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gao_GAO-08-228T | gao_GAO-08-228T_0 | In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. State’s Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, and Interagency Support
S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and inconsistent guidance on roles and responsibilities for S/CRS and other State bureaus and offices; the lack of a common definition for stability and reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency collaboration; and some partners have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would be responsible for developing U.S. government policies that integrate civilian and military plans and for mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Further, some interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces Significant Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning
DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach to stability operations but has encountered challenges in several areas. Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing working groups and other outreach efforts to include non-DOD organizations in the development of a wide range of military plans that combatant commanders routinely develop, but these efforts have had a limited effect because of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of all organizations involved. Specific Challenges Hinder DOD’s Ability to Develop Capabilities and Encourage Interagency Participation in Combatant Command Planning Efforts
We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may hinder DOD’s ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in the routine planning activities at the combatant commands. The department recognizes the importance of successfully completing these capability assessments, and in the August 2006 report on stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary stated that the department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD’s stability operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the department. DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness. First, DOD has not provided specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate planning with non- DOD organizations. DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans. State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals
Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises. Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps; Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept
To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian response capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing three corps of civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction operations. Conclusions
State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better coordinate stability and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to successfully integrate planning for potential future operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy for coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian capabilities. GAO's statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD stability operations and preliminary observations related to State's interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities.
What GAO Found
State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework's planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework's effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination. DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement efforts. Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies face challenges in establishing two of these units--the Active Response Corps and Standby Response Corps--because of staffing and resource constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of missions these personnel would be deployed to support. |
gao_GAO-08-52 | gao_GAO-08-52_0 | According to DOD, the four management systems, collectively, are the means by which the department—and its components—selects, controls, and evaluates its business systems investments. According to DOD, in 2005 it also adopted a tiered accountability approach to business transformation. However, while Air Force has established the basic management structures needed to effectively manage its IT projects as investments, it has not fully implemented many of the related policies and procedures outlined in our ITIM framework. Relative to its business system investments, Air Force has implemented three of nine practices that call for project-level structures, policies, and procedures, and has not defined any of the five practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures. Air Force officials stated that they are aware of the absence of documented policies and procedures, and they are currently working on guidance to address these areas. Until Air Force has fully defined policies and procedures for both individual projects and the portfolio of projects, it risks selecting and controlling these business system investments in an inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc manner, which in turn could reduce the chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most effective manner. ITIM Stage 2 critical processes include (1) defining investment board operations, (2) identifying the business needs for each investment, (3) developing a basic process for selecting new proposals and reselecting ongoing investments, (4) developing project-level investment control processes, and (5) collecting information about existing investments to inform investment management decisions. Air Force officials stated that they are aware of the absence of documented procedures in certain areas of project-level management, and plan to issue new policies and procedures addressing these areas by December 2007. According to Air Force officials, this guidance is expected to be completed and approved by December 2007. Analyzing, selecting, and maintaining business system investment portfolios. Regarding our recommendation that DOD direct Air Force to ensure that the well-defined and disciplined business system investment management policies and procedures also include portfolio-level management policies and procedures, the department stated that DOD Instruction 8115.02 defines the DOD IT portfolio management process, which Air Force is applying in its decisionmaking. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the investment management approach of the Department of the Air Force (a major Department of Defense (DOD) component) is consistent with leading investment management best practices. Our analysis was based on the best practices contained in GAO’s Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) framework and the framework’s associated evaluation methodology, and focused on Air Force’s establishment of policies and procedures for business system investments needed to assist organizations in complying with the investment management provisions of the Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996 (Stages 2 and 3). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high-risk" and continues to do so today. In 2004, Congress passed legislation reflecting prior GAO recommendations that DOD adopt a corporate approach to information technology (IT) business systems investment management including tiered accountability for business systems at the department and component levels. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's efforts, GAO assessed whether the investment management approach of one of DOD's components--the Department of the Air Force (Air Force)--is consistent with leading investment management best practices. In doing so, GAO applied its IT Investment Management (ITIM) framework and associated methodology, focusing on the stages related to the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.
What GAO Found
The Air Force has established the basic management structures needed to effectively manage its IT projects as investments, but has not fully implemented many of the related policies and procedures outlined in GAO's ITIM framework. Air Force has fully implemented three of the nine key practices that call for project-level management structures, policies, and procedures, and has not implemented any of the five practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures. Regarding project-level practices, it has established an IT investment board that is responsible for defining and implementing the department's business systems investment governance process, has developed procedures for identifying and collecting information about its business systems to support investment selection and control, and has assigned responsibility for ensuring that the information collected during project identification meets the needs of the investment management process. However, Air Force has not fully documented business systems investment policies and procedures for directing investment board operations, selecting new investments, reselecting ongoing investments, or integrating the investment funding and investment selection processes. In addition, it has not implemented any of the policies and procedures for developing and maintaining a complete business system investment portfolio. Air Force officials stated that they are aware of the absence of documented policies and procedures in certain areas of project-level and portfolio-level management and that they are currently working on guidance to address these areas. For example, officials stated that they had begun drafting portfolio-level policies and procedures. According to Air Force officials, the policies and procedures are expected to be completed and approved by December 2007. Until Air Force fully defines policies and procedures for both individual projects and portfolios of projects, it risks not being able to select and control these business system investments in a way that is consistent and complete, which in turn increases the chances that these investments will not meet mission needs in the most effective manner. |
gao_HEHS-95-133 | gao_HEHS-95-133_0 | Most Studies Conclude Illegal Aliens Generate More in Costs Than in Revenues
The literature on the public fiscal impact of illegal aliens reflects considerable agreement among researchers that illegal aliens are a net cost, though the magnitude of the cost is a subject of continued debate. Only 3 of the 13 studies estimated the fiscal impact of all illegal aliens in the United States on all levels of government. For these reasons, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the actual national net cost of illegal aliens. Studies’ Estimates of Net Costs Vary Considerably
Donald Huddle estimated that the national net cost of illegal aliens to federal, state, and local governments was $11.9 billion in 1992. The net cost estimates in each of the national studies are derived from three major components: (1) the direct costs of providing public benefits and services to illegal aliens, (2) displacement costs—the costs of providing various types of public assistance to U.S. citizens displaced from their jobs by illegal aliens, and (3) public revenues attributable to illegal aliens. The variation in the studies reflects an absence of clear standards for determining the items that are appropriate to include in such estimates. Why National Estimates Vary
A relatively small number of costs and revenues account for much of the variation in the estimates of the national net cost of illegal aliens. Obtaining better data on the illegal alien population and providing clearer explanations of which costs and revenues are appropriate to include would help improve the usefulness of the national estimates. Clearer explanations of which costs and revenues are appropriate to include would also help improve the usefulness of the estimates. The estimate does not include this item. 1-5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the costs of providing benefits and services to illegal aliens, focusing on: (1) current estimates of the national net costs of illegal aliens to all levels of government; (2) the variation in these estimates; and (3) areas in which the estimates could be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) illegal aliens in the United States generate more in costs than revenues to federal, state, and local governments combined; (2) estimates of the national net cost of illegal aliens vary greatly, ranging from $2 billion to $19 billion; (3) a great deal of uncertainty remains about the national fiscal impact of illegal aliens, because little data exists on illegal aliens' use of public services and tax payments; (4) displacement costs and revenue estimates account for much of the variation in the estimates of the national net costs of illegal aliens; (5) the estimates are difficult to assess because the studies do not always clearly explain the criteria used to determine which costs and revenues are appropriate to include in the estimates; and (6) the cost estimates could be improved by recognizing the difficulties inherent in collecting data on a hidden population, focusing on key characteristics of illegal aliens, and explaining more clearly which costs and revenues are appropriate to include in such estimates. |
gao_NSIAD-98-245 | gao_NSIAD-98-245_0 | EOP-Wide Procedures for Acquiring SCI Access Should Be More Specific
The EOP Security Officer told us that, for the period January 1993 until June 1996, (1) he could not find any EOP-wide procedures for acquiring access to SCI for the White House Office, the Office of Policy Development, the Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council, and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for which the former White House Security Office provided security support and (2) there were no EOP-wide procedures for acquiring access to SCI for the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Office of Administration for which the EOP Security Office provides security support. EOP Has Not Established Procedures for Safeguarding SCI Material
The EOP-wide security procedures issued in March 1998 do not set forth security practices EOP offices are to follow in safeguarding classified information. In contrast, the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of the Vice President had issued office-specific security procedures that deal with safeguarding SCI material. The remaining seven EOP offices that did not have office-specific procedures for safeguarding SCI and other classified information stated that they rely on Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/19 for direction on such matters. Neither the EOP Security Office nor the security staff of the nine EOP offices we reviewed have conducted security self-inspections as described in the order. EOP officials pointed out that security personnel routinely conduct daily desk, safe, and other security checks to ensure that SCI and other classified information is properly safeguarded. These same officials also emphasized the importance and security value in having within each EOP office experienced security staff responsible for safeguarding classified information. Information Security Oversight Office Has Not Conducted Security Inspections of EOP Activities
Executive Order 12958 gives the Director, Information Security Oversight Office, authority to conduct on-site reviews of each agency’s classified programs. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office said his office has never conducted an on-site security inspection of EOP classified programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Executive Office of the President (EOP) has established procedures for: (1) acquiring personnel access to classified intelligence information, specifically sensitive compartmented information (SCI); and (2) safeguarding such information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the EOP Security Officer told GAO that, for the period January 1993 until June 1996: (a) he could not find any EOP-wide procedures for acquiring access to SCI for the White House Office, the Office of Policy Development, the Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for which the former White House Security Office provided security support; and (b) there were no EOP-wide procedures for acquiring access to SCI for the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the Office of Administration for which the EOP security office provides security support; (2) the EOP-wide security procedures issued in March 1998 do not set forth security practices EOP offices are to follow in safeguarding classified information; (3) in contrast, the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of the Vice President had issued office-specific security procedures that deal with safeguarding SCI material; (4) the remaining seven EOP offices that did not have office-specific procedures for safeguarding SCI and other classified information stated that they rely on Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/19 for direction on such matters; (5) neither the EOP Security Office nor the security staff of the nine EOP offices GAO reviewed have conducted security self-inspections as described in Executive Order 12958; (6) EOP officials pointed out that security personnel routinely conduct daily desk, safe, and other security checks to ensure that SCI and other classified information is properly safeguarded; (7) these same officials also emphasized the importance and security value in having within each EOP office experienced security staff responsible for safeguarding classified information; (8) Executive Order 12958 gives the Director, Information Security Oversight Office, authority to conduct on-site reviews of each agency's classified programs; and (9) the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office said his office has never conducted an on-site security inspection of EOP classified programs. |
gao_GAO-06-216T | gao_GAO-06-216T_0 | NASA’s Long-standing Financial Management Challenges Threaten the Agency’s Ability to Manage Its Programs and Produce Auditable Financial Statements
NASA has fundamental problems with its financial management operations that not only affect its ability to externally report reliable information, but more importantly, hamper its ability to effectively manage and oversee its major programs, such as the space station and shuttle program. Since 1990, we have identified NASA’s contract management as a high-risk area. NASA Lacks the Systems, Processes, and Human Capital Needed to Effectively Manage Its Programs
As currently designed, NASA’s financial management system has not addressed many of the agency’s most significant program management challenges—including improving contract management and producing credible cost estimates. In fact, as part of its report disclaiming an opinion on NASA’s fiscal year 2004 financial statements, NASA’s independent auditor reported that the core financial module was unable to (1) produce transaction-level detail in support of financial statement account balances, (2) identify adjustments or correcting entries, and (3) correctly and consistently post transactions to the right accounts. First, it illustrates the shortcomings of NASA’s financial management system and NASA’s ongoing struggle to provide transaction-level support for key account balances. As discussed previously, NASA did not use IEMP as an opportunity to transform the way it does business and instead, NASA automated many of its existing, ineffective business processes—including its process for recording PP&E and material in its general ledger. While Most Agencies Receive Unqualified Opinions on Their Financial Statements, Systems Modernization Continues to be a Challenge
The problems experienced by NASA in its effort to reform its financial management organization and implement a modern, integrated financial management system are not uncommon. The federal government has spent billions of dollars developing and implementing financial management systems throughout federal agencies. However, many of these efforts have exceeded budgeted cost and scheduled delivery dates without providing the anticipated system functionality. Similarly, many of NASA’s financial management problems outlined in our testimony are the result of an undisciplined, ineffective requirements management process—including the failure of NASA’s financial management system to (1) post transactions to the right accounts, (2) properly identify adjustment or correcting entries, and (3) provide the information program managers and cost estimators need to monitor contractor performance and produce credible cost estimates. NASA Has Begun Taking Steps to Implement Some of Our Recommendations for IEMP, but Progress Is Slow
Our related report, released today, details our assessment of NASA’s progress toward implementing our prior recommendations related to IEMP. Clear, strong executive leadership will be critical for ensuring that NASA’s financial management organization delivers the kind of analysis and forward-looking information that the agency needs to effectively manage its many complex programs. To be effective, such leadership must also combine with effective organizational alignment, strategic human capital management, and end-to-end business process improvement. The challenges that NASA faces in reforming its financial management operations are daunting, but not insurmountable. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress asked GAO to testify on the status of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) financial management reform efforts. NASA faces major financial management challenges that, if not addressed, will weaken its ability to manage its highly complex programs. NASA has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1990 because of its failure to effectively oversee its contracts, due in part to the agency's lack of accurate and reliable information on contract spending. GAO's statement focuses on (1) NASA's key financial management challenges, (2) how NASA's financial management challenges compare with other federal agencies, (3) GAO's assessment of NASA's progress toward implementing recommendations aimed at improving its financial management system, and (4) the steps NASA must take to reform its financial management organization. In its related report, released today, GAO recommends that NASA develop an integrated enterprise master schedule and milestones--including improvement activities and plans, dates for completion, performance measures, and clear accountability.
What GAO Found
NASA's new core financial management system has not addressed many of the agency's most significant management challenges--including improving contract management, producing credible cost estimates, and producing auditable financial statements. Because NASA did not use disciplined acquisition and implementation practices, the new system lacks basic functionality--such as the ability to (1) produce transaction-level support for key account balances, (2) properly identify adjustments or correcting entries, and (3) correctly and consistently post transactions to the right accounts. In addition, NASA did not use the implementation of its new system as an opportunity to transform its operations and instead, automated many of its existing, ineffective processes. Compounding its existing problems, NASA also failed to recognize the importance and need for highly skilled, well-trained financial personnel. Most federal agencies have been able to obtain unqualified audit opinions, while NASA's financial statements remain unauditable. However, the problems experienced by NASA in its effort to reform its financial management organization and implement a modern, integrated financial management system are not uncommon among federal agencies. In fact, many federal financial system modernization efforts have exceeded budgeted cost and scheduled delivery dates without providing the anticipated system functionality. GAO's related report, released today, details NASA's progress toward implementing prior recommendations related to its financial management system. Overall progress has been slow, but in some areas NASA is beginning to take steps toward improvements. To its credit, NASA has recognized the need to enhance the capabilities and improve the functioning of its core financial management system. Strong executive leadership will be critical for ensuring that NASA's financial management organization delivers the kind of analysis and forward-looking information it needs to effectively manage its many complex programs. Such leadership must be combined with effective organizational alignment, strategic human capital management, and end-to-end business process reform. |
gao_GGD-98-36 | gao_GGD-98-36_0 | The RFA requires agencies to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for each draft rule, unless the head of the agency certifies in the Federal Register that “the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” If a draft rule is expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, agencies must publish their initial regulatory flexibility analysis, or a summary of it, in the Federal Register when they publish the proposed rule. To determine whether the EPA and OSHA panels, the regulatory agencies themselves, and SBA’s Chief Counsel for Advocacy followed the advocacy review panel procedural requirements and whether there were differences in how the panels were conducted, we interviewed (1) selected officials from EPA, OSHA, SBA’s Office of Advocacy, and OIRA who participated in the panels that had been convened as of November 1, 1997, and (2) 32 of the 63 small entity representatives who were identified by the agencies and were asked to provide advice and recommendations to the panels. Whether EPA Should Have Convened Additional Advocacy Review Panels Is Unclear
We reviewed a total of 19 notices of proposed rulemaking that EPA and OSHA published (17 and 2 notices, respectively) during the first year’s implementation of SBREFA’s advocacy review panel requirements. SBA’s Chief Counsel for Advocacy agreed with OSHA’s certifications that neither of its two proposed rules required an advocacy review panel. EPA convened panels between June 1996 and November 1, 1997, to review the following four draft rules: (1) control of emissions of air pollution from nonroad diesel engines (Mar. The EPA and OSHA panels, the regulatory agencies themselves, and the SBA Chief Counsel for Advocacy generally followed SBREFA’s procedural requirements in these five panels, as shown in the examples below. Implementation of the Panels Differed
Although the five advocacy review panels convened as of November 1, 1997, generally followed SBREFA’s procedural requirements, there were differences among the panels in how those requirements were implemented and in the general operation of the panels. Some of those differences appeared to occur because the panel process was new and evolving, and the panels made adjustments to their procedures as they gained experience. In the five panels convened as of November 1, 1997, EPA and OSHA provided the small entity representatives with information about the draft rules before the representatives provided input to the panels. The SBA Chief Counsel for Advocacy and some small entity representatives believe that EPA should have convened advocacy review panels for two rules for which advocacy review panels were not held. EPA and three of the five panels that were held did not meet some of the specific time requirements of the statute. Many of the suggestions that small entity representatives made regarding the panel process would not require changes to SBREFA. Selected EPA- and OSHA-Proposed Rules for Which Panels Were Not Held
This appendix lists the proposed rules that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published under notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register during the first year’s implementation of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) advocacy review panel process. EPA and OSHA did not convene advocacy review panels for these proposed rules because they certified that the rules would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) implementation of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act's (SBREFA) advocacy review panel requirements, focusing on: (1) whether EPA and OSHA had applied the advocacy review panel requirements to all rules that they proposed between June 28, 1996, and June 28, 1997, that may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (2) whether the EPA and OSHA panels, the regulatory agencies themselves, and SBA's Chief Counsel for Advocacy followed the statute's procedural requirements for panels convened between June 28, 1996, and November 1, 1997, and whether there were differences among the panels in how the statute's requirements were implemented; (3) the changes, if any, that EPA and OSHA made to notices of proposed rulemaking as a result of the panels' recommendations; and (4) any suggestions that EPA and OSHA agency officials and small entity representatives may have regarding how the advocacy review panel process could be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the first year of the SBREFA advocacy review panel requirements' implementation, OSHA convened a panel for one draft rule and published two other proposed rules for which panels were not held; (2) the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Chief Counsel for Advocacy agreed with OSHA's certification that neither of these two proposed rules required an advocacy review panel; (3) as of November 1, 1997, EPA had convened advocacy review panels for four draft rules; (4) EPA published 17 other proposed rules during the first year of the panel requirements that were reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and for which panels were not held because EPA certified that the proposed rules would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (5) the Chief Counsel said EPA should have convened panels for 2 of these 17 proposed rules; (6) it is unclear whether EPA should have convened panels for these rules because there are no criteria for determining whether a draft rule will have an impact on small entities; (7) EPA and OSHA panels, the regulatory agencies themselves, and the SBA Chief Counsel for Advocacy generally followed SBREFA's advocacy review panel procedural requirements in the five panels that had been convened as of November 1, 1997; (8) however, the panels did not meet some of the specific deadlines that SBREFA established; (9) there were some differences in how the five panels were conducted; (10) some of these differences appeared to occur because the panel process is new and evolving; however, the panels have made adjustments to their procedures as they have gained experience; (11) the five panels' recommendations to the regulatory agency heads focused on the agencies' consideration of additional regulatory alternatives and clarification of what the draft rules would require; (12) as of November 1, 1997, EPA and OSHA each had published one notice of proposed rulemaking for which they had convened advocacy review panels; (13) the agencies primarily responded to the panels' recommendations in the preambles of those notices, soliciting public comments on issues that the panels had recommended; and (14) many of the small entity representatives that GAO interviewed suggested ways to improve the panel process. |
gao_GAO-16-819 | gao_GAO-16-819_0 | 1). Awards for such projects grew from about $76 million in fiscal year 2010 to nearly $432 million in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. Minimum reporting requirements for project final reports. USAID and Implementing Partners Have Established Processes for Monitoring Cash and Voucher Projects
USAID has established a process for monitoring implementation of EFSP cash transfer and food voucher projects by assigning monitoring roles and responsibilities to headquarters and in-country mission staff, developing country monitoring plans, and developing tools to assist its field staff. To ensure that assistance is delivered according to their procedures and to the targeted beneficiaries, implementing partners monitor distributions and interview beneficiaries about the distribution process. In addition, implementing partners conduct postdistribution surveys to gather information about the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the assistance. While most of the 14 final reports that we reviewed included most of the required data on project beneficiaries, only 1 report, for a food voucher project in Sudan, included all 12 data elements required by USAID; the other reports lacked up to 8 of the required elements. USAID’s Current Indicators for Assessing Cash and Voucher Projects’ Timeliness, Cost- Effectiveness, and Appropriateness Have Weaknesses
USAID’s indicators for measuring cash transfer and food voucher projects’ timeliness, cost-effectiveness, and appropriateness have weaknesses that limit the agency’s ability to evaluate these aspects of projects’ performance. Further, USAID does not have a benchmark for the market appropriateness indicators that measure the impact of cash or voucher assistance on local markets. According to federal standards for internal control, management should use quality information, including relevant data from reliable sources, to achieve an agency’s objectives. USAID’s Indicator for Cost- Effectiveness Does Not Produce Comparable Data
The indicator that USAID uses to measure the cost-effectiveness of cash transfer and food voucher projects does not include a standardized unit for measuring cost. According to WFP officials, WFP may also change the assistance modality as a result of price fluctuations. In addition, weaknesses in USAID’s indicators for measuring EFSP cash transfer and food voucher projects’ timeliness, cost, and appropriateness—criteria that USAID considers in approving the projects—limit the extent to which reported data can demonstrate the effectiveness of such projects and be used to evaluate the performance of cash and vouchers relative to in-kind food aid. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen USAID’s monitoring and evaluation of cash transfer and food voucher projects and help ensure improved program oversight of these projects, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following two actions:
Take steps to ensure that final reports submitted for cash transfer and food voucher projects comply with USAID’s minimum data requirements. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) examine the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) and implementing partners’ processes for monitoring cash transfer and food voucher projects; (2) analyze the extent to which monitoring data that partners reported to USAID can be used to evaluate the performance of such projects; and (3) review studies that examined the relative impacts of cash transfers, food vouchers, and food transfers on food security outcomes and the relative cost of these modalities. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than 60 years, the United States provided assistance to food-insecure countries primarily in the form of food commodities procured in the United States and transported overseas. In recent years, the U.S. government has increasingly provided food assistance in the form of cash transfers or food vouchers. In fiscal years 2010 through 2015, USAID funding for Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) for cash transfers and food voucher projects grew from about $76 million to nearly $432 million.
GAO was asked to review USAID's monitoring and evaluation of cash-based food assistance. This report examines, among other things, (1) USAID's and implementing partners' processes for monitoring cash transfer and food voucher projects and (2) the extent to which monitoring data reported to USAID can be used to evaluate the performance of such projects. GAO analyzed program data, interviewed relevant officials; and conducted fieldwork in Kenya and Liberia, selected on the basis of criteria such as funding and types of projects. GAO also reviewed the final reports for a nonprobability sample of closed cash transfer and food voucher projects.
What GAO Found
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have established processes to monitor cash transfer and food voucher projects. To monitor the implementation of these projects, USAID has assigned monitoring roles and responsibilities to staff, is developing country monitoring plans and monitoring tools, and is working to verify information that partners have provided through actions such as conducting site visits, and speaking with beneficiaries. To ensure that assistance is delivered according to their procedures and to the targeted beneficiaries, implementing partners monitor distributions, and interview beneficiaries regarding the distribution of the assistance. In addition, implementing partners conduct postdistribution surveys to gather information about the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of the assistance (see figure).
Incomplete reporting and weaknesses in certain performance indicators limit USAID's ability to use monitoring data to evaluate cash transfer and food voucher projects' performance. GAO's review of 14 final reports, which USAID requires for each project, found that a majority of the reports lacked required data elements, such as prices for key staple foods. Only 1 report included all 12 required data elements, and the other reports were missing up to 8 elements. As a result, USAID has limited ability to assess the overall performance of these projects. Further, GAO found weaknesses in USAID's indicators for measuring cash and voucher projects' timeliness, cost-effectiveness, and appropriateness. USAID's indicator for timeliness does not track delays in implementation. In addition, the indicator for cost-effectiveness does not include a standardized unit for measuring project costs. Further, the indicator for project appropriateness does not have associated benchmarks for measuring cash transfer and food voucher projects' impact on local markets. As a result, USAID lacks information that would be useful for evaluating the projects' effectiveness relative to that of in-kind food aid. According to standards for internal control in the federal government, management should use quality information, including relevant data from reliable sources, to achieve an agency's objectives.
What GAO Recommends
USAID should (1) take steps to ensure compliance with its requirements for data in final reports and (2) strengthen the indicators it uses to measure the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, and appropriateness of cash transfer and food voucher projects. USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-429 | gao_GAO-03-429_0 | 1.) 2.) 3.) Baby Boom and Generation X Workers Have More Assets and More Debt Than Current Retirees Had at Similar Ages
Baby Boom and Generation X households headed by individuals aged 25 to 34 have greater accumulated assets, adjusted for inflation, than current retirees had when they were the same age but they also have more debt. The modest increase in assets between the Baby Boom and Generation X can be accounted for in large part by the increase in the ownership and value of DC retirement accounts, because SCF data do not reflect the value of benefits from DB pension plans. Generation X and the Baby Boom Are Estimated to Have Similar Levels of Real Retirement Income, but Generation X Could Have Lower Replacement Rates
In our simulations, Generation X and the Baby Boom have similar levels of retirement income in real terms (adjusted for inflation). Social Security benefit levels for Generation X and the Baby Boom will depend on how the Social Security funding shortfall is resolved. The Distribution of Retirement Income Will Vary within Generations, and Certain Groups Will Be More Likely to Have Lower Retirement Incomes
Our simulations suggest that retirement income will vary significantly within both Generation X and the Baby Boom. Retirement income will also vary by demographic group, with income being lower for the less educated and single women. In comparison, married couples in the top 20 percent in terms of Social Security benefits receive about 31 percent of all Social Security benefits, while those in the bottom 20 percent receive about 10 percent. The percentage difference between those with pensions and without pensions is even larger for single persons. Again this is due to lower lifetime earnings and a lower rate of pension coverage. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To gain an understanding of what today’s workers might expect to receive in terms of retirement income, we compared the wealth of current workers with that of current retirees, at similar points in their lives, and estimated the pension and Social Security benefits that the Baby Boom and Generation X might receive. Analysis of Simulated Retirement Income
To analyze how workers from the Baby Boom and Generation X compare in terms of the retirement income they can expect to receive and the likely distribution across workers within the Baby Boom and Generation X, we simulated expected retirement income at age 62. Social Security: Program’s Role in Helping Ensure Income Adequacy. Social Security Reform: Implications for Private Pensions. Pension Plans: Characteristics of Persons in the Labor Force Without Pension Coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today's workers will rely to a large extent on Social Security, private pensions, and personal wealth for their retirement income. But some analysts question whether these sources will provide sufficient retirement income to maintain workers' standards of living once they leave the labor force. Indeed, the Social Security trust funds are projected to become exhausted in 2042, at which time, unless action is taken, Social Security will not be able to pay scheduled benefits in full. To gain an understanding of what today's workers might expect to receive in terms of retirement income, GAO was asked to examine (1) how the personal wealth of Baby Boom (born between 1946 and 1964) and Generation X (born between 1965 and 1976) workers compare with what current retirees had at similar ages, (2) how workers from the Baby Boom and Generation X compare in terms of the pension and Social Security benefits they can expect to receive, and (3) the likely distribution of pension and Social Security benefits across workers within the Baby Boom and Generation X.
What GAO Found
Baby Boom and Generation X households headed by an individual aged 25 to 34 have greater accumulated assets, adjusted for inflation, than current retirees had when they were the same age, but also more debt. Most of the large increase in assets between current retirees and the Baby Boom is due to increased ownership and equity in housing. Contributions to defined contribution pension plans play a role in explaining the modest increase in assets between the Baby Boom and Generation X, in part, because GAO's data do not allow it to consider the value of benefits from defined benefit pension plans. Workers from Generation X are estimated to have similar levels of retirement income in real terms (adjusted for inflation) at age 62 as their counterparts in the Baby Boom, but Generation X may be able to replace a smaller percentage of their pre-retirement income. Whether Social Security benefits for Generation X are higher or lower than those for the Baby Boom will depend on how the Social Security funding shortfall is resolved. With regard to pensions, Generation X and the Baby Boom are estimated to have similar levels of pension income even with a continued shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension coverage. Retirement income will vary within both Generation X and the Baby Boom households, and certain groups will be more likely to have lower retirement incomes. As one might expect, given significant variation in workers' earnings, if households were arrayed from lowest to highest in terms of estimated total retirement income, those in the top 20 percent would receive a substantially larger proportion of income compared with those in the bottom 20 percent. Retirement income is lower for the less educated and single women. |
gao_HEHS-97-46 | gao_HEHS-97-46_0 | DI and SSI are the two largest federal programs providing cash assistance to people with disabilities. The DI and SSI programs use the same statutory definition of disability. In addition, many technological and medical advances have created more opportunities for some individuals with disabilities to work. Weaknesses in the design and implementation of the DI and SSI programs, summarized in table 1, have impeded identifying and encouraging the productive capacities of those who might benefit from reasonable and appropriate rehabilitation and employment assistance. Social insurance disability programs in Germany and Sweden also invest in return-to-work efforts, and their experiences show that return-to-work strategies can be applied to government-scale programs that serve people with a wide range of work histories, job skills, and disabilities. Our analysis of practices advocated and implemented by the U.S. private sector and other countries reveals three common strategies in the design of their return-to-work programs. Disability managers emphasized that these return-to-work strategies are not independent of each other and are most effective when merged into a comprehensive return-to-work program. Return-to-work strategies and practices may potentially enhance federal disability programs by enabling beneficiaries to work and by helping to reduce program costs. In Germany and Sweden, laws and policies require that an individual’s potential for returning to work be assessed soon after the onset of a disabling condition. Setting return-to-work goals soon after the onset of disability and providing timely rehabilitation services are believed to be critical in encouraging workers with disabilities to return to the workplace as soon as possible. Conclusions
Return-to-work strategies used in the U.S. private sector and other countries reflect the expectation that people with disabilities can and do return to work. If even an additional 1 percent of the 6.6 million working-age beneficiaries were to leave SSA’s disability rolls by returning to work, lifetime cash benefits would be reduced by an estimated $3 billion. These reductions, however, would be offset at least in part by rehabilitation and other costs that may be necessary to return a person with disabilities to work. Although SSA faces constraints and challenges in applying the return-to-work strategies of other programs, opportunities exist for providing the return-to-work assistance that could enable more of SSA’s beneficiaries to reduce or eliminate their dependence on cash benefits. We are sending copies of this report to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO updated information in previous reports regarding the Social Security Administration's (SSA) return-to-work program for Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries. Although GAO did not independently verify the data used in the analysis of this report, the data cited came from either U.S. government data systems or issue area experts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) design and implementation weaknesses in the DI and SSI programs hinder maximizing beneficiary work potential; (2) the application process places a heavy emphasis on work incapacity and presumes that many medical impairments preclude employment; (3) SSA does little to provide the support and assistance that many people with disabilities need to work; (4) these and other program weaknesses yield poor return-to-work outcomes and mean that DI and SSI have not kept pace with societal trends toward the economic self-sufficiency of people with disabilities; (5) lessons learned from return-to-work strategies and practices now used in the U.S. private sector and in other countries may hold potential for improving federal disability programs by helping people with disabilities return to productive activity and at the same time reduce cash benefits; (6) SSA serves a population with a wide range of disabilities that often may be more severe than the disabilities of the average person served by U.S. private sector programs; (7) SSA may face greater difficulty in returning some of its clients to the workplace; (8) the experiences of the social insurance programs of Germany and Sweden show that return-to-work strategies are applicable to government-scale programs serving a broad and diverse population with a wide range of work histories, job skills, and impairment types; (9) GAO's analysis of practices advocated and implemented by the U.S. private sector and by social insurance programs in Germany and Sweden revealed three common strategies in the design of their return-to-work programs: (a) intervene as soon as possible after an actual or potentially disabling event to promote and facilitate return to work; (b) identify and provide necessary return-to-work assistance and manage cases to achieve return-to-work goals; and (c) structure cash and health benefits to encourage people with disabilities to return to work; (10) disability managers emphasize that these return-to-work strategies are interrelated and work most effectively when integrated into a comprehensive return-to-work program; (11) although SSA faces constraints in applying these strategies, opportunities for better identifying and providing assistance to enable more of SSA's clients to engage in work could be created; (12) if an additional 1 percent of the 6.6 million working-age SSI and DI beneficiaries were to leave SSA's disability rolls by returning to work, lifetime cash benefits would be reduced by an estimated $3 billion; and (13) these reductions would be offset by rehabilitation and other costs that may be necessary to return a person with disabilities to work. |
gao_GAO-06-361 | gao_GAO-06-361_0 | Smaller Public Companies Have Incurred Disproportionately Higher Audit Costs in Implementing the Act, but Impact on Access to Capital Remains Unclear
Based on our analysis, costs associated with implementing the Sarbanes- Oxley Act—particularly those costs associated with the internal control provisions in section 404—were disproportionately higher (as a percentage of revenues) for smaller public companies. However, the 245 companies represented 2 percent of public companies as of January 31, 2004. As a result, SEC staff asked COSO to develop additional guidance to assist smaller public companies in implementing COSO’s internal control framework in a small business environment. The committee plans to issue its final report to SEC by April 2006. GAO also participated in this roundtable. Reasons for these changes range from audit cost and service concerns cited by companies to client profitability and risk concerns cited by accounting firms, including capacity constraints and assessments of client risk. Despite client gains for mid-sized and small firms, the overall market for audit services remained highly concentrated, with mid-sized and smaller firms auditing just 2 percent of total U.S. publicly traded company revenue. Overall, mid-sized and small accounting firms conducted 30 percent of the total number of public company audits in 2004—up from 22 percent in 2002. Regulators, public companies, audit firms, and investors generally have acknowledged that many of the act’s provisions have had a positive and significant impact on investor protection and confidence. The ultimate impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the majority of smaller public companies remains unclear because the time frame to comply with section 404 of the act was extended until fiscal years ending after July 2007 for the approximately 5,971 public companies with less than $75 million in public float. First, the recommendations propose relief “unless and until a framework for assessing internal control over financial reporting” for smaller companies is developed that “recognizes the characteristics and needs of those companies.” While the recommendations hinge on the need for a framework that recognizes smaller public company characteristics and needs of smaller public companies, they do not address what needs to be done to establish such a framework or how such a framework should take into consideration the characteristics and needs of smaller public companies. Recommendations
In light of concerns raised by the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies and others regarding the ability of smaller public companies to effectively implement section 404, we recommend that the Chairman of SEC assess the guidance available, with an emphasis on implementation guidance for management’s assessment of internal control over financial reporting, to determine whether the current guidance is sufficient and whether additional action is needed, such as issuing supplemental or clarifying guidance to help smaller public companies meet the requirements of section 404, and coordinate with PCAOB to (1) help ensure that section 404-related audit standards and guidance are consistent with any additional guidance applicable to management’s assessment of internal control and (2) identify additional ways in which auditors’ can achieve more economical, effective, and efficient implementation of the standards and guidance related to internal control over financial reporting. SEC agreed that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had a positive impact on investor protection and confidence, and that smaller public companies face particular challenges in implementing certain provisions of the act, notably section 404. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to (1) analyze the impact of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act on smaller public companies in terms of costs of compliance and access to capital; (2) describe the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) efforts related to the implementation of the act and their responses to concerns raised by smaller public companies and the accounting firms that audit them; (3) analyze the impact of the act on smaller privately held companies, including costs, ability to access public markets, and the extent to which states and capital markets have imposed similar requirements on smaller privately held companies; and (4) analyze smaller companies’ access to auditing services and the extent to which the share of public companies audited by small accounting firms has changed since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In doing so, we may have missed some companies going private. This limitation is insignificant in the context of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to help protect investors and restore investor confidence. While the act has generally been recognized as important and necessary, some concerns have been expressed about the cost for small businesses. In this report, GAO (1) analyzes the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on smaller public companies, particularly in terms of compliance costs; (2) describes responses of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to concerns raised by smaller public companies; and (3) analyzes smaller public companies' access to auditing services and the extent to which the share of public companies audited by mid-sized and small accounting firms has changed since the act was passed.
What GAO Found
Regulators, public companies, audit firms, and investors generally agree that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has had a positive and significant impact on investor protection and confidence. However, for smaller public companies (defined in this report as $700 million or less in market capitalization), the cost of compliance has been disproportionately higher (as a percentage of revenues) than for large public companies, particularly with respect to the internal control reporting provisions in section 404 and related audit fees. Smaller public companies noted that resource limitations and questions regarding the application of existing internal control over financial reporting guidance to smaller public companies contributed to challenges they face in implementing section 404. The costs associated with complying with the act, along with other market factors, may be encouraging some companies to become private. The companies going private were small by any measure and represented 2 percent of public companies in 2004. The full impact of the act on smaller public companies remains unclear because the majority of smaller public companies have not fully implemented section 404. To address concerns from smaller public companies, SEC extended the section 404 deadline for smaller companies with less than $75 million in market capitalization, with the latest extension to 2007. Additionally, SEC and PCAOB issued guidance intended to make the section 404 compliance process more economical, efficient, and effective. SEC also encouraged the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), to develop guidance for smaller public companies in implementing internal control over financial reporting in a cost-effective manner. COSO's guidance had not been finalized as of March 2006. SEC also formed an advisory committee to examine, among other things, the impact of the act on smaller public companies. The committee plans to issue a report in April 2006 that will recommend, in effect, a tiered approach with certain smaller public companies partially or fully exempt from section 404, "unless and until" a framework for assessing internal control over financial reporting is developed that recognizes the characteristics and needs of smaller public companies. As SEC considers these recommendations, it is essential that the overriding purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act--investor protection--is preserved and that SEC assess available guidance to determine if additional supplemental or clarifying guidance for smaller public companies is needed. Smaller public companies have been able to obtain access to needed audit services and many moved from the largest accounting firms to mid-sized and small firms. The reasons for these changes range from audit cost and service concerns cited by companies to client profitability and risk concerns cited by accounting firms, including capacity constraints and assessments of client risk. Overall, mid-sized and small accounting firms conducted 30 percent of total public company audits in 2004--up from 22 percent in 2002. However, large accounting firms continue to dominate the overall market, auditing 98 percent of U.S. publicly traded company sales or revenues. |
gao_GAO-02-690T | gao_GAO-02-690T_0 | Background
Hospitals’ budgets for medical devices and other goods are substantial. 1.) However, GPOs assert that this selective contracting is part of a competitive process allowing the GPO to negotiate lower prices. Use of GPO Contract Often Did Not Yield Price Savings for Hospitals Buying Pacemakers and Safety Needles
Purchasing with GPO contracts did not ensure that hospitals saved money. 2.) Small and Medium-Sized Hospitals More Likely Than Large Hospitals to Realize Price Savings on Pacemakers with GPO Contract
We examined how hospitals of different sizes using GPOs fared relative to their peers purchasing pacemakers on their own and found that whether there were savings depended on the size of the hospital. Concluding Observations
While this is a pilot study based on one market, the data raise questions about one of the intended benefits from having large GPOs. In fact, there were several instances in which individual hospitals using a large GPO’s contracts paid prices that were at least 25 percent higher than prices negotiated by hospitals on their own, and smaller GPOs also sometimes offered better prices. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses group purchasing organizations (GPO) for medical devices and supplies used in hospitals. By pooling the purchases of their member hospitals, these specialized firms negotiate lower prices from vendors.
What GAO Found
GAO found that a hospital's use of a GPO contract did not guarantee that the hospital saved money: GPOs' prices were not always lower and were often higher than prices paid by hospitals negotiating directly with vendors. GAO studied price savings with respect to: (1) whether hospitals using GPO contracts received better prices than hospitals that did their own contracting, (2) the size of the hospital, and (3) size of the GPO. This data raises questions about whether GPOs, specially large GPOs, achieve consistent price savings. |
gao_GAO-06-196 | gao_GAO-06-196_0 | New Restrictions Now Prevent Payment of Benefits to Noncitizens Unauthorized to Work in the United States
While SSA previously paid benefits to all individuals who met Social Security entitlement requirements, without regard to their work authorization status, the Social Security Protection Act (SSPA) now prevents payment of benefits to noncitizens who lack authorization. SSA Provided Guidance and Training to Its Staff to Implement Section 211, but Lacked Internal Controls for Assuring Proper Determinations
SSA has issued guidance and provided training to assist staff in processing benefit claims covered by Section 211; however, we found some improper determinations by staff and a lack of internal controls for detecting such errors. The claims with improper determinations consisted of 17 claims involving workers who were assigned nonwork SSNs after 2003, which should not have been approved, and 1 claim that was improperly disapproved. In August 2004, SSA issued detailed guidance through its Program Operations Manual System (POMS). In 17 of the 19 approved cases we reviewed in which the primary workers had been assigned a nonwork SSN after 2003, we found that the determinations were erroneous because the workers lacked the work authorization or past qualifying work experience required under Section 211. In reviewing the 41 letters sent to claimants to inform them of disapproval decisions based on Section 211, we found that SSA staff did not always provide the claimants with information on their appeals rights and other required information. 1). Although SSA has disallowed only 41 claims as a result of Section 211 requirements, the number will increase in future years as more unauthorized workers reach retirement age or become disabled. While SSA data for the approximately 105,000 claims approved during 2004 and 2005 shows that 97 percent of the workers assigned SSNs before 2004 had work authorized SSNs, there are millions of noncitizens assigned nonwork SSNs before 2004 who may qualify for benefits in the coming years because Section 211 does not affect them. Section 211 May Not Restrict Benefits to Certain Noncitizen Temporary Workers Who Engage in Unauthorized Work
Even with Section 211 restrictions, opportunities may still exist for certain noncitizens assigned SSNs after 2003 to collect benefits without current work authorization. As demonstrated by the Office of the Inspector General report, however, temporary visa holders do, in many instances, continue working after their visas expire. Also, if temporary visa holders accrue sufficient work credits and meet other eligibility requirements, they may be able receive benefits without meeting the lawful presence requirement under certain conditions. Conclusions
Section 211 has imposed new restrictions on the payment of Social Security benefits to noncitizens who work without authorization, but, not surprisingly, few have been denied benefits thus far. Additionally, we discussed with managers and staff in the four SSA field offices we visited the claims that they had disapproved based on Section 211. We compared SSA’s data to the number of temporary work visas that the Department of State had issued for the 23 visa types between 2000 and 2004 and found that SSA’s overall numbers were reasonable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Continued high levels of unauthorized immigrant workers in the United States have fostered concerns about whether they should be eligible for Social Security benefits. Until recently, the Social Security Administration (SSA) allowed noncitizens to collect benefits, regardless of their work authorization status, provided that they met certain legal presence requirements. However, in March 2004, Congress passed the Social Security Protection Act, which under Section 211, requires that noncitizens assigned a Social Security number (SSN) after 2003 have work authorization from current or past qualifying work to collect benefits. This report describes (1) the steps SSA has taken to implement Section 211 and how effective SSA's policies and procedures are in preventing improper benefit decisions, and (2) how Section 211 has affected the payment of benefits to unauthorized workers.
What GAO Found
SSA has issued guidance and provided training to assist staff in processing benefit claims under Section 211, but the absence of certain internal controls has allowed some errors to go undetected. SSA issued detailed guidance in August 2004 and subsequently provided staff with training on the law, which some SSA field offices supplemented with additional training. Although SSA's policies and procedures were fairly detailed, GAO found several incorrect claims determinations and a lack of internal review for preventing them. With regard to the provisions of Section 211, GAO found that SSA improperly approved 17 of the 19 claims that involved noncitizen workers who had been issued SSNs after 2003 and who lacked required work authorization. GAO also found that 1 of the 41 claims that SSA disapproved was improper. SSA officials stated that the improper determinations were likely due to staff's unfamiliarity with the new requirements. In addition, GAO found that letters sent to claimants informing them of disapproval decisions did not always contain all required information. Because Section 211 does not apply to noncitizens who were assigned SSNs before 2004, few noncitizens have been affected by the law thus far. Only 41 (less than 1 percent) of the approximately 72,000 noncitizen-related claims SSA disapproved during 2004 and 2005 were due to Section 211. It is likely that the number of disapprovals based on the law will grow as more unauthorized workers file for benefits in coming years. However, opportunities may exist for certain noncitizens who receive their SSNs after 2003 to collect benefits without current work authorization. For example, noncitizens who are issued SSNs under temporary work visas may be able to engage in work not authorized under their visas and subsequently claim benefits based on that work. Although SSA officials told GAO the likelihood of this occurring was low, the SSA Inspector General reported in 2005 that a significant number of temporary visa holders overstayed their visas. |
gao_GAO-04-202T | gao_GAO-04-202T_0 | Within OUSD (I), the Defense Security Service (DSS) is responsible for conducting background investigations and administering the personnel security investigations program for DOD and 24 other federal agencies that allow industry personnel access to classified information. To ensure the trustworthiness, judgment, and reliability of contractor personnel in positions requiring access to classified information, DOD relies on a three-stage personnel security clearance process that includes (1) determining that the position requires a clearance and, if so, submitting a request for a clearance to DSS, (2) conducting an initial investigation or reinvestigation, and (3) using the investigative report to determine eligibility for access to classified information—a procedure known as “adjudication.” Figure 1 depicts this three-stage process and the federal government offices that have the lead responsibility for each stage. Long-standing Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel Continue to Exist and Can Have Adverse Effects
DOD’s security clearance backlog for industry personnel is sizeable, and the average time needed to determine eligibility for a clearance increased during the last 3 fiscal years to over 1 year. Sizeable backlog continues to exist—As of March 31, 2004, the security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases. This estimate is the sum of four separate DSS-supplied estimates: over 61,000 reinvestigations that were overdue but had not been submitted, over 101,000 ongoing DSS investigations, over 19,000 cases awaiting adjudication at DISCO, and more than 6,300 cases awaiting adjudication at DOHA that had exceeded the case-completion time frames established for conducting them. This comparison does not include the backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted because DSS was not able to estimate that backlog as of September 30, 2003. Furthermore, the size of the industrial personnel backlog may be underestimated. Average time to determine clearance eligibility has increased—In the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that DOD took to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days, an increase of 18 percent. Backlogs and delays can have adverse effects—Delays in renewing security clearances for industry personnel and others who are doing classified work can lead to a heightened risk of national security breaches. In addition, delays in determining security clearance eligibility for industry personnel can affect the timeliness, quality, and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts. The report also stated that delays in the clearance process hampered industrial contractors’ ability to perform duties required by their contracts and increased the amount of time needed to complete national-security-related contracts. Impediments Hinder Elimination of the Backlog and Reduction of Time Needed to Determine Eligibility for a Clearance
A number of impediments hinder DOD’s efforts to eliminate the clearance backlog for industry personnel and reduce the time needed to determine eligibility for a clearance. Impediments include large investigative and adjudicative workloads resulting from a large number of clearance requests in recent years and an increase in the proportion of requests requiring top secret clearances, inaccurate workload projections, and the imbalance between workforces and workloads. Furthermore, DOD does not have a management plan that could help it address many of these impediments in a comprehensive and integrative manner. For example, inaccurate forecasts for both the number and type of security clearances needed for industry personnel make it difficult for DOD to plan ahead to size its investigative and adjudicative workforce to handle the workload and fund its security clearance program. DOD Is Considering Several Initiatives to Decrease the Backlog and Time Period Needed to Obtain Eligibility for a Clearance
DOD and industry association officials have suggested several initiatives to reduce the backlog and delays in issuing eligibility for a security clearance. Our final report to you will provide a more complete evaluation of these and other initiatives. As part of a larger review of DOD’s security clearance processes, DOD’s Senior Executive Council is considering this consolidation. Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because of increased awareness of threats to national security and efforts to privatize federal jobs, the demand for security clearances for government and industry personnel has increased. Industry personnel are taking on a greater role in national security work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because many of these jobs require access to classified information, industry personnel need security clearances. As of September 30, 2003, industry workers held about one-third of the approximately 2 million DOD-issued security clearances. Terrorist attacks have heightened national security concerns and underscored the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that DOD had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to review the clearance eligibility determination process and backlog for industry personnel. This testimony presents our preliminary observations on the security clearance process for industry personnel and describes (1) the size of the backlog and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) the impediments to reducing the backlog and delays, and (3) some of the initiatives that DOD is considering to eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays. Later this month, we plan to issue our final report.
What GAO Found
On the basis of our preliminary observations, long-standing backlogs and delays in determining security clearance eligibility for industry personnel continue to exist and can have adverse effects. DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases as of March 31, 2004. The backlog included estimates by the Defense Security Service (DSS)--the agency responsible for administering DOD's personnel security investigations program--that consisted of more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances) that were overdue but had not been submitted to DSS; over 101,000 new DSS investigations or reinvestigations that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames; and over 25,000 cases awaiting adjudication (a determination of clearance eligibility) that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased by 56 days to over 1 year. Delays in completing reinvestigations of industry personnel and others doing classified work can increase national security risks. In addition, delays in determining clearance eligibility can affect the timeliness, quality, and cost of contractor performance on defense contracts. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and decrease the amount of time needed to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Impediments include a large number of new clearance requests; an increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances, which require more time to process; inaccurate workload projections for both the number and type of clearances needed for industry personnel; and the imbalance between workforces and workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that can cause industry delays in filling positions and starting work on government contracts. Furthermore, DOD does not have an integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing the backlog and delays. DOD is considering a number of initiatives to supplement actions that it has implemented in recent years to reduce the backlogs and the time needed to determine eligibility for a security clearance. Additional initiatives include (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation; (2) establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; and (3) reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. GAO's forthcoming report will provide a more complete discussion of these and other initiatives. |
gao_GAO-03-984T | gao_GAO-03-984T_0 | State DDSs provide crucial support to the initial disability claims process— one that accounts for most of SSA’s workload—through their role in determining an individual’s medical eligibility for disability benefits. To address concerns regarding the program’s efficiency, in 1992 SSA initiated a plan to redesign the disability claims process, emphasizing the use of automation to achieve an electronic (paperless) processing capability. AeDib’s Strategy Calls For Developing and Integrating Multiple Disability System Projects
In undertaking AeDib, SSA has embarked on a major initiative consisting of multiple projects that are intended to move all partners in its disability claims adjudication and review to an electronic business process. The AeDib strategy focuses on developing the capability for claimant information and large volumes of medical images, files, and other documents that are currently maintained in paper folders to be stored in electronic folders, and then accessed, viewed, and shared by the disability processing offices. SSA is undertaking five key projects to support the strategy: An Electronic Disability Collect System to provide the capability for SSA field offices to electronically capture information about the claimant’s disability and collect this structured data in an electronic folder for use by the disability processing offices; A Document Management Architecture that will provide a data repository and scanning and imaging capabilities to allow claimant information and medical evidence to be captured, stored, indexed, and shared electronically between the disability processing offices. By late January 2004, SSA plans to have developed these two components. SSA Has Completed Important AeDib Tasks, But Much Work Remains
SSA has performed several important project tasks since beginning the accelerated initiative in 2002. Nonetheless, the agency still has a significant amount of work to accomplish to achieve the electronic disability folder by the end of next January. The pilot tests were to begin this month, and some of the test results upon which decisions are to be based are not expected to be available until the end of December at the earliest, leaving little time to incorporate the results into the system that is to be implemented by late January. Further, even when completed, the pilot tests will provide only limited information about the electronic folder’s functionality. In addition, given the technological complexity of the AeDib project, the need for end-to-end testing is substantial. Compounding AeDib’s vulnerability is that SSA has not yet undertaken a comprehensive assessment of project risks to identify facts and circumstances that increase the probability of failing to meet project commitments, and taking steps to prevent this from occurring. SSA disability program and systems officials told us that the agency has involved its various stakeholders in developing AeDib. However, officials that we contacted in nine of the ten DDS offices stated that their concerns were not adequately heard and considered in the decision-making process for the development of AeDib, despite the critical and extensive role that states play in making disability determinations. Our review to date has not assessed the validity of the concerns expressed by the stakeholders, or SSA’s responses to them. Nonetheless, SSA’s accelerated strategy may involve risks of delivering a system that will not sufficiently address its needs. Given the importance of this project to SSA’s future service-delivery capability, it is essential that the agency satisfy itself that AeDib will perform as intended with minimal risk before it is deployed nationwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Providing benefits to disabled individuals is one of the Social Security Administration's (SSA) most important service delivery obligations--touching the lives of about 10 million individuals. In recent years, however, providing this benefit in a timely and efficient manner has become an increasing challenge for the agency. This past January, in fact, GAO designated SSA's disability programs as highrisk. Following a prior unsuccessful attempt, the agency is now in the midst of a major initiative to automate its disability claims functions, taking advantage of technology to improve this service. Seeking immediate program improvements, SSA is using an accelerated approach--called AeDib--to develop an electronic disability claims processing system. At the request of the Subcommittee on Social Security, House Committee on Ways and Means, GAO is currently assessing the strategy that underlies SSA's latest initiative to develop the electronic disability system. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its key observations to date regarding the AeDib initiative, including strategy, risks, and stakeholder involvement. GAO plans to discuss more fully the results of this continuing review in a subsequent report
What GAO Found
SSA's goal to establish a more efficient, paperless disability claims processing system is important, and one that could benefit millions. To achieve this goal, SSA's immediate focus is on developing an electronic folder to store claimant information and large volumes of medical images, files, and other documents that are currently maintained in paper folders, and then make this information accessible to all entities involved in disability determinations. SSA's accelerated strategy calls for development of this capability by January 2004 rather than in 2005, as originally planned. Since accelerating this effort, SSA has performed important tasks toward establishing this initial electronic capability. Nonetheless, it has substantial work to accomplish in order to develop the technologically complex electronic folder and begin implementation by late next January. While responsive to the agency's need for an operational system as soon as possible, SSA's accelerated strategy involves risks. For example, pilot tests that are to provide important information about the electronic folder's performance are not expected until late December--just 1 month before its planned implementation. In addition, a strategy for end-to-end testing to demonstrate that the individual components will work together reliably has not been completed. Further increasing the system's vulnerability is that SSA has not yet comprehensively assessed project risks. Unless addressed, these factors could ultimately derail the initiative. While SSA has taken steps to involve key stakeholders in the systems development process, officials in state Disability Determination Services offices that we contacted expressed concerns that they had only limited involvement in the development effort. They stated that their concerns were not adequately heard and considered in the decision-making process. Unless SSA addresses these issues, it cannot be assured of stakeholder agreement with and full use of the system. |
gao_NSIAD-96-127 | gao_NSIAD-96-127_0 | How Legislation Is Administered Can Affect Cleanup Costs
Our August 1994 report on the impact of incorporating land use planning decisions into cleanup decision-making stated that incorporating more realistic land use assumptions into the selection process for a cleanup remedy under CERCLA could result in significant cost savings—from $200 million to $600 million annually, according to DOE’s Assistant Secretary for EM. DOE and EPA have recognized the potential impact of this duplication. DOE’s Large Carryover Balances Continue to Be an Issue
In addition to making the cleanup more cost effective, an additional way to provide funds for DOE’s cleanup is through the use of excess carryover balances of uncosted obligations and unobligated balances. As a result, DOE cannot be sure it has reduced its balances to the minimum needed to operate its programs. However, as of February 1996, evaluations had been done for 7,450 of the sites. DOD and the military services plan to spend 83 percent of their fiscal year 1996 cleanup funds on sites in the high relative risk category. DOD has identified goals, strategies, budget items, and measures of merit for three of its environmental quality pillars: pollution prevention, conservation, and compliance. The Agency found 17 projects valued at $3.2 million that did not qualify for environmental compliance funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) and Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to control the cost of environmental cleanup of their nuclear weapons facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) if DOE incorporated more realistic land use assumptions into the selection process for cleanups, that could result in significant cost savings of $200 million to $600 million annually; (2) deactivation of surplus facilities, a shortened environmental restoration process, and privatization of some cleanup processes could also result in DOE savings; (3) DOE excess carryover balances of uncosted obligations and unobligated balances could be used to fund cleanup efforts and reduce its future budget requests; (4) DOD has evaluated about 70 percent of its 10,000 cleanup sites, but it has not ranked over half of the sites based on relative risk or ranked sites based on geographical or organizational boundaries; and (5) DOD does not have sufficient data to manage its environmental compliance programs. |
gao_GAO-08-697 | gao_GAO-08-697_0 | New reporting and data collection requirements. As shown in figure 2, consumer bankruptcy filings in the United States more than doubled between 1990 and 2004, with an average of more than 1.5 million people filing annually between 2001 and 2004. Immediately after the act went into effect, filings fell substantially. Trustee Program Incurred Approximately $72 Million in Overall Costs, and the Judiciary Approximately $48 Million in Start-up Costs, Related to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
The Trustee Program estimated its costs related to carrying out responsibilities resulting from the Bankruptcy Reform Act to be approximately $72.4 million in fiscal years 2005-2007, mostly in personnel costs, to implement the means test and credit counseling and debtor education requirements, conduct debtor audits, comply with reporting requirements, establish information technology systems, and expand facilities. The federal judiciary could not isolate costs specifically resulting from the Bankruptcy Reform Act since the act had a broad effect on nearly all bankruptcy court staff and operations, but did estimate that $48.4 million was incurred in one-time costs associated with start-up activities to implement the act’s requirements. The cost estimates for the Trustee Program and the judiciary do not incorporate the effect of the decline in bankruptcy filings since the act, which presumably has helped reduce their overall costs to some extent. As shown in table 2, these costs were incurred for the following functions: Revision of rules, forms, and procedures. Training and communication to courts. As a Result of Fewer Filings Since the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Revenues from Bankruptcy Filing Fees Have Declined
Revenues to the Trustee Program and federal judiciary from bankruptcy filing fees and other fees have declined since the implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act due to the reduction in the number of bankruptcy filings. Cost to Bankruptcy Filers Has Risen Due to Increased Legal and Filing Fees and New Counseling and Education Requirements
Based on our sample of bankruptcy files, we estimate that the average attorney fee for a Chapter 7 case has increased roughly 50 percent since the Bankruptcy Reform Act. The proportion of Chapter 7 debtors filing without attorney representation (pro se) appears to have declined, but we did not find a change in the proportion of Chapter 7 debtors receiving free legal assistance. For Chapter 13 cases, our analysis found the standard attorney fees that individual courts approve rose in nearly all the districts and divisions with such fees that we reviewed. As shown in figure 5, on the basis of our sample we estimate that the average attorney fee in Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases was $712 in February–March 2005 and $1,078 in February–March 2007. In more than half of those districts and divisions, the increase was 55 percent or more. The total fees paid for cases under Chapter 13 rose from $194 to $274—an increase of $80. As noted earlier, private trustees—individuals who are not government employees and are overseen in most districts by the Trustee Program—administer individual Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to examine (1) new costs incurred as a result of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Bankruptcy Reform Act) by the Department of Justice and the federal judiciary, (2) new costs incurred as a result of the act by consumers filing for bankruptcy, and (3) the impact of the act on private trustees. We also obtained documentation from, and interviewed representatives of, the Department of Justice’s U.S. For the Department of Justice’s Trustee Program, these included its actual or projected annual budgets for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, as well as annual budget and performance summaries, strategic plans, annual reports, and congressional testimonies by Trustee Program officials. In addition, we collected and analyzed data on the Trustee Program’s and judiciary’s revenues from bankruptcy-related statutory and miscellaneous filing fees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Bankruptcy Reform Act) made significant changes to the administration of bankruptcy relief, affecting (1) the U.S. Trustee Program (Trustee Program), which oversees the bankruptcy process; (2) the federal judiciary, which includes bankruptcy courts and a central administrative support office; (3) consumers filing for bankruptcy; and (4) private trustees--individuals who administer bankruptcy cases and are supervised by the Trustee Program but are not government employees. The number of new personal bankruptcy filings declined after the act--about 600,000 people filed in 2006 as compared to an average of 1.5 million annually between 2001 and 2004. GAO was asked to examine (1) new costs incurred as a result of the Bankruptcy Reform Act by the Trustee Program and federal judiciary, (2) new costs to consumers, and (3) the impact of the act on private trustees. GAO reviewed budget information from the Trustee Program and federal judiciary, and collected data on attorney fees from a random and projectable sample of personal bankruptcy cases. GAO also obtained documentation and interviewed staff from these entities, as well as from organizations representing consumers, bankruptcy attorneys, creditors, and private trustees.
