, letter to this Committee, DOE stated that the estimates of spent fuel project costs of over $1 billion and 9 years to complete the project (the December 1997 revision) were still less than early estimates of the cost of addressing the spent fuel storage problem at Hanford, which were projected to cost up to $2 billion and take up to 15 years to complete. Some of the reasons for cost overruns and schedule slippage are similar to the management problems that have occurred on this spent fuel project. DOE insisted on a very optimistic schedule for the project because of the deteriorated condition of the spent fuel and the storage basins and the need to resolve the storage problems expeditiously. In addition, DOE officials thought that a tight schedule would force Westinghouse to accomplish the project more quickly. The proposal was developed by Westinghouse, the company that was the management and operations contractor at Hanford until October 1996. According to the Assistant Manager for Waste Management at Hanford, the optimistic schedule for the project reflected a trade-off between the health and safety risks associated with continuing to store the spent fuel in the basins and the management risks associated with setting an optimistic schedule and knowing that it would be difficult to meet. Management by Companies in Charge Exacerbated Problems With Original Schedule
During the project’s history, two different companies have been responsible for the project. Although Duke Engineering has recently made changes to its management team and operating procedures and Fluor Daniel has stepped up its oversight of the project, it is too early to tell if these changes will improve Duke Engineering’s ability to manage the project within cost and schedule constraints. In addition, we interviewed DOE and contractor officials, as well as officials from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington State Department of Ecology. To determine the major causes of schedule delays and cost increases, we reviewed DOE’s, the Safety Board’s, and the contractors’ records and reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) project to change how DOE stores spent (or irradiated) nuclear fuel from its nuclear reactors at DOE's Hanford site in Washington, focusing on the: (1) risks posed by the storage of the spent nuclear fuel; (2) project's status; (3) major reasons for delays and cost increases; and (4) measures being taken to address these delays and cost increases.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as stored, most of the spent fuel at Hanford presents a risk of releasing nuclear materials to the environment and a consequent danger both to workers and the public; (2) this fuel sits in two water basins that are well beyond their design life and are located just 1,400 feet from the Columbia River; (3) never designed for long-term storage in water, some of the spent fuel has corroded, creating a radioactive sludge that has accumulated in the storage basins; (4) because of leaks in the basins, workers risk exposure to radioactive materials if contaminated water is released to the soil, and the public risks exposure if this water moves through the soil to the river; (5) it is likely that radioactive materials carried in water leaking from one of the basins have reached the river at least twice in the past; (6) although progress has been made in designing and constructing the new facilities, the schedule proposed by the contractors in April 1998 is over 4 years behind the original schedule for completion, and the estimated costs to build and operate the project have almost doubled, to about $1.4 billion; (7) the date to begin moving the spent fuel out of the basins, an important milestone for the project, given the health and safety risks associated with storage conditions, will be delayed until November 2000--almost 3 years beyond the original plan; (8) DOE wanted a compressed schedule for completing the project because of safety concerns at the existing storage basins and because DOE thought that a compressed schedule would improve the contractor's performance; (9) the lack of adequate management by the companies working on the spent fuel project for DOE--Westinghouse Hanford Company, the company that managed the project until 1996, and Duke Engineering, the company now responsible for the project--also contributed to schedule delays and cost overruns; (10) furthermore, oversight by both DOE and its management and integration contractor at the Hanford site--Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc.--was insufficient to ensure that problems were quickly corrected; (11) recent management changes have been made, and oversight of the project has become more aggressive; (12) in addition, Duke Engineering has replaced several key managers and reorganized its operations and procedures; (13) DOE is negotiating with its regulators--the Environmental Protection Agency and the Washington Department of Ecology--new milestone dates that DOE believes it can meet; and (14) these problems and unresolved technical questions will continue to affect DOE's ability to set reliable targets. |
gao_GAO-03-346 | gao_GAO-03-346_0 | DOD Provided Limited Internal Guidance on Use of Initial Emergency Response Funds
DOD adhered to OMB guidance in managing the allocation of $15 billion in initial emergency response funds placed in the Defense Emergency Response Fund after the September 11th attacks. DOD Adhered to OMB Guidance Managing Emergency Response Funds
In accordance with OMB guidance, DOD reported on its allocation of funds to its components in 10 funding categories and did not transfer these funds into its regular appropriation accounts. We did not verify the accuracy or completeness of this data. However, these line items were broad in nature and DOD did not identify the specific types of expenses that could be funded within each line item. In addition, OMB, among other things, directed that any requirement to be funded must reflect an urgent and known need. In the absence of detailed guidance, command officials often had to use their best judgment in deciding how to spend the defense emergency response funds, and we found the same type of uncertainty among commands as we reported in May 2002. DOD’s Ability to Track the Use of Emergency Response Funds Has Varying Limitations
DOD’s ability to track funds appropriated for the war on terrorism has varying limitations depending on the appropriation. For funds provided under the two emergency supplemental appropriations of fiscal years 2001 and 2002 and managed out of the Defense Emergency Response Fund, DOD is able to report a breakdown of obligations by the 10 categories, but found that tracking these obligations was cumbersome because the categories do not correlate with its regular appropriations account structure. For the two subsequent appropriations in fiscal year 2002 and 2003, DOD cannot separately identify obligations funded with emergency response funds because these funds are commingled with funds appropriated for other purposes, and DOD’s accounting system does not distinguish among obligations. All of these funds were commingled in the Air Force’s operation and maintenance account. DOD officials agreed that DOD’s accounting system does not separately track obligations funded with emergency response funds, but they emphasized that DOD has established procedures intended to track obligations for contingency operations, including operations associated with the war on terrorism such as in Afghanistan. Under DOD’s financial management regulation, DOD components are required to track and report the incremental costs (obligations) for each contingency operation. DOD noted that it had implemented a process to track incremental costs related to the war on terrorism and, in particular, the Defense Finance Accounting Service collects cost information on contingencies from components. Major contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent that the Department of Defense (DOD) adhered to the Office of Management and Budgets (OMB) guidance for managing funds provided separately for the Defense Emergency Response Fund (appropriated in the first two emergency supplemental appropriations) and the sufficiency of DOD’s guidance to its components on the use of these funds, we reviewed the guidance provided by OMB to federal government departments and agencies and the guidance provided by DOD to its defense components for justifying their obligations funded through the emergency supplementals of fiscal years 2001 and 2002. We also relied on prior GAO work regarding DOD’s guidance and reporting for contingency operations. Appendix II: Appropriation of Emergency Response Funds to DOD for Fiscal Years 2001, 2002, and 2003
As of January 2003, Congress appropriated a total of about $38 billion in fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003 to fund DOD’s expenses related to the war on terrorism. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of January 2003, Congress had provided a total of $38 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) to cover emergency response costs related to the war on terrorism. Appropriated in different ways in fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003, these funds are meant to pay for expenses that DOD would not normally incur, such as contingency military operations and Pentagon building repairs. Because our prior work raised questions about DOD's oversight of contingency fund spending, GAO was asked to review DOD's management of emergency response funds, specifically: (1) DOD's adherence to OMB guidance in managing funds and the sufficiency of DOD's guidance on the use of these funds, and (2) DOD's ability to track the use of emergency response funds in general. We limited our review of DOD's guidance to the initial funds placed in the Defense Emergency Response Fund. We did not verify the accuracy of the data contained in DOD's obligation reports or the appropriateness of individual expenditures.
What GAO Found
While DOD followed the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance in managing the initial $15 billion in war on terrorism funds that were placed in the Defense Emergency Response Fund in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD provided its components with limited guidance on how to use these funds. DOD allocated the funds according to OMB's 10 funding categories. However, DOD's designations of allowable line items for each category were broad and, thus, could be interpreted in different ways. Also, while OMB directed that the funds were to be used for urgent and known needs, DOD did not define those needs further. Finally, DOD directed the components to use an internal financial management regulation for contingency funding to determine if costs were incremental or not; however, as we have reported previously, these regulations are insufficient for this purpose. In the absence of detailed guidance military officials sometimes had to use their best judgment in obligating emergency response funds. DOD's ability to track the use of emergency response funds has varying limitations depending on the appropriation. For the fiscal years 2001 and 2002 emergency response funds managed separately in the Defense Emergency Response Fund ($15 billion), DOD can report a breakdown of obligations by its 10 funding categories, but cannot correlate this information with its appropriation account structure. For emergency response funds provided in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 ($20.5 billion) that were transferred into or placed directly into DOD's regular appropriations accounts, DOD cannot use its accounting system to track the use of these funds because they are commingled with those appropriated for other purposes. While DOD has an alternative process intended to track obligations for contingency operations related to the war on terrorism, it cannot identify the portion of obligations that are funded with emergency response funds. DOD acknowledged these limitations and, in December 2002, began requiring additional reporting on the use of these funds. DOD partially concurred with this report, noting it clearly told components to use DOD's financial regulation for guidance and also held meetings for clarification. DOD agreed funds were commingled, but noted it had a process to track incremental costs for the war on terrorism. |
gao_GAO-11-842T | gao_GAO-11-842T_0 | For fiscal year 2010, HHS reported improper payment estimates for several programs, including Medicare. Collectively, HHS reported an estimate of almost $48 billion in improper payments in Medicare. As shown in figure 1, the Medicare program represents about 38 percent of the $125.4 billion improper payment estimated amount reported by 20 federal agencies covering 70 programs. HHS’s estimated amount of improper payments for Medicare is incomplete because it has yet to report a comprehensive improper payment estimate for the Medicare prescription drug benefit program, which had reported outlays of about $59 billion in fiscal year 2010. It is important to recognize that the $48 billion in estimated improper payments reported by HHS in fiscal year 2010 is not an estimate of fraud in Medicare. In addition, because the improper payment estimation process is not designed to detect or measure the amount of fraud in Medicare, there may be fraud that exists in the Medicare program that is not included in the reported improper payment estimate. In 2010, CMS created the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) to serve as its focal point for all national Medicare program integrity issues. Status of CMS’s Efforts to Implement Key Strategies to Help Remediate Improper Payments
CMS has begun a number of initiatives related to the five strategies identified in our previous reporting that are key to reducing Medicare improper payments. However, CMS still faces significant challenges in designing and implementing internal controls to effectively prevent or detect and recoup improper payments and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO has made recommendations to strengthen CMS’s actions to address these strategies, some of which have not been implemented. Strengthening provider enrollment standards and procedures. As discussed in our March 2011 testimony, strengthening the standards and procedures for provider enrollment could help reduce the risk of enrolling providers intent on defrauding or abusing the program. Improving prepayment review of claims. According to CMS, as of July 1, 2011, initial predictive modeling has been used on claims prior to payment to identify their level of risk for being improper and to focus investigative efforts. As of July 2011, this governmentwide database was still under development. We previously reported that postpayment reviews are critical to identifying payment errors to recoup overpayments in Medicare. CMS has not acted to implement our recommendation about focusing postpayment home health claims review based on high rates of improper billing identified through prepayment reviews. The national program was designed to help the agency supplement the postpayment reviews conducted by contractors other than RACs. In June 2011, we reported that CMS has also developed information technology to help it better identify claims paid in error, but the systems are not being used to the extent originally planned, and CMS has not measured whether they have helped in reducing payment errors. Improving oversight of contractors. CMS agreed with this recommendation. Developing a robust process for addressing identified vulnerabilities. Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to improper payments is key to effective program management. But our work has shown that CMS has not developed a robust process to specifically address identified vulnerabilities that lead to improper payments in Medicare. Because of these weaknesses, we recommended that CMS develop and implement a corrective action process that includes policies and procedures to ensure that the agency promptly (1) evaluates findings of RAC audits, (2) decides on the appropriate response and a time frame for taking action based on established criteria, and (3) acts to correct the vulnerabilities identified. CMS concurred with this recommendation. CMS began implementing it in March 2009. These provisions include: establishing procedures for screening providers enrolling in Medicare, including assessing the risk levels of fraud, waste, and abuse by categories of providers; expanding the Medicare RAC program to Medicare Advantage and Medicare prescription drug benefit program; adding requirements for providers to disclose any current or previous affiliation with a provider that has uncollected debt; has been or is subject to a payment suspension under a federal health care program; has been excluded from participation under Medicare, Medicaid, or the Children’s Health Insurance Program or has had its billing privileges denied or revoked; expanding the number of areas to be included in the competitive bidding program for durable medical equipment; and strengthening the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, a joint effort of the HHS Inspector General and the Department of Justice, which is designed to coordinate law enforcement activities regarding health care fraud and abuse, including that in Medicare. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Effective Implementation of Recent Laws and Agency Actions Could Help Reduce Improper Payments. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program because of its size, complexity, and susceptibility to improper payments. In 2010, Medicare covered 47 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries and had estimated outlays of $516 billion. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for administering the Medicare program and leading efforts to reduce Medicare improper payments. This testimony focuses on estimated improper payments in the Medicare program for fiscal year 2010 and the status of CMS's efforts to implement key strategies to help reduce improper payments. This testimony is primarily based on previous GAO reporting related to governmentwide improper payments, Medicare high-risk challenges and program integrity efforts, and CMS's information technology systems intended to identify improper payments. GAO supplemented that prior work with additional information on the nature and extent of Medicare improper payments reported by HHS in its fiscal year 2010 agency financial report. GAO also received updated information from CMS in February 2011 and, in select cases, as of July 2011, on its actions related to relevant laws, regulations, guidance, and open recommendations pertaining to key remediation strategies.
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2010, HHS reported an estimate of almost $48 billion in Medicare improper payments, representing about 38 percent of the total $125.4 billion estimate for the federal government. However, this Medicare improper payment estimate is incomplete because HHS has yet to develop a comprehensive estimate for the Medicare prescription drug benefit. The improper payment estimate includes both overpayments and underpayments. Causes cited include inadequate documentation, medically unnecessary services, coding errors, and payment calculation errors. It is important to recognize that the $48 billion is not an estimate of fraud in Medicare. Because the improper payment estimation process is not designed to detect or measure the amount of fraud that may exist, there may be fraud that is not reflected in HHS's reported estimate. CMS faces challenges in designing and implementing internal controls to effectively prevent or detect and recoup improper payments. In 2010, CMS established the Center for Program Integrity to serve as its focal point for all national Medicare program integrity issues. Based on past work, GAO identified five key strategies to help reduce fraud, waste, and abuse and improper payments in Medicare, which CMS has reported initiating actions to address.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to strengthen CMS's implementation of these strategies, some of which the agency has not implemented. (1) Strengthen provider enrollment standards and procedures. Strong standards and procedures can help reduce the risk of enrolling providers intent on defrauding the program. CMS has taken action to implement provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act by screening providers by levels of risk and providing more stringent review of high-risk providers, but has yet to implement certain GAO recommendations in this area. (2) Improve prepayment reviews. Prepayment reviews of claims help ensure that Medicare pays correctly the first time. According to CMS, as of July 1, 2011, CMS has begun applying predictive modeling analysis to claims and plans to expand Medicare prepayment controls. CMS has not implemented GAO's recommendation to improve prepayment reviews. (3) Focus postpayment reviews on vulnerable areas. Postpayment reviews are critical to identifying payment errors and recouping overpayments. In March 2009, CMS began instituting a national recovery audit contractor (RAC) program to help the agency supplement its postpayment reviews. CMS has also developed information technology to help it better identify claims paid in error, but GAO recently reported that the systems are not being used to the extent originally planned and made several recommendations to address the issues. (4) Improve oversight of contractors. CMS has taken action to improve oversight of prescription drug plan sponsors' fraud and abuse programs, which addresses GAO's recommendation, but is still developing specific performance statistics. (5) Develop a robust process to address identified vulnerabilities. Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to improper payments is critical. While CMS has begun actions in this area, it has not developed a robust corrective action process for vulnerabilities identified by Medicare RACs as GAO recommended. |
gao_GAO-10-622T | gao_GAO-10-622T_0 | Law Enforcement Finds a Number of FinCEN’s Services and Products Useful, but Would Like More Information about Select Products and Opportunities to Provide FinCEN with Input about Some Types of Support
In our December 2009 report, we found that law enforcement agencies we surveyed generally reported finding FinCEN’s services and products useful, citing direct access to BSA data, on-site liaisons, and access to financial information on people or organizations suspected of being involved in significant money laundering or terrorist financing activities— known as the 314(a) process—as those that are among the most useful. However, we found that FinCEN could (1) better inform law enforcement of the types of complex analytic products that it can provide, (2) more clearly define the types of requests for complex analytic support that it will accept, and (3) actively solicit input on the development of complex analytic products in order to help law enforcement better utilize FinCEN’s expertise and enhance the value of the products it provides to law enforcement. This tool, developed by FinCEN in response to Section 314(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, enables federal law enforcement agencies to reach out to financial institutions across the country for potential information related to financial crimes investigations. FinCEN has sought to increase its production of more complex analytic products, which law enforcement agencies report are also helpful in financial crimes investigations. We reported that from 2004 through 2007, requests to FinCEN to conduct such queries decreased 80 percent from 2,048 to 409.As a result, FinCEN has identified a need to redefine its role in supporting law enforcement agencies and to enhance the value and relevance of its analytic work. These liaisons noted that because FinCEN does not actively communicate with them about when completed products are available, they may not be aware of all of FinCEN’s products that could be useful in their investigations of financial crimes. We recommended that FinCEN clarify and communicate to law enforcement agencies the various types of complex analytic products FinCEN can provide and establish a process for informing law enforcement agencies about the availability of these products. FinCEN agreed with our recommendation and outlined plans it would take in order to improve communication with law enforcement regarding the services, products, and capabilities FinCEN offers. In April 2010, FinCEN officials reported that they have taken steps to collect information about law enforcement customer’s priorities, needs, and plans. In interviews with officials from FinCEN’s top five federal law enforcement customers, liaisons from all five agencies reported that FinCEN does not consistently seek their input about ongoing or planned analytic work. As a result, we recommended that FinCEN establish a systematic process for actively soliciting input from law enforcement agencies and incorporating this input into the selection and development of its analytic products. However, we reported that liaisons from four of FinCEN’s top five federal law enforcement customers reported concerns that their agencies do not have sufficient opportunities to provide input when FinCEN is considering proposed regulatory changes. However, we reported that liaisons from four of FinCEN’s top five federal law enforcement customers reported that the public record is not always the most appropriate venue for providing comments on proposed regulatory changes because their comments often contain law enforcement sensitive information. According to these officials, raising these concerns in a public forum may compromise key investigative techniques or strategies used in ongoing investigations. FinCEN agreed with our recommendation and stated that it would determine and implement appropriate ways to communicate to the law enforcement community its ability to receive and use law enforcement sensitive information in this context. In April 2010, FinCEN officials stated that they have developed an approach for collecting law enforcement sensitive information during the public notice and comment period of the NPRM process without making the comments publicly available. | Why GAO Did This Study
Financial investigations are used to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, crimes that can destabilize national economies and threaten global security. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), within the Department of the Treasury, supports law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in their efforts to investigate financial crimes by providing them with services and products, such as access to financial data, analysis, and case support. This statement discusses the extent to which the law enforcement community finds FinCEN's support useful in its efforts to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. This statement is based on work GAO completed and issued in December 2009.
