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gao_GAO-17-184 | gao_GAO-17-184_0 | 1.) Five Key Factors Affect EHR Use and Electronic Health Information Exchange in Post-Acute Care Settings
We identified five key factors that affect the use of EHRs and the electronic exchange of health information in post-acute care settings, based on our stakeholder interviews: (1) the cost of EHRs, (2) implementation of standards for EHRs and electronic health information exchange, (3) the impact of EHRs on workflow, (4) technological challenges such as lack of EHR capabilities, and (5) the need to train staff to use EHRs. Concerns included variability in the implementation of standards and the difficulty of finding relevant information when it is exchanged. For example, stakeholders we interviewed stated that providers may be reluctant to implement an EHR because it would require them to make changes to their workflow, which can be disruptive. Technological Challenges: Sixteen of the 20 stakeholders stated that technological challenges prevent some facilities from using EHRs or electronically exchanging health information. In addition to high turnover, stakeholders noted that post-acute care settings may lack information technology (IT) staff to manage the EHR software and train staff to use the technology. HHS Has Not Measured the Effectiveness of Each of Its Efforts to Promote the Use of EHRs and Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Meet Its Goal for Post-Acute Care
HHS Has Four Key Efforts Designed to Promote the Use of EHRs and the Electronic Exchange of Health Information
ONC and CMS officials identified four key efforts that promote the use of EHRs in post-acute care settings, including the electronic exchange of health information. HHS Has Not Measured the Effectiveness of Each of Its Key Efforts to Promote the Use of EHRs and the Electronic Exchange of Health Information in Post-Acute Settings
HHS does not have information on the effectiveness of its four key efforts to promote EHRs and the electronic exchange of health information in post-acute settings. In addition to the limited evaluation plans geared specifically for HHS’s four key efforts, ONC officials told us that ONC is planning to survey providers in all four post-acute settings to gather baseline information about the rates of EHR adoption and the extent to which post-acute care providers are engaging in activities that demonstrate interoperability— specifically, sending, receiving, finding, and integrating electronic health information. HHS Lacks a Comprehensive Plan with Specific Action Steps and Consideration of External Factors to Achieve Its Goal for Post-Acute Care
HHS’s ongoing activities to increase EHR use and the electronic exchange of health information are intended to help achieve the goal of ONC’s Roadmap to increase the proportion of post-acute care providers electronically exchanging health information by 2017. However, HHS does not have a comprehensive plan to achieve this goal. According to leading principles of sound planning identified in our prior work, these elements include a plan with specific action steps and the identification and consideration of external factors. 2.) The lack of a comprehensive plan with specific action steps and the failure to consider external factors, such as cost and high staff turnover, in the Roadmap may adversely affect the implementation of HHS’s key efforts and thus the ability of HHS to achieve the Roadmap’s goal for post-acute providers. HHS officials indicated that while achieving the goal of the Roadmap depends in part on actions by post- acute care vendors and providers, the Roadmap does not address how to facilitate or encourage vendor and provider actions. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To improve efforts to promote EHR use and electronic exchange of health information in post-acute care settings, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct CMS and ONC to take the following two actions:
Evaluate the effectiveness of HHS’s key efforts to determine whether they are contributing to HHS’s goal for increasing the use of EHRs and electronic exchange of health information in post-acute care settings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many patients who leave hospitals receive care in post-acute settings such as skilled nursing facilities and long-term care hospitals. Exchange of accurate and timely health information is particularly important in these transitions, and technology like EHRs could help to improve quality and reduce costs.
GAO was asked to review issues related to the use of EHRs in post-acute care settings. With regard to post-acute settings, GAO (1) described factors that affect EHR use and electronic exchange of health information and (2) examined HHS efforts to promote EHR use and electronic information exchange. GAO reviewed HHS planning and related documents and best practices for planning identified in prior GAO work. GAO also interviewed HHS officials, and through those interviews and background research identified and interviewed a non-generalizable selection of individuals representing 20 relevant stakeholder groups, including experts, vendors, and professional associations.
What GAO Found
Stakeholders that GAO interviewed, including experts on electronic health records (EHR) in post-acute care settings, described five key factors that affect the use of EHRs and the electronic exchange of health information in these settings.
Cost: Stakeholders stated that facilities often have limited financial resources to cover the initial cost of an EHR and noted that additional costs may be incurred for exchanging information and for EHR maintenance.
Implementation of standards: Stakeholders expressed concerns with the variability in implementation of health data standards and the difficulty of finding health information relevant to post-acute care providers when this information is exchanged.
Workflow disruptions: Stakeholders stated that implementation of EHRs requires post-acute facilities to change their daily work activities or processes, which can be disruptive.
Technological challenges: Stakeholders stated that they face technological challenges, such as having EHRs that are not capable of electronically exchanging health information.
Staffing: Stakeholders noted that a lack of staff with expertise to manage EHRs and high staff turnover result in a constant need to train staff to use the technology.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has not measured the effectiveness of each of its efforts to promote the use of EHRs, and it lacks a comprehensive plan to meet its goal of increasing the proportion of post-acute care providers electronically exchanging health information. HHS identified four key efforts related to post-acute care settings; however, the lack of measurement of the effectiveness of these efforts is contrary to leading principles of sound planning. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) is planning to survey providers in post-acute settings to gather baseline data on the rates of EHR adoption and activities that demonstrate ways to electronically exchange health information. However, these surveys are not intended to assess the effectiveness of HHS's efforts to promote EHR use. In addition, most of the key efforts lack specific plans for evaluating their progress. Therefore, HHS cannot determine if its efforts are contributing to its goal, or if they should be adjusted. In addition, although HHS's goal depends in part on actions by post-acute care providers and EHR vendors, HHS lacks a comprehensive plan with specific action steps to achieve this goal. HHS's planning also does not address how to overcome key external factors that may adversely affect its key efforts. Without a comprehensive plan to address these issues, HHS risks not achieving its goal of increasing EHR use and the electronic exchange of health information in post-acute care settings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS (1) evaluate the effectiveness of its key efforts to increase the use of EHRs and electronic information exchange, and (2) comprehensively plan for how to achieve the department's goal regarding the use of EHRs and electronic information exchange in post-acute care settings. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-1095T | gao_GAO-02-1095T_0 | The two largest blood suppliers, the Red Cross and ABC, each collect about 45 percent of the nation’s blood supply, and roughly 10 percent is supplied by other independent blood centers, the Department of Defense, and hospitals that have their own blood banks. For example, after the September 11 attacks, FDA issued emergency guidelines to speed the delivery of blood to areas affected by the attacks. The Blood Supply Has Increased and Remains Generally Adequate
Available data indicate that the nation’s blood supply has increased and remains generally adequate. Although no one data source has comprehensively tracked the nation’s blood supply in the past, all of the sources we identified indicated that the national supply has grown in recent years and was at historically high levels before the surge in donations that occurred after September 11. The number of units of blood collected annually increased from 12.4 million in 1997 to an estimated 15 million in 2001. The annual number of units that were available but not transfused remained at about 1 million units. According to NBDRC data, collections for the first half of 2002 have been similar to the same period in 2001. The nationwide blood supply was substantially greater than needed for transfusions. Blood Suppliers Are Focusing Emergency Planning on Maintaining Adequate Inventory
Incorporating the lessons learned from past disasters, blood suppliers and the federal government are reevaluating how blood is collected during and after disasters and are focusing on maintaining a consistently adequate inventory in local blood banks in preparation for disasters and not collecting more blood after a disaster than is medically necessary. Since September 11, federal public health agencies and blood suppliers have been critical of their responses to prior disasters and have begun to plan for a more effective response to future emergencies. Through an interorganizational task force organized by AABB in late 2001, the focus has begun to shift away from increasing blood collections in an emergency to maintaining an adequate inventory of blood at all times. The Red Cross expects to increase annual collections by 9 percent during each of the next 5 years. The blood community’s response to disasters can be improved, and the community is beginning to take the necessary steps to learn from past experiences. | What GAO Found
The terrorist attacks of September 11 underscored the critical importance of a safe and adequate supply of blood for transfusions. In recent years, an average of 8 million volunteers have donated more than 14 million units of blood annually, and 4.5 million patients per year have received life-saving blood transfusions, according to the American Association of Blood Banks. Ninety percent of the U.S. blood supply is collected by two blood suppliers, the American National Red Cross and the independent blood banks affiliated with America's Blood Centers. Within the federal government, the Food and Drug Administration is responsible for overseeing the safety of the nation's blood supply. The surge in donations after the terrorist attacks added an estimated 500,000 units to annual collections in 2001. The experience illustrated that large numbers of Americans are willing to donate blood in response to disasters. However, because very few of the units donated immediately after September 11 were needed by the survivors, this experience has also raised concerns among blood suppliers and within the government about how best to manage and prepare the blood supply for emergencies. Data indicate that the blood supply has increased in the past 5 years and that it remains generally adequate. Blood collections increased 21 percent from 1997 to 2001, and collections in the first half of 2002 appear to have been roughly equivalent to the same period in 2001. Blood suppliers and the federal government have begun to reevaluate how blood is collected during and after disasters to avoid repeating this experience and also to ensure that enough blood is available during emergencies. A task force, including members from federal agencies and blood suppliers, has been formed to coordinate the response in future emergencies to the need for blood. Insights from the experiences of September 11 and other disasters have led the task force to conclude that the need for blood in most emergencies can be best met by maintaining an adequate blood inventory at all times, rather than increasing blood collections following a disaster. |
gao_GAO-06-1082 | gao_GAO-06-1082_0 | In addition to the limitations and restrictions placed on the issuance of tax-exempt bonds by state and local governments, there are additional restrictions on tribal governments’ issuance of tax-exempt bonds. From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $46.4 billion in 3,557 bond issues for multi-family housing projects, according to Thomson Financial data. According to Thomson Financial data, from 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $61.4 billion in 1,094 issues for toll roads and highways. Thomson Financial data indicate that while state and local governments allocated 9 percent to 13 percent of total bond issuances to transportation facilities in the period from 2000 through 2004, between 27 and 38 percent of those issues went toward toll roads and highways. We found the following details on debt financing for parking facilities. According to Thomson Financial data, from 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $3.5 billion in 220 issues for parking facilities. According to 2002 Census of Governments data, about 73 percent of the population of the United States lived in MSAs that reported user charges on government-owned parking facilities. Ninety-two percent of the MSAs listed reported positive user charges, and 97 percent of the population in the largest MSAs lived in MSAs that reported positive user charges. Governments Provide Financing for a Wide Variety of Recreational Facilities
We did not find readily available data that identify community recreational facilities as a specific category and were unable to determine the number of these facilities financed, constructed, or operated by state and local governments. From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $60.9 billion in 3,085 tax-exempt issues to build public facilities, according to Thomson Financial data. This general category includes several recreation-related facilities, including libraries and museums ($7.5 billion in 470 issues); convention centers ($11.1 billion in 236 issues); theaters ($0.6 billion in 29 issues); parks, zoos, and beaches ($6.1 billion in 723 issues); stadiums and arenas ($5.3 billion in 119 issues); and other recreation facilities ($4.6 billion in 420 issues). Numerous Municipal Golf Courses Exist, Some with Lodging Facilities
According to National Golf Foundation data, in 2005 there were about 16,000 public and private golf courses in the United States. Of those, about 2,400 (15 percent) are municipal golf courses, that is, they are owned by state and local governments. All states have municipal golf courses. Figure 4 shows the trend in municipal real estate development golf courses. According to data provided by Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, a major law firm, at least 120 golf courses in 29 states have been financed, at least in part, with tax-exempt bonds. From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed in 2004 dollars $11.1 billion in 236 issues for financing convention centers, according to Thomson Financial data. Different Sources Show Public Financing of Hotels and Related Facilities
According to lists we obtained from government finance experts, 39 hotels associated with convention centers or airports or golf courses that have been financed with tax-exempt bonds have been identified. According to states’ financial reports and gaming studies all but 2 states— Hawaii and Utah—have some form of legal gaming. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia reported assets and revenues related to lotteries. We found three examples of tax-exempt financing related to gaming facilities. Parking garages and parking lots 4. Hotel and tourist accommodations 8. State-owned gaming support facilities We performed an extensive review of possible data sources and did not find a comprehensive, reliable source of data for the above facilities. This data source only provides information on a particular method of housing finance and therefore does not provide information on the total government rental housing expenditures; the number of rental housing units constructed, financed, or owned by state and local governments; or other forms of government financing for rental housing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unlike state and local governments, Indian tribal governments are in general restricted to using tax-exempt bonds for activities that are an "essential government function," where "essential government function" does not include functions not customarily performed by state and local governments. This restriction has been difficult to enforce by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and increased the tax compliance burden on Indian tribal governments. GAO was asked for information on the number of facilities that state and local governments finance, construct, and operate in eight categories: (1) Rental housing, (2) Road infrastructure, (3) Parking garages and lots, (4) Community recreational facilities, (5) Golf courses, (6) Conference centers, (7) Hotel and tourist accommodations, and (8) State-owned gaming support facilities. GAO did not find a comprehensive, reliable source of the number of facilities. Instead, GAO searched and found a variety of public and private sources that had limited information on the amounts of financing provided by state and local governments in related categories.
What GAO Found
Data sources showed state and local governments (municipalities) provided a wide range of financial support in the following types of facilities: (1) Rental housing: From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $46.4 billion in 3,557 bond issues for multi-family housing projects. Over the period these borrowings accounted for 33 to 45 percent of debt issued for housing projects. (2) Road transportation: From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $61.4 billion in 1,091 issues for toll roads and highways. Over the period these borrowings accounted for 27 to 38 percent of debt issued for transportation facilities. (3) Parking facilities: From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $3.5 billion in 220 issues for parking facilities. In addition, about 73 percent of the U.S. population lived in metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) that reported positive user charges for parking facilities. (4) Park and recreation facilities: From 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $60.9 billion in 3,085 tax-exempt issues to build public facilities, including $0.6 billion in 29 issues for theaters; $6.1 billion in 723 issues for parks, zoos and beaches; $5.3 billion in 119 issues for stadiums and arenas; and $4.6 billion in 420 issues in other recreation facilities. In addition, about 75 percent of the U.S. population lived in MSAs that reported positive user charges for park and recreation facilities. (5)Golf facilities: In 2005 there were about 2,400 municipal golf courses, about 15 percent of total golf courses in the United States. Municipal golf courses exist in all states. At least 120 golf courses in 29 states have been identified as financed, at least in part, with tax-exempt bonds. About 5 percent of municipal golf courses are connected to resorts or real estate developments. (6) Convention centers: Over 300 government owned convention centers have been identified by government finance experts. In addition, from 2000 through 2004 municipalities borrowed, in 2004 dollars, a total of $11.1 billion in 236 issues related to convention centers. (7) Hotels: GAO identified 12 hotel projects related to convention centers or airports that were financed with tax-exempt bonds in recent years and additional data sources identify 39 tax-exempt financed hotel projects. (8) Gaming support facilities: According to financial and gaming reports all but 2 states have some form of legal gaming, and 41 states and the District of Columbia providing state lotteries. In addition, tax-exempt financing has been used for capital projects related to the gaming industry. |
gao_GAO-10-2 | gao_GAO-10-2_0 | Prior Reviews on Agency Use of EVM to Acquire and Manage IT Systems Have Identified Weaknesses
We have previously reported on the weaknesses associated with the implementation of sound EVM programs at various agencies, as well as on the lack of aggressive management action to correct poor cost and schedule performance trends based on earned value data for major system acquisition programs: In July 2008, we reported that the Federal Aviation Administration’s EVM policy was not fully consistent with best practices. Agencies’ EVM Policies Are Not Comprehensive
While the eight agencies we reviewed have established policies requiring the use of EVM on their major IT investments, none of these policies are fully consistent with best practices, such as standardizing the way work products are defined. Criteria for implementing EVM on all IT major investments: Seven of the eight agencies fully defined criteria for implementing EVM on major IT investments. However, for all 13 programs, the project schedules contained issues that undermined the quality of their performance baselines. Inconsistent Implementation Is Due in Part to Weaknesses in Policy and Lack of Enforcement
The inconsistent application of EVM across the investments exists in part because of the weaknesses we previously identified in the eight agencies’ policies, as well as a lack of enforcement of the EVM policy components already in place. Until key EVM practices are fully implemented, selected programs face an increased risk that program managers cannot effectively optimize EVM as a management tool to mitigate and reverse poor cost and schedule performance trends. Earned Value Data Show Trends of Cost Overruns and Schedule Slippages on Most Programs
Earned value data trends of the 16 case study programs indicate that most are currently experiencing cost overruns and schedule slippages, and, based on our analysis, it is likely that when these programs are completed, the total cost overrun will be about $3 billion. With timely and effective action taken by program and executive management, it is possible to reverse negative performance trends so that the projected cost overruns at completion may be reduced. Without comprehensive policies, it will be difficult for the agencies to gain the full benefits of EVM. Until agencies expand and enforce their EVM policies, it will be difficult for them to optimize the effectiveness of this management tool, and they will face an increased risk that managers are not getting the information they need to effectively manage the programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess whether key departments and agencies have appropriately established earned value management (EVM) policies, (2) determine whether these agencies are adequately using earned value techniques to manage key system acquisitions, and (3) evaluate the earned value data of these selected investments to determine their cost and schedule performances. For this governmentwide review, we assessed eight agencies and 16 investments. We initially identified the 10 agencies with the highest amount of spending for information technology (IT) development, modernization, and enhancement work as reported in the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Fiscal Year 2009 Exhibit 53. The resulting eight agencies also made up about 75 percent of the government’s planned IT spending for fiscal year 2009. These best practices are contained in the GAO cost guide. As a result, the total life- cycle cost of the JTRS-HMS program was reduced from an estimated $19.2 billion to $11.6 billion, a $7.6 billion decrease. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2009, the federal government planned to spend about $71 billion on information technology (IT) investments. To more effectively manage such investments, in 2005 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to implement earned value management (EVM). EVM is a project management approach that, if implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of anticipated costs at completion. GAO was asked to assess selected agencies' EVM policies, determine whether they are adequately using earned value techniques to manage key system acquisitions, and eval- uate selected investments' earned value data to determine their cost and schedule performances. To do so, GAO compared agency policies with best practices, performed case studies, and reviewed documenta- tion from eight agencies and 16 major investments with the highest levels of IT development-related spending in fiscal year 2009.
What GAO Found
While all eight agencies have established policies requiring the use of EVM on major IT investments, these policies are not fully consistent with best practices. In particular, most lack training requirements for all relevant personnel responsible for investment oversight. Most policies also do not have adequately defined criteria for revising program cost and schedule baselines. Until agencies expand and enforce their EVM policies, it will be difficult for them to gain the full benefits of EVM. GAO's analysis of 16 investments shows that agencies are using EVM to manage their system acquisitions; however, the extent of implementation varies. Specifically, for 13 of the 16 investments, key practices necessary for sound EVM execution had not been implemented. For example, the project schedules for these investments contained issues--such as the improper sequencing of key activities--that undermine the quality of their performance baselines. This inconsistent application of EVM exists in part because of the weaknesses contained in agencies' policies, combined with a lack of enforcement of policies already in place. Until key EVM practices are fully implemented, these investments face an increased risk that managers cannot effectively optimize EVM as a management tool. Furthermore, earned value data trends of these investments indicate that most are currently experiencing shortfalls against cost and schedule targets. The total life-cycle costs of these programs have increased by about $2 billion. Based on GAO's analysis of current performance trends, 11 programs will likely incur cost overruns that will total about $1 billion at contract completion--in particular, 2 of these programs account for about 80 percent of this projection. As such, GAO estimates the total cost overrun to be about $3 billion at program completion (see figure). However, with timely and effective management action, it is possible to reverse negative trends so that the projected cost overruns may be reduced. |
gao_GAO-15-711 | gao_GAO-15-711_0 | Professionalism relates to the military profession, which DOD defines as the values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and attributes of its workforce. DOD Has a Management Framework to Help Oversee Its Ethics and Professionalism Programs and Initiatives but Has Not Taken Certain Actions That Could Promote Continued Progress
DOD has a management framework to help oversee its required ethics program, and it has initiated steps to establish a management framework to oversee its professionalism-related programs and initiatives. However, DOD has not fully addressed an internal recommendation to develop a department-wide values-based ethics program, and it does not have performance information to assess the Senior Advisor for Military Professionalism’s (SAMP) progress and to inform its decision on whether the office should be retained beyond March 2016. DOD Has a Management Framework to Help Oversee Its Ethics Program but Has Not Fully Addressed an Internal Recommendation to Develop a Values-Based Ethics Program
DOD Has a Management Framework in Place to Oversee Its Established Ethics Program
DOD has a decentralized structure to administer and oversee its required ethics program and to ensure compliance with departmental standards of conduct. In response to the Panel’s recommendation, DOD contracted for a 2010 survey and a 2012 study to assess DOD’s ethical culture and to design and implement a values-based ethics program, respectively. Recent department-wide activities have been wide-ranging, and include (1) 13 character development initiatives for general and flag officers; (2) a review of ethics content in professional military education; and (3) the development of tools, such as command climate and 360-degree assessments, that can be used to identify and assess ethics-related issues. The SAMP office has taken steps toward implementing its major tasks, but DOD does not have key performance information to help inform the decision as to whether the SAMP position should be retained beyond its initial 2-year term—which is set to expire in March 2016. The need for senior-level oversight of professionalism or ethics issues also was cited by other DOD, industry, and foreign military organizations we contacted. DOD Has Identified Potential Tools for Assessing Ethics and Professionalism Issues but Has Not Fully Implemented Key Tools or Developed Performance Metrics
DOD has identified a number of mandatory and optional tools that defense organizations can use to identify and assess individual and organizational ethics and professionalism issues. In addition, not all of the military services’ guidance fully meets DOD guidance. DOD Does Not Have Performance Metrics to Measure Its Progress in Addressing Ethics and Professionalism Issues
Federal internal control standards emphasize the importance of assessing performance over time, but DOD is unable to determine whether its ethics and professionalism initiatives are achieving their intended effect because it has not yet developed metrics to measure the department’s progress in addressing ethics and professionalism issues. In particular, without fully considering the Panel on Contracting Integrity’s recommendation to create a values-based ethics program and the subsequent 2012 study recommendations, as well as assessing the feasibility of expanding annual values-based ethics training beyond the current mandated personnel, DOD will not have assurance that it is doing enough to promote an ethical culture, and it may face challenges in identifying areas for future action. If DOD does not believe such a program or the actions recommended by the 2012 study are warranted, then it should demonstrate why additional actions are unwarranted. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed and implemented a management framework to oversee its programs and initiatives on professionalism and ethics for active duty officers and enlisted servicemembers we assessed—against leading practices for strategic planning and performance management, and federal internal control standards—guidance, plans, and work products to determine the extent to which DOD has defined roles, responsibilities, measures, and timelines for managing its existing ethics program and professionalism oversight framework. We did not assess the reliability of these data, but we have included them in the report to provide context. To do this, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and the Joint Staff to obtain information on the status of their efforts to implement and track command climate assessments, and to develop and implement 360- degree assessments for general and flag officers in accordance with statutory requirements and departmental initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Professionalism and sound ethical judgment are essential to executing the fundamental mission of DOD and to maintaining confidence in military leadership, but recent DOD and military service investigations have revealed misconduct related to, among other things, sexual behavior, bribery, and cheating.
House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's ethics and professionalism programs for military servicemembers. This report examines the extent to which DOD has developed and implemented (1) a management framework to oversee its programs and initiatives on ethics and professionalism; and (2) tools and performance metrics to identify, assess, and measure progress in addressing ethics and professionalism issues. GAO analyzed DOD guidance and documents related to military ethics and professionalism, reviewed literature to identify ethics issues and practices, and interviewed DOD, industry, and foreign military officials experienced in implementing ethics and professionalism programs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has a management framework to help oversee its existing ethics program and has initiated steps to establish such a framework to oversee its professionalism-related programs and initiatives, but its efforts could be strengthened in both areas.
DOD has a decentralized structure to administer and oversee its existing, required compliance-based ethics program, which focuses on ensuring adherence to rules. However, DOD has not fully addressed a 2008 internal recommendation to develop a department-wide values-based ethics program, which would emphasize ethical principles and decision-making to foster an ethical culture and achieve high standards of conduct. In 2012, DOD studied the design and implementation of a values-based ethics program and in 2013 delivered related training to certain DOD personnel. DOD has decided to take no further actions to establish a values-based ethics program, but it has not demonstrated that additional actions are unwarranted or assessed the feasibility of expanding training to additional personnel. As a result, the department neither has assurance that it has adequately addressed the identified need for a values-based ethics program nor has information needed to target its training efforts appropriately.
DOD established a 2-year, potentially renewable, position for a Senior Advisor for Military Professionalism, ending in March 2016, to oversee its professionalism-related efforts. Since 2014 the Advisor's office has identified and taken steps toward implementing some of its major tasks, which relate to coordinating and integrating DOD's efforts on professionalism. Professionalism relates to the values, ethics, standards, code of conduct, skills, and attributes of the military workforce. However, the office has not developed timelines or information to assess its progress in completing its major tasks. Thus, DOD does not have information to track the office's progress or assess whether the SAMP position should be retained after March 2016.
DOD has not fully implemented two key tools for identifying and assessing ethics and professionalism issues, and it has not developed performance metrics to measure its progress in addressing ethics-related issues. DOD has identified several tools, such as command climate and 360-degree assessments, that can be used to identify and assess ethics and professionalism issues. However, guidance issued by the military services for command climate assessments does not meet all statutory requirements and DOD guidance. As a result, the services do not have the required level of accountability during the performance evaluation process over the occurrence of these assessments, or assurances that all military personnel are able to anonymously participate in them. Further, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff have developed and implemented 360-degree assessments for some but not all general and flag officers, and therefore some of these officers are not receiving valuable feedback on their performance as intended by DOD guidance. Finally, federal internal control standards emphasize the assessment of performance over time, but DOD is unable to determine whether its ethics and professionalism initiatives are achieving their intended effect because it has not developed metrics to measure their progress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD determine whether there is a need for a values-based program, assess the expansion of training, modify guidance, assess the use of a key tool for identifying ethics and professionalism issues, and develop performance metrics. DOD generally or partially concurred with these recommendations but did not agree to develop information to assess the Advisor's office. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as further discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-701T | gao_GAO-09-701T_0 | Specifically, FISMA requires information security programs to include, among other things periodic assessments of the risk that could result from the compromise of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations; and an annually updated inventory of major information systems operated by the agency or under its control. Weaknesses in Information Security Controls Place Sensitive Information at Risk
Significant weaknesses in information security policies and practices expose sensitive data to significant risk, as illustrated by recent incidents at various agencies. In their fiscal year 2008 performance and accountability reports, 20 of 24 major agencies noted that their information system controls over their financial systems and information were either a material weakness or a significant deficiency (see fig. 2). Over the last several years, most agencies have not implemented controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements for an agencywide information security program, as required by FISMA. Twenty-three of the 24 major federal agencies had weaknesses in their agencywide information security programs. Agencies Continue to Report Progress in Implementing Requirements
Federal agencies reported increased compliance in implementing key information security control activities for fiscal year 2008; however, inspectors general at several agencies noted shortcomings with agencies’ implementation of information security requirements. Specifically, agencies reported increases in the number and percentage of systems that had been certified and accredited, the number and percentage of employees and contractors receiving security awareness training, and the number and percentage of systems with tested contingency plans. However, the number and percentage of systems that had been tested and evaluated at least annually decreased slightly (from 95 percent in fiscal year 2007 to 93 percent in fiscal year 2008) and the number and percentage of employees who had significant security responsibilities and had received specialized training decreased significantly (from 90 percent in fiscal year 2007 to 76 percent in 2008). Each year, OMB provides instructions to federal agencies and their inspectors general for FISMA annual reporting. Additionally, OMB summarizes the information provided by the agencies and the inspectors general in its report to Congress. This information could be useful in determining whether agencies are effectively implementing information security policies, procedures, and practices. In addition, OMB did not include key information about findings and significant deficiencies identified by inspectors general in its governmentwide report to Congress and did not approve or disapprove agency information security programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Without proper safeguards, federal agencies' computer systems are vulnerable to intrusions by individuals and groups who have malicious intentions and can obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other computer systems and networks. Concerned by reports of significant weaknesses in federal systems, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), which permanently authorized and strengthened information security program, evaluation, and annual reporting requirements for federal agencies. GAO was asked to testify on its draft report on (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of federal agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) their implementation of FISMA requirements. To prepare for this testimony, GAO summarized its draft report where it analyzed agency, inspectors general, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), congressional, and GAO reports on information security.
What GAO Found
Significant weaknesses in information security policies and practices expose sensitive data to significant risk, as illustrated by recent incidents at various agencies. GAO's audits and reviews by inspectors general note significant information security control deficiencies that place agency operations and assets at risk. In their fiscal year 2008 performance and accountability reports, 20 of 24 major agencies noted that the information system controls over their financial systems and information were either a significant deficiency or a material weakness. In addition, over the last several years, most agencies have not implemented controls to sufficiently prevent, limit, or detect access to computer networks, systems, or information. An underlying cause for information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements for an agencywide information security program, as required by FISMA. Twenty-three of the 24 major federal agencies had weaknesses in their agencywide information security programs. Federal agencies reported increased compliance in implementing key information security control activities for fiscal year 2008; however, inspectors general at several agencies noted shortcomings with agencies' implementation of information security requirements. For fiscal year 2008 reporting, agencies reported higher levels of FISMA implementation for most information security metrics and lower levels for others. Increases were reported in the number and percentage of employees and contractors receiving security awareness training, the number and percentage of systems with tested contingency plans, and the number and percentage of systems that were certified and accredited. However, the number and percentage of employees who had significant security responsibilities and had received specialized training decreased significantly and the number and percentage of systems that had been tested and evaluated at least annually decreased slightly. In addition, the current reporting instructions do not request inspectors general to report on agencies' effectiveness of key activities and did not always provide them with clear guidance for annual reporting. This information could be useful in determining whether agencies are effectively implementing information security policies, procedures, and practices. Without such information, Congress may not be fully informed about the state of federal information security. |
gao_GAO-15-535T | gao_GAO-15-535T_0 | Background
Under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, the Railroad Retirement Board operates two distinct disability programs—the occupational disability program and the total and permanent disability program. The occupational disability program provides benefits for railroad workers when they are unable to perform the duties required of them by their railroad employment. The program—which uses labor- and management- negotiated disability criteria that apply only to a worker’s’ ability to perform his or her specific railroad occupation—provides benefits for workers who have physical or mental impairments that prevent them from performing their specific job, regardless of whether they can perform other work. Workers determined to be eligible for benefits under the occupational disability program may ultimately be able return to the workforce, but generally may not return to their original occupation. The eligibility criteria for the total and permanent disability program differ from the occupational disability program. In other words, these workers are essentially deemed unable to perform any gainful work and are generally unable to engage in any regular employment. Past Fraud Highlights Gaps in RRB Oversight of the Occupational Disability Program
In 2009 and 2010, we reviewed the claims process for RRB’s occupational disability program and found no overall evidence of unusual claims at similar commuter railroads like those exhibited at the Long Island Railroad; however, we did identify several potential program vulnerabilities including a reliance on a manual, paper-based claims process and the lack of a systematic way to evaluate potentially fraudulent claims. Our work found that RRB had not analyzed occupational disability data or performed other analyses that could have enabled the agency to identify unusual patterns in disability applications. Claims are assigned to examiners randomly, and due to the manual nature of the claims process, it is difficult for individual examiners and the agency to detect potential patterns of fraud or abuse such as a high concentration of claims from one source, or boilerplate medical exam information from a small number of doctors or hospitals. Further, RRB does not maintain electronic data for all railroads on claimants’ doctors in a format that would facilitate analysis and allow the agency to analyze and detect potentially fraudulent claims. Currently, RRB only has information on claimants’ doctors in their paper claim files. However, this office’s limited reviews have thus far focused on RRB’s occupational disability program and RRB officials told us during our 2014 review that there were no current plans to include and evaluate data from the total and permanent disability program in its analyses. Total and Permanent Disability Program Is Also Vulnerable To Fraud and Improper Payments
Our recent work examining the processes and controls associated with the total and permanent disability program indicated that it too was vulnerable to fraud and improper payments. Outdated earnings information: Our 2014 review found that RRB awarded total and permanent disability claims based on out-dated work and earnings information. Insufficient supervisory review process: Our examination of RRB’s total and permanent disability claims review process uncovered gaps in internal controls such as allowing a single claims examiner to review claims and award disability benefits—in many cases without an independent review by a second party. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agencies should ensure that key duties and responsibilities are divided or segregated among different people to reduce the risk of error, waste, or fraud. In recent years, about one-quarter to one-third of all total and permanent initial claims were approved by the same claims examiner who reviewed the application. RRB’s performance monitoring standards have been focused primarily on payment timeliness and accuracy and less on whether claimants were properly qualified to receive benefits. Information on approval rates and the accuracy of disability determinations is critical towards ensuring the accountability of the agency’s work. However, RRB did not draw any conclusions about new ways to identify potential fraud and, as a result, did not make any system-wide changes to the determination process. RRB agreed with this recommendation and has begun taking steps to increase fraud awareness, amend its policies and procedures with new fraud detection and reporting mechanisms, and provide fraud awareness training to its staff. In summary, our recent work has found that RRB’s disability programs lack sufficient policies and procedures to address the vulnerabilities it faces and, as a result, remains vulnerable to fraud and runs the risk of making improper payments. Without a commitment to fundamental aspects of internal control and program integrity, RRB remains vulnerable to fraud and runs the risk of making payments to ineligible individuals, thereby undermining the public’s confidence in these important disability programs. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over time, GAO, the RRB Inspector General, and the U.S. Department of Justice have reviewed or investigated RRB's disability benefit programs and found them to be vulnerable to fraud and abuse which places the agency at risk of making improper payments. In 2008, the Department of Justice investigated and prosecuted railroad workers who were suspected of falsely claiming RRB benefits. As of September 30, 2014, these investigations and prosecutions have resulted in approximately $614 million in restitution, forfeiture, and fines, raising concerns about RRB's administration of its disability claims process.
Implementing strong preventive controls can serve as a frontline defense against improper payments. Examples of preventive controls include 1) ensuring that key duties and responsibilities are divided or segregated among different people to reduce the risk of error, waste or fraud and 2) using timely earnings information to ensure claimants are eligible to receive program benefits. GAO did not make recommendations regarding the occupational disability program, and in 2014, made five recommendations regarding the total and permanent disability program.
This testimony provides information on (1) the critical program vulnerabilities of RRB's occupational disability program, and (2) the potential for fraud and threat of improper payments in RRB's total and permanent disability program.
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) administers two disability programs—the occupational disability program and the total and permanent disability program. The occupational disability program provides benefits to railroad workers in situations where workers are unable to perform their railroad work, but may be able to return to the workforce in another occupation. The total and permanent disability program provides benefits to workers who have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment severe enough that they are generally unable to engage in any regular employment. As a steward of taxpayer dollars, the RRB is responsible for how it disperses billions of taxpayer dollars each year.
In recent years, the RRB has been the subject of Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits that have highlighted shortcomings in RRB's administration of its disability programs. RRB Inspector General audits and a U.S. Department of Justice investigation have found similar challenges. GAO found that RRB's continued reliance on a paper-based process and the agency's lack of a robust analytical framework to target potential fraud and abuse in the occupational disability program left the agency susceptible to making improper payments to individuals who did not qualify for benefits. For example, individual occupational disability claims were kept in paper-based files making it difficult for claims examiners to identify unusual patterns or instances where medical information may originate from a small number of doctors or hospitals. Similarly, RRB did not maintain information on doctors in a format that would allow the agency to detect and analyze potential instances of fraud. RRB had begun separately collecting data to detect unusual patterns in relation to a high-profile fraud incident involving employees of the Long Island Railroad, but had not expanded these analyses to other railroads or to other programs outside the occupational disability program.
GAO also found last year that RRB's total and permanent disability program was vulnerable to fraud and improper payments. A shortage of timely data, gaps in internal controls, a lack of a comprehensive system of quality assurance and performance monitoring, and insufficient focus on potential fraud all contributed to a need for fundamental program reform. For example, GAO found that RRB was using information to verify a claimant's self-reported work and earnings history that was up to 1 year old when newer data were available. Further, RRB's claims review process did not follow accepted internal controls by sufficiently separating claim reviews from approvals and, as a result, from one-quarter to one-third of total and permanent disability cases were approved without independent review by a second party. In addition, RRB's performance monitoring standards were focused primarily on payment timeliness and accuracy and less on whether claimants were properly qualified to receive benefits. Lastly, RRB's process lacked a fundamental awareness and sensitivity to instances of potential fraud. In a recent report examining the total and permanent disability program, GAO made several recommendations to improve the oversight of this program including ways to improve information, increase internal controls and foster fraud awareness. RRB officials agreed with all of GAO's recommendations and the agency has begun taking steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-16-589T | gao_GAO-16-589T_0 | In carrying out its mission, IRS relies extensively on computerized information systems, which it must effectively secure to protect sensitive financial and taxpayer data for the collection of taxes, processing of tax returns, and enforcement of federal tax laws. Accordingly, it is critical for IRS to effectively implement information security controls and an agency- wide information security program in accordance with federal law and guidance. Although IRS Has Made Improvements, Information Security Weaknesses Continue to Place Taxpayer and Financial Data at Risk
As we reported in March 2016, IRS has implemented numerous controls over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented access and other controls, including elements of its information security program. Nevertheless, the control weaknesses can be attributed in part to IRS’s inconsistent implementation of elements of its agency-wide information security program. The collective effect of the deficiencies in information security from prior years that continued to exist in fiscal year 2015, along with the new deficiencies we identified, are serious enough to merit the attention of those charged with governance of IRS and therefore represented a significant deficiency in IRS’s internal control over financial reporting systems as of September 30, 2015. Implementing GAO Recommendations Can Help IRS Better Protect Sensitive Taxpayer and Financial Data
To assist IRS in fully implementing its agency-wide information security program, we made two new recommendations to more effectively implement security-related policies and plans. Implementing these recommendations—in addition to the 49 outstanding recommendations from previous audits—will help IRS improve its controls for identifying and authenticating users, limiting users’ access to the minimum necessary to perform their job-related functions, protecting sensitive data when they are stored or in transit, auditing and monitoring system activities, and physically securing its IT facilities and resources. While its estimates have inherent uncertainty, IRS estimated that it prevented or recovered $22.5 billion in fraudulent IDT refunds in filing season 2014 (see figure 1). However, IRS also estimated, where data were available, that it paid $3.1 billion in fraudulent IDT refunds. IRS has taken steps to address IDT refund fraud; however, it remains a persistent and continually changing threat. As described above, IRS received an additional $290 million for fiscal year 2016 to improve customer service, IDT identification and prevention, and cybersecurity efforts and the agency plans to use $16.1 million of this funding to help prevent IDT refund fraud, among other things. IRS also works with third parties, such as tax preparation industry participants, states, and financial institutions to try to detect and prevent IDT refund fraud. In January 2015, we reported that IRS’s authentication tools have limitations and recommended that IRS assess the costs, benefits and risks of its authentication tools. Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement (W-2) Pre-refund Matching. In August 2014 we reported that the wage information that employers report on Form W-2 is not available to IRS until after it issues most refunds, and that if IRS had access to W-2 data earlier, it could match such information to taxpayers’ returns and identify discrepancies before issuing billions of dollars of fraudulent IDT refunds. In December 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 amended the tax code to accelerate W-2 filing deadlines to January 31. Through April 1, 2016, IRS had processed about 95 million returns and issued 76 million refunds totaling about $215 billion. Weaknesses in information security can also increase the risk posed by identity theft refund fraud. IRS needs to establish an approach for addressing identity theft refund fraud that is informed by assessing the cost, benefits, and risks of IRS’s various authentication options and improving the reliability of fraud estimates. While this year’s tax filing season has generally gone smoothly and IRS has improved customer service, it still needs to develop a comprehensive approach to customer service that will meet the needs of taxpayers while ensuring that their sensitive information is adequately protected. | Why GAO Did This Study
In collecting taxes, processing returns, and providing taxpayer service, IRS relies extensively on computerized systems. Thus it is critical that sensitive taxpayer and other data are protected. Recent data breaches at IRS highlight the vulnerability of taxpayer information. In addition, identity theft refund fraud is an evolving threat to honest taxpayers and tax administration. This crime occurs when a thief files a fraudulent return using a legitimate taxpayer's identity and claims a refund. In 2015, GAO added identity theft refund fraud to its high-risk area on the enforcement of tax laws and expanded its government-wide high-risk area on federal information security to include the protection of personally identifiable information.