What GAO Found
The Trustee Program estimated that its costs to carry out responsibilities resulting from the Bankruptcy Reform Act were approximately $72.4 million for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. These costs were mostly for staff time for ongoing activities related to the means test, debtor audits, data collection and reporting, and counseling and education requirements. The federal judiciary could not isolate all costs related to the act since it broadly affected nearly all bankruptcy court staff and operations, but estimated about $48 million was incurred in one-time start-up costs for such things as training and revisions of rules, forms, and procedures. These estimates do not incorporate the effect of the decline in bankruptcy filings since the act, which presumably has helped reduce the Trustee Program's and judiciary's overall costs, but has also reduced fee revenues. Trustee Program filing fee revenues declined from $74 million to $52 million between fiscal years 2005 and 2007, and federal judiciary filing and miscellaneous fee revenues declined from $237 million to $135 million. Consumers filing for bankruptcy pay higher legal and filing fees since the Bankruptcy Reform Act went into effect. Based on a random sample of bankruptcy files, GAO estimated that the average attorney fee for a Chapter 7 case increased from $712 in February-March 2005 to $1,078 in February-March 2007. For Chapter 13 cases, the standard attorney fees that individual courts approve rose in nearly all the districts and divisions with such fees that GAO reviewed, and in more than half the cases the increase was 55 percent or more. As a result of the act and subsequent budget legislation, total bankruptcy filing fees have risen from $209 to $299 for Chapter 7 and from $194 to $274 for Chapter 13. GAO estimated that the proportion of Chapter 7 debtors filing without an attorney had declined and did not find a significant change in the proportion of such debtors receiving free legal assistance. In addition, fees to meet the act's credit counseling and debtor education requirements are typically about $100, although some clients receive a fee reduction or a full waiver. Private trustees told GAO that new Bankruptcy Reform Act requirements related to documentation, verification, and reporting have increased the time and resources they spend administering each case. The caseload of some private trustees has declined in concert with the significant decline in bankruptcy filings that has occurred since the act went into effect, but trustees' overall rate of attrition has not changed significantly. |
gao_GAO-17-538 | gao_GAO-17-538_0 | In addition, annual disbursements increased from $820 million in 2008 to $2.2 billion in 2012, a 167 percent increase. Specifically:
Lifeline participation rates are low compared to the percentage of low- income households that pay for phone service. However, broadband adoption rates have steadily increased for the low-income population absent a Lifeline subsidy for broadband. FCC Has Recently Taken Steps towards Evaluating Lifeline
FCC has recently taken some steps toward evaluating Lifeline. This information serves as a key internal control for billing, collection, and disbursement operations. The results of this test are illustrative rather than generalizable. In addition to addressing any risks associated with having the funds outside the Treasury, FCC identified potential benefits of moving the funds. For example, FCC explained that having the funds in the Treasury could allow USF payments to be used to offset other federal debts, and would provide USAC with better tools for fiscal management of the funds, including access to real-time data and more accurate and transparent data. Until FCC finalizes and implements its plan and actually moves the USF funds, the risks that FCC identified will persist and the benefits of having the funds in the Treasury will not be realized. The NLAD database was completely implemented by March 2014 and contains a real-time list of Lifeline beneficiaries to assist carriers in identifying and preventing duplicate subscribers. In total, we were unable to confirm whether 1,234,929 individuals out of the 3,474,672 that we reviewed, or 36 percent, participated in the qualifying benefit programs they stated on their Lifeline enrollment applications or were recorded as such by Lifeline providers. In June 2015, FCC adopted a rule requiring Lifeline providers to retain eligibility documentation used to qualify consumers for Lifeline support to improve the auditability and enforcement of FCC rules. However, we identified key Lifeline functions for which FCC and USAC had limited visibility. For example, some Lifeline providers pay commissions to third-party agents to enroll subscribers, creating a financial incentive to enroll as many subscribers as possible. Conclusions
Lifeline’s large and diffuse administrative structure creates a complex internal control environment susceptible to significant risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Nevertheless, while some academic studies have raised questions whether Lifeline is a costly and inefficient means of achieving universal service, FCC has not evaluated the program to determine whether it is efficiently and effectively meeting its goals, as we recommended in our March 2015 report. In March 2016, FCC expanded the program’s performance goals by including subsidies for broadband service. Although classified as federal funds, the USF, with net assets of $9 billion, is maintained outside the Treasury in an account with a private bank. As a result, OMB observed that USF funds do not enjoy the same rigorous management practices and regulatory safeguards as funds for other federal programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address control weaknesses and related program-integrity risks we identified in Lifeline, we recommend that the Chairman of FCC require Commissioners to review and approve, as appropriate, spending above the budget in a timely manner; maintain and disseminate an updated list of state eligibility databases available to Lifeline providers that includes the qualifying programs those databases access to confirm eligibility; this step would help ensure Lifeline providers are aware of state eligibility databases and could also help ensure USAC audits of Lifeline providers can verify that available state databases are being utilized to verify subscriber eligibility; establish time frames to evaluate compliance plans and develop instructions with criteria for FCC reviewers how to evaluate these plans to meet Lifeline’s program goals; and develop an enforcement strategy that details what violations lead to penalties and apply this as consistently as possible to all Lifeline providers to ensure consistent enforcement of program violations; the strategy should include a rationale and method for resource prioritization to help maximize the effectiveness of enforcement activities. To address our findings regarding the USF, we recommend that the Chairman of FCC take action to ensure that the preliminary plans to transfer the USF funds from the private bank to the U.S. Treasury are finalized and implemented as expeditiously as possible; require a review of customer bills as part of the contribution audit to include an assessment of whether the charges, including USF fees, meet FCC Truth-in-Billing rules with regard to labeling, so customer bills are transparent, and appropriately labeled and described, to help consumers detect and prevent unauthorized charges; and respond to USAC requests for guidance and address pending requests concerning USF contribution requirements to ensure the contribution factor is based on complete information and that USF pass-through charges are equitable. In written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, FCC generally agreed with our recommendations. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing four research questions: (1) the extent to which the Lifeline program (Lifeline) demonstrates effective performance towards program goals; (2) steps the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) have taken to improve financial controls in place for Lifeline and the Universal Service Fund (USF), and any remaining weaknesses that might exist; (3) steps FCC and USAC have taken to improve subscriber-eligibility verification, and any remaining weaknesses that might exist; and (4) steps FCC and USAC have taken to improve oversight of Lifeline providers, and any remaining weaknesses that might exist. To do this, we matched NLAD data to the SNAP, Medicaid, and SSI data to identify potential improper payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Created in the mid-1980s, FCC's Lifeline provides discounts to eligible low-income households for home or wireless telephone and, as of December 2016, broadband service. Lifeline reimburses telephone companies that offer discounts through the USF, which in turn is generally supported by consumers by means of a fee charged on their telephone bills. In 2016, Lifeline disbursed about $1.5 billion in subsidies to 12.3 million households.
In 2010, GAO found Lifeline had limited abilities to detect and prevent ineligible subscribers from enrolling. FCC adopted a reform order in 2012 to enhance Lifeline's internal controls. GAO was asked to examine FCC's reforms. This report discusses, among other objectives, (1) the extent to which Lifeline demonstrates effective performance towards program goals, and (2) steps FCC and USAC have taken to enhance controls over finances, subscribers, and providers, and any weaknesses that might remain.
GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from FCC and USAC. GAO analyzed subscriber data from 2014 and performed undercover tests to identify potential improper payment vulnerabilities. The results of GAO's analysis and testing are illustrative, not generalizable.
What GAO Found
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not evaluated the Lifeline program's (Lifeline) performance in meeting its goals of increasing telephone and broadband subscribership among low-income households, but has recently taken steps to do so. Lifeline participation rates are low compared to the percentage of low-income households that pay for telephone service, and broadband adoption rates have increased for the low-income population even without a Lifeline subsidy. Without an evaluation, which GAO recommended in March 2015, FCC is limited in its ability to demonstrate whether Lifeline is efficiently and effectively meeting its program goals. In a July 2016 Order, FCC announced plans for an independent third party to evaluate Lifeline design, function, and administration by December 2020.
FCC and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC)—the not-for-profit organization that administers Lifeline—have taken some steps to enhance controls over finances and subscriber enrollment. For example, FCC and USAC established some financial and management controls regarding billing, collection, and disbursement of funds for Lifeline and related programs. To enhance the program's ability to detect and prevent ineligible subscribers from enrolling, FCC oversaw completion in 2014 of a database with a real-time list of subscribers to assist carriers in identifying and preventing duplicate subscribers. Additionally, in June 2015, FCC adopted a rule requiring Lifeline providers to retain eligibility documentation used to qualify consumers for Lifeline support to improve the auditability and enforcement of FCC rules.
Nevertheless, GAO found weaknesses in several areas. For example, Lifeline's structure relies on over 2,000 Eligible Telecommunication Carriers that are Lifeline providers to implement key program functions, such as verifying subscriber eligibility. This complex internal control environment is susceptible to risk of fraud, waste, and abuse as companies may have financial incentives to enroll as many customers as possible. Based on its matching of subscriber to benefit data, GAO was unable to confirm whether about 1.2 million individuals of the 3.5 million it reviewed, or 36 percent, participated in a qualifying benefit program, such as Medicaid, as stated on their Lifeline enrollment application. FCC's 2016 Order calls for the creation of a third-party national eligibility verifier by 2019 to determine subscriber eligibility. Further, FCC maintains the Universal Service Fund (USF)—with net assets exceeding $9 billion, as of September 2016—outside the Department of the Treasury in a private bank account. In 2005, GAO reported that FCC should reconsider this arrangement given the USF consists of federal funds. In addition to addressing any risks associated with having the funds outside the Treasury, where they do not enjoy the same rigorous management practices and regulatory safeguards as other federal programs, FCC identified potential benefits of moving the funds. For example, by having the funds in the Treasury, USF payments could be used to offset other federal debts, and would provide USAC with better tools for fiscal management of the funds. In March 2017, FCC developed a preliminary plan to move the USF to the Treasury. Until FCC finalizes and implements its plan and actually moves the USF funds, the risks that FCC identified will persist and the benefits of having the funds in the Treasury will not be realized.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes seven recommendations, which FCC generally agreed with, including that FCC take action to ensure the preliminary plans to transfer the USF from a private bank to the U.S. Treasury are finalized and implemented expeditiously. |
gao_HEHS-96-122 | gao_HEHS-96-122_0 | Educational Issues
Problems That Single-Gender Programs Might Address
Educators and other experts with whom we spoke view single-gender programs as a way to address (1) high dropout rates, low academic achievement, and other problems faced by many urban males— particularly minorities—and (2) girls’ low academic performance in advanced mathematics and science; general lack of confidence, competence, and leadership skills; and narrow views of potential careers. Finally, some educators report that single-gender settings reduce the distraction that boys and girls create for each other. The middle school years are the most distracting for students, according to some educators. Although public school single-gender programs have not been rigorously researched, some studies of minority students in private single-gender schools suggest academic gains for both boys and girls. Also in 1992, the Department of Education’s Office of Education Research and Improvement convened a group of researchers and practitioners to share their views and findings about single-gender education. Some believe that successful strategies used in single-gender settings— smaller classes and more individual attention—can be just as effective in coeducational settings. They believe teacher training in diversity and equity can also contribute to a bias-free coeducational classroom. Legal Issues
Whatever the effectiveness and desirability of single-gender programs, single-gender public elementary and secondary education is limited by law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the major educational and legal issues involved with public single-gender education.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) single-gender educational programs are thought to reduce dropout rates and improve overall academic performance among urban males and academic achievement in mathematics and science among females; (2) single-gender settings are believed to reduce the distraction boys and girls create for each other, particularly during the middle school years; (3) some studies of minority students in private single-gender schools have suggested that both boys and girls improve academically in such settings; (4) the effectiveness of single-gender programs may be due more to students' and parents' motivation and commitment and small student populations; (5) some experts fear that single-gender educational programs will lead to unequal resource allocations and reinforcement of stereotypes; (6) some believe that training teachers in diversity and equity, creating smaller classes, and providing more individual attention would be just as effective in coeducational settings; (7) some public schools have terminated or modified their single-gender programs because of federal and state limitations on single-gender educational programs; and (8) the Department of Education has received numerous complaints regarding single-gender educational settings. |
gao_GAO-07-935T | gao_GAO-07-935T_0 | Incidents Place Sensitive Information at Risk
Since May 2006, federal agencies have reported a spate of security incidents that put sensitive data at risk. Personally identifiable information about millions of Americans has been lost, stolen, or improperly disclosed, thereby exposing those individuals to loss of privacy, identity theft, and financial crimes. Agencies have experienced a wide range of incidents involving data loss or theft, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches, underscoring the need for improved security practices. Most agencies did not implement controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. For example, agencies did not consistently (1) identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access, (2) enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized access was necessary and appropriate, (3) establish sufficient boundary protection mechanisms, (4) apply encryption to protect sensitive data on networks and portable devices, and (5) log, audit, and monitor security-relevant events. Agencies also lacked effective controls to restrict physical access to information assets. Agencies did not always configure network devices and services to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, such as patching key servers and workstations in a timely manner; assign incompatible duties to different individuals or groups so that one individual does not control all aspects of a process or transaction; and maintain or test continuity of operations plans for key information systems. Agencywide Security Programs Were Not Fully Implemented
An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented all the FISMA-required elements for an agencywide information security program. However, IGs at several agencies sometimes disagreed with the information reported by the agency and have identified weaknesses in the processes used to implement these and other security program activities. Opportunities Exist to Enhance Reporting and Independent Evaluations
Periodic reporting of performance measures for FISMA requirements and related analysis provides valuable information on the status and progress of agency efforts to implement effective security management programs; however, opportunities exist to enhance reporting under FISMA and the independent evaluations completed by IGs. In summary, as illustrated by recent incidents at federal agencies, significant weaknesses in information security controls threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of federal agencies. Almost all major agencies exhibit weaknesses in one or more areas of information security controls. Despite these persistent weaknesses, agencies have continued to report steady progress in implementing certain information security requirements. However, IGs sometimes disagreed with the agency’s reported information and identified weaknesses in the processes used to implement these and other security program activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, GAO has reported that weaknesses in information security are a widespread problem with potentially devastating consequences--such as intrusions by malicious users, compromised networks, and the theft of personally identifiable information--and has identified information security as a governmentwide high-risk issue. Concerned by reports of significant vulnerabilities in federal computer systems, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which permanently authorized and strengthened the information security program, evaluation, and reporting requirements for federal agencies. In this testimony, GAO discusses security incidents reported at federal agencies, the continued weaknesses in information security controls at major federal agencies, agencies' progress in performing key control activities, and opportunities to enhance FISMA reporting and independent evaluations. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed agency, inspectors general (IG), and GAO issued and draft reports on information security.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have recently reported a spate of security incidents that put sensitive data at risk. Personally identifiable information about millions of Americans has been lost, stolen, or improperly disclosed, thereby exposing those individuals to loss of privacy, identity theft, and financial crimes. The wide range of incidents involving data loss or theft, computer intrusions, and privacy breaches underscore the need for improved security practices. As illustrated by these security incidents, significant weaknesses in information security controls threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems used to support the operations, assets, and personnel of federal agencies. Almost all of the major federal agencies had weaknesses in one or more areas of information security controls. Most agencies did not implement controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. For example, agencies did not consistently identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access, apply encryption to protect sensitive data on networks and portable devices, and restrict physical access to information assets. In addition, agencies did not always manage the configuration of network devices to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity, such as patching key servers and workstations in a timely manner; assign incompatible duties to different individuals or groups so that one individual does not control all aspects of a process or transaction; and maintain or test continuity of operations plans for key information systems. An underlying cause for these weaknesses is that agencies have not fully or effectively implemented agencywide information security programs. Nevertheless, federal agencies have continued to report steady progress in implementing certain information security requirements. However, IGs at several agencies sometimes disagreed with the agency's reported information and identified weaknesses in the processes used to implement these and other security program activities. Further, opportunities exist to enhance reporting under FISMA and the independent evaluations completed by IGs. |
gao_GAO-14-47T | gao_GAO-14-47T_0 | Background
In response to the destruction caused by the earthquake, Congress provided more than $1.14 billion in reconstruction funds for Haiti. 1). The IDB committed to provide funding to the Haitian government to build the CIP and some associated facilities; the U.S. government committed to build a power plant, contribute to the building of a nearby port, and support the construction of 5,000 nearby housing units; and
Sae-A committed to be the anchor tenant and hire 20,000 local employees at the CIP. Most of USAID’s 2010 Supplemental Funds Have Not Been Disbursed
As of June 30, 2013, almost 3 years after passage of the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act, USAID had obligated $336.0 million (52 percent) and disbursed $229.5 million (35 percent) of the $651 million it allocated for bilateral earthquake reconstruction activities in Haiti. Figure 2 shows the percentage of funding obligated and disbursed. USAID Completed Power Plant’s First Phase, but Port Is Delayed and Their Sustainability Depends on CIP’s Success
USAID Completed First Phase of Power Plant in Time to Deliver Power to CIP
As of June 30, 2013, USAID had allocated $98.1 million to the CIP power plant project and had obligated 22 percent of these funds. Port Project Is Delayed, and Current Estimates for Construction Costs Are Higher Than Expected
USAID has allocated $72.5 million to plan and contribute toward building a new port in northern Haiti; however, as of June 2013, the agency had obligated only $4.3 million (6 percent) because of planning delays. A lack of staff with technical expertise in port planning, construction, and oversight, such as a port engineer, at the USAID mission in Haiti contributed to these delays. According to a USAID planning document for the port sector, the agency planned to complete a feasibility study by March 2012, to initiate construction in spring 2013 through a private company that would supplement USAID’s funding contribution for port construction, and to complete construction in fall 2015. As a result of these planning delays, port construction will not begin until more than 2 years later than initially planned. USAID does not know what portion of this funding is needed for the additional planning and design; however, it is clear that the amount remaining will be a significantly smaller portion than USAID had initially planned to contribute to the port’s total construction cost, given the estimated funding gap of at least $117 million to $189 million. Sustainability of CIP, Power Plant, and Port Are Interdependent and Rely on Haitian Government Capacity
The sustainability of the CIP, port, and power plant are interdependent in several respects. These cost increases stemmed primarily from the inaccuracy of USAID’s original estimates, which were based in part on costs reported by the World Bank and an NGO that was building houses in northern Haiti. As of August 2013, USAID had reduced the number of houses it expects to complete, and therefore the number of beneficiaries, by more than 80 percent. Of the 15,000 houses that it originally planned, USAID expects that only 2,649 will be completed across eight settlement sites. USAID also reduced the total number of projected beneficiaries, from an original estimated range of 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimated range of approximately 13,200 to 15,900. Difficulties partnering with NGOs and other donors. According to USAID officials, that partnership did not develop as planned because of the delays in securing land title and because of turnover in Red Cross leadership that resulted in shifting approaches to housing in Haiti. Specifically, beneficiaries will face site-specific issues such as affordability and community cohesion. In addition, it is unclear whether such partnerships will be available to support all of the remaining settlements. In our June report, we recommended that the USAID Administrator direct the mission in Haiti to ensure that each new settlement has community support mechanisms in place prior to beneficiary occupation, including by making funds available as necessary to help ensure this support. USAID agreed with this recommendation and noted that the mission is prepared to provide additional resources if they are needed to finance community development activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
On January 12, 2010, an earthquake in Haiti is estimated to have caused about 230,000 deaths, resulted in 300,000 injuries, and displaced about 2 million persons. Following immediate relief efforts, Congress provided $1.14 billion for Haiti reconstruction in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010. USAID, which is responsible for implementing $651 million of this amount, has allocated about $268 million of this and other funding to construct a power plant and port to support the CIP in northern Haiti and permanent housing in several locations in the Port-au-Prince, St-Marc, and Cap-Haitien areas.
This testimony draws from GAO's June 2013 report on Haiti reconstruction and further examines (1) USAID's funding obligations and disbursements; (2) USAID's progress in two CIP-related activities--a power plant and port; and (3) USAID's progress in constructing permanent housing. For this statement, GAO updated funding information and data regarding progress, based on information from USAID and Department of State officials.
What GAO Found
As of June 30, 2013, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had obligated $336 million (52 percent) and disbursed $229.5 million (35 percent) of $651 million in funding for Haiti earthquake reconstruction from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010.
USAID has allocated $170.6 million to construct a power plant and port to support the newly developed Caracol Industrial Park (CIP). According to USAID documents and other studies, the CIP, power plant, and port are interdependent; each must be completed and remain viable for the others to succeed. USAID completed the first phase of the CIP power plant in time to supply the first CIP tenant with power. Port construction will begin more than 2 years later than originally planned, in part because of a lack of USAID expertise in port planning at the Haiti mission. According to current estimates of port construction costs, USAID funding will be insufficient to cover a majority of projected costs. The estimated gap of more than $117 million to $189 million is larger than initially estimated, and it is unclear whether the Haitian government will be able to find a private sector company willing to finance the remainder of the project.
USAID has reduced the targets for its permanent housing program in Haiti, to which it has allocated $97.3 million. The agency decreased the projected number of houses by more than 80 percent, from 15,000 to 2,649. The estimated number of beneficiaries was reduced from a range of 75,000 to 90,000 to its current estimate of approximately 13,200 to 15,900. These reductions resulted from inaccurate original cost estimates that used inappropriate cost comparisons and from the Haitian government's request for larger houses with improvements such as flush toilets. USAID currently estimates that construction will be completed more than 2 years later than initially scheduled. Delays occurred primarily because of difficulties in securing land titles and coordinating with partner donors. USAID is attempting to mitigate potential sustainability risks, such as affordability and community cohesion, through community development mechanisms. However, it is uncertain whether these mechanisms will fully cover all sites.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. In its June 2013 report, GAO recommended that USAID (1) hire a port engineer to oversee port planning and construction and (2) provide timely community support mechanisms for each new settlement to help ensure the sustainability of its permanent housing program. USAID agreed with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-424 | gao_GAO-13-424_0 | Background
According to international animal health authorities, disease surveillance in livestock and poultry has as its main purpose the early detection of diseases and disease outbreaks. To manage these reportable diseases, APHIS has worked closely with the states and industry over the past decades to eradicate them by, for example, providing states funding and guidance. APHIS’s New Approach Monitors Overall Health of Livestock and Poultry and Seeks to Improve Collection and Analysis of Information
As funding for disease eradication programs changes, and the global landscape of animal and human diseases produces new threats, APHIS has since fiscal year 2012 begun broadening its previous disease-by- disease approach to one in which the agency monitors the overall health of certain livestock and poultry species. APHIS’s intention is to examine the nation’s livestock herds and poultry flocks in detail, using diverse sources of data, to better detect, monitor, and control diseases that may be new or reemerging, including domestic diseases of economic importance. This program—called Comprehensive and Integrated Swine Surveillance—identifies new sources and types of data on diseases in swine, among other things. In planning documents, APHIS officials said that they plan to collect data from farms where swine are raised, markets where they are sold, slaughter facilities, and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, among other sites (see fig. For example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of pseudorabies at slaughter facilities, but it has proposed monitoring these facilities for a range of other diseases as well, including classical swine fever. APHIS Faces Challenges Implementing Its New Approach
APHIS faces key challenges in carrying out this new approach to disease surveillance in livestock and poultry, in particular, gathering data from current and additional sources, such as from industry and from state animal health authorities, and determining how best to deploy declining resources. According to agency documentation, the budget for APHIS recently decreased by about 14 percent for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. According to federal and state officials, a decrease in the number of APHIS field veterinarians has also reduced the agency’s ability to carry out critical disease surveillance activities effectively. No Overall Strategy with Goals and Measures Guides APHIS’s New Approach to Animal Disease Surveillance
APHIS has a vision for its new approach but has not integrated that vision into an overall strategy with associated goals and performance measures aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance efforts. The Government Performance and Results Act, as amended, requires federal agencies to develop performance plans that include measurable We have previously reported that these requirements can also goals.serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within agencies, such as individual divisions, programs, or initiatives.and performance measures helps an organization balance competing priorities, particularly if resources are constrained, and helps an agency assess progress toward intended results. Veterinary Services’ planning documents acknowledge that in preventing and detecting diseases in livestock and poultry and protecting animal health, the agency plays an important role in safeguarding public and environmental health as well. The goals APHIS has identified in these planning documents focus primarily on processes or activities but do not specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to accomplish or have associated performance measures. APHIS’s Plans Do Not Define Their Relationship with the Nation’s Biosurveillance Efforts
None of APHIS’s various plans indicate how they individually or collectively support national homeland security efforts called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, or additional biosurveillance efforts that together make up a national policy to defend the nation’s food and agricultural systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Even with its efforts to date, however, without integrating the vision in its planning documents into an overall strategy with associated goals and measures that are aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human health. Recommendation for Executive Action
As APHIS develops goals and measures for its new approach to disease surveillance in livestock and poultry, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the APHIS Administrator to integrate the agency’s vision into an overall strategy, with associated goals and measures, that guides how APHIS’s new approach will support national homeland security efforts to enhance the detection of biological threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
International animal health authorities have stated that disease surveillance in livestock and poultry has as its main purpose the early detection of diseases and disease outbreaks. APHIS has worked closely with states and industry over the past decades to eradicate diseases by, for example, providing states with funding and guidance. But the disease landscape has changed, with rapid global movement of humans and animals, creating new threats. GAO was asked to review federal animal disease surveillance efforts. This report examines (1) USDAs new approach to disease surveillance in light of a changing disease landscape and challenges, if any, the agency faces with this approach and (2) the extent to which this approach is guided by a strategy with measurable goals and supports broader national biosurveillance efforts. GAO reviewed relevant presidential directives, laws, regulations, guidance, policies, documents, and strategic plans related to disease surveillance in animals; visited swine facilities; and interviewed federal, state, and industry veterinarians and other officials.
What GAO Found
Under a new approach, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has begun broadening its previous disease-by-disease approach to disease surveillance to one in which the agency monitors the overall health of livestock and poultry and uses additional sources and types of data to better detect and control new or reemerging diseases. APHIS's first effort under its new approach is to monitor the health of the nation's swine herds and identify new sources and types of data on diseases in swine, among other things. In planning documents, APHIS officials have proposed collecting data from farms where swine are raised, markets where they are sold, slaughter facilities, and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, among other sites. For example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of pseudorabies--a viral disease of swine that may cause respiratory illness and death--at slaughter facilities, but under the new approach, it has proposed monitoring these facilities for a range of other diseases as well. Key challenges to carrying out this new approach are how best to obtain data from producers, who are concerned that health information about their herds and flocks be kept confidential, and how to obtain health data in sufficient quantity from some animals like feral swine. Resource constraints also present a challenge, according to agency and state officials, given the recent decrease in APHIS's budget of about 14 percent for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.
APHIS has a vision for its new approach but has not integrated that vision into an overall strategy with associated goals and performance measures that are aligned with the nation's larger biosurveillance efforts. The Government Performance and Results Act, as amended, requires federal agencies to develop performance plans that include goals and performance measures. GAO has previously reported that these requirements can also serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within agencies, such as individual divisions or programs. Developing goals and measures helps an organization balance competing priorities, particularly if resources are constrained, and helps an agency assess progress toward intended results. APHIS has developed a number of planning documents related to the agency's capabilities in disease surveillance in livestock and poultry, which acknowledge that the agency plays an important role in safeguarding public and environmental health. Goals APHIS has identified in these documents, however, focus primarily on processes or activities and do not specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to accomplish or have associated performance measures. Moreover, none of the planning documents indicate how they individually or collectively support national homeland security efforts called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, which assigns several federal agencies, including USDA, responsibility for establishing a comprehensive and coordinated surveillance system to support early detection of biological threats, including infectious diseases. Agency officials said they plan to develop goals and measures for the new approach. Without integrating its vision into an overall strategy with goals and measures aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human health.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that as APHIS develops goals and measures for its new approach, it integrate the agency's vision into an overall strategy guiding how this approach supports national homeland security efforts to enhance the detection of biological threats. In their comments, USDA concurred with GAO's recommendation, and the Department of Homeland Security described its commitment to disease surveillance efforts. |
gao_GAO-07-19 | gao_GAO-07-19_0 | Phase 4: Includes implementing a new case management system to replace ACS. Sentinel Short-Term Staffing Needs Largely Met, but Strategic Approach to Managing Program Human Capital Needs Is Lacking
To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program office, following what the Sentinel program manager describes as a meticulous series of actions to determine staffing needs, develop position descriptions, review resumes and reassess program needs. During the last year, it has also filled most of the positions in the plan primarily by using contractors. Nevertheless, a few key positions remain unfilled. Moreover, the staffing plan addressed only the program’s immediate staffing needs; it does not provide for the kind of strategic human capital planning and management that our research has shown to be critical to the success of any organization, such as inventorying the knowledge and skills of existing staff, forecasting knowledge and skill needs over the life of the program, and formulating explicit strategies for filling gaps. Exacerbating this lack of a strategic approach to human capital management is that the program’s inventory of risks does not include human capital as a program risk, and thus steps are not planned to proactively address these risks. In contrast, other program documentation cites human capital as a program challenge and risk. Available Sentinel program documentation and other statements by program officials, however, suggest otherwise. Notwithstanding the FBI’s considerable efforts to quickly staff-up the Sentinel program office, it has not adopted the kind of strategic management approach needed to effectively leverage Sentinel human capital throughout the life of the program, in part because the FBI’s IT program management policies and procedures do not require it. Unless the FBI adopts a more strategic and proactive approach to managing Sentinel human capital and treats it as a program risk, the chances of the program delivering required intelligence and investigative capabilities and mission value in a timely and cost effective manner are diminished. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has adequately provided for the human capital needs of its Sentinel program. To address our objective, we focused on three areas: FBI’s efforts to date in staffing the Sentinel program office, the bureau’s plans to address gaps between the program’s human capital needs and existing FBI capabilities, and the extent to which FBI is proactively treating and managing human capital as a program risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently began a 6-year, $425 million program called Sentinel to replace and expand on both its failed Virtual Case File (VCF) project and its antiquated, paper-based, legacy system for supporting mission-critical intelligence analysis and investigative case management activities. Because of the FBI's experience with VCF and the importance of Sentinel, GAO was requested to address a number of program management issues associated with acquiring Sentinel via a prime development contractor. This report focuses on one of these issues: whether the FBI is adequately providing for the program's human capital needs. The findings are based on GAO's review of relevant program documentation, interviews with program officials, and human capital management guidance.
What GAO Found
To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program office. During the last year, it created a staffing plan for Sentinel, which defines the positions needed for the program, and it has filled most of the positions in the plan, primarily by using contract staff (77 percent). However, a few key program management positions remain to be filled. More importantly, the Sentinel staffing plan addresses only the program office's immediate staffing needs. It does not provide for the kind of strategic human capital management focus that GAO's research and evaluations have shown to be essential to the success of any organizational entity. For example, the staffing plan was not derived using a documented, data-driven methodology and does not provide for inventorying the knowledge and skills of existing staff, forecasting future knowledge and skill needs, analyzing gaps in capabilities between the existing staff and future workforce needs, (including consideration of expected succession needs), and formulating strategies for filling expected gaps. Exacerbating this situation is that the FBI is not proactively managing Sentinel human capital availability as a program risk; it has not included human capital in the program's risk inventory nor has it developed and implemented a proactive risk mitigation strategy, even though program documents cite human capital as both a challenge and a risk. According to program officials, they plan to manage their human capital needs in the same way as when they initially staffed the program office, in part because the bureau's IT system life cycle management policies and procedures do not require them to do otherwise. Unless the FBI adopts a more strategic approach to managing human capital for the Sentinel program and treats human capital as a program risk, the chances of delivering required intelligence and investigative support capabilities in a timely and cost-effective manner are reduced. |
gao_RCED-99-163 | gao_RCED-99-163_0 | We examined the implementation of UMRA during its first 2 years of operation and, for several reasons, concluded that it had little effect on agencies’ rulemaking actions. First, the act’s cost-benefit requirement did not apply to many of the rulemaking actions that were considered “economically significant”actions under Executive Order 12866 (78 out of 110 issued in the 2-year period). Second, UMRA gave agencies discretion not to take certain actions if they determined that those actions were duplicative or unfeasible. “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” “(A) the agency proposing the rule or the Director (of the Office of Management and Budget) reasonably determines is likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more in reasonably quantifiable costs; or (B) is otherwise designated a major rule by the Director on the ground that the rule is likely to adversely affect, in a material way, the economy, a sector of the economy, including small business, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local or tribal governments, or communities.”
Therefore, a rule that is economically significant under Executive Order 12866 because it is likely to have more than $100 million in benefits (but perhaps only $90 million in costs) would not be covered by the analytical requirements in S. 746 (unless designated by the Director). Mr. Chairman, in a 1998 report prepared at your and Senator Glenn’s request, we examined 20 cost-benefit analyses at 5 agencies to determine the extent to which those analyses contain the “best practices” elements recommended in the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) January 1996 guidance for conducting cost-benefit analyses. We concluded that some of these 20 analyses did not incorporate OMB’s best practices. Six of the cost-benefit studies did not assign dollar values to benefits, and only six analyses specifically identified net benefits (benefits remaining after costs have been accounted for)—a key element in OMB’s guidance. Eight of the 20 cost-benefit analyses that we examined in our 1998 report did not include an executive summary that could help Congress, decisionmakers, the public, and other users quickly identify key information addressed in the analyses. S. 746 addresses many of these areas of concern. Peer Review Can Improve Regulatory Decisionmaking
S. 746 also requires agencies to provide for an independent peer review of any required risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses of major rules that the agencies or the OMB Director reasonably anticipate are likely to have a $500 million effect on the economy. Given the uncertainties associated with predicting the future economic impacts of various regulatory alternatives, the rigorous, independent review of economic analyses should help enhance the quality, credibility, and acceptability of agencies’ decisionmaking. We believe that enactment of the public disclosure requirements in S. 746 would provide a statutory foundation to help ensure the public’s access to regulatory review information. In particular, the bill’s requirement that these rule changes be described in a single document would make it easier for the public to understand how rules change during the review process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed S.746, the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, focusing on: (1) the effectiveness of previous regulatory reform initiatives; (2) agencies' cost-benefit analysis practices and the trigger for the analytical requirements; (3) peer review of agencies' regulatory analyses; and (4) the transparency of the regulatory development and review process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO examined the implementation of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) during its first 2 years of operation and, for several reasons, concluded that it had little effect on agencies' rulemaking actions; (2) the act's cost-benefit requirement did not apply to many of the rulemaking actions considered economically significant under Executive Order 12866; (3) UMRA gave agencies discretion not to take certain actions if they determined that those actions were duplicative or unfeasible; (4) UMRA requires agencies to take actions that they were already required to take; (5) the centerpiece of S. 746 is its emphasis on cost-benefit analysis for major rules; (6) in 1998, GAO examined 20 cost-benefit analyses at 5 agencies to determine the extent to which those analyses contain the best practices elements recommended in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance for conducting cost-benefit analysis; (7) GAO concluded that some of these 20 analyses did not incorporate OMB's best practices; (8) 6 of the cost-benefit studies did not assign dollar values to benefits, and only 6 analyses specifically identified net benefits; (9) 8 of the 20 cost-benefit analyses that GAO examined did not include an executive summary that could help Congress, decisionmakers, the public, and other users quickly identify key information addressed in the analyses; (10) S. 746 addresses many of these areas of concern; (11) enactment of the analytical, transparency, and executive summary requirements in S. 746 would extend and underscore Congress' previous statutory requirements that agencies identify how regulatory decisions are made; (12) S. 746 also requires agencies to provide for an independent peer review of any required risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses of major rules that the agencies or the OMB Director reasonably anticipate are likely to have a $500 million effect on the economy; (13) GAO believes that important economic analyses should be peer reviewed; (14) given the uncertainties associated with predicting the future economic impacts of various regulatory alternatives, the rigorous, independent review of economic analyses should help enhance the quality, credibility, and acceptability of agencies' decisionmaking; (15) GAO believes that enactment of the public disclosure requirements in S. 746 would provide a statutory foundation to help ensure the public's access to regulatory review information; and (16) in particular, the bill's requirement that rule changes be described in a single document would make it easier for the public to understand how rules change during the review process. |
gao_GAO-08-778 | gao_GAO-08-778_0 | Persons Are Frequently Associated with Ugland House Registered Entities
Many of the 18,857 entities registered at Ugland House are U.S.-connected. These entities most frequently involve investment funds and structured finance vehicles. A Maples and Calder partner also said that the make-up of entities in Ugland House was reflective of the nature of their business and largely international, institutional client base, and was not necessarily representative of the types of entities registered with other company service providers in the Cayman Islands. Persons and Fewer than 50 Percent Are U.S.-Related
Maples and Calder partners estimated that 5 percent of the overall number of Ugland House entities are wholly owned by U.S. persons. Ugland House Investment Entities Are Hedge and Private-Equity Funds, And U.S. Investors Are Largely Institutional, such as University Endowments and Pension Funds
The Cayman Islands is a major domicile for global hedge funds. Several Factors Influence U.S. Taxpayers’ Decisions to Conduct Financial Activity in the Cayman Islands
U.S. persons who engage in Cayman-based financial activity commonly do so to gain business advantages, including tax advantages under U.S. law. Although such activity is typically legal, some persons have engaged in activity in the Cayman Islands, like other jurisdictions, in an attempt to avoid detection and prosecution of illegal activity by U.S. authorities. In particular, the Cayman Islands is generally regarded as having a stable and internationally compliant legal and regulatory system, a business-friendly regulatory environment, and a reputation as a prominent international financial center. This approach has been proven to increase U.S. taxpayer compliance. The likely low level of compliance with these requirements is an example of the general problem with the completeness and accuracy of self-reported information. Some Financial Intelligence Information on U.S. Persons’ Cayman Activities Is Available to U.S. Regulators
The U.S. government’s financial intelligence unit, FinCEN, works to gather information about suspected financial crimes both offshore and in the United States. Some Other Information Sharing also Occurs between U.S. and Cayman Islands Regulators
In addition to the formal information sharing codified into law between the U.S. government and Cayman Islands government and financial institutions represented by TIEA and MLAT requests and SARs, Cayman Islands officials reported sharing with and receiving information from federal agencies, state regulators, and financial institutions: According to CIMA, 40 requests for assistance were dealt with between 2003 and early 2008, including requests from SEC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and various state insurance and banking regulators. U.S. and Cayman Officials Have Taken Steps to Address Illegal Activity, but Enforcement Challenges Exist
Tax evasion and other illegal activity involving offshore jurisdictions take a variety of forms. CIMA officials said that they do not regulate entities differently on the basis of their residence offshore or onshore. In the case of the licensing of branches or subsidiaries of non-Cayman Islands banks, CIMA officials stated that they look to the foreign bank regulator in the bank’s home jurisdiction to ensure that (1) the foreign regulator permits the Cayman Islands branch or subsidiary; (2) that the Cayman Islands operation will be subject to consolidated supervision by the foreign regulator in cooperation with CIMA as host regulator, in compliance with international standards; and (3) that the bank proposing to open a Cayman Islands operation is in good standing with its home-country regulator. Although the Maples and Calder law firm provides services that even U.S. government-affiliated entities have found useful for international transactions and the Cayman Islands government has taken affirmative steps to meet international standards, the ability of U.S. persons to establish entities with relatively little expense in the Cayman Islands and similar jurisdictions facilitates both legal tax minimization and illegal tax evasion. Despite the Cayman Islands’ adherence to international standards and the international commerce benefits gained through U.S. activities in the Cayman Islands, Cayman entities nevertheless can be used to obscure legal ownership of assets and associated income and to exploit grey areas of U.S. tax law to minimize U.S. tax obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Cayman Islands is a major offshore financial center and the registered home of thousands of corporations and financial entities. Financial activity in the Cayman Islands is measured in the trillions of dollars annually. One Cayman building--Ugland House--has been the subject of public attention as the listed address of thousands of companies. To help Congress better understand the nature of U.S. persons' business activities in the Cayman Islands, GAO was asked to study (1) the nature and extent of U.S. persons' involvement with Ugland House registered entities and the nature of such business; (2) the reasons why U.S. persons conduct business in the Cayman Islands; (3) information available to the U.S. government regarding U.S. persons' Cayman activities; and (4) the U.S. government's compliance and enforcement efforts. GAO interviewed U.S. and Cayman government officials and representatives of the law firm housed in Ugland House, and reviewed relevant documents.
What GAO Found
The sole occupant of Ugland House is Maples and Calder, a law firm and company-services provider that serves as registered office for the 18,857 entities it created as of March 2008, on behalf of a largely international clientele. According to Maples partners, about 5 percent of these entities were wholly U.S.-owned and 40 to 50 percent had a U.S. billing address. Ugland House registered entities included investment funds, structured-finance vehicles, and entities associated with other corporate activities. Gaining business advantages, such as facilitating U.S.-foreign transactions or minimizing taxes, are key reasons for U.S. persons' financial activity in the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands' reputation as a stable, business-friendly environment with a sound legal infrastructure also attracts business. This activity is typically legal, such as when pension funds and other U.S. tax-exempt entities invest in Cayman hedge funds to maximize their return by minimizing U.S. taxes. Nevertheless, some U.S. persons have used Cayman Island entities, as they have entities in other jurisdictions, to evade income taxes or hide illegal activity. Information about U.S. persons' Cayman activities comes from self-reporting, international agreements, and other sharing with the Cayman government. The completeness and accuracy of self-reported information is not easily verified. While U.S. officials said the Cayman government has been responsive to information requests, U.S. authorities must provide specific information on an investigation before the Cayman government can respond. The Internal Revenue Service has several initiatives that target offshore tax evasion, including cases involving Cayman entities, but tax evasion and crimes involving offshore entities are difficult to detect and to prosecute. Cayman officials said they fully cooperate with the United States. Maples partners said that ultimate responsibility for compliance with U.S. tax laws lies with U.S. taxpayers. U.S. officials said that cooperation has been good and that compliance problems are not more prevalent there than elsewhere offshore. |
gao_T-RCED-99-77 | gao_T-RCED-99-77_0 | Program Has Generated Considerable Revenue
The demonstration program gives opportunities to collect new and increased fees to the major agencies that provide the public with recreational opportunities on federal land—the Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service (all within the Department of the Interior), and the Forest Service (within the Department of Agriculture). The four agencies reported that, because of the program, their combined recreational fee revenues have nearly doubled, from about $93 million in fiscal year 1996 (the last year before the demonstration program was implemented) to about $180 million in fiscal year 1998. This extensive new revenue allows such sites to address past unmet needs in maintenance, resource protection, and visitor services. The Park Service and the Department of the Interior recognize that certain sites may be able to quickly fix all of the problems that meet the demonstration program’s criteria. Providing some further flexibility in the spending of fee revenues would give agencies more opportunities to address their highest-priority needs among all of their field units. Improving Interagency Coordination
The demonstration program was authorized with the expectation that the four agencies would coordinate their fee collection efforts, both among themselves and with state and local agencies, where it made sense to do so. Demonstration sites may be reluctant to coordinate on fees partly because the program’s incentives are geared towards increasing their revenues. By contrast, because joint fee arrangements may potentially reduce revenues to specific sites, there may be a disincentive among these sites to coordinate. In addition, there is currently no formal mechanism or entity within these agencies charged with pursuing opportunities for more and better coordination. As a result, our review showed that coordination among the agencies occurs infrequently. In our view, without such a person or group pursuing opportunities for better coordination, this lack of coordination among the fee sites is likely to continue. Greater Innovation Would Make Fees More Equitable
The demonstration program also encouraged the four agencies to be innovative in setting and collecting their own fees. However, we found fewer examples of the agencies experimenting with different pricing structures that could make the fees more equitable such as basing fees on (1) the extent of use, or (2) whether the visit occurred during a peak visitation period. Of the 206 sites in the demonstration program in fiscal year 1997, 58 percent had increases in visitation, 41 percent had decreases, and 1 percent were unchanged. The demonstration has brought millions of additional dollars to recreation areas across the country with little or no impact on visitation patterns. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the recreational fee demonstration program, focusing on: (1) ensuring that future revenues can be applied to the agencies' highest priority unmet needs; (2) coordinating fees between agencies at demonstration sites that are close to each other; (3) being more innovative in setting fees; and (4) assessing the effect of fees on specific segments of the population.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the demonstration program gives opportunities to collect new and increased fees to the major agencies that provide the public with recreational opportunities on federal land--the National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Forest Service; (2) the four agencies reported that, because of the program, their combined fee revenues have nearly doubled, from about $93 million in fiscal year (FY) 1996 to about $180 million in FY 1998; (3) this extensive new revenue allows such sites to address past unmet needs in maintenance, resource protection, and visitor services; (4) the Park Service and the Department of the Interior recognize that certain sites may be able to quickly fix all of the problems that meet the demonstration program's criteria; (5) providing some further flexibility in the spending of fee revenues would give agencies more opportunities to address their highest-priority needs among all of their field units; (6) the demonstration program was authorized with the expectation that the four agencies would coordinate their fee collection efforts, both among themselves and with state and local agencies, where it made sense to do so; (7) demonstration sites may be reluctant to coordinate on fees partly because the program's incentives are geared towards increasing their revenues; (8) by contrast, because joint fee arrangements may potentially reduce revenues to specific sites, there may be a disincentive among these sites to coordinate; (9) in addition, there is currently no formal mechanism or entity within these agencies charged with pursuing opportunities for more and better coordination; (10) as a result, GAO's review showed that coordination among the agencies occurs infrequently; (11) without such a person or group pursuing opportunities for better coordination, this lack of coordination among the fee sites is likely to continue; (12) the demonstration program also encouraged the four agencies to be innovative in setting and collecting their own fees; (13) GAO found many examples of agencies experimenting with ways to make payment more convenient; (14) however, GAO found fewer examples of the agencies experimenting with different pricing structures that could make the fees more equitable; (15) of the 206 sites in the demonstration program in FY 1997, 58 percent had increases in visitation, 41 percent had decreases, and 1 percent were unchanged; and (16) the demonstration has brought millions of additional dollars to recreation areas across the country with little or no impact on visitation patterns. |
gao_GAO-06-585T | gao_GAO-06-585T_0 | A Mandate for Change
Today we are at a key crossroad. In the past 5 years, DOD has doubled its planned investments in weapons systems, but this huge increase has not been accompanied by more stability, better outcomes, or more buying power for the acquisition dollar. Rather than showing appreciable improvement, programs are experiencing recurring problems with cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. It is within this context that we must engage in a comprehensive and fundamental reexamination of new and ongoing investments in our nation’s weapons systems. Moreover, it is counting on these efforts to enable transformation of military operations. It is not unusual to see development cost increases between 30 percent and 40 percent and schedule delays of approximately 1, 2 or more years. This is not to say that the nation does not get superior weapons in the end, but that at currently projected twice the level of investment, DOD has an obligation to get better results. There are several reasons for this, but the primary ones include the fact that DOD has never clearly specified who is accountable for what, invested responsibility for execution in any single individual, or even required program leaders to stay until the job is done. Likewise, contractors are not always held accountable when they fail to achieve desired acquisition outcomes. DOD is also reviewing changes to requirements setting. We believe DOD’s recently issued QDR did not lay out a long term, resource constrained, investment strategy. Solutions
Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves making tough tradeoff decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued, making sure programs are executable, locking in requirements before programs are ever started, and making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. These changes will not be easy to make. They require DOD to reexamine the entirety of its acquisition process—what we think of as the “Big A”. This includes making deep-seated changes to program requirements setting, funding, and execution. It also involves changing how DOD views success, and what is necessary to achieve success. In a recent study on program management best practices, we recommended that DOD determine the priority order of needed capabilities based on assessments of the resources—that is dollars, technologies, time, and people needed to achieve these capabilities. Our work over the past 10 years has consistently shown when these basic steps are taken, programs are better positioned to be executed within cost and schedule. It’s time to challenge such solutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the past 5 years, DOD has doubled its planned investments in weapons systems, but this huge increase has not been accompanied by more stability, better outcomes, or more buying power for the acquisition dollar. Rather than showing appreciable improvement, programs are experiencing recurring problems with cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO was asked to testify on ways to obtain a better return on DOD's weapons systems investments. This testimony identifies the following steps as needed to provide a better foundation for executing weapon programs: (1) developing a DOD-wide investment strategy that prioritizes programs based on realistic and credible threat-based customer needs for today and tomorrow, (2) enforcing existing policies on individual acquisitions and adhering to practices that assure new programs are executable, and (3) making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. Past GAO reports have made similar recommendations.
What GAO Found
DOD has a mandate to deliver high-quality products to warfighters, when they need them and at a price the country can afford. Quality and timeliness are especially critical to maintain DOD's superiority over others, to counter quickly changing threats, and to better protect and enable the warfighter. Cost is critical given DOD's stewardship responsibility for taxpayer money, combined with long-term budget forecasts which indicate that the nation will not be able to sustain its currently planned level of investment in weapons systems, and DOD's plans to increase investments in weapons systems that enable transformation of various military operations. At this time, however, DOD is simply not positioned to deliver high quality products in a timely and cost-efficient fashion. It is not unusual to see cost increases that add up to tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, schedule delays that add up to years, and large and expensive programs frequently rebaselined or even scrapped after years of failing to achieve promised capability. Recognizing this dilemma, DOD has tried to embrace best practices in its policies, and instill more discipline in requirements setting, among numerous other actions. Yet it still has trouble distinguishing wants from needs, and many programs are still running over cost and behind schedule. Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves making tough tradeoff decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued, making sure programs are executable, locking in requirements before programs are ever started, and making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. These changes will not be easy to make. They require DOD to re-examine the entirety of its acquisition process--what we think of as the "Big A"--including requirements setting, funding, and execution. Moreover, DOD will need to alter perceptions of what success means, and what is necessary to achieve success. |
gao_GAO-09-96 | gao_GAO-09-96_0 | Compliance with Legislative Conditions
The US-VISIT expenditure plan partially satisfies 8 of the 11 legislative conditions required of DHS. include a certification by the DHS Chief Procurement Officer that the program was reviewed and approved in accordance with the department’s investment management process and that this process fulfilled all capital planning and investment control requirements and reviews established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). While the plan did include such a certification, it was based on information that pertains to the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan and the fiscal year 2009 budget submission, rather than on the fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan, as required by the act. While the plan did provide an accounting of operations and maintenance, and program management costs, it did not separately identify the program’s contractor costs, as required by the act. The plan does not satisfy the remaining three conditions that apply to DHS. Public comments on the proposed air and sea exit solution raise a range of additional concerns. Beyond the expenditure plan, other program planning and execution limitations and weaknesses also confront DHS in its quest to deliver US- VISIT capabilities and value in a timely and cost-effective manner. Overall, while DHS has taken steps to implement a significant percentage of our prior recommendations aimed at improving management of US-VISIT, additional management improvements are needed to effectively define, justify, and deliver a system solution that meets program goals, reflects stakeholder input, minimizes exposure to risk, and provides Congress with the means by which to oversee program execution. Until these steps are taken, US-VISIT program performance, transparency, and accountability will suffer. U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) program for collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. 4 control requirements and reviews established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including Circular A-11, part 7; a certification by the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) that an independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract for the project; a certification by the DHS CIO that the system architecture of the program is sufficiently aligned with the department’s information systems enterprise architecture to minimize future rework, including a description of all aspects of the architectures that were and were not assessed in making the alignment determination, the date of the alignment determination, and any known areas of misalignment, along with the associated risks and corrective actions to address any such areas; a certification by the DHS CPO that the plans for the program comply with federal acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and practices, and a description of the actions being taken to address any areas of noncompliance, the risks associated with them, along with any plans for addressing these risks and the status of their implementation; a certification by the DHS CIO that the program has a risk management process that regularly identifies, evaluates, mitigates, and monitors risks throughout the system life cycle, and communicates high-risk conditions to agency and DHS investment decision makers, as well as a listing of all the program’s high risks, and a status of efforts to address them; 5 a certification by the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) that the human capital needs of the program are being strategically and proactively managed, and that current human capital capabilities are sufficient to execute the plans discussed in the report; a complete schedule for the full implementation of a biometric exit program or a certification that such a program is not possible within 5 years; a detailed accounting of operations and maintenance, contractor services, and program management costs associated with the program. However, the plan does not provide milestones for addressing these recommendations. In addition, the plan does not include two OIG recommendations. Observation 2: DHS reports that proposed solution would provide less security and privacy than other alternatives. However, DHS's proposed solution would have more privacy and security risks than alternative solutions. The plan does not fully satisfy any of the conditions that apply to DHS, either because it does not address key aspects of the condition or because what it does address is not adequately supported or is otherwise not reflective of known program weaknesses. To assist DHS in planning and executing US-VISIT, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the department’s Investment Review Board to immediately hold a review of the US-VISIT program that, at a minimum, addresses The reasons for the fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan not fully addressing each of the legislative conditions and corrective action to ensure that this does not occur for future expenditure plans; The adequacy of the basis for any future Air and Sea Exit solution, including the reliability of cost estimates, implication of privacy and security issues, and addressing key concerns raised in comments to the proposed rule; The weaknesses in the program’s implementation of risk management, and The weaknesses in the prime contractor’s implementation of earned value management, including the limitations in the quality of the schedule baselines and the schedule variance measurements. Our objectives were to (1) determine whether the plan satisfies the legislative conditions specified in the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, and (2) provide observations about the expenditure plan and management of US-VISIT. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program known as U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on certain foreign nationals who travel to and from the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine if the plan satisfies the twelve legislative conditions and (2) provide observations about the plan and management of the program. To accomplish this, GAO assessed the plan and related DHS certification letters against each aspect of each legislative condition and assessed program documentation against federal guidelines and industry standards.
What GAO Found
The fiscal year 2008 US-VISIT expenditure plan does not fully satisfy any of the eleven conditions required of DHS by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, either because the plan does not address key aspects of the condition or because what it does address is not adequately supported or is otherwise not reflective of known program weaknesses. More specifically, of the eleven conditions, the plan partially satisfies eight. For example, while the plan includes a listing of GAO recommendations, it does not provide milestones for addressing these recommendations, as required by the act. Further, although the plan includes a certification by the DHS Chief Procurement Officer that the program has been reviewed and approved in accordance with the department's investment management process, and that this process fulfills all capital planning and investment control requirements and reviews established by the Office of Management and Budget, the certification is based on information that pertains to the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan and fiscal year 2009 budget submission, rather than to the fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan. Moreover, even though the plan provides an accounting of operations and maintenance and program management costs, the plan does not separately identify the program's contractor services costs, as required by the act. With regard to the remaining three legislative conditions, the plan does not satisfy any of them. For example, the plan does not include a certification by the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer that the program's human capital needs are being strategically and proactively managed and that the program has sufficient human capital capacity to execute the expenditure plan. Further, the plan does not include a detailed schedule for implementing an exit capability or a certification that a biometric exit capability is not possible within 5 years. The twelfth legislative condition was satisfied by our review of the expenditure plan. Beyond the expenditure plan, GAO observed that other program planning and execution limitations and weaknesses also confront DHS in its quest to deliver US-VISIT capabilities and value in a timely and cost-effective manner. Concerning DHS's proposed biometric air and sea exit solution, for example, the reliability of the cost estimates used to justify the proposed solution is not clear, the proposed solution would provide less security and privacy than other alternatives, and public comments on the proposed solution raise additional concerns, including the impact the solution would have on the industry's efforts to improve passenger processing and travel. Moreover, the program's risk management database shows that key risks are not being managed. Finally, frequent rebaselining of one of the program's task orders has minimized the significance of schedule variances. Collectively, this means that additional management improvements are needed to effectively define, justify, and deliver a US-VISIT system solution that meets program goals, reflects stakeholder input, minimizes exposure to risk, and provides Congress with the means by which to oversee program execution. Until these steps are taken, US-VISIT program performance, transparency, and accountability will suffer. |
gao_GAO-09-635 | gao_GAO-09-635_0 | The improper and questionable activities and transactions that we identified demonstrate the Academy did not have assurance that it complied with applicable fund control requirements, including those in the ADA. Specifically, we identified improper and questionable midshipmen fee- related transactions with respect to: (1) collections for goods and services that were not the midshipmen’s responsibility, (2) collected amounts that exceeded the actual expense to the Academy for the goods or services provided to the midshipmen, and (3) the use of accumulated fee reserves for questionable purposes. Fee Collections and Uses of Fees not Related to Goods and Services Provided to All Midshipmen
For fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the Academy collected fees of approximately $7 million from midshipmen. Weak Control Environment and Flawed Academy Internal Controls
We found that a weak overall control environment and the flawed design and implementation of internal controls were the root causes of the Academy’s inability to prevent, or effectively detect, the numerous instances of improper and questionable sources and uses of funds discussed previously. We found that there was little evidence of awareness or support for strong internal control and accountability across the Academy at all levels, and risks, such as those that flow from a lack of clear organizational roles and responsibilities and from significant activities with affiliated organizations, that were not addressed by Academy management. The internal control weaknesses we identified were systemic and could have been identified in a timely manner had Academy and MARAD management had in place a more effective oversight and monitoring regimen. Further, we found that the Academy did not routinely prepare financial reports and information for use by internal and external users that could have helped to identify the improper and questionable sources and uses of funds. Actions by the Department, MARAD, and the Academy to Address Certain Accountability and Internal Control Challenges
Over the course of our review, we found that various actions were taken, and were in process, that were intended to improve the Academy’s and its affiliated organizations’ internal controls. Another significant action was the creation in July 2008 of the position of Assistant Chief Financial Officer for the Academy with direct reporting responsibility to the MARAD CFO. This position was initially temporary, but made permanent in March 2009. It provides for a senior financial official at the Academy to conduct oversight and monitoring of Academy financial activities on a real time basis. We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of MARAD, in coordination with the Superintendent of the Academy, to take the following actions: To improve the design and operation of the internal control system at the Academy, we recommend that the following actions be taken: Establish a comprehensive risk-based internal control system that addresses the core causes and the challenges to proper administration that we identify in this report, including the risks and challenges that flow from the close organizational and transactional relationships between the Academy and its affiliated organizations and implement internal controls that address the elements of our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, including the role and responsibilities of management and employees to establish and maintain a positive and supportive attitude toward internal control and conscientious management, and the responsibility for managers and other officials to monitor control activities. Our specific objectives were to determine whether there (1) were any potentially improper or questionable uses of funds by the Academy, including transactions with its affiliated organizations; (2) was an effective control environment with key controls in place over the Academy’s sources and uses of funds, including transactions with its affiliated organizations; and (3) were any actions taken, under way, or planned to improve controls and accountability over the Academy’s funds and resources. Specifically, we reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and procedures over Academy operations and activities; reviewed the MARAD report and discussed the objectives, scope, and methodology of the internal control review with MARAD officials; interviewed selected Department, Department—Office of Inspector General (OIG), MARAD, Academy, and NAFI staff and officials to obtain an understanding of (1) their roles and responsibilities, (2) the internal control environment at the Academy, including the Academy’s organizational structure and relationships to the NAFIs and management’s attitude towards and knowledge of internal controls; (3) the internal controls over selected Academy payments and activities with its affiliated organizations—the 14 NAFIs and 2 foundations; and (4) MARAD and Department practices for overseeing and monitoring the Academy; and obtained an understanding of the sources of funding for both the Academy and the NAFIs, including the appropriated funds of the Academy. We identified numerous improper or questionable activities and uses of funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (Academy), a component of the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD), is one of five U.S. service academies. The Academy is affiliated with 14 non-appropriated fund instrumentalities (NAFI) and two foundations. GAO was asked to determine whether there (1) were any potentially improper or questionable sources and uses of funds by the Academy, including transactions with its affiliated organizations; (2) was an effective control environment with key controls in place over the Academy's sources and uses of funds; and (3) were any actions taken, under way, or planned to improve controls and accountability. GAO analyzed selected transactions from fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 to identify improper or questionable sources and uses of funds and reviewed documents and interviewed cognizant officials to assess the Academy's internal controls, and identify corrective actions to improve controls.