What GAO Found
In December 2009, we reported that the majority of 25 LEAs GAO surveyed found FinCEN's support useful in their efforts to investigate and prosecute financial crimes, but FinCEN could enhance its support by better informing LEAs about its services and products and actively soliciting their input. Of the 20 LEAs that responded to a question GAO posed about which FinCEN services they found most useful, 16 LEAs cited direct access to Bank Secrecy Act data--records of financial transactions possibly indicative of money laundering that FinCEN collects--as the most valuable service FinCEN provides. Additionally, 11 federal LEAs cited a tool that allows federal LEAs to reach out, through FinCEN, to financial institutions nationwide to locate financial information related to ongoing investigations as a key service offered by FinCEN. To further enhance the value and relevance of its analytic work to LEAs, FinCEN has sought to increase development of complex analytic products, such as reports identifying trends and patterns in money laundering. Sixteen law enforcement agencies GAO surveyed reported that they generally found these complex analytic products useful. However, we reported that three of five LEAs that are among FinCEN's primary federal customers stated that FinCEN does not provide detailed information about the various types of complex analytic products it can provide. Three of FinCEN's primary customers also stated that they would like more information about when completed products become available. In December 2009, we recommended that FinCEN clarify the types of complex analytic products it can provide to LEAs. FinCEN agreed with our recommendation and in April 2010 outlined plans to improve communication with law enforcement regarding FinCEN's services, products, and capabilities. All five LEAs also reported that FinCEN does not actively seek LEAs' input about ongoing or planned analytic products, though four of these LEAs believed that doing so could improve the quality and relevance of the products FinCEN provides to its customers. We recommended that FinCEN establish a process for soliciting input regarding the development of its analytic products. FinCEN agreed with our recommendation and in April 2010 outlined a number of steps it plans to take to better assess law enforcement needs, including ongoing efforts to solicit input from LEAs. Finally, liaisons from four of FinCEN's top five federal LEAs reported that their agencies do not have sufficient opportunities to provide input when FinCEN is considering regulatory changes because their comments often contain sensitive information that may compromise investigative techniques or strategies used in ongoing investigations. We recommended that FinCEN develop a mechanism to collect sensitive information regarding regulatory changes from LEAs. In April 2010, FinCEN reported that it developed an approach for collecting sensitive information without making the comments publicly available. |
gao_GAO-09-217 | gao_GAO-09-217_0 | Challenges Increase the Risk That Some BRAC Recommendations Might Not Be Completed by the Statutory Deadline
DOD has made progress in implementing the BRAC 2005 round but faces challenges in its ability to meet the September 15, 2011, statutory completion deadline. First, DOD expects almost half of the 800 defense locations responsible for implementing BRAC to complete their recommendations within months of the deadline, and about 230 of those locations anticipate completion within the last 2 weeks of the implementation period. Second, some of these locations, which involve the most costly and complex recommendations, have already encountered delays in their implementation schedules. Finally, delays in interdependent recommendations could have a cascading effect on the timely completion of related recommendations. OSD recently issued guidance requiring the services and defense agencies to provide status briefings to improve oversight of issues affecting timely implementation of BRAC recommendations. However, this guidance did not establish a regular briefing schedule as needed or require the services to provide information about possible mitigation measures for any BRAC recommendations at risk of not meeting the statutory deadline. Specifically, DOD must synchronize the relocation of over 123,000 personnel with the construction of an estimated $23 billion in new or renovated facilities. However, delays have left little time in the planning schedule to relocate these personnel by the deadline. BRAC Implementation Cost Estimates Are Higher and Savings Estimates Are Lower Compared to Previous Fiscal Year
DOD’s BRAC fiscal year 2009 budget submission shows that DOD plans to spend more and save less as compared to last year’s BRAC budget submission to implement the recommendations. Net annual recurring savings estimates decreased by almost $13 million. Specifically, DOD’s cost estimates increased by $1.2 billion in DOD’s 2009 budget to a total estimated cost of $32.4 billion to implement this BRAC round. Twenty-Year Savings Have Decreased
Given the cumulative increase in estimated one-time costs and decrease in estimated net annual recurring savings, the estimated savings over a 20-year period ending in 2025, based on DOD’s fiscal year 2009 budget submission, has also decreased. Cost Estimates Could Continue to Rise, but the Potential for Savings Estimates to Change Is Unclear
Although DOD is almost 3½ years into the 6-year implementation period for this round of BRAC, cost estimates could potentially continue to increase, but the potential for changes in savings estimates is less clear. There is less visibility into potential changes in savings estimates because some military services and defense agencies are not periodically updating their BRAC savings estimates, and OSD is not enforcing its regulation requiring them to do so. The potential for additional cost increases is particularly important to the Army, as it is expected to incur the majority of the military construction costs related to base closures and realignments. On the other hand, BRAC implementing officials for the Army and the Air Force told us they do not plan to update their savings estimates and will continue to report the same savings estimates reported to Congress in February 2007 despite any revisions in implementation details or completion schedules that could cause savings estimates to change. 1.) Furthermore, without updated BRAC savings estimates, as required in DOD’s own Financial Management Regulation, DOD decision makers and Congress may be left with an unrealistic sense of the savings this complex and costly BRAC round may actually produce, a situation that could be used to justify another round of BRAC in the future. Anticipated savings was an important consideration in justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance OSD’s role in overseeing the implementation of BRAC 2005 recommendations and managing challenges that could impact DOD’s ability to achieve full BRAC implementation by the statutory deadline, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to modify the recently issued guidance on the status of BRAC implementation to establish a briefing schedule with briefings as frequently as OSD deems necessary to manage the risk that a particular recommendation may not meet the statutory deadline, but as a minimum, at 6-month intervals, through the rest of the BRAC 2005 implementation period, a schedule that would enable DOD to continually assess and respond to the challenges identified by the services and defense agencies that could preclude recommendation completion by September 15, 2011, and require the services and defense agencies to provide information on possible mitigation measures to reduce the effects of those challenges. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 2005 Round. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever. In addition to base closures, many recommendations involve realignments, such as returning forces to the United States from bases overseas and creating joint bases. However, anticipated savings remained an important consideration in justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round. The House report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed GAO to monitor BRAC implementation. Therefore, GAO assessed (1) challenges that might affect timely completion of recommendations, (2) any changes in DOD's reported cost and savings estimates since fiscal year 2008, and (3) the potential for estimates to continue to change. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the services' BRAC offices, and the Army Corps of Engineers; visited installations implementing some of the more costly realignments or closures; and analyzed BRAC budget data for fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
What GAO Found
DOD has made progress in implementing the BRAC 2005 round but faces challenges in its ability to meet the September 15, 2011, statutory completion deadline. DOD expects almost half of the 800 defense locations implementing BRAC recommendations to complete their actions in 2011; however, about 230 of these almost 400 locations anticipate completion within the last 2 weeks of the deadline. Further, some of these locations involve some of the most costly and complex BRAC recommendations, which have already incurred some delays and thus have little leeway to meet the 2011 completion date if any further delays occur. Also, DOD must synchronize relocating about 123,000 personnel with an estimated $23 billion in facilities that are still being constructed or renovated, but some delays have left little time in DOD's plans to relocate these personnel by the deadline. Finally, delays in interdependent recommendations could have a cascading effect on other recommendations being completed on time. OSD recently issued guidance requiring the services and defense agencies to provide status briefings to improve oversight of issues affecting timely implementation of BRAC recommendations. However, this guidance did not establish a regular briefing schedule or require the services to provide information about possible mitigation measures for any BRAC recommendations at risk of not meeting the statutory deadline. DOD's fiscal year 2009 BRAC budget submission shows that DOD plans to spend more to implement recommendations and save slightly less compared to the 2008 BRAC budget. DOD's 2009 estimate of one-time costs to implement this BRAC round increased by $1.2 billion to about $32.4 billion. Net annual recurring savings estimates decreased by almost $13 million to about $4 billion. Also, GAO's calculations of net present value, which includes both expected cost and savings over a 20-year period ending in 2025 and takes into account the time value of money, show that implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations is expected to save $13.7 billion. This compares to an estimated $15 billion in net present value savings based on last year's BRAC budget and the BRAC Commission's reported estimate of about $36 billion. Although DOD is about 3? years into the 6-year implementation period, the potential remains for BRAC cost estimates to continue to increase, but the potential for changes in savings estimates is unclear. Greater than expected inflation and increased market demands for construction materials could cause estimated construction costs to increase, although the extent of this increase is uncertain given today's economic market conditions. However, the potential for changes in savings estimates is unclear because BRAC headquarters officials at both the Army and the Air Force told us they do not plan to update their savings estimates regardless of factors that may cause those estimates to change, and OSD is not enforcing its own regulation requiring them to do so. Hence, congressional and defense decision makers could be left with an unrealistic sense of the savings this complex and costly BRAC round may actually produce, an issue that could be important in considering whether another round of BRAC may be warranted. |
gao_GAO-15-614 | gao_GAO-15-614_0 | Facilities with toxic release chemicals are to calculate and report in their Top-Screen submission the Distance of Concern—which represents the radius of an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud from a release event could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure. If ISCD does not categorize the chemical facility as high-risk, ISCD does not assign the facility to one of these four risk-based tiers and the facility is not subject to additional requirements under the CFATS regulation.Facilities that ISCD preliminarily categorizes to be high-risk—covered chemical facilities—are required to then complete the CSAT security vulnerability assessment, which includes the identification of potential critical assets at the facility, and a related vulnerability analysis.to review the security vulnerability assessment to confirm and notify the facility as to whether the facility remains categorized as high-risk and, if so, about its final placement in one of the four tiers. ISCD Used Self-Reported Data That Is Not Verified to Categorize Thousands of Facilities
ISCD has used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk for facilities with a toxic release threat. Of these facilities, we estimate that more than 6,400 facilities hold a chemical at or above the screening threshold quantity that could pose a toxic chemical release threat. On the basis of these results, we estimate more than 2,700 facilities, or at least 44 percent of facilities with a toxic release chemical, misreported the Distance of Concern. As described earlier, the Distance of Concern is one key input in the risk assessment approach that ISCD uses to preliminarily categorize facilities that could pose a toxic chemical release threat. On the basis of ISCD’s pace of site security plan approvals in calendar year 2014— between 80 and 100 plans per month—as of April 2015, we estimate that it could take between 9 and 12 months for ISCD to review and approve site security plans for the 929 facilities currently awaiting approval. For example, ISCD has continued the revised site security plan review process implemented in July 2012 in which teams of ISCD headquarters officials review plans by assessing how layers of security measures meet the intent of each of the performance standards; issued updates to the online Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) beginning in March 2014 to make the system more user- friendly and improve facility data collection; distributed updated internal guidance and lessons learned on plan approvals to inspectors and plan reviewers; transitioned to a new internal case management system in December 2013 that provides improved program and facility management capabilities; begun using inspectors alongside ISCD headquarters officials to review site security plans in order to leverage inspectors’ knowledge of facility security and role conducting CFATS inspections; implemented changes to inspection processes, such as employing smaller inspection teams, conducting preinspection phone calls with facilities to help them prepare for inspections, and enabling inspectors to help facility personnel edit their site security plans during inspections; distributed updated guidance to facilities to help them improve their site security plans and worked to expand the use of alternative security programs; and worked with corporations that have multiple covered chemical facilities to leverage inspection documents and security procedures that are standard across corporations to expedite the inspection process. ISCD began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013 and as of April 2015 had conducted 83 compliance inspections out of 1,727 facilities with approved site security plans. Our analysis of compliance inspections conducted by ISCD as of February 2015 indicated that inspectors made varying recommendations relating to the 34 facilities that inspectors found had not implemented planned measures as outlined in their site security plans by deadlines and therefore were not fully compliant with their approved site security plans: Inspectors recommended both a follow-on compliance inspection and an enforcement action for 1 of the 34 noncompliant facilities. According to ISCD officials, ISCD’s processes and procedures—although not documented— track noncompliant facilities through the compliance process and ensure they implement planned measures. Variations in the process for addressing noncompliant facilities—such as facilities having widely varying amounts of time to implement measures—may be warranted on a case-by-case basis. However, DHS has not taken steps to mitigate errors in some facility-reported data and does not have reasonable assurance that it has identified all of the nation’s highest-risk chemical facilities. Additionally, DHS cannot ensure consistency in how it addresses noncompliance in the CFATS program because it does not have documented processes and procedures. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for NPPD, the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Infrastructure Protection, and the Director of ISCD to take the following two actions to ensure the accuracy of the data submitted by chemical facilities: provide milestone dates and a timeline for implementation of the new Top-Screen and ensure that changes to this Top-Screen mitigate errors in the Distance of Concern submitted by facilities, and in the interim, identify potentially miscategorized facilities with the potential to cause the greatest harm and verify the Distance of Concern these facilities report is accurate. In addition, to better manage compliance among high-risk chemical facilities and demonstrate program results, we recommend the following two actions: develop documented processes and procedures to track noncompliant facilities and ensure they implement planned measures as outlined in their approved site security plans, and improve the measurement and reporting of the CFATS program performance by developing a performance measure that includes only planned measures that have been implemented and verified. DHS concurred with all four recommendations and outlined steps that the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) will take to address them. However, as stated in our report, we based our estimates on a simple random sample and followed a probability procedure based on random selections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. DHS established the CFATS program to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. Within DHS, ISCD oversees this program.
GAO was asked to assess the CFATS program. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which DHS has (1) categorized facilities as subject to the CFATS regulation, and (2) approved site security plans and conducted compliance inspections. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and program documents; randomly selected data submitted to ISCD by facilities from 2007 to 2015, tested the data's reliability; and generated estimates for the entire population of facilities, and interviewed officials responsible for overseeing, identifying, categorizing, and inspecting chemical facilities from DHS headquarters and in California, Maryland, Oregon, and Texas (selected based on geographic location and other factors).
What GAO Found
Since 2007, the Office of Infrastructure Protection's Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has identified and collected data from approximately 37,000 chemical facilities under its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and categorized approximately 2,900 as high-risk based on the collected data. However, ISCD used unverified and self-reported data to categorize the risk level for facilities evaluated for a toxic release threat. A toxic release threat exists where chemicals, if released, could harm surrounding populations. One key input for determining a facility's toxic release threat is the Distance of Concern (distance) that facilities report—an area in which exposure to a toxic chemical cloud could cause serious injury or fatalities from short-term exposure. ISCD requires facilities to calculate the distance using a web-based tool and following DHS guidance. ISCD does not verify facility-reported data for facilities it does not categorize as high-risk for a toxic release threat. However, following DHS guidance and using a generalizable sample of facility-reported data in a DHS database, GAO estimated that more than 2,700 facilities (44 percent) of an estimated 6,400 facilities with a toxic release threat misreported the distance. By verifying that the data ISCD used in its risk assessment are accurate, ISCD could better ensure it has identified the nation's high-risk chemical facilities.
