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gao_GAO-03-667 | gao_GAO-03-667_0 | For reporting purposes flow-through income is broken into several categories. Scope and Methodology
In order to describe IRS’s implementation of its Schedule K-1 matching program, reasons for suspending the issuance of notices, impact/burden on taxpayers, and results of the program, we: reviewed and analyzed IRS management plans, risk assessments, and other discussions of how the matching program would operate, including work group meeting minutes; interviewed IRS officials regarding the efforts required to plan and implement the program, including preliminary program testing, early plans for the program, changes made in program plans, problems with stakeholder communication, and the suspension of notices related to Schedule K-1 income; reviewed documents issued by external parties regarding concerns with the Schedule K-1 matching program; interviewed stakeholders from outside IRS, including enrolled agents and members of professional organizations, IRS advisory committees; and reviewed data and statistics resulting from the Schedule K-1 matching program, including number of taxpayers sent notices and tax revenue assessed. IRS Stopped Issuing Schedule K-1 Notices after Complaints about Burden Imposed by Program Changes
In its original plan for the Schedule K-1 matching program, IRS intended to focus on two categories of income: interest and dividends. In the face of complaints about the burden imposed on compliant taxpayers, IRS stopped sending K-1 underreporter notices. IRS based its decision on a risk matrix that summarized the risk of sending a notice to a compliant taxpayer for the various categories of flow-through income. IRS began sending notices about the discrepancies to taxpayers in April 2002. The compliant taxpayers or their preparers who responded to the notices were required to submit information to IRS in writing or via telephone that explained how they reported the flow-through income on their tax return. IRS responded by stopping the K-1 matching program notices as of August 1, 2002. These cases resulted in about $41.4 million of additional taxes assessed of which $26.9 million related exclusively to Schedule K-1 income. However, IRS did not timely implement two parts of the plan. First, IRS did not test the feasibility of focusing the program on interest and dividend income until after recommending such a focus and communicating the recommendation to taxpayers, tax preparers, and other stakeholders. Second, after changing the plan, IRS did not clearly communicate with taxpayers, tax preparers or other stakeholders about the changes. Also this year, IRS is taking steps intended to reestablish communication with external stakeholders and reducing the burden on compliant taxpayers. More specifically, it is not known how ambitious IRS’s goal to reduce notices sent to compliant taxpayers by at least 50 percent is nor is it known whether IRS can reduce notices sent to compliant taxpayers while maintaining the ability to act against noncompliant taxpayers. | Why GAO Did This Study
About $1 trillion in income was distributed in 2001 by flow-through entities such as partnerships and trusts. These entities do not pay taxes on flow-through income. They report it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a Schedule K-1 and their partners or beneficiaries pay any tax. Concerned about underreporting, IRS began matching the flow-through income reported on Schedule K-1s with that reported on individuals' returns. In 2002, IRS began sending notices to taxpayers about suspected noncompliance. After complaints that many notices were going to compliant taxpayers, IRS stopped sending notices. Concerned about the burden, Congress asked GAO to, among other things, (1) describe the burden caused by the notices and IRS's rationale for stopping them, (2) assess IRS's management of the program, and (3) describe the steps IRS will take to address any problems.
What GAO Found
IRS stopped issuing Schedule K-1 notices after complaints about the burden the program imposed on compliant taxpayers. Originally, IRS intended to focus the program on two categories of income--interest and dividends--wherein matching was straightforward, and therefore the number of notices sent to compliant taxpayers could be minimized. However IRS changed the matching program to cover additional categories of flow-through income without clearly informing taxpayers and tax preparers. Matching these additional categories of income was less straightforward. As a result, IRS sent notices about suspected noncompliance to more compliant taxpayers than it intended. In fact, about two-thirds of the notices were sent to taxpayers later determined to be compliant. After taxpayers complained, and after sending out about 70 percent of the planned notices, IRS responded by stopping the notices. IRS has assessed about $41.4 million in additional tax from the notices that were sent and approximately $26.9 million was directly attributable to Schedule K-1 underreporting. IRS did not timely implement two parts of the plans for managing the Schedule K-1 matching program. First, IRS did not test the feasibility of focusing the program on interest and dividend income until after recommending such a focus and communicating the recommendation to taxpayers, preparers, and other stakeholders. Second, after changing the plan, IRS did not clearly communicate the changes. IRS is taking steps to improve communications and reduce the burden on compliant taxpayers. However, neither IRS nor GAO knows whether these changes will improve communications and reduce burden while maintaining the effectiveness of the Schedule K-1 matching program as a compliance tool. |
gao_GAO-04-354 | gao_GAO-04-354_0 | The benefits have been enormous. In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection discussed the potential damaging effects on the electric power and oil and gas industries of successful attacks on control systems. In February 2003, the President clearly demonstrated concern about “the threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy, or national security,” noting that “disruption of these systems can have significant consequences for public health and safety” and emphasizing that the protection of control systems has become “a national priority.”
Several factors have contributed to the escalation of risk to control systems, including (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other networks, (3) insecure remote connections, and (4) the widespread availability of technical information about control systems. Efforts to Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Control Systems Under Way, but Lack Adequate Coordination
Government, academia, and private industry have independently initiated multiple efforts and programs focused on some of the key areas that should be addressed to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. In February 2003, the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace established a role for DHS to coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector to improve the cybersecurity of control systems. DHS’s coordination of these efforts could accelerate the development and implementation of more secure systems to manage our critical infrastructures. Securing these systems poses significant challenges. While some coordination is occurring, the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructures’ control systems could benefit from greater collaboration among all entities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the significant cybersecurity risks associated with control systems, (2) potential and reported cyber attacks against these systems, (3) key challenges to securing control systems, and (4) efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. Three of its study committees focus on control systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Computerized control systems perform vital functions across many of our nation's critical infrastructures. For example, in natural gas distribution, they can monitor and control the pressure and flow of gas through pipelines. In October 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection emphasized the increasing vulnerability of control systems to cyber attacks. The House Committee on Government Reform and its Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census asked GAO to report on potential cyber vulnerabilities, focusing on (1) significant cybersecurity risks associated with control systems (2) potential and reported cyber attacks against these systems (3) key challenges to securing control systems and (4) efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems.
What GAO Found
In addition to general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing, several factors have contributed to the escalation of the risks of cyber attacks against control systems. These include the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities and the increased connectivity of control systems to other systems. Control systems can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, examples of which have already occurred. Successful attacks on control systems could have devastating consequences, such as endangering public health and safety. Securing control systems poses significant challenges, including limited specialized security technologies and lack of economic justification. The government, academia, and private industry have initiated efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. The President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace establishes a role for DHS to coordinate with these entities to improve the cybersecurity of control systems. While some coordination is occurring, DHS's coordination of these efforts could accelerate the development and implementation of more secure systems. Without effective coordination of these efforts, there is a risk of delaying the development and implementation of more secure systems to manage our critical infrastructures. |
gao_GAO-11-16 | gao_GAO-11-16_0 | Congress appropriated federal payments for school improvement in the District every fiscal year from 2004 to 2009 to the state education office (now OSSE) to expand D.C. public charter schools and to DCPS to improve public education in the District. OSSE has allocated approximately $17 million for other initiatives to improve the quality of public charter school education, such as supplemental education (e.g. OSSE also used nearly $1.5 million for administrative purposes and the remaining funds on other activities that included a truancy center and data collection efforts. OSSE Conducts Monitoring But Policies and Procedures Not Fully Documented
According to OSSE officials, OSSE employs a range of activities to monitor public charter schools and other entities that receive grants funded by federal payments (federal payment grantees), but has limited written policies and procedures for conducting monitoring activities. OSSE staff did not consistently document their collection and review of grantee narrative and financial reports. In instances in which files did not include all of the reports, the Director indicated that this may be because the grantee did not submit the reports or the staff responsible for monitoring the grantee did not put the report in the file. Further, the files did not consistently have evidence that staff followed-up to obtain the reports. For example, two files that had no reports included notices to grant recipients requesting that they submit final performance reports since they had been reimbursed for the amount of the grant award. DCPS Used Federal Payments for a Range of Purposes, But Some Information Was Not Available Before 2009
According to the expenditure data D.C. provided, DCPS has used its $105 million in federal payments for school improvement since 2004 for a variety of purposes—ranging from summer school programs to staff incentive pay. However, a lack of available information describing programs or initiatives funded with federal payments prior to 2009 precludes a full identification of the use of these funds. Staff incentive pay. Supplemental education. For the period between 2004 and 2008, D.C. provided expenditure data showing that DCPS used federal payments to fund a variety of programs for early childhood education, supplemental education, professional development activities, and supply purchases. For example, expenditure data indicate that between 2004 and 2007, DCPS used $37.4 million to fund a literacy improvement program; however, DCPS was unable to provide information to describe the program’s goals, objectives, or outcomes. DCPS Monitoring Policies Existed But Were Not Con Followed In Monitoring Contracts
DCPS program offices have employed a variety of methods to monitor contractor performance; however, in practice we found evidence of weaknesses in carrying out some monitoring responsibilities possibly attributable to staff turnover and a lack of a formal process to reassign responsibilities when turnover occurs. In our review of 14 contract files, we found that som contained notes from the contracting staff that the program officer left before the end of the contract term, and the file had no evidence that anew program officer was assigned. The statu language appropriating these funds does not generally direct OSSE and DCPS on how to use these monies for school improvements. Because OSSE and DCPS distribute a large portion of federal payment for school improvement funds through grants and contracts, respectively, effective internal controls over grants and contracts are critical to their missions. Direct the State Superintendent of Education to establish and implement written policies and procedures for monitoring federal payment grantees. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the D.C. Mayor’s Office, OSSE, and DCPS for review and comment. DCPS agreed with our recommendation to improve monitoring acti and maintain contract files and other applicable documents. In response to this, we have provided additional clarification in the report, where appropriate, to explain that current DCPS officials took steps to locate information we requested on federal payment use prior to 2009, but spending plans or programmatic information that they could not locate may not have been created by prior administrations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the activities that both the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) and the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) funded with federal payments, we analyzed allocation and spending data, reviewed documentation provided by the offices, and conducted interviews with officials in these and other knowledgeable offices. OSSE identified 42 grants that were awarded during this time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between fiscal years 2004 and 2009, Congress appropriated nearly $190 million in federal payments for school improvement to the District of Columbia (D.C.). This includes $85 million to the state education office--currently the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE)--to expand public charter schools and $105 million to D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) to improve education in public schools. Over the years, GAO and others have identified challenges that DCPS and OSSE face in managing federal monies. This report identifies, on the basis of available information, activities for which OSSE and DCPS used federal payments between 2004 and 2009 and describes how OSSE and DCPS monitored grant and contract recipients, respectively. GAO reviewed expenditure data and interviewed and collected documentation from OSSE and DCPS, among others. GAO reviewed all available grants awarded by OSSE in 2008 and 2009 and 14 of the largest contracts awarded by DCPS during that time.
What GAO Found
Approximately 77 percent of federal payments for public charter school improvement in D.C. have been awarded for facility costs, including acquiring, renovating, constructing, or leasing facilities. The funding for facilities has mainly been disbursed through direct loans to schools and grants to expand schools in certain neighborhoods as part of a city improvement initiative. OSSE used the remaining funds for initiatives intended to improve the quality of education through efforts such as academic enrichment and supplemental education activities (provided beyond the normal school day), as well as a variety of other charter school expenditures. OSSE officials reported having established some policies and procedures for monitoring its grant recipients, but, with one exception, these were not documented. Furthermore, the procedures as explained to us by OSSE were not consistently followed. OSSE did create a list of information that program staff are to acquire from grantees. However, the grant files we reviewed often lacked evidence that staff collected this information or performed other monitoring activities. Specifically, most of the files did not include all the narrative and financial reports as required by OSSE in many of their grant agreements. Also, few included any record indicating that staff had followed-up to obtain such documents. According to the expenditure data D.C. provided, DCPS has used federal payments for a variety of purposes--ranging from summer school programs to teacher incentive pay--but available information prior to 2009 does not provide enough details for GAO to fully identify specific activities funded with federal payments. In 2009, DCPS used $40 million primarily for teacher incentive pay, salaries for staff such as physical education and art teachers at underserved schools, and supplemental education activities such as summer school. Expenditure data show that between 2004 and 2008, DCPS funded a variety of programs such as supplemental education and professional development; however, DCPS could not locate information that may have been created on specific activities funded with federal payments during this time. For example, about half of these expenditures were for a "literacy improvement program," but DCPS was unable to provide information to describe the program's goals, objectives, activities, or outcomes. DCPS has policies on responsibilities for monitoring contractor performance; however, these policies do not cover how to do the monitoring and they were not consistently followed. According to program office staff, they have some flexibility in how they implement their monitoring responsibilities and have employed a variety of methods to monitor contractor performance. Of the contract files we reviewed, we found that several lacked any evidence of a performance evaluation by a program officer, or any subsequent review. Notes added to several of the files indicated a program officer had left before the end of the contract term; however, we found no indication that these contracts had been reassigned. Furthermore, the contracting office could not locate 3 of the 17 files we requested for our review.
What GAO Recommends
To improve internal controls, GAO recommends that the Mayor direct OSSE and DCPS to establish and implement written policies and procedures for monitoring use of federal payments for school improvement, and DCPS to maintain contract files and other expenditure documentation. The District agreed with GAO's recommendations and provided additional information on steps taken to improve internal controls. |
gao_GAO-03-353 | gao_GAO-03-353_0 | Background
Although training for employed workers is largely the responsibility of employers and individuals, publicly funded training seeks to fill potential gaps in workers’ skills. Prior to WIA, welfare reform legislation created the TANF block grant, which provided flexibility to states to focus on helping needy adults with children find and retain employment. Two-thirds of the workforce boards responding to our survey provided assistance to train employed workers in a variety of ways, and nearly 40 percent of the workforce boards specifically targeted funds on training for these workers. Most Local Workforce Boards Supported Training for Employed Workers
Two-thirds of the local workforce boards reported performing tasks that facilitated the provision of employed worker training, such as partnering with employers to develop training proposals and providing individual services to employed workers. The number of boards that reported budgeting or spending funds on such training in program years 2000 or 2001 varied by state. Most states had at least one workforce board that targeted funds for such training. Employed Worker Training Focused on Occupational and Basic Skills Training Provided by Community and Other Colleges
Although states reported funding many types of training for employed workers, occupational skills training and basic skills training were the most prevalent. Fifteen of the 16 states we contacted funded occupational skills training—such as learning new computer applications—for employed workers. 6.) In Targeting Training to Low-Wage Workers, Officials Addressed Several Challenges, though WIA Performance Measures Were an Issue
In targeting training to low-wage workers, state and local officials addressed several challenges that hindered individuals’ and employers’ participation in training. Workforce officials developed ways to address the personal challenges low-wage workers faced that made participating in training difficult. Despite attempts to address these issues, however, challenges to implementing successful training still exist. Officials Identified Ways to Gain Employer Support for Low-Wage Worker Training
State and local officials developed a number of ways to address the concerns of employers who were reluctant to participate in low-wage worker training. State and local officials reported that the WIA performance measure that tracks the change in adult earnings after six months could limit training opportunities for employed workers, including low-wage workers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To provide the Congress with a better understanding of how states and local areas were training employed workers, including low-wage workers, we were asked to determine (1) the extent to which local areas and states provide assistance to train employed workers, including funding training; (2) the focus of such training efforts and the kind of training provided; and (3) when targeting training to low-wage workers, the approaches state and local officials identified to address the challenges in training this population. Workforce Investment Act: States and Localities Increasingly Coordinate Services for TANF Clients, but Better Information Needed on Effective Approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although training for employed workers is largely the responsibility of employers and individuals, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) allowed state and local entities to use federal funds for training employed workers. Similarly, welfare reform legislation created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants and gave states greater flexibility to design training services for TANF clients to help them obtain and retain jobs. To better understand how the training needs of employed workers, including low-wage workers, is publicly supported, GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which local areas and states provide assistance to train employed workers, including funding training; (2) the focus of such training efforts and the kind of training provided; and (3) when targeting training to low-wage workers, the approaches state and local officials identified to address challenges in training this population.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, two-thirds of the 470 local workforce boards responding to our survey provided assistance to train employed workers, such as partnering with employers to develop training proposals or funding training. Nearly 40 percent specifically budgeted or spent funds on training these workers. The number of boards that reported funding training for employed workers varied by state, but most states had at least one workforce board that targeted funds on such training. At the state level, all 16 states that GAO contacted also funded training for employed workers. These states and local workforce boards reported funding training that addressed specific business and economic needs. Although many types of training for employed workers were funded, most often occupational training to upgrade skills, such as learning new computer applications, and basic skills training, such as in English and math, were emphasized and community or technical colleges were most frequently used to provide these services. In targeting training specifically for low-wage workers, state and local officials identified approaches to challenges that hindered individuals' and employers' participation in training. Officials developed approaches to address some of the personal issues that low-wage workers face that made participating in training difficult. They also developed ways to gain support from employers who were reluctant to participate in low-wage worker training, such as by partnering with employers to develop career paths that help retain employees within companies. However, officials reported that challenges to implementing successful training still exist. For example, they explained that the WIA performance measure that tracks the change in adult earnings after 6 months could limit training opportunities for employed workers, including low-wage workers. The wage gain for employed workers would not likely be as great as that for unemployed job seekers, and this might provide a disincentive to enrolling employed workers into training because their wage gain may negatively affect program performance. |
gao_GAO-06-483 | gao_GAO-06-483_0 | According to Treasury Department officials, the U.S. interagency community has been acting to accomplish the goals articulated in section 330 through its interactions with FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies to ensure global compliance with international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Subsequently, at its most recent plenary meeting (October 12 to 14, 2005), FATF noted that “formal endorsement of the FATF standards by the U.N. Security Council is a major step toward effective implementation of the Recommendations throughout the world.”
Regarding the U.S. government’s continuing efforts to actively engage and negotiate with foreign jurisdictions as encouraged by section 330, Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial Crime said that outreach to the international community to enhance global best practices to combat money laundering and terrorist financing involves various challenges. In sum, the Treasury officials stressed that enactment of section 330 provided a welcomed congressional endorsement of long- standing U.S. government policy and also provided a stimulus for continued efforts in negotiating with foreign jurisdictions. Given the significant growth in the number of FIUs recognized by the Egmont Group, which now totals 101, more attention is being focused on improving the capabilities of existing units, especially in reference to combating terrorist financing—an operational task now included in the Egmont Group’s definition of an FIU. 1). Further, the growth in the number of FIUs is attributable partly to federal interagency efforts, including training and technical support provided by FinCEN and Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, as well as funding provided by the State Department. As a member of the Egmont Group since 1995, FinCEN in particular has focused its global efforts on assisting jurisdictions establish new FIUs and improving existing units. In January 2006, to enhance its support role, FinCEN assigned an analyst to the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operations Section. Further, FinCEN is allocating additional staff resources to facilitate responding to foreign requests for assistance and is developing a new case management system. Future surveys would need to be more inclusive and incorporate better survey development and administration practices, such as follow-up efforts to achieve higher response rates, if the surveys are to serve as a useful management information tool for monitoring and enhancing performance. Such tools are particularly relevant for FinCEN, a networking organization that has a significant role and responsibilities in combating international financial crime. One management priority of FinCEN is to periodically conduct customer satisfaction surveys. Under section 361, how has FinCEN contributed to establishing FIUs in foreign countries and enhancing the capabilities of these units to combat money laundering and terrorist financing? What actions is FinCEN taking to maximize its performance as a global partner in combating money laundering and terrorist financing? Treasury Department Efforts to Accomplish Goals Articulated under Section 330 of the USA PATRIOT Act
Regarding section 330 of the USA PATRIOT Act, to determine how the Department of the Treasury has interacted or negotiated with foreign jurisdictions to promote cooperative efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, we interviewed responsible officials at and reviewed relevant documentation obtained from the departments of the Treasury, Justice, and State and the Federal Reserve Board. Actions FinCEN Is Taking to Maximize Its Performance as a Global Partner in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
We inquired about FinCEN’s efforts to update or modernize the Egmont Secure Web, which is the Internet-based communications system developed and maintained by FinCEN and used by FIUs worldwide to share or exchange information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Money laundering and terrorist financing can severely affect the nation's economy and also result in loss of lives. To combat these transnational crimes, the Treasury Department (Treasury) and its component bureau, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), have key roles. Section 330 of the USA PATRIOT Act encourages the federal government to engage foreign jurisdictions in negotiations to ensure that foreign banks and financial institutions maintain adequate records to combat international financial crime. Treasury plays a lead role in facilitating such efforts. In accordance with its various responsibilities codified by section 361, FinCEN is to coordinate with its foreign counterparts--financial intelligence units (FIU). This report describes (1) Treasury's approach for negotiating with foreign jurisdictions, (2) how FinCEN has contributed to establishing FIUs in foreign countries and enhancing the capabilities of these units, and (3) what actions FinCEN is taking to maximize its performance as a global partner.
What GAO Found
With Treasury's leadership, the U.S. interagency community has been acting to accomplish the goals articulated in section 330 of the USA PATRIOT Act. In particular, according to Treasury, negotiations with foreign jurisdictions are being accomplished through U.S. interactions with the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an intergovernmental entity that has developed international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Treasury emphasized that enactment of section 330 provided a welcomed congressional endorsement of long-standing U.S. policy to combat international financial crime by negotiating with foreign jurisdictions through multilateral organizations, such as FATF. Since its formation in 1995, FinCEN has helped foreign jurisdictions establish new FIUs and improve the capabilities of existing units. The number of FIUs has jumped from 14 in 1995 to 101 currently, partly because of training and technical support provided by FinCEN and Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance and funding provided by the Department of State. Given the growth in the number of FIUs, future efforts likely will involve giving more attention to improving the capabilities of existing units, especially in reference to combating terrorist financing--an operational task now included in the formal definition of an FIU. To maximize performance as a global partner, FinCEN is taking various actions, such as assigning an analyst to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Financing Operations Section. Also, FinCEN is modernizing the Egmont Secure Web, which is used by FIUs worldwide to exchange sensitive case information. To enhance its responsiveness to FIUs that request case assistance, FinCEN is allocating additional staff to its Office of Global Support and also is developing a new case management system. However, in the most recent customer satisfaction survey, FinCEN invited less than one-half of FIUs to participate and received only two responses. Future surveys would need to be more inclusive and incorporate better survey development and administration practices, such as follow-up efforts to achieve higher response rates, if the surveys are to serve as a useful management information tool for monitoring and enhancing performance. |
gao_HEHS-98-182 | gao_HEHS-98-182_0 | The Congress recently enacted legislation that places a greater emphasis on adoption when foster children cannot be safely returned to their parents in a timely manner. Most of these parents had been abusing drugs or alcohol for 5 years or more. These substance-abusing parents often neglect their children because their primary focus is obtaining and using drugs. In addition, substance abusers often engage in criminal activity that can threaten the safety and well-being of their children. Parental Substance Abuse Is Involved in Most Foster Care Cases
On the basis of the results of our survey, we estimate that about 65 percent of the foster children in California and 74 percent in Illinois, or about 84,600 children combined, had at least one parent who was required to undergo drug or alcohol treatment as part of the case plan for family reunification. 1.) Most Substance Abusing Parents Have Serious and Longstanding Drug or Alcohol Abuse Problems
In both California and Illinois, at least two-thirds of the substance-abusing parents of foster children in our survey used cocaine, methamphetamines, or heroin—hard drugs that are highly addictive and debilitating. 2 .) 3.) Recovery from drug and alcohol addiction is generally characterized, by drug treatment professionals, as a difficult and lifelong process that frequently involves periods of relapse. Foster care agencies face difficulties in helping parents enter drug or alcohol treatment programs. Links between foster care agencies and treatment providers may not always be adequate; and as a consequence, close monitoring of parents’ progress in treatment does not always occur. Finally, agencies also face several barriers to quickly achieving adoption or guardianship in these cases when family reunification efforts fail. 4.) State laws on permanency decisionmaking for foster care cases involving parental substance abuse are discussed further in appendix V.
Given the lack of consensus as to what constitutes reasonable efforts to help reunify families, judges also need detailed information about what foster care agencies have done to help parents recover from their drug or alcohol addictions in order to determine whether reasonable efforts have been made. 5.) Initiatives Addressing Parental Substance Abuse Seek to Achieve Permanency for Children
Some locations have launched initiatives that seek to improve the prospects for recovery and family reunification when parental substance abuse is involved. These initiatives involve linkages between foster care agencies, drug treatment providers, and sometimes the courts and other organizations. Some locations are undertaking other efforts to more quickly achieve other permanency outcomes for children when the decision is made to end family reunification efforts. Some locations are also implementing programs to encourage more relatives of children in foster care to adopt or assume legal guardianship of them. While these efforts to more quickly achieve other permanency outcomes for children are not specific to cases involving parental substance abuse, they may be useful in achieving timely permanency outcomes in these foster care cases. Some indicators associated with a poor prognosis for family reunification are relevant to cases involving parental substance abuse, such as if the parent’s “only visible support system and only visible means of financial support is found in illegal drugs, prostitution, and street life.” When a poor prognosis for family reunification is indicated, foster care agencies in California should now try to place children as early as possible in foster homes in which the caregiver is willing not only to support the agency’s efforts to reunify the child with his or her parents but also to provide a permanent home if reunification efforts fail. This may reduce the time it takes to identify an adoptive parent and terminate parental rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the extent and characteristics of parental substance abuse among foster care cases; (2) the difficulties foster agencies face in making timely permanency decisions for foster children with substance abusing parents; and (3) initiatives that address reunifying families or achieving other permanency outcomes in a timely manner for foster children whose parents are substance abusers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of GAO's survey, it estimated that about two-thirds of all foster children in both California and Illinois, or about 84,600 children combined, had at least one parent who abused drugs or alcohol, and most had been doing so for at least 5 years; (2) most of these parents abused one or more hard drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin; (3) substance abusers often abandon or neglect their children because their primary focus is obtaining and using drugs or alcohol; (4) they also place their children's safety and well-being at risk when they buy drugs or engage in other criminal activity to support their drug habit; (5) recovery from drug and alcohol addiction is generally a difficult and lifelong process that may involve periods of relapse; (6) parental substance abuse makes it more difficult to make timely decisions that protect foster children and provide them with stable homes; (7) foster care agencies face difficulties in helping parents enter drug or alcohol treatment programs; (8) in addition, foster care agencies and treatment providers may not always be adequately linked, and as a consequence, close monitoring of parents' progress in treatment does not always occur; (9) foster care agencies also face several challenges when trying to quickly achieve adoption or guardianship in these cases after family reunification efforts have failed; (10) to accommodate children's need for timely permanency decisions, some locations have launched highly collaborative initiatives, involving drug treatment providers and sometimes the courts and other organizations, to help parents obtain treatment; (11) in addition to maximizing the prospects for reunification, these initiatives may produce the detailed information about parents' progress in treatment that judges need to make timely permanency decisions; (12) some locations are undertaking other efforts to better enable foster care agencies to quickly achieve other permanency outcomes for children who cannot be safely returned to their parents in a timely manner; (13) while not designed specifically for foster care cases involving parental substance abuse, such efforts may be useful in these cases; (14) for example, concurrent planning is being used to reduce the time it takes to achieve permanency by simultaneously working to reunify the family and planning for some other permanency outcome should family reunification efforts fail; and (15) some locations are also implementing programs to encourage relatives of children in foster care to adopt or become the legal guardians of these children. |
gao_GGD-96-75 | gao_GGD-96-75_0 | In addition, our results do not apply to all MEP services because we limited our analysis to four MEP service categories. Our survey revealed no significant differences in how the companies viewed the impact on their overall business performance of MEP that did and did not receive NIST funds. Also, they said that they believed NIST support improves programs’ efficiency and effectiveness, which are dimensions of MEP that our survey did not address. We found that most of the companies (between 61 and 77 percent) reported that MEP assistance met or exceeded their expectations for improvements to specific business performance indicators, such as manufacturing time frames, the quality of market research, and sales to new and repeat customers. 1). 2). 3). 4). Ninety-one percent of respondents rated reasonably priced MEP service fees and project proposals as important MEP attributes, and most were satisfied with the price of fees and proposals costs at their own program. Our objectives for this report were to analyze (1) the factors that may have contributed to the positive impact of MEP assistance on companies’ overall business performance; (2) the question of whether companies’ expectations were met regarding the impact of MEP assistance on specific business performance indicators, such as manufacturing time frames and labor productivity; and (3) the issue of whether MEP actually demonstrated attributes that companies indicated they valued most, such as MEP staff expertise, timely assistance, and reasonably priced fees. In designing our survey questions, we obtained input from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and MEP officials, MEP evaluation experts, and managers at manufacturing facilities. Companies receiving recommendations were more likely to devote more staff hours to the program and to make financial investments as a result of MEP assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO surveyed manufacturers' views regarding the impact of manufacturing extension programs (MEP), focusing on: (1) factors contributing to the positive impact of overall business performance reported by the majority of survey respondents; (2) whether companies' expectations were met regarding MEP impact on specific business performance indicators; and (3) whether companies thought that MEP actually demonstrated attributes they valued most.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the results of its survey could not be applied to all MEP participants or all MEP service categories; (2) companies that supplemented MEP assistance with their own resources, implemented more MEP recommendations, were small and relatively new, and did not pay fees for MEP assistance were more likely to view the MEP program positively; (3) the source of MEP funding did not influence companies' views of the assistance's impact; (4) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) officials believed that NIST support improved MEP programs' efficiency and effectiveness and made MEP services more widely available; (5) about two-thirds to three-quarters of the companies that expected MEP assistance to enhance specific business indicators believed that the results met or exceeded their expectations; and (6) over 90 percent of the companies rated staff expertise, timely assistance, and reasonably priced MEP service fees and project proposals as important MEP features and most were satisfied with their specific MEP programs in these areas. |
gao_GAO-15-532T | gao_GAO-15-532T_0 | NNSA Faces Challenges Implementing Its Plans to Modernize the Nuclear Security Enterprise
NNSA manages a complex, decades-long effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. In its recent report, the Augustine-Mies Panel observed that NNSA’s SSMP, which is intended to communicate long- range plans and cost estimates, has varied from year to year in the costs and schedules for the delivery of several major life extension programs (LEP) and nuclear facilities, and the Panel concluded that the lack of a stable, executable plan for modernization is a fundamental weakness for NNSA. that NNSA’s stockpile budget estimates from 2014 through 2031 increased by about $27 billion compared with the 2012 stockpile budget estimates for the same time period. We recommended that NNSA include in its estimates at least a range of budget estimates for known future expenses for large capital projects even when a fully developed cost estimate had not been developed. NNSA Does Not Fully Understand the Causes of Its Contract and Project Management Problems and Appears Resistant to Implementing GAO’s Recommendations
In our February 2015 update to our high risk list, we expressed concern that DOE, including NNSA, may not have adequately identified the root causes of its contract and project management challenges. The report also included 21 recommendations to address continuing project management challenges. As we noted in our February 2015 update to our high risk list,long history of identifying additional corrective actions suggests that it has not always fully understood the causes of its contract and project management problems. However, DOE did not specify a timeline for implementing many of these recommendations, indicating to us DOE’s lack of urgency or commitment in correcting these issues. A reliable analysis is critical to ensuring that key capital asset and program decisions will both meet mission needs and be cost- effective. NNSA’s DNN Programs Have Made Some Progress Securing Vulnerable Nuclear Material, but Significant Challenges Remain
Our reports have found that DNN has made some progress in securing vulnerable nuclear material. In addition, in September 2011, we found that DNN and U.S. agencies faced significant challenges in accounting for and ensuring the security of U.S. weapons-usable nuclear materials as a result of foreign nuclear research and commercial power activities. NNSA disagreed with our recommendations. We recommended that NNSA develop and maintain useful and reliable measures to assess the performance of the initiative. Finally, the effectiveness of NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation mission depends in part on the agency’s plutonium disposition program, and we found in 2014 NNSA faces challenges in this regard. NNSA Faces Challenges in Its Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise
The Augustine-Mies’s Panel’s report highlighted the challenges NNSA faces in its governance of the nuclear security enterprise. The issues and concerns identified in this report appear to be consistent with those that we have previously described in our work. As noted earlier, our work has found that NNSA’s long-term budget estimates for the nuclear security enterprise have continued to change from year to year and that some assumptions in the SSMP may be unrealistic. In addition, consistent with our 2015 high risk update, the Augustine-Mies Panel found that NNSA’s capital projects have been a continuing source of cost overruns and schedule delays. The panel noted that these have significantly undermined the agency’s credibility and recommended that DOE strengthen its efforts to develop independent cost and resource analysis capabilities and that leadership employ a rigorous analysis of alternatives early in the decision process as the basis for assessing and validating program requirements. Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Observations on NNSA’s Options for Meeting Its Plutonium Research Needs. Department of Energy: Observations on DOE’s Management Challenges and Steps Taken to Address Them. Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Improve Guidance on Weapon Limitations and Planning for Its Stockpile Surveillance Program. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Action Needed to Address NNSA’s Program Management and Coordination Challenges. Implemented and Sustained. National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA is responsible for managing the nation's nuclear security missions, which include ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; achieving reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts (known as DNN programs). NNSA executes its missions at eight sites that make up the nuclear security enterprise.
GAO's reports have highlighted challenges NNSA has faced for several years. These challenges contribute to GAO's continuing inclusion of NNSA's management of contracts and major projects on GAO's list of agencies and program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are in most need of transformation. A recent series of commissions on NNSA's management, governance, and structure—such as the Augustine-Mies Panel—highlights the importance of NNSA's mission.
This testimony is based on eight prior GAO products issued from December 2010 through February 2015 and discusses NNSA's (1) plans to modernize the nuclear security enterprise, (2) understanding of the causes of contract and project management problems and the extent to which it is has implemented GAO's related recommendations, (3) DNN programs' status in securing vulnerable nuclear materials, and (4) challenges in its governance of the nuclear security enterprise.
GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement.
What GAO Found
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) faces challenges implementing its plans to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. In its November 2014 report, the Augustine-Mies Panel observed that NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan, which is intended to communicate long-range plans and cost estimates, has varied from year to year in the costs and schedules for the delivery of several major life extension programs and nuclear facilities. The panel concluded that the lack of a stable, executable plan for modernization is a fundamental weakness for NNSA. Similarly, GAO found in 2013 that the Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan has shown changes in long-term budget and schedule estimates from year to year—for example, NNSA's stockpile budget estimates for 2014 through 2031 increased by about $27 billion compared with the 2012 stockpile budget estimates for the same time period. GAO recommended that NNSA include in future plans a range of estimates that reflects projects that the agency knows are needed. NNSA agreed and appears to be implementing this recommendation.
As noted in GAO's 2015 high risk report, NNSA has a long history of identifying corrective actions and declaring them successfully resolved, only to follow with the identification of additional actions. As GAO has reported, this suggests that NNSA does not have a full understanding of the root causes of its contract and project management challenges. In its prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations to correct NNSA's project management problems. While NNSA has initiated some actions and made some progress, the agency has not taken action on many of these recommendations, including improving cost estimating capabilities and employing a rigorous analysis of alternatives to ensure that key capital asset and program decisions will both meet mission needs and be cost-effective. This suggests a lack of urgency or commitment on DOE's part to address identified challenges.
NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs have made progress securing vulnerable nuclear materials, but significant challenges remain. For example, GAO found in 2011 that NNSA faced challenges accounting for and ensuring the security of U.S. weapons-usable nuclear materials. GAO recommended that NNSA improve its process for securing these materials. Although NNSA disagreed, it has since taken some steps to prioritize its efforts. In addition, prior GAO work has raised concerns about the effectiveness of DNN program management and implementation, particularly with regard to execution of its plutonium disposition program, performance measures, and sustainability.
NNSA faces challenges in its governance of the nuclear security enterprise. The Augustine-Mies Panel highlighted such challenges in its report. The report addresses issues and concerns that GAO has also previously described in its work. For example, consistent with GAO's 2015 update to its high risk list, the Panel noted that NNSA major projects have been a continuing source of program schedule delays and cost overruns and that, as a result, NNSA needs to strengthen its cost estimating capabilities. The report also recommended that NNSA leadership employ a rigorous analysis of alternatives early in the decision process as the basis for assessing and validating program requirements, which is consistent with past GAO recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-97-73 | gao_NSIAD-97-73_0 | Under DOD’s measurement of infrastructure, O&M funds approximately half of DOD’s infrastructure costs that can be clearly identified in DOD’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). O&M Has Declined More Slowly Than Personnel Levels
Total O&M funding for DOD is projected to decline at a slower rate than either civilian or military personnel levels between fiscal years 1985 and 2001. Because personnel levels decline at a faster rate than annual O&M funding levels, annual O&M funds when allocated per person (military and civilian) are projected to increase by about 20 percent over the fiscal year 1985-2001 period, as shown in figure 2. Projections show that between fiscal years 1998 and 2001, DOD will have 10 program accounts. As a share of total annual O&M funds, the Defense Health Program budget account is projected to grow from 10.6 percent in fiscal year 1993 to 11.8 percent in fiscal year 2001. Only the Army experienced an increase in its share of annual O&M funds. This change caused a significant increase in the total annual O&M funds provided to the combined DOD agencies. Beginning in fiscal year 1998, the Army will annually receive the smallest portion of O&M funds. The level of Navy/Marine Corps military personnel fell almost 10 percent less than the other two services, while Navy/Marine Corps civilian personnel levels fell by almost 30 percent, similar to the Army. The Air Force’s proportion of annual O&M funds changed the least of the three services. Although the Air Force’s share of O&M funds fell by about 2 percent between fiscal years 1991 and 1992, the Air Force’s annual portion of O&M funds are planned to remain between 24.6 and 27.6 percent for the fiscal year 1993 through 2001 period. Therefore, the proportion of total DOD infrastructure funded by O&M is clearly greater than 50 percent. During fiscal years 1985 through 2001, direct infrastructure O&M funds decline by 22.6 percent, similar to total O&M trends. O&M Funds Are Concentrated in Three Major Defense Programs, and Only One of Those—Training, Medical, and Other General Purpose Activities—Increased
Another way to analyze the changes and components of O&M funding is to aggregate FYDP data by DOD’s major defense programs. 7.) In total, there are about 30 mission categories during the fiscal year 1993-2001 period. Most of the growth in medical occurs prior to fiscal year 1997, and the majority of these costs are for health care needs. In contrast, between fiscal years 1985 and 2001 military and civilian personnel levels decline by 34.4 and 36.5 percent, respectively. Base operations and management headquarters activities have received and are planned to continue to receive the largest portion of annual O&M funds for this mission category, although its portion of the training mission’s O&M funds has declined. Figure II.24: Annual O&M Funding by Service for Active Military Training Mission Activities for Fiscal Years 1985-2001 (Constant 1997 dollars in billions)
Figure II.24 also shows that O&M training funds for the Navy/Marine Corps and the Air Force have declined between fiscal years 1985 and 1996 in concert with declines in their force structure, but similar to the Army, funding levels are expected to remain fairly stable in the out-years. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget request for fiscal year (FY) 1997 for its operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts, focusing on: (1) how annual funding relates to military and civilian personnel levels through 2001; (2) overall trends from fiscal years 1985 though 2001; and (3) key areas in which most money has been budgeted through 2001.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) total DOD O&M funds, in constant FY 1997 dollars, are projected to decline at a slower rate than either civilian or military personnel levels between fiscal years 1985 and 2001; (2) however, beginning in FY 2000, projections show that O&M funds begin to rise at the same time civilian personnel decline and military personnel remain relative stable; (3) increases in other O&M-funded programs will more than offset the decline in O&M-funded civilian salaries; (4) since 1993, approximately 85 percent of the funds are concentrated in five budget accounts; (5) another data view shows that three major defense programs receive the majority of annual O&M funds; (6) between fiscal years 1993 and 2001, about 50 percent of annual O&M funds are found in five of DOD's mission categories; (7) in total, there are about 30 mission categories during the FY 1993-2001 time period; (8) from an organizational perspective, the military services' portion of total annual O&M funds declines; (9) beginning in FY 1998, the Army is projected to receive a smaller proportion of annual O&M funds than either of the other two services or the combined DOD agencies; (10) even though the Army will receive the smallest portion of annual O&M funds, this service will have the second largest active military force and the largest civilian workforce; (11) the Navy-Marine Corps' share of annual O&M funds declined by almost 10 percent prior to FY 1996; (12) in contrast, the Air Force's proportion of annual O&M funds changes the least of the three services, while Air Force military and civilian personnel levels fall significantly over the FY 1985-2001 time period; (13) only the combined DOD agencies' share of annual O&M funds increases between fiscal years 1985 and 2001 because of the health program funding consolidation into a Defensewide account; (14) regardless of how the O&M budget is analyzed, medical is the only area where consistent growth occurred; (15) O&M funds for medical activities increase by 72.8 percent from fiscal years 1985 through 2001; (16) the majority of these costs are for the health care needs of DOD's 8.3 million eligible beneficiaries; (17) during fiscal years 1985 through 2001, O&M infrastructure funds that can be clearly identified in the Future Years Defense Program decline by 22.6 percent and thus mirror total O&M trends; (18) despite increases, O&M continues to fund about half of DOD's clearly identifiable infrastructure costs; and (19) thus, if DOD is to identify significant savings from infrastructure to fund modernization, it must look to the O&M appropriations. |
gao_GAO-08-434T | gao_GAO-08-434T_0 | DOE Has Overstated the IPP Program’s Progress and Achievements
DOE has not accurately portrayed the IPP program’s progress in the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long- term, private sector jobs created. In addition, DOE has overstated the rate at which weapons scientists have been employed in long-term, private sector jobs because it does not independently verify the data it receives on the number of jobs created, relies on estimates of job creation, and includes in its count a large number of part-time jobs that were created. Many Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Who Did Not Claim Direct Experience with WMD Have Received Funds from DOE
A major goal of the IPP program is to engage former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians, and DOE claims to have supplemented the incomes of over 16,770 of these individuals since the program’s inception. Finally, many IPP project participants that DOE supports are too young to have contributed to the Soviet Union’s WMD programs. While DOE guidance for the IPP program does not prohibit participation of younger scientists in IPP projects, DOE has not clearly stated the proliferation risk posed by younger scientists and the extent to which they should be a focus of the IPP program. DOE reported that these 32 commercial successes had helped create or support 2,790 new private sector jobs for former weapon scientists in Russia and other countries. DOE Has Not Developed an Exit Strategy for the IPP Program but Instead Has Expanded Efforts to New Areas
DOE has yet to develop criteria for phasing-out the IPP program in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian Government Officials, Russian and Ukrainian Scientists, and U.S. Industry Representatives Questioned the Continuing Need for the IPP Program
Officials from the Russian government, representatives of Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and individuals at U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the IPP program. Specifically: A senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told us in July 2007 that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia’s economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. Officials from 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed told us that they do not see scientists at their institutes as a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should be “graduated” from the IPP program, and DOE officials believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In contrast, State has assessed institutes and developed a strategy—using a range of factors, such as the institute’s ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract external funding—to graduate certain institutes from its Science Centers program. We found that DOE is currently supporting 35 IPP projects at 17 Russian and Ukrainian institutes that State considers to already be graduated from its Science Center program and, therefore, no longer in need of U.S. assistance. DOE Has Expanded Efforts to Iraq and Libya and Is Working to Support GNEP
DOE recently expanded its scientist assistance efforts on two fronts: DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya, and, through the IPP program, is working to develop IPP projects that support GNEP. Specifically, in every fiscal year from 1998 through 2007, DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the program in those fiscal years. Two main factors have contributed to DOE’s large and persistent carryover of unspent funds: the lengthy and multilayered review and approval processes DOE uses to pay IPP project participants for their work, and long delays in implementing some IPP projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the decades before its dissolution, the Soviet Union produced a cadre of scientists and engineers whose knowledge and expertise could be invaluable to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, many of these scientists suffered significant cuts in pay or lost their government-supported work. To address concerns about unemployed or underemployed Soviet-era weapons scientists, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994 to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary work in the short term and create private sector jobs for these scientists in the long term. GAO was asked to assess (1) DOE's reported accomplishments for the IPP program, (2) DOE's exit strategy for the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has experienced annual carryovers of unspent funds and the reasons for any such carryovers. In December 2007, GAO issued a report--Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, (GAO-08-189)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO, among other things, analyzed DOE policies, plans, and budgets and interviewed key program officials and representatives from 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes.
What GAO Found
DOE has overstated accomplishments on the number of scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. First, although DOE claims to have engaged over 16,770 scientists in Russia and other countries, this total includes both scientists with and without weapons-related experience. GAO's analysis of 97 IPP projects involving about 6,450 scientists showed that more than half did not claim to possess any weapons-related experience. Furthermore, officials from 10 Russian and Ukrainian weapons institutes told GAO that the IPP program helps them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists and contributes to the continued operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. Second, although DOE asserts that the IPP program helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs for former weapons scientists, the credibility of this number is uncertain because DOE relies on "good-faith" reporting from U.S. industry partners and foreign institutes and does not independently verify the number of jobs reported to have been created. DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program. Officials from the Russian government, Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the program. Importantly, a senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told GAO that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia's economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should "graduate" from the program. In contrast, the Department of State, which supports a similar program to assist Soviet-era weapons scientists, has assessed participating institutes and developed a strategy to graduate certain institutes from its program. Even so, we found that DOE is currently supporting 35 IPP projects at 17 Russian and Ukrainian institutes where State no longer funds projects because it considers them to have graduated from its program. In addition, DOE has recently expanded the program to new areas. Specifically, DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya and, through the IPP program, is working to develop projects that support a DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power. In every fiscal year since 1998, DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the program. Two main factors have contributed to this recurring problem--lengthy review and approval processes for paying former Soviet weapons scientists and delays in implementing some IPP projects. In its recent report, GAO recommended, among other things, that DOE conduct a fundamental reassessment of the IPP program, including the development of a prioritization plan and exit strategy. DOE generally concurred with GAO's findings, but does not believe that the IPP program needs to be reassessed. |
gao_GAO-16-81 | gao_GAO-16-81_0 | USAID Water and Development Strategy
Improving health outcomes through the provision of sustainable WASH is the first strategic objective of USAID’s Water and Development Strategy, 2013-2018 (Water Strategy). These projections included persons receiving first- time and improved access to water supply and sanitation. Each mission’s total funding for WASH activities in these nine countries ranged from about $53.4 million, in Indonesia, to about $4.4 million, in Haiti. The most frequent key focus areas for these activities were capacity building and behavior-change communication, followed by infrastructure construction, technical assistance, policy and governance, and financing. USAID Is Taking Steps to Enhance Strategic WASH Approach and Address WASH Sustainability
In the nine countries we selected for our review, we found that USAID missions are taking steps to develop and implement WASH plans and are incorporating the Water Strategy’s principles and approach into recent and planned WASH activities. The remaining four missions were in the process of developing or finalizing such plans. The reasons for lack of verification for water beneficiaries were generally unclear, and mission officials, as discussed later, generally provided varying reasons for the inaccurate reporting for sanitation activities. Our interviews with mission officials and reviews of monitoring documents indicated that the selected USAID missions modified ongoing or planned activities—for at least 6 of the 10 we reviewed that had relevant evaluations—on the basis of evaluation results. In response, USAID missions in a number of priority countries are developing a more strategic approach to WASH, and USAID’s Office of Water and missions have begun taking steps to address sustainability of WASH investments. Moreover, unless USAID identifies and addresses factors contributing to missions’ inconsistent adherence to guidance for verifying beneficiaries of water activities and accurately reporting beneficiaries of sanitation activities, USAID cannot ensure the accuracy of its annual reports regarding progress in increasing access to safe water and sanitation. Specifically, with respect to inconsistent adherence to agency guidance for establishing annual targets, for reporting gender disaggregated data, for verifying beneficiaries of water activities, and for accurately reporting beneficiaries of sanitation activities, USAID should identify factors contributing to missions’ inconsistent adherence to agency guidance and take steps to address these factors. In its written comments, USAID generally concurred with our recommendations and outlined steps it is taking to address our second recommendation. 2. 3. 4. 6. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) describe the types of water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) activities the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has implemented in selected countries and the funding it has provided for these activities; (2) assess the extent to which USAID guidance has informed the agency’s efforts to plan and implement WASH activities in these countries; and (3) assess USAID’s monitoring and evaluation of selected WASH activities. The activities we selected included those to which the missions in the selected countries had allocated the largest amounts of WASH funding, with one exception: In Uganda, the selected activities did not include the Uganda mission’s activity that received the largest allocations of WASH funding in fiscal years 2012 through 2014, because the mission had allocated the majority of funding for its largest WASH activity before fiscal year 2012, did not initially inform us of this activity, and did not provide the prior-year funding data until after we had made our activity selection. To assess USAID evaluations for WASH activities in the nine countries, we selected all evaluations for WASH activities completed in fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Monitoring. All 14 evaluations reported on monitoring of WASH activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of people in developing countries lack access to safe water and improved sanitation. Congress passed the Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 to improve access to safe water and sanitation for developing countries. In 2013, USAID released its first Water and Development Strategy , which includes the objective of improving health through sustainable WASH.
GAO was asked to review USAID's WASH efforts. Focusing on WASH activities in 9 selected countries, this report (1) describes recent activities and funding, (2) assesses USAID missions' efforts to plan and implement activities, and (3) assesses USAID's monitoring of activities. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 9 countries from USAID's list of 22 priority WASH countries. These 9 countries received about 53 percent of funding attributed to WASH for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. GAO also selected 16 activities for detailed review in the 9 countries, primarily on the basis of levels of funding. GAO analyzed USAID WASH funding data for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 and reviewed agency documents, interviewed mission officials, and visited sites in 2 African countries.
What GAO Found
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions in the 9 countries GAO selected for its review reported implementing a variety of water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) activities in fiscal years 2012 through 2014. WASH activities included capacity building, behavior-change communication, infrastructure construction, technical assistance, policy and governance, and financing. The missions' funding for WASH activities in these countries ranged from $4.4 million to $53.4 million.
Note: Funding shown generally represents allocations for activities through Sept. 2014.
USAID missions in these 9 countries are taking steps to develop and implement plans for WASH activities, with some missions making more progress than others. These missions are also generally taking steps to address long-term sustainability when planning WASH activities, as directed by USAID guidance, including the Water and Development Strategy . USAID is in the process of developing additional guidance to help all its missions address the sustainability of WASH activities.
The completeness and accuracy of USAID's monitoring of WASH activities varied in the 9 selected countries. GAO found that, inconsistent with agency guidance, these missions did not (1) consistently set annual targets for 6 of 16 WASH activities, (2) disaggregate beneficiaries by gender for 6 of 10 water supply and sanitation activities, (3) verify the accuracy of beneficiary data for 3 of 10 water supply activities, and (4) report accurate numbers of beneficiaries for 6 of 8 sanitation activities. Mission officials cited a variety of reasons for adhering inconsistently with agency guidance in some instances and in others the reasons for inconsistent adherence were not clear. These limitations in the completeness and accuracy of monitoring information for WASH activities may inhibit the effectiveness of USAID's oversight of such activities and affect its ability to accurately report on progress in increasing access to safe water and sanitation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID take steps to improve monitoring and reporting of WASH activities, by identifying and addressing reasons for missions' inconsistent adherence with agency guidance. USAID generally concurred with the recommendations and, in particular, outlined steps it is taking to address the report's second recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-1012T | gao_GAO-02-1012T_0 | Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs are in line with previous recommendations and show promise towards reducing fragmentation and improving coordination. However, as the Comptroller General has recently testified,implementation of the new department will be an extremely complex task, and in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to make it effective. In areas ranging from fire protection to drinking water to port security, the new threats are prompting a reassessment and shift of longstanding roles and responsibilities. However, until this time, proposed shifts in roles and responsibilities have been considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide this process. Current homeland security proposals recognize that the unique scale and complexity of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and capacities of all levels of government as well as the private sector. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the homeland security challenge, national performance goals and measures may best be developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and the private sector. Appropriate Tools Need to Be Selected for Providing Assistance
The choice and design of the policy tools the federal government uses to engage and involve other levels of government and the private sector in enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for performance and accountability. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of resources. The national strategy acknowledges the shared responsibility of providing homeland security between federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector and recognizes the importance of using tools of government such as grants, regulations, and information sharing to improve national preparedness. The proposed department will clearly have a central role in the success of efforts to strengthen homeland security, and has primary responsibility for many of the initiatives in the national homeland security strategy. Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory Management Are Needed. | What GAO Found
The challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation against these threats calls for a truly integrated approach, bringing together the resources of all levels of government. The proposed Department of Homeland Security will clearly have a central role in efforts to enhance homeland security. The proposed consolidation of homeland security programs has the potential to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, and clarify roles and responsibilities. Realistically, the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and it will take additional resources to make it effective. Moreover, formation of a department should not be considered a replacement for the timely issuance of a national homeland security strategy to guide implementation of the complex mission of the department. Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of long-standing roles and responsibilities, but these shifts are being considered on a piecemeal basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process. A national strategy could provide such guidance by more systematically identifying the unique capacities and resources of each level of government to enhance homeland security and by providing increased accountability within the intergovernmental system. The nation does not yet have performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness and develop common criteria that can demonstrate success, promote accountability, and determine areas where additional resources are needed, such as improving communications and equipment interoperability. A careful choice of the most appropriate tools is critical to achieve and sustain national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and tax incentives, can enhance the capacity of all levels of government to target areas of highest risk and greatest need, promote shared responsibilities, and track progress toward achieving preparedness goals. |
gao_GAO-02-352 | gao_GAO-02-352_0 | Moreover, some records that contain SSNs are considered part of the public record and, as such, are routinely made available to the public for review. Use of SSN Has Grown, in Part, Because of Federal Requirements
SSA is the federal agency responsible for issuing SSNs, which are used to track workers’ earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits. In 1936, SSA created a numbering system designed to provide a unique identifier, the SSN, to each individual. Governments Are Taking Some Steps to Safeguard SSNs but Important Measures Not Universally Employed
When agencies that deliver services and benefits use SSNs to administer programs, they are taking some steps to safeguard SSNs, but certain measures that could provide more assurances that these SSNs are secure are not universally in place at any level of government. Further, they store and use SSNs in varied formats. Almost all states have modified their policies on placing SSNs on state drivers’ licenses. In addition, some program agencies also reported maintaining public records that contain SSNs. However, efforts to protect individuals’ privacy can be more far-reaching when the initiatives are statewide. Neither state tracked costs for making changes to better protect personal information, such as SSNs. Matter For Congressional Consideration
To address SSN security and display issues in state and local government and in public records, including those maintained by the judicial branch of government at all levels, the Congress may wish to convene, in consultation with the president, a representative group of federal, state and local officials including, for example, state attorneys general, county recorders, and state and local chief information officers, selected members of the Congress, and state or local elected officials, to develop a unified approach to safeguarding SSNs used in all levels of government and particularly those displayed in public records. Finally, we surveyed each county’s personnel office. | What GAO Found
The Social Security number (SSN) was created in 1936 to track workers' earnings and eligibility for Social Security benefits. Because SSNs are unique identifiers and do not change, the numbers provide a convenient and efficient way to manage records. Government agencies are taking some steps to safeguard the number, but some protections are not uniformly in place at any level of government. Many of the state and county agencies responding to GAO's survey maintain records that contain SSNs; federal agencies maintain public records less frequently. At the state and county levels, some offices, such as state professional licensing agencies and county recorders' offices, have traditionally been repositories for public records that may contain SSNs. Some government agencies are trying to better safeguard the SSN by trying innovative approaches to protect them from public display. For example, some agencies and courts are modifying their processes or their forms so that they can collect SSNs but prevent the number from becoming part of the publicly available record. The most far-reaching efforts took place in states with a statewide initiative that established a policy and procedures designed to protect individuals' personal information, including SSNs, in all circumstances where they collect, store, and use it. |
gao_GAO-15-61 | gao_GAO-15-61_0 | 1.) The directive requires each VAMC to conduct an ongoing staffing analysis to evaluate staffing plans annually, at a minimum, and for VAMC directors to incorporate projected staffing needs into their annual budget review. However, VAMCs experienced problems in both the development and execution of their staffing plans. VAMCs in Our Review Have Implemented VHA’s Nurse Staffing Methodology by Developing Staffing Plans and Taking Steps to Execute Them
The seven VAMCs in our review have implemented VHA’s nurse staffing methodology; specifically, each of these VAMCs has developed a facility- wide staffing plan, comprised of unit-level staffing plans for inpatient units, and has taken steps to execute it. Time required. Improvements in Nurse Staffing Were Reported When VAMCs Executed Staffing Plan Initiatives
Some VAMC staff reported improvements in the adequacy and qualifications of their units’ nursing staff when nurse staffing plan initiatives were executed. For example, at two VAMCs at which the number of nurses was increased or support services for nurses, such as patient transporters or sitters, were put in place,adequacy of the nursing staff had improved. However, some VAMC unit staff reported that unit nurse staffing continued to be inadequate and that nurse unit assignments and job duties were not always appropriate for their qualifications. VHA’s Oversight to Ensure Its Nurse Staffing Methodology Is Implemented, Administered Appropriately, and Contributes to an Adequate and Qualified Nurse Workforce Is Limited
Our review of VHA’s oversight of its nurse staffing methodology found that some internal controls—those related to environmental assessment, a plan for monitoring compliance, evaluation, timeliness of communication, and organizational accountability—are limited. Without these internal controls in place, VHA cannot ensure that its methodology meets department goals, such as establishing a standardized methodology for determining adequate and qualified nurse staffing at all VAMCs, and ultimately, having nurse staffing that is adequate to meet veterans’ health care needs. VHA did not comprehensively assess each VAMC to ensure preparedness for implementing its methodology, including having the necessary technical support and resources, prior to the issuance of the methodology directive in 2010. ONS did not develop a plan for monitoring VAMCs to ensure they were in compliance with the implementation and ongoing administration of Phase I of the methodology. The lack of a plan for monitoring VAMCs’ compliance with the implementation and ongoing administration of the methodology hinders VHA from being able to ensure that all VAMCs are staffing their nurses using the same, standardized methodology. Evaluation. There have been limited evaluations of the methodology, and one of these evaluations has been significantly delayed. Timeliness of Implementation and Communication. The long timeline for implementing the pilots and national rollouts of Phases I and II, as well as evaluating Phase I of the staffing methodology—more than 7 years— and for communicating methodology-related information to VAMCs may have hindered the ability of VAMCs to develop their staffing plans and to execute the initiatives contained in those plans. VHA did not define areas of responsibility or establish the appropriate line of reporting within the framework of VA’s management structure for the ongoing administration and oversight of the methodology. VHA does not require VAMCs to submit any information or reports on the implementation and ongoing administration of the methodology to ONS or the VISNs. Although some improvements in nurse staffing were reported with the implementation of the staffing methodology, the seven VAMCs in our review experienced problems developing and executing the related staffing plans, including problems pertaining to data resources, training, and communication. We also found that VHA’s oversight of the staffing methodology is limited and in many cases lacks sufficient internal controls, which could diminish VHA’s ability to ensure an adequate and qualified nurse workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO and others have raised prior concerns about the adequacy and qualifications of VHA's nurse staffing. In part to address these concerns, VHA issued a directive in 2010 requiring all VAMCs to implement a standardized methodology for determining an adequate and qualified nurse workforce, which includes developing and executing nurse staffing plans. It also requires VAMCs to use the methodology on an ongoing basis to evaluate staffing plans.