What GAO Found
GAO identified numerous instances of improper and questionable sources and uses of funds by the Academy and its affiliated organizations. These improprieties and questionable payments GAO identified demonstrate that, while MARAD and the Academy have been taking action to improve the Academy's internal controls, the Academy did not have assurance that it complied with applicable fund control requirements, including the Antideficiency Act (ADA). Further, the Academy had numerous breakdowns in its important stewardship responsibilities with respect to maintaining accountability over the receipt and use of funds. For example, GAO identified improper and questionable midshipmen fee transactions related to: (1) fee collections and uses of fees unrelated to goods and services provided to all midshipmen, (2) fee collections that exceeded the actual expense to the Academy for the goods or services, and (3) the use of accumulated excess midshipmen fees for improper and questionable purposes. GAO found that a weak overall control environment and the flawed design and implementation of internal controls were the root causes of the Academy's inability to prevent or effectively detect numerous instances of improper and questionable sources and uses of funds. Specifically, GAO found that there was a lack of awareness or support for strong internal control and accountability across the Academy at all levels and risks, such as those that flow from a lack of clear organizational roles and responsibilities and from significant activities with affiliated organizations. The internal control weaknesses GAO identified were systemic and could have been identified in a timely manner had Academy and MARAD management had a more effective oversight and monitoring regimen. For example, GAO found that the Academy did not routinely prepare financial reports and information for use by internal and external users. GAO found that various actions were taken and in process that were intended to improve the Academy's internal controls, including actions to address issues of accountability with its affiliated organizations. For example, a permanent position of Assistant Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for the Academy was established in March 2009 with direct reporting responsibility to the MARAD CFO. This action provides a senior financial official at the Academy with authority to conduct needed oversight and monitoring of financial activities on a real time basis. Further, following discussions GAO had with Department and MARAD officials, the MARAD CFO took steps to secure and protect accumulated reserves held in commercial bank accounts of an affiliated organization. However, even though MARAD and the Academy have taken actions, much more needs to be done, including determining the amount of midshipmen fees that were used to cover official Academy expenses, performing a comprehensive analysis of the risks posed by the Academy's organizational structure and its relationships with its affiliated organizations, and establishing and implementing policies, procedures, and internal controls over many Academy activities. |
gao_GAO-13-321 | gao_GAO-13-321_0 | The primary information included in the Coast Guard’s COP is vessel and aircraft position information—or tracks— and descriptive information about the vessels, their cargo, and crew. Command and control systems. These procedures address the development and the use of the COP. It would also include the requirements document, which identifies the essential capabilities and associated requirements needed to make the COP function. The Coast Guard’s SDLC process is documented in the U.S. Coast Guard SDLC Practice Manual. This could increase the time it takes for COP information gathered by a vessel operating with a classified system to be shared with an aircraft operating with an unclassified system. In February 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard had increased access to its WatchKeeper software by allowing access to the system for Coast Guard port partners; however, the Coast Guard had limited success in improving information sharing between the Coast Guard and local port partners. We found that the Coast Guard did not follow established guidance during the development of WatchKeeper—a major component of the $74 million Interagency Operations Center acquisition project—by, in part, failing to determine the needs of its users, define acquisition requirements, or determine cost and schedule information. The Coast Guard Has Made Some Progress in Increasing the Availability of COP Information to Users, but Has Experienced Challenges in Implementing COP- Related Systems
The Coast Guard has made some progress in increasing the amount and type of information included in the COP, and has increased the number of users with access to that information. However, it has faced challenges in implementing some COP-related systems. The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Adding Information to the COP and Making That Information Available to More Users
Since the COP became operational in 2003, the Coast Guard has made progress in adding useful data sources and in increasing the number of users with access to the COP. The Coast Guard has Encountered Challenges in Meeting its Goals for Multiple COP-Related Systems
The Coast Guard has experienced multiple challenges in meeting its goals for multiple COP-related systems. Our site visits to area, district, and sector command centers in six Coast Guard field locations, and discussions with headquarters personnel identified numerous examples of user concerns about EGIS. When EGIS was installed on these older computers performance suffered. The Coast Guard Has Not Adhered to its Information Technology Development Guidance for Most Recent COP Technology
Although the SDLC process has been in place since 2004, the Coast Guard has not adhered to this guidance for the development of more recent COP-related technology—Coast Guard One View, or CG1V. Although officials stated in October 2012 that efforts were underway to complete phase one documents for CG1V, as of February 2013, almost a year after CG1V’s April 2012 designation into the second phase of the SDLC, the Coast Guard has not completed two of the five key documents needed to exit the first phase. The tailoring plan is to provide a clear and concise listing of SDLC process requirements throughout the entire system lifecycle, and facilitates the documentation of calculated deviations from standard SDLC activities, products, roles, and responsibilities from the outset of the project. Though the SDLC manual clearly states that the tailoring plan is a key first step in the SDLC, CG1V’s tailoring plan was not approved until February 2013, almost a year after CG1V was designated into the SDLC. Coast Guard officials stated that they were completing some documents retroactively because projects cannot exit any phase of the SDLC process without completing the documents required in each of the preceding phases. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure that the Coast Guard follows the SDLC as required, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard direct the Coast Guard Chief Information Officer to issue guidance clarifying the application of the SDLC for the development of future projects. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security for comment. With regard to our recommendation, that the Coast Guard issue guidance clarifying the application of the SDLC for the development of future projects, DHS stated that the Coast Guard will review, clarify, and issue guidance related to the applicability of the SDLC process to mitigate risks of implementation challenges and maximize the potential contribution of future technology development for the COP. EGIS can display this information on multiple viewers. | Why GAO Did This Study
To facilitate its mission effectiveness and share maritime situational awareness, the Coast Guard developed its COP--a map-based information system shared among its commands. The COP displays vessels, information about those vessels, and the environment surrounding them on interactive digital maps. COP information is shared via computer networks throughout the Coast Guard to assist with operational decisions.
GAO was requested to evaluate the Coast Guard's development of COP-related systems. GAO assessed the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has made progress in making information included in the COP available to users and any challenges it has encountered in implementing COP-related systems, and (2) followed its approved information technology development guidance when developing new technology.
GAO conducted site visits to six Coast Guard sector commands and five district command centers, based on geography to engage a broad range of COP users, analyzed Coast Guard policies and documents, and interviewed Coast Guard headquarters officials managing the COP's development and implementation.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Coast Guard, a component of the Department of Homeland Security, has made progress in developing its Common Operational Picture (COP) by increasing the information in the COP and increasing user access to this information, but the Coast Guard has also faced challenges in developing COP-related systems. The Coast Guard has made progress by adding internal and external data sources that allow for better maritime domain awareness--the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could affect the United States. In addition, the COP has made information from these sources available to more COP users and decision makers throughout the Coast Guard. However, the Coast Guard has also experienced challenges in meeting the COP's goals and implementing systems to display and share COP information. For example, it experienced challenges when it deployed its Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS), a tool that did not meet user needs. The challenges Coast Guard personnel experienced with EGIS included system slowness and displays of inaccurate information. Our prior work found similar challenges with other Coast Guard COP-related systems not meeting intended objectives. For example, in February 2012, GAO reported that the intended information-sharing capabilities of the Coast Guard's WatchKeeper software, a major part of the $74 million Interagency Operations Center project, did not meet port partners' needs, in part, because the agency failed to determine these needs.
The Coast Guard has not followed its own information technology development guidance when developing new technology. A recent example occurred in 2012 when the agency did not follow its System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) guidance during its initial development of Coast Guard One View (CG1V), its new planned COP viewer. The SDLC requires documents to be completed during specific phases of product development. The Coast Guard, however, did not follow this process during the early development of CG1V. Specifically, we found in February 2013, 9 months after CG1V had entered into the SDLC that the Coast Guard either had not created certain required documents or had created them outside of the sequence prescribed by the SDLC. For example, the SDLC-required tailoring plan is to provide a clear and concise listing of SDLC process requirements throughout the entire system lifecycle, and facilitates the documentation of calculated deviations from standard SDLC activities, products, roles, and responsibilities from the outset of the project. Though the SDLC clearly states that the tailoring plan is a key first step in the SDLC, for CG1V it was not written until after documents required in the second phase were completed. Coast Guard officials stated that this late completion of the tailoring plan occurred because the Coast Guard's Chief Information Officer had allowed the project to start in the second phase of the SDLC because they believed it was a proven concept. Without key phase one documents, the Coast Guard may have dedicated resources without knowing project costs. In October 2012, Coast Guard officials acknowledged the importance of following the SDLC process and stated their intent to complete the SDLC-required documents. Clarifying the application of the SDLC to new technology development would better position the Coast Guard to maximize the usefulness of the COP.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard clarify the application of the SDLC for the development of future technology projects. DHS concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-421 | gao_GAO-06-421_0 | State and SSA reported acquiring personal information from information resellers for fraud detection and investigation, identity verification, and benefit eligibility determination. The four agencies reported approximately $30 million in contractual arrangements with information resellers in fiscal year 2005. Approximately 91 percent of agency uses of reseller data were in the categories of law enforcement (69 percent) or counterterrorism (22 percent). For example, the U.S. DEA, the second largest Justice user of information resellers in fiscal year 2005, obtains reseller data to detect fraud in prescription drug transactions. Resellers Take Steps to Protect Privacy, but These Measures Are Not Fully Consistent with the Fair Information Practices
Although the information resellers that do business with the federal agencies we reviewed have practices in place to protect privacy, these measures were not fully consistent with the Fair Information Practices. However, the information reseller industry presupposes that the collection and use of personal information is not limited to specific purposes, but instead that information can be collected and made available to multiple customers for multiple purposes. However, resellers generally limited the extent to which individuals could gain access to personal information held about themselves, and because they obtain their information from other sources, most resellers also had limited provisions for correcting or deleting inaccurate information contained in their databases (relevant to the individual participation principle). Regarding the principle that, where appropriate, information should be collected with the knowledge and consent of the individual, resellers do not make provisions to notify the individuals involved when they obtain personal data from their many sources, including public records. Given recent incidents, large information resellers reported having recently taken steps to improve their safeguards against unauthorized access. Agencies Lack Policies on Use of Reseller Data, and Practices Do Not Consistently Reflect the Fair Information Practices
Agency practices for handling personal information acquired from information resellers did not always fully reflect the Fair Information Practices. This practice is consistent with the data quality principle that data should be accurate, current, and complete. The inconsistencies in application of these principles as well as the lack of specific agency policies can be attributed in part to ambiguities in OMB guidance regarding the applicability of the Privacy Act to information obtained from resellers. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) component of DHS and the Office of Consular Affairs within the Department of State reported similar practices. They suggested that it would be unreasonable to require them to comply with aspects of the Fair Information Practices that they believe were intended for other types of users of personal information, such as organizations that collect information directly from consumers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the following: how the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration are making use of personal information obtained through contracts with information resellers; the extent to which the information resellers providing personal information to these agencies have policies and practices in place that reflect widely accepted principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information; and the extent to which these agencies have policies and practices in place for handling information reseller data that reflect widely accepted principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information. To determine the extent that they reflect widely accepted Fair Information Practices, we reviewed and compared information reseller’s privacy policies and procedures with these principles. General. Uneven. These permissible uses include the following: for use by any government agency in carrying out its functions; for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; motor vehicle market research activities; for use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business, but only to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business and, if such information is not correct, to obtain the correct information but only for purposes of preventing fraud by pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual; for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any federal, state, or local court or agency; for use in research activities; for use by any insurer or insurance support organization in connection with claims investigation activities; for use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded for use by a licensed private investigative agency for any purpose permitted under the act; for use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain information relating to the holder of a commercial driver’s license; for use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation for any other use, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom a request for personal information pertains; for bulk distribution of surveys, marketing, or solicitations, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains; for use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates that it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains; and for any other use specifically authorized under a state law, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. Comments from the Department of Justice
Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Comments from the Social Security Administration
Appendix VI | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies collect and use personal information for various purposes, both directly from individuals and from other sources, including information resellers--companies that amass and sell data from many sources. In light of concerns raised by recent security breaches involving resellers, GAO was asked to determine how the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration use personal data from these sources. In addition, GAO reviewed the extent to which information resellers' policies and practices reflect the Fair Information Practices, a set of widely accepted principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal data. GAO also examined agencies' policies and practices for handling personal data from resellers to determine whether these reflect the Fair Information Practices.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2005, the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State and the Social Security Administration reported that they used personal information obtained from resellers for a variety of purposes. Components of the Department of Justice (the largest user of resellers) used such information in performing criminal investigations, locating witnesses and fugitives, researching assets held by individuals of interest, and detecting prescription drug fraud. The Department of Homeland Security used reseller information for immigration fraud detection and border screening programs. Uses by the Social Security Administration and the Department of State were to prevent and detect fraud, verify identity, and determine eligibility for benefits. The agencies spent approximately $30 million on contractual arrangements with resellers that enabled the acquisition and use of such information. About 91 percent of the planned fiscal year 2005 spending was for law enforcement (69 percent) or counterterrorism (22 percent). The major information resellers that do business with the federal agencies we reviewed have practices in place to protect privacy, but these measures are not fully consistent with the Fair Information Practices. For example, the principles that the collection and use of personal information should be limited and its intended use specified are largely at odds with the nature of the information reseller business, which presupposes that personal information can be made available to multiple customers and for multiple purposes. Resellers said they believe it is not appropriate for them to fully adhere to these principles because they do not obtain their information directly from individuals. Nonetheless, in many cases, resellers take steps that address aspects of the Fair Information Practices. For example, resellers reported that they have taken steps recently to improve their security safeguards, and they generally inform the public about key privacy principles and policies. However, resellers generally limit the extent to which individuals can gain access to personal information held about themselves, as well as the extent to which inaccurate information contained in their databases can be corrected or deleted. Agency practices for handling personal information acquired from information resellers did not always fully reflect the Fair Information Practices. That is, some of these principles were mirrored in agency practices, but for others, agency practices were uneven. For example, although agencies issued public notices on information collections, these did not always notify the public that information resellers were among the sources to be used. This practice is not consistent with the principle that individuals should be informed about privacy policies and the collection of information. Contributing to the uneven application of the Fair Information Practices are ambiguities in guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding the applicability of privacy requirements to federal agency uses of reseller information. In addition, agencies generally lack policies that specifically address these uses. |
gao_GAO-10-478T | gao_GAO-10-478T_0 | Cost Increases and Schedule Delays Increase Risk of Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time
The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress—negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 ½ years, compared to the program baseline approved in 2007. DOD is now taking some positive steps that, if effectively implemented, should improve future outcomes and provide more realistic cost and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and funding for system development, added four aircraft to the flight test program, and reduced near-term procurement quantities by 122 aircraft. Dates for achieving initial operational capabilities may have to be extended or some requirements deferred to future upgrades. Also, aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by the statutory provision commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy and require the department to certify the need for the JSF to Congress. Manufacturing and Engineering Challenges Continue to Slow Aircraft Deliveries and Put the Production Schedule at Risk
Manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and effort than budgeted. Little Progress in Development Testing While Program Continues to Face Technical Challenges
Although DOD’s restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to push ahead and invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant designs are proven and system performance verified. At the same time, progress on flight testing is behind schedule—slowed by late aircraft deliveries and low productivity, the flight test program completed only 10 percent of the sorties planned during 2009, according to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Our updated analysis, based largely on data provided by the JSF program office, found that, without competition, an estimated $62.5 billion will be needed over the remainder of the F135 primary (current) engine to cover costs for completing system development, procuring 2,443 engines, production support, and sustainment. An additional investment of between $4.5 billion to $5.7 billion (depending on the competitive scenario) may be required should the department continue competition. Depending on assumptions, the additional costs of the alternate engine investment could be recouped if competition were to generate approximately 10.1 to 12.6 percent savings over the life of the program. Air Force data on the first 4 years of competition for engines on the F-16 aircraft projected they would recoup at least that much. Actual savings will ultimately depend on factors such as the number of aircraft actually purchased, the ratio of engines awarded to each contractor, and when the competition begins. Competition may also provide non-quantifiable benefits with respect to better contractor responsiveness, technical innovation and improved operational readiness. In previous years, we recommended, among other things, that DOD rethink plans to cut test resources, improve reliability and completeness of cost estimates, and reduce the annual number of aircraft procured before testing demonstrates their performance capabilities. In our March 2010 JSF report, we recommended that DOD (1) make a new, comprehensive and independent assessment of the costs and schedule to complete the program, including military construction, other JSF-related expenses, and life cycle costs; and (2) reassess warfighter requirements and, if necessary, defer some capabilities to future increments. The department concurred with both recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The current estimated investment is $323 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. This statement draws substantively from GAO's March 19, 2010 report (GAO-10-382). That report discusses JSF costs and schedules, warfighter requirements, manufacturing performance, procurement rates, and development testing plans. This statement also provides an updated analysis of relative costs and benefits from a second (or alternate) engine program. In previous years, we recommended, among other things, that DOD rethink plans to cut test resources, improve reliability of cost estimates, and reduce the number of aircraft procured before testing demonstrates their performance capabilities. In our March 2010 report, we recommended that DOD (1) make a new, comprehensive assessment of the program's costs and schedule and (2) reassess warfighter requirements. DOD concurred with both recommendations.
What GAO Found
The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress--negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 1/2 more years, compared to the approved program baseline approved in 2007. Aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by the statutory provision referred to as Nunn McCurdy and may require DOD to recertify the need for the JSF to Congress. The program is at risk for not delivering aircraft quantities and capabilities on time. Dates for achieving initial operational capabilities may have to be extended or some requirements deferred to future upgrades. DOD leadership is taking some positive steps that should reduce risk and provide more realistic cost and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and funding for system development, added four aircraft to the flight test program, and reduced near-term procurement quantities. If effectively implemented, these actions should improve future program outcomes. Currently, however, manufacturing JSF test aircraft continues to take more time, money, and effort than budgeted, hampering the development flight test program. Slowed by late aircraft deliveries and low productivity, the flight test program only completed 10 percent of the sorties planned during 2009. Although restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD continues to invest in large quantities of production aircraft before variant designs are proven and performance verified. Under the current plan, DOD may procure as many as 307 aircraft at a total estimated cost of $58.2 billion before development flight testing is completed. Our updated analysis on engine costs shows that, without competition, an estimated $62.5 billion will be needed over the remainder of the F135 primary engine effort to cover costs for completing system development, procuring 2,443 engines, production support, and sustainment. Additional investment of between $4.5 billion to $5.7 billion may be required should the department continue competition. Under certain assumptions, the additional costs of continuing the F136 alternate engine program could be recouped if competition were to generate approximately 10.1 to 12.6 percent savings over the life of the program. Air Force data on the first 4 years of competition for engines on the F-16 aircraft projected they would recoup at least that much. Actual savings will ultimately depend on factors such as the number of aircraft actually purchased, the ratio of engines awarded to each contractor, and when the competition begins. Competition may also provide non-quantifiable benefits with respect to better contractor responsiveness, technical innovation and improved operational readiness. |
gao_GAO-06-238 | gao_GAO-06-238_0 | Private Sector Companies We Interviewed Routinely Use Third Party Contractors and Occasionally Share SSNs with Them
Banks, securities firms, telecommunication companies, and tax preparation companies we interviewed routinely obtain SSNs from their customers for authentication and identification purposes. All the companies we interviewed contracted out various services, such as data processing, administrative, and customer service functions. Although these companies may share consumer information, such as SSNs, with contractors that provide services to their customers, company officials said that they only share such information with their contractors for limited purposes, generally when it is necessary or unavoidable. Furthermore, we found that some industry associations have voluntarily developed guidance for their members regarding the sharing of personal information with third parties. Federal Regulation and Oversight of SSN Sharing Varies Widely Among the Industries We Reviewed
Federal regulation and oversight of SSN sharing varies across the four industries we reviewed, revealing gaps in the federal law and oversight in different industries that share SSNs with their contractors. Federal law and oversight of the sharing of personal information in the financial services industry is very extensive: Financial services companies must comply with GLBA requirements for safeguarding customer’s personal information, and regulators have an examination process in place that includes determining whether banks and securities firms are safeguarding this information. IRS has regulations and guidance in place to restrict the disclosure of SSNs by tax preparers and their contractors, but does not perform periodic reviews of tax preparers’ compliance. Because it believes that it lacks statutory authority to do so, FCC has not issued regulations covering SSNs and also does not periodically review telecommunications companies to determine whether they are safeguarding such information. State Laws Also Affect the Disclosure and Sharing of SSNs with Third Parties
Company officials informed us of laws in 15 states they believe either affect how they share sensitive personal information including SSNs with their contractors or limit both their own and their contractors use and handling of this information. Closely evaluate all contracts to ensure necessary provisions for assuring security and confidentiality are included. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent data breaches highlight how identity theft may occur when businesses share individuals' personal information, including Social Security Numbers (SSNs), with contractors. Because private sector entities are more likely to share consumers' personal information via contractors, members of Congress raised concerns about the protection of this information in contractual relationships. In response, GAO examined (1) how entities within certain industries share SSNs with contractors; (2) the safeguards and notable industry standards in place to ensure the protection of SSNs when shared with contractors; and (3) how federal agencies regulate and monitor the sharing and safeguarding of SSNs between private entities and their contractors.
What GAO Found
Banks, securities firms, telecommunication companies, and tax preparation companies share SSNs with contractors for limited purposes. Firms GAO interviewed routinely obtain SSNs from their customers for authentication and identification purposes, and contract out various services, such as data processing and customer service functions. Although these companies may share consumer information, such as SSNs, with contractors, company officials said that they only share such information with their contractors when it is necessary or unavoidable. Companies in the four business sectors GAO studied primarily relied on accepted industry practices and used the terms of their contracts to protect the personal information shared with contractors. Most company officials stated that their contracts had provisions for auditing and monitoring to assure contract compliance. Some noted that their industry associations have also developed general guidance for their members on sharing personal information with third parties. Federal regulation and oversight of SSN sharing varied across the four industries GAO reviewed, revealing gaps in federal law and agency oversight in the four industries GAO reviewed that share SSNs with contractors. Financial services companies must comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) for safeguarding customers' personal information and regulators have an examination process in place to determine whether banks and securities firms are safeguarding this information. IRS has regulations and guidance in place to restrict the disclosure of SSNs by tax preparers and their contractors, but does not perform periodic reviews of tax preparers' compliance. Because the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) believes that it lacks statutory authority to do so, it has not issued regulations covering SSNs and also does not periodically review telecommunications companies to determine whether they are safeguarding such information. |
gao_NSIAD-98-140 | gao_NSIAD-98-140_0 | Background
FBCB2 will be the principal digital command and control system for the Army at the brigade level and below and will constitute the third major component of the Army’s Battle Command System. FBCB2 is currently classified as a category II acquisition program. Program Significance, Estimated Cost, and Schedule Risk Indicate Need for Higher Level Systematic Oversight
FBCB2 is currently designated a category II acquisition on the basis of the Army’s estimate of research, development, test, and evaluation costs. However, despite this critical role, the Army has not designated FBCB2 as a category I acquisition—a designation it has given to the other major systems in the Army’s Battle Command System. However, despite this acknowledged schedule risk, the Army is moving ahead with its highly compressed schedule without specifically addressing the implications of not fielding an adequately developed system by the end of fiscal year 2000. FBCB2 Experimental Results Revealed Problems and Potential for Improvement
Since the FBCB2 program has only recently entered engineering and manufacturing development and is scheduled to undergo about 18 months of testing, no operational evaluations are yet available for analysis. The report candidly discussed poor message completion rates, difficulty with message formats, and the limitations of the experimental hardware and software. Specific systems observed were the Applique and the Tactical Internet. Army program officials currently assess the program’s technical risk as medium. Conclusions and Recommendations
Even though FBCB2 is one of the Army’s top priorities and a key component of the systems needed to field the first digitized division, the Army has not designated the program as a category I acquisition. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology to consider our analysis of the FBCB2 program and make a determination of whether it should be appropriately characterized as an acquisition category I-D on the basis of its significance to the Army’s battlefield digitization goal, the costs we discuss in this report, schedule risk, the new Army cost estimate expected to be available by the end of this fiscal year, and the benefits of prudent oversight and analyze, regardless of eventual category designation, the risks and likely immediate benefits associated with equipping a division with an FBCB2 capability by the end of fiscal year 2000 and provide guidance to Army acquisition executives on managing those risks. Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the significance of the FBCB2 program, we reviewed the objectives of the Army XXI and Army After Next initiatives, the priority of FBCB2 within the Army’s digitization programs, system comparability with other Army command and control programs, and an assessment of FBCB2’s significance prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Operational Test and Evaluation Office. In reviewing experimental performance results of the FBCB2 prototype at the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment, we considered the Army’s Operational Test and Evaluation Command’s Live Experiment Assessment Report and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, briefing on early operational insights. GAO Comments
1. 2. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's acquisition plans for the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) program, focusing on the: (1) program's significance to the Army's battlefield digitization goal; (2) Army's derivation of cost estimates; and (3) feasibility of the Army's fielding schedule.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of the Army's estimate of FBCB2 research, development, test and evaluation costs, the program has been classified as a category II acquisition--one that does not require systematic oversight by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; (2) GAO believes that because of the FBCB2's significance, cost, and schedule risk, the FBCB2 should be classified as a category I acquisition and receive a higher level of oversight; (3) although FBCB2 is critical to the Army's digitization plan--the system ties the upper level command and control systems to the digital battlefield--FBCB2 is the only major system in the Army's Battle Command System that has not been designated category I; (4) the system's potential to provide thousands of soldiers with the ability to send and receive clear and consistent battlefield information in almost real time demonstrates the system's significance as a linchpin of the digital battlefield; (5) this significance is confirmed by the Army's own designation of FBCB2 as one of the highest priority command and control systems and the Army's plan to equip a division with a FBCB2 capability by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2000; (6) GAO's analysis indicates that there are additional research, development, test, and evaluation costs that, when included, increase the dollar significance of this program to a category I acquisition level; (7) the FBCB2 program faces a significant schedule risk in meeting the FY 2000 mandate for fielding the first digitized division; (8) however, despite this acknowledged schedule risk, the Army is moving ahead with its highly compressed schedule with no apparent risk management strategy specifically addressing alternatives and the implications of not fielding an adequately developed system by the end of FY 2000; (9) because the FBCB2 program has only recently entered engineering and manufacturing development, no operational evaluations are yet available for analysis; (10) however, the 1997 Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment employed a prototype FBCB2; (11) two independent organizations, the Army's Operational Test and Evaluation Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operational Test and Evaluation Office, assessed FBCB2 results and found a number of problems; (12) these included poor message completion, limitations related to the experimental hardware and software, a lack of adequate digital connectivity, immaturity of the Applique--the Army's name for FBCB2 computer--and the Tactical Internet, and inadequate training; and (13) Army officials currently assess the program's technical risk as medium. |
gao_GAO-09-824 | gao_GAO-09-824_0 | However, Border Patrol officials have stated that additional canines, non- intrusive inspection technology, and staff are needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. Apprehending Illegal Aliens
Checkpoints have also contributed to apprehensions of illegal aliens. Checkpoint Performance Measures Have Been Established, but Data Limitations Hinder their Usefulness
The Border Patrol established a number of measures for checkpoint performance to inform the public on program results and provide management oversight; however, information gaps and reporting issues have hindered public accountability, and inconsistent data collection and entry have hindered management’s ability to monitor the need for program improvement. The Border Patrol first reported the checkpoint performance results for these three measures in CBP’s fiscal year 2007 PAR. This includes the accurate recording and reporting of data necessary to demonstrate agency operations. Unclear definitions in guidance. Border Patrol Considered Community Impact in Checkpoint Placement and Design
Among other factors, the Border Patrol considered community safety and convenience in recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, in accordance with Border Patrol guidelines and requirements of other federal, state, and local agencies. Community Members Cited Some Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations, and Border Patrol Reported Having Limited Resources to Minimize Them
Community members living near checkpoints we visited across the four southwest border states told us they generally supported checkpoints operating near them because of the law enforcement presence they provide, but remained most concerned about the property damage that occurs when illegal aliens trespass on private property to avoid the checkpoints. Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and respond to this circumvention activity; however, officials stated that other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents and resources on checkpoint circumvention routes. However, given the limited resources currently deployed to address circumvention activity at the I-19 checkpoint and community concerns regarding the extent of illegal activity in the circumvention areas, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help the Border Patrol ensure that sufficient resources are planned for and deployed at the new checkpoint to address circumvention activity. The Department’s Director believed that this was due, in part, to the presence of the Border Patrol agents at the checkpoints on U.S. Border Patrol Has Identified Measures for Assessing Impact of Checkpoint Operations on Surrounding Areas, but Has Not Used Them
Border Patrol officials said that they are not yet using performance measures they had developed to examine how checkpoint operations— including checkpoint circumvention activity—impact the quality of life in surrounding communities. Despite these investments at the border, however, it would appear that checkpoints will continue to serve a purpose as part of the Border Patrol’s three-tiered strategy. Establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data. To ensure that the checkpoint design process results in checkpoints that are sized and resourced to meet operational and community needs, we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection take the following two actions: Require that current and expected traffic volumes be considered by the Border Patrol when determining the number of inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be conducted and documented, and that these requirements be explicitly documented in Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards. Checkpoint Contributions
To assess the contributions checkpoints make to the Border Patrol’s mission and the factors that affect checkpoint performance, we reviewed Border Patrol policy and guidance regarding checkpoint operations and interviewed officials at Border Patrol headquarters, including the Chief and other senior managers, and officials responsible for operating checkpoints in five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the southwest border. These checkpoint performance measures reported in the PAR are (1) apprehensions at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol apprehensions, (2) drug seizures at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol drug seizures, and (3) percentage of checkpoint cases referred to a U.S. Attorney. 4. 19. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. GAO was asked to assess (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance, (2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint operations on nearby communities. GAO work included a review of Border Patrol data and guidance; visits to checkpoints and communities in five Border Patrol sectors across four southwest border states, selected on the basis of size, type, and volume, among other factors; and discussions with community members and Border Patrol officials in headquarters and field locations.
What GAO Found
Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol's ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. Checkpoint contributions included over one-third of the Border Patrol's total drug seizures, according to Border Patrol data. Despite these and other contributions, Border Patrol officials said that additional staff, canine teams, and inspection technology were needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials said they plan to increase these resources. The Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These factors hindered management's ability to monitor the need for program improvement. Internal control standards require that agencies accurately record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency performance, and that they provide proper oversight of these activities. The Border Patrol generally followed its guidelines for considering community safety and convenience in four recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, including the proposed permanent checkpoint on Interstate 19 in Arizona. Current and projected traffic volume was a key factor in the design of the proposed Interstate 19 checkpoint, but was not considered when determining the number of inspection lanes for three recently completed checkpoints in Texas due to a lack of guidance. Having explicit guidance on using current and projected traffic volumes could help ensure that future checkpoints are appropriately sized. Individuals GAO contacted who live near checkpoints generally supported their operations but expressed concerns regarding property damage that occurs when illegal aliens and smugglers circumvent checkpoints to avoid apprehension. The Border Patrol is not yet using performance measures it has developed to examine the extent that checkpoint operations affect quality of life in surrounding communities. The Border Patrol uses patrols and technology to detect and respond to circumventions, but officials said that other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents on checkpoint circumvention routes. The Border Patrol has not documented the number of agents needed to address circumventions at the proposed I-19 checkpoint. Given the concerns of nearby residents regarding circumventions, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help ensure that resources needed for addressing such activity are planned for and deployed. |
gao_GAO-13-808 | gao_GAO-13-808_0 | Through its acquisition process, DOD contracts with a pharmacy benefit manager— currently Express Scripts—to provide access to a retail pharmacy network and operate a mail order pharmacy for beneficiaries, and to provide administrative services. 2.) Acquisition planning. In addition, we have previously reported that sound acquisition planning includes an assessment of lessons learned to identify improvements. DOD Used Market Research to Align the Requirements for Its Upcoming Pharmacy Services Contract with Industry Best Practices and Promote Competition
DOD solicited information from industry during its acquisition planning for the upcoming pharmacy services contract through the required market research process, including issuing RFIs and a draft RFP for industry comment, to identify changes to requirements for its pharmacy services contract. DOD has also used the RFI process to obtain information on promoting competition. For example, DOD’s December 2011 RFI asked for industry perspectives on the length of the contract period. DOD officials told us that the responses they received confirmed that potential offerors would prefer a longer contract period because it would allow a non-incumbent more time to recover any capital investment made as part of implementing the contract. The RFP for the upcoming contract includes a contract period of 1 base year and 7 option years. DOD Identified Changes to Requirements for its Upcoming and Current Pharmacy Services Contracts in Response to Legislation, Efforts to Improve Service Delivery, and Contractor Performance
Since the start of the current pharmacy services contract in 2009, DOD has identified changes to the contract requirements in response to legislative changes to the pharmacy benefit, efforts to improve service delivery to beneficiaries, and improvements identified through monitoring of the current contractor’s performance. A third legislative change to the pharmacy benefit was the mail-order pilot for maintenance drugs for TRICARE for Life beneficiaries. DOD officials incorporated this change in the requirements for the upcoming pharmacy services contract, as outlined in the RFP. DOD Has Not Conducted an Assessment of Its Pharmacy Services Contract that Includes an Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Alternative Structures
Since retail pharmacy services were carved out about 10 years ago, DOD has not conducted an assessment of the appropriateness of its current pharmacy services contract structure that includes an evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative structures. Alternative structures can include a carve-in of all pharmacy services into the managed care support contracts, or a structure that carves in a component of pharmacy services, such as the mail-order pharmacy, while maintaining a carve-out structure for other components. DOD officials told us they believe that DOD’s current pharmacy services contract structure continues to be appropriate, as it affords more control over pharmacy data and allows for more detailed data analyses and increased transparency about costs. The managed care support contractors we spoke with expressed similar concerns. While DOD officials believe the current structure is appropriate, there have been significant changes in the pharmacy benefit management market in the past decade. These changes include mergers, as well as companies offering new services that may change the services and options available to DOD. We have also reported that a comparative evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternatives can provide an evidence-based rationale for why an agency has chosen a particular alternative (such as a decision to maintain or alter the current pharmacy services contract structure). Without such an evaluation, DOD cannot effectively demonstrate to Congress and stakeholders that it has chosen the most appropriate contract structure, in terms of costs to the government and services for beneficiaries. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide decision makers with more complete information on the continued appropriateness of the current pharmacy services contract structure, and to ensure the best value and services to the government and beneficiaries, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take the following two actions: conduct an evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of alternative contract structures for the TRICARE pharmacy services contract; and incorporate such an evaluation into acquisition planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD offers health care coverage--medical and pharmacy services--to eligible beneficiaries through its TRICARE program. DOD contracts with managed care support contractors to provide medical services, and separately with a pharmacy benefit manager to provide pharmacy services that include the TRICARE mail-order pharmacy and access to a retail pharmacy network. This is referred to as a carve-out contract structure. DOD's current pharmacy contract ends in the fall of 2014. DOD has been preparing for its upcoming contract through acquisition planning, which included identifying any needed changes to contract requirements.
Senate Report 112-173, which accompanied a version of the NDAA for fiscal year 2013, mandated that GAO review DOD's health care contracts. For this report, GAO examined: (1) how DOD identified changes needed, if any, to requirements for its upcoming pharmacy services contract; and (2) what, if any, assessment DOD has done of the appropriateness of its current contract structure. GAO reviewed DOD acquisition planning documents and federal regulations, and interviewed officials from DOD and its pharmacy services contractor.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) used various methods to identify needed changes to requirements for its upcoming pharmacy services contract. During acquisition planning for the upcoming TRICARE pharmacy services contract, DOD solicited feedback from industry through its market research process to align the contract requirements with industry best practices and promote competition. For example, DOD issued requests for information (RFI) in which DOD asked questions about specific market trends, such as ensuring that certain categories of drugs are distributed through the most cost-effective mechanism. DOD also issued an RFI to obtain information on promoting competition, asking industry for opinions on the length of the contract period. DOD officials told us that responses indicated that potential offerors would prefer a longer contract period because it would allow a new contractor more time to recover any capital investment made in implementing the contract. The request for proposals for the upcoming contract, issued in June 2013, included a contract period of 1 base year and 7 option years. DOD also identified changes to contract requirements in response to legislative changes to the TRICARE pharmacy benefit. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2013 required DOD to implement a mail-order pilot for maintenance drugs for beneficiaries who are also enrolled in Medicare Part B. DOD officials incorporated this change in the requirements for the upcoming pharmacy services contract.
DOD has not conducted an assessment of the appropriateness of its current pharmacy services contract structure that includes an evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative structures. Alternative structures can include incorporating all pharmacy services into the managed care support contracts--a carve-in structure--or a structure that incorporates certain components of DOD's pharmacy services, such as the mail-order pharmacy, into the managed care support contracts while maintaining a separate contract for other components. DOD officials told GAO they believe that DOD's current carve-out contract structure continues to be appropriate, as it affords more control over pharmacy data that allows for detailed data analyses and cost transparency, meets program goals, and has high beneficiary satisfaction. However, there have been significant changes in the pharmacy benefit management market in the past decade, including mergers and companies offering new services that may change the services and options available to DOD. GAO has previously reported that sound acquisition planning includes an assessment of lessons learned to identify improvements. Additionally, GAO has reported that a comparative evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternatives can provide an evidence-based rationale for why an agency has chosen a particular alternative. Without this type of evaluation, DOD cannot effectively demonstrate that it has chosen the most appropriate contract structure in terms of costs to the government and services for beneficiaries.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD conduct an evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of alternative structures for the TRICARE pharmacy services contract, and incorporate such an evaluation into acquisition planning. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-699 | gao_GAO-14-699_0 | The Corps Does Not Track All Construction Projects and Studies on Its Backlog
The Corps’ report of a $62 billion backlog list of more than 1,000 projects is incomplete because the agency does not track all of its authorized construction projects and studies. Specifically, the Corps does not enter all authorized projects and studies into its databases because of the absence of a policy to do so. Without having complete information on its backlog, the Corps does not know the full extent of unmet water resources needs of the nation, and Congress does not have complete information to make informed decisions on project and study authorizations and appropriations. Corps headquarters officials told us that the agency does not have a policy instructing district offices to enter projects that are authorized but have not been appropriated funds into their databases, and it is left to the discretion of the district offices to do so. Officials at the 15 other district offices told us they enter projects into the Corps’ databases only after funds are appropriated. However, federal standards for internal control call for agencies to document internal control in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals and be readily available for examination. We also have previously found that it is important to have agencywide policies and procedures to help ensure consistent treatment, especially if employees are geographically dispersed. The Corps’ reported backlog does not include studies. Corps officials stated the agency does not track a backlog of all authorized studies, nor does it have a policy instructing districts to do so, due to manpower and resource constraints. Without having this data, the Corps cannot comply with the requirement to submit a list to Congress identifying studies for deauthorization that have not had funds appropriated for 5 fiscal years. Without having a complete backlog list of projects and studies, it is difficult for the Corps to know the full universe of unmet water resources needs in the country. Corps headquarters officials said that once the new database has been implemented, district or headquarters officials will be required to enter data on new construction projects following authorization. However, federal internal control standards call for agencies to have mechanisms in place to appropriately document transactions and other significant events. The Corps Has Not Identified All Projects and Studies for Deauthorization or Complied with Statutory Deauthorization Requirements
The Corps has not identified all eligible construction projects and studies for deauthorization and has not complied with statutory requirements to notify Congress of all projects and studies eligible for deauthorization. As discussed earlier, the Corps does not require its district offices to enter all authorized projects into its databases; therefore, the agency is unlikely to identify as eligible for deauthorization those projects that are excluded from the database and have not had funds obligated for 5 fiscal years. The Corps Has Not Identified All Projects Eligible for Deauthorization Due to Limited Data
As discussed earlier, not all projects are included in the Corps’ databases because the agency does not have policies and procedures in place to enter all authorized projects; therefore, some projects that have not had obligations in 5 fiscal years are unlikely to appear on the Corps’ list of projects eligible for deauthorization. Officials we interviewed from 5 of the 16 Corps district offices in our review said they do not attempt to identify and add projects to the draft list because they were not aware that they were to do so. The Corps Cannot Demonstrate It Has Consistently Notified Congress of Projects That Meet Deauthorization Eligibility
Current federal statute requires the Secretary of the Army to transmit to Congress a list of authorized projects or separable elements of projects that have had no obligations during the previous 5 full fiscal years. Without having a mechanism to compile data on studies or a documented policy and procedures in place to deauthorize studies as noted in federal internal control standards,Corps cannot comply with deauthorization requirements for studies specified in statute, and the agency, Congress, and nonfederal sponsors have incomplete information on what is feasible to address the water resources needs of the country. To ensure that the Corps meets the statutory requirements related to deauthorization of incomplete water resources studies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following three actions:
Establish a mechanism for tracking all authorized studies and establish and implement a written policy to ensure all authorized studies are tracked. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which the Corps tracks data on its backlog of construction projects and studies, and (2) the extent to which the Corps identifies construction projects and studies eligible for deauthorization, and meets statutory deauthorization requirements. We also interviewed officials from a nonprobability sample of 16 of 38 Corps domestic civil works district offices to determine how district offices track data on studies and projects and implement the deauthorization process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps reports having a backlog of more than 1,000 authorized water resources construction projects in its Civil Works Program that it estimates to cost more than $62 billion to complete, as of June 2014. Federal statute requires the Corps to identify for deauthorization projects that have had no obligations for 5 years and studies that have had no appropriations for 5 years. Once a project or study is deauthorized, it must be reauthorized to begin or resume construction or study.
GAO was asked to review the Corps' construction backlog and deauthorization processes. This report examines (1) the extent to which the Corps tracks its backlog of construction projects and studies, and (2) the extent to which the Corps identifies construction projects and studies eligible for deauthorization, and meets statutory deauthorization requirements. GAO reviewed legislation, Corps policy, guidance, and documentation of its backlog and deauthorization process. GAO interviewed Corps headquarters officials and officials from 16 of the Corps' 38 domestic civil works districts, selected based on geographical representation and number of projects.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) backlog list of authorized water resources construction projects is incomplete because the agency does not track all authorized projects and the list does not include studies. Specifically, GAO found that the backlog does not include some projects that were authorized but were not appropriated funds. Corps headquarters officials said that the agency does not have a policy instructing its district offices to enter into their databases projects that are authorized but have not been appropriated funds and that it is up to the discretion of the district offices to do so. Corps officials also stated that the agency does not include studies on its backlog, nor does it have a policy instructing district offices to track studies. Federal internal control standards state that agencies are to document internal controls in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals to help ensure consistent treatment. Officials at 15 of 16 district offices told GAO that they enter projects into the databases only after funds are appropriated. The Corps has begun to take steps to include all authorized projects in a new agency database; however, this database will not include studies. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to have mechanisms to appropriately document transactions and other significant events. Without written policies requiring districts to track all projects and studies and a mechanism to track studies, the Corps may continue to have an incomplete backlog list. The absence of a complete backlog list of projects and studies will likely make it difficult for the Corps to know the full universe of unmet water resource needs of the country, and Congress to make informed decisions when authorizing projects and studies, and appropriating funds.
The Corps has not identified all eligible construction projects and studies for deauthorization and has not complied with statutory requirements to notify Congress of all projects and studies eligible for deauthorization. The agency is unlikely to identify those projects that have been excluded from the databases and had no funds obligated for 5 fiscal years, because, as discussed above, the Corps does not require districts to enter all authorized projects into its databases. Officials GAO interviewed from 5 of 16 districts said they likely would not identify and add projects to the draft deauthorization eligible list because they were not required to do so. Moreover, the Corps has not complied with statutory requirements to notify Congress of all projects that have not had obligations in 5 fiscal years. Specifically, the Corps cannot demonstrate it transmitted a list of projects eligible for deauthorization 8 times in the 12 years it was required to do so since 1997. Corps headquarters officials said that the process and communication mechanisms for deauthorizing projects are not in Corps policies or procedures. Without documented policies and procedures consistent with federal standards for internal control, the Corps may continue its inconsistent publishing of deauthorization lists. In addition, the Corps has not complied with requirements to identify studies for deauthorization because officials have said the agency does not have the policies and procedures in place to do so. Without having the data, as discussed above, or policies and procedures in place to identify studies for deauthorization, the Corps and Congress will not have complete information to make decisions when prioritizing the water resources needs of the country.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Corps establish and implement policies to ensure projects and studies are tracked; establish a mechanism to track studies; and develop and implement policies to identify projects and studies that meet deauthorization criteria, and notify Congress. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-1024T | gao_GAO-10-1024T_0 | AoA at the Department of Health and Human Services provides grants to the states through the SUAs. Agencies Report Increased Requests for Meals and Transportation and Varied Efforts to Reach Those Most in Need
Local agencies who responded to our survey identified home-delivered meals and transportation as frequently requested services in fiscal year 2009. Thirteen of 67 agencies said they are generally or very unable to serve all clients who request home-delivered meals; 15 of the 63 agencies that provide transportation services said they are generally or very unable to meet all transportation requests. State and local officials we spoke with also said requests for some OAA services are increasing. A survey conducted by the National Association of State Units on Aging to determine the impact of the economic crisis on state-provided services also found requests for the types of services provided by OAA increased, particularly for home-delivered meals, transportation, and personal care. Given the number of agencies that cannot meet all requests for services and the increasing demand for certain services, agencies must make decisions about which applicants to serve. To reach and serve seniors with the greatest economic or social need, local agencies responding to our survey reported a range of strategies. Over 50 of 67 agencies said they advertise, conduct outreach, and coordinate with other local organizations to reach and provide services to seniors who are targeted by OAA: seniors who are low-income, minority, or live in rural areas. Some officials we spoke to said there are additional seniors who need services but do not contact OAA providers to request them. Preliminary responses to our survey indicate agencies utilize the flexibility provided by the OAA to transfer funds among Title III programs to meet requests from seniors for services. Twenty-eight of 61 local agencies responding to our question said they transferred funds among programs in fiscal year 2009, most often removing funds from congregate meals, which are less requested, to home- delivered meals or other services. In addition to receiving federal funding, the programs created by Title III of OAA receive funding from other sources as well. OAA funds to states and local agencies increased in fiscal year 2009 by $97 million due to Recovery Act funding explicitly for meal programs. Forty-four of 64 local agencies said state funding – the second largest source of funding for these programs nationally—decreased for fiscal year 2010. To replace lost state and local monies and maintain service levels to seniors, just under half of those responding to our survey said they took some steps to reduce administrative and operations costs and used Recovery Act funds to fill budgeting gaps. In our preliminary survey results, 27 of 65 agencies reported cutting administrative expenses, 22 of 54 reported cutting capital expenses, and 26 of 62 reported cutting operating expenditures in fiscal year 2010. Additionally, 29 of 63 said they did not fill vacant positions. These preliminary survey data are consistent with what we heard from state officials on our site visits. Some state and local agencies we visited also told us they adapt to limited funding or increased requests for services by providing less service to all rather than full service to only some. Seniors’ needs for the types of services provided through these programs will only increase over time since demographic studies show a larger proportion of Americans will be age 60 and older over the next few decades. Programs that allow seniors to remain in their own homes and communities afford seniors the independence and dignity they desire. As current fiscal stress and looming deficits continue to constrain available resources, it will be increasingly important for all elements of the home and community-based service network to focus services on those in greatest need. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the Title III services requested most often, local agencies’ use of federal funds, and steps agencies take to deliver resources to those most in need, we conducted a web-based random national sample survey of 125 Area Agencies on Aging (AAA). The survey included questions about: (1) utilization of OAA Title III services, (2) requests for OAA Title III services, (3) approaches for measuring unmet need to target resources to areas of greatest need, (4) use of OAA Title III funds, and (5) the economic climate and use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) funds. The survey is on-going, and the information included in this testimony presents preliminary results, based on the 67 responses (54 percent) we received as of July 30, 2010. Some individual questions have lower response rates. These states were selected due to varying sizes of the population age 60 and over and Title III expenditures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Administered by the Administration on Aging (AoA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Title III of the Older Americans Act (OAA) is intended to assist individuals age 60 and older by providing supportive services. Title III, Medicaid and Medicare, state, and other sources of funding provide for several types of services, including congregate and home-delivered meals, transportation, and support for caregivers. This testimony reports on ongoing GAO work in preparation for the reauthorization of the OAA and a full report to be issued by GAO in 2011. Based on preliminary findings, GAO describes (1) Title III services most requested by seniors and how state and local agencies reach those most in need, and (2) how agencies have coped with increasing requests in the current economic environment. To do this, GAO reviewed aging plans from the 50 states and District of Columbia; conducted site visits to 4 states; interviewed national, state, and local officials; and analyzed preliminary responses to a Web-based survey of 125 Local Area Agencies on Aging for fiscal year 2009. The survey data used in this document reflect a 54 percent response rate as of July 30, 2010. The survey is still in progress and our results are not generalizable at this time. GAO shared its findings with AoA and incorporated their comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Seniors frequently requested home-delivered meals and transportation services, and based on preliminary responses to GAO's survey and information from site visits, demand for some Title III services may be increasing. Some agencies said they were unable to meet all requests for services in fiscal year 2009. For example, 13 of 67 survey respondents said they were generally or very unable to serve all seniors who requested home-delivered meals, and 15 of 63 said they were generally or very unable to serve all who requested transportation assistance. Local officials cite seniors' desire to remain in their homes as they age, and the economic downturn as possible reasons for increased requests. Given this demand, providers must make decisions about which applicants will receive services. OAA requires providers to target those with the greatest economic and social need,--low-income, minority, lacking proficiency in English, and rural residents--and local officials said they advertise, conduct outreach, and coordinate with other local organizations to identify and serve these groups. Additionally, most local agencies reported screening potential clients to assess level of need, for example, to determine those most at risk of hospitalization due to poor nutrition. In addition to these known service needs, an unknown number of other seniors may need services but not know to contact OAA providers, some officials told GAO. Local agencies who responded to GAO's survey reported using the flexibility afforded by the OAA to transfer funds among Title III programs to meet increased requests for specific services. Twenty-eight of 61 local agencies said they transferred funds in fiscal year 2009, most often removing funds from congregate meals to home-delivered meals or other services. Although the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) provided an additional $97 million specifically for meal programs, Title III programs are heavily reliant on state funds, and 44 of 64 local agencies responding to our survey said their state funding was reduced for fiscal year 2010. To cope with funding reductions, some reported cutting services to seniors. Twenty-seven of 65 local agencies said they cut administrative expenses in fiscal year 2010; others relocated offices or left agency positions vacant. Some state and local officials said they provided less service to individuals so that more could get some amount of assistance. Some agencies said they used Recovery Act funds to replace lost state and local funding or created new programs, but the funding was restricted to meal services and was a relatively small percentage of total OAA allocations. The proportion of Americans age 60 and over will continue to grow over the coming decades, and demand for Title III services also will likely grow. Therefore it will be increasingly important for service providers to focus services on those most in need. |
gao_GAO-12-608 | gao_GAO-12-608_0 | The provisions concerning qualified appraisals do not apply to estate or gift taxes. In 2007, TTCA made the appraiser penalty applicable for appraisals improperly supporting estate and gift tax returns. Appraiser penalty cases are audited separately from the taxpayer examination cases in which IRS may have first noticed improper appraisals. Appraiser Use Is Most Prominent in Estate Taxes, Is Associated with a Higher Probability of Being Audited for Gift Tax Returns, and Has Led to Six PPA Penalties
Appraisers Play a More Prominent Role in the Reporting of Estate Taxes Than Gift Taxes or Individuals’ Noncash Charitable Contributions
We estimated that more than 90 percent of estate tax returns filed in 2009 included assets, deductions, or exclusions of more than $50,000 in categories that IRS officials told us were likely to require the use of an appraiser. In contrast, less than 20 percent of gift tax returns and less than 1 percent for individual returns with noncash charitable contributions were likely to need an appraiser. For estate tax returns, we estimated that the aggregate value of property needing appraisers was at least $75 billion in 2009. Under current IRS guidance, examiners should refer cases with appraisals above certain thresholds to Engineering and AAS appraisers for assistance. Therefore, IRS does not meet the GAO quality review standard with respect to AAS. Although IRS does not specifically target tax returns that involve appraisals, the policies and procedures that IRS has in place to audit estate, gift, and individual income tax returns ensures some coverage of returns that do involve appraisals. For example, IRS already gives priority to higher-income individual returns in the examination selection process, and such returns are more likely to have appraisals supporting noncash contributions than the general population of returns. First, the fact that the $5,000 threshold at which taxpayers are required to obtain qualified appraisals for noncash contributions has remained unchanged for more than 25 years means that some contributors today must hire appraisers to value property that would not have needed appraisals in the mid-1980s, when the threshold was adopted. Consequently, there seems to be little risk in adjusting the threshold for price inflation to better reflect the level Congress initially believed was appropriate to deter noncompliance. Second, the lack of appraisal training requirements for AAS appraisers and the lack of a comprehensive quality control process for AAS cases put the quality of potentially high-value appraisal cases involving art at risk. IRS agreed with our recommendations. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides further details on the methodologies that we used to estimate (1) the extent to which appraisals are an issue for estate and gift tax returns and for returns of individuals making noncash charitable contributions and (2) the rates at which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits returns with potential appraisal issues. Next, we used data from SOI’s annual studies of noncash contributions relating to the amounts and types of contributions that taxpayers reported on various parts of Form 8283 from tax years 2005 through 2008 (the latest years available at the time of our analysis) to (1) identify an upper bound for the number of taxpayers who potentially required qualified appraisals to support noncash contribution deductions claimed on Form 1040, Schedule A, Line 17, and (2) determine how many Form 8283 filers we could identify as either being likely to require a qualified appraisal or unlikely to require one. Penalty Thresholds and Valuation Misstatements
For noncash charitable contributions, the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 lowered the threshold for substantial valuation misstatements from 200 percent of the correct valuation to 150 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Misstated appraisals used to support tax returns have long caused concern. In 2006, Congress adopted the Pension Protection Act, which changed the criterion for when appraisals are considered to be substantiallymisstated and created a penalty for improper appraiser practices and qualifications for appraisers with respect to noncash charitable deductions. The Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007 extended the penalty for misstated appraisals to estate and gift taxes.
Among its objectives, GAO was asked to (1) describe the extent to which individual, estate, and gift tax returns are likely to involve an appraiser and the extent to which IRS audits them; (2) describe how IRS selects returns likely to involve appraisals for compliance examinations, and assess whether the current appraisal threshold is useful; and (3) assess IRS procedures for ensuring that itsappraisal experts are qualified.
To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed IRS data, reviewed IRS guidance, and interviewed appropriate IRS officials.
What GAO Found
Appraisers most prominent role relative to the three types of tax returns GAO studied is in the valuation of estates. In the most recent years for which GAO had data, appraisers were likely involved in the valuation of property worth from $75 billion to $167 billion reported on estate tax returns in 2009. In contrast, less than $17 billion worth of gifts in 2009 and less than $10 billion in noncash contributions in 2008 likely involved an appraiser. Gift tax returns that likely used appraisers had higher audit rates than gift returns that were unlikely to have appraisers. The use of appraisers was not associated with higher audit rates for estate tax returns and individual returns with noncash contributions.
The Internal Revenue Services (IRS) procedures for selecting returns to audit do not specifically target noncash contributions or gift or estate tax returns supported by appraisals. Nevertheless, returns with appraisals do get included in the population of audited returns because certain types of returns on which IRS does focus, such as higher-income ones, are also the most likely ones to have noncash charitable contributions that require appraisals. The current appraisal threshold for certain contributions over $5,000 has existed since 1984. The absence of an inflation adjustment over the past 25 years means that many contributors who pay for appraisals would not have needed to do so when the current threshold was first introduced. IRS seldom takes issue with appraisals for noncash contributions. Consequently, there seems to be little risk in Congress raising the $5,000 dollar threshold.