ISCD has made substantial progress approving site security plans but does not have documented processes and procedures for managing facilities that are noncompliant with their approved site security plans. Site security plans outline, among other things, the planned measures that facilities agree to implement to address security vulnerabilities. As of April 2015, GAO estimates that it could take between 9 and 12 months for ISCD to review and approve security plans for approximately 900 remaining facilities—a substantial improvement over the previous estimate of 7 to 9 years GAO reported in April 2013. ISCD officials attributed the increased approval rate to efficiencies in ISCD's security plan review process, updated guidance, and a new case management system. Further, ISCD began conducting compliance inspections in September 2013, but does not have documented processes and procedures for managing the compliance of facilities that have not implemented planned measures outlined in their site security plans. According to the nature of violations thus far, ISCD has addressed noncompliance on a case-by-case basis. Almost half (34 of 69) of facilities ISCD inspected as of February 2015 had not implemented one or more planned measures by deadlines specified in their approved site security plans and therefore were not fully compliant with their plans. GAO found variations in how ISCD addressed these 34 facilities, such as how much additional time the facilities had to come into compliance and whether or not a follow-on inspection was scheduled. Such variations may or may not be appropriate given ISCD's case-by-case approach, but having documented processes and procedures would ensure that ISCD has guidelines by which to manage noncompliant facilities and ensure they close security gaps in a timely manner. Additionally, given that ISCD will need to inspect about 2,900 facilities in the future, having documented processes and procedures could provide ISCD more reasonable assurance that facilities implement planned measures and address security gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) verify the Distance of Concern reported by facilities is accurate and (2) document processes and procedures for managing compliance with site security plans. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and outlined steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-09-686T | gao_GAO-09-686T_0 | To address its obsolete infrastructure, VA initiated its CARES process— the first comprehensive, long-range assessment of its health care system’s capital asset requirements since 1981. The decisions that emerged from the CARES process will result in an overall expansion of VA’s capital assets. CARES Process and Modeling Tools Drive VHA’s Capital Planning Efforts
Through the CARES process, VA gained the tools and information needed to plan capital investments. VA continues to use the tools developed through CARES as part of its capital planning process. The CARES process serves as the foundation for VHA’s capital planning efforts. According to VA officials, all capital projects must be based on the CARES planning model to advance through VHA’s capital planning process. Some CARES Decisions Implemented, but Additional Information Needed to Fully Assess Status and Impact of Decisions
VA has begun implementing some CARES decisions. Specifically, VA is currently in varying stages (e.g., planning or construction) of implementing 34 of the major capital projects that were identified in the CARES process. In 2007, we reported that VA does not use, or in some cases does not have, performance measures to assess its progress in implementing CARES or whether CARES is achieving the intended results. Although VA has over 100 performance measures to monitor other agency programs and activities, these measures either do not directly link to the CARES goals or VA does not use them to centrally monitor the implementation and impact of CARES decisions. Such measures would allow VA officials to monitor the implementation and impact of CARES decisions as well as allow stakeholders to hold VA accountable for results. In responding to our recommendation, VA created the CARES Implementation Monitoring Working Group. This working group has identified performance measures for CARES and the group will monitor the implementation and impact of CARES decisions. VA Has A Variety of Legal Authorities to Manage Real Property, But Does Not Track How Using Them Contributes to the Reduction in Underutilized Property
VA has a variety of legal authorities available to help it manage real property. These authorities include enhanced-use leases (EUL), sharing agreements, and outleases. However, legal restrictions associated with implementing some authorities affect VA’s ability to dispose of and reuse property in some locations. For example, legal restrictions limit VA’s ability to dispose of and reuse property in West Los Angeles and North Hills (Sepulveda) California. In our previous work, we reported several administrative and oversight challenges with using capital asset funds. Despite these challenges, VA has used these legal authorities to help reduce its inventory of unneeded space. In 2008, we reported that VA reduced underutilized space ( i.e., space not used to full capacity) in its buildings by approximately 64 percent from 15.4 million square feet in fiscal year 2005 to 5.6 million square feet in fiscal year 2007. While VA’s use of various legal authorities, such as EULs and sharing agreements, likely contributed to VA’s overall reduction of underutilized space since fiscal year 2005, VA does not track the overall effect of using these authorities on its space reductions. Without such information, VA does not know what effect these authorities are having on its effort to reduce underutilized or vacant space or which types of authorities have the greatest effect. According to VA officials, VA will institute a system in June 2009 that will track square footage reductions at the building level, but the system will not track financial benefits at this level. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through its Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates one of the largest integrated health care systems in the country. In 1999, GAO reported that better management of VA's large inventory of aged capital assets could result in savings that could be used to enhance health care services for veterans. In response, VA initiated a process known as Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES). Through CARES, VA sought to determine the future resources needed to provide health care to our nation's veterans. This testimony describes (1) how CARES contributes to VHA's capital planning process, (2) the extent to which VA has implemented CARES decisions, and (3) the types of legal authorities that VA has to manage its real property and the extent to which VA has used these authorities. The testimony is based on GAO's body of work on VA's management of its capital assets, including GAO's 2007 report on VA's implementation of CARES (GAO-07-408).
What GAO Found
The CARES process provides VA with a blueprint that drives VHA's capital planning efforts. As part of the CARES process, VA adapted a model to estimate demand for health care services and to determine the capacity of its current infrastructure to meet this demand. VA continues to use this model in its capital planning process. The CARES process resulted in capital alignment decisions intended to address gaps in services or infrastructure. These decisions serve as the foundation for VA's capital planning process. According to VA officials, all capital projects must be based on demand projections that use the planning model developed through CARES. VA has started implementing some CARES decisions, but does not centrally track their implementation or monitor the impact of their implementation on its mission. VA is in varying stages (e.g., planning or construction) of implementing 34 of the major capital projects that were identified in the CARES process and has completed 8 projects. Our past work found that, while VA had over 100 performance measures to monitor other agency programs and activities, these measures either did not directly link to the CARES goals or VA did not use them to centrally monitor the implementation and impact of CARES decisions. Without this information, VA could not readily assess the implementation status of CARES decisions, determine the impact of such decisions, or be held accountable for achieving the intended results of CARES. VA has recently created the CARES Implementation Working Group, which has identified performance measures for CARES and will monitor the implementation and impact of CARES decisions in the future. VA has a variety of legal authorities available, such as enhanced-use leases, sharing agreements, and others, to help it manage real property. However, legal restrictions and administrative- and budget-related disincentives associated with implementing some authorities affect VA's ability to dispose and reuse property in some locations. For example, legal restrictions limit VA's ability to dispose of and reuse property in West Los Angeles and Sepulveda. Despite these challenges, VA has used these legal authorities to help reduce underutilized space (i.e., space not used to full capacity). In 2008, we reported that VA reduced underutilized space in its buildings by approximately 64 percent from 15.4 million square feet in fiscal year 2005 to 5.6 million square feet in fiscal year 2007. While VA's use of various legal authorities likely contributed to VA's overall reduction of underutilized space since fiscal year 2005, VA does not track the overall effect of using these authorities on space reductions. Not having such information precludes VA from knowing what effect these authorities are having on reducing underutilized or vacant space or knowing which types of authorities have the greatest effect. According to VA officials, VA will institute a system in 2009 that will track square footage reductions at the building level. |
gao_GAO-15-266 | gao_GAO-15-266_0 | 1. DOD and Three of the Four Military Services Cannot Identify the Number of Enlisted Servicemembers Separated for Non- Disability Mental Conditions
DOD and three of the four military services—Army, Navy, and Marine Corps—cannot identify the number of enlisted servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions because, for most separations, they do not use available codes to specifically designate the reason why servicemembers were separated. Instead, they use the broad separation code, “condition, not a disability,” that mixes non-disability mental conditions with non-disability physical conditions, making it difficult to distinguish one from the other without a time-consuming and resource- intensive record review. DOD policy requires a separation code to be used by the military services so that DOD can track and analyze the reason for separations and evaluate DOD’s separation policy to determine if changes are needed. Moreover, under the internal control standard for control activities, all transactions—such as separations of enlisted servicemembers—need to be clearly and accurately documented so they can be examined when needed; for example, to monitor trends in the reasons for servicemembers’ separations. Army officials had a similar concern, stating that they use the broad separation code for most non-disability mental condition separations to protect enlisted servicemembers after they leave the service. If DOD and the military services cannot systematically identify or periodically evaluate the number of enlisted servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions, they cannot assess how well the separation policy and process is working or respond specifically to key stakeholders, including the Congress, about trends in or concerns about separations for non-disability mental conditions. Military Services’ Separation Policies Do Not Address All DOD Requirements for Non-Disability Mental Conditions Separations, and DOD and the Services Lack Oversight of Such Separations
From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, when the services were filing compliance reports, most services did not report full compliance with DOD separation requirements for separations for personality disorder. Further, based on a review of separation policies, we found that none of the services’ policies address all DOD requirements for non-disability mental condition separations. Most Services Did Not Report Full Compliance with Requirements for Personality Disorder Separations, the Reports Contained Incomplete and Inconsistent Data, and DOD Conducted Limited Review
Most of the Military Services Had Not Reported Full Compliance When DOD Discontinued the Compliance Reports
From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, DOD required the military services to monitor and report to DOD on their compliance with DOD requirements for separating servicemembers for personality disorders; however, while the services generally reported improved compliance over the 5 years of reporting, we found in the 2012 compliance reports that three of the services had not yet achieved full compliance with all of DOD’s 2008 separation requirements. To discontinue compliance reporting and not institute any other type of oversight is inconsistent with the standards for internal control in the federal government, which states that there should generally be assurance that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations. The Military Services’ Policies Have Not Been Updated to Fully Address DOD Requirements for Separating Servicemembers for All Non-Disability Mental Conditions
In addition to problems we identified with compliance reports focusing on personality disorder separations, we also found that the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and components of the Air Force—namely, the Reserves and National Guard—have been separating servicemembers for non-disability mental conditions according to policies that are not consistent with all DOD requirements. DOD and the Military Services Do Not Conduct Oversight for Servicemember Separations for Non- Disability Mental Conditions
Beyond the limited review DOD conducted of the military services’ compliance reports conducted for personality disorder separations, which was discontinued after fiscal year 2012, DOD and military service officials stated they do not conduct any oversight of all non-disability mental condition separations. According to DOD officials, the military services are responsible for conducting oversight of their separation processes, not DOD. Conclusions
The inability to easily identify the number of enlisted servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions hinders oversight by DOD and the military services to ensure that servicemembers are being separated appropriately. Absent an effective process for monitoring and reporting compliance, DOD and the military services cannot assure that the military services are complying with DOD requirements for separating servicemembers with non-disability mental conditions. Meanwhile, these members risk not receiving the protections intended by DOD’s separation requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve identification of enlisted servicemembers separated for non- disability mental conditions, and to provide reasonable assurance that enlisted servicemembers, including Air Force National Guard members, are separated for non-disability mental conditions as appropriate and in accordance with DOD requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following six actions:
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to use the separation codes specific to a non- disability mental condition or develop another uniform method to track servicemembers who have been separated for specific non-disability mental conditions so that this information can be easily retrieved. DOD generally concurred with our six recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Non-disability mental conditions, such as personality disorders, can render a servicemember unsuitable for military service and can lead to an administrative separation. GAO was mandated to report on non-disability mental condition separations. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD and the military services are able to identify the number of enlisted servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions, and (2) the military services are complying with DOD requirements when separating enlisted servicemembers for non-disability mental conditions, including personality disorders, and how DOD and the military services oversee such separations. GAO analyzed DOD and the military services' separation policies, policies related to tracking separations, reports the military services submitted to DOD regarding compliance with separation requirements, and interviewed DOD and military service officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and three of the four military services—Army, Navy, and Marine Corps—cannot identify the number of enlisted servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions—mental conditions that are not considered service-related disabilities. For most non-disability mental condition separations, these services use the broad separation code, “condition, not a disability,” which mixes non-disability mental conditions with non-disability physical conditions, such as obesity, making it difficult to distinguish one type of condition from the other. In contrast, the Air Force is able to identify such servicemembers because it uses all five of the separation codes specific to non-disability mental conditions. DOD policy requires the military services to use a separation code so that DOD can track and analyze separations. Moreover, federal standards for internal control state that all transactions need to be clearly and accurately documented and readily available for examination when needed. The three services had varying reasons as to why they use the broad separation code. For example, Army officials believed that stating in servicemembers' discharge papers that they were discharged for non-disability mental conditions might stigmatize them with future employers. However, DOD stated that there are ways to protect servicemembers in this regard by providing them with discharge papers that are more general and that do not disclose specific reasons for discharge. By not systematically identifying or periodically evaluating the number of separations for non-disability mental conditions, DOD and the services cannot assess how well the separation policy and process are working or inform key stakeholders, including the Congress, about separation frequency, trends, and other data.
The military services lack separation policies that address all of DOD's eight requirements for separating servicemembers with non-disability mental conditions; both DOD and the services also lack oversight over such separations. From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, DOD required the services to report on their compliance with DOD requirements for personality disorder separations, one of the non-disability mental conditions. Most of the services reported by fiscal year 2012 that they were not compliant with all eight requirements and many of the 20 reports contained incomplete and inconsistent information. For example, 19 reports were missing information on reserve members. DOD discontinued these reports and did not institute any other oversight, which is inconsistent with the internal control standard for monitoring. GAO also found, based on a review of the services' separation policies, that the services have not updated their policies to meet all DOD requirements for non-disability mental condition separations. For example, Navy officials stated that they were unaware that DOD separation policies had changed since 2008 until GAO's review. DOD officials stated that the military services are responsible for conducting oversight of their separation processes; however, GAO found that the military services do not have processes to oversee non-disability mental condition separations. Without up-to-date and consistent policies and oversight processes, DOD and the military services cannot ensure that servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions have been afforded the protections intended by DOD's separation requirements and that servicemembers have been appropriately separated for such conditions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and the military services develop a method to identify the number of servicemembers separated for non-disability mental conditions and take a number of actions to ensure that their policies and processes can ensure that servicemembers are appropriately separated for non-disability mental conditions in accordance with DOD's separation requirements. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations, but did not provide information on how or when it plans to implement the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-563T | gao_GAO-06-563T_0 | According to the breakdown in table 2, one-third of taxpayers filing the simplest individual tax form—the Form 1040EZ—used a paid preparer for tax year 2002, and two-thirds of a low-income working group—those claiming the EIC—paid someone to prepare their tax returns. However, only paid preparers who choose to represent taxpayers before IRS are governed by IRS Circular No. Some Regulations Apply to All Paid Preparers
All paid preparers are subject to IRC penalties and the regulations that implement them. Enrolled agent applicants must either pass an examination on tax matters or have past IRS employment experience. In the section on diligence as to accuracy in Circular 230, a practitioner will have been “presumed to have exercised due diligence for purposes of this section if the practitioner relies on the work product of another person and the practitioner used reasonable care in engaging, supervising, training, and evaluating the person, taking proper account of the nature of the relationship between the practitioner and the person.” According to an IRS official, “another person” includes an unenrolled preparer, and enrolled agents are responsible for ensuring that unenrolled preparers working for them do high quality work. Taxpayers Using Paid Preparers May Receive Incorrectly Completed Tax Returns
Taxpayers relying on paid preparers to provide them with accurate, complete, and fully compliant tax returns may not get what they pay for. The National Research Program’s review of 2001 tax returns also found many errors on returns prepared by paid preparers, and some of those errors were more frequent on paid prepared returns than on self- prepared returns. Identifying information. Of the 10 returns prepared for the sales worker, 5 reported two children on Schedule EIC, Earned Income Credit, instead of the one child who lived with the taxpayer in 2005 and was eligible for the EIC. Only 1 preparer asked all of the required questions. Refunds reported for the sales worker were correct in 2 cases and overstated in the other 8 cases. IRS officials said that if the preparers had been preparing tax returns to be actually filed, many of them would have been subject to civil penalties for such things as negligence and willful or reckless conduct. For example, as stated earlier in our testimony, if a paid preparer encourages a taxpayer not to report or to erroneously report transactions on his or her tax return, resulting in a tax-due understatement or refund overstatement, the preparer could be assessed penalties of up to $1,000 for willful or reckless disregard of tax rules and regulations. With their important role in helping taxpayers meet their obligations, paid preparers become a critical quality-control checkpoint for the tax system. While the preparer did not ask about side income, when the taxpayer volunteered that he had non-W-2 income, the preparer included it on the return without discussing whether to either change it or not report it. Example of a Plumber Visit with Serious Problems
Costly issues for the taxpayer during this site visit were the paid preparer’s failure to itemize deductions and the preparer’s decision to claim the tuition and fees deduction instead of the Hope education credit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite the importance of paid tax return preparers in helping taxpayers fulfill their obligations, little data exist on the quality of services they provide. Paid preparers include, for example, enrolled agents, who are approved by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) once they pass an examination on tax matters or demonstrate past IRS employment experience, and unenrolled preparers, who include self-employed individuals and people employed by commercial tax preparation chains. GAO was asked to determine (1) what the characteristics were of tax returns done by paid preparers, (2) what government regulation exists for paid preparers, and (3) what specific issues taxpayers might encounter in using paid preparers. To do its work, GAO analyzed IRS data, reviewed paid preparer regulatory requirements, and had tax returns prepared at 19 outlets of several tax preparation chains.