GAO was asked to provide information on nurse staffing at VAMCs. This report reviews the extent to which (1) VAMCs have implemented VHA's nurse staffing methodology, and (2) VHA oversees VAMCs' implementation and ongoing administration of the methodology. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from VHA, seven VAMCs selected to ensure variation in factors such as geographic location, and regional offices for these VAMCs. GAO used federal internal control standards to evaluate VHA's oversight. GAO also interviewed representatives of veterans service organizations, nursing organizations, and unions.
What GAO Found
The seven Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers (VAMC) in GAO's review implemented the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) nurse staffing methodology, experienced problems developing and executing the related nurse staffing plans, and some reported improvements in nurse staffing. Specifically, GAO found that each of the seven VAMCs had developed a facility-wide staffing plan—which outlines initiatives needed to ensure appropriate unit-level nurse staffing and skill mix—and taken steps to execute it. However, VAMCs experienced problems—such as lack of data resources and difficulties with training—in both the development and execution of their staffing plans. Some VAMC staff reported improvements in the adequacy and qualifications of their units' nursing staff when nurse staffing plan initiatives were executed. For example, at two VAMCs where the number of nurses was increased or where support services for nurses were put in place, such as a designated group of staff to assist in transporting patients to and from appointments off the unit, unit staff said the adequacy of the nursing staff had improved. However, some VAMC unit staff reported that unit nurse staffing continued to be inadequate and that nurse unit assignments and job duties were not always appropriate for their qualifications.
VHA's oversight is limited for ensuring its nurse staffing methodology is implemented and administered appropriately. GAO found the following internal controls were limited in VHA's oversight process:
Environmental assessment. VHA did not comprehensively assess each VAMC to ensure preparedness for implementing the methodology, including having the necessary technical support and resources, prior to the issuance of the directive requiring each VAMC to implement the methodology.
Monitoring compliance. VHA does not have a plan for monitoring VAMCs to ensure compliance with the implementation and ongoing administration of the methodology.
Evaluation. VHA has conducted limited evaluations of the methodology, and at least one of these evaluations has been significantly delayed.
Timeliness of communication. VHA's protracted timeline for communicating methodology-related information may have hindered the ability of VAMCs to appropriately develop their staffing plans and to execute the initiatives contained in those plans.
Organizational accountability. VHA did not define areas of responsibility or establish the appropriate line of reporting within VA's management structure for oversight of the implementation and ongoing administration of the methodology.
Without these internal controls in place, VHA cannot ensure its methodology meets department goals, such as establishing a standardized methodology for determining an adequate and qualified nurse workforce at VAMCs, and ultimately, having nurse staffing that is adequate to meet veterans' growing and increasingly complex health care needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends VA: (1) assess VAMCs' ability to implement the methodology, (2) monitor VAMCs' ongoing compliance with the methodology, (3) complete timely evaluations, (4) improve the timeliness of communication with VAMCs, and (5) define areas of responsibility and reporting within VA's management structure. VA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-388 | gao_GAO-14-388_0 | Treasury Continues to Make Progress in Winding Down the CPP Program
As of January 31, 2014, a total of 624 of the 707 institutions that originally participated in CPP, about 88 percent, had exited the program. As of January 31, 2014, Treasury had received $225 billion in repayments and income from its CPP investments, exceeding the amount originally disbursed by $20.1 billion (see fig. Treasury estimated a lifetime gain of $16.1 billion for CPP as of November 30, 2013. Remaining Capital Purchase Program Investment Concentrated in a Few Institutions
As of January 31, 2014, the 83 remaining institutions accounted for the $2.1 billion in outstanding investments or about 1 percent of the original investment. The outstanding investments were concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions. As of January 31, 2014, Treasury has sold all or part of its investments in 162 institutions, through the auction process, including the rights to approximately $207 million in missed dividends and interest payments. Remaining CPP Institutions Are Generally Less Financially Healthy Than Those That Have Exited
Institutions that remain in CPP tend to be financially weaker than institutions that have exited the program and institutions that did not receive CPP capital. Almost 84 percent, or 75 of the 89 financial institutions remaining in CPP as of November 30, 2013, have missed a dividend payment. The Number of Remaining CPP Institutions on FDIC’s Problem Bank List Has Declined
Showing a similar trend to missed dividend or interest payments, the number of CPP institutions on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) “problem bank list” has decreased in recent months after months of steady increases. This list is a compilation of banks with demonstrated financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threaten their continued financial viability and is publicly reported on a quarterly basis. Federal and state bank regulators may not allow institutions on the problem bank list to make dividend payments in an effort to preserve their capital and promote safety and soundness. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to Treasury for its review and comment. In its written comments, Treasury generally concurred with our findings. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine (1) the status of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), including repayments and other proceeds, as well as investments outstanding; and (2) the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP. To assess the status of CPP at the program level, we analyzed data from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). To assess the financial condition of institutions that received investments under CPP, we used data from Treasury’s Dividends and Interest reports from February 2009 through November 2013 to determine the extent to which participants had missed payments throughout the life of the program. We identified those CPP participants that raised capital in calendar year 2013 using the SNL database. We analyzed financial data on the 83 institutions remaining in CPP as of January 31, 2014, and 482 former CPP institutions that exited CPP through full repayments, conversion to the Small Business Lending Fund, or Treasury’s sale of its investments through an auction, accounting for 565 of the 707 CPP participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
CPP was established as the primary means of restoring stability to the financial system under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under CPP, Treasury invested almost $205 billion in 707 eligible financial institutions between October 2008 and December 2009. CPP recipients have made dividend and interest payments to Treasury on the investments. TARP's authorizing legislation requires GAO to report every 60 days on TARP activities. This report examines (1) the status of CPP and (2) the financial condition of institutions remaining in the program.
To assess the program's status, GAO reviewed Treasury reports on the status of CPP. GAO also used financial and regulatory data to compare the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP with those that had exited the program and those that did not participate. GAO also obtained information through a questionnaire from CPP participants as of November 20, 2013, and former CPP participants that raised capital in calendar year 2013. GAO received completed questionnaires from 72 of the 104 institutions.
GAO provided a draft of this report to Treasury for its review and comment. Treasury generally concurred with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
The Department of Treasury (Treasury) continues to make progress in winding down the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). As of January 31, 2014, Treasury's data showed that 624 of the original 707 institutions, or about 88 percent, had exited CPP. Treasury had received about $225 billion from its CPP investments, exceeding the approximately $205 billion it had disbursed. Most institutions exited by repurchasing their preferred shares in full or by refinancing their investments through other federal programs. Treasury also continues to sell its investments in the institutions through auctions; a strategy first implemented in March 2012 to expedite the exit of a number of CPP participants. As of January 31, 2014, Treasury has sold all or part of its CPP investment in 162 institutions through auctions, receiving a total of about 80 percent of the principal amount. A relatively small number of the remaining 83 institutions accounted for most of the outstanding investments. Specifically, 10 institutions accounted for $1.5 billion or about 73 percent of the $2.1 billion in outstanding investments. Treasury estimated a lifetime gain of $16.1 billion for CPP as of November 30, 2013.
GAO's analysis of financial data found that the institutions remaining in CPP were generally less financially healthy than those that have exited or that never participated. In particular, the remaining CPP institutions tended to be less profitable, hold riskier assets, and have lower capital levels and reserves. Most remaining participants also have missed scheduled dividend or interest payments, with 60 missing their November 2013 payment. Further, 47 of the remaining CPP institutions were on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's problem bank list in December 2013—that is, they demonstrated financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threatened their continued financial viability. Institutions that continue to miss dividend payments or find themselves on the problem bank list may have difficulty fully repaying their CPP investments because federal and state bank regulators may not allow these institutions to make dividend payments or repurchase outstanding CPP shares in an effort to preserve their capital and promote safety and soundness. |
gao_GAO-06-440T | gao_GAO-06-440T_0 | AOC Has Moved Construction Forward, Revised the Project’s Schedule, and Postponed Opening Dates
AOC and the CVC team have continued to refine the project’s schedule since the November hearing and have made substantive progress in addressing the issues that we and the Subcommittee have raised, particularly concerning the base project’s schedule. To reflect the results of its review, the team revised the project’s December 2005 and January 2006 schedules, and in collaboration with the team that is planning for CVC operations, enhanced the manner in which the operations activities are incorporated into the project’s master schedule. According to AOC’s December 2005 and January 2006 schedules, the CVC base project will be ready to open to the public with a temporary certificate of occupancy on February 13, 2007, and the House and Senate expansion spaces will be ready on April 24, 2007. To allow for possible delays and start-up time for operations, AOC has proposed an April 2007 opening date for the base project and a May 2007 occupancy date for the expansion spaces. The additional time AOC says is necessary for operations preparation after construction completion would mean that the CVC would be ready for opening with a temporary cap on visitor occupancy by about the end of May 2007, according to our analysis. We believe the later time frames are more likely because (1) AOC has scheduled the acceptance testing of the expansion spaces after the acceptance testing of the base project and, according to our work, the base project testing will take longer than scheduled and (2) AOC’s Chief Fire Marshal believes that the acceptance testing of the expansion spaces will take longer than scheduled. We have discussed the results of our analysis with AOC, and it continues to believe that it will be able to meet its April and May 2007 time frames for the CVC and the expansion spaces, respectively. However, we also believe that AOC will be challenged to meet even the later opening dates we have identified given the problems, challenges, risks, and uncertainties the project faces. Complex building systems remain a significant risk. Estimated Project Costs Exceed Funding Provided as of February 2006
We currently estimate that the total cost to complete the entire CVC project is about $555 million without an allowance for risks and uncertainties and could be as much as about $584 million with such an allowance. This $12 million increase is largely attributable to additional delay costs estimated by AOC’s construction management contractor and actual and anticipated changes in the design and scope of the project. In particular, changes in the project’s fire protection system, which we discussed at the Subcommittee’s October 18, 2005, CVC hearing, are now expected to cost more than previously estimated. We now estimate that the total cost to complete the entire project with an allowance for risks and uncertainties could be as much as $584 million, or about $25 million more than we estimated in November 2005. To date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC construction. This request was based, in part, on discussions with us and took into account our November 16, 2005, estimate of the cost to complete the project’s construction without an allowance for risks and uncertainties and funding from existing appropriations. Estimated Construction Costs for Library of Congress Tunnel Close to, but under, Limit
Public Law 108-83 limits to $10 million the amount of federal funds that can be obligated or expended for the construction of the tunnel connecting the CVC with the Library of Congress. AOC’s remaining estimated costs are for potential changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO testified before the Senate Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Committee on Appropriations to provide the results of a risk-based analysis of schedule and cost for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC). Our remarks focused on (1) our assessment of the risks associated with the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) December 2005 schedule, and our estimate of a time frame for opening the project to the public; and (2) the project's costs and funding, including the potential impact of scheduling issues that have arisen since the Subcommittee's November 16, 2005, hearing on the CVC project's schedule and cost.
What GAO Found
Since the Subcommittee's November 16 CVC hearing, AOC and the CVC team have moved the project's construction forward and significantly revised the schedule, particularly for the base project. For example, they have reached agreement with AOC's Chief Fire Marshal on the schedule for testing the base project's life safety systems and have enhanced the manner in which the project's operations schedule is incorporated into the project's master schedule. In addition, they have reviewed and revised the schedule, postponing the opening dates for the CVC and the House and Senate expansion spaces by about 2 months each. Under AOC's revised schedule, the CVC would be open to the public in February 2007 with a temporary cap on visitor occupancy, and the expansion spaces would be open in April 2007. However, to allow for possible delays and start-up time for operations, AOC is proposing to open the CVC in April 2007 and the expansion spaces in May 2007, at which time the temporary cap on CVC occupancy would be lifted. We concur with AOC about the need for postponing the opening dates, but do not believe that AOC has scheduled enough time to complete several of the project's critical tasks and to address the problems, challenges, risks, and uncertainties that AOC and the CVC team are attempting to address. If they are successful in addressing these issues, we believe that the CVC can be opened to the public with the temporary cap on visitor occupancy in May 2007 and that the expansion spaces can be opened beginning in mid-August to early September 2007. Congress may be able to begin occupying the expansion spaces earlier if AOC implements a phased opening plan it is considering. However, if AOC experiences major problems completing construction, such as with installing interior stone or testing major building systems, the work could be finished even later than we have estimated. According to our current estimate, the total estimated cost to complete the entire CVC project is about $555 million without an allowance for risks and uncertainties. This estimate exceeds our November 16, 2005, estimate by about $12 million because we and AOC's construction management contractor are now projecting further delay-related costs. Changes in the project's design and scope have also been occurring, and more are likely. For example, the project's fire protection system has been evolving, and the system is now expected to cost more than previously estimated. To date, about $528 million has been provided for CVC construction. Thus, we now estimate that another $25.6 million will be needed to complete construction without an allowance for risks and uncertainties and taking into account funding from existing appropriations that AOC is planning to use. With an allowance for risks and uncertainties, we now estimate that the project could cost as much as about $584 million at completion, or about $25 million more than we estimated in November 2005. Estimated costs for the tunnel connecting the CVC with the Library of Congress are still within, but are now approaching, the $10 million statutorily mandated limit. |
gao_GAO-10-482 | gao_GAO-10-482_0 | The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force’s Basing Decision Processes Are Comprehensive, but the Navy’s Process Lacks Guidance in Some Areas
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes include all of the key elements, associated factors, and management control standards that we identified as necessary in a comprehensive process and that when incorporated in the process, increase its transparency, repeatability and defendability. Specifically, we found that some of the Navy’s guidance documents do not provide detailed information about how certain types of analyses will be completed and who is responsible for completing them. Without comprehensive and clear guidance of the Navy’s overall basing decision process, the Navy may lack the completeness and management control to ensure that its basing decisions can facilitate external stakeholders’ examination and scrutiny or ensure effective implementation of Navy’s basing process. However, Navy guidance does not provide a clear explanation for how all of these guidance documents are linked together in the process. However, the Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart does not describe in any detail how the analysis is to be conducted and who is to conduct it. OSD Does Not Have a Clear Process to Exercise Management Control over the Services’ Basing Decision Processes
The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a clear role for providing management control of the services’ basing decision processes within the United States and not made under the BRAC legislation, and as a consequence may lack reasonable assurance that certain DOD-wide initiatives will be fully supported in service basing decisions. Without implementing a DOD-wide policy that includes guidance and oversight of the military services’ basing processes and assigns an OSD office with authority and responsibility for providing this oversight, the Secretary of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that DOD plans for sharing facilities among the services, possible impacts on global basing and operations, or other departmentwide issues are adequately considered by the services in their basing decision making. 2. Establish guidance for the services to ensure that they fully consider joint use of DOD facilities, impacts to global operations, and other departmentwide initiatives during the course of their basing processes. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to describe the link between its five guidance documents—the Chief of Naval Operations Organization Change Manual; Strategic Laydown Flow Chart; Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart; the Secretary of the Navy’s environmental planning document; and the Chief of Naval Operations environmental planning document—used to implement the Navy’s overall basing decision process. We used the services’ guidance documents and other pertinent documents, interviews with the service officials, and officials’ comments regarding our analyses of the services’ processes to determine the extent to which the services have comprehensive basing decision processes in place that are designed to result in well-informed basing decisions within the United States that are not made under BRAC legislation. To determine the extent to which the Secretary of Defense exercises management control, such as providing DOD-wide guidance and oversight of the services’ basing decision processes, we reviewed DOD and military service guidance, policies, instructions, regulations, and orders and relevant law to identify whether an office within OSD has been clearly assigned a role and responsibilities over the services’ basing processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decisions by the military services on where to base their force structure can have significant strategic, socioeconomic, and cost implications for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the communities surrounding the bases. Each service uses its own process to make basing decisions. The House Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to review the services' basing decision processes. GAO examined the extent to which (1) the services have comprehensive processes in place that are designed to result in well-informed basing decisions and (2) DOD exercises management control of these processes. GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and service guidance, studies, and relevant documents on implementation and oversight of the services' basing processes.
What GAO Found
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes fully incorporate the key elements, associated factors, and management control standards that GAO identified as necessary in a comprehensive process; however, the Navy needs additional guidance for its process to be complete. GAO found that while the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force each have issued comprehensive guidance for their basing possesses that describes the organizational roles and responsibilities within the service, establishes links among all of the service's strategic and environmental guidance documents, and identifies the service's basing criteria, some of the Navy's guidance documents lacked detailed information about specific actions taken during the process and defined responsibility for completing certain types of analyses. For example, the Navy's Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart--one of the five guidance documents used to implement the Navy's process--shows that some types of analyses are conducted to review a range of considerations, such as access to training areas, sailor and family quality of life, and ship size, for a particular basing decision. But the document does not describe in any detail how and by whom these analyses will be conducted. Additionally, Navy guidance does not provide a clear explanation of how its five guidance documents are linked together in implementing the Navy's overall basing process. Without comprehensive and clear guidance on all aspects of the Navy's overall basing decision process, the Navy may lack the completeness and management control to ensure that Navy basing decisions can facilitate external stakeholders' examination and scrutiny or ensure effective implementation of the Navy's basing process. The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a clear role for providing management control of the services' basing decision processes within the United States, and as a consequence may lack reasonable assurance that certain departmentwide initiatives will be fully supported in the services' basing decisions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials said that OSD is promoting joint sharing of DOD facilities and seeking to ensure that domestic basing decisions support global operations. However, OSD has not fully promoted service consideration of the joint sharing, global operations, and potentially other initiatives because the Secretary of Defense has neither provided a comprehensive policy for, nor clearly assigned an office within OSD to oversee domestic service basing processes. Without OSD guidance and an office to provide effective oversight of military service basing decision processes, the Secretary of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that departmentwide initiatives are adequately considered by the services in their domestic basing decision making. |
gao_GAO-02-7 | gao_GAO-02-7_0 | During the past three decades, the Department of Education has created many nonintegrated information systems to support its growing number of student financial aid programs. In adopting this approach to better integration and utilization of its existing data on student loans and grants, SFA may be able to address, at least in part, long-standing database integration problems. In addressing the human capital skills issue associated with successful middleware implementation, SFA will count on the help of its modernization partner, who has substantial experience in implementing middleware solutions in the banking industry and the use of the middleware product’s vendor (IBM) as programmers. While middleware provides a means for better user integration, sound business practices and disciplined internal management controls will be needed for any organization to achieve mission improvements and financial benefits from its information systems investments. 10. | What GAO Found
Although the Department of Education spent millions of dollars to modernize and integrate its nonintegrated financial aid systems during the past 10 years, these efforts have met with limited success. Recently, Education's Office of Student Financial Assistance (SFA) began using a software approach known as middleware to provide users with a more complete and integrated view of information in its many databases. In selecting middleware, SFA has adopted a viable, industry-accepted means for integrating and utilizing its existing data on student loans and grants. To meet its human capital needs, SFA has solicited the help of a private sector "modernization partner" with experience in implementing and managing middleware solutions--particularly in the financial industry--and has also chosen to use a leading middleware software product. |
gao_GAO-03-468T | gao_GAO-03-468T_0 | Market Participants and Infrastructure Providers Employed Innovative Solutions to Restore Trading
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had a devastating effect on the U.S. financial markets with significant loss of life, extensive physical damage, and considerable disruption to the financial district in New York. Although most stock exchanges and clearing organizations escaped direct damage, the facilities and personnel of several key broker-dealers and other market participants were destroyed or displaced. Attacks Revealed Limitations in Market Participants’ Preparedness for Wide-scale Disasters, and Some Limitations Remain
Although financial market participants, regulators, and infrastructure providers made heroic efforts to restore the functioning of the markets as quickly as they did, the attacks and our review of 15 key financial market organizations—including 7 critical ones—revealed that financial market participants needed to improve their business continuity planning capabilities and take other actions to better prepare themselves for potential disasters. The 15 stock exchanges, ECNs, clearing organizations, and payment systems we reviewed had implemented various physical and information security measures and business continuity capabilities both before and since the attacks. Although these organizations have taken steps to reduce the likelihood that their operations would be disrupted by physical or electronic attacks and had also developed plans to recover from such events, we found that some organizations continued to have some limitations that would increase the risk of their operations being impaired by future disasters. Regulators Have Addressed Operations Risks but Have Not Developed Complete Strategies and Practices to Better Assure Recovery of Trading
Securities and banking regulators have made efforts to examine operations risk measures in place at the financial market participants they oversee. Regulators also have begun efforts to improve the resiliency of clearing and settlement functions for the financial markets. The U.S. economy has demonstrated that it can withstand short periods during which markets are not trading. SEC’s Automation Review Policy Program Could Be Strengthened
Given the increased threats demonstrated by the September 11 attacks and the need to assure that key financial market organizations are following sound practices, securities and banking regulators’ oversight programs are important mechanisms to assure that U.S. financial markets are resilient. In addition, the intervals between examinations were sometimes long. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks exposed the vulnerability of U.S. financial markets to wide-scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the nation's economy, GAO's testimony discusses (1) how the financial markets were directly affected by the attacks and how market participants and infrastructure providers worked to restore trading; (2) the steps taken by 15 important financial market organizations to address physical security, electronic security, and business continuity planning since the attacks; and (3) the steps the financial regulators have taken to ensure that the markets are better prepared for future disasters.
What GAO Found
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks severely disrupted U.S. financial markets as the result of the loss of life, damage to buildings, loss of telecommunications and power, and restrictions on access to the affected area. However, financial market participants were able to recover relatively quickly from the terrorist attacks because of market participants' and infrastructure providers' heroic efforts and because the securities exchanges and clearing organizations largely escaped direct damage. The attacks revealed limitations in the business continuity capabilities of some key financial market participants that would need to be addressed to improve the ability of U.S. markets to withstand such events in the future. GAO's review of 15 stock exchanges, clearing organizations, electronic communication networks, and payments system providers between February and June 2002 showed that all were taking steps to implement physical and electronic security measures and had developed business continuity plans. However, some organizations still had limitations in one or more of these areas that increased the risk that their operations could be disrupted by future disasters. Although the financial regulators have begun efforts to improve the resiliency of clearance and settlement functions within the financial markets, they have not fully developed goals, strategies, or sound practices to improve the resiliency of trading activities. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) technology and operations risk oversight, which is increasingly important, has been hampered by program, staff, and resource issues. GAO's report made recommendations designed to better prepare the markets to deal with future disasters and to enhance SEC's technology and operations risk oversight capabilities. |
gao_GAO-07-439T | gao_GAO-07-439T_0 | Army Reset Tracking System Cannot Confirm Funds Appropriated for Reset are Expended for that Purpose
The Army cannot track or report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose. In order to provide effective oversight of the Army’s implementation of its equipment reset strategies and to plan for future reset initiatives, the Congress needs to be assured that the funds appropriated for reset are used as intended. The Army, however, is unable to confirm that the $38 billion that Congress has appropriated to the Army since fiscal year 2002 for equipment reset has been obligated and expended for reset. Because equipment reset was not a separate program within the budget, it was grouped together with other equipment-related line items in the O&M and Procurement accounts. The Conference Report accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007 directed the Secretary of Defense to provide periodic reports to congressional defense committees which include a detailed accounting of obligations and expenditures of appropriations provided in Title IX of the act by program and subactivity group. The Army has established a subactivity group for reset, and, according to Army officials, beginning in fiscal year 2007, the Army has begun to track reset obligations and expenditures by subactivity group. However, based on our analysis, the Army’s reset tracking system does not provide sufficient detail to provide Congress with the visibility it needs to provide effective oversight. Army Cannot Be Assured Its Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements
The Army cannot be assured its reset strategies will sustain equipment availability for deployed as well as non-deployed units while meeting ongoing operational requirements. The Army’s primary objective for equipment reset is to equip its deployed forces and units preparing for deployment. Army Reset Strategies Do Not Target Low Levels Of Equipment On Hand To Mitigate Operational Risk
The Army’s reset strategies do not specifically target low levels of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment in order to mitigate operational risk. The Army continues to be faced with increasing levels of operational risk due to low levels of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment. According to the Army’s fiscal year 2007 framework for reset and the Army’s ARFORGEN implementation strategy, the primary goal of reset is to prepare units for deployment and to improve next-to-deploy units’ equipment on hand levels. However, since the Army’s reset planning process is based on resetting the equipment that will be returning to the United States in a given fiscal year, and not based on an aggregate equipment requirement to improve the equipment on hand levels of deploying units, the Army cannot be assured that its reset programs will provide sufficient equipment to train and equip deploying units for ongoing and future GWOT requirements, which may lead to increasing levels of operational risk. Army Has Begun To Track Equipment Readiness But Readiness Indicators Are of Limited Value
As of fiscal year 2007, Army officials stated they have begun to track the equipment readiness of returning units and units approaching deployment dates in an effort to assess the effectiveness of their reset efforts. However, these readiness indicators such as equipment on hand and equipment serviceability are of limited value in assessing the effectiveness of reset. Concluding Observations
Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated approximately $38 billion for Army equipment reset. In addition, the Army estimates that future funding requirements for equipment reset will be about $12 to $13 billion per year for the foreseeable future. Also, the Army’s reset strategies need to ensure that priority is given to repairing, replacing, and modernizing the equipment that is needed to equip units preparing for deployment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Continuing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are taking a heavy toll on the condition and readiness of the Army's equipment. Harsh combat and environmental conditions in theater over sustain periods exacerbates the wear and tear on equipment. Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated about $38 billion to the Army for the reset (repair, replacement, and modernization) of equipment that has been damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. As operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Army's equipment reset requirements increase, the potential for reset costs to significantly increase in future Department of Defense annual budgets also increases. For example, the Army estimates that it will need about $12 billion to $13 billion per year for equipment reset until operations cease, and up to two years thereafter. Today's testimony addresses (1) the extent to which the Army can track and report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose, and (2) whether the Army can be assured that its equipment reset strategies will sustain future equipment readiness for deployed as well as non-deployed units while meeting ongoing requirements. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from November 2005 through December 2006.
What GAO Found
The Army cannot track or report equipment reset expenditures in a way that confirms that funds appropriated for reset are expended for that purpose. In order to provide effective oversight of the Army's implementation of its equipment reset strategies and to plan for future reset initiatives, the Congress needs to be assured that the funds appropriated for reset are used as intended. The Army, however, is unable to confirm that the $38 billion that Congress has appropriated to the Army since fiscal year 2002 for equipment reset has been obligated and expended for reset. Because equipment reset had not been identified as a separate program within the budget, it was grouped together with other equipment-related line items in the O&M and Procurement appropriations. With the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations Act, Congress directed DOD to provide a detailed accounting of obligations and expenditures by program and subactivity group. The Army has established a subactivity group for reset, and, according to Army officials, beginning in fiscal year 2007, the Army has begun to track reset obligations and expenditures by subactivity group. However, based on our analysis, the Army's reset tracking system does not provide sufficient detail to provide Congress with the visibility it needs to provide effective oversight. The Army cannot be assured its reset strategies will sustain equipment availability for deployed as well as non-deployed units while meeting ongoing operational requirements. The Army's primary objective for equipment reset is to equip units preparing for deployment. However, the Army's reset strategy does not specifically target low levels of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment. Although deployed Army units generally report high readiness rates, the Army continues to be faced with increasing levels of operational risk due to low levels of equipment on hand among units preparing for deployment. According to the Army's fiscal year 2007 framework for reset and the Army's Force Generation model implementation strategy, the goal of reset is to prepare units for deployment and to improve next-to-deploy unit's equipment on hand levels. However, since the Army's current reset planning process is based on resetting equipment that it expects will be returning to the United States in a given fiscal year, and not based on an aggregate equipment requirement to improve the equipment on hand levels of deploying units, the Army cannot be assured that its reset programs will provide sufficient equipment to train and equip deploying units for ongoing and future requirements for the Global War on Terrorism. The Army has recently begun to track the equipment readiness of returning units and units approaching deployment in an effort to assess the effectiveness of their reset efforts. However, these readiness indicators are of limited value in assessing the effectiveness of reset because they do not measure the equipment on hand levels against the equipment that the units actually require to accomplish their directed missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. |
gao_GAO-04-551T | gao_GAO-04-551T_0 | (GAO-04-344, Feb. 9, 2004)
These examples clearly demonstrate not only the severity of DOD’s current problems, but also the importance of reforming financial management and related business operations to improve mission support and the economy and efficiency of DOD’s operations, and to provide for transparency and accountability to Congress and American taxpayers. Underlying Causes of Financial and Related Business Process Transformation Challenges
The underlying causes of DOD’s financial management and related business process and system weaknesses are generally the same ones I outlined in my prior testimony before this Subcommittee 2 years ago. Over the years, the department has undertaken many initiatives intended to transform its business operations departmentwide and improve the reliability of information for decision making and reporting but has not had much success because it has not addressed the following four underlying causes: a lack of sustained top-level leadership and management accountability for deeply embedded cultural resistance to change, including military service parochialism and stovepiped operations; a lack of results-oriented goals and performance measures and inadequate incentives and accountability mechanisms relating to business transformation efforts. Keys to Successful Reform and Current Status of Reform Efforts
Over the years, we have given DOD credit for beginning numerous initiatives intended to improve its business operations. These elements are addressing the department’s financial management and related business operational challenges as part of a comprehensive, integrated, DOD-wide strategic plan for business reform; providing for sustained and committed leadership by top management, including but not limited to the Secretary of Defense, establishing resource control over business systems investments; establishing clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability; incorporating results-oriented performance measures and monitoring progress tied to key financial and business transformation objectives; providing appropriate incentives or consequences for action or inaction; establishing an enterprise architecture to guide and direct business systems modernization investments; and ensuring effective oversight and monitoring. Later, I will offer a suggestion for improving the management and oversight of the billions of dollars DOD invests annually in system modernization efforts. Since we reported problems with DOD’s purchase card program, DOD and the military services have taken actions to address all of our 109 recommendations. Suggestions for Legislative Consideration
I would like to offer two suggestions for legislative consideration that I believe could contribute significantly to the department’s ability to not only address the impediments to DOD success but also to incorporate needed key elements to successful reform. All domain owners would be responsible for coordinating their business system modernization efforts with the chief management official who would chair the Defense Business Systems Modernization Executive Committee. Further, the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all business areas has resulted in certain fraud, waste, and abuse and hinders DOD’s attempts to develop world-class operations and activities to support its forces. DOD’s senior leaders have demonstrated a commitment to transforming the department and improving its business operations and have taken positive steps to begin this effort. We believe that our two suggested legislative initiatives will greatly improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-based reform at DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2002, GAO testified on the Department of Defense's (DOD) financial management problems and key elements necessary for successful reform. Although the underlying conditions remain fundamentally unchanged, within the past 2 years DOD has begun a number of initiatives intended to address previously reported problems and transform its business operations. The Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to provide a current status report on DOD's progress to date and suggestions for improvement. Specifically, GAO was asked to provide (1) an overview of the impact of financial and related business weaknesses on DOD operations, (2) the underlying causes of DOD business transformation challenges, and (3) the status of DOD reform efforts. In addition, GAO reiterates the key elements to successful reform: (1) an integrated business transformation strategy, (2) sustained leadership and resource control, (3) clear lines of responsibility and accountability, (4) results-oriented performance, (5) appropriate incentives and consequences, (6) an enterprise architecture to guide reform efforts, and (7) effective monitoring and oversight. GAO also offers two suggestions for legislative consideration which are intended to improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-based financial management and related business reform at DOD.
What GAO Found
DOD's senior civilian and military leaders are committed to transforming the department and improving its business operations and have taken positive steps to begin this effort. However, overhauling the financial management and related business operations of one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world represents a huge management challenge. Six DOD program areas are on GAO's "high risk" list, and the department shares responsibility for three other governmentwide high-risk areas. DOD's substantial financial and business management weaknesses adversely affect not only its ability to produce auditable financial information, but also to provide timely, reliable information for management and Congress to use in making informed decisions. Further, the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all of DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars in annual wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal constraint. Four underlying causes impede reform: (1) lack of sustained leadership, (2) cultural resistance to change, (3) lack of meaningful metrics and ongoing monitoring, and (4) inadequate incentives and accountability mechanisms. To address these issues, GAO reiterates the keys to successful business transformation and makes two additional suggestions for legislative action. First, GAO suggests that a senior management position be established to spearhead DOD-wide business transformation efforts. Second, GAO proposes that the leaders of DOD's functional areas, referred to as domains, receive and control the funding for system investments, as opposed to the military services. Domain leaders would be responsible for managing business system and process reform efforts within their business areas and would be accountable to the new senior management official for ensuring their efforts comply with DOD's business enterprise architecture. |
gao_GAO-07-44 | gao_GAO-07-44_0 | State and Local Governments Face Challenges in Identifying and Locating Transportation- Disadvantaged Populations, Determining Their Evacuation Needs, and Providing for Their Transportation
According to experts and officials, the challenges state and local governments face in preparing for the evacuation of transportation- disadvantaged populations include identifying and locating these populations, determining their evacuation needs, and providing for their transportation. Additionally, data on the location of transportation-disadvantaged populations is not readily available because such data: have not previously been collected; cannot be collected because of the amount of time, staff, and other resources required, or cannot be shared due to the preference of some transportation-disadvantaged populations; for example, the established registration system in one of the five major cities we visited had only 1400—or 0.3 percent—of the 462,000 people projected to need evacuation assistance registered; are not compiled in a central location, but reside in separate databases across numerous agencies, companies, or organizations, including social service agencies, departments of motor vehicles, and public and private sector transportation providers; are not traditionally shared with emergency management officials; for example, a local metropolitan planning organization may collect data on those who are transit-dependent, but may not have shared that information with emergency management officials; or cannot be shared with emergency officials due to privacy restrictions; for example, social service agencies or nonprofit organizations that regularly transport people during non-emergency times and have information on clients’ needs, but may not be able or willing to share that data because of privacy concerns. Although some state and local governments have taken steps to address challenges and related barriers, the outcomes of these actions remain uncertain. However, 2000 U.S. Census data reported that 16.5 percent of households in that major city are car-less. Such entities can assist emergency management officials in efficiently determining the needs of these populations. Amendments to the Stafford Act in October 2006 have further clarified that FEMA, within DHS, is the single federal agency responsible for leading and coordinating evacuation assistance. V.)
Despite Some Federal Assistance to State and Local Governments, Gaps Remain in Evacuation Preparedness for Transportation- Disadvantaged Populations
Although the federal government provides some assistance to state and local governments for preparing to evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations, gaps in this assistance remain, including the following: Requirements: Until October 2006, while federal law required that emergency plans include an evacuation plan, there was no specific requirement that the evacuation plan address how to transport those who could not self-evacuate. Federal law now requires that state and local governments with mass evacuation plans incorporate special needs populations into their plan. However, this requirement does not necessarily ensure the incorporation of all transportation-disadvantaged populations. Gaps Also Remain in Federal Agencies’ Role and Responsibilities for Providing Evacuation Assistance When State and Local Governments are Overwhelmed
Although the Stafford Act gives the federal government the authority to assist state and local governments with an evacuation, we found that the National Response Plan—the federal government’s plan for disaster response—does not clearly define the lead, coordinating, and supporting agencies to provide evacuation assistance for transportation- disadvantaged and other populations or outline these agencies’ responsibilities when state and local governments are overwhelmed by a catastrophic disaster. However, despite these improvements, DHS has not yet clarified, in the National Response Plan, the leading, coordinating, and supporting federal agencies to provide evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed, and what their responsibilities are. While state and local governments have primary responsibility for planning, training, and conducting exercises for the evacuation of these populations, gaps in federal assistance have hindered the ability of many state and local governments to sufficiently prepare to address the complex challenges and barriers of evacuating transportation- disadvantaged populations. This includes the lack of any requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation- disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in guidance and technical assistance, such as problems with DHS’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing online portal. In addition, information that DOT grantees and stakeholders have could be useful in evacuation preparedness efforts. To identify challenges and barriers, we reviewed selected reports on evacuations. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the evacuation of New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many of those who did not own a vehicle and could not evacuate were among the over 1,300 people who died. This raised questions about how well state and local governments, primarily responsible for disaster planning, integrate transportation-disadvantaged populations into such planning. GAO assessed the challenges and barriers state and local officials face; how prepared these governments are and steps they are taking to address challenges and barriers; and federal efforts to provide evacuation assistance. GAO reviewed evacuation plans; Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Transportation (DOT), and other studies; and interviewed officials in five major city and four state governments.
What GAO Found
State and local governments face evacuation challenges in identifying and locating transportation-disadvantaged populations, determining their needs, and providing for their transportation. These populations are diverse and constantly changing, and information on their location is often not readily available. In addition, these populations' evacuation needs vary widely; some require basic transportation while others need accessible equipment, such as buses with chair lifts. Legal and social barriers impede addressing these evacuation challenges. For example, transportation providers may be unwilling to provide evacuation assistance because of liability concerns. State and local governments are generally not well prepared--in terms of planning, training, and conducting exercises--to evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations, but some have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, DHS reported in June 2006 that only about 10 percent of state and about 12 percent of urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these populations. Furthermore, in one of five major cities GAO visited, officials believed that few residents would require evacuation assistance despite the U.S. Census reporting 16.5 percent of car-less households in that major city. DHS also found that most states and urban areas significantly underestimated the advance planning and coordination required to effectively address the needs of persons with disabilities. Steps being taken by some such governments include collaboration with social service and transportation providers and transportation planning organizations--some of which are DOT grantees and stakeholders--to determine transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance to state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered many of these governments' ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations. This includes the lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in the usefulness of DHS's guidance. Although federal law requires that state and local governments with mass evacuation plans incorporate special needs populations into their plans, this requirement does not necessarily ensure the incorporation of all transportation-disadvantaged populations. Additionally, while DHS has made improvements to an online portal for sharing related information, this information remains difficult to access because of poor search and organizational functions. Moreover, although the federal government can provide evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed, the federal government is not prepared to do so. Amendments to the Stafford Act in October 2006 affirmed that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (an agency within DHS) is responsible for leading and coordinating evacuation assistance. DHS has not yet clarified, in the National Response Plan, the lead, coordinating, or supporting agencies in such cases. |
gao_GGD-96-172 | gao_GGD-96-172_0 | IRS’ Efforts to Reduce EIC Noncompliance in 1995: Some Positive Results, Some Problems
IRS took several steps in 1995 to combat a growing problem with refund fraud in general and, more specifically, EIC noncompliance. Most significantly, IRS (1) expanded the up-front controls in its Electronic Filing System, (2) placed increased emphasis on its efforts to verify SSNs on paper returns, and (3) held up the refunds on millions of EIC returns with valid SSNs to allow IRS time to check for duplicate SSN usage. IRS expanded its SSN validation efforts in 1995 to include dependents with a problem SSN and identified 3.3 million paper returns with 1 or more missing or invalid SSNs for EIC-qualifying children and/or dependents.About 3 million of those returns involved requests for refunds. Examination had enough resources to review only about 1 million of the questionable returns. IRS Did Not Follow Through on Plans to Check for Duplicate SSN Use
Because IRS studies have shown a high risk of noncompliance with returns claiming the EIC, IRS decided to delay about 4 million EIC refunds in 1995 even though IRS had identified no missing or invalid SSNs on those returns.The 4 million returns included returns filed electronically and on paper with EIC claims above a certain dollar amount. After holding the refunds for several weeks, IRS released almost all of them without checking for duplicate SSNs. Comments From the Internal Revenue Service
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to reduce Earned Income Credit (EIC) noncompliance in calendar year 1995.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the up-front controls used by IRS in its Electronic Filing System helped IRS reduce some EIC noncompliance and identify about 1.3 million social security number (SSN) problems on electronically filed tax returns in 1995; (2) IRS placed increased emphasis on validating SSN on paper returns, since it identified about 3.3 million returns with missing or invalid SSN for EIC-qualifying children; (3) although IRS identified 3.3 million returns with problems, IRS only had the resources to follow up on 1 million cases; (4) IRS delayed refunds on about 4 million EIC returns that did not have any SSN problems to check for the use of duplicate SSN, but released almost all of those refunds without checking for duplicate SSN; (5) IRS has taken steps to better utilize its resources in 1996, such as attempting to identify more productive cases and limiting the number of delayed refunds; and (6) the overall impact on IRS efforts to reduce EIC noncompliance cannot be assessed because IRS commingled 1995 data with data from previous years. |
gao_GAO-14-740 | gao_GAO-14-740_0 | Recent commodity trends, such as the increase in domestic crude oil production from shale formations, have affected freight movements. In 2012, the President signed into law the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) . In November 2013, DOT released for comment a draft primary freight network. Truck volumes have also increased in recent years and are approaching levels prior to the 2008 recession, causing community impacts when trucks must travel on local roads, such as roads connecting ports to freeways. Traffic Congestion at Highway-Rail Crossings is a Longstanding Concern but Impacts and Costs Are Not Always Documented
DOT, state, and local officials identified a key negative impact of increasing freight flows as freight-related traffic congestion occurring at highway-rail grade crossings, where road traffic must wait to cross the tracks when trains are passing. Several communities we visited had documented longstanding concerns over highway-rail grade crossings. For example, the 2004 Billings, Montana, study described above included some general information on train counts but no information documenting the number of vehicles delayed, the hours of delay, or any costs associated with such delays. This study concluded that rail crossings in the area caused delays of roughly 235,000 person-hours per year at a cost of $2.4 million. However, DOT and other national and state freight stakeholders that commented on the draft network raised concerns that the lack of a defined purpose for the network in MAP-21 and the mileage limit requirement—that it be limited to 27,000 centerline miles—had resulted in a network that omits the types of The significance of the 27,000 roads where local traffic congestion impacts of national freight movements are often experienced. With Limited Guidance from MAP-21, DOT Has Not Yet Defined the Federal Role in Addressing Local Freight Impacts and Lack of Data Hampers Effort
In the context of limited direction in MAP-21 related to community impact issues, to date, DOT’s efforts to implement certain freight requirements in MAP 21 do not clearly establish a federal role related to local impacts such as freight-related traffic congestion by identifying goals, objectives, or measures in this area. DOT also stated that as required by MAP-21, it plans to incorporate a discussion of best practices to mitigate the impacts of freight movement on communities in the National Freight Strategic Plan, which is due in 2015. As a result, in the Freight Transportation Conditions and Performance Report, DOT is not planning to identify specific goals, objectives, or measures for addressing freight-related congestion in local communities. Good data and information systems are essential to supporting sound capital planning and decision-making. DOT’s efforts as previously described do not yet fully establish the federal role in this area, which could limit the usefulness of the eventual National Freight Strategic Plan in laying out a strategy related to these issues. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In reauthorizing the federal highway program, Congress should consider establishing a clear purpose for the national freight network and primary freight network that incorporates inclusion of the types of roads where communities are likely to experience significant freight-related traffic congestion, and, as relevant to this purpose, consider revising certain requirements such as the mileage limit of 27,000 miles or changing the requirement from a centerline to a corridor approach. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to clarify the federal role related to freight-related local traffic congestion, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following two actions in implementing MAP-21 and any subsequent reauthorization: in its final guidance on state freight plans, incorporate additional information to help states define and prioritize local community impacts of national freight movements, including traffic-congestion impacts, and to establish what data could be consistently collected and analyzed in order to prioritize impacts of freight on local traffic congestion; include in the National Freight Strategic Plan a written statement articulating the federal role in freight-related local congestion impacts, by clearly identifying potential objectives and goals (under the general area DOT has established for the Freight Transportation Conditions and Performance Report of reducing adverse environmental and community impacts) for mitigating local congestion caused by national freight movements and the type of role federal and state stakeholders could play in achieving each objective and goal, and including a written strategy for improving the availability of national data needed to quantify, assess, and establish measures on freight trends and impacts on local traffic congestion. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) how U.S. rail and truck freight flows are changing, and the extent to which freight-related traffic congestion is reported to impact local communities; (2) how communities have funded efforts to mitigate freight-related traffic congestion, and what funding challenges, if any, communities report facing; and (3) the extent to which DOT’s efforts to implement freight-related provisions of MAP-21 have addressed local freight-related traffic congestion. To understand the extent that MAP-21 addresses freight-related traffic congestion in communities, we reviewed federal laws and programs, including MAP-21 freight provisions, and documentation of DOT’s efforts to implement MAP-21’s freight provisions, such as its draft primary freight network, as well as DOT’s April 2014 surface transportation reauthorization proposal. | Why GAO Did This Study
Projected increases in the transport of freight by rail and truck may produce economic benefits but also increase traffic congestion in communities. MAP-21, which contains a number of provisions designed to enhance freight mobility, is currently before Congress for reauthorization. GAO was asked to review trends in freight flows and any related traffic-congestion impacts.
This report addresses among other things: (1) recent changes in U.S. rail and truck freight flows and the extent to which related traffic congestion is reported to impact communities, and (2) the extent to which DOT's efforts to implement MAP-21 address freight-related traffic congestion in communities. GAO analyzed rail data from 2007 through 2012 and highway data from 2010 and 2012 and reviewed 24 freight-related traffic congestion mitigation projects at 12 locations selected on the basis of different geographical locations and sizes. The results are not generalizable. GAO also reviewed federal laws and interviewed freight stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Recent trends in freight flows, if they continue as expected, may exacerbate congestion issues in communities, particularly along certain corridors. As of 2012, the latest year for which data were available, national freight rail and truck traffic had approached levels of 2007 prior to the economic recession. Certain trends related to specific commodities have affected rail flows, including increases in domestic crude oil production. A key negative impact of increasing freight flows is congestion at highway-rail grade crossings, where road traffic must wait to cross the tracks when trains are passing. For example, a Miami-area study found that rail crossings in the area caused delays of roughly 235,000 person-hours per year at a cost of $2.4 million. Although several communities we visited had documented long-standing concerns over freight-related traffic congestion, state and local stakeholders we met with had varying levels of quantified information regarding the extent of the impacts or costs to the community. For example, in contrast to the Miami study, another study we reviewed included some information on train counts, but did not document hours of delay or any costs associated with such delays.
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) efforts to implement the freight-related provisions of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) are still underway but so far do not fully consider freight-related traffic congestion. MAP-21's freight policy goals do not explicitly include addressing freight-related traffic congestion, but MAP-21 requires DOT to identify best practices to mitigate the impacts of freight movement on communities in a national freight strategic plan, which is due in October 2015. MAP-21's requirements and DOT's efforts so far do not fully establish the federal role or identify goals, objectives, or performance measures in this area, which may limit the usefulness of the National Freight Strategic Plan . For example:
DOT issued for comment a required draft primary freight network, but according to DOT and other stakeholders, MAP-21's lack of defined purpose for the primary freight network and mileage limit of 27,000 miles hampered DOT's ability to include in this draft network some types of roads where local traffic congestion impacts of national freight movements are often experienced, such as roads connecting ports to freeways. The significance of the 27,000 mileage limitation is not clear. DOT released a surface transportation reauthorization proposal in April 2014 that proposed establishing a multimodal national freight network with a defined purpose and with no mileage limit.
DOT is currently developing the Freight Transportation Conditions and Performance Report , which is to support the National Freight Strategic Plan . For this and other documents, DOT established a broad goal to reduce freight-related community impacts. However, DOT did not identify clear goals, objectives, or measures related to freight-related traffic congestion in local communities due to a lack of reliable national data. Thus, a clear federal role has not been established. High-quality data are essential to supporting sound planning and decision-making. Without reliable national data, it will be difficult for DOT to establish goals and objectives and to define the extent of freight-related traffic congestion and measure performance.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider clarifying the purpose of the primary freight network and, as relevant to this purpose, revising the mileage limit requirement.
DOT should clarify the federal role for mitigating local freight-related congestion in the National Freight Strategic Plan , including a strategy for improving needed data. DOT concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-506T | gao_GAO-02-506T_0 | Table 1 summarizes the progress made by both units. In addition, in fiscal year 2002, SPAWAR Systems Center increased the number of approving officials to 203 and NPWC, to 43. We previously reported that the lack of documented evidence of purchase card training contributed to a weak internal control environment at these two units. Monitoring and Oversight
Both SPAWAR Systems Center and NPWC have recently made some efforts to implement new policies directed at improving internal review and oversight activities, which, as we previously testified, were ineffective. While still relatively ineffective, this area has great potential to strengthen the control environment at these two Navy units. Critical Internal Controls Remained Ineffective
Basic internal controls over the purchase card program remained ineffective during the last quarter of fiscal year 2001 at the two units we reviewed. For SPAWAR Systems Center, this included SPAWAR Headquarters, which is located in San Diego, and SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego. Specifically, our assessment of SPAWAR Systems Center and the NPWC purchase card controls covered the overall management control environment, including (1) span of control issues related to the number of cardholders, (2) training for cardholders and accountable officers, (3) monitoring and audit of purchase card activity, and (4) management’s attitude in establishing the needed controls, or “tone at the top;” tests of statistical samples of key controls over fourth quarter fiscal year 2001 purchase card transactions, including (1) documentation of independent confirmation that items or services paid for with the purchase card were received and (2) proper certification of the monthly purchase card statement for payment; to the extent feasible, substantive tests of accountable items in our sample transactions to verify whether they were recorded in property records and whether they could be found; data mining of the universe of fiscal year 2001 transactions to identify any potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable transactions; analysis and audit work related to invoices and other information obtained from three vendors—Cabela’s, REI, and Franklin Covey—from which, based on interviews with cardholders and our review of other transactions, we had reason to believe that SPAWAR Systems Center had made significant improper and abusive or questionable purchases during fiscal year 2001; and analysis of the universe of fourth-quarter fiscal year 2001 purchase card transactions to identify purchases that were split into one or more transactions to avoid micropurchase thresholds or other spending limits. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's follow-up on the audit of key internal controls over purchase card activity at two Navy units based in San Diego--the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems Center and the Navy Public Works Center (NPWC).
What GAO Found
A breakdown in internal controls over $68 million purchase card transactions in fiscal year 2000 left these two units vulnerable to fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases and to theft and misuse of government property. Although both units improved the overall control environment, including reducing the number of cardholders, increasing the number of approving officials, and decreased purchase card usage, serious weaknesses persisted in three key control environment areas. First, SPAWAR Systems Center needs to ensure that all cardholders receive required training and that this training is documented. Second, SPAWAR Systems Center needs to more carefully implement internal review and oversight activities, which have been ineffective. Third, GAO identified a significant impairment of management "tone at the top" at SPAWAR Systems Center during the last quarter of fiscal year 2001. The two basic internal controls over the purchase card program that GAO tested remained ineffective during the last quarter of fiscal year 2001 at both units. These weaknesses contributed to additional fraudulent, improper, abusive, or otherwise questionable purchases. GAO also identified purchases by SPAWAR Systems Center cardholders that were either excessively expensive or for questionable government needs. |
gao_GAO-16-761 | gao_GAO-16-761_0 | QHP enrollees have also expressed satisfaction, to varying degrees, with specific aspects of their plans, including their coverage, their choice of providers, and plan affordability, according to five national surveys we reviewed. Overall Plan Satisfaction
QHP enrollees who obtained their coverage through the exchanges have reported overall satisfaction with their plans from 2014 through 2016, according to national surveys that we reviewed. The overall satisfaction level of QHP enrollees was somewhat lower than or similar to those who were enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance in 2015 and 2016. Concerns Have Been Noted by Stakeholders and in Research about Some Enrollees’ Ability to Afford and Access Care
Although available data show most QHP enrollees were satisfied overall with their plans, our interviews with stakeholders—including experts, assisters, state department of insurance and exchange officials—and our review of literature, also revealed concerns about some QHP enrollees’ ability to afford and access their care, and understand their QHP, among other things. Specifically, some individuals have reported concerns affording care, or have been deterred from seeking care, because they found it too expensive to pay for their out-of-pocket expenses before reaching their deductibles, according to experts we interviewed. Understanding QHPs
Some QHP enrollees who obtained their coverage through the exchanges have faced difficulties understanding how to use their plans, according to our interviews with stakeholders and our review of literature. Other Concerns
To varying degrees, QHP enrollees who obtained their coverage through the exchanges have also faced a range of other challenges related to their health insurance plans, according to assisters and state department of insurance and exchange officials we interviewed and literature we reviewed. CMS and Selected States Have Monitored Post- Enrollment Experiences by Reviewing Information Reported by Consumers and Assisters
CMS and the five selected states in our review have monitored QHP enrollees’ post-enrollment experiences by reviewing information reported by consumers, through call centers and enrollee surveys, as well as by assisters. Consumer Call Centers
CMS uses information collected from enrollees through its call center to monitor QHP post-enrollment experiences. QHP enrollees and their representatives, such as assisters, may call the CMS exchange call center to request agency assistance in resolving concerns. Officials from all five of the selected states’ departments of insurance we interviewed reported tracking consumer complaints at the issuer level and working to resolve reported issues. Specifically, CMS developed a survey, which was administered to a sample of QHP enrollees nationwide, including those in FFE and SBE states, about their experiences with their plans in 2015 and 2016. CMS officials told us that they ultimately expect the results of their 2017 and future surveys to, among other things, inform the agency’s monitoring of enrollee post-enrollment experiences, as well as their monitoring of issuers beginning in 2017. For example, CMS officials told us that they expect to use survey results to identify issues in enrollee overall satisfaction and access to care. Officials from the state’s exchange office told us that they used the survey results to inform their prioritization of work related to improving enrollee experiences, such as developing better methods to educate enrollees on financial literacy and health insurance information, and to work with issuers to ensure that consumers with complaints are using the appropriate channels for filing them. Assisters
CMS and states have also monitored enrollee experiences with information received from assisters. CMS officials told us that they use information they receive from navigators and other assisters to help them troubleshoot FFE enrollee problems, clarify policy, and develop additional training or materials for dissemination. Exchange offices in the two selected states in our study that operated an SBE, Colorado and Vermont, required their state-funded assisters to routinely report information about the post-enrollment assistance they provided, according to officials and assisters, and, officials from the state exchange offices told us that they use this information to, among other things, identify and address any problems related to enrollees’ experiences with their QHPs, or identify training needs. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment; HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Methodology Information for Literature Review and Five National Surveys
To examine what is known about the early experiences of enrollees in qualified health plans (QHP) obtained through the exchanges, we conducted a structured search of research databases using various combinations of relevant search terms including, “Affordable Care Act,” “qualified health plan,” “marketplace,” and “exchange,” to identify any literature published from January 1, 2014, through April 30, 2016, that reported on QHPs obtained through the exchanges. In addition, the surveys reported similar results with respect to enrollee experiences. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), enacted in 2010, included provisions that were intended to make health insurance more available and affordable for individuals seeking coverage, including the establishment of health insurance exchanges. Health insurance was made available to individuals through the exchanges beginning in 2014. While PPACA contributed to an overall expansion in health insurance coverage, experts and consumer advocates have raised concerns about enrollees' experiences with QHPs, including access to providers and affordability of care.
PPACA includes a provision for GAO to conduct an examination of exchange activities and QHP enrollees. This report describes (1) what is known about enrollee experiences with QHPs obtained through the exchanges during the first years of exchange operation, and (2) how CMS and selected states have monitored the post-enrollment experiences of those who obtained their QHPs through the exchanges. GAO examined federal and state laws, regulations, and reports, and conducted a literature review to identify original research on enrollees' experiences with QHPs obtained through the exchanges. GAO interviewed officials from CMS and five selected states—Colorado, Indiana, Montana, North Carolina, and Vermont—that varied in geography and whether the state or CMS operated the exchange on which QHPs were offered, as well as officials from stakeholder groups and consumer assisters.