IRS appraisal experts in one division met standards for ensuring that they were qualified. However, art appraisal experts in another division are not subject to either a comprehensive quality review program or continuing education requirements specific to appraising art. The lack of comprehensive quality reviews and mission-specific continuing education requirements could make the art appraisers less effective than they otherwise would be.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS develop a comprehensive quality review program for Art Appraisal Services (AAS) and establish appraisal training requirements specifically for AAS staff. Congress also should consider raising the dollar threshold at which qualified appraisals are required for noncash contributions to reflect inflation. IRS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-345 | gao_GAO-01-345_0 | An ISP is the consumer’s “on-ramp” to the Internet, and once connected to the ISP, the consumer actually becomes part of the Internet. FCC also found that for the majority of Americans who live in rural areas, lowest- cost access to advanced services was not readily available, and that some rural areas still lacked basic access to the Internet through a local telephone call. Over time, this suggests that the digital divide may narrow. Internet Users Were More Likely to Be White, Well- Educated, and Have a Higher-Than-Average Household Income
One of the most important statistical findings of our survey was that Internet users tended to have a higher household income and more education than the general U.S. population. Surveys from just a few years ago, however, showed women lagging behind men in Internet usage. This point is illustrated by reports from two financial services firms, showing that as recently as 1998 only about 2 percent of Internet users subscribed to a broadband service. Do not include in your amount the purchase of a computer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans' use of the Internet has grown dramatically during the last few years. Nationally, more than half of all households have a computer and more than 80 percent of those households have access to the Internet. Yet, during the last few years, even as Internet usage has continued to expand, concerns have arisen about whether access to the Internet and other advanced telecommunications services is limited for Americans in lower socioeconomic classes or who live in rural areas.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Internet users are more likely to be white and well-educated and have higher-than-average household incomes. There is no noticeable difference between the genders when it comes to Internet usage. GAO also found that the availability of some services is limited by location. Some of this information points to the existence of the "digital divide," but the evidence is not clear. It is important, however, to ensure that the differences in Internet availability do not adversely affect existing societal divisions. |
gao_RCED-97-17 | gao_RCED-97-17_0 | During the period 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 different MSAs. All of these acquisitions have suffered from a lack of advance planning and ineffective management oversight that has led to cost overruns and schedule slippages. As agreed with the Chairman’s office, this report (1) assesses DOE’s performance in completing its MSAs, (2) identifies key factors that hinder the timely, cost-effective completion of the acquisitions; and (3) determines what DOE is doing to improve its performance. DOE’s Limited Success With Its MSAs
Since 1980, DOE has conducted 80 projects that it designated as MSAs. Most of the completed projects were not finished on schedule, and many of the ongoing MSAs were behind schedule. High Rate of Project Terminations
Since 1980, 31 MSAs were terminated prior to completion. Project cost overruns have occurred for other reasons. 4.) These actions could help DOE address some of the key factors leading to major cost overruns and schedule slippages for its MSAs. DOE Management Initiatives
We believe that DOE’s difficulties in completing MSA projects, or of completing them on time and within original cost estimates, are a result of the key factors that we discuss in chapter 3—constantly changing missions, incremental funding of MSAs, lack of effective incentives, and shortages of employees with contracting and oversight skills. DOE currently has undertaken several initiatives to improve the management of its operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) ability to complete its major system acquisitions within originally estimated cost and time schedules, focusing on: (1) DOE's performance in completing its major system acquisitions; (2) key factors that hinder the timely, cost-effective completion of the acquisitions; and (3) DOE efforts to improve its performance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) from 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 projects that it designated as major system acquisitions; (2) DOE has completed 15 of these projects, and most of them were finished behind schedule and with cost overruns; (3) 31 other projects were terminated prior to completion after expenditures of over $10 billion; (4) cost overruns and schedule slippages continue to occur on many of the ongoing projects; (5) the four key factors underlying the cost overruns, schedule slippages, and terminations include unclear or changing missions, incremental project funding, a flawed incentive system for DOE employees and contractors, and lack of sufficient DOE personnel with the appropriate skills to effectively oversee contractor operations; and (6) DOE has implemented several initiatives that are helping to improve its overall management, but all of these initiatives may not improve DOE's management of its major system acquisitions. |
gao_RCED-95-26 | gao_RCED-95-26_0 | FAA May Not Achieve Future GPS Milestones
Although FAA has met all milestones for GPS to date, the agency will face more complex and difficult tasks in achieving future milestones. We are concerned that the revised schedule for augmenting GPS will not give the agency enough time to develop and implement the wide area system by 1997, when civil aircraft are expected to use the augmented GPS domestically as a primary means of navigation. However, FAA estimates that the system’s software development alone may take from 24 to 28 months, thereby leaving little time for the agency to accept and commission the system. FAA’s Actions Are Encouraging, but Plans Provide Incomplete Information to Decisionmakers
In 1994, FAA took several actions to strengthen its capacity to manage its GPS-related efforts, including integrating GPS activities within the agency, securing additional funding to develop the wide area system, and issuing plans for developing and implementing the augmentation systems and a draft plan for transitioning to GPS. However, the plans are not comprehensive because they exclude schedule and cost estimates for implementing augmentation systems and information on the likelihood of achieving these estimates. Some of these problems are beyond FAA’s control, such as the difficulties that may be experienced during the launching of commercial communication satellites. FAA has the above information for the wide area system. B* and C*: Milestones based on the implementation of the wide area augmentation system. FAA determines whether GPS augmented by local area systems can support these types of precision approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) augmentation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for use in civil aviation navigation, focusing on whether FAA: (1) will have sufficient time under its new milestones to augment GPS; and (2) has taken appropriate actions to better manage its GPS-related efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although FAA has met all of its milestones to date, its future milestones involve more complex and difficult tasks; (2) FAA may not have enough time to develop and implement its wide area system augmentation by 1997, although civil aircraft are expected to use the augmented GPS without relying on other navigation aids for backup; (3) FAA estimates that system software development alone may take 24 to 28 months; (4) implementation of the wide area system may be delayed by factors beyond FAA control, such as the launching of commercial satellites needed to support the system; (5) in 1994, FAA strengthened its GPS management by integrating its GPS activities, securing the necessary funding to accelerate the wide area system's development, and issuing plans for developing and implementing augmentation systems and transitioning to GPS; and (6) the FAA GPS plans are not comprehensive, since they omit a schedule for implementing the local area system, cost estimates for the local and wide area systems, and the probabilities of meeting schedule and cost estimates. |
gao_GAO-06-141 | gao_GAO-06-141_0 | Condition of Some Selected Equipment Has Been Degraded by the High Pace of Operations and the Advanced Age or Complexity of the Systems
While the condition of the 30 equipment items we reviewed varied, we found that average fleet-wide readiness rates for most of these items declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. DOD is currently conducting a Quadrennial Defense Review that will examine defense programs and policies and may change some equipment requirements. In addition, the Marine Corps’ Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement vehicles are being aggressively used in support of operations in Iraq, but also met their mission capable goals for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Services Near- and Long-Term Program Strategies and Funding Plans Exist for Most Equipment Reviewed, but Some Gaps Remain
The military services have identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that most of the 30 selected equipment items can meet defense requirements, but some gaps remain. For the 30 selected equipment items, we found that 20 of the services’ near- term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address capability shortfalls, full funding is not included in DOD’s 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may affect near-term readiness. DOD is required to develop sustainment plans in 10 U.S.C. § 2437. Without developing complete near-term plans and identifying the associated funding needs to ensure that all key equipment items can be sustained and modernized—and assessing the risk involved if gaps in these strategies are not addressed—DOD may be unable to meet some future requirements for defense capabilities. We assessed 7 of the selected equipment items as red, only 2 of which will be covered by this statute, because the services’ program strategies and funding plans to meet long-term requirements are not fully identified, studies to determine future system requirements are not complete, funding for maintenance or technological upgrades may not be available, or replacement systems were delayed or not identified, and in some cases, the selected equipment items may be unable to meet their long-term requirements. Moreover, DOD faces challenges to sustain and modernize its current equipment while continuing these operations and transforming to a new force structure. Recommendations
To ensure that DOD can sustain key equipment items to meet future equipment requirements and to provide greater visibility over key equipment items to Congress, we recommend that, after the department completes its Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Services, take the following two actions: Reassess the near- and long-term program strategies for sustaining and modernizing key equipment, particularly those items not covered by 10 U.S.C. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should require the Secretary of Defense to report on program strategies and funding plans to ensure that DOD’s budget decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment. The department is not currently required to report sustainment plans for some of these critical items to Congress. To select the 30 equipment items we reviewed, we included 18 of the equipment items reviewed in our December 2003 report, and based upon input from the military services, your offices, and our prior work, we judgmentally selected an additional 12 items. )—does not apply to existing systems for which a replacement system will reach initial operational capability before October 1, 2008, we did not assess compliance with this section of the act. The increase in the goal occurred as B-1 usage to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan increased. | Why GAO Did This Study
With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) is spending billions of dollars sustaining or replacing its inventory of key equipment items while also planning to spend billions of dollars to develop and procure new systems to transform the department's warfighting capabilities. GAO developed a red, yellow, green assessment framework to (1) assess the condition of 30 selected equipment items from across the four military services, and (2) determine the extent to which DOD has identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that these items can meet defense requirements. GAO selected these items based on input from the military services, congressional committees, and our prior work. These 30 equipment items included 18 items that were first assessed in GAO's 2003 report.
What GAO Found
While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected for review varied, GAO's analysis showed that reported readiness rates declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items. The decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues caused by the advancing ages and complexity of the systems. Key equipment items--such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and rotary wing aircraft--have been used well beyond normal peacetime use during deployments in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting future requirements. Until the department completes this review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment are addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. GAO found that, in some cases, the services' near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address capability shortfalls, funding is not included in DOD's 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of the equipment items GAO reviewed in that future requirements are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet identified. Title 10 U.S.C. 2437 requires the military services to develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that GAO assessed as red had issues severe enough to warrant immediate attention because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not covered by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report sustainment plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to sustain or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other DOD priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, and replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete sustainment and modernization plans and identifying funding needs for all priority equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops these plans, Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD's budget decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment. |
gao_GAO-12-763 | gao_GAO-12-763_0 | Recognizing that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the DRC is helping to finance conflict, in July 2010 The act stated that it is Congress included a provision in section 1502(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires SEC to issue a rule for covered companies to disclose whether necessary conflict minerals used in their products originated in the DRC or in an adjoining country and, if they did, to provide an additional report with certain disclosures. According to industry association and company representatives, in practice, a company’s supply chain for products containing tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold can be complex and can vary considerably. SEC Has Taken Some Steps toward Developing a Rule but Has Delayed Issuing a Final Rule
SEC has published a proposed conflict minerals disclosure rule and has taken steps to gather input from various stakeholders. Senator Richard Durbin and U.S. SEC’s Final Rule Delayed
Since SEC issued a proposed rule in December 2010, it has announced, on several occasions, new target dates for the publication of a final rule, as shown in table 1 below: In its December 2011 announcement concerning the target publication date for a final rule, SEC estimated that it would issue a final rule by June 2012; however, SEC did not issue a final rule by the end of June 2012. On July 2, 2012, SEC announced that the Commission will hold an open meeting on August 22, 2012 to consider whether to adopt a final conflict minerals disclosure rule. Intense stakeholder interest and input. Rigorous economic analysis in rule-making process. Stakeholder- Developed Initiatives May Facilitate Compliance with the Anticipated Rule, but Efforts to Improve Some Initiatives Have Been Hindered by the Absence of a Final Rule
Various stakeholders have developed and implemented initiatives that may help covered companies and their suppliers comply with the anticipated rule. However, due to the uncertainty regarding potential due diligence and disclosure requirements stemming from SEC’s delay in issuing a final rule, some stakeholders’ efforts to improve their initiatives through expansion and harmonization have been hindered. Stakeholders Have Developed Initiatives
Although SEC has not issued a final rule, industry associations, multilateral organizations, and other stakeholders have developed and implemented initiatives that may help covered companies and their suppliers comply with the anticipated rule. Stakeholder-developed initiatives—which include the development of guidance documents, audit protocols, and in- region sourcing systems—support covered companies’ efforts to (1) conduct due diligence of their conflict minerals supply chains, (2) identify the source of conflict minerals within their supply chains, and (3) responsibly source conflict minerals. Little Additional Information on the Rate of Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC and Neighboring Countries Has Become Available since GAO’s 2011 Report
Since our 2011 report, one population-based survey has been conducted in Rwanda, while none have been conducted in eastern DRC, Uganda, or Burundi. During our current review, we identified one new population- based survey—a 2010 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in Rwanda that estimates that 22 percent of women ages 15 to 49 have experienced sexual violence in that country in their lifetimes. Other organizations have plans to conduct population-based surveys in eastern DRC. Recommendation for Executive Action
To address the delay and uncertainty in finalizing a conflict minerals disclosure rule regarding what covered companies will be required to do, we recommend that the Chairman of SEC identify the remaining steps it needs to take and the associated time frames to finalize and issue such a conflict minerals disclosure rule. While SEC neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation, in its comment letter, SEC said that it would continue its endeavor to complete the rule making expeditiously to provide certainty. In response to a requirement in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that GAO submit an annual report that assesses the rate of sexual violence in war-torn areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries, we identified and assessed any additional information available on sexual violence in war-torn eastern DRC, as well as three neighboring countries that border eastern DRC— Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi—since our 2011 report on sexual violence in these areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
In eastern DRC, armed groups continue to commit severe human rights abuses and profit from exploitation of minerals and other trades. In 2010, Congress included a provision in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to address the trade of conflict mineralstin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold. Section 1502(b) of the act requires SEC to issue a disclosure rule for companies using these minerals in their products. The act also requires GAO to assess the rules effectiveness and the rate of sexual violence in war-torn areas of DRC and neighboring countries.
Since a rule has not been issued, this report examines (1) steps SEC has taken toward issuing a conflict minerals disclosure rule; and (2) stakeholder-developed initiatives that may help covered companies comply with the anticipated rule. This report also examines (3) any additional information available on the rate of sexual violence in eastern DRC and neighboring countries since GAOs 2011 report on that subject.
GAO reviewed and analyzed reports and documents from SEC, other U.S. agencies, industry associations and other nongovernmental stakeholders; and interviewed representatives from those organizations.
What GAO Found
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken some steps toward developing a conflict minerals disclosure rule, but it has not issued a final rule. For example, SEC published a proposed rule in December 2010 and has gathered and reviewed extensive input from external stakeholders through comment letters and meetings. SEC has also announced, on several occasions, new target dates for the publication of a final rule. In July 2012, SEC announced that the Commission will hold an open meeting in August 2012 to consider whether to adopt a final rule. According to SEC officials, various factors have caused delays in finalizing the rule beyond the April 2011 deadline stipulated in the act, including the intensity of input from stakeholders and the public; the amount of time required to review this input; and the need to conduct a thorough economic analysis for rule making.
Various stakeholders have developed initiatives that may help covered companies comply with the anticipated rule, but some initiatives have been hindered by SECs delay in issuing a final rule. Industry associations, multilateral organizations, and other stakeholders have developed global and in-region sourcing initiatives, which include the development of guidance documents, audit protocols, and in-region sourcing systems. These initiatives may support companies efforts to conduct due diligence and to identify and responsibly source conflict minerals. In the absence of SECs final rule, however, stakeholders note that uncertainty regarding SECs reporting and due diligence requirements has complicated their efforts to expand and harmonize their initiatives. For example, in the absence of a final rule, one initiative is facing difficulty engaging additional participants, while stakeholders efforts to harmonize two initiatives have been hindered.
Little additional information on the rate of sexual violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and neighboring countries has become available since GAOs 2011 report on that subject. For example, only one population-based survey has been published on sexual violence in Rwanda, and it reports that 22 percent of women ages 15-49 have experienced sexual violence there in their lifetimes. No additional surveys have been conducted in eastern DRC; however, one organization is currently conducting a survey and another is planning to conduct a survey there in 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Chairman of SEC identify remaining steps and associated time frames to issue a final rule. SEC neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, but noted that it will expedite the completion of its rule making to provide certainty. |
gao_GAO-15-807 | gao_GAO-15-807_0 | For example, in the appropriate circumstance, an agency could authorize an informant to purchase illegal drugs from someone who is the target of a drug-trafficking investigation. Five Agencies’ Policies Do Not Include All Requirements in the Guidelines
DOJ and DHS component agencies’ policies in our review generally address a majority of the Guidelines’ requirements for vetting potential informants; however, about half of those policies are not fully consistent with the provisions for overseeing informants’ illegal activities. Without such documentation, if an informant engages in an activity that exceeds the scope of the authorization, the agency may not be able to demonstrate that the informant’s actions were not authorized, thereby limiting the agency’s ability to prosecute the informant for the unauthorized illegal activity. Thus, these agencies’ monitoring processes, do not verify compliance with these provisions in the Guidelines. Additionally, these agencies have developed administrative evaluation tools, such as standardized forms that correspond with their respective policy requirements, to help ensure that agents capture necessary information when vetting an informant. Confidential informant coordinators. Field office–based inspection programs. DEA, ICE, and USSS Do Not Have Reasonable Assurance That They Are Following the Guidelines for Overseeing Informants’ Illegal Activities
As noted above, DEA, the FBI, ICE, and USSS have monitoring processes in place to help ensure compliance with their respective policies on handling informants. As a result, agencies may not have reasonable assurance that agents are complying with provisions in the Guidelines for overseeing informants’ illegal activities. Conclusions
The use of confidential informants is an important law enforcement tool that supports investigations and prosecutions, but because informants often have criminal histories, it is important for agencies to have procedures that address the associated risks. The Attorney General’s Guidelines established procedures to help ensure that agencies exercise their authorities—especially for vetting the suitability of an informant and authorizing the informant to conduct otherwise illegal activities— appropriately and with adequate oversight of informants. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that agencies’ policies and oversight are fully consistent with The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants, we recommend that the Administrator of DEA and the Director of USMS, with assistance and oversight from the DOJ Criminal Division, update their agencies’ respective policies and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly address the Guidelines’ provisions on oversight of informants’ illegal activities; the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security provide oversight and guidance to ensure that DHS agencies comply with the Guidelines; and the Assistant Secretary of ICE and the Commandant of USCG update their respective agencies’ informant policies and corresponding monitoring processes to explicitly address the Guidelines’ provisions on oversight of informants’ illegal activities. In their comments, DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions under way or planned to address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For this report, we reviewed the policies and processes for the eight Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies that used confidential informants in fiscal year 2013, the most recent year for which data were available. The DOJ agencies included in our review are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). The DHS agencies are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). To determine the extent to which DOJ and DHS component agencies’ policies include procedures outlined in The Attorney General’s Guidelines, we assessed the eight agencies’ informant policies against provisions in the Guidelines regarding vetting informants or overseeing informants’ illegal activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law enforcement components used more than 16,000 confidential informants in fiscal year 2013 as part of criminal investigations. Informants can be critical to an investigation, but without appropriate oversight, problems can occur that undermine the credibility of the informant's role in an investigation. The Attorney General's Guidelines sets forth procedures on the management of informants, including vetting potential informants and overseeing informants' illegal activities that components authorize to support an investigation.
GAO was asked to review the use of confidential informants. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOJ and DHS components' policies address the Guidelines for vetting informants and overseeing their illegal activities and (2) selected components have monitoring processes to ensure compliance with the Guidelines.
GAO reviewed components' documented policies and monitoring processes and interviewed agency officials about their practices. GAO visited components' field offices in three locations chosen based on the numbers of informants overseen, among other factors.
What GAO Found
Some components within the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) do not fully address procedures outlined in The Attorney General's Guidelines (the Guidelines)—which established procedures to help ensure that components exercise their authorities regarding the use of informants appropriately and with adequate oversight. Eight components within DOJ and DHS—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)—have policies in place that generally address the procedures outlined in the Guidelines for vetting a confidential informant.
However, five of the eight components' policies are not fully consistent with the Guidelines' provisions for overseeing informants' illegal activities. For example, the Guidelines require agencies to document certain information when authorizing an informant to participate in an activity that would otherwise be considered illegal (e.g., purchasing illegal drugs from someone who is the target of a drug-trafficking investigation). DEA, USMS, ICE, USCG, and USSS do not fully address the requirements to provide the informant with written instructions about the authorized activity and require signed acknowledgment from the informant. Without such documentation, if an informant engages in an activity that exceeds the scope of the authorization, the agency may not be able to demonstrate that the informant's actions were not authorized, thereby limiting the agency's ability to prosecute the informant for the unauthorized illegal activity.
The DOJ and DHS components that oversaw the most informants in fiscal year 2013—the FBI, DEA, ICE, and USSS—have monitoring processes in place to help ensure that agents are complying with their respective components' policies. Such monitoring activities include supervisory reviews, as well as headquarters inspections and self-inspections within the field offices. These agencies also use administrative tools, such as standardized forms, that cover the requirements in their policies and help ensure that agents capture necessary information. However, as noted above, some components' policies do not fully address the procedures in the Guidelines, and as a result, the components' monitoring processes likewise do not assess compliance with those procedures in the Guidelines. Consequently, agencies may not have reasonable assurance that they are complying with procedures established in the Guidelines to address the risks associated with using informants.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in March 2015. It does not include details that ICE deemed law enforcement sensitive.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ and DHS and their components take actions to update components' policies and monitoring processes to improve handling and oversight of confidential informants. DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-546T | gao_GAO-05-546T_0 | The program is funded through statutorily mandated payments by companies that provide interstate telecommunications services. FCC Established an Unusual Program Structure without Comprehensively Addressing the Applicability of Governmental Standards and Fiscal Controls
FCC established an unusual structure for the E-rate program but has never conducted a comprehensive assessment of which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to the program, to USAC, or to the Universal Service Fund itself. Since the inception of the E-rate program, FCC has struggled with identifying the nature of the Universal Service Fund and the managerial, fiscal, and accountability requirements that apply to the fund. For example, FCC has concluded that the Universal Service Fund is a permanent indefinite appropriation subject to the Antideficiency Act and that its issuance of funding commitment letters constitutes recordable obligations for purposes of the act. Given this important ongoing study and the unresolved issues mentioned previously, Congress may wish to consider deferring a decision on permanently exempting the Universal Service Fund from the Antideficiency Act at this time and instead consider either granting the fund a two- or three-year exemption from the Antideficiency Act or crafting a limited exemption that would provide management flexibility. For example, Congress could specify that FCC could use certain receivables or assets as budgetary resources. These more limited solutions would allow time for the National Academy of Public Administration to complete its study of the Universal Service Fund program and report its findings to FCC. Congress and FCC could then comprehensively assess, based on decisions concerning the structure of the program, which federal requirements, policies, and practices should apply to the fund and to any entities administering the program. It could then be determined whether a permanent and complete exemption from the Antideficiency Act is warranted. FCC Did Not Develop Useful Performance Goals and Measures for Assessing and Managing the E-Rate Program
Although $13 billion in E-rate funding has been committed to beneficiaries during the past 7 years, FCC did not develop useful performance goals and measures to assess the specific impact of these funds on schools’ and libraries’ Internet access and to improve the management of the program, despite a recommendation by us in 1998 to do so. However, the data that FCC used to report on its progress was limited to public schools (thereby excluding two other major groups of beneficiaries—private schools and libraries) and did not isolate the impact of E-rate funding from other sources of funding, such as state and local government. For example, a review of the program by OMB in 2003 concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in the cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services for schools and libraries. OMB also noted that there was little oversight to ensure that the program beneficiaries were using the funding appropriately and effectively. We found weaknesses with FCC’s implementation of each of these mechanisms, limiting the effectiveness of FCC’s oversight of the program and the enforcement of program procedures to guard against waste, fraud, and abuse of E-rate funding. FCC’s E-rate rulemakings, however, have often been broadly worded and lacking specificity. Beneficiary audits are the most robust mechanism available to the commission in the oversight of the E-rate program, yet FCC generally has been slow to respond to audit findings and has not made full use of the audit findings as a means to understand and resolve problems within the program. We agree with FCC’s conclusion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) E-rate program has committed more than $13 billion to help schools and libraries acquire Internet and telecommunications services. As steward of the program, FCC must ensure that participants use E-rate funds appropriately and that there is managerial and financial accountability surrounding the funds. This testimony is based on GAO's February 2005 report GAO-05-151 , which reviewed (1) the effect of the current structure of the E-rate program on FCC's management of the program, including the applicability of the Antideficiency Act, (2) FCC's development and use of E-rate performance goals and measures, and (3) the effectiveness of FCC's program oversight mechanisms.
What GAO Found
FCC established E-rate as a multibillion-dollar program operating under an organizational structure unusual to the federal government, but never conducted a comprehensive assessment to determine which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to the program, to the Universal Service Administrative Company, and to the Universal Service Fund itself. FCC has addressed these issues on a case-by-case basis, but this has put FCC and the E-rate program in the position of reacting to problems as they occur rather than setting up an organization and internal controls designed to ensure compliance with applicable laws. With regard to the Antideficiency Act, we agree with FCC's conclusions that the Universal Service Fund is a permanent indefinite appropriation, is subject to that act, and that the issuance of E-rate funding commitment letters constitutes obligations for purposes of the act. We believe that Congress should consider either granting the Universal Service Fund a two- or three-year exemption from the Antideficiency Act or crafting a limited exemption that would provide management flexibility. For example, Congress could specify that FCC could use certain receivables or assets as budgetary resources. These more limited solutions would allow time for the National Academy of Public Administration to complete its study of the Universal Service Fund program and report its findings to FCC. Congress and FCC could then comprehensively assess, based on decisions concerning the structure of the program, which federal requirements, policies, and practices should apply to the fund and to any entities administering the program. It could then be determined whether a permanent and complete exemption from the Antideficiency Act is warranted. FCC has not developed useful performance goals and measures for assessing and managing the E-rate program. The goals established for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 focused on the percentage of public schools connected to the Internet, but the data used to measure performance did not isolate the impact of E-rate funding from other sources of funding, such as state and local government. In its 2003 assessment of the program, OMB concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in the cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services. In response, FCC is working with OMB on developing new E-rate measures. According to FCC officials, oversight of the program is primarily handled through agency rulemaking procedures, beneficiary audits, and appeals decisions. FCC's rulemakings, however, have often lacked specificity, which has affected the recovery of funds for program violations. FCC has also been slow to respond to beneficiary audit findings and make full use of them to strengthen the program. In addition, the small number of these audits completed to date do not provide a basis for accurately assessing the level of fraud, waste, and abuse occurring in the program. According to FCC officials, there is also a substantial backlog of E-rate appeals. |
gao_GAO-02-213 | gao_GAO-02-213_0 | TEA-21 requires DOT to conduct a nationwide solicitation for Job Access grant applications and to select grantees on a competitive basis. Specifically, FTA adopted a noncompetitive process for the entities designated in the conference reports or applicants selected by those entities. FTA set aside funding for the designated entities and selected them without scoring and ranking their applications—that is, comparing them to those submitted by other applicants. Recommendation
We recommend that, in the absence of statutory authority to select Job Access grantees on a noncompetitive basis, the Secretary of Transportation ensure that future grants to entities designated in conference reports, including grants to applicants selected by those entities, be made on a competitive basis. These notices did not describe FTA’s process for those entities identified in the conference reports as “competitive”; rather, they distinguished between funds “reserved for specific projects” and funds “available for competitive award.” Importantly, FTA’s description of its Job Access formula proposal clearly stated with reference to the fiscal year 2000 and 2001 conference reports that “earmarking of funds does not allow for projects to emerge from a competitive process.” Therefore, DOT has not provided us with any basis to agree with its view that projects for entities identified in conference reports were competitively selected or to change our recommendation. In 1998, Congress found that three-fourths of welfare recipients lived in central cities or rural areas, but two-thirds of new, entry-level jobs were located in the suburbs. Public transportation facilities, such as buses or subways, often offer limited or no access to many of these jobs. Although the jobs can be reached by car, many welfare recipients do not have cars. To address this mismatch, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) authorized up to $750 million for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 to implement the Job Access and Reverse Commute (Job Access) program. The program authorizes the Department of Transportation (DOT) to provide grants to local agencies, nonprofit organizations, transit authorities, and others to improve transportation to employment. | What GAO Found
In 1998, three-fourths of welfare recipients lived in central cities or rural areas, but two-thirds of new, entry-level jobs were in the suburbs. Public transportation, such as buses or subways, often offer little or no access to these jobs, and many welfare recipients do not have cars. To address this mismatch, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century authorized up to $750 million through fiscal year 2003 for the Job Access and Reverse Commute (Job Access) program. Under the program, the Department of Transportation (DOT) can provide grants to improve transportation to employment sites. DOT must conduct a nationwide solicitation for grant applications and select grantees on a competitive basis. DOT adopted a two-track process for the selection of grantees. A noncompetitive process set aside funds for entities identified in conference reports, or applicants selected by those entities, and they were chosen without scoring or ranking their applications. The previously established competitive process for other applicants was continued. This two-track process for selecting Job Access grantees decreased opportunities to fund projects identified as "meritorious" through the competitive selection process. Although grantees must be chosen on a competitive basis, the allocation of program funds on a noncompetitive basis to entities designated in conference reports, or applicants selected by those entities, was not consistent. Furthermore, the conference reports did not impose legally binding requirements and did not provide a legal basis to deviate from the act's requirements. Therefore, the use of a noncompetitive process for the selection of program grantees in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 was not authorized. |
gao_GAO-13-767T | gao_GAO-13-767T_0 | Background
DOE’s missions encompass energy resources, scientific and technological development, environmental cleanup, and nuclear security. DOE Faces Challenges Managing Its Major Projects and Programs
As we have reported in the past decade, DOE continues to face challenges managing its major projects and programs, which have incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays in several instances. Some recent examples include:
As we reported earlier this month, NNSA estimates that the project to build the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will cost between five and seven times more than previously thought and will be completed over a decade behind schedule. NNSA estimated in 2004 that the UPF would cost from $600 million to $1.1 billion to construct and would start operating in 2012. We also reported in December 2012 on progress by EM and NNSA in managing nonmajor projects (i.e., those costing less than $750 million). We are currently assessing DOE cost estimating policies and practices and plan to issue a report based on this work later this year. DOE’s actions to improve project management appear promising, but their impact on meeting cost and schedule targets may not be clear. Because all ongoing major projects have been in construction for several years, neither EM nor NNSA has a major project that can yet demonstrate the impact of DOE’s recent reforms. DOE Faces Challenges Managing Security and Safety
As we testified before this Subcommittee in March 2013, reviews of the July 2012 security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex identified numerous, long-standing, and systemic security issues across the nuclear security enterprise, and significant safety problems remain at DOE sites that have not been fully addressed. In addition, both a NNSA Security Task Force and an independent panel convened at the request of the Secretary of Energy and composed of three former executives from federal agencies and the private sector found systemic security issues across the nuclear security enterprise. Both the Secretary’s panel and the NNSA Security Task Force’s leader found deficiencies in DOE’s security culture and oversight, with some of these being closely matched to issues we identified a decade earlier. We have ongoing work assessing DOE security reforms and plan to issue a report based on this work later this year. DOE Has Not Produced Reliable Enterprise-Wide Management Data
For more than a decade, we have reported that DOE has not produced reliable enterprise-wide management data needed to, among other things, prepare its budget requests, identify the costs of its activities and ensure the validity of its cost estimates. Some recent examples include: In June 2013, we reported that NNSA’s M&O contractors differ in how they classify and allocate indirect costs at NNSA laboratories. Although different approaches are allowed by Cost Accounting Standards, these differences limit NNSA’s ability to assess cost data and meaningfully compare cost management performance across laboratories, potentially impeding NNSA’s efforts to oversee M&O contractors’ costs. This work built on the report we issued in June 2010, in which we found that NNSA could not accurately identify the total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities and infrastructure because of differences among contractors’ accounting practices. We have made numerous recommendations in our reports to address challenges such as those identified in this testimony, and DOE has agreed with and implemented most of them. In addition, our work has recognized steps that DOE has taken to address these challenges. For example, in the most recent update of our high-risk series in February 2013, we narrowed the focus of the high-risk designation of DOE’s contract management to EM’s and NNSA’s major contracts and projects. As the new Secretary of Energy considers needed reforms in these areas, we note that DOE’s management of projects and programs, security and safety, and enterprise-wide data must improve—regardless of the department’s structure. We will continue to monitor DOE’s implementation of actions to resolve its long-standing management challenges, including actions that we have recommended to facilitate the resolution of these challenges. Department of Energy: Observations on Project and Program Cost Estimating in NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management, GAO-13-510T (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2013). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE missions encompass energy resources, scientific and technological development, environmental cleanup, and nuclear security. Management of major projects and contracts within EM and NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, remain on GAO's list of areas at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, where they have been listed since 1990. Progress has been made, but GAO continues to identify management problems related to cost and schedule overruns on major environmental cleanup and nuclear projects and safety problems at DOE sites that have not been fully addressed.
This testimony discusses DOE's management challenges in (1) managing major projects and programs, (2) managing security and safety at DOE sites, and (3) producing reliable enterprise-wide information, including budget and cost data.
Over the past decade, GAO has made numerous recommendations in its reports to address challenges such as those identified in this testimony. DOE agreed with most of them and is taking steps toward implementing them. GAO's work has also recognized some of the steps that DOE has taken to address these challenges. For example, in the most recent update of GAO's high-risk series, GAO narrowed the focus of the high-risk designation of DOE's contract management to EM's and NNSA's major contracts and projects (i.e., those costing $750 million or more). GAO will continue to monitor DOE's implementation of actions to resolve long-standing management challenges, including actions taken in response to GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
As GAO has reported over the last decade, the Department of Energys (DOE) management of major projects and programs, security and safety at DOE sites, and reliable enterprise-wide management information, including budget and cost data, are among the most persistent management challenges the department faces.
Challenges managing major projects and programs . The Office of Environmental Management (EM) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continue to face challenges managing major projects and programs, which have incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays. For example, GAO reported in July 2013 that the cost estimate range for a project to construct a modern Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at DOEs Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, had increased five- to seven-fold to up to $6.5 billion since the projects inception in 2004. Furthermore, the most recent cost estimate range may no longer be valid after the contractor reported in August 2012 that the UPFs roof would have to be raised 13 feet. GAO is currently assessing DOE cost estimating policies and practices and plans to issue a report based on this work later this year. DOE's actions to improve project management appear promising, but their impact on meeting cost and schedule targets may not be clear. Because all ongoing major projects have been in construction for several years, neither EM nor NNSA has a major project that can yet demonstrate the impact of DOE's recent reforms.
Challenges managing security and safety . Reports about the July 2012 security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex identified numerous, long-standing and systemic security issues across the nuclear security enterprise and significant safety problems at DOE sites that have not been fully addressed. A NNSA Security Task Force and an independent panel convened at the request of the Secretary of Energy also found systemic security issues across the nuclear security enterprise, and found deficiencies in DOEs security culture and oversight, which closely matched issues GAO identified a decade earlier. GAO has ongoing work assessing DOE security reforms and plans to issue a report based on this work later this year. GAO has also found that DOE management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems at NNSA sites.
Challenges in producing reliable enterprise-wide management information . GAO has reported that DOE does not have reliable enterprise-wide management data needed to, among other things, prepare its budget requests, identify the costs of its activities, and ensure the validity of its cost estimates. For example, in June 2013, GAO reported that while different approaches are allowed by Cost Accounting Standards, NNSAs management and operations contractors differ in how they classify and allocate indirect costs at NNSA laboratories, which limits NNSAs ability to assess cost data and meaningfully compare cost management performance across laboratories. In addition, GAO reported in June 2010 that NNSA could not accurately identify the total costs to operate and maintain weapons facilities and infrastructure because of differences among contractors accounting practices. GAO is currently monitoring DOEs ongoing efforts to improve its capability to produce reliable enterprise-wide information. |
gao_GAO-10-794 | gao_GAO-10-794_0 | However, activities are being implemented as the detailed supporting plans for conducting many activities have not yet been finalized. AFRICOM Has Developed Some Overarching Strategies and Led Planning Meetings
AFRICOM has published command-level overarching strategic guidance and has led activity planning meetings with its components and interagency partners. However, AFRICOM has not yet approved its military service components, special operations command, and task force support plans for use in guiding their activities. AFRICOM Is Generally Not Measuring the Long- Term Effects of Its Activities to Determine Whether They Fully Align with the Command’s Mission
It is unclear whether all of the activities that AFRICOM has inherited or is planning fully align with its mission of sustained security engagement in Africa because, in addition to unfinished strategic plans, AFRICOM is generally not measuring the long-term effects of its activities. Moreover, DOD officials observed that, with respect to the Maghreb news Web site sponsorship, the intent of the activity is to influence African public sentiment—the same effect for which some State officials have expressed concern. Despite the challenges associated with measuring long-term effects, implementing such assessments for all of its activities can help AFRICOM make successful future planning decisions and allocate resources to maximize its effect in Africa. Determining which specific funding sources should be used for various activities has sometimes resulted in problems with activities. AFRICOM component officials told us that guidance or training on applying funding sources to activities would be helpful. Without a greater understanding of how to apply funding to activities, AFRICOM will likely continue to face difficulties in implementing activities—including the potential that activities may be delayed, funds may not be effectively used, and African partner nations may be excluded from participating—as well as institutionalizing knowledge within the command. AFRICOM Has Made Efforts to Collaborate with Interagency Partners but Is Not Fully Engaging Them in Activity Planning Processes
AFRICOM has made efforts to integrate interagency personnel into its command and collaborate with other federal agencies on activities, but it is not fully engaging interagency partners in planning processes. As of June 2010, AFRICOM reported that it embedded 27 interagency partners into its headquarters staff, which represents about 2 percent of the total headquarters staff. Several interagency officials stated that AFRICOM has tended to develop initial activity plans before integrating interagency perspectives. AFRICOM identified five key observations based on its assessment: (1) embedded staff want to ensure they can accomplish their own objectives and not merely perform duties that a DOD employee could perform; (2) interagency personnel arrive at AFRICOM with the expectation that they will help achieve not only command goals and objectives but also U.S. government goals, yet they feel that DOD employees do not expect embedded personnel to develop new programs; (3) embedded interagency personnel need to understand the function, operation, and role of a military command and how it differs from other federal government agencies; (4) the military planning process is more structured than the planning approaches of other government agencies; and (5) embedded personnel experience an overwhelming adjustment to military culture. AFRICOM Faces Challenges in Building Personnel Expertise to Work in Africa
AFRICOM emphasizes the importance of collaborating with its interagency partners and building cultural awareness; however, the command has sometimes experienced difficulty implementing activities because some personnel have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa. Developing a well- trained workforce that understands the complexities associated with working on the continent can advance the department’s efforts to foster stability and security through improved relationships with African nations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively plan, prioritize, and implement activities in a collaborative interagency environment that aligns with both the command’s mission of sustained security engagement and U.S. foreign policy goals; make effective use of resources in a fiscally constrained environment; and take steps to institutionalize its processes and procedures, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, AFRICOM, to take the following five actions: Synchronize activities among AFRICOM’s components by expediting the completion of its regional engagement plans, country work plans, and component support plans; and develop a process whereby plans are reviewed on a recurring basis to ensure that efforts across the command are complementary, comprehensive, and supportive of AFRICOM’s mission. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
In conducting our work, we reviewed a wide range of Department of Defense (DOD) and command guidance and other guidance including DOD strategies; U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) theater strategy, theater campaign plan, and 2009 and 2010 posture statements; and AFRICOM’s military service component and task force’s priorities, draft strategic plans (if available), and engagement plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
When the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) became fully operational in 2008, it inherited well over 100 activities, missions, programs, and exercises from other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. AFRICOM initially conducted these inherited activities with little change. However, as AFRICOM has matured, it has begun planning and prioritizing activities with its four military service components, special operations command, and task force. Some activities represent a shift from traditional warfighting, requiring collaboration with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other interagency partners. GAO's prior work has identified critical steps and practices that help agencies to achieve success. For this report, GAO was asked to assess AFRICOM in five areas with respect to activity planning and implementation. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD and AFRICOM guidance; observed portions of AFRICOM activities; interviewed officials in Europe and Africa; and obtained perspectives from interagency officials, including those at 22 U.S. embassies in Africa.
What GAO Found
AFRICOM has made progress in developing strategies and engaging interagency partners, and could advance DOD's effort to strengthen the capacity of partner nations in Africa. However, AFRICOM still faces challenges in five areas related to activity planning and implementation. Overcoming these challenges would help AFRICOM with future planning, foster stability and security through improved relationships with African nations, and maximize its effect on the continent. (1) Strategic Planning. AFRICOM has created overarching strategies and led planning meetings, but many specific plans to guide activities have not yet been finalized. For example, AFRICOM has developed a theater strategy and campaign plan but has not completed detailed plans to support its objectives. Also, some priorities of its military service components, special operations command, and task force overlap or differ from each other and from AFRICOM's priorities. Completing plans will help AFRICOM determine whether priorities are aligned across the command and ensure that efforts are appropriate, complementary, and comprehensive. (2) Measuring Effects. AFRICOM is generally not measuring long-term effects of activities. While some capacity-building activities appear to support its mission, federal officials expressed concern that others--such as sponsoring a news Web site in an African region sensitive to the military's presence--may have unintended effects. Without assessing activities, AFRICOM lacks information to evaluate their effectiveness, make informed future planning decisions, and allocate resources. (3) Applying Funds. Some AFRICOM staff have difficulty applying funding sources to activities. DOD has stated that security assistance efforts are constrained by a patchwork of authorities. Limited understanding of various funding sources for activities has resulted in some delayed activities, funds potentially not being used effectively, and African participants being excluded from some activities. (4) Interagency Collaboration. AFRICOM has been coordinating with partners from other federal agencies. As of June 2010, AFRICOM had embedded 27 interagency officials in its headquarters and had 17 offices at U.S. embassies in Africa. However, the command has not fully integrated interagency perspectives early in activity planning or leveraged some embedded interagency staff for their expertise. (5) Building Expertise. AFRICOM staff have made some cultural missteps because they do not fully understand local African customs and may unintentionally burden embassies that must respond to AFRICOM's requests for assistance with activities. Without greater knowledge of these issues, AFRICOM may continue to face difficulties maximizing resources with embassy personnel and building relations with African nations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that AFRICOM complete its strategic plans, conduct long-term activity assessments, fully integrate interagency personnel into activity planning, and develop training to build staff expertise. DOD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-383 | gao_GAO-06-383_0 | Federal law and policy related to critical infrastructure protection activities recognize the importance of sharing information about threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents and call for related initiatives. As Required by the CII Act, DHS Has Established Procedures, Organized a Program Office, and Received and Shared Information
In February 2004, DHS issued an interim rule that established procedures, as required by the CII Act, and created a Program Office to administer the program. The office has developed and maintained processes for accepting, protecting, and sharing CII; received about 290 submissions from critical infrastructure owners; begun some outreach with potential submitters to increase information flow; shared PCII on a limited basis with users in DHS and several other federal entities; and trained approximately 750 potential users at DHS, other federal, state, and local government entities and, at least 16 state and local officials how to establish their own programs. The interim rule includes mechanisms specified by the act regarding acknowledging to the submitter that the Program Office has received the voluntarily submitted CII; maintaining the identification of this information as voluntarily submitted to the government under the act; receiving, handling, storing, and properly marking information as PCII, including reviewing submitted information, determining that it meets the requirements for protection (a process known as validation), and protecting it; safeguarding and maintaining the confidentiality of the submitter of the information, but permitting the sharing of the information, as determined by the Program Manager; and protecting and maintaining the confidentiality of the information, so as to permit (1) the sharing of it within the federal government and with state and local governments and (2) the issuance of notices and warnings related to the protection of critical infrastructure and protected systems, in such a manner as to protect from public disclosure the identity of the submitting person or entity or information that is proprietary, is business-sensitive, relates specifically to the submitting person or entity, and is otherwise not appropriately in the public domain. To increase submissions, the Program Office has initiated outreach efforts to publicize the PCII program to the public and private sectors. For example, the Program Office gave DHS’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) limited authority to receive recurring submissions. These challenges include better defining specific government needs for CII, determining how the information will be used, assuring the private sector that the information will be protected and who will be authorized to have access to it, and demonstrating to critical infrastructure owners the benefits of sharing the information. Without this knowledge, the private sector will continue to be hesitant to provide information to DHS. If DHS were able to surmount these challenges, it and other government users may begin to overcome the lack of trust critical infrastructure owners have in the government’s ability to use and protect their sensitive information. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to your request that we review the implementation of the Critical Infrastructure Information (CII) Act of 2002, we determined (1) the status of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) implementation efforts and (2) the challenges DHS faces in implementing the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
A wide array of cyber and physical assets is critical to America's national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety. Information related to threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and security techniques is instrumental to guarding these critical infrastructures against attacks and mitigating the impact of attacks that may occur. The ability to share security-related information can unify the efforts of federal, state, and local government as well as the private sector, as appropriate, in preventing and minimizing terrorist attacks. The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 was enacted to encourage nonfederal entities to voluntarily share critical infrastructure information and established protections for it. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a lead role in implementing the act. GAO was asked to determine (1) the status of DHS's efforts to implement the act and (2) the challenges it faces in carrying out the act.
What GAO Found
DHS has issued interim operating procedures and created a Program Office to administer the critical infrastructure protection program called for by the Critical Infrastructure Information Act. The interim procedures designate the responsibilities and authority of the Program Manager, and establish requirements related to accepting, protecting, sharing, and using critical infrastructure information as required by the act. The Program Office has begun to accept and safeguard critical infrastructure information submitted voluntarily by infrastructure owners and is sharing it with other DHS entities and, on a limited basis, with other government entities. For example, as of January 2006, the Program Office had received about 290 submissions of critical infrastructure information from various sectors. The Program Office also has initiated outreach efforts to publicize the program to the public and private sectors. In addition, it has trained approximately 750 potential users in DHS and other federal, state, and local government entities how to handle protected critical infrastructure information. This training is a prerequisite to being allowed to view the information. The Program Office has also trained at least 16 federal and state officials how to establish programs in their own entities so they can receive protected critical infrastructure information from DHS and then be authorized to store and share it. DHS faces challenges that impede the private sector's willingness to share sensitive information. Key challenges include defining specific government needs for critical infrastructure information, determining how the information will be used, assuring the private sector that the information will be protected and who will be authorized to have access to the information, and demonstrating to critical infrastructure owners the benefits of sharing the information. If DHS were able to surmount these challenges, it and other government users may begin to overcome the lack of trust that critical infrastructure owners have in the government's ability to use and protect their sensitive information. |
gao_GAO-06-426 | gao_GAO-06-426_0 | Satellite. A variety of broadband access technologies and services are also provided on unlicensed spectrum— that is, spectrum that is not specifically under license for a particular provider’s network. About 30 Million American Households Purchase Broadband Service; Despite Evidence of Substantial Broadband Deployment throughout the United States, It Is Difficult to Assess Deployment Gaps in Some Areas
We found that in 2005, about 30 million American households—or 28 percent—subscribed to broadband, although households in rural areas were less likely to subscribe to broadband service than were households in urban and suburban areas. Some stakeholders find FCC data collection efforts useful for comparison of adoption of broadband across states, but we found that the data may not be as useful for understanding the status of broadband deployment across the country. Deployment of Broadband Appears to Be Extensive, but FCC’s Form 477 Data May Not Provide an Accurate Depiction of Gaps in Broadband Deployment
In order to fulfill its responsibility under section 706 of the Telecommunications Act, FCC collects data on companies’ broadband operations. A Variety of Market and Technical Factors, in Addition to Government Involvement and Access to Resources at the Local Level, Have Influenced the Deployment of Broadband
Several market characteristics appear to influence providers’ broadband deployment decisions. As such, some stakeholders noted that highly rural areas—which generally have low population density—can be costly to serve. Terrain was also frequently cited as a factor affecting broadband deployment decisions. Some stakeholders also said costs for what is known as “backhaul” are higher for rural areas and can affect the deployment of broadband networks in these areas. Federal and State Government Efforts, and Access to Resources at the Local Level, Have Impacted the Deployment of Broadband
We found that government involvement in several venues, and access to resources at the local level, have affected the deployment of broadband networks throughout the nation. Federal Programs Have Funded Broadband Infrastructure
We found that several federal programs have provided significant financial assistance for broadband infrastructure. A Variety of Household and Service Characteristics Influence the Adoption of Broadband
We developed an econometric model to assess the many factors that might influence whether a household purchases broadband service. Some stakeholders also told us that the availability of applications and content not easily accessible through dial-up, as well as the degree to which consumers are aware of and value this availability, contribute to a household’s decision to adopt broadband. Stakeholders Identified Several Options to Address the Lack of Broadband in Certain Areas, but Challenges Exist with Implementation
Stakeholders we spoke with identified several options to facilitate greater broadband service in unserved areas; however, each option poses special challenges. It is not clear whether a loan program—such as the RUS loan program—is effective for helping rural areas gain access to broadband services. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of the report were to provide information on (1) the current status of broadband deployment and adoption, (2) the factors that influence the deployment of broadband networks, (3) the factors that influence the adoption of broadband service by households, and (4) the options that have been suggested to spur greater broadband deployment and adoption. The decision to deploy broadband service is a function of the population in the area; the population density in the area; the percentage of the population residing in an urban area; the per-capita income in the area; the educational attainment of the population in the area; the population teleworking in the area; the age of the population in the area; the distance to a metropolitan area with a population of 250,000 or whether the state in which the area is located imposed a tax on Internet access in 2005. Industry stakeholders expressed concerns about the ubiquity of service, data transmission speeds, and the monthly costs associated with 3G service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Both Congress and the President have indicated that access to broadband for all Americans is critically important. Broadband is seen as a critical economic engine, a vehicle for enhanced learning and medicine, and a central component of 21st century news and entertainment. As part of our response to a mandate included in the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act of 2004, this report examines the factors that affect the deployment and the adoption of broadband services. In particular, this report provides information on (1) the current status of broadband deployment and adoption; (2) the factors that influence the deployment of broadband networks; (3) the factors that influence the adoption, or purchase, of broadband service by households; and (4) the options that have been suggested to spur greater broadband deployment and adoption.
What GAO Found
About 30 million American households have adopted broadband service, but the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) data indicating the availability of broadband networks has some weaknesses. FCC conducts an extensive data collection effort using its Form 477 to assess the status of advanced telecommunications service in the United States. For its zip-code level data, FCC collects data based on where subscribers are served, not where providers have deployed broadband infrastructure. Although it is clear that the deployment of broadband networks is extensive, the data may not provide a highly accurate depiction of local deployment of broadband infrastructures for residential service, especially in rural areas. A variety of market and technical factors, government efforts, and access to resources at the local level have influenced the deployment of broadband infrastructure. Areas with low population density and rugged terrain, as well as areas removed from cities, are generally more costly to serve than are densely populated areas and areas with flat terrain. As such, deployment tends to be less developed in more rural parts of the country. Technical factors can also affect deployment. GAO also found that a variety of federal and state efforts, and access to resources at the local level, have influenced the deployment of broadband infrastructure. A variety of characteristics related to households and services influence whether consumers adopt broadband service. GAO found that consumers with high incomes and college degrees are significantly more likely to adopt broadband. The price of broadband service remains a barrier to adoption for some consumers, although prices have been declining recently. The availability of applications and services that function much more effectively with broadband, such as computer gaming and file sharing, also influences whether consumers purchase broadband service. Stakeholders identified several options to address the lack of broadband in certain areas. Although the deployment of broadband is widespread, some areas are not served, and it can be costly to serve highly rural areas. Targeted assistance might help facilitate broadband deployment in these areas. GAO found that stakeholders have some concerns about the structure of the Rural Utilities Service's broadband loan program. GAO was also told that modifications to spectrum management might address the lack of broadband infrastructure in rural areas. Also, because the cost of building land-based infrastructure is so high in some rural areas, satellite industry stakeholders noted that satellite broadband technology may be the best for addressing a lack of broadband in those regions. While several options such as these were suggested to GAO, each has some challenges to implementation. Also, a key difficulty for analyzing and targeting federal aid for broadband is a lack of reliable data on the deployment of networks. |
gao_GAO-11-941T | gao_GAO-11-941T_0 | BLM Field Offices Used Section 390 Categorical Exclusions for More Than One-Quarter of Their APDs, Although Benefits of Use Varied Widely across Field Offices
In September 2009, we reported that 26 of the 30 field offices with oil and gas activities used almost 6,900 section 390 categorical exclusions to approve oil-and-gas-related activities from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2008. Additionally, field office policies could contribute to how often section 390 categorical exclusions were used. BLM’s Use of Section 390 Categorical Exclusions from Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2008 Often Did Not Comply with Either the Implementing Statute or Agency Guidance
In September 2009, we reported that BLM’s field offices used section 390 categorical exclusions to approve oil and gas activities in violation of the law and also failed to follow agency guidance. In some instances, violations we found may have thwarted NEPA’s twin aims of ensuring that both BLM and the public were fully informed of the environmental consequences of BLM’s actions. Specifically, BLM’s guidance at the time said little, if anything, about (1) the documentation needed to support a decision to use a section 390 categorical exclusion or (2) the proper circumstances for using section 390 categorical exclusions to approve modifications to existing APDs through “sundry notices.” Furthermore, BLM headquarters and state offices we spoke with had generally not provided any oversight or review of the field offices’ actions in using section 390 categorical exclusions that could have ensured compliance with the law or BLM guidance. Lack of Clarity in the Law and in BLM Guidance Raised Serious Concerns about Section 390 Categorical Exclusions
We reported in September 2009 that the lack of clarity in section 390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and in BLM’s implementing guidance led to serious concerns on the part of industry, environmental groups, BLM officials, and others about when and how section 390 categorical exclusions should be used to approve oil and gas development. Specifically, these concerns included the following: Key elements of section 390 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 were undefined, leading to fundamental questions about what section 390 categorical exclusions were and how they should be used. This lack of direction left these elements open to differing interpretations, debate, and litigation, leading to serious concerns that BLM was using section 390 categorical exclusions in too many—or too few— instances. BLM officials, environmental groups, industry groups, and others raised serious concerns with the law as a whole. Concerns about how to interpret and apply key terms that describe the conditions that must be met when using a section 390 categorical exclusion. Vague or nonexistent definitions of key terms in the law and BLM guidance led to varied interpretations among field offices and concerns about misuse and a lack of transparency. In addition, to improve BLM field offices’ implementation of section 390 categorical exclusions, we recommended that BLM take the following three actions: issue detailed and explicit guidance addressing the gaps and shortcomings in its guidance; provide standardized templates or checklists for each of the five types of section 390 categorical exclusions, which would specify, at minimum, what documentation is required to justify their use; and develop and implement a plan for overseeing the use of section 390 categorical exclusions to ensure compliance with both law and guidance. BLM Took Actions in Response to Litigation and Our Report, but These Actions Have Been Affected by a Recent Court Decision
While we were working on our September 2009 report, the exact meaning of the phrase “shall be subject to a rebuttable presumption that the use of a categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) would apply” was in dispute in a lawsuit in federal court. In May 2010, BLM issued “Instruction Memorandum No. This draft second instruction memorandum was undergoing review by the department when, on August 12, 2011, a decision was reached in Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar. The court held that the instruction memorandum constituted a regulation that BLM adopted without following proper rule-making procedures, and the court issued a nationwide injunction blocking implementation of the memorandum. According to a BLM official, the ruling has prevented BLM from implementing the parts of the May 2010 instruction memorandum directly related to extraordinary circumstances and the use of section 390 CX2 and CX3 and also called into question the issuance of the second instruction memorandum aimed at further addressing our recommendations. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 was enacted in part to expedite domestic oil and gas development. Section 390 of the act authorized the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to use categorical exclusions to streamline the environmental analysis required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) when approving certain oil and gas activities. Numerous questions have been raised about how and when BLM should use these section 390 categorical exclusions. In September 2009, GAO reported on BLM's first 3 years of experience-- fiscal years 2006 through 2008--using section 390 categorical exclusions. This testimony is based on GAO's September 2009 report (GAO-09-872) and updated with information on court decisions that have been reached since the report was issued. The testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which BLM used section 390 categorical exclusions and the benefits, if any, associated with their use; (2) the extent to which BLM complied with the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and agency guidance; (3) key concerns, if any, associated with section 390 categorical exclusions; and (4) how BLM has responded to GAO's recommendations and other recent developments. For its September 2009 report, GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable random sample of 215 section 390 categorical exclusion decision documents from all BLM field offices that used section 390 categorical exclusions and interviewed agency officials and others.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of BLM field office data showed that section 390 categorical exclusions were used to approve almost 6,900 oil-and-gas-related activities from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2008. Nearly 6,100 of these categorical exclusions were used for drilling permits and the rest for other nondrilling activities. Most BLM officials GAO spoke with said that section 390 categorical exclusions increased the efficiency of certain field office operations, but it was not possible to quantify these benefits. GAO reported that BLM's use of section 390 categorical exclusions through fiscal year 2008 often did not comply with either the law or BLM's guidance. First, GAO found several types of violations of the law, including approving projects inconsistent with the law's criteria and drilling a new well after mandated time frames had lapsed. Second, GAO found numerous examples where officials did not correctly follow agency guidance, most often by failing to adequately justify the use of a categorical exclusion. A lack of clear guidance and oversight contributed to the violations and noncompliance. Many instances of noncompliance were technical in nature, whereas others were more significant and may have thwarted NEPA's twin aims of ensuring that BLM and the public are fully informed of the environmental consequences of BLM's actions. In September 2009, GAO reported that a lack of clarity in section 390 and BLM's guidance had caused industry, environmental groups, BLM officials, and others to raise serious concerns about the use of section 390 categorical exclusions. First, fundamental questions about what section 390 categorical exclusions were and how they should be used led to concerns that BLM might have been using these categorical exclusions in too many--or too few--instances. Second, specific concerns were raised about key concepts underlying the law's description of certain section 390 categorical exclusions. Third, vague or nonexistent definitions of key terms in the law and BLM guidance that describe the conditions to be met when using a section 390 categorical exclusion led to varied interpretations among field offices and concerns about misuse and a lack of transparency. As a result, GAO suggested that Congress may want to consider amending the act to clarify section 390, and GAO recommended that BLM clarify its guidance, standardize decision documents, and ensure compliance through more oversight. The Department of the Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations. In May 2010, in response to a court settlement and GAO's recommendations, BLM issued a new instruction memorandum substantially addressing the gaps and shortcomings in BLM's guidance that GAO had identified. In addition, BLM was developing a second instruction memorandum to address GAO's recommendation that it standardize decision documents when, on August 12, 2011, a decision was reached in Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar. The court held that the May 2010 instruction memorandum constituted a regulation that BLM adopted without using proper rule-making procedures and issued a nationwide injunction blocking the memorandum's implementation. According to a BLM official, the ruling has prevented BLM from implementing key parts of the memorandum and called into question the issuance of the second memorandum aimed at further addressing GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-12-649 | gao_GAO-12-649_0 | Although Medicaid is jointly financed by the states and the federal government, it is directly administered by the states, with oversight from CMS, within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). States are required by federal Medicaid law to cover certain mandatory benefits in their state Medicaid plan. Four PPACA Options Provide States with New Incentives and Flexibilities for Offering HCBS
The four PPACA options include new incentives and flexibilities to help states increase the availability of HCBS for Medicaid beneficiaries. PPACA also requires the Secretary of HHS to conduct an evaluation of Community First Choice to determine (1) the effectiveness of the provision of services in allowing individuals to lead independent lives, (2) the impact of the services on individuals’ physical and emotional health, and (3) the cost of services provided under the option compared with the cost of institutional care. Since PPACA’s Enactment, 13 States Applied for and Received New Money Follows the Person Grants, and States Have Begun to Apply for the Other Three Options
Thirteen of the 20 states that had not previously received Money Follows the Person grants applied for and received new grants made available as a result of funds appropriated in PPACA. In addition, states were beginning to apply and applications had been approved for the other three PPACA HCBS options. As of April 2012—18 months after PPACA’s changes to the option became effective—three states had submitted state plan amendments and received CMS approval to offer the revised 1915(i) state plan option. States Are Factoring Potential Effect on State Budgets, Staff Availability, and Interaction with Existing Reform Efforts into Their Decisions
Medicaid officials in the states we selected for our study reported being attracted to the enhanced federal matching funds available under three of the PPACA options, but also expressed concern about the potential effect on budgets given continuing fiscal challenges at the state level. Officials were also considering broader Medicaid reforms occurring in the state and the potential interaction with existing HCBS. Limited Staff Resources and Competing Priorities Pose Barriers to States’ Pursuing New Options
According to state officials, staffing shortages in a number of states have made it difficult for states to review all the new HCBS options in depth or put together the teams needed to assemble applications and implement the options. Planned Changes to State Medicaid Programs and Potential Interaction of Options with Existing HCBS Programs Factor into States’ Decisions
Officials in several of the states we interviewed reported putting off decisions about the HCBS options in PPACA until they completed major reforms to their Medicaid programs. Similarly, Florida was also moving to statewide Medicaid managed care. The complexities of the Medicaid HCBS options available and the changing factors affecting states’ planning underscore the importance of ongoing federal technical assistance to help states navigate various HCBS options as they seek to ensure appropriate availability of HCBS. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review. HHS had no general comments on the report but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Medicaid Options for Home- and Community-Based Services in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) created two new options—Community First Choice and the Balancing Incentive Program—and amended two existing options—1915(i) state plan option and Money Follows the Person—for states to cover home- and community-based services (HCBS) for Medicaid beneficiaries. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded Money Follows the Person grants to 30 states and the District of Columbia as part of the original round of funding in 2007. Therefore, individuals with intellectual disabilities were some of the first to start transitioning. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1999 Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C. held that states must serve individuals with disabilities in community-based settings under certain circumstances. Under the joint federal and state Medicaid program, states are required to cover nursing facility care for eligible individuals, while the provision of most HCBS is optional. In 2010, PPACA created two new options and revised two existing options for states to cover HCBS for Medicaid beneficiaries.