What GAO Found
Many taxpayers choose to pay others to prepare their tax returns rather than prepare their own returns. According to the most recent reliable data, about 56 percent of all the individual tax returns filed for tax year 2002 used a paid preparer, with higher paid preparer usage among taxpayers with more complicated returns such as those claiming the earned income credit (EIC). All paid preparers are subject to some IRS regulations and may be penalized if they fail to follow them. For example, all paid preparers must identify themselves on the returns they prepare and must not deliberately understate a taxpayer's tax liability. When the EIC is involved, paid preparers must also ask specific questions to determine a taxpayer's eligibility for the credit. In GAO visits to commercial preparers, paid preparers often prepared returns that were incorrect, with tax consequences that were sometimes significant. Their work resulted in unwarranted extra refunds of up to almost $2,000 in 5 instances, while in 2 cases they cost the taxpayer over $1,500. Some of the most serious problems involved preparers not reporting business income in 10 of 19 cases; not asking about where a child lived or ignoring GAO's answer to the question and, therefore, claiming an ineligible child for the EIC in 5 out of the 10 applicable cases; failing to take the most advantageous postsecondary education tax benefit in 3 out of the 9 applicable cases; and failing to itemize deductions at all or failing to claim all available deductions in 7 out of the 9 applicable cases. GAO discussed these findings with IRS and referred to it problems that were found. Had these problems been discovered by IRS on real returns, IRS officials said that many of the preparers would have been subject to penalties for such things as negligence and willful or reckless disregard of tax rules. |
gao_GAO-06-18 | gao_GAO-06-18_0 | Previously Reported DOD Travel Issues
Over the past several years, we have reported pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s travel program. Ongoing DTS Testing Remains a Concern
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that the system would perform as intended. Given the lack of adherence to such key practices, it is not surprising that critical flaws have been identified after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages. Figure 2 shows the schedule slippage between the planned and actual implementation of DTS. More specifically, for the reservation module our analysis found that the flights actually displayed in DTS did not meet the stated DOD requirements. The following examples illustrate these problems. DTS Has Corrected Some Previously Reported Travel Problems
DTS has corrected one of the previously reported travel problems, but others remain. We have previously reported that a breakdown in internal controls and a weak control environment have led to potential fraud, waste, and abuse of hundreds of millions of dollars being improperly spent on DOD travel.Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased through CBAs. However, problems remain related to improper premium-class travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of travelers’ claims. The three remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and will take departmentwide action to address. While DOD has developed 31 system interfaces, the PMO-DTS is aware of at least 18 additional DOD business systems for which interfaces must be developed. Additionally, the underutilization of DTS at the sites where it has been deployed is also hindering the department’s efforts to have a standard travel system. Interfaces Are Critical to Implementing an End-to- End System
One of DOD’s long-standing problems has been the lack of integrated systems. Underutilization of DTS Affects Estimated Savings
Another challenge in establishing DTS as a standard travel system within DOD is the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems, which are controlled and operated by the various DOD components. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the department’s management and oversight of DTS and streamline its administrative process for travel, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 10 actions: direct the PMO-DTS to effectively implement the disciplined processes necessary to provide reasonable assurance that (1) requirements are properly documented and (2) requirements are adequately tested; direct the PMO-DTS to properly test new or modified system interfaces so that the intended functionality is properly operating prior to a software update being provided to DTS users; direct the PMO-DTS to require that all CTOs adhere to the department’s policy on the use of premium-class travel, even in those instances where it is listed as the only available airfare; direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the heads of all DOD agencies, to reemphasize that travelers are to justify exceptions from department policy and the importance of the authorizing officials not approving any travel authorization in which exceptions are not properly justified; direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the heads of all DOD agencies, to routinely monitor, such as on a quarterly basis, information on the number and cost of processing travel vouchers outside of DTS and initiate action to eliminate funding for legacy systems, where applicable; direct the PMO-DTS to develop and implement the means to automate the approval of changes to authorized travel expenses where possible; direct the PMO-DTS to consider the viability of using commercial databases to identify unused airline tickets, for which reimbursement should be obtained and help improve the assurance that the actual travel taken was consistent with the information shown on the travel voucher; direct the PMO-DTS to consider simplifying the display of airfares in direct the PMO-DTS to determine the feasibility of utilizing restricted airfares, where cost effective; and direct the PMO-DTS to work with IRS to develop an approach that will permit the use of automated methods to reduce the need for hard copy receipts to satisfy requirements to substantiate travel expenses. To determine if DTS will correct the problems previously identified with DOD travel, we analyzed past GAO reports and testimonies, selected Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and DOD congressional testimonies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been working to develop and implement a standard end-to-end travel system for the last 10 years. Over the past several years numerous GAO reports and testimonies have highlighted problems with DOD's travel practices that resulted in wasteful spending of millions of dollars. In response, the department has noted that the Defense Travel System (DTS), in part, will help correct these problems. Because of the widespread congressional interest in DTS, GAO initiated the audit under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General of the United States. The objectives of the audit were to (1) determine if DOD effectively tested key DTS functionality, (2) ascertain if DTS will correct the weaknesses previously identified, (3) identify the challenges that remain, and (4) identify opportunities to streamline DOD's travel process.
What GAO Found
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in the area of testing key functionality to ensure that the system will perform as intended. Consequently, critical flaws have been identified that resulted in significant schedule slippages between the planned and actual system deployment. GAO's recent analysis of selected requirements related to DTS's reservation module disclosed that system testing was ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability has been delivered as intended. For example, GAO found that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that DTS properly displayed flight and airfare information. This problem was not detected prior to deployment, since DOD failed to properly test system interfaces. While DTS has corrected some of the previously reported travel problems, others remain. Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased with the centrally billed accounts. However, problems remain related to improper premium-class travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of travelers' claims. These remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and will take departmentwide action to address. GAO also identified two key challenges facing DTS in becoming DOD's standard travel system: (1) developing needed interfaces and (2) underutilization of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. While DTS has developed 36 interfaces with various DOD business systems, it will have to develop interfaces with at least 18 additional systems--not a trivial task. Additionally, the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems results in underutilization of DTS and affects the savings that DTS was planned to achieve. Furthermore, GAO has identified concepts that the department can adopt to streamline its travel management practices. |
gao_GAO-02-192T | gao_GAO-02-192T_0 | Under federal law, all employment service staff must give priority to serving veterans, and the assignment of DVOP and LVER staff to local offices does not relieve other employment and training program staff of this requirement. There are also greater expectations for serving Vietnam-era veterans and disabled veterans. Veterans Receive Priority Service, but Effectiveness of Service Is Unknown
Veterans receive priority employment services at one-stop centers as required under the law, but the effectiveness of these services cannot be determined. Those who find employment before being registered are not counted as having entered employment after using self-service resources available through the one- stop center. VETS Does Not Adequately Manage DVOP and LVER Grants
Despite recently proposed improvements to its performance measures, VETS’ overall management of the DVOP and LVER grants is ineffective because the agency does not have a comprehensive system in place to manage state performance in serving veterans with these grants. VETS does not effectively communicate performance expectations to states because its goals and measures are unclear. For example, instead of coordinating with other programs to determine how best to fit the DVOP and LVER programs into the one-stop system, VETS officials reported that they are waiting to see how states implement their programs and will then decide how to integrate the staff or adjust their programs. VETS has not developed practices for operating within the one-stop system or adequately shared innovative ways to help veterans find and retain jobs. Consequently, they fail to adapt to the new workforce environment created by WIA. The new one- stop center system, while giving veterans priority for employment services, gives states flexibility in planning and implementing employment and training systems and holds them accountable for performance. Specifically, we suggested that the Congress consider revising title 38 to provide states and local offices more discretion to decide where to locate DVOP and LVER staff and provide states the discretion to have half-time DVOP positions; allow VETS and/or states the flexibility to better define the roles and responsibilities of staff serving veterans instead of including these duties in the law; combine the DVOP and LVER grant programs into one staffing grant to better meet states’ needs for serving veterans; provide VETS with the flexibility to consider alternative ways to improve administration and oversight of the staffing grants, for example, eliminating the prescriptive requirements for monitoring DVOP and LVER grants; eliminate the requirement that VETS report to the Congress a comparison of the job placement rate of veterans with that of nonveterans; and eliminate the requirement that VETS report on Federal Contractor Job Listings. | What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Disabled Veterans' Outreach Program (DVOP) and Local Veterans' Employment Representative (LVER) program allow states to hire staff members to serve veterans exclusively. The two programs are mandatory partners in the new one-stop center system created in 1998 by the Workforce Investment Act, which requires that services provided by numerous employment and training programs be made available through one-stop centers. The act also gives states the flexibility to design services tailored to local workforce needs. Although the DVOP and LVER programs must operate within the one-stop system, the act does not govern the programs--and the law that governs them does not provide the same flexibility that the act does. Because Congress sees employment service for veterans as a national responsibility, it established the Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS) to ensure that veterans, particularly disabled veterans and Vietnam-era veterans, receive priority employment and training opportunities. To make better use of DVOP and LVER staff services, VETS needs the legislative authority to grant each state more flexibility to design how this staff will fit into the one-stop center system. VETS also needs to be able to hold states accountable for achieving agreed upon goals. Veterans receive priority employment service at one-stop centers as required under the law, but the effectiveness of the services, as indicated by the resulting employment, cannot be determined because VETS does not require states to collect sufficient data to measure outcomes. VETS does not adequately oversee the DVOP and LVER program grants because it does not have a comprehensive system in place to manage state performance in serving veterans. VETS has not adequately adapted the DVOP and LVER programs to the new one-stop environment and determined how best to fit them into the one-stop system. |
gao_GAO-07-1103 | gao_GAO-07-1103_0 | In doing so, DOD certifies that the export appropriately qualifies for one or more of a limited number of applicable ITAR license exemptions. These guidelines were provided to the military services, given that they are primarily responsible for managing and implementing international defense cooperative programs. Guidelines for DOD’s Certification of Exemption Use Have Raised Some Concerns by State
In support of defense activities, DOD components prepare letters certifying the use of certain exemptions by exporters under State’s export control regulations. Nonservice DOD components also certify the use of exemptions but are not subject to the guidelines, which were not issued departmentwide. State suggested that DOD revise its guidelines to include (1) ITAR sections 126.6(a) and 126.6(c) on foreign military sales to provide further context, citing that their inclusion would inform the military services that other ITAR exemptions are provided for the exclusive use of DOD in the conduct of its official business, and (2) ITAR section 125.4(b)(3)—the provision of technical data in furtherance of a contract between the exporter and the U.S. government if the contract provides for the export of data—which State identified as one that may be certified by DOD for use by exporters when conducting DOD’s mission. However, to date, State and DOD officials have not reached agreement on these issues, and the lack of common understanding of regulatory exemption use could result in inconsistent application of the regulations. DOD Components Certified the Use of Exemptions for a Variety of Programs and Foreign Recipients
On the basis of over 1,100 certification letters that DOD components provided to us and our review of them, DOD components certified the use of over 1,900 exemptions for multiple companies and various programs from 2004 through 2006. More than 270 exporters, including prime contractors and subcontractors, were identified in exemption certification letters we reviewed. The most frequently identified exporters were defense contractors, but university laboratories and federally funded research and development centers were also identified. State and DOD Lack Complete Data to Oversee Exemptions Certified by DOD
State and DOD lack comprehensive data to oversee the use of DOD- certified exemptions, limiting their knowledge of defense activities under this process. DOD’s annual report to State on the use of exemptions captures data from the military services but not from other DOD components. In addition, the data may not capture the magnitude of transfers certified for exemption use. This information was not included in the DOD component’s reporting on exemption certification use. Further, DOD’s 2006 report to State includes only the certification letter that was broad in scope, but it does not include the magnitude of transfers under this certification. Others making key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the approach used by the Department of Defense (DOD) for certifying the use of export exemptions for exporters, we reviewed export control regulations and discussed with the Department of State and DOD their interpretation of when DOD can certify that a specific export activity qualifies for the use of certain export exemptions. We also interviewed officials from State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls—from the Licensing, Compliance, Management, and Policy offices, and DOD’s Defense Technology Security Administration about their views on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) allowances for exemption use by exporters, requirements for DOD to direct the use of certain ITAR exemptions, and practices by DOD components that certify the use of exemptions by exporters in support of DOD activities. We collected and summarized DOD export exemption certification letters for calendar years 2004 through 2006 to summarize the use of DOD- certified exemptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Defense (DOD) activities, U.S. defense companies may export defense items. The Department of State (State) controls such exports through its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which provides for some exemptions from export licensing requirements. For a limited number of these exemptions, DOD may confirm--or certify--that the export activity qualifies for the use of an ITAR exemption. As part of an initiative, DOD is to make more effective use of ITAR exemptions, but little is known about the extent to which this is done. This report (1) describes DOD's approach for certifying exporters' exemption use in support of defense activities, (2) summarizes the use of selected DOD-certified exemptions, and (3) examines State and DOD's oversight of exemption use. GAO's findings are based on its review of export control law, regulation, and DOD guidelines; interviews with State, DOD, and defense industry officials; and a GAO-developed database of DOD certification letters.
What GAO Found
In support of defense activities, DOD prepares letters certifying that a proposed export qualifies for the use of certain ITAR exemptions by exporters. To guide this approach, DOD issued exemption certification guidelines in March 2004 to the military services because they are the DOD components primarily responsible for managing and implementing defense international cooperative programs. However, GAO found other DOD components that also certify the use of exemptions in support of international activities but are not subject to the DOD guidelines. Officials from State, which regulates and controls defense exports, have raised several concerns to DOD about its guidelines, including the use of one ITAR exemption by contractors and the comprehensiveness of the guidelines. While State and DOD officials have met and exchanged correspondence on these issues, to date, they have not resolved fundamental disagreements. A lack of common understanding of regulatory exemption use could result in inconsistent application of the regulations. The exemption certification letters from DOD components that we reviewed showed that over 1,900 exemptions were certified for about 270 exporters in calendar years 2004 through 2006. The majority of the certifications related to missile defense and Air Force programs and included the export of technical data. While most of the exporters identified in the DOD-certified exemption letters were defense contractors, other exporters included university laboratories and federally funded research and development centers. The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were the most frequently cited recipients for exports under exemptions certified by DOD components. State and DOD lack comprehensive data to oversee the use of DOD-certified exemptions, limiting their knowledge of defense activities under this process. While DOD's guidelines provide for annual reporting to State on certified exemptions, this report captures data from the military services, but not from other DOD components. GAO identified 271 letters from nonservice components that were not included in DOD's 2006 report to State. In addition, DOD's report to State may not capture the magnitude of transfers certified for exemption use. For example, one letter that GAO reviewed certified the use of an exemption for more than 50 companies, but only the certification letter--not the actual transfers, which totaled 600 over a 3-year period--was captured in the cognizant military service's record keeping on exemption certifications. Furthermore, the details on these transfers were not included in DOD's report to State, limiting insight into the number of transfers under this certification. |
gao_GAO-07-169 | gao_GAO-07-169_0 | As of May 2006, the NFIP had paid about 162,000 claims for losses from flood damage from Hurricane Katrina in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The majority of Hurricane Katrina and Rita paid losses were for flood damage to residences. Building only (3,620)
Building and contents (4,264)
FEMA and Private Sector NFIP Partners Were Challenged to Process a Record Number of Claims and Address the Needs of NFIP Claimants and Communities
The magnitude and severity of the damages from Hurricane Katrina closely followed by Hurricane Rita presented FEMA and its private sector NFIP partners with challenges to accurately process a record number of flood claims in a timely manner under adverse conditions and address other needs of NFIP claimants and communities. By May 2006, about 9 months after the storms, FEMA reported that over 95 percent of the Gulf Coast claims were closed. These time frames for closing claims are comparable to time frames for closing claims in other, smaller flood events. Because FEMA did not reinspect a random sample of all claims closed, as we recommended in October 2005, the results of the reinspections cannot be projected to a population larger than the 4,316 claims reinspected. General Adjusters and Disaster Analysts Did Quality Reinspections of About 2.5 Percent of All Claims and Additional Reinspections of Claims Adjusted Using Expedited Processes
To determine whether claims were correctly adjusted by the large cadre of adjusters deployed after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA’s program contractor conducted quality assurance reinspections of 4,316 Hurricane Katrina and Rita claims conducted from January to September 2006. Quality Reinspection Program Does Not Rely on a Statistically Valid Sampling Methodology
FEMA did not adopt our October 2005 recommendation that it select the claims to be reinspected in its quality reinspection program using a random sample of the population of all claims. FEMA has fully implemented the first two requirements to establish notifications on coverage to policyholders and an appeals process for claimants. Some States Have Established Minimum Education and Training Requirements
With respect to the requirement that FEMA establish minimum education and training requirements for agents who sell NFIP policies, the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 requires FEMA, in cooperation with the insurance industry, state insurance regulators, and other interested parties, to establish minimum training and education requirements for all insurance agents who sell flood insurance policies and to publish the requirements in the Federal Register. FEMA made progress in implementing provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen and improve FEMA’s monitoring and oversight of the NFIP, including ensuring that claims payments are accurately determined, we are recommending that for future flood events when FEMA implements our prior recommendation to do quality assurance reinspections of a statistically valid sample of claims adjustments, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security also direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to take the following action: Analyze the overall results of claims adjustments done for each future flood events to determine the number and type of claims adjustment errors made and to help determine whether new, cost-efficient methods for adjusting claims that were introduced after Hurricane Katrina are feasible to use after other flood events. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the extent of the losses paid by location and property type, we reviewed congressional actions to increase the NFIP borrowing authority, and we interviewed the Director, Deputy Director, and other officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Mitigation Division on the actions they took to estimate the amount of funds they needed to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to cover claims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and other 2006 flood events. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August and September 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused unprecedented destruction to property along the Gulf Coast, resulting in billions of dollars of damage claims to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). This report, which we initiated under the authority of the Comptroller General, examines (1) the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the NFIP and paid losses by location and property type; (2) the challenges the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and others faced in addressing the needs of NFIP claimants and communities; (3) FEMA's methods of monitoring and overseeing claims adjustments; and (4) FEMA's efforts to meet the requirements of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to establish policyholder coverage notifications, an appeals process for claimants, and education and training requirements for agents. To conduct these assessments, GAO interviewed FEMA and insurance officials, analyzed claims data, and examined a sample of reports done on the accuracy of claims adjustments.