This statement discusses (1) IRS information security controls over financial and tax processing systems, (2) IRS actions to address identity theft refund fraud, and (3) the status of selected IRS filing season operations. This statement is based on previously published GAO work as well as an update of selected data.
What GAO Found
In March 2016, GAO reported that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had instituted numerous controls over key financial and tax processing systems; however, it had not always effectively implemented other controls intended to properly restrict access to systems and information, among other security measures. In particular, while IRS had improved some of its access controls, weaknesses remained in key controls for identifying and authenticating users, authorizing users' level of rights and privileges, encrypting sensitive data, auditing and monitoring network activity, and physically securing facilities housing its information technology resources. These weaknesses were due in part to IRS's inconsistent implementation of its agency-wide security program, including not fully implementing prior GAO recommendations. GAO concluded that these weaknesses collectively constituted a significant deficiency for the purposes of financial reporting for fiscal year 2015. As a result, taxpayer and financial data continue to be exposed to unnecessary risk.
Identity theft refund fraud also poses a significant challenge. IRS estimates it paid $3.1 billion in these fraudulent refunds in filing season 2014, while preventing $22.5 billion (see figure). The full extent is unknown because of the challenges inherent in detecting this form of fraud.
IRS has taken steps to combat identity theft refund fraud such as improving phone service for taxpayers to report suspected identity theft and working with industry, states, and financial institutions to detect and prevent it. However, as GAO reported in August 2014 and January 2015, additional actions can further assist the agency in addressing this crime, including pre-refund matching of taxpayer returns with information returns from employers, and assessing the costs, benefits, and risks of improving methods for authenticating taxpayers. In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016 includes a provision that would help IRS with pre-refund matching and also includes an additional $290 million to enhance cybersecurity, combat identity theft refund fraud, and improve customer service.
According to IRS and industry partners, the 2016 filing season has generally gone smoothly, with about 95 million returns and $215 billion in refunds processed through April 1, 2016. In addition, IRS increased its level of phone service to taxpayers, although it has not developed a comprehensive strategy for customer service as GAO recommended in December 2015.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to 49 prior recommendations that had not been implemented, GAO made 45 new recommendations to IRS to further improve its information security controls and the implementation of its agency-wide information security program. GAO has also made recommendations to help IRS combat identity theft refund fraud, such as assessing costs, benefits, and risks of taxpayer authentication options. |
gao_GAO-12-657T | gao_GAO-12-657T_0 | Generally, the National Guard can operate in three different statuses: (1) state status—state funded under the command and control of the governor; (2) Title 32 status—federally funded under command and control of the governor (Title 32 forces may participate in law enforcement activities); and (3) Title 10 status—federally funded under command and control of the Secretary of Defense. Factors that Affect the Cost of a DOD Role at the Southwest Land Border
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 mandated that we examine the costs and benefits of an increased DOD role to help secure the southwest land border. This mandate directed that we report on a number of steps that could be taken that might improve security on the border, including the potential deployment of additional units, increased use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems, use of mobile patrols by military personnel, and an increased deployment of unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft to provide surveillance of the southern land border of the United States. In September 2011, we reported that DOD estimated a total cost of about $1.35 billion for two separate border operations—Operation Jump Start and Operation Phalanx—conducted by the National Guard forces in Title 32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and from June 2010 through September 30, 2011, respectively. Further, DOD estimated that it has cost about $10 million each year since 1989 to use active duty Title 10 forces nationwide, through its Joint Task Force-North, in support of drug law enforcement agencies with some additional operational costs borne by the military services. Federal Officials See Some Benefits of a DOD Role in Helping to Secure the Border
Federal officials cited a variety of benefits from a DOD role to help secure the southwest land border. For example, DOD assistance has (1) provided a bridge or augmentation until newly hired Border Patrol agents are trained and deployed to the border; (2) provided training opportunities for military personnel in a geographic environment similar to combat theaters abroad; (3) contributed to apprehensions and seizures made by Border Patrol along the border; (4) deterred illegal activity at the border; (5) built relationships with law enforcement agencies; and (6) maintained and strengthened military-to-military relationships with forces from Mexico. Challenges of a DOD Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border
A number of challenges exist for both the National Guard and for active- duty military forces in providing support to law enforcement missions on the southwest land border. In this status, National Guard personnel are permitted to participate in law enforcement activities; however, the Secretary of Defense has limited their activities, which has resulted in the inability of the National Guard units to make arrests while performing border security missions. Therefore, all arrests and seizures at the southwest land border are performed by the Border Patrol. In addition, we reported in September 2011 that DOD’s operational tempo may impact the availability of DOD units to fill law enforcement support missions. While some DOD units are regularly available to meet specific mission needs at the border (e.g., mechanized units to construct roads), other DOD units (e.g., ground-based surveillance teams) are deployed or may be deployed abroad making it more difficult to fulfill law enforcement requests at any given time. Considerations of an Increased DOD Role at the Southwest Land Border
During our examination of an increased role for DOD at the southwest land border, agency officials we spoke with raised a number of broader issues and concerns surrounding any future expansion of such assistance. Agency officials identified four areas of concern:
DOD officials expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for southwest border security and the resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role. DHS officials expressed concerns that DOD’s border assistance is ad hoc in that DOD has other operational requirements. DOD assists when legal authorities allow and resources are available, whereas DHS has a continuous mission to ensure border security. Department of State and DOD officials expressed concerns that greater or extended use of military forces on the border could create a perception of a militarized U.S. border with Mexico, especially when Department of State and Justice officials are helping support civilian law enforcement institutions in Mexico to address crime and border issues. Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border. GAO-11-856R. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2011. Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS reports that the southwest border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, including the smuggling of humans and illegal narcotics. Several federal agencies are involved in border security efforts, including DHS, DOD, Justice, and State. In recent years, the National Guard has played a role in helping to secure the southwest land border by providing the Border Patrol with information on the identification of individuals attempting to cross the southwest land border into the United States. Generally, the National Guard can operate in three different statuses: (1) state statusstate funded under the command and control of the governor; (2) Title 32 statusfederally funded under command and control of the governor; and (3) Title 10 statusfederally funded under command and control of the Secretary of Defense.
This testimony discusses (1) the costs and benefits of a DOD role to help secure the southwest land border, including the deployment of the National Guard, other DOD personnel, or additional units; (2) the challenges of a DOD role at the southwest land border; and (3) considerations of an increased DOD role to help secure the southwest land border.
The information in this testimony is based on work completed in September 2011, which focused on the costs and benefits of an increased role of DOD at the southwest land border. See "Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border," GAO-11-856R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2011).
What GAO Found
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 mandated that GAO examine the costs and benefits of an increased Department of Defense (DOD) role to help secure the southwest land border. This mandate directed that GAO report on, among other things, the potential deployment of additional units, increased use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems, use of mobile patrols by military personnel, and an increased deployment of unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft in national airspace. In September 2011, GAO reported that DOD estimated a total cost of about $1.35 billion for two separate border operationsOperation Jump Start and Operation Phalanxconducted by National Guard forces in Title 32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and from June 2010 through September 30, 2011, respectively. Further, DOD estimated that it has cost about $10 million each year since 1989 to use active duty Title 10 forces nationwide, through its Joint Task Force-North, in support of drug law enforcement agencies with some additional operational costs borne by the military services. Agency officials stated multiple benefits from DODs increased border role, such as assistance to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Border Patrol until newly hired Border Patrol agents are trained and deployed to the border; providing DOD personnel with training opportunities in a geographic environment similar to current combat theaters; contributing to apprehensions and seizures and deterring other illegal activity along the border; building relationships with law enforcement agencies; and strengthening military-to-military relationships with forces from Mexico.
GAO found challenges for the National Guard and for active-duty military forces in providing support to law enforcement missions. For example, under Title 32 of the United States Code, National Guard personnel are permitted to participate in law enforcement activities; however, the Secretary of Defense has precluded National Guard forces from making arrests while performing border missions because of concerns raised about militarizing the U.S. border. As a result, all arrests and seizures at the southwest border are performed by the Border Patrol. Further, DOD officials cited restraints on the direct use of active duty forces, operating under Title 10 of the United States Code in domestic civilian law enforcement, set out in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. In addition, GAO has reported on the varied availability of DOD units to support law enforcement missions, such as some units being regularly available while other units (e.g., ground-based surveillance teams) may be deployed abroadmaking it more difficult to fulfill law enforcement requests.
Federal officials stated a number of broad issues and concerns regarding any additional DOD assistance in securing the southwest border. DOD officials expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for southwest border security and the resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role. DHS officials expressed concerns that DODs border assistance is ad hoc in that DOD has other operational requirements. DOD assists when legal authorities allow and resources are available, whereas DHS has a continuous mission to ensure border security. Further, Department of State and DOD officials expressed concerns about the perception of a militarized U.S. border with Mexico, especially when Department of State and Justice officials are helping civilian law enforcement institutions in Mexico on border issues. |
gao_GAO-03-54 | gao_GAO-03-54_0 | The program is implemented by CMRs, who promote small business subcontracting in two primary ways, as described in SBA regulations.First, CMRs review prime contractors’ compliance with the requirements of their subcontracting plans. Second, CMRs conduct various marketing activities, such as marketing small businesses to prime contractors or matching certain types of small business subcontractors with prime contractors. In addition, workloads and prime contractor coverage vary greatly between CMRs. SBA officials and CMRs have several concerns about the CMR role. At the end of fiscal year 2001, about 90 percent of the CMRs had other substantial responsibilities in addition to their CMR duties. Shift from On-Site to Desk Reviews
CMRs use desk reviews far more frequently than on-site reviews to monitor prime contractors’ compliance with subcontracting plans. With downsizing and retirements taking place and no staff assigned to replace lost personnel, the number of CMR FTEs declined significantly and resulted in workload imbalances across and even within SBA’s Area Offices. Travel fund reductions have meant fewer on-site visits and greater reliance on desk reviews. Without such a plan, SBA implemented ad hoc measures to deal piecemeal with resource declines. Conclusions
Subcontracting on federal contracts is a large and growing marketplace for small businesses. CMRs have been long considered to be key to fostering small business participation in such subcontracting. Unless steps are taken to better assess, evaluate, and plan for the future of the CMR role, SBA will continue to lack an understanding of CMR contributions to small business subcontracting. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of SBA assess, evaluate, and plan the CMR role, including addressing such issues as the impact of assigning multiple roles to CMRs, the appropriate CMR role focus, the effectiveness of compliance- monitoring methods, and the impact of uneven CMR workloads and prime contractor coverage; develop specific outcome and impact measures for CMRs’ clearly communicate the strategic plan and expectations for the CMR role to both SBA staff and small businesses. Four staff that work 80 percent of their time as Commercial Marketing Representatives (CMRs) constitute about three full-time equivalents (FTEs), not four FTEs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Subcontracting on federal contracts is a large and growing marketplace for small businesses. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Commercial Marketing Representatives (CMRs) have long been considered to be key to fostering small businesses' participation in subcontracts. GAO was asked to assess the role that CMRs are playing in administering SBA's subcontracting assistance program.
What GAO Found
CMRs are supposed to promote small business subcontracting in two primary ways. First, they review prime contractors' compliance with the requirements of their subcontracting plans--either through on-site visits to contractors or by simply reviewing their subcontractor activity reports. Second, they conduct various marketing activities, such as marketing small businesses to prime contractors. In recent years, however, additional duties placed on CMRs have often taken priority over these responsibilities. In fact, in fiscal year 2000, 87 percent of the CMRs had other substantial responsibilities. Moreover, workloads and prime contractor coverage now vary greatly between CMRs. Additionally, CMRs are relying more on "desk" reviews of subcontractors' activity to monitor compliance with subcontracting plans as opposed to on-site reviews. This is a concern to some SBA officials who believe that on-site reviews are more thorough, though others believe the desk review offers the potential for greater coverage. Declines in staffing and travel funds have contributed to the changing role of the CMR. With downsizing and retirements taking place and no staff assigned to replace lost personnel, the number of CMR full-time equivalents (FTEs) has decreased significantly and has resulted in workload imbalances. While there are concerns about the changing nature of the CMR role, SBA has not strategically planned for these changes or assessed their collective impact. Instead, it has implemented ad hoc measures to deal piecemeal with resource declines. Unless steps are taken to better evaluate and plan for the future of CMRs, SBA will continue to lack an understanding of their contributions to small business subcontracting. |
gao_GAO-01-853 | gao_GAO-01-853_0 | Before it established the Command, the Navy did not have an organization dedicated to operational experimentation. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching, long-term strategy that integrates these activities or that clearly defines transformation goals, organizational roles and responsibilities, timetables for implementation, resources to be used to achieve its transformation goals, and ways to measure progress toward those goals. Navy Does Not Have a Defined, Integrated Strategy for Transformation
There is no clear consensus on the precise definition, scope, or direction of Navy transformation. The Navy has not developed a plan that clearly identifies what transformation is and what its goals or components are. It has also established a constructive working arrangement with the Naval War College and the Strategic Studies Group. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more clearly determine the Navy’s direction and promote better understanding of actions taken to transform its forces for the 21st century, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a long-term strategic plan and roadmap that clearly articulates priorities, objectives, and milestones; identifies the scope, resource requirements, and responsibilities; and defines the metrics for assessing progress in achieving successful transformation. | Why GAO Did This Study
With the end of the Cold War, national security strategies changed to meet new global challenges. The Navy developed a new strategic direction in the early 1990s, shifting its primary focus from open ocean "blue water" operations to littoral, or shallow water, operations closer to shore.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although the Navy has recently placed more emphasis on transformation, it does not have a well-defined and overarching strategy for transformation. It has not clearly identified the scope and direction of its transformation; the overall goals, objectives, and milestones; or the specific strategies and resources to be used in achieving these goals. It also has not clearly identified organizational roles and responsibilities, priorities, resources, or ways to measure progress. Without a well-defined strategic plan to guide the Navy's efforts, senior leaders and Congress will not have the tools they need to ensure that the transformation is successful. |
gao_RCED-95-11 | gao_RCED-95-11_0 | Federal Financial Interests Are Not Adequately Protected During Debt Settlements
FmHA forgave billions of dollars in loans through debt settlements without always taking aggressive action to protect the government’s interests. FmHA officials we spoke with noted that problems in adhering to the procedures stemmed from, among other things, (1) competing program objectives that create incentives to write off large amounts of delinquent loans in an attempt to “clean up” the loan portfolio and (2) limited staff resources. Most Debt Is Written Off With No Recovery
During fiscal years 1991 through 1993, FmHA wrote off about $3.4 billion worth of outstanding direct farm loans through debt settlements. The amount already written off through debt settlements may be just the tip of the iceberg because FmHA continues to have a large number of problem loans that may eventually be subject to settlement. Field Offices Do Not Always Implement Debt Settlement Procedures
FmHA has established procedures for its field office officials to use when settling debts. Limited Emphasis on Minimizing Losses Inhibits Maximum Recovery During Debt Settlements
FmHA has placed little emphasis on minimizing losses during debt settlements. Specifically, during fiscal years 1991-93, 86 borrowers, who had received about $20 million in debt relief when their accounts with FmHA were settled, obtained about $13 million in new direct or guaranteed loans. Concerns over providing new loans to borrowers who have defaulted on previous FmHA loans are not new. However, FmHA does not take sufficient action to identify and recover payments from those with the resources to reduce their debts. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Farmers Home Administration's (FmHA) debt settlements, focusing on: (1) how well FmHA protects government interests during debt settlements; and (2) additional FmHA loans to borrowers whose previous debts were forgiven.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FmHA is not adequately protecting government interests during debt settlements; (2) FmHA wrote off about $3.4 billion in outstanding farm loans during fiscal years (FY) 1991 through 1993 without receiving any payments from borrowers on most of the loans; (3) FmHA has $7.6 billion in problem loans that may be subject to future settlements; (4) FmHA officials do not always follow FmHA debt settlement procedures such as developing a complete inventory of borrowers' financial resources, using the borrowers' resources to offset loan losses, or offsetting loans with other government payments; (5) FmHA does not emphasize minimizing loan losses during debt settlements; (6) problems in implementing debt settlement procedures include competing work priorities and limited staff resources; (7) borrowers in default are not prohibited from receiving new loans; (8) in FY 1991 through 1993, FmHA approved new loans worth $13 billion to 86 borrowers who had $20 million in debts forgiven; and (9) some of these borrowers became delinquent on their new loans. |
gao_GAO-03-878 | gao_GAO-03-878_0 | Prospective Payment for HHAs
On October 1, 2000, HCFA implemented the PPS for home health care. Even with the revisions, HCFA officials acknowledged that the HHRGs may not adequately differentiate among home health patients, particularly those who need wound-care supplies, and that additional modifications might be needed. Episode Payments May Not Reflect Variation in Nonroutine Medical Supply Costs across Patients
HCFA used the total costs associated with furnishing home health care, including the costs of nonroutine medical supplies, to establish the average episode payment. For some types of patients, such as those needing wound-care supplies and dressing changes, increasing payments in proportion to the cost of staff time is likely to result in an appropriate adjustment to total payments if wound-care supply costs are proportionately higher for patients receiving more costly staff time. Although the agency asked HHAs to provide patient-specific information on the use of and charges for wound-care supplies, HHAs have not done so, which will hamper CMS’s ability to better account for these costs in the episode payments. Certain Nonroutine Medical Supplies May Warrant Exclusion from Episode Payment
Patients requiring nonroutine medical supplies are classified into many different payment groups, so the payment for any given group, which is based on the group’s average cost, may not account for unusually high nonroutine medical supply costs. Some of clinical experts we consulted said there are no nonroutine medical supplies that are both high-cost and infrequently provided. Such changes required some patients who had been self-managing chronic conditions to either change the type of supply (for example, the type of ostomy appliance) or number of supplies used while receiving home health care. This could include an examination of whether certain types of patients, such as those requiring nonroutine medical supplies, have the same utilization now as they did prior to the PPS. Conclusions
The adequacy of Medicare’s home health payment groups and adjustments to reflect the variation in episode costs across patients is critical to ensuring that patients and HHAs are not disadvantaged under the PPS. While there are sound reasons to retain most nonroutine medical supplies in the episode payment, excluding certain supplies may be warranted if the payment groups will not adequately account for their costs or if it has been demonstrated that patient access to care or continuity of care has been disrupted. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that in evaluating refinements to the PPS, the Administrator of CMS collect and analyze patient-specific data on the cost and utilization of individual nonroutine medical supplies to determine whether the payment groups and adjustments appropriately reflect the differences in supply costs. Because HHAs could identify many of the patients with costly nonroutine medical supply needs prior to admitting them for home health care, we believe it is important to explicitly consider this group of patients in designing analyses of the impact of the home health PPS and to consider changes to the payment to ameliorate any identified problems. Appendix I: Comments from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services | Why GAO Did This Study
Under Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS), home health agencies receive a single payment, adjusted to reflect the care needs of different types of patients, for providing up to 60 days of home health care. Some home health industry representatives have suggested that certain nonroutine medical supplies (such as wound-care dressings) should be excluded from this payment and reimbursed separately because of their high cost. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 required GAO to examine home health agency payments for nonroutine medical supplies and recommend whether payment for any such supplies should be excluded from the PPS.
What GAO Found
Although Medicare's home health payment includes the average costs of nonroutine medical supplies, adjusted payments may not reflect variation in supply costs across types of patients. Further, home health agencies can be paid the same amount for treating patients with quite different supply costs. This means that under the PPS, patients who require costly supplies may have problems accessing home health care and the agencies that treat them may be financially disadvantaged. This is of particular concern for patients who have nonroutine medical supply needs that are easily identified prior to admission or who require supplies for which there are no lower-cost alternatives. Excluding certain nonroutine medical supplies from the home health payment and reimbursing them separately would help ensure that patients have access to these supplies and that agencies are protected financially for providing them. At the same time, this would weaken the cost-control incentives of the PPS as well as increase patient out-of-pocket costs. Such a policy might be warranted, however, for nonroutine medical supplies that are high-cost, relative to the total payment, and infrequently used because the payment adjustment to account for differences in patient needs may not be adequate to compensate a home health agency for providing these supplies. Patient care representatives suggest that an additional category of supplies should be excluded from the payment and reimbursed separately, namely those that a patient had been using prior to home health care to treat an ongoing condition. Clinical experts indicated that care has been disrupted for some patients who require these kinds of supplies because some home health agencies have required patients to switch supplies or limited the supplies provided to them. Although the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has asked home health agencies to report information on nonroutine medical supply use and cost, they have not done so. Without this patient-specific supply data, CMS does not have the ability to determine whether the PPS needs to be adjusted to account for nonroutine medical supply costs or whether certain supplies should be excluded from the payment. |
gao_T-RCED-97-120 | gao_T-RCED-97-120_0 | Airline Barriers to Entry Persist and Predominantly Affect Competition in the East and Upper Midwest
Operating barriers continue to limit competition and contribute to higher airfares in several key markets in the upper Midwest and East. As a result, our October 1996 report recommended that DOT take actions that we originally suggested in 1990 and highlighted areas for potential congressional action. The report specifically addressed the effects of slots, perimeter rules, exclusive-use gate leases, and marketing strategies developed by the established airlines since airline deregulation. In October 1996, we reported that this level of control over slots by a few established airlines had increased even further (see app. Recognizing the need for new entry at the slot-controlled airports, the Congress in 1994 created an exemption provision to allow for entry at O’Hare, LaGuardia, and Kennedy in cases where DOT “finds it to be in the public interest and the circumstances to be exceptional.” However, the exemption authority, which in effect allows DOT to issue new slots, has resulted in little new entry because DOT has interpreted the “exceptional circumstances” criterion very narrowly. Thus, we suggested that the Congress consider granting DOT the authority to allow exemptions to the perimeter rule at National when proposed service will substantially increase competition. In particular, they deter new as well as established airlines from entering those markets where an established airline is dominant. In our 1996 report, we found that the effect of these marketing strategies tends to be the greatest—and fares the highest—in markets where the dominant carrier’s position is protected by operating barriers. While DOT’s Recent Actions Represent Positive First Steps, Additional Actions Will Likely Be Needed
In its January 1997 response to our report, DOT stated that it shared our concerns that barriers to entry limit competition in the airline industry. The agency indicated that it would include competitive benefits as a factor when determining whether to grant slots to new entrants under the exceptional circumstances criterion. While this is a positive step, additional action will likely be needed because the number of new slots that DOT can grant is very limited. Recognizing this, DOT committed to giving careful consideration to our recommendation that it hold periodic slot lotteries. However, DOT did not concur with our recommendation that FAA make an airport’s efforts to have gates available to nonincumbents a factor in its decisions on awarding federal grants to airports. According to DOT, the number of airports that we identified as presenting gate access problems is sufficiently small that the agency would prefer to address those problems on a case by case basis. Finally, DOT expressed concern about potentially overly aggressive attempts by some established carriers to thwart new entry. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed competition in the domestic airline industry, focusing on: (1) barriers to entry in the airline industry; and (2) the Department of Transportation's (DOT) response to the recommendations in GAO's October 1996 report.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in its October 1996 report, GAO stated that little progress has been achieved in lowering the barriers to entry since GAO first reported on these barriers in 1990; (2) as a result, the full benefits of airline deregulation have yet to be realized; (3) in particular, operating limits in the form of slot controls, restrictive gate leasing arrangements, and perimeter rules continue to block entry at key airports in the East and upper Midwest; (4) several marketing strategies give advantages to the established carriers; (5) these strategies, taken together, continue to deter new as well as established airlines from entering those markets where an established airline is dominant; (6) these strategies' effect tends to be greatest, and airfares the highest, in markets where the dominate carrier's position is protected by operating barriers; (7) GAO recommended that DOT take actions that GAO had previously suggested in 1990 to lower the operating barriers; (8) moreover, GAO suggested that, absent action by DOT, Congress may wish to consider revising the legislative criteria that governs DOT's granting slots to new entrants and consider granting DOT the authority to allow exemptions to National Airport's perimeter rule to increase competition; (9) DOT concurred with GAO's recent findings and expressed concern about "overly aggressive" attempts by established airlines to thwart new entry; (10) to make it easier for new entrants to obtain slots, DOT indicated that it would revise its restrictive interpretation of the legislative criteria governing the granting of new slots; (11) while this is a positive step, additional action will likely be needed because the number of new slots that DOT can grant is very limited; (12) in its report, GAO also recommended that DOT create a pool of available slots by periodically withdrawing a small percentage from the major incumbents at each airport and distribute those slots in a fashion that increases competition; (13) DOT indicated that it is still considering this action; (14) DOT did not agree with GAO's recommendation that the Federal Aviation Administration consider an airport's efforts to make gates available to nonincumbents when making federal airport grant decisions; (15) DOT said that it would rather address this issue on a case by case basis as problems are brought to its attention; and (16) in light of the lack of progress over the past 7 years, however, GAO believes that its recommendations, combined with GAO's suggestions for potential congressional action, offer prudent steps to promote competition in regions that have not experienced the benefits of airline deregulation. |
gao_GAO-13-94 | gao_GAO-13-94_0 | For many years, the federal government has taken steps to coordinate geospatial activities both within and outside the federal government. OMB and Interior generally agreed with our recommendations. Specifically, agencies differed on what investments they included as an IT investment. Implementing Established Policies Is Not a Federal Priority, Resulting in Duplicative Investments
While the President and OMB have established policies and procedures for managing and coordinating investments in geospatial data, the FGDC, federal departments and theme-lead agencies, and OMB itself have not effectively implemented them. While the FGDC has developed and endorsed several standards, it has not yet planned for or implemented an approach to manage data as related groups of themes and their associated key datasetsinvestments designed to allow agencies to more effectively plan geospatial data collection efforts and minimize duplicative investments. None of the three federal departments in our review have fully implemented important activities for coordinating geospatial data and assets, such as developing and implementing a strategy for advancing geospatial activities within the department. The three theme-lead agencies in our review have implemented some but not all important activities to ensure the national coverage and stewardship of geospatial data themes. OMB’s annual budget reporting mechanisms have not provided complete and reliable information to identify duplicative geospatial investments. The primary cause for why the FGDC, federal departments and theme- lead agencies, and OMB have not yet fully implemented established policies and procedures for coordinating geospatial investments is because, according to OMB staff members and agency officials, they have been focusing on other priorities. FGDC has prepared a strategic plan; however, it is missing key components and has not been kept up-to-date. According to OMB guidance and the executive order, federal departments and agencies that handle geospatial data are to: designate a senior agency official for geospatial information that has departmentwide responsibility, accountability, and authority for geospatial information issues; prepare, maintain, publish, and implement a strategy for advancing geographic information and related geospatial data activities appropriate to their mission, and in support of the NSDI strategy; develop a policy that requires them to make their geospatial metadata available on the clearinghouse; make all metadata associated with geospatial data available on the clearinghouse, and use the metadata standard; and adopt internal procedures to ensure that they access the NSDI clearinghouse before they expend funds to collect or produce new geospatial data to determine (1) whether the information has already been collected by others, or (2) whether cooperative efforts to obtain the data are possible. According to OMB,provide the leadership necessary to ensure the national coverage and stewardship of specific geospatial data themes, NSDI-designated theme- lead agencies are to: in order to effectively manage geospatial data and designate a point of contact who is responsible for the development, maintenance, coordination, and dissemination of data using the clearinghouse; prepare goals relating to the theme that support the NSDI strategy, and as needed, collect and analyze information from user needs and include those needs in the theme-related goals; develop and implement a plan for the nationwide population of the data theme that includes (1) the development of partnership programs with states, tribes, academia, the private sector, other federal agencies, and localities that meet the needs of users; (2) human and financial resource needs; (3) standards, metadata, and the clearinghouse needs; and (4) a timetable for the development for the theme; and create a plan to develop and implement theme standards. All three agencies have designated a point of contact. OMB Does Not Have Complete and Reliable Information to Identify Duplicative Geospatial Investments
OMB has oversight responsibilities for federal IT systems and acquisition activities—including GIS—to help ensure their efficient and effective use. Interior participates in several efforts aimed at coordinating one of its themes, orthoimagery. Further, until OMB establishes a way to obtain reliable information about federal geospatial investments, OMB will not be able to identify potentially duplicative geospatial investments. Unless the FGDC, federal departments and agencies, and OMB decide that investments in geospatial information are a priority, these investments will remain uncoordinated, and although the extent of duplication is unknown, the federal government will continue to acquire duplicative geospatial information and waste taxpayer dollars. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Federal Geographic Data Committee; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, the Interior, and Transportation; and the Administrator of the General Services Administration. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the extent to which the federal government has established and effectively implemented policies and procedures for coordinating its investments in geospatial data and avoiding duplication. We then reviewed FGDC and federal department documentation, such as policies, procedures, strategic plans, implementation plans, technical documentation of standards and metadata, committee charters and meeting minutes, and budget documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government collects, maintains, and uses geospatial information--information linked to specific geographic locations--to support many functions, including national security and disaster response. In 2012, the Department of the Interior (Interior) estimated that the federal government invests billions of dollars on geospatial data annually, and that duplication is common. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the federal government has established and effectively implemented policies and procedures for coordinating its geospatial investments and avoiding duplication. To do so, GAO focused on FGDC coordination activities; efforts within the departments of Commerce, the Interior, and Transportation; and OMB oversight. GAO reviewed FGDC and department documentation, such as policies, procedures, and strategic plans; OMB guidance and an executive order; and reports concerning duplicative investments.
What GAO Found
While the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have established policies and procedures for coordinating investments in geospatial data, governmentwide committees and federal departments and agencies have not effectively implemented them. The committee that was established to promote the coordination of geospatial data nationwide--the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC)--has developed and endorsed key standards-- including a metadata standard that includes descriptive information about a particular set of geospatial data--and established a clearinghouse of metadata; however, the clearinghouse is not being used by agencies to identify planned geospatial investments to promote coordination and reduce duplication. The FGDC has not yet planned or implemented an approach to manage geospatial data as related groups of investments to allow agencies to more effectively plan geospatial data collection efforts and minimize duplicative investments; and its strategic plan is missing key elements, such as performance measures for many of its defined objectives. Further, none of the three federal departments in GAO's review have fully implemented important activities for coordinating geospatial data, such as preparing and implementing a strategy for advancing geospatial activities within their respective departments.
Further, the three agencies in GAO's review responsible for governmentwide management of specific geospatial data have implemented some but not all important activities for coordinating the national coverage of specific geospatial data. For example, only one agency has developed a plan for the nationwide population of the datasets under its responsibility, and none of the agencies have developed a plan to develop standards that facilitate the collection and sharing of geospatial data. Finally, while OMB has oversight responsibilities for geospatial data, OMB staff members acknowledged that OMB does not have complete and reliable information to identify potentially duplicative geospatial investments.
FGDC, federal departments and agencies, and OMB have not yet fully implemented policies and procedures for coordinating geospatial investments because these efforts have not been a priority. As a result, efforts to acquire data are uncoordinated and the federal government is acquiring duplicative geospatial data. For example, three agencies are independently acquiring road data, which is reported to have resulted in millions of wasted taxpayers' dollars. Unless OMB, the FGDC, and federal departments and agencies decide that coordinating geospatial investments is a priority, this situation will likely continue.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations aimed at improving coordination and reducing duplication, to include FGDC developing a national strategy for coordinating geospatial investments; federal agencies following federal guidance for managing geospatial investments; and OMB developing a mechanism to identify and report on geospatial investments. Two agencies and OMB generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and one agency neither agreed nor disagreed. |
gao_GAO-13-517 | gao_GAO-13-517_0 | Leading Practices for Federal Websites Should Guide the Continued Development of Performance.gov in a Number of Areas
HowTo.gov is a key source of leading practices for federal website development and management. OMB staff stated that, thus far, the specific legal requirements of GPRAMA have been the primary framework used to guide efforts to develop Performance.gov. They have been focused on working to comply with these requirements by providing information on agency and cross- agency priority goals and by establishing a phased development plan for integrating additional information from agency strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports and the inventory of federal programs. OMB and GSA staff members have said, however, that the leading practices provided by HowTo.gov will help guide the future development of Performance.gov. GPRAMA provides direction on the purposes and audiences for Performance.gov. In addition to specifying the types of information to be made available on the website, the act states that information on the website “shall be readily accessible and easily found on the Internet by the public and members and committees of Congress.” OMB’s written guidance states that Performance.gov “serves as the public window on the Federal Government’s goals and performance in key areas of focus,” and will be “the single, government-wide performance website required under the GPRA Modernization Act.” OMB’s written guidance and information on the website also say that Performance.gov will make information about cross-agency and agency-specific goals and performance easier to find for the public and Congress, as required by GPRAMA, as well as for delivery partners, agency employees, the media, and other stakeholders. However, if the specific intended uses of Performance.gov are not clarified, while taking into consideration what the law requires, it could lead to varying ideas and expectations for how Performance.gov should be developed and designed and the audiences it should serve. HowTo.gov also recommends that developers engage potential users through focus groups and other outreach; regularly conduct usability tests to gather insight into navigation, the organization of content, and the ease with which different types of users can complete specific tasks; and collect and analyze performance, customer satisfaction, and other metrics. HowTo.gov states that these efforts are important for collecting and analyzing information about audiences, their needs, and how they are using, or want to use, the website. Furthermore, while a focus of GPRAMA is to make federal performance information more accessible to the public, efforts to collect input and feedback from interested members of the public and other potential audiences have thus far been limited to the collection of suggestions through the website’s “Feedback” page. Of the 24 metrics recommended by Howto.gov, 15 are currently tracked for Performance.gov. HowTo.gov also recommends setting goals for metrics, and making sure that these align with the objectives of a website, to help prioritize and guide design changes for improved performance and usability. These goals can be identified based on prevailing practices or the desire to improve a particular metric over time. Except for customer satisfaction, which is discussed later in this report, OMB has not yet established goals for any recommended metrics. GSA staff acknowledged the need to collect additional recommended metrics for the website. OMB and GSA staff have said that as the phased development of Performance.gov takes place, they expect to use outreach to a broader set of audiences, including members of the public, and usability testing with these audiences to make Performance.gov more “public-facing” and “citizen-centric.” While they have developed a general time frame for conducting usability tests, they have not yet established a specific plan, a timeline for other forms of outreach, or indicated the specific audiences they plan to target for greater outreach. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the value of Performance.gov for intended audiences and improve the ability to identify and prioritize potential improvements, we are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget—working with the Performance Improvement Council and the General Services Administration—take the following three actions:
Clarify the ways that intended audiences could use the information on the Performance.gov website to accomplish specific tasks and specify the design changes that would be required to facilitate that use. OMB staff agreed with our recommendations. Specifically, this report examines the extent to which Performance.gov incorporates leading practices for the development of federal websites. We reached out to groups most likely to use the information on Performance.gov because of their management, oversight, advocacy, or academic interest and asked them to review the website prior to our interviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress took steps to improve federal performance reporting through GPRAMA by requiring that OMB provide performance information via a publicly-available central website, Performance.gov. GAO is mandated to review GPRAMA's implementation at several junctures; this report is part of a series doing so. The report examines the extent to which Performance.gov incorporates leading practices for the development of federal websites. To address this objective, GAO compared the design of Performance.gov to GSA's Top 10 Best Practices for federal websites on HowTo.gov; reviewed performance reporting literature and OMB guidance; collected information from 13 national, state, and local performance reporting website practitioners; and interviewed federal and nonfederal groups most likely to use the information on the website because of their management, oversight, advocacy, or academic interests. These groups included officials from five selected agencies, staff from 13 U.S. Senate and House of Representatives congressional committees, and representatives from 10 transparency organizations and academic institutions.
What GAO Found
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires Performance.gov to provide program and performance information accessible to the public and members and committees of Congress. GAO used leading practices from HowTo.gov, a key source of guidance for federal website development and management, to assess the website and found that although Performance.gov incorporates some leading practices, opportunities exist to further incorporate them through continued development. For example, consistent with leading practices, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), working with the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Performance Improvement Council (PIC), provided information about the purposes and audiences for the website, but they have made limited efforts to clarify how audiences can use the information provided. If the specific uses of Performance.gov are not clarified, while taking into consideration what the law requires, it could lead to varying ideas and expectations for how Performance.gov should be developed.
Leading practices also recommend that developers engage potential users through focus groups and other outreach and regularly conduct usability tests to gather insight into areas such as navigation and the organization of website content. Efforts to collect input and feedback from potential audiences of Performance.gov, however, have been limited to the collection of suggestions through the website's "Feedback" page and briefings for selected audiences. Similarly, OMB has not yet conducted any usability tests of the website, although staff said that usability testing is being planned for September 2013. Without this information, the needs of the audiences and how they are using or want to use the website cannot guide further improvements.
In addition, leading practices recommend that agencies collect, analyze, and report on a baseline set of performance, customer satisfaction, and other metrics. Of the 24 recommended metrics, 15 are currently tracked for Performance.gov. Leading practices also recommend setting goals for metrics and making sure these align with the website's objectives to help prioritize and guide design changes. These goals can be identified based on prevailing practices or the desire to improve a particular metric over time. Except for the area of customer satisfaction, OMB has not established performance metric goals, which may make it more difficult to analyze the effectiveness of the website.
OMB staff stated that, thus far, the specific legal requirements of GPRAMA have been the primary framework used to guide efforts to develop Performance.gov. They said they have been focused on compliance with these requirements by providing information on agency and cross-agency priority goals and by establishing a phased development plan for integrating additional information from agency strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports. OMB and GSA staff members said, however, that the leading practices provided by HowTo.gov will help guide the development of Performance.gov. They also noted that as the phased development of Performance.gov unfolds, they expect to use broader outreach to a wider audience, including members of the public, to make Performance.gov more "public-facing" and "citizen-centric."
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB should work with GSA and the PIC to (1) clarify specific ways that intended audiences could use Performance.gov and specify changes to support these uses; (2) systematically collect information on the needs of intended audiences; and (3) collect recommended performance metrics and, as appropriate, create goals for those metrics. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-245 | gao_GAO-07-245_0 | Background
Congress authorized the Emergency Relief program in Title 23, United States Code, Section 125, to provide for the repair or reconstruction of federal-aid highways and roads on federal lands that have sustained serious damage resulting from natural disasters or catastrophic failures from an external cause. Permanent repairs restore seriously damaged highway facilities to predisaster conditions. As part of its responsibilities, FEMA provides funds to state and local governments to repair and replace roads damaged as a result of disasters that are not on the federal-aid highway system. Extraordinary Events Determine Which States Receive Most Emergency Relief Allocations
During the 10-year period 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated over $8 billion to the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. territories, and other federal agencies to repair or replace highway facilities damaged by natural or man-made events. Of this total, 70 percent has gone to five especially hard-hit states that have experienced extraordinary or multiple disasters—California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York. Despite the program’s long- term fiscal imbalance and a depleting Highway Trust Fund, FHWA is not recapturing unused program funds. Funding needs for extraordinary events—those events needing more than $100 million in funding—have averaged about $460 million annually since 1998, the earliest year for which FHWA has data on individual disaster events. The Emergency Relief program has been funded with an annual authorization of $100 million through contract authority from the Highway Trust Fund, with a $100 million per event obligation limit imposed since 1972. 5). However, the Highway Trust Fund authorization is limited to $100 million, and under SAFETEA-LU, additional supplemental funds are to be appropriated from the General Fund. In the past, because the Highway Trust Fund maintained significant unexpended balances, the Emergency Relief program’s supplemental appropriations have been funded through the Highway Trust Fund. However, environmental requirements, community concerns, congressional direction, and unique localized circumstances have increased the scope and costs of projects, increased the portion of project costs funded by the program, expanded the definition of program-eligible events, and resulted in projects that go beyond the original intent of the program. Additionally, the program is not intended to supplant other federal or state funds for correction of preexisting nondisaster- related deficiencies. Definition of a Disaster Has Been Expanded, and New Types of Work Have Been Authorized
In the Emergency Relief program regulations, a natural disaster is described as a sudden and unusual natural occurrence, and a catastrophic failure is described as the sudden failure of a segment of the highway system due to an external cause. FHWA’s next Emergency Relief Manual revision in 1998 identified basin flooding as an Emergency Relief-eligible disaster. We found that different FHWA division offices accepted differing definitions of what constituted a site. From this perspective, the Emergency Relief program faces sustainability concerns in the future, exacerbated by the gradual expansion of eligibility criteria that should be addressed. Matters for Congressional Consideration
In order to put the Emergency Relief program on a sound financial footing, Congress should consider the expected future demands on the program and reexamine the appropriate level and sources of funding—including whether to increase the $100 million annual authorized funding and whether the Highway Trust Fund, the General Fund, or some combination would allow the program to accomplish its purpose in a fiscally sustainable manner. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the total amount of Emergency Relief program funding allocated to the states in recent years, how this funding was distributed among the states, and the events for which it was allocated; (2) the sources of funding used to finance these emergency relief allocations and the financial challenges facing the program; and (3) the scope of activities eligible for funding and the extent to which the scope of eligible activities has changed in recent years. We identified congressional waivers of program requirements such as the requirement for state matching funds and the $100 million maximum limit on program funding that could be provided to a single state per fiscal year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1972, Congress has authorized $100 million a year for highway disaster recovery needs through the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Emergency Relief (ER) program. Increasingly, the program's actual costs have exceeded this amount, and Congress has provided additional funding. Because of this fiscal imbalance between program funding and program needs, we reviewed ER under the Comptroller General's authority to determine the (1) total funding, distribution of funds among the states, and disaster events funded; (2) sources of funding provided and financial challenges facing the program; and (3) scope of activities eligible for funding and how the scope of eligible activities has changed in recent years. GAO's study is based on financial data, document analysis, stakeholder interviews, and site visits, among other methods.