GAO was asked to assess the implementation status of the four Medicaid HCBS options in PPACA. GAO assessed (1) how the four options are structured to increase the availability of services, (2) what is known about states plans to use the options, and (3) factors affecting states decisions regarding implementing the options.
To determine the structure of the options, GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations and interviewed officials at CMS. To determine what is known about states plans, GAO obtained copies of states grant applications and state plan amendments. To understand factors affecting states decisions, GAO conducted interviews with officials in 10 states. The states were selected to reflect a range of state Medicaid spending for HCBS as a percentage of total Medicaid expenditures for long-term services and supports.
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS had no general comments on the report but provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The four Medicaid options for home- and community-based services (HCBS) included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provide states with new incentives and flexibilities to help increase the availability of services for Medicaid beneficiaries. Two of the options were newly created by PPACA, and the other two were existing options amended by the law. Three of the options provide states with financial incentives in the form of enhancements to the Medicaid matching rate that determines the federal share of the programs costs.
As of April 2012, 13 states had applied for and received Money Follows the Person grants, in addition to the 30 states and the District of Columbia that had received grants prior to PPACA, and states were beginning to apply for the other three options. The 13 new Money Follows the Person states were awarded $621 million and were in various stages of implementation. One state had applied for Community First Choice. Two states had received approval to participate in the Balancing Incentive Program, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) was reviewing two additional state applications. Three states had received approval to offer the revised1915(i) state plan option since PPACAs enactment.
The 10 states GAO contacted reported considering several factors in deciding whether to pursue the PPACA options, including potential effects on state budgets, staff availability, and interaction with existing state Medicaid efforts. States were attracted by the increased federal funding available under some of the options, but were concerned about their ability to contribute their share of funding. Limited staff resources and competing priorities were also concerns. Finally, broader Medicaid reform efforts, such as transitions to statewide managed care, and the potential interaction with existing HCBS options factored into states considerations. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and CMS have initiatives under way to assist states with their HCBS efforts. The complexities of the Medicaid HCBS options available and the changing factors affecting states planning underscore the importance of ongoing federal technical assistance to help states navigate various HCBS options as they seek to ensure appropriate availability of HCBS. |
gao_GAO-16-437 | gao_GAO-16-437_0 | The U.S. Supreme Court Provides Audio of Oral Arguments; Two U.S. Courts of Appeals and Almost All Other Selected Appellate Courts Have Policies that Allow Video Coverage
The U.S. Supreme Court Provides Audio Recordings of Oral Arguments and Releases Recordings on the Same Day of Arguments in Selected Cases
The U.S. Supreme Court does not provide or allow video or live-audio coverage of oral arguments, but provides taped audio coverage of arguments. Specifically, beginning in the October 2010 term, the Court has posted audio recordings of all oral arguments on its website at the end of each argument week. Further, starting with the presidential election cases in 2000, the Court began granting requests for access to audio recordings of oral arguments on the same day arguments are heard in selected cases. The PIO stated that the Court has made audio recordings of oral arguments available on the same day as the argument in rare cases, generally in response to extraordinarily high interest among the public and the media. At its discretion, the Court granted these requests in 26 cases and declined them in 32 cases. Officials from 9 of these 10 courts stated that their court generally posts audio recordings on the same day arguments are heard. Of these cases, 6 were granted and 9 were denied based on judicial discretion. The Policies of the Courts of Last Resort in 49 States Allow Media Video and Audio Coverage of Oral Arguments, Though Policies and Procedures Vary
Courts of last resort in 49 states have written policies that allow media video and audio coverage of oral arguments and almost all of these courts have video or audio of oral arguments available online. The Policies of the Courts of Last Resort in Three Countries Provide Video Coverage of Oral Arguments, Though Procedures and Allowable Use of Footage Vary
The courts of last resort in the three countries included in our review— Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—have policies that provide video coverage of oral arguments by the court itself and do not allow media organizations to record oral arguments using their own equipment. Stakeholders Cited Educational Benefits and Media Distortion, Among Others, as Potential Effects of Video or Audio Coverage in Appellate Courts, Including the U.S. Supreme Court
Judges and Attorneys in Selected Appellate Courts Stated that Enhanced Access and Education Were Among Key Benefits of Video or Audio Coverage of Oral Arguments
The judges and attorneys we interviewed in selected appellate courts who have experience with video and audio coverage of oral arguments cited several benefits of such coverage, including greater public access to the courts and educating the public on the judicial system, among others. Administrative officials in selected courts also provided additional examples of these benefits. For instance, one judge said that because the work of the courts can easily be misunderstood and is not in the headlines as much as the work of other branches of the government, video coverage is useful for providing the public a window into how the courts think about the issues in a case. Effect on court participants. For instance, 5 of the 16 judges and eight of the nine attorneys we interviewed stated that they believed that video or audio coverage might potentially result in portions of the proceeding being distorted by the media. Selected Stakeholders Cited Potential Benefits of and Concerns with Allowing Video Coverage of U.S. Supreme Court Arguments, and Some Said Coverage Could Affect Participant Behavior
Perspectives of Appellate Judges and Attorneys
In our interviews with selected appellate judges and attorneys who have had experience with video or audio coverage, we asked for their perspectives on the extent to which the benefits, concerns, or potential effects of coverage discussed previously might also apply to video or live- audio coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s oral arguments, if such coverage were to be allowed. Perspectives of the U.S. Supreme Court and Attorneys Who Have Argued Before the Court
We also requested perspectives on the potential benefits of and concerns with video coverage of oral arguments from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Public Information Officer, as well as four attorneys who have argued before the Court. This attorney noted that the Court providing coverage of arguments in their entirety, as opposed to edited coverage by the media, could help alleviate this concern. The Justices have expressed caution about introducing changes that could diminish the public’s respect for and create misconceptions about the Court. 2. The selected appellate courts included the U.S. courts of appeals for the 13 federal circuits and courts of last resort—the highest appellate courts in a given jurisdiction—in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Supreme Court—the highest appellate court in the country—hears high-interest cases potentially affecting millions. The Court generally hears oral arguments for these cases, which are open to the public. Seating in the Court is limited and media organizations, as well as members of Congress, have requested video coverage of oral arguments. GAO was asked to review video and audio coverage of proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court and other appellate courts.
This report addresses (1) the U.S. Supreme Court's policy regarding video and audio coverage of oral arguments and the policies of other selected appellate courts and (2) perspectives of selected stakeholders on the benefits of and concerns with allowing such coverage.
GAO analyzed policies on video and audio coverage of oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court and other selected appellate courts—13 U.S. courts of appeals and the highest appellate courts in the 50 states and the District of Columbia and three foreign countries—chosen because of comparability to the U.S. Supreme Court. GAO obtained information from administrative officials in 8 courts, selected based on video and audio policies, and perspectives on the benefits of and concerns with coverage from (1) 16 judges in 6 of these courts and 9 attorneys in 5 of these courts and (2) the PIO of the U.S. Supreme Court and 4 attorneys who have argued before the Court. Results are not generalizable but provided insights on video and audio coverage of oral arguments. GAO also reviewed studies on this issue.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Supreme Court (the Court) posts audio recordings of oral arguments on its website at the end of each argument week, but does not provide video coverage of these arguments. In addition, starting in 2000, the Court began granting requests for access to audio recordings of oral arguments on the same day arguments are heard in selected cases. As of October 4, 2015, the Court had received media requests for access to same-day audio recordings in 58 cases and had granted them in 26 cases.
Other selected appellate courts have varying policies on video and audio coverage of oral arguments. For example,
Two of the 13 U.S. courts of appeals allow media video coverage of oral arguments. Also, 9 of these 13 courts generally post audio recordings of arguments on their websites the same day arguments are heard.
The highest appellate courts in 49 states have written policies that allow media video and audio coverage of oral arguments and almost all of these courts have video or audio of oral arguments available online.
The highest appellate courts in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have policies that provide video coverage of oral arguments by the court itself.
Stakeholders in selected courts stated that the benefits of video or audio coverage of oral arguments in their courts include educating the public on the judicial system, among others, but also expressed concerns with regard to how the media might use such coverage. For example,
Fourteen of the 16 judges and seven of the nine attorneys GAO interviewed in the selected appellate courts cited public education on the judiciary as a benefit or potential benefit of video or audio coverage of arguments. One judge noted that video coverage is useful for providing a window into how the courts think about the issues in a case.
Five judges and eight attorneys stated that coverage might potentially result in portions of the arguments being distorted by the media. However, four judges and four attorneys said that the court providing coverage itself might help mitigate these concerns. For example, one attorney stated that this allows the court to control and release the coverage as it sees fit.
With regard to the U.S. Supreme Court allowing video coverage of oral arguments, the four attorneys GAO interviewed who have argued before the Court also cited similar educational benefits and concerns regarding the media potentially distorting coverage. Further, three of the four attorneys and the Court's Public Information Officer (PIO) raised concerns that coverage may potentially affect court participants' behavior. The PIO stated that individual Justices have commented that televising proceedings could adversely affect the dynamics of the oral arguments, among other concerns, and have expressed caution about introducing changes that could create misconceptions about the Court. |
gao_GAO-07-40 | gao_GAO-07-40_0 | Vast Majority of Reported Contract Obligations Were for Competitive Awards
While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide Iraq reconstruction contract data, we obtained competition information on $10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in obligations for Iraq reconstruction contracts collectively awarded by DOD, USAID, and State from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006, and found that about $9.1 billion, or 91 percent, of the obligations was for competitive awards. We obtained information on approximately $7 billion of the $8.55 billion DOD obligated and found that competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Most DOD Obligations Were for Competitively Awarded Contract Actions
Based on available data, we found that the majority of DOD’s IRRF contract obligations incurred during the period we reviewed were for competitive awards. Complete information on DOD’s contract actions and competition type for the period of our review was not available, in part because not all offices consistently tracked or reported this information. These data indicated that USAID competitively awarded contract actions for about $2.25 billion, or 99 percent, of the approximately $2.27 billion it obligated; approximately $20.4 million, or about 1 percent, of these obligations were noncompetitively awarded. Agency contracting staff reported that USAID has pursued competition with very few exceptions when awarding contracts and issuing task orders for Iraq reconstruction. We found that the agencies generally followed the FAR and the applicable agency supplements regarding documentation requirements for contract actions but did not always comply with congressional notification requirements. Of the 51 contract actions that we reviewed, 22 were awarded noncompetitively, while 29 were awarded competitively. While State failed to provide the required notifications, State officials told us that they have taken steps to address the problem for future awards. State Did Not Always Provide Required Congressional Notifications
Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in our review, State should have notified Congress of 2 actions it awarded using other than full and open competition in accordance with the congressional notification requirement in section 2202 of Public Law 108-106 but did not. We did not identify any USAID or DOD contract actions within our sample that required congressional notification. DOD provided only one technical comment, which was incorporated into the report. In response, we focused our review on reconstruction contract actions funded solely with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). We included the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as these agencies are responsible for 98 percent of the total obligations made with IRRF through June 2006. The contract actions were selected based on the following criteria: reconstruction contract actions funded with IRRF monies; actions awarded from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006; current obligations of $1 million or more; represented both competed and noncompeted actions; selected more actions from DOD than USAID and State based on volume of contract actions obtained; included a variety of contracts, task orders, and modifications; and included a variety of goods and services provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to support Iraq rebuilding efforts. The majority of these efforts are being carried out through contracts awarded by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). When awarding IRRF-funded contracts for $5 million or more noncompetitively, agencies are required by statute to provide notification and justification to Congress. In June 2004, GAO found that agencies generally complied with laws and regulations governing competition to award new contracts, but did not always comply with competition requirements when issuing task orders under existing contracts. As mandated by Congress, this report (1) describes the extent of competition in Iraq reconstruction contracts awarded by DOD, USAID, and State since October 1, 2003, based on available data, and (2) assesses whether these agencies followed applicable documentation and congressional notification requirements regarding competition for 51 judgmentally selected Iraq reconstruction contract actions. In written comments, State and USAID concurred with the report findings. DOD provided a technical comment.
What GAO Found
While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide Iraq reconstruction contract data, available data showed that from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006, DOD, USAID, and State collectively awarded the majority of Iraq reconstruction contracts competitively. Based on competition information we obtained on $10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in IRRF obligations by these agencies during the period of our review, we found that about $9.1 billion--or 91 percent--was for competitively awarded contracts. While our ability to obtain complete competition data for all DOD Iraq reconstruction contract actions was limited because not all DOD components consistently tracked or fully reported this information, we obtained information on approximately $7 billion, or 82 percent, of DOD's total Iraq reconstruction contract obligations, and of this, we found that competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Additionally, based on complete data for the period of our review we found that USAID competitively awarded contract actions for 99 percent of its obligations, while State awarded contract actions competitively for only 10 percent of its obligations. GAO reviewed the files for 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion--22 of which were awarded noncompetitively and 29 of which were awarded competitively--almost all of which contained proper documentation. One contract file--for a noncompetitively awarded task order issued by State--did not contain justifications or other required documentation. DOD was also unable to provide documentation for 4 of the competitively awarded contract actions. Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in GAO's review, State should have notified Congress of 2 actions awarded using other than full and open competition in accordance with notification requirements but did not. State officials told GAO that they have taken steps to address the problem. GAO did not identify any DOD or USAID contract actions within the sample that required notification. |
gao_GAO-17-192 | gao_GAO-17-192_0 | Two federal departments are primarily responsible for ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply, including the safe use of antibiotics in food animals—HHS and USDA. HHS and USDA Increased Oversight and Data Collection for Antibiotic Use in Animals, but Gaps Exist, and the Impact of These Actions Is Unknown
Since 2011, HHS has increased veterinary oversight of antibiotics in food animals and, along with USDA, collected additional data on antibiotic use and resistance, but gaps exist in oversight and data collection, and the impact of the agencies’ efforts is unknown. In addition, agencies in HHS and USDA made several improvements in collecting and reporting data on antibiotic sales, resistance, and use. HHS and USDA are continuing to search for evidence of colistin-resistant bacteria in the United States through the National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System, according to the HHS website. Gaps in Oversight of Antibiotics in Food Animals
FDA’s guidance to industry has improved oversight of some antibiotics, but it does not address long-term and open-ended use of medically important antibiotics for disease prevention because some antibiotics do not have defined durations of use on their labels. Gaps in Farm-Specific Data Persist
Gaps in farm-specific data on antibiotic use and resistance in food animals persist since we last reported on this in 2011. HHS and USDA officials told us they are continuing to make progress towards developing a joint data collection plan but that funding has been an impediment. FDA and APHIS Do Not Have Measures to Assess the Impact of Actions Taken
FSIS has developed a performance measure to assess the impact of its actions to manage the use of antibiotics in food animals, but FDA and APHIS have not done so. Selected Countries and the EU Have Taken Various Actions to Manage Use of Antibiotics
To manage the use of antibiotics in food animals and combat the emergence and spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark and the EU have taken actions to strengthen the oversight of veterinarians’ and producers’ use of antibiotics and to collect farm-specific data. For Oversight and Data Collection, the Netherlands Relied on a Public-Private Partnership, and the EU and Other Countries Used Government Policies and Regulations
To strengthen oversight and collect farm-specific data on antibiotic use in food animals, the Netherlands primarily relied on a public-private partnership, whereas Canada, Denmark, and the EU relied on government policies and regulations. According to FSIS Directive 8080.3, the objectives of foodborne illness investigation include identifying contributing factors to the foodborne illness, including outbreaks, and recommending actions or new policies to prevent future occurrences. Without developing a process to establish appropriate durations of use on labels of all medically important antibiotics, FDA will not know whether it is ensuring judicious use of medically important antibiotics in food animals. In addition, although APHIS and FSIS established a memorandum of understanding in 2014 to assess the root cause of foodborne illness outbreaks, the memorandum does not include a decision-making framework for determining when on-farm investigations are needed. In the first use of the memorandum in a 2015 outbreak, there was no consensus among stakeholders on when such investigations were needed. Developing a framework for deciding when on-farm investigations are warranted during outbreaks, in coordination with CDC and other stakeholders, would help APHIS and FSIS identify factors that contribute to or cause foodborne illness outbreaks, including those from antibiotic-resistant pathogens in animal products. USDA agreed with our recommendations. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) examines actions the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have taken since 2011 to manage the use of antibiotics in food animals and to assess the impact of their actions, (2) identifies actions that selected countries and the European Union (EU) have taken to manage the use of antibiotics in food animals, and (3) examines the extent to which HHS and USDA have conducted on-farm investigations of outbreaks of foodborne illness from antibiotic-resistant pathogens in animal products. To examine the extent to which HHS and USDA conducted on-farm investigations of outbreaks of foodborne illness from antibiotic-resistant pathogens in animal products, we reviewed HHS’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Service (APHIS) and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) documentation, including directives, relevant to investigations of foodborne illness outbreaks, as well as the 2014 APHIS-FSIS memorandum of understanding and corresponding standard operating procedures to access farms for investigations during such outbreaks. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the World Health Organization, antibiotic resistance is one of the biggest threats to global health. CDC estimates antibiotic-resistant bacteria cause at least 2 million human illnesses in the United States each year, and there is strong evidence that some resistance in bacteria is caused by antibiotic use in food animals (cattle, poultry, and swine). HHS and USDA are primarily responsible for ensuring food safety, including safe use of antibiotics in food animals. In 2011, GAO reported on antibiotic use and recommended addressing gaps in data collection. GAO was asked to update this information. This report (1) examines actions HHS and USDA have taken to manage use of antibiotics in food animals and assess the impact of their actions, (2) identifies actions selected countries and the EU have taken to manage use of antibiotics in food animals, and (3) examines the extent to which HHS and USDA conducted on-farm investigations of foodborne illness outbreaks from antibiotic-resistant bacteria in animal products.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials and stakeholders. GAO selected three countries and the EU for review because they have taken actions to mitigate antibiotic resistance.
What GAO Found
Since 2011, when GAO last reported on this issue, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has increased veterinary oversight of antibiotics and, with the Department of Agriculture (USDA), has made several improvements in collecting data on antibiotic use in food animals and resistance in bacteria. For example, HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a regulation and guidance for industry recommending changes to drug labels. However, oversight gaps still exist. For example, changes to drug labels do not address long-term and open-ended use of antibiotics for disease prevention because some antibiotics do not define duration of use on their labels. FDA officials told GAO they are seeking public comments on establishing durations of use on labels, but FDA has not clearly defined objectives for closing this gap, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Without doing so, FDA will not know whether it is ensuring judicious use of antibiotics. Moreover, gaps in farm-specific data on antibiotic use and resistance that GAO found in 2011 remain. GAO continues to believe HHS and USDA need to implement a joint on-farm data collection plan as previously recommended. In addition, FDA and USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) do not have metrics to assess the impact of actions they have taken, which is inconsistent with leading practices for performance measurement. Without metrics, FDA and APHIS cannot assess the effects of actions taken to manage the use of antibiotics.
Three selected countries and the European Union (EU), which GAO reviewed, have taken various actions to manage use of antibiotics in food animals, including strengthening oversight of veterinarians' and producers' use of antibiotics, collecting farm-specific data, and setting targets to reduce antibiotic use. The Netherlands has primarily relied on a public-private partnership, whereas Canada, Denmark, and the EU have relied on government policies and regulations to strengthen oversight and collect farm-specific data. Since taking these actions, the use or sales of antibiotics in food animals decreased and data collection improved, according to foreign officials and data reports GAO reviewed. Still, some U.S. federal officials and stakeholders believe that similar U.S. actions are not feasible because of production differences and other factors.
HHS and USDA officials said they have not conducted on-farm investigations during foodborne illness outbreaks including those from antibiotic-resistant bacteria in animal products. In 2014, USDA agencies established a memorandum of understanding to assess the root cause of foodborne illness outbreaks. However, in 2015 in the agencies' first use of the memorandum, there was no consensus among stakeholders on whether to conduct foodborne illness investigations on farms and the memorandum does not include a framework to make this determination, similar to a decision matrix used in other investigations. According to a directive issued by USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, foodborne illness investigations shall include identifying contributing factors and recommending actions or new policies to prevent future occurrences. Developing a framework, in coordination with HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other stakeholders, would help USDA identify factors that contribute to or cause foodborne illness outbreaks, including those from antibiotic-resistant bacteria in animal products.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that HHS address oversight gaps, HHS and USDA develop metrics for assessing progress in achieving goals, and USDA develop a framework with HHS to decide when to conduct on-farm investigations. USDA agreed and HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-598T | gao_GAO-17-598T_0 | Federal law requires each state, under both fee-for-service and managed care delivery models, to operate a claims processing system to record information about the services provided and report this information to CMS:
Provider claims and managed care encounter data are required to include information about the service provided, including the general type of service; a procedure code that identifies the specific service provided; the location of the service; the date the service was provided; and information about the provider who rendered the service (e.g., provider identification number). Medicaid spending on long-term services and supports provided in home and community settings has increased dramatically over time—to about $80 billion in federal and state expenditures in 2014—while the share of spending for care in institutions has declined, and HCBS spending now exceeds long-term care spending for individuals in institutions (see fig. Together with federal statutes, the regulations and guidance issued by CMS establish a broad federal framework for the provision of personal care services. Federal Program Requirements for Maintaining Beneficiary Safety and Ensuring That Billed Services Are Provided Differ Significantly
In our 2016 report examining the federal program requirements for the multiple programs under which personal care services are provided, we found significant differences in federal requirements related to beneficiary safety and ensuring that billed services are provided. These differences may translate to differences in beneficiary protections across program types. For example, states implementing an HCBS Waiver program or a State Plan HCBS program must:
Describe to CMS how the state Medicaid agency will determine that it is assuring the health and welfare of beneficiaries. States implementing HCBS Waiver programs and State Plan HCBS programs, for example, are required by CMS to provide evidence that the state is only paying claims when services are actually rendered, while the State Plan personal care services and Community First Choice programs are not required to do so. We recommended that CMS take additional steps to better harmonize and achieve a more consistent application of program requirements, as appropriate, across the different personal care services programs in a way that accounts for common risks faced by beneficiaries and to better ensure billed services were provided. CMS agreed with these recommendations, and has sought input by publishing a request for information on numerous topics related to Medicaid home and community-based services, including input on how to ensure beneficiary health and safety and program integrity across different types of personal care services programs. Data on Personal Care Services Collected by CMS were Often Not Timely, Complete, Consistent, or Accurate Claims and Encounter Data Were Not Timely, Complete, or Consistent
In our 2017 report examining the data CMS uses to monitor the provision of personal care services, we found that claims and encounter data collected by CMS were not timely. Type of services provided. More than 400 unique procedure codes were used by the 35 states. Medicaid Expenditure Data Collected by CMS Were Not Always Accurate or Complete
In our 2017 report we found that Medicaid personal care services expenditure data collected were not always accurate or complete, according to our analysis of expenditure data collected by CMS from states for calendar years 2012 through 2015. As illustrated in figure 4, nearly two-thirds of the reporting errors were a result of states not separately identifying and reporting personal care services expenditures using the correct reporting lines, as required by CMS. We recommended that CMS take steps to improve the collection of complete and consistent personal care services data and better monitor the states’ provision of and spending on Medicaid personal care services. Having various options for providing personal care services provides flexibilities for states in how they administer their programs and provide services to different groups of beneficiaries. At the same time, our work has also found a patchwork of federal requirements, resulting in varying levels of beneficiary safeguards and requirements to ensure that billed services are actually provided. Similarly, the level of assurance that billed services are actually provided could vary based on the type of program. Without better data, CMS is hindered in effectively performing key management functions related to personal care services, such as ensuring state claims for enhanced federal matching funds are accurate. CMS has taken steps to improve the data it collects from states, and to establish more consistent administration of policies and procedures across the programs under which personal care services are provided. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a joint federal-state health care program, provides long-term services and supports for disabled and aged individuals, increasingly in home and community settings. Federal and state Medicaid spending on home- and community-based services was about $80 billion in 2014. Personal care services are a key component of this care. States can offer personal care services through many different types of programs, and each may be subject to different federal requirements established by statute, regulations, and guidance. The provision of personal care in beneficiaries' homes can pose safety risks, and these services have a high and growing rate of improper payments, including cases where services for which the state was billed were not provided. In recent years Congress has directed HHS to improve coordination of these programs which could harmonize requirements--that is, implement a more consistent administration of policies and procedures--and enhance oversight.
This statement highlights key issues regarding (1) the federal program requirements to protect beneficiaries' safety and ensure that billed services are provided, and (2) the usefulness of data collected by CMS for oversight. This testimony is based on reports GAO issued in 2016 and 2017. For these reports, GAO assessed CMS data on personal care services provided to beneficiaries and state spending. GAO also reviewed federal statutes, regulations, and guidance, and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
In its November 2016 report, GAO found a patchwork of federal requirements related to how states must protect the safety of beneficiaries in their personal care services programs and to how states ensure that billed services are actually provided. Personal care services help beneficiaries with basic activities of daily living such as bathing and dressing, in a home- or community-based setting. For two types of programs under which personal care services can be offered, states must describe to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) how they will ensure the health and welfare of beneficiaries. Similar requirements were not in place for several other programs GAO examined. In addition, for some but not all personal care services programs that GAO reviewed, states must provide evidence to CMS that the state is paying claims for services that have actually been provided. These differing federal program requirements result in uneven beneficiary safeguards and levels of assurances regarding states' beneficiary protections and oversight of billed services. GAO recommended that CMS take steps to harmonize and achieve a more consistent application of federal requirements across programs. CMS agreed with GAO's recommendation and sought input on how to do so by publishing a request for information.
In its January 2017 report, GAO found limitations in the data that CMS collects to monitor the provision of personal care services and to monitor state spending on services. For example:
Data on personal care services provided were often not timely, complete or consistent. The most recent data available during GAO's review (2016) were for 2012 and included data for only 35 states. Further, 15 percent of claims lacked provider identification numbers and 34 percent lacked information on the quantity of services provided. Data were also inconsistent as more than 400 different procedure codes were used by states to identify personal care services. Without timely, complete, and consistent data, CMS is unable to effectively oversee state programs and verify who is providing personal care services or the type, amount, and dates of services provided.
Data on states' spending on CMS's expenditure reports, the basis for states' receipt of federal matching funds, were not always accurate or complete. From 2012 through 2015, 17 percent of expenditure lines were not reported correctly by states, according to GAO's analysis. Nearly two-thirds of these errors were due to states not separately identifying personal care services expenditures, as required by CMS, from other types of expenditures. Inaccurate and incomplete data limit CMS's ability to, among other oversight functions, ensure federal matching funds are appropriate.
GAO made several recommendations to improve the data CMS collects to monitor the provision of and expenditures on personal care services. CMS agreed with some but not all of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-687 | gao_GAO-05-687_0 | Since World War II, DOD has relied primarily on a government-owned base to meet its conventional ammunition needs. DOD’S Increased Requirements for Small and Medium Caliber Ammunition Primarily Driven by Increased Proficiency Requirements
DOD’s increased requirements for small and medium caliber ammunitions have largely been driven by increased weapons training requirements, dictated by the Army’s transformation to a more self-sustaining and lethal force—which was accelerated after the attacks of September 11, 2001— and by the deployment of forces to conduct recent U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 2000, requirements for small caliber ammunition have more than doubled, and requirements for medium caliber ammunition have almost doubled. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, total requirements for small caliber ammunition increased from about 730 million to nearly 1.8 billion rounds (see figure 2). Between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, medium caliber requirements almost doubled, from 11.7 million rounds to almost 22 million rounds (see figure 3). The three government-owned, contractor-operated plants that produce small and medium caliber ammunition were built in 1941. PEO Is Taking Steps to Meet Future Small and Medium Caliber Needs, but Implementation Problems Exist
The PEO has taken certain steps to ensure that the national technology and industrial base can meet future small and medium caliber ammunition needs. As part of these efforts, the PEO is attempting to build flexibility into its acquisition system to address near-term fluctuations in the requirement for small caliber ammunition. This commercial producer will serve as a second source in addition to Lake City, to meet small caliber ammunition needs. A Planning Process for Ammunition Has Been Initiated, but Information Needed for Effective Implementation and Measuring Performance Is Lacking
The PEO has initiated a planning process to ensure that the national technology and industrial base for conventional ammunition’s capacity can effectively and efficiently respond to future DOD ammunition needs, including small and medium caliber ammunition requirements. While DOD has been able to meet its near-term ammunition requirements, it has had to rely on foreign suppliers to make up for some shortfalls. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify changes over the past several years that have increased the requirement for small and medium caliber ammunition and assess the actions DOD has taken to address the increased requirement, we reviewed documentation and data, and interviewed DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology; the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; the Office of the PEO for Ammunition; and the Training and Doctrine Command. To determine how DOD plans to ensure that it can meet future small and medium caliber ammunition needs, we interviewed officials from previously mentioned DOD offices, including the Office of the PEO for Ammunition, to determine the status of their planning efforts. industrial base. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DOD) significantly reduced its purchases of small and medium caliber ammunition and reduced the number of government-owned plants that produce small and medium caliber ammunition. Since 2000, however, DOD's requirements for these types of ammunition have increased notably. Because the success of military operations depends in part on DOD having a sufficient national technology and industrial base to meet its ammunition needs, Congress asked GAO to review DOD's ability to assess if its supplier base can meet small and medium caliber ammunition needs. Specifically, we (1) identified changes over the past several years that have increased the requirement for small and medium caliber ammunition, (2) assessed the actions DOD has taken to address the increased requirement, and (3) determined how DOD plans to ensure that it can meet future small and medium caliber ammunition needs.
What GAO Found
DOD's increased requirements for small and medium caliber ammunition over the past several years are largely the result of increased weapons training requirements needed to support the Army's transformation to a more self-sustaining and lethal force--an effort accelerated after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001--and the deployment of forces to conduct recent U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2005, total requirements for small caliber ammunitions more than doubled, from about 730 million to nearly 1.8 billion rounds, while total requirements for medium caliber ammunitions increased from 11.7 million rounds to almost 22 million rounds. DOD has initiated several steps to meet the increased demand, including funding about $93.3 million for modernization improvements at the three government-owned ammunition plants producing small and medium caliber ammunition. DOD is currently able to meet its medium caliber requirement through modernization efforts at the government-owned ammunition plants and through contracts with commercial producers. The government-owned plant producing small caliber ammunition cannot meet the increased requirements, even with these modernization efforts. Also, commercial producers within the national technology and industrial base have not had the capacity to meet these requirements. As a result, DOD has had to rely at least in part on foreign commercial producers to meet its small caliber ammunition needs. DOD has taken steps to ensure that the national technology and industrial base can meet future small caliber ammunition needs by building flexibility into the acquisition system to address fluctuations. In addition, a planning process has been put in place to ensure that the base can respond to longer-term DOD ammunition needs, including small and medium caliber ammunition. While the process is ongoing, information to effectively implement the plan and timely performance measures to ensure accountability are lacking. |
gao_GAO-10-606 | gao_GAO-10-606_0 | The policy review also recommended that the President establish a cybersecurity coordinator position to integrate the government’s cybersecurity policies. Several Key Entities and Efforts Address Global Cyberspace Security and Governance
There are a number of key entities and efforts whose international activities significantly influence the security and governance of cyberspace. The organizations range from information-sharing forums that are nondecision-making gatherings of experts to private organizations to treaty-based, decision-making bodies founded by countries. Their efforts include those to address topics such as incident response, technical standards, and law enforcement cooperation. ISO is a nongovernmental organization that develops and publishes international standards through a consensus-based process involving a network of the national standards institutes of 162 countries with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, supporting the process. ITU members include delegations from 191 nations, as well as more than 700 members from the private sector. Federal entities’ involvement in these efforts ranges from engaging in bilateral and multilateral relationships with foreign countries to providing personnel to foreign agencies to leading or being a member of a U.S. delegation to attending meetings. It is responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade policy and has the responsibility for trade negotiations with other countries. The U.S. Government Faces Challenges in Addressing the Global Aspects of Cyberspace
The U.S. government faces a number of challenges that impede its ability to formulate and implement a coherent approach to addressing the global aspects of cyberspace, including (1) providing top-level leadership, (2) developing a coherent and comprehensive strategy, (3) coordinating across all relevant federal entities, (4) ensuring cyberspace-related technical standards and policies do not pose unnecessary barriers to U.S. trade, (5) participating in international cyber incident response, (6) differing legal systems and enforcing U.S. criminal and civil laws, and (7) defining international norms for cyberspace. Although the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State have served in leadership roles for the specific activities of the key entities and efforts identified, federal agencies have not provided top-level leadership for the U.S. on these issues. Until these challenges are addressed, the United States will be at a disadvantage in promoting its national interests in the realm of cyberspace. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In oral comments on a draft of this report, the national Cybersecurity Coordinator and his staff generally concurred with our recommendations and stated that actions are already being taken to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) significant entities and efforts addressing global cyberspace security and governance issues, (2) U.S. entities responsible for addressing cyberspace security and governance and the extent of their involvement at the international level, and (3) challenges to effective U.S. involvement in global cyberspace security and governance efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent foreign-based intrusions on the computer systems of U.S. federal agencies and commercial companies highlight the vulnerabilities of the interconnected networks that comprise the Internet, as well as the need to adequately address the global security and governance of cyberspace. Federal law and policy give a number of federal entities responsibilities for representing U.S. cyberspace interests abroad, in collaboration with the private sector. More recently, the President appointed a national Cybersecurity Coordinator charged with improving the nation's cybersecurity leadership. GAO was asked to identify (1) significant entities and efforts addressing global cyberspace security and governance issues, (2) U.S. entities responsible for addressing these issues and the extent of their involvement at the international level, and (3) challenges to effective U.S. involvement in global cyberspace security and governance efforts. To do this, GAO analyzed policies, reports, and other documents and interviewed U.S. government and international officials and experts from over 30 organizations.
What GAO Found
There are a number of key entities and efforts with significant influence on international cyberspace security and governance. The organizations range from information-sharing forums that are nondecision-making gatherings of experts to private organizations to treaty-based, decision-making bodies founded by countries. Their efforts include those to address topics such as incident response, technical standards, and law enforcement cooperation. For example, the International Organization for Standardization is a nongovernmental organization that develops and publishes international standards, including those related to cybersecurity, through a consensus-based process involving a network of the national standards bodies of 162 countries. A number of U.S. federal entities have responsibilities for, and are involved in, international cyberspace governance and security efforts. Specifically, the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State, among others, are involved in efforts to develop international standards, formulate cyber-defense policy, facilitate overseas investigations and law enforcement, and represent U.S. interests in international forums. Federal entities have varying roles among organizations and efforts with international influence over cyberspace security and governance, including engaging in bilateral and multilateral relationships with foreign countries, providing personnel to foreign agencies, leading or being a member of a U.S. delegation, coordinating U.S. policy with other U.S. entities through the interagency process, or attending meetings. The global aspects of cyberspace present key challenges to U.S. policy. Until these challenges are addressed, the United States will be at a disadvantage in promoting its national interests in the realm of cyberspace.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the national Cybersecurity Coordinator address challenges including developing a comprehensive national global cyberspace strategy. The national Cybersecurity Coordinator and his staff generally concurred with the recommendations and stated that actions are already being taken. |
gao_GAO-11-630 | gao_GAO-11-630_0 | 1.) For example, some carriers guarantee coverage to a group of eligible individuals, such as active employees, during an open enrollment period. As part of FLTCIP’s second contract, OPM and John Hancock agreed to a premium increase of up to 25 percent for current enrollees who had selected the program’s 5 percent ACIO benefit and were less than 70 years old at the time of their enrollment. A Variety of Factors Influenced Carriers’ Interest in FLTCIP, Business Strategy Most Significantly
A variety of factors have influenced carriers’ interest in contracting to insure FLTCIP enrollees and administer the program, according to officials from the carriers we interviewed. In contrast, officials from the carriers who indicated that their business strategy detracted from their interest in FLTCIP said that they wanted to grow their long-term care insurance business at a slower pace or focus on other segments of the market, such as the individual market. FLTCIP History Generally Detracted from Carriers’ Interest in the Second Contract
Factors related to FLTCIP’s history generally detracted from carriers’ interest in the program at the time of OPM’s solicitation for the second contract and had the second most significant influence on carriers’ interest in FLTCIP at that time. When asked about how FLTCIP’s history affected the carrier’s interest at the time of the second contract, officials from four of the carriers noted that as a result of the program’s history— including the premiums charged for the benefits offered during the first contract period and the actuarial experience of the program—a premium increase was warranted. Four carriers also cited concerns about transitioning the program from other carriers. The large size of the eligible population had a positive influence on carriers’ interest in FLTCIP, but the lack of a list of home addresses for the eligible population and the voluntary nature of the program had a negative influence. These enrollees elected to pay the premium increase. 2.) Changes to Actuarial Assumptions Used to Set FLTCIP Premiums Resulted in a Projected Increase in Future Claims
Since FLTCIP’s inception in 2002, John Hancock has revised the actuarial assumptions used to set the program’s premiums—specifically, those made for the program’s lapse, mortality, morbidity, and return on investment. Changes to FLTCIP’s lapse and mortality assumptions reflect an expectation that a larger portion of enrollees will voluntarily maintain their coverage over time and will live longer than originally expected. When setting premiums for FLTCIP’s second contract period, John Hancock used the same return on investment assumption—6.5 percent— that it used when setting premiums for the first contract period. The new strategy, which invests a considerable portion of FLTCIP assets in public equities, has a higher expected rate of return than the investment strategy utilized during the first contract period, according to John Hancock officials. While John Hancock expects that the amount of claims payments made for enrollees of each age will be less than initially assumed, it also expects more enrollees to continue their coverage and reach older ages. Consequently, FLTCIP expects to pay claims for a greater number of enrollees than initially expected. OPM’s Oversight Includes an Evaluation of FLTCIP’s Actuarial Assumptions and a Review of Program Communications
OPM evaluates the actuarial assumptions proposed by carriers and monitors how the program’s experience compared to those assumptions. In addition, OPM reviews all program communications for accuracy and clarity. OPM Evaluates FLTCIP’s Actuarial Assumptions and Monitors Program Experience
OPM evaluates the actuarial assumptions carriers propose for FLTCIP to ensure that the assumptions are reasonable and collectively support the premiums proposed for FLTCIP plans. Once FLTCIP’s premiums are finalized with the award of the contract, OPM monitors how FLTCIP’s experience compares with the actuarial assumptions that were used to set premiums. OPM and John Hancock provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Influence of Carriers’ Business Strategies on Their Interest in the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP)
Appendix I: Influence of Carriers’ Business Strategies on Their Interest in the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP)
Appendix II: Influence of Program History on Carriers’ Interest in FLTCIP
Appendix III: Influence of Program Size and Other Characteristics on Carriers’ Interest in FLTCIP
Appendix IV: Selected Features of FLTCIP Benefit Plans Offered during the Program’s First and Second Contract Periods
Appendix V: Changes in the Cost of Long- Term Care Services Compared with FLTCIP Inflation Protection Options
To summarize changes in the cost of long-term care services from 2002 through 2010, we analyzed consumer price index data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on changes in the cost of nursing home care and home care. 3.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the federal government has offered long-term care insurance to its employees, retirees, and certain others through the Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program (FLTCIP). Enrollees pay the full cost of their premiums. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) oversees the program. OPM has held two competitive processes to select contractors to insure enrollees and administer FLTCIP, although interest in and competition for these contracts has been limited. In 2009, soon after OPM's award of FLTCIP's second 7-year contract to John Hancock Life Insurance Company (John Hancock), 66 percent of enrollees were notified that their premiums would increase up to 25 percent in order to compensate for how the actuarial assumptions used to set premiums differed from the program's experience. GAO was asked to review FLTCIP. In this report, GAO describes (1) factors affecting carriers' interest in FLTCIP, (2) how the actuarial assumptions used to set FLTCIP premiums have changed since the program's inception, and (3) OPM's oversight of actuarial assumptions and experience and program communications. To do so, GAO interviewed officials from six carriers that in 2009 insured over 60 percent of all long-term care insurance policyholders. GAO also interviewed officials from OPM and John Hancock and reviewed program documentation, including FLTCIP contracts.
What GAO Found
A variety of factors influenced carriers' interest in FLTCIP. Carriers' business strategies had the most significant influence on their interest, though in different ways. Some carriers wanted to increase their market share and thus were attracted to FLTCIP. In contrast, some carriers wanted to grow their long-term care insurance business at a slower pace, which detracted from their interest in FLTCIP. At the time of FLTCIP's second contract, factors relating to the program's history had the second-most significant influence on carriers' interest, and generally detracted from it as a result of FLTCIP's need for a premium increase and concerns about transitioning a large, complex program from another carrier. A variety of other factors also affected carriers' interest. For example, the large number of eligible individuals and the lack of a requirement to guarantee coverage to them positively influenced carriers' interest, while the lack of a list of home addresses for the eligible population--which could have been used to market the program--and the relatively large portion of eligible individuals who were disabled detracted from carriers' interest. Since FLTCIP's inception in 2002, John Hancock has revised the program's actuarial assumptions. When setting premiums for the second contract period, John Hancock updated FLTCIP's assumptions to reflect an expectation that a larger portion of enrollees will voluntarily maintain their coverage longer and will live longer than initially expected. The carrier also reduced the amount of claims costs the program expects for enrollees of any given age. Although FLTCIP yielded a lower-than-expected return on investment during the first contract period, John Hancock did not revise this assumption when setting premiums for the second contract period. Instead, it revised the investment strategy to include considerable investments in public equities--such as stocks--which the carrier said have a higher expected rate of return. Altogether, John Hancock expects that more enrollees will continue their coverage, reach older ages, and submit claims than initially assumed. As such, the carrier increased projections for the total amount of future FLTCIP claims. As part of its assessment of carriers' proposals to insure FLTCIP enrollees and administer the program, OPM evaluated the actuarial assumptions carriers proposed for the program to ensure that the assumptions were reasonable and collectively supported the proposed premiums. Once the program's premiums were finalized with the award of the contract, OPM has monitored the program's experience by reviewing regular reports comparing the experience of the program to the actuarial assumptions used to set premiums. OPM's oversight has also included a review of all program communications for accuracy and clarity prior to their use. OPM and John Hancock provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-449T | gao_GAO-07-449T_0 | GAO’s High-Risk Series Raises the Priority and Visibility of the Need to Transform Federal Oversight of Food Safety
Overall, our High-Risk Series has served to identify and help resolve serious government weaknesses in areas that involve substantial resources and provide critical services to the public. With that in mind, we designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area to raise the priority and visibility of the need to transform the federal government’s oversight system. Similarly, food contamination, such as the recent E. coli outbreaks, can harm local economies. While 15 agencies collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety, the two primary agencies are the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for virtually all other foods. During the past 30 years, we have detailed problems with the current fragmented federal food safety system and reported that the system has caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. Specifically: Existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and enforcement authorities. Under current law, thousands of USDA inspectors maintain continuous inspection at slaughter facilities and examine all slaughtered meat and poultry carcasses. They also visit each processing facility at least once during each operating day. For foods under FDA’s jurisdiction, however, federal law does not mandate the frequency of inspections. Federal agencies are spending resources on overlapping food safety activities. USDA and FDA both inspect shipments of imported food at 18 U.S. ports of entry. However, these two agencies do not share inspection resources at these ports. USDA and FDA provide guidance to companies for carrying out voluntary recalls. These agencies do not know how promptly and completely companies are carrying out recalls, do not promptly verify that recalls have reached all segments of the distribution chain, and use procedures that may not be effective to alert consumers to a recall. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have heightened concerns about agriculture’s vulnerability to terrorism. Federal Oversight of Food Safety Should Be Addressed as a 21st Century Challenge
We have cited the need to integrate the fragmented federal food safety system as a significant challenge for the 21st century, to be addressed in light of the nation’s current deficit and growing structural fiscal imbalance. To help Congress review and reconsider the base of federal spending, we framed illustrative questions for decision makers to consider. While these questions can apply to other areas needing broad-based transformation, we specifically cited the myriad of food safety programs managed across several federal agencies. How can agencies more strategically manage their portfolio of tools and adopt more innovative methods to contribute to the achievement of national outcomes? As I have discussed, GAO designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area that is in need of a broad-based transformation to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, about 76 million people contract a foodborne illness in the United States; about 325,000 require hospitalization; and about 5,000 die. While the recent E. coli outbreaks highlighted the risks posed by accidental contamination, the attacks of September 11, 2001, heightened awareness that the food supply could also be vulnerable to deliberate contamination. This testimony focuses on the (1) role that GAO's high-risk series can play in raising the priority and visibility of the need to transform federal oversight of food safety, (2) fragmented nature of federal oversight of food safety, and (3) need to address federal oversight of food safety as a 21st century challenge. This work is based on previously issued reports.
What GAO Found
GAO's high-risk series is intended to raise the priority and visibility of government programs that are in need of broad-based transformation to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and sustainability. In January 2007, as part of our regular update of this series for each new Congress, GAO designated the federal oversight of food safety as a high-risk area for the first time. While this nation enjoys a plentiful and varied food supply that is generally considered to be safe, the federal oversight of food safety is fragmented, with 15 agencies collectively administering at least 30 laws related to food safety. The two primary agencies are the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which is responsible for the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for other food. In many previous reports, GAO found that this fragmented system has caused inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. For example, existing statutes give agencies different regulatory and enforcement authorities. Under current law, thousands of USDA inspectors must examine all slaughtered carcasses and visit all processing facilities at least once during each operating day. However, federal law does not mandate the frequency of inspection for foods that are under FDA's jurisdiction. Food recalls are generally voluntary. While USDA and FDA provide guidance to companies for carrying out voluntary recalls, they do not know how promptly and completely companies carry out recalls and do not promptly verify that recalls have reached the entire distribution chain. In addition, they use procedures that may not be effective to alert consumers to a recall. Federal agencies are spending resources on overlapping food safety activities. USDA and FDA both inspect shipments of imported food at 18 U.S. ports of entry but do not share inspection resources at these ports. Integrating the fragmented federal food safety system is a significant challenge for the 21st century, particularly in light of the nation's current deficit and growing structural fiscal imbalance. To help Congress review and reconsider the base of federal spending, GAO framed illustrative questions for decision makers to consider in 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government. Among these questions are how agencies can integrate and share accountability for their activities on crosscutting issues and how they can adopt more innovative methods to contribute to the achievement of national outcomes. While framing these questions, GAO specifically cited the myriad of food safety programs managed across several federal agencies. |
gao_AIMD-99-142 | gao_AIMD-99-142_0 | TVA established a 10-year horizon for implementing the key changes outlined in the plan largely because TVA officials expect to be facing greater competitive pressures within that time frame and many of its long- term contracts with customers could begin to expire in 2007. Plan Objectives Address Key Issues Confronting TVA
Implementation of the 10-year plan is moving TVA in the right direction and addresses important issues facing TVA: its high fixed financing costs and limited financial flexibility to respond to competitive pressure and the large amount of deferred assets that have not been recovered through rates. However, the plan does not include certain major costs. The plan assumes that TVA would meet the increasing demand for power over the plan period by purchasing power from other utilities. Plan Does Not Include Costs of Complying With Environmental Regulations
The 10-year plan does not include estimated costs of complying with recent and proposed environmental regulations because TVA did not believe the costs were estimable at the time the plan was developed. Debt Reduction and Deferred Assets Recovery Goals Are Unachievable
The 10-year plan calls for reducing debt by about one-half to about $14 billion by 2007. However, as discussed previously, the plan excluded additional capital costs related to investing in new generating capacity to meet growth in demand for power, complying with new environmental regulations, and funding nonpower programs that were previously funded through appropriations. This revised goal is reflected in TVA’s fiscal year 2000 federal budget request. However, TVA has not formally updated the plan to reflect these and other changes. TVA has acknowledged that its debt reduction goal will not be achieved until at least 2009. To the extent it does not sufficiently reduce debt and related fixed costs and increase financial flexibility during the 10-year period, TVA’s ultimate strategic objective—to be able to offer competitively priced power by the end of 2007—could be jeopardized, depending on market conditions at the time. Conversely, TVA could achieve all of its objectives and not be competitive if its cost of producing power is higher than market. One option would be for TVA to expand its discussion of the 10-year plan in its annual reports, including reporting how actual results compare to all of the plan’s key goals and assumptions, including those for revenues, debt reduction, capital expenditures, cost savings, and the market price of power; progress toward achieving performance measures related to the plan, an overall assessment of whether TVA is on course to provide competitive power in 2007. Specifically, we were asked to determine whether the 10-year plan (1) addresses key issues facing TVA, (2) takes into consideration all applicable costs and revenue sources, (3) contains assumptions that are reasonable and in line with industry estimates and expectations, and (4) has been updated to reflect significant changes in key assumptions or actual experience that differs from TVA’s expectations when the plan was developed. Specifically, we assessed the achievability and reasonableness of the following goals and assumptions: the future market price of wholesale power will be 3.4 to 3.5 cents per annual growth in demand through 2007 will average 2 percent; fuel costs will increase 1.7 percent annually through 2007; improvements in supply chain management will save $50 million
TVA’s labor force will be reduced, and additional costs savings will be achieved through the creation of shared services and other initiatives; debt will be reduced by about one-half to about $14 billion, and the balance of deferred assets will be reduced from $8.5 billion to $500 million—TVA’s estimated net realizable value of these assets; capital expenditures will be limited to about $600 million annually and increases in demand through 2007 will be met primarily through purchased power; $200 million will be saved annually through cost improvement initiatives primarily related to refinancing Federal Financing Bank (FFB) and public bond debt, pursuing changes to its retirement plan, and improving business processes; revenues from power sales will be increased by about $325 million annually by implementing a rate increase in 1998 and maintaining it through 2007; and customer relations will improve through new contract and pricing options. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) 10-year business plan, focusing on whether the 10-year plan: (1) addresses key issues facing TVA; (2) takes into consideration all applicable costs and revenue sources; (3) contains goals and assumptions that are achievable or reasonable and in line with industry estimates and expectations; and (4) has been updated to reflect significant changes in key goals and assumptions or actual experience.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) implementation of the 10-year plan is moving TVA in the right direction toward its strategic objectives by addressing the key issues it faces--its high fixed financing costs and large investment in nonproducing and other deferred assets that have not been recovered through utility rates; (2) the plan calls for lowering fixed costs by reducing outstanding debt by about one-half--to about $14 billion--by 2007; (3) the plan also provides for the recovery through rates of all but about $500 million of the $8.5 billion in deferred assets outstanding as of the plan issuance date; (4) the year 2007 is key for TVA because it expects to face greater competitive pressures by then and because many long-term contracts with customers could expire at about that time; (5) the plan emphasizes changes designed to enable TVA to offer competitive rates by the end of 2007; (6) while focusing on the right issues, TVA's plan does not fully address certain costs; (7) the plan does not include: (a) the capital costs of increasing generating capacity to meet the growth in demand for power as is now planned; instead, it provides for meeting the growth in demand for power by purchasing power from other utilities; (b) the costs of complying with new and proposed environmental regulations; and (c) the costs of nonpower programs that were formerly fully funded through appropriations; (8) TVA estimates that these additional costs will total about $1 billion over the remaining life of the plan and will likely be higher; (9) GAO also found that while many of the plan's goals and assumptions were achievable or reasonable, certain of them were not, largely due to the additional expected costs described above; (10) some of these additional costs could be offset by increases in expected market rates of power in 2007; (11) because of the additional costs not addressed in the 10-year plan, it is unlikely that TVA can reduce its debt to the extent planned by 2007; (12) estimates in TVA's fiscal year 2000 federal budget request indicate that its debt reduction goal will likely not be achieved until 2009; (13) however, since it is not possible to accurately predict what the market price of power will be in 2007, TVA could still achieve its objective of offering competitively priced power, even if it does not fully achieve the plan's other goals and objectives; and (14) while TVA has acknowledged major changes to several of the plan's goals and assumptions and has factored these into its internal planning, the 10-year plan has not been formally updated to reflect these changes. |
gao_RCED-98-51 | gao_RCED-98-51_0 | The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 authorized the National Register of Historic Places, the official list of the nation’s districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture. Over 700 Historic Properties Are Located at HBCUs
Most of the 712 historic properties are at a small number of HBCUs and are mostly buildings rather than structures, sites, or objects. About half of the historic properties identified are already on the National Register of Historic Places. Most Restoration Costs Are for Properties Either Listed on or Eligible for the National Register of Historic Places
Of the estimated $755 million needed to restore the 712 properties, $356.7 million was for properties listed on the National Register; $239.1 million was for properties eligible for the National Register on the basis of SHPO surveys and assessments; and $159.2 million was for properties identified by the schools as historic but not included in either of the previous two categories. If the schools used other methods, we asked them to explain what they were. To determine the estimated restoration costs for the historic properties, we asked each HBCU to provide a cost estimate to restore each property identified. We requested that the estimate include only capital improvement costs and not normal day-to-day operating and maintenance costs. The accuracy of the results contained in this report is affected by the extent to which the respondents accurately reported the number of historic properties at their schools and the estimated costs to restore and preserve these properties. Locations of the 103 Historically Black Colleges and Universities, as of June 1, 1997
Survey Sent to Each of the 103 Historically Black Colleges and Universities
Section 1. Estimated total cost to preserve & restore. 3. 2. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the: (1) number of historic properties located at historically black colleges and universities (HBCU); and (2) estimated cost to restore and preserve these properties.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) all 103 historically black colleges and universities responded to GAO's survey; (2) respondents identified 712 historic properties that were owned by the schools; (3) most of these properties were at a small number of schools and were mostly buildings rather than structures, sites, or objects; (4) about half, 323, of the historic properties identified were already on the National Register of Historic Places--the official list of sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture; (5) the others were either eligible for the National Register on the basis of state historic preservation officers' surveys or considered historic by the colleges and universities; (6) according to information the schools provided, an estimated $755 million is needed to restore and preserve the 712 properties; (7) the cost estimates include the capital improvement costs to restore and preserve the historic properties, such as making the properties more accessible to people with disabilities, replacing roofs, and removing lead-based paint or asbestos; (8) the respondents were asked not to include routine maintenance costs; (9) some of the schools identified a total of about $60 million in funds that had already been set aside to restore and preserve specific historic properties; and (10) the schools used a number of different methods to calculate the estimated restoration and preservation costs. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-204 | gao_T-HEHS-97-204_0 | Despite 3 decades of federal efforts, the number of areas HHS has classified as underserved using these systems has not decreased. But until, and depending on how, the Secretary defines the types of areas needing rural health clinics, HHS will continue to rely on flawed HPSA and MUA systems that assume providing services to anyone living in a designated shortage area will improve access to care. In the meantime, new legislation continues to require the use of these systems, thereby increasing the problem. Implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act Provides an Opportunity to Address Identified Problems
To make the Rural Health Clinic program and other federal programs more accountable for improving access to primary care, HHS will have to devise a better management approach to measure need and evaluate individual program success in meeting this need. If effectively implemented, the management approach called for under the Results Act offers such an opportunity. Using information on how well programs are working to improve access in communities, program managers can decide whether federal intervention has been successful and can be discontinued, or if other strategies for addressing access barriers that still exist in communities would provide a more effective solution. Establishing performance goals and measures such as the following could go far to improve accountability in HHS’ primary access programs. Conclusion
Although the Rural Health Clinic program and other federal programs help to provide health care services to many people, the magnitude of federal investment creates a need to hold these programs accountable for improving access to primary care. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Rural Health Clinic Program in the broader context of GAO's past reviews of federal efforts to improve access to primary health care, focusing on: (1) the common problems GAO found and some recent initiatives to address them; and (2) how the type of management changes called for under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 can help the Rural Health Clinic and related programs improve accountability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's work has identified many instances in which the Rural Health Clinic program and other federal programs have provided aid to communities without ensuring that this aid has been used to improve access to primary care; (2) in some cases, programs have provided more than enough assistance to eliminate the defined shortage, while needs in other communities remain unaddressed; (3) GAO's work has identified a pervasive cause for this proa reliance on flawed systems for measuring health care shortages; (4) these systems often do not work effectively to identify which programs would work best in a given setting or how well a program is working to meet the needs of the underserved once it is in place; (5) for several years, the Department of Health and Human Services has tried unsuccessfully to revise these systems to address these problems; and (6) the goal-setting and performance measurement discipline available under the Results Act, however, appears to offer a suitable framework for ensuring that programs are held accountable for improving access to primary care. |
gao_GAO-14-87 | gao_GAO-14-87_0 | Agencies Operate a Wide Variety of Structures, Including Structures Specific to Their Missions
In the fiscal year 2012 FRPP, federal agencies reported that they were responsible for over 480,000 structures. Inconsistent Approaches to Tracking Structures and Inaccurate Information May Undermine the Reliability of Nationwide Data on Structures
Agencies take different approaches to defining and inventorying structures making the aggregation of data in the FRPP’s database unreliable. Agencies we reviewed defined structures differently leading to inconsistencies as to what assets are included in the FRPP, including counting some building-like facilities as structures. We also found that the agencies we reviewed counted structures differently, provided inaccurate location information, and categorized their structures inconsistently, all of which limits the usefulness of their data on structures in the FRPP. Additionally, the agencies we reviewed submitted outdated or incorrect information for key data elements, such as the replacement value, annual operating costs, and condition. GSA officials that manage FRPP said that FRPC chose to provide flexibility in the reporting guidance to account for the wide diversity in federal structures, but the FRPP also aggregates the data as if they were comparable. Even if this data were useful, FRPC reports very little of what it collects from agencies and officials at GSA told us that there is low interest in and demand for information on structures, a situation that creates few incentives to improve data reliability. In prior reports, we have stressed the importance of limiting the number of elements to the vital few that are considered essential for producing data for decision making in light of the costs of collecting this data. Figure 2 shows some of these examples. Agencies Face Similar Challenges in Maintaining, Securing, and Disposing of Structures as They Do for Buildings
We found that agencies generally face similar challenges in managing structures as they do in managing buildings. All agency officials we spoke with stated that most challenges centered on prioritizing resources to maintain structures, ensuring the safety and security of structures, and disposing of excess structures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure the quality of both the more detailed data that agencies collect on their structures and the summary information submitted in the FRPP, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in collaboration with FRPC, develop guidance to improve agencies’ internal controls to produce consistent, accurate, and reliable data on their structures. Assess the feasibility of limiting the data elements agencies would be required to submit for structures submitted to the FRPP. GSA agreed with our recommendations and provided its action plan for addressing the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the scale and scope of federally- owned or leased structures, (2) how federal agencies track and categorize federal structures, and (3) the extent to which the challenges the federal agencies face in managing buildings also apply to structures. The primary source of government-wide federal real property information is the Federal Real Property Council’s (FRPC) Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP). To determine to the scale and scope of federal structures, we obtained and analyzed FRPP data submissions and other real property data from the five selected agencies; interviewed real property officers at these agencies; visited sites where the agencies had structures; interviewed Office of Management and Budget and General Services Administration staff about the FRPP data for structures; and reviewed FRPC guidance and other documents related to the agencies’ real property data and the FRPP database. In all, we selected 24 sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's real property portfolio includes land, buildings, and structures. GAO has designated the management of federal real property as high-risk based largely on the management of federal buildings. However, over half of the assets are structures, such as roads, dams, and radio towers. GAO was asked to examine management issues related to structures. This report examines (1) the scale and scope of federally owned or leased structures, (2) how federal agencies track and categorize federal structures, and (3) the extent to which the challenges federal agencies face in managing buildings also apply to structures. GAO analyzed FRPP data on structures managed by federal civilian agencies against federal internal control standards for executive branch agencies and OMB guidelines, visited 24 sites selected to represent a variety of structure types from five civilian federal agencies with high numbers of structures, and interviewed officials from the five agencies, OMB and GSA about FRPP data collection and how agencies manage their structures.