What GAO Found
Available survey data show that most enrollees who obtained their coverage through the health insurance exchanges were satisfied overall with their qualified health plans (QHP) during the first few years that exchanges operated, according to five national surveys of QHP enrollees that GAO identified through its literature review. Specifically, most QHP enrollees who obtained their coverage through the exchanges reported overall satisfaction with their plans in 2014 through 2016, according to three national surveys. The surveys reported that QHP enrollees' satisfaction with their plans was either somewhat lower than or was similar to that of those enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance in 2015 and 2016. To varying degrees, QHP enrollees expressed satisfaction with specific aspects of their plan, including their coverage and choice of providers, and plan affordability. Stakeholders—including experts, state departments of insurance, and others GAO interviewed—and literature GAO reviewed also revealed some concerns about QHP enrollee experiences. Some enrollees found it too expensive to pay for their out-of-pocket expenses before reaching their deductibles and have reported concerns about affording care or have been deterred from seeking care, according to experts. Some enrollees have faced difficulties understanding their QHP's coverage terminology and others have faced problems accessing care after enrollment, according to stakeholders and literature reviewed. These issues have also been identified in literature as longstanding concerns of the private health insurance market.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and selected states GAO reviewed have monitored enrollees' post-enrollment experiences by reviewing information reported by consumers and consumer assisters. For example, CMS uses information collected from enrollees through its Marketplace Call Center—where exchange enrollees may call to request agency assistance in resolving concerns. CMS officials said that they use this information to identify trends in enrollees' post-enrollment experiences and ensure that enrollee concerns are resolved in a timely manner. They began using it in 2016 to identify issuers for compliance reviews. Similarly, officials from the five selected states' departments of insurance reported tracking consumer complaints by issuer and working to resolve all reported issues. CMS developed a survey that was administered to a sample of QHP enrollees nationwide in 2015 and 2016, to gather information about their experiences with their plans. According to CMS officials, the agency expects to use results of its 2017 and future surveys to inform its monitoring of issuers. In addition, QHP enrollees in Vermont were surveyed with respect to their satisfaction in 2015; state officials reported using the results to inform their prioritization of work. CMS and selected states also reported monitoring enrollee experiences with information received from consumer assisters—including navigators—who interact directly with QHP enrollees. CMS officials told GAO that they have used information received from federally funded navigators to troubleshoot enrollee problems, clarify policies, or develop additional training or materials for dissemination.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-RCED-96-247 | gao_T-RCED-96-247_0 | However, we believe that Team Nutrition officials acted improperly in assigning tasks under the Global contract that were beyond the contract’s scope of work. These officials also did not follow normal contracting procedures in dealing with subcontractors under the Global contract. This evaluation, for which FCS has budgeted about $49,000, differs materially from the subject matter of the Global contract, which is to assist FCS in its efforts to provide “effective nutrition education” and to communicate “sound nutrition information.”
Furthermore, contrary to normal contracting practices, Team Nutrition officials directed Global to hire specific subcontractors and did not give Global the opportunity to perform the work itself. Therefore, the COR did not provide the technical direction that Prospect needed to effectively perform several tasks. To assess the impact of these characters on the Team Nutrition nutrition education campaign, FCS had Global conduct focus groups to determine what messages children were receiving from these characters. However, the Under Secretary for Food, Nutrition and Consumer Services, through her involvement in the administration of this grant, violated federal ethics regulations. However, our review of the former Project Manager’s employment application raised several concerns about her qualifications for the position she held. Failure to Comply With Agency’s Procedures and Poor Planning Resulted in Procurement and Personnel Problems
USDA’s problems in managing its Team Nutrition procurement and personnel hiring practices can be attributed largely to the failure to follow the agency’s procedures and the lack of a strategic plan for the Team Nutrition initiative. These steps included establishing new operational procedures and increasing reporting responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Team Nutrition contracts, cooperative agreement, and grant for multimedia nutrition education.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Team Nutrition officials acted improperly in assigning tasks under the the Global contract and did not follow normal contracting procedures in dealing with Global's subcontractors; (2) Team Nutrition officials did not provide the technical direction that another contractor needed to perform several tasks; (3) Team Nutrition failed to determine the message that children were receiving from the Team Nutrition Initiative advertisement; (4) the Under Secretary for Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services (FCS) violated federal ethics regulations by participating in the administration of this grant; (5) FCS improperly reviewed the former project manager's employment application, academic credentials, and financial disclosure statements; (6) USDA management problems resulted from USDA failure to follow agency procedures and its lack of a strategic plan for the Team Nutrition Initiative; and (7) FCS has taken steps to improve its procurement and personnel practices, including establishing new operational procedures, increasing reporting responsibilities, requiring procurement administration training, establishing an agency ombudsman to handle procurement improprieties, tightening procedures for the applications process, reviewing applicant documentation, and intensifying collection of employee financial disclosure statements. |
gao_GAO-02-134 | gao_GAO-02-134_0 | The Water Infrastructure Network—a consortium of industry, municipal, and nonprofit associations—recently estimated needs of up to $1 trillion over the next 20 years for drinking water and wastewater systems combined, when both the capital investment needs and the cost of financing are considered. Federal Agencies Made $44 Billion Available for Drinking Water and Wastewater Infrastructure in Fiscal Years 1991 Through 2000
From fiscal years 1991 through 2000, nine federal agencies made about $44 billion available for drinking water and wastewater capital improvements. Four agencies—EPA, USDA, HUD, and Commerce— account for about 98 percent of the total. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provided $23.7 million for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure during the 10-year period. Loan amounts can range from $300,000 to $25,000,000. To help financially stressed communities replace and upgrade wastewater treatment facilities. Purpose To enhance the state's water quality. | What GAO Found
U.S. drinking water and wastewater systems encompass thousands of treatment and collection facilities and more than a million miles of pipes and conduits. The estimated cost to repair, replace, or upgrade aging facilities; accommodate the nation's growing population; and meet new water quality standards ranges from $300 billion to $1 trillion over the next 20 years. Although user rates are the major source of facilities' financing, federal and state government agencies also offer financial support. From fiscal years 1991 through 2000, nine federal agencies provided $44 billion for drinking water and wastewater capital improvements. Four agencies--the Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, and Commerce--accounted for about 98 percent of that account. State governments made $25 billion available for water infrastructure programs during the past 10 years. |
gao_GAO-13-820 | gao_GAO-13-820_0 | Fee Design Affects the Balance between Congressional Control and Agency Flexibility and Has Implications for Program Management
Congress Delegates or Retains Varying Degrees of Decision-Making Authority Depending on How It Designs Key Aspects of User Fees
When designing fees, Congress is presented with a number of decisions regarding how a fee will be set, collected, used, and reviewed. In the aggregate, these decisions enable Congress to design a fee that strikes its desired balance between agency flexibility and Congressional control. Congress’s fee design decisions have implications for fee program management beyond striking the desired balance between agency flexibility and Congressional control. The frequency of fee review and adjustment, and the ability to keep fees and costs aligned, have a number of potential implications for agencies. We have previously reported that the failure to review fees regularly can result in large fee increases when the fees are eventually updated, which creates costly challenges. For example, the U.S. As of March 2013, OMB had not taken action on this recommendation. Agencies Manage Unobligated Balances Differently Depending on Whether They Represent Operating Reserves or Reflect the Timing of Collections and Outlays
Identifying and understanding unobligated balances in fee-based accounts is challenging. There is no single list of all federal user fees. In general, budget accounts are not labeled in a way that indicates whether the account contains fee collections. This also makes it challenging to identify which unobligated balances in an account are related to fee collections. Further, as discussed below, some fee designs include dedicated reserves that appear as unobligated balances. The three fee-funded agencies took different approaches to managing their unobligated balances. This amount remains available until With respect to USF contributions, FCC officials reported expended.that the approximately $3 billion in unobligated balances from USAC’s USF amounts was largely the result of the timing of collections and obligations for the four programs funded by USF contributions: (1) the Connect America Fund (also known as the High Cost program) for rural areas, (2) the Lifeline program (for low-income consumers), (3) the Schools and Libraries (or E-rate) program, and (4) the Rural Health Care program.collections and the funding commitment. Considering Key Questions About Costs and Collections Can Enable Congress and Agencies to Identify and Manage Revenue Instability
The more a program or agency depends on fees to fund its activities, the more vulnerable it is to revenue instability: that is, the extent to which fee collections cover the intended share of costs over time. In order to identify and manage revenue instability, decision makers need regular information and analysis to understand potential vulnerabilities in the context of the specific fee design. The appropriate analysis can help an agency obtain a thorough understanding of factors such as cost drivers and elements that influence collections. Are there limitations to the available data (such as preliminary estimates) that could add uncertainty to collection estimates? There may be indirect influences as well. What Factors Can Affect Costs in Fee-funded Programs? If revenue instability is a function of a fee’s design, the most sustainable solutions will be found by realigning costs and collections. Maintaining a reserve can help address sudden or temporary fluctuations in collections and/or costs, and can minimize the effect of revenue instability on operations. In light of the nation’s current fiscal condition, it is essential that every funding source and spending decision be carefully considered and applied to its best and most efficient use. In light of this, it is critical for Congress and agencies to understand the implications of the key design decisions— each choice in isolation and also in the aggregate—to achieve a deliberate design that minimizes unintended consequences. Appendix II: Key Questions about Costs and Collections to Enable Congress and Agencies to Identify and Manage Revenue Instability
Appendix II: Key Questions about Costs and Collections to Enable Congress and Agencies to Identify and Manage Revenue Instability What Data and Analysis Are Needed to Identify and Manage Revenue Instability? What is the risk that fee revenue instability will affect this program? What is the timing and pattern of spending? Can the agency quickly respond to changing costs? Related GAO Products
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Fees: Major Changes Needed to Align Fee Revenues with Program Costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, the President's Budget reported nearly $300 billion collected in user fees from the public. Given the nation's fiscal condition it is critical that every funding source and spending decision be carefully considered and applied to its best use. GAO was asked to review oversight opportunities for fees. GAO examined (1) key Congressional design decisions and related implications for achieving the desired balance between agency flexibility and congressional control, (2) issues related to identifying and managing unobligated balances in selected fee-funded agencies, and (3) key questions to identify potential sources of fee revenue instability and to manage any consequences. To do so, GAO analyzed laws, agency documents and guidance, literature, and prior GAO work. In addition, GAO interviewed officials at three fully feefunded agencies, which were selected to illustrate implications of key design options, unobligated fee balances, and approaches for managing revenue instability. GAO also validated certain findings with budget subject matter specialists.
What GAO Found
GAO identified six key fee design decisions related to how fees are set, used, and reviewed that, in the aggregate, enable Congress to design fees that strike the desired balance between agency flexibility and congressional control. For example, narrowly limiting the activities for which fees may be used heightens congressional control over the funds; however, doing so can also reduce an agency's flexibility to reallocate resources as needs change and may increase administrative costs. Design decisions also have program management implications. For example, the frequency of fee reviews and adjustments affects the alignment between collections and costs. Failing to review fees regularly has sometimes resulted in large increases when fees are eventually updated, creating costly challenges. Understanding the implications of fee design is important to avoid such unintended consequences.
Identifying and understanding unobligated balances--the portion of obligational authority that has not yet been obligated--in fee-based accounts is challenging. There is no single list of all federal user fees, and in general, budget accounts are not labeled in a way that indicates whether an account contains fee collections. This makes it challenging to identify whether (or which) unobligated balances in an account are fee-related. Further, some fee designs include dedicated reserves that appear as unobligated balances. Despite these challenges, funding a program or agency through fees does not eliminate the need for careful monitoring and managing of unobligated balances.
Considering key questions about costs and collections can enable Congress and agencies to identify and manage potential fluctuations in fee collections-known as revenue instability-as well as potential consequences. Importantly, decision makers need to understand potential vulnerabilities in the context of a fee's design. Examples of such questions include: what is the risk that fee revenue instability will affect a program? What analysis is needed to understand factors such as cost drivers and elements that influence collections? Are there data limitations that could add uncertainty to collection estimates? Can the agency quickly respond to changing costs? What factors affect the timing and pattern of collections and spending? If revenue instability is a function of a fee's design, the most sustainable solutions are often found by realigning costs and collections. In other cases, maintaining a reserve can help address sudden or temporary fluctuations in collections and/or costs and can minimize the effect of revenue instability on operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. GAO previously recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review fee-funded programs and identify opportunities to improve their design and better align fee collections with program costs. OMB has not yet taken action on this recommendation. Two of the three selected fully fee-funded agencies provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-96-23 | gao_NSIAD-96-23_0 | PLO’s Ability to Contribute to Palestinian Authority Expenses Is Not Clear
Our review of available information did not lead to a definitive conclusion on whether PLO could financially assist the Palestinian Authority. Undoubtedly, there are other economic enterprises as well.”
Certain PLO Expenses Subsumed Under Palestinian Authority’s Budget
Historically, PLO’s major expenses have included (1) an administrative staff in Tunis, Tunisia; (2) diplomatic missions in over 100 countries; (3) armed militias in several Middle Eastern states; (4) civil servant pensions and supplementary salary payments for certain Palestinian civil servants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and (5) several social welfare programs offering such benefits as free schooling, free health care, and martyr payments to compensate families of deceased fighters or those injured or disabled in fighting for the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian Authority’s budgets do not include references to any of these traditional PLO revenue sources—some of which have lapsed and some of which remain active. Later, however, it became apparent that the Palestinian Authority could not immediately finance its operations with local tax collections and revenue transfers from Israel. To meet the Palestinian Authority’s need for immediate cash assistance, the donors have spent $120 million to cover the Palestinian Authority’s operating deficit for 1994. Donor Attempts to Eliminate Future Calls for External Assistance
In an effort to control and eventually eliminate the Palestinian Authority’s reliance on external assistance, the donors have pressured the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government to improve their revenue collection efforts. Nor is it clear why the Palestinian police force has grown to an 18,000-member force when the Gaza/Jericho Agreement between PLO and Israel stipulates a 9,000-member force for the Gaza/Jericho enclave. The action plan also noted the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to freeze salaries and hiring at existing levels and the need to hold expenditures to the levels outlined in the Palestinian Authority’s March 1995 budget. Donor concerns about accountability have tended to focus on the use of donor funds by the Palestinian Authority to pay for certain recurring and start-up costs. In response to these concerns, the donor community, in coordination with the World Bank and the United Nations, has developed a number of controls to monitor the expenditure of such funds. The World Bank’s Holst Fundensures transparency and accountability by (1) specifying the types of expenditures for which funds may be used, (2) using an established auditing firm to verify documentation of expenditures, and (3) stipulating that donor funds be channeled to the Palestinian Authority only to replenish approved and documented disbursements. PECDAR serves as a common address for all donor aid to be provided to the Palestinian Authority. This mechanism relies on a United Nations Relief and Works Agency-managed disbursement and accounting system. The United States disbursed $5 million for police salaries in 1994. We have not independently determined that donor-developed controls are effective. Scope and Methodology
The starting point for our review was an attempt to obtain financial information directly from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) finances, focusing on whether: (1) PLO is able to help finance the Palestine Authority's operations in the West Bank and Gaza; (2) international donors have effectively analyzed the need to help fund the Palestinian Authority's operating expenses; and (3) appropriate controls are in place to ensure that donor funds are adequately accounted for.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) it was unable to reach a definitive conclusion on PLO's ability to assist the Palestinian Authority with its operating expenses; (2) it was able to determine that some of PLO's administrative, military, and social welfare expenses have been subsumed under the Palestinian Authority's budget; (3) at the same time, several traditional PLO revenue sources were not included in the Palestinian Authority's budget; (4) in 1994, donor contributions accounted for $120 million, or 68 percent, of the Palestinian Authority's budget, and in 1995, donor contributions are expected to account for about $200 million, or 45 percent, of the budget; (5) in an effort to control and eventually eliminate the Palestinian Authority's need for external assistance, the donor community called on the Palestinian Authority and Israel to implement an action plan designed to increase domestic tax revenues and revenue transfers from Israel; (6) the donors have not paid equal attention to the Palestinian Authority's expenditure plans, which require significant outlays for a 30,000-member civil service and an 18,000-member police force; (7) most donor aid is being disbursed through traditional channels, which utilize established financial control procedures; (8) the donors implemented a number of financial controls to reduce the risk that operating funds provided directly to the Palestinian Authority will be mishandled; (9) these controls include: (a) a World Bank-managed trust fund, which relies on audits of filed claims to monitor the use of donor funds; (b) the establishment of a Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, which serves as a focal point for receiving and accounting for aid that is disbursed to the Palestinian Authority; and (c) a standard disbursement mechanism for police salary payments, with accounting and oversight controls provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency; (10) GAO has not independently determined that these controls are effective; and (11) GAO received documents having possible implications that some funds may have been diverted by the Palestinian Authority and is reviewing the matter. |
gao_HEHS-99-161 | gao_HEHS-99-161_0 | The six sites we studied can support operational findings about the demonstration as a whole. Several complex issues had to be resolved along the way. However, because of the time required to develop the MOA and complete the application and review process, the demonstration will cover 24 to 28 months of service rather than 3 years. The first site certified, Madigan, began service September 1, 1998, and all of the sites had begun delivering services by January 1, 1999. The demand for enrollment appeared to reflect both the temporary nature of the demonstration and site-specific factors. The fact that the temporary nature of this demonstration reduced enrollment numbers to an unknown degree argues that the demonstration may not be an accurate indicator of the number of people who would enroll in a permanent program. Various Site Factors Also Made a Difference
Our interviews indicated that there were also variables at each site that affected enrollment, such as the breadth of services available at the MTF, amount of space-available care at the MTF, health care environment in the area, and maturity of the TRICARE program. But in other respects, preparing for the implementation of the Senior Prime demonstration brought useful new practices to the MTFs. Preparing for Service Delivery Also Revealed Operational Difficulties
Sites’ experiences during marketing, enrollment, and the first weeks of service delivery revealed several operational difficulties. Operating in a dual- systems environment has created some points of strain for the test sites. Experience in the Start-up Phase Raises Issues for the Future
Experience in the start-up phase raises issues for the later years of this demonstration program, as well as for any future subvention program. Conclusions
A demonstration is intended to produce useful evidence of the feasibility or effectiveness of a new approach, and the start-up period of the Medicare Subvention Demonstration has done so. This demonstration provides evidence that it is feasible for DOD-designed plans to meet HCFA requirements for Medicare managed care plans and begin delivering health care to seniors, building on the TRICARE Prime framework but adapting it to the needs of this older population. The start-up period also offered lessons regarding coordination within and between DOD and HCFA. Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to work with HCFA to examine Medicare and DOD procedures, measurement, and reporting systems with an eye toward seeking waivers (where warranted) and eliminating duplication to the extent possible; work with HCFA to determine conditions for transitioning out of the demonstration into other coverage (including Medicare options, access to Medigap insurance, and care at the MTF) and to notify enrollees of these conditions as soon as possible; determine (in advance, whenever possible) which HCFA directives and operational matters will be handled centrally and will be uniform across the Senior Prime program and which matters will be handled at the site level; and review plans for the provision of health care to seniors during times of military deployment and either (1) ensure that staffing at participating MTFs is sufficient to provide seniors with primary care or (2) provide for primary care to be delivered through some other means. Preparing for HCFA Approval
This site’s primary source of information on Medicare requirements was a local independent consultant who had worked with Health Care Financing Administration’s (HCFA) regional office staff in Denver. Information from other Department of Defense (DOD) demonstration sites about their experiences was also useful. 13, 1999). 12, 1999). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of its Medicare Subvention Demonstration program, focusing on: (1) progress in establishing the ground rules for program operation, receiving Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) approval, attracting enrollment, and starting to deliver health services; (2) the useful practices and operational difficulties that emerged during program start-up; and (3) issues for the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the start-up period of the Medicare Subvention demonstration was successful; (2) despite unanticipated delays, the six demonstration sites met the requirements for Medicare managed care plans, enrolled substantial numbers of beneficiaries, and began delivery of health care services by January 1, 1999; (3) the sites' experience in dealing with the difficulties that arose along the way has yielded valuable lessons and has also pinpointed issues that remain to be resolved; (4) while the successful start-up of the demonstration is encouraging, it will be some time before the results of its mature operation can be assessed; (5) establishing the ground rules for the demonstration took longer and HCFA approval process was more demanding than anticipated; (6) as a result, the demonstration will cover 24 to 28 months of service rather than 3 years; (7) the initial demand for enrollment overall was not as great as expected, in part because retirees were wary of a temporary program and feared that they might be unable to obtain affordable supplementary insurance at the demonstration's end; (8) enrollment also reflected site-specific factors, such as prospects for getting space-available care at a military treatment facility (MTF) without joining Senior Prime, the breadth of services available at the MTF, and options for care elsewhere in the community; (9) preparing for the start-up of the demonstration brought some useful new senior health care and management practices to the MTFs, but also revealed operational difficulties; (10) the fact that this demonstration program operates within two bureacracies--DOD and HCFA--caused some points of strain; (11) being new to Medicare, demonstration sites had to devote substantial DOD staff and consultant time learning HCFA requirements; (12) the dual organizational structures within DOD carry with them the potential for conflict; (13) additionally, dual DOD and HCFA procedures may result in duplication of effort; (14) experience in the start-up phase of this demonstration raises issues for the future of this or other similar demonstrations; and (15) enrollees will need to know several months in advance of the end of this demonstration whether service will continue so that they can plan for their continued health care. |
gao_T-AIMD-97-54 | gao_T-AIMD-97-54_0 | Our audits of IRS’ financial statements, however, have identified many significant weaknesses in IRS’ accounting for revenue and accounts receivable, as well as for funds provided to carry out IRS’ operations. IRS has improved payroll processing and accounting for administrative operations and is working on solutions to revenue and accounts receivable accounting problems. In addition, IRS is hampered in efficiently and effectively managing its huge inventory of accounts receivable due to inadequate management information. Further, while IRS’ efforts to reduce filing fraud have resulted in some success—especially through more rigid screening in the electronic filing program—this continues to be a high-risk area. The Customs Service has made considerable progress in correcting major management and organizational structure weaknesses we pointed to in our 1992 high-risk report. Controlling Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Mismanagement in Benefit Programs
Medicare—the nation’s second largest social program—is inherently vulnerable to and a perpetually attractive target for exploitation. The Congress and the President have been seeking to introduce changes to Medicare to help control program costs, which were $197 billion in fiscal year 1996. A newly designated high-risk area involves overpayments in the SSI program, which provided about $22 billion in federal benefits to recipients between January 1, 1996, and October 31, 1996. One root cause of SSI overpayments is SSA’s difficulty in corroborating financial eligibility information that program beneficiaries self report and that affects their benefit levels. In September 1996, we reported that during the previous 2 years, serious information security control weaknesses had been reported for 10 of the 15 largest federal agencies. We have made dozens of recommendations for improvement to individual agencies, and they have started acting on many of them. The Year 2000 Problem
The Year 2000 Problem poses the high risk that computer systems throughout government will fail to run or malfunction because computer equipment and software were not designed to accommodate the change of date at the new millennium. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed major government programs and operations GAO has identified as high-risk areas, focusing on high-risk areas related to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Medicare and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, legislative and agency actions have resulted in progress toward fixing these high-risk areas and establishing a solid foundation to help ensure greater progress; (2) however, because these areas involve long-standing problems which are difficult to fix, additional corrective measures are necessary to remove the high-risk designation; (3) GAO's audits of IRS' financial statements, however, have identified many significant weaknesses in IRS' accounting for revenue and accounts receivable, as well as for funds provided to carry out IRS' operations; (4) IRS has improved payroll processing and accounting for administrative operations and is working on solutions to revenue and accounts receivable accounting problems; (5) in addition, IRS is hampered in efficiently and effectively managing its huge inventory of accounts receivable due to inadequate management information; (6) further, while IRS' efforts to reduce filing fraud have resulted in some success, especially through more rigid screening in the electronic filing program, this continues to be a high-risk area; (7) the Customs Service has made considerable progress in correcting major management and organizational structure weaknesses GAO pointed to in its 1992 high-risk report; (8) Medicare, the nation's second largest social program, is inherently vulnerable to and a perpetually attractive target for exploitation; (9) the Congress and the President have been seeking to introduce changes to Medicare to help control program costs, which were $197 billion in fiscal year 1996; (10) a newly designated high-risk area involves overpayments in the SSI program, which provided about $22 billion in federal benefits to recipients between January 1, 1996, and October 31, 1996; (11) one root cause of SSI overpayments is the Social Security Administration's difficulty in corroborating financial eligibility information that program beneficiaries self report and that affects their benefit levels; (12) in September 1996, GAO reported that during the previous 2 years, serious information security control weaknesses had been reported for 10 of the 15 largest federal agencies; (13) GAO had made dozens of recommendations for improvement to individual agencies, and they have started acting on may of them; and (14) the year 2000 problem poses the high risk that computer systems throughout government will fail to run or malfunction because computer computer equipment and software were not designed to accommodate the change of date at the new millennium. |
gao_GAO-12-670 | gao_GAO-12-670_0 | Federal law also allows certain households to be deemed categorically eligible for SNAP. According to FNS, BBCE policies make most, if not all, households that apply for SNAP categorically eligible because they receive a TANF-funded non- cash service, such as an informational brochure or toll-free number. In addition, CBO estimates include assumptions about the share of these households that exceed federal asset limits. Households eligible under BBCE with incomes over the federal limits had characteristics that were generally similar to all other SNAP households; however, they were more likely to be working or receiving unemployment benefits (see table 2). Available data suggest few households that qualified for SNAP under BBCE likely had assets that would have exceeded federal asset limits. However, other national data sources suggest the number is relatively small. State Eligibility Changes Increased Benefit Costs Somewhat, but Their Effect on Administrative Costs Is Unclear
Benefit Costs Increased Less Than 1 Percent
Although SNAP households that had incomes over the federal limits made up an estimated 2.6 percent of the SNAP caseload in fiscal year 2010, this group received an estimated 0.7 percent of all SNAP benefits. These benefits totaled an estimated $38.3 million a month, or approximately $460 million annually. For example, because household benefits are primarily determined based on each household’s monthly income, increases in the poverty and unemployment rates likely correlate with increases in the average benefit provided to households. Although BBCE may impact SNAP benefit costs because the policy both expands who is eligible for the program and streamlines the process for receiving benefits, state and local officials we met with consistently indicated that they did not think BBCE had a significant impact on benefits. State Eligibility Changes May Negatively Affect Program Integrity
Payment Errors May Be Negatively Affected
In recent years, the SNAP payment error rate declined to an historic low while multiple program changes occurred, including BBCE, but evidence suggests that factors other than BBCE may have played a larger role in the decline. Further, both our analysis of USDA data and our discussions with SNAP staff suggest that BBCE may, in fact, contribute to more payment errors. However, because a state can certify families receiving $0 in SNAP benefits as eligible in its SNAP data system, it can directly certify children in such families for free school meals, even though they do not receive SNAP benefits. While the federal gross income-eligibility limit for SNAP aligns with that of the school meals programs—providing free meal benefits to children in households at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty guidelines— the programs no longer align in states with BBCE policies that have raised the SNAP gross income limit. While USDA has issued guidance to states in this area, its guidance relies on TANF reporting requirements that do not exist. While USDA touted BBCE as a way to improve program integrity and administrative efficiency, state adoption of BBCE has created unintended consequences that may weaken both SNAP and related programs’ integrity and introduce inequities. Finally, USDA’s guidance on SNAP reporting requirements has resulted in lower-income households eligible under federal SNAP rules having to do more to retain their benefits than higher-income SNAP households eligible solely because of states’ BBCE policies. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve SNAP program integrity and oversight, we are recommending that the Secretary of Agriculture require FNS to take several actions:
Review state procedures for implementing BBCE, specifically those in place for providing the relevant TANF-funded service to all SNAP applicants deemed eligible under BBCE, as well as ensuring the relevant service is funded with TANF dollars. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Data Analysis
Quality Control Data
To determine the prevalence and characteristics of households deemed eligible under states’ broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) policies that had incomes over the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) eligibility limits in fiscal years 2008 and 2010, we analyzed the Food and Nutrition Service’s (FNS) quality control (QC) system data of active SNAP cases. Specifically, we analyzed data on average monthly SNAP participation in recent years obtained from USDA reports. In addition, we obtained data on total benefit costs and the average monthly SNAP benefits per household from USDA’s Web site and the annual SNAP State Activity Reports for fiscal years 2001-2011, as well as data on the proportion of households receiving the maximum SNAP benefit from the annual Characteristics of SNAP Households reports for fiscal years 2001-2010. Site Visits
To better understand the effects of state BBCE policies on SNAP, as well as other factors impacting SNAP, we conducted site visits to 5 states and 18 local offices responsible for administering SNAP in those states, during January and February 2012. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Implications of Caseload and Program Changes for Families and Program Monitoring. GAO-10-346. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last 10 years, participation in the U.S. Department of Agricultures (USDA) SNAP, previously known as the Food Stamp Program, has more than doubled, and costs have quadrupled. Since 1999, USDA has allowed states to expand SNAP eligibility by adopting BBCE policies, which make households that receive services funded by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, such as a toll-free number or brochure, categorically eligible for SNAP. Under BBCE policies, states are able to increase federal SNAP limits on household income and remove limits on assets. Although USDA has encouraged states to adopt BBCE to improve SNAP access and administration, little is known about the effects of these policies. GAO was asked to assess: (1) To what extent are households that would otherwise be ineligible for SNAP deemed eligible for the program under BBCE? (2) What effect has BBCE had on program costs? (3) What are the program integrity implications of BBCE? GAO analyzed data from USDA, selected states, and other national sources; conducted site visits to 5 states; and interviewed federal, state, and local officials, as well as others with knowledge of SNAP.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2010, GAO estimates that 2.6 percent (473,000) of households that received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits would not have been eligible for the program without broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE) because their incomes were over the federal SNAP eligibility limits. The characteristics of these households were generally similar to other SNAP households, although they were more likely to work or receive unemployment benefits. BBCE removes asset limits in most states, and while reliable data on participants assets are not available, other data suggest few likely had assets over these limits. Although BBCE contributed to recent increases in SNAP participation, other factors, notably the recent recession, had a greater effect.
GAO estimates that BBCE increased SNAP benefit costs, which are borne by the federal government, by less than 1 percent in fiscal year 2010. In that year, total SNAP benefits provided to households that, without BBCE, would not have been eligible for the program because their incomes were over the federal SNAP eligibility limits were an estimated $38 million monthly or about $460 million for the year. These households received an estimated average monthly SNAP benefit of $81 compared to $293 for other households. BBCEs effect on SNAP administrative costs, which are shared by the federal and state governments, is unclear, in part because of other recent changes that affect this spending, such as state budget and staffing reductions in the recent recession.
BBCE has potentially had a negative effect on SNAP program integrity. In recent years, the SNAP payment error rate declined to an historic low, but evidence suggests the decline is primarily due to changes other than BBCE. While BBCE may improve administrative efficiency, both national data and discussions with local staff suggest BBCE may also be associated with more errors. In addition, BBCE has led to unintended consequences for SNAP and related programs. For example, in implementing BBCE, some states are designating SNAP applicants as categorically eligible without providing them with the service required to make this determination. Further, likely because they are unaware of recent USDA guidance, some states certify children for free school meals when their households are determined eligible for SNAP, even though they do not receive SNAP benefitsa result more common in states with BBCE. Finally, because of federal guidance on BBCE, rules for reporting changes in household circumstances now differ by household income level and may leave higher income households without reporting requirements for several months.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA review state procedures for implementing BBCE, disseminate guidance to states on certifying SNAP households as eligible for school meals, and revisit its guidance on SNAP reporting requirements to ensure they address all households. USDA generally agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-689 | gao_GAO-02-689_0 | It created the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Association Insurance Fund, which are responsible for protecting insured bank and thrift depositors, respectively, from loss due to institution failures. Security Improvements Made, but System Vulnerabilities Remain
In our audit of FDIC’s calendar year 2001 financial statements, we found that FDIC made progress in correcting previously identified weaknesses. Specifically, FDIC has not adequately limited access to data and programs by controlling mainframe access authority, providing sufficient network security, or establishing a comprehensive program to monitor access activities. Other information system control weaknesses were also identified that could likewise hinder FDIC’s ability to provide adequate physical security for its computer facility, appropriate segregation of computer functions, effective control of system software changes, or ensure continuity of operations. Although progress was made in limiting access, FDIC’s information systems controls were not adequately protecting financial and sensitive information. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed information systems general controls in the calendar year 2001 financial statement audits of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) Bank Insurance Fund, Savings Association Insurance Fund, and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund.
What GAO Found
FDIC made progress in correcting information security weaknesses previously identified and has taken steps to improve security. Nevertheless, GAO identified new weaknesses in its information systems controls that affect the corporation's ability to safeguard electronic access to critical financial and other sensitive information. FDIC did not adequately limit access to data and programs by controlling mainframe access authority, providing sufficient network security, or establishing a comprehensive program to monitor access activities. Further, other information systems control weaknesses were identified that could hinder FDIC's ability to provide physical security for its computer facility, appropriate segregation of computer functions, effective control of system software changes, or continuity of operations. |
gao_RCED-99-16 | gao_RCED-99-16_0 | After review by the Office of Management and Budget, HUD published the final rule implementing NAHASDA on March 12, 1998; it went into effect on April 13, 1998. NAHASDA eliminated 9 of HUD’s 14 separate Indian housing programs, replacing them with a single block grant program with one set of funding criteria for HUD to administer and, according to HUD officials, one system for managing and accounting for funds. HUD Used Competitive and Noncompetitive Processes to Provide Indian Housing Grant Funding
Prior to NAHASDA, HUD provided funding directly to Indian housing authorities and tribes through 14 programs for which a total of $2.8 billion was appropriated in fiscal years 1993 through 1997. For the other five programs, HUD allocated funds to Indian housing authorities or tribes noncompetitively through a formula or on a first-come, first-served basis. The formula also did not factor in $929 million provided in past years but not yet spent by the Indian housing authorities and tribes. According to HUD’s Office of General Counsel, there is no provision under NAHASDA allowing HUD, when awarding block grant funding under the act, to consider Indian housing authorities’ failure to comply with requirements and regulations that are no longer in effect. However, HUD does have the authority and has, in several instances, placed conditions, such as additional monitoring and oversight, on the use of grant funds by a housing entity that has a history of poor performance in administering federal grant programs. In future fiscal years, regulations permit HUD, when dispensing new grants, to consider how well housing entities have managed past NAHASDA grants. Unspent Indian Housing Funding Was Not a Factor in Calculating Fiscal Year 1998 NAHASDA Block Grants
The unspent $929 million in Indian housing funding was not a factor in calculating the fiscal year 1998 block grants because, according to HUD officials, the unspent funding addresses needs that continue to exist. Housing entities report these unspent funds and the plans for their use as part of the Indian housing plans they submit for HUD’s approval. To receive grants from the $590 million available for the NAHASDA program in fiscal year 1998, each of the 575 housing entities had to submit an Indian housing plan by July 1, 1998. HUD had received plans representing over 97 percent of the entities by the deadline. For the fiscal year 1999 program, HUD requested $600 million from the Congress. We point out that most of the unspent funding was appropriated over a recent 5-year period—fiscal years 1993 through 1997. Scope and Methodology
To determine how HUD awarded and allocated funding to Indian housing authorities and tribes before NAHASDA’s enactment, we reviewed regulations governing HUD’s grant award programs. To determine the amount, type, and “age” of unspent Indian housing program funds, we analyzed data obtained for us by HUD from its Program Accounting System. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Grant Award Criteria and Fiscal Year 1997 Funding for Competitive and Noncompetitive Indian Housing Programs
Fiscal year 1997 funding (dollars in millions)
For scoring and ranking proposals — Bureau of Indian Affairs housing needs assessment — Percentage of the area’s total need — Estimated number of units to be funded — Weighted average cost of developing housing within each area — Indian housing authority established under state law or a HUD-approved tribal ordinance — Indian housing authority had the capacity to administer the program as demonstrated by compliance with HUD standards for housing development, modernization, and operations — Indian housing authority met performance eligibility thresholds to apply for housing development funding: environmental review, fiscal closeout, final site approval and control, utility supplier’s firm commitment, and preconstruction certification — Relative unmet need for housing — Relative Indian housing authority occupancy rate compared with the occupancy rates of other eligible Indian housing authorities — Time since last Development grant was approved compared with that for other eligible Indian housing authorities — Current Indian housing authority development “pipeline” activity already in progress — For fiscal year 1997, HUD applied additional factors for scoring and ranking that included clear Indian housing authority demonstration of preplanning housing project activities, site selection that results in cost savings, and innovative approaches to development or financing that reduce housing delivery time or increase the number of units — $1 million base amount for each field office — Additional amount calculated by a formula that considered the latest Census data for the eligible Native American population residing in each area and the extent of poverty and housing overcrowding — Reasonableness of project’s cost — Project’s appropriateness for intended use — Project can be achieved within 2 years — Tribe’s administrative, managerial, and technical capacity — Tribe’s past grants administration — Tribe’s actions to impede development of housing for low- and moderate-income individuals — Outstanding block grant obligations to HUD — Need for project and its design — Project planning — Leveraging of block grant funding (continued)
Fiscal year 1997 funding (dollars in millions)
Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program for modernization(Nonemergency)
Degree to which — project addressed the housing needs of the tribe and maximized benefits to low-income families — tribe had taken the financial, administrative, and legal actions necessary to undertake the proposed project and had the administrative staff to carry out the project — tribe would use other sources of funding, such as state grants, private mortgage insurance, private contributions, and other federal grants, to leverage funding for the project — Plan for evaluating activities — Plan for establishing a relationship with local law enforcement entities — Coordination with empowerment zone and welfare reform efforts — Description of use of community facilities and bringing back community focus to housing authority properties — Assurance that Indian housing authority has a broad range of tools for making and maintaining a safe community — Indian housing authority’s administrative capacity and relevant experience — Problem’s extent — Support of residents, local government, and community in implementing activities — Soundness of proposed plan — Extent of coordination and participation with other organizations in community planning (continued)
Fiscal year 1997 funding (dollars in millions)
For scoring and ranking proposals — Formula calculating emergency shelter needs for tribes within each field office area — Form, timeliness, and completeness of application — Tribe’s eligibility as determined by Department of Treasury Office of Revenue Sharing — Eligibility of persons to be served for program assistance — Tribe’s building compliance with disability requirements — Tribe’s capacity to carry out the proposed activities successfully and within a reasonable time — Tribe’s service to the homeless population that is most difficult to reach and serve — Existence of an unmet need for the proposed project — Appropriateness of proposed activities to meet the needs of the served population — Extent of coordination with other community programs — 51 percent or more of the residents included in the proposed project are affected by welfare reform — Proposed activities must take place in a community facility that is easily accessible for applicants — Community resources must be firmly committed to the project — Indian housing authority’s compliance with current programs — Troubled housing authority must use a contract administrator — Indian housing authority’s administrative capacity and relevant experience — Extent of problem and need for project — Soundness of program approach and methodology — Indian housing authority’s ability to leverage project resources — Extent of coordination with community to identify and address problems — Funding provided to field offices to assist Indian housing authorities in providing funds for eligible families — Families, not Indian housing authorities or tribes, must be eligible for assistance — Funding provided to field offices to assist Indian housing authorities in providing funds for eligible families (continued)
Fiscal year 1997 funding (dollars in millions)
For scoring and ranking proposals — Funding awarded directly to organizations by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing — 51 percent or more of the residents included in the proposed project are affected by welfare reform — Signed agreement between the applicant and the housing authority describing each of their roles and responsibilities — Proposed activities must take place in a community facility that is easily accessible for applicants — Must use the services of a contract administrator or mediator — Must be a registered nonprofit organization — Compliance with current programs and no unresolved audit findings — Contract administrator must not be in default — Letters of support from project participants — Certification of resident organization board elections — Resident organization’s administrative capacity to carry out the project and its relevant experience — Need for the project and extent of the problem — Soundness of program approach and methodology — Resident organization’s ability to leverage project resources — Extent that project reflects a coordinated community-based process identifying and addressing the problem — HUD ONAP awarded a small portion of the funding using a lottery system Fiscal year 1997 funding (dollars in millions)
Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program for modernization(Emergency)
For allocating funding to Indian housing authorities or tribes — Funding allocated directly to field offices by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing — HUD approval of Indian housing authority’s comprehensive plan identifying all physical condition and management improvements of existing housing and action plan for achieving them — Coordination with local officials in developing comprehensive plan — Indian housing authority board resolution approving comprehensive plan — Additional assurances or information required from HUD monitoring, audit findings, civil rights compliance findings, or corrective action orders — Formula calculating housing modernization needs of Indian housing authorities — Funding allocated directly to field offices by HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing — Indian housing authorities must meet HUD financial management and occupant income requirements — Performance Funding System formula for calculating what a well-managed Indian housing authority would need to operate its housing programs — Compliance with Fair Housing, Civil Rights, and environmental statutes — Housing projects have to be fully available for occupancy — All eligible applications funded subject to the availability of funds — HUD does not allocate funding for loan guarantees to field offices — Tribe must have developed eviction and foreclosure procedures — HUD guarantees loans made by private lenders to applicants that meet loan qualifications (continued)
Fiscal year 1997 funding (dollars in millions)
Formula Used to Allocate NAHASDA Block Grant Funding
Using the block grant formula established under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) allocates funds to Indian housing entities for (1) the costs of operating and modernizing existing housing units and (2) the need for providing affordable housing activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) implementation of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA), focusing on: (1) how HUD allocated funding to Indian housing authorities and tribes before NAHASDA's enactment, and how much was appropriated for Indian programs in fiscal years (FY) 1993 through 1997; (2) identifying the factors HUD used to allocate Indian housing block grant funding to tribes and tribally designated housing entities under NAHASDA, and whether HUD considered current tribal housing needs, past tribal housing management performance, and the magnitude of unspent housing grant funding for incomplete housing projects; (3) the amount, type, and age of unspent funding for incomplete housing projects; and (4) the status of HUD's Indian housing block grant funding for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) before NAHASDA became effective, HUD distributed funding to Indian housing authorities and tribes through 14 different programs, each having its own criteria for awarding and allocating grant funding; (2) for nine of these programs, funding was awarded competitively, requiring the Indian housing authorities or tribes to submit project proposals, which HUD then scored and ranked; (3) for the other five programs, HUD allocated funding to Indian housing authorities or tribes noncompetively, using formulas or distributing the funds on a first-come, first-serve basis; (4) over fiscal years 1993 through 1997, HUD provided a total of $2.8 billion to Indian housing authorities and tribes through these 14 programs; (5) after NAHASDA went into effect for FY 1998, eliminating 9 of the 14 separate Indian housing programs and replacing them with a single block grant program, HUD used the act's noncompetitive allocation formula to determine the grant amounts for the 575 Indian housing entities; (6) the formula has two components: (a) the costs of operating and modernizing existing housing units; and (b) the need for providing affordable housing activities; (7) the allocation formula does not include a factor for past management performance; (8) HUD's rationale was that there is no authority under the new act for it to consider the authorities' failure to comply with requirements and regulations that are no longer in effect; (9) relying on other guidance, HUD has placed conditions on the use of NAHASDA grant funds if a housing entity has a history of problems with administering other federal grant programs; (10) in subsequent years, HUD can consider performance under NAHASDA when dispensing new grants; (11) the block grant formula also did not consider the approximately $929 million in total unspent Indian housing program funding awarded in previous years because the funding addresses needs that continue to exist; (12) most of the unspent funds were provided in fiscal years 1993 through 1997 through two programs--Development and Modernization; (13) entities must report their planned use of those funds to HUD as part of their Indian housing plans; (14) for FY 1998, $590 million was appropriated for the Indian housing block grants awarded under the new act; (15) as of July 1, 1998, over 97 percent of the housing entities had submitted the required Indian housing plans to HUD describing their planned use of block grant funds and HUD approved 327 of those plans; and (16) for FY 1999, HUD requested $600 million for the program. |
gao_GAO-17-224 | gao_GAO-17-224_0 | Specifically, the 2014 Farm Bill increased the total amount of 202(e) funding USAID can provide from 13 percent to 20 percent of funds made available to implement Title II of the Food for Peace Act. Title II also authorizes USAID to use ITSH funding to cover costs that partners incur while moving and storing U.S. in-kind food aid after it reaches a destination country. USAID data for fiscal years 2012 through 2015 show that the agency provided about 4.5 million metric tons of food commodities. USAID Used Most of the Increase in 202(e) Funding to Provide Cash Transfers, Food Vouchers, and Locally and Regionally Procured Commodities in Title II Projects
USAID used most of the 2014 Farm Bill’s increase in authorized 202(e) funding (from 13 percent to 20 percent of total Title II appropriations) to provide cash transfers, food vouchers, and locally or regionally procured food for beneficiaries—modalities the agency did not previously support through Title II. As table 1 shows, in fiscal year 2014, USAID’s obligations for these modalities comprised 75 percent of the additional 202(e) amount it obligated under the 2014 Farm Bill; in fiscal year 2015, USAID’s obligations for these modalities comprised 96 percent of the additional obligated amount. USAID Has Used Funding Authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act Along with Title II Development and Emergency Projects
Our review of USAID funding data shows that USAID has used funds from two accounts authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act along with Title II food assistance projects. With regard to funding for emergency food assistance, USAID’s implementation of the new 202(e) authorities to enhance existing Food for Peace programs provided by the 2014 Farm Bill has resulted in USAID’s use of both 202(e) funding and IDA account funds to provide either cash transfers, food vouchers, or local or regional procurement in the same emergency food assistance projects. USAID Has Various Controls for Financial Oversight of Title II Implementation and Support Costs, but Its Oversight Has Certain Deficiencies
USAID and its partners have various internal controls for financial oversight of implementation and support costs funded by 202(e) and ITSH in selected Title II development and emergency projects, although we found certain deficiencies in control activities, information and communication, and risk assessment. USAID’s and implementing partners’ internal controls for Title II project implementation and support costs include reviews of planned budgets and high-level spending, reviews of audit reports, and periodic monitoring data, according to USAID and partner officials. Our limited, nongeneralizable financial transactions testing identified instances where partners had not correctly recorded 202(e) and ITSH spending. Second, regarding information and communication, USAID lacks key monitoring data related to these costs that could identify areas needing additional financial oversight and inform future decisions. USAID Generally Does Not Conduct Systematic, Targeted Financial Reviews
Although USAID reviews partners’ quarterly SF-425 reports of high-level expenditures for 202(e) and ITSH, USAID generally does not conduct systematic, targeted reviews of partners’ spending on these costs. For example, for one project, we found a 202(e) charge of $6,543 for fuel that should have been charged to another project. As a result, USAID cannot have reasonable assurance that partners are spending, and accounting for, ITSH funds in compliance with its policy and the Food for Peace Act. USAID Does Not Require Risk Assessments for Cash Transfers and Food Vouchers in Development Projects despite Requiring Them in Emergency Projects
USAID does not require implementing partners for Title II development projects to conduct and document comprehensive risk assessments and mitigation plans for cash transfer and food vouchers funded by 202(e) despite requiring risk assessments for these modalities in emergency projects implemented by NGOs. We found that award documentation submitted by partners for the three projects generally included some broad discussion of risks, such as security or weather risks. In its official comments, USAID concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) any changes in the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) use of Title II funding to implement and support projects since the enactment of the 2014 Farm Bill and (2) USAID’s financial oversight of Title II funding used to implement and support selected projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, USAID has awarded about $1.4 billion annually for international food assistance projects under Title II of the Food for Peace Act (Title II). This funding has traditionally been used to provide U.S.-purchased commodities to food-insecure beneficiaries overseas. Section 202(e) of the Food for Peace Act authorizes USAID to also provide funding to cover project implementation costs, which have typically included administrative expenses such as implementing partner staff salaries. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 Farm Bill) increased the amount of 202(e) funding USAID can use for implementation costs from 13 to 20 percent of the annual Title II appropriation and also expanded the eligible uses of these funds. USAID's utilization of these new authorities presents potential oversight challenges.
GAO was asked to review Title II implementation costs. This report examines (1) any changes in USAID's use of Title II funding to implement and support projects since the 2014 Farm Bill and (2) USAID's financial oversight of this funding for selected projects. GAO analyzed USAID funding data for fiscal years 2012 through 2015 (the most recent available), reviewed USAID and partner documents, and interviewed officials. GAO conducted financial reviews of a nongeneralizable sample of seven Title II projects, selected on the basis of project funding and implemented modalities.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has used most of the 2014 Farm Bill's increase in authorized funding for section 202(e) of the Food for Peace Act to provide cash transfers, food vouchers, and locally or regionally procured food—modalities not previously supported through Title II. Of the additional authorized funding that the agency utilized, USAID obligated 75 percent in fiscal year 2014 and 96 percent in fiscal year 2015 for these modalities. In addition, to better meet beneficiaries' needs, USAID has increasingly used funds from accounts authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act, along with 202(e) funding, to implement and support projects—costs that 202(e) funding has typically covered. Also, in some cases, USAID has used funds from those accounts along with 202(e) funding to provide cash transfers, food vouchers, or local or regional procurement in a single project.
USAID and its partners have various controls for financial oversight of Title II funding used for implementation and support costs; however, GAO found certain deficiencies in USAID's oversight. USAID reviews partners' detailed planned budgets for these costs and high-level quarterly financial reports, according to USAID officials, but it generally has not conducted systematic, targeted financial reviews of partners' actual spending on these costs. While GAO found that partners' internal controls generally included policies and procedures to help ensure proper use of funds, GAO's limited, nongeneralizable financial transactions testing identified instances of misspending, such as charging a 202(e) cost to one project that should have been charged to another. Also, USAID has not obtained key monitoring data from partners related to these costs that could identify areas needing additional financial oversight. Moreover, USAID does not require partners to conduct comprehensive assessments of financial and fraud risks for cash transfers and food vouchers in development projects, although it requires risk assessments for emergency projects. GAO found that partners for selected development projects provided broad discussions of risk to USAID but did not provide comprehensive risk assessments. As a result, USAID is limited in its ability to ensure that partners are spending funds as planned.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to USAID—for example, to conduct financial reviews, collect monitoring data, and assess risks. USAID concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-89 | gao_GAO-07-89_0 | Six of the seven primary operational agencies, and the Operations Directorate of the department, have identified the need to conduct activities in support of the homeland security mission 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. CBP sponsors two 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers: the Air and Marine Operations Center and the National Targeting Center. The products of the four multi-agency operations centers reflect their different missions and range from reports on suspect individuals traveling on commercial flights to reports on suspicious private air and marine craft. The NOC-Watch has a more strategic mission in providing an overall assessment of situational awareness. NTC monitors the movement of potential terrorists and prevents them and any weapons of terror from entering and exiting our country through land, air, and sea ports. TSOC maintains situational awareness of passengers on commercial flights and works to minimize and mitigate security vulnerabilities of the National Capital Region and critical infrastructure such as commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines. NOC-Watch staff use information gathered and communicated by the three tactical centers; other DHS operation centers; other federal, state, and local entities; and a wide variety of other information sources to provide overall national situational awareness related to homeland security. Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at DHS’s Four Multi- Agency Operations Centers
DHS has leveraged its resources—one key collaborative practice—by having staff from multiple agencies work together at the four operations centers. Our previous work has shown that these are all critical components in enhancing collaboration among federal agencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff at each multi-agency 24/7/365 operations center, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security charge the Director of the Operations Directorate with developing and providing guidance and helping to ensure the agencies that sponsor the centers take the following six actions: define common goals and joint strategies; clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders; implement compatible standards, policies, and procedures for using DHS’s information network to provide a means of operating across agency boundaries; conduct staffing needs assessments; implement mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of collaborative efforts; and address collaborative efforts at the four multi-agency operations centers in plans and reports on the level of each operation center’s managing agency. 2. To what extent has DHS implemented key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration at these multi-agency centers? We identified four centers that employed staff from multiple DHS component agencies: the Air and Marine Operations Center, the National Targeting Center, the Transportation Security Operations Center, and the National Operations Center-Interagency Watch. We assessed DHS’s efforts and actions taken by the Operations Directorate to encourage coordination among the multi-agency centers and to promote collaboration among the staff representing DHS agencies at the centers to determine the extent that they reflected consideration of key practices that our previous work has shown can enhance and sustain a collaborative relationship among federal agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because terrorists do not operate on a 9-5 schedule, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its operational components have established information gathering and analysis centers that conduct activities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Staff at these operations centers work to help detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts. DHS has determined that out of 25 operations centers, four require higher levels of collaboration that can only be provided by personnel from multiple DHS agencies, and other federal, and sometimes state and local, agencies. For these four multi-agency operations centers, this report (1) describes their missions, products, functions, and customers and (2) assesses the extent to which DHS efforts to promote collaboration among the multiple agencies responsible for the centers reflect key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaborative efforts. To do so, GAO visited operations centers, reviewed data and reports from the centers, and interviewed center and other DHS officials.
What GAO Found
Each of the four multi-agency 24/7/365 operations centers has a different mission and therefore produces different products, yet all contribute to the larger mission of DHS and have similar functions and customers. Customs and Border Protection runs two of the four multi-agency operations centers--the National Targeting Center and the Air and Marine Operations Center. The former monitors the international movement of potential terrorists and produces reports on suspect individuals; the latter maintains situational awareness of the nation's airspace, general aviation, and sea-lanes and produces reports on suspicious private air and marine craft. The Transportation Security Administration's operations center monitors passengers on commercial flights; works to mitigate the vulnerabilities of commercial airports, rail stations, and pipelines, the National Capital Region, and critical infrastructure across the nation; and produces reports on these topics. DHS's Operations Directorate runs the National Operations Center Interagency Watch and works to enhance efficiency and collaboration among DHS components. This operations center has a more strategic mission in that it uses information gathered by the other operations centers to provide overall national situational awareness, and it prepares security briefs for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Opportunities exist to enhance collaboration among 24/7/365 multi-agency operations centers. While DHS has leveraged resources by having staff from multiple agencies work together, the centers lack joint strategies for collaboration and staffing needs assessments, and they have not established a definition of watchstander roles for all agencies at each center. The centers also lack standards and procedures for using DHS's primary information sharing network; mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and reinforced accountability through agency plans and reports. GAO's previous work has shown that such practices are effective in enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies. The establishment of DHS's Operations Directorate in 2005 provides a means to promote implementation of more collaborative practices at the centers. |
gao_GAO-10-526 | gao_GAO-10-526_0 | The Plan Does Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results- Oriented Management Framework
Air Force Plan Does Not Fully Address Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework and Lacks Clear Linkages in Planning Documents
While the Air Force plan focuses Air Force efforts on weapon system and equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link information between the two planning documents. The Air Force plan fully addresses one of the seven elements, partially addresses four elements, and does not address the remaining two elements that our prior work has shown to be critical in a comprehensive strategic plan. For example, the plan identifies a strategy to achieve its infrastructure goal. While the plan includes some metrics, it does not discuss any metrics that directly assess the degree to which the depots are achieving the plan’s goals. Moreover, the plan does not discuss the desired levels for each of these metrics. Similarly, the plan does not identify how the Air Force will evaluate its programs and use the results of these evaluations to adjust the plan’s long- term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. The Lack of Clear Linkage in the Plan’s Two Documents May Limit the Plan’s Usefulness
The content of the Air Force depot maintenance Strategy and Master Plan are not clearly linked to one another, which may make the collective plan difficult to use as a decision-making tool. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals that are unrelated to depot maintenance. In addition, the Master Plan does not clearly align its content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. However, that team did not review any of the services’ plans. The Air Force Lacked an Effective Oversight Mechanism to Systematically Evaluate the Plan
At the time the Air Force developed its plan, it lacked an effective oversight mechanism to help ensure that its plan fully addresses the elements of a results-oriented management framework and that the plan’s two documents are clearly linked to one another. The Plan Does Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)’s Direction Designed to Meet Future Challenges
While the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan describes many initiatives and programs important to the Air Force depots, it is not fully responsive to OUSD (AT&L)’s direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. Specifically, the plan does not fully address logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment—the four areas that OUSD (AT&L) directed each service, at a minimum, to include in its plan. Within these four general areas are 10 issues that OUSD (AT&L) also identified. The Air Force’s plan partially addresses 8 and does not address the remaining 2. However, at present, information missing from the Air Force plan may limit the service’s assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future maintenance requirements. To address reengineering existing employees’ skills, the plan indicates that the depots are partnering with local universities and technical schools to provide training. Neither the benchmarks for evaluating the adequacy of investment funding nor the Air Force’s basis for selecting the benchmarks are in the Air Force’s plan despite OUSD (AT&L)’s direction to address this issue. To strengthen the oversight mechanism for depot maintenance strategic planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement procedures to review revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure they fully address all key elements of a results-oriented management framework, explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans, and periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent needed in meeting the plans’ goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force's maintenance depots provide critical support to ongoing operations around the world. Previously, the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support, coupled with downsizing, led to a general deterioration in the capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of the military services' depots. In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and provided direction for the content of those plans. The Air Force issued two documents in response to this direction--a Strategy and a Master Plan. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the extent to which the Air Force's collective plan addresses (1) key elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OUSD's (AT&L) direction for the plan's content.