What GAO Found
During the 10-year period of 1997 to 2006, ER provided about $8 billion to states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American territories, and federal agencies, a total of 56 states and other jurisdictions. About 70 percent of these funds has gone to 5 states--California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York--that have been especially affected by major disaster events, such as Hurricane Katrina. Since 1990, 86 percent of the ER program has been funded through supplemental appropriations as the program's annual demands have exceeded the $100 million annual authorization. Even excluding extraordinary disasters, those exceeding $100 million in eligible damage per event, the program still needed $271 million per year for smaller eligible events. Meanwhile, the program has been authorized at a constant $100 million level since 1972, resulting in the current authorization being worth about one-fourth the authorization level of 1972. Until Hurricane Katrina, Congress funded extraordinary disasters through the Highway Trust Fund, but with Trust Fund balances dwindling, in 2005, Congress designated the General Fund as the source of future ER supplemental funding. But the nation faces a pending fiscal crisis, raising concerns about future use of the General Fund and financial sustainability of the ER program. Despite funding concerns, FHWA does not routinely recapture unused program funds by reviewing the program's state balances to identify potentially unneeded funds. GAO also identified $62 million in potentially unneeded statutory allocations from past disasters that could be recaptured. Activities eligible for ER funding include the repair or reconstruction of highways and roads that are supported by the Federal-aid Highway program, and of roads on federal lands that have suffered serious damage from natural disasters or catastrophic failures due to external causes. ER funds are not intended to replace other federal-aid, state, or local funds to increase capacity, correct nondisaster-related deficiencies, or make other improvements. However, contributing to future financial sustainability concerns is the fact that the scope of eligible activities funded by the ER program has expanded in recent years with congressional or FHWA waivers of eligibility criteria or changes in definitions. As a result, some projects have been funded that go beyond repairing or restoring highways to predisaster conditions--such as the $441 million Devil's Slide project and $811 million I-880 project in California--projects that grew in scope and cost to address environmental and community concerns. Also, Congress and FHWA have expanded eligibility to allow additional types of work, such as a gradual flooding of a lake basin, to be funded. Congress has also directed that in some cases the program fully fund projects rather than requiring a state match. Finally, varying interpretations of what constitutes a damage site have led to inconsistencies across states in FHWA's application of ER eligibility standards. |
gao_GAO-03-725 | gao_GAO-03-725_0 | Background
The Workforce Investment Act created a new, comprehensive workforce investment system designed to change the way employment and training services are delivered. One-Stops Used Strategies to Streamline Services for Job Seekers
The one-stop centers we visited embraced the customer-focused provisions of WIA by streamlining one-stop services for job seekers. All 14 one-stop centers we visited used at least one of three different strategies to build a streamlined one-stop system—ensuring job seekers could readily access needed services, educating program staff about all of the one-stop services available to job seekers, and consolidating case management and intake procedures (see fig. One-Stops Developed Strategies to Engage and Provide Services to Employers in the One- Stop System
All of the one-stops we visited implemented at least one of three different approaches to engage and provide services to employers—dedicating specialized staff to establish relationships with employers or industries, working with employers through intermediaries, and providing tailored services to meet employers’ specific workforce needs (see fig.4). Many of the one-stops also worked with employers through intermediaries, such as the Chambers of Commerce or economic development entities, in order to market one-stop services and expand their base of employer customers. One-Stop Centers Built a Solid Infrastructure by Strengthening Program Partnerships and Raising Additional Funds
To build the solid infrastructure needed to support better services for job seekers and employers, many of the one-stops we visited developed and strengthened program partnerships and raised funds beyond those provided under WIA. Center operators fostered the development of strong program partnerships by encouraging communication and collaboration among partners through functional teams and joint projects. Many one-stops also worked toward improving one-stop operations and services by raising additional funds through fee-based services, grants, and contributions from partners and state or local government. Little Is Known about the Impact of Strategies to Improve One-Stop Services and Management
While Labor currently tracks outcome data—such as job placement, job seeker satisfaction, and employer satisfaction—and funds several studies to evaluate workforce development programs and service delivery models, little is known about the impact of various one-stop service delivery approaches on these and other outcomes. Labor’s studies largely take a program-by-program approach rather than focusing on the impact on job seekers of various one-stop integrated service delivery approaches, such as sharing customer intake forms across programs, or on employers, such as dedicating staff to focus on engaging and serving employers. Further, Labor’s efforts to collaborate with other federal agencies to assess the effects of different strategies to integrate job seeker services or to serve employers through the one-stop system have been limited. While Labor has developed a promising practices Web site to facilitate such information sharing, it is unclear how well the site currently meets this objective. Labor also said that it is engaged in other activities to effectively share information about what is working well in one-stop centers. In addition, this collaboration has improved local labor market information and sharing of promising practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
To create a more comprehensive workforce investment system, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 requires states and localities to coordinate most federally funded employment and training services into a single system, called the one-stop center system. This report examines how selected one-stop centers have used the law's flexibility to implement their own vision of WIA and provides information on promising practices for (1) streamlining services for job seekers, (2) engaging the employer community, (3) building a solid one-stop infrastructure by strengthening partnerships across programs and raising additional funds. In addition, it provides information on the actions the Department of Labor is taking to collect and share information about what is working well for job seeker and employer customers in one-stop centers.
What GAO Found
Of the 14 one-stop centers in GAO's study that were identified as exemplary by government officials and workforce development experts, all had implemented a range of promising practices to streamline services for jobseekers, engage the employer community, and built a solid one-stop infrastructure. The one-stop centers GAO visited streamlined services for job seekers by ensuring access to needed services, educating program staff about all of the one-stop services available to job seekers, and consolidating case management and intake procedures. In addition, all of the one-stop centers GAO visited used at least one of the following three methods to engage employers--dedicating specialized staff to work with employers or industries, working with employers through intermediaries, such as Chambers of Commerce or economic development entities, or tailoring services to meet specific employers' needs. To provide the infrastructure to support better services for job seekers and employers, many of the one-stops GAO visited found innovative ways to strengthen program partnerships and to raise additional funds beyond those provided under WIA. Center operators fostered the development of strong program partnerships by encouraging partner collaboration through functional work teams and joint projects, and they raised additional funds through fee-based services, grants, and contributions from partners and state or local governments. While Labor currently tracks outcome data--such as job placement, job seeker satisfaction and employer satisfaction--and funds several studies to evaluate workforce development programs and service delivery models, little is known about the impact of various one-stop service delivery approaches on these and other outcomes. Labor's studies largely take a program-by-program approach rather than focusing on the impact on job seekers of various one-stop integrated service delivery approaches, such as sharing customer intake forms across programs, or on employers, such as dedicating staff to focus on engaging and serving employers. Further, Labor's efforts to collaborate with other federal agencies to assess the effects of different strategies to integrate job seeker services or to serve employers through the one-stop system have been limited. While Labor has developed a promising practices Web site to facilitate such information sharing, it is unclear how well the site currently meets this objective. |
gao_GAO-12-685 | gao_GAO-12-685_0 | The DCMO is also responsible for developing and maintaining the department’s enterprise architecture for its business mission area. DOD Lacks Governance Mechanisms for Institutionalizing Modernization Management Controls
DOD continues to take steps to comply with the provisions of the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, as amended, and to satisfy relevant system modernization management guidance. However, despite undertaking activities to address NDAA requirements and its future vision; the department has yet to demonstrate significant results. has not included all business system investments in its fiscal year 2013 budget submission, due in part to an unreliable inventory of all defense business systems. In addition, while DOD implemented a business process reengineering (BPR) review process, the department is not measuring and reporting its results. Specifically, the office of the DCMO, which took over these responsibilities from another office that was disestablished in 2011, reported that it had filled only 82 of its planned 139 positions, with 57 positions vacant. Until the long-standing institutional modernization management controls provided for under the act, addressed in our recommendations, and otherwise called for in best practices are fully implemented, it is likely that the department’s business systems modernization will continue to be a high-risk program. Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Submission Did Not Include Key Information on All Business Systems
Another requirement of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, as amended, is that DOD’s annual IT budget submission must include key information on each business system for which funding is being requested, such as the system’s precertification authority and designated senior official, the appropriation type and amount of funds associated with modernization and current services (i.e., operation and maintenance), and the associated Defense Business Systems Management Committee approval decisions. Therefore, SNAP-IT did not reflect about 500 business systems that were identified in DITPR. DOD Has Not Yet Redefined Its Investment Management Process
DOD has made limited progress in defining and implementing investment management policies and procedures as required by the act and addressed in our ITIM framework since our last review in 2011. However, it has not implemented any additional practices since that time. While the department has reported its intent to implement this new organizational structure and guidance to address statutory requirements and redefine the process by which the department selects, evaluates, and controls business systems investments, this structure and guidance have yet to be established. Consistent with its guidance, DOD has begun to implement its BPR review process in an effort to meet the act’s requirements. DOD’s Annual Report Continues to Describe Certification Actions for Its Business System Investments
Among other things, the act requires DOD to include, in its annual report to congressional defense committees, a description of specific actions the department has taken on each business system submitted for certification. DOD’s annual report identifies that the Defense Business Systems Management Committee approved 198 actions to certify, decertify, or recertify defense business system modernizations. These 198 IRB certification actions represented a total of about $2.2 billion in modernization spending. While DOD has continued to report its certification actions, these actions have been based on limited information, such as unvalidated architecture compliance assertions, as discussed in the previous section. The department is taking steps to establish such a business architecture and modernize its business systems and processes, but long-standing challenges remain. While the department has agreed with these recommendations, its progress in addressing the act’s requirements, its vision for a federated architecture, and our related recommendations is limited, in part, by continued uncertainty surrounding the roles and responsibilities of key organizations and senior leadership positions. In addition, to ensure that DOD continues to implement the full range of institutional management controls needed to address its business systems modernization high-risk area, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the department’s Chief Management Officer, establish a policy that clarifies the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the Chief Management Officer, Deputy Chief Management Officer, DOD and military department Chief Information Officers, Principal Staff Assistants, military department Chief Management Officers, and the heads of the military departments and defense agencies, associated with the development of a federated BEA. Including information about the department’s progress in staffing the office that was recently established to be responsible for business systems modernization would not only facilitate congressional oversight, but also promote departmental accountability. § 2222 and related federal guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, DOD has been challenged in modernizing its business systems. Since 1995, GAO has designated DODs business systems modernization program as high risk, and it continues to do so today. To assist in addressing DODs business system modernization challenges, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the department to take certain actions prior to obligating funds for covered systems. It also requires DOD to annually report to the congressional defense committees on these actions and for GAO to review each annual report. In response, GAO performed its annual review of DODs actions to comply with the act and related federal guidance. To do so, GAO reviewed, for example, the latest version of DODs business enterprise architecture, fiscal year 2013 budget submission, investment management policies and procedures, and certification actions for its business system investments.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to take steps to comply with the provisions of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, as amended, and to satisfy relevant system modernization management guidance. While the department has initiated numerous activities aimed at addressing the act, it has been limited in its ability to demonstrate results. Specifically, the department
released its most recent business enterprise architecture version, which continues to address the acts requirements and is consistent with the departments future vision for developing its architecture. However, the architecture has not yet resulted in a streamlined and modernized business systems environment, in part, because DOD has not fully defined the roles, responsibilities, and relationships associated with developing and implementing the architecture.
included a range of information for 1,657 business system investments in its fiscal year 2013 budget submission; however, it does not reflect about 500 business systems, due in part to the lack of a reliable, comprehensive inventory of all defense business systems.
has not implemented key practices from GAOs Information Technology Investment Management framework since GAOs last review in 2011. In addition, while DOD has reported its intent to implement a new organizational structure and guidance to address statutory requirements, this structure and guidance have yet to be established. Further, DOD has begun to implement a business process reengineering review process but has not yet measured and reported results.
continues to describe certification actions in its annual report for its business system investments as required by the actDOD approved 198 actions to certify, decertify, or recertify defense business system modernizations, which represented a total of $2.2 billion in modernization spending. However, the basis for these actions and subsequent approvals is supported with limited information, such as unvalidated architectural compliance assertions.
lacks the full complement of staff it identified as needed to perform business systems modernization responsibilities. Specifically, the office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer, which took over these responsibilities from another office in September 2011, reported that 41 percent of its positions were unfilled.
DODs progress in modernizing its business systems is limited, in part, by continued uncertainty surrounding the departments governance mechanisms, such as roles and responsibilities of key organizations and senior leadership positions. Until DOD fully implements governance mechanisms to address these long-standing institutional modernization management controls provided for under the act, addressed in GAO recommendations, and otherwise embodied in relevant guidance; its business systems modernization will likely remain a high-risk program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to strengthen the departments mechanisms for governing its business systems modernization activities. DOD concurred with two of GAOs recommendations and partially concurred with one, but did not concur with the recommendation that it report progress on staffing the office responsible for business systems modernization to the congressional defense committees. GAO maintains that including staffing progress information in DODs annual report will facilitate congressional oversight and promote departmental accountability. |
gao_AIMD-99-29 | gao_AIMD-99-29_0 | IGs’ Views on Current Policy Issues
As requested, we sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain their views on current policy issues affecting them. 2. 3. 4. Do the IGs generally believe that they have sufficient independence in the performance of their work? As shown in figure 20, the survey results indicated that 81 percent of the presidential IGs and 73 percent of the DFE IGs responded that they have the level of independence needed to accomplish their mission. List of Presidentially Appointed Inspectors General
List of Designated Federal Entity Inspectors General
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to obtain (1) information on IG organization, staffing, workload, and operational issues and (2) the views of the IGs on policy issues affecting them such as term limits, law enforcement authority, semiannual reporting, and the IG selection process. One questionnaire was for attribution and requested information regarding the IGs’ organizational structure, staffing, and workload. GAO Comments
1. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO surveyed inspectors general (IG) to obtain: (1) information on their organizational structure, staffing, and workload; and (2) their views on current policy issues affecting them.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IGs' work covers a broad spectrum of agency programs and operations; (2) in general, the IGs responded that they have the expertise and resources necessary to assemble the teams of staff needed to perform the major types of work for which they are responsible; (3) additionally, while they generally anticipate the level of work to remain the same or slightly increase across the range of areas they review, IGs anticipated the greatest increase to be in information technology reviews; and (4) IGs also indicated that they were generally satisfied with their role and the overall legislation governing them, but did identify certain potential areas for modification. |
gao_T-RCED-98-243 | gao_T-RCED-98-243_0 | However, the FCC directed the establishment of the Schools and Libraries Corporation. To date, the Corporation has conducted over 130 outreach sessions informing schools and libraries about the program. NECA has 66 staff, the majority of whom are part of the program integrity assurance operation, which reviews the applications for compliance with the program’s eligibility requirements. Concerns Over Key Compliance Checks
To ensure compliance with FCC rules and regulations, the Corporation relies on a combination of applicants’ self-certifications, third-party reviews, and its own procedures. Instead, the Corporation focuses on reviewing the information submitted by applicants in their subsequent application for discounts (Form 471). As indicated above, the Corporation has already applied these three tests to more than one-half of the 32,600 applications it has received. Key Program Procedures Have Not Yet Been Finalized
The Corporation has not yet finalized all the procedures, systems, and internal controls that it needs in order to make funding commitments and approve vendor compensation for the discounted services provided to applicants. However, the procedures are still subject to change. The Corporation itself estimates that the invoices for payment could begin as soon as 15 days after commitment letters are sent. Verification of Soundness of Internal Controls Not Planned to Be Completed Before Funds Are Committed
In December 1997, FCC’s Chairman requested the Corporation to contract with an independent auditor to verify that the program’s processes and procedures provide the controls needed to mitigate against fraud, waste, and abuse. As noted earlier, applicants and vendors could begin sending in forms and invoices for funds disbursement as soon as 15 days after commitment letters have been sent out. It is therefore important that the Corporation have all of its disbursement procedures, systems, and controls in place and reviewed by the independent auditor before commitment letters are issued. FCC’s combined “Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 1997-2002 and Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 1999,” prepared in response to the Results Act, mentions the schools and libraries program in the context of a large number of telecommunications initiatives. An annual performance goal is to consist of two parts: (1) the performance measure that represents the specific characteristic of the program used to gauge performance and (2) the target level of performance to be achieved during a given fiscal year for the measure. Recommendations
To help strengthen the Corporation’s program integrity assurance operations and help ensure that funding is properly directed to eligible applicants, for eligible and appropriate services, and at appropriate discount levels, we recommend that the FCC Chairman direct the Chief Executive Officer of the Schools and Libraries Corporation to complete the following actions before issuing any funding commitment letters to applicants:
Conduct detailed reviews of a random sample of applications to assess not only the soundness of these applications but also the overall effectiveness of the Corporation’s program integrity procedures for detecting ineligible applicants, ineligible services, and inappropriate discount levels as defined by FCC orders. Obtain a report from its independent auditor that finds that the Corporation has developed an appropriate set of internal controls to mitigate against waste, fraud, and abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed issues related to the Schools and Libraries Corporation's operating procedures and internal controls, focusing on: (1) its progress in reviewing applications; (2) the scope and timing of key compliance tests; (3) the status of its efforts to finalize its operating procedures; and (4) the status of the independent audit to determine whether the Corporation has developed an appropriate set of internal controls to mitigate against fraud, waste, and abuse.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Corporation has made substantial progress in establishing an operational framework for the program that is consistent with relevant Federal Communications Commission (FCC) orders; (2) with regard to processing applications, the Corporation has worked with schools and libraries to inform them about the program and its application procedures; (3) during the initial application period, which began on January 30, 1998, and ended on April 15, 1998, schools and libraries sent in over 32,600 applications for discounts; (4) however, processing these applications has taken longer than either the Corporation or FCC expected; (5) the Corporation relies on a combination of applicants' self-certifications, third-party reviews, and its own procedures to ensure compliance with FCC's rules and regulations; (6) the Corporation tests applications for compliance with rules on the eligibility of applicants and requested services, and on the amount of requested discounts; (7) also, while the Corporation plans to conduct additional tests and reviews to ensure that applications are consistent with program rules, their scope and timing have not been finalized; (8) while the Corporation has established procedures for initially reviewing the applications, it has not yet finalized all necessary procedures and related internal controls for the program; (9) GAO is particularly concerned about this because the Corporation estimates that invoices for payment could begin to arrive as soon as 15 days after commitment letters are sent out; (10) the FCC Chairman has called for an independent audit of the Corporation's internal controls to help mitigate against fraud, waste, and abuse; (11) since applicants and vendors could begin submitting forms and invoices for disbursement of funds as soon as 15 days after they receive their commitment letters, it is important that the Corporation have all of its disbursement procedures, systems, and controls in place and reviewed by the independent auditor before sending these letters; (12) the FCC has not developed performance goals and measures for this program consistent with the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; (13) FCC's Strategic Plan for Fiscal Year 1997-2002 and Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 1999 mentions the schools and libraries program in the context of a large number of telecommunications initiatives, but establishes no specific performance measures or target levels of performance to be achieved by the program; and (14) the Corporation is still developing and finalizing some of its procedures and controls, and they are subject to change. |
gao_GAO-07-703 | gao_GAO-07-703_0 | We also analyzed a sample of ongoing DB plans associated with the 13 consultants that, as of year-end 2004, had assets of $183.5 billion for these plans, while average assets were $155.3 million. Additional analysis found that the DB plans using these 13 consultants had annual returns that were generally 1.3 percent lower than those that did not. Because many factors can affect returns, and data and modeling limitations limit the ability to generalize and interpret the results, this finding, while suggestive, should not be considered as proof of causality between consultants and lower rates of return. In particular, the 13 consultants: in 2006, had over $4.5 trillion in U.S. assets under advisement, including private DB and defined contribution (DC) plan assets, as well as public pension plan and other types of assets; provided advisory services to 36 percent (9 out of 25) of the largest plan sponsors, in terms of claims, currently trusteed by PBGC since 2000; provided advisory services to 14 percent (12 out of 86) of the plan sponsors that were trusteed by the PBGC in 2005; and provided advisory services to 24 percent (1009 out of 4203) of the sponsors of ongoing DB plans between the years 2000 and 2004. Specifically, we conducted an econometric analysis using ongoing DB plans and SEC study data on pension consultants that either adequately disclosed their conflicts of interest and those who did not. Independent experts and officials stated that though a typical first step to identify harm related to a conflict of interest is to examine a plan’s investment returns, determining whether any financial harm is caused to an individual pension plan by a conflict of interest requires a detailed forensic audit. PBGC’s Current Policy and Procedures Are Not Focused on Detecting Conflicts of Interest among Service Providers
As a creditor and a trustee of a sponsor’s terminated plan, PBGC’s policies and procedures are designed to review a plan’s assets and liabilities and recover any shortfall. PBGC has pursued cases against plan fiduciaries in an effort to seek such recoveries. According to a PBGC 2004 annual report, more than 90 percent of the participants and beneficiaries of single employer plans that were trusteed by the agency received their full promised plan benefits. EBSA’s Enforcement Strategy Does Not Include Procedures That Focus on Conflicts of Interest Involving PBGC Trusteed Plans or High Risk Plans Likely to Terminate
Though EBSA’s enforcement program is concerned with conflicts of interest affecting all private sector pension plans, the agency does not have a specific focus on plans that are trusteed by PBGC or ongoing high risk plans that PBGC identifies as most likely to terminate. EBSA Has No Specific Enforcement Strategy for PBGC-Trusteed Plans or Plans that PBGC Deems Likely to Terminate
While EBSA’s enforcement program does include a focus on conflicts of interest affecting all private sector pension plans, agency officials told us they have no specific procedures for detecting conflicts that may have involved plans that have been trusteed by PBGC or may be trusteed in the future. EBSA Officials Cite ERISA as Constraint in Pursuing Conflicts of Interest
EBSA’s ability to recover plan losses related to conflicts of interest by a service provider is largely limited by the extent to which the service provider was functioning as a fiduciary under ERISA. Different Agency Responsibilities Tend to Reinforce Limited Collaboration among EBSA, SEC, and PBGC
To some extent, differences in each agency’s roles and responsibilities affect the level of collaboration regarding conflicts of interest among the three agencies. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We obtained comments from the acting Assistant Secretary for the Employee Benefits Security Administration, the Deputy Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the Director of Compliance Inspections and Examinations for the Securities and Exchange Commission. Using the Labor’s 5500 data, GAO used the SEC information to identify 983 pension plans associated with these 13 pension consultants and 39 pension plans associated with the 11 pension consultants found to have less significant disclosure issues. 1, 2, . . | Why GAO Did This Study
To protect workers' retirement security, the requesters asked GAO to assess: 1) What is known about conflicts of interest affecting private sector defined benefit (DB) plans? 2) What procedures does the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) have to identify and recover losses attributable to conflicts? 3) What procedures does Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) have to detect conflicts among service providers and fiduciaries for PBGC-trusteed plans? 4) To what extent do EBSA, PBGC, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) coordinate their activities to investigate conflicts? GAO interviewed experts, including agency officials, attorneys, financial industry representatives, and academics, and GAO reviewed PBGC documentation and EBSA enforcement materials. GAO analyzed Labor, SEC, PBGC, and private sector data, including data on pensions, pension consultants, and rates of return data, and conducted statistical and econometric analyses.
What GAO Found
A conflict of interest typically exists when someone in a position of trust, such as a pension consultant, has competing professional or personal interests. Though data are limited on the prevalence of conflicts involving plan fiduciaries and consultants, a 2005 SEC staff report examining 24 registered pension consultants identified 13 that failed to disclose significant conflicts. GAO's analysis found that, in 2006, these 13 consultants had over $4.5 trillion in U.S. assets under advisement. GAO also analyzed a sample of ongoing DB plans associated with the 13 consultants that, as of year-end 2004, had total assets of $183.5 billion and average assets of $155.3 million. Additional sample analysis showed that the DB plans using these 13 consultants had annual returns generally 1.3 percent lower than those that did not. Because many factors can affect returns, and data as well as modeling limitations limit the ability to generalize and interpret the results, this finding should not be considered as proof of causality between consultants and lower rates of return, although it suggests the importance of detecting the presence of conflicts among pension plans. Whether specific financial harm was caused by a conflict of interest is difficult to determine without a detailed audit. As a creditor and a trustee of terminated plans, PBGC's policies and procedures are oriented toward the likely recovery of assets, rather than explicitly focusing on losses associated with conflicts of interest involving service providers. Although PBGC has broad legal authority to recover losses attributable to conflicts of interest, PBGC officials told us that the agency limits its pursuit of cases to those in which the recovery will likely exceed the cost of bringing a case to court successfully. While monetary recoveries by PBGC may improve the agency's financial position, they generally have little effect on participant benefits because most affected participants already receive their full benefits promised by their plans. According to PBGC, more than 90 percent of all beneficiaries of PBGC trusteed plans received their full promised plan benefit. While EBSA's enforcement program is concerned with conflicts of interest affecting all private pension plans, it does not have specific procedures for plans trusteed or likely to be trusteed by PBGC. EBSA has recently initiated the Consultant/Advisor Project (CAP) to focus on conflicts among service providers, though it includes no specific focus on high risk or terminated plans. Moreover, existing law limits EBSA's efforts to pursue conflicts and redress for financial harm when certain service providers are either not fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) or did not knowingly act in concert with a fiduciary. Coordination among EBSA, PBGC, and the SEC on conflicts of interest is primarily informal, in part because of agencies' different responsibilities. The agencies' investigative activities for conflicts of interest tend to operate independently. Differences in agency missions pose challenges to the three agencies' developing a coordinated focus to pursue conflicts of interest affecting individual pension plans. |
gao_HEHS-96-27 | gao_HEHS-96-27_0 | 1.) Most States Provided Facilities Financial Assistance, Though Levels Varied
A total of 40 states reported providing ongoing financial assistance to local districts for the construction of public elementary and secondary schools.Collectively, these states reported providing an estimated $3.5 billion in grants and loans for school facilities construction in state fiscal year 1994. On a per pupil basis, state funding provided in fiscal year 1994 ranged from a high of $2,254 per student in Alaska to a low of $6 per student in Montana (see table 2). Some states supplement their regular construction funding programs from time to time with additional monies for school facilities construction. 2). 3). Other types of facility information that states collected included data on the total appraised value of school facilities and building architectural plans. Nearly all states collecting information on the condition of school buildings reported maintaining other facilities data as well. Conclusions
Although local governments have traditionally been responsible for facilities construction, renovation, and major maintenance, most SEAs have established a state presence in school facilities matters using a variety of approaches. Methodology
To determine the extent to which states provided funding and technical assistance and compliance review for school facilities and maintained information on the condition of school buildings, we conducted telephone interviews with state officials responsible for school facilities in all 50 states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the role of states in supporting school facilities improvements, focusing on: (1) state funding and technical assistance to local school districts; and (2) the extent to which states collect information on school building conditions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most states have a role in school facilities construction, renovation, and maintenance, and 13 states have established comprehensive facilities programs; (2) states provided $3.5 billion for school facilities construction during fiscal year 1994; (3) state financial assistance for school facility construction ranged from $6 per student to more than $2,000 per student; (4) the number of staff devoted to providing facilities guidance and oversight varied, with most states having fewer than 6 full-time equivalent staff; (5) twenty-three states collected data on the condition of school buildings in their area, seventeen states collected data on building inventories, and 10 states collected no data on school facilities; and (6) some state officials believe that school facilities matters are primarily a local responsibility. |
gao_GAO-13-77 | gao_GAO-13-77_0 | 1.) Mileage-based User Fee Initiatives in the United States and Abroad
In recent years, the federal government and several states have taken steps to evaluate mileage fee systems, although none of these U.S.- based pilot projects has collected fees from drivers based on their road use: In 2005, Congress authorized $16.5 million for a field test for assessing highway use fees to vehicles based on their mileage driven and using satellite-enabled, on-board units. Reliable cost estimates for mileage fee systems are not available; but launching and operating a system to collect fees from 230 million U.S. passenger vehicles is expected to greatly exceed the current costs of collecting federal fuel taxes. Commercial truck user fee systems in Germany and New Zealand show that considerable revenues and other benefits can be achieved by charging these vehicles, but enforcing compliance in a cost-effective manner presents trade-offs. Recent efforts in two states suggest that charging mileage fees to commercial trucks presents several benefits over passenger vehicle fees, including fewer privacy-related concerns and cost challenges. GPS- based systems can lead to more equitable and efficient use of roadways by charging drivers based on their actual road use and by providing pricing incentives to reduce road use. Mileage Fees Could Generate Highway Trust Fund Revenues and Would Affect Users Differently
We modeled the average mileage fee rates that would be needed for passenger vehicles and commercial trucks to meet three illustrative Highway Trust Fund revenue targets ranging from about $34 billion to $78.4 billion per year. To meet these targets, a driver of a passenger vehicle with average fuel efficiency would pay from $108 to $248 per year in mileage fees compared to the $96 they currently pay annually in federal gasoline tax. Mileage fees, like federal fuel taxes, would comprise a small portion of users’ overall fuel costs and thus would only marginally increase users’ overall transportation costs. However, setting rates that reflect the current costs that different users impose on the system would require up-to-date estimates of vehicles’ responsibility for road damage, which are not available. Effects of Mileage Fees on Users
Passenger Vehicles
Mileage fees for passenger vehicles would affect users differently based on their vehicle’s fuel efficiency because drivers of less fuel efficient vehicles currently pay more in fuel taxes, as they have to purchase more gasoline to travel the same distance as more efficient vehicles. A flat-rate mileage fee for commercial trucks could also increase users’ costs compared with current diesel fuel taxes but would affect users differently, in part, because larger (combination) trucks are less fuel efficient than smaller (single-unit) trucks. States Recognize That Alternative Transportation Revenues Are Needed, and Many Would Support Federal Actions to Evaluate Mileage Fee Systems
Fifty of the 51 state DOTs we surveyed agreed that it is important that an alternative federal funding mechanism be identified in the next 10 years in However, only 8 of order to meet surface transportation revenue needs.the 51 states reported that they are likely to introduce some type of mileage fee program in the next 10 years. Germany and New Zealand have demonstrated that variable rate, distance-based user fees for commercial trucks can generate substantial revenues linked to road damage costs and help reduce emissions while posing fewer privacy concerns than passenger vehicle systems. State DOTs reported broad support for federal initiatives to evaluate federal mileage fees, including federally-led field tests for electric vehicles and commercial trucks. In the absence of any current federal pilot programs or efforts to evaluate (1) options to more accurately charge commercial trucks and electric vehicles for their road use and (2) the cost to launch and administer such systems, Congress lacks critical information to assess whether mileage fees for these vehicles could be a viable and cost- effective tool to begin to address federal surface transportation funding challenges. The most recent FHWA estimates from 2000 suggest that many commercial trucks underpay, but these estimates may not reflect current conditions. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Should Congress wish to explore mileage fees as a mechanism for funding surface transportation, it should consider establishing a pilot program to evaluate the viability, costs, and benefits of mileage fee systems for: commercial trucks—to ensure that fees paid by the owners of these vehicles cover the costs of their use of the nation’s roads and bridges, and electric vehicles—to develop a mechanism through which the owners of these vehicles can contribute to the Highway Trust Fund for their use of the nation’s roadways. The department provided technical comments via email which we incorporated as appropriate. To determine the mileage fee rates necessary to replace and supplement current fuel tax revenues deposited in the Highway Trust Fund and the effect these fees would have on users’ costs, we conducted an economic simulation to produce illustrative rates for passenger vehicles and commercial trucks, an approach that is commonly used in relevant existing studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal funding to build and maintain the nation's highways and bridges comes primarily from highway users through federal fuel taxes. These revenues have eroded due to improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency and other factors contributing to shortfalls in the Highway Trust Fund. Experts have proposed alternative means of raising revenues by charging drivers fees based on their miles traveled. Several states have tested systems that gather vehicle mileage and location data, which has raised privacy concerns. GAO examined (1) the benefits and challenges of mileage fee initiatives in the United States and other selected nations, (2) mileage fee rates necessary to replace and supplement current Highway Trust Fund revenues and the effect these fees would have on users' costs, and (3) state DOTs' views on future revenue demands and mileage fees. GAO reviewed five domestic pilot projects and programs in Germany, New Zealand, and the Netherlands; modeled mileage fees for passenger vehicles and commercial trucks; and surveyed 51 state DOTs.
What GAO Found
Mileage-based user fee initiatives in the United States and abroad show that such fees can lead to more equitable and efficient use of roadways by charging drivers based on their actual road use and by providing pricing incentives to reduce road use. Mileage fees for passenger vehicles, however, continue to face significant public concerns related to privacy as well as cost challenges. Privacy concerns are particularly acute when Global Positioning System (GPS) units are used to track the location of passenger vehicles. Reliable cost estimates for mileage fee systems are not available, but implementing a system to collect fees from 230 million U.S. passenger vehicles is likely to greatly exceed the costs of collecting fuel taxes. Commercial truck user fee systems in Germany and New Zealand have achieved substantial revenues and benefits such as reduced road damage and emissions with fewer privacy concerns, but ensuring compliance in a cost effective manner presents trade-offs. Few commercial truck mileage fee pilots have been conducted in the United States, but efforts in two states suggest such fees pose fewer privacy and cost challenges than passenger vehicle fees.
Mileage fee rates could be set to replace or supplement current Highway Trust Fund revenues. GAO calculated average mileage fee rates for passenger vehicles and commercial trucks needed to meet three federal revenue targets ranging from $34 billion (replace current federal fuel tax revenues) to $78 billion (increase spending to maintain existing system conditions and performance). To meet these targets, drivers of passenger vehicles with average fuel efficiency would pay $108 to $248 per year in mileage fees compared to the $96 these drivers currently pay in federal gasoline tax. These fees would affect users' costs differently based on each vehicle's fuel efficiency, because drivers of less efficient vehicles now pay more in fuel taxes than drivers of vehicles with greater fuel efficiency. However, like federal fuel taxes, mileage fees would comprise a small portion of users' overall fuel costs and thus only marginally increase users' overall transportation costs. A mileage fee for commercial trucks could also increase users' costs, particularly for larger trucks that log more miles. In 2000, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) estimated that heavy commercial trucks generally pay less in federal taxes than the road damage costs they impose. Adjusting mileage fee rates to account for vehicle road damage costs would increase rates for commercial truck users. However, FHWA's estimates may not reflect current conditions. Setting rates to cover these costs would require updated estimates of vehicles' responsibility for road damage.
State departments of transportation (DOT) recognize the need for an alternative funding mechanism to meet future revenue demands, and many would support federal actions to evaluate mileage fees. Few states reported that they are likely to introduce such fees in the next 10 years, but more than half would support federally-led field tests of mileage fees for commercial trucks and electric vehicles. Although few electric vehicles are on the roads today, their numbers are expected to increase, and they do not contribute to the Highway Trust Fund. Without a federal pilot program to evaluate (1) options to more accurately charge commercial trucks and electric vehicles for their road use and (2) the costs and benefits of such systems, Congress lacks critical information to assess whether mileage fees for these vehicles could be a viable and cost-effective tool to help address the nation's surface transportation funding challenges.
What GAO Recommends
Should Congress further explore mileage fees, it should consider establishing a pilot program to test the viability of such fees for commercial trucks and electric vehicles. FHWA should update its estimates of road damages imposed by all vehicle types compared with the tax revenues generated by each. The Department of Transportation took no position on GAOs recommendation but provided technical comments which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-485 | gao_GAO-14-485_0 | reported income (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) related to lobbying activities during the quarter (rounded to the nearest $10,000). The LDA also requires lobbyists to report certain political contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report. Figure 1 shows that most newly registered lobbyists filed their disclosure reports as required from 2010 through 2013. For Most LD-2 Reports Lobbyists Provided Documentation for Key Elements, but for Some LD-2 Reports Lobbyists Rounded Their Income or Expenses Incorrectly
For selected elements of lobbyists’ LD-2 reports that can be generalized to the population of lobbying reports, unless otherwise noted, our findings were consistent from year to year. For Most LD-2 Reports, Lobbyists Filed LD-203 Reports for All Listed Lobbyists
Lobbyists for an estimated 92 percent of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2012 or midyear 2013 LD-203 reports for all lobbyists and lobbying firms listed on the report as required. This year, we estimate that 17 percent of all LD-2 reports did not properly disclose one or more previously held covered positions as required. We estimate that overall, for 2013, lobbyists failed to disclose one or more reportable contributions on 4 percent of reports. Most lobbyists we interviewed rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting their reporting requirements. This is consistent with prior reviews. U.S. Attorney’s Office Actions to Enforce LDA
The Office’s Authorities, Processes, and Resources to Enforce LDA Compliance
The Office stated it continues to have sufficient personnel resources and authority under the LDA to enforce LD-2 reporting requirements, including imposing civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance of LD-2 reporting. Noncompliance refers to a lobbyist’s or lobbying firm’s failure to comply with LDA requirements. According to the Office, it has sufficient authority to enforce LD-203 compliance with the LDA for lobbying firms and certain individual lobbyists. In March 2014, the Office filed a civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a registrant’s failure to comply with LDA reporting requirements. In our first lobbying disclosure report in September 2008, we concluded that the lobbying community could benefit from creating an organization to share examples of best practices of the types of records maintained to support filings; use this information gathered over an initial period to formulate minimum standards for recordkeeping; provide training for the lobbying community on reporting and disclosure requirements intended to help the community comply with the LDA; and report annually to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House on opportunities to clarify existing guidance and ways to minimize sources of potential confusion for the lobbying community. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia responded on behalf of the Attorney General that the Department of Justice had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Consistent with the mandate in the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) and the efforts the Office has made to improve enforcement of the LDA. We used the House database for sampling LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2012 and the first and second quarters of 2013, as well as for sampling year-end 2012 and midyear 2013 political contributions (LD-203) reports and finally for matching quarterly registrations with filed reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The LDA requires lobbyists to file quarterly lobbying disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The LDA also requires that GAO annually (1) audit the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to the Office in its role in enforcing LDA compliance and the efforts the Office has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's seventh report under the mandate.
GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 104 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of 2012 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2013. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2012 and midyear 2013. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 65,489 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity and 31,482 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from the Office to obtain updated statuses on the Office's efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. On behalf of the Attorney General, the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia responded that the Department of Justice had no comments.
What GAO Found
Most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contribution (LD-203) reports GAO estimated the following:
Ninety-six percent of newly registered lobbyists filed LD-2 reports as required. Lobbyists are required to file LD-2 reports for the quarter in which they first register.
Ninety-six percent could provide documentation for income and expenses. However, 33 percent of these LD-2 reports were not properly rounded to the nearest $10,000.
Ninety-two percent filed year-end 2012 or midyear 2013 LD-203 reports as required.
Seventeen percent of all LD-2 reports did not properly disclose one or more previously held covered position as required.
Four percent of all LD-203 reports omitted one or more reportable political contributions that were documented in the Federal Election Commission database.