What GAO Found
In 2012, federal agencies reported to the Federal Real Property Council (FRPC)--an organization comprised of all real property holding federal agencies--that they are responsible for operating over 480,000 federally owned structures. Information about these structures is recorded in the FRPC's Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP), the government's comprehensive database that describes the nature, use, and extent of federal real property. About 176,000 of those structures are operated by civilian federal agencies. The federal government manages a wide variety of structures. Some of these are common across agencies, such as roads and parking structures, while some are more specific to agencies' missions, such as historic structures or particle accelerators.
Agencies take different approaches to defining and inventorying structures making the aggregation of data in the FRPP's database unreliable. Agencies we reviewed defined structures differently leading to inconsistencies in what assets are included in the FRPP, including counting some building-like facilities as structures. We also found that these agencies counted structures differently, provided inaccurate structure location information, and categorized their structures inconsistently, all of which limits the usefulness of the data on structures in the FRPP. Additionally, the agencies we reviewed submitted incorrect information for key data elements, such as the replacement value, annual operating costs, and condition. General Services Administration (GSA) officials who manage the FRPP said that FRPC chose to provide flexibility in the reporting guidance for data on structures to account for the wide diversity in federal structures, but it also aggregates the data as if they were comparable. Even if this data were useful, FRPC reports very little information on structures, and officials at GSA told us that there is low interest in and demand for this information, creating few incentives to improve data reliability. In prior reports, we have stressed the importance of limiting the number of elements to the vital few that are considered essential for producing data for decision making in light of the costs in collecting this data.
Agencies generally face similar challenges in managing structures as they do in managing buildings. Officials from all of the selected agencies stated that most challenges centered on prioritizing resources to maintain structures, disposing of excess structures, and ensuring their safety and security.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB, in coordination with the FRPC, develop guidance to improve agencies internal controls to produce consistent, accurate and reliable information on their structures. GSA, in coordination with the FRPC, should clarify the definition of structures and assess the feasibility of limiting the data collected on structures submitted to the FRPP. OMB and GSA agreed with the recommendations, and GSA provided an action plan to implement GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-728T | gao_GAO-13-728T_0 | Background
Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. Last year we found, however, that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policies and procedures to consistently determine if a civilian position requires a security clearance.for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, and gives the Director authority to issue guidance to agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those determinations. says that, subject to In our July 2012 report, we found that Department of Homeland Security and DOD components’ officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. Conversely, underdesignating positions could lead to security risks. In July 2012, we recommended, among other things, that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. We also recommended that the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The Director of National Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and has taken steps to implement them. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were missing required documentation. We recommended that the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Division to measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards in order to improve the completeness—that is, quality—of future investigation documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented our recommendation to measure how frequently investigative reports meet federal investigative standards. Government-wide suitability and personnel security clearance reform efforts have not yet focused on identifying potential cost savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes improving cost savings. For example, OPM’s investigation process—which represents just a portion of the security clearance process and had significant costs—has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, we reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations (suitability determinations and personnel security clearances) for government employees in fiscal year 2011. As a result, OPM may be simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, we recommended that, to improve transparency of costs and the efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this recommendation and we are working with OPM to assess any progress it has made in this area. In conclusion, while the executive branch has made strides in improving the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process, now is the time to focus on making the improvements GAO has recommended. Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process. DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held a security clearance.
Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in the government-wide personnel security clearance process. The Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, is to develop uniform and consistent policies and procedures. Executive branch agencies are to determine which positions require access to classified information. OPMs investigators from the Federal Investigative Service conduct the majority of security investigations on personnel holding those positions, and adjudicators from requesting agencies, such as DOD, make the final clearance eligibility determination. Reform efforts and reporting requirements since 2005 have focused on expediting the processing of clearances.
This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued between 2008 and 2013 on DODs personnel security clearance programs and security clearance reform efforts. This testimony addresses three areas for improvement to the government-wide personnel security clearance process: (1) a sound requirements determination process, (2) performance metrics to measure quality, and (3) guidance to enhance efficiencies.
What GAO Found
In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, had not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine whether a civilian position required a security clearance. Underdesignating positions can lead to security risks; overdesignating positions can result in significant cost implications. Also, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense (DOD) components' officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. GAO recommended that, among other things, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policies and procedures to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance, and also guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The Director of National Intelligence concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified actions to implement them.
Executive branch agency efforts to improve the personnel security process have emphasized timeliness but not quality. In May 2009, GAO reported that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most of OPM investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation. In May 2009, GAO recommended that the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM's Federal Investigative Services to measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards in order to improve the completeness--that is, quality--of future investigation documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented this recommendation.
Government-wide personnel security reform efforts have not yet focused on potential cost savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes improving cost savings. For example, OPM's investigation process--which represents a portion of the security clearance process and has significant costs--has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, GAO reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in fiscal year 2011. GAO raised concerns that OPM may be simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, GAO recommended that, to improve the efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this recommendation and GAO is working with OPM to assess any progress it has made in this area. |
gao_HEHS-96-71 | gao_HEHS-96-71_0 | Under this procedure, the CPMP reviewed all biotechnology and other high-technology pharmaceutical products for approval across the EU. Because the CPMP opinions were not binding, Member States issued different decisions on drug approvals, which prevented pharmaceutical companies from obtaining EU-wide approval for their products. Although the new EU drug approval process changes the method for obtaining a marketing authorization, it does not affect drug pricing and reimbursement policies, which remain the responsibility of each Member State. CPMP opinions under the decentralized procedure, once accepted by the Commission, are binding on all the Member States. The decentralized approval procedure is expected to take between 300 and 686 days depending on whether other Member States object to the marketing authorization granted by the first Member State, objections lead to a formal arbitration by the CPMP, the applicant appeals an unfavorable opinion, the Member States raise important new scientific or technical questions, or the Standing Committee cannot reach consensus on a Commission draft decision and refers the matter to the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, industry officials contend that future prospects for using the centralized procedure are dependent on the EMEA’s success in expediting the drug approval process. EMEA Tasks, Structure, Staffing, and Financing
The EMEA was created by the Commission in 1993 to administer the new centralized approval procedure, which is mandatory for biotechnology and optional for other high-technology and innovative pharmaceutical products. The EMEA is funded by the Commission and industry application fees and has a small permanent staff and two scientific committees that draw upon EU-wide scientific expertise. Under the centralized procedure, the EMEA is responsible for coordinating the evaluation of the safety, efficacy, and quality of human pharmaceutical products that will be marketed throughout the EU. European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA)
Central agency within the EU that supports the CPMP in its scientific evaluations of pharmaceutical products. European Union (EU)
Formerly known as the European Community, the EU was established by treaty to create a single market. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the new European Union (EU) procedures for approving new drug applications (NDA); and (2) why the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) was established, how it operates, and how it is financed.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) because member states did not always accept EU or other members' drug approvals, the EU Commission of European Communities makes decisions on drug approvals and dispute resolutions that are binding on all members; (2) EU has also established new approval procedures for biotechnology, other high-technology, and innovative products; (3) regulating drug prices and reimbursement policies remains the responsibility of member states; (4) the centralized approval procedure for biotechnology and some innovative products is expected to take between 298 and 448 days; (5) the decentralized procedure allows manufacturers to seek approval from member states and appeal denied approvals; (6) the decentralized procedure is expected to take between 300 and 686 days; (7) industry officials are concerned about drug evaluators' qualifications and whether EU-wide interests will be upheld over national interests; (8) EMEA is responsible for the timeliness and coordination of new drug approvals, administrative duties, ensuring that drugs meet the highest standards of safety, efficacy, and quality, and maintaining information on the drugs and their adverse reactions; (9) the Commission and industry application fees fund EMEA, which has a small permanent staff and 2 scientific evaluation committees that draw on EU-wide scientific expertise; and (10) EMEA also provides advice to companies on their trial procedures and other matters. |
gao_GAO-06-367 | gao_GAO-06-367_0 | We have reported that, as FCS started product development, it did not have mature technologies or adequately defined requirements. Yet system-level requirements are not yet stabilized and will continue to change, postponing the needed match between requirements and resources. Since program start, the Army has made a number of design trade- offs that have been incorporated into the current design concepts. As shown in figure 2 above, at the system of systems level, there are about 11,500 requirements. Some of FCS’s critical technologies may not reach a high level of maturity until the final major phase of acquisition, the start of production. Even if requirements setting and technology maturity proceed without incident, FCS design and production maturity will still not be demonstrated until after the production decision is made. FCS affordability depends on the accuracy of the cost estimate, the overall level of development and procurement funding available to the Army, and the level of competing demands. FCS Costs Have Increased as Army Attains More Information, but Firm Knowledge Base Still Lacking
At the start of product development, FCS program officials estimated that the program would require about $20 billion in then-year dollars for research, development, testing, and evaluation and about $72 billion to procure the FCS systems to equip 15 brigade combat teams. The total FCS program is now expected to cost $160.7 billion in then-year dollars, a 76 percent increase. While it is a more accurate reflection of program costs than the original estimate, the latest estimate is still based on a low level of knowledge about whether FCS will work as intended. Also, the latest cost estimate has not yet been independently validated, as called for by DOD’s acquisition policy. The Army is planning to make substantial financial investments in the FCS program before key knowledge is gained on requirements, technologies, system designs, and system performance. Army Has Taken Steps to Control FCS Program Costs
The Army has taken several steps to help manage the growing cost of FCS. FCS began product development prematurely in 2003, and today is a long way from having the level of knowledge it should have had before committing resources to a new product development effort. The elements of a sound business case—firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding—are not present. A full commitment to the Army’s strategy for acquiring FCS is not yet warranted because the Army has not demonstrated sufficient knowledge to provide confidence that it can deliver a fully capable FCS within projected costs and time frames. The markers should include, but not be limited to the schedules for all critical technologies to realistically progress through TRL 7; waypoints and criteria for reaching a set of system-level requirements that are both technically feasible and affordable; the schedule and funding availability for developing essential complementary programs; waypoints and criteria to be used to lead up to and complete the preliminary and critical design reviews; waypoints and criteria to be used to lead up to and complete testing of fully integrated prototypes of all FCS systems, including the network; and waypoints and criteria to be used to demonstrate that key production processes are in statistical control. The Congress should also consider restricting annual appropriations for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the FCS program until definitive progress in establishing a sound business case is demonstrated in terms of firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To develop the information on the Future Combat System program’s progress toward meeting established goals, the contribution of critical technologies and complementary systems, and the estimates of cost and affordability, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Army G-8; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the Program Manager for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator; and LSI One Team contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) anticipates that the Future Combat System (FCS) will modernize the U.S. Army's ability to move, shoot, and communicate on the battlefield. It is an impressive concept that is the product of holistic, non-traditional thinking. The Army describes FCS as one of the most complex weapon acquisition programs ever executed because it involves developing and integrating a family of 18 systems and an information network. Army leadership started the program early as part of its effort to change Army culture and believes that the program risks are manageable. GAO is required by law to review the program annually. In this report, GAO analyzes FCS's acquisition business case and assesses requirements stability, technology maturity, soundness of the acquisition strategy, and reasonableness and affordability of program costs.
What GAO Found
The FCS entered the development phase in 2003 and has not yet reached the level of knowledge it should have attained in the pre-development stage. The elements of a sound business case--firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding--are still not demonstrably present. The Army will continue building basic knowledge in areas such as requirements and technologies for several more years. Requirements stability: The Army has reached agreement on FCS system of systems requirements--about 11,500--that help define how FCS units are expected to work as a whole. But the Army must continue to work out the technical feasibility and expected costs of the requirements for individual FCS systems. These requirements may not be completely stabilized until 2008. Until then, the Army expects the system-level requirements to change and to make trade-offs to offset technical risks and cost. Technology maturity: None of FCS's 49 critical technologies was at a level of maturity recommended by DOD policy at the start of a program. Some technologies may not reach full maturity until after production starts. Not having firm requirements matched with mature technologies at the start of development is a key indicator of program risk. Also, the Army is depending on 52 complementary programs, each of which is essential for FCS to perform as intended. Some of these programs have significant technical challenges; some do not have the funding needed to complete development. Soundness of acquisition strategy for design and production: The current acquisition strategy for FCS is improved over the original strategy but still calls for maturing technologies, designing systems, and preparing for production at the same time. Even if requirements and technologies proceed without incident, FCS design and production process maturity will not be demonstrated until after the production decision is made. Although production representative prototypes will not be available, the Army plans to test all FCS systems before committing to production. If problems are discovered in testing at that stage, they will be very expensive to correct. Reasonableness and affordability of program costs: The estimated cost of the FCS program now stands at $160.7 billion, a 76 percent increase since program start. This is a better estimate than the original, as it embodies a more realistic schedule and scope. Including the total investment for the 52 essential complementary programs, the FCS program cost estimate would reach the $200 billion range. The Army has taken steps it believes will control FCS costs. Yet, the current level of knowledge about FCS is low, which makes it difficult to have a solid basis for cost projections. FCS's long-term affordability depends on the accuracy of cost estimates, an increased level of procurement funding, and the level of competing demands. |
gao_GAO-11-26 | gao_GAO-11-26_0 | The law originally capped the number of H-1B visas at 65,000 per year, but the cap has changed several times pursuant to legislation. Demand for H-1B Workers Exceeded the Cap in Most Years and Was Largely Driven by a Small Number of Companies
Available data show that, while demand for H-1B workers by employers has fluctuated with the economy over the past decade, the demand for H-1B workers tended to exceed the cap, as measured by the numbers of initial petitions submitted by employers. If initial petitions submitted by employers exempt from the cap are also included in this measure, the demand for new H-1B workers is higher, since over 14 percent of all initial petitions across the decade were submitted by employers who are not subject to the cap. Second, according to Homeland Security officials, Homeland Security stops accepting petitions that are subject to the cap once the cap is reached. Consequently, we cannot precisely determine the level of any unmet demand among those employers who are subject to the cap. Most Interviewed Companies Said the H-1B Cap and Program Created Costs, but Were Not Factors in Their Decisions on R&D and Offshoring
To better understand the impact of the H-1B cap and program on H-1B employers, GAO interviewed 34 companies—including individual structured interviews with 31 companies and group discussions with 3 companies—about how the H-1B program affects their costs of doing business, their R&D activities, and their decisions about whether to locate work overseas. These companies reported that the H-1B cap created various costs, but those costs varied depending on the size and maturity of the company. Two firms also said that delays in processing their petitions, such as requests for additional evidence, sometimes resulted in their candidates accepting other positions in the United States or abroad instead of waiting for a resolution. Limitations in Agency Data Systems Hinder Tracking the Cap and H-1B Workers Over Time, Though Homeland Security Is Working to Improve Its Systems
Although Homeland Security generally tracks the flow of likely H-1B workers into the United States on an annual basis, it cannot determine the size of the cumulative H-1B workforce because several agencies or departments manage data on this population over time, and the systems that capture the data are not easily linked. The Impact of Raising the H-1B Cap on the U.S. Labor’s Employment and Training Administration. Lack of Accountability Provisions for Staffing Companies Also Hinders Enforcement
The laws governing the H-1B program do not include explicit provisions to hold employers that obtained the H-1B worker through a staffing company accountable to the program requirements that are applicable to the employer who applied for H-1B visas on behalf of foreign workers. Changes to Program Legislation Have Diluted Worker Protections
Changes to the H-1B program over time have weakened U.S. worker protections related to the (1) temporary nature of the program, (2) pool of H-1B workers eligible for H-1B status, and (3) cap. As currently structured, however, the program may not be used to its full potential and may be detrimental in some cases. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To ensure that the H-1B program continues to meet the needs of businesses in a global economy while maintaining a balance of protections for U.S. workers, Congress may wish to consider reviewing the merits and shortcomings of key program provisions and making appropriate changes as needed. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice provided written responses to one or more of our recommendations, which appear in appendixes VI and VII of this report. With respect to H-1B and U.S. workers, we examined what is known about (3) H-1B worker characteristics, (4) how raising the H-1B cap might affect employment and wages of U.S. workers, and (5) how well H-1B program requirements ensure that U.S. workers are not displaced or disadvantaged by the program. Using the CLAIMS 3 Mainframe database from fiscal years 2000 through 2009, for each fiscal year we determined the number of H-1B initial petitions and extensions submitted by all employers, employers subject to the cap, and cap-exempt employers; the number of H-1B petitions approved or denied by Homeland Security, by initial petitions and extensions; the total number of companies and the total number of cap-exempt companies that submitted and had approved H-1B petitions, by initial petitions and extensions; the characteristics of companies that were approved by Homeland Security to hire H-1B workers, including their industry codes and the number of workers they requested; and the characteristics of workers that Homeland Security approved as H-1Bs, including whether or not the workers were residing in the United States at the time of application; their countries of birth, education level, age, rate of pay, occupation, industry, and the location of their prospective place of employment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the H-1B program in 1990 to enable U.S. employers to hire temporary, foreign workers in specialty occupations. The law capped the number of H-1B visas issued per fiscal year at 65,000. Since then, the cap has fluctuated with legislative changes. Congress asked GAO to assess the impact of the cap on the ability of domestic companies to innovate, while ensuring that U.S. workers are not disadvantaged. In response, GAO examined what is known about (1) employer demand for H-1B workers; (2) how the cap affects employer costs and decisions to move operations overseas; (3) H-1B worker characteristics and the potential impact of raising the cap; and (4) how well requirements of the H-1B program protect U.S. workers. GAO analyzed data from 4 federal agencies; interviewed agency officials, experts, and H-1B employers; and reviewed agency documents and literature.
What GAO Found
In most years, demand for new H-1B workers exceeded the cap: From 2000 to 2009, demand for new H-1B workers tended to exceed the cap, as measured by the numbers of initial petitions submitted by employers who are subject to the cap. There is no way to precisely determine the level of any unmet demand among employers, since they tend to stop submitting (and the Department of Homeland Security stops tracking) petitions once the cap is reached each year. When we consider all initial petitions, including those from universities and research institutions that are not subject to the cap, we find that demand for new H-1B workers is largely driven by a small number of employers. Over the decade, over 14 percent of all initial petitions were submitted by cap-exempt employers, and only a few employers (fewer than 1 percent) garnered over one-quarter of all H-1B approvals. Most interviewed companies said the H-1B cap and program created costs, but were not factors in their decisions to move R&D overseas: The 34 H-1B employers GAO interviewed reported that the cap has created some additional costs, though the cap's impact depended on the size and maturity of the company. For example, in years when visas were denied by the cap, most large firms reported finding other (sometimes more costly) ways to hire their preferred job candidates. On the other hand, small firms were more likely to fill their positions with different candidates, which they said resulted in delays and sometimes economic losses, particularly for firms in rapidly changing technology fields. Limitations in agency data and systems hinder tracking the cap and H-1B workers over time: The total number of H-1B workers in the U.S. at any one time--and information about the length of their stay--is unknown, because (1) data systems among the various agencies that process such individuals are not linked so individuals cannot be readily tracked, and (2) H-1B workers are not assigned a unique identifier that would allow for tracking them over time--particularly if and when their visa status changes. Restricted agency oversight and statutory changes weaken protections for U.S. workers: Elements of the H-1B program that could serve as worker protections--such as the requirement to pay prevailing wages, the visa's temporary status, and the cap itself--are weakened by several factors. First, program oversight is fragmented and restricted. Second, the H-1B program lacks a legal provision for holding employers accountable to program requirements when they obtain H-1B workers through a staffing company. Third, statutory changes made to the H-1B program have, in combination and in effect, increased the pool of H-1B workers beyond the cap and lowered the bar for eligibility. Taken together, the multifaceted challenges identified in this report show that the H-1B program, as currently structured, may not be used to its full potential and may be detrimental in some cases. This report offers several matters for congressional consideration, including that Congress re-examine key H-1B program provisions and make appropriate changes as needed. GAO also recommends that the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor take steps to improve efficiency, flexibility, and monitoring of the H-1B program. Homeland Security disagreed with two recommendations and one matter, citing logistical and other challenges; however, we believe such challenges can be overcome. Labor did not respond to our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-773T | gao_GAO-09-773T_0 | EPA Reforms Have the Potential to Significantly Improve IRIS, but EPA Could Clarify Some Issues
In March 2008, we reported that the IRIS database—a critical component of EPA’s capacity to support scientifically sound risk management decisions, policies, and regulations—was at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency had not been able to complete timely, transparent, and credible chemical assessments or decrease its backlog of ongoing assessments. In April 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process. Largely as a result of EPA’s lack of responsiveness, we added transforming EPA’s processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals as a high- risk area in our January 2009 biennial status report on governmentwide high-risk areas requiring increased attention by executive agencies and Congress. Taking positive action, on May 21, 2009, EPA issued a new IRIS assessment process, effective immediately. In a memorandum announcing the reforms to the IRIS assessment process, the EPA Administrator echoed our prior findings that the April 2008 changes to the process reduced the transparency, timeliness, and scientific integrity of the IRIS process. Under EPA’s prior process, these two interagency reviews were required and managed by OMB—and EPA was not allowed to proceed with assessments at various stages until OMB notified EPA that it had sufficiently responded to comments from OMB and other agencies. EPA Has Improved the Policies and Procedures of Its Science Advisory Board, but Their Wider Use by Other EPA Scientific Advisory Committees Could Enhance EPA’s Scientific Integrity
Independent, expert peer review of EPA’s scientific and regulatory products, such as risk assessments and proposed rules, is integral to the agency’s ability to effectively protect public health and the environment. In 2001, we reported on limitations in the policies and procedures developed by EPA’s Science Advisory Board to ensure that its panels’ peer reviewers are independent and that a balance of viewpoints is represented on each panel. These limitations could reduce the effectiveness of the Board overall by contributing to its being perceived as biased and could inadvertently expose some panelists to violations of federal conflict-of- interest laws. Demonstrating a strong commitment to the integrity of its peer reviews, EPA took a number of actions to implement our report’s recommendations, including establishing a standard process for Science Advisory Board panel formation that includes a requirement to document decisions about conflicts of interest and balance of viewpoints and expertise in forming each panel, as well as prospective panelists’ responses to several standardized questions aimed at assessing impartiality; developing a new confidential financial disclosure form designed to capture needed information to evaluate potential conflicts of interest; allowing the public to review a “short list” of candidates selected for a specific Science Advisory Board panel and to comment on the appropriateness of including any of these candidates on the panel; and developing CD-based conflict-of-interest training for Science Advisory Board panelists. Regarding the latter issue, we concluded that the National Academies and the EPA Science Advisory Board have developed clear processes that, if effectively implemented, can provide these organizations with an assurance that relevant conflicts of interest are identified and addressed—and that committees are appropriately balanced in terms of points of view. Regarding the federal advisory committee policies and procedures at nine departments and agencies, in 2004 we found that the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior had a long-standing practice of appointing most or all members of their federal advisory committees as “representatives”—expected to reflect the views of the entity or group they are representing and not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews—even when the departments called upon the members to provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment and thus should have appointed them as special government employees. We note that 16 of the 24 EPA federal advisory committees currently use representative appointments, according to the government’s database of federal advisory committee information. While EPA may be appropriately seeking stakeholder advice from some of these advisory committees, a number of its committees focus on scientific and technical questions for which EPA is likely to be seeking advice on behalf of the government on the basis of committee members’ best judgment, rather than stakeholder advice. As EPA moves forward with actions to enhance its scientific integrity, it will be appropriate for the agency to review its federal advisory committee appointments, especially those for which it appoints members as representatives, to help ensure that committee work is not jeopardized by allegations of conflict of interest or bias. Among other things, the reforms appropriately restore EPA’s control of the IRIS process and increase the transparency of the process. 2009. Chemical Assessments: EPA’s New Assessment Process Will Further Limit the Productivity and Credibility of Its Integrated Risk Information System. Toxic Chemicals: EPA’s New Assessment Process Will Increase Challenges EPA Faces in Evaluating and Regulating Chemicals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ability to effectively implement its mission of protecting public health and the environment relies largely on the integrity and transparency of (1) its assessments of the potential human health effects of exposure to chemicals and (2) its federal advisory committees, which are to provide independent, expert reviews of EPA's scientific work, among other functions. EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) program is critical in developing the agency's scientific positions on the potential health effects of exposure to toxic chemicals. These positions, used as a basis for environmental risk management decisions by EPA and others, are maintained in IRIS' database of more than 540 chemical assessments. Since 2001, GAO has issued a number of reports addressing the importance of integrity and transparency to EPA's chemical assessments and to EPA's federal advisory committees. GAO work on EPA's advisory committees has focused on its Science Advisory Board--1 of 24 EPA federal advisory committees--which convenes panels to review many of the agency's scientific assessments and proposals. This testimony highlights scientific integrity and transparency issues GAO has reported on and relevant EPA reform efforts regarding (1) the IRIS assessment process and (2) federal advisory committee policies and procedures and appointment mechanisms. GAO has supplemented information from its prior reports with a preliminary review of the IRIS assessment process EPA issued on May 21, 2009, and the current appointment mechanisms for members of EPA's federal advisory committees.
What GAO Found
In March 2008, GAO reported that the database of chemicals assessed under the IRIS program was at serious risk of becoming obsolete because EPA had not been able to complete timely, transparent, and credible assessments or decrease its backlog of ongoing assessments. A revised IRIS assessment process EPA issued in April 2008 did not respond to GAO's recommendations; rather, it made changes likely to further exacerbate concerns GAO had identified. Largely as a result of EPA's lack of responsiveness, GAO added EPA's processes for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals as a high-risk area in its January 2009 biennial status report on governmentwide high-risk areas requiring increased attention by executive agencies and Congress. Taking positive action, EPA issued a new IRIS assessment process on May 21, 2009. In announcing these reforms, EPA echoed GAO's findings that the April 2008 assessment changes reduced the transparency, timeliness, and scientific integrity of the IRIS process. The IRIS reforms, if implemented effectively, will represent significant improvements. Among other things, they restore EPA's control of the process and increase its transparency. For example, under the prior process, interagency reviews were required and managed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and EPA was not allowed to proceed with assessments at various stages until OMB notified EPA that it had sufficiently responded to comments from OMB and other agencies. In contrast, under the recently announced process, EPA is to manage the entire IRIS assessment process, including what are now called interagency consultations. In 2001, GAO reported on limitations in the policies and procedures developed by EPA's Science Advisory Board to ensure that its panels' peer reviewers are independent and that a balance of viewpoints is represented on each panel. These limitations could have reduced the effectiveness of the Board by contributing to its being perceived as biased and could have inadvertently exposed panelists to violations of federal conflict-of-interest laws. EPA revised the Board's policies and procedures, as GAO had recommended. In a broader 2004 report on federal advisory committees, GAO highlighted the Board's revised policies and procedures, and those of the National Academies, which can--if implemented effectively--provide an assurance that relevant conflicts of interest are identified and addressed and that the committees are balanced in terms of points of view. However, EPA currently appoints members to 16 of its federal advisory committees using an appointment mechanism reserved for cases in which members are to speak as representatives of identified entities and are not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews, rather than as individuals speaking on behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment. While EPA may be appropriately seeking stakeholder advice from some of its advisory committees, a number of these committees focus on scientific and technical questions for which EPA is likely to be seeking advice on behalf of the government. As EPA works to enhance scientific integrity, a review of advisory committee appointments could help ensure that committee work is not jeopardized by allegations of conflicts of interest or bias. |
gao_GAO-04-514 | gao_GAO-04-514_0 | FYDP Provides Congress with Mixed Visibility of Projected DOD Spending
The FYDP provides Congress visibility of broad DOD funding shifts and priorities regarding thousands of programs that have been aggregated, or grouped, by appropriation category. Finally, the costs of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been funded through supplemental appropriations, are not projected in the FYDP thereby limiting the visibility over these funds. However, some requirements it plans to fund with the supplemental appropriation have already been identified. As a result, DOD has too many programs for the available dollars, which often leads to program instability, costly program stretch-outs, and program termination. Further, although DOD is considering how to link resources to these initiatives, it does not have specific plans to make these linkages in the FYDP. DOD Does Not Have Specific Plans to Link the FYDP to Important QDR Initiatives
According to officials, DOD does not have specific plans to link capabilities and the risk management framework to the FYDP, in part, because these concepts have not been fully developed. In the past, DOD focused on whom an adversary might be, whereas the current approach focuses on how future adversaries might fight. We recognize that defining those expected costs is challenging and that supplemental appropriations are sometimes necessary. Nonetheless, the consequences of not considering the expected costs of ongoing operations as part of larger budget deliberations will mean that neither the administration nor congressional decision makers will have the opportunity to fully examine budget implications of the global war on terrorism. Indeed, the FYDP could be a useful tool for weighing the costs of defense priorities such as the global war on terrorism and DOD’s transformation efforts. Furthermore, this linkage could provide a crosswalk between capabilities and the risk management framework such that assessments of capabilities could be made in terms of the risk management framework, which balances dimensions of risk, such as near term operational risk versus risks associated with mid- to long-term military challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
In the interest of providing Congress greater visibility over projected defense spending, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) to take the following two actions: (1) provide Congress data on known or likely costs for ongoing operations that are expected to extend into fiscal year 2005 for consideration during its deliberation over DOD’s fiscal year 2005 budget request and accompanying FYDP and (2) include known or likely projected costs of ongoing operations for the fiscal year 2006 and subsequent budget requests and accompanying FYDPs. To enhance the effectiveness of the FYDP as a tool for planning and analysis in the current strategic environment, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation to take the following two actions: (1) align the program elements in the FYDP to defense capabilities needed to meet the defense strategy, as these capabilities are identified and approved, and the dimensions of the risk management framework and include this alignment with the FYDP provided to Congress, and (2) report funding levels for defense capabilities and the dimensions of the risk framework in its summary FYDP report to Congress. DOD objected to our observation that DOD has historically employed overly optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress needs the best available data about DOD's resource tradeoffs between the dual priorities of transformation and fighting the global war on terrorism. To help shape its priorities, in 2001 DOD developed a capabilities-based approach focused on how future adversaries might fight, and a risk management framework to ensure that current defense needs are balanced against future requirements. Because the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) is DOD's centralized report providing DOD and Congress data on current and planned resource allocations, GAO assessed the extent to which the FYDP provides Congress visibility over (1) projected defense spending and (2) implementation of DOD's capabilities-based defense strategy and risk management framework.
What GAO Found
The FYDP provides Congress with mixed visibility over DOD's projected spending for the current budget year and at least four succeeding years. On the one hand, it provides visibility over many programs that can be aggregated so decision makers can see DOD's broad funding priorities by showing shifts in appropriation categories. On the other hand, in some areas DOD likely understates the future costs of programs in the FYDP because it has historically employed overly optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulations. As such, DOD has too many programs for the available dollars, which often leads to program instability, costly program stretchouts, and delayed program termination decisions. Also, the FYDP does not reflect costs of ongoing operations funded through supplemental appropriations. Since September 2001, DOD has received $158 billion in supplemental appropriations to support the global war on terrorism, and DOD expects to request another supplemental in January 2005 to cover operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While DOD officials stated they are uncertain of the amount of the request, some requirements they intend to fund with the supplemental appropriation have already been identified, such as temporarily increasing the Army's force structure. Defining costs during ongoing operations is challenging and supplemental appropriations are sometimes necessary; however, not considering the known or likely costs of ongoing operations expected to continue into the new fiscal year as part of larger budget deliberations will preclude DOD and congressional decision makers from fully examining the budget implications of the global war on terrorism. The FYDP provides Congress limited visibility over important DOD initiatives. While DOD is considering how to link resources to defense capabilities and the risk management framework, it does not have specific plans to make these linkages in the FYDP, in part because the initiatives have not been fully defined or implemented. Because the FYDP lacks these linkages, decision makers cannot use it to determine how a proposed increase in capability would affect the risk management framework, which balances dimensions of risk, such as near term operational risk versus risks associated with mid- to long-term military challenges. |
gao_GAO-03-849T | gao_GAO-03-849T_0 | Strengthening Strategic Human Capital Management
An agency’s most important organizational asset is its people—they define the agency’s culture, drive its performance, and embody its knowledge base. In January 2001, we reported that NASA’s shuttle workforce had declined significantly to the point of reducing NASA’s ability to safely support the shuttle program. NASA believes that similar workforce problems affect the entire agency and that, as a result, its ability to perform future missions and manage its programs may be at risk. In 2000, we reported that NASA’s frequent use of undefinitized contract changes could result in contract cost overruns and cost growth in the International Space Station program. Controlling International Space Station Costs
The International Space Station represents an important effort to foster international cooperation in scientific research and space exploration. While controlling cost and schedule and retaining proper workforce levels have been difficult in the past, the shuttle grounding will likely exacerbate these challenges. (See table 1.) NASA’s Administrator, who comes to the position with a strong management background and expertise in financial management, has made a personal commitment to change the way NASA does business and has appointed a chief operating officer to provide sustained management attention to strategic planning, organizational alignment, human capital strategy, performance management, and other elements necessary for transformation success. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its inception, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has undertaken numerous programs that have greatly advanced scientific and technological knowledge. NASA's activities span a broad range of complex and technical endeavors. But the agency is at a critical juncture, and major management improvements are needed. In January of this year, we identified four challenges facing NASA: (1) strengthening strategic human capital management, (2) improving contract management; (3) controlling International Space Station costs, and (4) reducing space launch costs.
What GAO Found
In summary, these challenges affect NASA's ability to effectively run its largest programs. NASA's ultimate challenge will be in tackling the root problems impeding those programs. This will require (1) instituting a results-oriented culture that fosters knowledge sharing and empowers its workforce to accomplish programmatic goals; (2) ensuring that the agency adheres to management controls to prevent cost overruns and scheduling problems; (3) transforming the financial management organization so it better supports NASA's core mission; and (4) sustaining commitment to change. |
gao_GAO-10-153T | gao_GAO-10-153T_0 | However, over the past several decades, there has been a shift in pension plan coverage; the number of DC plans has increased while the number of DB plans has declined. Today, DC plans are the dominant type of private- sector employee pension. One option available under some 401(k) plans is automatic enrollment, under which workers are enrolled in a 401(k) plan automatically, unless they explicitly choose to opt out. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, defines and sets certain standards for employee benefit plans, including 401(k) plans, sponsored by private-sector employers. Low Participation and Saving Rates Affect the Building of 401(k) Savings While Other Factors Affect Participants Ability to Maintain Retirement Savings
Challenges to Building and Maintaining 401(k) Savings
One issue of concern with DC plans is that participation and saving rates have been low. About 40 percent worked for an employer that did not sponsor a plan, and about 8 percent did not participate in the plan that their employer sponsored. Also, some may be focused on more immediate savings objectives, such as saving for a house. We also found that, for workers who participated in DC plans, plan savings were low. We reported that the account balances of lower-income and older workers were of particular concern. 401(k) Leakage Erodes Retirement Savings Levels
In addition to somewhat small savings contributions, 401(k) participants can take actions, such as taking loans, withdrawals, or lump-sum cashouts, that reduce the savings they have accumulated. We also called for measures to provide participants with more information on the disadvantages of hardship withdrawals. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 and recent regulatory changes have facilitated plan sponsors’ adoption of automatic enrollment. One of our recent reports found that automatic enrollment policies can result in considerably increased participation rates for plans adopting them, with some plans’ participation rates increasing to as high as 95 percent and that these high participation rates appeared to persist over time. TDFs allocate their investments among various asset classes and shift that allocation from equity investments to fixed-income and money market investments as a “target” retirement date approaches; this shift in asset allocation is commonly referred to as the fund’s “glide path.” Recent evidence suggests that participants who are automatically enrolled in plans with TDF defaults tend to have a high concentration of their savings in these funds. Concluding Observations
DC plans, particularly 401(k) plans, have clearly overtaken DB plans as the principal retirement plan for U.S. workers and are likely to become the sole retirement savings plan for most current and future workers. Yet, 401(k) plans face major challenges, not least of which is the fact that many employers do not offer employer-sponsored 401(k) plans or any other type of plan to their workers. Workers have a role to participate and save in 401(k) plans when they are given the opportunity to do so. Private Pensions: Increased Reliance on 401(k) Plans Calls for Better Information on Fees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 25 years, the number of defined benefit (DB) plans has declined while the number of defined contribution (DC) plans has increased. Today, DC plans are the dominant type of employer-sponsored retirement plans, with more than 49 million U.S. workers participating in them. 401(k) plans currently cover over 85 percent of active DC plan participants and are the fastest growing type of employer-sponsored pension plan. Given these shifts in pension coverage, workers are increasingly relying on 401(k) plans for their pension income. Recently, policy makers have focused attention on the ability of 401(k) plans to provide participants with adequate retirement income and the challenges that arise as 401(k) plans become the predominant retirement savings plan for employees. As a result, GAO was asked to report on (1) challenges to building and maintaining of savings in 401(k) plans, and (2) recent measures to improve 401(k) participation and savings levels.
What GAO Found
There are challenges to building and saving through 401(k) plans. While low participation rates may be due, in part, to the fact that some workers participate in DB plans, there is also a large portion of workers who do not have access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan, as well as some who do not enroll in such a plan when an employer offers it. We found that for those who did participate, their overall balances were low, particularly for low-income and older workers who either did not have the means to save or have not had the opportunity to save in 401(k)s for much of their working lifetimes. There are also challenges workers face in maintaining savings in 401(k) plans. For example, 401(k) leakage--actions participants take that reduce the savings they have accumulated, such as borrowing from the account, taking hardship withdrawals, or cashing out the account when they change jobs--continues to affect retirement savings and increases the risk that 401(k) plans may yield insufficient retirement income for individual participants. Further, various fees, such as investment and other hidden fees, can erode retirement savings and individuals may not be aware of their impact. Automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans is one measure to increase participation rates and saving. Under automatic enrollment, which was encouraged by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and recent regulatory changes, employers enroll workers into plans automatically unless they explicitly choose to opt out. Plan sponsors are increasingly adopting automatic enrollment policies, which can considerably increase participation rates, with some plans' rates reaching as high as 95 percent. Employers can also set default contribution rates and investment funds. Though target-date funds are a common type of default investment fund, there are concerns about their risks, particularly for participants nearing retirement. |
gao_GAO-05-464 | gao_GAO-05-464_0 | Selected Law Enforcement Agencies Have Established Policies and Procedures to Help Ensure Proper Taser Use
The seven law enforcement agencies we contacted have attempted to ensure proper deployment of the Taser weapon by establishing and employing use-of-force policies, training requirements, operational protocols, and safety procedures. Use-of-Force Policies
Although none of the seven agencies had separate use-of-force policies that specifically addressed Tasers, all of the agencies included the use of such weapons into their existing policies so that police officers would have guidance on the circumstances in which the use of Tasers may be appropriate. In addition, all seven agencies require Taser-specific training. Regarding Tasers, the protocols in the seven agencies require, among other things, that Tasers be visually inspected on a daily basis, be appropriately safeguarded, and, in some cases, be tested on a weekly basis or at the beginning of an officer’s shift. A Taser is by nature a weapon and carries with it inherent dangers.”
As shown in table 4, the seven agencies’ safety guidelines provide that the Taser should not be used on children, pregnant suspects, or near bystanders or flammable liquids. Some Federal, State, and Local Laws Address Tasers But Requirements Differ
In reviewing various laws, including statutes, regulations, and ordinances, we found that Tasers were addressed in some federal, state, and local jurisdictions. We also found that the state of Indiana and the city of Chicago, Illinois regulate the sale or possession of Tasers by non-law enforcement persons by requiring that the same restrictions that apply to firearms must also apply to Tasers. Other states, such as California, prohibit Tasers from being carried into public facilities such as schools and airports. TSA also has broad authority under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as amended by Section 1405 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, to approve the use of less-than- lethal weapons by flight deck crew members, as long as the TSA Secretary prescribes “…rules requiring that any such crew member be trained in the proper use of the weapon…” and “…guidelines setting forth the circumstances under which such weapons may be used.” Based on this authority, in October 2004, TSA approved a request from Korean Airlines that specially trained cabin attendants be permitted to use Tasers on commercial flights in U.S. airspace. For example, in the state of Indiana, Tasers are subject to the same licensing requirements as other handguns. If Taser use becomes more widespread, particularly among non-law enforcement personnel who have little or no firearms experience, we believe that this training will become even more critical for safe, effective, and appropriate use of the weapon. We also received comments from Taser International and the seven law enforcement agencies we contacted. They generally agreed with the information in the report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this report, our first objective was to obtain information on the policies and procedures related to the issues of use of force, training, operations, and safety for selected law enforcement agencies that have purchased and used Tasers. Our second objective was to obtain information on federal, state, and local laws that specifically address Tasers, including the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) authority to regulate Tasers on aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
Emerging domestic and international threats have generated a growing interest in the use of less-than-lethal weapons by government and law enforcement agencies and other entities such as commercial airlines. One such weapon--the Taser--is a hand-held weapon that delivers an electric shock via two stainless steel barbs, effectively incapacitating an individual. According to the manufacturer--Taser International, Incorporated (Taser International)--Tasers are currently used by over 7,000 of the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, with more than 140,000 Tasers in use by police officers in the field and an additional 100,000 Tasers owned by civilians worldwide. Tasers have been used on over 100,000 volunteers, including individuals involved in training seminars and research experiments, and involved in over 70,000 actual field uses during police encounters. In light of the expanding interest in the Taser, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the policies and procedures related to the issues of "use-of-force," training, operations, and safety for selected law enforcement agencies that have purchased and used Tasers and (2) federal, state, and local laws that specifically address Tasers, including the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) authority to regulate Tasers on aircraft.
What GAO Found
The seven law enforcement agencies we contacted have established use-of-force policies, training requirements, operational protocols, and safety procedures to help ensure the proper use of Tasers. Although none of the agencies have separate use-of-force policies that specifically address Tasers, all seven agencies include the use of Tasers into their existing policies. Taser training is required for officers who use the weapons, and agency officials said that training for officers and other non-law enforcement persons who are allowed to use Tasers is critically important to help ensure their safe use. Operational protocols require that Tasers be visually inspected daily, appropriately safeguarded, and, in some cases, tested weekly or at the beginning of an officer's shift. Safety procedures require that Tasers not be used on children, pregnant suspects, or near bystanders or flammable liquids and that individuals hit in specific body areas with Taser barbs, such as the neck or face, be examined by a physician. Some federal, state, and local jurisdictions have laws that address Tasers but requirements differ. For example, at the federal level, the Army prohibits Tasers from being brought into selected military installations in Georgia. Also, TSA may approve the use of Tasers on aircraft but must prescribe training rules and guidance on appropriate circumstances for using Tasers. At the state and local levels, the state of Indiana and the city of Chicago, Illinois, regulate the sale or possession of Tasers by non-law enforcement persons by subjecting Tasers to the same restrictions that apply to firearms. Other states, such as California, prohibit Tasers from being carried into public facilities such as airports. GAO observes that as the Taser becomes more widely used, especially by non-law enforcement persons, training is critical to help ensure its safe, effective, and appropriate use. TSA, Taser International, and the seven law enforcement agencies we contacted generally agreed with the information in this report. |
gao_GAO-08-47 | gao_GAO-08-47_0 | Coverage Determination Processes Allow for Prompt Decisions, Apply a Range of Criteria, and Have Resulted in Approvals for the Majority of Requests
Study sponsors have designed their coverage determination processes to allow for prompt decision making within CMS-required time frames. In the sample of coverage determination case files we reviewed at the seven study sponsors, coverage of the requested drug was approved in approximately two-thirds of the cases. Technical staff, such as pharmacy technicians or call center representatives, enter the patient information into the computer system. Sponsors Apply a Range of Coverage Criteria in Making Coverage Decisions
Sponsors apply a range of coverage criteria to evaluate requests for drugs with restrictions. In order to show medical necessity, the prescribing physician must provide a statement that the requested drug is medically necessary because (1) all of the covered Part D drugs on the sponsor’s formulary for treatment of the same condition would not be as effective for the beneficiary, would have adverse effects for the beneficiary, or both; (2) the prescription drug alternatives on the formulary have been ineffective in the past, are likely to be ineffective, or are likely to cause an adverse reaction for the beneficiary; or (3) the number of doses available under a quantity limit for a requested drug has been ineffective or is likely to be ineffective. Sponsors in our study also considered the following factors. Approval rates varied among sponsors, ranging from 57 percent to 76 percent. The approval rates for standard and expedited requests were 67 percent and 53 percent, respectively. Appeals Processes Allow for Better Informed Decisions, Have Often Resulted in Coverage Approvals, and Are Impeded by AOR Requirement
The appeals process allows for individuals not involved in the previous case review to make better-informed decisions by considering additional supporting evidence. In making redeterminations—the first level of appeal—sponsor staff evaluate any corrected or augmented evidence to see if coverage criteria have been met. In conducting reconsiderations— the second level of appeal—IRE officials consider the information the sponsor reviewed, along with any additional support that may be available. In many cases, appeals result in new interpretations of whether the requested drug should be covered. CMS appeals data show that, from July 2006 through December 2006, the median approval rate across all Part D sponsors was 40 percent; from July 2006 through June 2007, appeals to the IRE received full or partial approval in 28 percent of cases. We found that, for some standard appeals, missing AOR documentation contributed to delays in study sponsor redetermination decisions and dismissals of IRE reconsideration cases. Some study sponsors have developed “workarounds” to eliminate the need for a completed AOR form. As part of the decision process, the IRE determines whether the sponsor has met its obligation for coverage under the Part D rules. CMS Efforts to Inform Beneficiaries about Sponsors’ Performance Have Improved; Oversight Hindered by Poorly Defined Reporting Requirements
CMS has improved its efforts to inform beneficiaries about sponsors’ performance, but its oversight of sponsors is hindered by poorly defined reporting requirements. To oversee sponsors’ processes, CMS requires that sponsors report data on several coverage determinations and appeals measures; however, the agency provided minimal guidance on the information to be included in each coverage determination measure. As a result, our study sponsors have reported data differently to CMS, hindering the agency’s ability to monitor sponsors’ activities adequately. Areas of sponsor noncompliance ranged from incomplete written policies and procedures to delays in authorizing drug coverage after the IRE approved an expedited request. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Medicare Part D coverage determination and appeals processes, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS: reduce the need for completed AOR forms by requiring sponsors and the IRE, upon receipt of standard appeal requests submitted by prescribing physicians without completed AOR forms, to telephone beneficiaries to determine whether they wish to initiate the appeal, and ensure that sponsor-reported data used for monitoring coverage determination and appeals activities are accurate and consistent by providing specific data definitions for each measure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Medicare Part D program, prescription drug coverage is provided through plans sponsored by private companies. Beneficiaries, their appointed representatives, or physicians can ask sponsors to cover prescriptions restricted under their plan--a process known as a coverage determination--and can appeal denials to the sponsor and the independent review entity (IRE). GAO was asked to review (1) the processes for sponsors' coverage determination decisions and the approval rates, (2) the processes for appealing coverage denials and the approval rates at the sponsor and IRE levels, and (3) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) efforts to inform the public about sponsors' performance and oversee sponsors' processes. GAO visited seven sponsors that account for over half of Part D enrollment. GAO also interviewed and obtained data from CMS and IRE officials.
What GAO Found
Sponsors in our study address coverage requests for drugs with restrictions using processes that allow for prompt decisions, apply a range of criteria, and have resulted in approvals of most cases. To minimize the amount of time needed to make a determination, study sponsors use automated systems to compare the patient information they receive from prescribing physicians against preset coverage criteria. The coverage criteria for specific drugs incorporate Medicare requirements--such as whether the drug use is excluded from coverage under Medicare Part D--and discretionary components--such as whether a less expensive alternative drug has been tried and failed. Some study sponsors indicated they feel pressure to make decisions within the CMS-required time frames even when all pertinent patient information from physicians is not at hand. In reviewing a sample of 421 case files, GAO found that overall, study sponsors approved about 67 percent of the coverage determination requests, ranging from 57 percent to 76 percent. The process for conducting appeals allows staff not involved in the previous case review to make better-informed decisions by considering additional supporting evidence. At the first level of appeal, sponsor staff evaluate any corrected or augmented evidence to see if coverage criteria have been met. At the second level of appeal, IRE staff consider the information the sponsor reviewed, along with any additional support that may be available. In many cases, appeals result in new interpretations of whether the requested drug should be covered. CMS appeals data show that, from July 2006 through December 2006, the median approval rate across all Part D sponsors was 40 percent; from July 2006 through June 2007, appeals to the IRE received full or partial approval in 28 percent of cases. For some standard appeals, missing appointment of representative (AOR) documentation contributed to delays in sponsor-level appeals decisions and dismissals of IRE appeals cases. Some study sponsors have developed "workarounds" to eliminate the need for the completed AOR form. CMS has improved its efforts to inform beneficiaries about sponsors' performance, but its oversight of sponsors is hindered by poorly defined reporting requirements. CMS developed two performance metrics on sponsors' timeliness and the outcomes of their coverage decisions. The agency improved the way it displays this information on the Medicare Web site in late 2007. In addition, CMS requires that sponsors report data on various measures of coverage requests and approvals. However, the agency has provided minimal guidance on the types of cases to be included in each coverage determination measure. As a result, our study sponsors reported data differently to CMS, hindering the agency's ability to adequately monitor sponsors' activities. Finally, CMS has conducted several audits and found that sponsors were noncompliant with a number of specific requirements. Areas of sponsor noncompliance ranged from incomplete written policies and procedures to delays in authorizing drug coverage after the IRE approved an urgent request. |
gao_RCED-95-15 | gao_RCED-95-15_0 | To ensure that personnel with access to classified information do not compromise national defense and security, DOE’s operations offices may suspend security clearances. Statistical Disparities Occur in Number of Clearances Suspended for Minorities
At the locations included in our review, in various 1-year periods during fiscal year 1989 through fiscal year 1993, contractor employees from several minority groups had their security clearances suspended more often than would be expected statistically when they were compared with the majority population of the workforce. The population of contractor employees includes Asians, American Indians, African-Americans, Hispanics, and whites. Over 10,000 of those employees have security clearances. Because DOE is not required to do so, no organization in the Department collects information on the suspension of clearances by racial or ethnic group, and DOE was not aware of the statistical disparities discussed in this report. Conclusions
DOE has not been tracking the suspension of clearances by racial/ethnic group. We believe DOE needs to determine why these statistical disparities are occurring. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) security clearance program, focusing on: (1) whether racial or ethnic disparities existed among those employees who had their security clearances suspended; and (2) actions DOE needs to take to respond to these disparities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between fiscal years 1989 and 1993, DOE suspended 425 security clearances for contractor employees; (2) African-American, Hispanic, and American Indian contractor employees had their security clearances suspended more often than would be statistically expected when compared with the majority of the workforce; (3) DOE was not aware of the statistical disparities because it did not monitor or track the suspension of clearances by racial/ethnic group; and (4) DOE needs to further evaluate why disparities in security clearances are occurring to ensure that discrimination is not occurring. |
gao_RCED-99-14 | gao_RCED-99-14_0 | Studies of Welfare Reform’s Financial Impact on HUD’s Housing Subsidy Programs Varied Widely
We identified five studies estimating welfare reform’s financial impact on housing programs nationally, one estimating the impact for eight housing agencies, and another seven estimating the impact for a single housing agency. Differences in the studies’ focus and assumptions help explain the widely varying estimates. Moreover, because certain welfare and housing policies have changed since the estimates were developed, the economy has been stronger than anticipated, and the effects of welfare reform on welfare recipients’ behavior are difficult to predict, some of the authors of the studies we reviewed expressed uncertainty about their estimates. The studies used varying assumptions and models to estimate welfare reform’s impact under different scenarios. Multiple Issues Complicate Efforts to Forecast Welfare Reform’s Financial Impact on HUD’s Housing Subsidy Programs
The experts with whom we spoke generally agree that several methodological and data issues complicate efforts to forecast welfare reform’s financial impact on HUD’s housing subsidy programs. Some issues, such as differences in state welfare policies and plans for implementing welfare reform and uncertainty about the strength of the economy and the behavior of welfare recipients, make it difficult to predict the impact of welfare reform itself. Housing researchers generally agree, however, that estimating welfare reform’s financial impact on housing programs is more complex than estimating welfare reform’s impact overall because the characteristics of welfare recipients with housing assistance may be different from those of other welfare recipients, and housing agencies and landlords may adopt a broad range of housing philosophies and policies. Finally, the lack of consistent and reliable data further hampers researchers’ efforts to predict welfare reform’s financial impact on HUD’s housing programs with any certainty. The supply of low-skilled workers will depend, in part, on how welfare recipients respond to changes in their state’s welfare program. HUD collects administrative data on the residents of public and tenant-based assisted housing in its Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System database. Scope and Methodology
To identify studies that estimated welfare reform’s financial impact on housing assistance programs, we contacted known experts and officials from a variety of organizations and government agencies. To better understand the methodological and data issues that arise when estimating welfare reform’s financial impact on HUD’s housing programs, we also contacted known experts in welfare and housing who represented a broad range of views. “Technical Paper: Welfare Reform Budgeting.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Office of Policy Studies and Research. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on welfare reform's financial impact on the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) budget, focusing on what: (1) studies have been done on welfare reform's financial impact on public and assisted housing; and (2) methodological and data issues, if any, arise when researchers estimate welfare reform's financial impact on low-income housing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) officials at housing agencies and researchers at government agencies, universities, trade associations, and a consulting firm have estimated welfare reform's financial impact on some components of HUD's housing subsidy programs; (2) GAO identified 13 studies that estimated this impact; (3) these studies of welfare reform's financial impact on HUD's housing subsidy programs varied in their geographic scope, focus and assumptions, methods, and findings; (4) some studies also estimated welfare reform's impact under alternative scenarios and therefore developed a range of estimates of welfare reform's cost for HUD and housing agencies; (5) the estimates in the studies GAO reviewed generally varied with the issues on which they focused and the assumptions on which they were based; (6) some of the authors of the studies GAO reviewed told it that their estimates might not hold up over time because some federal and state welfare laws have changed since the estimates were first developed and the economy has been more robust than anticipated; (7) experts with whom GAO spoke generally agree that several issues complicate efforts to forecast welfare reform's financial impact on HUD's housing subsidy programs; (8) these issues include not only those encountered in predicting welfare reform's impact on the recipients and providers of public assistance, but also those specific to estimating welfare reform's financial impact on the residents of assisted housing, providers of subsidized housing, and HUD; (9) in general, wide variations in state welfare plans and their implementation complicate the estimation of welfare reform's impact; (10) the employment and wage prospects for welfare recipients depend, in part, on future local and national economic health and on recipients' behavior; (11) housing experts generally agree that estimating welfare reform's impact on housing programs is more complex than estimating welfare reform's impact overall because of possible differences in the behavior of welfare recipients with and without housing assistance, as well as variations in policies adopted by housing agencies and landlords; and (12) a lack of reliable data further hampers researchers' efforts to predict welfare reform's financial impact on HUD's housing programs. |
gao_GAO-06-843T | gao_GAO-06-843T_0 | Additionally, the financial services industry is a major source of employment in the United States. Diversity in the Financial Services Industry at the Management Level Did Not Change Substantially between 1993 and 2004
Overall EEO-1 data do not show substantial changes in diversity at the management level and suggest that certain financial sectors are more diverse at this level than others. Figure 1 shows that overall management- level representation by minorities increased from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent from 1993 through 2004. Specifically, African-Americans increased their representation from 5.6 percent to 6.6 percent, Asians from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent, Hispanics from 2.8 percent to 4.0 percent and American Indians from 0.2 to 0.3 percent. Initiatives to Promote Workforce Diversity in the Financial Services Industry Face Challenges
Minorities’ rapid growth as a percentage of the overall U.S. population and increased global competition have convinced some financial services firms that workforce diversity is a critical business strategy. Financial Services Firms Have Implemented a Variety of Diversity Initiatives
Since the mid-1990s, some financial services firms have implemented a variety of initiatives designed to recruit and retain minority and women candidates to fill key positions. Officials from several banks said that they had developed scholarship and internship programs to encourage minority students to consider careers in banking. Some firms and trade organizations have also developed partnerships with groups that represent minority professionals and with local communities to recruit candidates through events such as conferences and career fairs. A few firms have also developed performance indicators to measure progress in achieving diversity goals. In addition, some industry officials said that achieving “buy-in” from key employees such as middle managers could be challenging. An official from an investment bank told us that the bank has been reaching out to middle managers who oversee minority and women employees by, for example, instituting an “inclusive manager program.”
Minority- and Women- Owned Businesses Often Face Difficulties in Obtaining Capital
Studies and reports, as well as interviews we conducted, suggest that minority- and women-owned businesses face challenges obtaining bank credit in conventional financial markets for several reasons, including business characteristics (e.g., small firm size) and the possibility that lenders may discriminate. Some business characteristics may also limit the ability of minority- and women-owned businesses to raise equity capital. Business Characteristics May Affect Minority- and Women-Owned Businesses’ Access to Commercial Loans and Equity Capital
Reports and other research, as well as interviews we conducted with commercial banks, including minority-owned banks and trade groups representing minority- and women-owned businesses, highlight some of the challenges these businesses may face in obtaining commercial bank credit. However, assessing such alleged discrimination may be complicated by limitations in data availability. Likewise, at least one bank official noted that Regulation B limited the bank’s ability to measure the success of its efforts to provide financial services to minority groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
A July 2004 congressional hearing raised concerns about the lack of diversity in the financial services industry, particularly in key management positions. Some witnesses noted that these firms (e.g., banks and securities firms) had not made sufficient progress in recruiting minorities and women at the management level. Others raised concerns about the ability of minority-owned businesses to raise debt and equity capital. At the request of the House Financial Services Committee, GAO was asked to provide a report on overall trends in management-level diversity and diversity initiatives from 1993 through 2004. This testimony discusses that report and focuses on (1) what the available data show about diversity at the management level, (2) the types of initiatives that the financial services industry has taken to promote workforce diversity and the challenges involved, and (3) the ability of minority- and women-owned businesses to obtain capital and initiatives financial institutions have taken to make capital available to these businesses. For our analysis, we analyzed data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); reviewed select studies; and interviewed officials from financial services firms, trade organizations, and federal agencies. GAO makes no recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
From 1993 through 2004, overall diversity at the management level in the financial services industry did not change substantially, but some racial/ethnic minority groups experienced more change in representation than others. EEOC data show that management-level representation by minority women and men overall increased from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent. Specifically, African-Americans increased their representation from 5.6 percent to 6.6 percent, Asians from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent, Hispanics from 2.8 percent to 4.0 percent, and American Indians from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent. Financial services firms and trade groups have initiated programs to increase workforce diversity, but these initiatives face challenges. The programs include developing scholarships and internships, partnering with groups that represent minority professionals, and linking managers' compensation with their performance in promoting a diverse workforce. Some firms have developed indicators to measure progress in achieving workforce diversity. Industry officials said that among the challenges these initiatives face are recruiting and retaining minority candidates, as well as gaining the "buy-in" of key employees, such as the middle managers who are often responsible for implementing such programs. Research reports suggest that minority- and women-owned businesses have difficulty obtaining access to capital for several reasons, such as that these businesses may be concentrated in service industries and lack assets to pledge as collateral. Some studies suggest that lenders may discriminate, but proving such an allegation is complicated by the lack of available data. However, some financial institutions, primarily commercial banks, said that they have developed strategies to serve minority- and women-owned businesses. These strategies include marketing existing financial products specifically to minority and women business owners. |
gao_GGD-98-56 | gao_GGD-98-56_0 | Further, the consultant’s report also noted that “An organized system should be developed for managing information concerning the facility operations to be used to monitor performance against established standards.”