What GAO Found
While the Air Force plan focuses efforts on weapon system and equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link information between the plan's two component documents. GAO's prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic planning. The plan fully addresses one of these elements by including a mission statement that summarizes the Air Force depots' major functions and operations, but it partially addresses or does not address the remaining six elements. For example, while the plan describes goals for the depots' mission-related functions, it does not provide time frames to achieve them. Additionally, the plan does not discuss any factors beyond the Air Force's control that could affect its ability to achieve the plan's goals nor does it identify how the Air Force will evaluate its programs and use the results of such evaluations to adjust the plan's long-term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. Moreover, the content of the plan's two component documents are not clearly linked to one another. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals that are unrelated to depot maintenance. Nor does the Master Plan clearly align its content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. The plan does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework and the plan's two documents are not clearly linked to one another in part because of weaknesses in oversight. Specifically, although OUSD (AT&L) established an oversight body, which included senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L) and the services, to review the services' plans, this body did not review the plan. Also, the Air Force did not establish an oversight mechanism to review its plan. The plan's weaknesses may limit the Air Force's ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges. In addition, the Air Force plan is not fully responsive to OUSD's (AT&L) direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. The plan partially addresses 8 of these issues and does not address the remaining two. For example, while the plan notes that the Air Force is partnering with local universities and technical schools to provide training to reengineer existing employees' skills, the plan does not address Air Force actions to identify new and emerging skill requirements, as directed. Furthermore, the plan does not discuss any benchmarks to evaluate the adequacy of investment funding, as directed. As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management framework, the plan does not fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction for the plan's content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force. The plan's shortcomings may limit the Air Force's assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future maintenance challenges. |
gao_GAO-11-702 | gao_GAO-11-702_0 | Information on the Rate of Sexual Violence in War-Torn Eastern DRC and Adjoining Countries
We identified five population-based surveys, shown in table 1 below, that provide data on the rate of sexual violence in eastern DRC and Uganda. McGill University Survey (2010)
Data from a survey conducted by McGill University in 2010 estimated that 9 percent of the population had experienced sexual violence in the 1-year period from March 2009 through March 2010, and 13 percent of the population had experienced sexual violence in the 2-year period from March 2008 through March 2010. Over the period covered by the survey—1994 through 2010—the survey estimated about 33 percent of the population had experienced some form of sexual violence. It was designed similarly to McGill University’s, as a multistage cluster survey, but it is difficult to assess the accuracy of the survey because it did not employ the standard survey estimation techniques used in the 2010 survey conducted by McGill University. The survey estimated that in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, about 8 percent and 6 percent of females between the ages of 15 and 49, respectively, had experienced sexual violence within the 1- year period preceding the survey. The most recent survey, conducted in 2010 in four districts in northern Uganda, estimated that less than 0.5 percent of the population reported experiencing sexual violence at the hands of armed groups in the 1-year period from April 2009 to April 2010. According to the results of this survey, an estimated 39 percent of females and 11 percent of males had experienced sexual violence in their lifetimes. Population-Based Surveys Present Challenges and Limitations when Used to Gather Data and Estimate the Rate of Sexual Violence
Sampling and Nonsampling Errors Can Present Challenges for Population-Based Surveys
According to researchers, undercoverage can be a significant limitation when conducting surveys using random sampling in war-torn, conflict- ridden locations. Thus, according to U.N. officials, NGO representatives, and researchers, data from population-based surveys may suffer from underreporting because response rates depend, in part, on whether or not victims are willing to discuss experiences of sexual violence. As previously stated, population-based survey data are the more appropriate type of data for estimating sexual violence rates. Service Providers Collect Data on Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC and Adjoining Countries, but the Data Are Not Suitable for Estimating a Rate of Sexual Violence
Providers of medical services to victims of sexual violence in eastern DRC and adjoining countries and others collect case file data on sexual violence. For service providers, the UN, and NGOs active in eastern DRC, case file information on sexual violence can provide indicators that sexual assaults are occurring in certain locations and can help service providers respond to the needs of victims. However, as case file data are not based on a random sample and the results of analyzing these data are not generalizable, case file data are not suitable for estimating a rate of violence. UN officials and NGO representatives said service providers generally are hesitant to share their case file data with each other or outside parties, such as the UN. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and to the United States Agency for International Development, for their review and comment. 1502(d)) that GAO submit an annual report that assesses the rate of sexual and gender- based violence in war-torn areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries to appropriate congressional committees and based on parameters agreed upon with appropriate congressional staff, we identified and assessed available information on sexual violence in war-torn eastern DRC, as well as three neighboring countries that border eastern DRC—-Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. To assess the rate of sexual violence in eastern DRC and adjoining countries, we reviewed Section 1502(d)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. | Why GAO Did This Study
Large numbers of civilians in war-torn areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been the victims of horrific violence, including rape, mutilation, and sexual slavery carried out by armed groups and others. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act mandated GAO to submit to appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the rate of sexual and gender-based violence in war-torn areas of the DRC and adjoining countries. This report aims to provide Congress with the best possible understanding of the most recent estimates of sexual violence in eastern DRC and adjoining countries as it considers the range of policy options available to address the alarming incidence of such violence in the region. This report identifies and assesses available information on sexual violence in war-torn eastern DRC and adjoining countries. GAO reviewed and analyzed reports, memorandums, and other documents and interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), other United States agencies, and the United Nations (UN), as well as researchers and representatives from nongovernmental organizations.
What GAO Found
Of the two types of data on sexual violence from war-torn eastern DRC and adjoining countries GAO reviewed--data from population-based surveys and case file data--population-based surveys are more appropriate for estimating a rate of sexual violence. Unlike case file data, surveys are conducted using the techniques of random sampling and their results are generalizable. However, there are limitations and challenges to using surveys to gather sexual violence data and estimate rates of violence, particularly in eastern DRC. Specifically, GAO found the following: (1) Three population-based surveys provide data on the rate of sexual violence in eastern DRC. The most recent survey, conducted in eastern DRC in 2010, estimated that 9 percent of the population had experienced some form of sexual violence in the 1-year period from March 2009 through March 2010. An earlier survey in eastern DRC conducted in late 2007 estimated about 16 percent of the population had experienced sexual violence over the period 1993 through 2007, although this survey did not employ the standard survey estimation techniques used in the 2010 survey. The third survey was conducted in early to mid-2007 and estimated that about 8 percent of females in North Kivu and 6 percent of females in South Kivu had experienced sexual violence within the 1-year period preceding the survey. (2) Two population-based surveys for Uganda--the only adjoining country for which such information is available--provide data on the rate of sexual violence. The most recent survey, conducted in 2010 in four districts in northern Uganda, estimated less than 0.5 percent of the population reported experiencing sexual violence at the hands of armed groups in the 1-year period from April 2009 to April 2010. An earlier survey conducted nationwide in Uganda in 2006 estimated 39 percent of females and 11 percent of males had experienced sexual violence at some point in their lifetimes. (3) There are limitations and challenges to using population-based surveys to gather data and estimate rates of sexual violence, particularly in war-torn areas like eastern DRC. For example, there can be undercoverage due to poor infrastructure and insecurity which can limit access to some areas; underreporting, as survey response rates partly depend on whether or not sexual violence victims are willing to discuss such difficult experiences; and higher survey costs if large sample sizes are required. (4) Case file data, such as data collected by medical service providers or law enforcement agencies on sexual violence victims, can provide indicators that sexual assaults are occurring in certain locations and can help service providers respond to the needs of victims. However, since case file data are based on a nonrandom sample, the results of analyzing such data are not generalizable. Also, UN officials and others noted that case file data are largely anecdotal and not uniform, and service providers are generally hesitant to share their data with outside parties. This report does not contain recommendations. GAO provided a draft of this report to State and other relevant agencies for review and comment. These agencies reviewed the report and responded that they did not have comments. |
gao_GAO-03-546T | gao_GAO-03-546T_0 | Biometrics have been used in border control environments for several years. Challenges and Implications to Applying Biometrics at the Border
While biometric technology is currently available and used in a variety of applications, questions remain regarding the technical and operational effectiveness of biometric technologies in applications as large as border control. In addition, before implementing any biometric border control system, a number of other issues would have to be considered including: The system’s effect on existing border control procedures and people. The system’s effect on privacy, convenience, and the economy. Introducing Technology Affects People and Procedures
The successful implementation of any technology depends not only on the performance of the technology but also on the operational processes that employ the technology and the people who execute them. The second decision, made at the ports of entry, is whether to admit travelers into the country. System goals address the system’s expected outcomes and are usually based on business or public policy needs, which for a border control system could include items such as binding a biometric feature to a person’s identity on a travel document, identifying undesirable persons on a watch list, checking for duplicate enrollments in the system, verifying identities at the borders, ensuring the security of the biometric data, and ensuring the adequacy of privacy protections. As we have noted, the desired benefit is the prevention of the entry of travelers who are inadmissible to the United States. INS has previously estimated that up to 60 percent of the 275,000 new illegal immigrants a year do not present themselves at a port of entry to enter the United States. These challenges include: Integrity of the Inspections Process. The need to balance the dual objectives of identifying those who should not be permitted entry into the country and keeping traffic and trade flowing through the ports creates potential weaknesses in the process that biometrics can help resolve but not entirely. Providing Technology and Equipment to Inspectors. Access to Intelligence Information. In conclusion, biometric technologies are available today that can be used for border security. Technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. Weaknesses In Screening Entrants Into The United States. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the primary missions of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) focuses on border control--preventing the illegal entry of people and goods into the United States. Part of this mission is controlling the passage of travelers through official ports of entry into the United States. Facilitating the flow of people while preventing the illegal entry of travelers requires an effective and efficient process that authenticates a traveler's identity. Generally, identifying travelers at the ports of entry is performed by inspecting their travel documents, such as passports and visas, and asking them questions. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of individual travelers by one or more of their distinct physiological characteristics. Biometrics have been suggested as a way of improving the nation's ability to determine whether travelers are admissible to the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO found that biometric technologies are available today that can be used for border control. However, questions remain regarding the technical and operational effectiveness of biometric technologies in applications as large as border control. Before implementing any biometric border control system, a number of other issues would have to be considered, including the system's effect on existing border control procedures and people, the costs and benefits of the system, and the system's effect on privacy, convenience, and the economy. Furthermore, technology is only part of the solution. Effective security requires technology and people to work together to implement policies, processes, and procedures. At land border ports of entry, DHS faces several challenges including ensuring that the inspections process has sufficient integrity to enable inspectors to intercept those who should not enter our country, while still facilitating the entry of lawful travelers; ensuring that inspectors have the necessary technology, equipment, and training to do their job efficiently and effectively; and providing inspectors the access to necessary intelligence information. |
gao_GAO-04-339 | gao_GAO-04-339_0 | We found that 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda were in place, compared with 38 percent of the 66 reform initiatives in the 2002 agenda. In particular, the Secretariat made the most progress on the 1997 reforms to restructure U.N. operations to provide more unified leadership and coordination across departments, programs, and offices; institute a new human capital management system that sets expectations and rates staff performance; and adopt results-based budgeting. However, we found that approximately 40 percent of these reforms are not fully in place. Secretariat Will Need to Take Additional Steps to Achieve the Secretary General’s Overall Goals
More than one-quarter of the Secretary General’s completed reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, only represent the first steps in achieving longer-term and more important goals. Reforms in Four Key Areas of U.N. Operations Are Progressing, but Overall Impact Is Still Not Clear
We found that the U.N. has implemented many reforms in four key areas: (1) human capital management, (2) performance-oriented budgeting, (3) public information activities, and (4) the human rights program. In addition, although the Secretariat has an overall reform strategy in place, this strategy does not include specific time frames to complete reform actions. This review is not yet complete. We found that the office has implemented reforms to address its management deficiencies. Secretary General Does Not Have Authority to Implement Reforms of Human Rights Activities outside Secretariat
The Secretary General’s reform agendas called for the Secretariat’s human rights office to develop a strategy to strengthen its financial and human capital management and internal oversight procedures, among other things. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote full implementation and accountability of the Secretary General’s overall reform actions, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations work with other member states to encourage the Secretary General to report regularly through an existing U.N. reporting mechanism on the status and impact of the 1997 and 2002 reforms and other reforms that may follow; differentiate between short- and long-term reform goals and establish time frames for completion for those reforms that are not in place; and conduct assessments of the financial and personnel implications needed to implement the reforms. Specifically, we assessed (1) the overall status of U.N. reforms proposed in 1997 and 2002 by the Secretary General; (2) the Secretariat’s efforts to implement reforms in four key areas: human capital management, performance- oriented budgeting, public information activities, and the human rights program; and (3) the challenges facing the implementation of U.N. reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.N. Secretary General launched two reform agendas, in 1997 and 2002, to address the U.N.'s core management challenges--poor leadership of the Secretariat, duplication among its many offices and programs, and the lack of accountability for staff performance. In 2000, GAO reported that the Secretary General had reorganized the Secretariat's leadership and structure, but that the reforms were not yet complete. As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has a strong interest in the completion of these reforms. GAO was asked to assess the (1) overall status of the 1997 and 2002 reforms, (2) implementation of reforms in four key areas, and (3) potential challenges to reform.
What GAO Found
As of December 2003, 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 percent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place. In general, reforms under the Secretary General's authority were progressing more quickly than those requiring member states' approval. Since 1997, the Secretariat has implemented reforms to provide more unified leadership and coordination across departments and offices. However, the Secretariat has implemented other reforms, such as developing a written plan or establishing a new office, that are only the first step in achieving the Secretary General's overall goals. Reforms in four key areas of U.N. operations are in various stages. First, the Secretariat has taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in this area are ongoing and additional challenges remain. Second, the U.N. has begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system does not measure program impact. Third, although the Secretariat reorganized its public information department, reforms of library management and publications are not fully in place. Fourth, the Secretariat's human rights office implemented the majority of its management reforms but does not have the authority to implement reforms outside the Secretariat. U.N. reform faces several challenges. For example, the Secretariat does not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of U.N. reforms. In addition, the reform agendas lack clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges include resistance to change from program managers and possible resource constraints. |
gao_GAO-08-730 | gao_GAO-08-730_0 | These analyses include establishing the minimum ERR that the compact should achieve, projecting the compact’s ERR, and estimating the compact’s impact on income and growth. 1). Economic Analyses
For each compact proposal, MCC and the eligible country conduct economic analyses, which MCC uses to inform its decisions to fund compacts and report to Congress and the public. 2). 3.) MCC Used Different Time Frames and Methods to Calculate ERRs but Is Taking Steps to Increase Consistency
MCC used different time frames to calculate project-level ERRs; these differences did not affect the ERR significantly in 18 of the 20 compact projects we examined, but two ERRs would fall below the minimum ERR if MCC applied the 20-year time frame it used for other compacts and similar projects. In addition, we found that MCC used varying methods to account for the costs of same-sector projects, although its approaches to determining benefits were generally similar. MCC also used two different methods to calculate compact-level ERR; however, the choice of method did not change the ERRs significantly. MCC has recently taken steps to standardize elements of its economic analyses and improve its records management and plans to implement additional measures. MCC Used Different Time Frames for Project and Compact ERRs
In its ERR calculations for 20 projects included in the four compacts we reviewed, MCC used a 20-year time frame for 9 projects and used different time frames for 11 projects. For these three compacts, MCC’s records management did not fully preserve the information and analysis used to support the investment decision. MCC also used different methods to estimate numbers of compact beneficiaries, but stated that it is taking steps to provide more detailed guidance for estimating number of beneficiaries. MCC Identified and Corrected Analytic Errors for Three Compacts
In responding to our questions about its impact analyses for Armenia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, MCC identified a number of analytic errors in its projections of impact on income and poverty. MCC subsequently corrected these errors, generally reducing the projected impacts on income and poverty for each compact. MCC also used the wrong baseline in projecting poverty effects. In correcting these errors, MCC lowered its projections of income and poverty impact. Mozambique. Revised Projections Would Not Have Changed Funding Decisions, but Future Compact Impact Projections Will Undergo Review
According to MCC officials, the revisions to its initial calculations of compact impact on income and poverty for Armenia, El Salvador, and Mozambique would not have changed MCC’s decision to recommend each compact to the MCC Board. However, MCC has not documented its procedures for conducting these reviews, so it is unclear what criteria and level of detail the peer review includes. MCC Used Varying Methods to Project Compact Impact on Income and Poverty
MCC used different methods to project the four compacts’ impact on income and poverty, limiting the estimates’ comparability and replicability. Although the method chosen can affect the results, MCC has not provided preferred methods, or guidelines for selecting a method, for these calculations. This method entailed summing the total benefits of individual compact projects and adding them to the income that would have prevailed without MCC. For Lesotho, MCC estimated the impact of the compact on the country’s GDP growth rate using the published results from a World Bank simulation model. For one revised projection, MCC used its initial elasticity based on cross-country data. The transaction team’s choice of method for defining beneficiaries, in turn, affects the compact-level projections of impact on income and poverty. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, we assessed the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) economic analyses, including its projections of the compact’s economic rate of return (ERR), changes in income and poverty, and the number of beneficiaries. We also reviewed MCC’s guidance on projecting these economic impacts. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for foreign assistance. Eligible countries submit compact proposals for MCC funding for projects aimed at reducing poverty through economic growth. To assess the proposed compacts' likely impact, MCC performs economic analyses estimating the compacts' economic rate of return (ERR) and effects on income and poverty as well as the number of compact beneficiaries. MCC uses these analyses to inform its decisions to fund proposed compacts and to inform Congress and the public about its progress in achieving its mission of poverty reduction through economic growth. GAO was asked to examine MCC's projections of (1) ERR and (2) compacts' impact on income and poverty as well as numbers of beneficiaries. GAO reviewed MCC's stated impacts and analyses for four MCC compacts that represented 41 percent of MCC's compact assistance and met with MCC officials.
What GAO Found
MCC used different time frames and methods to calculate ERRs for its compacts with Armenia, El Salvador, Lesotho, and Mozambique. In calculating ERR for 20 projects within the compacts, MCC used a 20-year time frame for 9 projects and used different time frames for the other 11. In 2 of the 11 projects, using a 20-year time frame, as MCC used for similar projects, would reduce the ERR below the level MCC set as the minimum acceptable ERR. At the compact level, MCC's use of varying time frames did not affect the ERRs significantly. MCC used varying methods to account for the costs of same-sector projects, although its approaches to determining project benefits were generally similar. MCC also used two different methods to calculate compact-level ERR; however, the choice of method did not reduce it below the minimum ERR. In three of the four compacts that we reviewed, MCC did not retain documentation of the economic analyses used to support the investment decision, but continued to modify the analyses. MCC has recently begun to standardize elements of its economic analyses and centralize its records management. MCC identified and corrected analytic errors in its projections of impact on income and poverty. MCC also used varying methods to project these impacts. In responding to GAO's questions about its published projections of impact on income and poverty, MCC identified analytic errors for three of the four compacts and, in correcting these errors, generally lowered the projected impacts. Correcting these errors raised one projection by 5 percent but reduced others by 3 percent to 96 percent. According to MCC officials, the revised projections would not have affected MCC's decision to recommend signing the compacts. The officials noted that, in the future, compact impact projections will undergo peer review. However, MCC has not documented procedures for these reviews. MCC used varying methods for its projections of impact on income and poverty, limiting comparability and replicability across compacts. To project impact on income for Armenia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, MCC estimated the compacts' impact by summing the total benefits of individual compact projects and adding them to the income that would have prevailed without MCC. However, for Lesotho, MCC estimated the impact on income based on the published results of a World Bank model based on elements different from those of the MCC compact. In response to our questions, MCC revised its initial estimate of the effect of income growth on poverty for Mozambique by presenting two estimates, based on Mozambique-specific and cross-country data, respectively. Although a number of methods for projecting poverty impact are valid, the method chosen can affect the results, and MCC's guidelines do not identify preferred methods for these calculations. MCC also used varying methods to estimate numbers of beneficiaries for the compacts and has not provided specific criteria for defining beneficiaries; however, MCC officials reported they are taking steps to provide more detailed guidance. |
gao_T-GGD-97-21 | gao_T-GGD-97-21_0 | For businesses, each tax presents, in turn, its own set of rules and regulations with its own particular exceptions and unique regulatory requirements. For the small business owner just starting up, these employment tax rules make compliance with the taxes both complex and confusing. Accomplishing the different goals of the various taxes and the policy trade-offs made in their design requires different regulatory schemes. The number and type of state and local tax assessments also vary. 3. Under the federal tax law, however, she will not be liable for FUTA taxes. Compliance with such regulations requires the employer to pay meticulous attention to detailed legal provisions. Since 1988, various federal and state groups have been trying to simplify aspects of the employment taxes. Even the smallest change to the current very complicated regulatory scheme can involve political and economic trade-offs between types of taxes and between federal and state jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the enormity of the challenge, however, we believe that efforts to simplify the tax code are essential to reducing compliance burden, thereby making voluntary tax compliance easier for all types of businesses, large and small. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the impact of various employment tax laws and regulations on small businesses hiring their first employees and all employees thereafter.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) employment tax compliance can be particularly burdensome to employers because of multiple federal, state, and local taxes; (2) each tax generally requires it own unique set of rules, regulations, and exceptions, which makes compliance difficult for employers; (3) the complexities discussed reflect the various trade-offs that have been made to address assorted tax policy issues; (4) these trade-offs include considerations as to the type of tax imposed, the types of compensation to be socially encouraged, and the fiscal requirements of individual governmental units and, consequently, they will not be easy to simplify; (5) respondents to an earlier GAO survey described characteristics of especially troublesome tax provisions, such as ambiguity, frequent changes, expiration clauses, and layers of federal and state regulation; and (6) efforts to simplify the tax code are essential to reducing compliance burden, thus making voluntary tax compliance easier for all types of businesses, large and small. |
gao_AIMD-96-55 | gao_AIMD-96-55_0 | The Argentine privatization process was less centralized and more flexible than in the other countries we studied. Valuation and Preparation for Sale
In Argentina, the government was required to estimate the worth of an entity prior to sale as well as determine what level of improvements and investment should be required from the purchaser once it acquired the entity. The new owners were then required to create private sector corporations to control the assets of the privatized entities. Type of Sale and Sale Process
The Argentine government privatized public enterprises primarily through divestiture and the awarding of concessions. Competition and Regulation
Although the Argentine government generally tried to foster competition through the privatization process, it has experienced some problems promoting competition. Use of Proceeds
We were told by a government official in Argentina that the government is required to use the proceeds from privatization to finance the social security system or to buy down existing debt. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined privatization in Argentina, focusing on how Argentina: (1) values and prepares assets for sale; and (2) uses sales proceeds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Argentina's privatization process is less centrally controlled than other countries and uses special privatization committees to foster its sales process; (2) the Argentine government generally retains the liabilities and obligations of the entities being privatized in order to enhance their sale price and ensure their sale; (3) the Argentine government believes that the private sector does a better job of investing in and improving enterprises; (4) although the government dissolved some industries to foster more competition, many are still monopolies and require some regulatory framework; (5) when the Argentine government values the assets of an entity, it determines the level of improvement and investment that the purchaser will need to make; and (6) the proceeds from Argentina's privatization are used to finance its social security system and existing debt. |
gao_GAO-02-524 | gao_GAO-02-524_0 | Congress responded by passing the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. During the 1980s and 1990s, railroads used their increased pricing freedoms to improve their financial health and competitiveness. Wheat and Corn
From 1997 through 2000, real rail rates for shipments of wheat and corn generally stayed the same or decreased for the markets that we reviewed. However, some rail rates on short-distance routes increased between 1999 and 2000. Rates in the other markets generally stayed about the same or decreased. Proportion of Rail Industry Revenues Exceeding 180 Percent of Variable Costs Generally Were Stable
Between 1997 and 2000, the proportion of all railroad revenue that came from shipments transported at rates that generated revenues exceeding 180 percent of variable costs stayed relatively constant at just under 30 percent. As described previously, the R/VC ratio is a jurisdictional threshold for the Surface Transportation Board to consider rate relief cases. Real Rail Rates for Coal
The following are real (inflation-adjusted) rail rates for coal shipments in the various markets and distance categories we reviewed. | What GAO Found
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 gave freight railroads increased freedom to price their services according to market conditions. A number of shippers are concerned that freight railroads have used these pricing freedoms to unreasonably exercise their market power in setting rates for shippers with fewer alternatives to rail transportation. This report updates the rate information in GAO's 1999 report (RCED-99-93) using selected commodities and with effective competitive transportation alternatives. From 1997 through 2000, rail rates generally decreased, both nationwide and for many of the specific commodities and markets that GAO examined. However, rail rates for some commodities and distance categories--such as wheat moving long distances and coal moving short distances--have stayed about the same or increased. In other instances, such as wheat moving medium distances, rail rates stayed about the same or decreased. Overall, the proportion of rail shipments above the Surface Transportation Board's statutory jurisdictional threshold for considering rate relief actions--where railroad revenues for the shipment exceed 180 percent of variable costs--stayed relatively constant at 30 percent from 1997 through 2000. However, the proportion of shipments for which revenues exceeded variable costs by 180 percent varied, depending on commodity and markets. |
gao_GAO-11-759T | gao_GAO-11-759T_0 | USPS’s Dire Financial Outlook and Changing Mail Use Require Network Restructuring
USPS urgently needs to restructure its networks and operations as its financial condition and outlook reach a crisis level. USPS has experienced a cumulative net loss of nearly $20 billion over the last 5 fiscal years and has already reported a net loss of $2.6 billion through the first 6 months of fiscal year 2011. By the end of this fiscal year, USPS projects that it will incur a $8.3 billion loss, experience a substantial cash shortfall, reach its $15 billion borrowing limit, and be unable to make its scheduled retiree health benefits payment to the federal government. USPS’s financial problems have been building, as customers’ mail use has been changing— that is, mail volume is declining as customers shift to electronic communications and payment alternatives. According to USPS, customer visits have declined over the last decade by about 21 percent and retail revenue generated at USPS-operated retail locations has dropped by about 16 percent, yet the number of USPS-operated facilities has remained largely unchanged since fiscal year 2001. Several factors have constrained USPS’s efforts to make significant changes to its retail network: Legal requirements: USPS officials have stated that the legal process has hindered USPS’s ability to make progress in retail realignment. Mail Processing
USPS has taken actions to reduce excess capacity and improve operational efficiency throughout its mail processing network for sorting and transporting mail, but has had difficulty comprehensively adjusting its network to respond to the unprecedented mail volume decline since fiscal year 2006. Costly excess mail processing capacity remains for several reasons: Mail volume has declined, particularly single-piece First-Class Mail, which has dropped by about 23 billion pieces over the past decade. USPS and Congress Need to Take Urgent Action to Restructure Networks
Congress and USPS urgently need to reach agreement on a package of actions that will address difficult constraints and legal restrictions and allow USPS to accelerate progress on restructuring its networks. We also have recommended in prior reports that USPS realign its postal operations, networks, and workforce with changes in mail usage and customer behavior. As part of this work, we proposed options for action by Congress and USPS to reduce costs and improve efficiency. Realigning Postal Networks Involves Key Public Policy Questions and Consideration of Changes
Restructuring decisions involve key public policy questions as well as difficult trade-offs—for example, what postal services are needed and what is affordable? As we have reported, Congress’s decisions about how to address the following questions will shape USPS’s future role, operations, networks, and ability to adapt to changes in mail use and mail volume: Universal service: What aspects of universal service, including 6-day delivery, are appropriate in light of fundamental changes in customers’ use of the mail? In order for USPS to be self-sustaining, it needs to significantly reduce its costs to match its revenues. Change is needed to needed to facilitate restructuring postal networks and operations. Improve outreach and transparency of information used to make decisions. Enhance public input by simplifying rules and requirements so that they are consistent, timely, and easy to understand. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) recently reported that its financial results for the first half of this fiscal year--a net loss of $2.6 billion--are worse than projected. USPS expects continued financial challenges as mail volume continues to decline. Most notable is the decline of First-Class Mail (its most profitable mail) by over 25 billion pieces, or about 25 percent, over the past decade. GAO has reported on proposals to revise USPS pension and retiree health obligations, but such actions alone will not be sufficient to address the accelerating volume decline and changing use of the mail. This statement discusses (1) why it is important to restructure USPS's networks and (2) what actions are needed to facilitate additional progress. This statement is based primarily on past and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
USPS urgently needs to restructure its networks and operations as its financial condition and outlook are reaching a crisis. USPS has been experiencing billion-dollar losses and cash shortfalls over the last 5 years, and expects to reach its $15 billion borrowing limit this year. USPS officials have stated that USPS may default on its retiree health payments owed to the federal government in September 2011. These financial problems are due to declining mail volume brought on by customers' shift to electronic alternatives and USPS's difficulty in reducing costs and eliminating excess network capacity. USPS faces restructuring challenges in three areas: (1) Retail--Although USPS has provided alternatives to post offices, it has been slow to modernize its network. As customer visits to, and revenue generated at, post offices have declined, USPS has not made commensurate reductions in its number of retail facilities. (2) Mail processing--USPS has improved operational efficiency and reduced employee work hours, but excess capacity remains as large mail volume declines continue. (3) Delivery--USPS has adjusted routes and deployed new sorting equipment to make delivery more efficient, but additional efforts are needed, since delivery is USPS's most costly activity. Restructuring decisions involve key public policy questions. For example, what postal services are needed and what is affordable? In order for USPS to be self-sustaining, it needs to significantly reduce its costs to match its revenues. Change is needed to facilitate restructuring postal networks and operations. GAO has suggested the following changes: (1) Revise legal requirements to facilitate network-wide restructuring, perhaps similar to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approach. (2) Improve outreach and the transparency of information used to make decisions. (3) Enhance public input by simplifying rules and requirements so that they are consistent, timely, and easy for the public to understand.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. Recently, GAO has reported that Congress, the administration, and USPS urgently need to reach agreement on a package of actions that will address constraints and legal restrictions to facilitate progress in rightsizing USPS's operations, networks, and workforce. GAO has also recommended that Congress consider providing USPS with financial relief, and in doing so, consider all options available to reduce costs. |
gao_GAO-14-139T | gao_GAO-14-139T_0 | As previously mentioned, DOD and DHS grant the most security clearances. OPM Has Developed a Tool to Help Agencies Determine the Proper Sensitivity Level for Most Federal Positions; However the Tool Was Not Developed with Input from the DNI
In the absence of clearly defined guidance to help ensure that executive branch agencies use appropriate and consistent criteria when determining if positions require a personnel security clearance, agencies are using an OPM-designed tool to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. The determination to grant a clearance is based on whether a position requires access to classified information and, if access is required, the responsible official will designate the position to require a clearance. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) officials told us that they believe OPM’s tool is useful for determining a position’s sensitivity level. Accordingly, we found in July 2012 that the Director of OPM and the DNI had not fully collaborated in executing their respective roles in the process for determining position designations. More recently, after the implementation of the tool, in an April 2012 audit of a DOD agency, OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions, and OPM’s designations differed from the agency’s designations in 26 of those positions. Because we found that the executive branch had not provided clear guidance for the designation of national security positions, we recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. Subsequently, ODNI and OPM drafted the proposed regulation, published it in the Federal Register on May 28, 2013, and obtained public comment on the regulation through June 27, 2013. In reviewing the proposed regulation, we found that it would, if finalized in its current form, meet the intent of our recommendation to issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. Further, we also recommended in 2012 that once clear policy and procedures for position designation are issued, the DNI and the Director of OPM should collaborate in their respective roles as Executive Agents to revise the position designation tool to reflect that guidance. However, we reported in 2012 that the DNI had not issued policies and procedures for agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the existing clearance requirements for their federal civilian positions to ensure that clearances are 1) kept to a minimum and 2) reserved only for those positions with security clearance requirements that are in accordance with the national security needs of the time. During our 2012 review of several DOD and DHS components, we found that officials were aware of the requirement to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum but were not always subject to a standard requirement to review and validate the security clearance needs of existing positions on a periodic basis. The federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations in fiscal year 2011. Without a requirement to consistently review, revise, or validate existing security clearance position designations, executive branch agencies—such as DOD and DHS—may be hiring and budgeting for both initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that do not reflect national security needs. Finally, since reviews are not being done consistently, DOD, DHS, and other executive branch agencies cannot have reasonable assurance that they are keeping to a minimum the number of positions that require security clearances on the basis of a demonstrated and foreseeable need for access. Therefore, we recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. ODNI and OPM are currently in the process of finalizing revisions to the position designation federal regulation. As part of our ongoing processes to routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior recommendations, we note that the proposed regulation would newly require agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position designations within 24 months of the final regulation’s effective date, which is an important step towards ensuring that the current designations of national security positions are accurate. GAO-12-800. | Why GAO Did This Study
Personnel security clearances allow individuals access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. A sound requirements process to determine whether a national security position requires access to classified information is needed to safeguard classified data and manage costs. The DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a security clearance in 2012. GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations (in support of security clearances and suitability determinations--the consideration of character and conduct for federal employment) in fiscal year 2011.
This testimony addresses policies and procedures executive branch agencies use when (1) first determining whether federal civilian positions require a security clearance and (2) periodically reviewing and revising or validating existing federal civilian position security clearance requirements. This testimony is based on a July 2012 GAO report (GAO-12-800), in which GAO (1) reviewed relevant federal guidance and processes, (2) examined agency personnel security clearance policies, (3) obtained and analyzed an OPM tool used for position designation, and (4) met with officials from ODNI and OPM because of their Directors' assigned roles as Security and Suitability Executive Agents. Because DOD and DHS grant the most security clearances, that report focused on the security clearance requirements of federal civilian positions within those agencies.
What GAO Found
In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as Security Executive Agent, had not provided executive branch agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a personnel security clearance. Absent this guidance, agencies are using an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) position designation tool to determine the sensitivity and risk levels of civilian positions which, in turn, inform the type of investigation needed. OPM audits, however, found inconsistency in these position designations, and some agencies described problems implementing OPM's tool. For example, in an April 2012 audit OPM assessed the sensitivity levels of 39 positions, and its designations differed from the agency in 26 positions. Problems exist, in part, because OPM and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) did not collaborate on the development of this tool, and because their respective roles for suitability and security clearance reform are still evolving. As a result, to help determine the proper designation, GAO recommended that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM, issue clearly defined policy and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance. The DNI concurred with this recommendation. In May 2013, the DNI and OPM jointly drafted a proposed revision to the federal regulation on position designation which, if finalized in its current form, would provide additional requirements and examples of position duties at each sensitivity level. GAO also recommended that once those policies and procedures are in place, the DNI and the Director of OPM, in their roles as Executive Agents, collaborate to revise the position designation tool to reflect the new guidance. ODNI and OPM concurred with this recommendation and recently told GAO that they are revising the tool.
GAO also reported in July 2012 that the DNI had not established guidance to require agencies to periodically review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. GAO reported that Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component officials were aware of the requirement to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. GAO found that without such a requirement, executive branch agencies may be hiring and budgeting for initial and periodic security clearance investigations using position descriptions and security clearance requirements that do not reflect current national security needs. Further, since reviews are not done consistently, executive branch agencies cannot have assurances that they are keeping the number of positions that require security clearances to a minimum. Therefore, GAO recommended in July 2012 that the DNI, in coordination with the Director of OPM, issue guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. As of October 2013, ODNI and OPM are finalizing revisions to the federal regulation on position designation. While the proposed regulation requires agencies to conduct a one-time reassessment of position designation within 24 months of the final rule's effective date, it does not require a periodic reassessment of positions' need for access to classified information. GAO continues to believe that periodic reassessment is important. |
gao_GAO-09-728 | gao_GAO-09-728_0 | In addition to addressing the published recommendations, the SOC assumed responsibility for addressing the policy development and reporting requirements contained in the NDAA 2008. Also, the IPO’s scope of responsibility was broadened to include personnel and benefits data sharing between DOD and VA.
DOD and VA Have Completed the Majority of the Requirements to Jointly Develop Policies on Care and Management, Medical and Disability Evaluation, Return to Active Duty, and the Transition from DOD to VA
As of April 2009, DOD and VA have completed 60 of the 76 requirements we identified for jointly developing policies for recovering servicemembers on (1) care and management, (2) medical and disability evaluation, (3) return to active duty, and (4) servicemember transition from DOD to VA. DOD and VA Have Completed More Than Two-Thirds of the Requirements for the Care and Management of Recovering Servicemembers
We found that more than two-thirds of the requirements for DOD’s and VA’s joint policy development to improve the care and management of recovering servicemembers have been completed, while the remaining requirements are in progress. According to DOD and VA officials, the January 2009 DTM serves as the interim policy for care, management, and transition until the completion of DOD’s comprehensive policy instruction, which is estimated to be completed by August 2009. DOD and VA Have Completed All of the Requirements for Developing Policy on the Medical Evaluation and Disability Evaluation of Recovering Servicemembers
DOD and VA have completed all of the requirements for developing policy to improve the medical and physical disability evaluation of recovering servicemembers. According to a DOD official, further assessment of the feasibility and advisability of consolidation will be conducted. DOD and VA anticipate issuing a final report on the pilot in August 2009. A VA official reported that VA plans to separately issue policy guidance addressing the requirements for transitioning servicemembers from DOD to VA in the fourth quarter of 2009. DOD and VA Officials Experienced Challenges during Joint Development of Required Policies
DOD and VA officials told us that they experienced numerous challenges as they worked to jointly develop policies to improve the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. According to officials, these challenges contributed to the length of time required to issue policy guidance, and in some cases the challenges have not yet been completely resolved. Establishing standard definitions for operational terms. One of the important tasks facing the SOC was the need to standardize key terminology relevant to policy issues affecting recovering servicemembers. The need to resolve this challenge assumes even greater importance in light of DOD’s and VA’s increasing capability to exchange medical records electronically, which will expand DOD’s ability to access records of servicemembers who have received medical treatment from VA.
Changes to the SOC’s Staff and Scope of Responsibilities Could Pose Future Challenges to Joint Policy Development
The SOC has experienced turnover in leadership, reconfiguration in its organizational structure at DOD, and changes affecting policy development responsibilities. In contrast, others are concerned by DOD’s changes, stating that the new organizations disrupt the unity of command that once characterized the SOC’s management because personnel within the SOC organization now report to three different officials within DOD and VA. However, it is too soon to determine how well DOD’s new structure will work in conjunction with the SOC. DOD and VA officials we spoke with told us that the SOC’s work groups continue to carry out their roles and responsibilities. Finally, according to DOD and VA officials, the scope of responsibilities of both the SOC and the DOD and VA Joint Executive Council appear to be in flux and may evolve further still. While the SOC will remain responsible for policy matters directly related to recovering servicemembers, a number of policy issues may now be directed to the Joint Executive Council, including issues that the SOC had previously addressed. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOD and VA for comment. VA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD and VA did not provide other comments. Appendix I: Summary of Selected Requirements from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
To summarize the status of the Departments’ of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) efforts to jointly develop policies for each of the four policy areas outlined in sections 1611 through 1614 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA 2008), we identified 76 requirements in these sections and grouped related requirements into 14 logical categories. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA 2008) requires the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) to jointly develop and implement comprehensive policies on the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. The Wounded, Ill, and Injured Senior Oversight Committee (SOC)--jointly chaired by DOD and VA leadership--has assumed responsibility for these policies. The NDAA 2008 also requires GAO to report on the progress DOD and VA make in jointly developing and implementing the policies. This report focuses on the joint development of the policies. Implementation of the policies will be addressed in future reports. Specifically, this report provides information on (1) the progress DOD and VA have made in jointly developing the comprehensive policies required by the NDAA 2008 and (2) the challenges DOD and VA are encountering in the joint development of these policies. GAO determined the current status of policy development by assessing the status reported by SOC officials and analyzing supporting documentation. To identify challenges, GAO interviewed the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Executive Director and Chief of Staff of the SOC, the departmental co-leads for most of the SOC work groups, the Acting Director of DOD's Office of Transition Policy and Care Coordination, and other knowledgeable officials.
What GAO Found
DOD and VA have made substantial progress in jointly developing policies required by sections 1611 through 1614 of the NDAA 2008 in the areas of (1) care and management, (2) medical and disability evaluation, (3) return to active duty, and (4) transition of care and services received from DOD to VA. Overall, GAO's analysis showed that as of April 2009, 60 of the 76 policy requirements GAO identified have been completed and the remaining 16 policy requirements are in progress. DOD and VA have completed all of the policy development requirements for medical and physical disability evaluations, including issuing a report on the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the DOD and VA disability evaluation systems, although the pilot for this approach is still ongoing. DOD has also completed establishing standards for returning recovering servicemembers to active duty. More than two-thirds of the policy development requirements have been completed for the remaining two policy areas--care and management and the transition of recovering servicemembers from DOD to VA. Most of these requirements were addressed in a January 2009 DOD memorandum that was developed in consultation with VA. DOD officials reported that more information will be provided in a subsequent policy instruction, which is to be issued in August 2009. VA also plans to issue related policy guidance in the fourth quarter of 2009. DOD and VA officials told GAO that they have experienced numerous challenges as they worked to jointly develop policies to improve the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers. According to officials, these challenges contributed to the length of time required to issue policy guidance, and in some cases the challenges have not yet been completely resolved. For example, the SOC must still standardize key terminology relevant to policy issues affecting recovering servicemembers. DOD and VA agreement on key definitions for what constitutes "mental health," for instance, is important for developing policies that define the scope, eligibility, and service levels for recovering servicemembers. Recent changes affecting the SOC may also pose future challenges to policy development. Some officials have expressed concern that DOD's recent changes to staff supporting the SOC have disrupted the unity of command because SOC staff now report to three different officials within DOD and VA. However, it is too soon to determine how well DOD's staffing changes will work. Additionally, according to DOD and VA officials, the SOC's scope of responsibilities appears to be in flux. While the SOC will remain responsible for policy matters for recovering servicemembers, a number of policy issues may now be directed to the DOD and VA Joint Executive Council. Despite this uncertainty, DOD and VA officials told GAO that the SOC's work groups continue to carry out their roles and responsibilities. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD and VA for comment. VA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. DOD and VA did not provide other comments. |
gao_GAO-02-514T | gao_GAO-02-514T_0 | Agencies Reported Varied Foreign Language Shortages
Officials in the four agencies we reviewed reported varied types and degrees of foreign language shortages depending on the agency, job position, language, and skill level. They noted shortages of translators and interpreters and people with skills in specific languages, as well as a shortfall in proficiency level among people who use foreign language skills in their jobs. Agencies Use a Variety of Strategies to Meet Their Foreign Language Needs
Our second objective was to examine federal agencies’ strategies to address these foreign language shortages. To help fill existing skills shortages, some agencies have begun to adopt a strategic approach to human capital management and workforce planning. We used this model to assess the relative maturity of workforce planning at the four agencies we reviewed. In contrast, the other three agencies have yet to pursue this type of comprehensive strategic planning and had only completed some of the steps outlined in OPM’s planning model. | What GAO Found
Federal agencies' foreign language needs have increased during the past decade because of increasing globalization and the changing security environment. At the same time, agencies have seen significant reductions-in-force and no-growth or limited-growth environments during the last decade. As a result, some agencies now confront an aging core of language-capable staff while recruiting and retaining qualified new staff in an increasingly competitive job market. The four agencies GAO reviewed reported shortages of translators and interpreters and other staff, such as diplomats and intelligence specialists, with foreign language skills. These shortfalls varied depending on the agency, job position, language, and skill level. The agencies reported using a range of strategies to address their staffing shortfalls, such as providing employees with language training and pay incentives, recruiting employees with foreign language skills, hiring contractors, or taking advantage of information technology. One of the four agencies has adopted a strategic approach to its workforce planning efforts. In contrast, the other three agencies have yet to pursue overall strategic planning in this area. |
gao_GAO-15-791 | gao_GAO-15-791_0 | During the program’s first four fiscal years—2010 through 2013—the USOC served an intermediary role in program management, receiving grant funds from VA and sub-granting them to organizations that provided adaptive sports opportunities and events. Grant Selection Process Had Limitations in Fiscal Year 2014, but VA Implemented an Improved Process in Fiscal Year 2015
VA Faced a Tight Timeframe in Selecting Fiscal Year 2014 Grantees
In fiscal year 2014, the first year VA was responsible for selecting eligible entities to receive grants under the adaptive sports grant program, VA officials reported challenges because of tight time frames to obtain and review grant applications and the lack of a standard application form tailored for the adaptive sports grant program. Because law and regulation required the program’s grant applications to include information that the SF-424 forms are not designed to include—such as a description of the roles of any partner organization—VA required narrative attachments to this standard application form. These narratives varied greatly in length, detail, and format. In addition, VA officials said that, despite repeated VA communication, some applicants did not understand the limitation on administrative expenses. However, 3 of 16 grant files we reviewed contained neither this form nor any other documentation of the administrative and financial capabilities of the grantee. For example, 7 of the 16 grant applications we reviewed lacked clear documentation that the 7.5 percent limit on administrative expenses had been observed in proposed budgets. VA Monitors Grantees in Several Ways, but its Approach for 2014 Grantees Had Limitations
The Design of VA’s Monitoring Approach is Consistent with Grants Management Criteria, but Further Improvements Could be Made
VA’s approach to monitoring grantees, as outlined in VA grants management policy and an agency memorandum on monitoring techniques, includes regular grantee reporting, supplemented with monitoring through detailed site visits and desk audits of selected grantees. However, the draft plan lacks certain elements, such as information on the number and frequency of site visits and desk audits. Also, in our review of the selected grantee files, we found evidence that VA reviewed the quarterly reports to ensure that grantees were operating according to the terms of their grant agreements with VA.
For 6 of the first-quarter and 12 of the second-quarter reports we reviewed, we found that VA identified issues for follow up, and requested additional information from grantees. We reviewed reports on the results of 8 VA site visits, covering 9 of its 69 grants, conducted from November 2014 through June 2015. In August 2015, a VA official stated that they had initiated a desk audit of one grantee. VA Grants Funded a Range of Adaptive Sports Activities, but Some Grantees Expressed Concern with No-Shows
Fiscal Year 2014 Grants Funded Many Distinct Sport Activities
The 69 adaptive sports grants awarded by VA in fiscal year 2014 supported a wide range of activities, with cycling, boating, snow skiing, and archery among the most frequent (see fig. 2). 3). Importantly, a total of about $459,000—about 5.7 percent of the total $8 million awarded— was budgeted as administrative costs. VA officials confirmed that no-shows are a problem. However, VA has not systematically gathered and disseminated permissible techniques for reducing no-show rates to all of its grantees. Our review indicates that through the first half of fiscal year 2015, grantees were substantially complying with reporting requirements and that site visits to selected grantees have identified opportunities for improvement. Further, VA is amending its quarterly reporting template so that it will require a report of staff time spent on direct personal interaction with participants, and time spent on other matters, as required by program regulations. However, VA’s draft monitoring plan does not include a regular schedule for site visits or desk audits, which risks the possibility that none will be performed in some years, or that they will be performed very late in the year. VA concurred with our conclusions and both of our recommendations. Regarding the second recommendation, VA stated that the agency plans to systematically gather and disseminate techniques from a variety of sources to reduce no-show rates. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this engagement were to determine (1) how the VA adaptive sports grant program selected grantees to provide adaptive sports programs and activities for veterans and service members with disabilities; (2) how VA monitors grantees’ use of funds; and (3) what programs and activities have been supported with fiscal year 2014 funds, and what is known about how veterans and service members with disabilities have benefited from these programs and activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA's adaptive sports grant program distributes $8 million annually to organizations that provide sports activities for veterans and service members with disabilities. The U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) played an intermediary role from fiscal year 2010, when the program was implemented, through 2013. USOC received funds from VA and subgranted them to selected grantees. VA is now responsible for selecting grantees and program administration. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review VA's program management.
GAO reviewed (1) how VA selected grantees to provide activities for veterans and service members with disabilities; (2) how VA monitors grantees' use of funds; and (3) what programs and activities were supported with fiscal year 2014 funds, and what is known about its benefits. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 16 of the 69 grant files accounting for about $3.7 million of the $8 million awarded in fiscal year 2014; and interviewed VA officials, as well as grantee officials and adaptive sports participants during site visits to adaptive sports events in three states, selected in part to ensure regional diversity.
What GAO Found
From December 2013 through September 2014, VA developed implementing regulations, announced availability of funding, and selected grantees—ultimately awarding 69 grants from a pool of 161 applications to receive funding under its adaptive sports grant program. VA selected grantees in three steps, including (1) eliminating non-qualifying applications, (2) scoring and ranking qualifying applications using nine criteria, such as strength of the proposed program concept, and (3) a final step that included, among other things, eliminating unnecessary costs from proposed budgets. VA officials said limited available time necessitated the use of a standard federal grant application form rather than one tailored for the program. Because the form did not include some information needed to assess applications—such as the roles of partner organizations—VA asked for narrative attachments. These attachments varied greatly in length and detail which VA officials said made their review quite labor intensive. In addition, some applications did not contain needed information. For example, 3 of the 16 grant files reviewed by GAO did not contain documentation of the grantee's financial management capabilities. VA customized its application form for fiscal year 2015, and VA officials said this led to a substantial improvement in the application process.
VA developed a grant monitoring approach for fiscal year 2014 grants that relied on quarterly and annual reports from grantees (containing information on financial and sports activities), site visits, and remote auditing of selected grantees. In the sample of 16 grant files reviewed, GAO found grantees generally complied with VA's quarterly reporting requirements. VA has improved the quarterly report template so that it requests information on time spent on direct personal interaction with participants. Through June 2015, VA provided GAO with reports of 8 visits covering 9 of its 69 grants. However, VA did not initiate a remote audit until August 2015. The agency developed a draft grant monitoring plan in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015, but the plan does not specify the number or frequency of site visits and remote audits. This omission risks the possibility that none will be performed in some years, or performed very late in the year, thus missing an opportunity for prompt detection of the misuse of funds.
The grants supported a variety of sports activities and afforded participant benefits such as socialization and improved personal independence, according to the participants, coaches, and grantee officials GAO interviewed. The 69 grantees in fiscal year 2014 planned activities that encompassed many different adaptive sports, with cycling, boating, and snow skiing among the most common. Overall, the allotment for administrative costs in grantees' budgets was about 5.7 percent of the total $8 million awarded in fiscal year 2014—below the statutory maximum of 7.5 percent. However, some grantee officials expressed concern about a significant no-show rate. VA officials confirmed that no-shows are a problem, and stated that they had shared information with some grantees about ways to reduce no-shows. However, they have not systematically gathered and disseminated such techniques to all grantees, which could promote higher attendance rates and maximum benefit of federal dollars.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) specify the number and frequency of annual site visits and remote audits, and (2) systematically identify and disseminate techniques for reducing no-shows. VA concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-837 | gao_GAO-01-837_0 | FEMA is responsible for recommending to the President whether to declare a disaster and trigger the availability of funds as provided for in the Stafford Act. To facilitate their review, approval, and funding, projects are divided into two groups. When FEMA published its declaration criteria in 1999, it maintained that the $1.00-per-capita measure was not a violation of the statutory prohibition because the agency examines all the other listed criteria when it decides whether to recommend a disaster declaration. FEMA also developed a new training curriculum for its permanent and temporary staff. To meet this need, the agency designed a credentialing program with minimum standards for the disaster personnel who make program and cost eligibility decisions that obligate federal funds for disaster projects. However, it has not implemented the program. In addition, the system does not automatically verify certain information that has been entered, and it can be unreliable, time-consuming, and difficult to use in a remote disaster environment, according to FEMA officials. Project data may be lost or not entered as a result. As a result, data are not entered promptly or may not be entered at all. However, they are not necessarily indicative of state or local capability to respond effectively to a disaster without federal assistance. To determine whether FEMA ensures that proposed Public Assistance projects meet eligibility criteria, we (1) reviewed FEMA’s Public Assistance program policies, procedures, and guidance; (2) assessed the extent to which the program’s policies and procedures were disseminated and made available to staff that make eligibility determinations; (3) analyzed the availability of the training provided to staff; and (4) reviewed files on selected projects and interviewed managers and staff to assess how effectively the program’s policies and procedures were used to determine eligibility. The Senate Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, established by Public Law 103-211, noted in its report that one approach to modifying federal disaster assistance and possibly reducing federal disaster assistance costs would be to establish “more explicit and/or stringent criteria for providing Federal disaster assistance.” That report also cited a 1994 FEMA Office of Inspector General report stating that (1) neither a governor’s findings nor FEMA’s analysis of capability were supported by standard factual data or related to published criteria and (2) FEMA’s process did not ensure equity in disaster decisions because the agency did not always review requests for declarations in the context of previous declarations. FEMA has also begun to address the issue of insurance requirements for public buildings. | What GAO Found
Since 1990, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has provided more than $27 billion in disaster assistance, more than half of which was spent for public assistance projects, such as repairs of damaged roads, government buildings, utilities, and hospitals. FEMA uses established criteria to determine whether to (1) recommend that the President declare a disaster and (2) once a disaster has been declared, approve and fund Public Assistance projects. In 1999, FEMA published formal criteria for recommending the presidential approval of disaster declarations. These criteria include both minimum financial thresholds and other qualitative measures that FEMA applies in deciding whether to recommend presidential approval. These criteria do not necessarily indicate a state's ability to pay for the damage because they do not consider the substantial differences in states' financial capacities to respond when disasters occur. As a result, federal funds may be provided for some disasters when they are not needed. Problems with applying FEMA's criteria remain. In part, these problems may persist because many of the staff assigned to disaster field offices who make eligibility decisions are temporary and may not have the skills and training needed to make appropriate decisions. FEMA has developed a credentialing program to establish qualifications and training requirements for these staff but has not implemented this program. FEMA officials said that budgetary and programmatic factors have delayed implementation. In addition, FEMA's review process does not ensure that all projects are reviewed by the most knowledgeable officials. FEMA also lacks centralized, quantified information that would be helpful for managing the Public Assistance program. Its information system--essentially an electronic filing cabinet--stores information project by project and does not provide effectively for programwide analysis. Furthermore, the system is unreliable and difficult to use, according to FEMA officials. As a result, data are lost or never entered. |
gao_GAO-09-440 | gao_GAO-09-440_0 | To participate in the HUBZone program, small business firms generally must meet certain criteria established by the SBA, most notably: (1) the firm must be at least 51 percent owned and controlled by one or more U.S. citizens; (2) at least 35 percent of its employees must live in a HUBZone; (3) the principal office (i.e., the location where the greatest number of qualifying employees perform their work) must be located in a HUBZone; and (4) the firm must qualify as a small business under the size standard that corresponds with its primary industry classification. In July 2008, we testified that SBA’s lack of controls over the HUBZone program exposed the government to fraud and abuse. Specifically, we identified substantial vulnerabilities in SBA’s application and monitoring process by demonstrating the ease of obtaining HUBZone certification. In addition, we also identified 10 firms from the Washington, D.C., metro area that were participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly did not meet eligibility requirements. Selected Case Studies of Fraud and Abuse Outside the Washington, D.C., Metro Area
HUBZone program fraud and abuse continues to be problematic for the federal government. We identified 19 firms in the states of Texas, Alabama, and California participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly do not meet program requirements. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, federal agencies had obligated a total of nearly $30 million to these firms for performance as the prime contractor on federal HUBZone contracts. Our investigation found that the purported principal office was in fact a residential trailer in a trailer park. For the HUBZone program this would mean (1) front-end controls at the application stage, (2) fraud detection and monitoring of firms already in the program, and (3) the aggressive pursuit and prosecution of individuals committing fraud. Further, SBA did not adequately field test its interim process for processing applications. If it had done so, SBA would have known that it did not have the resources to effectively carry out its review of applications in a timely manner. As a result, SBA had a backlog of about 800 HUBZone applications as of January 2009. At that time, SBA officials stated that it would take about 6 months to process each HUBZone application—well over the 1 month goal set forth in SBA regulations. SBA Has Initiated Some Enforcement Actions Against 10 HUBZone Firms Previously Investigated by GAO
SBA has taken some enforcement steps on the 10 firms that we found did not meet HUBZone program requirements as of July 2008. However, SBA’s failure to examine some of the most egregious cases we previously identified has resulted in an additional $7.2 million in HUBZone obligations and about $25 million in HUBZone set-aside or price preference contracts to these firms. For example, a construction firm identified in our July 2008 testimony admitted that it did not meet HUBZone requirements and was featured in several national publications by name. It has continually represented itself as HUBZone certified and has received $2 million in HUBZone obligations and a $23 million HUBZone set-aside contract since our testimony. Table 2 highlights the 10 firms that we noted at the July 2008 hearing that clearly did not meet the HUBZone program requirements, new HUBZone obligations and contracts these firms received, as well as the actions the SBA has taken against these firms as of January 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program provides federal contracting assistance to small firms located in economically distressed areas, with the intent of stimulating economic development. In July 2008, GAO identified substantial vulnerabilities in SBA's application and monitoring process that demonstrated the HUBZone program is vulnerable to fraud and abuse. GAO also investigated 10 case studies of HUBZone firms in the Washington, D.C., area that misrepresented their eligibility. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether additional cases of fraud and abuse exist outside of the Washington, D.C., area; (2) what actions, if any, SBA has taken to establish an effective fraud prevention program for the HUBZone program; and (3) what actions, if any, SBA took against the 10 case study firms in GAO's July 2008 testimony. To meet these objectives, GAO identified selected HUBZone firms based on certain criteria, such as magnitude of HUBZone contracts and firm location. GAO also interviewed SBA officials and reviewed SBA data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that fraud and abuse in the HUBZone program extends beyond the Washington, D.C., area. GAO identified 19 firms in Texas, Alabama, and California participating in the HUBZone program that clearly do not meet program requirements (i.e., principal office location or percentage of employees in HUBZone and subcontracting limitations). For example, one Alabama firm listed its principal office as "Suite 19," but when GAO investigators performed a site visit they found the office was in fact trailer 19 in a residential trailer park. The individual living in the trailer had no relationship to the HUBZone firm. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, federal agencies obligated nearly $30 million to these 19 firms for performance as the prime contractor on HUBZone contracts and a total of $187 million on all federal contracts. Although SBA has initiated steps in strengthening its internal controls as a result of GAO's 2008 testimonies and report, substantial work remains for incorporating a fraud prevention system that includes effective fraud controls consisting of (1) front-end controls at the application stage, (2) fraud detection and monitoring of firms already in the program, and (3) the aggressive pursuit and prosecution of individuals committing fraud. In addition, SBA did not adequately field test its interim process for processing applications. If it had done so, SBA would have known that it did not have the resources to effectively carry out its review of applications in a timely manner. As a result, SBA had a backlog of about 800 HUBZone applications as of January 2009. At that time, SBA's interim application process was taking about 6 months--well over its 1-month goal set forth in SBA regulations. SBA has taken some enforcement steps on the 10 firms previously identified by GAO that knowingly did not meet HUBZone program requirements. However, SBA's failure to promptly remove firms from the HUBZone program and examine some of the most egregious cases from GAO's July 2008 testimony has resulted in an additional $7.2 million in HUBZone obligations and about $25 million in HUBZone contracts to these firms. For example, a construction firm from the July 2008 testimony admitted that it did not meet HUBZone requirements and was featured in several national publications by name. It has continually represented itself as HUBZone certified and has received $2 million in HUBZone obligations and a $23 million HUBZone set-aside contract since the July 2008 testimony. |
gao_GAO-02-21 | gao_GAO-02-21_0 | Background
The U.S. Customs Service and INS work closely together to perform their diverse missions at the nation’s ports of entry. To determine the effect of differences in the two systems on officers’ pay, we analyzed some Customs and INS officers’ work schedule and pay data at the San Ysidro port of entry. Under certain circumstances, INS officers are also compensated for overtime under the 1945 Act. The systems are not easy to compare because pay rates and time periods that count toward overtime and night differential pay also differ. Two other differences between Customs and INS pay provisions involve extra pay for foreign language proficiency and consideration of overtime in calculating retirement benefits. Effect of Differences in Customs and INS Pay Provisions Varied Depending on Schedules and Shifts Worked
Our six comparisons of Customs and INS officers’ overtime and premium pay showed that the effect of differences in pay provisions varied based on schedules and shifts worked. | What GAO Found
The U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) use different provisions to calculate pay for officers. Fundamental differences in how work is scheduled and how hours are counted also result in pay differences. For overtime, Sunday, and holiday work, Customs officers are generally paid for hours worked, whereas INS officers are often paid on the basis of minimum periods of time worked. Night pay is also fundamentally different. Foreign language awards and the inclusion of overtime pay in calculating retirement benefits are other examples of pay provisions that apply to Customs officers but not to INS officers. Because Customs and INS schedule work differently, it is difficult to compare the two systems and to analyze the effects of differences on officers' pay. |
gao_GAO-03-921 | gao_GAO-03-921_0 | Because DOD could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it used a modified mobilization process that was slower than the traditional mobilization process. About 300,000 Reservists Called to Active Duty
DOD has called about 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel to active duty since September 2001. According to senior Air Force officials, none of the operation plans that existed on September 11, 2001, contained requirements for the extended use of Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols over the nation’s capital and major cities. The Modified Mobilization Process Was Slower and Less Efficient Than the Traditional Process
After September 11, 2001, DOD used a modified mobilization process because existing operation plans had not adequately addressed mobilization requirements and changing priorities. For example, under the modified process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists between September 11, 2001, and May 21, 2003, compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Gulf War. DOD Officials Had Limited Visibility Over the Mobilization Process
DOD officials did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process primarily because DOD lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and other resources. First, DOD’s primary automated readiness reporting system could not adequately track the personnel and other resources within the small units that were frequently needed by combatant commanders. Second, some systems used by the active and reserve components to track personnel were incompatible. The Services Have Two Approaches to Provide Preparation Time for Mobilizations and Deployments
The services have used two primary approaches—predictable operating cycles and formal advanced notification—to provide time for units and servicemembers to prepare for upcoming mobilizations and deployments. All the services provide predictability to portions of their active forces through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and reserve forces. The Army assigns priority categories to its units, and lower- priority units generally need extra training and preparation time prior to deploying. Because existing operation plans had not accurately identified all mobilization requirements, a number of lower-priority units were mobilized with relatively little advance notice. Despite the large number of lower-priority units within the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating cycle concept to provide predictability to its reserve forces. Without such a concept, the Army’s opportunities to provide extra training and preparation time to its reserve forces, particularly those with low priorities, are limited. DOD Has Limited Access to Portions of the Ready Reserve
After September 11, 2001, mobilizations were hampered because about one-quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily accessible. Some Selected Reserve members could not be mobilized due to the lack of training. Conclusions
About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked down terrorists throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, the process to mobilize reservists had to be modified and contained numerous inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not adequately address the mobilization requirements needed to deal with terrorist attacks and overseas requirements. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify all of the mobilization requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001, and create or update operation plans as necessary, to account for these requirements; the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to capture readiness information on the resources within all the units that are available to meet the tailored requirements of combatant commanders so that these resources will be visible to key mobilization officials within DOD, the Joint Staff, and the service headquarters; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to develop a single automated system or fully integrated automated systems that will provide for the seamless transfer of reservists information, regardless of whether the reservists are in an active or reserve status; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to update their applicable mobilization instructions, notices, and publications; the Secretary of the Army to develop a standard operating cycle concept to help increase predictability for Army reserve units; the service secretaries to develop and use results-oriented performance metrics to guide service efforts to gain and maintain improved information on IRR members; and the service secretaries to review and update their IRR policies to take into account the nature of the mobilization requirements as well as the types of reservists who are available to fill the requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Under section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, the President is allowed to call up to 1 million National Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following September 11, 2001. GAO examined (1) whether the Department of Defense (DOD) followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces, (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process, and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. GAO also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98 percent of nonretired reservists, were available.