These findings are generally consistent with GAO's reviews from 2010 through 2012 and can be generalized to the population of disclosure reports.
Most lobbyists in GAO's sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand with regard to meeting reporting requirements. However, some disclosure reports demonstrate compliance difficulties, such as failure to disclose covered positions or misreporting of income or expenses. In addition, lobbyists amended 18 of 104 original disclosure reports in GAO's sample to change previously reported information.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) stated it has sufficient authority and resources to enforce LD-2 and LD-203 compliance with the LDA for lobbying firms and certain individual lobbyists. It has one contract paralegal working full time and six attorneys working part time on LDA enforcement issues. The Office continues its efforts to follow up on referrals for noncompliance with lobbying disclosure requirements by contacting lobbyists by e-mail, telephone, and letter. In March 2014, the Office filed a civil complaint against a lobbyist for failure to comply with LDA reporting requirements.
GAO's first report on lobbying disclosure under the LDA concluded that the lobbying community could benefit from creating an entity to share examples of best practices, provide training, and report annually on opportunities to clarify guidance and minimize sources of potential confusion for the lobbying community. Given the ongoing difficulties with compliance, GAO continues to believe that such an entity could be useful to the lobbying community. |
gao_GAO-03-608T | gao_GAO-03-608T_0 | The Vehicle Donation Process
Individuals often first learn about vehicle donation programs through advertisements. Figure 2 identifies the vehicle donation process for both in-house and fund-raiser vehicle donation programs. A charity working with a fund-raiser may have no oversight of the process, leaving the operation of the program, and distribution of proceeds, up to the fund-raiser. Vehicle Donation Proceeds
The total proceeds a charity receives from a vehicle donation may be less than what a donor expects. We identified two factors that contribute to this difference. First, charities and fund-raisers often sell vehicles at auto auctions for wholesale or liquidation prices or to salvage yards for parts, rather than obtaining the amount they would receive if vehicles were sold to private parties. Second, vehicle processing and fund-raising costs are subtracted from vehicle revenue, further lowering proceeds. Proceeds received by charities participating in vehicle donation programs run by fund-raisers also varied, in part due to the different processing costs deducted by fund-raisers, as well as different agreements between charities and fund-raisers for splitting net proceeds. We will identify any concerns regarding the amount of net proceeds fund-raisers keep from vehicle donations and the significance of vehicle donation programs to charity operations. Charities may consider proceeds from vehicle donations to be a welcomed, if not crucial, source of revenue to support their operations. Of the 129 million returns filed that year, a projected 0.6 percent, or an estimated 733,000 returns, had tax deductions for vehicle donations. We estimate that in 2000, vehicle donations deductions lowered taxpayers’ income tax liability by an estimated $654 million of the $1 trillion tax liability reported on returns. IRS guidance limits the amount of an allowable deduction to the vehicle’s fair market value, or the amount a willing, knowledgeable buyer would pay for the vehicle. Taxpayer Guidance and Cautions
IRS and other organizations, including the National Association of State Charity Officials and the Better Business Bureau, have issued guidance on steps potential donors should take before donating their vehicles to charity and claiming associated tax deductions. These steps include the following: Verify that the recipient organization is a tax-exempt charity. Ask questions about how the donated vehicle will be used to determine whether it will be used as intended. Deduct only the fair market value of the vehicle. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), charities are increasingly turning to vehicle donation programs as a fund- raising activity, resulting in increased solicitations for donated vehicles. Therefore, to make informed decisions about donating their vehicles, taxpayers should be aware of how vehicle donation programs operate, the role of fund- raisers and charities in the vehicle donation process, and IRS rules and regulations regarding allowable tax deductions. Due to the increased use of vehicle donation programs, GAO was asked to describe (1) the vehicle donation process, (2) the amount of proceeds received by charities and fund-raisers, (3) donor tax deductions, and (4) taxpayer cautions and guidance.
What GAO Found
Revenue from donated vehicles is a welcomed, and sometimes crucial, source of income for a number of charities. Donors, by following available guidance and making careful selection of charities for their donations, can provide charity support while benefiting themselves through tax deductions or disposing of unwanted vehicles. Taxpayers generally first learn about vehicle donation programs through advertisements. Interested donors call the advertised number and either reach a charity that operates its program in-house, or a third-party fund-raiser acting on the charity's behalf. The charity or fund-raiser asks questions of the potential donor regarding the vehicle, and then collects and sells the vehicle for proceeds. The proceeds a charity receives from a vehicle donation may be less than what a donor expects. Two factors contribute to this difference. First, charities often sell vehicles at auto auctions for wholesale prices rather than the prices donors may receive if they sold their vehicles themselves. Second, vehicle processing costs--whether the charity's or the fund-raiser's--- as well as the fund-raiser's portion of net proceeds further reduces the amount of proceeds a charity receives. Of the 129 million individual returns filed for tax year 2000, an estimated 733,000 returns had tax deductions for vehicle donations that lowered taxpayers' tax liability by an estimated $654 million. No data exist on whether these deductions were appropriately claimed. To assist donors in making decisions regarding vehicle donations, IRS and other organizations have issued guidance on steps potential donors should take before making vehicle donations. These steps include verifying that the recipient organization is tax-exempt, asking questions about vehicle donation proceeds, and deducting only the fair market value of the vehicle on tax returns. |
gao_AIMD-97-67 | gao_AIMD-97-67_0 | The Forest Service and Interior expect to collectively spend up to several hundred millon dollars over the next 8 years acquiring new radio equipment and services to convert to narrowband requirements by 2005. As we previously reported at USDA, consolidating and optimizing telecommunications offers organizations a way to reduce costs by combining resources and services where sharing opportunities exist and by eliminating unnecessary services. Savings Opportunities Missed Because Telecommunications Resources Not Consolidated and Optimized
To its credit, Interior has undertaken a number of cost-saving initiatives to eliminate some unused telephone lines and unnecessary data services. While significant savings have been achieved in some cases, such efforts have generally been isolated and ad hoc rather than departmentwide. Savings are being missed because Interior is not systematically identifying and acting on opportunities to consolidate and share telecommunications resources within and among its bureaus or its 2,000-plus field locations. At just four of these field locations, we found that bureaus and offices were paying thousands of dollars annually for telecommunications services that were redundant and unnecessary. Interior does not know to what extent similar telecommunications savings may exist at its other offices because it lacks the basic information necessary to make such determinations. Interior and USDA Also Missing Savings Opportunities
Interior and USDA may likewise be missing opportunities to save millions of dollars by not sharing telecommunications resources among Interior bureaus and the Forest Service. While the two departments have a 2-year old agreement to identify and act on sharing opportunities, they have taken little action on this agreement and accordingly, only limited savings have been realized. Moreover, while Interior and USDA’s Forest Service plan to spend several hundred million dollars to acquire separate radio systems over the next 8 years, the Departments have not jointly determined the extent to which they can reduce these costs by sharing radio equipment and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed efforts by the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service to reduce costs by consolidating their telecommunications services, focusing on whether Interior: (1) has consolidated and optimized telecommunications services to eliminate unnecessary services and maximize savings; and (2) and the Forest Service are sharing telecommunications services where they can.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to its credit, Interior has undertaken a number of telecommunications cost-savings initiatives that have produced significant financial savings and helped reduce the Department's more than $62-million annual telecommunications investment; (2) however, Interior is not systematically identifying and acting on other opportunities to consolidate and optimize telecommunications resources within and among its bureaus or its 2,000-plus field locations; (3) the cost-savings initiatives that have been undertaken have generally been done on an isolated and ad hoc basis, and have not been replicated throughout the Department; (4) GAO did not review consolidation and sharing opportunities at all of Interior's field locations; (5) however, at the four sites GAO visited, GAO found that telecommunications resources were often not consolidated or shared, and bureaus and offices were paying thousands of dollars annually for unnecessary services; (6) Interior does not know to what extent similar telecommunications savings may exist at its other offices because it lacks the basic information necessary to make such determinations; (7) Interior and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) may also be missing opportunities to save millions of dollars by not sharing telecommunications resources; (8) even though the Departments have a 2-year old agreement to identify and act on sharing opportunities, little has been done to implement this agreement and, accordingly, only limited savings have been realized; and (9) moreover, while Interior and the Forest Service currently plan to collectively spend up to several hundred million dollars to acquire separate radio systems over the next 8 years, the Departments have not jointly determined the extent to which they can reduce these costs by sharing radio equipment and services. |
gao_GAO-16-159T | gao_GAO-16-159T_0 | Preliminary Results of Undercover Attempts to Obtain Qualified Health-Plan Coverage from the Federal Marketplace and Selected State Marketplaces
Our undercover testing for the 2015 coverage year found that the health- care marketplace eligibility determination and enrollment process remains vulnerable to fraud. As shown in figure 1, the federal Marketplace or selected state marketplaces approved each of our 10 fictitious applications for subsidized qualified health plans. For 4 of these applications, we used Social Security numbers that could not have been issued by the Social Security Administration. Thus, this fictitious applicant received subsidized qualified health-plan coverage from the federal Marketplace and the two selected state marketplaces at the same time. The other two applicants were accepted by phone. The marketplaces are required to seek postapproval documentation in the case of certain application “inconsistencies”—instances in which information an applicant has provided does not match information contained in data sources that the marketplace uses for eligibility verification at the time of application, or such information is not available. For the four fictitious applicants who claimed their employer did not provide minimum essential coverage, the marketplace did not contact our fictitious employer to confirm the applicant’s account that the company offers only substandard coverage. In August 2015, we briefed CMS and California and Kentucky state officials on the results of our undercover testing, to obtain their views. According to these officials, the marketplaces only inspect for documents that have obviously been altered. Thus, if the documentation submitted does not appear to have any obvious alterations, it would not be questioned for authenticity. In addition, according to Kentucky officials, in the case of the impossible Social Security number, the identity-proofing process functioned correctly, but a marketplace worker bypassed identity- proofing steps that would have required a manual verification of the fictitious Social Security card we submitted. If an applicant receives a qualified health-plan subsidy because the applicant’s employer- sponsored plan does not meet the guidelines, the Kentucky marketplace sends a notice to the employer asking it to verify the applicant information. Preliminary Results of Undercover Attempts to Obtain Medicaid Coverage through the Federal Marketplace and Selected State Marketplaces
In addition to our applications for subsidized private health plans, we also made eight additional fictitious applications for Medicaid coverage in order to test the ability to apply for that program through the marketplaces. As shown in figure 2, in these tests, we were approved for subsidized health-care coverage for seven of the eight applications. For three of the eight applications, we were approved for Medicaid, as originally sought. For four of the eight applications, we did not obtain Medicaid approval, but instead were subsequently approved for subsidized qualified health-plan coverage. After we discussed the results of our undercover testing with California officials, they told us their system requires applicants to provide either a Social Security number or an individual taxpayer-identification number to process an application. For the two New Jersey Medicaid applications, we periodically called the state Medicaid offices over approximately 4 months, attempting to determine the status of our applications. For our North Dakota Medicaid application in which we did not provide a Social Security number but did provide an impossible immigration document number, we called the North Dakota Medicaid agency to determine the status of our application. Because we did not disclose the specific identities of our fictitious applicants, CMS officials could not explain why the federal Marketplace originally said our application may be eligible for Medicaid but subsequently notified North Dakota that it was denied. Details of Medicaid Applications through State Marketplaces
As with our applications for coverage under qualified health plans, described earlier, the state marketplace for Kentucky directed two of our Medicaid applicants to submit supplementary documentation. We applied for such coverage and were approved for an advance premium tax credit and the cost-sharing reduction subsidy. By contrast, during the Medicaid application process for one applicant, California did not direct that we submit any documentation. As noted earlier, the findings discussed in this statement are preliminary, and we plan to issue a final report later, upon completion of our work. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health-insurance marketplaces where consumers can, among other things, select private health-insurance plans or apply for Medicaid. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of subsidies and related spending under PPACA at $60 billion for fiscal year 2016. PPACA requires verification of applicant information to determine enrollment or subsidy eligibility. In addition, PPACA provided for the expansion of the Medicaid program. GAO was asked to examine application and enrollment controls for the marketplaces and Medicaid.
This testimony provides preliminary results of undercover testing of the federal and selected state marketplaces during the 2015 open-enrollment period, for both private health-care plans and Medicaid. GAO submitted, or attempted to submit, 18 fictitious applications by telephone and online, 10 of which tested controls related to obtaining subsidized health-plan coverage available through the federal Marketplace in New Jersey and North Dakota, and through state marketplaces in California and Kentucky. GAO chose these four states based partly on a range of population sizes and whether the state had expanded Medicaid eligibility under terms of the act. The other 8 applications, among the 18 GAO made, tested marketplace and state controls under the marketplace system for determining Medicaid eligibility in these four states. The undercover results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of enrollees. GAO discussed the results of its testing with CMS and state officials to obtain their perspectives.
What GAO Found
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), health-insurance marketplaces are required to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, determine eligibility for income-based subsidies or Medicaid. These verification steps include reviewing and validating information about an applicant's Social Security number, if one is provided; citizenship, status as a national or lawful presence; and household income and family size.
For 10 fictitious applicants, GAO tested application and enrollment controls for obtaining subsidized health plans available through the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace) (for New Jersey and North Dakota) and two selected state marketplaces (California and Kentucky). Although 8 of these 10 fictitious applications failed the initial identity-checking process, all 10 were subsequently approved by the federal Marketplace or the selected state marketplaces. Four applications used Social Security numbers that, according to the Social Security Administration (SSA), have never been issued, such as numbers starting with “000.” Other applicants had duplicate enrollment or claimed their employer did not provide insurance that meets minimum essential coverage.
For 8 additional fictitious applicants, GAO tested enrollment into Medicaid through the same federal Marketplace and the two selected state marketplaces, and was able to obtain either Medicaid or alternative subsidized coverage for 7 of the 8 applicants. Specifically:
Three were approved for Medicaid, which was the health-care program for which GAO originally sought approval. In each case, GAO provided identity information that would not have matched SSA records. For two applications, the marketplace directed the fictitious applicants to submit supporting documents, which GAO did (such as a fake immigration card), and the applications were approved. For the third, the marketplace did not seek supporting documentation, and the application was approved by phone.
For four, GAO did not obtain approval for Medicaid; however, GAO was subsequently able to gain approval of subsidized health plans based on the inability to obtain Medicaid coverage. In 1 case, GAO falsely claimed that it was denied Medicaid in order to obtain the subsidized health plan when in fact no Medicaid determination had been made by the state at that time.
For one, GAO was unable to enroll into Medicaid, in California, because GAO declined to provide a Social Security number. According to California officials, the state marketplace requires a Social Security number or taxpayer-identification number to process applications.
According to officials from the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (CMS), California, Kentucky, and North Dakota, the marketplaces and Medicaid offices only inspect for supporting documentation that has obviously been altered. Thus, if the documentation submitted does not show such signs, it would not be questioned for authenticity. GAO's work is continuing, and GAO plans to issue a final report at a later date. |
gao_GAO-09-924 | gao_GAO-09-924_0 | For-hire motor carriers are required to register with FMCSA and obtain federal operating authority before operating in interstate commerce. Reincarnated Motor Carriers Exist
Our analysis of FMCSA data for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 identified 20 motor coach companies that likely reincarnated from “out-of-service” carriers. This represents about 9 percent of the approximately 220 motor coach carriers that FMCSA ordered out of service for those fiscal years. The number of potential reincarnated motor coach carriers is understated because (1) our analysis was based on exact matches, so it could not find links if abbreviations were used or typos occurred in the data, (2) FMCSA only provided us data on vehicles and drivers when an accident or inspection took place, and thus the provided FMCSA data does not include the entire population of vehicles or drivers for either new entrants or out-of-service carriers, and (3) our analysis could not identify owners who purposely provided FMCSA bogus or otherwise deceptive information on the application (e.g., ownership) to hide the reincarnation from the agency. Although the number of reincarnated motor coach carriers that we could identify was relatively small, the threat these operators pose to the public has proven deadly. According to FMCSA officials, registration and enforcement policies at the time of the Sherman, Texas, crash, reincarnation was relatively simple to do and hard to detect. As a result, motor coach carriers known to be safety risks were continuing to operate, such as the company that was involved in the bus crash in Sherman, Texas. Five of the reincarnated carriers we identified were still operating as of May 2009. We referred all five companies to FMCSA for further investigation. Appendix III provides a summary of the key data elements that matched on the new entrants that were substantially related to out-of-service carriers. The same owner started the new company in June 2008. Tools FMCSA Uses to Identify Reincarnated Carriers and Their Limitations
Passenger Carrier Vetting Process
Prior to the August 2008 crash in Sherman, Texas, FMCSA did not have a dedicated processe to identify and prevent motor coach carriers from reincarnating. DOT officials also provided technical comments to the report, which we addressed, as appropriate. Our analysis understates the actual number of reincarnated carriers because the matching scheme used cannot detect even minor changes in spelling, addresses, or owner names. To determine the tools FMCSA uses to identify reincarnated carriers, we interviewed FMSCA officials on the process that the agency uses to attempt to identify potentially reincarnating carriers. Appendix III: Summary of Reincarnated Motor Coach Carriers
As stated earlier, we identified 20 new entrants that were substantially related to motor carriers ordered out of service. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) reports that there were about 300 fatalities from bus crashes in the United States. Although bus crashes are relatively rare, they are particularly deadly since many individuals may be involved. FMCSA tries to identify unsafe motor coach carriers and take them off the road. GAO was asked to determine (1) to the extent possible, the number of motor coach carriers registered with FMCSA as new entrants in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 that are substantially related to or in essence the same carriers the agency previously ordered out of service, and (2) what tools FMCSA uses to identify reincarnated carriers. To identify new entrants that were substantially related to carriers placed out of service, we analyzed FMCSA data to find matches on key fields (e.g., ownership, phone numbers, etc.). Our analysis understates the actual number of reincarnated carriers because, among other things, the matching scheme used cannot detect minor spelling changes or other deception efforts. We interviewed FMCSA officials on how the agency identifies reincarnated carriers. GAO is not making any recommendations. In July 2009, GAO briefed FMCSA on our findings and incorporated their comments, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Our analysis of FMCSA data for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 identified twenty motor coach companies that likely reincarnated from "out of service" carriers. This represents about 9 percent of the approximately 220 motor coach carriers that FMCSA placed out of service during these two fiscal years. The number of likely reincarnated motor carriers is understated, in part, because our analysis was based on exact matches and also could not identify owners who purposely provided FMCSA deceptive information on the application (e.g., ownership) to hide the reincarnation from the agency. Although the number of reincarnated motor coach carriers that we could identify was small, these companies pose a safety threat to the motoring public. According to FMCSA officials, under registration and enforcement policies up to summer 2008, reincarnation was relatively simple to do and hard to detect. As a result, motor coach carriers known to be safety risks were continuing to operate. According to FMCSA data, five of the twenty bus companies were still in operation as of May 2009. We referred these cases to FMCSA for further investigation. The twenty cases that we identified as likely reincarnations were registered with FMCSA at the time that FMCSA did not have any dedicated controls in place to prevent motor coach carriers from reincarnating. In 2008, FMCSA instituted a process to identify violators by checking applicant information against those of poor-performing carriers. For example, if FMCSA finds a new entrant with a shared owner name or company address for an out-of-service company, the agency will make inquiries to determine if the new applicant is related to the out-of-service carrier. If such a determination is made, FMCSA still faces legal hurdles, such as proving corporate successorship, to deny the company operating authority. |
gao_GAO-07-91 | gao_GAO-07-91_0 | With respect to the two key areas, we reviewed the nine agencies’ fiscal years 2004 and 2003 comparative financial statements and the related audit reports to determine, among other things, whether the appropriate columns of the agencies’ restated financial statements were labeled “Restated”; fiscal year 2003 ending balance agreed with the fiscal year 2004 beginning balance on the agencies’ Statement of Changes in Net Position, if restated; agencies’ restatement footnotes were properly labeled; agencies asserted in their MD&A that they had received a consecutive number of clean audit opinions, and if so, whether they disclosed that certain of their previously issued financial statements were subsequently restated to correct for a material misstatement; audit reports referred the reader to the agencies’ restatement footnote; agencies timely notified their auditors and users of their financial statements of the material misstatement and plans for correcting the misstatement in the financial statements; and auditors were aware of a material misstatement to previously issued financial statements prior to the beginning of the fourth quarter of the following fiscal year and whether the amount and effect were known, and if so, did the auditors advise the agencies’ management to reissue the financial statements. 15, Management’s Discussions and Analysis; SFFAS No. A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements. Insufficient and Inconsistent Disclosure of Financial Statement Restatements by Certain Federal Agencies and Their Auditors
During our review of the nine CFO Act agencies’ restatements reported in fiscal year 2004, we identified issues with the disclosures made by those agencies and their respective auditors regarding the restatements. The primary contributing factor for these disclosure issues was insufficient guidance available at the time to both the agencies’ management and their auditors for disclosing the restatements. Although the available guidance did not provide explicit details for disclosing restatements, we believe that information regarding restatements should be disclosed in a transparent and timely manner consistent with the qualitative characteristics of information in financial reports described in SFFAC No. 1. In our view, more detailed accounting and auditing guidance on how to satisfy the financial reporting characteristics in SFFAC No. 1 as it relates to the disclosure of restatements would have been helpful. Revisions made to OMB Circular No. In our view, none of the nine agencies’ audit reports we reviewed sufficiently disclosed all the essential information that would clearly explain the restatement. Specifically, we found that seven of the nine audit reports did not provide a statement that the previously issued audit report was withdrawn and replaced by the opinion on the restated financial statements, three of the nine audit reports either did not disclose the restatement or include a reference to the agency restatement footnote in the financial statements, and none of the nine agencies provided a sufficient description of the restatement (i.e., the nature and cause of the misstatement, year(s) being restated, financial statements and line items impacted, specific amount(s) of the material misstatement(s) and the related effects on the previously issued financial statements, and actions management took after discovering the misstatement) in the notes to their financial statements and none of these agencies’ auditors compensated for this by providing such information in their audit reports. 01-09, did not provide explicit guidance for timely communication of a restatement to users of financial statements. Conclusions
The issues we identified regarding the transparency and timeliness of restatement disclosures primarily resulted from insufficient guidance available during fiscal year 2004 to both the agencies’ management and their respective auditors for disclosure of the restatements and the timeliness of such disclosures. It will also be important that the agencies’ financial statements and the related audit reports provide sufficient detail so that the reader will be able to gain at least a basic understanding of why the agencies needed to restate their previously issued financial statements and the effects of such on the agencies’ previously issued financial statements. The revision of OMB Circular No. A-136 during fiscal year 2005 addressed many of our concerns regarding the agencies’ disclosure of restatements; however, additional guidance is still needed. In addition, OMB provided some technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 06-03
GAO recommends that section 5.2 of OMB Bulletin No. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO continues to have concerns about restatements to federal agencies' previously issued financial statements. During fiscal year 2005, at least 7 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies restated certain of their fiscal year 2004 financial statements to correct misstatements. To study this trend, GAO reviewed the nature and causes of the restatements made by certain CFO Act agencies in fiscal year 2004 to their fiscal year 2003 financial statements. Eleven CFO Act agencies had restatements for fiscal year 2003. Nine of those 11 received unqualified opinions on their originally issued fiscal year 2003 financial statements. GAO's view is that users of federal agencies' financial statements and the related audit reports need to be provided at least a basic understanding of why a restatement was necessary and its effect on the agencies' previously issued financial statements and related audit reports. This report communicates GAO's observations on the transparency and timeliness of the 9 federal agencies' and their auditors' restatement disclosures.
What GAO Found
The nine agencies GAO reviewed did not consistently communicate financial statement restatements. GAO found that all nine agencies could have greatly enhanced the adequacy, effectiveness, and timeliness of their restatement disclosures to users. Similar transparency issues existed with the associated audit reports regarding disclosure of all the essential information that would clearly explain the restatements. GAO highlighted the following issues as among the more prevalent issues to be addressed: 1) columns of the agencies' restated financial statements were not labeled as "Restated"; 2) agencies' restatement footnote disclosures lacked clarity or sufficient detail regarding the nature of the restatements and the effect on balances reported in previously issued financial statements; 3) restatement information was not sufficiently disclosed in the agencies' Management Discussion and Analysis; 4) audit reports did not disclose that the respective agencies had restated certain of their fiscal year 2003 financial statements; 5) audit reports did not provide a statement that the previously issued audit report was withdrawn and replaced by the opinion on the restated financial statements; and 6) material misstatements and potential material misstatements were not timely communicated by agencies to either their auditors or to the users of the financial statements. The primary contributing factor for the restatement disclosure issues that GAO identified was insufficient guidance available at the time to both the agencies' management and their respective auditors for disclosure of the restatements and the timeliness of such disclosures. GAO believes that information regarding restatements should be disclosed in a transparent and timely manner consistent with the qualitative characteristics of information in financial reports described in Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts (SFFAC) No. 1. In GAO's view, more detailed accounting and auditing guidance on how to satisfy the financial reporting characteristics as outlined in SFFAC No. 1 as it relates to the disclosure of restatements would have been helpful. OMB revised Circular No. A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements, which provides additional guidance to federal agencies' management regarding disclosure of restatements to previously issued financial statements. Revisions made to OMB Circular No. A-136 address many of GAO's concerns regarding the agencies' disclosure of restatements. In addition, the proposed 2006 revision of generally accepted government auditing standards now includes a section on reporting on restatement of previously issued financial statements. In addition, on August 23, 2006, OMB issued Bulletin No. 06-03, which also provides some information regarding reporting on restatements. However, GAO believes that OMB needs to timely provide additional, though complementary, restatement guidance to both the agencies' management and their respective auditors. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-99 | gao_T-HEHS-97-99_0 | Rising tuition, coupled with the shift to providing loans instead of grants, could result in fewer low-income and minority students’ staying in college. At the same time the Department is concerned with access, its ongoing challenge is to improve its processes to ensure financial accountability in its postsecondary student aid programs, particularly FFELP, FDLP, and the Pell Grant Program. Recurring Problems Hamper the Department’s Ability to Protect Federal Financial Interests
Although major federal student aid programs, such as FFELP, FDLP, and the Pell Grant Program, have succeeded in providing students access to billions of dollars for postsecondary education, our work has shown that the Department has been less successful in protecting the financial interests of U.S. taxpayers. Management shortcomings also continue as a major problem and contribute to the Department’s financial accountability difficulties. In the past, congressional hearings and investigations, reports by the Department’s OIG, our reports, and other studies and evaluations have shown that the Department (1) did not adequately oversee schools that participated in the programs; (2) managed each title IV program through a separate administrative structure, with poor or little communication among programs; (3) used inadequate management information systems that contained unreliable data; and (4) did not have sufficient and reliable student loan data to determine the Department’s liability for outstanding loan guarantees. Challenges in Promoting Access and Excellence in Elementary, Secondary, and Adult Education Programs
Excellence in education in America has become a major concern for the public, and both the Congress and the Department have promoted initiatives to improve the quality of American education. Because the federal role in funding elementary and secondary education is relatively small, and states and local governments have the primary responsibility for and control of education programs, the Department faces a significant challenge in ensuring access and promoting excellence. $7.7 billion appropriated in fiscal year 1997. At this time, the Department does not have the information it needs to determine whether the funding is being targeted as intended. The lack of clearly defined program objectives was one of the reasons for the difficulty. In February, the administration used our reports as the basis for proposing the Partnership to Rebuild America’s Schools Act, which, if enacted, would be administered by the Department. In the 1998 budget, the administration has doubled the amount of money requested for educational technology to help schools integrate technology into the curriculum in order to increase students’ technological literacy and improve the quality of instruction in core subjects. Statutory Framework for Improving the Department’s Management Practices
Adopting improved management practices can help the Department become more effective in achieving its mission of ensuring equal access to education and promoting educational excellence. Although the Department has made progress in improving many management functions, it still has a long way to go. Additional copies are $2 each. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the major challenges the Department of Education faces in achieving its mission to: (1) ensure access to postsecondary institutions, while at the same time protecting the financial interests of the government; and (2) promote access to and excellence in elementary, secondary, and adult education.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although the Department has made progress in ensuring access to postsecondary education and in providing financial accountability, challenges remain, especially in providing educational access to low-income and minority students in an era of rising tuition costs and in protecting the financial interests of the federal government; (2) the student aid programs make available billions of dollars in loans and grants to promote access to education, but these programs continue to be hampered by problems with process complexity, structure, and program management; (3) the student aid process is a complicated one, it has several participants who play different roles as well as various processes for each of the grant or loan programs; (4) the federal government continues to bear a major portion of the risk for loan losses; (5) moreover, management shortcomings, especially inadequate management information systems that contain unreliable data, contribute to the Department's difficulties; (6) the Department also faces challenges in promoting access to and excellence in preschool, elementary, secondary, and adult education programs; (7) through leadership and leverage, the Department works with states and local education agencies to effect changes intended to improve the nation's educational system; (8) demonstrating accountability is dependent on having clearly defined objectives, valid assessment instruments, and accurate program data; (9) in addition, it is unclear whether the Department has the resources it needs to manage its funds, including funds for the proposed Partnership to Rebuild America's Schools Act of 1997 and for helping schools integrate technology into the curriculum to make students technologically literate; (10) similarly, the Department only has selected information on the implementation of the title 1 program, the largest single federal elementary and secondary grant program, for which $7.7 billion was appropriated in fiscal year 1997; (11) thus, the Department does not have the informational basis to determine whether mid-course changes are necessary; (12) in meeting these challenges, the Department will need to improve its management; (13) major pieces of recent legislation provide powerful tools in the form of a statutory framework for improving agency operations and accountability; and (14) the Department has made progress in implementing these laws, but work remains to be done before the goal of improved management can be reached. |
gao_HEHS-95-180 | gao_HEHS-95-180_0 | Job Corps seeks to enroll the most severely disadvantaged youth who have multiple barriers to employment. However, the students who completed vocational training at these centers were 5 times more likely to obtain a training-related job at wages 25 percent higher than students who did not complete their training. 7). Employers Satisfied With Job Corps Students
On the basis of our survey of employers of a random sample of Job Corps students from the six centers, we found that employers were generally satisfied with the basic work habits and technical preparation of the Job Corps students they employed. Our work directed at this long-standing practice raises questions about whether the program and its students are benefiting from this arrangement. Its justification for making sole source awards, rather than using full and open competition, is based on three broad factors: (1) the contractor’s past relationship with Job Corps, that is, experience with Labor’s Employment and Training Administration in general and Job Corps specifically, and its thorough knowledge of Job Corps procedures and operation; (2) the contractor’s organizational structure, that is, a large nationwide membership related to a trade, and its strong relationship with national and local apprenticeship programs; and (3) the contractor’s instructional capability, that is, qualified and experienced instructors; ability to provide training specifically developed for the learning level of Job Corps students; and the ability to provide recognition of training as credit toward meeting the requirements of a journeyman. Using Labor’s national data, we found only moderate differences in the performance of the national contractors as compared with other Job Corps training providers. The national contractors account for about one-third of Job Corps’ vocational training expenditures and the training they provide is primarily in a declining occupational category—the construction trades—which represents about 4 percent of the job market. Scope and Methodology
We designed our study to collect information on the characteristics of Job Corps students, the services they were provided, and the outcomes they achieved, including employers’ satisfaction with the students hired. These characteristics included (1) being a school dropout, (2) having basic skills deficiencies (that is, reading or math skills below eighth grade), (3) receiving public assistance, and (4) having limited English proficiency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Job Corps program operations, focusing on: (1) who is being served and the services provided; (2) the outcomes that the program is achieving in relation to program cost and employers' satisfaction with Job Corps students they hire; and (3) whether the long-standing practice of awarding sole-source contracts for vocational training services is cost-effective.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Job Corps services severely disadvantaged youth and provides them with comprehensive services in a residential setting; (2) 68 percent of the students that left Job Corps in 1994 encountered several barriers to employment, such as not having a high school diploma, lacking basic skills, receiving public assistance, and having limited English proficiency; (3) 20 percent of Job Corps' funds were spent on basic education and vocational skills training in 1994; (4) Job Corps students that complete vocational training are five times more likely to get higher paying, training-related jobs; (5) most employers are generally satisfied with Job Corps students' basic work habits and the technical training provided by the Job Corps program; (6) only moderate differences exist between the job placement rates of national contractors and Job Corps training providers; and (7) the continued use of national contractors as training providers is not cost-effective because they account for nearly one-third of Job Corps' vocational training expenditures and the training they provide is primarily in a declining occupational category. |
gao_GAO-16-223 | gao_GAO-16-223_0 | ONDCP. Most Firearms Seized in Mexico That Are Traced by ATF Come from the United States, and Most Are Purchased in Southwest Border States
Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico That Are Traced by ATF Come from the United States
Data from ATF on firearms seized in Mexico and traced from calendar year 2009 to 2014 indicate that the majority originated in the United States. About 17 percent of the total, 17,544 firearms, were traced to a country other than the United States. Of firearms seized by ICE from 2009 to 2014, 2,341, or 39 percent, were long guns—including rifles and shotguns. 3). Trafficking in Firearms Parts May Facilitate DTOs’ Acquisition of Firearms and Complicates Authorities’ Efforts to Prevent Trafficking
ATF and Mexican government officials told us that a new complicating factor in their efforts to fight firearms trafficking is the use of weapons parts transported to Mexico to be later assembled into finished firearms. ATF and ICE Have Taken Steps to Improve Collaboration, but Lack of Monitoring May Contribute to Coordination Challenges
ATF and ICE Have Taken Steps to Improve Collaboration, but Some Challenges Remain
ATF and ICE have taken several steps to improve coordination on efforts to combat firearms trafficking that we previously identified. In 2009, we reported instances of dysfunctional operations, duplicative initiatives, and jurisdictional conflicts between ATF and ICE. In response to our recommendations on how to address these challenges, ATF and ICE updated and signed an interagency collaboration memorandum of understanding (MOU) in June 2009. ICE and ATF officials said that after the MOU was signed, they held joint training exercises and conferences to ensure that agents had knowledge of the MOU and its jurisdictional parameters and collaboration requirements. Agencies in Stemming Firearms Trafficking to Mexico
The indicator used in the Strategy to track progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico does not adequately measure implementation of the strategic objective. As previously noted in this report, ATF officials readily acknowledge that shifts in the number of guns seized and traced do not necessarily reflect fluctuations in the volume of firearms trafficked from the United States to Mexico in any particular year. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of Homeland Security convene cognizant officials from ATF and ICE to institute a mechanism to regularly monitor the implementation of the MOU and inform agency management of actions that may be needed to enhance collaboration and ensure effective information sharing. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. We corroborated this information in discussions with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials. To learn more about U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to stem the flow of these firearms across the Southwest border into Mexico, we interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) ATF, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of State (State) regarding their relevant efforts. We reviewed and analyzed DOJ and DHS documents relevant to U.S. government efforts and collaboration to address arms trafficking to Mexico, including funding data provided to us by ATF and ICE, the 2009 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ICE and ATF, data from ICE on seizures of firearms destined for Mexico, data from ATF and ICE on efforts to investigate and prosecute cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico, and agency reports and assessments related to the issue. To assess the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (Strategy) outlines U.S. goals and progress made in efforts to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico, we reviewed the 2011 and 2013 versions of the Strategy’s Weapons Chapter and the 2010 implementation guide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico.
GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report ( GAO-09-709 ) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border.
What GAO Found
According to data from the Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), 73,684 firearms (about 70 percent) seized in Mexico and traced from 2009 to 2014 originated in the United States. ATF data also show that these firearms were most often purchased in Southwest border states and that about half of them were long guns (rifles and shotguns). According to Mexican government officials, high caliber rifles are the preferred weapon used by drug trafficking organizations. According to ATF data, most were purchased legally in gun shops and at gun shows in the United States, and then trafficked illegally to Mexico. U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials also noted a new complicating factor in efforts to fight firearms trafficking is that weapons parts are being transported to Mexico to be later assembled into finished firearms, an activity that is much harder to track.
In 2009, GAO reported duplicative initiatives, and jurisdictional conflicts between ATF and the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). That year, in response to GAO's recommendations on these problems, ATF and ICE updated an interagency memorandum of understanding (MOU) to improve collaboration. ATF and ICE have taken several steps since then to improve coordination on efforts to combat firearms trafficking, such as joint training exercises and conferences to ensure that agents are aware of the MOU and its jurisdictional parameters and collaboration requirements. However, GAO found that ATF and ICE do not regularly monitor the implementation of the MOU. In the absence of a mechanism to monitor MOU implementation and ensure that appropriate coordination is taking place between the two agencies, GAO found that gaps in information sharing and misunderstandings related to their roles and responsibilities persist.
The indicator used to track U.S. agencies' efforts to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico in the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy , by itself, does not adequately measure progress. ONDCP tracks progress based on the number of arms seized in Mexico and traced to the United States; however, this number does not reflect the total volume of firearms trafficked from the United States, and it does not take into account other key supporting agency actions and activities as measures.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-552 | gao_GAO-05-552_0 | Background
Federal agencies and our nation’s critical infrastructures—such as power distribution, water supply, telecommunications, national defense, and emergency services—rely extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their missions. The security of these systems and data is essential to prevent data tampering, disruptions in critical operations, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information. Specifically, this program is to include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency, through plans of action and milestones; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Pervasive Weaknesses in Federal Agencies’ Information Security Policies and Practices Place Data at Risk
The 24 major federal agencies continue to have significant control weaknesses in their computer systems that threaten the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of federal information and systems. Software Change Controls Were Not Always in Place
Software change controls ensure that only authorized and fully tested software is placed in operation. Security Programs Were Not Fully Implemented at Agencies
The underlying cause for the information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully implemented agencywide information security programs. Government Makes Progress in Implementing FISMA, but Challenges Remain
FISMA provides a comprehensive framework for developing effective agencywide information security programs. The government is progressing in its implementation of the information security management requirements of FISMA, but challenges remain. NIST, however, has developed a schedule for its required activities and has begun to issue required guidance, and OMB has issued guidance on the roles and responsibilities of both the agencies and NIST and has also issued annual reporting guidance and reported annually, as required, to the Congress. Our analysis of the annual reporting guidance identified opportunities to increase the usefulness of the reports for oversight. The IGs have conducted annual evaluations as required and have reported on the results. These weaknesses place federal operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and abuse, and may put financial data at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption. In addition, the Administrator made several general comments. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In accordance with the FISMA requirement that the Comptroller General report periodically to the Congress, our objectives were to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies’ information security policies and practices and (2) implementation of FISMA requirements. Information Security: Continued Efforts Needed to Fully Implement Statutory Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies rely extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their missions. The security of these systems and data is essential to prevent data tampering, disruptions in critical operations, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information. Concerned with accounts of attacks on systems via the Internet and reports of significant weaknesses in federal computer systems that make them vulnerable to attack, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) in 2002. In accordance with FISMA requirements that the Comptroller General report periodically to the Congress, GAO's objectives in this report are to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) the federal government's implementation of FISMA requirements.