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to develop information on the status of the Center’s efforts to (1) define and implement facility management positions; (2) develop or procure and implement a facility management system; and (3) develop facility project and financial reports, since the 1994 transfer of facility responsibilities from NPS to the Board. Officials to whom we spoke told us that they do not anticipate a need for additional facility management positions. Project Executive. Director of Contracting. The position description summarized the roles and responsibilities to include (1) the head of the contracting activity for the Center; (2) responsibility for the organization and management of the Office of Procurement; (3) management and control of the Center’s appropriated fund contracting procedures; and (4) management of all aspects of the procurement cycle, including planning, negotiation and administration of construction, personal services, technical services, maintenance, supply, and related contracts in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Center guidance. Director of Security. On August 7, 1996, the position of Director of Auxiliary Services was established and filled. Vice President for Facilities. Contract Personnel Support Managers in Facility Management Positions
The Center managers, including the Board, determined that the Center’s facility management program would be operated by a few managers supported by a small in-house staff and contractor technical staff. Management and Staff Committees Provide a Forum for Facilities Management Decisionmaking
In addition to the six facilities management positions, several committees that relate to facility management assist managers in establishing facility policy, coordinating facility work with other Center activities, and managing the day-to-day contractual aspects of facilities projects. Vice Presidents’ Committee. This committee, headed by the Vice President for Facilities, focuses on facility projects’ progress, schedules, problems, or open issues requiring the vice president’s input or decision. CIFM System and New Management Reports Designed to Assist Managers
The Center has purchased and is currently implementing a CIFM system. CIFM System Is Designed to Track Numerous Facility Operations to Assist in Decisionmaking
On August 9, 1996, after announcing its intent in the Commerce Business Daily, the Center purchased a system to assist in managing the facility. The officials advised us that they have focused implementation efforts on the Property Portfolio, Asset Manager, Maintenance Manager, and Preventive Maintenance modules. We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Chairman of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts' efforts to define and implement: (1) facility management positions; (2) a facility management system; and (3) facility project and financial reports.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Center managers, including the Board of Trustees, determined that the Center's facility management program would be operated by a few managers supported by a small in-house staff and contractor technical staff; (2) currently, six facility-related managerial positions have been established and, according to Center officials, they do not anticipate a need for additional positions in the future; (3) the six managerial positions include the Vice President for Facilities; the Directors of Contracting, Facilities, Security, and Auxiliary Services; and the Project Executive; (4) all but the Vice President for Facilities and the Director of Auxiliary Services positions were established in 1994 and 1995; (5) in August and September 1996, the Center created the Director of Auxiliary Services and Vice President for Facilities positions, respectively; (6) with the exception of the Vice President for Facilities, the managers in these positions use contractors to either support operations that they are responsible for, such as parking, or provide management support; (7) in the latter instance, the Project Executive--in so far as major construction projects are underway--uses contracted technical management expertise, particularly for project planning, design, construction, and construction management; (8) several committees have been established to assist in coordinating facility operations with performing arts schedules and to provide a forum for decisionmaking; (9) these committees bring together managers and staff from throughout the Center; (10) the committees consider a range of facility issues and problems, varying from those associated with the day-to-day execution of construction contracts to resolving policy level issues such as the approval of the appropriated funds budget; (11) to provide facility operating information to key managers, the Center has purchased and is implementing a computer-integrated facility management (CIFM) system; (12) to date, the Center is progressing with implementation of four module: Property Portfolio, Asset Manager, Maintenance Manager, and Preventative Maintenance; (13) GAO did not evaluate the usefulness of the system or the output that managers obtain because of the recent and ongoing implementation of the system; (14) in addition to the CIFM system, the Center staff developed 11 reports for use in managing appropriated funds; and (15) these reports are to provide managers with information for tracking items such as appropriated funds usage, contractor progress on work, and contract payment approvals. |
gao_NSIAD-97-5 | gao_NSIAD-97-5_0 | Applications, Availability, and Importance of Exported Telecommunications Equipment
Broadband telecommunications equipment, such as ATM and SDH, have numerous civilian and military applications and are becoming increasingly available in China as it strives to improve its telecommunications networks to meet international standards. According to U.S. government officials, overall improvements to China’s telecommunications networks will likely benefit the Chinese military as well. Prior to the liberalization of exports of dual-use telecommunications equipment in April 1994, the export of ATM and SDH equipment to China would have required a validated license from the Commerce Department. According to these officials, the Chinese military is seeking to acquire ATM and SDH equipment, which may increase their operational readiness by the end of the next decade. Creation of the General License GLX
According to U.S. government officials, the Commerce Department created GLX in April 1994 to ease export restrictions and reduce administrative burdens on U.S. exporters. Because most of the telecommunications items on the list were covered by advisory notes, they became eligible for export under GLX. In 1993, SCM Brooks Telecommunications entered into a joint venture with Galaxy New Technology, a Chinese company controlled by the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), an agency of the Chinese military, to form Guangzhou HuaMei Communications Limited. Civil End User Not Defined Under GLX
GLX allows the export of ATM and SDH equipment to China without a validated license, if the exports are going to “civil end-users for civil end-uses.” However, Commerce Department regulations do not define a “civil end-user” or offer any guidance on how an exporter is to determine who is a civil end user in China. U.S. company and government officials stated that determining end users in China is problematic because the Chinese military is often involved in commercial activities. Currently, there is no guidance or criteria available to exporters on how much military involvement in a commercial entity is needed before it is considered a military end user. However, in the export of telecommunications equipment to HuaMei, the Commerce Department did not have an opportunity to review the end user because prior government review is not required under GLX. Commerce noted that our suggestion that it assess the need to provide additional guidance to exporters on determining civil end users as it gains experience under CIV (formerly known as GLX) was helpful. To determine civil and military applications of ATM and SDH equipment, availability of the equipment, and the importance of those applications to China’s military, we interviewed officials from AT&T and SCM Brooks and obtained technical descriptions of the products and potential applications. To examine the process and rationale for liberalizing the export of broadband telecommunications equipment, we reviewed a chronology of the export of AT&T equipment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the transfer of broadband telecommunication equipment to HuaMei, a joint venture between SCM Brooks Telecommunications, a U.S. limited partnership, and Galaxy New Technology, a Chinese company primarily owned by an agency of the Chinese military, focusing on the: (1) civil and military applications of the exported telecommunications equipment, its availability, and the importance of these applications to China's military; and (2) process and rationale for liberalizing the export of telecommunications equipment shipped to China.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there are numerous civil and military applications for broadband telecommunications equipment, such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) equipment, including video-conferencing, remote command and control, and telemedicine; (2) since the liberalization of exports of advanced telecommunications equipment, such equipment is now readily available in China; (3) SDH equipment, in particular, is being manufactured and used to upgrade China's telecommunications networks to international standards; (4) according to U.S. government officials, the Chinese military is seeking to acquire ATM and SDH equipment, which may benefit its command and control networks by the end of the next decade; (5) furthermore, these officials stated that as China's telecommunications infrastructure is modernized, the Chinese military will also benefit; (6) the creation of the new General License category, GLX, by the Commerce Department in April 1994, allowed the export of ATM and SDH equipment to HuaMei without a validated license having to be issued by the Commerce Department; (7) ATM and SDH equipment were two of a number of dual-use telecommunications items that were included under GLX; (8) GLX includes many items that would have been typically approved for export to civil end users in the licensing process; (9) according to U.S. government officials, GLX was created in response to the end of the Cold War and the expiration of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, to ease export restrictions and reduce administrative burdens on U.S. exporters; (10) determining who is a civil end user under GLX is the responsibility of the exporting companies; (11) however, this is particularly difficult in China because of the Chinese military's significant involvement in various commercial ventures; (12) there is no information readily available to exporters on how much military involvement in a commercial entity constitutes a military end user; and (13) based on this one case, GAO is not making any recommendations; however, as the Commerce Department gains experience under GLX, it may want to assess the need to provide additional information or guidance to exporters to help them determine when they should request a government review of an end user. |
gao_T-GGD-00-24 | gao_T-GGD-00-24_0 | NARA and Federal Agencies Face ERM Challenges
We found that NARA and federal agencies are confronted with many ERM challenges, particularly technological issues. NARA must be able to receive electronic records from agencies, store them, and retrieve them when needed. Agencies must be able to create electronic records, store them, properly dispose of them when appropriate, and send valuable electronic records to NARA for archival storage. In addition to increasing volume, NARA must address some definitional problems, such as what constitutes an electronic record. In addition, because agencies follow no uniform hardware or software standards, NARA must be capable of accepting various formats from agencies and maintaining a continued capability of reading those records. NARA is not alone in facing ERM challenges, the agencies also must meet Federal Records Act responsibilities. Agencies must incorporate NARA’s guidance into their own recordkeeping systems. Agencies Vary in Their Implementation of ERM
Agencies’ reactions to the challenges I just mentioned are varied. On the basis of our discussions with NARA and some agency officials, we learned that some agencies are waiting for more specific guidance from NARA while others are moving forward by looking for ways to better manage their electronic records. NARA Does Not Have Governmentwide Data on Agencies’ ERM Efforts
Even though NARA is aware of what some agencies are doing – such as DOD, NASA, OTS, and some others -- it does not have governmentwide data on the records management capabilities and programs of federal agencies. NARA had planned to do a baseline assessment survey to collect such data on all agencies by the end of fiscal year 2000. The Archivist decided, however, to temporarily postpone doing this baseline survey because he accorded higher priority to such activities as reengineering NARA’s business processes. In response to our draft report and in a September 17, 1999, letter to the Comptroller General, the Archivist said that much of this baseline data would not be relevant to BPR and therefore NARA would not collect it at this time. NARA Is Revising Its ERM Guidance
Even though NARA lacks governmentwide data on how agencies are implementing ERM, NARA has already begun revising its guidance to agencies. ERM Activities in Some States and Foreign Countries Differ from Those of the Federal Government
Our review of the ERM activities in four states and three foreign governments showed that approaches to ERM differ. These entities often did things differently from each other and/or NARA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the challenges that face the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and federal agencies in their efforts to manage the rapidly increasing volume of electronic records.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NARA and federal agencies are confronted with many electronic records management (ERM) challenges, particularly technological issues; (2) NARA must be able to receive electronic records from agencies, store them, and retrieve them when needed; (3) agencies must be able to create electronic records, store them, properly dispose of them when appropriate, and send valuable electronic records to NARA for archival storage; (4) NARA officials told GAO that NARA needs to expand its capacity to accept the increasing volume of electronic records from agencies; (5) in addition to increasing volume, NARA must address some definitional problems, such as what constitutes an electronic record; (6) in addition, because agencies follow no uniform hardware or software standards, NARA must be capable of accepting various formats from agencies and maintaining a continued capability of reading those records; (7) NARA is not alone in facing ERM challenges, the agencies also must meet Federal Records Act responsibilities; (8) agencies must incorporate NARA's guidance into their own recordkeeping systems; (9) agencies' reactions to ERM challenges are varied; (10) on the basis of GAO's discussions with NARA and some agency officials, GAO learned that some agencies are waiting for more specific guidance from NARA while others are moving forward by looking for ways to better manage their electronic records; (11) even though NARA is aware of what some agencies are doing, it does not have governmentwide data on records management capabilities and programs of federal agencies; (12) NARA had planned to do a baseline survey to collect such data on all agencies by the end of fiscal year 2000; (13) the Archivist decided, however, to temporarily postpone doing this baseline survey because he accorded higher priority to such activities as reengineering NARA's business processes; (14) GAO recommended that NARA do the baseline survey as part of its reengineering process; (15) the Archivist stated that the baseline data would not be relevant to its reengineering efforts and therefore NARA would not collect it at this time; (16) even though NARA lacks governmentwide data on how agencies are implementing ERM, NARA has already begun revising its guidance to agencies; (17) GAO's review of the ERM activities in four states and three foreign governments showed that approaches to ERM differ; and (18) these entities often did things differently from each other and NARA. |
gao_GAO-04-381 | gao_GAO-04-381_0 | In order to foster the participation of small businesses in subcontracting, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires DOD contractors to have subcontracting plans for most contracts of more than $500,000 ($1 million for construction contracts). DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Outcome of Its Test Program
Although the Test Program has been in existence since fiscal year 1991, DOD does not know if it is achieving its intended objectives to provide more small business subcontracting opportunities and to reduce administrative burden for contractors. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Office of Small and Disadvantage Business Utilization, which is to report the results of the Test Program in December 2005, shortly after the program is set to expire, commissioned a preliminary study of the program in 2002. Contractors Have Met Some Small Business Goals, but Results Are Inconsistent
In the past 5 years, the 15 DOD contractors participating in the Test Program had varying success in meeting their small business goals established in their subcontracting plans. Changing Contracting Environment May Affect Contractors’ Ability to Meet Small Business Goals
DOD and contractor officials noted that a changing acquisition environment has added to the challenge in meeting their small business goals. Changes included (1) the increased breadth, scope, and complexity of DOD prime contracts that require, among other things, teaming arrangements with other, typically large contractors and (2) prime contractors’ strategic sourcing decisions to leverage their purchasing power by reducing the number of their suppliers including small businesses. Test Program plan reviews—annually assess each contractor participating in the Test Program. In July 2003, DCMA published an updated policy for monitoring contractors’ small business subcontracting programs. Concerns Remain about Reliability of Data on Subcontracts Performed Outside U.S.
We could not assess the full extent that defense contractors’ subcontract with firms performing outside the U.S. In October 2003, during our review, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy—through the Office of Program Acquisition and International Contracting—began to take the following actions to address contractor compliance sent letters to the top 100 parent companies of DOD contractors to remind them about DOD reporting requirements for subcontracts to firms performing outside the U.S. and requested they ensure all their subsidiaries also comply with this reporting requirement, sent a memorandum to the Senior Acquisition Executives of the Military Department and the Defense Agencies requesting they remind their contracting officers of the reporting requirement, engaged in outreach efforts with government and industry personnel to help ensure this effort to improve contractor compliance was fully communicated, sent a memorandum to DCMA requesting its assistance in periodically verifying that contractors are complying with the reporting requirements, and clarified reporting requirements for subcontracts to firms performing outside the U.S. Conclusions
Because of its large contracting operations, DOD is critical to the success of federal programs designed to provide opportunities for small businesses. DOD has recognized the importance of its role in federal contracting; has taken limited steps to help improve opportunities for small businesses, such as the Test Program; and has revised DCMA guidance to hold contractors more accountable for their small business goals. As a result, there is no systematic way of determining whether the program is meeting its intended objectives and whether further changes need to be made. Without accurate and complete information on subcontracts to firms performing outside the U.S., DOD cannot make informed decisions on industrial base issues. Also, to ensure DOD has the information it needs to accurately determine the number and dollar amount of subcontracts to firms performing outside the U.S., we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct DOD’s Office of Program Acquisition and International Contracting to establish procedures to improve the quality of the information in its database of subcontracts performed outside the U.S.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. To determine the performance of contractors participating in the Test Program, we collected data on the 15 DOD contractors (i.e., parent companies or their subsidiaries) participating in the Test Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
More small businesses are turning to subcontracting as a way to participate in the federal government's $250 billion procurement program. DOD, accounting for about two-thirds of federal procurements, has a critical role in providing opportunities to small businesses through subcontracting programs such as the Test Program for Negotiation of Comprehensive Small Business Subcontracting Plans (Test Program). In addition, Congress raised concerns about the potential for small businesses to lose opportunities to firms performing work outside of the United States. GAO was asked to review (1) DOD's assessment of the Test Program's effectiveness, (2) the performance of contractors participating in the Test Program, (3) the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) oversight of contractors' small business subcontracting efforts, and (4) the extent and reasons contractors are subcontracting with businesses performing outside the U.S.
What GAO Found
In order to foster small business participation in subcontracting, government contractors with larger dollar value contracts are required to have subcontracting plans that establish goals for contractors to award small businesses a percentage of subcontract dollars. DOD created the Test Program to provide more small business opportunities and reduce the administrative burden for contractors in managing their subcontracting programs. Many of DOD's largest contractors participate in the program. A lthough the Test Program was started more than 12 years ago, DOD has yet to establish metrics to evaluate the program's results and effectiveness. As a result, there is no systematic way of determining whether the program is meeting its intended objectives and whether further changes need to be made. DOD contracted for an assessment of the Test Program in 2002, but the results of the assessment are considered preliminary and, therefore, have not been reported. DOD is required to report the results of the Test Program in 2005, when the program is set to expire. DOD contractors participating in the Test Program have experienced mixed success in meeting their various small business subcontracting goals. DOD and contractor officials noted that a changing acquisition environment has added to their challenge in meeting small business goals. Two of the major challenges they identified include (1) the increased breadth, scope, and complexity of DOD prime contracts that require, among other things, teaming arrangements with other, typically large contractors and (2) prime contractors' strategic sourcing decisions to leverage their purchasing power by reducing the number of their suppliers including small businesses. DCMA plays a key role in overseeing the performance of contractors in the Test Program and has made significant changes to its policy and guidance. The revised approach is designed to better monitor contractors' efforts, provide more consistency in assessing contractor performance, and hold contractors accountable for achieving their subcontracting goals. DCMA is still in the process of revamping its oversight activities. GAO could not assess the full extent contractors used firms performing outside the U.S. because of data reliability concerns. Contractors in GAO's review reported several reasons for awarding subcontracts to firms performing outside the U.S., such as fulfilling commitments included in offset agreements or executing teaming arrangements for major defense programs. Without accurate and complete information on subcontracts to firms performing outside the U.S., DOD cannot make informed decisions on industrial base issues. |
gao_GAO-11-801 | gao_GAO-11-801_0 | Both HHS and USDA officials have stated that it is likely that the use of antibiotics in animal agriculture leads to some cases of antibiotic resistance among humans and that medically important antibiotics should be used judiciously in animals. Agency Data Are Limited and Restrict Efforts to Understand Antibiotic Resistance
The 2001 interagency plan discusses two types of data needed to understand antibiotic resistance—data on the amount of antibiotics used in food animals (“use data”) and data on the level of antibiotic resistance in bacteria found in food animals and retail meat (“resistance data”). Agencies have collected some data to track antibiotic use in animals, but these data lack crucial details identified by the 2001 interagency plan as essential for agencies to examine trends and understand the relationship between use and resistance. However, FDA faces several challenges in collecting detailed antibiotic sales data from drug sponsors. Instead, FDA has proposed a voluntary strategy to mitigate this risk but has neither developed a plan nor collected the “purpose of use” data necessary to measure the effectiveness of its strategy. In 2003, FDA issued guidance recommending that antibiotic sponsors include a risk assessment of any new antibiotics for use in food animals. FDA officials told us that conducting individual postapproval risk assessments for all of the antibiotics approved prior to 2003 would be prohibitively resource intensive, and that pursuing this approach could further delay progress on the issue. Agencies Took Steps to Research Alternatives and Educate Users, but Progress Is Unclear
USDA and HHS agencies have taken some steps to research alternatives to current antibiotic use practices and educate producers and veterinarians on appropriate use of antibiotics but the extent of these steps is unclear because neither USDA nor HHS has assessed the progress toward fulfilling the related action items in the 2001 interagency plan. Without an assessment of past research efforts, agencies may be limited in their ability to identify gaps where additional research is needed. Regulation of Antibiotics in the EU and Denmark May Offer Lessons for the United States
Since 1995, the EU and Denmark have taken a variety of actions to regulate antibiotic use in food animals and mitigate the risk such use may pose to humans. Officials also mentioned declines in resistance among Campylobacter bacteria (which can cause foodborne illness in humans) from food animals and retail meat. Second, they mentioned that data on both antibiotic use and antibiotic resistance are needed in order to fully understand how use in animals is related to resistance in humans. EU officials said these baseline studies provide information that is comparable across countries. For example, although FDA has a new effort to collect data on antibiotics sold for use in food animals, these data lack crucial details, such as the species in which the antibiotics are used and the purpose for their use. In addition, two USDA agencies collect data on antibiotic use from food animal producers, but data from these surveys provide only a snapshot of antibiotic use practices and cannot be used to examine trends. For data on antibiotic resistance, HHS and USDA agencies have leveraged existing programs to collect samples of bacteria, but the resulting data are not representative of antibiotic resistance in food animals and retail meat throughout the United States. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following three recommendations: To track the effectiveness of policies to curb antibiotic resistance, including FDA’s voluntary strategy designed to reduce antibiotic use in food animals and to address action items in the surveillance focus area of the 2001 interagency plan, we recommend the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services direct agencies to, consistent with their existing authorities, (1) identify potential approaches for collecting detailed data on antibiotic use in food animals, including the species in which antibiotics are used and the purpose for their use, as well as the costs, time frames, and potential trade-offs associated with each approach; (2) collaborate with industry to select the best approach; (3) seek any resources necessary to implement the approach; and (4) use the data to assess the effectiveness of policies to curb antibiotic resistance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the extent to which federal agencies have collected data on antibiotic use and resistance in food animals; (2) the actions the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken to mitigate the risk of antibiotic resistance in humans as a result of antibiotic use in food animals; (3) the extent to which federal agencies have conducted research on alternatives to current antibiotic use practices and educated producers and veterinarians about appropriate antibiotic use; and (4) what actions the European Union (EU) and an EU member country, Denmark, have taken to regulate antibiotic use in food animals and what lessons, if any, have been learned. | Why GAO Did This Study
Antibiotics have saved millions of lives, but antibiotic use in food animals contributes to the emergence of resistant bacteria that may affect humans. The Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA) are primarily responsible for ensuring food safety. GAO reviewed the issue in 2004 and recommended improved data collection and risk assessment. GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent to which agencies have collected data on antibiotic use and resistance in animals, (2) actions HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took to mitigate the risk of antibiotic resistance in humans as a result of use in animals, (3) extent to which agencies have researched alternatives to current use practices and educated producers and veterinarians about appropriate use, and (4) actions the European Union (EU) and an EU member country, Denmark, have taken to regulate use in animals and lessons that have been learned. GAO analyzed documents, interviewed officials from national organizations, and visited producers in five states and Denmark..
What GAO Found
HHS and USDA have collected some data on antibiotic use in food animals and on resistant bacteria in animals and retail meat. However, these data lack crucial details necessary to examine trends and understand the relationship between use and resistance. For example, since GAO's 2004 report, FDA began collecting data from drug companies on antibiotics sold for use in food animals, but the data do not show what species antibiotics are used in or the purpose of their use, such as for treating disease or improving animals' growth rates. Also, although USDA agencies continue to collect use data through existing surveys of producers, data from these surveys provide only a snapshot of antibiotic use practices. In addition, agencies' data on resistance are not representative of food animals and retail meat across the nation and, in some cases, because of a change in sampling method, have become less representative since GAO's 2004 report. Without detailed use data and representative resistance data, agencies cannot examine trends and understand the relationship between use and resistance. FDA implemented a process to mitigate the risk of new animal antibiotics leading to resistance in humans, which involves the assessment of factors such as the probability that antibiotic use in food animals would give rise to resistant bacteria in the animals, but it faces challenges mitigating risk from antibiotics approved before FDA issued guidance in 2003. FDA officials told GAO that conducting postapproval risk assessments for each of the antibiotics approved prior to 2003 would be prohibitively resource intensive, and that pursuing this approach could further delay progress. Instead, FDA proposed a voluntary strategy in 2010 that involves FDA working with drug companies to limit approved uses of antibiotics and increasing veterinary supervision of use. However, FDA does not collect the antibiotic use data, including the purpose of use, needed to measure the strategy's effectiveness. HHS and USDA have taken some steps to research alternatives to current antibiotic use practices and educate producers and veterinarians on appropriate use of antibiotics. However, the extent of these efforts is unclear because the agencies have not assessed their effectiveness. Without an assessment of past efforts, the agencies may be limited in their ability to identify gaps where additional research is needed. Except for one $70,400 USDA project, all other federal education programs have ended. Since 1995, the EU, including Denmark, banned the use of antibiotics to promote growth in animals, among other actions. Some of their experiences may offer lessons for the United States. For example, in Denmark, antibiotic use in animals initially decreased following a series of policy changes. The prevalence of resistant bacteria declined in food animals and retail meat in many instances, but a decline in humans has only occasionally been documented. Denmark's data on use and resistance helped officials track the effects of its policies and take action to reverse unwanted trends. The EU faces difficulty collecting data that can be compared across countries, but officials there said such data are needed to fully understand how use in animals may lead to resistance in humans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS and USDA (1) identify and evaluate approaches to collecting detailed data on antibiotic use in animals and use these data to evaluate FDA's voluntary strategy, (2) collect more representative data on resistance, and (3) assess previous efforts on alternatives to identify where more research is needed. HHS and USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-906 | gao_GAO-05-906_0 | Studies Show Wind Power Facility Impacts on Wildlife Vary, Although Notable Gaps in the Literature Remain and Few Studies Address Mitigation
Recent studies and interviews with experts reveal that the impacts of wind power facilities on birds and other wildlife vary by region and by species. However, gaps in the literature make it difficult to develop definitive conclusions about the impacts of wind power on birds and other wildlife. Such large numbers of raptor kills due to wind power are not seen elsewhere in the United States. Studies Show That Bird and Bat Mortality from Wind Power in Other Parts of the Country Is Comparatively Lower Than in California and Appalachia
Results from studies on bird and bat mortality from wind power conducted in areas other than northern California and Appalachia have not caused the same degree of concern as in these two locations. Regulating Wind Power Facilities on Nonfederal Land Is Largely the Responsibility of State and Local Governments
Since most wind power development has occurred on nonfederal land, regulating wind power facilities is largely a state and local government responsibility. In the six states we reviewed, wind power development is subject to local-level processes, state-level processes, or a combination of the two. The federal role in regulating wind power development is limited to projects occurring on federal lands or those that have some form of federal involvement, such as projects that receive federal funding; to date, there have been relatively few wind power projects on federal land. In these cases, wind power projects must comply with federal laws as well as any relevant state and local laws. Federal and State Laws Protect Wildlife
As with any other activity, federal and state laws afford protections to wildlife from wind power. Three federal laws—the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Act—generally forbid harm to various species of wildlife. While wildlife mortality events have occurred at wind power facilities, the federal government has not prosecuted any cases against wind power companies under these wildlife laws, preferring instead to encourage companies to take mitigation steps to avoid future harm. Regarding state wildlife protections, all of the six states we reviewed had statutes that can be used to protect some wildlife from wind power impacts. However, similar to FWS, no states have taken any prosecutorial actions against wind power facilities where mortalities have occurred. Various Wildlife Protections Are Provided by Three Federal Laws
The primary federal regulatory framework for protecting wildlife from impacts from wind power includes three laws—the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Act. Scientists, in particular, are concerned about the potential cumulative impacts of wind power on species populations if the industry expands as expected. Specifically, we assessed (1) what available studies and experts have reported about the impacts of wind power facilities on wildlife in the United States and what can be done to mitigate or prevent such impacts, (2) the roles and responsibilities of government agencies in regulating wind power facilities, and (3) the roles and responsibilities of government agencies in protecting wildlife from the risks posed by wind power facilities. We reviewed a nonprobability sample of six states with wind power development— California, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wind power has recently experienced dramatic growth in the United States, with further growth expected. However, several wind power-generating facilities have killed migratory birds and bats, prompting concern from wildlife biologists and others about the species affected, and the cumulative effects on species populations. GAO assessed (1) what available studies and experts have reported about the impacts of wind power facilities on wildlife in the United States and what can be done to mitigate or prevent such impacts, (2) the roles and responsibilities of government agencies in regulating wind power facilities, and (3) the roles and responsibilities of government agencies in protecting wildlife. GAO reviewed a sample of six states with wind power development for this report.
What GAO Found
The impact of wind power facilities on wildlife varies by region and by species. Specifically, studies show that wind power facilities in northern California and in Pennsylvania and West Virginia have killed large numbers of raptors and bats, respectively. Studies in other parts of the country show comparatively lower levels of mortality, although most facilities have killed at least some birds. However, many wind power facilities in the United States have not been studied, and, therefore, scientists cannot draw definitive conclusions about the threat that wind power poses to wildlife in general. Further, much is still unknown about migratory bird flyways and overall species population levels, making it difficult to determine the cumulative impact that the wind power industry has on wildlife species. Notably, only a few studies exist concerning ways in which to reduce wildlife fatalities at wind power facilities. Regulating wind power facilities is largely the responsibility of state and local governments. In the six states GAO reviewed, wind power facilities are subject to local- or state-level processes, such as zoning ordinances to permit the construction and operation of wind power facilities. As part of this process, some agencies require environmental assessments before construction. However, regulatory agency officials do not always have experience or expertise to address environmental and wildlife impacts from wind power. The federal government plays a minimal role in approving wind power facilities, only regulating facilities that are on federal lands or have some form of federal involvement, such as receiving federal funds. In these cases, the wind power project must comply with federal laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, as well as any relevant state and local laws. Federal and state laws afford generalized protections to wildlife from wind power as with any other activity. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is the primary agency tasked with implementing wildlife protections in the United States. Three federal laws--the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Act--generally forbid harm to various species of wildlife. Although significant wildlife mortality events have occurred at wind power facilities, the federal government has not prosecuted any cases against wind power companies under these wildlife laws, preferring instead to encourage companies to take mitigation steps to avoid future harm. All of the six states GAO reviewed had statutes that can be used to protect some wildlife from wind power impacts; however, similar to FWS, no states have taken any prosecutorial actions against wind power facilities where wildlife mortalities have occurred. |
gao_GAO-16-608 | gao_GAO-16-608_0 | Background
This section describes (1) WIPP’s layout and base operations, (2) the February 2014 truck fire and radiological release accident investigation reports, (3) DOE’s requirements for operations activities and for project management applicable to the WIPP Recovery effort, (4) best practices for cost and schedule estimating, (5) best practices for conducting an AOA, (6) Revisions in 2014 and 2015 to DOE’s requirements for AOAs, and (7) DOE’s AOA process for WIPP’s new permanent ventilation system. The process entails identifying, analyzing, and selecting a preferred alternative. Selecting a preferred alternative. Later, in June 2015, the Secretary of Energy directed the department to develop guidance for conducting AOAs consistent with the AOA best practices that GAO has published. A DOE official told us in June 2016 that the department expected the guidance to be completed by December 2016. DOE Did Not Meet Its Initial Cost and Schedule Estimates for Restarting Waste Disposal Operations
DOE did not meet its initial cost and schedule estimates for the efforts needed to restart WIPP disposal operations, resulting in about $64 million in added costs and a delay of nearly 9 months. Specifically, in January 2016, approximately a year after approving the initial project baseline, DOE approved a new project management baseline that increased the estimated costs for the recovery project by $2 million (from $242 million to $244 million) and added 8.5 months to the project schedule, extending the date when limited waste disposal operations might begin from March 2016 to December 2016. In December 2015, DOE received $192.1 million for fiscal year 2016 base operations, an increase of $61.6 million (47 percent) over the initial estimate for base operations in fiscal year 2016. DOE partially met best practices for a credible schedule, in particular, because its schedule did not include extra time, or contingency, to account for known project risks. However, according to DOE officials, they did not follow other best practices. DOE did not follow all best practices in developing the initial cost and schedule estimates for the WIPP recovery project or in developing new estimates because, unlike DOE’s requirements for capital asset projects under Order 413.3B, DOE’s EM operations activities protocol that governs cleanup operations such as WIPP recovery does not require the use of best practices in developing such estimates. Without having followed all best practices, including having an independent cost estimate conducted to validate the estimates, DOE cannot be confident that NWP sufficiently accounted for these challenges in revising its risk analysis and that DOE set an appropriate allowance for contingency to reduce the risk of cost overruns and delays in restarting WIPP’s operations. DOE Did Not Follow All Best Practices in Analyzing and Selecting an Alternative for the New Ventilation System at WIPP
DOE did not follow all best practices in analyzing and selecting an alternative for the new ventilation system at WIPP. As a result, DOE’s analysis was not reliable and DOE cannot be confident that the selected alternative will best provide the needed capabilities. NWP and Trinity identified a broad range of alternatives. Most notably, DOE and its contractors did not follow the best practice to select the alternatives based on a cost-benefit analysis and only partially followed the best practice to independently review the AOA process, as follows:
Regarding cost-benefit analysis, DOE and its contractors did not select the alternatives based on such an analysis which compares the life-cycle costs and benefits or effectiveness of each alternative. Specifically, an independent review conducted by DOE’s Office of Project Management Oversight and Assessments found that the project team did not adequately document a cost-benefit analysis and that, as a result, the selection of the preferred alternative was not supported by compelling information. By not implementing the recommendation from the independent review to do a cost-benefit analysis or not justifying and documenting the reason for not doing so, DOE cannot provide assurance that the final alternative selected would best provide the capabilities needed at WIPP. DOE did not develop its estimates for WIPP recovery following best practices, in part because DOE does not require its cleanup operations activities, such as WIPP, to follow them. This lack of a requirement is in contrast to a new policy put into effect in June 2015 by the Secretary of Energy, which established the requirements that DOE develop cost and schedule estimates for its capital asset projects following best practices—such projects include the new permanent ventilation system at WIPP. By also requiring cleanup operations to follow best practices, DOE would have more confidence in the estimates for its cleanup operations activities and its capital asset projects. In addition, the report includes a breakout of the cost increase. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report examined the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) (1) met its initial cost and schedule estimates for restarting waste disposal operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and (2) followed best practices in analyzing and selecting an alternative for the new ventilation system. Overall, DOE’s AOA process fully met the category for identifying alternatives and partially or minimally met the other three categories of best practices—general principles, analyzing alternatives, and selecting the preferred alternative. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE's WIPP is the only deep geologic repository for the disposal of U.S. defense-related nuclear waste. In February 2014, waste operations were suspended following a truck fire and an unrelated radiological release. DOE estimated in February 2015 that it would complete recovery activities and restart limited waste operations by March 2016. To resume full operations, DOE planned to build a new ventilation system at WIPP. DOE completed an AOA to identify the best solution for this system in December 2015.
The Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review WIPP operations. This report examines the extent to which DOE (1) met its initial cost and schedule estimates for restarting waste disposal operations, and (2) followed best practices in analyzing and selecting an alternative for the new ventilation system. GAO examined documentation on the WIPP recovery estimates. GAO compared DOE's February 2015 cost and schedule estimates and AOA with best practices GAO published.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) did not meet its initial cost and schedule estimates for restarting nuclear waste disposal operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), resulting in a cost increase of about $64 million and a delay of nearly 9 months. DOE incurred this cost increase and delay partly because it did not follow all best practices in developing the cost and schedule estimates. In particular, DOE's schedule did not include extra time, or contingency, to account for known project risks. Instead, DOE estimated it would restart waste operations in March 2016 based on a schedule with no contingency that gave DOE less than a 1 percent chance of meeting its restart date. In January 2016, DOE approved new estimates that added 8.5 months to the schedule, extending the restart to December 2016; increased the estimated cost of recovery by $2 million; and resulted in an additional $61.6 million in costs for operating WIPP in fiscal year 2016. DOE's WIPP operations activity manager said the revised schedule included contingency. However, according to DOE officials, they did not follow other best practices. For example, DOE did not provide evidence of having an independent cost estimate to validate the revised estimate. DOE did not follow all best practices for cost and schedule estimates in part because DOE does not require that its cleanup operations, such as WIPP, follow these practices. Therefore, DOE cannot have confidence that its estimates are reliable. In contrast, DOE established new requirements in June 2015 that its capital asset projects, such as the new ventilation system at WIPP, follow these best practices. By also requiring cleanup operations to follow them, DOE would have more confidence in the estimates for cleanup operations and capital asset projects.
DOE did not follow all best practices in analyzing and selecting an alternative for the new ventilation system at WIPP. As a result, DOE's analysis was not reliable and DOE cannot be confident that the alternative it selected in December 2015 will best provide the needed capabilities at WIPP. The analysis of alternatives (AOA) process entails identifying, analyzing, and selecting a preferred alternative to best meet the mission need. Of the four categories of best practices for AOAs, DOE's process fully met the category for identifying alternatives. For example, DOE identified a broad range of ventilation alternatives. However, DOE only partially or minimally met the other three categories: general principles, analyzing alternatives, and selecting the preferred alternative. DOE did not follow the best practice to select the preferred alternative based on a cost-benefit analysis that assesses the difference between the life-cycle costs and benefits of each alternative. In addition, an independent review that DOE commissioned consistent with best practices found that DOE's AOA did not adequately document a cost-benefit analysis and that, as a result, the selection of the preferred alternative was not supported by compelling information. The independent review recommended that DOE conduct a cost-benefit analysis consistent with best practices. However, DOE did not conduct the recommended analysis and document it before selecting the final alternative because there was no requirement to do so. In June 2015, the Secretary of Energy directed DOE to develop guidance for conducting AOAs consistent with AOA best practices. A DOE official said the department expected to issue the new guidance by December 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE require cleanup operations to follow best practices for cost and schedule estimates and require projects, including the WIPP ventilation system, to implement recommendations from independent AOA reviews or document the reasons for not doing so. DOE concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-621SP | gao_GAO-12-621SP_0 | Our work on overlap and duplication has found crosscutting areas where performance information is limited or does not exist. How We Developed This Guide
This guide builds upon a large body of work we have conducted during the past two decades related to performance management in the federal government. To identify how Congress can use the consultations required under GPRAMA, we identified requirements specified in the act, as well as the intent of these requirements as reported by the Senate Committee on Additionally, we identified Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Section I: Consultations Provide Congress with Opportunities to Influence Development of Executive Branch Performance Information That Is Useful for Decision Making
Consultations Are Intended to Strengthen Collaboration between the Congress and Federal Agencies
GPRAMA requires OMB and agencies to consult with relevant committees, obtaining majority and minority views, about proposed goals at least once every 2 years. Specifically, OMB is required to consult with relevant committees with broad jurisdiction on crosscutting priority goals.Agencies are to consult with their relevant appropriations, authorization, and oversight committees when developing or making adjustments to their strategic plans and agency priority goals. The act also requires OMB, on a governmentwide website, and agencies, in their strategic plans, to describe how input provided during consultations was incorporated into the crosscutting priority goals and agency goals, respectively. performance and confirm that various committees are getting the types of performance information they need. Congress also emphasized this point in the report accompanying GPRAMA. According to committee staff members, the involvement of program officials is more likely to ensure that consultations are informative for both Congress and the agency. As the consultations proceed, the involvement of Members of Congress and agency leadership is important because they are ultimately responsible for making decisions about the agency’s strategic direction and funding. In addition, to the extent feasible, consultations should be held jointly with relevant authorizing, appropriations, budget, and oversight committees. Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How Congress Uses Performance Information to Inform Its Decision Making
Performance information can be used to inform congressional decisions about authorizing or reauthorizing federal programs, provisions in the tax code, and other activities; appropriating funds; and developing budget resolutions. In one case study, Congress required an agency to develop and submit a strategic plan prior to receiving a portion of its appropriations. In May 2007, USCIS submitted its Transformation Program Strategic Plan and Expenditure Plan to the appropriations committees. Our report noted that more attention was needed in a number of management-related activities, including performance measurement. Performance Information Can Be Used to Measure the Federal Government’s Progress toward Addressing Issues
After identifying issues, Congress has established expectations for the level of performance to be achieved by federal agencies and programs, and regular reporting on results. As highlighted in our case study on efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, setting clear goals— with target levels of performance and timeframes for achieving them— and expectations for periodic progress reports helped Congress sustain attention on improving results over the course of several years. Performance Information Can Help Identify Better Strategies to Address Issues
Finally, Members of Congress, congressional committees, and staff can assess whether existing strategies are the most efficient and effective means for agencies to meet their goals. Analyzing existing performance information can help identify new strategies that could lead to improved results. As the case study on addressing improper payments shows, when it is clear that agencies are not meeting performance expectations, Congress has provided agencies with additional authorities and required alternate approaches to achieve results. Appendix I: Illustrative Questions to Assist Congress in Focusing Consultations on Key Issues
We have previously reported that consultations provide an opportunity for Congress to influence 1. what results agencies should seek to achieve (long-term and annual 2. how those results will be achieved, including how an agency’s efforts are aligned and coordinated with other related efforts (strategies and resources); 3. how to measure progress given the complexity of federal programs and activities (performance measures); and 4. how to report on results (reporting). Table 2 presents examples of questions that Members of Congress and their staffs can ask on strategic plans and related performance issues— during consultations with agencies or in other venues such as hearings— to help ensure that the associated performance information meets their needs and expectations. Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides Important Opportunities to Address Government Challenges. Government Performance: Strategies for Building a Results-Oriented and Collaborative Culture in the Federal Government. Managing for Results: Enhancing the Usefulness of GPRA Consultations Between the Executive Branch and Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to achieve, such as those related to protecting food and agriculture, providing homeland security, and ensuring a well-trained and educated workforce, require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency. As Congress creates, modifies, and funds federal programs and activities, it needs pertinent and reliable information to adequately assess agencies progress in meeting established performance goals, ensure accountability for results, and understand how individual programs and activities fit within a broader portfolio of federal efforts.
However, as our annual reports on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in the federal government have recently highlighted, there are a number of crosscutting areas where performance information is limited or does not exist. Even in instances where agencies produce a great deal of performance information, our past work has shown that it does not always reach the interested parties in Congress, and when it does, the information may not be timely or presented in a manner that is useful for congressional decision making.
To help ensure that executive branch performance information is useful to Congress for its decision making, congressional involvement on what to measure and how to present this information is critical. Recognizing this, Congress updated the statutory framework for performance management in the federal government, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), which significantly enhances the requirements for agencies to consult with Congress when establishing or adjusting governmentwide and agency goals. Specifically, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is required to consult with relevant committees with broad jurisdiction on crosscutting priority goals. Agencies are to consult with their relevant appropriations, authorization, and oversight committees when developing or making adjustments to their strategic plans and agency priority goals.
This guide, prepared at Congressional request, is intended to assist Members of Congress and their staffs in (1) ensuring the consultations required under GPRAMA are useful to the Congress and (2) using performance information produced by executive branch agencies in carrying out various congressional decision-making responsibilities, such as authorizing programs or provisions in the tax code, making appropriations, developing budgets, and providing oversight.
What GAO Found
GPRAMA requires OMB and agencies to consult with relevant committees, obtaining majority and minority views, about proposed goals at least once every 2 years. Specifically, OMB is required to consult with relevant committees with broad jurisdiction on crosscutting priority goals. Agencies are to consult with their relevant appropriations, authorization, and oversight committees when developing or making adjustments to their strategic plans and agency priority goals. The act also requires OMB, on a governmentwide website, and agencies, in their strategic plans, to describe how input provided during consultations was incorporated into the crosscutting priority goals and agency goals, respectively.
According to the Senate report accompanying the act, consultations are intended to strengthen collaboration between Congress and federal agencies to improve government performance. Successful strategic planning requires the involvement of key stakeholders, which can help build consensus. As the committee report notes, the consultation process was established so agencies could take congressional views into account as appropriate. If an agency waits to consult with relevant congressional stakeholders until a strategic plan has been substantially drafted and fully vetted within the executive branch, it foregoes important opportunities to learn about and address early on specific concerns that will be critical to successful implementation. The committee, therefore, emphasized that consultations should take place during the development of a strategic plan, not after. In addition, the requirement for consultations at least once every 2 years is intended to ensure that each Congress has input on agency goals, objectives, strategies, and performance measures. Consultations also provide agencies with opportunities to share information on their performance and confirm that various committees are getting the types of performance information they need.
Performance information can be used to inform congressional decisions about authorizing or reauthorizing federal programs, provisions in the tax code, and other activities; appropriating funds; and developing budget resolutions.
After identifying issues, Congress has established expectations for the level of performance to be achieved by federal agencies and programs, and regular reporting on results. As highlighted in our case study on efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, setting clear goalswith target levels of performance and timeframes for achieving themand expectations for periodic progress reports helped Congress sustain attention on improving results over the course of several years.
Finally, Members of Congress, congressional committees, and staff can assess whether existing strategies are the most efficient and effective means for agencies to meet their goals. Analyzing existing performance information can help identify new strategies that could lead to improved results. As the case study on addressing improper payments shows, when it is clear that agencies are not meeting performance expectations, Congress has provided agencies with additional authorities and required alternate approaches to achieve results. |
gao_GAO-06-115 | gao_GAO-06-115_0 | While Consular Affairs’ controls are consistent with accepted control standards, we found that some of the controls were not always being followed at the posts we visited. Internal Controls Are in Place, and Many Are Either New or Have Been Reinforced
To prevent the issuances of nonimmigrant visas to unqualified applicants, Consular Affairs has strengthened its efforts to limit employee access to automated systems that issue visas and has taken steps to ensure that visa applicants cannot predict which officers will interview them. Each year, posts are required to issue a report certifying their compliance with internal controls, including routine inventory counts of controlled items, established referral policies and procedures, and supervisory reviews of visa refusals and issuances. Internal Controls Not Fully and Consistently Implemented
Consular Affairs has established and reinforced a system of internal controls, described above, designed to reduce visa malfeasance risks; however, we found that the controls were not being fully and consistently implemented. Two posts, for example, reported reviewing controlled items, but did not note whether they were reconciled. Documented Cases of Visa Malfeasance
Between 2001 and 2004, Diplomatic Security substantiated through investigation 28 cases of U.S. employee visa malfeasance that resulted in various actions. Several factors impede visa malfeasance investigations, including differences in U.S. and foreign laws, investigative techniques, and other issues. The following are examples of visa malfeasance or alleged visa malfeasance and how lack of strict compliance with internal controls may have been a contributing factor in creating an environment where the malfeasance could take place. Established internal controls make it more difficult for an employee to commit visa malfeasance. State has established a system of internal controls. Finally, U.S. investigators cannot obtain a U.S. search warrant to search the offices or residences overseas of employees, which, according to Justice and Diplomatic Security officials, affects their ability to gather evidence in malfeasance cases. Improve State’s existing mechanisms to combat visa malfeasance. This could be accomplished by (1) improving the software available to the Vulnerability Assessment Unit to automatically sort data to identify and analyze abnormalities in post visa issuance statistics that could be an indication of malfeasance and (2) enhancing the investigative case tracking systems used by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in order to better identify trends and vulnerabilities in the visa process for use by investigators and consular managers. These data covered 2001 to 2004 because this was the most recent information available. To determine how State and Justice interact to investigate suspicious activity and allegations of employee malfeasance, we interviewed officials from State’s Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, and Justice’s Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section, and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys. | Why GAO Did This Study
Issuing a U.S. visa to a foreign citizen in exchange for money or something of value is a crime that can facilitate entry into the United States of unqualified persons, including those who may wish to do our country harm. Internal controls make it difficult for an employee to commit visa malfeasance without being detected, but, despite these safeguards, visa malfeasance does occur. GAO examined (1) State's internal controls to prevent nonimmigrant visa malfeasance and if they are being implemented and (2) visa malfeasance cases from 2001-2004 and factors cited by State and the Department of Justice (Justice) that contributed to visa malfeasance and affected investigations and prosecutions.
What GAO Found
State has a set of internal controls to prevent visa malfeasance and has taken actions to improve them; however, these internal controls are not being fully and consistently implemented by the posts we visited. While State's controls are consistent with accepted control standards, we found noncompliance with required supervisory oversight at 6 of the 11 posts we visited. This included failure to inventory items used to issue visas, review visa decisions, and follow State's procedures when issuing visas for applicants referred by officers within the post. Lack of full compliance with internal controls increases vulnerability to visa malfeasance. State recently established two headquarters entities to monitor post visa operations. While stronger oversight should help strengthen compliance with internal controls, State has not developed automated software to sort and analyze abnormalities in visa issuances that could indicate potential malfeasance. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security substantiated 28 visa malfeasance cases between 2001 and 2004 involving U.S. employees. The suspects were fired, chose to resign, or were arrested. State investigators could not tell us how many opened cases were referred to Justice for possible prosecution because they had not been routinely collecting that information. In fact, their case records did not permit investigators to identify malfeasance trends or consular managers to identify internal control weaknesses needing attention. Justice's Public Integrity Section successfully prosecuted 10 U.S. government employees. State Diplomatic Security and Justice officials noted that their investigations and prosecutions were impeded by constraints on evidence gathering. Additionally, investigators can not obtain U.S. search warrants to search consular officer's offices or residences overseas. Justice and State are discussing the possibility of pursuing legal changes and other means to address these constraints. |
gao_GAO-12-115 | gao_GAO-12-115_0 | Therefore, we refer to national data from these four data sources as key measures of prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse. The largest increases were in measures of adverse health consequences, though increases were not consistent across all measures. Federal officials suggested that increasing availability of prescription pain relievers and increasing high-risk behaviors by those who abuse or misuse the drugs, such as combining prescription pain relievers with other drugs or alcohol, likely contributed to the rise in adverse health consequences, though data about the reasons for the increases are limited. Federal Agencies Are Using Various Strategies to Educate Prescribers about Issues Related to Prescription Pain Reliever Abuse and Misuse
FDA, NIH, and SAMHSA are using a variety of strategies to fill the gaps federal agencies have identified in prescriber education related to treating pain, prescribing opioids appropriately, and identifying substance abuse in their patients, but officials told us that more education is needed. Strategies that these agencies pursued in fiscal year 2011 include developing CME programs, requiring training and certification in order to prescribe certain drugs, organizing physician mentoring networks, and developing curriculum resources for future prescribers. Currently, in order to register with DEA to prescribe a controlled substance, prescribers must hold a valid state license.agencies we spoke with expressed support for mandatory prescriber education, with some noting that this would ensure that all prescribers were starting from the same baseline of knowledge. All Agencies Followed Almost All Key Practices; Efforts Varied in Size and Approach
All federal agencies used almost all of the key practices for developing consumer education efforts when developing the efforts that we reviewed to educate the general public about prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse. Agencies varied in how they used the key practices for developing public education efforts. All Agencies Followed the Key Practice of Establishing Process Metrics but Most Did Not Assess Program Outcomes
While all agencies established metrics to monitor the implementation and functional elements of their educational initiatives, only two agencies have established or planned to establish metrics to assess the impact of their initiatives on audiences’ knowledge, attitudes, and behavior with regard to prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse. Federal Agencies Have Begun Coordinating Similar Public and Prescriber Education Efforts, but Have Missed Opportunities to Share Resources
There are several similarities among agencies’ efforts, target audiences, and mediums across the nine public education initiatives and nine prescriber education programs we identified. Officials said that these similarities in public education efforts are beneficial in addressing prescription drug abuse and misuse because having multiple, reinforcing messages about the same subject is valuable in public health communications and because federal agencies provide slightly different perspectives on the issues surrounding prescription drug abuse and misuse. Likewise, the prescriber education programs we identified, though similar, are different in content and focus. Although these similar programs have the potential to be duplicative if not effectively coordinated, federal agencies have recently begun to coordinate their educational efforts. Develop and implement a plan to evaluate outcomes from the proposed national education campaigns. Ensure that federal agencies undertaking similar educational efforts leverage available resources and use coordination mechanisms to share information on the development of their efforts. In written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, ONDCP did not explicitly agree or disagree with our recommendations, but noted that it will continue to work for improved coordination of prescription drug abuse educational efforts and evaluation of outcomes. Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes recent national trends in prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, (2) describes how federal agencies are educating prescribers about prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, (3) assesses the extent to which federal agencies follow key practices for developing public education efforts about prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, and (4) identifies educational efforts that use similar strategies and assess how agencies coordinate those efforts. To describe recent national trends in prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, we interviewed officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), DEA, FDA, the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has declared that the United States is in the midst of an epidemic of prescription drug overdose deaths, with deaths associated with prescription pain relievers of particular concern. To address this issue, federal agencies are raising awareness by educating prescribers and the general public. In response to your request, GAO (1) described recent national trends in prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, (2) described how federal agencies are educating prescribers, (3) assessed the extent to which federal agencies follow key practices for developing public education efforts, and (4) identified educational efforts that use similar strategies and assessed how agencies coordinate those efforts.
GAO interviewed officials and reviewed documents and websites from seven agencies involved in federal drug control efforts and analyzed the most recent data from several data sources related to prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse. GAO also assessed the development of public education efforts and federal coordination efforts against key practices from prior GAO work.
What GAO Found
Key measures of prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse increased from 2003 to 2009. The largest increases were in measures of adverse health consequences such as emergency department visits, substance abuse treatment admissions, and unintentional overdose deaths, though increases were not consistent across all measures. Federal officials suggested that increasing availability of prescription pain relievers and high-risk behaviors by those who abuse or misuse the drugs, such as combining prescription pain relievers with other drugs or alcohol, likely contributed to the rise in adverse health consequences, though data about the reasons for the increases are limited.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) use a variety of strategies to educate prescribers about issues related to prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, but officials told us that more education is needed. The strategies used include developing continuing medical education programs, requiring training and certification in order to prescribe certain drugs, and developing curriculum resources for future prescribers. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is working to develop a legislative proposal to require education for prescribers registering with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to prescribe controlled substances. Officials from some agencies said such a requirement would ensure all prescribers were starting from the same baseline of knowledge.
In their efforts to educate the public about prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, DEA, FDA, NIH, ONDCP, and SAMHSA used almost all of the key practices for developing their consumer education efforts. Agencies varied in how they used the key practices when developing these efforts, which varied in size, scope, and duration. All agencies established metrics to monitor the implementation and functional elements of their educational efforts, but only two agencies have established or are planning to establish metrics to assess the impact of their efforts on audiences knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. Without outcome evaluations, federal agencies have limited knowledge of how effective their efforts are in achieving their goalsin this case, reducing prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse.
Among federal initiatives to educate prescribers and the public about prescription pain reliever abuse and misuse, GAO found several instances of agencies engaging in similar efforts, directed at similar target audiences and using similar mediums. Officials said that these similarities in public education efforts are beneficial in addressing prescription drug abuse and misuse because having multiple, reinforcing messages about the same subject is valuable in public health communications and because federal agencies provide slightly different perspectives on the issues surrounding prescription drug abuse and misuse. Likewise, the prescriber education programs GAO identified, though similar, are different in content and focus. Though these similar programs have the potential to be duplicative if not effectively coordinated, federal agencies have recently begun to coordinate their educational efforts. Nevertheless, federal agencies have missed opportunities to share lessons learned and pool resources among similar education efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of ONDCP establish outcome metrics and implement a plan to evaluate proposed educational efforts, and ensure that agencies share lessons learned among similar efforts. ONDCP did not explicitly agree or disagree with GAOs recommendations, but noted that it will continue to work for improved coordination of educational efforts and evaluation of outcomes. |
gao_GGD-96-78 | gao_GGD-96-78_0 | Extent and Nature of Declines in the Number of Dealer Licenses
Since reaching a high point in April 1993, the number of licensed firearms dealers declined steadily and sharply by approximately 35 percent as of September 30, 1995. The decline occurred in every state. Figures 4 and 5 show the number of abandonments and withdrawals, respectively, for both new and renewal applications in fiscal years 1990 through 1995. Several Factors Contributed to the Decline in the Number of Dealers
The following factors contributed to the recent decline in the number of federally licensed firearms dealers: In January 1993, ATF initiated a National Firearms Program, which consisted of several regulatory enforcement strategies, including efforts to increase the number of inspections of applicants for federal firearms dealer licenses and the operations of licensees to ensure strict compliance with the GCA. We found no evidence that ATF had a policy, or sought, to reduce the number of licensed dealers by some targeted number. Handgun Control and VPC believed other reasons for the decline were (1) ATF’s increased enforcement of already existing laws, particularly the “engaged in the business” provision of GCA; and (2) the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 provision requiring applicant certification of compliance with state and local laws as a condition for federal licensing. We agreed to (1) determine the extent and nature of recent declines in the number of licensed firearms dealers; (2) determine what factors were likely to have affected recent declines in the number of licensed firearms dealers, including whether ATF had a policy to reduce the number of licensed dealers; and (3) obtain the views of pertinent organizations on the advantages and disadvantages of reducing the number of licensed firearms dealers. We also reviewed related materials that may have affected ATF’s policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (ATF) policies and procedures for licensing and inspecting firearms dealers, focusing on: (1) the extent and nature of the decline in the number of firearms dealers since 1993; (2) factors that may have affected the decline, including whether ATF had a policy to reduce the number of dealers; and (3) the views of interested organizations on the advantages and disadvantages of reducing the number of federal firearms dealers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of September 30, 1995, the number of federally licensed firearms dealers had declined by about 35 percent nationwide from its high point in April 1993; (2) the decline occurred in every state and in applications for both new licenses and renewals; (3) more applications were abandoned or withdrawn and licenses voluntarily surrendered than were denied or revoked by ATF; (4) the reasons for the decline included new ATF efforts to increase enforcement of existing laws through increased inspections, revised application requirements and forms requiring more information, and new legislation that increased license fees and licensing requirements; (5) increased state and local enforcement of their laws may have also contributed to the decline; (6) there was no evidence that ATF had a policy or deliberately sought to reduce the number of licensed firearms dealers, although ATF realized that its strict enforcement of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the new legislation would likely reduce the number of licensed dealers; (7) officials of 7 organizations representing firearms interests concurred with GAO-identified factors that led to the decline in dealers; (8) a survey of former dealers found various reasons for their not renewing their licenses; and (9) some organizations believed that reducing the number of firearms dealers would lead to a reduction in crime and better monitoring of dealers and guns, while other organizations believed that the decrease would curb competition, raise prices, and limit the lawful availability of firearms. |
gao_GAO-16-470T | gao_GAO-16-470T_0 | The Epidemiology and Transmission of the Zika Virus are Not Fully Understood and Accurate Information on the Incidence is Lacking
While several countries have reported outbreaks of Zika virus disease, unanswered questions remain regarding the epidemiology and the transmission of the disease. Many factors, including a large number of asymptomatic patients, mild symptoms, a lack of a consistent international case definition of Zika virus disease, as well as of microcephaly, and a lack of validated diagnostic tests complicate our understanding of the virus and may hinder our response to the current outbreak. Questions also remain regarding the strength of the association between Zika virus infection and microcephaly or Guillain-Barré syndrome. As of February 24, 2016, 107 cases of continental U.S. travel-associated Zika virus disease have been reported, according to CDC. Zika virus can also be transmitted through blood transfusion, according to U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) documents. Mild Symptoms and Asymptomatic Cases May Lead to Underestimation
Researchers have reported that an estimated 80 percent of the individuals infected with the Zika virus are asymptomatic, that is, they have the virus but do not manifest clinical symptoms. Lack of Consistent International Case Definitions May Lead to Inaccurate Count
An accurate count of the number of Zika virus disease cases requires a consistent case definition, or set of uniform criteria to define the disease for public health surveillance and to determine who is included in the count and who is excluded. When detecting antibodies, diagnosing cases of Zika virus disease and differentiating it from other diseases caused by other flaviviruses, such as dengue or yellow fever, is difficult if someone has been infected by another flavivirus. For example, a person previously infected with another flavivirus such as dengue could be falsely identified as also having been exposed to the Zika virus (and vice-versa). According to the CDC, while there are no commercially-available diagnostic tests for Zika, an antibody-based test for the Zika virus (Zika MAC-ELISA) was recently authorized for Emergency Use by the FDA. Various Methods of Mosquito Control Exist and Novel Approaches Are Underway
Because Zika virus disease cannot yet be prevented by drugs or vaccines, vector (mosquito) control remains a critical factor in mitigating risks associated with this disease. There are both large scale and personal methods for mosquito control. We provide a brief preliminary overview of some population-scale control methods identified in the literature, agency documents, and interviews with industry officials and academicians, which include three potentially- overlapping categories: (1) standing water treatment, (2) insecticides, and (3) emerging technologies. Emerging Technologies
Emerging technologies include (1) use of biological control methods, (2) genetically-modified mosquitoes, and (3) auto-dissemination traps. Scientific literature has identified another approach—using bacteria to reduce disease transmission from mosquitoes to humans. NIH has identified areas of high priority including:
Basic research to understand viral replication, pathogenesis, and transmission, as well as the biology of the mosquito vectors; potential interactions with co-infections such as dengue and yellow fever viruses; animal models of Zika virus infection; and novel vector control methods; and
Pursuing Zika virus research to develop sensitive, specific, and rapid clinical diagnostic tests; drug treatments for Zika virus as well as broad spectrum therapeutics that treat multiple flaviviral infection; and effective vaccines and vaccination strategies. The CDC has identified priority areas of research focus on Zika including:
Determining the link between Zika virus infections and the birth defect microcephaly and measuring changes in incidence rates of the birth defect over time; Improving diagnostics for the Zika virus, including advanced methods to refine tests and support advanced developments for vector control; and
Enhancing international capacity for virus surveillance, expanding laboratory testing, and health care provider testing in countries at highest risk of Zika virus outbreaks. The priority research areas identified by NIH and CDC are ambitious and agencies may face some challenges in implementing this agenda, including:
Given that there are few known cases in the United States, NIH and CDC may have to rely on the cooperation of other countries with sufficient number of cases in order to carry on the proposed research. Biosurveillance: Challenges and Options for the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Emerging infectious diseases constitute a clear and persistent threat to the health and well-being of people and animals around the world. The Zika virus, which at present appears to be primarily transmitted to humans by infected mosquitos, can cause symptoms including fever, rash, and joint pain. A large ongoing outbreak is occurring in Brazil that started in May 2015. As of February 24, 2016, over 100 cases of U.S. travel-associated Zika virus disease cases have been reported.