What GAO Found
About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked terrorists throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, DOD's process to mobilize reservists after September 11 had to be modified and contained numerous inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not fully address the mobilization requirements needed to deal with the terrorist attacks or uncertain overseas requirements. For example, no previous requirements called for the extended use of National Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols over the nation's capital and major cities. Because DOD could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it used a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination, which resulted in a process that was slower and less efficient than the traditional process. Under the modified process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. DOD did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process primarily because it lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and other resources. DOD's primary automated readiness reporting system could not adequately track the personnel and other resources within the small units that were frequently needed. Also, visibility was lost because some services' active and reserve systems for tracking personnel were incompatible, resulting in ad hoc coordination between active and reserve officials. Both groups often resorted to tracking mobilizations with computer spreadsheets. In addition, some reservists were deployed beyond dates specified in their orders or stayed on alert for more than a year and never mobilized because officials lost visibility. The services have used two primary approaches--predictable operating cycles and advance notification--to provide time for units and personnel to prepare for mobilizations. All the services provide predictability to portions of their forces through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and reserve forces. The Army prioritizes its units, and lower-priority units generally need extra training and preparation time before deploying. Yet, since September 11, a number of lower-priority units have been mobilized with relatively little advance notice. Despite the large number of lower-priority units within the Army Guard and Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating cycle to provide predictability to its reserves. Without such a concept, the Army's opportunities to provide extra training and preparation time to its reserve forces are limited. Mobilizations were hampered because one-quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily available for mobilization. Over 70,000 reservists could not be mobilized because they had not completed their training requirements, and the services lacked information needed to fully use the 300,000 pretrained IRR members. |
gao_GAO-01-805 | gao_GAO-01-805_0 | Conclusions
Since our 1990 report on this issue, federal agencies continue to locate for the most part in higher cost, urban areas. Eight of the 13 cabinet agencies surveyed had no formal RDA siting policy, and there was little evidence that agencies considered RDA’s requirements when siting new federal facilities. Further, GSA has not developed for congressional consideration a cost-conscious, governmentwide location policy, as we recommended in 1990. In our survey, the sites that involved relocated operations still largely remained in urban areas, while the sites that involved newly established operations were more evenly spread over rural and urban areas. Federal agencies’ mission requirements, such as the need to be near clients or other organizations, apparently have led them to select urban areas. Several government functions, such as research and development, data processing, accounting and finance, and teleservice centers, can be located in rural areas. Although it is not clear from the information we collected whether any of the federal agencies that located sites in urban areas could have located them in rural areas, one matter that is clear is that RDA has not had the influence on federal siting practices that the Congress appears to have intended when RDA was enacted. Many agencies had no RDA policy, as required by the act, and many agency personnel in our survey either did not consider RDA or did not know whether the act was used in making their site selection decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have been raised that federal agencies may not have been considering locating facilities in rural areas, as required by the Rural Development Act of 1972 (RDA), despite recent advances in telecommunications technology.
What GAO Found
GAO found that, since its 1990 report (GGD-90-109) on this issue, federal agencies generally continue to be located in higher cost, urban areas. Eight of the 13 cabinet agencies surveyed had no formal RDA siting policy, and there was little evidence that agencies considered RDA's requirements when siting new federal facilities. Furthermore, GSA has not developed the cost-conscious, governmentwide location policy recommended by GAO in 1990. In GAO's survey, the sites that involved relocated operations still largely remained in urban areas, while the sites that involved newly established operations were more evenly spread over rural and urban areas. Federal agencies' mission requirements, such as the need to be near clients or other organizations, apparently have led them to select urban areas. GAO found that government functions, such as research and development, data processing, accounting and finance, and teleservice centers, can be located in rural areas. Although it is unclear from the information GAO collected whether any of the federal agencies that located sites in urban areas could have located them in rural areas, it is clear is that RDA has not had the influence on federal siting practices that Congress intended. Many agencies had no RDA policy, as required by the act, and many agency personnel in GAO's survey either did not consider RDA or did not know whether the act was used in making their site selection. |
gao_GAO-09-610 | gao_GAO-09-610_0 | FDA’s Bottled Water Standard of Quality Regulations Are Similar to EPA’s Drinking Water Standards, but the Agency’s Authority to Enforce Them Is Weaker
FDA’s bottled water standard of quality regulations, for the most part, mirror EPA’s drinking water requirements, although the case of DEHP (an organic compound widely used in the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride plastics) is a notable exception. Although FDA proposed a standard in August 1993, the agency subsequently deferred action on DEHP and has yet to either adopt a standard or publish a reason for not doing so. Among our key findings are that (1) when compared with EPA’s regulation of public water systems, several key differences reflect the limited nature of FDA’s regulation of bottled water, particularly regarding how violations are reported and whether the use of certified laboratories is required; (2) because FDA’s experience over the years has not shown that bottled water poses a significant public health risk, the agency devotes fewer resources to the enforcement of bottled water regulations than it does for higher risk foods; (3) while state regulatory requirements for bottled water often meet or exceed those of FDA, the requirements vary across the states and, in some states, are still less comprehensive than state requirements for tap water under the Safe Drinking Water Act; and (4) FDA’s oversight of imported bottled water is limited. How violations are reported: The FFDCA does not specifically authorize FDA to require bottlers to report test results, even if violations of the standard of quality regulations are found. Our survey of 50 states and the District of Columbia identified variability in their requirements in governing certain key practices that protect and ensure bottled water quality and safety. FDA and State Bottled Water Labeling Requirements Resemble Those for Other Food Types, but Demand Less Information Than Is Required for Tap Water
FDA Regulations Require Bottled Water Labels to Contain Specific Information, in Addition to Information Required for All Food Products
Because it is considered a food, bottled water must comply with FDA’s general requirements for food labeling, which include ingredient and nutrition information. In addition, like other food products, bottled water is subject to the same general prohibitions against misbranding. In its 2000 report, FDA concluded that certain methods were feasible for the bottled water industry to provide the same type of information to consumers that the Safe Drinking Water Act requires public water systems to provide in an annual consumer confidence report—including the source and levels of contaminants tested for and found in the water. Nonetheless, the agency was not required to take action on its findings and has yet to do so. Additional Information about Bottled Water Would Be Beneficial to Consumers
Our work suggests that consumers may benefit from additional information. For example, when asked whether consumers in their state had misconceptions about bottled water, 24 of the 51 state and District of Columbia officials responding to our survey replied that consumers believe that bottled water is safer, is healthier, or is of higher quality than tap water. Nonetheless, our review of bottled water labels revealed that, when compared with what public water systems are required to provide to consumers of tap water, very few bottled water facilities provide such information to consumers, either through labels, company Web sites, telephone calls to company representatives, or any combination of these avenues. Representatives of the beverage industry and an environmental nonprofit organization reported that about 827,000 to 1.3 million tons of PET plastic water bottle containers were produced in the United States in 2006. Second, although the overall production and consumption of bottled water makes up a small share of the total U.S. energy demand, bottled water is much more energy-intensive than public drinking water. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the extent to which federal and state authorities regulate the quality of bottled water to ensure it is safe and the extent to which they regulate the accuracy of labels or claims about the purity and source of bottled water, we reviewed federal and state bottled water regulations. To identify the environmental and other impacts of bottled water, we reviewed the following three subtopics: (1) the impact of discarded water bottles on municipal landfill capacity; (2) the effects on U.S. energy demands from the manufacture and transport of plastic bottles for drinking water; and (3) the impacts, if any, on communities and the environment of groundwater extraction for the purposes of bottling water. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, per capita consumption of bottled water in the United States has more than doubled. With this increase have come several concerns in recent years about the safety, quality, and environmental impacts of bottled water. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates bottled water under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as a food and is responsible for ensuring that domestic and imported bottled water is safe and truthfully labeled. Among other things, GAO (1) evaluated the extent to which FDA regulates and ensures the quality and safety of bottled water; (2) evaluated the extent to which federal and state authorities regulate the accuracy of labels and claims regarding the purity and source of bottled water; and (3) identified the environmental and other impacts of bottled water. GAO reviewed FDA data, reports, and requirements for bottled water; conducted a state survey of all 50 states and the District of Columbia; reviewed bottled water labels; and interviewed FDA officials and key experts.
What GAO Found
FDA's bottled water standard of quality regulations generally mirror the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) national primary drinking water regulations, as required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, although the case of DEHP (an organic compound used in the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride plastics) is a notable exception. Specifically, FDA deferred action on DEHP in a final rule published in 1996 and has yet to either adopt a standard or publish a reason for not doing so. GAO also found that FDA's regulation of bottled water, particularly when compared with EPA's regulationof tap water, reveal key differences in the agencies' statutory authorities. Of particular note, FDA does not have the specific statutory authority to require bottlers to use certified laboratories for water quality tests or to report test results, even if violations of the standards are found. Among GAO's other findings, the state requirements to safeguard bottled water often exceed FDA's, but still are often less comprehensive than state requirements to safeguard tap water. FDA and state bottled water labeling requirements are similar to labeling requirements for other foods, but the information provided to consumers is less than what EPA requires of public water systems under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Like other foods, bottled water labels must list ingredients and nutritional information and are subject to the same prohibitions against misbranding. In 2000, FDA concluded that it was feasible for the bottled water industry to provide the same types of information to consumers that public water systems must provide. The agency was not required to conduct rulemaking to require that manufacturers provide such information to consumers, however, and it has not done so. Nevertheless, GAO's work suggests that consumers may benefit from such additional information. For example, when GAO asked cognizant officials in a survey of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, whether their consumers had misconceptions about bottled water, many replied that consumers often believe that bottled water is safer or healthier than tap water. GAO found that information comparable to what public water systems are required to provide to consumers of tap water was available for only a small percentage of the 83 bottled water labels it reviewed, companies it contacted, or company Web sites it reviewed. Among the environmental impacts of bottled water are the effects on U.S. municipal landfill capacity and U.S. energy demands. Regarding impacts on landfill capacity, GAO found that about three-quarters of the water bottles produced in the United States in 2006 were discarded and not recycled, on the basis of figures compiled by an industry trade association and an environmental nonprofit organization. Discarded water bottles, however, represented less than 1 percent of total municipal waste that EPA reported entered U.S. landfills in 2006. Regarding the impact on U.S. energy demands, a recent peer-reviewed article found that the production and consumption of bottled water comprises a small share of total U.S. energy demand but is much more energy-intensive than the production of public drinking water. |
gao_GAO-08-327 | gao_GAO-08-327_0 | DOD’s Prescription Drug Spending More Than Tripled from Fiscal Years 2000 through 2006, with Retail Pharmacies Accounting for the Largest Increase
DOD’s spending on prescription drugs more than tripled from $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $6.2 billion in fiscal year 2006. Retail pharmacy spending accounted for the greatest increase, rising almost ninefold from $455 million to $3.9 billion. It also grew from 29 percent of DOD’s overall drug spending to 63 percent—the largest increase of the points of service. In fiscal year 2000, MTF spending accounted for 65 percent of DOD’s overall drug spending but declined to 25 percent in fiscal year 2006. First, because federal pricing arrangements that generally result in lower prices were not applied to drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies during this time period, these drugs were generally more expensive for both DOD and its beneficiaries than the drugs dispensed at MTFs or the TMOP. However, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requires that federal pricing arrangements now be applied to TRICARE prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. More beneficiaries are using only retail pharmacies to obtain their prescriptions—about 2 million in fiscal year 2006, up from about 1 million in fiscal year 2002 (see fig. DOD Has Efforts Under Way to Limit Prescription Drug Spending through the Uniform Formulary, Beneficiary Outreach, and Other Proposed Changes
DOD has efforts under way to limit its prescription drug spending through the use of its uniform formulary and through beneficiary outreach for the TMOP. DOD’s Uniform Formulary Has Limited Prescription Drug Spending
According to DOD officials, the agency has limited its prescription drug spending primarily through costs avoided through the use of its uniform formulary, which was implemented during 2005. DOD data show that the agency avoided about $447 million in drug costs in fiscal year 2006 and $916 million in drug costs in fiscal year 2007. In exchange for including a manufacturer’s drug on the uniform formulary, manufacturers can offer DOD prices below those otherwise available through statutory federal pricing arrangements, which applied only to drugs dispensed at MTFs and the TMOP during the time of our review. Changes in beneficiaries’ use of MTFs, the TMOP, and retail pharmacies as a result of formulary designations. DOD officials told us that as of October 1, 2007, the agency had collected about $28 million through Uniform Formulary VARRs for fiscal year 2007. In 2006, according to DOD officials, the agency began to expand its outreach for the TMOP through quarterly newsletters, news releases, and other materials emphasizing its convenience and cost savings for beneficiaries. In addition, DOD launched its Member Choice Center in August 2007, the goal of which is to help beneficiaries transfer their prescriptions from retail pharmacies to the TMOP. In addition to these efforts, DOD intended to specifically target those beneficiaries who frequently obtained high-cost drugs from retail pharmacies. DOD’s ongoing efforts are important to limit future prescription drug spending. The agency is also undertaking a fundamental reform—the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requirement to apply federal pricing arrangements to drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies—that could have an even greater effect on spending. DOD will need to carefully monitor the effect of this new requirement along with its ongoing efforts in order to assess the progress in controlling spending. DOD will also need to determine what types of additional efforts, if any, will be necessary to ensure the fiscal sustainability of its pharmacy benefits program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure the fiscal sustainability of DOD’s pharmacy benefits program and complement more fundamental reforms recently enacted or recently proposed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to monitor the effect of federal pricing arrangements for drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies along with ongoing efforts to limit pharmacy spending to determine the extent to which they reduce the growth in retail pharmacy costs, and identify, implement, and monitor other efforts, as needed, to reduce the growth in retail pharmacy spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
Estimated to reach $15 billion by 2015, the Department of Defense's (DOD) prescription drug spending has been a growing concern for the federal government. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 required GAO to examine DOD's pharmacy benefits program. Specifically, as discussed with the committees of jurisdiction, GAO examined DOD's prescription drug spending trends from fiscal years 2000 through 2006 and DOD's key efforts to limit its prescription drug spending. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD's data on spending trends, including trends in beneficiary pharmacy use. GAO also assessed DOD's cost avoidance data and the agency's efforts to limit spending through its uniform formulary, which is a list of preferred drugs available to all beneficiaries. GAO interviewed DOD officials about these and other efforts to limit spending.
What GAO Found
Collectively, DOD's drug spending at retail pharmacies, military treatment facilities (MTF), and the TRICARE Mail Order Pharmacy (TMOP) more than tripled from $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $6.2 billion in fiscal year 2006. Retail pharmacy spending drove most of this increase, rising almost ninefold from $455 million to $3.9 billion and growing from 29 percent of overall drug spending to 63 percent. The growth in retail spending reflects the fact that federal pricing arrangements, which generally result in prices lower than retail prices, were not applied to drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies during this time. In addition, beneficiaries' increased use of retail pharmacies over the less costly options of MTFs or the TMOP exacerbated the effect of these higher prices. For example, 2 million beneficiaries used only retail pharmacies in fiscal year 2006--double the number in fiscal year 2002. However, future growth in retail pharmacy spending may slow as the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 now requires that federal pricing arrangements be applied to drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies. DOD's key efforts to limit its prescription drug spending have included its use of the uniform formulary and beneficiary outreach to encourage use of the TMOP. By leveraging its uniform formulary, which was implemented in fiscal year 2005, the agency avoided about $447 million in drug costs in fiscal year 2006 and $916 million in fiscal year 2007, according to DOD's data. In exchange for formulary placement, manufacturers can offer DOD prices below those otherwise available through federal pricing arrangements, which at the time of our review were applied only to drugs dispensed at MTFs and the TMOP. To compensate, in August 2006, DOD began obtaining voluntary manufacturer rebates for formulary drugs dispensed at retail network pharmacies. As of October 1, 2007, DOD collected about $28 million in rebates for fiscal year 2007. Also in 2006, DOD began beneficiary outreach--through quarterly newsletters and other materials--emphasizing the TMOP's convenience and cost savings. To help beneficiaries transfer their prescriptions to the TMOP, DOD launched the Member Choice Center in August 2007 and plans to target related outreach toward beneficiaries who frequently obtain high-cost drugs from retail pharmacies. DOD's ongoing efforts are important to limit future prescription drug spending. In addition, DOD has the recommendations of a congressionally mandated task force to consider--that copayment policies be changed to encourage beneficiaries to purchase preferred drugs from cost-effective sources. The agency is also undertaking a fundamental reform--the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 requirement to apply federal pricing arrangements to drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies--that could have an even greater impact on spending. DOD will need to carefully monitor the impact of this new requirement along with its ongoing efforts in order to assess the progress in controlling spending. DOD will also need to determine what types of additional efforts, if any, will be necessary to ensure the fiscal sustainability of its pharmacy benefits program. |
gao_GAO-13-182 | gao_GAO-13-182_0 | Prior to deploying, servicewomen are screened for potentially deployment-limiting conditions. According to DOD officials and health care providers with whom we met, such pre-screening helps ensure that many female-specific health care needs are addressed prior to deployment. DOD Policies Addressing the Health Care Needs of Deployed Servicemembers Include Female-specific Aspects
DOD components have put in place policies and guidance that include female-specific aspects to help address the health care needs of servicewomen during deployment. DOD Has Also Conducted Some Reviews of the Health Care Needs of Servicewomen during Deployments
DOD components have conducted reviews of the health care needs of servicewomen while they are deployed. Health Care Providers and Servicewomen Said DOD Generally Meets Women’s Health Care Needs during Deployments
At the 15 selected locations we visited in Afghanistan and Navy vessels, health care providers and servicewomen told us that the health care services available to deployed servicemembers generally meet the needs of servicewomen. Health care providers we spoke with in Afghanistan and aboard Navy vessels told us they were capable of providing a wide range of female-specific health care services—including treating certain gynecological conditions such as urinary tract infections and conducting clinical breast examinations—that women might seek while deployed. Based on information provided by the 92 servicewomen we interviewed at selected locations in Afghanistan and aboard Navy vessels, the responses from 60 indicated that they felt the medical and mental health needs of women were generally being met during deployments, whereas the responses from 8 indicated they did not feel the medical and mental health needs of women were generally being met during deployments. The responses from an additional 8 servicewomen suggested that they had a mixed opinion as to whether the medical and mental health needs of women were being met during deployments, and 16 told us they did not know or did not have an opinion. Of servicewomen who offered a mixed opinion, one female sailor told us that she felt junior health care providers were limited in the types of procedures they could perform and lacked practical experience. Further, first responders such as Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates are not always aware of the specific health care services available to sexual assault victims at their respective locations. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs has performed these responsibilities for some medical issues in DOD, but it has not established guidance for the treatment of injuries stemming from sexual assault—a crime that requires a specialized level of care to help ensure that forensic evidence is properly collected, medical care is provided in a way that minimizes the risk of revictimization, and a victim retains the right to disclose the assault with confidentiality. Accordingly, we found that military health care providers do not have a consistent understanding of their responsibilities in caring for sexual assault victims. Additionally, we found that not all first responders fulfill the requirement to annually complete refresher training on tasks DOD deems essential to their role in responding to incidents of sexual assault. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that sexual assault victims have consistent access to health care services and the reporting options specified in DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response policies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to develop and implement department-level guidance on the provision of medical and mental health care to victims of sexual assault that specifies health care providers’ responsibilities to respond to and care for sexual assault victims, whether in the United States or in deployed environments. DOD concurred, without comment, on our second recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in collaboration with the military departments, take steps to improve compliance with completing annual refresher training on sexual assault prevention and response. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Determining the Extent to Which the Health Care Needs of Deployed Servicewomen Are Being Addressed and Female- specific Health Care Services Are Available
In our review of female-specific health care services provided by DOD to deployed servicewomen, our scope included each of the military services. Determining the Availability of Medical and Mental Health Care to Servicewomen Who Are Victims of Sexual Assault
To determine the extent to which medical and mental health care are available to servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault, we obtained and reviewed various documents, including legislative requirements and DOD’s and the military services’ policies and guidance establishing requirements for the prevention of and response to sexual assault. | Why GAO Did This Study
The roles for women in the military have been expanding and evolving. Servicewomen today are integral to combat, combat support, and counterinsurgency operations, and serve in many roles they previously did not hold. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 725 (2011) mandated that GAO conduct a review of the female-specific health care services provided by DOD to female servicemembers, including the treatment of servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault. In this report, GAO evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD is addressing the health care needs of deployed servicewomen; (2) female-specific health care services are available to deployed servicewomen; and (3) medical and mental health care are available to servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault. GAO reviewed pertinent DOD policies, guidance, and data. GAO also met with health care providers, servicewomen, and others during site visits to 18 locations where servicewomen are currently serving or deployed, including 15 installations in Afghanistan and Navy vessels.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) is taking steps to address the health care needs of deployed servicewomen. For example, DOD has put in place policies and guidance that include female-specific aspects to help address the health care needs of servicewomen during deployment. Also, as part of pre-deployment preparations, servicewomen are screened for potentially deployment-limiting conditions, such as pregnancy, and DOD officials and health care providers with whom GAO met noted that such screening helps ensure that many female-specific health care needs are addressed prior to deployment. GAO also found that DOD components have conducted reviews of the health care needs of servicewomen during deployments and are collecting data on the medical services provided to deployed servicewomen.
At the 15 selected locations GAO visited in Afghanistan and aboard Navy vessels, health care providers and most servicewomen indicated that the available health care services generally met deployed servicewomen's needs. In Afghanistan and aboard Navy vessels, health care providers said they were capable of providing a wide range of the female-specific health care services that deployed servicewomen might seek, and servicewomen GAO spoke with indicated that deployed women's needs were generally being met. Specifically, based on information provided by the 92 servicewomen GAO interviewed, 60 indicated that they felt the medical and mental health needs of women were generally being met during deployments; 8 indicated they did not feel those needs were generally being met during deployments; an additional 8 indicated a mixed opinion; and 16 said they did not have an opinion. For example, some servicewomen told GAO that they were satisfied with their military health care, given the operating environment. Among those who expressed dissatisfaction with their military heath care, GAO heard a concern about difficulty in obtaining medications. Among those who expressed mixed views, a comment was raised that junior health care providers were limited in the types of procedures they could perform and lacked practical experience.
DOD has taken steps to provide medical and mental health care to victims of sexual assault, but several factors affect the availability of care. For example, this care can vary by service and can be impacted by operational factors, such as transportation and communication challenges, that are inherent to the deployed environment. Further, military health care providers do not have a consistent understanding of their responsibilities in caring for sexual assault victims because the department has not established guidance for the treatment of injuries stemming from sexual assault--which requires that specific steps are taken while providing care to help ensure a victim's right to confidentiality. Additionally, while the services provide required annual refresher training to first responders, GAO found that some of these responders were not always aware of the health care services available to sexual assault victims because not all of them are completing the required training. Without having a clearer understanding of their responsibilities, health care providers and first responders will be impeded in their ability to provide effective support for servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault.
What GAO Recommends
To enhance the medical and mental health care for servicewomen who are victims of sexual assault, GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop department-level guidance on the provision of care to victims of sexual assault; and (2) take steps to improve first responders' compliance with the department's requirements for annual refresher training. DOD did not concur with the first recommendation, but cited steps it is taking that appear consistent with the recommendation. DOD concurred with the second recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-98-58 | gao_AIMD-98-58_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this assignment is to provide information on the formal education, professional work experience, training, and professional certifications of personnel serving in key financial management positions in the Army. The Assistant Secretary had spent 30 years at DOD. The three Deputy Assistant Secretaries’ DOD careers ranged from 29 to 38 years. Two executives were Certified Government Financial Managers. The 63 officers served mainly as resource managers at major commands and installations, and the 170 civilians served most often in resource manager and budget officer positions at installations. Formal Education Attained
Of the 233 respondents, over 90 percent (including the 63 officers and 148 of 170 civilians) reported holding bachelor’s degrees, and about 57 percent (53 officers and 79 civilians) reported holding master’s degrees. Of the 132 respondents holding master’s degrees, 17 reported more than one major. One civilian also reported holding a doctoral degree in public administration. Professional Work Experience Acquired
A review of the profiles showed that the 63 officers’ careers ranged from 10 to 31 years, averaging 23 years, while the 170 civilians’ careers ranged from 15 to 42 years, averaging 27 years. Training Completed During 1995 and 1996
During 1995 and 1996, about 56 percent of the officers and 75 percent of the civilians reported completing some training in one or more of the categories included in our review. Professional Certifications Held
Almost 20 percent of the 233 respondents reported holding one or more professional certifications. A review of the profiles showed that, of these 46 managers,
11 civilians were CPAs,
37 were CGFMs (6 officers and 31 civilians),
2 civilians held other financial management-related certifications, including the Certified Cost Estimator/Analyst and Certified Internal Auditor, and
3 civilians reported nonfinancial management-related certifications. The four senior executives in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) ASA(FM&C) included the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Operations, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget. One manager held a master’s degree in accounting, while 32 managers reported 33 other business-related majors. Four of these managers majored in accounting, while five managers reported six other business-related majors. As shown in table VI.3, 11 respondents also held master’s degrees, with 2 reporting more than one major. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the qualifications, including formal education, professional work experience, training, and professional certifications of personnel serving in key financial management positions in the Army.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the four Army financial management executives included in its review are the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Operations, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget; (2) each of the executives had attained master's degrees; (3) the Assistant Secretary had spent 30 years at the Department of Defense (DOD); (4) the Deputy Assistant Secretaries had DOD careers ranging from 29 to 38 years, with one of the three also spending part of his career in the private sector; (5) two of the executives held certifications in government financial management; and (6) of the 233 other key Army financial managers responding to GAO's review: (a) about 27 percent (63) were miliary officers, serving mainly as resource managers and budget officers at major commands and installations; and 73 percent (170) were civilian personnel serving mainly in resource manager and budget officer positions at installations; (b) all 63 officers and 148 of the 170 civilians reported holding bachelor's degrees, with 17 of these respondents reporting more than one major; (c) about one-third of these 211 managers majored in accounting, while approximately 40 percent reported degrees in business-related majors other than accounting; (d) 132 respondents (53 officers and 79 civilians) also reported holding advanced degrees, with 17 of these respondents reporting more than one major; (e) five of the 132 managers held master's degrees in accounting, while about 75 percent reported degrees in business-related majors other than accounting; (f) the officers' careers ranged from 10 to 31 years, averaging 23 years, while civilians' careers ranged from 15 to 42 years, averaging 27 years; (g) 163 respondents reported completing training in one or more of the categories included in GAO's review during 1995 and 1996; (h) about 20 percent of the 233 respondents reported holding one or more professional certifications; and (i) of the 46 managers in this group, 44 reported holding accounting and other financial management-related certifications, as follows: 11 were Certified Public Accountants, 37 were Certified Government Financial Managers, and 2 held other certifications, including the Certified Cost Estimator/Analyst and Certified Internal Auditor. |
gao_GAO-05-405 | gao_GAO-05-405_0 | Further, in 1987, the Department of Justice issued guidelines on waiving fees when FOIA requests are determined to be in the public interest. Of all new cases received across the department, headquarters, Albuquerque, and Richland—the sites selected for our review—received 31 percent (705 of 2,289). DOE Generally Adhered to FOIA Guidance
Based on an analysis of 170 cases, DOE at these three locations generally followed FOIA and related guidance in its processes for making each of three major decisions related to fees and fee waivers: (1) determining the requester’s fee category, (2) determining if a fee waiver is to be granted, and (3) assessing actual fees, if any, to be charged. DOE also generally adhered to FOIA guidance by asking requesters to address all relevant fee waiver criteria. In assessing actual fees to be charged, if any, FOIA offices at all three sites we reviewed charged fees in accordance with guidance. DOE Did Not Always Inform Requesters About Fee and Fee- Waiver Decisions
DOE’s three FOIA offices did not always communicate all the specifics of their fee-related decisions to requesters. Current FOIA processing guidelines do not require agencies to explicitly inform requesters of fee-related decisions. Of the three locations, headquarters was most likely to inform requesters of their fee category. Richland and Albuquerque rarely communicated fee category determinations to requesters. The three sites also rarely informed requesters of the outcome of fee waiver determinations. Specifically, requesters were not informed of fee waiver determinations in 87 percent of the completed fee waiver cases that we reviewed (83 of 95). If requesters do not understand what determinations have actually been made, they could develop false expectations for the handling of future FOIA requests. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine, for fiscal year 2004, (1) the volume and nature of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request processing at the Department of Energy (DOE), (2) the extent to which the department’s process for handling fee assessments and waivers is consistent with FOIA and related guidance, and (3) the extent to which DOE has clearly communicated its fee-related decisions to requesters. We determined that DOE Headquarters and the department’s sites at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington, processed about 77 percent of DOE’s fee waiver cases in fiscal year 2004 and 35 percent of the cases in which fees were charged. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) gives the public the right to access information about the federal government. In addressing requests for information, agencies have the authority to assess fees for certain categories of requesters to cover the costs of locating and copying records, as well as discretion to waive fees if specific criteria are met. GAO was asked to determine, for fiscal year 2004, the volume and nature of FOIA request processing at the Department of Energy (DOE), to what extent DOE followed the act and related Office of Management and Budget and Department of Justice guidance in processing cases that involve fees, and to what extent DOE communicated its fee-related decisions to requesters.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2004, DOE received 2,289 new FOIA cases, of which 31 percent (705 of 2,289) were received by the department's headquarters in Washington, D.C., and DOE sites at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington--the sites selected for our review. Generally, very few of the requests at these sites involved assessments of fees or requests for waivers of possible fees. DOE's process includes several phases ranging from initial processing and acknowledgement to preparing and releasing records to requesters. DOE generally followed FOIA and related guidance when determining fee categories for requesters, fee waivers, and actual fees to be charged. All three sites we reviewed always made explicit determinations about requesters' fee categories in accordance with guidance. DOE also generally adhered to guidance in determining fee waivers by seeking information addressing the prescribed criteria for making fee waiver determinations. In assessing actual fees to be charged, FOIA offices at all three sites charged fees in accordance with guidance. DOE's FOIA offices often did not communicate the specifics of their fee-related decisions to FOIA requesters. For example, while DOE headquarters often informed requesters of determinations about their fee category, the Richland and Albuquerque offices rarely did. In addition, the three sites rarely informed requesters of the outcome of fee waiver determinations. Further, when fees were not charged, requesters were rarely informed of the reason. Current FOIA guidelines do not require agencies to inform requesters of fee-related decisions. However, without being informed of fee-related determinations, requesters could misunderstand agency fee determinations and have false expectations for the handling of future FOIA requests. |
gao_GAO-16-864 | gao_GAO-16-864_0 | The Air Force’s Process for Developing Combat Aircrew Annual Training Requirements for the Full Range of Core Missions Is Based on Dated Assumptions
The Air Force establishes combat aircrew training requirements for the full range of core missions based on an annual process, but these requirements may not reflect current and emerging training needs, because the Air Force has not comprehensively reassessed the assumptions underlying them. Since 2012, Air Combat Command has set the same requirement for the minimum number of live-fly sorties across all combat aircraft platforms, regardless of the number of core missions assigned to each platform. Combat Fighter Squadrons Are Not Meeting All of Their Annual Training Requirements across the Full Range of Core Missions, and Completed Training Is Not Being Evaluated for Effectiveness
Combat Fighter Squadrons Are Not Meeting All of Their Annual Training Requirements across the Full Range of Core Missions
Based on our analysis of data on the completion of annual training, we found that combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete mission training requirements for ongoing contingency operations, such as close air support to ground forces, but were unable to meet annual training requirements across the full range of core missions. The Air Force Does Not Systematically Evaluate the Effectiveness of Completed Training against Expectations
Air Force processes used to record and monitor combat fighter squadrons’ annual training are focused on the frequency of training completed to meet annual requirements and do not include a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of that training against established expectations. First, Air Combat Command has not established the desired learning objectives and training support elements needed to accomplish the training expectations in its annual Ready Aircrew Program tasking memorandums. Air Force Planning Documents for Virtual Training Do Not Include All Desirable Characteristics of a Comprehensive Strategy
The Air Force’s virtual training plans do not include all desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy, such as a risk-based investment strategy or a time line for addressing training needs. Having a consistent basis for monitoring training results is critical for tracking progress in achieving the Air Force’s goal of training units for the full range of core missions. Further, the Air Force lacks a comprehensive strategy for virtual training, because it has not fully refined its planning documents to achieve its training vision, for example by developing a risk- based investment strategy and a time line for prioritizing its needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that annual training plans are aligned with the Air Force’s stated goals to ensure that its forces can successfully achieve missions across a broad range of current and emerging threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to comprehensively reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training requirements—including, but not limited to, the total annual training requirements by aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator training—and make any appropriate adjustments in future training plans. To improve the Air Force’s ability to consistently monitor training results and better position it to allocate resources to address factors that limit the effectiveness of training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish desired learning objectives and training support elements needed to accomplish the training expectations in its annual Ready Aircrew Program tasking memorandums and develop a process to collect data to assess the effectiveness of annual training against these features. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on the non-public sensitive version of this report, DOD did not concur with the first and second recommendations, and concurred with the third recommendation. Therefore, we believe the recommendation remains valid. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to determine the extent to which the Air Force has (1) determined requirements to train its combat aircrews for the full range of core missions, (2) met annual training requirements for combat fighter squadrons across the full range of core missions and evaluated the effectiveness of this training, and (3) established virtual training plans that include desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy. This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we issued in August 2016. Therefore, this report omits FOUO information and data on some of the Air Force’s training priorities, completion of annual training requirements for active-duty fighter squadrons, and aircraft maintenance generation capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, the Air Force focused its training on supporting operations in the Middle East. The Air Force has established goals for its combat aircrews to conduct training for the full range of core missions. Both the Senate and House Reports accompanying bills for the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review the Air Force's training plans.
This report discusses the extent to which the Air Force has (1) determined requirements to train combat aircrews for the full range of core missions, (2) met annual training requirements for combat fighter squadrons across the full range of core missions and evaluated the effectiveness of this training, and (3) established virtual training plans that include desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy. GAO reviewed Air Force training requirements and plans and interviewed officials with a non-generalizable sample of units based on the units' range of core missions.
What GAO Found
The Air Force establishes combat aircrew training requirements for the full range of core missions based on an annual process, but these requirements may not reflect current and emerging training needs, because the Air Force has not comprehensively reassessed the assumptions underlying them. Specifically, assumptions about the total annual live-fly sortie requirements by aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator training have remained the same since 2012. For example, Air Combat Command has set the same minimum number of live-fly sortie requirements across aircraft platforms, but has not conducted the analysis needed to determine if requirements should differ based on the number of core missions for each platform. Reassessing the assumptions underlying annual training requirements would better position the Air Force to meet its stated goals for its forces to achieve a range of missions for current and emerging threats.
Combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete mission training requirements for ongoing contingency operations, such as close air support to ground forces, but were unable to meet annual training requirements across the full range of core missions. Further, the Air Force does not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of training that has been completed against established expectations. Selected unit commanders that GAO interviewed cited four common factors that limited their ability to complete training, such as high deployment rates, and other factors that affected the training that aircrews were able to accomplish. However, Air Force processes used to record and monitor annual training do not include a systematic evaluation of training effectiveness against expectations. Specifically, Air Combat Command has not established the desired learning objectives or training support elements needed to accomplish training expectations and does not collect data to assess effectiveness. A more consistent basis for monitoring results is critical in tracking the Air Force's progress in training units for the full range of core missions.
Air Force plans for virtual training do not include all desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy, such as a risk-based investment strategy or a time line for addressing training needs. A strategy that included these elements would help ensure that the Air Force's plans addressed its capability needs.
This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2016. It omits sensitive information and data on some of the Air Force's training priorities, completion of annual training requirements for active-duty fighter squadrons, and aircraft maintenance generation capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force (1) reassess assumptions for annual training requirements, (2) establish and collect data on desired learning objectives and training support elements for its training expectations, and (3) develop a risk-based investment strategy for its virtual training plans. DOD concurred with the third recommendation and did not concur with the first and second recommendations, stating that existing initiatives and policies address these issues. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid for the reasons discussed in this report. |
gao_T-GGD-99-86 | gao_T-GGD-99-86_0 | Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the serious and continuing threat of corruption to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest Border by persons involved in the illegal drug trade. My testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which INS and Customs have and comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) an identification and comparison of the Departments of Justice’s and the Treasury’s organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct and whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) an identification of the types of illegal drug-related activities in which INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been convicted; and (4) the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of INS and Customs employees. Opportunities to learn lessons from closed corruption cases have been missed. Background
across the Southwest Border. INS and Customs Generally Completed Background Investigations, but Not Reinvestigations, When Due
INS and Customs follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations, which require background investigations to be completed for new hires by the end of their first year on the job. In some instances, reinvestigations were as many as 3 years overdue. Basic Integrity Training Was Required and Advanced Training Was Not
Newly hired immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors are required to attend basic training. Justice OIG and INS Generally Complied with Investigative Procedures, but Customs’ Compliance Was Uncertain
The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have established procedures for handling allegations of employee misconduct. INS’ Office of Internal Audit complied with its procedures for receiving and resolving employee misconduct allegations in all of its cases. The 28 INS and Customs employees engaged in one or more drug-related criminal activities, including waving drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, and disclosing drug intelligence information. In the 28 cases involving INS or Customs employees who were convicted for drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, no reports were prepared. corruption. INS and Customs Have Not Evaluated Their Integrity Procedures
INS and Customs have not evaluated the effectiveness of their integrity assurance procedures to identify areas that could be improved. Recommendations
require the Justice OIG to document that policies and procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in cases where an INS employee is determined to have engaged in drug-related criminal activities; and require the Director of the FBI to develop a procedure to provide information from closed FBI cases, involving INS or Customs employees, to the Justice OIG or Customs’ Office of Internal Affairs so they can identify and report internal control weaknesses to the responsible agency official. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the threat of corruption to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Customs Service employees along the Southwest Border, focusing on: (1) the extent to which INS and the Customs Service have and comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) an identification and comparison of the Departments of Justice's and the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct and whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) an identification of the types of illegal drug-related activities in which INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been convicted; and (4) the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of INS and Customs employees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) some INS and U.S. Customs Service employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities, including waving drug loads through ports of entry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, and disclosing drug intelligence information; (2) both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to help ensure the integrity of their employees; (3) however, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies and procedures and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption-cases; (4) the policies and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity training; (5) while the agencies generally completed required background investigations for new hires by the end of their fist year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances by as many as 3 years; (6) both INS and Customs provided integrity training to new employees during basic training, but advanced integrity training was not required; (7) Justice and Treasury have different organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct; (8) at Justice, the Office of the Inspector General is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees; (9) GAO found that the Justice OIG generally complied with its policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct; (10) at Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees; (11) Customs' automated case management system and its investigative case files did not provide the necessary information to assess compliance with investigative procedures; (12) INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and change their policies and procedures for preventing drug-related corruption of their employees; (13) the Justice OIG and Customs' OIA are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so; (14) GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported; and (15) INS and Customs had not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-02-322 | gao_GAO-02-322_0 | SSA found the results of the initiative to be mixed. SSA officials were also concerned about the agency’s lack of progress in developing an automated disability claims process, which was expected to support the Disability Claim Manager initiative. In spite of the significant resources SSA has dedicated to improving the disability claims process, the overall results—including the results from the five initiatives that are the subject of this report—have been disappointing. As a result, the problem will likely worsen. Without such a system, it is difficult for SSA to ensure the integrity of SSA’s disability claims process. We are sending copies of this report to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of people applying for benefits from the Social Security Administration's (SSA) two disability programs grew dramatically during the 1990s. As a result, the Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Programs began to experience huge backlogs of undecided claims. SSA has spent $39 million during the past seven years on various initiatives to help it better manage its caseloads and ensure high-quality service. SSA spent another $71 million to develop an automated disability claims process. This report reviews the status and outcomes of five initiatives intended to improve SSA's disability claims process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the results of the initiatives have been disappointing. |
gao_GAO-07-559 | gao_GAO-07-559_0 | It does not mention the 40 percent of work completed. DOD Does Not Know the Full Extent of Its UCA Usage
DOD faces a potentially large gap in its data and thus does not know the extent to which it is using UCAs. Undefinitized task or delivery orders, as well as contract modifications, are not identified. As figure 1 shows, DOD’s reported obligations for letter contracts have increased from $5.98 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $6.53 billion in fiscal year 2005. The local commands we visited performed oversight of their UCA usage to varying degrees. UCAs Used to Quickly Fill Needs in a Variety of Circumstances
DOD is using UCAs to rapidly fill needs in a variety of circumstances, many of which are directly or indirectly related to the war in Iraq. For example, one National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency UCA for the continuation of ongoing services was awarded the day after the services from the prior contract ended. Local Command Policies Generally Focus on Limiting UCAs
The “tone at the top” provided by the local commands we visited is to not use UCAs unless absolutely necessary. However, this message is emphasized differently from one location to another and has only recently come about in some locations. DOD is Often Not Meeting Definitization Time Frame Requirements
DOD did not meet the definitization time frame requirement of 180 days after award for over half the UCAs we reviewed. While DOD regulations allow up to half of the funding to be provided before definitization, we found that DOD tends to obligate this maximum amount of funding immediately at award—a practice that could provide a disincentive for the timely definitization of the UCA. Based on our review of the contract files and discussions with contracting and program officials, the most common reasons for the delays were (1) delays in obtaining a qualifying proposal from the contractor, (2) acquisition workforce shortages that led to overly heavy workloads, and (3) complexity of requirements at award of the UCA or changing requirements after award. In hindsight, he said it would have been easier to just obligate the 50 percent at the beginning. As such, we were unable to assess whether DOD is in compliance with this requirement. Each contract type includes either profit (fixed-price contracts) or fee (cost-type contracts) for the contractor. The profit rate or fee is derived at definitization and then applied across the entire period of performance, including the undefinitized period. “When the final price of a UCA is negotiated after a substantial portion of the required performance has been completed, the head of the contracting activity shall ensure the profit allowed reflects (a) Any reduced cost risk to the contractor for costs incurred during contract performance before negotiation of the final price; and (b) The contractor’s reduced cost risk for costs incurred during performance of the remainder of the contract.”
When costs have been incurred prior to definitization, contracting officers are to generally regard the contract type risk to be in the low end of the designated range. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve oversight of UCAs, we recommend that the Administrator of the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy assess whether the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation data fields need to be modified to require coding that will identify undefinitized task and delivery orders and undefinitized contract modifications, and the Secretary of Defense issue guidance to program and contracting officials on how to comply with the FAR requirement to definitize when 40 percent of the work is complete. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the level of insight the Department of Defense (DOD) has into its use of undefinitized contract actions (UCA), we interviewed DOD senior-level acquisition officials and service-level acquisition officials to identify any additional policies specifically addressing the use of undefinitized contract actions at the locations selected for our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
To meet urgent needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) can issue undefinitized contract actions (UCA), which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract terms. The contractor has little incentive to control costs during this period, creating a potential for wasted taxpayer dollars. Pursuant to the House of Representatives report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, we assessed (1) the level of insight DOD has into its use of UCAs, (2) how and when DOD is using UCAs, (3) whether DOD is definitizing UCAs in a timely fashion, and (4) whether contracting officers are documenting the basis for negotiated profit or fee. GAO reviewed 77 randomly-selected contracts at seven locations and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
DOD faces a potentially large gap in its data and thus does not know the extent to which it is using UCAs. DOD's reported obligations for UCAs increased from $5.98 billion in 2001 to $6.53 billion in 2005. However, the government's procurement system does not identify undefinitized task or delivery orders or undefinitized contract modifications. In light of DOD's reported increase in its use of task and delivery orders in recent years, the data gap could be large. Because DOD decentralizes oversight of its UCAs, the department would have to manually obtain data from each of its local commands in order to obtain a complete picture. The local commands GAO visited performed oversight of their UCAs to varying degrees. DOD is generally using UCAs to rapidly fill urgent needs, as permitted, in a variety of circumstances. Local managements' message to the contracting community is to not use a UCA unless absolutely necessary, but this message is emphasized differently from one location to another. GAO found 10 instances in the 77 UCAs we reviewed where UCAs could have been avoided with better acquisition planning. For example, one UCA for the continuation of ongoing services was awarded the day after the previous contract expired. DOD did not meet the definitization time frame requirement of 180 days after award on 60 percent of the 77 UCAs reviewed. The most common reasons for the delays were untimely receipt of an adequate proposal from the contractor, acquisition workforce shortfalls, and changing requirements. GAO also found that DOD tends to obligate the maximum amount of funding permitted--up to 50 percent of the not-to-exceed amount--immediately at award of UCAs. As a result, contractors may have little incentive to quickly submit proposals. In addition, since DOD does not track whether it meets the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirement to definitize letter contracts (one type of UCA) before 40 percent of the work is complete, GAO was unable to assess compliance with this requirement. Contracting officers are not documenting, as required, the basis for the profit or fee prenegotiation objective and the profit or fee negotiated. As such, it is unclear whether the costs incurred prior to definitization are considered when computing the profit rates or fee amounts. For the 40 fixed-price contracts GAO reviewed, profit ranged from 3 to 17 percent, and for the 37 cost-type contracts in our sample, fees ranged from 4 to 15 percent. Generally the rate was applied equally over the entire contract term, including the undefinitized period. |
gao_GAO-05-55 | gao_GAO-05-55_0 | Energy Savings Performance Contracts
ESPCs finance energy-saving capital improvements such as lighting retrofits and ventilation systems for federal facilities without the government recording the full cost up-front. Various Features Enabled Agencies to Delay Recognition in the Budget
ESPCs and partnership arrangements were authorized by Congress. As a result, the full cost of the assets were not required to be reflected in the budget. Although these arrangements represent long-term commitments, funds for ESPCs are obligated on an annual basis. For example, case study agencies incurred a higher rate of interest by using ESPCs and partnerships than if they had obtained that same capital through timely, full, and up-front appropriations. In our six ESPC case studies, use of ESPCs increased the government’s costs of acquiring ECMs by 8 to 56 percent compared to the use of timely, full, and up-front appropriations. For both ESPCs and partnerships, agency officials said they did not request full, up-front appropriations to finance the specific capital projects we reviewed. However, there are insufficient data to measure this effect. Acquiring Capital through ESPCs Is More Expensive Than Acquiring the Same Capital through Timely, Full, and Up-Front Appropriations in Our Case Studies
Since the federal government’s cost of capital is lower than that of the private sector, alternative financing mechanisms may be more expensive than timely, full, and up-front appropriations. In these cases, agencies sometimes incurred higher interest costs by using partnership financing rather than timely, full, and up-front appropriations. Different Financing Alternatives Present Different Implementation and Monitoring Challenges
Third-party financing can make it easier for agencies to manage in the short term within a given amount of budget authority but may have additional long-term costs. Such relationships increase the need for effective implementation and monitoring by agencies to ensure the government’s interests are protected. An evaluation of funding alternatives was not always done to determine the most appropriate way of funding capital projects. Officials explained that their agencies did not request full, up-front appropriations since appropriations might not have been made available in a timely manner and the use of ESPCs had been authorized. Implementation and monitoring of ESPCs is a relatively uniform process. Since partnerships take a variety of forms, their implementation and monitoring is more complex. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) what specific attributes of energy savings performance contracts (ESPC) and public/private partnerships (partnerships) contributed to budget scoring decisions, (2) the costs of financing through ESPCs and partnerships compared to the costs of financing via timely, full, and up-front appropriations, and (3) how ESPCs and partnerships are implemented and monitored. | Why GAO Did This Study
ESPCs finance energy-saving capital improvements, such as lighting retrofits for federal facilities, without the government incurring the full cost up front. Partnerships tap the capital and expertise of the private sector to develop real property. This report describes (1) what specific attributes of ESPCs and partnerships contributed to budget scoring decisions, (2) the costs of financing through ESPCs compared to the costs of financing via timely, full, and up-front appropriations, and (3) how ESPCs and partnerships are monitored. Using case studies, GAO reviewed GSA and Navy ESPCs and DOE and VA partnerships.