What GAO Found
Pervasive weaknesses in the 24 major agencies' information security policies and practices threaten the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of federal information and information systems. Access controls were not effectively implemented; software change controls were not always in place; segregation of duties was not consistently implemented; continuity of operations planning was often inadequate; and security programs were not fully implemented at the agencies. These weaknesses exist primarily because agencies have not yet fully implemented strong information security management programs. These weaknesses put federal operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and destruction. In addition, they place financial data at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption. Overall, the government is making progress in its implementation of FISMA. To provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls, FISMA details requirements for federal agencies and their inspectors general (IG), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and OMB. Federal agencies reported that they have been increasingly implementing required information security practices and procedures, although they continue to face major challenges. Further, IGs have conducted required annual evaluations, and NIST has issued required guidance in the areas of risk assessments and recommended information security controls, and has maintained its schedule for issuing remaining guidance required under FISMA. Finally, OMB has given direction to the agencies and reported to Congress as required; however, GAO's analysis of its annual reporting guidance identified opportunities to increase the usefulness of the reports for oversight. While progress has been made in implementing statutory requirements, agencies continue to have difficulty effectively protecting federal information and information systems. |
gao_GAO-17-346SP | gao_GAO-17-346SP_0 | During 2016, More than Half of 26 Programs Were on Track to Meet Their Schedules and Cost Goals
For the first time since we began our annual assessments of DHS’s major acquisition programs, all of the programs included in our review had a department-approved baseline. The remaining 9 of the 26 programs experienced schedule slips, including 4 that also experienced cost growth. The overall schedule and cost changes were largely driven by increases experienced by a few programs. Programs Generally Did Not Meet All KPPs before Deploying Capabilities and Late Requirements Definition May Affect Program Execution
Fourteen of the 26 programs we reviewed deployed capabilities prior to meeting all of their department-approved KPPs—the most important requirements that a system must meet to fulfill its purpose. As a result, DHS faces increased risk of fielding capabilities that do not work as intended. Program officials identified multiple reasons that KPPs have not been met, such as programs had not yet tested the KPPs or KPPs were poorly defined. This timing is counter to acquisition best practices, and may potentially cause programs to experience cost growth, schedule slips, and inconsistent performance if requirements are not firmly established at the time the baseline is set. DHS officials identified several reasons why programs have deployed capabilities, but not met all of their department-approved KPPs. The policy requires programs to obtain department-level approval for initial APBs— including KPPs, schedules, and cost goals—at ADE 2A, that is, prior to gaining full knowledge about the program’s technical requirements. For example, DHS established new processes for assessing programs’ staffing needs and monitoring major acquisition program progress. Further, we also found that no programs in our review had reported performance breaches and that DHS’s policy does not clearly define at what point not meeting KPPs constitutes a performance breach. Senior DHS officials acknowledged that the department could better document these decisions and leadership’s rationale in acquisition decision memorandums. DHS leadership’s decisions to approve programs to proceed through the acquisition process without meeting all acquisition policy instruction requirements may be reasonable in any given case. However, unless the rationale for these decisions is documented and communicated through acquisition decision memorandums, effective oversight and insight into approval decisions for internal and external stakeholders is limited. Updated DHS Breach Policy Not Clear on Timing for Reporting Performance Breaches
DHS’s March 2016 revised acquisition policy instruction also includes changes to the department’s breach policy, which applies to programs that fail to meet any cost, schedule, or performance threshold in a program’s approved APB. As a result, DHS may be missing opportunities for oversight and correction of performance issues, and is at risk of fielding systems that may not work as intended. Recommendations
To mitigate the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and strengthen the department’s investment decisions, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Undersecretary for Management to take the following three actions: Update the acquisition policy to:
Require that major acquisition programs’ technical requirements are well defined and key technical reviews are conducted prior to approving programs to initiate product development and establishing APBs, in accordance with acquisition best practices. However, in August 2016, NPPD officials told GAO that they were revising the program’s operational requirements document as a part of the program’s re-baseline effort. As of January 2017, DHS’s DOT&E had not independently validated these results. We assessed the extent to which (1) DHS’s major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, (2) major acquisition programs are making progress in meeting key performance parameters (KPP), and (3) DHS has taken actions to strengthen implementation of its acquisition policy and to improve major acquisition program outcomes. To determine the extent to which DHS has taken actions to improve major acquisition program outcomes and to strengthen implementation of its acquisition policy, we reviewed DHS’s acquisition policy and guidance, including current and prior versions of the Acquisition Management Directive Instruction 102-01-001; acquisition decision memorandums issued in calendar year 2016; and key acquisition documentation for major acquisition programs, such as APBs, LCCEs, operational requirements documents, as well as breach notifications and remediation plans. We assessed DHS’s acquisition management policies, guidance, and practices against the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2016, DHS planned to invest about $7 billion in major acquisitions. DHS's acquisition activities are on GAO's High Risk List, in part due to program management, requirements, and funding issues.
The Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions. This report, GAO's third annual review, addresses the extent to which (1) DHS's major acquisition programs are on track to meet schedule and cost goals, (2) these programs are meeting KPPs, and (3) DHS has strengthened implementation of its acquisition policy.
GAO assessed DHS's 15 largest acquisition programs that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities as of May 2016, and 11 additional programs that GAO or DHS identified were at risk of poor outcomes. For all 26 programs, GAO reviewed key documentation, assessed performance against baselines established since DHS's 2008 acquisition policy, and met with program officials. GAO also met with DHS acquisition officials and assessed DHS's policies and practices against GAO acquisition best practices and federal internal control standards.
What GAO Found
For the first time since GAO began its annual assessments of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) major acquisitions, all 26 programs that were reviewed had a department-approved baseline. During 2016, over half of the programs reviewed (17 of the 26) were on track to meet their initial or revised schedule and cost goals. However, 7 of these 17 programs only recently established baselines, 6 of which operated for several years and deployed capabilities without approved baselines. The remaining 9 programs experienced schedule slips, including 4 that also experienced cost growth. The table shows the schedule and cost changes across all 26 programs reviewed, much of which was driven by changes in a few programs.
As of January 2017, 14 of the 26 programs deployed capabilities before meeting all key performance parameters (KPP)—the most important requirements that a system must meet. As a result, DHS may be deploying much-needed capabilities—such as border surveillance equipment and Coast Guard cutters—that do not work as intended. Programs did not meet KPPs for a variety of reasons, such as KPPs were not yet ready to be tested, systems failed to meet KPPs during testing, or KPPs were poorly defined. Contrary to acquisition best practices, DHS policy requires programs to establish schedule, cost, and performance baselines prior to gaining full knowledge about the program's technical requirements. As a result, DHS programs do not match their needs with available resources before starting product development, which increases programs' risk for cost growth, schedule slips, and inconsistent performance.
In 2016, DHS strengthened implementation of its acquisition policy by, for example, focusing on program staffing needs, requiring programs to obtain department-approval for key acquisition documents, and revising the process for when programs breach their cost goals, schedules, or KPPs. However, DHS could better document leadership's acquisition decisions to improve insight into cases that diverge from policy. For example, DHS approved six programs to proceed through the acquisition life cycle even though required documentation was not comprehensive or had not been approved, as required by DHS's policy. Senior DHS officials told GAO these decisions were also based on discussions held at the programs' formal acquisition reviews, but these considerations were not documented. Federal internal control standards require clear documentation of significant events. DHS leadership's decisions may be reasonable, but unless these decisions are documented, insight for internal and external stakeholders is limited. Furthermore, no programs reported a performance breach, even though some programs had not met KPPs. DHS's policy is not clear on how to determine whether a performance breach has occurred. As a result, DHS lacks insight into potential causes of performance issues that may contribute to poor outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
DHS should ensure that programs define technical requirements before setting baselines; document rationale for key acquisition decisions; and clarify when not meeting KPPs constitutes a breach. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-177T | gao_GAO-12-177T_0 | Background
DOD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world. In fact, all of the DOD programs on GAO’s High-Risk List relate to business operations, including systems and processes related to management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, and support infrastructure, as well as weapon systems acquisition. Long-standing and pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s financial management and related business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable information needed to make decisions and report on the financial status and cost of DOD activities to Congress and DOD decision makers, (2) adversely affected its operational efficiency in business areas, such as major weapon systems acquisition and support and logistics, and (3) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Ten Critical DOD ERP Systems
The department has stated that the following ERPs are critical to transforming the department’s business operations and addressing some of its long-standing weaknesses. The General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) was initiated in October 2004 and is intended to support the Army’s standardized financial management and accounting practices for the Army’s general fund, with the exception of that related to the Army Corps of Engineers, which will continue to use its existing financial system, the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System. Additionally, ECSS is intended to provide the financial management and accounting functions for the Air Force’s working capital fund operations. Effective implementation of the ERPs is also critical to DOD’s auditability efforts and goals. However, to date, DOD’s ERP implementations have been negatively impacted by schedule delays, cost increases, failures in delivering the necessary functionality, and a lack of compliance with required standards. The following are examples of weaknesses in DOD’s implementation efforts. In October 2010, we reported that based upon the data provided by DOD, 6 of the 10 ERPs DOD had identified as critical to transforming its business operations had experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years, and five had incurred cost increases totaling an estimated $6.9 billion. More specifically, none of the programs had developed a fully integrated master schedule that reflected all activities, including both government and contractor activities. DOD has stated that its ERPs will replace over 500 legacy systems that cost hundreds of millions of dollars to operate annually. Our preliminary results from an ongoing ERP review identified problems related to GFEBS and DEAMS providing Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) users with the expected capabilities in accounting, management information, and decision support. To compensate for the deficiencies, DFAS users have devised manual workarounds and applications to obtain the information they need to perform their day-to-day tasks. DFAS officials told us that DEAMS does not provide the capability— which existed in the legacy systems—to produce ad hoc query reports that can be used to perform the data analysis needed for daily operations. In a November 2010 report, the DOD IG stated that after more than 10 years in development and a cost of $1.1 billion, the Army’s LMP system was not compliant with the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger, which supports the consistent recording of financial information and the preparation of standard reports required by the OMB and the Department of the Treasury. The DOD IG also reported that the system also did not resolve any of the Army Working Capital Fund internal control weaknesses. GAO will continue to monitor the department’s progress of and provide feedback on the status of the department’s financial management improvement efforts. Closing Comments
DOD has invested billions of dollars and will invest billions more to implement the modern business systems it will rely on for timely, accurate, and reliable information in managing its financial and other business operations, preparing auditable financial statements, and maintaining accountability for its stewardship of public funds. While the implementation of the ERPs is a complex, demanding endeavor, the success of these systems is critical if DOD is to reach its auditability goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
As one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces many challenges in resolving its long-standing financial and related business operations and system problems. DOD is in the process of implementing modern multifunction enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems to replace many of its outdated legacy systems. The ERPs are intended to perform business-related tasks such as general ledger accounting and supply chain management. Modernizing DOD's business systems is a critical part of transforming the department's business operations, addressing high-risk areas, and providing more-accurate and reliable financial information to Congress on DOD's operations. The Panel requested that GAO provide its perspective on DOD's ERP implementation efforts and the impact implementation problems could have on DOD's efforts to improve financial management and be audit ready by fiscal year 2017. This statement is based on GAO's prior work, reports issued by the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG), and GAO's ongoing oversight of selected DOD ERP efforts. Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations to improve the department's financial management operations.
What GAO Found
DOD has invested billions of dollars and will invest billions more to develop and implement 10 ERPs that it has estimated will replace over 500 legacy systems that reportedly cost hundreds of millions of dollars to operate annually. DOD considers implementation of the ERPs as critical not only for addressing weaknesses in financial management, but also for resolving weaknesses in other high-risk areas such as business systems modernization and supply chain management. The ERPs are also important for DOD's goal of departmentwide audit readiness by fiscal year 2017. Furthermore, in light of the Secretary of Defense's recent decision that the Statement of Budgetary Resources is to be audit ready by fiscal year 2014, it is critical that the department have such systems in place to support its auditability goals. To date, however, DOD's ERP implementation has been impaired by delays, cost increases, failures in delivering the necessary functionality, and a lack of compliance with required standards. Delays in implementation have extended the use of existing duplicative, stovepiped systems, and the need to fund them. More specifically, (1) GAO has reported that, based upon the data provided by DOD, 6 of the 10 ERPs DOD had identified as critical to transforming its business operations experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years, and five had incurred cost increases totaling an estimated $6.9 billion. (2) GAO's review of 6 ERPs found that none of the programs had developed a fully integrated master schedule, a best practice and tool in the management of business-system development that is crucial to estimating the overall schedule and cost of a program. (3) DOD IG has reported that the Army's Logistics Modernization Program, which is intended to provide financial management capabilities for the Army Working Capital Fund, was not compliant with the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger, which supports the consistent recording of financial information and the preparation of standard reports required by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of the Treasury. Further, GAO's preliminary results from an ongoing audit of two ERPs--the Army's General Fund Enterprise Business System and the Air Force's Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System--found that the systems did not provide Defense Finance and Accounting Service users with the expected capabilities in accounting, management information, and decision support. System problems identified include interface issues between legacy systems and the new ERPs, lack of ad hoc query reporting capabilities, and reduced visibility for tracing transactions to resolve accounting differences. To compensate for these operational deficiencies, users were relying on manual workarounds to perform day-to-day operations. Such performance deficiencies, delays, and other problems in ERP implementation can negatively impact DOD's auditability goals. |
gao_GAO-13-194 | gao_GAO-13-194_0 | A first-level category summarizes information for an entire type of system or equipment, such as aircraft or ground vehicles. A first-level category can be broken down into second-level subcategories, which are the major elements that make up the system or equipment in the first-level category. DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report Partially Complies with Section 2464 and Includes Information for Each of the Military Services
DOD’s 2012 Biennial Core Report to Congress complies with two of the required reporting elements of Section 2464—including core capability requirements and planned workload—and partially complies with the third element by including mitigation plans, but not all detailed rationales for workload shortfalls. In the report, OSD included complete information on the amount of planned workload that is available to maintain the required capability, expressed in direct labor hours at the top-level categories and the estimated cost of these workloads for each of the military services. As reported, DOD has a total planned workload of about 92 million direct labor hours at an estimated cost of about $12 billion. The Report Includes Information on Shortfalls and Mitigation Plans but Does Not Include Detailed Explanations for Some Shortfalls
While DOD’s overall planned workloads exceed its core capability requirements, DOD’s report shows shortfalls in certain categories for the Army and the Air Force. However, the report does not include required information on the rationale for some of these shortfalls—the reasons why the services do not have the workloads to meet core maintenance requirements. Section 2464 requires that DOD include in its report “in any case where core depot-level maintenance and repair capability requirements exceed or are expected to exceed sustaining workloads,”—that is, in any case where there are shortfalls—“a detailed rationale for the shortfall and a plan either to correct, or mitigate, the effects of the shortfall.”
Consistent with how it reported the core requirements and planned workloads, OSD aggregated the workload shortfalls under the top-level categories of the work breakdown structure for each service. The report shows that the Navy and Marine Corps did not identify any shortfalls in the workloads available to support their core capability requirements. The report shows workload shortfalls for the Army and Air Force totaling about 1.4 million direct labor hours. For the report, OSD aggregated the information on core requirements and planned workloads provided by the services at the top- level categories of the work breakdown structure. The report provides mitigation plans for identified shortfalls in the Air Force core capabilities but does not provide explanations for all of the shortfalls. The report does not always include detailed explanations for identified workload shortfalls, because the Army and Air Force did not always provide explanations for them. Without clear explanations for why the services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance requirements, Congress does not have visibility whether the services’ plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls will address the cause of the shortfalls. Conclusions
Section 2464, among other things, requires DOD to maintain a core maintenance capability that is government-owned and government- operated, assign sufficient workload to support this capability, and report information on this capability to Congress. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2012 Biennial Core Report complies with Section 2464 of Title 10 of the United States Code and includes service data and information required by DOD to support the report, we analyzed the text of DOD’s Biennial Core Report and obtained supporting information on DOD’s core determination process for 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD uses both military depots and contractors to maintain many complex weapon systems and equipment. Recognizing the key role of the depots and the risk of overreliance on contractors, Section 2464 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to maintain a core maintenance capability--a combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, processes, and technology (expressed in direct labor hours) that is government-owned and government-operated--needed to meet contingency and emergency requirements. Section 2464 directs DOD to provide a Biennial Core Report to Congress and include three elements: (1) core capability requirements, (2) planned workloads, and (3) explanations and mitigation plans for any shortfalls between core capability requirements and planned workloads. In response to a requirement in Section 2464, GAO assessed the extent to which the report complied with the statute and included supporting information from the services as required by DOD. GAO reviewed relevant legislation, DOD's 2012 Biennial Core Report, the services' submissions to support the report, and related DOD guidance.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2012 Biennial Core Report complies with two of the three biennial reporting elements of Section 2464 by including information on core capability requirements and planned workloads available for maintaining these requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reported core capability requirements totaling about 70 million direct labor hours for the military services. Also, OSD reported a total of about 92 million direct labor hours for planned workloads with an estimated cost of about $12 billion. OSD reported complete information on core requirements and planned workload at the top-level categories, such as Sea Ships, of the work breakdown structure. The statute directs that this information be organized by work breakdown structure, which is a group of categories of equipment and technologies. The top-level category--an entire type of system or equipment--can be broken down into lower levels of detail or subcategories, such as Aircraft Carriers or Submarines, that make up the system or equipment. DOD's overall planned workloads exceed its core capability requirements, but the report shows shortfalls in certain categories for the Army and the Air Force.
The report partially complies with the third biennial reporting element. DOD's report includes information on shortfalls at the top-level categories and plans to mitigate all shortfalls--where requirements exceed planned workload--identified in the report. However, the report does not include required information on the rationale for some of these shortfalls--reasons why the services do not have the workload to meet core requirements. The Navy and Marine Corps did not identify any shortfalls and were not required to provide explanations or mitigation plans. The report includes mitigation plans for shortfalls identified by the Army and the Air Force but does not always provide detailed explanations for why the Army and Air Force do not have sufficient planned workload to meet core requirements. The report does not always include detailed explanations for identified workload shortfalls, because the Army and Air Force did not always provide explanations for them. Without reporting clear explanations for why the services have shortfalls, Congress does not have visibility on whether the services' plans to correct or mitigate the shortfalls will address the cause of the shortfalls.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve its Biennial Core Report by including detailed explanations of why the services do not have the workload to meet core maintenance requirements for each identified shortfall. In written comments on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_T-GGD-98-142 | gao_T-GGD-98-142_0 | Postal Service. In my testimony, I shall briefly discuss the Service’s overall performance during fiscal year 1997, including the Service’s reported successes and remaining challenges. Also, I will discuss work that we have completed since the spring of 1997, when we last testified at the Subcommittee’s Postal Service oversight hearing. In addition, I shall provide information on our ongoing work, which relates primarily to the issues of competition and diversity. Service Performance Has Continued to Improve in Some Areas, but Challenges Remain
First, I would like to briefly discuss the continuation of the Service’s reported performance successes and mention some areas of concern and challenges that still remain. In fiscal year 1997, the overall delivery score for the on-time delivery of overnight mail reached a 3-year high of 92 percent, and total mail volume increased to about 191 billion pieces. Although such performance results appear to be encouraging, other information suggests that some areas of concern and challenges remain. The topics we addressed included (1) labor-management relations; (2) automated letter sequencing, also known as Delivery Point Sequencing (DPS); and (3) the Service’s plans prepared in response to the Government Performance and Results Act (Results Act). However, the underlying problems that have hampered good relationships between the Service and most of its labor unions remain and pose significant challenges to the Service and its unions. The Service has made substantial progress in implementing DPS, despite initial obstacles. The Service acknowledged that it had been overly optimistic in its DPS expectations. Subsequently, it revised goals and benchmarks for the implementation of DPS to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1998. In its 1997 Comprehensive Statement on Postal Operations, the Service included a preliminary version of the Annual Performance Plan for fiscal year 1999. To provide you with additional information on the mailbox restriction, among other things, we obtained the views of over 1,000 randomly selected adults in the continental United States and other postal stakeholders, including the Service and the seven major postal labor unions and management associations. In addition, we said a variety of other factors, such as a reduction in First-Class Mail volume due to increased use of electronic media along with costs, inflation, and service quality, could in the long run, in combination with any change in the scope of the postal monopoly, have an impact on the Service’s ability to provide affordable universal service. Ongoing GAO Work Related to Competition and Diversity Issues
I would now like to discuss our ongoing work, most of which has been initiated at your request, Mr. Chairman, or at the request of members of your Subcommittee, in which we are focusing on various postal activities that in large part relate to the issues of competition and diversity. Postal Service: Little Progress Made in Addressing Persistent Labor-Management Problems (GAO/GGD-98-1, Oct. 1, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the Postal Service's overall performance during fiscal year (FY) 1997, including the Service's reported successes and remaining challenges; (2) work that GAO has completed since the spring of 1997; and (3) information on ongoing work, which relates primarily to the issues of competition and diversity.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as the Postal Service stands ready to enter the 21st century, it faces significant challenges that call for vigilance and attention as it strives to sustain and expand on reported performance improvements; (2) in FY 1997, the Postal Service ended another year of overall high performance in some of its operational areas, sustaining 3 years of encouraging results; (3) with reported net income of over $1 billion and increasing on-time delivery scores for first-class mail, the Service has shown that it can maintain a high income level while providing its customers with improved service; (4) also, in some management areas, such as automation of mail processes and labor-management relations, GAO acknowledges that some progress has been made; (5) however, challenges remain for the Service to sustain performance and continue on a progressive path toward accomplishing established goals and objectives and improving operations; and (6) sustaining and expanding on recent progress will be dependent upon the extent to which Congress, the Service, and other major postal stakeholders continue to focus attention on key issues, particularly: (a) labor-management relations, in which efforts to address persistent problems continue, although the sometimes adversarial nature of the relationships among the Service and many of its labor unions can affect progress in implementing improvements; (b) postal reform, in which fundamental issues are still being considered, such as defining universal service obligations and the scope of the postal monopoly; (c) competition, in which the Service is continually striving to deal with competitors so that it can maintain a firm position in a dynamic communications environment; and (d) the effectiveness with which the Service implements the Government Performance and Results Act, particularly with respect to the implementation of its strategic plan and the development and execution of its 1999 and beyond annual performance plans. |
gao_GAO-06-818 | gao_GAO-06-818_0 | 1). Westat’s evaluation assessed youth self-reported drug use and intermediate outcomes—such as youth and parent attitudes and beliefs toward drug use and parental involvement with their children—that were believed to influence youth drug use. In the conference report for fiscal year 2003 omnibus appropriations, the conferees reported that they were “deeply disturbed by the lack of evidence that the National Youth Anti- Drug Media Campaign has had any appreciable impact on youth drug use.” The conferees further acknowledged that while the evaluation conducted under NIDA’s auspices showed “slight and sporadic impact on the attitudes of parents, it has had no significant impact on youth behavior.” The conferees further acknowledged that while other surveys of youth drug use—such as Monitoring the Future, a survey of high school youth—showed recent declines in drug use, “the NIDA study was undertaken to measure the specific impact of the Media Campaign, not simply to gauge general trends,” and the conferees stated that they “intend to rely on the scientifically rigorous NIDA study to gauge the ultimate impact of the campaign” and to reevaluate the use of taxpayer money to support the campaign if the campaign continued to fail to demonstrate its effectiveness. In 2002, the strategy for the campaign was redirected. The study period included advertisements aired under the campaign’s Marijuana Initiative. Westat’s Evaluation Design, Use of Generally Accepted and Appropriate Sampling and Analytic Techniques, and Reliable Methods for Measuring Campaign Exposure Produced Credible Evidence to Support Its Findings
Westat was able to produce credible evidence to support its findings about the relationship between exposure to campaign advertisements and both drug use and intermediate outcomes by employing a longitudinal panel design—i.e., collecting multiple observations on the same persons over time—using generally accepted and appropriate sampling and analytic techniques and establishing reliable and sufficiently powerful measures of campaign exposure. In our view, Westat’s follow-up response rates resulted in a sample that was sufficient to provide reliable findings about the effects of exposure on outcomes. Westat’s Analytic Methods Aimed to Isolate Causal Effects of the Campaign and Did So Using Sophisticated Techniques That Enhanced the Strength of Its Findings
In it analysis, Westat used three types of evidence to draw inferences about the effects of the campaign: (1) trend data—data that describe increases or decreases in drug use and other outcomes over time; (2) cross-section analysis—measures of association between exposure to campaign messages and individual drug use beliefs, intentions, and behaviors, at the time data were collected; and (3) longitudinal analysis— measures of association, for youth and parents who were observed at two points in time, between exposure to campaign messages at the earlier time on outcomes at the later time. On the basis of the analysis of the relationship between exposure to campaign advertisements and youth self-reported drug use in the NSPY data— assessments that used statistical methods to adjust for individual differences and control for other factors that could explain changes in self- reported drug use—for the entire period covered by its evaluation, Westat found no significant effects of exposure to the campaign on initiation of marijuana by prior nonusing youth. Westat assessed the effects of two types of exposure on initiation of marijuana use—general exposure and specific exposure. Although ONDCP has pointed to declines in teen drug use and credited the campaign along with other prevention efforts as contributing to significant success in reducing teen drug use, trend data derived from the Monitoring the Future survey that show declines in teen marijuana use from 2001 to 2005 do not explicitly take into account exposure to the campaign, and therefore, by themselves, cannot be used as evidence of effectiveness. However, Westat’s findings for the period from 2002 to 2004 showed that the campaign also was not effective after ONDCP took these steps. We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Westat reported that it could not conclusively rule out the first explanation for coverage losses. Westat’s sample had sufficient power to detect this amount of annual change in youth attitudes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 1998 and 2004, Congress appropriated over $1.2 billion to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) for the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign. The campaign aimed to prevent the initiation of or curtail the use of drugs among the nation's youth. In 2005, Westat, Inc., completed a multiyear national evaluation of the campaign. GAO has been mandated to review various aspects of the campaign, including Westat's evaluation which is the subject of this report. Applying generally accepted social science research standards, GAO assessed (1) how Westat provided credible support for its findings and Westat's findings about (2) attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of youth and parents toward drug use and (3) youth self-reported drug use.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of Westat's evaluation reports and associated documentation leads to the conclusion that the evaluation provides credible evidence that the campaign was not effective in reducing youth drug use, either during the entire period of the campaign or during the period from 2002 to 2004 when the campaign was redirected and focused on marijuana use. By collecting longitudinal data--i.e., multiple observations on the same persons over time--using generally accepted and appropriate sampling and analytic techniques, and establishing reliable methods for measuring campaign exposure, Westat was able to produce credible evidence to support its findings about the relationship between exposure to campaign advertisements and both drug use and intermediate outcomes. In particular, Westat was able to demonstrate that its sample was not biased despite sample coverage losses, maintained high follow-up response rates of sampled individuals to provide for robust longitudinal analysis, established measures of exposure that could detect changes in outcomes on the order of magnitude that ONDCP expected for the campaign and that could reliably measure outcomes, and used sophisticated statistical methods to isolate causal effects of the campaign. Westat's findings on the effects of exposure on intermediate outcomes--theorized precursors of drug use--were mixed. Specifically, although sampled youth and parents' recall of campaign advertisements increased over time, they had good impressions of the advertisements, and they could identify the specific campaign messages, exposure to the advertisements generally did not lead youth to disapprove of using drugs and may have promoted perceptions among exposed youth that others' drug use was normal. Parents' exposure to the campaign led to changes in beliefs about talking about drug use with their children and the extent to which they had these conversations with their children. However, exposure did not appear to lead to increased monitoring of youth. Moreover, the evaluation was unable to demonstrate that changes in parental attitudes led to changes in youth attitudes or behaviors toward drug use. Westat's evaluation indicates that exposure to the campaign did not prevent initiation of marijuana use and had no effect on curtailing current users' marijuana use, despite youth recall of and favorable assessments of advertisements. Although general trend data derived from the Monitoring the Future survey and the Westat study show declines in the percentage of youth reportedly using marijuana from 2002 to 2004, the trend data do not explicitly take into account exposure to the campaign, and therefore, by themselves, cannot be used as evidence of effectiveness. In Westat's evaluation of relationships between exposure and marijuana initiation the only significant finding was of small unfavorable effects of the campaign exposure on marijuana initiation during some periods of data collection and in some subgroups. |
gao_GAO-13-659 | gao_GAO-13-659_0 | Most recently, in May 2011, the President directed each federal agency to determine its optimal fleet inventory—including the number and types of vehicles needed—and to set targets for achieving this inventory by December 31, 2015. VA and the Army Corps, lease most of the vehicles in their fleets. Selected Agencies Follow Leading Practices for Fleet Management to Varying Degrees
We identified three leading practices for fleet management: 1) maintaining a well-designed fleet management information system (FMIS), 2) analyzing life-cycle costs to inform investment decisions, and 3) optimizing fleet size and composition and found that the selected agencies in our review follow these practices to varying degrees. None of these agencies are fully analyzing lifecycle costs to make vehicle investment decisions. All of the agencies we examined have carried out an internal process for determining their optimal fleet size and composition and have set targets for achieving these optimal inventories, but most have not provided GSA, which reviews these targets, with clear information on the methods they used for producing them. We identified these leading practices based on views provided by fleet management experts in the private sector, local government, and fleet management associations. We also compared these practices with legal requirements and GSA and OMB guidance related to federal fleet management. Overall, according to the experts and GSA officials we interviewed, these practices provide a foundation for agencies to manage fleet costs while meeting their missions. Based on information provided by the selected agencies, most of their FMISs capture the majority of the types of fleet data recommended by GSA but none include all of these types of data. While GSA identifies in its guidance the types of indirect costs that agencies should capture in their FMISs, it has not provided agencies with guidance on how to estimate those costs. Some agencies have not yet developed an approach for estimating these costs. Officials anticipate that the new fleet card In 2012, GSA recommended that DHS, USDA, Interior, and VA obtain centralized, department-wide FMISs. Selected Agencies Have Adopted Strategies to Mitigate Such Challenges as Competing Requirements, Funding Allocation, and Lack of Expertise
As previously discussed, data availability and integration of data systems are key challenges that affect many aspects of fleet management; however, agency officials also identified three additional, broad challenges: multiple and competing energy requirements, the allocation of funding to fleet management activities, and ensuring that fleet managers have adequate expertise in a decentralized environment. Agencies have pursued or are pursuing a variety of strategies to address these challenges, which include the fleet optimization process, leveraging Department of Energy (DOE) tools, using a working capital fund, and providing online training, among other things. A key goal of the fleet optimization process is to determine what fleet size and composition would best meet the agency’s mission while also adhering to requirements for alternative fuel and fuel- efficient vehicles. The steps these agencies are taking to improve data collection and system integration have the potential to improve their ability to access and analyze data related to fleet management, including their ability to capture and analyze life cycle costs. By not fully tracking and analyzing total fleet costs, including such indirect costs, some agencies may not have full cost information with which to analyze life-cycle costs and make cost- effective investment decisions, such as decisions about whether to lease or purchase vehicles, and may not be able to fully monitor and report on fleet costs. 1. Develop and publish guidance for agencies on estimating indirect costs attributable to fleet management to help ensure that agencies have complete and accurate cost data. 2. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We assessed the extent to which the following agencies use leading practices to manage their fleets, including the size and costs of these fleets: the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Interior (Interior), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA), and the United States Air Force (Air Force) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) within the Department of Defense. Collectively, these agencies account for about 46 percent of the roughly 450,000 civilian and non-tactical military vehicles maintained by the federal government (excluding the U.S. Postal Service). We looked for variation in fleet characteristics, including: age of passenger vehicles, change in fleet size from 2005- 2011, and change in fleet composition (owned versus leased) from 2005- 2011, to ensure that we selected agencies with a range of fleet characteristics. To determine the extent to which the selected federal agencies use leading practices to manage their fleets, including the size and cost of these fleets, we reviewed agency fleet management policies, procedures, plans, and other documentation on their fleet management practices and conducted interviews with fleet management officials at these agencies. To identify challenges these agencies face in managing their fleets and strategies they use to address these challenges, we interviewed agency fleet managers from our selected agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies (excluding the U.S. Postal Service) spend about $3 billion annually to acquire, operate, and maintain about 450,000 civilian and non-tactical military vehicles. Agencies may lease or buy vehicles from GSA, which also issues requirements and guidance on fleet management. In recent years, Congress and the President have raised concerns about the size and cost of federal agencies' fleets. In 2011, the President directed agencies to determine their optimal fleet inventories and set targets for achieving these inventories by 2015 with the goal of a more cost-effective fleet.
GAO was asked to review agency efforts to reduce fleet costs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which selected federal agencies use leading practices to manage their fleets, including their sizes and costs, and (2) any challenges these agencies face in managing their fleets and strategies they use to address these challenges. GAO selected USDA, DHS, Interior, VA, Air Force, and the Army Corps for review based on factors such as fleet size, fleet composition, and changes in fleet size from 2005 to 2011. To identify leading practices, GAO interviewed recognized private sector and government fleet management experts and GSA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified three leading practices for fleet management and found that selected federal agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Homeland Security (DHS), the Interior (Interior), and Veterans Affairs (VA); the U.S. Air Force (Air Force); and the Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps)--follow these practices to varying degrees. These practices are 1) maintaining a well-designed fleet-management information system (FMIS), 2) analyzing life-cycle costs to inform investment decisions, and 3) optimizing fleet size and composition. GAO identified these practices based on views provided by recognized fleet experts and determined that the practices align with legal requirements and General Services Administration (GSA) recommendations.
None of the agencies GAO reviewed capture in their FMISs all of the data elements recommended by GSA. The types of data missing most frequently are data on fleet costs, including indirect costs, such as salaries of personnel with fleet-related duties. Also, some of these systems are not integrated with other key agency systems. As a result, fleet managers face challenges in performing analyses that can guide fleet decisions. All of these agencies are making efforts to improve their data and FMISs, but some lack an approach for estimating indirect fleet costs. GSA's guidance does not discuss how to estimate these costs.
Most of the selected agencies are not fully analyzing life-cycle costs to make decisions about when to replace vehicles. In addition, although most of the selected agencies use life-cycle cost analyses to decide whether to lease or purchase vehicles, some agencies' analyses do not consider a full set of costs. As a result, agencies may not have full information with which to make vehicle replacement and procurement decisions. Officials mainly cited problems with their cost data and FMISs as contributing factors, and efforts to improve in these areas have the potential to enhance agencies' ability to conduct these types of analyses.
In response to the President's 2011 directive and related GSA guidance, the selected agencies have set targets for achieving optimal fleet size and composition. Planned changes in fleet sizes from 2011 to 2015 range from DHS's 15 percent fleet reduction to VA's 8 percent increase. GSA reviewed agencies' initial targets in 2012 and recommended some changes, but lacked supporting documentation to explain how most agencies produced their targets. GSA's lack of information on these methods limits its ability to oversee agencies' fleet optimization efforts and help agencies ensure that their fleets are the right size and composition to meet their missions cost-effectively.
In addition to data-related challenges, agency officials identified three broad fleet management challenges: meeting energy requirements, such as requirements for acquiring alternative fuel vehicles; uncertainty regarding the allocation of funding to fleet management activities; and ensuring that fleet managers have adequate expertise. Agencies have pursued or are pursuing a variety of strategies to address these challenges. These include the fleet optimization process, which calls for agencies to determine how best to fulfill requirements for alternative fuel vehicles; using a working capital fund, which provides a steady stream of funding; and providing online training for fleet managers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of GSA 1) develop and publish guidance for agencies on estimating indirect fleet costs and 2) request that agencies provide supporting documentation on their methods for determining their optimal fleet inventories. GSA agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-391 | gao_GAO-13-391_0 | Background
In implementing ERRP, CCIIO is responsible for, among other things, determining which plan sponsors are eligible to participate in the program and providing reimbursements to the participating sponsors. to operate the PCIP in their state. CCIIO Discontinued ERRP Enrollment in Early 2011 and Stopped Most Reimbursements the Following Year to Keep Spending within the $5 Billion Appropriation
CCIIO stopped accepting applications for ERRP enrollment in May 2011, anticipating the $5 billion appropriation would be exhausted. Officials told us that in September 2012, CCIIO suspended making reimbursements to plan sponsors, with reimbursements having exceeded the $4.7 billion cap established for paying claims under the original appropriation nearly a year earlier. When the $4.7 billion was reached, significant demand for the program remained with 5,699 ERRP reimbursement requests left outstanding that accounted for about $2.5 billion in unreimbursed claims. Overpayments are identified through the claims adjudication process and can happen when, for example, a plan receives a rebate from a provider that lowers the total cost of a claim after the claim was initially submitted to ERRP. As of January 2013, CCIIO had identified $60.2 million in overpayments and recovered $54 million of this amount. In addition to recovering overpayments, officials told us that any money recovered from program audits would also be used to pay outstanding reimbursement requests. PCIP Enrollment and Spending Have Grown Substantially
PCIP enrollment has grown substantially. By the end of December 2012, cumulative enrollment had reached 103,160, up more than 50,000 from a year earlier when enrollment was 48,862. By the end of January 2013, cumulative PCIP spending reached about $2.6 billion, representing over half of the $5 billion appropriated for the program.when about $782 million had been spent, representing about 16 percent of the total appropriation. PCIP spending has varied on a monthly basis, but overall, monthly spending also has increased over the life of the program. Most recently, monthly spending reached its highest point since the program’s inception, increasing about 35 percent from the end of December 2012 to the end of January 2013. PCIP Spending Is Likely to Approach the $5 Billion Appropriation in 2013, and CCIIO Is Taking Steps Intended to Ensure Spending Does Not Exceed This Amount
According to CMS, PCIP spending is likely to approach the $5 billion appropriation in 2013. In June 2012, CMS’s OACT released a projection of PCIP spending, and reported the entire $5 billion in funding would be used “through 2013.” When asked for more specifics, OACT officials told us that this projection was not intended to produce a point-in-time estimate for when the program would run out of money, but rather represents their expectation that the entire $5 billion appropriation would be needed to pay for care provided through 2013. CCIIO officials similarly told us that they anticipate total PCIP spending will be close to $5 billion, and that they are taking program management steps—many of which are not yet reflected in the spending data— intended to ensure that the appropriated funding lasts until the end of 2013. According to officials, about one quarter of the hospitals approached agreed to the renegotiation. More recently, CCIIO instituted benefit changes for the federally run PCIP that shifted more costs onto enrollees starting in January 2013. It also increased enrollee coinsurance from 20 percent to 30 percent. Finally, due to growing concerns about the rate of PCIP spending, in February 2013, CCIIO suspended PCIP enrollment to ensure the appropriated funding would be sufficient to cover claims for current enrollees through the end of the program. Officials told us that if spending trends begin to indicate that funding will not be used as quickly as they are projecting, they could reinstate PCIP enrollment to use remaining funds. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Private Health Insurance: Implementation of the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans: Program Features, Early Enrollment and Spending Trends, and Federal Oversight Activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) appropriated $5 billion each to establish and carry out two temporary programs--ERRP and PCIP. ERRP reimburses sponsors of employment-based health plans to help cover the cost of providing health benefits to early retirees--individuals age 55 and older not eligible for Medicare. The PCIP program is a high-risk pool that provides access to health insurance for individuals unable to acquire affordable coverage due to a preexisting condition. Both programs are operated by CCIIO within CMS (an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services) and are intended to operate through 2013, after which PPACA will provide new insurance coverage options.
GAO was asked to provide updated information on ERRP and PCIP spending. This report describes the current status of ERRP and PCIP enrollment and spending as well as projected PCIP spending and how CCIIO is ensuring that program funding is sufficient through 2013. GAO obtained the most recent data available on ERRP and PCIP enrollment and spending and on overpayments recovered from ERRP plan sponsors during the claims adjudication process. GAO also obtained other supporting documentation where available. GAO interviewed CMS officials about ERRP and PCIP enrollment and spending as well as their predictions of future PCIP spending and steps they are taking to ensure the sufficiency of PCIP funding.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) discontinued enrollment in the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP) in early 2011 and stopped most program reimbursements the following year to keep spending within the $5 billion ERRP appropriation. Specifically, anticipating exhaustion of funds, CCIIO stopped ERRP enrollment in May 2011. According to CCIIO officials, CCIIO suspended making reimbursements to plan sponsors in September 2012, as reimbursements had reached the $4.7 billion cap established for paying claims under the original appropriation, and the remainder was reserved for administrative expenses. When the cap was reached, significant demand for the program remained with 5,699 ERRP reimbursement requests left outstanding that accounted for about $2.5 billion in unpaid claims. CCIIO officials told GAO that they planned to pay some of the outstanding reimbursement requests by redistributing any overpayments recovered from plan sponsors--when, for example a plan receives a rebate that lowers the total cost of a prior claim--as well as money recovered from program audits. As of January 2013, officials told GAO that CCIIO had recovered a total of $54 million and redistributed $20.7 million of this amount.
Enrollment and spending for the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) program have grown substantially. Cumulative PCIP enrollment had reached 103,160 by the end of December 2012, more than doubling from a year earlier. By the end of January 2013, total PCIP spending reached about $2.6 billion, representing over half of the $5 billion PCIP appropriation compared to a year earlier when only about 16 percent of the total appropriation had been spent. PCIP spending has varied on a monthly basis, but overall, monthly spending also has increased over the life of the program. Most recently, monthly spending reached its highest point since the program's inception, increasing about 35 percent from December 2012 to January 2013.