Due to concerns about its potential impact, you asked GAO to present preliminary observations on the Zika virus. This statement addresses (1) the epidemiology and transmission of the Zika virus disease, including reporting on the incidence of disease and what is known about its link to microcephaly; (2) detection and testing methods; (3) methods for mosquito control; and (4) the proposed federal research agenda as it relates to the Zika virus and Zika virus disease.
To report on these questions, GAO reviewed relevant peer-reviewed scientific literature, epidemiological alerts, agency documents, and prior GAO work from 2003-2016 on related topics; consulted experts in the fields of virology, infectious diseases, and vector control, including industry representatives; and interviewed officials of the CDC and NIH.
What GAO Found
While several countries have reported outbreaks of Zika virus disease—which appear to be primarily transmitted to humans by mosquitos—unanswered questions remain regarding the epidemiology and transmission of the disease. Many factors—including a large number of asymptomatic patients and patients with mild symptoms, and a lack of a consistent international case definition of Zika virus disease—complicate understanding of the virus and may hinder responses to the current outbreak. For example, an estimated 80 percent of individuals infected with the Zika virus may not manifest clinical symptoms. As a result, incidence of the infection may be underestimated. Questions also remain regarding the strength of the association between Zika virus infection and two other conditions: microcephaly and Guillain-Barré syndrome.
A lack of validated diagnostic tests, consistent international case definitions, and trend information may also contribute to difficulty in estimating the prevalence of the virus. The United States uses two diagnostic tests for Zika, and according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), while there are no commercially-available diagnostic tests for Zika, an antibody-based test for Zika virus was recently authorized for Emergency Use by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Diagnosing Zika virus infection is also complicated because it is difficult to differentiate it from other similar diseases, such as dengue or yellow fever. For example, a person previously infected with dengue could be falsely identified as also having been exposed to the Zika virus (and vice-versa). Moreover, the World Health Organization has acknowledged the need for a consistent case definition—that is, a set of uniform criteria to define the disease for public health surveillance and to determine who is included in the count and who is excluded. Additionally, a lack of pattern and trend data has made surveillance challenging.
Because Zika virus disease cannot yet be prevented by drugs or vaccines, vector (mosquito) control remains a critical factor in preventing and mitigating the occurrence of this disease. There are three methods for mosquito control: (1) standing water treatment, (2) insecticides, and (3) emerging technologies. Mosquito control has been achieved in some locations by methods such as reducing or chemically-treating water sources where mosquitoes breed or mature, or by insecticide dispersal. Emerging technologies, including biological control methods—such as infecting mosquitoes with bacteria— genetically-modified mosquitoes, and auto-dissemination traps, show some promise but are still in development and testing phases.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the CDC have identified several high priority areas of research. Research priorities include basic research to understand viral replication, pathogenesis, and transmission, as well as the biology of the mosquito vectors; potential interactions with co-infections such as dengue and yellow fever viruses; linkages between Zika and the birth defect microcephaly; improving diagnostic tests; vaccine development; and novel vector control methods. These efforts are ambitious, and agencies may face challenges in implementing this agenda.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-10-297T | gao_GAO-10-297T_0 | The remaining operating revenues came from the Smithsonian’s private trust funds. Smithsonian Implemented Most Governance Committee Reforms and One of Four GAO Governance Recommendations, but Work Remains on Others
The Smithsonian Has Implemented 39 of 42 Governance Committee Reforms, while Work Remains on 3 Reforms
The Smithsonian has implemented 9 reforms recommended by the Board of Regents’ Governance Committee since May 2008—in addition to the 30 reforms it had implemented as of May 2008—bringing the total number of reforms implemented to 39 of 42 reforms. The Smithsonian has not completed implementation of 3 reforms—2 related to improving policies on broader Smithsonian operations (to develop a contracting policy and conduct a comprehensive review of financial reporting and internal controls) and one related to communication and stakeholder relationships (to enhance the role of the Smithsonian advisory boards). Figure 1 summarizes the status of the Smithsonian’s implementation of the Governance Committee’s recommended reforms as of May 2008 and December 1, 2009. As shown in Figure 1, the Smithsonian has implemented 9 Governance Committee reforms since May 2008, including the following: The Smithsonian (1) developed a database to identify potential conflicts of interest; (2) implemented a policy requiring the former Smithsonian Business Ventures (SBV)—now reorganized and renamed Smithsonian Enterprises—to follow Smithsonian policies except in the case of a few documented exceptions; (3) developed an event expense policy covering regent and other Smithsonian events; (4) completed a review of the Smithsonian’s internal controls for travel and expense reimbursement and implemented a number of additional accountability measures for travel and expense reimbursement; (5) held two regent annual public forums; (6) developed a Board orientation process; (7) completed a review and revision of the Board of Regents committees’ charters; (8) completed a review of appointment procedures to Board of Regents committees, which included clarifying the process for appointing nonregents to committees and making this process publicly available on the Smithsonian’s Web site; and (9) implemented a reform calling for a regular assessment of the Board, its committees, and its members. We discuss the Smithsonian’s efforts regarding this reform later in this testimony, when we discuss the Smithsonian’s actions toward implementing our related May 2008 recommendation. 2.) Assessment—actions in the event of persistent neglect of duties: The Smithsonian implemented GAO’s recommendation to evaluate what actions it can take in the event of persistent neglect of duties by a regent. Structure and composition: The Board of Regents has not fully implemented GAO’s recommendation to develop and make public its process for the selection, use, and evaluation of nonregents. The Board of Regents implemented part of the recommendation by posting on its Web site the process for selecting nonregent committee members. However, the Board of Regents did not make a final decision regarding the use of nonregents on committees when in July 2009, its Governance and Nominating Committee tabled a proposed bylaw to give nonregent members of committees the same roles and responsibilities as regents. Communication and stakeholder relationships: The Board of Regents took steps to improve its relationship with stakeholders, including advisory boards. However, due to limitations of the efforts thus far—such as their informal nature and focus on dissemination of information from the regents rather than two-way communication—several advisory board chairs with whom we spoke expressed concern that the Board of Regents still lacked a sufficient understanding of Smithsonian museums and other entities to govern as effectively as possible. Assessment—evaluation: The Board of Regents has not yet conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its reforms but plans to do so in fiscal year 2010. Both the Smithsonian and the Board of Regents concurred with the findings of that report. Smithsonian Implemented Most GAO Facilities Recommendations, but Has Not Submitted a Recommended Report to Congress
The Smithsonian has fully implemented four of the five recommendations we made in our September 2007 report on the Smithsonian’s facilities, security, and funding challenges. It has not implemented the fifth recommendation regarding submitting a report to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on its funding strategy, but plans to do so. 3.) Furthermore, although the Smithsonian has implemented our recommendation to more comprehensively analyze funding strategies to meet the needs of its facilities projects and is planning to launch a national fundraising campaign, it is unclear what amount of funds will be raised through such a campaign and, more specifically, what amount will be dedicated to facilities. In November 2007, the Board of Regents concurred with a more comprehensively analyzed and prioritized list of nonfederal funding strategies, which included establishing a national campaign to raise private sector funds for Smithsonian programs and facilities, among other strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) is the world's largest museum complex. Its funding comes from its own private trust fund assets and federal appropriations. The Smithsonian Board of Regents, the Smithsonian's governing body, is responsible for the long-term stewardship of the Smithsonian. In recent years, GAO and others have documented (1) significant governance and accountability breakdowns at the Smithsonian, which could ultimately put funding and the organization's credibility at risk, and (2) the deterioration of the Smithsonian's facilities and the threat this deterioration poses to the Smithsonian's collections. This testimony discusses (1) the Smithsonian's status in implementing governance reforms recommended by its Governance Committee and by GAO in a 2008 report (GAO-08-632)--as discussed in a GAO report being released today (GAO-10-190R)--and (2) the Smithsonian's progress in implementing facilities and funding recommendations GAO made in a 2007 report (GAO-07-1127). The work for this testimony is based on GAO-10-190R and an analysis of documentary and testimonial evidence from Smithsonian officials. GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony and did not make new recommendations in GAO-10-190R . The Smithsonian and the Board of Regents concurred with the findings of GAO-10-190R .
What GAO Found
Since May 2008 the Smithsonian has implemented 9 reforms recommended by the Board of Regents Governance Committee--in addition to the 30 it had implemented prior to May 2008--and 1 of 4 GAO recommendations, but work remains on 3 reforms and 3 recommendations. The 9 Governance Committee reforms implemented since May 2008 include efforts such as revising policies related to travel and expense reimbursement and event expenses, creating a regents' annual public forum, completing a review and revision of Board of Regents committees' charters, and developing an assessment process for the Board of Regents. The Smithsonian has not completed implementation of 3 Governance Committee reforms related to the Smithsonian's contracting policy, a comprehensive review of financial reporting and internal controls, and enhancing the role of advisory boards. Regarding GAO's May 2008 recommendations, the Smithsonian implemented GAO's recommendation to evaluate what actions it can take in the event of persistent neglect of duties by a regent, but has not completed implementation of the following three recommendations: (1) The Board of Regents has not fully implemented GAO's recommendation to develop and make public its process for the selection, use, and evaluation of nonregents. The Board of Regents posted on its Web site the process for selecting nonregent committee members but did not make a final decision regarding a proposed bylaw to give nonregent members of committees the same roles and responsibilities as regents. (2) The Board of Regents took steps to improve its relationship with stakeholders, including advisory boards. However, because of limitations of the efforts thus far--such as the informal nature of the Board of Regents' efforts and their focus on the dissemination of information from the regents rather than two-way communication--several advisory board chairs with whom GAO spoke expressed concern that the Board of Regents still lacked a sufficient understanding of Smithsonian museums and other entities to govern as effectively as possible. (3) The Board of Regents has not yet conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its reforms but plans to do so in fiscal year 2010. The Smithsonian has implemented four of GAO's five 2007 recommendations related to facilities and funding. These include recommendations related to improving the Smithsonian's security communications and the comprehensiveness of its capital plan. Furthermore, the Smithsonian has implemented GAO's recommendation to more comprehensively analyze nonfederal funding options to meet the needs of its facilities projects. The Smithsonian is planning to launch a national fund-raising campaign to raise private sector funds for its programs and facilities. It is unclear how much in funds will be raised or dedicated to facilities through such a campaign. The Smithsonian has not implemented GAO's recommendation to submit a report to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget on its funding strategy, but it plans to do so as part of its national fund-raising campaign. |
gao_NSIAD-97-157 | gao_NSIAD-97-157_0 | In past reports, we criticized DOD’s logistics system as being cumbersome, inefficient, and costly. The report concluded that cumulative savings during fiscal years 1998 to 2010, ranging from $2.2 billion to $3.8 billion, might accrue if the management of all ICPs were transferred to DLA. Savings Estimates Associated With Consolidation Would Be Higher Using BRAC Principles
After examining the report on consolidation, we believe OSD’s approach was reasonable, given the sensitive nature of the issue, the limited amount of time to perform the review, and the data available. However, we concluded that the cost savings estimates would have been $1.3 billion to $2.3 billion greater if BRAC principles had been used. Also, indications are that the savings estimates would be even greater if the review included the savings associated with all 16 business process improvements and likely future improvements to the material management information systems. LMI projected cost savings over a 13-year period (i.e., fiscal years 1998-2010), which included an 11-year implementation period and 2 years of steady-state savings. To estimate additional potential cost savings, we adjusted LMI’s data to include a longer time period of steady-state savings and a present value analysis. Management of all DOD ICPs under DLA. Comments From the Department of Defense
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) report on its review of the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) management of all Department of Defense (DOD) inventory control points (ICP).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OSD used conservative assumptions and cost factors in estimating cost savings from consolidating service ICPs under DLA; (2) its projected cost savings of $2.2 billion to $3.8 billion cover a 13-year period, fiscal years 1998 to 2010; (3) GAO believes this approach to be reasonable, given the sensitive nature of the issue, the limited amount of time to perform the review, and the data available; (4) however, the projected cost savings estimates would be at least $1.3 billion to $2.3 billion greater if OSD used base realignment and closure principles, such as estimating steady-state savings over a longer time period and a present value analysis instead of a constant dollar analysis; and (5) the potential savings would likely be greater yet if the analysis included: (a) savings from all business process improvements related to the consolidation; and (b) planned future improvements to DOD's existing material management information systems. |
gao_GAO-10-236T | gao_GAO-10-236T_0 | FPS Faces Challenges in Many Areas, Raising Concerns about Vulnerabilities
Risk Management Approach Is Inadequate and Has Limitations
FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies; however, FPS’s ability to influence the allocation of resources using risk management is limited because resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies, which may be unwilling to fund the countermeasures FPS recommends. Finally, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges that impede its ability to allocate resources to more effectively manage risk. Improvements Needed in Human Capital Planning and Contract Guard Management
FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, including effective processes for training, retention, and staff development. In the absence of a strategic human capital plan, it is difficult to discern how effective an inspector-based workforce approach will be. Because guards were not properly trained and did not comply with post orders, our investigators—with the components for an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons—passed undetected through access points controlled by FPS guards at 10 of 10 level IV facilities in four major cities where GAO conducted covert tests. As a result, GSA and tenant agencies have limited assurance that the investments in technologies and other countermeasures that FPS inspectors recommend are cost-effective, consistent across buildings, and the best available alternatives. In 2006, FPS had recommended, based on the results of its risk analysis, the use of this dog and an X-ray machine, although at the time of our visit only the dog was being used. We recently recommended that FPS reach consensus with GSA on what information contained in the BSA is needed for GSA to fulfill its responsibilities related to the protection of federal buildings and occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance for employees to use in deciding what information to protect with sensitive but unclassified designations; provisions for training on making designations, controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and other entities; and a review process to evaluate how well this information sharing process is working, with results reported to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Some of these measures are also included in FPS’s federal facilities security index, which is used to assess its performance. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal employees and facilities, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions. FPS Is Taking Steps to Better Protect GSA Buildings, but Has Not Fully Implemented Actions and Faces Significant Challenges
FPS is taking some steps in each of the key practice areas to improve its ability to better protect GSA buildings. Additionally, GAO has recommended that FPS implement specific actions to promote greater usage of key protection practices and otherwise improve security. However, FPS has not completed many related corrective actions and FPS faces implementation challenges as well. Having tools and guidance to determine which technologies most cost-effectively address identified vulnerabilities is a central component of the leveraging technology key practice. For example, we have examined how DHS and the Smithsonian Institution secure their assets and identified challenges. Without greater attention to key protection practices, FPS will be ill equipped to efficiently and effectively fulfill its responsibilities of assessing risk, strategically managing its workforce and contract guard program, recommending countermeasures, sharing information and coordinating with GSA and tenant agencies to secure GSA buildings, and measuring and testing its performance as the security landscape changes and new threats emerge. Overall, following this framework—adhering to key practices and implementing recommendations in specific areas—would enhance FPS’s chances for future success and could position FPS to become a leader and benchmark agency for facility protection in the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing law enforcement and related security services for nearly 9,000 federal facilities under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2004 GAO identified a set of key protection practices from the collective practices of federal agencies and the private sector, which included allocation of resources using risk management, strategic management of human capital, leveraging of technology, information sharing and coordination, and performance measurement and testing. This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses (1) limitations FPS faces in protecting GSA buildings and resulting vulnerabilities; and (2) actions FPS is taking. To perform this work, GAO used its key practices as criteria, visited a number of GSA buildings, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed pertinent laws and DHS and GSA documents, conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected high-security buildings in four cities, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, and tenant agencies, and contractors and guards.
What GAO Found
FPS's approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some aspects of key protection practices; however, GAO found limitations in each area and identified vulnerabilities. More specifically: (1) FPS faces obstacles in allocating resources using risk management. FPS uses an outdated risk assessment tool and a subjective, time-consuming process to assess risk. In addition, resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies. This leads to uncertainty about whether risks are being mitigated. Also, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges that impede its ability to allocate resources effectively. (2) FPS does not have a strategic human capital management plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, making it difficult to discern how effective its transition to an inspector-based workforce will be. Furthermore, because contract guards were not properly trained and did not comply with post orders, GAO investigators concealing components for an improvised explosive device passed undetected by FPS guards at 10 of 10 high-security facilities in four major cities. (3) FPS lacks a systematic approach for leveraging technology, and inspectors do not provide tenant agencies with an analysis of alternative technologies, their cost, and the associated reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited assurance that the recommendations inspectors make are the best available alternatives, and tenant agencies must make resource allocation decisions without key information. (4) FPS has developed information sharing and coordination mechanisms with GSA and tenant agencies, but there is inconsistency in the type of information shared and the frequency of coordination. (5) FPS lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measurement and testing. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate resources, or make informed risk management decisions. FPS is taking actions to better protect GSA buildings, in part as a result of GAO's recommendations. For example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program and has recently focused on improving oversight of its contract guard program. Additionally, GAO has recommended that FPS implement specific actions to make greater use of key practices and otherwise improve security. However, FPS has not completed many related corrective actions and FPS faces implementation challenges as well. Nonetheless, adhering to key practices and implementing GAO's recommendations in specific areas would enhance FPS's chances for future success, and could position FPS to become a leader and benchmark agency for facility protection in the federal government. |
gao_GAO-03-751 | gao_GAO-03-751_0 | EOUSA Has Yet to Institutionalize Key IT Management Disciplines
Research into the IT management practices that are employed by leading public- and private-sector organizations has identified key institutional IT management disciplines that are interrelated and critical to ensuring, among other things, the integrity, security, and efficiency of IT systems. However, none has been institutionalized, meaning that they are not fully defined in accordance with best practices and what has been defined has not been fully implemented. However, the office has not, for example, defined procedures for project oversight. Until the office develops and implements a plan for establishing mature IT investment management processes (including all critical processes for building the investment management foundation), EOUSA will not have the full suite of capabilities it needs to ensure that project selection and control processes are repeatable or that it has the best mix of investments to meet agency priorities. Currently, EOUSA is not fully satisfying any of these tenets of effective security. While EOUSA is guided by many Justice security policies, it has not yet implemented key security controls that are needed to satisfy them. Nevertheless, key aspects of each discipline have yet to be institutionalized, leaving the office challenged in its ability to achieve the department’s strategic goal of improving the integrity, security, and efficiency of its IT systems. Recommendations
To strengthen the office’s IT management capacity and increase its chances of improving the integrity, security, and efficiency of its IT systems, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the EOUSA Director to treat institutionalization of EA management, IT investment management, IT security management, and system acquisition management as priorities by developing and implementing action plans to address the weaknesses in each discipline that are identified in this report. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the extent to which the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) has institutionalized key information technology (IT) management capabilities to achieve the Department of Justice’s strategic goal of improving the integrity, security, and efficiency of its IT systems. EOUSA has not gained this maturity level. As stated in the report, while a contingency plan was developed for the replacement network, it was not prepared in accordance with federal guidelines. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) of the Department of Justice is responsible for managing information technology (IT) resources for the United States Attorneys' Offices. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which EOUSA has institutionalized key IT management capabilities that are critical to achieving Justice's strategic goal of improving the integrity, security, and efficiency of its IT systems.
What GAO Found
To varying degrees, EOUSA has partially defined and implemented certain IT management disciplines that are critical to successfully achieving the Justice Department's strategic goal of improving the integrity, security, and efficiency of its IT systems. However, it has yet to institutionalize any of these disciplines, meaning that it has not defined existing policies and procedures in accordance with relevant guidance, and it has yet to fully implement what it has defined. In particular, while EOUSA has developed an enterprise architecture--a blueprint for guiding operational and technological change--the architecture was not developed in accordance with certain best practices. In addition, while the office has implemented certain process controls for selecting, controlling, and evaluating its IT investments, it has not yet implemented others that are necessary in order to develop an effective foundation for investment management. Further, it has not implemented important management practices that are associated with an effective security program. In contrast, it has defined--and is implementing on a major system that we reviewed--most, but not all, of the management practices associated with effective systems acquisition. Institutionalization of these IT management disciplines has not been an agency priority and is not being guided by plans of action or sufficient resources. Until each discipline is given the priority it deserves, EOUSA will not have the IT management capabilities it needs to effectively achieve the department's strategic goal of improving the integrity, security, and efficiency of its IT systems. |
gao_GAO-02-1109T | gao_GAO-02-1109T_0 | HUD Administers 21 Technical Assistance Programs at an Annual Total Cost of between $128 Million and $201 Million
Between fiscal years 1998 and 2002, HUD administered a total of 21 technical assistance programs, most of which are associated with programs in its offices of Community Planning and Development and Public and Indian Housing. As shown in Figure 1, from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the annual funding for all of HUD’s technical assistance programs ranged from $128 million to $201 million. These sums accounted for less than 1 percent of HUD’s overall budget, which averaged about $28 billion in each of those years. Technical Assistance Programs Vary by Program, Provider, and Recipient
While the overriding purpose of technical assistance is to improve the ability of program participants to administer HUD’s programs more effectively, each HUD program office determines its own approach and administers technical assistance according to its program needs. Table 2 describes the purpose of the technical assistance as defined by the five HUD program offices. The providers of technical assistance can be HUD officials but typically are entities or organizations that receive funding from HUD to deliver such assistance. The recipients of the Office of Community Planning and Development’s technical assistance are local nonprofit organizations, state and local governments, and other organizations participating in and receiving funds through HUD’s community development programs. The providers of the technical assistance are resident and other nonprofit organizations. The training was designed to increase the knowledge and build the capacity of public housing agencies, their residents, and state and local officials involved in planning and rulemaking. HUD refers to all three award mechanisms as funding instruments. HUD does not offer any central guidance on, or require its program offices to directly measure, the impact or outcomes of the technical assistance programs they administer. While some program officials have said that it is difficult or not even possible to measure the impact of technical assistance, other program offices have impact measures in place. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the results of GAO's review of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) technical assistance and capacity-building programs.
What GAO Found
Technical assistance programs can be defined as training designed to improve the performance or management of program recipients, such as teaching one-on-one procurement regulations to housing authority staff. Capacity building can be generally defined as funding to strengthen the capacity or capability of program recipients or providers--typically housing or community development organizations--thereby building the institutional knowledge within those organizations. The overall goal of both technical assistance and capacity building is to enhance the delivery of HUD's housing and community development programs. HUD administers 21 technical assistance programs through five program offices. From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the annual funding for HUD technical assistance ranged between $128 million and $201 million, accounting for less than 1 percent of HUD's overall budget each year. Although the general purpose of HUD's technical assistance is to help program participants carry out HUD program goals, each program office designs technical assistance specifically related to its programs. Recipients could be states and units of local government, public or Indian housing agencies, private and nonprofit organizations, or individuals. Providers could be HUD officials or, more commonly, state or local governments, profit and nonprofit organizations, or public housing agencies. HUD awards funding for 17 of the 21 technical assistance programs competitively. The funding for the remaining programs is awarded noncompetitively. HUD uses three types of funding instruments and determines which type to use on the basis of its relationship with the awardee and the level of federal involvement anticipated. All five HUD program offices perform basic oversight of the technical assistance they administer, such as visually observing the technical assistance or reviewing reports submitted by the providers to ensure that the technical assistance was provided. In addition, some program offices also have impact measures in place. HUD does not measure the impact or outcome of technical assistance and does not offer any central guidance on how the program offices should measure its impact. |
gao_GAO-16-362 | gao_GAO-16-362_0 | Approximately $994 Million in Undisbursed Balances Remained in Expired Grant Accounts in the Payment Management System
Undisbursed Balances Increased While the Number of Expired Grant Accounts Decreased Since 2011
As of September 30, 2015, $993.5 million in undisbursed balances remained in 8,832 expired grant accounts in PMS (see figure 4). More than half of the accounts exceeded their expiration date by 1 to 3 years. About $651 Million of Undisbursed Balances in Expired HHS Grant Accounts Comprised More than Half of Those in PMS
As of September 30, 2015, $651.3 million in undisbursed balances in expired HHS grant accounts made up 66 percent of the total $993.5 million in undisbursed balances in PMS (see figure 6). Similar to all PMS expired grant accounts and undisbursed balances, about half of expired HHS grant accounts and undisbursed balances exceeded their expiration dates by 1 to 3 years. In 2015, 3,922 expired HHS grant accounts made up 66 percent of the 5,906 grants PMS flagged for closeout, down from 79 percent (more than 21,000) in 2011. Agency officials told us that grant closeout delays can occur for a number of reasons that may be placed into several larger categories, and sometimes these reasons can be attributed to more than one category: grantee failure to submit final reporting in a timely manner; agency failure to review, process, and reconcile final reporting in a timely manner; and external processes or factors. A quarterly analysis is completed to measure the number of expired grant awards that have completed the closeout process and the total grant funding that has been deobligated. Officials from Commerce and Justice also told us their respective agencies have developed training guides for grantees or awarding agency grant managers. However, according to OMB staff and officials at the affected agencies we interviewed, OMB had not issued any instructions on reporting these balances since 2011, and OMB staff did not think that restating additional guidance was necessary given the language in the selected agencies’ appropriations acts. Our review included four of the affected agencies under this appropriations act—Commerce, Justice, NASA, and NSF. As a result of OMB not recognizing the language in the appropriations acts as a requirement to instruct agencies to report these balances and NASA and Commerce not recognizing the language in the appropriations acts to report, the undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts for NASA and Commerce have not been reported since fiscal years 2011 and 2012, respectively. The Secretary for the Department of Commerce resume reporting on the undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts in the agency’s annual performance reporting. The Secretary of HHS, to improve the enforcement of existing HHS Grant Policy Manual grant closeout guidance and reduce undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts, require all HHS grant-making operating divisions to take the following two actions: identify grants expired for more than 1 year past their period of performance end date and to either close the expired grant in the Payment Management System or to determine why these grants are not closed; and identify expired grant accounts designated for immediate closure by the Payment Management System and require these operating divisions to close the expired grant accounts in PMS or explain why these grants are not closed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which there are undisbursed balances remaining in expired grant accounts in the federal government’s largest civilian payment management system—the Payment Management System (PMS) administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); (2) the reasons selected agencies give for their grant accounts remaining open past their end dates; and (3) the extent to which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) monitors agency progress with regard to tracking and reporting on undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts. PSC provided us with the PMS quarterly closeout report for the end of fiscal year 2015 (September 30, 2015). We interviewed OMB staff on providing government-wide guidance for grants management and grant closeout and officials at the four agencies that reported undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts in 2010 and 2011 annual performance reports—the United States Department of Commerce, the United States Department of Justice, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Science Foundation—to discuss their implementation of OMB’s instructions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008 and 2012, GAO reported on hundreds of millions of dollars in undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts in the largest civilian payment system for grants, PMS. GAO was asked to update this work. GAO examined: (1) the extent to which there are undisbursed balances remaining in expired grant accounts in PMS; (2) the reasons selected agencies give for their grant accounts remaining open past their end dates; and (3) the extent to which OMB monitors agency progress with regard to tracking and reporting undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts. To do this, GAO analyzed PMS data as of September 30, 2015; reviewed audit reports issued by GAO and federal inspectors general, agency performance reports, and OMB guidance; and interviewed agency officials from OMB, HHS, Commerce, Justice, NASA and NSF.
What GAO Found
GAO found approximately $994 million in funding remained in expired grant accounts in the Payment Management System (PMS), operated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), at the end of fiscal year 2015. PMS identifies expired grant accounts for users as those accounts more than 3 months past their grant end date that have not had payment activity for 9 months. PMS makes payments for 12 federal entities and about 77 percent of all federal civilian grant payments. GAO’s analysis of the September 30, 2015, PMS data indicated the following:
The total undisbursed balance increased by approximately $200 million from what GAO reported for the end of fiscal year 2011. However, the number of expired grant accounts with undisbursed balances decreased to 8,832 in 2015 compared to 10,548 in 2011.
More than half the accounts exceeded their expiration date by 1 to 3 years.
A relatively small number of expired grant accounts represented more than half of the total undisbursed balance—151 grants represented $514.7 million in undisbursed balances.
HHS grant accounts in PMS comprised approximately $651 million (66 percent) of the identified undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts.
The number of expired grant accounts with no undisbursed balance that PMS flagged for closeout dropped to 5,906 from the more than 28,000 accounts GAO reported for the end of fiscal year 2011. HHS accounts made up 66 percent of the 5,906 expired accounts flagged for closeout, which is inconsistent with HHS policy.
Agency officials told GAO that closeout delays can occur for a number of reasons, including grantee failure to submit final financial and performance reports and agency failure to review, process, and reconcile grantees’ final reporting in a timely manner.These agency officials included staff from HHS, the largest PMS user, and the Departments of Commerce (Commerce) and Justice (Justice), the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF), which previously reported undisbursed balances for expired grants. These agencies have implemented various internal policies to elevate the issue of timely grant closeout internally, including developing internal working groups that set grant closeout goals and analyzing the number of expired grants not yet closed out.
Since 2010, Congress has required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to specifically instruct Commerce, Justice, NASA, and NSF to track and provide information onbalances in expired grant accounts. OMB has not issued this guidance since 2011, and NASA and Commerce have not reported on these balances since 2011 and 2012, respectively. OMB staff did not think that it was necessary to restate the requirements given the language in these agencies’ appropriations acts. OMB updated its guidance on grant closeout in December 2013. However, OMB did not specify procedures for tracking and reporting undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB resume instructing agencies to report undisbursed balances for expired grant accounts as required under their respective appropriations acts and that NASA and Commerce resume reporting on these balances. GAO also recommends that HHS require its grant-making operating divisions to identify grants expired more than 1 year past their period of performance end date and close those grants or determine why they are not closed, consistent with agency policy. OMB and the agencies agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-763 | gao_GAO-14-763_0 | Selected Federal Agencies Undertake Distinct Chemical Toxicity Assessment Activities, and Selected States Largely Rely on Federal Assessments
The federal agencies we reviewed undertake distinct chemical toxicity assessment activities that differ in type and purpose and are driven largely by agency needs derived from statutory requirements, while officials in the 10 states we reviewed told us that they largely rely on federal agencies’ chemical toxicity assessment activities. Office of Water. Selected Federal Agencies’ Chemical Toxicity Assessment Activities Are Fragmented and Overlapping but Are Not Duplicative
The chemical toxicity assessment activities at the five federal agencies we reviewed are fragmented because they address the same broad area of national need; they overlap because they have similar goals, and some target similar beneficiaries. Overlap
Selected federal agencies’ chemical toxicity assessment activities overlap because some of these activities have similar goals—such as identifying the extent to which a chemical may cause cancer—and because some target similar beneficiaries—such as local health authorities for use in dealing with hazardous waste sites or the general public. However, beneficiaries for these agencies also differ. Duplication
We did not find evidence of duplication among selected federal agencies’ chemical toxicity assessment activities because the agencies did not engage in the same activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. For example, we did not find duplication between NIOSH and EPA’s chemical toxicity assessment activities because NIOSH assesses the potential risks that chemicals pose to working-aged adults in occupational settings (e.g., exposure by dermal contact or inhalation) over the course of working time periods (e.g., an 8- or 10-hour workday or a 40-hour workweek). In contrast, EPA assesses risks that chemicals pose to a broader population as opposed to workers, which includes children and vulnerable populations in the larger nonoccupational environment (e.g., in the air, soil, or groundwater) typically over the course of an entire lifetime. Selected Federal Agencies and States Coordinate Their Chemical Toxicity Assessment Activities
Officials at all five of the federal agencies and 3 of the 10 states we reviewed told us that, in the last 5 years, they have coordinated their chemical toxicity assessment activities using a variety of coordination mechanisms. Further, all executive departments and agencies, whether or not they are represented on the NSTC, are to coordinate science and technology policy through the NSTC and share information on research and development budget requests. An official from OSTP similarly stated that NSTC could serve an interagency coordinating function to address certain cross- cutting challenges, and it has already done so by coordinating chemical toxicity assessment activities and providing opportunities for agency officials to meet in person. By having an interagency body to address the challenges the five selected agencies identified (i.e., constraints on sharing CBI, limited opportunities for agency officials to meet, and informal communication processes) and any future cross-cutting challenges, the five agencies would be positioned to better coordinate their assessment activities in the most effective and efficient manner. Conclusions
With thousands of chemicals in commercial use in the United States, decision makers rely on information derived from toxicity assessment to examine the risks these substances may pose. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve coordination of federal and state chemical toxicity assessment activities, we recommend that the Director of OSTP encourage the NSTC to support relevant federal agency officials’ efforts to address, as appropriate, the agencies’ cross-cutting coordination challenges, such as constraints on sharing confidential business information, limited opportunities for agency officials to meet, and informal communication processes. They did not provide official written comments to include in our report. Instead, they provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the chemical toxicity assessment activities selected federal and state agencies undertake, we examined the chemical toxicity assessment activities of five federal agencies: (1) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (2) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), (3) the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), (4) the National Toxicology Program (NTP), and (5) the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which follow the National Academies’ four-step risk assessment process. We selected a nonprobability sample of 12 state agencies in 10 states that provide a range of chemical toxicity assessment activities. To assess the extent to which, if at all, selected federal agencies’ chemical toxicity assessment activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative, we reviewed the summaries of federal agency assessment activities and federal agency documentation that sets forth the scope and purpose of their assessment activities, and we compared them with one another and with our definitions of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. EPA. NIOSH. OSHA. | Why GAO Did This Study
With thousands of chemicals in commercial use in the United States, decision makers rely on toxicity assessment information to examine the risks these substances may pose. Several key federal agencies—including ATSDR, EPA, NIOSH, NTP, and OSHA—as well as state agencies, assess the toxicity of chemicals.
GAO was asked to review chemical toxicity assessment activities. This report (1) describes the chemical toxicity assessment activities selected federal and state agencies undertake; (2) assesses the extent to which these federal agencies' chemical toxicity assessment activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative; and (3) assesses the extent to which these federal and state agencies coordinate their chemical toxicity assessment activities and challenges in doing so. GAO selected five key federal agencies that assess chemicals, and a nonprobability sample of agencies in 10 states that provide a range of assessment activities. GAO reviewed federal agency documentation and compiled summaries of chemical toxicity assessment activities and compared them with one another. GAO interviewed officials from these agencies, representatives from industry, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The federal agencies GAO reviewed—the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the National Toxicology Program (NTP), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)—undertake distinct chemical toxicity assessment activities that differ in type and purpose and are driven in part by statutory requirements; the 10 states GAO reviewed largely rely on federal agencies' assessment activities. For example, ATSDR's toxicity assessment activities include evaluating hazards at contaminated sites and NIOSH's activities include identifying potential health risks to workers. Agency officials from all 10 of the selected states told GAO that they have used assessment information produced by these federal agencies in the last 5 years. Officials from 6 of the 10 states told GAO they rely on federal assessments, and the remaining 4 said that they may produce their own assessments in some cases—for example, when a chemical is of interest to the state but is not a national priority.
The chemical toxicity assessment activities at these five federal agencies are fragmented and overlapping, but GAO did not find evidence that these activities are duplicative. Their activities are fragmented because they address the same broad area of national need—providing information on the toxicity of chemicals. The five agencies' activities overlap because some of them have similar goals—such as identifying the extent to which a chemical may cause cancer—or some target similar beneficiaries—such as the general public. GAO did not find evidence of duplication, however, because the agencies did not engage in the same activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. For example, although both NIOSH and EPA develop chemical toxicity assessment information, NIOSH assesses the potential risks that chemicals pose to working-aged adults in occupational settings, such as over the course of a 40-hour workweek, and EPA assesses risks that chemicals pose to a broader population, including children, typically over the course of an entire lifetime.
Officials from all five federal agencies and 3 of the 10 states told GAO that they have coordinated their chemical toxicity assessment activities and also identified challenges. For example, some agency officials identified constraints on sharing confidential business information because of legal restrictions on dissemination of such information across agencies. The Office of Science and Technology Policy's (OSTP) National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) coordinates science and technology policies across the federal government. All executive department and agencies, whether or not they are represented on the NTSC, are to coordinate science and technology policy through it. Given that NSTC has previously facilitated federal coordination on cross-cutting topics, such as nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals in the environment, and given its purpose, an official from OSTP stated that NSTC could serve an interagency coordinating function to address certain cross-cutting challenges. By having an interagency body to address these, and any future cross-cutting challenges, the five selected federal agencies would be positioned to better coordinate their assessment activities in the most effective and efficient manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OSTP encourage the NSTC to support relevant federal agency officials' efforts to address, as appropriate, the agencies' cross-cutting coordination challenges. OSTP did not provide official written comments, but instead provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-09-578 | gao_GAO-09-578_0 | National Surveys Show That Certain Health Conditions Are Prevalent among Children and Adults in Medicaid, and Receipt of Recommended Preventive Services Varies Widely
National survey data suggest that children in Medicaid under age 21 are at risk of certain health conditions, particularly obesity, that can be identified or managed by preventive services, and many are not receiving well-child check ups. 1). Among Medicaid children aged 8 through 20 years, an estimated 4 percent had high blood pressure. Among Medicaid children aged 6 through 20 years, an estimated 10 percent had high cholesterol. Among Medicaid Children, Almost Half Did Not Receive a Well-Child Check Up during a 2-Year Period
MEPS data from 2003 through 2006 suggest that many children in Medicaid do not regularly receive well-child check ups. An estimated 57 percent of Medicaid adults had obesity, diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, or a combination of these conditions. 3). Estimated rates of high blood pressure and high cholesterol were similar between both health insurance groups (see fig. The NHANES interview data also suggest that a large proportion of adults in Medicaid found to have these health conditions may not have been aware of them prior to participation in the NHANES examination. 4). Medicaid Adults’ Receipt of Recommended Preventive Services Varied Widely by Service
MEPS data suggest that Medicaid adults’ receipt of recommended preventive services varied widely by service. Most states also reported undertaking multiple initiatives since 2004 to promote preventive services. When asked the reasons why they were not conducting more monitoring of children’s utilization of preventive services in Medicaid (beyond federally required monitoring through the CMS 416), the top two reasons states chose were “administrative burden” and “technology challenges.”
In addition to monitoring specific preventive services, about two-thirds of state Medicaid programs reported that the state had established its own target goals or benchmarks for children’s utilization of preventive services, in addition to the CMS goal that each state provide EPSDT well-child check ups to at least 80 percent of Medicaid children in a state who should receive one, based on the state’s periodicity schedule. For Adults, Most State Medicaid Programs Reported Covering Some but Not All Recommended Preventive Services
Most state Medicaid programs reported that they choose to cover some but not all of the preventive services we asked about on our survey. Of the eight recommended services we asked about, the services that were most commonly reported as covered for adults were cervical cancer screenings and mammograms, which were covered by 49 and 48 states, respectively. Four additional preventive services were reported as covered for adults by three-quarters or more of the 51 states. Of those eight states, six had not had their EPSDT programs reviewed by CMS between April 2001 and June 2009. CMS oversight of preventive services for children in Medicaid also includes providing policy guidance to state Medicaid programs, such as through its State Medicaid Manual and other guidance; for example, CMS officials reported that they intend to draft guidance for states on coverage of obesity services as part of EPSDT services, but as of the time of our review had not done so. A 2006 study raised concerns that Medicaid providers may not be aware to what extent obesity services were covered or reimbursed under EPSDT, and that states’ provider manuals did not often explain this coverage. For Adults in Medicaid, CMS Has Recognized the Value of Preventive Services and Provided Oversight by Issuing Some Related Guidance for State Medicaid Programs
Unlike CMS’s oversight of children’s EPSDT services, CMS is not required to collect utilization data from states on adults’ receipt of services and— according to officials—does not conduct program reviews as it does for EPSDT services for children in Medicaid. Although Medicaid children generally are entitled to coverage of EPSDT services that may identify and address health conditions such as obesity, both national survey data and states’ 416 reports to CMS suggest that children’s receipt of EPSDT services is well below national goals. State-specific reviews of EPSDT programs have helped identify needed improvements but too few have been done. However, gaps in provision of services remain. For this study, we examined data from 1999 through 2006 on children aged 2 through 20 and adults aged 21 through 64. Blood Pressure Test. It included questions on the coverage of preventive services for adults, the methods used for oversight of preventive services for children and adults, including monitoring of utilization of specific services, utilization goals, including whether or not goals were being met, state promotion efforts and specific initiatives aimed at preventive services, and the federal support provided to state Medicaid programs for the provision of preventive services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a federal-state program that finances health care for certain low-income populations, can play a critical role in the provision of preventive services, which help prevent, diagnose, and manage health conditions. GAO examined available data to assess (1) the extent to which Medicaid children and adults have certain health conditions and receive certain preventive services, (2) for Medicaid children, state monitoring and promotion of the provision of preventive services, (3) for Medicaid adults, state coverage of preventive services, and (4) federal oversight by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). GAO analyzed data from nationally representative surveys: the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), which includes physical examinations of participants, and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). GAO also surveyed state Medicaid directors and interviewed federal officials.
What GAO Found
Nationally representative data suggest that a large proportion of children and adults in Medicaid have certain health conditions, particularly obesity, that can be identified or managed by preventive services, and adults' receipt of preventive services varies widely. For Medicaid children, NHANES data from 1999 through 2006 suggest that 18 percent of children aged 2 through 20 were obese, 4 percent of children aged 8 through 20 had high blood pressure, and 10 percent of children aged 6 through 20 had high cholesterol. Furthermore, MEPS data from 2003 through 2006 suggest that many Medicaid children were not receiving well-child check ups. For Medicaid adults aged 21 through 64, NHANES data suggest that more than half were obese or had diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, or a combination. MEPS data suggest that receipt of preventive services varied widely by service: receipt of some services, such as blood pressure tests, was high, but receipt of several other services was low. MEPS data also suggest that a lower percentage of Medicaid adults received preventive services compared to privately insured adults. For children in Medicaid, who generally are entitled to coverage of comprehensive health screenings, including well-child check ups, as part of the federally required EPSDT benefit, most but not all states reported to GAO that they monitored or set goals related to children's utilization of preventive services and had undertaken initiatives to promote their provision. Nine states reported that they did not monitor children's utilization of specific preventive services. Forty-seven states reported having multiple initiatives to improve the provision of preventive services to children. For adults in Medicaid, for whom states' Medicaid coverage of preventive services is generally not required, most states reported to GAO that they covered most but not all of eight recommended preventive services that GAO reviewed. Nearly all state Medicaid programs, 49 and 48 respectively, reported covering cervical cancer screening and mammography, and three-quarters or more states reported covering four other preventive services. Two additional recommended services--intensive counseling to address obesity or to address high cholesterol--were reported as covered by fewer than one-third of states. For children in Medicaid, CMS oversees the provision of preventive services through state EPSDT reports and reviews of EPSDT programs, but gaps in oversight remain; for adults, oversight is more limited. For children, state reports showed that, on average, 58 percent of Medicaid children who were eligible for an EPSDT service in 2007 received one; far below the federal goal of 80 percent. CMS reviewed only 11 state EPSDT programs between April 2001 and June 2009. Few states reporting low rates of service provision were reviewed. CMS guidance to states may also have gaps: a 2006 study raised concerns that providers may not be aware of coverage of obesity-related services for Medicaid children. CMS has recognized the need for but has not yet begun drafting guidance on such coverage. For adults, CMS has provided some related guidance to states, but not on the reviewed preventive services. |
gao_HEHS-99-14 | gao_HEHS-99-14_0 | In 1996, responding to a congressional mandate, the U.S. Navy studied the possibility of establishing a VA inpatient facility within the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam to serve the health care needs of veterans. Naval Hospital. Guam and CNMI Veterans’ Health Care Needs Met Through VA’s Network of Providers
Veterans residing on Guam and CNMI receive VA health care through a network of providers, including outpatient care provided through the VA clinic, inpatient and specialty care provided at the U.S. For Cardiac Care and Other Services Not Available on Guam, Aeromedical Evacuations Are Used
When veterans require health care that is not available on Guam, VA will send them (as DOD does for its military beneficiaries) via a military or commercial aircraft to a VA, military, or private hospital in Hawaii or the continental United States. According to VA and DOD records, in fiscal years 1995 through 1997, a total of 1,140 medical evacuations were provided—1,071 for military beneficiaries and 69 for veterans. VA Can Likely Meet Future Demand for Health Care to Veterans on Guam and CNMI
While representatives of veterans organizations on Guam expressed concern about the future availability of health care on Guam, DOD and VA officials believe that VA’s network for providing outpatient care, inpatient care, and medical evacuations will continue into the future even if there is an increase in demand for these services. Naval Hospital. Under this scenario, we estimate that by the year 2010, these veterans could potentially need 1.01 inpatient beds per day, on average, up from the 1997 utilization of about 0.5 beds per day, on average. Naval Hospital
With a current capacity of 146 beds—consisting of 29 active and 117 inactive beds—U.S. Naval Hospital officials told us that the hospital could handle even the highest potential veteran inpatient need, projected under the high-demand scenario of up to 14 inpatient beds by the year 2010. Naval Hospital officials are confident that—using VA reimbursements for veteran inpatient care—they could activate beds and hire additional staff to care for these veterans, if needed. Apart from a large conflict or war, which they could not predict, Navy officials felt confident that they had or could obtain sufficient resources to handle any likely increase in veteran inpatient workload. Also, in the unlikely event that Guam and CNMI veteran demand for services increased significantly, U.S. Navy officials believe that the U.S. Naval Hospital will be able to meet even the highest projected workload. While veterans consider evacuations inconvenient and would like the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam would not be able to offer cardiac surgery and ensure quality of care. Scope and Methodology
We were asked to (1) describe how VA currently meets Guam and CNMI veterans’ health care needs, (2) estimate these veterans’ possible future demand for health care and assessed VA’s ability to meet this demand, and (3) estimate the cost to establish a veterans’ inpatient ward at the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the need for establishing a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) inpatient facility on Guam, focusing on: (1) how VA currently meets Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) veterans' health care needs; (2) veterans' possible future demand for health care and VA's ability to meet this demand; and (3) the cost to establish a veterans' inpatient ward at the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to meet the health care needs of veterans on Guam and CNMI, VA currently provides services through a network of providers; (2) this network includes outpatient and inpatient care provided on Guam as well as by military or private hospitals in Hawaii or the continental United States, which is accessed through aeromedical evacuations; (3) in discussing their concerns about the VA health care system, veterans on Guam told GAO that medical evacuations, while necessary, are inconvenient and that they would like the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam to provide cardiac care to reduce the need for some of these evacuations; (4) however, VA and Naval Hospital records indicate that only 15 percent of the 1,140 medical evacuations provided to military beneficiaries and veterans over the past 3 years were for cardiac care, which, according to Department of Defense officials, is an insufficient workload to maintain quality care for this specialty; (5) in the future, VA and Navy officials expect to be able to continue to meet veterans' demand for health care; (6) VA and Navy officials told GAO that they expect to continue providing the same type of health care to Guam and CNMI veterans that is currently available, including the services provided by the U.S. Naval Hospital; (7) even if there were a significant increase in veterans' demand for inpatient medical care in the future, U.S. Naval Hospital officials believe that their hospital could handle the potential veteran inpatient workload; (8) currently, the U.S. Naval Hospital has a total capacity of 146 beds--consisting of 29 active beds and 117 inactive beds; (9) in fiscal year 1997, of the 29 active beds, military beneficiaries used 22 beds per day on average and veterans used less than 1 on average; (10) GAO's analyses indicate that, under a high-demand scenario, Guam and CNMI veterans would use, on average, 14 inpatient beds per day; (11) while it is highly unlikely that Guam and CNMI veterans' demand for inpatient health care will ever reach this level, Navy officials told GAO that the U.S. Naval Hospital could hire staff and activate additional beds, if needed, to meet this demand; (12) these officials said that apart from a large conflict or war, which they could not predict, they were confident that the U.S. Naval Hospital on Guam could handle any likely increase in veteran inpatient workload; and (13) in light of GAO's analysis, establishing an inpatient ward at the U.S. Naval Hospital is not warranted and would be expensive. |
gao_GAO-03-196 | gao_GAO-03-196_0 | The average price PBMs obtained for drugs from retail pharmacies was about 18 percent below the average price cash-paying customers would pay at retail pharmacies for 14 selected brand-name drugs and 47 percent below the cash price for 4 selected generic drugs. The FEHBP plans passed on savings generated by the PBMs to enrollees in the form of lower out-of- pocket costs for prescription drugs in certain instances, such as through lower cost sharing for drugs obtained through mail-order pharmacies, and a smaller increase in premiums for all enrollees than might occur absent the PBM savings. Pharmacies Included in PBM Retail Networks Must Accept Discounted Prices and Perform Various Administrative Tasks
Retail pharmacies that participate in the PBM networks used by FEHBP plans are affected by PBM policies and practices. Processing PBM or other third-party prescriptions involves additional administrative requirements compared to cash transactions, and some PBMs may draw business away from retail pharmacies by providing savings and other incentives to encourage pharmacy customers to use PBMs’ mail-order pharmacies. However, pharmacy association representatives report that PBMs’ large market shares leave many retail pharmacies with little leverage in negotiating with PBMs. PBMs shared with the FEHBP plans certain rebates that a drug manufacturer provides a PBM associated with their FEHBP business, although the extent to which the PBMs retained a portion of these rebates varied, depending on the contracts negotiated between the plans and PBMs. For example, in financial reports submitted to the SEC, two of the PBMs we reviewed stated that manufacturer rebates and fees were key to their profitability. Concluding Observations
PBMs are central to most FEHBP plan efforts to manage their prescription drug benefits, and PBMs have helped the FEHBP plans we reviewed reduce what they would likely otherwise pay in prescription drug expenditures while generally maintaining wide access to most retail pharmacies and drugs. In written comments, OPM generally concurred with our findings. Relationships between PBMs and manufacturers and pharmacies for other plans were beyond the scope of this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined the use of pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) by three Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) plans: Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS), Government Employees Hospital Association (GEHA), and PacifiCare of California. Together, these plans accounted for about 55 percent of the 8.3 million people covered through FEHBP plans as of July 2002 and represented various plan types and PBM contractors. We also obtained pricing information from retail pharmacies, interviewed officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal agency responsible for administering FEHBP, and associations representing PBMs and retail pharmacies, and reviewed studies regarding the use of PBMs and prescription drug payments. We did not independently verify the accuracy of these plan-reported prices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rising prescription drug costs have contributed to rising employer health plans premiums in recent years. Most federal employees, retirees, and their dependents participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), are enrolled in plans that contract with pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) to administer their prescription drug benefits. GAO was asked to examine how pharmacy benefits managers participating in the federal program affect health plans, enrollees, and pharmacies. GAO examined the use of PBMs by three plans representing about 55 percent of the 8.3 million people covered by FEHBP plans. For example, GAO surveyed 36 retail pharmacies on prices that a customer without third party coverage would pay for 18 high-volume or high-expenditure drugs and compared these prices to prices paid by the plans and PBMs.
What GAO Found
The PBMs reviewed produced savings for health plans participating in FEHBP by obtaining drug price discounts from retail pharmacies and dispensing drugs at lower costs through mail-order pharmacies, passing on certain manufacturer rebates to the plans, and operating drug utilization control programs. For example, the average price PBMs obtained from retail pharmacies for 14 brand name drugs was about 18 percent below the average price paid by customers without third-party coverage. Enrollees in the plans reviewed had wide access to retail pharmacies, coverage of most drugs, and benefited from cost savings generated by the PBMs. Enrollees typically paid lower out-of-pocket costs for prescriptions filled through mail-order pharmacies and benefited from other savings that reduced plans' costs and therefore helped to lessen rising premiums. Most retail pharmacies participate in the FEHBP plans' networks in order to obtain business from the large number of enrollees covered. Pharmacy associations report that the PBMs' large market shares leave some retail pharmacies with little leverage in negotiating with PBMs. Retail pharmacies must accept discounted reimbursements from PBMs they contract with and perform additional administrative tasks associated with claims processing. OPM generally concurred with GAO's findings. The plans and PBMs reviewed provided technical comments, and two independent reviewers stated the report was fair and balanced. One pharmacy association expressed strong concerns, including that the report did not more broadly address economic relationships in the PBM industry. GAO examined relationships between the PBMs and manufacturers and pharmacies specific to their FEHBP business. However, relationships between PBMs and other entities for other plans were beyond the report's scope. |
gao_GAO-10-528 | gao_GAO-10-528_0 | Background
Information security is a critical consideration for any organization that depends on information systems and computer networks to carry out its mission or business. The act also gave FHFA the responsibility for, among other things, the supervision and oversight of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 12 federal home loan banks. If left uncorrected, the deficiencies increase the risk that unauthorized individuals may gain access to FHFA computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. Finally, FHFA policy requires that information systems enforce the most restrictive set of rights needed by users to perform their assigned duties. FHFA implemented numerous controls to prevent, limit, and detect logical access to its financial systems and information. For example, FHFA did not always maintain authorization records for network and system access, enforce the most restrictive access needed by users on shared network files and directories, and restrict access to sensitive system resources. However, numerous instances existed in which FHFA did not sufficiently secure its facilities. During our testing, we were able to obtain unauthorized access from outside FHFA facilities into its interior space containing sensitive information and IT equipment. Because these spaces were not sufficiently secured, FHFA has less assurance that computer operations are protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse including fraud or destruction. To their credit, senior FHFA officials acknowledged these physical security and environmental safety control shortcomings and told us that they have taken steps or are planning to take steps to mitigate most of the deficiencies. FHFA Has Not Fully Implemented All Elements of Its Information Security Program
A key reason for the information security deficiencies in FHFA’s information systems discussed previously is that it has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. The agency has begun putting procedures from the handbook in place and expects to fully implement these in fiscal year 2010. Although FHFA made important progress in developing and documenting elements of its information security program, its policies, procedures, plans, and technical standards related to separation of duties, configuration management, and continuity of operations do not reflect the current operating environment. Appropriate policies and procedures should be developed to ensure that the activities performed by external third parties are documented, agreed upon, implemented, and monitored for compliance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen access controls and other information system controls over key financial systems, information, and networks, we recommend that the Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency implement the following 16 recommendations for strengthening logical access controls, physical access controls, and the agency’s information security program. To strengthen controls over physical access, we recommend that the Acting Director ensures FHFA: (4) secures areas that contain IT equipment and sensitive (5) completes sufficient physical security policies to address protection of agency assets, including incident response, access authorizations, and environmental safety controls; (6) performs physical security risk assessments at key facilities; (7) develops, documents, and implements monitoring procedures to ensure that physical access authorizations to secure areas containing sensitive computer resources, including server rooms and sensitive information, are current and controlled; (8) develops, documents, and implements monitoring procedures and installs appropriate equipment to ensure that FHFA can detect and respond to potential physical security incidents; (9) implements and enforces visitor control practices at all facilities; (10) increases employees’ awareness of the need to enforce physical security safeguards; and (11) secures and removes construction materials from telecommunications and electrical closets that support computer operations. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether controls over key financial systems were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) relies extensively on computerized systems to carry out its mission to provide effective supervision, regulation, and housing mission oversight of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the federal home loan banks. Effective information security controls are essential to ensure that FHFA's financial information is protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of FHFA's fiscal year 2009 financial statements, GAO assessed the effectiveness of the agency's information security controls to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the agency's financial information. To do this, GAO examined FHFA information security policies, procedures, and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials.
What GAO Found
Although FHFA has implemented important information security controls, it has not always implemented appropriate controls to sufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial information stored on and transmitted over its key financial systems, databases, and computer networks. The agency's financial system computing environment had deficiencies in several areas and the controls that were in place were not always effectively implemented to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to the agency network and systems. Specifically, FHFA did not always maintain authorization records for network and system access, enforce the most restrictive access needed by users on shared network files and directories, and enforce the most restrictive set of rights needed by users to perform their assigned duties. Further, it did not effectively implement physical protection and environmental safety controls over its facilities and information technology resources. GAO identified numerous instances in which FHFA facilities were not adequately secured and was able to obtain unauthorized access from outside agency facilities into the agency's interior space containing sensitive information and information technology equipment. FHFA officials acknowledged these shortcomings and indicated that the agency has taken steps or is planning to take steps to mitigate these deficiencies. A key reason for the control deficiencies in FHFA's financial system computing environment is that the agency has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. Although FHFA made important progress in developing and documenting elements of its information security program, written policies, procedures, and technical standards do not reflect the current operating environment. Further, the agency has not yet developed, documented, and implemented sufficient policies and procedures to ensure that the activities performed by external third parties are monitored for compliance with FHFA's policies. Although these deficiencies were not considered significant deficiencies for financial reporting purposes, if left uncorrected they unnecessarily increase the risk that sensitive and financial information is subject to unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction. |
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