What GAO Found
NFIP paid an unprecedented dollar amount for a record number of claims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Congress increased NFIP's borrowing authority with the U.S. Treasury from a pre-Katrina level of $1.5 billion to about $20.8 billion in March 2006, but FEMA will probably not be able to repay this debt on annual premium revenues of about $2 billion. As of May 2006, NFIP had paid approximately 162,000 flood damage claims from Hurricane Katrina and another 9,000 claims from Hurricane Rita. Most paid claims were for primary residences where flood insurance was generally required. FEMA and its private sector partners faced several challenges in processing a record number of flood claims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, among them were (1) reaching insured properties in a timely way because of blocked roadways and flood water contamination and (2) identifying badly damaged homes to be inspected in locations where street signs had washed away. Despite these and other obstacles, FEMA reported that over 95 percent of Gulf Coast claims had been closed by May 2006, a time frame comparable to those for closing claims in other, smaller recent floods. To help keep pace with the volume of claims filed, FEMA approved expedited methods for claims processing that were unique to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. To provide oversight of the claims adjustment process, FEMA's program contractor did quality assurance reinspections of Hurricane Katrina and Rita claims adjustments. FEMA did not adopt our October 2005 recommendation that it select the claims to be reinspected from a random sample of the universe of all closed claims; thus, the results of the reinspections cannot be projected to a universe larger than the 4,316 claims adjustments that were reinspected. FEMA agrees with our prior recommendation and plans to do quality reinspections in future flood events based on a random sample of all claims. FEMA did not analyze the overall results of the quality reinspections for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA has made progress but has not fully implemented the NFIP program changes mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act. For example, 15 states had adopted minimum education and training requirements for insurance agents who sell NFIP policies, as of October 2006. |
gao_GAO-01-822 | gao_GAO-01-822_0 | For example, a terrorist act may at first appear to be a routine hazardous materials incident, leading to the activation of a federal response under this plan. Presidential Decision Directive 63
This May 1998 directive acknowledges computer security as a national security risk and established several entities within the NSC, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to address critical infrastructure protection, including federal agencies’ information infrastructures. It called for the development of a national plan for critical infrastructure protection. It also identifies the specific tasks federal agencies perform when responding to terrorist incidents and sets forth current and projected efforts by the Attorney General in partnership with other federal agencies; the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism; and state and local entities to improve readiness to address the threat of terrorism. If state and local first responders are unable to manage a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident or become overwhelmed, the incident commander can request these and other federal assets. Coordinates federal resources in responding to the off-site monitoring and assessment needs at the scene of a radiological emergency. GAO recommendations We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for coordinating efforts to combat terrorism, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council (NSC), in consultation with the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the heads of other executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities to implement the national counterterrorism policy and strategy are established; (2) agencies’ programs, projects, activities, and requirements for combating terrorism are analyzed in relation to established governmentwide priorities; and (3) resources are allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack. No national threat and risk assessment has been completed to use for resource decisions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agreed with our recommendation. All of the agencies have made significant progress toward implementing our recommendations. We also recommend that the President establish a single focal point for overall leadership and coordination to combat terrorism. The Administration currently is reviewing the federal CIP strategy. governments to manage the consequences of WMD terrorism. The Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support took the position that the Department of Justice, in both legal and programmatic terms, was the lead agency for preparing state and local governments for WMD terrorism. | What GAO Found
As concerns about terrorism have grown, Executive Branch responsibilities and authorities have received greater attention, which led to the 1998 appointment of a national coordinator in the National Security Council. Both Congress and the President have recognized the need to review and clarify the structure for overall leadership and coordination. The President recently requested that the Vice President oversee a coordinated national effort to improve national preparedness, including efforts to combat terrorism. Federal efforts to develop a national strategy to combat terrorism and related guidance have progressed, but key efforts remain incomplete. The first step toward developing a national strategy is to conduct a national threat and risk assessment. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have collaborated on such an assessment, but they have not formally coordinated with other departments and agencies on this task. Under current policy, the federal government also has improved its capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are tasked with leading federal efforts in their respective roles for managing a terrorist crisis and the consequences of an incident. Several other federal agencies with response capabilities would support these two agencies. Federal assistance to state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents has resulted in training for thousands of first responders--those state and local officials who would first respond at the scene of an incident. To improve this training effort, state and local officials have called for a single federal liaison for state and local preparedness programs. To protect computer systems and the critical operations and infrastructures they support, various efforts have been undertaken to implement a national strategy outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63. However, progress in some areas has been slow. Specifically, federal agencies have taken initial steps to develop critical infrastructure protection plans, but independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant information security weaknesses that place federal operations at high risk of tampering and disruption. |
gao_GAO-05-204 | gao_GAO-05-204_0 | Over the years, Congress established various requirements for immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens to report their addresses while residing in the United States. Because legacy INS did not inform aliens of change of address notification requirements when they entered the country, in our November 2002 report, we recommended that legacy INS publicize change of address notification requirements nationwide. Specifically, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress mandated that INS improve its ability to identify nonimmigrant aliens who arrive and depart the United States and who overstay their visas. The officials estimated that an increase of over 2 million address reporting forms would increase USCIS’s current annual change of address form processing costs from about $1.6 million to at least $4.6 million per year. USCIS’s estimate does not include the potentially substantial cost of enforcing the address reporting requirement, which would include hiring, training, and compensating additional ICE agents. Nonimmigrant aliens who comply with address reporting requirements or seek DHS benefits might be found using existing DHS systems or other information sources. Although almost all of the 17 agents we interviewed stated that self- reported nonimmigrant alien addresses would not be helpful in locating nonimmigrants, several agents described some possible benefits associated with an annual nonimmigrant alien address reporting requirement: According to one Los Angeles ICE agent, implementing an annual nonimmigrant alien address requirement could be useful if biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and digitized photographs) were included with forms during the reporting process so that nonimmigrant alien registration forms could be traced to other DHS forms, such as visas, and also linked to a biometric identifier. If nonimmigrant aliens were required to report their current address annually and within a specified time period (for example, between January 1 and 15 of each year), the annual reporting requirement could allow federal investigators to refer to a list of nonimmigrants reported to be within the United States on the date the form was submitted to DHS. Concluding Observations
While implementing an annual registration requirement for nonimmigrants is feasible, the consensus of the USCIS and ICE headquarters officials and ICE field office agents we contacted recognized that a self-reporting system would be of limited use in locating the group of aliens who are not in compliance with immigration laws or otherwise do not want to be contacted by the government. Nonimmigrant aliens who do not wish to be located are not likely to comply with an annual requirement to self-report address information. Consequently, agents have used other databases to locate this class of alien and have found such databases to be more current and reliable than the existing self-reporting system. Potential benefits cited by law enforcement agents, such as the ability to verify that the nonimmigrant alien is still in the country and to provide a basis for detaining noncompliant aliens, might be available with current systems and law but have seldom been used. For these reasons, it is questionable whether the usefulness of an annual reporting requirement would outweigh the cost of implementation and enforcement. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and had technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1940, Congress has provided a statutory framework that requires aliens entering or residing in the United States to provide address information. By 1981, aliens who remain in the United States for 30 days or more were required to initially register and report their address information and then to report their change of address only if they move. In the months immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, federal investigators' efforts to locate and interview nearly one-half of the 4,112 nonimmigrant aliens they attempted to contact were impeded by lack of current address information. Nonimmigrant aliens are defined as those who seek temporary entry into the United States for a specific purpose, including those aliens who are in the country as students, international representatives, or temporary workers, or for business or pleasure. Because of growing concern over the government's need to locate aliens, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 directed GAO to study the feasibility and the utility of a requirement that each nonimmigrant alien in the United States self-report a current address on a yearly basis.
What GAO Found
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials told us that while implementing an annual address reporting requirement for nonimmigrant aliens is technically feasible, such a requirement would increase the number of reporting forms DHS would have to process. In turn, this increase would raise form-processing costs from an estimated $1.6 million to at least an estimated $4.6 million per year, according to DHS, which does not include the cost of enforcing the annual reporting requirement. The consensus of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, who investigate activities that may violate immigration law, was that a self-reporting system would be of limited use in locating aliens who are avoiding contact with the government. Nonimmigrant aliens who do not wish to be located are not likely to comply with an annual requirement to self-report address information. Consequently, agents use other databases to locate this class of alien as well as nonimmigrant aliens who may not be aware of address reporting requirements. Public and private databases that record information concerning benefits, an alien's department of motor vehicle records, or credit bureau information are examples of information sources that agents have used to locate nonimmigrant aliens. Despite the unreliability of self-reported information, some agents did recognize the possibility of limited enforcement benefits for implementing an annual address reporting requirement, such as verifying that compliant nonimmigrant aliens are still in the country and providing a basis for detaining noncompliant nonimmigrant aliens. However, existing systems are available for compliant nonimmigrant aliens to notify DHS of address changes. Also, DHS already has the authority to detain all aliens not in compliance with current change of address reporting requirements but has seldom used the authority. Consequently, it is questionable whether the usefulness of an annual reporting requirement would outweigh the cost of implementation and enforcement. DHS reviewed a draft of this report and had technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-840T | gao_GAO-02-840T_0 | TEA-21 requires that FTA evaluate projects against “project justification” and “local financial commitment” criteria contained in the act (see fig. 1). Status of the New Starts Program
Although FTA has been faced with an impending transit budget crunch for several years, the agency is likely to end the TEA-21 authorization period with about $310 million in unused commitment authority if its proposed fiscal year 2003 budget is enacted. Although the New Starts program will likely have unused commitment authority through fiscal year 2003, the carry-over commitments from existing grant agreements that will need to be funded during the next authorization period are substantial. (Currently, New Starts funding—and all federal funding—is capped at 80 percent.) Bus Rapid Transit Shows Promise as a Means for Expanding Transit at a Lower Capital Cost
With demand high for New Starts funds, a greater emphasis on lower cost options may help expand the benefits of federal funding for mass transit; Bus Rapid Transit shows promise in this area. Bus Rapid Transit systems using arterial streets may include lanes reserved for the exclusive use of buses and street enhancements that speed buses and improve service. Communities may prefer Light Rail systems in part because the public sees rail as faster, quieter, and less polluting than bus service, even though Bus Rapid Transit is designed to overcome those problems. FTA believes that this negative image can be improved over time through bus service that incorporates Bus Rapid Transit features. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Transportation Administration's (FTA) New Starts Program helps pay for designing and constructing rail, bus, and trolley projects through full funding grant agreements. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), authorized $6.1 billion in "guaranteed" funding for the New Starts program through fiscal year 2003. Although the level of New Starts funding is higher than ever, the demand for these resources is also extremely high. Given this high demand for new and expanded transit facilities across the nation, communities need to examine approaches that stretch the federal and local dollar yet still provide high quality transit services. Although FTA has been faced with an impending transit budget crunch for several years, it is likely to end the TEA-21 authorization period with $310 million in unused New Starts commitment authority if its proposed fiscal year 2003 budget is enacted. Bus Rapid Transit is designed to provide major improvements in the speed and reliability of bus service through barrier-separated busways, buses on High Occupancy Vehicle Lanes, or improved service on arterial streets.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Bus Rapid Transit was a less expensive and more flexible approach than Light Rail service because buses can be rerouted more easily to accommodate changing travel patterns. However, transit officials also noted that buses have a poor public image. As a result, many transit planners are designing Bus Rapid Transit systems that offer service that will be an improvement over standard bus service (see GAO-02-603). |
gao_GAO-13-89 | gao_GAO-13-89_0 | To measure overall claims processing timeliness, VBA uses two measures: (1) the number of days the average pending claim has been awaiting a decision (Average Days Pending) and (2) the average number of days that VBA took to complete a claim where a decision has been reached (Average Days to Complete). A number of factors have contributed to the substantial increase in claims received. One factor was the commencement in October 2010 of VBA’s adjudication of 260,000 previously denied and new claims when a presumptive service connection was established for three additional Agent Orange-related diseases.and assigned experienced claims staff to process and track them. While federal law requires veterans to use an application form prescribed by VA when submitting a claim for original disability compensation benefits, VBA central office officials said they accept reopened claims or claims requesting an increase in disability compensation benefits in any format, which can contribute to lengthy processing times. Gathering Records from Federal Agencies and Others Can Take Months
According to VBA officials, delays in obtaining military service and medical treatment records, particularly for National Guard and Reserve members, is a significant factor lengthening the evidence gathering phase. VBA Is Taking Steps to Improve Claims and Appeals Processing, but Future Impact Is Uncertain
VBA is currently taking steps to improve the timeliness of claims and appeals processing. Although VBA is monitoring these efforts, the planning documents provided to us lack key aspects of sound planning, such as performance measures for each effort. In exchange for expedited processing, veterans participating in the FDC program send VBA any relevant private medical evidence with the claim and certify that they have no additional evidence to provide. Efforts to Redesign Key Aspects of the Process Are Under Way without a Comprehensive Plan
In March 2012, VBA implemented a nationwide initiative that requires staff to use the Simplified Notification Letter (SNL), a process to communicate ratings decisions to veterans.the goal of the SNL is to reduce the time it takes claims staff to provide veterans with claims decisions that are more consistent and easier to understand. According to claims staff at each of the regional offices we According to VBA officials, visited, SNL has decreased the time it takes to rate claims, but claims staff in three regional offices told us it created additional steps in preparing the decision letter sent to the veteran, adding time to the processing awards phase. For this initiative, VBA created specialized teams that process claims based on their complexity. In 2010, VBA began to develop the Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS), a paperless claims processing system that is intended to help streamline the claims process and reduce processing times. According to VBA officials, the Claims Organizational Model and VBMS will work together to reduce processing times and help VA process veterans’ claims within 125 days by 2015. Although VBMS began its pilot in 2010, VBA has not yet reported on how VBMS has affected processing times. Conclusions
VA provides a critical benefit to veterans who have incurred disabilities as a result of their military service. For years, VA’s disability claims and appeals processes have received considerable attention as VA has struggled to process disability compensation claims in a timely fashion. And that number is projected to continue to increase as 1 million servicemembers become veterans over the next 5 years due to the drawdown of troops from a decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the evidence gathering phase in fiscal year 2011, which took over 5 months (157 days) on average, continues to worsen in 2012, partly due to difficulties in obtaining records for National Guard and Reserve and SSA medical records, according to VBA officials. Develop improvements for partnering with Social Security Administration officials to reduce the time it takes to gather medical records. Ensure the development of a robust backlog reduction plan for VBA’s initiatives that, among other best practice elements, identifies implementation risks and strategies to address them and performance goals that incorporate the impact of individual initiatives on processing timeliness. In its comments, VA stated it generally agreed with our conclusions and concurred with our recommendations, and summarized efforts that are planned or underway to address the recommendations. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the (1) factors that contribute to lengthy processing times for disability claims and appeals at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and (2) status of the Veteran Benefits Administration’s (VBA) recent efforts to improve disability claims and appeals processing timeliness. To examine factors that contribute to lengthy processing times for disability claims and appeals, we reviewed past GAO and VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports and other relevant studies on VA’s claims and appeals processing, such as the Veterans’ Disability Benefits Commission’s 2007 report, Honoring the Call to Duty: Veterans’ Disability Benefits in the 21st Century. Below is a list of 15 improvement efforts we identified as having a stated purpose of improving timeliness of claims or appeals processing, based on a review of VA documents and interviews with VBA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
For years, VA has struggled with an increasing workload of disability compensation claims. The average time to complete a claim was 188 days in fiscal year 2011, and VA expects an increase in claims received as 1 million servicemembers leave military service over the next 5 years. As GAO and other organizations have previously reported, VA has faced challenges in reducing the time it takes to decide veterans’ claims. GAO was asked to review these issues. Specifically, this report examines (1) the factors that contribute to lengthy processing times for disability claims and appeals, and (2) the status of VBA’s recent efforts to improve disability claims and appeals processing timeliness. To do this, GAO analyzed VBA performance data and program documents, reviewed relevant studies and evaluations, met with staff from five VA regional offices, and interviewed VBA officials and Veterans Service Organizations.