According to CMS, PCIP spending is likely to approach the $5 billion appropriation by the end of 2013, and CCIIO is taking steps intended to ensure it does not exceed this amount. In June 2012, Office of the Actuary (OACT) within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released a projection that the entire $5 billion in PCIP funding would be used "through 2013." Similarly, CCIIO officials told GAO they anticipate total PCIP spending to closely approach $5 billion, and that they are taking program management steps--many of which are not yet reflected in spending data--to ensure appropriated funding lasts through 2013. For example, in the second half of 2012, CCIIO was able to obtain lower provider reimbursement rates for the PCIP program. Also, in January 2013, CCIIO instituted benefit changes that shifted more costs onto PCIP enrollees, including by increasing enrollee coinsurance from 20 percent to 30 percent in many states. Due to growing concerns about the rate of PCIP spending, in February 2013, CCIIO suspended PCIP enrollment to ensure the appropriated funding would be sufficient to cover claims for current enrollees through the end of the program. Officials told GAO that if spending trends begin to indicate that funding will not be used as quickly as they are projecting, they could reinstate PCIP enrollment to use remaining funds. |
gao_GAO-02-663 | gao_GAO-02-663_0 | Under the cost-based system, HHAs were paid their costs up to a per-visit limit for each visit provided. For example, 48 Medicare beneficiaries per 1,000 in Hawaii received home health care in 1997. BBA Changes to Home Health Payment Policies
To constrain Medicare home health spending growth, BBA required HCFA to replace Medicare’s cost-based, per-visit payment method with a PPS by fiscal year 2000. We also said that the PPS could lead to substantial overpayments to some HHAs relative to the level of services being provided. Home Health PPS Episode Payments Are Considerably Higher than Estimated Costs of Care Provided
The average episode payment HHAs received to provide an episode of care in the first 6 months of 2001 was about 35 percent higher than the average estimated cost of providing that care. But certain HHAs may have costs higher than payments if they face extraordinary costs not accounted for by the PPS payment groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 significantly changed Medicare's home health care payments to home health agencies (HHAs). Under a prospective payment system (PPS), HHAs are paid a fixed amount, adjusted for beneficiary care needs, for providing up to 60 days of care---termed a "home health episode." The act also imposed new interim payment limits to moderate spending until the PPS could be implemented.
What GAO Found
Although PPS was designed to lower Medicare spending below what it was under the interim system, GAO found that Medicare's payments for full home health care episodes were 35 percent higher than estimated in the first six months of 2001. These disparities indicate that Medicare's PPS overpays for services actually provided, although some HHAs facing extraordinary costs not accounted for by the payment system may be financially disadvantaged. |
gao_AIMD-98-126 | gao_AIMD-98-126_0 | Background
Key DOD financial managers face considerable challenges in addressing the financial management needs of a DOD organization that is without parallel in the size, diversity, and complexity of its operations; repeated audit findings that deficiencies in personnel experience or competencies are a major contributor to DOD’s continuing financial deficiencies; and existing and enhanced accounting requirements that must be implemented throughout DOD. DOD has a vast number of financial management systems. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA or “the Results Act”). It is also noteworthy that several of the state government and private sector respondents indicated that they had designed their training programs, in part, in recognition of the training requirements that existed for holders of professional certifications. Many Key DOD Financial Managers Received No Accounting and Financial Training
Our recent studies showed that 53 percent of DOD’s key financial managers responding to our survey did not receive any accounting or financial training during calendar years 1995 and 1996, the 2-year period covered by our survey. Some of these state government and private sector respondents had established training requirements for their financial managers. In addition, several organizations noted that their programs were designed, in part, in recognition of the training requirements that existed for holders of professional certifications. Those states with such requirements had, on average, 36 hours of training required in 1996, including 26 hours in technical accounting training. In his 1997 “Defense Reform Initiative: The Business Strategy for Defense in the 21st Century,” Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that DOD considers itself to be a world-class organization despite rendering second-rate education, training, and professional development to its civilian employees. For example, the plan does not specifically address minimum annual training requirements, including a recognition that the majority of the training must be in technical accounting or other related financial management areas; the key competencies associated with knowledge of accounting concepts, such as the statements of federal accounting standards, and JFMIP’s systems requirements; how the general courses/subject areas will be linked to specific training courses that can be used to attain an identified competency; and how the competencies and developmental activities identified will be applied to both new hires and individuals currently on-board by job series and grade level. The military services’ efforts to improve the skills of their financial management personnel include (1) an Air Force professional development guide for its financial management and comptroller officers, which provides information on career broadening, formal training, and professional development, (2) an Army initiative intended to improve its personnel capabilities with respect to information technology, workforce effectiveness, financial management tools, funds management, and resource management, and (3) a Navy effort to revise its training program for its civilian financial management workforce to address financial management competencies. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the general conclusion presented in the report regarding providing a strong emphasis on training as a means of upgrading workforce knowledge of current financial management, accounting, and reporting requirements. We disagree with DOD’s position. We also drew upon the information gathered from our audit of the state governments and private sector companies that may be useful to DOD in assessing changes needed to enhance its financial management workforce. Federal Financial Accounting Standards
Comments From the Department of Defense
The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s letter dated June 16, 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the lessons learned from the results of its survey of selected large state governments and private-sector corporations that the Department of Defense (DOD) could use to augment its existing plans to upgrade the competencies of its key financial managers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a key lesson learned from its survey data is that many state government and private-sector organizations place a strong emphasis on training as a means of upgrading workforce knowledge of current financial management, accounting, and reporting requirements; (2) on average, key financial managers in the surveyed large state governments and private-sector organizations received 31 hours and 26 hours of training, respectively, in 1996--most of which was in technical accounting subjects; (3) some of the surveyed organizations had established training requirements for their financial personnel; (4) also, several organizations noted that their programs were designed, in part, in recognition of the training requirements that existed for employees holding professional certifications; (5) these approaches may be useful to DOD in addressing its financial management problems; (6) over half of the key DOD financial managers GAO surveyed--who all held leadership positions throughout DOD's network of financial organizations--had received no financial- or accounting-related training during 1995 and 1996; (7) these key personnel face the challenge of leading DOD's efforts to produce reliable financial data: (a) throughout a large complex DOD organization with acknowledged difficult financial deficiencies; and (b) that build upon existing requirements to include recent, more comprehensive accounting standards and federal financial management system requirements; (8) in addition, full implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act will require DOD financial personnel to provide information on cost data associated with DOD's program results; (9) technical financial- and accounting-related training to supplement on-the-job experiences of DOD's key financial managers is critical to ensuring that such accurate financial data are available; (10) the Secretary of Defense has stated in a recent major reform initiative that while the department is a world-class organization, it is rendering second-rate education, training, and professional development to its civilian employees; (11) moreover, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) is developing a plan intended to identify the kinds of skills and developmental activities DFAS financial personnel need to improve their competencies; and (12) in addition, DOD has not yet established a departmentwide focus with accountability to ensure that efforts to improve DOD's financial managers' training are effectively coordinated with the Secretary's broader training reform initiative. |
gao_GAO-02-635 | gao_GAO-02-635_0 | As previously stated, in December 2001, the Congress amended Title 31 of the United States Code to require an agency with contracts totaling over $500 million to have a cost-effective program for identifying payment errors and for recovering amounts erroneously paid to contractors. Overpayments and Underpayments Continue
Defense contractors’ responses to our survey indicated that they have millions of dollars in overpayments and underpayments on their records, and based on DFAS Columbus records, they are continuing to refund overpayments. However, according to DFAS Columbus records, contract administration actions were the primary reason for the $488 million that contractors refunded in fiscal year 2001. Its plan is to complete audits at 190 contractors in fiscal year 2002. DCAA officials stated that they would continue overpayment audits until contractors’ controls ensure prompt identification and reporting of overpayments to DOD. Management and Accounting Control Issues Remain
Despite DOD’s initiatives and accomplishments in addressing overpayment problems, DOD does not yet have fundamental control over contractor debt and underpayments because its procedures and practices do not fully meet federal accounting standards, federal financial system requirements, and its own accounting policy. As a result, DOD managers do not have appropriate management control of accounts receivable and accounts payable and other liabilities stemming from its contract administration and payment processes. A similar revision to the FAR contract financing clauses would ensure that all contractor debt would be promptly identified, reported, and collected. | What GAO Found
Since GAO reported on Department of Defense (DOD) contractor overpayments in 1994, additional reports have been issued highlighting billions of dollars of overpayments to Defense contractors. In December 2001, Congress amended Title 31 of the United States Code to require a federal agency with contracts totaling over $500 million in a fiscal year to have a cost-effective program for identifying payment errors and for recovering amounts erroneously paid to contractors. DOD contractors' responses to GAO's survey indicate that they have millions of dollars of overpayments on their records and that they are continuing to refund overpayments-- about $488 million in fiscal year 2001. DOD has taken actions to address problems with contractor overpayments. In addition to its contract audit functions and as part of a broad based program to assist the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is auditing at least 190 large DOD contractors to identify overpayments and ensure that contractors have adequate internal controls for prompt identification and reporting of overpayments. Although DOD has several initiatives to reduce overpayments, it still does not yet have basic administrative control over contractor debt and underpayments because its procedures and practices do not fully meet federal accounting standards and federal financial system requirements for the recording of accounts receivable and liabilities. As a result, DOD managers do not have important information for effective financial management, such as ensuring that contractor debt is promptly collected. |
gao_GAO-14-478T | gao_GAO-14-478T_0 | Twenty-six New Areas Identified to Improve Efficiency and Effectiveness across the Federal Government
We identified 11 new areas in which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication and present 19 actions to executive branch agencies and Congress to address these issues. By not consolidating its requirements, this facility missed the opportunity to achieve potential cost savings and other efficiencies. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), this action could save $1.2 billion over 10 years in the Social Security Disability Insurance program. In addition to areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, our 2014 report identified 15 new areas where opportunities exist either to reduce the cost of government operations or to enhance revenue collections for the Treasury and suggest 45 actions that the executive branch and Congress can take to address these issues. For example, to achieve cost savings, Congress may wish to consider rescinding all or part of the remaining credit subsidy appropriations to the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program, unless the Department of Energy (DOE) can demonstrate sufficient demand for new ATVM loans and viable applications. We also identified multiple opportunities for the government to increase revenue collections. Executive Branch and Congress Continue to Make Progress in Addressing Previously Identified Issues
In addition to the new actions identified for this year’s annual report, we have continued to monitor the progress that executive branch agencies and Congress have made in addressing the issues we identified in our last three annual reports. As of March 6, 2014, the date we completed our audit work, 19 percent of these areas were addressed, 62 percent were partially addressed, and 15 percent were not addressed (see fig.1). Within these areas, we presented about 380 actions that the executive branch agencies and Congress could take to address the issues identified. We estimate that executive branch and congressional efforts to address these and other actions from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013 have resulted in over $10 billion in realized cost savings to date, and projections of these efforts have estimated that billions of dollars more in savings will accrue over the next 10 years. More specifically, over 60 percent of actions directed to Congress and executive branch agencies identified in 2011, 2012, and 2013 remain partially addressed or not addressed. Without increased or renewed leadership focus, agencies may miss opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their programs and save taxpayers’ dollars. Table 4 highlights selected opportunities that could result in cost savings or enhanced revenues. Better Data and a Focus on Outcomes Are Essential to Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness
Even with sustained leadership, addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication within the federal government is challenging because it may require agencies and Congress to re-examine within and across various mission areas the fundamental structure, operation, funding, and performance of a number of long-standing federal programs or activities with entrenched constituencies. Currently, no comprehensive list of federal programs exists, nor is there a common definition for what constitutes a federal program. Without knowing the scope of programs or the full cost of implementing them, it is difficult for executive branch agencies or Congress to gauge the magnitude of the federal commitment to a particular area of activity or the extent to which associated federal programs are effectively and efficiently achieving shared goals. In addition, we have called attention to the need for improved and regular performance information. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the fiscal pressures facing the government continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. Opportunities to take action exist in areas where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative.
To highlight these challenges and to inform government decision makers on actions that could be taken to address them, GAO is statutorily required to identify and report annually to Congress on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives, both within departments and government-wide, which have duplicative goals or activities. GAO has also identified additional opportunities to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness by means of cost savings or enhanced revenue collection.
This statement discusses the (1) new areas identified in GAO's 2014 annual report; (2) status of actions taken by the administration and Congress to address the 162 areas previously identified in GAO's 2011, 2012 and 2013 annual reports; and (3) opportunities to address the issues GAO identified. To identify what actions exist to address these issues and take advantage of opportunities for cost savings and enhanced revenues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work and recommendations for consideration.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2014 annual report identifies 64 new actions that executive branch agencies and Congress could take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 26 areas of government. GAO identifies 11 new areas in which there is evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, under current law, individuals are allowed to receive concurrent payments from the Disability Insurance and Unemployment programs. Eliminating the overlap in these payments could save the government about $1.2 billion over the next 10 years. GAO also identifies 15 new areas where opportunities exist either to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections. For example, Congress could rescind all or part of the remaining $4.2 billion in credit subsidies for the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan program unless the Department of Energy demonstrates sufficient demand for this funding.
The executive branch and Congress have made progress in addressing the approximately 380 actions across 162 areas that GAO identified in its past annual reports. As of March 6, 2014, the date GAO completed its progress update audit work, nearly 20 percent of these areas were addressed, over 60 percent were partially addressed, and about 15 percent were not addressed, as shown in the figure below. Executive branch and congressional efforts to address these and other actions over the past 3 years have resulted in over $10 billion in cost savings with billions of dollars more in cost savings anticipated in future years.
Better data and a greater focus on outcomes are essential to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of federal efforts. Currently, there is not a comprehensive list of all federal programs and agencies often lack reliable budgetary and performance information about their own programs. Without knowing the scope, cost, or performance of programs, it is difficult for executive branch agencies or Congress to gauge the magnitude of the federal commitment to a particular area of activity or the extent to which associated federal programs are effectively and efficiently achieving shared goals. |
gao_GAO-04-330 | gao_GAO-04-330_0 | DTRA used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993 (GPRA) to guide its planning process. DTRA’s Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat
DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through four core functions: (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat support, and (4) technology development. Third, DTRA supports military commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD threats on the battlefield and U.S. installations. Threat Reduction Has Focused on the WMD Threat in the Former Soviet Union
DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet Union to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store and transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) reduce the risk of the WMD proliferation. DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies
As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD threats, DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can assist civilian entities, including Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DOD- Energy responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA’s relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and therefore may change. DTRA’s Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes Progress, but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals
DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of GPRA, to prioritize its resources and assess its progress. It has developed strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term objectives by which it measures progress in meeting its goals. DTRA’s Planning Is Influenced by Its Funding
Most of DTRA’s funding is appropriated only for specific programs over which it has various levels of control. Conclusions
When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic planning process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress toward its organizational goals. The performance report does not compare accomplishments and activities with established goals and objectives, nor does it explain what actions are needed to achieve or modify goals that are not met. Recommendations
We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the agency’s annual performance report by comparing the agency’s actual performance against planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why the goals were not met and the agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future. Scope and Methodology
To report on DTRA’s mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill that mission, we reviewed agency documentation. Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from the Former Soviet Union. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the visibility of DTRA's role has increased as federal agencies and military commanders have looked to the agency for additional support and advice. GAO was asked to report on DTRA's (1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other government entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational goals.
What GAO Found
Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting inspections of U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by eliminating and securing weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, supports military commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD, and develops technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various ways to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources and assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA's planning process identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess progress. DTRA's planning process is influenced by funding, most of which is appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that the performance report resulting from its internal review summarized DTRA's accomplishments and activities but did not compare them with established goals and objectives nor explain the actions needed to achieve or modify these unmet goals as called for under GPRA. |
gao_GAO-07-612T | gao_GAO-07-612T_0 | DOD has asked for an additional $5.8 billion to develop the Iraqi security forces in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request (see table 1). Iraqi Military and Police Force Levels Have Increased Over Time
The number of military and police forces in Iraq has increased from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007, making the total number of personnel over twice that of the 153,000 U.S. and other coalition forces under MNF-I, as of January 2007. Levels of Violence in Iraq Remain High Despite Increased Numbers of Iraqi Security Forces and Greater Numbers of Iraqi Battalions Leading Operations
The overall growth in trained and equipped Iraqi security forces and the increasing number of Iraqi army battalions leading counterinsurgency operations has not resulted in lower levels of violence in Iraq. Several Factors Complicate the Development of the Iraqi Security Forces; More Information Is Needed to Assess Their Capabilities
Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. These factors include (1) the portion of Iraqi security forces dedicated to a counterinsurgency mission, (2) high-rates of absenteeism and poor Iraqi ministry reporting of active duty personnel, (3) sectarian and militia influences within Iraqi forces, and (4) shortfalls in Iraqi logistical, command and control, and sustainment capabilities. First, Iraqi security forces are not a single, unified force; instead, they are comprised of a wide range of units with different missions that have changed over time. Of the security forces’ major components, only the Iraqi army currently has the primary mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations. In addition, according to DOD’s November 2006 report to Congress, due to a lack of standardized personnel strength reporting in the Ministry of Interior, it is unclear how many of the coalition-trained police the ministry still employs, or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the ministry payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Third, sectarian and militia influences on the Iraqi security forces have frustrated U.S. efforts to develop effective Iraqi military and police forces and have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq. According to the unclassified January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi units and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas where they were recruited. Further, in November 2006, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated that the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including life support, fuel, uniforms, building supplies, ammunition, vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and medical supplies. More Information Is Needed to Fully Assess Progress in Developing Effective Iraqi Security Forces
The extent of the challenges affecting the development of effective Iraqi security forces cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such information in its TRAs, but DOD does not provide this critical information to Congress. The TRA reports provide ratings of Iraqi capabilities and identify gaps in areas such as each Iraqi unit’s manpower, equipment, training levels and, as of late 2006, operational effectiveness and reliability. DOD provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall readiness levels for the Iraqi security forces and information on units in the lead. UNCLASSIFIED This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in U.S. efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. DOD has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to continue U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security responsibilities to them. This testimony discusses the (1) results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents.
What GAO Found
As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000 Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000 reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of the 153,000-strong U.S.-led coalition currently in Iraq. While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 2006. Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary mission of counterinsurgency--specifically, the Iraqi army. The other major component--the Iraqi police--has civilian law enforcement as its primary mission. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units. Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including fuel and ammunition. The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures this information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it does not provide this critical information to Congress. These data provide information on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units' manpower, equipment, and training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit's operational effectiveness. Congress needs this information to make informed appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight. Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be provided the TRA information we are seeking. |
gao_GAO-01-840 | gao_GAO-01-840_0 | Units Do Not Ask for Required Ordnance
We reviewed Navy and Marine aviation training ordnance requests submitted in fiscal years 1998 through 2001 for 10 types of air-to-ground training ordnance. Foremost, they lower the training readiness of tactical aviation units, they extend the periods where units experience low readiness levels, and they compress a considerable amount of predeployment training into the weeks immediately prior to deployment. For Navy units, this reduces the number of training tasks that can be applied toward training readiness. Ordnance shortages also extend the period in which units report low readiness. Conclusions
The availability of Navy and Marine training ordnance depends on an accurate requirements determination process, a procurement program that supports identified needs, and an allocation process that puts the right amount of ordnance where it is needed for training. The Navy program has problems with all three of these elements. Neither the Navy nor Marine Corps provides request data that reflects the training needs identified in its training instruction. While both services have linked their ordnance requirements to readiness in their training instructions, neither services’ request indicates that its instruction serves as the basis for identifying its needs. However, we believe each service has the knowledge and ability to develop more accurate and justifiable training ordnance requirements. | What GAO Found
During the last several years, senior Navy officials have testified before Congress on the effects of shortages in training resources on the readiness of aviation units. This report examines one of these resources--ordnance for air-to-ground training--to assess the potential for enhancing Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation unit readiness by improving training ordnance management. The availability of Navy and Marine training ordnance depends on an accurate requirements determination process, a procurement program that supports identified needs, and an allocation process that puts the right amount of ordnance where it is needed for training. The Navy program has problems with all three of these elements. Neither the Navy nor Marine Corps provides request data that reflect the training needs identified in its training instruction. Although both services have linked their ordnance requirements to readiness in their training instructions, neither services' request indicates that its instruction serves as the basis for identifying its needs. GAO believes each service has the knowledge and ability to develop more accurate and justifiable training ordnance requirements. Training ordnance shortages limit the amount of training and exercises aircrews can carry out and reportedly affect their proficiency in certain tasks. The shortages also extend the period of time when units are at lower readiness levels and force them to make a last-minute "rush" to achieve readiness just before deployment. This increases the risk that units may not be sufficiently prepared if they suddenly are needed for an unexpected deployment. |
gao_GAO-10-689 | gao_GAO-10-689_0 | That same year, State embarked on a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to replace overseas facilities. NECs Do Not Fully Meet the Space and Functionality Needs of Overseas Posts and State Actions Have Addressed Some, but Not All, Challenges
State is making progress moving staff into more secure and functional facilities. However, we found that over half of the 44 NECs completed from 2001 through 2009 have staffing levels that exceed the number of desks originally provided by 5 percent or more. State officials also indicated that budget constraints affected decisions about the overall size and types of features provided in NECs. State has taken steps to address some space and functionality challenges, such as creating M/PRI to standardize the process for projecting future staffing levels; incorporating some additional flexibility for future growth into NECs; and implementing a lessons learned program to analyze issues in completed NECs and modify design criteria for future NECs. State officials noted that, in general, NECs are a dramatic improvement over older facilities. Post management has converted common spaces, such as conference rooms or training rooms, into offices in order to accommodate additional desks on the compound. Officials at Nearly All Posts We Reviewed Reported the Design of Some Spaces Did Not Fully Meet Their Functional Needs
Though staff at overseas posts noted many aspects of NECs function well, officials at 21 of the 22 posts we reviewed reported the design of some spaces within the NEC did not fully meet their functional needs, with an average of five functionality-related issues per post. Challenges with Projecting Future Staffing Levels and Budget Constraints Have Resulted in the Need to Conduct Follow-on Work
According to State officials, it is difficult to predict changes to staffing levels associated with shifting foreign policy priorities, and the process for planning NECs has not been able to fully account for those changes. While State’s efforts to implement the lessons learned program have resulted in improvements, State has not ensured that reviews of completed NECs are undertaken in a timely manner. NECs Are Challenging to Operate and Maintain; State Has Taken Steps to Address These Challenges, but Problems Remain
State has constructed NECs that are state-of-the-art buildings, built in accordance with current building codes, security, and energy-efficiency standards. State has made organizational changes, revised its commissioning process, and changed design criteria to avoid problems with future NECs. However, State has not developed a plan to recommission or retest completed NECs to ensure building systems are operating as efficiently as possible and that outstanding and potential problems with NEC building systems, such as the increased risk of failure of NEC cooling systems, are being fully addressed. In addition, State has had problems in hiring U.S. facility managers and hiring and training locally employed maintenance staff that have the necessary technical skills to operate and maintain an NEC’s complex systems. Larger, More Technologically Complicated New Facilities Cost More to Operate and Maintain than Those They Replaced
The comparatively larger size of NECs and the complexity of their building systems have resulted in higher operations and maintenance costs than at the facilities they replaced. These alarms can cause disruptions. Conclusions
State has built 52 NECs that are more secure, safe, and functional for U.S. government personnel working overseas. Problems with commissioning and transferring the NECs from the contractors to the posts have resulted in some building systems that do not function as they should and led to added costs to repair and replace systems, contributed to higher operating costs, and created potential safety risks for staff. Identify time frames for implementing the maintenance projects that are outlined in the LROMP. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the extent to which new diplomatic facilities match the space and functionality needs of overseas posts and the actions State has taken to address any space and functionality challenges; and (2) operations and maintenance challenges at these new facilities and State’s steps to address them. To obtain more detailed information on space, functionality, and operations and maintenance challenges, we reviewed 22 NECs, or one-half of the posts within our scope, in greater depth. 3. 6. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies, the Department of State (State) embarked on a multiyear, multibillion dollar program to replace insecure and dilapidated diplomatic facilities. Since 2001, State has constructed 52 new embassy compounds (NECs) under this program, and moved over 21,000 U.S. government personnel into more secure and safe facilities. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which new facilities match the space and functionality needs of overseas missions and State's actions to address space and functionality challenges; and (2) operations and maintenance challenges at these new facilities and State's steps to address them. GAO analyzed staffing data and other documentation for 44 NECs built from 2001 to 2009 and interviewed State headquarters and embassy officials at 22 of these 44 NECs to obtain information on their functionality and operations and maintenance issues.
What GAO Found
State has located nearly one-quarter of overseas staff in NECs, which posts said are an improvement over older facilities. However, NECs do not fully meet the space and functionality needs of overseas missions. Current staffing levels exceed the originally-built desk--or office--space at over half of the 44 NECs GAO analyzed. Post management has dealt with space limitations by converting spaces, like conference rooms, into offices, but 4 posts have had to retain space outside the compound for staff that could not fit in the NECs. Also, officials at almost all of the 22 NECs that GAO reviewed in depth reported some spaces, like consular affairs spaces, did not fully meet their functional needs. According to State officials, it is difficult to predict changing foreign policy priorities that can affect staffing levels, and the process for planning NECs has been unable to fully account for these changes. Budget constraints also affected decisions about the size of NECs and types of features provided. State has taken some actions to improve NEC sizing, but does not have sufficient flexibility in its staffing projection and design processes to better address sizing challenges. To address problems with functionality, State implemented a lessons learned program to analyze issues in completed NECs and modify design criteria for future NECs, but State has not completed, in a timely manner, planned evaluations that are designed to identify such issues. While NECs are state-of-the-art buildings, they have presented operations and maintenance challenges, and the larger size and greater complexity of NECs, compared to facilities they replaced, have resulted in increased operations and maintenance costs. In 2010, State developed its first long-range maintenance plan that identifies $3.7 billion in maintenance requirements over 6 years for all overseas facilities, but it does not include time frames for implementing identified maintenance projects or address increased operating costs. Problems with testing, or "commissioning," new building systems have contributed to problems with building systems that do not function as they should, causing higher maintenance costs. State strengthened its commissioning process, though this change only applies to future NECs and does not address problems at existing NECs. Further, State does not currently recommission--or retest--NECs to ensure they are operating as intended. In addition, more than half of the 22 NECs that GAO reviewed in detail experienced problems with some building systems, resulting in the need for premature repair and replacement. Through its lessons learned program, State has changed some design criteria for future NECs to avoid problems with building systems. Finally, State has had problems hiring and training personnel who have the technical skills necessary to manage the complex NEC systems. State has taken initial steps to improve its staff hiring and training, but does not have an overall plan to establish its NEC human resource needs and the associated costs. |
gao_HEHS-96-3 | gao_HEHS-96-3_0 | Federal and state laws support innovative efforts to improve education. Characteristics of School Districts Selecting Private Management
In school year 1994-95, four school districts—Baltimore City Public School District, Baltimore, Maryland; Dade County Public Schools, Dade County, Florida; Hartford School District, Hartford, Connecticut; and Minneapolis School District, Minneapolis, Minnesota—had contracts with private companies for school management. Under the contract, EAI was to (1) implement its Tesseract instructional approach, which included supplying computers for use as instructional tools and college-educated teaching assistants; (2) provide building maintenance and other noninstructional services; (3) manage the nine schools’ budgets; and (4) determine school staffing levels for the nine schools with the approval of the school district superintendent. With the money, which totaled $26.7 million in the first contract year, EAI was to pay the costs of operating the nine schools, including employees’ salaries and benefits, utilities, leasing costs for computers and other equipment, and repairs and maintenance. EAI was also to help the district hire the school’s principal and its teachers. The teachers union, however, opposed EAI’s requirement that teaching assistants have at least 90 college credits. It was not paid, however, when student test scores did not improve or when it did not negotiate the teachers’ contract to the district’s satisfaction. For example, students received individualized instruction and had greater access to computers and cleaner school buildings. Attendance and Suspension Rates Improved in Some Districts
In Dade County and Minneapolis, attendance rates improved; in Minneapolis, suspension rates declined. EAI installed computer labs in 5 of Hartford’s 32 schools. In Baltimore, officials told us that the nine schools were cleaner as well as better maintained. Impact of Private Management on Students’ Standardized Test Scores
In the Baltimore and Dade County privately managed schools—scores on standardized achievement tests, a traditional measure of student learning, showed no improvement when the scores were compared with those in other comparable schools. For example, EAI was to focus its instructional approach in only one school in Dade County but was to manage the entire Hartford School District. In the end, three of the four contracts had either expired, been terminated, or were in the process of being terminated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the experiences of four school districts that contracted for public school management, focusing on the effects of private management contract arrangements on students.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in Baltimore, Maryland, one contractor used its average per pupil allocation to manage 9 of the district's 183 schools, implement an instructional approach, and pay employees' salaries and benefits, utilities, and leasing and maintenance costs; (2) the Dade County, Florida, contractor raised $2 million to implement its instructional approach in one school and hire principals and teachers, but the district retained its responsibilities over the school's budget, food service, and maintenance and repair; (3) in Hartford, Connecticut, the contractor received district, state, and federal funds to manage the district's 32 schools and made recommendations for improving instruction; (4) the Minneapolis, Minnesota, contractor served as the district's superintendent and was paid for achieving specific goals, objectives, and assignments; (5) while the school boards and teachers unions supported implementation of private management in Dade County and Minneapolis, there was opposition to private management in Baltimore and Hartford; (6) in Baltimore, teaching assistants with college degrees were placed in each class, students had access to more computers, and schools were cleaner and better maintained; (7) in Dade County, attendance rates improved, teaching assistants with college degrees increased, and students had access to more computers; (8) in Hartford, students had access to more computers and the contractor was in the process of repairing school buildings and installing computer labs in five schools; (9) in Minneapolis, attendance rates improved and suspension rates declined; and (10) in each of the four districts, standardized achievement test scores did not significantly increase or were not available. |
gao_GAO-01-832 | gao_GAO-01-832_0 | Assessment of FEMA’s Progress and Strategies in Achieving Selected Key Outcomes
This section discusses our analysis of FEMA’s performance in achieving its selected key outcomes and the strategies it has in place, particularly strategic human capital management and information technology, for accomplishing these outcomes. Although the goals themselves appear to be clear and reasonable, they could result in confusion over who is responsible for achieving these goals. In addition, FEMA did not report the results achieved for some of the performance measures. Comparison of FEMA’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in FEMA’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. FEMA’s fiscal year 2000 performance report used more data to illustrate progress towards achieving goals. FEMA continued to streamline its performance goals and make them more outcome-oriented. The third column discusses the extent to which FEMA’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan includes performance goals and measures to address the challenges that we and/or FEMA’s OIG identified. FEMA’s fiscal year 2000 performance report generally discussed the agency’s progress in resolving its challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.
What GAO Found
Although FEMA did not attain all of its goals for selected key outcomes in its fiscal year 2000 annual performance report, FEMA did make progress toward achieving the outcomes. FEMA's progress varied for each outcome, and the information presented in the performance report did not always provide enough information to allow an independent assessment of FEMA's progress in achieving the outcome. In general, FEMA's strategies for achieving these key outcomes appeared to be clear and reasonable. Although FEMA has more work to do on the outcomes GAO reviewed, its fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan reflect continued improvement compared with the prior year's report and plan. FEMA has refined its performance goals and made them more outcome oriented. FEMA's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan generally addressed the management challenges GAO cited in earlier reports. The report and plan indicate that FEMA has taken some actions to address strategic human capital management and information security management challenges. |
gao_GAO-04-903T | gao_GAO-04-903T_0 | Reported incidence rates for most types of assaults have increased since Peace Corps began collecting data in 1990, but have stabilized in recent years. Peace Corps’ system for gathering and analyzing data on crime against volunteers has produced useful insights, but we reported in 2002 that steps could be taken to enhance the system. The full extent of crime against volunteers, however, is unknown because of significant underreporting. In 2002, we observed that opportunities for additional analyses existed that could help Peace Corps develop better-informed intervention and prevention strategies. The agency has hired an analyst responsible for maintaining the agency’s crime data collection system, analyzing the information collected, and publishing the results for the purpose of influencing volunteer safety and security policies. However, these new systems have not yet been put into operation. We previously reported that volunteers were generally satisfied with the agency’s training programs. However, recent Inspector General reports continued to find significant shortcomings at some posts, including difficulties in developing safe and secure sites and preparing adequate emergency action plans. In 2002, we reported that, while all posts had tested their emergency action plan, many of the plans had shortcomings, and tests of the plans varied in quality and comprehensiveness. Also, our analysis showed improvement in the quality of information forwarded to headquarters. Underlying Factors Contributed to Uneven Field Implementation, but Agency Has Taken Steps to Improve Performance
In our 2002 report, we identified a number of factors that hampered Peace Corps efforts to ensure that this framework produced high-quality performance for the agency as a whole. These included high staff turnover, uneven application of supervision and oversight mechanisms, and unclear guidance. The agency has made some progress but has not completed implementation of these initiatives. The Peace Corps Director has employed his authority under this law to designate 23 positions as exempt from the 5-year rule. In addition, Peace Corps has appointed six additional field-based safety and security officers, bringing the number of such individuals on duty to nine (with three more positions to be added by the end of 2004); authorized each post to appoint a safety and security coordinator to provide a point of contact for the field-based safety and security officers and to assist country directors in ensuring their post’s compliance with agency policies, including policies pertaining to monitoring volunteers and responding to their safety and security concerns (all but one post have filled this position); appointed safety and security desk officers in each of Peace Corps’ three regional directorates in Washington, D.C., to monitor post compliance in conjunction with each region’s country desk officers; and appointed a compliance officer, reporting to the Peace Corps Director, to independently examine post practices and to follow up on Inspector General recommendations on safety and security. To clarify agency guidance, Peace Corps has created a “compliance tool” or checklist that provides a fairly detailed and explicit framework for headquarters staff to employ in monitoring post efforts to put Peace Corps’ safety and security guidance into practice in their countries, strengthened guidance on volunteer site selection and development, developed standard operating procedures for post emergency action plans, concluded a protocol clarifying that the Inspector General’s staff has responsibility for coordinating the agency’s response to crimes against volunteers. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 7,500 Peace Corps volunteers currently serve in 70 countries. The administration intends to increase this number to about 14,000. Volunteers often live in areas with limited access to reliable communications, police, or medical services. As Americans, they may be viewed as relatively wealthy and, hence, good targets for crime. In this testimony, GAO summarizes findings from its 2002 report Peace Corps: Initiatives for Addressing Safety and Security Challenges Hold Promise, but Progress Should be Assessed, GAO-02-818 , on (1) trends in crime against volunteers and Peace Corps' system for generating information, (2) the agency's field implementation of its safety and security framework, and (3) the underlying factors contributing to the quality of these practices.
What GAO Found
The full extent of crime against Peace Corps volunteers is unclear due to significant under-reporting. However, Peace Corps' reported rates for most types of assaults have increased since the agency began collecting data in 1990. The agency's data analysis has produced useful insights, but additional analyses could help improve anti-crime strategies. Peace Corps has hired an analyst to enhance data collection and analysis to help the agency develop better-informed intervention and prevention strategies. In 2002, we reported that Peace Corps had developed safety and security policies but that efforts to implement these policies in the field had produced varying results. Some posts complied, but others fell short. Volunteers were generally satisfied with training. However, some housing did not meet standards and, while all posts had prepared and tested emergency action plans, many plans had shortcomings. Evidence suggests that agency initiatives have not yet eliminated this unevenness. The inspector general continues to find shortcomings at some posts. However, recent emergency action plan tests show an improved ability to contact volunteers in a timely manner. In 2002, we found that uneven supervision and oversight, staff turnover, and unclear guidance hindered efforts to ensure quality practices. The agency has taken action to address these problems. To strengthen supervision and oversight, it established an office of safety and security, supported by three senior staff at headquarters, nine field-based safety and security officers, and a compliance officer. In response to our recommendations, Peace Corps was granted authority to exempt 23 safety and security positions from the "5-year rule"--a statutory restriction on tenure. It also adopted a framework for monitoring post compliance and quantifiable performance indicators. However, the agency is still clarifying guidance, revising indicators, and establishing a performance baseline. |
gao_GAO-08-402 | gao_GAO-08-402_0 | Federal support for nanotechnology research totaled about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2006. The NSTC is an organization through which the President coordinates science and technology policies across the federal government. Almost 20 Percent of EHS Research Projects Were Not Primarily Focused on Studying the EHS Risks of Nanotechnology
Although the NNI reported that federal agencies in fiscal year 2006 devoted $37.7 million—or about 3 percent of the total of all nanotechnology research funding—to research that primarily focused on studying the EHS risks of nanotechnology, we found that about 18 percent of the EHS research reported by the NNI cannot actually be attributed to this purpose. This was largely due to a reporting structure that did not lend itself to categorizing particular types of projects and limited guidance provided to the agencies by the NNI on how to consistently report EHS research. Our review of data on agency funding for 119 projects that were underway in fiscal year 2006 largely confirmed the figures reported by the NNI. We found that the primary purpose of many of these 22 projects was to explore ways to use nanotechnology to remediate environmental damage or to identify environmental, chemical, or biological hazards. Agencies Conduct Additional Research that Also Helps Advance Scientific Knowledge of Potential EHS Risks
In addition to research reported to the NNI as being primarily focused on the EHS risks of nanotechnology, some agencies conduct research that is not reflected in the EHS totals provided by the NNI either because they are not considered federal research agencies or because the primary purpose of the research was not to study EHS risks. Processes to Identify and Prioritize Needed EHS Research Appear Reasonable and Are Ongoing but a Comprehensive Research Strategy Has Not Yet Been Developed
Ongoing agency and NEHI working group efforts to identify and prioritize needed research related to the potential EHS risks of nanotechnology appear reasonable but have not as yet resulted in a comprehensive research strategy to guide EHS research across agencies. We found that the EHS risk research undertaken in fiscal year 2006 addressed a range of EHS topics, was generally consistent with both agency- and NEHI- identified research priorities, and focused on the priority needs within each category to varying degrees. NNI’s Efforts to Prioritize Research Needs Are Ongoing
In addition to the efforts of individual agencies, the NSET subcommittee has engaged in an iterative prioritization process through its NEHI working group, although this process is not yet complete. According to agency and NNI officials, once this gap analysis is complete, NEHI will formulate a long-term, overarching EHS research strategy. Agencies’ and the NNI’s Prioritization Processes Appear Reasonable
Despite the fact that a comprehensive research strategy for EHS research has yet to be finalized, the prioritization processes taking place within individual agencies and the NNI appear so far to be reasonable. For example, 8 of the 11 projects in the Instrumentation, Metrology, and Analytic Methods category focused on the highest-priority need to “develop methods to detect nanomaterials in biological matrices, the environment, and the workplace.” In contrast, of the 25 projects related to Nanomaterials and the Environment, 3 addressed the highest-priority need in the category—”understand the effects of engineered nanomaterials in individuals of a species and the applicability of testing schemes to measure effects”—and 11 addressed the fourth- ranked priority—”determine factors affecting the environmental transport of nanomaterials.” Moreover, although the NEHI working group considered the five specific research priorities related to human health equally important, 19 of the 43 projects focused on a single priority— ”research to determine the mechanisms of interaction between nanomaterials and the body at the molecular, cellular, and tissular levels.” See table 3 for a summary of projects by agency and specific NEHI research priority. Coordination Processes Have Fostered Interagency Collaboration and Information-Sharing
Agency and NNI processes to coordinate research and other activities related to the potential EHS risks of nanotechnology have been generally effective, and have resulted in numerous interagency collaborations. Furthermore, the NEHI working group has adopted a number of practices GAO has previously identified as essential to helping enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. Finally, all agency officials we spoke with expressed satisfaction with their agency’s participation in the NEHI working group, specifically, the coordination and collaboration on EHS risk research and other activities that have occurred as a result of their participation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), administered by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), is a multiagency effort intended to coordinate the nanotechnology-related activities of 25 federal agencies that fund nanoscale research or have a stake in the results. Nanotechnology is the ability to control matter at the scale of a nanometer--one billionth of a meter. A key research area funded by some federal agencies relates to potential environmental, health, and safety (EHS) risks that may result from exposure to nanoscale materials. Because of concerns about federal efforts to fund and prioritize EHS research, GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which selected agencies conducted such research in fiscal year 2006; (2) the reasonableness of the agencies' and the NNI's processes to identify and prioritize such federal research; and (3) the effectiveness of the agencies' and the NNI's process to coordinate this research. GAO reviewed quantitative and qualitative data from five federal agencies that provided 96 percent of fiscal year 2006 funding for EHS research.