What GAO Found
Energy savings performance contracts (ESPC) and public/private partnership arrangements we examined were authorized by Congress and did not require reporting of the full, long-term costs up front in the budget. ESPCs are financed over time through annual cost savings from energy conservation measures (ECM) and only their initial-year costs must be recognized up front. OMB policy determined how agencies obligated ESPCs in their budgets. With partnerships, agencies sometimes used short-term leases to acquire assets constructed for the government's long-term use and benefit. As a result, budgetary decisions may favor alternatively financed assets. However, spreading costs over time enabled agencies to acquire capital that might not have been obtainable if full, up-front appropriations were required. A number of factors may cause third-party financing to be more expensive than timely, full, and up-front appropriations. For example, a higher rate of interest is incurred by using ESPCs and partnerships than if the same capital is acquired through timely, full, and up-front appropriations. For our six ESPC case studies, the government's costs of acquiring assets increased 8 to 56 percent by using ESPCs rather than timely, full, and up-front appropriations. However, officials noted that there are opportunity costs, such as foregone energy and maintenance savings, associated with delayed appropriations, but there are insufficient data to measure this effect. For ESPC and partnership case studies, agency officials said they did not specifically consider or request full up-front appropriations because they did not believe funds would be available in a timely manner and because alternative mechanisms were authorized. An evaluation of funding alternatives on a present value basis could have helped agencies determine the most appropriate way of funding capital projects. Implementation and monitoring of ESPCs is a relatively uniform process. Since partnerships take a variety of forms, their implementation and monitoring is more complex. Although third-party financing can make it easier for agencies to manage within a given amount of budget authority, it also increases the need for effective implementation and monitoring by agencies to ensure the government's interests are protected. |
gao_GAO-11-744 | gao_GAO-11-744_0 | DEA Has Expanded Its Resources and Targeted Its Investigation Strategies to Respond to Rising Criminal Diversion and Growing Registrant Population
To respond to the increasing rate of criminal diversion and a growing registrant population, DEA has expanded its resources and targeted investigation strategies in ways to collaborate with state and local entities and enhance the effectiveness of its Diversion Control Program. Specifically, DEA has expanded its use of Tactical Diversion Squads, which work with DEA’s state, local, and other federal partners, to maximize resources and improve efforts to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle individuals or organizations involved in diversion schemes related to controlled substances and listed chemicals. DEA has also renewed its focus on regulatory oversight of the more than 1.3 million DEA registrants to ensure registrants comply with the CSA and implementing regulations. According to DEA and local officials we interviewed, the establishment of the squads has been a means to improve communication, coordination, and simplify information sharing as the squads have become the clearinghouse for diversion-related investigative information. According to the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Diversion Control, DEA was able to increase its regulatory investigations primarily by using the squads to free up Diversion Investigator resources that had previously been working both criminal and regulatory cases and DEA plans to hire additional diversion staff in the future to conduct investigations. Furthermore, DEA has conducted other targeted outreach efforts to specific registrant types to inform them of specific regulatory responsibilities or help them prepare for regulatory investigations: In 2005 DEA established an initiative to better inform wholesale distributors of controlled substances of their responsibilities under the CSA to report suspicious orders from pharmacies that are possibly filling invalid prescriptions. The presentation provided examples of Internet pharmacies and rogue pain clinics as well as their purchase patterns and methods of operation. To ensure that Diversion Investigators and Special Agents have the necessary skills to carry out their responsibilities and that DEA monitors the results of its employee guidance and training, DEA has established internal control activities, which are consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. DEA has established performance measures to assess and report on its progress toward meeting its performance goal of reducing the diversion of licit drugs, but could reassess the measures to identify ways to better capture and report on the results of DEA’s investigations. DEA has established internal control activities related to guidance and training such as program policy and procedures manuals and diversion investigation courses. DEA has implemented a multilayered approach to monitor the work of its Diversion Control Program personnel to help ensure that they are following policies and procedures for diversion investigations. The monitoring process includes direct supervisory review, self-inspection/peer review, and on-site internal inspection. The Office of Inspections also conducts on-site internal inspections of DEA’s 21 field divisions to ensure that employees are following required program policies and procedures—in accordance with the Diversion Investigator manual. We found that the inspections did not identify widespread findings or issues related to the timeliness and overall quality of the diversion investigations. DEA Could Better Identify and Report on the Results of Its Diversion Control Efforts
Given DEA’s increased focus on regulatory and criminal investigations in response to growing prescription drug diversion, it is critical for DEA to determine and report on the extent to which these additional efforts are helping to reduce diversion. However, while the performance measure is focused on the regulatory investigations and provides a count of the number of investigations completed, this measure does not demonstrate the results of those completed investigations or give a sense as to the extent to which registrants were found to comply with the CSA and thereby the extent to which DEA is achieving its stated objective. As a result, this measure does not provide a clear indication as to the effect DEA’s investigative efforts are having on the problem of diversion. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order for DEA to better determine to what extent its efforts are decreasing diversions and to inform future program decisions, we recommend that the Administrator of DEA strengthen the agency’s performance measurement for the Diversion Control Program by reassessing its set of performance measures for the program to identify ways to enhance the measures and their link to the program outcome goal of reducing diversion. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Diversion Control Program is responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and ensuring the availability of prescription drugs such as pain relievers and stimulants while preventing their diversion for abuse. The CSA requires entities handling controlled substances--such as manufacturers, pharmacies, and physicians, among others-- to register with DEA, which conducts regulatory investigations of registrants, as well as criminal investigations. GAO was asked (1) how DEA manages diversion investigation efforts, and (2) how DEA ensures policies and procedures are followed for investigations and the extent to which it determines the results of its efforts. GAO reviewed DEA policies and procedures, and interviewed DEA, state, and local officials at eleven locations which were selected on the basis of volume of cases handled, geographic diversity, and other considerations. These observations are not generalizable, but provided insights on DEA operations.
What GAO Found
To respond to the increasing rate of criminal diversion of prescription drugs and a growing registrant population, DEA has expanded its resources and targeted its investigation strategies to collaborate with state and local entities and enhance the effectiveness of its diversion investigations. Specifically, the agency expanded its use of Tactical Diversion Squads (squads) of DEA personnel as well as other federal, state, and local partners investigating diversion schemes to maximize resources and improve efforts to investigate criminal diversion. DEA currently has 40 squads across the country and plans to establish more. According to squad participants and DEA officials GAO contacted, the squads have improved communication and coordination and simplified information sharing for investigations. Because of the growing registrant population and noncompliance by some with the CSA and implementing regulations, DEA renewed its focus on regulatory oversight of registrants to better ensure compliance. By using the squads to free up resources previously dedicated to both criminal and regulatory cases, DEA used those resources to increase regulatory investigations of the registrants. As a result, the number of regulatory investigations more than tripled between fiscal years 2009 and 2010. DEA also conducted outreach to specific registrant types to inform them of regulatory responsibilities and prepare them for regulatory investigations. DEA has taken steps to ensure that investigators follow policies and procedures for such investigations, but could better assess how its efforts are reducing the diversion of prescription drugs. To ensure that diversion investigators and special agents have the necessary skills to carry out their responsibilities and that DEA monitors the extent to which policies and procedures are followed during investigations, DEA has established internal controls related to guidance, training, and oversight of investigations. These controls include providing and updating guidance to investigators to follow during investigations, providing initial and on-going training to investigators, and monitoring the quality of investigations through a combination of direct supervisory reviews, self-inspections, and on-site internal inspections by DEA's Office of Inspections. Recent reports from on-site internal inspections of each of DEA's field divisions did not identify any widespread or systematic issues related to the timeliness and overall quality of diversion investigations. Given DEA's increased focus on investigations in response to growing prescription drug diversion, it is critical for DEA to determine the extent to which these additional efforts are reducing diversion. DEA has established performance measures for the Diversion Control Program, but these measures do not clearly demonstrate the effect the additional efforts are having on the diversion problem the program seeks to address. For example, for its overall performance measure of the diversion control program, DEA is tracking the development and implementation of an internal information technology project. By more closely linking performance measures to the goal of reducing diversion, DEA could better capture the results of the Diversion Control program to help inform decision makers in allocating resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DEA reassess the program's performance measures to better link them to the goal of reducing diversion. DEA did not concur. GAO continues to believe the measures could be enhanced as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-17-348 | gao_GAO-17-348_0 | FTA’s FWSO and region three office, which includes the Washington metropolitan area, have jointly managed oversight of SafeTrack. WMATA Did Not Fully Follow Leading Practices When Planning SafeTrack Because It Wanted to Address Safety Issues Immediately, but Future Projects Could Benefit from Additional Planning
WMATA’s planning of SafeTrack did not fully align with leading project management practices, including some that are focused on projects for rehabilitating transit assets. Specifically, while WMATA’s efforts to coordinate with local stakeholders after SafeTrack began have generally been in line with such practices, WMATA did not (1) comprehensively collect and assess data on its assets, (2) analyze alternatives, or (3) develop a project management plan before starting work. WMATA did not follow these practices because it believed it needed to start work immediately to address critical safety issues. By not gathering and using detailed data on all aspects of the track infrastructure when planning SafeTrack, WMATA decision-makers may not have had sufficient information to develop project objectives and properly prioritize SafeTrack work. According to WMATA officials, WMATA did not develop a comprehensive project management plan before beginning SafeTrack because they believed a project management plan was not appropriate for such a project. Without a policy and procedures that require the development of a plan for future large-scale rehabilitation projects, WMATA lacks a key tool to ensure its projects are completed on-time, on-budget, and according to quality standards. WMATA Is Using Several Leading Practices to Implement SafeTrack and Improve the Quality of Completed Work
WMATA’s implementation of SafeTrack generally aligns with leading project management practices. Specifically, during the course of each SafeTrack surge, WMATA officials collect and document information about the work performed and the condition of assets. Last, WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control and assurance framework that it is implementing for the first time through SafeTrack. However, although WMATA is collecting information on the condition of assets repaired through SafeTrack, WMATA does not have a policy or procedures requiring it to use asset data when planning future large-scale rehabilitation projects, as previously discussed. In accordance with leading project management practices, WMATA officials have developed lessons learned during and after each surge period, and have used those lessons during subsequent maintenance and planning efforts. FTA Has Used Inspections and Other Tools to Direct WMATA to Make Safety Repairs and Oversee SafeTrack
FTA Has Conducted Inspections and Directed WMATA to Make Safety Critical Repairs before and during SafeTrack
Prior to WMATA’s announcement of SafeTrack in May 2016, FTA conducted many inspections of WMATA’s track infrastructure and internal inspection program. As a result of its inspections, FTA directed WMATA to complete safety critical work both prior to starting and during SafeTrack, specifically: In response to WMATA’s initial SafeTrack plan provided to FTA on May 6, 2016, FTA sent a letter on May 11, 2016, directing WMATA to make urgent repairs to reduce the risk of smoke and fire events and the occurrence of arcing insulators on certain sections of the rail system. In the case of SafeTrack, due to WMATA’s desire to begin SafeTrack work immediately, and FTA’s determination of SafeTrack as a major capital project after work had already commenced, WMATA did not submit its project management plan to FTA until 4 months into the project. Recommendations
To ensure future large-scale rehabilitation projects are in line with leading project management practices, WMATA should develop a policy that requires and includes relevant procedures specifying that the following three actions be taken prior to starting large-scale projects: use detailed data on the conditions of assets to develop project evaluate and compare alternative ways of accomplishing the project objectives, including estimates for the alternatives’ costs and impacts; and develop a comprehensive project management plan for the selected alternative—to include key elements such as detailed plans for managing the project’s scope, schedule, and cost—for those projects that may not be designated major capital projects. NTSB also said that FTA’s public transportation safety oversight approach lacks the necessary standards, expertise, and resources. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, WMATA agreed with our findings and conclusions, and said that it is working to address the recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent inquiries into WMATA's Metrorail system have revealed a range of serious safety issues. In response to some of these issues, as well as a backlog of track maintenance, WMATA announced in May 2016 that it was undertaking SafeTrack, a large-scale rehabilitation project. The SafeTrack project is overseen by FTA.
GAO was asked to review a range of safety and oversight issues regarding WMATA. This report examines the extent to which WMATA's (1) planning and (2) implementation of SafeTrack was consistent with leading project management practices as well as (3) the steps taken by FTA to oversee SafeTrack.
GAO reviewed documentation on WMATA's planning and project implementation, and FTA's oversight of SafeTrack. GAO also interviewed officials from WMATA, FTA, and local jurisdictions, and compared WMATA's planning and implementation of SafeTrack to leading project management practices developed by professional organizations.
What GAO Found
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) planning of SafeTrack did not fully align with leading project management practices. While WMATA generally followed leading practices to coordinate with stakeholders, it did not comprehensively collect and use data on the condition of its assets, analyze project alternatives, and develop a project management plan before starting work. WMATA did not follow these practices because it believed it needed to start work immediately to address critical safety issues.
Although WMATA inspected its track assets when planning SafeTrack, those inspections were not comprehensive and did not collect detailed data on the condition of all track infrastructure, such as all “interlockings,” where trains cross from one track to another. As a result, WMATA's decision makers may not have used sufficient information to develop project objectives and to properly prioritize SafeTrack work.
Though WMATA developed three alternatives for SafeTrack, it did not determine the costs and impacts of each alternative, or assess them to determine which approach may have resulted in greater efficiencies, lower costs, or less disruption for riders and local jurisdictions.
Before WMATA began SafeTrack, it lacked a comprehensive project management plan, which is a key tool to ensure a project is completed on-time, within-budget, and according to quality standards.
WMATA does not have a policy that requires, and includes relevant procedures for how to carry out, these planning activities for large-scale rehabilitation projects. Without such a policy and procedures, WMATA lacks a framework to plan future rehabilitation projects so that they achieve their objectives.
WMATA's implementation of SafeTrack generally aligned with leading project management practices. Specifically, WMATA officials collected information on the work performed and the condition of assets repaired during SafeTrack. WMATA officials also collect lessons learned during and after each surge, and use those lessons during subsequent maintenance and planning efforts. Additionally, WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control and assurance framework and is implementing it for the first time through SafeTrack.
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has used safety inspections and other tools to oversee SafeTrack and direct WMATA to undertake safety-critical work. FTA has relied on two different authorities to oversee SafeTrack: (1) FTA's public transportation safety oversight authority, and (2) its project management oversight authority. Prior to the start of SafeTrack and during the project, FTA conducted safety inspections and directed WMATA to make repairs to reduce the risk of smoke and fires on the rail system. After SafeTrack work began and estimated project costs exceeded $100 million, FTA determined SafeTrack to be a major capital project, triggering the statutory requirement that WMATA prepare a project management plan. WMATA did not submit its project management plan until 4 months into SafeTrack. FTA found the plan lacked sufficient detail, and WMATA told GAO it is working to improve the plan.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that WMATA develop a policy that requires and includes procedures for it to, prior to starting future large-scale rehabilitation projects: (1) use asset data to develop project objectives; (2) analyze alternatives; and (3) develop a project management plan for those projects that may not be designated as major capital projects. WMATA agreed with GAO's findings and said that it is working to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-1024 | gao_GAO-02-1024_0 | Ex-Im Bank provides medium- and long-term loans and guarantees, export credit insurance, and working capital guarantees. Trends in the Number and Values Financed for Energy Sector Projects and Applications
Of the $28 billion Ex-Im Bank provided in loans and guarantees for energy- related projects from 1990 to 2001, about 93 percent was used to finance fossil fuel projects. Overall, Ex-Im Bank financed renewable energy projects totaling $730 million from 1990 through 2001 or about 3 percent of all energy projects financed. The 1995 and 1998 reports did not address renewable energy. The relatively small share of most renewable resources in world energy consumption, due partly to cost disadvantages, is viewed as a key factor underlying the demand for Ex-Im Bank financing. While Ex-Im Bank has undertaken some efforts to increase its funding of renewable energy exports, they have been limited. In addition to information on types of outreach and specific processes or programs to promote renewable energy exports, Ex-Im Bank should provide information on the types and amounts of financing actually provided, including the number and values financed for renewable energy transactions each year, and the specific renewable energy sectors to which the financing is provided. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to Chairman Bereuter’s request, we identified and assessed (1) trends in Ex-Im Bank’s financing of and applications for fossil fuel and renewable energy-related projects, (2) the extent of Ex-Im Bank’s reporting to Congress on its renewable energy efforts, and (3) key factors affecting Ex-Im Bank’s renewable energy sector financing. | What GAO Found
From 1990 through 2001, the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) of the United States provided export financing commitments totaling $31 billion to promote the export of U.S. goods and services for use in the energy sector. The energy sector is divided into fossil fuel, renewable, and nuclear energy. Financing is provided through a range of products, including loans and guarantees, export credit insurance, and working capital guarantees. Of the $28 billion Ex-Im Bank provided in loans and guarantees for energy-related projects from 1990 to 2001, 93 percent was used to finance fossil fuel projects, and 3 percent was for renewable energy projects. Trends in applications for fossil fuel and renewable energy projects largely mirrored trends in the energy projects financed because 90 percent of applications submitted were financed. Since 1990, Ex-Im Bank has not consistently provided information about its renewable energy program to Congress; its 1995 and 1998 annual reports did not address renewable energy. Ex-Im Bank's energy portfolio is affected by broad factors such as worldwide market conditions and to some degree by its policies, promotion efforts, and programs. The relatively small share of renewable energy in worldwide energy consumption, due in part to cost factors, is a key factor. Although Ex-Im Bank has undertaken some efforts to promote renewable energy, it has not focused specifically on this sector. |
gao_GAO-08-502 | gao_GAO-08-502_0 | Background
Since 1997, we have identified management of DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area because infrastructure costs have affected the department’s ability to devote funds to other more critical programs and needs. During fiscal year 2008, DOD plans to spend around $55 billion to support its facilities and installations. Reliability of the Facilities Sustainment Model’s Estimates Can Be Improved
Although the facilities sustainment model provides a consistent and reasonable framework for preparing estimates of DOD’s annual facility sustainment funding requirements, accuracy and supportability issues with two of the model’s key inputs—the inventory quantity and the sustainment cost factor associated with each of DOD’s 448 facility categories—have affected the reliability of the model’s estimates. Regarding the sustainment cost factor input, we identified issues concerning the accuracy and supportability of some cost factors used by the model. The study, completed in February 2006, reported that only 13 of 45 factors evaluated were deemed to be reasonably accurate and adequately supported. Military Services Have Not Met All Funding Goals for Facility Sustainment and Recapitalization
The military services have not met all of DOD’s goals for funding facility sustainment and recapitalization at levels to prevent deterioration and ensure that facilities are restored and modernized in accordance with established benchmarks. Service officials stated that they generally did not meet the sustainment funding goals because resources were limited and some programs, such as force modernization, often had higher funding priority. Air Force officials stated that restoration and modernization requirements had not been adequately funded and that the Air Force had a restoration and modernization backlog of about $9.3 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007. DOD Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance on Deferred Sustainment Requirements
The military services do not have consistent estimates of their deferred sustainment requirements or plans to deal with these needs because DOD has not provided adequate guidance on deferred sustainment requirements. As shown in table 4, the military services did not fund over $3.5 billion of their annual sustainment requirements in fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Thus, in order to reach a common definition and service standard for the chaplain program, this difference among the military services must be resolved. Until DOD takes additional steps to improve the accuracy and supportability of its inventory quantity and sustainment cost factor inputs to the facilities sustainment model, the model’s estimates of annual facility sustainment funding requirements will not be as reliable as possible, which could jeopardize DOD’s ability to adequately provide for its facility sustainment needs. Until DOD provides guidance that clearly defines deferred sustainment requirements, directs the services to consistently measure and track deferred sustainment needs, establishes a goal to address these needs, and ensures that the military services’ financial reporting of deferred facility maintenance is consistent with financial reporting requirements, the services will not have consistent estimates of their total facility sustainment requirements, will be unable to develop plans to address these needs, and may continue to report deferred maintenance information that is inconsistent with financial reporting requirements. DOD has a goal to establish common standards and metrics for installation services by the end of 2008. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the support provided for DOD’s facilities and installation services, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the following five actions in order to increase the reliability of the facilities sustainment model, address deferred facility sustainment funding requirements, and advance progress towards implementing the installation services model: Monitor and ensure compliance with guidance requiring verification of real property inventory records. To determine DOD's progress in meeting funding goals for facility sustainment and recapitalization, we reviewed DOD’s installation strategic plans to identify DOD’s goals for facility sustainment and recapitalization. To determine the status of DOD's efforts to develop a funding requirements model for installation services, we obtained and reviewed documentation on the history of the model’s development and interviewed DOD officials concerning past progress on the model, the model’s status at the end of calendar year 2007, and future plans for completing and implementing the model. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) manages and operates about 577,000 structures worldwide, valued at about $712 billion. DOD has worked for several years to develop models that can reliably estimate the installation support funds needed to sustain these facilities, and plans to spend over $55 billion to support these facilities and operate its bases in fiscal year 2008. Because GAO has identified support infrastructure as a high-risk area that affects DOD's ability to devote funds to other more critical needs, GAO initiated this review under the Comptroller General's authority. This report discusses (1) the reliability of the annual funding estimates produced by the facilities sustainment model, (2) DOD's progress in meeting funding goals for facility sustainment and recapitalization, (3) the extent to which DOD has addressed deferred facility sustainment funding needs, and (4) the status of DOD's efforts to develop a new installation services model. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the accuracy and support for the model's key inputs, analyzed pertinent documents, and visited eight judgmentally selected installations.
What GAO Found
Although the facilities sustainment model, implemented in 2003, provides a consistent and reasonable framework for preparing estimates of DOD's annual facility sustainment funding requirements, accuracy and supportability issues with two of the model's key inputs have affected the reliability of the model's estimates. First, regarding the inventory quantity input, GAO found that the services had not complied with DOD regulations requiring verification of each real property inventory record. Without the verifications, DOD lacked assurance that the model used accurate inventory quantities, and GAO's analysis identified inaccuracies in some quantities used by the model. Second, regarding the sustainment cost factor input, GAO identified issues concerning some cost factors used by the model. For example, an independent study reported that only 13 of 45 cost factors evaluated were deemed to be reasonably accurate and adequately supported. Until DOD improves the accuracy of these two inputs, the model's estimates of facility sustainment funding requirements will not be as reliable as possible. The military services have not met all of DOD's goals for funding facility sustainment and recapitalization at levels to prevent deterioration and ensure that facilities are restored and modernized. Service officials stated that they generally did not meet the sustainment funding goals because resources were limited and programs such as force modernization often had higher funding priority. Although the services achieved more success in meeting DOD's goal to fund recapitalization, funding remains an issue with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force reporting recapitalization backlogs of over $50 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007. DOD has not taken actions to estimate and address its deferred facility sustainment requirements. In fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the services did not fund over $3.5 billion of their estimated annual facility sustainment requirements. The services do not have consistent estimates of their deferred sustainment requirements or plans to deal with these needs because DOD has not provided adequate guidance to clearly define deferred sustainment requirements, or direct the services to measure, track, and address these needs. As a result, DOD's plans to address facility sustainment requirements do not include all deferred sustainment requirements, which could result in continued facility deterioration and increased future recapitalization costs. DOD's progress in developing a new model to estimate funding requirements for installation services, such as airfield and port operations, has been slow. Although DOD's goal is to establish common standards and metrics for installation services by the end of 2008, the services had agreed on common definitions and standards for only 2 of 29 areas by the end of 2007. DOD officials stated that reaching agreement has been difficult for several reasons, such as differences among the services in how tasks for installation services are performed and managed. Without a reliable model, DOD cannot provide the Congress with a clear basis for making funding decisions. |
gao_GAO-05-390T | gao_GAO-05-390T_0 | The JSF is intended to provide greater capability and to replace DOD’s aging fighter and attack aircraft. Since the program began in November 1996, it has experienced technical challenges that have resulted in significant cost increases and schedule overruns. A New Business Case Is Needed to Justify Continued Investment in the F/A-22 Program
Since its inception in 1986, the F/A-22 aircraft program has encountered numerous and continuing management and technical challenges. Changing threats, missions, and requirements have severely weakened the original business case. The recent budget decision to terminate procurement after fiscal year 2008, the prospect of additional cuts because of ceilings on program cost, and upcoming defense reviews have significant implications for the program’s viability and the future of modernization efforts. In March 2004, we reported that the significant changes in the F/A-22’s cost, quantity, capabilities, and mission and the persistent problems and delays in its development and testing schedules called for a new business case to justify the continued need for the F/A-22. New JSF Business Case and Acquisition Strategy Is Critical for Program Success
Unlike the F/A-22 program, which is near the end of development, the JSF program is approaching key investment decisions that will greatly influence the efficiency of the remaining funding—-over 90 percent of the $245 billion estimated total program costs—-and determine the risk DOD is willing to accept. DOD has not been able to deliver on its initial promise, and the sizable investment greatly raises the stakes to meet future promises. Given continuing program uncertainties, DOD could use more time to gain knowledge before it commits to a new business case and moves forward. Any new business case must be accompanied by an acquisition strategy that adopts an evolutionary approach to product development—one that enables knowledge-based decisions to maximize the return on remaining dollars—as dictated by best practices. The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF has increased by over 80 percent. At the same time, procurement quantities have been reduced by 535 aircraft and the delivery of operational aircraft has been delayed. The program plans to have a more comprehensive cost estimate in the spring of 2005. Implications for the Current Status of Tactical Aircraft Programs
Continuing changes and uncertainties in the F/A-22 and JSF programs present significant challenges to DOD in achieving its modernization plans which attempt to blend many factors within affordability constraints. The reduced F/A-22 force size, now fewer than 180 F/A-22 aircraft instead of 750 aircraft planned at the start of the program, could affect the Air Force’s force structure and employment strategy. The upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review provides an opportunity for DOD to assess tactical fixed wing aircraft modernization plans and weigh options for accomplishing its specific as well as overarching tactical aircraft goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)--two of the Department of Defense's (DOD) major tactical aircraft fighter programs--are intended to replace aging tactical fighter aircraft with highly advanced, stealthy aircraft. The two programs combined have a potential future investment of more than $240 billion. Later this month, GAO plans to issue comprehensive reports on the numerous setbacks each of these programs has experienced since they were initiated and their effect on the F/A-22 and JSF business cases. This testimony highlights key concerns in the F/A-22 and JSF programs and discusses the implications of these concerns on DOD's overall investment strategy for modernizing its tactical fixed wing aircraft.
What GAO Found
Significant changes in the F/A-22 program have severely weakened its original business case. Since the F/A-22 program began in 1986, new threats emerged and mission requirements changed; to keep the F/A-22 viable, the Air Force has planned for large investments in new capabilities. Significant delays and cost increases have affected affordability, reducing planned deliveries from 750 F/A-22 aircraft to fewer than 180. The recent budget decision to terminate procurement of the F/A-22 after fiscal year 2008 and the prospect of additional funding cuts also have significant implications for the program's viability and modernization efforts. JSF's original business case, established when the program began in 1996, is unexecutable. The cost estimate to develop the aircraft has increased 80 percent, operational capability has been pushed out 2 years, and expected acquisition quantities have been cut by 535 aircraft. The JSF program is approaching key investment decisions that will greatly influence the efficiency of the remaining funding--over 90 percent of the $245 billion estimated total program costs. This sizable investment greatly raises the stakes to meet future promises. While DOD has been working to resolve early design and performance problems, continuing program uncertainties suggest DOD could use more time to gain knowledge before it commits to a new business case and moves forward. To reduce the risk of further cost and schedule growth, any new business case must include an acquisition strategy that adopts an evolutionary, knowledge-based approach to product development. Currently, the JSF program plans to make key production decisions before critical knowledge is captured. Taken together, the status and problems in these two programs have broader implications for the DOD tactical fixed wing aircraft modernization program, raising questions as to whether its overarching goals to reduce average aircraft age and ownership costs while maintaining the force structure are now achievable. The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review provides an opportunity for DOD to assess needs and plans and to weigh options for accomplishing its tactical aircraft goals. |
gao_GAO-11-701 | gao_GAO-11-701_0 | Reported Practices for Overseeing Premium Rates, as Well as Outcomes of Rate Reviews, Varied across States in 2010
Through our survey and interviews with state officials, we found that oversight of health insurance premium rates—primarily reviewing and approving or disapproving rate filings submitted by carriers—varied across states in 2010. While Nearly All State Officials Reported Reviewing Premium Rates in 2010, the Timing of Reviews, Information Reviewed, and Extent of Consumer Involvement in Reviews Varied
Nearly all—48 out of 50—of the state officials who responded to our survey reported that they reviewed rate filings in 2010. Specifically, the practices reported by state insurance officials varied in terms of (1) the timing of rate filing reviews—whether rate filings were reviewed before or after the rates took effect, (2) the information considered during reviews, and (3) opportunities for consumer involvement in rate reviews. Respondents from 38 states reported that all rate filings they reviewed were reviewed before the rates took effect, while respondents from 8 states reported reviewing at least some rate filings after the rates went into effect. In contrast, fewer than half of state survey respondents reported reviewing carrier capital levels compared with states’ minimum requirements or compared with an upper threshold. Some survey respondents also reported conducting relatively more comprehensive reviews and analyses of rate filings, while other respondents reported reviewing relatively little information or conducting cursory reviews of the information they received. Survey respondents from eight states reported that they provided consumers with opportunities to participate in public comment periods for premium rates in 2010. Specifically, survey respondents from 5 of these states—Connecticut, Iowa, New York, North Dakota, and Utah—reported that over 50 percent of the rate filings they reviewed in 2010 were disapproved, withdrawn, or resulted in rates lower than originally proposed, while survey respondents from 13 of these states reported that these outcomes occurred in less than 10 percent of rate reviews. State Officials Reported Taking Steps to Improve Processes, Increase Capacity, and Obtain Additional Legislative Authority to Oversee Premium Rates
Our survey of state insurance department officials found that 41 respondents from states that were awarded Cycle I HHS rate review grants have begun making three types of changes in order to enhance their states’ abilities to oversee health insurance premium rates. Twenty-two survey respondents reported taking steps to either review their existing rate review processes or develop new processes. Over two-thirds of the state survey respondents that reported making changes to rate oversight reported that they have begun to make changes to increase their capacity to oversee premium rates. These reported changes consisted primarily of hiring staff or outside actuaries, and improving the information technology systems used to collect and analyze rate filing data. More than a third of state survey respondents that reported making changes to rate oversight reported that their states have taken steps—such as introducing or passing legislation—in order to obtain additional legislative authority for overseeing health insurance premium rates. HHS and NAIC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its written comments, HHS also noted the steps it is taking to improve transparency, help states improve their health insurance rate review, and assure consumers that any premium increases are being spent on medical care. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) states’ practices for overseeing health insurance premium rates in 2010, including the outcomes of premium rate reviews, and (2) changes that states that received Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) rate review grants have begun making to enhance their oversight of health insurance premium rates. Appendix II: Additional Results from Our Survey on State Oversight of Health Insurance Premium Rates
This appendix presents additional results from our survey of insurance department officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia on their oversight of health insurance premium rates in 2010, and changes they have begun to make to enhance their oversight of health insurance premium rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
With premiums increasing for private health insurance, questions have been raised about the extent to which increases are justified. Oversight of the private health insurance industry is primarily the responsibility of states. In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to award grants to assist states in their oversight of premium rates. GAO was asked to provide information on state oversight of premium rates. In this report, GAO describes (1) states' practices for overseeing health insurance premium rates in 2010, including the outcomes of premium rate reviews; and (2) changes that states that received HHS rate review grants have begun making to enhance their oversight of premium rates. GAO surveyed officials from insurance departments in 50 states and the District of Columbia (referred to as states) about their practices for overseeing premium rates in 2010 and changes they have begun making to enhance their oversight. GAO received responses from all but one state. GAO also interviewed officials from California, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, and Texas to gather additional information on state practices. GAO selected these states based on differences in their authority to oversee premium rates, and proposed changes to their oversight, their size, and their geographic location. GAO also interviewed officials from advocacy groups and two large carriers to obtain contextual information.
What GAO Found
GAO found that oversight of health insurance premium rates--primarily reviewing and approving or disapproving rate filings submitted by carriers--varied across states in 2010. While nearly all--48 out of 50--of the state officials who responded to GAO's survey reported that they reviewed rate filings in 2010, the practices reported by state insurance officials varied in terms of the timing of rate filing reviews, the information considered in reviews, and opportunities for consumer involvement in rate reviews. Specifically, respondents from 38 states reported that all rate filings reviewed were reviewed before the rates took effect, while other respondents reported reviewing at least some rate filings after they went into effect. Survey respondents also varied in the types of information they reported reviewing. While nearly all survey respondents reported reviewing information such as trends in medical costs and services, fewer than half of respondents reported reviewing carrier capital levels compared with state minimums. Some survey respondents also reported conducting comprehensive reviews of rate filings, while others reported reviewing little information or conducting cursory reviews. In addition, while 14 survey respondents reported providing consumers with opportunities to be involved in premium rate oversight, such as participation in rate review hearings or public comment periods, most did not. Finally, the outcomes of states' reviews of rate filings varied across states in 2010. Specifically, survey respondents from 5 states reported that over 50 percent of the rate filings they reviewed in 2010 were disapproved, withdrawn, or resulted in rates lower than originally proposed, while survey respondents from 19 states reported that these outcomes occurred from their rate reviews less than 10 percent of the time. GAO's survey of state insurance department officials found that 41 respondents from states that were awarded HHS rate review grants reported that they have begun making changes in order to enhance their states' abilities to oversee health insurance premium rates. For example, about half of these respondents reported taking steps to either review their existing rate review processes or develop new processes. In addition, over two-thirds reported that they have begun to make changes to increase their capacity to oversee premium rates, including hiring staff or outside actuaries, and improving the information technology systems used to collect and analyze rate filing data. Finally, more than a third reported that their states have taken steps--such as introducing or passing legislation--in order to obtain additional legislative authority for overseeing health insurance premium rates. HHS and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) reviewed a draft of this report. In its written comments, HHS highlighted the steps it is taking to improve transparency, help states improve their health insurance rate review, and assure consumers that any premium increases are being spent on medical care. HHS and NAIC provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-241 | gao_GAO-04-241_0 | The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also took steps to allow telephone and electric companies to enter the subscription television market. Unlike local telephone and cable television companies, which are adapting their existing networks to provide additional services, and other entrants that focus on providing service in one communications market, broadband service providers focus on a core business strategy of building a new fiber-optic network over which they can provide local telephone, subscription television, and high-speed Internet services. Additionally, a common goal is to have most of their subscribers purchase more than one of the three offered services. Consumers Benefited from Lower Prices for Telecommunications Services in the 6 Markets With BSPs That We Reviewed
Rates were generally lower for the subscription television, high-speed Internet, and local telephone services in the 6 markets we examined with a BSP present than in the 6 markets that did not have BSP competition. The extent to which rates were lower for one local phone line in BSP markets compared to their matched market varied considerably: rates were 4 to 33 percent lower in 5 of the 6 markets with a BSP we reviewed, and the rates for local telephone service were the same in 1 of the matched-pair markets we reviewed. All 6 of the BSPs we interviewed mentioned the size of the market as a key factor that they considered in market selection. Four of the 6 BSPs we spoke with stated that the average household income in a market was a key criterion in their decisions about what markets to enter. Five of the 6 case study markets that do not have a BSP competitor had companies express interest in entering their cities, but, according to local government officials, these companies decided not to enter for several reasons. BSPs we interviewed said that certain factors, such as difficulty in gaining access to certain programming, can create obstacles to their ability to compete effectively. BSPs May Have Underestimated the Level of Competition in Telecommunications Markets
One of the most significant factors that may hinder the BSP’s marketing success is that the communications markets BSPs seek to serve may be more competitive today than these providers envisioned when they first developed their plans. None of the 6 BSPs we studied are aggressively expanding their operations. The FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated. Industry Association Comments and Our Evaluation
We also invited representatives from the Broadband Service Provider Association (BSPA), the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors (NATOA), the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA), and the United States Telecom Association (USTA) to review and comment on a draft of this report. The USTA did not provide any comments. However, as stated in the report, our BSP sample represents more than 20 percent of the households nationwide that are in areas where BSPs currently offer the three-service package. In particular, this report provides information on (1) BSPs’ business strategy; (2) the impact of BSPs’ market entry on incumbent cable and telephone companies’ market behavior and consumer prices of subscription television, high-speed Internet, and local telephone services; (3) the key factors BSPs consider when making decisions about which local markets to enter; and (4) the success of BSPs in attaining subscribership and any key factors that may limit their success. However, because we used a case-study method, our results are not generalizable to all markets with such providers. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the primary purposes of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to promote competition in telecommunication markets, but wire-based competition has not developed as fully as expected. However, a new kind of entrant, called broadband service providers (BSP), offers an alternative wire- based option for local telephone, subscription television, and high- speed Internet services to consumers in the markets they have chosen to enter. This report provides information on (1) BSPs' business strategy, (2) the impact of BSPs' market entry on incumbent companies' behavior and consumer prices for telecommunications services, (3) the key factors that BSPs consider when making decisions about which local markets to enter, and (4) the success of BSPs in attaining subscribership and any key factors that may limit their success. We developed a case-study approach to compare 6 cities where a BSP has been operating for at least 1 year with 6 similar cities that do not have such a competitor. The 6 markets with a BSP presently account for more than 20 percent of the households nationwide that are in areas where BSPs currently offer the three-service package, but the results of these case studies are not generalizable to all markets.
What GAO Found
BSPs' primary business strategy is to build a fiber-optic network to provide consumers with a bundle of services, including subscription television, high-speed Internet access, and local telephone. To entice consumers to purchase more than one service of the three services they offer--a key marketing goal--all of the BSPs we reviewed offer substantial savings to consumers who buy more than one service. The rates for telecommunications services were generally lower in the 6 markets with BSPs than in the 6 markets without a BSP. For example, expanded basic cable television rates were 15 to 41 percent lower in 5 of the 6 markets with a BSP when compared with their matched market. The 6 BSPs we interviewed said that demographic factors, such as city size, income, and computer use were important factors in their decision to enter a market. For example, most of the BSPs avoided entering large cities. Location of the markets to key facilities and receptivity of local government officials were also considered when deciding which markets to enter. The 6 BSPs we interviewed have gained significant market shares for the services they provide, but they have also faced a number of obstacles that may be hindering their success. For example, the BSPs we spoke with are experiencing some financial difficulties and are putting off network expansion. Two of these companies also currently lack the resources necessary to adequately market their services within their existing markets. We provided a draft of this report to the FCC and DOJ. The DOJ did not provide any comments, and FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated. We invited the Broadband Service Provider Association, the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Administrators, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA), and the United States Telecom Association to comment on a draft of this report. We summarize and discuss NCTA's detailed comments in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-312 | gao_GAO-15-312_0 | In states that chose not to expand Medicaid, the minimum income level for individuals to qualify for APTC and cost-sharing subsidies is 100 percent of the FPL, as specified in PPACA, assuming the state’s As of January Medicaid eligibility threshold is at or below this level.2015, 27 states and the District of Columbia opted to expand Medicaid under PPACA. Early Evidence Suggests That While the APTC Likely Contributed to an Expansion of Coverage, the Small Employer Tax Credit Has Had Little Effect
Early evidence suggests that the APTC likely contributed to an expansion of health insurance coverage because it significantly reduced the cost of premiums for those eligible, though there are limitations to measuring the effects of the APTC using currently available data. For example, one study found that the rate of uninsured among individuals with household incomes between 139 and 400 percent of the FPL fell 9 percentage points between January 1, 2012, and June 30, 2014, in Medicaid expansion states. This expansion in health insurance coverage is likely partially a result of the APTC having reduced the cost of health insurance premiums for those deemed eligible. Among those who selected a plan through 1 of the 34 federally facilitated exchanges or the 2 state-based exchanges that used the federal website for enrollment in 2014 and were deemed eligible for the APTC (4.7 million individuals), the APTC reduced premiums by 76 percent, on average (see table 4). As of January 2015, data were not available on the extent to which the APTC reduced 2015 premiums for enrollees. Studies that examined changes in premiums between 2014 and 2015 found that, on average, premiums changed modestly. While Most Nonelderly Adults Had Access to Affordable Health Insurance Coverage, Maintaining Minimum Essential Coverage May Be Challenging for Some
Most nonelderly adults had access to affordable minimum essential coverage through their employer, Medicaid, the exchanges, or other sources, although about 16 percent of nonelderly adults remained uninsured as of March 2014. While there are many reasons people remain uninsured, some—including certain families or individuals not eligible for the APTC—may not have access to affordable coverage. Regardless of the affordability of premiums, some may face challenges in maintaining their insurance. Some Individuals without Affordable ESI Who Are Not Financially Eligible for the APTC
Some nonelderly adults who lack access to affordable coverage elsewhere, such as through an employer, and instead shop for health insurance coverage on the individual exchanges may find this insurance unaffordable without financial assistance from the APTC—those with household incomes greater than 400 percent of the FPL. Based on nine household scenarios we examined, the affordability of the lowest-cost bronze plans available varied across different demographic subsets in the United States, for example: Individual age 60-years-old: A 60-year-old individual with household income at 450 percent of the FPL would have had to spend greater than 8 percent of their household income for the lowest-cost bronze plan in most (84 percent) of the 501 rating areas in the United States. Individual age 27-years-old: The lowest-cost bronze plan would have been considered affordable in all but one rating area for a 27-year-old with income too high to receive the APTC. For example, a change in employment status can affect eligibility for ESI, the most common form of insurance for the nonelderly. Concluding Observations
This report provides an early look at the effect of the tax credits and affordability of health insurance under PPACA, finding that evidence suggests that the APTC likely contributed to an expansion of health insurance coverage because it significantly reduced the cost of premiums for those eligible. As a result, it is important to note that our findings about the first year of the exchanges cannot be generalized to future years. Agency Comments
We received technical comments on a draft of this report from HHS and IRS and incorporated them as appropriate. Among these studies, we identified summary results from three surveys that estimated the change in the rate of uninsured nonelderly adults between 2013 and 2014 by household income amounts comparable to APTC eligibility limits. We interviewed a range of experts to explore what is known about the effects of the APTC and the small employer tax credit on health insurance coverage and what is known about the extent to which health benefit plans are available and individuals are able to maintain minimum essential coverage, as well as what is known about the potential effects of changing the ESI affordability threshold. We asked experts at 11 research and industry organizations, in addition to officials at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), about their work related to the potential effect of tax credits on health insurance coverage, the types of individuals that may have more or less difficulty maintaining minimum essential coverage, and the potential effects on employers, employees, and federal costs of changing the ESI affordability threshold (we did not ask every question of every expert). | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of uninsured individuals and the rising cost of health insurance have been long-standing issues. PPACA mandated that most individuals have health insurance that provides minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty. To make health insurance more affordable and expand access, PPACA created the APTC to subsidize the cost of exchange plans' premiums for those eligible. PPACA used two standards for defining affordability of health insurance: 8 percent of household income for the purposes of minimum essential coverage and 9.5 percent for APTC eligibility for individuals offered employer-sponsored plans.
PPACA mandated that GAO review the affordability of health insurance coverage. GAO examined (1) what is known about the effects of the APTC and (2) the extent to which affordable health benefits plans are available and individuals are able to maintain minimum essential coverage. GAO conducted a structured literature search to identify studies on the rate of uninsured individuals, among other topics, and interviewed experts from HHS, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and 11 research and industry organizations to understand factors affecting affordability. GAO also analyzed the variation in the affordability of exchange plan premiums nationwide using 2014 data—the most recent data available at the time of GAO's analysis.
GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from HHS and IRS and incorporated them as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Early evidence suggests that the advance premium tax credit (APTC)—the refundable tax credit that can be paid on an advance basis—likely contributed to an expansion of health insurance coverage in 2014 because it significantly reduced the cost of exchange plans' premiums for those eligible. Although there are limitations to measuring the effects of the APTC using currently available data, surveys GAO identified estimated that the uninsured rate declined significantly among households with incomes eligible for the APTC. For example, one survey found that the rate of uninsured among individuals with household incomes that make them financially eligible for the APTC fell 5.2 percentage points between September 2013 and September 2014.This expansion in health insurance coverage is likely partially a result of the APTC having reduced the cost of health insurance premiums for those eligible. Among those eligible for the APTC who the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) initially reported selected a plan through a federally facilitated exchange or one of two state-based exchanges, the APTC reduced premiums by 76 percent, on average. As of January 2015, data were not yet available on the extent to which the APTC reduced 2015 premiums, although studies have found that, on average, premiums (before applying the APTC) changed only modestly from 2014 to 2015, though some areas saw significant increases or decreases.
Most nonelderly adults had access to affordable health benefits plans—as defined by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)—but some may face challenges maintaining coverage. Most nonelderly adults had access to affordable plans through their employer, Medicaid, the exchanges, or other sources as of March 2014, although about 16 percent of nonelderly adults remained uninsured. While there are many reasons people remain uninsured, some people may not have access to affordable coverage, including (1) low-income nonelderly adults—those with household income below 100 percent of the federal poverty level—who live in one of the 23 states that chose not to expand Medicaid and (2) some nonelderly adults who do not have affordable employer-sponsored insurance and who were not eligible for the APTC. For those with incomes too high to qualify for the APTC, the affordability of health insurance coverage available in the individual exchanges in 2014 varied by age, household size, income, and location. For example, a 60-year-old with an income of 450 percent of the federal poverty level would have had to spend more than 8 percent of their household income for the lowest-cost plan in 84 percent of all health insurance rating areas in the United States, but a 27-year-old had access to an affordable plan in all but one. Regardless of the affordability of premiums, some may face challenges in maintaining coverage that qualifies under PPACA as minimum essential coverage; for example, changes in income can result in changes in APTC eligibility.
This report provides an early look at the effect of the APTC and the affordability of health insurance under PPACA. However, it is important to note that these findings about the first year of the exchanges cannot be generalized to future years. Numerous factors, including additional data and changes in trends in health care costs, could affect the affordability of health insurance going forward. |
gao_GAO-04-533T | gao_GAO-04-533T_0 | Regulators Are Taking Actions to Address Abusive Mutual Fund Practices
In reaction to allegations of widespread misconduct and abusive practices involving mutual funds, regulators have responded with various proposals. In September 2003, SEC sought information from fund advisers and broker-dealers about their pricing of mutual fund orders and late trading policies. Another abuse that has come to light is known as market timing. Additional abusive practices associated with mutual funds have also come to light. Since many of the cases of late trading involved orders submitted through intermediaries, including banks and pension plans not regulated by SEC, the proposed amendments to its rules would require that orders to purchase or redeem mutual fund shares be received by a fund, its transfer agent, or a registered clearing agency before the time of pricing (that is, 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time). Because the hard close could affect some investors’ ability to trade at the current day’s price, some groups have called on SEC to allow industry participants to develop systems of internal controls that would serve to ensure that intermediaries receive individual orders before 4:00 p.m. With such controls in place, these orders could continue to be processed after this time. SEC is also proposing to take actions to address market timing. SEC’s proposal to address late trading with a hard 4:00 p.m. close appears, in the short-term, to be the solution that provides the most certainty that all orders being submitted to the funds legitimately deserve that day’s price. We also commend SEC for proposing to require that mutual funds more fully disclose their market timing and portfolio disclosure policies. However, such disclosures would likely also require improving related investor education programs to better ensure that investors understand the importance of these new disclosures. Regulators Are Taking Actions to Improve the Effectiveness of Mutual Fund Boards of Directors
Mutual fund boards of directors have a responsibility to protect shareholder interests and SEC has issued various proposals to increase the effectiveness of these bodies. These rules are designed to protect investors by ensuring that all funds and advisers have internal programs to enhance compliance with federal securities laws. To further ensure that board members are truly independent, we would support the Congress giving SEC rulemaking authority to specify the types of persons who qualify as “interested persons.” Having compliance officers report to fund boards and having advisers implement codes of ethics should also provide additional tools to hold fund advisers and boards accountable for ensuring that all fund activities are conducted in compliance with legal requirements and with integrity. Specifically, SEC is seeking comments on how to revise a rule that allows mutual funds to deduct fees to pay for the marketing and sale of fund shares. In addition, to address a practice that raises potential conflicts of interest between broker-dealers and their customers, SEC and NASD have also proposed rules that would require broker-dealers to disclose revenue sharing payments that fund advisers make to broker-dealers to compensate them for selling fund shares. We support this action as a means of better ensuring that fund advisers choose broker-dealers based on their ability to effectively execute trades and not for other reasons. Although SEC has taken some actions, we believe that additional steps could be taken to provide further benefits to investors by increasing the transparency of certain mutual fund practices and enhancing competition among funds on the basis of the fees that are charged to shareholders. Soft Dollar Arrangements Provide Benefits, but Could Adversely Impact Investors
Soft dollar arrangements allow fund investment advisers to obtain research and brokerage services that could potentially benefit fund investors but also increase investor costs. Regulators in other countries and other industries have acted to address the conflicts created by soft dollars. To address concerns over soft dollars, our June 2003 report recommends that SEC evaluate ways to provide additional information to fund directors and investors on their fund advisers’ use of soft dollars. As such, an enhanced investor education campaign would also likely be warranted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 2003, widespread allegations of abusive practices involving mutual funds have come to light. An abuse called late trading allowed some investors, at times in collusion with pension plan intermediary, broker-dealer, or fund adviser staff, to profit at other investors' expense by submitting orders for fund shares to receive that day's price after the legal cutoff. Other investors were allowed to conduct market timing trades to take advantage of stale prices used by funds to calculate their net asset values at funds with stated policies against such trading. SEC and other regulators have responded with numerous proposals for new or revised practices. Based on a body of work that GAO has conducted involving mutual funds, GAO analyzed and provides views on proposed and final rules involving (1) fund pricing and compliance practices intended to address various mutual fund trading abuses that have come to light recently, (2) fund boards' independence and effectiveness, (3) fund adviser compensation of broker-dealers that sell fund shares, and (4) additional actions regulators could take to further improve transparency and investor understanding of the fees they pay.
What GAO Found
GAO commends SEC and other regulators for their swift regulatory response to recently revealed abusive mutual fund practices. However, some proposed actions need to be thoroughly assessed to ensure equitable treatment for all investors and others will need to be reinforced with enhanced compliance, enforcement, and investor education programs to be truly effective. In particular, to prevent further late trading, SEC has proposed that all mutual fund orders be received by funds or designated processors by 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time, but this action may unfairly impact some retail investors that place orders through financial intermediaries. Although GAO supports in the short run the proposed hard 4:00 p.m. close as a way of increasing the certainty that all orders have been legitimately received, GAO believes that SEC should continue to work with industry participants, including pension plan intermediaries, to address concerns that the hard close would adversely affect investors that use such intermediaries. To address market timing, SEC is proposing that funds make greater disclosure of market timing, securities pricing, and portfolio disclosure policies. GAO supports these steps and encourages regulators to educate investors about the importance of such disclosures. To improve mutual fund corporate governance and oversight, SEC has also proposed increasing the proportion of independent directors to 75 percent and to require independent chairs. SEC is also proposing that fund advisers appoint compliance officers that report to fund boards. GAO sees these actions as giving increased prominence to independent members on fund boards of directors and providing them with additional tools to effectively oversee fund practices. However, additional actions may be needed to ensure that independent directors have no relationships with the fund adviser or its personnel that could impair their independence. SEC and other regulators have also proposed that the broker-dealers that sell fund shares make more extensive disclosures about payments they receive from fund advisers. SEC is also seeking comments on how to revise the fees they charge investors that also compensate broker-dealers for selling fund shares. GAO supports these actions as increasing the transparency of these costs to investors but recognizes that the effectiveness of these proposals could be enhanced by expanded compliance and investor education programs. SEC is also seeking information on how fund advisers use investor dollars to obtain research under a practice called soft dollars. Given the increased spotlight that Congress and regulators are placing on the mutual fund industry, GAO believes the time is right to more effectively address the conflicts of interest created by soft-dollar arrangements. In addition, GAO identifies further actions that could be taken to improve disclosure of mutual fund fees to enhance competition among funds on the basis of the fees that are charged to shareholders. |
gao_AIMD-99-53 | gao_AIMD-99-53_0 | The projects are directed at improving systems, enhancing the accuracy and completeness of Interior’s data regarding the ownership and lease of Indian lands, and correcting deficiencies with respect to records management, training, policy and procedures, and internal controls within 3 years. Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess whether Interior has reasonable assurance that (1) the High Level Plan provides an effective solution for addressing long-standing problems with Interior’s Indian trust responsibilities and (2) its acquisition of a new asset and land records management service will cost effectively satisfy trust management needs. To determine whether Interior has reasonable assurance that the High Level Plan provides an effective solution for addressing Interior’s long- standing problems with its Indian trust responsibilities, we reviewed the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and current technical literature as a basis for assessing the information technology aspects of the High-Level Plan; reviewed the process that was used to develop the plan; reviewed the Strategic Plan that was produced by Interior’s Special Trustee for American Indians; met with senior Interior officials responsible for developing the plan, including Interior’s Chief Information Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Deputy Special Trustee, and the Interior contractor who assisted in the development of the plan; and analyzed the High Level Plan for internal consistency and compliance with generally accepted best practices. Specifically, Interior did not adequately define important service requirements or sufficiently analyze technical alternatives. Further, Interior did not develop an overall risk management plan, require the contractor to demonstrate its system could work with Interior’s data and systems, or establish realistic project time frames. First, Interior did not develop a risk management plan. As a result, Interior will not know whether the contractor’s system can interoperate with its legacy systems. Because it did not establish clear requirements and did not take critical steps to manage risk effectively, Interior has no assurance that the new asset and land records management service will meet its specific performance, security, and data management needs or that the service can be delivered on schedule and within budget. Conclusions
Interior cannot realistically expect to develop compatible and optimal information systems without first developing an information systems architecture for Indian trust operations. Interior also disagrees with the report’s second conclusion that Interior does not have reasonable assurance that its acquisition of the new asset and land records management (TAAMS/LRIS) service will cost effectively satisfy trust management needs. Interior then describes several actions which it feels minimizes acquisition risk. GAO Comments
1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of the Interior's High-Level Implementation Plan for improving its management of the Indian trust funds and resources under its control, focusing on whether the Interior has reasonable assurance that: (1) the High-Level Plan provides an effective solution for addressing its long-standing problems; and (2) its acquisition of a new asset and land records management service will cost effectively satisfy trust management needs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Interior does not have reasonable assurance that its High-Level Plan for improving Indian trust operations provides an effective solution for addressing long-standing management weaknesses; (2) the plan: (a) recognizes the severity of long-standing weaknesses in managing trust fund assets; (b) identifies 13 projects intended to improve information systems, enhance the accuracy and completeness of its data regarding the ownership and lease of Indian lands, and address deficiencies with respect to records management, training, policy and procedures, and internal controls; and (c) assigns responsibility for oversight and management of the 13 projects; (3) however, Interior has not properly analyzed its information technology needs which are essential to the overall success of the plan; (4) until Interior develops an information systems architecture addressing all of its trust management functions, it cannot ensure that its information systems will not be duplicative or incompatible or will optimally support its needs across all business areas; (5) Interior also does not know whether its acquisition of a new service for managing Indian assets and land records will cost-effectively meet trust management needs; (6) before deciding to contract with a service vendor, Interior did not adequately define important service requirements or sufficiently analyze technical alternatives; (7) Interior also did not take the steps needed to minimize acquisition risks; (8) in particular, it did not develop a risk management plan, ensure that the vendor's system could work with Interior's data and systems, or establish realistic project timeframes; and (9) thus, Interior faces an unnecessarily high risk that the service will not meet its general business and specific performance needs, and it lacks the means for dealing with this risk. |
gao_GAO-11-907 | gao_GAO-11-907_0 | Public Financial Management Roadmap to Improve Afghan Government Capacity
In July 2010, the Afghan government published a plan, called the Public Financial Management Roadmap, to strengthen the Afghan government’s performance in three key areas at the national and provincial level: budget formulation, budget execution, and accountability and transparency of financial management. Various U.S. Agency Efforts Support Afghanistan’s PFM Capacity-Building Goals
USAID, Treasury, and DOD support the Roadmap goals through various activities such as (1) USAID projects that provide technical assistance and training to Afghan civil servants, (2) Treasury advisers’ assistance to MOF, and (3) DOD’s mentoring and coaching assistance through CSTC- A to MOD and MOI. USAID provides training and technical assistance mainly through two contractor-implemented projects. Treasury provides technical assistance through 6 advisers in MOF, who work with senior officials on issues such as budget execution. Through CSTC-A, DOD has 22 advisers at MOD and MOI, who advise officials on developing their budgets and strengthening the payroll system to improve accuracy. USAID Provides Technical Assistance and Training to Afghan Civilian Ministries
USAID is funding several projects that provide training, mentoring and coaching, and technical assistance that address Roadmap goals. Results of U.S. Efforts to Improve Afghanistan’s PFM Capacity Cannot Be Fully Determined
The overall results of U.S. efforts cannot be fully determined because (1) U.S. agencies providing PFM capacity assistance to the Afghan government have reported mixed results of their efforts, and (2) weaknesses in USAID’s performance management plans and frameworks, such as lack of performance targets and data, prevent reliable assessments of USAID’s results. USAID’s evaluations of its two primary PFM projects indicate that some activities were successfully completed, while others were terminated because their usefulness was questionable. Additionally, CSTC-A reported that while MOD has progressed to being able to perform critical financial-management functions with minimal coalition support, MOI continues to rely on coalition support for these functions. It provided training in five core subjects, including financial management and procurement. For the period October 2009 to September 2010, Treasury advisers assessed that although their assistance related to budget and financial management at MOF had a positive effect, the results were less than what they were trying to accomplish. The time frames for MOI to reach interim and final goals have also been revised. For example, one of the indicators, “Percent increase in standardized Public Financial Management assessment scores,” relies on baseline data for Afghan civilian ministries that is not yet available. The performance management frameworks for PFM capacity-building projects did not meet USAID guidance because of deficiencies such as a lack of baselines, targets, and performance data. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that for public financial management (PFM) efforts, the USAID Administrator take the following three actions: (1) establish targets, as required, for each PFM-related performance indicator in its Mission Performance Management Plan for Afghanistan, (2) take steps to ensure that the USAID-approved performance management plan for each implementing partner includes baseline data and targets for each indicator, and (3) ensure that implementing partners report performance data at the frequency established in the performance management plan. USAID concurred with all three recommendations and noted that it has started taking steps to address these. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) U.S. efforts to improve the Afghan government’s public financial management (PFM) capacity, including the extent to which these efforts aligned with the PFM goals identified by the Afghan government and the international community; and (2) the extent to which U.S. efforts have helped to improve the Afghan government’s PFM capacity. Departments of Defense (DOD), State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Additionally, in Kabul, we interviewed officials from other international donors providing PFM assistance, such as the World Bank and the United Kingdom, as well as Afghan government officials from organizations including the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Public Health, and the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission. Appendix IV: CSTC-A Process to Assess Ministry Capacity
The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has established a process to regularly assess and rate the capability of Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) in various areas including finance and budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has allocated over $72 billion to Afghanistan since 2002. With other international donors, it is focused on transitioning leadership to the Afghan government and has pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its development aid through the Afghan government budget. Improving Afghanistan's public financial management capacity is critical to this transition. In 2010, the Afghan government, consulting with donors, issued a Public Financial Management Roadmap (Roadmap), which outlines goals to improve Afghanistan's capacity to develop a national budget and expend funds. GAO reviewed (1) U.S. efforts to improve the Afghan government's public financial management capacity, including the extent to which they support Roadmap goals, and (2) the extent to which U.S. efforts have improved the government's capacity. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); Departments of State, Defense (DOD), and the Treasury (Treasury); World Bank; and Afghan government in Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
USAID, Treasury, and DOD support the Public Financial Management Roadmap (Roadmap) goals through various activities such as (1) USAID projects that provide technical assistance and training to Afghan civil servants, (2) Treasury advisers' assistance to the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and (3) DOD's Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) that provides support to the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI). GAO found that these efforts are aligned with the Roadmap goals. USAID provides training and technical assistance mainly through two contractor-implemented projects. One USAID project provides technical assistance to 37 civilian ministries to develop their annual budgets, while another USAID project provides training in areas such as financial management and procurement to Afghan civil servants. Treasury provides technical assistance through 6 advisers in MOF, who work with senior officials on issues such as budget execution. Through CSTC-A, DOD has 22 advisers at MOD and MOI, who advise officials on developing their budgets and strengthening the payroll system to improve accuracy. The overall extent to which U.S. efforts have improved the public financial management capacity of the Afghan government cannot be fully determined because (1) U.S. agencies have reported mixed results, and (2) weaknesses in USAID's performance management frameworks, such as lack of performance targets and data, prevent reliable assessments of its results. USAID's evaluations of its two public financial management projects indicate that some activities were successfully completed, while others were terminated because these activities were not deemed useful. Treasury advisers assessed that although their assistance at MOF had a positive effect, some results had limitations. For example, advisers assessed that their efforts to design reports for improved communication of financial information were not as successful as they had expected. Additionally, CSTC-A assessed that while MOD has made progress since 2008 and can perform critical financial management functions with minimal international support, MOI still needs significant international support for such operations. In early 2010, CSTC-A projected that MOD would transition to needing no coalition support for finance and budget functions by January 2012, and MOI would reach a similar goal by March 2012. However, in early 2011, CSTC-A extended time frames for meeting its benchmarks for MOD and MOI to March 2012 and November 2012, respectively. Regarding deficiencies in USAID's performance management framework, both the USAID Mission performance management plan and project-specific plans lack performance targets as required for each indicator related to public financial management. Additionally, implementing partners, such as contractors, have not consistently reported performance data for all indicators. Moreover, baselines for public financial management capacity of civilian ministries have not yet been established. In the absence of baselines, performance targets, and data, it is difficult to assess the extent to which USAID efforts have increased the public financial management capacity of Afghan ministries.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator take steps to (1) establish performance targets in its Mission Performance Management Plan (PMP); (2) ensure implementing partners' PMPs include baselines and approved targets; and (3) ensure implementing partners routinely report performance data. USAID concurred with GAO recommendations and is taking steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-17-431 | gao_GAO-17-431_0 | Background
Personnel from each of the services utilize a variety of PPE based on factors such as the operational environment, job description or occupation, and commander discretion. This PPE, added to the other items that personnel typically carry or wear in operational environments (weapon systems, food and water, communications equipment, and other items), cumulatively represent the total load burden on personnel. Current PPE Requirements Are Designed to Address Operational Risks but Also Contribute to the Total Load Burden on Ground Combat Personnel
Performance Parameters and Protection Standards Guide the Development of Primary PPE
The Army and the Marine Corps have developed requirements for PPE to address operational threats but these requirements contribute to the total load burden on ground combat personnel. Officials stated that the two services conducted capability and threat assessments in this theater to determine how best to mitigate threats without hindering mobility or combat effectiveness. PPE Systems Increase the Total Load Burden on Ground Combat Personnel, Which Could Hinder Combat Effectiveness
Army and Marine Corps officials we met with stated that the body armor that was fielded to meet current threats provides significant additional protection when compared with previously available equipment. However, they also noted that providing this level of protection adds significant bulk and weight to the total load on Soldiers and Marines, which could impede mobility and have other adverse effects. The primary PPE (hard armor plates, soft armor vest, and combat helmet) currently used by both Army and Marine Corps personnel averages approximately 27 pounds (for size medium equipment), and adds to the weight of other uniform items and equipment worn or carried by personnel. According to program managers we met with, the typical total load on personnel has increased since about 2003 based on the incorporation of new PPE systems and other equipment that is designed to enhance personnel performance or protection capabilities. Army and Marine Corps Have Coordinated on PPE- Related Weight Reductions and Are Pursuing Efforts to Reduce Overall Load Burdens on Personnel
Army and Marine Corps Coordinate to Develop and Improve PPE
Army and Marine Corps officials coordinate through formal and informal working groups that seek to develop and improve PPE. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps work together on the development and procurement of PPE, such as the hard armor plates and the enhanced combat helmet that meet both services’ needs. Army and Marine Corps Prioritize Protection Capabilities but Have Reduced the Weight of Some PPE and Have Plans for Additional Reductions
Army and Marine Corps program managers said that when developing or improving PPE and other equipment, they prioritize protection and operational capabilities, and that they have overarching goals of reducing weight, and improving form, fit, and function of equipment. These overarching goals have led to some improvements and reductions in the weight of some PPE. Further, in 2016 the Army began developing a goal and subsequent plan to reduce the weight of hard armor plates by 20 percent, or about 2 pounds, by identifying and eliminating excess ballistic protection parameters and potentially updating testing methodologies. The Army and Marine Corps are also pursuing other efforts to reduce the weight of PPE. According to officials with whom we met, the two services see their analyses potentially resulting in improvements to the weight, form, and function of Soldier and Marine equipment. Army and Marine Corps Are Exploring Other Research Initiatives to Reduce the Total Load Burden on Ground Combat Personnel
Army and Marine Corps researchers are exploring initiatives—such as improvements to logistics and resupply capabilities, load transfer technologies, lighter ammunition, and reduced battery usage—that may decrease the total load burden on ground combat personnel. Agency Comments
DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Army and Marine Corps ground combat personnel have long worn a variety of PPE such as vests, armor, and helmets to help protect them from operational risks. The two services have documented the advanced protection capabilities of current PPE systems, but identified that the armor contributes to the total load burden—or cumulative weight of items typically worn or carried. In addition to PPE, personnel typically carry food, water, ammunition, communications equipment, and other items.