What GAO Found
A number of factors—both external and internal to the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)—have contributed to the increase in processing timeframes and subsequent growth in the backlog of veterans’ disability compensation claims. As the population of new veterans has swelled in recent years, the annual number of claims received by VBA has gone up. Compared to the past, these claims have a higher number of disabling conditions, and some of these conditions, such as traumatic brain injuries, make their assessment complex. Moreover, due to new regulations that have established eligibility for benefits for new diseases associated with Agent Orange exposure, VBA adjudicated 260,000 previously denied and new claims. Beyond these external factors, issues with the design and implementation of the compensation program have contributed to timeliness challenges. For example, the law requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to assist veterans in obtaining records that support their claim. However, VBA officials said that lengthy timeframes in obtaining military records—particularly for members of the National Guard and Reserve—and Social Security Administration (SSA) medical records impact VA’s duty to assist, possibly delaying a decision on a veteran’s disability claim. As a result, the evidence gathering phase of the claims process took an average of 157 days in 2011. Further, VBA’s paper-based claims processing system involves multiple hand-offs, which can lead to misplaced and lost documents and can cause unnecessary time delays. Concerning timeliness of appeals, VBA regional offices have shifted resources away from appeals and toward claims in recent years, which has led to lengthy appeals timeframes.
VBA is currently taking steps to improve the timeliness of claims and appeals processing; however, prospects for improvement remain uncertain because timely processing remains a daunting challenge. VBA is using contractors to handle some aspects of the claims process, and is also shifting some workload between regional offices. Also, VBA is modifying and streamlining certain claims and appeals processing procedures for veterans who opt to participate in these initiatives in exchange for an expedited decision. For example, veterans receive expedited processing when they submit a claim that is certified as having all required evidence. Not many veterans have elected this option, but VA is making adjustments to increase its attractiveness. In addition, VBA is trying to decrease the amount of time it takes to gather medical evidence. For example, VBA recently encouraged medical providers to use a standardized form when responding to VBA’s request for information. However, results of this initiative have been mixed. VBA is also taking steps to streamline the claims process, including implementing initiatives to create (1) standardized language for decision letters sent to veterans, (2) specialized teams that process claims based on level of complexity, and (3) a paperless claims system. According to VBA officials, these efforts will help VA process veterans’ claims within 125 days by 2015. However, the extent to which VA is positioned to meet this ambitious goal remains uncertain. Specifically, VBA’s backlog reduction plan—its key planning document—does not articulate performance measures for each initiative, including their intended impact on the claims backlog. Furthermore, VA has not yet reported on how these efforts have affected processing times, a condition which raises concern given the mixed results that have emerged to date.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VBA (1) partner with military officials to reduce timeframes to gather records from National Guard and Reserve sources, (2) partner with SSA to reduce timeframes to gather SSA medical records, and (3) ensure the development of a robust plan for its initiatives that identifies performance goals that include the impact of individual initiatives on processing timeliness. In response to a draft of this report, VA officials generally agreed with GAO’s conclusions and concurred with the recommendations, and summarized efforts that are planned or underway to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-206T | gao_GAO-12-206T_0 | The L.A. Court’s operations are currently split between two buildings—the Spring Street Courthouse built in 1938 and the Roybal Federal Building built in 1992. 1.) Courthouse Project Cancelled After Delays and Increases in Estimated Costs
In our 2008 report, we found that GSA had spent $16.3 million designing a new courthouse for the L.A. court and $16.9 million acquiring and preparing a new site for it in downtown Los Angeles. In addition, we reported that about $366.45 million remained appropriated for the construction of a 41-courtroom L.A. courthouse. The project was delayed because GSA decided to design a larger courthouse than congressionally authorized, GSA and the judiciary disagreed over the project’s scope, costs escalated unexpectedly, and there was low contractor interest in bidding on the project. GAO Found Judiciary’s Rent Challenge Stems from Courthouses Having Unneeded Space with Higher Associated Costs
GAO Found That Increases in the Judiciary’s Rent Costs Were Primarily Due to Increases in Space and That Courthouses Have Significant Unneeded Space
In 2004, the judiciary requested a $483 million permanent, annual exemption from rent payments to GSA because it was having difficulty paying for its increasing rent costs. GSA denied this request. In 2010, we found that the 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000 include 3.56 million square feet of unneeded space—more than a quarter of the space in courthouses completed since 2000. This extra space consists of space that was constructed as a result of (1) exceeding the congressionally authorized size, (2) overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have, and (3) not planning for judges to share courtrooms. Overall, this space is equal to the square footage of about 9 average-sized courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space, when adjusted to 2010 dollars, is $835 million, and the annual cost to rent, operate, and maintain it is $51 million. Using the judiciary’s data, we designed a model for courtroom sharing, which shows that there is enough unscheduled time for substantial courtroom sharing. Sharing could also be increased by having three senior judges—instead of two—share one courtroom. We recommended, among other things, that GSA ensure that new courthouses are constructed within their authorized size or that congressional committees are notified if authorized sizes are going to be exceeded; that the Judicial Conference of the United States retain caseload projections to improve the accuracy of its 10-year-judge planning; and that the Conference establish and use courtroom sharing policies based on scheduling and use data. GSA and the judiciary agreed with most of the recommendations, but expressed concerns about our methodology and key findings. We continue to believe that our findings were well supported and developed using an appropriate methodology, as explained in the report. Challenges Related to Costs and Unneeded Space in Courthouses Are All Applicable to the L.A. Courthouse Project
The three causes of extra space—and the associated extra costs—in courthouses that we identified in 2010 are all applicable to the L.A. courthouse project. Second, overestimates of how many judges the L.A. Court would need led to the design of a courthouse with more courtrooms than necessary. Specifically, we reported in 2004 that the proposed L.A. courthouse was designed to include courtrooms for 61 judges (47 current district and magistrate judges and 14 additional judges expected by 2011), but in 2011, the L.A. Court still has 47 district and magistrate judges—and none of the 14 additional judges that were expected. This outcome calls into question the space assumptions that the original proposals were based on. Third, in 2008 we reported that in planning for judges to share courtrooms, the judiciary favored an option proposed by GSA that provided for sharing by senior judges, but our 2010 analysis indicated that further sharing was feasible and could reduce the size and cost of the L.A. courthouse project. Specifically, GSA’s proposal to build a 36- courtroom, 45-chamber building and add 4 courtrooms to Roybal’s existing 34 courtrooms—which GSA estimated at the time would cost $1.1 billion, or $733.6 million more than Congress had already appropriated—would have provided the L.A. Court with 74 courtrooms in total—36 district courtrooms in the new building and 38 courtrooms (20 magistrate and 18 bankruptcy) in Roybal. As described above, our model suggested that additional courtroom sharing would be possible in a courthouse such as the L.A. courthouse, which could reduce the number of courtrooms needed for this project, broadening the potential options for housing the L.A. District Court. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, as part of a multibillion-dollar courthouse construction initiative, the judiciary requested and the General Services Administration (GSA) proposed building a new courthouse in Los Angeles to increase security, efficiency, and space--but construction never began. About $400 million was appropriated for the L.A. courthouse project. For this testimony, GAO was asked to report on (1) the status of the L.A. courthouse project, (2) challenges GAO has identified affecting federal courthouses nationwide, and (3) the extent to which these challenges are applicable to the L.A. courthouse project. This testimony is based on GAO-10-417 and GAO's other prior work on federal courthouses, during which GAO analyzed courthouse planning and use data, visited courthouses, modeled courtroom sharing scenarios, and interviewed judges, GSA officials, and others. In GAO-10-417 , GAO recommended that (1) GSA ensure that new courthouses are constructed within their authorized size or, if not, that congressional committees are notified, (2) the Judicial Conference of the United States retain caseload projections to improve the accuracy of its 10-year-judge planning, and (3) the Conference establish and use courtroom sharing policies based on scheduling and use data. GSA and the judiciary agreed with most of the recommendations, but expressed concerns with GAO's methodology and key findings. GAO continues to believe that its findings were well supported and developed using an appropriate methodology..
What GAO Found
GAO reported in 2008 that GSA spent about $33 million on design and site preparations for a new 41-courtroom L.A. courthouse, leaving about $366 million available for construction. However, project delays, unforeseen cost escalation, and low contractor interest had caused GSA to cancel the project in 2006 before any construction took place. GSA later identified other options for housing the L.A. Court, including constructing a smaller new courthouse (36 courtrooms) or using the existing courthouses--the Spring Street Courthouse and the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and Courthouse. As GAO also reported, the estimated cost of the 36-courthouse option as of 2008 was over $1.1 billion, significantly higher than the current appropriation. The challenges that GAO has identified in recent reports on federal courthouses include increasing rent and extra operating, maintenance, and construction costs stemming from courthouses being built larger than necessary. For example, in 2004, the judiciary requested a $483 million permanent, annual exemption from rent payments to GSA due to difficulties in paying for its increasing rent costs. GAO found in 2006 that these increasing rent costs were primarily due to increases in total courthouse space--and in 2010, GAO reported that more than a quarter of the new space in recently constructed courthouses is unneeded. Specifically, in the 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000, GAO found 3.56 million square feet of excess space. This extra space is a result of (1) courthouses exceeding the congressionally authorized size, (2) the number of judges in the courthouses being overestimated, and (3) not planning for judges to share courtrooms. In total, the extra space GAO identified is equal in square footage to about 9 average-sized courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space, when adjusted to 2010 dollars, is $835 million, and the estimated annual cost to rent, operate and maintain it is $51 million. Each of the challenges GAO identified related to unnecessary space in courthouses completed since 2000 is applicable to the L.A. courthouse project. First, as GAO reported in 2008, GSA designed the L.A. Courthouse with 13 more courtrooms than congressionally authorized. This increase in size led to cost increases and delays. Second, in 2004, GAO found that the proposed courthouse was designed to provide courtrooms to accommodate the judiciary's estimate of 61 district and magistrate judges in the L.A. Court by 2011--which, as of October 2011, exceeds the actual number of such judges by 14. This disparity calls into question the space assumptions on which the original proposals were based. Third, the L.A. court was planning for less courtroom sharing than is possible. While in 2008 the judiciary favored an option proposed by GSA that provided for some sharing by senior judges, according to GAO's 2010 analysis, there is enough unscheduled time in courtrooms for three senior judges to share one courtroom, two magistrate judges to share one courtroom, and three district judges to share two courtrooms. In 2011, the judiciary also approved sharing for bankruptcy judges. Additional courtroom sharing could reduce the number of additional courtrooms needed for the L.A. courthouse, thereby increasing the potential options for housing the L.A. Court. |
gao_GAO-14-470 | gao_GAO-14-470_0 | GCSS-Army Program Schedule and Cost Estimates Did Not Fully Meet Best Practices
We found that the program schedule and cost estimates for the GCSS- Army did not fully meet best practices. Specifically, the GCSS-Army schedule supporting the December 2012 full deployment decision partially met the comprehensiveness and construction characteristics and substantially met the credibility and control characteristics for developing a high-quality and reliable schedule. In addition, the cost estimate fully met the comprehensiveness characteristic, substantially met the documentation and accuracy characteristics, and partially met the credibility characteristic for developing a high-quality and reliable cost estimate. However, resources were not loaded into the schedule software and were not assigned to specific activities in the schedule. Without a valid critical path, management cannot focus on activities that will have detrimental effects on the key project milestones and deliverables if they slip. The schedule was substantially horizontally integrated, which means that outcomes were aligned with sequenced activities. The cost estimate included both government and contractor costs of the program over its life cycle—from the inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance. We found that the cost estimate for GCSS-Army was substantially well- documented. The cost estimate captured such things as the calculations performed to derive each element’s cost and the results of the calculations. The program management officials’ cost estimate mentioned results of a risk analysis; however the risk and uncertainty analysis was not documented. Conclusions
While the Army made some improvements to the schedule and cost estimates that supported the full deployment decision, the Army did not fully meet best practices in developing schedule and cost estimates for the GCSS-Army program. By incorporating best practices for developing reliable schedule and cost estimates, DOD would increase the probability of GCSS-Army successfully achieving full deployment by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2017 to provide needed functionality for financial improvement and audit readiness. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the implementation of GCSS-Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following two actions:
Ensure that the Under Secretary of the Army, in his capacity as the Chief Management Officer, directs the GCSS-Army Program Management Office to develop an updated schedule that fully incorporates best practices, including assigning resources to all activities, establishing durations of all activities, confirming that the critical path is valid, and ensuring reasonable total float. DOD described completed actions that the department has taken to address the recommendation. As stated in our report, we focused on the extent to which GCSS-Army’s schedule and cost estimates were prepared consistent with GAO’s Schedule and Cost Guides. As stated in our report, incorporating best practices for a reliable cost estimate would help ensure that DOD has a reliable cost estimate that provides the basis for effective resource allocation, proactive course correction when warranted, and accountability for results. Appendix II: Assessment of the Global Combat Support System-Army Program’s Cost Estimate
This appendix provides the results of our analysis of the extent to which the Global Combat Support System-Army cost estimate supporting the December 2012 full deployment decision met the characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD officials have stated that the implementation of enterprise resource planning systems, such as GCSS-Army, is critical to the department's goal of correcting financial management deficiencies and ensuring that its financial statements are validated as audit ready by September 30, 2017, as called for by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
GAO was asked to review the schedule and cost estimates for selected DOD systems. This report addresses the extent to which the schedule and cost estimates for GCSS-Army were prepared consistent with GAO's Schedule and Cost Guides. The schedule and cost estimates are designed to cover GCSS-Army implementation through 2017.
GAO assessed the schedule and cost estimates that supported DOD's December 2012 full deployment decision, which granted approval for GCSS-Army to be deployed for operational use to all remaining locations. GAO also met with GCSS-Army program officials, including lead schedulers and cost estimators.
What GAO Found
The Army made some improvements to its schedule and cost estimates that supported the December 2012 full deployment decision for the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army); however, the schedule and cost estimates did not fully meet best practices. GAO found that the schedule substantially met the credibility and control characteristics for developing a high-quality and reliable schedule. For example, the schedule was horizontally integrated, which means that it links products and outcomes with other associated sequenced activities. In addition, the GCSS-Army program management officials followed general guidelines for updating the schedule on a regular basis. GAO found that the schedule partially met the comprehensiveness and construction characteristics for a reliable schedule. Specifically, resources were not assigned to specific activities, and the schedule lacked a valid critical path, preventing management from focusing on the activities most likely to have detrimental effects on key program milestones if not completed as planned. By incorporating best practices for developing a reliable schedule, the Department of Defense (DOD) would increase the probability of completing the GCSS-Army program by the projected date.
GAO found that the GCSS-Army cost estimate fully or substantially met the comprehensiveness, documentation, and accuracy characteristics of a high-quality and reliable cost estimate. For example, the cost estimate included both government and contractor costs for the program over its life cycle, provided documentation that substantially described detailed calculations used to derive each element's cost, and was adjusted for inflation. In addition, GAO found that the cost estimate partially met the credibility characteristic of a reliable cost estimate. Although program management officials provided a cost model that discussed a limited risk analysis, the results of the risk and uncertainty analysis were not documented. Incorporating best practices would help ensure that DOD has a reliable cost estimate that provides the basis for effective resource allocation, proactive course correction when warranted, and accountability for results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making two recommendations aimed at improving the Army's implementation of schedule and cost best practices for GCSS-Army. DOD concurred, but the completed actions it described related to the cost estimate were not fully responsive to GAO's recommendation. GAO continues to believe that fully incorporating best practices in the cost estimate would help improve its reliability. |
gao_GAO-10-8 | gao_GAO-10-8_0 | Financial market organizations also have received consolidated information through other sources. According to a DHS study and Internet providers, this additional pandemic-related traffic is likely to exceed the capacity of Internet providers’ network infrastructure in metropolitan residential Internet access networks. DHS has undertaken several pandemic planning activities. Although DHS staff identified a list of potential authorities that may or may not apply, they told us they were not able to specify whether their agency had clear or specific authority to require telecommunications providers to take actions to address congestion, such as reducing customer transmission speeds or blocking entertainment Web sites. Key Securities Market Participants Have Prepared Response Plans, but Not All Have Documented Staffing Analyses or Plans for Alternatives to Teleworking
We reviewed seven organizations whose operations are critical to the overall functioning of U.S. securities markets and found that all have developed formal plans that address key elements of pandemic preparedness. Although congestion during a pandemic could interfere with individuals’ ability, including teleworkers and others, to access the Internet, the primary communications of the critical markets organizations would not be affected because these organizations and their participants communicate via high-capacity, proprietary networks that do not traverse the public Internet infrastructure. However, the organization has not made adequate preparations for some critical staff in another geographic area to telework during a pandemic. These organizations have also not developed and assessed the feasibility of alternatives to teleworking in their plans. To assess the extent to which securities exchanges, electronic markets, and clearing organizations are adequately managing risks to their operations, staff from SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets regularly conduct examinations through its Automation Review Program (ARP). However, whether DHS, FCC, or others have sufficient existing authorities to direct private sector Internet providers to take the actions necessary to relieve congestion is not clear. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that securities market participants as well as organizations in other critical sectors of the economy will continue to have access to the Internet during a pandemic, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: develop a strategy outlining actions that could be taken to address coordinate with other relevant federal and private sector entities about actions that could potentially reduce Internet congestion, work with other federal partners to determine if sufficient authority exists for one or more relevant agencies to take any contemplated actions to address Internet congestion, and assess the effectiveness and feasibility, and undertake if warranted, a public education campaign to reduce such congestion. In evaluating these organizations’ pandemic readiness, we attempted to determine whether these organizations’ pandemic plans adequately address the five elements required by the regulators, including: (1) a process for monitoring the pandemic’s progress and a plan that escalates response steps as various pandemic phases are reached; (2) a preventive program to minimize, to the extent possible, illness among employees, including social distancing of employees by curtailing meetings; (3) a documented strategy of facilities or procedures designed to allow the organization to continue its critical operations in the event that large numbers of its staff are unavailable for prolonged periods, including an analysis of staffing levels needed for critical functions and, as applicable, an alternative to teleworking; (4) a testing program to ensure that the practices and capabilities will be effective and allow it to continue its critical operations; and (5) an oversight program to ensure ongoing review and updates to the pandemic plan. In addition to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FINRA oversees broker-dealers conducting business domestically in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns exist that a more severe pandemic outbreak than 2009's could cause large numbers of people staying home to increase their Internet use and overwhelm Internet providers' network capacities. Such network congestion could prevent staff from broker-dealers and other securities market participants from teleworking during a pandemic. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for ensuring that critical telecommunications infrastructure is protected. GAO was asked to examine a pandemic's impact on Internet congestion and what actions can be and are being taken to address it, the adequacy of securities market organizations' pandemic plans, and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) oversight of these efforts. GAO reviewed relevant studies, regulatory guidance and examinations, interviewed telecommunications providers and financial market participants, and analyzed pandemic plans for seven critical market organizations.