What GAO Found
The NNI reported that in fiscal year 2006,federal agencies devoted $37.7million--or 3 percent of the $1.3 billion total nanotechnology research funding--to research that was primarily focused on the EHS risks of nanotechnology. However, about 20 percent of this total cannot actually be attributed to this purpose; GAO found that 22 of the 119 projects identified as EHS-related by five federal agencies in fiscal year 2006 were not focused on determining the extent to which nanotechnology poses an EHS risk. Instead, the focus of many of these projects was to explore how nanotechnology could be used to remediate environmental damage or to detect a variety of hazards. GAO determined that this mischaracterization is rooted in the current reporting structure which does not allow these types of projects to be easily categorized and the lack of guidance for agencies on how to apportion funding across multiple topics. In addition to the EHS funding totals reported by the NNI, federal agencies conduct other research that is not captured in the totals. This research was not captured by the NNI because either the research was funded by an agency not generally considered to be a research agency or because the primary purpose of the research was not to study EHS risks. Federal agencies and the NNI are currently in the process of identifying and prioritizing EHS risk research needs; the process they are using appears reasonable overall. For example, identification and prioritization of EHS research needs is being done by the agencies and the NNI. The NNI also is engaged in an iterative prioritization effort through its Nanotechnology Environmental and Health Implications (NEHI) working group. NEHI has identified five specific research priorities for five general research categories, but it has not yet completed the final steps of this process, which will identify EHS research gaps, determine specific research needed to fill those gaps, and outline a long-term, overarching EHS research strategy. GAO found that the focus of most EHS research projects underway in fiscal year 2006 was generally consistent with agency priorities and NEHI research categories and that the projects focused on the priority needs within each category to varying degrees. The anticipated EHS research strategy is expected to provide a framework to help ensure that the highest priority needs are met. Agency and NNI processes to coordinate activities related to potential EHS risks of nanotechnology have been generally effective. The NEHI working group has convened frequent meetings that have helped agencies identify opportunities to collaborate on EHS risk issues, such as joint sponsorship of research and workshops to advance knowledge and facilitate information-sharing among the agencies. In addition, NEHI has incorporated several practices that are key to enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration, such as leveraging resources. Finally, agency officials GAO spoke with expressed satisfaction with the coordination and collaboration on EHS risk research that has occurred through NEHI. They cited several factors they believe contribute to the group's effectiveness, including the stability of the working group membership and the expertise and dedication of its members. |
gao_GAO-06-62 | gao_GAO-06-62_0 | The Medicare DME fee schedule payment rate for a device is based on either the manufacturer’s retail price or historic reasonable Medicare charges, which CMS considers equivalent measures. MMA provided for a 0 percent annual update for most Medicare DME fee schedule payment rates from 2004 through 2008. Manufacturers of class III devices pay higher FDA user fees for review of their devices, because of the more complex FDA review required prior to marketing, than do manufacturers of class II devices. According to FDA data, compared to class II manufacturers, class III manufacturers have a longer period before approval during the FDA application process, which lengthens the time before they can market their devices and begin receiving revenue. FDA requires that manufacturers submit clinical data for class III devices, but only occasionally requires the same for class II devices. However, class II manufacturers also stated that they incur substantial premarketing costs related to other research and development. Specifically, manufacturers of class III devices subject to this review pay the FDA user fee for PMA, which in 2005 was $239,237 for each PMA. Because we did not evaluate proprietary data for other premarketing research and development costs, we were unable to determine whether a difference in other premarketing research and development costs exists between class III and class II manufacturers. DME Fee Schedule Rate-Setting Methodology Accounts for Premarketing Costs of Class II and III Devices in a Consistent Manner
The CMS rate-setting methodology for Medicare’s DME fee schedule accounts for the premarketing costs of class II and class III devices in a consistent manner. Manufacturers of class III devices we spoke with, whose devices accounted for over 96 percent of class III DME payments in 2004, stated that when setting their retail prices, they take into account the premarketing costs of complying with federal agencies’ requirements, including the costs of collecting clinical data, and the costs of research and development. In addition, for these devices, for 2007, MMA provided for a payment update to be determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and for 2008, a payment update equal to the annual percentage increase in the CPI-U. From 2004 through 2008, for class II devices, however, MMA provided for a 0 percent payment update. Manufacturers of class III devices, with limited exceptions, have higher premarketing costs than manufacturers of class II devices, specifically, higher costs related to FDA user fees and submission of clinical data. Concerning comments about the class II manufacturers we interviewed, as noted in the draft report, our conclusion that class III devices have higher premarketing costs than do manufacturers of class II devices is based on FDA requirements and FDA data that apply to class III and class II manufacturers and not on information obtained from class III and class II manufacturers. Two class III manufacturers we spoke with volunteered that they take these labor costs into account when setting retail prices prior to the device going to market. We interviewed the four manufacturers of osteogenesis stimulators and one manufacturer of both implantable infusion pumps and automatic external defibrillators, all class III medical devices, about the types of costs they incur in producing the devices, including FDA fees for device review and the costs of research and development, both for any clinical data the manufacturer is required to submit and for other research and development costs, such as labor costs related to designing a device. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare fee schedule payments for durable medical equipment (DME) that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates as class III devices, those that pose the greatest potential risk, increased by 215 percent from 2001 through 2004. From 2004 through 2006, and for 2008, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provided for a payment update for class III DME equal to the increase in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). For 2007, MMA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine the payment update. MMA also requires that other DME receive a 0 percent update from 2004 through 2008. MMA directed GAO to report on an appropriate payment update for 2007 and 2008 for class III DME. In this report, GAO (1) examined whether class III devices have unique premarketing costs and (2) determined how the fee schedule rate-setting methodology accounts for the premarketing costs of such devices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that manufacturers of class III devices, with limited exceptions, have higher premarketing costs than do manufacturers of class II devices that are similar to class III devices. Premarketing costs consist of FDA user fees and research and development costs, both for any clinical data the manufacturer is required to submit and for other research and development costs. Manufacturers of class III devices pay higher FDA user fees, because of the more complex FDA review required prior to marketing, than do manufacturers of class II devices. Specifically, the user fee for class III devices subject to this review in 2005 was $239,237, while the fee for class II devices in 2005 was $3,502. The FDA application and approval process takes longer for class III manufacturers, which lengthens the time it takes before they can market their devices and begin receiving revenue. FDA requires that manufacturers submit clinical data for class III devices, but only occasionally requires the same for class II devices. In interviews with GAO, class III manufacturers stated that they incur higher premarketing costs for other research and development, such as labor costs related to designing a device, compared to manufacturers of class II devices. Class II manufacturers also told GAO that they incur substantial costs related to other research and development. GAO did not evaluate proprietary data to determine whether a difference in other premarketing research and development costs exists between the two types of manufacturers. GAO found that the Medicare DME fee schedule rate-setting methodology accounts for the respective premarketing costs of class II and class III devices in a consistent manner. Regardless of device classification, the Medicare DME fee schedule payment rate for a device is based on either the manufacturer's retail price or historic reasonable Medicare charges, which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services considers equivalent measures. In interviews with GAO, manufacturers of class III devices stated that when setting their retail prices, they take into account the premarketing costs of complying with federal regulatory requirements, including the costs of required clinical data collection and other research and development. These manufacturers accounted for over 96 percent of class III DME payments in 2004. Manufacturers of class II devices also stated that they take into account these costs when setting retail prices. |
gao_HEHS-95-93 | gao_HEHS-95-93_0 | To help clients meet their employment goals, FSA encourages programs to draw on existing community services to meet participants’ needs, especially to the extent that they can be obtained at no cost to JOBS. JOBS Serves a Small Percentage of the AFDC Caseload
The JOBS program serves a small percentage of the total AFDC caseload because program rules exempt most adult AFDC recipients from participation and because FSA established minimum participation rate requirements. In 1992, about 13 percent of all single female heads of households on AFDC, about one-fourth of the nonexempt adult recipients, were participating each month. 3). JOBS Participants Receive Diverse Education, Training, and Supportive Services
JOBS participants are enrolled in a variety of JOBS components and many receive supportive services. Reasons Varied Why Participants Did Not Receive Needed Services
About two-thirds or more of program administrators selected transportation problems as a reason why JOBS programs could not provide participants with the specific education or training component they needed, even though transportation was the supportive service most participants received (selected reasons appear in table 1). 4), recently passed by the House, repeals the requirement for states to offer a range of services and instead requires states to place an increasing percentage of participants in a work-related activity. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assist the 104th Congress in its deliberations on welfare reform, you asked us to examine (1) who is and is not being served under the JOBS program, (2) the range of services JOBS participants are receiving and the extent to which participants’ needs are being met, and (3) the implications of serving participants in a system of time-limited benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Program (JOBS), focusing on: (1) who is being served by JOBS; (2) the services JOBS participants receive and the extent to which their needs are being met; and (3) the implications of serving participants in a time-limited benefit system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most adult Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients do not participate in JOBS due to the Family Support Act's allowable exemptions and minimum participation standards; (2) JOBS only served about 13 percent of single female-headed households receiving AFDC in 1992; (3) even if states meet the minimum participation standard, JOBS will still be serving only a small percentage of AFDC households, which raises questions about whether JOBS can transform the culture of welfare; (4) JOBS services are drawn from existing community programs to avoid duplicative services; (5) JOBS programs obtain many services at no cost, although most programs also purchase some needed education and training services; (6) despite low participation, many JOBS programs are unable to provide participants with the services they need due to a variety of reasons, such as transportation problems; and (7) proposed legislation could require states to place increasing numbers of JOBS participants in a variety of work-related activities over time and impose a 5-year limit on the receipt of benefits. |
gao_RCED-96-4 | gao_RCED-96-4_0 | Nuclear Facilities and Radiation Sources in the Former Soviet Union
At least 221 nuclear facilities—other than civil nuclear power reactors—operate in the former Soviet Union. The largest number of operating nuclear facilities are in Russia. During our discussions with these experts, the following five factors emerged as the main contributors to unsafe conditions: (1) lack of technology as well as aging facilities and equipment, (2) the lack of awareness and commitment to the importance of safety, (3) the long-standing emphasis on production over safety, (4) the absence of independent and effective nuclear regulatory bodies, and (5) the lack of funds to improve safety. V for additional information about international assistance efforts.) Planned and Ongoing U.S. Activities
As of August 1995, the United States had committed about $55 million to support various programs that primarily focus on the environmental and health effects of the long-term operation of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons production complex, including activities associated with the production and processing of plutonium. Specifically, U.S. programs focus on studying the disposal of nuclear waste by the former Soviet Union in the Arctic region (DOD/Office of Naval Research); assessing the radioactive waste contamination at a naval nuclear training facility in Estonia (DOE); developing technology on a cooperative basis with Russia to clean up radioactive waste (DOE); studying the health consequences of radiation contamination at Chelyabinsk and other locations in the former Soviet Union (DOE and DOD); upgrading and expanding a Russian facility that processes low-level liquid radioactive waste to prevent its continued dumping in the Arctic seas (EPA and Department of State); helping Russian and Ukrainian regulatory authorities establish regulatory control over radioactive materials, including the fuel cycle, the industrial and the medical uses of radioisotopes, and the disposal of radioactive materials (NRC); and studying options to replace power and steam lost as a result of the shutdown of the plutonium production reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk (TDA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on U.S. and international efforts to address nuclear safety and environmental problems in the former Soviet Union.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the former Soviet Union has at least 221 nuclear facilities operating, 99 of which are located in Russia; (2) as many as 20,000 organizations throughout the former Soviet Union are using various types of radiation for medicine, industry, and research; (3) aging facilities and equipment, inadequate technology, a lack of commitment to safety, the absence of independent nuclear regulatory bodies, and a lack of funding are contributing to unsafe conditions in the former Soviet Union; (4) efforts are under way to study the radiological effects of operating nuclear facilities and nuclear-powered submarines; and (6) the United States has committed $55 million to support programs focusing on the environmental and health effects caused by the production of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. |
gao_GAO-02-944 | gao_GAO-02-944_0 | The school lunch and school breakfast programs are among the largest of these programs. Any child at a participating school may purchase a meal through the school meals programs. These processes comprise only a small part of the federal school meal programs’ administrative requirements. Costs for Providing, Accepting, and Reviewing Applications for Free and Reduced-Price Meals
For school year 2000-01, the estimated application process costs at the federal and state levels were much less than 1 cent per program dollar, and the median cost at the local level was 1 cent per program dollar. In this way, eligible children can receive free or reduced-price school meals without being delayed by the verification process. The federal and state level costs were incurred for providing oversight and administering funds for reimbursement throughout the school year. In comparison, FNS administered $8 billion and the region administered $881 million in the school meals program. State agencies are responsible for operating a system to reimburse school food authorities for the meals served to children. To calculate these costs we: (1) divided the school program dollars by the school food authority program dollars; (2) multiplied the resulting amount by the total school food authority costs for each process—application, verification, and meal counting and reimbursement claiming—to determine the portion of the costs for each process at the school food authority that was attributable to each selected school; (3) added these costs to the total costs for each of the schools; and (4) divided the resulting total amount by the program dollars for each selected school to arrive at the cost per program dollar at the local level for each school. | What GAO Found
Each school day, millions of children receive meals and snacks provided through the National School Lunch and National School Breakfast Programs. Any child at a participating school may purchase a meal through these school meal programs, and children from households that apply and meet established income guidelines can receive these meals free or at a reduced price. The federal government reimburses the states, which in turn reimburse school food authorities for each meal served. During fiscal year 2001, the federal government spent $8 billion in reimbursements for school meals. The Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service, state agencies, and school food authorities all play a role in these school meal programs. GAO reported that costs for the application, verification, and meal counting and reimbursement processes for the school meal programs were incurred mainly at the local level. Estimated federal and state-level costs during school year 2000-2001 for these three processes were generally much less than 1 cent per program dollar administered. At the local level--selected schools and the related school food authorities--the median estimated cost for these processes was 8 cents per program dollar and ranged from 3 cents to 16 cents per program dollar. The largest costs at the local level were for counting meals and submitting claims for reimbursement. Estimated costs related to the application process were the next largest, and estimated verification process costs were the lowest of the three. |
gao_GAO-10-968 | gao_GAO-10-968_0 | Many legitimate reasons explain why a business owner (or owners) may choose to use a network of related entities to conduct operations. IRS has charged SAT ESC with coordinating information about tax shelter schemes—including those that might involve networks—that individual operating divisions identify. IRS Suspects Networks Pose a Growing Tax Evasion Risk but Faces Barriers in Addressing the Risk through Its Traditional Enforcement Efforts
IRS Does Not Know the Magnitude of Network Tax Evasion, but Has Observed an Increase in Risk Factors for Such Evasion
IRS does not have an estimate of the total amount of revenue lost through network tax evasion because of cost and complexity constraints. IRS’s Traditional Enforcement Programs Are Not Designed to Detect Network Tax Evasion
IRS’s programs for addressing network-related tax evasion include its examinations (or audits) in which IRS examiners analyze taxpayers’ records to ensure that the proper tax was reported. IRS traditionally has conducted examinations on a return-by-return basis, beginning with a single tax return in a particular tax year as the unit of analysis and examining other tax returns connected with the original return, if necessary, in what can be called a bottom-up approach. Single tax year examinations. IRS’s Recent Efforts to Better Detect and Pursue Network Tax Evasion Show Promise, but Opportunities Exist for Additional Progress
IRS Is Developing Programs and Tools Intended to Help Address Network Tax Evasion
IRS has been creating specific programs and tools that address network tax evasion more directly than its traditional examination approach. Global High Wealth Industry (GWHI)
Under GHWI, IRS identifies certain high-wealth individuals and then examines each individual’s network. A variety of entities could comprise a network, which could be under the purview of different IRS divisions. The efforts are supported by upper management, offer new analytical approaches that more directly address network tax evasion, and attempt to cut across IRS’s divisional boundaries and databases. For example, the table notes the lack of agencywide strategy and goals for IRS’s various network efforts that are spread throughout the agency. As already discussed, the population of networks is not known, networks can be complex, and IRS does not know which programs and tools will be most effective. The strategy should include: assessing the effectiveness of network analysis tools, such as yK-1; determining the feasibility and benefits of increasing access to existing IRS data, such as scanning additional data from Schedule K-1, or collecting additional data for use in its network analysis efforts; putting the development of analytical techniques and tools that focus on networks as the unit of analysis, such as GraphQuery, on a specific time schedule; and deciding how network efforts will be managed across IRS, such as whether a core program team or management group is needed. IRS also generally agreed with our recommendations to establish an IRS-wide strategy with goals, ensure that staff understand the capabilities of IRS’s network tools, and establish a more formal way for IRS staff to collaborate as new network tools are developed and implemented. Our recommendation is that IRS develops a strategy. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe what the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) knows about network tax evasion and how well IRS’s traditional enforcement efforts address network tax evasion and (2) assess IRS’s progress in addressing network tax evasion and opportunities, if any, in making further progress. We also interviewed relevant IRS officials and staff. We also interviewed IRS auditors about their work. The criteria for selection of these studies were similar to those used in selecting experts. Four types of entities that IRS recognizes that also can form networks are corporations, partnerships, trusts, and individuals. Trusts can be connected to other entities in a network in several ways. The IRS will look at this issue. It may not be possible nor appropriate to manage network compliance activity centrally. | Why GAO Did This Study
A taxpayer can control a group of related entities--such as trusts, corporations, or partnerships--in a network. These networks can serve a variety of legitimate business purposes, but they also can be used in complex tax evasion schemes that are difficult for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to identify. GAO was asked to (1) describe what IRS knows about network tax evasion and how well IRS's traditional enforcement programs address it and (2) assess IRS's progress in addressing network tax evasion and opportunities, if any, for making further progress. To do this, GAO reviewed relevant documentation about IRS programs and interviewed appropriate officials about those programs and IRS's plans for addressing such tax evasion. GAO also interviewed relevant experts and agency officials in developing criteria needed to perform the assessment.
What GAO Found
IRS views network-based tax evasion as a problem but does not have estimates of the associated revenue loss in part because data do not exist on the population of networks. IRS does know that at least 1 million networks existed involving partnerships and similar entities in tax year 2008. IRS also knows that many questionable tax shelters and abusive transactions rely on the links among commonly owned entities in a network. IRS generally addresses network-related tax evasion through its examination programs. These programs traditionally involve identifying a single return from a single tax year and routing the return to the IRS division that specializes in auditing that type of return. From a single return, examiners may branch out to review other entities if information on the original return appears suspicious. However, this traditional approach does not align well with how network tax evasion schemes work. Such schemes can cross multiple IRS divisions or require time and expertise that IRS may not have allocated at the start of an examination. A case of network tax evasion also may not be evident without looking at multiple tax years. IRS is developing programs and tools that more directly address network tax evasion. One, called Global High Wealth Industry, selects certain high-income individuals and examines their network of entities as a whole to look for tax evasion. Another, yK-1, is a computerized visualization tool that shows the links between entities in a network. These efforts show promise when compared to GAO's criteria for assessing network analyses. They represent new analytical approaches, have upper-management support, and cut across divisions and database boundaries. However, there are opportunities for more progress. For example, IRS has no agencywide strategy or goals for coordinating its network efforts. It has not conducted assessments of its network tools, nor has it determined the value of incorporating more data into its network programs and tools or scheduled such additions. Without a strategy and assessments, IRS risks duplicating efforts and managers will not have information about the effectiveness of the new programs and tools that could inform resource allocation decisions. Among other items, GAO recommends that IRS establish an IRS-wide strategy that coordinates its network tax evasion efforts. Also, IRS should assess its network programs and tools and should evaluate adding more data to its current tools. IRS generally agreed with these recommendations and noted additional organizational changes the agency is making that will address networks. |
gao_GAO-13-198 | gao_GAO-13-198_0 | In November 2002, MTSA further required DHS to issue a maritime worker identification card that uses biometrics to control access to secure areas of maritime transportation facilities and vessels. Transportation Security Administration. August 2008. Among other things, we recommended that an evaluation plan and data analysis plan be developed to guide the remainder of the pilot and to identify how DHS would compensate for areas where the TWIC reader pilot would not provide the information needed to report to Congress and implement the TWIC card reader rule. In addition, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 required that the findings of the pilot be included in a report to Congress, and that we assess the reported findings and recommendations. TWIC Reader Pilot Results Are Not Sufficiently Complete, Accurate, and Reliable for Informing Congress and the TWIC Card Reader Rule
Challenges related to pilot planning, data collection, and reporting affect the completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the pilot test aimed at assessing the technology and operational impact of using TSA’s TWIC with card readers. Moreover, according to our review of the pilot and TSA’s past efforts to demonstrate the validity and security benefits of the TWIC program, the program’s premise and effectiveness in enhancing security are not supported. DHS concurred with these recommendations. While TSA developed a data analysis plan, TSA and USCG reported that they did not develop an evaluation plan with an evaluation methodology or performance standards, as we recommended. TSA and the independent test agent did not collect complete data on malfunctioning TWIC cards. Pilot participants did not document instances of denied access. Issues with DHS’s Congressional Report on the Pilot and the Validity of the TWIC Security Premise Raise Concerns about the Effectiveness of the TWIC Program
DHS’s Report to Congress Presented Findings and Lessons Learned That Were Not Always Supported by the Collected Data
As required by the SAFE Port Act and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, DHS’s report to Congress on the TWIC reader pilot presented several findings with respect to technical and operational aspects of implementing TWIC technologies in the maritime environment. However, according to our review, the findings and lessons learned in DHS’s report to Congress were based on incomplete or unreliable data, and thus should not be used to inform the development of the future regulation on the use of TWIC with readers. Transportation Security Administration. Furthermore, one of the driving assumptions in the TWIC cost-benefit analysis was that the lack of a common credential across the industry could leave facilities open to a security breach with falsified credentials. Additionally, the TWIC reader pilot report concluded that TWIC cards and readers provide a critical layer of security at our nation’s ports. The depth and pervasiveness of the TWIC program’s planning and implementation challenges require a reassessment of DHS’s efforts to improve maritime security through the issuance of a U.S. government-sponsored TWIC card and card readers. Specifically, as discussed in our report, and as confirmed by the supplemental technical comments provided by DHS, the pilot test’s results were incomplete, inaccurate, and unreliable for informing Congress and for developing a regulation about the readers. For example, as discussed in the report: Installed TWIC readers and access control systems could not collect required data, including reasons for errors, on TWIC reader use, and TSA and the independent test agent did not employ effective compensating data collection measures, such as manually recording reasons for errors in reading TWICs. TSA and the independent test agent did not record clear baseline data for comparing operational performance at access points with TWIC readers. TSA and the independent test agent did not collect complete data on malfunctioning TWIC cards. To evaluate the extent to which the results from the TWIC reader pilot were sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable for informing Congress and the TWIC card reader rule, we assessed (1) TWIC reader pilot test planning and preparation activities, (2) pilot implementation and data collection practices, and (3) the findings reported in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) February 2012 report to Congress on the results of the TWIC reader pilot against underlying pilot data. These techniques provided us with the following summary and comparative views of collected pilot data, among others, which in part served as the basis of our data analysis: compiled data by pilot site; compiled data on baseline population of users at each pilot site and reported access points; comparison of the total population at baseline to total population reported during the ST&E phase; view of pilot site access point and reader matches across testing results (baseline data, Systems Operational Verification Testing (SOVT) data, EOA data, and ST&E data); view of tested reader and access control system characteristics; comparison of baseline throughput times versus EOA and ST&E throughput times for access points with similar readers used; comparison of data across the pilot to identify trends, if any, in areas such as risk level, facility and vessel type, access point type, access decision location, testing mode throughput and transactions, reader hardware model and software version, reader types (fixed versus portable), interface type (contact versus contactless), communication protocol, whether or not registration was used, the enrollment process, the source of the biometric reference template, and canceled card list input frequency by site; comparison of the total number of access points identified during baseline data collection versus the total of access points tested during the EOA and ST&E phases of the pilot; comparison of the mean, median, and mode based on the ST&E number of throughput transactions; and assessment of testing duration during EOA and ST&E testing phases for both throughput and transaction data collection efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within DHS, TSA and USCG manage the TWIC program, which requires maritime workers to complete background checks and obtain biometric identification cards to gain unescorted access to secure areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)-regulated entities. TSA conducted a pilot program to test the use of TWICs with biometric card readers in part to inform the development of a regulation on using TWICs with card readers. As required by law, DHS reported its findings on the pilot to Congress on February 27, 2012. The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 required that GAO assess DHS's reported findings and recommendations. Thus, GAO assessed the extent to which the results from the TWIC pilot were sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable for informing Congress and the proposed TWIC card reader rule. GAO reviewed pilot test plans, results, and methods used to collect and analyze pilot data since August 2008, compared the pilot data with the pilot report DHS submitted to Congress, and conducted covert tests at four U.S. ports chosen for their geographic locations. The test's results are not generalizable, but provide insights.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of the pilot test aimed at assessing the technology and operational impact of using the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) with card readers showed that the test's results were incomplete, inaccurate, and unreliable for informing Congress and for developing a regulation (rule) about the readers. Challenges related to pilot planning, data collection, and reporting affected the completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the results. These issues call into question the program's premise and effectiveness in enhancing security.
Planning. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not correct planning shortfalls that GAO identified in November 2009. GAO determined that these weaknesses presented a challenge in ensuring that the pilot would yield information needed to inform Congress and the regulation aimed at defining how TWICs are to be used with biometric card readers (card reader rule). GAO recommended that DHS components implementing the pilot--TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)--develop an evaluation plan to guide the remainder of the pilot and identify how it would compensate for areas where the TWIC reader pilot would not provide the information needed. DHS agreed and took initial steps, but did not develop an evaluation plan, as GAO recommended.
Data collection . Pilot data collection and reporting weaknesses include:
Installed TWIC readers and access control systems could not collect required data, including reasons for errors, on TWIC reader use, and TSA and the independent test agent (responsible for planning, evaluating, and reporting on all test events) did not employ effective compensating data collection measures, such as manually recording reasons for errors in reading TWICs.
TSA and the independent test agent did not record clear baseline data for comparing operational performance at access points with TWIC readers.
TSA and the independent test agent did not collect complete data on malfunctioning TWIC cards.
Pilot participants did not document instances of denied access.
TSA officials said challenges, such as readers incapable of recording needed data, prevented them from collecting complete and consistent pilot data. Thus, TSA could not determine whether operational problems encountered at pilot sites were due to TWIC cards, readers, or users, or a combination of all three.
Issues with DHS's report to Congress and validity of TWIC security premise. DHS's report to Congress documented findings and lessons learned, but its reported findings were not always supported by the pilot data, or were based on incomplete or unreliable data, thus limiting the report's usefulness in informing Congress about the results of the TWIC reader pilot. For example, reported entry times into facilities were not based on data collected at pilot sites as intended. Further, the report concluded that TWIC cards and readers provide a critical layer of port security, but data were not collected to support this conclusion. For example, DHS's assumption that the lack of a common credential could leave facilities open to a security breach with falsified credentials has not been validated. Eleven years after initiation, DHS has not demonstrated how, if at all, TWIC will improve maritime security.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should halt DHSs efforts to promulgate a final regulation until the successful completion of a security assessment of the effectiveness of using TWIC. In addition, GAO revised the report based on the March 22, 2013, issuance of the TWIC card reader notice of proposed rulemaking. |
gao_RCED-98-21 | gao_RCED-98-21_0 | Specifically, we were asked to address the following questions:
What is the nature and scope of the oversight of repair stations conducted by FAA personnel? How well does FAA follow up on inspections to ensure that deficiencies in repair stations’ operations are corrected once they have been identified? Current Inspection Approach Limits FAA’s Ability to Ensure Compliance
Although FAA is meeting its oversight goal to inspect every domestic and foreign repair station at least once a year, the use of one-person inspections at large, complex facilities restricts the agency’s ability to identify deficiencies and ensure compliance with regulations. These special team inspections identified far more deficiencies than inspections done by individual inspectors. Our analysis of the data confirmed that these minimum inspection requirements were met. 2.1). 2.3). At present, however, FAA does not require the use of a checklist during a repair station inspection. In each of the eight areas, more than half of the inspectors surveyed saw the need for at least some improvement. At such facilities, team inspections have proven more effective in identifying deficiencies. Resolving problems with documentation is particularly important because FAA is taking new steps to use its management information systems to determine where inspection resources should be targeted. After analyzing FAA’s inspection and follow-up program, we determined that, at a minimum, the files need to contain the following if the extent to which repair stations are correcting problems in a timely manner is to be monitored: a memo to the file or other documentation showing that an inspection was performed, what was inspected, and the results; a deficiency letter from FAA informing the repair station of the problems that needed to be corrected; a response from the repair station indicating what actions it was taking to address the deficiencies; and a memo to the file or other acknowledgment that the repair station’s actions were an acceptable response and that the deficiencies had been resolved. SPAS is a computer-based analysis system designed to assist FAA in applying its limited inspection resources to those entities and areas that pose the greatest risk to aviation safety. Actions Currently Under Way to Augment Oversight of Repair Stations
Following the May 1996 crash of a ValuJet airplane in the Florida Everglades, FAA announced six initiatives to upgrade the oversight of repair stations. FAA did not intend that these initiatives would provide for any significant improvements in FAA’s own inspections of repair stations. 4.1). For example, one inspector stated that inspectors need specific training on aircraft and systems. Conclusions
Although the various activities FAA has under way may help strengthen the oversight of repair stations, none of them directly addresses the concerns about inspection and follow-up that we discussed in chapters 2 and 3—namely the limited success in identifying problems through reviews by individual inspectors of large facilities and the inadequate documentation of efforts to correct deficiencies found during inspections. FAA’s initiatives may help the air carriers—and the FAA inspectors who monitor those air carriers—be more attentive to the work being performed by repair stations, but they do not appear to have any direct link to improving the quality of FAA’s inspections of repair stations or the speed and thoroughness with which problems are resolved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of the aviation repair station industry, focusing on: (1) the nature and scope of the oversight of repair stations conducted by FAA personnel; (2) how well FAA follows up on inspections to ensure that the deficiencies in repair station operations are corrected once they have been identified; and (3) the steps taken by FAA to improve the oversight of repair stations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA's records indicate that the agency is meeting its goal of inspecting every repair station at least once a year; (2) GAO examined FAA's 1996 inspection records on about one-fourth of the 2,800 repair stations doing work for air carriers and confirmed that minimum inspection requirements had been met; (3) in addition, 84 percent of the inspectors GAO surveyed stated that they believed the overall compliance of repair stations was good or excellent; (4) however, more than half of the inspectors stated that there were areas of compliance that repair stations could improve; (5) FAA relies primarily on reviews by individual inspectors of most domestic repair stations; (6) in a few cases, FAA also uses teams to assess compliance at large, complex facilities; (7) at such facilities, a team approach has been shown to be more effective at identifying problems than visits by individual inspectors, uncovering more systemic and long-standing deficiencies; (8) a few of FAA's offices have recognized that the traditional approach of relying on one inspector may be inadequate in such situations and have begun to use teams to inspect large repair stations; (9) FAA officials acknowledge and support these initiatives; (10) GAO could not find sufficient documentation to determine how well FAA followed up to ensure that the deficiencies found during the inspections of repair stations were corrected; (11) FAA does not tell its inspectors what documentation to keep, and the resulting information gaps lessen the agency's ability to determine how well its inspection activities are working or to identify and react to trends; (12) these gaps in documentation are particularly important because FAA is spending more than $30 million to develop a reporting system that, among other things, is designed to use the documentation to make inspection decisions, such as where to apply the agency's inspection resources to address those areas that pose the greatest risk to aviation safety; (13) following the May 1996 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades, FAA announced new initiatives to upgrade the oversight of repair stations; (14) these initiatives were directed at clarifying and augmenting air carriers' oversight of repair stations, not at ways in which FAA's own inspection resources could be better utilized; and (15) however, FAA does have three other efforts under way that would have a more direct bearing on its own inspection activities at repair stations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-25 | gao_NSIAD-98-25_0 | Number of Headquarters Personnel Are Significantly Higher Than DOD Reports
The total number of personnel associated with DOD’s management headquarters and headquarters support activities are significantly higher than DOD has reported to Congress. However, DOD does not report personnel at most of its noncombat organizations that are directly subordinate to management headquarters. In our review of selected subordinate noncombat organizations, we found that almost three-fourths of the organizations were primarily performing management or management support functions and should have been reported to Congress by DOD, using the criteria in DOD Directive 5100.73. DOD’s Cost Data Are Unreliable
DOD reported a 19-percent decrease in management headquarters and headquarters support costs—from $5.3 billion to $4.3 billion—during fiscal years 1985-96, using constant 1997 dollars and PB-22 data. Headquarters Personnel and Costs Are Understated for Several Reasons
DOD’s management headquarters and headquarters support personnel and cost data are understated for several reasons. Sustained criticism from Congress about the size of DOD’s headquarters has been a disincentive for DOD to accurately report the number of such personnel and their related costs. Second, many DOD officials believe that they are required to report only personnel that make policy, allocate resources, or plan for the future, even though DOD Directive 5100.73 requires that headquarters support personnel be reported. Third, the directive’s criteria for analyzing organizations to determine whether they should be included in budget exhibits on management headquarters are complicated. Challenges Remain in Reducing Size of DOD Headquarters
DOD faces challenges in reducing the size of its management headquarters and headquarters support activities. While DOD wants to reduce the size and cost of its management headquarters to reallocate funds to other areas, it has not determined the scope of future reductions or developed a detailed plan for making the reductions. Determining whether and how much to reduce management headquarters is difficult because DOD has no generally accepted staffing standards to objectively size a management headquarters. Furthermore, DOD officials have a range of views on whether and how to reduce management headquarters further—some advocate significant reductions while others have no plans to reduce. DOD and Congress cannot rely on the data to determine trends in headquarters and help them make informed decisions about whether headquarters are appropriately sized. However, OSD/DA&M did not review the numbered air forces. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the accuracy and reliability of DOD’s reported data on management headquarters and headquarters support personnel and costs, (2) reasons that data on personnel and costs could be inaccurate, and (3) DOD’s plans to reduce the size of its management headquarters and headquarters support activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) program to account for its management headquarters and headquarters support activities, focusing on: (1) the accuracy and reliability of DOD's reported data on management headquarters and headquarters support personnel and costs; (2) reasons that data on personnel and costs could be inaccurate; and (3) DOD's plans to reduce the size of its management headquarters and headquarters support activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's annual budget exhibits to Congress on management headquarters and headquarters support are unreliable because the number of personnel and costs are significantly higher than reported; (2) neither DOD nor Congress can determine trends in headquarters personnel and costs to help them make informed decisions about the appropriate size of headquarters; (3) during fiscal years (FY) 1985-86, DOD reported steady decreases in its management headquarters and headquarters support personnel, however, these data did not include personnel at most of DOD's noncombat organizations that are subordinate to management headquarters; (4) in a review of selected subordinate organizations, GAO found that almost three-fourths were primarily performing management or headquarters support functions and should have been reported to Congress by DOD; (5) DOD's headquarters costs are also significantly higher than reported to Congress; (6) DOD's data indicate that management headquarters and headquarters support costs decreased from $5.3 billion to $4.3 billion in constant 1997 dollars during FY 1985-86, however, DOD's reported data did not include all costs; (7) DOD's reported headquarters personnel and cost data are understated for several reasons: (a) sustained criticism from Congress about the size of DOD's headquarters has been a disincentive; (b) many DOD officials believe that they are required to report only personnel that make policy, allocate resources, or plan for the future; (c) the criteria for determining whether organizations should be included in management headquarters are complicated; and (d) oversight has been limited; (8) DOD faces challenges in reducing the size of its headquarters; (9) DOD has not determined the scope of future reductions or developed a detailed plan for making the reductions; (10) DOD is examining the effects of a possible 15-percent reduction in management headquarters and support personnel during FY 1998-2003; (11) a Defense Reform Task Force is assessing the missions, functions, and size of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other headquarters; (12) determining whether and how much to reduce management headquarters is difficult because DOD has no generally accepted staffing standards; and (13) DOD officials have a range of views on whether and how to reduce management headquarters, some advocating reduction while others have no plans for reduction. |
gao_GAO-10-483T | gao_GAO-10-483T_0 | Given the importance of social insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security to the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook, the Statement of Social Insurance is critical to understanding the federal government’s financial condition and fiscal sustainability. Those material weaknesses relate to the federal government’s inability to satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the Department of Defense (DOD), were properly reported in the accrual-based consolidated financial statements; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain federal entities; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; ensure that the federal government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities’ financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); and identify and either resolve or explain material differences between certain components of the budget deficit reported in Treasury’s records, which are used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and related amounts reported in federal entities’ financial statements and underlying financial information and records. The material weaknesses discussed in our audit report continued to (1) hamper the federal government’s ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; (2) affect the federal government’s ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities; (3) impair the federal government’s ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions; and (4) hinder the federal government from having reliable financial information to operate in an efficient and effective manner. Addressing Impediments to an Opinion on the Accrual-Based Consolidated Financial Statements
Three major impediments continued to prevent us from rendering an opinion on the U.S. government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD that have prevented DOD’s financial statements from being auditable, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. Consequently, the ultimate cost of the federal government’s actions and their effect on the federal government’s financial condition will not be known for some time. Looking ahead, the federal government will need to determine the most expeditious manner in which to bring closure to its financial stabilization initiatives while optimizing its investment returns. In addition to managing these actions, problems in the nation’s financial sector have exposed serious weaknesses in the current U.S. financial regulatory system, which, if not effectively addressed, may cause the system to fail to prevent similar or even worse crises in the future. Consequently, meaningful financial regulatory reform is of utmost concern. As table 1 shows, many of the pressures highlighted in GAO’s simulations, including health care cost growth and the aging population, have already begun to affect the federal budget—in some cases sooner than previously estimated—and the pressures only grow in the coming decade. For example, Social Security cash surpluses have previously served to reduce the unified budget deficit; however, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently estimated that due to current economic conditions the program will run small temporary cash deficits for the next 4 years and then, similar to the Trustees’ estimates, run persistent cash deficits beginning in 2016. The fluctuation and eventual disappearance of the Social Security cash surplus will put additional pressure on the rest of the federal budget. Since GAO’s long-term fiscal simulations include projections of revenue and expenditures for all federal programs, they present a comprehensive analysis of the sustainability of the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook. It is not only the federal government that faces a long-term fiscal challenge. The recession and the federal government’s unprecedented actions intended to stabilize the financial markets and to promote economic recovery have significantly affected the federal government’s financial condition, especially with regard to certain of its investments and increases in its liabilities and net operating cost. Further, sound decisions on the current and future direction of all vital federal government programs and policies are more difficult without reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information. Moreover, of utmost concern are the federal government’s long-term fiscal challenges that result from large and growing structural deficits that are driven on the spending side primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO annually audits the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS). Congress and the President need reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information to make sound decisions and conduct effective oversight of federal government programs and policies. The federal government began preparing the CFS 13 years ago. Over the years, certain material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements. Unless these weaknesses are adequately addressed, they will, among other things, continue to (1) hamper the federal government's ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; and (2) affect the federal government's ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities. This testimony presents the results of GAO's audit of the CFS for fiscal year 2009 and discusses certain of the federal government's significant near- and long-term fiscal challenges.