House Report 114-537, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to review Army and Marine Corps efforts to reduce the weight of PPE and other equipment worn or carried in combat.
This report describes (1) the current operational requirements associated with PPE, and how those requirements contribute to the total load burden on Soldiers and Marines in combat environments; and (2) the coordination between the Army and the Marine Corps regarding efforts to reduce the weight of PPE and the total load burden on personnel.
GAO reviewed Army and Marine Corps documentation related to PPE, total load burden on combat personnel, and weight reduction initiatives; and interviewed service researchers and program officials.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps have developed requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE) to address operational threats in ground combat environments, but this PPE has increased in weight over time and has added to the total load burden on personnel. PPE primarily consists of hard armor plates, soft armor plate carrier vests, and combat helmets. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that the PPE provides significant additional protection when compared with equipment used prior to operations in Iraq in the 2000s. However, they also noted that providing this level of protection adds significant bulk and weight to the total load on Soldiers and Marines, which could impede mobility and hinder combat effectiveness. According to service-provided data, the typical total load in 2016 for Army and Marine Corps ground combat personnel averaged about 119 and 117 pounds, respectively, of which the primary PPE represented about 27 pounds based on equipment sizes (see figure). Officials stated that these totals have increased over time based on the incorporation of new PPE and other equipment.
Recognizing that the weight of PPE and other equipment could have negative effects on personnel performance, the Army and the Marine Corps have coordinated and developed goals for PPE-related weight reductions and are pursuing some efforts to reduce overall load burdens on personnel. The two services coordinate through formal working groups and informal methods to develop and improve PPE. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that while they prioritize protection and operational capabilities when developing PPE, they have overarching goals of reducing weight, in addition to improving the form, fit, and function of equipment. These goals have led to reductions in the weight of some PPE. The Army is also developing a goal and plan to reduce the weight of hard armor plates by 20 percent by identifying and eliminating excess ballistic protection. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps are pursuing other efforts to reduce the weight of PPE, such as by giving commanders the option to employ varying levels of PPE at their discretion and studying the effects of integrating PPE with overall combat loads. Finally, the Army and Marine Corps are exploring research initiatives that may reduce the total load on ground combat personnel, such as improvements to logistics and aerial delivery capabilities, load transferring systems, and other enhancements to equipment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-111 | gao_T-AIMD-96-111_0 | As you requested, we also assessed Interior’s trust fund management improvement initiatives. BIA provided a report package to each tribe on its reconciliation results in January, 1996. In addition, BIA’s reconciliation report package did not disclose known limitations in the scope and methodology used for the reconciliation process. Secretary’s Report on Reconciliation Results
The American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994 required that the Secretary of the Interior report to the House Committee on Resources and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs by May 31, 1996, including a description of the methodology used in reconciling trust fund accounts and the tribes’ conclusions as to whether the reconciliation represents as full and complete an accounting of their funds as possible. According to the Secretary’s May 31, 1996, report
3 tribes, including 2 tribes for which additional pilot reconciliation procedures were performed, have disputed their reconciled account balances;
2 tribes with nominal balances have accepted their reconciled account
275 tribes, including 3 tribes that had additional pilot reconciliation procedures performed, have not yet decided whether to accept or dispute their account balances. BIA has not yet developed a comprehensive set of policies and procedures for trust fund management. Further, BIA and OTFM have not yet performed an adequate user needs assessment; explored the costs and benefits of systems options and alternatives; or developed a systems architecture as a framework for integrating trust fund accounting, land and lease ownership, and other trust fund and asset management systems. Because it is planned that LRIS will provide a BIA link to Interior’s core Automated Land Records Management System (ALMRS), a comprehensive strategic plan would need to consider the merits of LRIS in determining how trust ownership and accounting information needs can best be addressed. A legislated settlement process could be used to resolve questions about tribal account balances. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of the Interior's management of Indian trust funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has completed its reconciliation of trust fund accounts, but the accounts could not be fully reconciled due to missing records and the lack of an audit trail; (2) the January 1996 BIA report to the tribes did not explain limitations in scope and methodologies used for the reconciliation process; (3) two tribes have accepted their reconciliation results, three tribes are disputing their results, and the remaining 275 tribes have not yet decided whether to accept or dispute their reconciliation results; (4) if Interior cannot resolve the tribes' concerns, the disputes can be resolved through a legislated settlement process; (5) Interior's trust fund management improvements will take several years to complete; (6) although BIA is replacing its inadequate management and accounting systems, it has not developed systems requirements to ensure that the new systems provide accurate information; (7) Interior has appointed a special trustee for Native Americans who has developed an outline of needed trust fund management improvements, but this outline needs to include various departmentwide options and alternatives and their associated costs and benefits to become a comprehensive strategic plan; and (8) resource constraints have limited Interior's ability to make trust fund management improvements. |
gao_GAO-01-932 | gao_GAO-01-932_0 | In 1998, FAA and the aviation community agreed to a phased approach for implementing the free flight program, established a schedule for phase 1, and created a special program office to manage this phase. FAA plans to make an investment decision in March 2002 about whether to proceed to phase 2. FAA is currently revising its computer-based training to provide more realistic simulations. FAA officials maintain that these capabilities will be deployed before the end of phase 1. However, FAA might not be in a position to make an informed decision on URET because the schedule might not allow time to collect sufficient data to fully analyze the expected benefits from this tool during phase 1. This report discusses (1) the significant technical and operational issues that could impair the ability of the free flight tools to achieve their full potential and (2) the extent to which these tools will increase efficiency and capacity while helping to minimize delays in our nation’s airspace system. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) progress on implementing the Free Flight Program, which would provide more flexibility in air traffic operations. This program would increase collaboration between FAA and the aviation community. By using a set of new automated technologies (tools) and procedures, free flight is intended to increase the capacity and efficiency of the nation's airspace system while helping to minimize delays.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the scheduled March 2002 date will be too early for FAA to make an informed investment decision about moving to phase 2 of its Free Flight Program because of significant technical and operational issues. Furthermore, FAA's schedule for deploying these tools will not allow enough time to collect enough data to fully analyze their expected benefits. Currently, FAA lacks enough data to demonstrate that these tools can be relied upon to provide accurate data. |
gao_T-RCED-98-185 | gao_T-RCED-98-185_0 | Under the act, agencies are to develop strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance reports. Specifically, we reported that HUD: had made limited progress in addressing internal control weaknesses by implementing a new management planning and control program intended to identify and rank the major risks in each program and devise strategies to abate those risks, and had reduced its material weaknesses identified under the FMFIA assessment from 51 in the early 1990s to 9. continued to make progress in improving its information and financial management systems but much work remained: Some of the projects would not be completed until the year 2000. had completed a field reorganization that eliminated its regional office structure and transferred direct authority for staff and resources to the Assistant Secretaries, and was planning additional reorganization efforts. had made some progress in addressing the problems with staff members’ skills and with resource management. In addition, we and HUD’s Inspector General continued to identify staff resource problems in HUD’s major program areas, specifically in public housing and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). 2020 Reforms Are Directed Towards Correcting Management Weaknesses
Under the HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan and related efforts, HUD is in the process of making significant changes that will affect most aspects of its operations, including the long-standing management problems and issues facing the agency. The plan calls for reducing the number of programs, reducing staffing levels, retraining the majority of the staff, reorganizing the 81 field offices, consolidating processes and functions within and across program areas into specialized centers, and modernizing and integrating the financial and management information systems. Key Implementation Issues
Several interrelated issues are particularly important for achieving the intended benefits of HUD’s management reform efforts: (1) HUD’s ability to meet planned timetables for implementing key reforms, (2) the adequacy of staffing during and after the transition to the “new HUD,” (3) the Department’s ability to reduce the numbers of troubled public housing authorities and troubled multifamily projects, and (4) HUD’s ability to effectively improve its procurement and contracting practices, including its oversight of contractors. HUD Has Linked Results Act Plans to Management Reform Efforts
The HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan appears to be the driving force behind agency operations. HUD has clearly linked its management reform efforts to the agency’s Results Act plans, so that its success in meeting annual performance goals and achieving strategic objectives depends on the success of the management reform efforts. In reviewing HUD’s strategic plan, we observed that it contained a number of legislative proposals that appeared to affect the strategic objectives but did not make clear the impact on meeting the objectives if the legislative proposals were not enacted. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed management issues concerning the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), focusing on: (1) the progress HUD has made in addressing management deficiencies and the need for additional improvement; (2) the activities under HUD's 2020 management reform and other efforts to address its deficiencies; (3) issues that GAO believes are key as HUD implements its management reforms; and (4) the relationship between HUD's reform efforts and its Government Performance and Results Act plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD has made progress in addressing problems that led to GAO's high-risk designation, but much remains to be done; (2) prior to announcing the 2020 management plan, HUD had among other things: (a) addressed internal control weaknesses by implementing a new management planning and control program and reduced the material weaknesses identified under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) assessment; (b) continued to make progress in improving its information and financial management systems; (c) completed a field reorganization that transferred direct authority for staff and resources to the Assistant Secretaries; and (d) made some progress in addressing problems with staff members' skills and with resource management; (3) however, GAO's recent work and that of the Inspector General indicate the need for continued progress in these areas; (4) under HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan and related efforts, HUD is in the process of making significant changes that will affect most aspects of its operations; (5) the plan calls for reducing the number of programs, reducing staffing, retraining the majority of the staff, reorganizing the 81 field offices, consolidating processes and functions within and across program areas into specialized centers, and modernizing and integrating the financial and management information systems; (6) several interrelated issues are particularly important for achieving the intended benefits of HUD's management reform efforts: (a) HUD's ability to meet planned timetables for implementing key reforms; (b) the adequacy of staffing during and after the transition to the new HUD; (c) the Department's ability to reduce the number of troubled public housing authorities and troubled multi-family projects; and (d) HUD's ability to effectively improve its procurement and contracting practices, including its oversight of contractors; (7) the HUD 2020 Management Reform Plan appears to be the driving force behind agency operations, and it is clearly linked to the agency's strategic and annual performance plans required by the Results Act; (8) the degree to which HUD is successful in implementing its reform efforts will influence its success in meeting its goals and objectives outlined in the strategic and annual performance plans; (9) both appear to rely in part on many of the same legislative proposals that could affect HUD's staffing needs and the attainment of strategic objectives; and (10) HUD's strategic plan could be improved by clarifying the impact on meeting objectives if the legislative proposals are not enacted. |
gao_GAO-10-849 | gao_GAO-10-849_0 | These investigations are the responsibility of OPM’s FIS division. Federal Investigative Services Conducts Background Investigations for the Federal Government
FIS conducts approximately 90 percent of all personnel background investigations for the federal government. In fiscal year 2009, FIS conducted over 2 million investigations of varying types. To supplement guidance provided by the OPM Privacy Office, FIS also has developed a Policy on the Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to provide employees, including contractors, with a description of their responsibilities in protecting PII and reporting PII breaches. OPM’s Background Investigation Process Involves Extensive Collection and Use of PII
FIS conducts background investigations using extensive amounts of PII collected from a variety of sources. These steps can be categorized into four distinct phases: (1) Questionnaire Submission, (2) Scheduling and Initiation, (3) Investigation, and (4) Review. In addition, subjects are asked to provide personal information on family members, friends, and other contacts. For example, if the investigator did not corroborate the subject’s education, the investigator may need to interview educational sources. However, it has not assessed the risks associated with the use of PII, an important element of conducting a privacy impact assessment. In addition, while FIS policies and practices for conducting investigations generally align with the Fair Information Practices, the agency has exercised only limited oversight of the use of PII by its field investigators and customer agencies. As described earlier, a PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. FIS Oversight of the Implementation of Privacy Protections is Limited
Although FIS has established a number of privacy protection measures for its investigations program that reflect the Fair Information Practices, it has taken limited steps to oversee its field investigators and customer agencies to ensure they are implementing the measures appropriately. Without such oversight, it is unclear whether the agency’s protection measures are being properly implemented. Without an oversight mechanism to ensure investigators’ adherence to PII protection policies during investigations—such as through periodic, structured evaluations by supervisors—the agency lacks assurance that sensitive information is being handled appropriately during this critical phase of the background investigation process. FIS relies on memoranda of understanding (MOU) with its customer agencies to establish procedures and policies for protecting PII related to background investigation case files, and these agreements specifically designate OPM as being responsible for ensuring that customer agencies comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act when handling PII received from OPM. Specifically, it does not monitor customer agencies’ adherence to the requirements agreed upon through the MOUs. Until the guidance requires privacy risk analyses with PIAs and existing PIAs are revised to include privacy risk analyses, OPM will continue to have limited assurance that PII contained in its systems is being properly protected. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that appropriate privacy protections are in place during all stages of a background investigation, we recommend that the Director of the OPM take the following four actions: develop guidance for privacy impact assessments that directs agency officials to perform an analysis of privacy risks and identify mitigating techniques for all FIS systems that access, use, or maintain PII; ensure that all existing PIAs are revised to adhere to this guidance; perform periodic, structured evaluations to ensure that field investigators handle and protect PII according to agency policies and procedures while conducting their investigations; and develop and implement procedures for monitoring customer agencies’ adherence to the privacy provisions agreed to within memoranda of understanding. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: how the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) uses personally identifiable information (PII) in conducting background investigations, and the extent to which OPM’s privacy policies and procedures for protecting PII related to investigations meet statutory requirements and align with widely accepted privacy practices. To address our second objective, we reviewed OPM and FIS privacy policies and procedures and analyzed agency actions to (1) comply with the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002 and (2) align with the Fair Information Practices, a set of widely accepted privacy principles. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 90 percent of all federal background investigations are provided by the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Federal Investigative Services (FIS) division. In fiscal year 2009, FIS conducted over 2 million investigations of varying types, making the organization a major steward of personal information on U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to (1) describe how OPM uses personally identifiable information (PII) in conducting background investigations and (2) assess the extent to which OPM's privacy policies and procedures for protecting PII related to investigations meet statutory requirements and align with widely accepted privacy practices. To address these objectives, GAO compared OPM and FIS policies and procedures with key privacy laws and widely accepted practices.
What GAO Found
FIS, a component of OPM, conducts background investigations using extensive amounts of PII. Specifically, FIS collects PII from the individual being investigated, government agencies holding relevant data on the subject, and contacts familiar with the subject of the investigation. It uses this information during the four phases of the investigation process: (1) Questionnaire Submission, when requesting agencies submit a questionnaire completed by the individual who will be investigated; (2) Scheduling and Initiation, during which goals and milestones are set, automated information requests occur, and an investigator is assigned; (3) Investigation, during which an investigator gathers information from the automated requests and from interviews and prepares a report; and (4) Review, during which a reviewer determines if a report is complete before allowing it to be sent to the requesting agency. FIS has taken steps to incorporate key privacy laws and widely accepted privacy practices into policies and procedures for conducting background investigations. For example, field investigators are directed to limit collection of PII to only information relevant to an investigation, and several procedures are in place to ensure that such information is recorded as accurately as possible in OPM's systems. However, the agency has conducted limited oversight of FIS's development of privacy impact assessments (PIA), investigators' implementation of privacy protection guidance, and customer agencies' adherence to privacy agreements. A PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. It is required by the E-Government Act of 2002. Related Office of Management and Budget guidance emphasizes the need to identify and assess privacy risks in concert with developing a PIA. However, OPM's guidance for PIAs does not require that privacy risks be analyzed or mitigation strategies be identified for those risks. Consequently, OPM cannot be sure that potential risks associated with the use of PII in its information systems have been adequately assessed and mitigated. Additionally, widely accepted privacy practices call for accountability to ensure privacy-protection policies are implemented to safeguard personal information from potential risks. Such accountability includes monitoring to ensure proper implementation of privacy protection measures. However, although FIS tracks PII that is provided to and received from field investigators, it had not monitored investigators' adherence to its policies and procedures for protecting PII while investigations are underway. Further, while FIS has developed agreements with customer agencies related to the protection of PII contained in investigation case files, it does not monitor customer agencies' implementation of these policies, even though its agreements state it is responsible for doing so. Without oversight processes for monitoring investigators' and customer agencies' adherence to its PII protection policies, OPM lacks assurance that its privacy protection measures are being properly implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Director of OPM (1) develop guidance for analyzing and mitigating privacy risks in privacy impact assessments, and (2) develop and implement oversight mechanisms for ensuring that investigators properly protect PII and that customer agencies adhere to agreed-upon privacy protection measures. OPM agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_RCED-98-224 | gao_RCED-98-224_0 | Most of the $271 million—over one-fourth of the food safety budget—spent annually on FSIS’ organoleptic, carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspections could be spent more effectively on other food safety activities that better address food safety risks. In addition, if daily inspections of the processing plants—at an annual cost of about $109 million—were replaced by inspections based on health risk, an undetermined amount of funds could be made available. Under a risk-based approach, some of these inspections would occur less frequently because they would be based on the risk that specific food products pose to public health and the plants’ past inspection histories. In prior work, we identified a number of food safety concerns that could be addressed, such as the following:
FSIS could help to install HACCP inspection systems at the smallest meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants. Since industry will bear most of the installation cost for these new systems and the smallest plants have a smaller volume over which to spread this cost, these plants will be disproportionately affected by the cost of the new inspection systems. In addition to these actions, the food safety agencies may have other priorities for the use of the funds that are made available from organoleptic slaughter inspections of meat and poultry plants or by basing the frequency of meat- and poultry-processing plant inspections on risk. However, the initiatives do not address the fundamental problem of the system—its fragmented structure. Initiatives Do Not Address Fragmented Structure of the Food Safety System
While these food safety initiatives have addressed, and intend to address, some targeted problems, they do not effectively deal with the underlying fragmentation in the federal food safety system. Scope and Methodology
You asked us to (1) analyze the federal food safety agencies’ budgets for fiscal year 1999 to determine whether the appropriated funds of more than $1 billion can be spent more effectively and (2) provide our views on whether the food safety initiatives for fiscal years 1998-99 will address underlying problems in the federal food safety system. We revised the report to reflect the language requested by the Department. Comments From the Food and Drug Administration
The following are GAO’s comments on FDA’s letter dated July 7, 1998. GAO’s Comments
1. GAO’s Comments
1. (See comments 2, 3, 4, and 5.) However, the fact remains that FSIS continues to conduct these inspections on a daily basis. 6. Instead, the report identifies examples of food safety resources that could be used more effectively if they were redirected to other food safety activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) analyzed the federal food safety agencies' budgets for fiscal year 1999 to determine whether the appropriated funds of more than $1 billion can be spent more effectively; and (2) provided its views on whether the food safety initiatives for fiscal years 1998-1999 will address underlying problems in the federal food safety system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) more than one-fourth of the over $1-billion federal budget for food safety--about $271 million--could be used more effectively if most of these funds were congressionally redirected from the Food Safety and Inspection Service's organoleptic carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspections to a number of the other food safety activities that need attention; (2) funds currently used for organoleptic, carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspections do not optimize federal resources because these inspections do not detect the most serious public health threat associated with meat and poultry--microbial contamination; (3) instead, these inspections mostly assure the quality of food and therefore benefit the industry more than they ensure food safety for consumers; (4) the $271 million could be used, for example, by the Food Safety and Inspection Service to help the smallest slaughter and processing plants with the cost of installing new science- and risk-based inspection systems; (5) since industry will bear most of the installation cost and the smallest plants operate at a smaller volume over which to spread this cost, these plants will be disproportionately affected by the cost of the new inspection systems; (6) in addition to the funds that could be made available from the revisions to the carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspections, some funds used for daily inspections of meat- and poultry-processing plants could be congressionally redirected to other needs; (7) for example, inspections could be based on the risks at other food plants, such as cereal manufacturers; (8) if the frequency of these inspections were based on the health risk posed rather than on the Food Safety and Inspection Service's practice of conducting processing plant inspections on a daily basis, these inspections would be more effective; (9) the food safety initiatives have made some improvements to the federal food safety system, but they have not comprehensively addressed the underlying problem of the fragmented nature of this system; (10) in fact, while the initiatives provided funding for specific food safety efforts, the initiatives' effective implementation may be impeded by the system's fragmentation; and (11) for example, progress in carrying out the initiative's objective of consolidating seafood inspection activities under one agency has been impeded by the slow progress of the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Commerce in developing legislation for congressional consideration. |
gao_GAO-03-727 | gao_GAO-03-727_0 | DFAS Columbus Made $49 Billion of Adjustments at a Cost of about $34 Million in Fiscal Year 2002
For fiscal year 2002, our analysis of DFAS Columbus data showed that about $1 of every $4 in contract payment transactions in MOCAS was for adjustments to previously recorded payments—$49 billion of adjustments out of $198 billion in disbursement, collection, and adjustment transactions. To research the payment allocation problems and make adjustments to correct the disbursing and accounting records, DFAS Columbus reported that it incurred costs of about $34 million in fiscal year 2002, primarily for hundreds of DOD and contractor staff. This represented about 35 percent of the $97.4 million that DFAS Columbus spent on contract pay service operations. This occurred because DFAS Columbus currently bills DOD activities (for example, the Army) for contract pay services based solely on the number of lines of accounting on an invoice. Consequently, all DOD activities pay the same line rate, regardless of whether substantial work is needed to reconcile problem contracts and adjust the payment records. Contracts Were Complex Due to Legal and DOD Requirements, Contract Modifications, and Pricing Provisions
Our analysis of an Army and an Air Force contract showed that the contracts and related payment instructions were complex because of a combination of factors, including the (1) legal and DOD requirements to track and report on the funds used to finance the contract, (2) number of modifications made to the contract over the years that added goods and/or services, or added or changed payment instructions for these goods and/or services, and (3) different pricing provisions to pay for goods and services on the contract. Our evaluation of $160 million of adjustments showed that DFAS Columbus made these adjustments to reallocate payments to the correct ACRNs. Frequent Contract Modifications to Change Payment Instructions for Air Force Contract
In March 2001, DFAS Columbus processed 1,262 transactions totaling over $26 million to adjust previously recorded payment allocations on the Air Force contract. DOD has initiated a major long-term effort to develop and implement an enterprise architecture, which is intended to improve its business operations, including its acquisition and disbursement activities. If implemented successfully, this initiative may help correct many of the contract payment allocation problems. In the interim, DOD has several initiatives under way to address the payment allocation problems caused by complex contracts with confusing payment instructions. The working group concluded that payment allocation errors at DFAS Columbus (1) were often the result of problems experienced with confusing payment instructions and (2) were further compounded because DOD did not have payment allocation options for including standard contract payment instructions for use on DOD contracts. Our analysis of the working group initiative to develop standard payment instructions showed that it is a good first step because it should reduce some of the payment allocation errors that were the result of DFAS Columbus voucher examiners misinterpreting contract payment instructions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported that the Department of Defense's (DOD) inability to accurately account for and report on disbursements is a long-term, major problem. GAO was requested to determine (1) the magnitude of the adjustments and related costs in fiscal year 2002, (2) why contracts, including payment terms, are so complex, (3) the key factors that caused Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus to make payment adjustments, and (4) what steps DOD is taking to address the payment allocation problems.
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2002, DFAS Columbus data showed that about $1 of every $4 in contract payment transactions in the MOCAS system was for adjustments to previously recorded payments--$49 billion of adjustments out of $198 billion in transactions. To research payment allocation problems, DFAS Columbus reported that it incurred costs of about $34 million in fiscal year 2002. This represents about 35 percent of the total $97 million that DFAS Columbus spent on contract pay services. DFAS Columbus bills DOD activities for contract pay services based on the number of accounting lines on an invoice. Consequently, all DOD activities pay the same line rate, regardless of whether substantial work is needed to reconcile problem contracts and adjust payment records. GAO's analysis of two contracts showed that the contracts were complex because of the (1) legal and DOD requirements to track and report on the funds used to finance the contracts, (2) substantial number of modifications made on the contracts to procure goods and/or services, and (3) different pricing provisions on the contracts. GAO's review of $160 million of adjustments showed that the adjustments were made for four reasons. The Army made an error in accounting for obligations, resulting in about $127 million in payment allocation adjustments. DFAS Columbus did not follow its internal procedures for allocating payments to accounts on an Army contract containing multiple pricing provisions, resulting in about $5 million in adjustments. DFAS made over $2 million in adjustments to correct recording errors on an Army contract due to complex and changing payment instructions. The Air Force frequently changed payment instructions after payments were made on an Air Force contract, resulting in about $26 million in adjustments. DOD has initiated a major long-term effort to improve its business operations, including its acquisition and disbursement activities. If implemented successfully, this initiative may help correct many of the contract payment allocation problems. In the interim, DOD has initiatives under way to address payment allocation problems, including (1) billing DOD contracting offices for contract reconciliation services, (2) providing DOD activities information on the correct method for presenting payment instructions, and (3) establishing a working group to develop options for presenting standard contract payment instructions. While the DOD working group initiative may reduce payment allocation errors associated with misinterpreting contract payment instructions, DOD needs to automate the standard payment instructions to eliminate payment allocation errors associated with manually allocated payments. |
gao_GAO-01-1157T | gao_GAO-01-1157T_0 | Collections Have Increased in the Past Year, but Underlying Problems Continue
If VA’s current pattern of third-party collections continues into the last months of fiscal year 2001, VA will significantly increase its third-party collections for the first time since fiscal year 1995. Not only do long-standing problems in revenue operations appear to persist—which have been heightened with the implementation of reasonable charges—when compared to private sector benchmarks, VA’s collections performance is poor. VA expected its collections to increase as a result of its reasonable charges billing system, which was implemented in September 1999. Efforts to Improve Collections Provide Little Basis to Select the Best Alternative for Optimizing Net Revenue
The various efforts VA has undertaken to improve its revenue operations fall short of providing a basis to select among the two major alternatives— contracting out or using VA staff. For example, contractors identified the need to establish an interface with VA’s data systems. Current Improvement Plan Focuses on Enhancing In- House Operations, Not Net Revenues
VA’s Revenue Cycle Improvement Plan, finalized in September 2001, does not position the Department to choose between the two major alternatives for optimizing its third-party collections because the plan does not call for a comprehensive comparison of these two options nor does it focus on net revenues—collections minus operations costs. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has reversed the general decline in its third-party collections for the first time since fiscal year 1995. The fiscal year 2001 increase appears to be largely the result of VA's implementation of a new system, known as the reasonable charges billing system, which allowed VA to move from a flat-rate billing system to one that itemizes charges. However, long-standing problems in VA's revenue operations persist, and VA's collections performance is poor when compared to that of the private sector. VA's attempts at consolidation using either in-house or contractor staff have provided little basis for selecting the best alternative to VA's collections problems. Also, VA's recent 2001 Revenue Cycle Improvement Plan does not call for a comprehensive comparison of alternatives, nor does it focus on net revenues--collections minus operations costs. To collect the most funds for veterans' medical care at the lowest cost, VA needs to develop a business plan and detailed implementation approach that will provide useful data for optimizing net revenues from third-party payments. |
gao_GAO-05-158 | gao_GAO-05-158_0 | GSA’s plan also involves consolidating the U.S. Current Proposal Addresses Some Conditions That Led to the High Urgency Score, but Certain Operational and Security Concerns Would Remain
The current project proposal would address the judiciary’s need for more space and alleviate some security concerns, but the operational and security concerns related to a split court that contributed to the L.A. Courthouse’s high urgency score would remain. For example, it addresses the judiciary’s space constraints by providing additional courtrooms—sized to meet the Design Guide standards—to accommodate the 47 current district and magistrate judges and the 14 additional judges expected by 2011. According to GSA officials, there is also room to build an additional district judge courtroom in the new building and additional magistrate judge courtrooms in the Roybal building to address the judiciary’s projected 30-year needs. For example, Marshals Service officials said that a split court would require them to replicate much of their security equipment and contract guards to operate the equipment and protect each building. The L.A. As a result, we use the original methodology to discuss the L.A. Courthouse’s urgency score in this report. Additional Construction and Operational Costs Beyond the Estimated $400 Million for the New Courthouse Are Likely
To meet the long-term judiciary and related needs in Los Angeles, the federal government will likely incur additional construction and operational costs beyond the estimated $400 million for the new courthouse. Courthouse, to incur future escalation in construction costs. In addition to construction costs for the new courthouse, GSA has indicated that additional funds will be needed for construction related to the long-term space needs of the judiciary and other related agencies in Los Angeles. Preliminary estimates from GSA show that these additional costs may exceed $100 million. Once the District Court moves out of the Spring Street Courthouse and into the new courthouse, GSA said that it will need to renovate the Spring Street building to convert courtrooms into office space for U.S. Attorneys and other federal agencies. GSA estimates the costs associated with future expansion in the Roybal building and the new courthouse needed to meet expected judiciary space needs by 2031 to be $21 million. However, judiciary officials also acknowledge that a split court would result in higher costs due to operational inefficiencies, including additional travel time between buildings for movement of staff, evidence, and prisoners. The U.S. District Court in Los Angeles is ranked as the highest priority project in the judiciary’s 5-year construction plan1 based on its high urgency score—a measure of a court’s space, security, judges impacted, and operational deficiencies. The Los Angeles courthouse project could be one of the most expensive projects in the federal government’s multi- billion dollar courthouse construction program. Because of the project’s significance, GAO was asked: 1. To what extent does the current Los Angeles courthouse project proposal address the underlying conditions that led to Los Angeles’s high urgency score? What construction and other costs, if any, may be required to meet judiciary and related needs in Los Angeles? On all courthouse construction projects, including Los Angeles, there is a potential for future escalation in costs due to design and planning changes during the construction process. Although the current proposal addresses the judiciary’s space needs, the security and operational concerns that led to Los Angeles’s high urgency score will remain and GSA is likely to need significant additional funding to fully address judiciary and related needs in Los Angeles. Related GAO Products
General Services Administration: Factors Affecting the Construction and Operating Costs of Federal Buildings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the federal judiciary have been carrying out a multibillion dollar courthouse construction initiative to address the judiciary's growing space needs. To plan for and make funding decisions on projects, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and GSA have relied on a rolling 5-year plan prepared annually by the judiciary that prioritizes new courthouse projects based on an urgency score. The urgency score is based on the year a courthouse runs out of space, the number of judges without courtrooms, security concerns, and operational inefficiencies. In recent years, the L.A. courthouse had the highest urgency score in the judiciary's 5-year plan. At a cost of approximately $400 million, the new courthouse is expected to be one of the most expensive projects in the federal government's courthouse construction program to date. In light of the project's significance, GAO was asked: (1) To what extent does GSA's current L.A. courthouse project proposal address the underlying conditions that led to Los Angeles's high urgency score and (2) what construction and other costs, if any, may be required to meet judiciary and related needs in Los Angeles? The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and GSA provided technical comments on this report.
What GAO Found
GSA's current proposal to construct a new courthouse in Los Angeles, while expanding the judiciary's use of the existing Roybal Federal Building, would address some but not all of the underlying conditions that led to Los Angeles's high urgency score. For example, it would address the judiciary's need for additional space and alleviate some security concerns. There would be space to accommodate the 47 current district and magistrate judges and the 14 additional judges expected by 2011, with room to expand, if needed, for additional judges. The new building would also improve security by providing additional holding cells and separate prisoner walkways and elevators. However, the operational and security concerns related to housing a trial court in multiple buildings (split court) that was a significant factor in Los Angeles's high urgency score would remain. For example, U.S. Marshals Service officials said that a split court would require them to duplicate much of their security equipment and personnel necessary for fulfilling its mission of protecting the courthouses. To meet judiciary and related needs in Los Angeles, the federal government will likely incur additional construction and operational costs beyond the estimated $400 million for the new courthouse. Like other courthouse projects in recent years, GSA officials acknowledge that there is a potential for the L.A. Courthouse to incur future escalation in construction costs due to changes during the design and construction phases, such as increases in raw material and labor costs. Furthermore, additional construction costs will also be incurred to meet the judiciary's space needs over the long term. Preliminary estimates by GSA show that these costs may exceed $100 million. For example, GSA will need to build four additional magistrate courtrooms in the Roybal building and renovate the current courthouse to convert courtrooms into office space for the U.S. Attorneys and other federal agencies. GSA also plans a long-term expansion project to construct seven more courtrooms to meet judiciary space needs by 2031. Judiciary officials also acknowledge that a split court would result in additional operational costs due to duplicate offices and staff in the Roybal building and the new courthouse. |
gao_GAO-17-201 | gao_GAO-17-201_0 | Specifically, the administration’s new policy called for establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, adjusting regulations to more effectively empower the Cuban people, facilitating an expansion of travel under general licenses for the 12 existing categories of travel to Cuba authorized by law, facilitating remittances to Cuba by U.S. persons, authorizing expanded commercial sales/exports from the United States of certain goods and services, authorizing U.S. citizens to import additional goods from Cuba, facilitating authorized financial transactions between the United States and Cuba, initiating new efforts to increase Cubans’ access to communications and their ability to communicate freely, updating the application of Cuba sanctions in third countries, pursuing discussions with the Cuban and Mexican governments to discuss the unresolved maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico, initiating a review of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and addressing Cuba’s participation in the 2015 Summit of the Americas. The Cuban Private Sector Has Grown Rapidly Since 2008 but Remains Small Compared with Other Economies and Faces Various Constraints
The Cuban private sector has grown rapidly since 2008 but remains small compared with other economies and faces various constraints. Cuban government data indicate that the authorized private sector has grown rapidly, with 29 percent of the Cuban labor force in the private sector in 2015 compared to 17 percent in 2008. Although the percentage of the Cuban workforce in the private sector has grown, it is still smaller than in comparable countries, according to our analysis of International Labour Organization (ILO) data. In addition, the Cuban private sector is still highly constrained by the Cuban government and faces challenges including a lack of access to needed inputs. The Cuban Private Sector Has Three Primary Components Authorized by the Cuban Government
The Cuban private sector currently includes three primary components that are authorized by the Cuban government: (1) self-employed entrepreneurs known as cuentapropistas, (2) agricultural cooperatives and private farmers, and (3) nonagricultural cooperatives. U.S. Regulatory Changes Have Created Some New Opportunities in Cuba, but Economic Engagement Is Still Limited by the Embargo and Cuban Government Restrictions
U.S. regulatory changes have created some new opportunities in Cuba, but economic engagement is still limited. The changes in regulations on travel and remittances are also expected to benefit the Cuban private sector through increased remittances and purchases from U.S. visitors, among other things. The U.S. Government Has Made a Series of Regulatory Changes since December 2014 to Ease Restrictions on Travel, Remittances, Financial Services, and Trade with Cuba
The U.S. government has made a series of regulatory changes to the CACR and the EAR since the administration announced its new Cuba policy in December 2014. The U.S. government has also reported that some other U.S. businesses have taken steps to pursue new opportunities created by the regulatory changes. Driven by declining agricultural exports, U.S. trade with Cuba has decreased since the regulatory changes. Agencies Have Conducted Activities to Support Economic Engagement with Cuba but Have Not Collected and Documented Key Information
U.S. agencies have conducted a range of activities to support U.S. economic engagement with Cuba’s private sector but have limited information on the effects of their efforts. While U.S. regulatory changes have created opportunities for greater economic engagement with Cuba, prohibitions on U.S. assistance, resource constraints, and Cuban government priorities affect U.S. agencies’ ability to support U.S. businesses or engage the Cuban private sector. Within these limitations, a number of U.S. agencies have engaged with the Cuban government, U.S. businesses, and the Cuban private sector to enhance understanding of the regulatory changes and increase opportunities for economic engagement. U.S. Without collecting and documenting information, U.S. agencies risk being unable to monitor and assess changes in economic engagement since the December 2014 policy change. After more than 50 years of U.S. policy designed to isolate Cuba’s communist government, the President called for a new strategy of engagement. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that all relevant U.S. agencies have information on the effect of changes in U.S. policy related to Cuba, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with Commerce, Treasury, USDA, and other relevant agencies, take steps to identify and begin to collect the information that would allow them to monitor changes in economic engagement, including with the Cuban private sector. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine what is known about (1) the size and scope of the Cuban private sector, (2) the effect of changes to U.S. legal and regulatory restrictions related to Cuba on the Cuban private sector and U.S. businesses, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government planned and implemented activities designed to increase U.S. engagement with the Cuban private sector and expand U.S. economic opportunities in Cuba. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the more than 50 years since it established an embargo on Cuba, the U.S. government has pursued a policy designed to isolate Cuba's communist regime. In December 2014, the President announced a significant change in U.S. policy. Since then, the U.S. government has restored diplomatic relations with Cuba and modified some aspects of the U.S. embargo. The Cuban government has also implemented economic reforms in recent years to allow for certain private sector activity. While much of Cuba's economy is still state-controlled and the U.S. embargo on Cuba remains in place, developments in recent years have created new opportunities for U.S. economic engagement with Cuba.
This report examines what is known about (1) the size and scope of the Cuban private sector, (2) the effect of changes to U.S. legal and regulatory restrictions on the Cuban private sector and U.S. businesses, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has planned and implemented activities to increase U.S. engagement with the Cuban private sector and expand U.S. economic opportunities in Cuba. GAO analyzed U.S. government and other assessments of the Cuban private sector, analyzed Cuban government data, interviewed U.S. federal and nonfederal Cuba experts, and conducted fieldwork in Cuba.
What GAO Found
The Cuban private sector has grown rapidly since 2008 but remains small compared with other economies and faces various constraints. The Cuban private sector includes (1) self-employed entrepreneurs, (2) agricultural cooperatives and other private farmers, and (3) nonagricultural cooperatives. Cuban government data indicate that the percentage of the Cuban workforce in the private sector has grown from 17 percent in 2008 to 29 percent in 2015. However, the Cuban private sector is smaller than in 16 comparable countries GAO analyzed. It is also still highly constrained by the Cuban government and faces challenges, including a lack of access to needed supplies and equipment.
U.S. regulatory changes have created some new opportunities in Cuba, but economic engagement is still limited. The U.S. government has made six sets of regulatory changes since December 2014 to ease restrictions on travel, remittances, financial services, and trade with Cuba. For example, the Department of Commerce created a new export license exemption to facilitate U.S. exports that support the Cuban people, including the private sector. The regulatory changes have generated U.S. business interest; however, relatively few commercial deals have been completed. In addition, U.S. trade with Cuba has decreased, driven by declining agricultural exports, which have been legal since 2000. Changes in remittance and travel regulations are expected to benefit the Cuban private sector through increased capital and purchases from U.S. visitors. Although the regulatory changes have created some new opportunities for U.S. businesses and the Cuban private sector, embargo restrictions and Cuban government barriers continue to limit U.S.-Cuba economic engagement.
U.S. agencies have conducted a range of activities to support U.S. policy changes; however, embargo restrictions, resource constraints, and Cuban government priorities affect their ability to support U.S. businesses or engage the Cuban private sector. Within these limitations, the Department of State (State) and other U.S. agencies have engaged with the Cuban government, U.S. businesses, and the Cuban private sector. Among other things, they have established memoranda of understanding with the Cuban government, hosted events with Cuban entrepreneurs, and promoted training opportunities. However, U.S. agencies have not collected and documented key information on the Cuban economy, the effects of regulatory changes, and agency activities, in accordance with federal standards for internal control. Without collecting and documenting information, agencies risk being unable to monitor and assess changes over time in economic engagement with Cuba, including with the private sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State, in consultation with key agencies, take steps to identify and collect information to monitor changes in economic engagement resulting from the shift in U.S. policy. State concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-899T | gao_GAO-09-899T_0 | VA Facilities Provided Basic and Specialized Gender-Specific Services and Mental Health Services to Women Veterans, though Not All Services Were Provided On Site at Each VA Facility
The VA facilities we visited provided basic gender-specific and outpatient mental health services to women veterans on site, and some facilities also provided specialized gender-specific or mental health services specifically designed for women on site. Among CBOCs, other than the two largest facilities we visited, most offered limited specialized gender-specific care on site. Regarding mental health care, we found that outpatient services for women were widely available at the VAMCs and most Vet Centers we visited, but were more limited at some CBOCs. Basic Gender-Specific Care Services Were Generally Available On site at VA Medical Facilities
Basic gender-specific care services were available on site at all nine of the VAMCs and 8 of the 10 CBOCs that we visited. In general, women veterans had access to female providers for their gender-specific care: of the 19 medical facilities we visited, all but 4 had one or more female providers available to deliver basic gender-specific care. While All VAMCs Offered at Least Some Specialized Gender-Specific Services On site, CBOCs Typically Referred Patients Needing These Services to Other VA or Non-VA Medical Facilities
The provision of specialized gender-specific services for women, including treatment after abnormal cervical cancer screenings and breast cancer treatment, varied by service and by facility. All VA medical facilities referred female patients to outside providers for obstetric care. Some of the VAMCs we visited offered a broad array of other specialized gender-specific services on site, but all contracted or fee-based at least some services. Vet Centers generally offered some counseling services in the evenings. The smaller CBOCs, however, tended to rely on staff from the affiliated VAMC, often through telehealth, to provide mental health services. Medical Facilities Had Not Fully Implemented VA Policies Pertaining to the Delivery of Health Care Services for Women Veterans
The extent to which VA medical facilities we visited were following VA policies that apply to the delivery of health care services for women veterans varied, but none of the facilities had fully implemented VA policies pertaining to women veterans’ health care. In particular, none of the VAMCs or CBOCs we visited were fully compliant with VA policy requirements related to privacy for women veterans. Officials at some VA facilities reported that they were unclear about the specific steps they would need to take to meet VA’s definition of comprehensive primary care for women veterans. None of the VAMCs or CBOCs we visited ensured adequate visual and auditory privacy at check-in in all clinical settings that are accessed by women veterans. Medical Facilities Were in Various Stages of Implementing VA’s Initiative on Comprehensive Primary Care for Women Veterans, but Officials at Some Facilities Were Unclear about the Steps Needed to Implement VA’s New Initiative
VA has not set a deadline by which all VAMCs and CBOCs are required to implement VA’s new comprehensive primary care initiative for women veterans, which would allow women veterans to obtain both primary care and basic gender-specific services from one provider at one site. VA Officials Identified Key Challenges Related to Space, Hiring Staff with Specific Experience and Training, and Establishing the WVPM as a Full-time Position
VA officials at medical facilities we visited identified a number of key challenges in providing health care services to women veterans. In particular, officials at 7 of 9 VAMCs and 5 of 10 CBOCs we visited said that space issues, such as the number, size, or configuration of exam rooms or bathrooms at their facilities sometimes made it difficult for them to comply with some VA requirements related to privacy for women veterans. VA facility officials also told us they have struggled with space constraints as they work to comply with VA’s new policy on comprehensive primary care for women and the requirements in the September 2008 Uniform Mental Health Services in VA Medical Centers and Clinics, as well as the increasing numbers of women veterans requesting these services. We also considered whether VAMCs had programs specifically for women veterans, particularly treatment programs for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and for women who have experienced military sexual trauma (MST). For each of the factors listed below, we examined available facility- or market-level data to identify facilities of interest: total number of unique women veteran patients using the VAMC; total number of unique OEF/OIF women veteran patients using the VAMC; proportion of unique women veterans using the VAMC who are OEF/OIF proportion of unique OEF/OIF women veterans using the VAMC who were discharged from the National Guard or Reserves; within the VA-defined market area for the VAMC, the proportion of women veterans who use VA health care and live in rural or highly rural areas; and availability of on-site programs specific to women veterans, such as inpatient or residential treatment programs that offer specialized treatment for women veterans with PTSD or who have experienced MST, including programs that are for women only or have an admission cycle that includes only women; and outpatient treatment teams with a specialized focus on MST. | Why GAO Did This Study
Historically, the vast majority of VA patients have been men, but that is changing. VA provided health care to over 281,000 women veterans in 2008--an increase of about 12 percent since 2006--and the number of women veterans in the United States is projected to increase by 17 percent between 2008 and 2033. Women veterans seeking care at VA medical facilities need access to a full range of health care services, including basic gender-specific services--such as cervical cancer screening--and specialized gender-specific services--such as treatment of reproductive cancers. This testimony, based on ongoing work, discusses GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the on-site availability of health care services for women veterans at VA facilities, (2) the extent to which VA facilities are following VA policies that apply to the delivery of health care services for women veterans, and (3) some key challenges that VA facilities are experiencing in providing health care services for women veterans. GAO reviewed applicable VA policies, interviewed officials, and visited 19 medical facilities--9 VA medical centers (VAMC) and 10 community-based outpatient clinics (CBOC)--and 10 Vet Centers. These facilities were chosen based in part on the number of women using services and whether facilities offered specific programs for women. The results from these site visits cannot be generalized to all VA facilities. GAO shared this statement with VA officials, and they generally agreed with the information presented.
What GAO Found
The VA facilities GAO visited provided basic gender-specific and outpatient mental health services to women veterans on-site, and some facilities also provided specialized gender-specific or mental health services specifically designed for women on-site. Basic gender-specific services, including pelvic examinations, were available on-site at all nine VAMCs and 8 of the 10 CBOCs GAO visited. Almost all of the medical facilities GAO visited offered women veterans access to one or more female providers for their gender-specific care. The availability of specialized gender-specific services for women, including treatments after abnormal cervical cancer screenings and breast cancer, varied by service and facility. All VA medical facilities refer female patients to non-VA providers for obstetric care. Some of the VAMCs GAO visited offered a broad array of other specialized gender-specific services on site, but all contracted or fee-based at least some services. Among CBOCs, the two largest facilities GAO visited offered an array of specialized gender-specific care on-site; the other eight referred women to other VA or non-VA facilities for most of these services. Outpatient mental health services for women were widely available at the VAMCs and most Vet Centers GAO visited, but were more limited at some CBOCs. While the two larger CBOCs offered group counseling for women and services specifically for women who have experienced sexual trauma in the military, the smaller CBOCs tended to rely on VAMC staff,often through videoconferencing, to provide mental health services. The extent to which the VA medical facilities GAO visited were following VA policies that apply to the delivery of health care services for women veterans varied, but none of the facilities had fully implemented these policies. None of the VAMCs and CBOCs GAO visited were fully compliant with VA policy requirements related to privacy for women veterans in all clinical settings where those requirements applied. For example, many of the medical facilities GAO visited did not have adequate visual and auditory privacy in their check-in areas. Further, the facilities GAO visited were in various stages of implementing VA's new initiative to provide comprehensive primary care for women veterans, but officials at some VAMCs and CBOCs reported that they were unclear about the specific steps they would need to take to meet the goals of the new policy. Officials at facilities that GAO visited identified a number of challenges they face in providing health care services to the increasing numbers of women veterans seeking VA health care. One challenge was that space constraints have raised issues affecting the provision of health care services. For example, the number, size, or configuration of exam rooms or bathrooms sometimes made it difficult for facilities to comply with VA requirements related to privacy for women veterans. Officials also reported challenges hiring providers with specific training and experience in women's health care and in mental health care, such as treatment for women veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder or who had experienced military sexual trauma. |
gao_GAO-07-1036 | gao_GAO-07-1036_0 | Recent terrorist attacks and threats have underscored the need to protect our nation’s critical infrastructures. Control Systems Are Used in Many Critical Infrastructures
Control systems are computer-based systems that are used within many infrastructures and industries to monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Critical Infrastructure Control Systems Face Increasing Risks Due to Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and the Potentially Serious Impact of an Attack
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the potentially serious impact of an attack as demonstrated by reported incidents. Further, based on past events, the impact of a control systems incident on a critical infrastructure could be substantial. Critical Infrastructures Face Multiple Cyber Threats
Cyber threats can be unintentional and intentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast of the United States. In October 2006, a foreign hacker penetrated security at a water filtering plant. The intruder planted malicious software that was capable of affecting the plant’s water treatment operations. Technical Challenges Hinder Use of Traditional Information Security Measures for Control Systems
According to industry experts, existing information security technologies and practices—such as strong user authentication and patch management—are generally not implemented in control systems due to several technical issues, including limited computational processing capabilities, the need for real-time operation, and the lack of consideration of cybersecurity in the original design of the system. Organizational Issues Pose Challenges to Securing Control Systems
In addition to the technical challenges of securing control systems, critical infrastructure owners face organizational challenges in securing control systems, including difficulty in developing a compelling business case for improving control systems security, a reluctance to share information on control system incidents (which could help build a business case), and the division of technical responsibilities within an organization. The Private Sector Has Multiple Initiatives Under Way to Help Secure Control Systems
Industry-specific organizations in various sectors, including the electricity, chemical, oil and gas, and water sectors, have initiatives under way to help improve control system security. These initiatives include developing standards, publishing guidance, and hosting workshops. Federal Agencies Have Multiple Initiatives to Help Secure Critical Infrastructure Control Systems, but More Remains to Be Done
Over the past few years, federal agencies—including DHS, DOE, NIST, FERC, and others—have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems. Further, more can be done to address specific weaknesses in DHS’s ability to share information on control systems vulnerabilities. Until DHS develops an overarching strategy, there is an increased risk that the federal government and private sector will invest in duplicative initiatives and miss opportunities to learn from other organization’s activities. However, the federal government lacks an overall strategy for coordinating public and private sector efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve federal government efforts to secure control systems governing critical infrastructure, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security implement the following two actions: develop a strategy to guide efforts for securing control systems, including agencies’ responsibilities, as well as overall goals, milestones, and performance measures, and establish a rapid and secure process for sharing sensitive control system vulnerability information with critical infrastructure control system stakeholders, including vendors, owners, and operators. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems; (2) determine the challenges to securing critical infrastructure control systems; (3) identify private sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems; and (4) assess the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. We also met with representatives from trade associations and federal agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Control systems--computer-based systems that monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions--perform vital functions in many of our nation's critical infrastructures, including electric power, oil and gas, water treatment, and chemical production. The disruption of control systems could have a significant impact on public health and safety, which makes securing them a national priority. GAO was asked to (1) determine cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructure control systems; (2) determine the challenges to securing these systems; (3) identify private sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems; and (4) assess the adequacy of public sector initiatives to strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems. To address these objectives, we met with federal and private sector officials to identify risks, initiatives, and challenges. We also compared agency plans to best practices for securing critical infrastructures.