What GAO Found
Increased demand during a severe pandemic could exceed the capacities of Internet providers' access networks for residential users and interfere with teleworkers in the securities market and other sectors, according to a DHS study and providers. Private Internet providers have limited ability to prioritize traffic or take other actions that could assist critical teleworkers. Some actions, such as reducing customers' transmission speeds or blocking popular Web sites, could negatively impact e-commerce and require government authorization. However, DHS has not developed a strategy to address potential Internet congestion or worked with federal partners to ensure that sufficient authorities to act exist. It also has not assessed the feasibility of conducting a campaign to obtain public cooperation to reduce nonessential Internet use to relieve congestion. DHS also has not begun coordinating with other federal and private sector entities to assess other actions that could be taken or determine what authorities may be needed to act. Because the key securities exchanges and clearing organizations generally use proprietary networks that bypass the public Internet, their ability to execute and process trades should not be affected by any congestion. In analyzing seven critical market organizations, GAO found they had prepared pandemic plans that addressed key regulatory elements, including hygiene programs to minimize staff illness and continuing operations by spreading staff across geographic areas. However, not all had completed or documented analyses of whether they would have sufficient staff capable of carrying out critical activities if many of their employees were ill. Also, not all had developed alternatives to teleworking if congestion arises. SEC staff have been regularly examining market organizations' readiness, but could further reduce risk of disruptions by ensuring that these organizations prepare complete staffing analyses and teleworking alternatives. |
gao_GAO-10-89 | gao_GAO-10-89_0 | FAA has effective leadership and management. FAA has implemented these recommendations. By fiscal year 2013, FAA projects that 38 percent of its employees who perform work that is critical to FAA’s mission will be eligible to retire (see table 2). FAA Incorporates Many Leading Human Capital Practices in Strategic Workforce Planning, Training, Recruitment and Hiring, and Performance Management
FAA’s human capital system mirrors many leading human capital practices in strategic workforce planning, training, recruitment and hiring, and performance management, but FAA officials with responsibility for implementing human capital procedures in major segments of the agency and union representatives criticized FAA’s practices in performance management. FAA’s Low Ranking in Best Places to Work Could Pose Challenges in Recruitment, Motivation, and Retention
FAA’s ranking near the bottom in Best Places to Work in the Federal Government in 2007 and 2009, as published by the Partnership for Public Service (the Partnership) and American University’s Institute for the Study of Public Policy Implementation (ISPPI), could present a barrier to recruiting, motivating, and retaining the talented employees that FAA needs to meet future mission requirements. FAA Employees Indicated Less Satisfaction Than the Rest of the Federal Government with Their Jobs; Organization; and Items That Affect Recruitment, Motivation, and Retention
Compared with employees in the rest of the federal government, FAA employees indicated less satisfaction with key items in OPM’s 2008 Federal Human Capital Survey. FAA Is Working to Address Workplace Satisfaction, but Has Not Established Accountability for Improvement
FAA is taking actions that could improve employee satisfaction with their leaders over time. These activities could help increase positive responses regarding employee empowerment and employees’ involvement in decisions that affect their work. These efforts represent a good start. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that FAA can hire, motivate, and retain the talented staff it needs to operate the national airspace system and implement the transition to NextGen, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following three actions: 1. ensure that key leading practices in diversity management are incorporated in future updates of FAA’s plans to increase diversity in the controller and aviation safety workforces; 2. hold its managers accountable for the outcomes of the Federal Human Capital Survey Action Plan by establishing a performance expectation that FAA managers will achieve the plan’s stated increases in positive responses to designated survey items; and 3. hold the agency accountable to Congress and the American people by disclosing the plan, actions, goals, and outcomes in publicly available reports to Congress, such as the annual performance and accountability report. We also reviewed relevant studies by other organizations, including the National Academy of Public Administration. To determine how FAA employees’ workplace satisfaction compares with that of other federal government employees, and what steps FAA is taking to improve workplace satisfaction, we reviewed FAA employee responses to the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) biennial Federal Human Capital Surveys for 2004, 2006, and 2008. Developed an instructional guide for employees on the performance management system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aviation is critical to the nation's economic well-being, global competitiveness, and national security. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 48,000 employees guide aircraft, oversee safety, and maintain air traffic control equipment. FAA will need these skills and additional expertise to address evolving missions. As requested, GAO reviewed (1) how FAA's human capital system compares with practices of leading organizations and (2) how FAA employees' workplace satisfaction compares with that of other federal government employees. GAO reviewed documents and relevant studies, and interviewed FAA officials who implement human capital procedures and union representatives. GAO also reviewed survey data on workplace satisfaction.
What GAO Found
FAA's human capital system incorporates many practices used in leading organizations, but the agency's placement near the bottom in best places to work rankings, published by the Partnership for Public Service and American University's Institute for the Study of Public Policy Implementation, could pose challenges to employee recruitment, motivation, and retention. As part of strategic workforce planning, FAA determines the critical skills needed in its workforce and assesses individual worker skill levels. It also follows leading practices in performance management, but FAA officials and union representatives questioned the system's fairness, echoing concerns that they have raised in the past. FAA follows fewer leading practices in diversity management, but has an opportunity to strengthen its efforts as it updates diversity outreach plans. Despite these efforts, FAA ranked 214th out of 216 agencies in 2009 as the best place to work in the federal government, similar to its ranking in 2007. These low rankings could pose obstacles to FAA's efforts to retain its existing workforce and recruit staff with the requisite skills needed to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System. By fiscal year 2013, FAA projects that 38 percent of its employees who perform work that is critical to FAA's mission will be eligible to retire. While FAA employee responses to governmentwide surveys indicate that they like their work, their responses are considerably less positive than the rest of the federal government regarding other factors that have an impact on employee recruitment, motivation, and retention. The percentage of FAA employees' positive responses regarding communications, involvement in decisions that affect their work, and respect for their leaders were up to 19 points below those of the rest of the federal government. FAA has developed an action plan to improve leadership and create a performance-based culture that could improve employees' workplace satisfaction. However, FAA has not established accountability for the plan's success. |
gao_GAO-15-4 | gao_GAO-15-4_0 | 1). Eligibility for DOD and VA Coverage Is Primarily Based on Military Status, and Eligibility for Medicare, Medicaid, and Exchange- Purchased Coverage Is Based on Age, Income, or Other Factors
Servicemembers’, former servicemembers’, and their dependents’ eligibility for coverage through DOD and VA is primarily based on military status. However, these individuals’ eligibility for Medicare, Medicaid, and to purchase coverage through an exchange is based on age, income, or other factors. Certain dependents of servicemembers and former servicemembers who retired from military service, reservists, and retired reservists are not statutorily entitled to TRICARE coverage, but may choose to purchase TRICARE coverage through specified plans, according to DOD officials. Generally, former servicemembers—both retired and those who left military service for reasons other than retirement—are eligible for VA coverage. Individuals, including servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents, may purchase coverage through an exchange if they meet certain criteria established by PPACA. DOD, VA, Medicare, Medicaid, and Exchange- Purchased Coverage Generally Offer Comprehensive Health Care Coverage; Key Benefits within Programs May Vary
DOD, VA, Medicare, Medicaid, and health plans offered through the exchanges generally offer comprehensive care to their respective beneficiaries, which include servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents—coverage that includes certain benefit categories such as inpatient hospital services, outpatient medical services, and certain prescription drugs, though some of these benefits may vary. 2). 3). VA’s health care program generally does not require former servicemembers to pay premiums and generally does not require cost- sharing for certain groups of former servicemembers, such as those with certain service-connected disabilities or who are low income. The average, annual out-of-pocket costs for those required to participate in cost-sharing was $322 for fiscal year 2013. To qualify for federal subsidies, individuals must be eligible to enroll in an exchange plan, meet income criteria, and not have MEC, including coverage through government-sponsored programs, such as DOD or VA, Medicare, or Medicaid. Federal subsidies for exchange-purchased coverage may be available to certain former servicemembers and certain dependents of servicemembers and former servicemembers who are not covered by DOD or VA health care, if they meet applicable income and other Most servicemembers and former servicemembers and requirements.their dependents have MEC and therefore are ineligible for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions, regardless of their income.Therefore, in order to qualify for federal subsidies, these individuals would first need to cancel their government-sponsored coverage. DOD and VA Provide Information on Eligibility for Exchange-Purchased Coverage, but DOD Provides Limited Information on Qualifying for Federal Subsidies
Both DOD and VA provide information to servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents on how DOD and VA coverage is affected by PPACA requirements, as well as information on eligibility for exchange-purchased coverage. Specifically, DOD’s website does not inform servicemembers and former servicemembers that retired from military service that they and their dependents are statutorily entitled to TRICARE coverage and, as a result, they may not opt out of this coverage in order to potentially qualify for federal subsidies. Not providing such information is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. More Than 27 Million Servicemembers, Former Servicemembers, and Their Dependents Had Coverage through Federal Programs in 2012
More than 27 million servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents reported that they had health care coverage through DOD, VA, Medicare, Medicaid, or a combination of these in 2012, according to data we reviewed from the ACS. For example, an individual with coverage through DOD and Medicare is counted in the DOD count and the Medicare count. ACS survey respondents also reported coverage through Medicare and Medicaid. About 7 million servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents had health care coverage through two or more programs in 2012. While DOD and VA both provide information on their eligibility for coverage through the exchanges, only VA provides information on how individuals may qualify for federal subsidies. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents have complete information for considering their choices for their health care coverage, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense disseminate information on how DOD health care coverage may affect servicemembers’, former servicemembers’, and their dependents’ ability to qualify for federal subsidies that reduce the costs of exchange- purchased coverage. HHS had no comments. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of CMS, and the appropriate congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, there were about 53 million servicemembers and former servicemembers—those who retired from military service or left for reasons other than retirement—and their dependents. These individuals may be eligible for health care coverage through DOD, VA, Medicare, or Medicaid and may purchase coverage through the exchanges established by PPACA. These sources provide individuals opportunities for choosing the coverage that is most suited to their needs, but may also require consideration of complex factors when making choices.
GAO was asked to examine federal health care programs and exchange-purchased coverage available to servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents. GAO examined (1) eligibility for coverage, (2) the key benefits offered by this coverage and the individuals' costs, (3) the extent to which information on exchange-purchased coverage and federal subsidies is provided by DOD and VA, and (4) the extent to which these individuals have coverage through DOD, VA, Medicare, and Medicaid. GAO reviewed agency documents and relevant laws and regulations, analyzed U.S. Census Bureau data, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Servicemembers', former servicemembers', and their dependents' eligibility for health care coverage through the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is primarily based on military status, while eligibility for Medicare, Medicaid, and coverage purchased through an exchange established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is based on age, income, or other factors. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—oversees health care coverage provided through Medicare, Medicaid, and the exchanges. Most servicemembers, and former servicemembers who retired from military service, and their dependents are entitled to DOD coverage, according to DOD officials. Those who are not entitled to DOD coverage, such as reservists and certain of their dependents, may be eligible to purchase it. Former servicemembers who left military service for reasons other than retirement are not eligible for DOD coverage. All former servicemembers are generally eligible for VA coverage. Servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents may also be eligible for Medicare or Medicaid, if they meet eligibility criteria, and may purchase coverage through an exchange.
Federal programs and exchange-purchased plans generally offer comprehensive coverage, which includes coverage for certain benefit categories such as inpatient hospital and outpatient medical services. These forms of coverage may have cost-sharing, subject to certain limits. Cost limits vary and depend on factors such as military status and income. For example, servicemembers do not pay an annual enrollment fee for certain DOD coverage, but former servicemembers do. VA does not generally require cost-sharing for those with certain service-connected conditions or low incomes, while it may for others.
DOD and VA provide information about exchange-purchased coverage on their websites, including that their coverage satisfies the requirement for minimal essential coverage (MEC) established by PPACA. VA informs its beneficiaries that they do not qualify for federal subsidies that lower the cost of exchange plans, even if they meet income and other requirements, because VA coverage satisfies the requirement for MEC. VA also informs its beneficiaries that they may opt out of VA coverage, and thus potentially qualify for federal subsidies. DOD, however, does not provide information indicating that most individuals with DOD coverage cannot opt out of it and, therefore, cannot qualify for federal subsidies. Nor does DOD inform those that have the option of purchasing DOD coverage that they may qualify for federal subsidies, if they do not choose DOD coverage. This is inconsistent with federal internal controls that require communication with stakeholders, and by providing this information, DOD could potentially help servicemembers, certain former servicemembers, and their dependents make more informed decisions regarding their health care coverage.
About 27 million servicemembers, former servicemembers, and their dependents had health care coverage through DOD, VA, Medicare, or Medicaid, or a combination of these in 2012, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. Of these, about 7 million had health care coverage through two or more programs in 2012, most often VA and Medicare (2.4 million), Medicare and Medicaid (1.3 million), and DOD and Medicare (1.2 million).
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD provide information on how its coverage affects individuals' qualification for federal subsidies for exchange-purchased coverage. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. VA generally agreed with GAO's conclusions. HHS had no comments on this report. |
gao_GAO-15-308 | gao_GAO-15-308_0 | Boeing plans to modify the 767 aircraft in two phases to produce a militarized aerial refueling tanker. The Air Force is responsible for certifying the KC- 46 and its military systems. Program Cost Estimates Have Decreased and It is on Track to Meet Performance Goals
KC-46 total program acquisition cost estimates (development, procurement, and military construction costs) have declined from $51.7 billion to $48.9 billion—$2.8 billion or about 5.4 percent—since the program started in February 2011. Most of the estimated decline in costs is due to fewer than expected engineering changes, savings from a competitively awarded aircrew training system contract, and changes in military construction assumptions. Ultimately, these performance goals will be validated primarily through ground and flight testing. As the KC-46 low-rate production decisiona result of the wiring problems, Boeing only completed 3.5 hours of flight testing in 2014, compared to nearly 400 flight test hours it planned to conduct. With the program office’s approval, Boeing revised its nearly 2,400 development flight test hour plan to account for wiring-related delays and to focus on demonstrating key KC-46 aerial refueling capabilities that are required for the production decision. In addition, only 3 test months will be on a KC-46 prior to the decision compared to the original plan of 13 months. These challenges could result in additional schedule delays. This would have enabled Boeing to complete about 66 percent of the nearly 2,400 development flight test hours, including aerial refueling demonstration flights that are entrance criteria for that decision, as well as some of the activities necessary to support the start of initial operational test and evaluation.Boeing plans to complete a little more than 8 months of flight testing prior to the low-rate production decision, or about 22 percent of development flight test hours. The intent of developmental testing is to demonstrate the maturity of a design and to discover and fix design and performance problems before a system enters production. Program is Continuing to Gather Manufacturing Knowledge to Support the Production Decision
The program office and Boeing continue to collect most of the necessary manufacturing knowledge to make informed decisions as the program approaches its low-rate production decision in October 2015. While this increases the risk of discovering costly problems late in development, when the more complex software and advanced capabilities are tested, contract provisions specify that Boeing must correct any required deficiencies and bring development and production aircraft to the final configuration at no additional cost to the government. Based on our analysis, Boeing is at risk of not meeting the entrance criteria needed to support the projected October 2015 low-rate production decision, and will have less knowledge about the reliability of the aircraft than originally planned. No flight testing has been conducted on a KC-46 tanker. Recommendation for Executive Action
Given that the KC-46 program has encountered significant delays to the start of development test and the schedule moving forward remains risky, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to ensure that key aerial refueling capabilities are demonstrated prior to the low-rate production decision. The Air Force concurred with our recommendation. The KC-46 program office plans to collect all required data prior to the low-rate production decision, including the demonstration of key aerial refueling capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aerial refueling—when aircraft refuel while airborne—allows the U.S. military to fly farther, stay airborne longer, and transport more weapons, equipment, and supplies. Yet the mainstay of the U.S. tanker forces—the KC-135 Stratotanker—is over 50 years old. It is increasingly costly to support and its age-related problems could potentially ground the fleet. As a result, the Air Force initiated the $49 billion KC-46 program to replace the aerial refueling fleet. The program plans to produce 18 tankers by 2017 and 179 aircraft in total.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included provisions for GAO to annually review the KC-46 program through 2017. This report addresses progress made in 2014 towards (1) achieving cost and performance goals, (2) meeting schedule targets, and (3) gathering manufacturing knowledge prior to the low-rate production decision. GAO analyzed key program documents and discussed development and production plans and results with officials from the KC-46 program office, other defense offices, and the prime contractor.
What GAO Found
The KC-46 acquisition cost estimate has declined by about 5.4 percent from $51.7 billion to $48.9 billion since February 2011 and the program is on track to meet performance goals. Most of the estimated cost decline is due to fewer than expected engineering changes and changes in military construction plans.
The Air Force delayed the production decision two months, to October 2015, due to wiring problems that Boeing experienced that delayed aircraft delivery and testing. For example, Boeing completed 3.5 hours of flight testing during a single flight of the 767-2C (a precursor to the KC-46 tanker) in 2014, compared to nearly 400 flight test hours it planned to conduct. With program office approval, Boeing restructured its nearly 2,400 development flight test hour plan to focus on demonstrating key KC-46 aerial refueling capabilities required for the production decision. Significantly less testing will now be conducted prior to the decision and only three test months will be on a KC-46, compared to the original plan of 13 months. This testing is intended to demonstrate design maturity and fix design and performance problems before a system enters production. Boeing remains at risk of not being able to demonstrate the aerial refueling capabilities in time to meet the new production decision date due to late parts deliveries, software defects, and flight test cycle assumptions, which could result in additional delays.
Program officials are gathering manufacturing knowledge to support a production decision, such as determining if suppliers can produce military subsystems in a production environment. However, the program office will have less knowledge about the reliability and performance of the KC-46 than planned because of reduced testing prior to the decision. While this increases the risk of discovering costly problems late in development, contract provisions specify that Boeing must correct these at no cost to the government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force ensure that key aerial refueling capabilities are demonstrated prior to holding the production decision. The Air Force concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-757 | gao_GAO-10-757_0 | Also, we determined the status of corrective actions by Treasury and OMB to address open recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the CFS detailed in our previous reports. In our audit report on the fiscal year 2009 CFS, which is included in the fiscal year 2009 Financial Report of the United States Government (Financial Report), we discussed the material weaknesses related to the federal government’s processes used to prepare the CFS. These material weaknesses contributed to our disclaimer of opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements and our conclusion that the federal government did not have effective internal control over financial reporting. We performed our audit of the fiscal years 2009 and 2008 CFS in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Specifically, we found that SOPs were missing or inadequate in five key areas: (1) restatements and changes in accounting principles, (2) summary of significant accounting policies, (3) social insurance, (4) legal contingencies, and (5) analytical procedures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help assure that prior period adjustments are properly identified and reported in the CFS, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary to enhance the SOP entitled “Analyzing Agency Restatements” to (1) fully document all procedures related to identifying, analyzing, and reporting restated closing package data as well as changes in accounting principles; (2) clarify who is responsible for performing the procedures contained in the SOP; and (3) include procedures for analyzing the overall impact of entities’ restatements on the CFS and documenting the analysis and related conclusion. Of the 44 recommendations that are listed in appendix I, 2 were closed and 42 remained open as of February 19, 2010, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2009 CFS. Agency Comments
OMB Comments
In oral comments on a draft of this report, OMB stated that it concurred with the new findings and related recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS
Recommendation
GAO-04-45 (results of the fiscal year 2002 audit)
As the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is designing its new financial statement compilation process to begin with the fiscal year 2004 CFS, the Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to develop reconciliation procedures that will aid in understanding and controlling the net position balance as well as eliminate the plugs previously associated with compiling the CFS. Treasury should explain and document the differences between the operating revenue amount reported on the Statement of Operations and Changes in Net Position and unified budget receipts reported on the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities. OMB and Treasury continue to work toward establishing effective processes and procedures for identifying, resolving, and explaining material differences in net outlays and other components of the deficit between Treasury’s central accounting records and information reported in entity financial statements and underlying entity financial information and records. However, Treasury’s process did not ensure that the information in the remaining three principal financial statements was fully consistent with the underlying information in federal entities’ audited financial statements and other financial data. The federal government was unable to provide us with adequate legal representation regarding the accrual-based consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2009. Treasury is currently revising its internal control procedures to formalize monitoring and assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over the preparation of the CFS. The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of OMB, to develop, document, and implement processes and procedures for preparing and reviewing the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and “The Federal Government’s Financial Health: A Citizen’s Guide to the Financial Report of the United States Government” sections of the Financial Report of the U.S. Government (Financial Report) to help assure that information reported in these sections is complete, accurate, and consistent with related information reported elsewhere in the Financial Report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), material weaknesses in internal control and other limitations on the scope of GAO's work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the consolidated financial statements, other than the Statement of Social Insurance (accrual-based consolidated financial statements). The Department of the Treasury (Treasury), in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is responsible for preparing the CFS. As part of the fiscal year 2009 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in Treasury's processes used to prepare the CFS that warrant management's attention and corrective action. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details on new control deficiencies GAO identified during its audit of the fiscal year 2009 CFS that related to the preparation of the CFS, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions taken to address GAO's previous 44 recommendations in this area.
What GAO Found
During its audit of the fiscal year 2009 CFS, GAO identified continuing and new control deficiencies in the federal government's processes used to prepare the CFS. The control deficiencies GAO identified involved 1) enhancing policies and procedures for identifying and analyzing federal entities' reported restatements and changes in accounting principles; 2) establishing and documenting policies and procedures for disclosing significant accounting policies and related party transactions; 3) establishing and documenting procedures to assure the accuracy of Treasury staff's work in three areas: (1) social insurance, (2) legal contingencies, and (3) analytical procedures; and 4) various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits. These control deficiencies contribute to material weaknesses in internal control over the federal government's ability to (1) adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; (2) ensure that the accrual-based consolidated financial statements were consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and (3) identify and either resolve or explain material differences between components of the budget deficit reported in Treasury's records, which are used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and related amounts reported in federal entities' financial statements and underlying financial information and records. As a result of these and other material weaknesses, the federal government did not have effective internal control over financial reporting. Of the 44 open recommendations GAO reported in April 2009, 2 were closed and 42 remained open as of February 19, 2010, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2009 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 10 new recommendations as well as the 42 open recommendations from prior years.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 10 new recommendations to Treasury to address control deficiencies identified during the fiscal year 2009 CFS audit related to the processes used to prepare the CFS. In commenting on GAO's draft report, Treasury and OMB stated that they concurred with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-14-688 | gao_GAO-14-688_0 | DHS Processes for Evaluating Training Programs Could Be Better Documented and More Reliably Capture Costs
DHS components have documented processes in place for evaluating their training programs and have used evaluation feedback to improve their training offerings; however, their documented processes varied on the extent to which selected attributes of an effective training evaluation process were included. Further, DHS identified opportunities for efficiencies and cost savings, but varying approaches for capturing training costs across the department affect DHS’s ability to reliably capture and track its training costs department-wide. However, at DHS headquarters and at the component level, there are inconsistencies in how training costs are captured across the department that have made it a challenge to accurately and reliably capture these costs across DHS. Variations in the methods used to collect data can greatly affect the analysis of uniform, high-quality data on the cost and delivery of training and development programs. DHS Is Implementing a Department-wide Leader Development Framework, but Could Strengthen Its Program Assessment
DHS’s Leader Development Program Office is in the process of implementing a department-wide, five-tier Leader Development Framework to build leadership skills across all staff levels. However, the LDP Office could strengthen its performance measurement efforts by clearly identifying its program goals and better incorporating key attributes of successful performance measures we have previously identified. However, the LDP Office has not clearly identified goals for the program, and the 12 measures that the office has developed to assess its performance do not consistently exhibit attributes we have previously identified as key for successful measurement. By updating DHS components’ documented training evaluation processes to more fully address key attributes for effective training evaluation, DHS components could have better assurance that the components have more complete information to guide their efforts in conducting effective evaluations. Further, given limited budgetary resources, by identifying existing challenges that prevent DHS from accurately capturing its training costs department-wide and, to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs, implementing corrective measures to overcome these challenges, DHS could improve its awareness about the actual costs of its training programs, and enhance its ability to consistently and reliably capture training costs DHS-wide, thereby enhancing its resource stewardship. As DHS begins to assess the impact of the LDP program, clearly identifying LDP goals and ensuring that LDP performance measures possess key attributes, including (1) linkage to the program’s goals, (2) clarity, and (3) measurable targets by which to assess the measures could help provide DHS with the actionable information it needs to identify and make program improvements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure effective evaluation of federal training programs and enhance DHS’s stewardship of resources for federal training programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: direct DHS components to ensure that their documented training evaluation processes fully address attributes for effective training evaluation processes as they are drafted, updated, or revised and identify existing challenges that prevent DHS from accurately capturing training costs department-wide and, to the extent that the benefits of addressing those challenges exceed the costs, implement corrective measures to overcome these challenges. To address the first question, regarding the extent to which DHS has documented processes to evaluate training and development programs, and ensure training costs are reliably captured, we reviewed DHS and component-specific documents and interviewed relevant officials at DHS OCHCO and each of the components. Appendix II: Presence of Effective Training Attributes in DHS’s Documented Training Evaluation Processes
Establishes goals about what the training program is supposed to achieve
Component U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Coast Guard Transportation Security Administration (TSA)Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
Explains how the evaluation results will be used . | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is the third-largest cabinet-level department in the federal government, with over 230,000 employees doing diverse jobs. To fulfill its complex mission, DHS's workforce must have the necessary skills and expertise. GAO previously reported on DHS's hiring and recruiting efforts. GAO was asked to assess DHS's training practices.
This report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has documented processes to evaluate training and reliably capture costs and (2) the extent to which DHS measures the performance of its leader development programs. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed documented training evaluation processes, training cost data from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, and leadership training programs. GAO also interviewed training officials at the department level and at the five DHS components selected for this review about their varieties of training and development programs. Information from these components cannot be generalized to all of DHS, but provides insights.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has processes to evaluate training, track resources, and assess leader development. However, various actions could better position the department to maximize the impact of its training efforts.
Training evaluation: All five DHS components in GAO's review—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center—have a documented process to evaluate their training programs. Their documented processes fully included three of six attributes of effective training evaluation processes identifying goals, programs to evaluate, and how results are to be used. However, the documented processes did not consistently include the other three attributes: methodology, timeframes, and roles and responsibilities (see table). By updating documentation to address these attributes, DHS components would have more complete information to guide its efforts in conducting effective evaluations.
Capturing training cost: DHS identified efficiencies and cost savings for delivering a number of training programs. However, different methods are used for capturing training costs across the department, which poses challenges for reliably capturing these costs across DHS. Components capture training costs differently, contributing to inconsistencies in training costs captured across DHS. Variation in methods used to collect data can affect the reliability and quality of DHS-wide training program costs. However, DHS has not identified all challenges that contribute to these inconsistencies. DHS could improve its awareness about the costs of training programs DHS-wide and thereby enhance its resource stewardship by identifying existing challenges that prevent DHS from accurately capturing training costs and implementing corrective measures.
Leader development: DHS's Leader Development Program (LDP) Office is in the process of implementing a department-wide framework to build leadership skills. However, the LDP Office has not clearly identified program goals and the measures it uses to assess program effectiveness do not exhibit some attributes that GAO previously identified as key for successful performance measurement. These include linkage of performance measures to the program's goals, clarity, and establishment of measurable targets to assess the measures. By clearly identifying program goals and incorporating key attributes, the LDP could better ensure actionable information for identifying and making program improvements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS update its documentation to fully reflect key attributes of an effective evaluation, identify challenges to and corrective measures for capturing training costs department-wide, and clearly identify LDP goals and ensure that LDP performance measures reflect key attributes. DHS concurred and identified actions to address our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-473T | gao_GAO-04-473T_0 | In fiscal year 2003, GAO served the Congress and the American people by helping to identify steps to reduce improper payments and credit card fraud in government programs; restructure government and improve its processes and systems to maximize homeland security; prepare the financial markets to continue operations if terrorism update and strengthen government auditing standards; improve the administration of Medicare as it undergoes reform; encourage and help guide federal agency transformations; contribute to congressional oversight of the federal income tax system; identify human capital reforms needed at the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and other federal agencies; raise the visibility of long-term financial commitments and imbalances in the federal budget; reduce security risks to information systems supporting the nation’s critical infrastructures; oversee programs to protect the health and safety of today’s workers; ensure the accountability of federal agencies through audits and serve as a model for other federal agencies by modernizing our approaches to managing and compensating our people. In fiscal year 2003, our work generated $35.4 billion in financial benefits— a $78 return on every dollar appropriated to GAO. The funds made available in response to our work may be used to reduce government expenditures or reallocated by the Congress to other priority areas. Many of the benefits that flow to the American people from our work cannot be measured in dollar terms. This is especially important in light of the nation’s large and growing long- term fiscal imbalance. The following figure highlights, by GAO’s three external strategic goals for serving the Congress, examples of issues on which we testified during fiscal year 2003. Maximizing GAO’s Effectiveness, Responsiveness, and Value
The results of our work were possible, in part, because of the changes we have made to maximize the value of GAO. With the Congress’s support, we have demonstrated that becoming world class does not require substantial staffing increases, but rather maximizing the efficient and effective use of the resources available to us. We are grateful to the Congress for supporting our efforts through pending legislation that, if passed, would give us additional human capital flexibilities that will allow us, among other things, to move to an even more performance-based compensation system and help to better position GAO for the future. GAO’s Fiscal Year 2005 Request to Support the Congress
GAO is requesting budget authority of $486 million for fiscal year 2005. This fiscal year 2005 budget request represents a modest increase of 4.9 percent over our fiscal year 2004 projected operating level, primarily to fund mandatory pay and related costs and estimated inflationary increases. The funding we received in fiscal year 2004 is allowing us to conduct work that addressed many difficult issues confronting the nation. In keeping with my strong belief that the federal government needs to exercise fiscal discipline, our budget request for fiscal year 2005 is modest, but would maintain our ability to provide first class, effective, and efficient support to the Congress and the nation to meet 21st century challenges in these critical times. Enhancing Quality of Care in Nursing Homes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. In the years ahead, its support to the Congress will likely prove even more critical because of the pressures created by the nation's large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance, which is driven primarily by known demographic and rising health care trends. These pressures will require the Congress to make tough choices regarding what the government does, how it does business, and who will do the government's business in the future. GAO's work covers virtually every area in which the federal government is or may become involved, anywhere in the world. Perhaps just as importantly, GAO's work sometimes leads it to sound the alarm over problems looming just beyond the horizon--such as the nation's enormous long-term fiscal challenges--and help policymakers address these challenges in a timely and informed manner. The Comptroller General presented testimony that focused on GAO's progress during his first five years in office. He highlighted GAO's (1) fiscal year 2003 performance and results; (2) efforts to maximize its effectiveness, responsiveness, and value; and (3) budget request for fiscal year 2005 to support the Congress and serve the American people.
What GAO Found
The funding GAO received in fiscal year 2003 allowed it to conduct work that addressed many of the difficult issues confronting the nation, including diverse and diffuse security threats, selected government transformation challenges, and the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance. Its work was also driven by changing demographic trends, which led it to focus on such areas as the quality of care in the nation's nursing homes and the risks to the government's single-employer pension insurance program. Importantly, in fiscal year 2003, GAO generated a $78 return for each $1 appropriated to the agency. With the Congress's support, GAO demonstrated that becoming world class does not require a substantial increase in the number of staff authorized, but rather maximizing the efficient and effective use of the resources available to it. During tight budget times, human capital flexibilities would allow GAO, among other things, more options to deal with mandatory pay and related costs. In keeping with the Comptroller's belief that the federal government needs to exercise a greater degree of fiscal discipline, GAO has kept its request to $486 million, an increase of only 4.9 percent over fiscal year 2004. In keeping with the Congress's intent, GAO is continuing its efforts to revamp its budget presentation to make the linkages between funding and program areas more clear. Hopefully in the future the Congress will be able to use such performance information to make tough choices on funding, thereby enabling it to avoid across-the-board reductions that penalize agencies that exercise fiscal discipline and generate high returns on investment and real results. |
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