What GAO Found
Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the serious potential impact of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. Threats can be intentional or unintentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. Control systems are more vulnerable to cyber attacks than in the past for several reasons, including their increased connectivity to other systems and the Internet. Further, as demonstrated by past attacks and incidents involving control systems, the impact on a critical infrastructure could be substantial. For example, in 2003, a computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast and in 2006, a foreign hacker was reported to have planted malicious software capable of affecting a water filtering plant's treatment operations. Critical infrastructure owners face both technical and organizational challenges to securing control systems. Technical challenges--including control systems' limited processing capabilities, real-time operations, and design constraints--hinder an infrastructure owner's ability to implement traditional information technology security processes, such as strong user authentication and patch management. Organizational challenges include difficulty in developing a compelling business case for investing in control systems security and differing priorities of information security personnel and control systems engineers. Multiple private sector entities such as trade associations and standards setting organizations are working to help secure control systems. Their efforts include developing standards, providing guidance to members, and hosting workshops on control systems security. For example, the electricity industry has recently developed standards for cybersecurity of control systems and a gas trade association is developing guidance for members to use encryption to secure control systems. Federal agencies also have multiple initiatives under way to help secure critical infrastructure control systems, but more remains to be done to coordinate these efforts and to address specific shortfalls. Over the past few years, federal agencies--including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)--have initiated efforts to improve the security of critical infrastructure control systems. However, there is as yet no overall strategy to coordinate the various activities across federal agencies and the private sector. Further, DHS lacks processes needed to address specific weaknesses in sharing information on control system vulnerabilities. Until public and private sector security efforts are coordinated by an overarching strategy and specific information sharing shortfalls are addressed, there is an increased risk that multiple organizations will conduct duplicative work and miss opportunities to fulfill their critical missions. |
gao_GAO-06-654 | gao_GAO-06-654_0 | First, it criticized our use of readability tests to assess the clarity of the six sample documents we reviewed. Second, CMS expressed concern about our examination of the usability of the six sample documents. This question addressed which drug plan would cost the least for a beneficiary with certain specified prescription drug needs. Reading levels for the sample documents were challenging for at least the 40 percent of seniors, who read at or below the 5th grade level. Objective 1: Written Documents—Clarity (continued)
Undesirable features: The documents used too much technical jargon, often did not define difficult terms, included sentences and some paragraphs that were too long, did not use sufficient summaries to assist the reader in identifying key points. Objective 1: Written Documents—Clarity (continued)
Usability assessment: Beneficiaries and advisers to beneficiaries
were frustrated by the documents’ lack of clarity and often could not complete the 18 assigned tasks. Objective 1: Written Documents—Clarity (continued)
Some of the tasks that proved difficult included
computing projected total out-of-pocket costs for a plan that provided Part D’s standard coverage (successfully completed by none of the 11 beneficiaries and 2 of the 5 advisers), evaluating whether it was possible to enroll in Medicare Part D and keep drug coverage from a retiree health plan (successfully completed by 2 beneficiaries and 2 advisers), and determining the course of action for dual-eligibles who are automatically enrolled in a plan that does not cover all drugs used (successfully completed by 4 beneficiaries and 1 adviser). Objective 2: 1-800-MEDICARE Help Line Methodology (continued)
To evaluate the accuracy and completeness of CSRs’ responses to
our five questions, we used three resources: the prescription drug finder tool on the Medicare Web site, the 1-800-MEDICARE scripts prepared by CMS and contractors for CSRs to use in responding to callers’ questions, and input from CMS officials on the criteria we used to evaluate responses. In addition, it provided accurate—but incomplete— answers for about 3 percent of our calls. For example:
CSRs accurately and completely answered question 5 (whether a beneficiary qualifies for extra help), which had a specific script, 90 percent of the time. Many of the responses were inaccurate because the CSRs did not follow the available script or provide sufficient information about the implications of the beneficiary's decision. The rate is largely caused by CSRs’ inappropriate responses—35 out of 100 times— that they were unable to answer the question without personal identifying information, such as the beneficiary’s Medicare number or date of birth. The prescription drug plan finder Web tool used by CSRs was not operative at the time of our call (1 call). About 75 percent of calls were connected in less than 5 minutes. For calls where we waited more than 5 minutes to speak to a CSR, the wait time ranged from 5 minutes to over 55 minutes. The usability score was 47 percent for seniors and 53 percent for younger adults. While there is no widely accepted benchmark for usability, these scores indicate that using the site can be difficult. For example, tools such as the drug plan finder were complicated to use, and forms that collect information online from users were difficult to correct if the user made an error. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we assessed (1) the extent to which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) written documents describe the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit in a clear, complete, and accurate manner; (2) the effectiveness of CMS’s 1-800-MEDICARE help line in providing accurate, complete, and prompt responses to callers inquiring about the Part D benefit; (3) whether CMS’s Medicare Web site presents information on the Part D benefit in a usable manner; and (4) how CMS has used State Health Insurance Assistance Programs (SHIP) to respond to the needs of Medicare beneficiaries for information on the Part D benefit. To evaluate clarity, we contracted with the American Institutes for Research (AIR)—a firm with experience in evaluating written material. To identify those important factors associated with the Part D benefit, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and 1-800-MEDICARE scripts prepared for customer service representatives (CSR) to read to callers and obtained information from advocacy groups. We evaluated the accuracy and completeness of the responses by CSRs to the 500 calls by determining whether key information was provided. This study consisted of three separate evaluations. First, NN/g compared the site’s compliance with established usability guidelines to determine a usability score to reflect the ease of finding necessary information and performing various tasks. | Why GAO Did This Study
On January 1, 2006, Medicare began providing coverage for outpatient prescription drugs through its new Part D benefit. Beneficiaries who enroll in Part D may choose a drug plan from those offered by private plan sponsors under contract to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the Part D benefit. Beneficiaries have until May 15, 2006, to enroll in the Part D benefit and select a plan without the risk of penalties. GAO was asked to review the quality of CMS's communications on the Part D benefit. GAO examined 70 CMS publications to select 6 documents for review and contracted with the American Institutes for Research to evaluate the clarity of these texts; made 500 calls to the 1-800-MEDICARE help line; and contracted with the Nielsen Norman Group to evaluate the usability of the Medicare Web site.
What GAO Found
The information given in the six sample documents that GAO reviewed describing the Part D benefit was largely complete and accurate, although this information lacked clarity. The documents were unclear in two ways. First, although about 40 percent of seniors read at or below the fifth-grade level, the reading levels of these documents ranged from seventh grade to postcollege. Second, on average, the six documents did not comply with about half of 60 common guidelines for good communication. For example, the documents used too much technical jargon and often did not define difficult terms, such as formulary. Moreover, 16 beneficiaries and advisers that GAO tested reported frustration with the documents' lack of clarity and had difficulty completing the tasks assigned to them. Although the documents lacked clarity, they informed readers of enrollment steps and factors affecting coverage decisions and were consistent with laws, regulations, and agency guidance. Customer service representatives (CSR) responded to the 500 calls GAO placed to CMS's 1-800-MEDICARE help line accurately and completely about two-thirds of the time. Of the remainder, 18 percent of the calls received inaccurate responses, 8 percent of the responses were inappropriate given the question asked, and about 3 percent received incomplete responses. In addition, about 5 percent of GAO's calls were not answered, primarily because of disconnections. Accuracy and completeness rates of CSRs' responses varied significantly across the five questions GAO asked. For example, while CSRs provided accurate and complete responses to calls about beneficiaries' eligibility for extra help 90 percent of the time, the accuracy rate for calls concerning the drug plan that would cost the least for a specified beneficiary was 41 percent. For this question, the CSRs responded inappropriately for 35 percent of the calls by explaining that they could not identify the least costly plan without the beneficiary's personal information--even though CSRs had the information needed to answer the question. The time GAO callers waited to speak with CSRs also varied, ranging from no wait time to over 55 minutes. For 75 percent of the calls--374 of the 500--the wait was less than 5 minutes. The Part D benefit portion of the Medicare Web site can be difficult to use. GAO's test of the site's overall usability--the ease of finding needed information and performing various tasks--resulted in scores of 47 percent for seniors and 53 percent for younger adults, out of a possible 100 percent. While there is no widely accepted benchmark for usability, these scores indicate that using the site can be difficult. For example, the prescription drug plan finder was complicated to use and some of its key functions, such as "continue" and "choose a drug plan," were often not visible on the page without scrolling down. |
gao_GAO-04-49 | gao_GAO-04-49_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which federal agencies are following practices associated with key legislative and other requirements for (1) IT strategic planning/performance measurement and (2) IT investment management. Agencies’ Use of IT Strategic Planning/Performance Measurement Practices Is Uneven
The use of IT strategic planning/performance measurement practices is uneven (see fig. Moreover, without enterprisewide performance measures that are being tracked against actual results, agencies lack critical information about whether their overall IT activities, at a governmentwide cost of billions of dollars annually, are achieving expected goals. Strategic planning defines what an organization seeks to accomplish and identifies the strategies it will use to achieve desired results. Although the agencies largely have one or more of the required performance measures, these measures are not always linked to the agencies’ enterprisewide IT goals. Executive level oversight of project- level management activities provides the organization with increased assurance that each investment will achieve the desired cost, benefit, and schedule results. Although no agencies had the practices associated with the control phase fully in place, some have implemented important aspects of this phase. Conclusions
Federal agencies did not always have in place important practices associated with IT laws, policies, and guidance. Agencies cited a variety of reasons for not having these practices in place, such as that the CIO position had been vacant, not including a requirement in guidance was an oversight, or that the process was being revised. Nevertheless, not only are these practices based on law, executive orders, OMB policies, and our guidance, but they are also important ingredients for ensuring effective strategic planning, performance measurement, and investment management, which, in turn, make it more likely that the billions of dollars in government IT investments will be wisely spent. To improve the department’s IT investment management processes, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury take the following eight actions: develop a capital planning and investment control guide that includes, for example, the elements of practice 2.1; develop work processes and procedures for the agency’s IT investment management board, and document the alignment and coordination of responsibilities of its various boards for decision making related to investments, including the criteria for which investments—including cross-cutting investments—will be reviewed by the enterprisewide board; use the department’s IT asset inventory as part of managerial decision making, including using it to identify the potential for asset duplication; establish a policy requiring that proposed IT investments support work processes that have been simplified or redesigned to reduce costs and improve effectiveness and that makes maximum use of COTS software; implement a structured IT selection process that includes the elements of practices 2.12 and 2.13; establish a policy requiring modularized IT investments; implement an IT investment management process that includes a control phase that addresses, for example, the elements of practices 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17; and implement an IT investment management process that includes an evaluation phase that addresses, for example, the elements of practice 2.18. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, the Congress has promulgated laws and the Office of Management and Budget and GAO have issued policies and guidance, respectively, on (1) information technology (IT) strategic planning/performance measurement (which defines what an organization seeks to accomplish, identifies the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and then determines how well it is succeeding in reaching resultsoriented goals and achieving objectives) and (2) investment management (which involves selecting, controlling, and evaluating investments). To obtain an understanding of the government's implementation of these key IT management policies, congressional requesters asked GAO to determine the extent to which 26 major agencies have in place practices associated with key legislative and other requirements for (1) IT strategic planning/ performance measurement and (2) IT investment management.
What GAO Found
Agencies' use of 12 IT strategic planning/performance measurement practices--identified based on legislation, policy, and guidance--is uneven. For example, agencies generally have IT strategic plans and goals, but these goals are not always linked to specific performance measures that are tracked. Without enterprisewide performance measures that are tracked against actual results, agencies lack critical information about whether their overall IT activities are achieving expected goals. Agencies' use of 18 IT investment management practices that GAO identified is also mixed. For example, the agencies largely have IT investment management boards, but no agency had the practices associated with the control phase fully in place. Executive-level oversight of project-level management activities provides organizations with increased assurance that each investment will achieve the desired cost, benefit, and schedule results. Agencies cited a variety of reasons for not having practices fully in place, such as that the chief information officer position had been vacant, that not including a requirement in guidance was an oversight, and that the process was being revised, although they could not always provide an explanation. Regardless of the reason, these practices are important ingredients for ensuring effective strategic planning, performance measurement, and investment management, which, in turn, make it more likely that the billions of dollars in government IT investments are wisely spent. |
gao_GAO-13-464T | gao_GAO-13-464T_0 | CRs Provide Interim Funding for Agencies and Programs
We conducted our work for GAO-09-879 from September 2008 to September 2009 and updated the analysis of the number and duration of continuing resolutions from February to March 2013. until agreement is reached on final appropriations, they create uncertainty for agencies about both when they will receive their final appropriation and what level of funding ultimately will be available. The effects of CRs on federal agencies differ in part on the duration and number of CRs. As the examples in my statement will illustrate, shorter and more numerous CRs can lead to repetitive work. The effects of CRs also vary by agency and program. Not all federal agencies, for example, are under CRs for the same amount of time. Congress includes provisions applicable to the funding of most agencies and programs under a CR. In general, CRs prohibit new activities and projects for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available in the prior year. Also, so the agency action does not impinge upon final funding prerogatives, agencies are directed to take only the most limited funding actions and CRs limit the ability of an agency to obligate all, or a large share of its available appropriation during the CR. Recognizing the constraints inherent in a CR, Congress has at times provided flexibility for certain programs and initiatives through the use of legislative anomalies, which provide funding and authorities different from the standard CR provisions. Delays and Increased Workload Affected Agencies’ Ability to Carry Out their Missions Efficiently and Effectively
Continuing Resolutions Affected the Level, Cost, and Quality of Services
Case study agency officials contacted for our 2009 report said that, absent a CR, they would have hired additional staff sooner for government services such as grant processing and oversight, food and drug inspections, intelligence analysis, prison security, claims processing for veterans’ benefits, or general administrative tasks, such as financial management and budget execution. Several case study agencies also reported delaying contracts during the CR period, which could reduce the level of services agencies provided and increased costs. Increased Workload Stemming from Continuing Resolutions Diverted Resources from Competing Priorities
In addition to delays, all case study agencies reported having to perform additional work to manage within the constraints of the CR—potentially resulting in hundreds of hours of lost productivity. Agencies’ Strategies to Manage Inefficiencies Resulting from CRs Varied
Agency officials told us they took various actions to manage inefficiencies resulting from CRs, including delays and increased workload. To reduce the amount of additional work required to modify contracts and award grants in multiple installments, ACF and FDA reported shifting contract and grant cycles to later in the fiscal year. An agency can shift its contract cycle so that To reduce the administrative work required to subdivide funds from each CR to different offices, programs, or both, VBA and VHA reported that they did not allot specific dollar amounts during a CR but rather provided guidance that all offices operate at a certain percentage of the previous year’s appropriations. According to agency officials, this provides the agency with more flexibility during the CR period and reduces the workload associated with changes in funding levels. We have not reviewed agency operations under CRs since we issued our 2009 report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress annually faces difficult decisions on what to fund among competing priorities and interests with available resources. Continuing resolutions (CRs) can create budget uncertainty, complicating agency operations and causing inefficiencies. In all but 3 of the last 30 years, Congress has passed CRs to provide funding for agencies to continue operating until agreement is reached on final appropriations.
GAO was asked to provide a statement based on findings from its 2009 report on managing under CRs ( GAO-09-879 ). This statement focuses on (1) a history of CRs and the provisions that Congress includes within them and (2) the effects of CRs on agency operations and actions that federal agencies have taken to manage these effects. GAO's 2009 report reviewed six federal agencies within three cabinet-level departments selected based on factors such as the length of time spent managing under CRs and the types of services they provided. These six case study agencies were the Administration for Children and Families and the Food and Drug Administration within the Department of Health and Human Services; Veterans Health Administration and Veterans Benefits Administration within the Department of Veterans Affairs; and Bureau of Prisons and Federal Bureau of Investigation within the Department of Justice. Under CRs that provide funding for the remainder of a fiscal year, agencies obtain certainty about funding. Therefore, CRs that spanned the months remaining in a fiscal year were not the focus of GAO's report.
GAO did not make recommendations in the 2009 report.
What GAO Found
Because CRs only provide funding until agreement is reached on final appropriations, they create uncertainty for agencies about both when they will receive their final appropriation and what level of funding ultimately will be available. Effects of CRs on federal agencies differ based in part on the duration and number of CRs and may vary by agency and program. CRs include provisions that prohibit agencies from beginning new activities and projects and direct agencies to take only the most limited funding actions. Congress can provide flexibility for certain programs and initiatives through the use of legislative anomalies, which provide funding and authorities different from the standard CR provisions.
Officials from all six case study agencies reported that they delayed hiring or contracts during the CR period, potentially reducing the level of services agencies provided and increasing costs. After operating under CRs for a prolonged time, agencies faced additional challenges executing their final budget as they rushed to spend funds in a compressed timeframe. All case study agencies reported performing additional work to manage within CR constraints, such as issuing shorter term grants and contracts multiple times. Agency officials reported taking varied actions to manage inefficiencies resulting from CRs, including shifting contract and grant cycles to later in the fiscal year to avoid repetitive work, and providing guidance on spending rather than allotting specific dollar amounts during CRs to provide more flexibility and reduce the workload associated with changes in funding levels. |
gao_GAO-04-886T | gao_GAO-04-886T_0 | Several of these material weaknesses (referred to hereafter as material deficiencies) resulted in conditions that continued to prevent us from forming and expressing an opinion on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2003 and 2002. Major challenges include the federal government’s inability to properly account for and report property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily at the Department of Defense (DOD); reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities and related costs at DOD, and ensure complete and proper reporting for commitments and contingencies; support major portions of the total net cost of government operations, most notably related to DOD, and ensure that all disbursements are properly recorded; fully account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances; demonstrate how net outlay amounts reported in the consolidated financial statements were related to net outlay amounts reported in the underlying federal agencies’ financial statements; and effectively prepare the federal government’s financial statements, including ensuring that the consolidated financial statements are consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, balanced, and in conformity with GAAP. Three major impediments to an opinion on the consolidated financial statements are (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government’s inability to fully account for and reconcile transactions between federal government entities, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. Truth and Transparency in the Fiscal Outlook
Our nation’s large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance, which is driven largely by known demographic trends and rising health care costs—coupled with new homeland security and defense commitments—serves to sharpen the need to fundamentally review and re-examine basic federal entitlements, as well as other mandatory and discretionary spending, and tax policies. Current financial reporting does not clearly and transparently show the wide range of responsibilities, programs, and activities that may either obligate the federal government to future spending or create an expectation for such spending and provides an unrealistic and even misleading picture of the federal government’s overall performance and financial condition. In addition, too many significant federal government commitments and obligations, such as Social Security and Medicare, are not fully and consistently disclosed in the federal government’s consolidated financial statements and budget, and current federal financial reporting standards do not require such disclosure. Proper accounting and reporting practices are essential in the public sector. After all, the U.S. government is the largest, most diverse, most complex, and arguably the most important entity on earth today. Its services—homeland security, national defense, Social Security, mail delivery, and food inspection, to name a few—directly affect the well-being of almost every American. But sound decisions on the future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are made more difficult without timely, accurate, and useful financial and performance information. A top-to-bottom review of government activities to ensure their relevance and fit for the 21st century and their relative priority is long overdue. As I have spoken about in the past, the federal government needs a three-pronged approach to (1) restructure existing entitlement programs, (2) reexamine the base of discretionary and other spending, and (3) review and revise the federal government’s tax policy, including major tax preferences, and enforcement programs. New accounting and reporting approaches, budget control mechanisms, and metrics are needed for considering and measuring the impact of spending and tax policies and decisions over the long term. The requirement for timely, accurate, and useful financial and performance management information is greater than ever as our nation faces major long-term fiscal challenges that will require tough choices in setting priorities and linking resources to results. Problems in accounting for liabilities affect the determination of the full cost of the federal government’s current operations and the extent of its liabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required to annually audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Proper accounting and reporting practices are essential in the public sector. The U.S. government is the largest, most diverse, most complex, and arguably the most important entity on earth today. Its services--homeland security, national defense, Social Security, mail delivery, and food inspection, to name a few--directly affect the well-being of almost every American. But sound decisions on the future direction of vital federal government programs and policies are made more difficult without timely, accurate, and useful financial and performance information. Until the problems discussed in GAO's audit report on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements are adequately addressed, they will continue to (1) hamper the federal government's ability to accurately report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, and costs; (2) affect the federal government's ability to accurately measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs while effectively managing related operations; and (3) significantly impair the federal government's ability to adequately safeguard certain significant assets and properly record various transactions.
What GAO Found
As in the 6 previous fiscal years, certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and reporting practices resulted in conditions that continued to prevent GAO from being able to provide the Congress and American citizens an opinion as to whether the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government are fairly stated in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Three major impediments to an opinion on the consolidated financial statements continue to be (1) serious financial management problems at DOD, (2) the federal government's inability to fully account for and reconcile transactions between federal government entities, and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. For fiscal year 2003, 20 of 23 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies received unqualified opinions, the same number received by these agencies in fiscal year 2002, up from 6 for fiscal year 1996. However, only 3 of the CFO Act agencies had neither a material weakness in internal control, an issue involving compliance with applicable laws and regulations, nor an instance of lack of substantial compliance with Federal Financial Management Improvement Act requirements. The requirement for timely, accurate, and useful financial and performance management information is greater than ever as our nation faces major longterm fiscal challenges that will require tough choices in setting priorities and linking resources to results. Given the nation's large and growing long-term fiscal imbalance, which is driven largely by known demographic trends and health care costs, coupled with new homeland security and defense commitments, the status quo is unsustainable. Current financial reporting does not clearly and transparently show the wide range of responsibilities, programs, and activities that may either obligate the federal government to future spending or create an expectation for such spending and provides an unrealistic and even misleading picture of the federal government's overall performance and financial condition. In addition, too many significant federal government commitments and obligations, such as Social Security and Medicare, are not adequately addressed in the federal government's financial statements and budget process, and current federal financial reporting standards do not require such disclosure. A top-to-bottom review of government activities to ensure their relevance and fit for the 21st century and their relative priority is long overdue. The federal government needs a three-pronged approach to (1) restructure existing entitlement programs, (2) reexamine the base of discretionary and other spending, and (3) review and revise the federal government's tax policy and enforcement programs. New accounting and reporting approaches, budget control mechanisms, and metrics are needed for considering and measuring the impact of spending and tax policies and decisions over the long term. |
gao_GAO-04-1085T | gao_GAO-04-1085T_0 | In October 2003, GSA released a RFI describing its initial strategy for the Networx program. In the RFI, GSA proposed two acquisitions—Networx Universal and Networx Select. The Universal acquisition was expected to satisfy requirements for a full range of national and international network services. In addition, offerors were to provide these services at all locations across the United States. These contracts were to provide agencies with leading edge services and solutions with less extensive geographic and service coverage than that required by Universal. Awards under the Universal and Select acquisitions were to be staggered; the Select contracts were to be awarded 9 months after the Universal contracts. In February 2004, we testified on GSA’s initial planning efforts in support of FTS Networx. After reviewing the RFI and the comments submitted in response, we identified four major challenges that GSA was likely to face as it proceeded: ● structuring and scheduling the Networx contracts to ensure that federal agencies have available to them the competitively priced telecommunications services they need to support their mission objectives; initiating the implementation planning actions needed to ensure a smooth transition from current contracts to Networx; ● ensuring that adequate inventory information is available to planners to provide an informed understanding of governmentwide requirements; and ● establishing measures of success to aid acquisition decision making and enable effective program management. Instead of having to offer services in the entire country, service providers need only offer service where federal offices are located (as well as where the provider offers the service commercially) to qualify to compete for the contracts. GSA has also addressed the concern over the time between contracts, by changing the proposed 9-month lag between the two types of contracts. GSA currently plans to issue the requests for proposal (RFP) for both the Universal and the Enterprise contracts simultaneously. However, GSA has not yet developed procedures to ensure that lessons from past transitions are applied, nor has it established a timeline of actions needed during the transition process. GSA Has Developed an Inventory of Current Services, and Has Begun Planning for a More Detailed Inventory
We testified in February that it is important that GSA and its customer agencies have a clear understanding of agency service requirements in order to make properly informed acquisition planning decisions. Second, GSA is planning to work with its customer agencies to develop more detailed inventories for transition purposes. According to agency officials, GSA plans to measure its performance against each of the program’s goals. In addition, GSA has not developed a strategy outlining how it will use key measures to monitor ongoing program performance. We therefore recommend that GSA finalize its efforts to identify measures to evaluate progress towards program goals and develop a strategy for using those measures for ongoing program management. In response to industry’s concern about the number of billing elements, GSA reduced the number of elements required under the Networx contracts. In response to the concerns about the accuracy of billing information, GSA plans to introduce service level agreements with the carriers to hold the carriers accountable for the accuracy of the billing data they provide. To better address this challenge, we are recommending that GSA develop and implement a strategy for addressing the billing data issues raised by its customer agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Services Administration (GSA) has begun planning for a governmentwide telecommunications program known as Networx. GSA issued a request for information in October 2003 that proposed two acquisitions: Networx Universal, which was to provide a full range of national and international network services across the United States, and Networx Select, which was to provide agencies with leading-edge services with less extensive geographic coverage. Contracts under the Select acquisition were to be awarded 9 months after the Universal In February, we testified on GSA's initial plans and identified four key challenges GSA faced in ensuring a successful outcome for the program: structure and scheduling, transition planning, service inventories, and performance measures. GAO assessed GSA's progress in addressing the challenges identified as well as GSA's efforts to address long-standing issues related to billing.
What GAO Found
GSA has addressed several of the significant challenges facing the Networx program. Work is either planned or underway on other challenges, but additional efforts will be necessary to fully address them. Specifically, GSA has addressed concerns about the structure and scheduling of the two acquisitions, now known as Universal and Enterprise. Instead of a 9-month lag between acquisitions that might complicate agency decision-making, GSA now plans to issue the requests for proposal (RFP) for the contracts simultaneously. In addition, the Universal contracts will now require that offerors provide services only where federal agencies are located, rather than in the entire country, to allow more potential industry participants to compete--a concern raised in prior comments. GSA has solicited for contractor support to assist with the development of plans to transition to the Networx contracts. However, GSA has not yet developed procedures to ensure that lessons from past transitions are applied, or established a transition strategy. GSA worked with agencies to develop a service-level inventory as input into the requirements for the new contracts. In addition, it plans to work with agencies to build a more detailed inventory of currently-used telecommunications services for use during transition. GSA plans to implement performance measures that evaluate progress against the program's goals. However, some of the measures are still under development, and it does not have a strategy for using the measures to monitor ongoing program performance. GSA has reduced the number of billing elements it will track and has begun a study designed to identify potential improvements in the billing process, but it lacks a strategy for addressing agency concerns about the usability of billing data. Until GSA develops and applies strategies for addressing the outstanding challenges facing Networx, it risks not being able to deliver all of the operations and cost improvements outlined in the program's goals. |
gao_NSIAD-96-34 | gao_NSIAD-96-34_0 | Introduction
Since the 1940s, the U.S. government has assisted private voluntary organizations’ (PVO) overseas activities. Literature on PVOs’ development activities describes some of the qualities that PVOs exhibit: familiarity with local populations and ability to work with the poor at the community level, innovation in approaches and flexibility in responding to development needs, lower cost compared to government-to-government aid programs, staff dedicated to the PVOs’ mission and willing to work under difficult conditions, long-term commitment to development, and ability to work with INGOs to strengthen local development capabilities. Evolution of U.S. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine (1) PVOs’ role in delivering USAID-funded foreign assistance; (2) potential issues and implications of increasing their role in delivering assistance, including accountability issues; (3) the success of their projects in achieving their objectives; and (4) the extent to which these organizations are dependent on U.S. government funding. 2.5 for a water system project in Honduras.) Providing assistance funds directly to PVOs or through a foundation, as suggested in some of the reform proposals, would eliminate a key accountability mechanism from the U.S. foreign assistance program, and the Congress would have to accept more risk and less accountability for funds expended. Most projects we reviewed included some activities designed to improve local capacity. PVO Projects Generally Achieving Most Project Objectives
The 20 projects in our case study that were making progress toward their objectives reflected a combination of the factors identified in development literature as being necessary for successful projects: good design and clear objectives, experience in the country and the development sector, qualified management and staff, and local participation. The PVO had good project design, which included local input and clear objectives, and had capable staff. However, we found that PVOs generally are less dependent on government funding than they were a decade or more ago—although some individual PVO in-country projects are funded entirely by USAID. While federal spending on PVOs has increased in absolute terms since 1982, the percentage of total PVO resources coming from the federal government has decreased 13 percent (for PVOs that receive federal funds), from 42 percent in 1982 to 29 percent in 1992. This is because private donations have increased at a much faster rate than federal funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed private voluntary organizations' (PVO) role in delivering federally funded foreign assistance, focusing on the: (1) implications of increasing PVO role in delivering assistance; (2) success of PVO projects in achieving their objectives; and (3) extent to which PVO are dependent on U.S. government funding.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the PVO community encompasses organizations of varying sizes, missions, geographic focuses, and capabilities, and they work to address varied development needs; (2) PVOs serve as a complement to traditional government-to-government assistance and can be a mechanism to strengthen indigenous community-level organizations; (3) while PVOs have demonstrated that they are generally effective in carrying out community-based development projects, most have not had wide experience in working with governments and institutions on sectoral and macroeconomic policy reforms necessary to create an environment favorable to development; (4) twenty of the 26 PVO projects GAO reviewed were making progress toward their objectives, and good project design, competent in-country staff, and local participation were factors common to the most successful projects; (5) PVOs are increasingly using local groups to carry out projects, which should increase the local capacity for development; (6) most projects GAO reviewed included local capacity building, which is critical to long-term development and sustainability; (7) accountability for Agency for International Development (AID) assistance funds has been a continuing concern, and over the last decade, AID has encouraged and assisted PVOs to improve their program and financial management systems; (8) providing increased amounts of foreign aid directly through PVOs or through a foundation, as suggested in some reform proposals, would remove a key accountability mechanism from the U.S. foreign assistance programs; (9) although some individual PVO projects may be funded entirely by AID, PVOs, as a group, have become less dependent on U.S. funding; (10) federal funding as a share of total funding for PVOs receiving federal support dropped from 42 percent to 29 percent between 1982 and 1992; and (11) U.S. funding for PVOs has increased, but private resources have increased faster. |
gao_GAO-14-373 | gao_GAO-14-373_0 | The joint report is also to include a detailed description of costs included in the budget estimates and the methodology used to create the estimates.modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities—including nuclear delivery systems, the nuclear command and control system, and the DOE’s and DOD’s 10-year estimates for sustaining and nuclear stockpile and nuclear security enterprise—total $263.8 billion through fiscal year 2023. DOE’s and DOD’s 10- Year Estimates Are Incomplete, and DOD’s Methodology for Preparing Some Estimates Is Not Fully Transparent
DOE’s and DOD’s $263.8 billion budget estimates in the July 2013 joint report are generally consistent with their internal funding plans through fiscal year 2018, but their overall estimates in the joint report are incomplete; although DOE’s methodological assumptions are transparent in the related Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, key DOD methodological assumptions and limitations underlying some estimates are not documented in the joint report, limiting the report’s transparency. In December 2013 we recommended that DOE include a range of preliminary budget estimates in future funding plans to improve alignment, and DOE generally concurred with this recommendation. In this review, we found that DOD’s $125.5 billion estimate for nuclear delivery systems is generally consistent with its budget-justification documents and funding plans, but DOD’s 10-year budget estimate did not include potential estimates for key Air Force modernization efforts. Additionally, in preparing the $40.8 billion estimate for sustaining and modernizing the NC3 system, DOD did not document key methodological assumptions and limitations or make them transparent in the report. GAO Previously Reported That DOE’s Budget Estimates for Certain Near-Term and Long-Term Modernization Efforts Are Incomplete
DOE’s $97.5 billion estimate in the joint report for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security enterprise is consistent with the funding plans in its FYNSP and its Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and its methodological assumptions for preparing this estimate are transparent, but as we found in December 2013, these estimates are incomplete because they are less than what will be needed through fiscal year 2023 to meet the schedules of key modernization efforts. Consequently, DOD’s 10- year estimate in the joint report may be significantly underreported, depending on the magnitude of the costs resulting from upcoming decisions about how to modernize these delivery systems. By treating key Air Force modernization efforts as zero-cost, instead of including a range of potential budget estimates based on preliminary cost information, DOD limited the value of the joint report as a congressional tool for understanding the estimate or for assessing the long-term affordability of DOD’s modernization plans. As a result, it could be difficult for Congress to understand the basis for this estimate, or compare one year’s estimates to the next, as it assesses long-term affordability when allocating resources. Unless the Secretary of Defense directs that key assumptions and limitations are documented in future reports, the basis for its NC3 estimates may not be adequately transparent for Congress to determine reasonable resource allocations, and Congress may not be able to identify changes in the estimates from one annual report to the next. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve subsequent joint reports to Congress on plans for sustaining and modernizing U.S nuclear weapons capabilities:
To ensure the accuracy and completeness of DOD’s estimates for sustaining and modernizing strategic delivery systems over the 10- year period covered in subsequent joint reports, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the Navy, as appropriate, to include at least a range of potential budget estimates for projects and programs in future modernization plans that extend beyond the period covered by their 5- year internal funding plans, based on preliminary cost information. DOE generally agreed with this recommendation. Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or [email protected], or David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the July 15, 2013, joint report to Congress from the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) that describes their plans and 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities and assessed whether their budget estimates in that report are accurate and complete (consistent) with respect to their long-term plans, including whether the report provides complete information and a transparent methodology, in three areas: (1) DOE nuclear security enterprise modernization; (2) DOD nuclear delivery systems; and (3) the DOD nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system. To address our objective, we obtained and analyzed the DOE and DOD plans and estimates from the July 15, 2013, joint report, and analyzed the DOE and DOD data and methodologies used to prepare their 10-year budget estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE and DOD are undertaking an extensive effort to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile, research and production infrastructure, delivery systems, and the nuclear command and control system. Completing this effort is expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars over decades. Congress mandated the development of an annual report on the departments' plans and 10-year budget estimates for these efforts. Congress also mandated GAO to review the accuracy and completeness of the DOE and DOD report, with respect to the budget estimate contents and methodology.
This report addresses whether DOE's and DOD's 10-year budget estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent are consistent with their funding plans, including whether the report provides complete information and a transparent methodology. GAO analyzed the DOE and DOD plans and estimates as of July 2013, and the DOE and DOD guidance and methodologies used to prepare their budget estimates.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Energy's (DOE) and Defense's (DOD) $263.8 billion, 10-year estimates in their report to Congress for sustaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities are generally consistent with their funding plans through fiscal year 2018. However, GAO identified shortcomings with respect to the completeness of the budget estimates and the transparency of the assumptions and limitations that underlie the 10-year estimate. Specifically:
Nuclear stockpile and infrastructure: Based on GAO's recent review of DOE's long-term plans and estimates for sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise, we found that DOE's $97.5 billion estimate in the report includes less funding than will be needed through fiscal year 2018 to meet program milestones for planned nuclear weapon life extensions, and through fiscal year 2023 to meet milestones for constructing key facilities.
Nuclear delivery systems: DOD's $125.5 billion estimate in the report does not include potential budget estimates for Air Force efforts to modernize intercontinental ballistic missiles or to develop a new bomber. Instead, DOD treated these efforts as zero-cost in the estimate. Consequently, DOD may be significantly underreporting its 10-year estimate, depending on the magnitude of the costs resulting from upcoming decisions about how to modernize these delivery systems.
Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3): DOD's methodology for preparing its $40.8 billion estimate to sustain and modernize its system for assuring connectivity between the President and nuclear forces is not fully transparent because key assumptions and potential limitations are not documented in the report to Congress. As a result, Congress has a limited basis for understanding the estimate, or for comparing the estimates in one annual report to the next, as it assesses long-term affordability when allocating resources.
The report omits estimates for certain programs, such as the new bomber, and is not fully transparent in describing key assumptions and limitations for estimating nuclear command, control, and communications system funding, which limits its utility for budgetary planning. Key principles that GAO derived from federal budget guidance stress the importance of including all relevant funding estimates in the plan, as well as documenting methodological assumptions and potential limitations. However, DOD did not specifically direct the Air Force to include a range of potential budget estimates in the report for developing a new intercontinental missile or bomber, where a firm estimate was unavailable. DOD also did not direct that key assumptions and limitations be documented in the report for preparing its NC3 estimates. GAO reported in December 2013 that DOE's nuclear stockpile and infrastructure estimates did not include a range of preliminary budget estimates to account for known future expenses. GAO recommended that DOE include a range of potential budget estimates for preliminary projects and programs in future funding plans, and DOE generally agreed with this recommendation. Without a range of potential estimates and fully documented assumptions and limitations, the report is an incomplete tool for congressional oversight.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the completeness and transparency of subsequent joint reports, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct DOD components to (1) include at least a range of potential 10-year budget estimates for projects and programs, based on preliminary cost information (this is consistent with a December 2013 recommendation GAO made to DOE); and (2) document assumptions and limitations affecting its NC3 funding estimates. DOD agreed with these recommendations.
, or David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . |
gao_RCED-99-46 | gao_RCED-99-46_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the potential barriers that shippers face in seeking relief from allegedly unreasonable rail rates, Senators Byron L. Dorgan, Conrad R. Burns, John D. Rockefeller IV, and Pat Roberts asked us to describe (1) the Board’s rate relief complaint process and how it has changed since the ICC Termination Act of 1995 became law, (2) the number and outcome of rate relief cases pending or filed since 1990, and (3) the opinions of shippers as to the barriers they face when bringing rate complaints to the Board and potential changes to the process to reduce these barriers. The Board’s Rail Rate Complaint Process
While there have been some changes to the rate complaint process since the ICC Termination Act, the process continues to be relatively complex and time-consuming. The Board first determines whether the railroad dominates the shipper’s transportation market. Rate Relief Cases Require Determination of Market Dominance
By statute, the Board may assess whether a challenged rate is reasonable only if the railroad dominates the shipper’s transportation market. Under the stand-alone cost approach routinely used in rate cases, a shipper develops a model of a hypothetical, optimally efficient railroad that could serve the complaining shipper. Since 1986, the Board or its predecessor has attempted to develop simplified guidelines. These standard procedures address the concerns that the Board must consider under the statute as it seeks to balance two competing goals: considering the needs of the railroad industry for adequate revenues while simultaneously ensuring that the industry does not exert an unfair advantage over captive shippers. However, we have modified the report to reflect the Board’s views that important aspects of the rate-relief process or the competitive structure of the railroad industry can only be changed with the support and approval of the Congress. Accordingly, we believe that it is still too early to declare the simplified procedures a success. Decline in Complaints Filed, and Few Rates Have Been Found Unreasonable
Very few shippers served by class I railroads have complained to the Board or the ICC about the railroads’ rates. In addition, the challenged rates were found to be unreasonable in two cases, seven complaints were dismissed in favor of the railroad, and five were dismissed for other reasons. II for a complete list of these complaints.) Our survey responses suggest that the remaining 75 percent believe that their rates were unreasonable and that barriers kept them from filing a complaint under the standard procedures. Generally, shippers found cost, complexity, and time to be significant barriers that kept them from filing standard rate complaints. While the railroads recognize shippers’ concerns, they contend that the Board’s process is well suited to determining rate reasonableness. U.S. Legal costs associated with filing outweigh the benefits Rate complaint process is too complex Rate complaint process takes too long Stand-alone cost model is too costly to prepare Railroad will most likely win case Getting information from railroads is too difficult Consulting costs are too high Discovery requests from railroad difficult Fear of reprisal from railroads Other parts of the process are too costly 40.8 Table III.8: Percentage of Rail Shippers That Believe Suggested Changes for Improving the Rate Complaint Process Were Extremely to Very Important (Table 4.2)
Chemicals and plastics shippers Missing Each percentage represents rail shippers who expressed an opinion regarding a particular suggestion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the Surface Transportation Board's rate relief complaint process and how it has changed since the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Termination Act of 1995 became law; (2) the number and outcome of rate relief cases pending or filed since 1990; and (3) the barriers that shippers face when bringing rate complaints to the Board and potential changes to the process to reduce these barriers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Surface Transportation Board's standard procedures for obtaining rate relief are highly complex and time-consuming; (2) under these standard procedures, the Board: (a) evaluates all competition within the market allegedly dominated by a railroad; and (b) typically assesses the results of a shipper-developed model of a hypothetical, optimally efficient railroad that could provide comparable service in place of the shipper's railroad; (3) the process reflects a statutory scheme whereby the Board must balance two competing objectives: considering the need of the railroad industry for adequate revenues while simultaneously ensuring that the industry does not exert an unfair advantage over shippers without competitive alternatives; (4) since the ICC Termination Act, the Board has attempted to improve the rate complaint process and simplify the process for shippers; (5) it is too early to tell if these steps will significantly lessen the burden of the rate complaint process; (6) very few shippers served by class I railroads have complained to the Board about railroads' rates; (7) generally, only those shippers that depend on rail transportation, such as coal, chemical, and grain shippers, have filed complaints; (8) 18 of these complaints were resolved by negotiated settlements with the railroads before the Board or its predecessor determined whether the contested rate was reasonable; (9) in addition, seven complaints were dismissed in favor of the railroad, five were dismissed for other reasons, and two complaints resulted in rate relief to shippers; (10) nine complaints remain before the Board; (11) GAO's results suggest that of the 709 rail shippers that responded, 531 do not believe that their rail rates are always reasonable and therefore might use the rate complaint process; (12) of the shippers who expressed an opinion about the rate complaint process, GAO estimates that over 70 percent believe that the time, complexity, and costs of filing complaints are barriers that often preclude them from seeking rate relief; (13) all the major U.S. railroads, on the other hand, are generally satisfied with the standard rate complaint process, contending that it is well suited to determining whether a railroad dominates the shipper's market and what rate relief may be needed; (14) however, railroads do not support the simplified procedures or the Board's December 1998 decision to change aspects of its market dominance approach; and (15) this divergence of opinion may make responding to shippers' concerns about the barriers in the rate relief process difficult to resolve. |
gao_GAO-02-914T | gao_GAO-02-914T_0 | Transition assistance, including employment and job training services, was established to help such service members make suitable educational and career choices as they readjusted to civilian life. DOL spent about $5 million in fiscal year 2001 to provide about 3,200 workshops, in addition to the funding spent on transition assistance by the military branches shown in table 1. The Transition Commission examined pre- separation counseling and transition assistance program workshops as part of its work. Transition Assistance Varies in Key Ways Across the Military Branches
Each branch of the military provides the required pre-separation counseling and offers workshops focusing on employment assistance and veterans’ benefits, although not all service members participate. The military branches have considerable flexibility in designing their programs, allowing them to vary the content as well as the delivery of their programs. Service Members Experience Differences in Content, Delivery, and Access to Transition Services
Because the military experiences of the members in each branch are different, some branches tailor the content of transition services to better meet the needs of their service members. Evaluating the effectiveness of these services is complicated by data inadequacies and methodological difficulties. Two studies conducted about 10 years ago found limited impact of transition assistance on employment. | What GAO Found
Since its inception, the Transition Assistance Program has served more than one million separating and retiring military personnel through the coordinated efforts of the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Labor (DOL), and Veterans Affairs. In fiscal year 2001, the military branches and DOL spent $47.5 million to provide transition assistance to 222,000 separating and retiring service members. Although each branch provides required preparation counseling and offers transition assistance workshops to help service members transition to civilian life, not all eligible service members receive transition assistance. Because they have considerable flexibility in designing their programs, transition assistance varies in content and delivery across the military branches. In addition, service members experienced differences in access to transition assistance depending on their unique circumstances. Isolating the impact of transition assistance on employment, education, and other outcomes is difficult because of data inadequacies and methodological challenges. |
gao_GAO-02-617 | gao_GAO-02-617_0 | Fifth, Air Force procedures for following up on shipments that contractors have not confirmed as received are ineffective. Sixth, the Air Force has not provided adequate oversight of shipments to contractors. Quarterly Shipment Reports Not Provided
To independently verify that contractors have accounted for all government-furnished material received, DOD policy requires inventory control points to provide to property administrators at the Defense Contract Management Agency quarterly status reports showing all shipments of Air Force material to contractors. We found that contractors had not always properly posted material receipts for these items into their records or into the inventory control points’ reporting systems. Conclusions
Inventory worth billions of dollars has been vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse because the Air Force either did not adhere to control procedures or did not establish effective procedures. Finally, the Air Force has not exercised the required extent of program oversight by collecting data on contractor shipment discrepancies and using it to assess practices for safeguarding shipped inventory; as a result, it cannot identify the extent and cause of contractor shipment discrepancies or take corrective action. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the control of inventory being shipped, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to undertake the following: Improve processes for providing contractor access to government- furnished material by listing specific stock numbers and quantities of material in repair contracts (as they are modified or newly written) that the inventory control points have agreed to furnish to contractors; demonstrating that automated internal control systems for loading and screening stock numbers and quantities against contractor requisitions perform as designed; loading stock numbers and quantities that the inventory control points have agreed to furnish to contractors into the control systems manually until the automated systems have been shown to perform as designed; and requiring that waivers to loading stock numbers and quantities manually are adequately justified and documented based on cost- effective and/or mission-critical needs. High-Risk Series: Defense Inventory Management. | What GAO Found
GAO has considered Department of Defense (DOD) inventory management to be a high-risk area since 1990 because inventory management systems and procedures are ineffective. This report evaluates the Air Force's inventory control procedures for material shipped to contractors for repair or for use in repair. The Air Force and contractor personnel have not complied with DOD and Air Force inventory control procedures designed to safeguard material shipped to contractors, placing items worth billions of dollars at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. The Air Force's three inventory control points have not restricted repair contractors' access to the specific items and quantities of government-furnished material needed to accomplish the contract. Quarterly reports on the status of shipped material have not been sent to property administration officials at the Defense Contract Management Agency. Contractors receiving shipped material have not (1) properly entered the receipt of shipments into their records and into the inventory control points' reporting systems or (2) routinely reported shipment discrepancies. Air Force procedures for following up on shipments that contractors have not confirmed as received are ineffective, leaving the status of the shipments uncertain. The Air Force has not provided adequate program oversight because it does not request and analyze data on contractor shipment discrepancies to identify their extent and cause so that corrective action may be taken. |
gao_GAO-07-753 | gao_GAO-07-753_0 | Depending on workers’ circumstances, these policies can provide incentives to retire at certain ages, and send signals or set norms about when it is appropriate to retire. In general, the availability of Social Security benefits at age 62 offers an incentive to retire before full retirement age, though changes in program rules are progressively weakening that incentive. The Social Security full retirement age, which has traditionally been age 65, is gradually rising to 67. The increase in full retirement age and the larger penalty for early retirement reduce the incentive to start drawing Social Security benefits and retiring early. As such, it provides an incentive to reduce the number of hours worked or stop working altogether. On the other hand, Medicare’s availability at 65 can be an incentive to retire before Social Security’s rising full retirement age. Half of Workers Retire Well before Their Full Retirement Age, Although Early Evidence Points to Some Changes Following Recent Implementation of Social Security Policies
About half of those in the HRS study group reported being fully retired by the time they reached age 63, and over the last several years SSA data indicate that nearly half started drawing benefits at age 62 and 1 month, their earliest opportunity to do so. Following Elimination of the Earnings Test, More Workers Are Remaining in the Labor Force beyond Full Retirement Age
Along with these modest delays in claiming Social Security benefits that are associated with the rising full retirement age, we found that some increases in labor force participation coincided with the elimination of the earnings test in January 2000. Tax-Favored Private Retiree Health Insurance and Pension Plans May Influence Retirement Patterns
We found employer-provided retiree health insurance and pension plans are strongly associated with when workers retire based on our analysis of retirement behavior using the HRS. Workers with Employer- Provided Retiree Health Benefits Have Been More Likely to Retire before 65
Our analysis of retirement behavior suggests that workers who have access to health insurance in retirement are substantially more likely to retire before becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65 than those without such access. We also found that workers with retiree health insurance were more likely to retire before they became eligible for early Social Security benefits at the age of 62 (109 percent and 76 percent more likely, respectively for men and women). On the other hand, we found that men with DC plans were 47 percent less likely to retire by 62 than those without DC plans. With so many factors influencing workers’ decisions about when to retire, changes may be gradual and limited. For example, as Social Security’s full retirement age rises to age 67, Medicare’s eligibility age remains at 65. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to 1) identify incentives federal policies provide about when to retire; (2) determine recent retirement patterns and whether there is evidence that recent changes in Social Security requirements have resulted in later retirements; and 3) determine if there is evidence that tax- favored private retiree health insurance and pension benefits influence when people retire. | Why GAO Did This Study
While many factors influence workers' decisions to retire, Social Security, Medicare, and pension laws also play a role, offering incentives to retire earlier and later. Identifying these incentives and how workers respond can help policy makers address the demographic challenges facing the nation. GAO assessed (1) the incentives federal policies provide about when to retire, (2) recent retirement patterns and whether there is evidence that changes in Social Security requirements have resulted in later retirements, and (3) whether tax-favored private retiree health insurance and pension benefits influence when people retire. GAO analyzed retirement age laws and SSA data and conducted statistical analysis of Health and Retirement Study data. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO has prepared this report on its own initiative.
What GAO Found
Federal policies offer incentives to retire both earlier and later than Social Security's full retirement age depending on a worker's circumstances. The availability of reduced Social Security benefits at age 62 provides an incentive to retire well before the program's age requirement for full retirement benefits; however, the gradual increase in this age from 65 to 67 provides an incentive to wait in order to secure full benefits. The elimination of the Social Security earnings test in 2000 for those at or above their full retirement age also provides an incentive to work. Medicare's eligibility age of 65 continues to provide a strong incentive for those without retiree health insurance to wait until then to retire, but it can also be an incentive to retire before the full retirement age. Meanwhile, federal tax policy creates incentives to retire earlier, albeit indirectly, by setting broad parameters for the ages at which retirement funds can be withdrawn from pensions without tax penalties. Nearly half of workers report being fully retired before turning age 63 and start drawing Social Security benefits at the earliest opportunity--age 62. Early evidence, however, suggests small changes in this pattern. Traditionally, some workers started benefits when they reached age 65. Recently, workers with full retirement ages after they turned 65 waited until those ages to start benefits. Also, following the elimination of the earnings test, some indications are emerging of increased workforce participation among people at or above full retirement age. GAO's analysis indicates that retiree health insurance and pension plans are strongly associated with when workers retire. After controlling for other influences such as income, GAO found that those with retiree health insurance were substantially more likely to retire before the Medicare eligibility age of 65 than those without. GAO also found that men with defined benefit plans were more likely to retire early (before age 62) than those without, and men and women with defined contribution plans were less likely to do so. |
gao_GAO-16-188 | gao_GAO-16-188_0 | GSA Could Better Achieve Market Rates and Reduce Tenant Costs for Its Leases by Fostering Competition and Reducing Fees
About Half of Recent New GSA Lease Rates Have Exceeded Comparable Market Rates
While GSA’s fiscal year 2015 budget request stated that one of the agency’s strategic objectives is to procure leased space on behalf of federal tenants at or below market rates, our analysis of recent GSA office leases across all regions performed for this report found that about half of the rates negotiated in recent years exceeded market rates at the time the leases were executed. In doing so, the review of 714 new GSA leases finalized between 2008 and 2014 found that about half exceeded their local market’s average rate for similar space by 10 percent or more. In some cases, an agency’s requested geographic area may be so restricted that it does not include a single building that meets all the tenant’s requirements. GSA Has Opportunities to Reduce Federal Tenants’ Leasing Costs
GSA’s Focus on Longer Lease Term May Not Result in Cost Savings but Could Offer Other Benefits
GSA officials said that increasing the term of GSA leases is a key part of GSA’s efforts to reduce leasing costs, but our analysis found that longer terms do not necessarily lead to lower costs in the first year of leases. In total, these 9 leases incurred a total of $39 million in tenant improvement costs, of which nearly 40 percent ($15 million) was due to interest paid to private lessors. For example, in one lease we reviewed, the tenant agency chose to amortize its $2.1 million of tenant improvement costs over the life of a 15-year lease at a 9 percent interest rate, which will ultimately cost $4.0 million after including both the $1.7 million to be paid in interest charges and GSA’s 5 percent fee on those charges. GSA Requires Agencies to Pay More for Flexibility They May Not Need
GSA also requires most tenants to sign cancelable occupancy agreements, which can also increase federal leasing costs for agencies and may not be needed. GSA regularly requires tenant agencies to sign cancelable occupancy agreements that allow them to vacate the leased property under certain circumstances. However, the importance of routinely including the right to cancel in short- term leases is questionable and we believe that tenant agencies are in the best position to decide how to best meet their consolidation objectives. GSA’s cost estimates for standard leases have limited oversight mechanisms. GSA’s Cost Estimates Are Better Aligned with Actual Costs for Selected High- Value Leases, Which Require Congressional Authorization
Among the 11 GSA leases we reviewed in-depth, GSA’s initial cost estimates were more accurate for high-value leases that require a prospectus subject to congressional authorization than the cost estimates were for standard leases. Both GSA officials and these results suggest requiring congressional authorization for high-value leases may help control cost growth for these leases. Although just 4 percent of GSA’s overall lease inventory had current annual rents above the $2.85 million threshold as of August 2015, they account for 44 percent of GSA’s total net annual leasing costs. Similar Factors to Those That Drive Up Costs of Leases—Lack of Competition and GSA’s Lengthy Leasing Process—Can Cause Actual Leasing Costs to Exceed Initial Cost Estimates
According to both GSA regional officials and representatives of GSA tenant agencies, factors similar to those that played a role in causing higher rates for GSA leases can also cause costs to exceed GSA’s initial estimates:
Officials from GSA regional offices stated that a lack of competition for GSA leases can directly contribute to variations between initial cost estimates and actual leasing costs. The Federal Buildings Fund (FBF) has unobligated balances that, with sufficient controls, could help fund tenant improvements. Fully explore strategies to enhance competition for GSA leases by encouraging tenant agencies to broaden their allowable geographic areas and to limit their specialized building requirements to those justifiably unique to the federal government. 2. Allowing tenant agencies the option of choosing non-cancelable occupancy agreements with lower administrative costs, particularly for leases with firm terms of 5 years or less. With regards to our recommendation to seek to reduce tenants’ interest costs by exploring the possibility of loaning unobligated FBF balances to agencies to cover tenant improvement costs that would otherwise have to be financed for new leases, GSA agreed to evaluate its existing authorities to determine if the FBF could be used to fund tenant improvements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess: (1) the extent to which the General Services Administration (GSA) achieves market leasing rates for its leases and how overall federal leasing costs could be reduced, and (2) how GSA’s cost estimates for selected leases compared with the actual costs of leasing paid by federal tenants. To determine the extent to which GSA achieves market leasing rates for its leases, GAO contracted with a professional services real estate firm, selected through a competitive process based on previous experience and cost, to analyze data on GSA and private sector real property leases. The analysis for comparative performance of GSA leases and private sector leases involved: abstracting GSA leases based on GSA data, disaggregated to differentiate between shell rental rate, general tenant improvements, custom tenant improvements, and operating expenses; considering the net present value of the GSA leases, using the total cost of the lease and payments each year, discounted back at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) discount rate of 2.80 percent (nominal 10 year rate); considering nominal total cost of lease for both GSA and private sector leases; and plotting GSA lease and private sector lease performance in each market (such as by size, location, year executed) to identify any variations based on lease terms. The tenant in the lease pays these costs as a pass- through, as well as a management fee to GSA. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than half of GSA's 377 million square feet of space were leased from the private sector as of 2014. While GSA strives to match or beat private sector leasing rates, it is important to identify any opportunities to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
GAO was asked to review GSA's leasing costs. This report examines (1) the extent to which GSA's leases achieve market rates and how overall federal leasing costs could be reduced and (2) how GSA's cost estimates for selected leases compared with the actual costs of leasing paid by federal tenants. GAO determined the extent to which the rates of a sample of 714 GSA leases compared to market rates; analyzed selected leases for office space across all 11 GSA regions in more detail; and interviewed officials from all GSA regions and 2 GSA tenant agencies, as well as private sector real estate representatives. GAO contracted with a real estate consultant for the market rate analysis.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the General Services Administration's (GSA) lease rates exceeded comparable market rates for many of 714 leases reviewed. Specifically, a review of these leases from 2008 through 2014 determined that about half exceeded their local market's average private sector rate for similar space by 10 percent or more. According to officials from all 11 GSA regions and private sector stakeholders, GSA is unable to more consistently achieve lower rates because competition among private lessors for these leases is limited; this limited competition is due to factors including tenant agencies' requested geographic areas and specialized building requirements, as well as the length of GSA's leasing process. For example, an agency's initial requested geographic area may be so restricted that it does not include any buildings that meet all tenant requirements, resulting in increased costs and time as GSA explores alternatives.
In addition, overall federal leasing costs increase when tenants finance needed improvements to newly leased space—called tenant improvements—over time. GSA tenants routinely amortize these costs over the term of their leases and pay interest rates of up to 9 percent to the building's owner. Because GSA's tenants lack sufficient upfront capital, they chose to amortize their tenant improvements for all nine of the leases GAO studied that included those costs. In total, these 9 leases will incur $15 million in interest fees to be paid to private owners—nearly 40 percent of the total paid for these tenant improvement costs. GSA manages a fund—the Federal Buildings Fund, which pays rent and other real property costs—with sufficient unobligated balances to loan tenants enough funds to cover tenant improvement costs and avoid paying private sector interest, but GSA does not have budget authority to fund such costs. GSA also requires most of its tenants to sign cancelable occupancy agreements, which permit tenants to vacate leased space under certain circumstances in exchange for a higher fee paid to account for the risk of GSA's possibly having to find a new tenant for the space. However, the importance of routinely including this built-in flexibility for short term leases is questionable, as it is not often exercised. Allowing tenants the option of choosing non-cancelable agreements would reduce tenant fees.
The actual leasing costs paid by tenant agencies exceeded GSA's estimates for 7 of the 11 leases finalized from 2000 to 2014 that GAO reviewed in more detail. Seven of those leases were “standard” leases (costing less than $2.85 million in annual rent, as of fiscal year 2014) and four were “high value” (costing more than $2.85 million). For 4 of the 7 standard leases tenants' actual leasing costs exceeded GSA's estimates by more than 10 percent. Inaccurate estimates complicate tenant agencies' planning, but tenant agencies often have to accept increases in GSA's cost estimates because some lack authority to independently lease space. GSA officials said that the lack of competition for GSA leases and changes to tenant agencies' space needs during the leasing process contribute to cost growth. Conversely, GAO found GSA's initial cost estimates for 4 high-value leases to be more accurate than those for standard leases. High value leases, which represent only 4 percent of leases but more than 40 percent of GSA's leasing costs, are subject to congressional authorization, which may help control cost growth.
What GAO Recommends
GSA should (1) enhance competition by encouraging tenant agencies to modify their geographic and building requirements; (2) explore seeking authority to use Federal Building Fund balances to reduce interest fees; and (3) give tenants the option to reduce fees by choosing non-cancelable occupancy agreements. GSA agreed to increase competition and determine if it can use Fund balances to pay tenant improvement costs but disagreed with allowing tenant agencies to choose non-cancelable occupancy agreements. GAO believes GSA should provide this option as a potential cost-saving measure. |
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