What GAO Found
For the third consecutive year, GAO rendered an unqualified opinion on the Statement of Social Insurance (SOSI). Given the importance of social insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security to the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook, the SOSI is critical to understanding the federal government's financial condition and fiscal sustainability. Three major impediments continued to prevent GAO from rendering an opinion on the federal government's consolidated financial statements other than the SOSI: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) federal entities' inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances, and (3) an ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. In addition to the material weaknesses underlying these major impediments, GAO noted material weaknesses involving improper payments estimated to be at least $98 billion for fiscal year 2009, information security, and tax collection activities. The recession and the federal government's unprecedented actions intended to stabilize the financial markets and to promote economic recovery have significantly affected the federal government's financial condition. The resulting substantial investments and increases in liabilities, net operating cost, the unified budget deficit, and debt held by the public are reported in the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2009. The ultimate cost of these actions and their impact on the federal government's financial condition will not be known for some time in part because the valuation of these assets and liabilities is based on assumptions and estimates that are inherently uncertain. Looking ahead, the federal government will need to determine the most expeditious manner in which to bring closure to its financial stabilization initiatives while optimizing its investment returns. In addition, problems in the nation's financial sector have exposed serious weaknesses in the current U.S. financial regulatory system. If those weaknesses are not adequately addressed, we could see similar or even worse crises in the future. Consequently, meaningful financial regulatory reform is of utmost concern. The federal government faces a long-term fiscal challenge resulting from large and growing structural deficits that are driven on the spending side primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. GAO prepares long-term fiscal simulations that include projections of revenue and expenditures for all federal programs. As a result, these simulations present a comprehensive analysis of the sustainability of the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook. Many of the pressures highlighted in GAO's simulations, including health care cost growth and the aging population, have already begun to affect the federal budget--in some cases sooner than previously estimated--and the pressures only grow in the coming decade. For example, Social Security cash surpluses have previously served to reduce the unified budget deficit; however, the Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that due to current economic conditions the program will run small temporary cash deficits for the next 4 years and then, similar to the Trustees' estimates, run persistent cash deficits beginning in 2016. The fluctuation and eventual disappearance of the Social Security cash surplus will put additional pressure on the rest of the federal budget. |
gao_GAO-11-637 | gao_GAO-11-637_0 | For example, some countries do not have their own database systems with terrorist screening information or access to other countries’ terrorist screening information, which contains biographical or biometric information about individuals who are known or suspected terrorists. Several U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address the Use of Fraudulent Travel Documents but Some Efforts Lack Coordination
Multiple Agencies Fund and Implement Training Courses in Fraudulent Travel Document Recognition
Seven different U.S. government entities across three federal agencies are involved in providing fraudulent travel document training to foreign government officials, as shown in figure 2. These courses were provided to law enforcement officials from 17 of the approximately 60 countries that received ATA training in fiscal year 2010. State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, with its mission of issuing secure U.S. passports to traveling Americans, is involved in some efforts to enhance foreign countries’ passport issuance security. The U.S. Government Has Anticorruption Efforts Overseas although Not Specifically Aimed at Passport Issuance and Immigration Agencies
While the U.S. government, through USAID and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) anticorruption foreign capacity-building programs and State-led diplomatic efforts, has many efforts aimed at helping foreign countries to combat corruption, no U.S. government effort focuses directly on combating corruption in countries’ passport issuance and immigration agencies. No Performance Measures to Gauge Governmentwide Progress in Closing Key Gaps in Foreign Partners’ Ability to Prevent Terrorist Travel Have Been Established
The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. Some agency components have made efforts to track the performance of their specific program efforts aimed at improving information sharing about known and suspected terrorists—one of the four key gaps. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to institute a coordinated approach for delivering fraudulent travel document recognition training overseas to ensure that U.S. agencies prevent overlap and duplication; and given State’s role in working with all appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and effective international counterterrorism efforts, we recommend that: State develop a mechanism for agencies involved in funding and implementing fraudulent travel document recognition training at overseas posts to coordinate the delivery of such training to foreign partners. To allow the U.S. government to determine the extent to which it is building foreign partners’ ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and to make adjustments to improve its programs accordingly, we recommend that: The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies, develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on U.S. progress across the government toward its goal of enhancing foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel. DOD, the Department of Transportation, USAID, and the National Security Staff did not provide any comments on the draft. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Transportation; the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; the National Security Staff of the National Security Council; and other interested parties or interested congressional committees. GAO staff members that made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) identified the key gaps the U.S. government has assessed in foreign countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, (2) evaluated how U.S. foreign capacity-building efforts address those gaps, and (3) assessed the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. Our work focused on the efforts of the Departments of State (State), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Justice (DOJ) to build foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. We also reviewed the relevant agency strategic documents for State, DHS, DOD, DOJ, and USAID. | Why GAO Did This Study
Eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks continues to be a primary U.S. national security focus. According to the 9/11 Commission, constraining the mobility of terrorists is one of the most effective weapons in fighting terrorism. This report (1) describes key gaps the U.S. government has identified in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, (2) evaluates how U.S. capacity-building efforts address those gaps, and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. To identify the key gaps, GAO reviewed governmentwide assessments of vulnerabilities in the international travel system. GAO reviewed the strategies and documentation of U.S. agencies funding and/or implementing foreign capacity-building efforts to prevent terrorist travel overseas, including those of the Departments of State (State)--which coordinates U.S. efforts overseas--Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also interviewed officials from the National Security Staff, of the National Security Council (NSC), which oversees counterterrorism policy. GAO met with these agencies and conducted field work in Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government has identified four key gaps in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. U.S. government foreign capacity-building programs and activities address these gaps to varying degrees. For instance, as one of the U.S. efforts to enhance foreign partners' sharing of information about known and suspected terrorists, State's Terrorist Interdiction Program provides participating countries with hardware and software to develop, maintain, and use terrorist screening information. In fiscal year 2010, nearly 150 ports of entry overseas were using this program. With regard to addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents, GAO found the potential for overlap and duplication since seven components of three federal agencies are involved in providing training on fraudulent travel document recognition to foreign government officials, with no mechanism to coordinate such training. In two countries GAO visited, there was a lack of collaboration among agencies funding and implementing training on this topic. For example, in Pakistan, State and DHS were both planning to hold fraudulent travel document training for the same Pakistani agency during the same month without knowing of the other's plans. Regarding helping countries improve the security of their passport issuance, State and USAID have multiple efforts, including State's Bureau of Consular Affairs bringing delegations from foreign passport offices to the United States for briefings at passport-related agencies. Finally, the U.S. government has many efforts aimed at combating corruption overseas, such as encouraging countries to pass anticorruption laws. While these efforts are not aimed specifically at countries' passport and immigration agencies, they are intended to improve the effectiveness of all government functions. The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. None of the governmentwide or individual agency strategic documents GAO reviewed contained such measures. While components of State and DOJ have some performance measures related to information sharing, these measures do not provide decision makers with comprehensive information on governmentwide progress in enhancing foreign partners' capacity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) State develop a mechanism to improve coordination of various agencies' efforts to provide fraudulent travel document training to foreign partners, and (2) NSC develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on overall progress toward the goal of enhancing foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. State concurred with the first recommendation. NSC did not comment on the draft report. |
gao_NSIAD-98-99 | gao_NSIAD-98-99_0 | USTRANSCOM and its component commands operate under the Working Capital Fund system of financial management. 1.) The congressional defense committees have raised concerns regarding USTRANSCOM’s infrastructure. Customer satisfaction is another element that impacts the ability to reduce transportation costs. Our Analysis of USTRANSCOM Reported Savings and Effect on Reducing Infrastructure and Operating Costs
USTRANSCOM and the component commands have taken action to improve customer service, reduce costs, and improve operational efficiency. To the extent that these savings are expected to be realized, we found that most of the reported savings, over $400 million, would not reduce long-term operating costs, and that only a relatively small portion of the savings, about $260 million, was apt to result in reductions to transportation rates for users of the defense transportation system. Another $120 million actually involved improved revenue collections rather than efforts to reduce long-term operating costs. We found that USTRANSCOM and the component commands project increases in most common user transportation rates at or above the rate of inflation through fiscal year 1999, indicating that total customers’ charges are continuing to increase as well. As previously mentioned, $258 million of reported savings are likely to impact customer rates. Accordingly, this raises significant questions about the ability of these savings to substantively reduce charges. USTRANSCOM responded that the examples “. Our examples highlight the USTRANSCOM surcharge, that is the difference between what USTRANSCOM pays commercial carriers for basic underlying transportation services and what it charges its customers, illustrating the costs customers pay for USTRANSCOM and component command operating costs. Even if all the reported savings directly affected long-term operating costs, the $780 million in savings represents only about 3 percent of $27 billion in estimated TWCF operating costs during the same period. Consequently, we remain concerned that transportation charges to its military customers are unnecessarily high. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which USTRANSCOM expects to achieve long-term savings in its operating and infrastructure costs, we assessed the savings it reported to Congress in December 1996, including subsequent testimony that reported $780 million, cumulatively, in savings initiatives. We attempted to trace the savings to the affected budget accounts with the supporting documents and to validate the amount of the savings and their applicability to reducing transportation charges to defense customers. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) savings initiatives, focusing on the: (1) extent to which USTRANSCOM expects to achieve long-term savings in its operating and infrastructure costs; and (2) changes regarding transportation rates and customer charges.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USTRANSCOM and its components have sought to reduce costs and improve operating efficiencies in the defense transportation system, while at the same time preserving its readiness capabilities and effectiveness; (2) GAO recognizes that reducing transportation charges to defense customers is complicated by multiple factors that impact the ability of USTRANSCOM to affect transportation charges; (3) the lag time, for example, between reducing operating costs and realizing reductions in customer charges means that the impact of some of USTRANSCOM's savings initiatives has yet to occur; (4) at this time, however, it appears that the savings initiatives identified by USTRANSCOM will not yield as great a result as initially reported; (5) the reported savings are not likely to have a significant impact on lowering infrastructure and long-term operating costs, which is the key to reducing customer charges; (6) available data indicate that many costs USTRANSCOM charges its customers are rising at a rate greater than inflation and that surcharges may remain high, even when underlying transportation charges have declined; (7) specifically, only about $260 million of the $780 million reported savings represents reductions to infrastructure and long-term operating costs--savings that could more readily result in lower charges over time to defense customers for transportation services; (8) a small portion of the reported savings actually involves improved revenue collections rather than efforts to reduce long-term operating costs; (9) the reported savings that are to occur between fiscal years 1993 and 1999 represent less than 3 percent of USTRANSCOM's $27-billion working capital fund operating costs during that time period; (10) thus, the extent to which total operating costs might be affected raises questions about the ability of these savings to substantively reduce customer transportation charges; (11) customer rates have been increasing and USTRANSCOM projects increases to continue through the end of the decade; (12) the increases are at or above the rate of inflation; (13) in addition, USTRANSCOM's surcharge continues to be substantially higher than the amount component commands pay commercial carriers; and (14) there where instances where surcharges were increasing significantly even when underlying transportation costs had declined. |
gao_NSIAD-99-22 | gao_NSIAD-99-22_0 | Restructuring Savings and Costs
In April 1998, we reported that, for the seven business combinations, DOD expects to save a net of almost $3.3 billion between 1993 and 2000 from restructuring activities, such as laying off workers, closing facilities, and relocating employees and equipment. Table 1 shows DOD’s projection of its share of restructuring savings and costs for these business combinations. We reported in September 1998 that our work had shown that selected restructuring activities at 10 contractor business segments had enabled the contractors to reduce their projected operating costs by hundreds of millions of dollars. We reported in April 1998 that DOD estimated it had realized a net savings of about $1.9 billion from the seven business combinations. Now, DOD estimates it has realized a net savings of about $2.1 billion (see table 2). The estimated savings realized represent about 64 percent of the restructuring savings expected at the time of certification. Determining the precise impact that restructuring activities have on a contract price requires isolating the effect of restructuring from nonrestructuring-related factors. DOD noted that it is not feasible to precisely isolate the impact of restructuring from the impact of these other factors. Other Means to Ensure DOD Receives Restructuring Benefits
While it is not feasible to develop a methodology to precisely determine the impact of restructuring on contract prices, our work has shown that there are other ways to ensure that DOD receives benefits from restructuring activities. 30, 1998). 1, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on: (1) the six business combinations for which the Department of Defense (DOD), as of September 30, 1998, had certified that the projected restructuring savings should exceed associated restructuring costs; and (2) on a seventh combination, Hughes Aircraft Company's acquisition of General Dynamics' missile operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in April 1998, GAO reported that DOD estimated it would save a net of $3.3 billion between 1993 and 2000 from restructuring activities carried out by the seven business combinations; (2) GAO also reported that DOD estimated it had realized savings of about $1.9 billion as of August 1997, or more than half of the expected savings; (3) now, DOD estimates it has realized savings of about $2.1 billion, or 64 percent of the expected savings; (4) while GAO determined that selected restructuring activities had lowered the operational costs of the business combinations by hundreds of millions of dollars, it was not feasible to develop a methodology for precisely determining how contract prices were affected; (5) to make such a determination requires isolating the impact of restructuring from nonrestructuring-related factors, such as changes in business volume, quantities purchased, and accounting practices; (6) DOD, the contractors, and GAO were not able to isolate the effects of restructuring from those of other factors; and (7) however, other methods exist through which DOD can ensure that it receives its equitable share of restructuring savings in a timely manner. |
gao_GAO-07-922T | gao_GAO-07-922T_0 | Federal appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires, including appropriations for fuel treatments, have almost tripled. Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost of preparing for and responding to them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. In some cases, the agencies may simply monitor a fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure that the fire continues to pose little threat to important resources, a practice known as “wildland fire use.”
Federal Agencies Are Taking Some Steps to Contain Wildland Fire Costs, but Results Are Unknown
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of steps to address issues that we and others have identified as needing improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but the effects of these steps on containing costs are unknown, in part because many of the steps are not yet complete. First, federal firefighting agencies have made progress in developing a system to help them better identify and set priorities for lands needing treatment to reduce accumulated fuels. Second, the agencies have also taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use firefighting personnel, aviation resources, and equipment—assets that constitute a major cost of responding to wildland fires—but much remains to be done. However, they have yet to complete the more fundamental step of determining the appropriate type and quantity of firefighting assets needed for the fire season. Third, the agencies have clarified certain policies and are improving analytical tools to assist agency officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate response to a given fire. Nevertheless, other policies limit the agencies’ use of less aggressive strategies, which typically cost less. Federal agencies, working with nonfederal entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance and better ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies’ Management of Wildland Fire Cost- Containment Efforts
Despite steps taken to strengthen their management of cost-containment efforts, the agencies have neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and objectives nor developed a strategy for achieving them—steps that are fundamental to sound program management. First, although the agencies have established a broad goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost considering firefighter and public safety and the resources and structures to be protected, they have established neither clear criteria by which to weigh the relative importance of these often-competing priorities nor measurable objectives by which to determine if they are meeting their goal. Without such criteria and objectives, according to agency officials we interviewed and reports we reviewed, officials in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance that the agencies’ leadership places on containing costs and, therefore, are likely to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of costs. Third, the agencies recently adopted a new performance measure—known as the stratified cost index—that may improve the agencies’ ability to evaluate their progress in containing costs, but the measure may take a number of years to fully refine. Further, to date, the index is based solely on fires managed by the Forest Service. Finally, the agencies have also taken, or are beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and accountability framework, although the extent to which these steps will assist the agencies in containing costs is unknown. | Why GAO Did This Study
Annual appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires have increased substantially over the past decade, in recent years totaling about $3 billion. The Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the Interior (Interior) are responsible for responding to wildland fires on federal lands. GAO determined what steps federal agencies have taken to (1) address key operational areas that could help contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires and (2) improve their management of their cost-containment efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's June 2007 report, Wildland Fire Management: Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies' Efforts to Contain the Costs of Fighting Fires (GAO-07-655).
What GAO Found
The Forest Service and Interior agencies have initiated a number of steps to address key operational areas previously identified as needing improvement to help federal agencies contain wildland fire costs, but the effects on containing costs are unknown, in part because many of these steps are not yet complete. First, federal firefighting agencies are developing a system to help them better identify and set priorities for lands needing treatment to reduce fuels, but they have yet to decide how they will keep data in the system current. Second, federal agencies have taken some steps to improve how they acquire and use personnel, equipment, and other firefighting assets--such as implementing a computerized system to more efficiently dispatch and track available firefighting assets--but have not yet completed the more fundamental step of determining the appropriate type and quantity of firefighting assets needed for the fire season. Third, the agencies have clarified certain policies and are improving analytical tools that assist officials in identifying and implementing an appropriate response to a given fire, but several other policies limit the agencies' use of less aggressive firefighting strategies, which typically cost less. Fourth, federal agencies, working with nonfederal entities, have recently taken steps to clarify guidance to better ensure that firefighting costs are shared consistently for fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that this guidance is followed. The agencies have also taken steps to address previously identified weaknesses in their management of cost-containment efforts, but they have neither clearly defined their cost-containment goals and objectives nor developed a strategy for achieving them--steps that are fundamental to sound program management. Although the agencies have established a broad goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost--considering firefighter and public safety and resources and structures to be protected--they have no defined criteria by which to weigh the relative importance of these often-competing priorities. As a result, according to agency officials and reports, officials in the field lack a clear understanding of the relative importance the agencies' leadership places on containing costs and, therefore, are likely to select firefighting strategies without due consideration of the costs of suppression. The agencies have also yet to develop a vision of how the various cost-containment steps they are taking relate to one another or to determine the extent to which these steps will be effective. The agencies are working to develop a better cost-containment performance measure, but the measure may take a number of years to fully refine. Finally, the agencies have taken, or are beginning to take, steps to improve their oversight and increase accountability--such as requiring agency officials to evaluate firefighting teams according to how well they contained costs--although the extent to which these steps will assist the agencies in containing costs is unknown. |
gao_GAO-13-576 | gao_GAO-13-576_0 | Background
Video Programming and Distribution
Various entities and groups develop and distribute video content. Typically, the general public views television programming through broadcast or subscription video service. According to a 2012 report cited by FCC, seven companies’ broadcast and cable networks accounted for about 95 percent of all television viewing hours in the United States. Since 2005, Some Local Markets Have Gained Access to Additional MVPD Service
Since 2005, the introduction of telephone-based video service has brought additional MVPD competition to some areas. With the new entry in some areas, roughly 1 in 3 households had access to at least 4 MVPDs at year-end 2010. While the Internet has emerged as a new source for viewing video, online viewing and revenues represents a small portion of overall media activity, particularly as compared to traditional television. Consumers Continue to Acquire Programming and Content through Packages, but Online Video Providers Are Delivering New Choices
MVPDs Generally Provide Large Packages of Channels
In general, MVPDs provide video content by packaging together a large number of channels in different programming tiers—often the basic, expanded basic, and premium tiers. Services like Hulu and Netflix allow consumers to select content based on a program, or even an episode basis. Stakeholders Generally Noted That Laws and Regulations Have Not Kept Pace with Changes, and FCC Has Not Consistently Reported on Competition
The Majority of Stakeholders Noted that Some Laws and Regulations Are Out of Date, but Little Agreement Exists on Potential Changes
The 1992 Act was written over 20 years ago, and for a variety of reasons, the majority of stakeholders with whom we spoke stated that some provisions of the laws and associated regulations do not reflect the current marketplace. Since then, satellite and telephone companies have entered the marketplace, and consumers have more choices in selecting a video distributor. FCC Has Not Consistently Published Statutorily Required Reports
FCC is required by statute to report annually to Congress on both cable industry prices and competition in the video marketplace, but has not met this requirement every year. Since the 1992 Act, FCC has published the annual cable industry price report 13 times, but did not publish the report in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2010. According to FCC officials, this review and change contributed to the Commission missing the 2010 and 2011 video competition reports. In our review of the video competition reports, we saw little change in the reported findings from year to year; therefore, less frequent reporting could allow for continued measurement of industry performance while reducing the burden on FCC and industry participants. Competition has expanded in some segments of the video marketplace, most notably, the emergence of telephone companies providing video distribution services. FCC’s cable industry price and video competition reports provide useful information. FCC’s 2009 cable industry price and 2011 video competition reports covered several years of data and could serve as models for issuing such reports on a less frequent basis. Since these annual reports are statutorily required, Congress, with input from FCC, would determine any new reporting frequency. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the Commission’s cable industry price and video competition reports provide timely and useful information, while minimizing the reporting burden and meeting statutory deadlines, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission study the advantages and disadvantages of different reporting frequencies, including annual and biennial reporting, and transmit the results of its analysis to Congress. In its letter, FCC said that the Commission strives to use its resources efficiently to meet the agency’s mission and its Congressional requirements, and the Commission is reviewing our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how competition has changed since 2005; (2) the increased choices that consumers have in acquiring video programming and content; (3) the factors that can spur or hinder competition; and (4) stakeholders’ views on how the federal government’s regulations, reports, and other activities have kept pace with changes in the industry. We selected industry participants to include producers, aggregators, and distributors of content, such as broadcast and cable networks, multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD)—cable, satellite, and telephone companies—and online video distributors (OVDs). Our results reflect the competition, packages, and pricing in the 20 zip codes and are not generalizable to all zip codes. To identify the prices for traditional MVPD services, we gathered data from FCC’s reports on cable industry prices for the years 2005 through 2012, which represent the most recent available data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Video provided through subscription video services, such as cable and satellite television, is a central source of news and entertainment for the majority of U.S. households. Technological advances have ushered in a wave of new products and services, bringing online distribution of video to consumers. Federal laws and regulations have sought to foster competition in the video programming and distribution marketplace, but many such laws were adopted prior to the emergence of these advances.
Among other things, GAO examined (1) how competition has changed since 2005; (2) the increased choices that consumers have in acquiring video programming and content; and (3) stakeholders' views on how the government's regulations, reports, and other activities have kept pace with changes in the industry. GAO reviewed relevant literature and reports; interviewed agency officials, industry stakeholders, and experts; and analyzed prices and service offerings in 20 randomly sampled zip codes (the prices and services offerings reflect conditions in the 20 zip codes and are not generalizable to all zip codes).
What GAO Found
Since GAO reported on competition in 2005, competition among video content producers is little changed, while competition among distributors has increased. According to data cited by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), seven companies' broadcast and cable networks accounted for about 95 percent of all television viewing hours in the United States. Further, ownership of broadcast and cable networks changed little from 2005 through 2012. Alternatively, the introduction of video service provided by telephone companies, such as Verizon's FiOS service, has brought additional competition to video distribution. At year-end 2010, roughly 1 in 3 households could choose among 4 or more subscription video distributors: typically a cable company, 2 satellite companies, and a telephone company. With technological advances, companies are increasingly distributing video online. Online video distributors (OVD) are developing a variety of business models, including free and subscription-based services. However, online viewing and revenues represent a small portion of overall media viewing hours and revenue.
Consumers continue to acquire programming and content through packages, but OVDs are delivering new choices. All the video distributors that GAO analyzed required consumers to purchase a package of channels often through the basic, expanded basic, and premium tiers. According to FCC data, in 2011, the average price for expanded basic service was $57.46, and had increased over 33 percent since 2005, exceeding the 15 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index. OVDs and other companies allow consumers to select content on a program or episode basis. However, these services typically do not include the most recent television programs and movies, thereby limiting their value for some consumers.
Stakeholders generally noted that laws and regulations have not kept pace with changes in the video industry, and FCC has not consistently reported on competition. Some legislation governing the media industry was adopted over 20 years ago, before telephone companies entered the marketplace and the commercialization of the Internet facilitated new OVD services. A majority of stakeholders with whom GAO spoke stated that some provisions should be revisited. FCC is required to annually report to Congress on cable industry prices and competition in the video marketplace. However, since 1992, FCC has not published the cable industry price report 4 times--in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2010--and has not published the video competition report 4 times--in 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011. According to FCC officials, a variety of administrative factors contributed to the missed reports, and the reports are time consuming to prepare. The reports also impose burdens on some industry participants.
Less frequent reporting on cable industry prices and competition in the video marketplace could allow for continued measurement of industry performance while reducing the burden on FCC and industry participants. GAO found little change in the reported findings from year-to-year in FCC's video competition report. FCC's 2009 cable industry price and 2012 video competition reports followed missed reports, and these reports included data covering multiple years; these reports could serve as a model for issuing such reports less frequently. Since these reports are statutorily required, Congress, with input from FCC, would need to determine any new reporting frequency.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should study the advantages and disadvantages of different reporting frequencies for its cable industry price and video competition reports and transmit the results of its analysis to Congress. FCC said that the Commission strives to use its resources efficiently to meet the agency's mission and its Congressional requirements, and the Commission is reviewing GAO's recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-96-72 | gao_AIMD-96-72_0 | Eligibility screening is performed by a system separate from but often utilized with PRODUR systems. These systems reported screening over 31.7 million prescription drug claims during 12-month periods between January 1994 and June 1995, and sent pharmacists alerts of potentially inappropriate drug therapy for about 6.3 million (20 percent) of these claims. Program Costs Can Be Significantly Reduced
Along with increasing patient safety, the PRODUR systems in the states we reviewed reduced Medicaid program costs by millions of dollars annually through the cancellation of potentially wasteful prescriptions and the denial of prescriptions to ineligible recipients. States Implement Systems Differently, Often Not Sharing Experiences
The states in our review have all implemented their automated PRODUR systems differently, in large part because no overall source of information or guidance for implementing PRODUR systems exists. Each state has its own DUR board, which independently sets screening criteria and policies. In August 1994 HCFA issued guidelines to assist the states in estimating and reporting the costs and benefits of both retrospective and prospective drug utilization review. It stated that PRODUR systems are not specifically designed to detect Medicaid fraud and abuse and that retrospective DUR systems may be more capable of detecting potentially fraudulent activity and referring this activity to states’ Medicaid Surveillance Utilization Review units for follow-up. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states' experiences with automated prospective drug utilization review (PRODUR) systems in their Medicaid programs, focusing on: (1) how these systems can improve patient safety, control program costs, and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse; and (2) impediments to effective implementation of PRODUR systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between January 1994 and June 1995, PRODUR systems reviewed screened over 31.7 million prescription drug claims, and alerted pharmacists to potentially inappropriate drug treatments; (2) over 650,000 prescriptions were cancelled because of potential risks to patients; (3) PRODUR systems have reduced Medicaid costs by denying prescriptions to ineligible recipients, preventing hospitalizations due to illnesses caused by inappropriately prescribed drugs, and detecting and eliminating fraud and abuse; (4) PRODUR systems are more cost-effective than traditional review systems; (5) states implement their PRODUR systems differently because there is no guidance on PRODUR system implementation; and (6) each state has its own drug utilization review board which independently sets screening criteria and policies, but states have no systematic way to share experiences and best practices. |
gao_GAO-10-945 | gao_GAO-10-945_0 | Background
For decades, animal dealers have been providing dogs and cats to scientific researchers. These data showed that the total number of dogs and cats sold for that period by random source Class B dealers to research facilities was 3,139 animals (2,863 dogs and 276 cats), which was equivalent to about 3 percent of the total dogs and cats used in research in fiscal year 2008. APHIS Inspections Have Found Numerous Dealer Violations, but APHIS Has Not Completed All Tracebacks or Fully Analyzed Traceback Data
APHIS inspection reports documented one or more violations by seven of the nine random source Class B dealers from fiscal years 2007 through 2009. Additionally, about 29 percent of tracebacks APHIS conducted during this period were either unsuccessful or had not been completed as of June 2010, as directed by agency guidance. During Fiscal Years 2007 to 2009, About One-Third of Inspection Reports Reviewed Cited Violations, and Seven of the Nine Dealers Had One or More Violations
Our review of all APHIS inspection reports from fiscal years 2007 through 2009 indicates that the agency has generally inspected, or attempted to inspect, each of the random source Class B dealers at least four times a year, as called for in APHIS guidance, and has documented numerous violations among the dealers. According to APHIS guidance, when conducting an inspection, inspectors are to examine the condition and cleanliness of the dealer facility and the condition of the dogs and cats present, among other things. Inspectors also are to review dealer records pertaining to the acquisition and disposition of animals. As of July 2010, several of these dealers were under further investigation by APHIS in light of repeated violations and could be subject to fines or even license revocation in the future, depending on the severity or history of violations. Some APHIS Tracebacks for Verification Were Unsuccessful or Incomplete in Fiscal Year 2009, and APHIS Has Not Fully Used Its Traceback Data
APHIS has performed tracebacks to verify the records of random source Class B dealers since fiscal year 1993, but it only recently started to compile traceback information using electronic spreadsheet logs. We found that APHIS attempted a total of 326 tracebacks in fiscal year 2009. As of June 2010, the data in APHIS’s traceback logs showed that APHIS was able to successfully trace a dog or cat back to a legitimate source in 231 of the 326 traceback cases, or about 71 percent of the time. Because APHIS does not analyze the data in its traceback logs, it cannot systematically detect problems with its tracebacks. APHIS Does Not Collect Data on the Cost of Its Oversight of Specific Classes of Dealers, or Others It Inspects, Including Random Source Class B Dealers
According to APHIS officials, the agency does not collect cost information for its oversight of the specific classes of dealers and exhibitors, or others it inspects, including random source Class B dealers. Furthermore, APHIS officials also told us the agency does not currently have a mechanism in place to determine these costs. For example, APHIS inspectors do not currently record their time by specific oversight activity or class of dealer. Without such data, APHIS is not employing one of the standards of federal internal control. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve APHIS’s oversight of random source Class B dealers who purchase dogs and cats for research, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to take the following two actions: Improve the agency’s analysis and use of the traceback information it collects, such as whether the same sellers or inspectors were consistently involved in late or incomplete tracebacks, and ensure it is taking all available steps to verify random source Class B dealers are obtaining dogs and cats from legitimate sources, including making certain that tracebacks are completed in a timely manner and conducted according to APHIS guidance. Develop a methodology to collect and track the oversight costs associated with the specific classes of dealers, and others the agency inspects, including random source Class B dealers, in order to identify potential problems requiring management attention and develop a business case for changing this oversight, if appropriate, to more efficiently use available resources. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the number of Class B dealers that sell random source dogs and cats for research; (2) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) conducts inspections of these dealers and verifies the accuracy of their records; and (3) the costs associated with APHIS’s oversight of these dealers compared with its costs for oversight of other types of dealers. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, the public has been concerned that lost or stolen dogs and cats could be used in research. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for the licensing and oversight of dealers who provide animals for research. Random source Class B dealers--who generally obtain dogs and cats for research from individuals, pounds, and other dealers--have been the focus of this concern. GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of random source Class B dealers, (2) the extent to which APHIS conducts inspections of these dealers and verifies their records, and (3) the costs associated with APHIS's oversight of these dealers compared to other types of dealers. GAO reviewed the Animal Welfare Act (AWA); APHIS regulations and guidance; inspection reports; agency data, such as "traceback" data used to verify dogs and cats are not lost or stolen; and interviewed and reviewed documents from agency officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
As of July 2010, nine Class B dealers were licensed by APHIS to sell random source dogs and cats for research. This number has not changed significantly since fiscal year 2005 but declined from over 100 dealers in the early 1990s. Random source dealers sold 3,139 animals to research facilities from November 2007 to November 2008--equivalent to about 3 percent of the dogs and cats used in research in fiscal year 2008. APHIS inspections have found numerous random source Class B dealer violations, such as the condition of animal housing and inadequate veterinary care, but APHIS has not completed all of its fiscal year 2009 tracebacks related to these dealers or analyzed traceback verification data to detect problems with the process. In reviewing all inspection reports for fiscal years 2007 through 2009, GAO found APHIS generally inspected, or attempted to inspect, each of these dealers at least four times a year, as directed. APHIS guidance directs inspectors to examine the condition of a dealer facility, examine the condition of the dogs and cats present, and review dealer records. Overall, 54 of the 156 inspection reports cited at least one dealer violation, and seven of the nine dealers had one or more violations. As of July 2010, several dealers were under further APHIS investigation due to repeated violations. To verify dealer records and help ensure dealers are not obtaining lost or stolen animals, APHIS attempted a total of 326 tracebacks in fiscal year 2009. Though APHIS has conducted tracebacks since fiscal year 1993, it did not compile traceback data until fiscal year 2009. As of June 2010, data showed APHIS successfully traced a dog or cat back to a legitimate source about 71 percent of the time. About 29 percent of tracebacks APHIS conducted during this period were either unsuccessful or had not been completed as of June 2010, as directed by agency guidance. Because APHIS does not analyze traceback data, it cannot systematically detect problems with tracebacks and take all available steps to ensure random source dealers obtain dogs and cats from legitimate sources. For example, without analyzing data, APHIS cannot know whether the same sellers or inspectors were consistently involved in late or incomplete tracebacks. According to APHIS officials, the agency does not collect cost information specific to its oversight of random source Class B dealers, or to any other class of dealer it inspects. Officials also said the agency does not currently have a mechanism to determine these costs. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to obtain such information for program oversight. For example, APHIS inspectors do not record their time by specific oversight activity or class of dealer. Without a methodology to collect and track costs associated with the oversight of these dealers, and others APHIS inspects, APHIS management cannot identify trends or deficiencies requiring its attention. Furthermore, management cannot develop a business case to change its oversight program, if needed, to more effectively and efficiently use available resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA (1) improve its analysis and use of the traceback information it collects for random source Class B dealers and (2) develop a methodology to collect and track the oversight costs of each class of dealer and others APHIS inspects. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted specific actions it will take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-14-203 | gao_GAO-14-203_0 | Broadband Availability and Access
Broadband Internet access is widely available throughout the United States to both residences and businesses. areas. Some municipalities also support broadband deployment by funding, building, and operating networks to provide broadband access to their communities, much as some cities offer utilities such as water and electricity. Communities have used federal funds, issued bonds, and taken out loans to fund the construction of municipal broadband networks. Federally Funded Efforts to Expand Broadband Encompass but Do Not Specifically Target Small Businesses
Federal broadband programs do not target deployment to small businesses. Many programs do, however, have requirements that can result in networks maximizing the number of small businesses and residences served. Thus, the program’s funding supports providers who will serve residences and small businesses in areas of need. Since these programs do not focus on deployment to small businesses, they do not measure their impact on small businesses, including the broadband speeds and prices available to them. However, each program has broader goals and measures, some of which encompass the impact on businesses. Consistent with this goal, RUS reported in August 2013 that more than 5,800 businesses had received new or improved service as a result of BIP funding since passage of the Recovery Act in 2009, even though BIP does not have specific performance targets regarding services to businesses. Selected Federally Funded and Municipal Networks Have Improved Broadband Service for Small Businesses
Service Improvements
Federal programs have supported improvements to broadband networks through grants and loans for expansions, upgrades, and building of new networks, according to the service providers we spoke with. For example, Intermountain Cable in eastern Kentucky used a Community Connect grant to expand its broadband network to Hurley, Virginia. For example, in northwest Minnesota, Garden Valley Telephone Company used an RUS Telecommunications Infrastructure loan to upgrade the copper lines in the rural areas it serves with fiber optic lines, which provide a faster and more reliable connection. According to some providers, these federal and municipal investments have stimulated competition. We found that prices offered by federally funded and municipal networks were slightly lower than prices offered by nonfederally funded networks in the same community and networks in comparison communities. As this figure shows, prices in all the ranges are generally lower for federally funded or municipal networks, and at the 4 to 6 Mbps and 7 to 10 Mbps download ranges, networks in comparison communities tend to have higher prices than both federally funded and municipal networks and nonfederally funded networks located in the same community. We found that providers in urban areas generally offer higher speeds than those in nonurban areas. Small business owners we met with who use the services of federally funded or municipal networks told us that they made improvements to their business operations, often because the speed of online applications was improved, which allowed them to operate more efficiently. NTIA and FCC provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes: (1) the federal government’s efforts to ensure the availability of broadband services for small businesses, and (2) the effect of federally funded and municipal networks on broadband service and small businesses. We reviewed program rules regarding funding applicability and eligibility for FCC, RUS, NTIA, and EDA programs that provide funding for broadband infrastructure; status reports for the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) and the Broadband Infrastructure Program (BIP); SBA’s Office of Advocacy’s study on small business access to broadband; and reports from FCC and NTIA on broadband deployment and availability. For comparison purposes, we also collected speed and pricing information for all wireline providers in nearby towns that were similar to these locations in terms of population, income levels, and number of wireline service providers, but where federally funded or municipal networks were not present; and in two urban areas in each of the same states. Appendix II: Speeds and Prices Offered by Federally Funded and Municipal Broadband Service Providers That Were Part of GAO’s Analysis, as of September 30, 2013
Appendix II: Speeds and Prices Offered by Federally Funded and Municipal Broadband Service Providers That Were Part of GAO’s Analysis, as of September 30, 2013 Top available advertised speed (Mbps)
Most common speed subscribed to by businesses (Mbps)
Information for broadband speed and pricing is reported here only for the Georgia Communications Cooperative, a member of the North Georgia Network. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasingly, small businesses rely on Internet-based applications to improve efficiencies and expand market access. Although broadband Internet access is widely available to businesses, areas of the country remain that still have little or no access. Since 2008, federal programs have provided over $15 billion in funding to help deploy broadband to these areas. Additionally, some municipal governments have begun to build and operate networks to provide broadband access to their communities.
GAO was asked to describe issues related to broadband availability for small businesses. This report addresses (1) the federal government's efforts to ensure the availability of broadband services for small businesses, and (2) the effect of selected federally funded and municipal networks on broadband service and small businesses. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from five federal agencies that support broadband deployment and research on broadband availability. GAO interviewed service providers that received federal funding, municipal network operators, and small businesses in four states, and collected speeds and prices for broadband services in selected communities in these states. The states, communities, and businesses were selected based on the presence and use of a federally funded or municipal network.
GAO is not making any recommendations. In commenting on this report, the agencies provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Federally funded programs to expand broadband access encompass but do not specifically target small businesses. These programs—the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP), Broadband Technologies Opportunities Program, Community Connect Grants, Connect America Fund, Rural Broadband Access Loan and Loan Guarantee Program, and Telecommunications Infrastructure Loan Program—have eligibility requirements based on the need of an area, as well as deployment requirements that can maximize the number of businesses served. For example, the Community Connect grants require providers to serve all businesses and residences in deployment areas. Since these federal programs do not target deployment to small businesses, they do not measure the impact on small businesses. However, BIP has a specific goal to increase access to rural Americans and provide broadband speeds to businesses, and in August 2013, the United States Department of Agriculture reported BIP's funding had resulted in over 5,800 businesses' receiving new or improved broadband service since 2009. Other programs have broader goals and measures related to the program's purpose, such as serving schools and libraries.
Improvements to broadband service have resulted from federal funding and the existence of municipally operated networks. Service providers have used federal funding for expansions and upgrades, such as building out to previously unserved areas and replacing old copper lines with fiber optic cable, resulting in faster and more reliable broadband connections. GAO examined broadband services for 14 federally funded and municipal networks and found they tended to have higher speeds than other networks. For example, in 9 of the 14 communities where GAO collected information on broadband speeds and prices, federally funded or municipal networks offered higher top speeds than other networks in the same community and networks in nearby communities. Additionally, prices charged by federally funded and municipal networks were slightly lower than the comparison networks' prices for similar speeds. Prices for lower to mid-range speed tiers available from federally funded and municipal networks in nonurban areas also compared favorably to prices in urban areas in the same state. However, providers in urban areas were more likely than those in nonurban areas to offer higher speeds. According to small businesses GAO met with, the speed and reliability of their broadband service improved after they began using federally funded or municipal networks. Furthermore, according to small business owners, the improvements to broadband service have helped the businesses improve efficiency and streamline operations. Small businesses that use the services of these networks reported a greater ability to use bandwidth-intensive applications for inventory management, videoconferencing, and teleworking, among other things. |
gao_GAO-08-18 | gao_GAO-08-18_0 | 1). In addition, the agency recently decided to separate the space and ground elements of the program into two separate contracts to be managed by NASA and NOAA, respectively. However, this change has delayed a key decision to proceed with the acquisition, which was planned for September 2007. Further, independent estimates are higher than the program’s current $7 billion cost estimate and convey a low level of confidence in the program’s schedule for launching the first satellite by 2014. As NOAA works to reconcile the independent estimate with its own program office estimate, costs are likely to grow and schedules are likely to be delayed. GOES-R Cost Estimates Are Likely to Grow and Schedule Estimates Are Likely to Slip
NOAA’s current estimate that the life cycle cost of the GOES-R program would be $7 billion is likely to grow, and its estimate that the first satellite would be launched in December 2014 is likely to slip. NOAA is Taking Steps to Address Key Risks, but More Remains to Be Done
To address cost, schedule, and technical risks, the GOES-R program established a risk management program and has taken steps to identify and mitigate selected risks. Specifically, the program has multiple risk watchlists and they are not always consistent. Further, key risks are missing from the risk lists, including risks associated with unfilled executive positions, limitations in NOAA’s insight into NASA’s deliverables, and insufficient funding for unexpected costs (called management reserve) on a critical sensor. As a result, the GOES-R program is at increased risk that problems will not be identified or mitigated in a timely manner and that they could lead to program cost overruns and schedule delays. As another example, the program office considers the lack of an integrated master schedule to be its highest priority risk. Conclusions
Over the last year, NOAA has completed preliminary design studies of its GOES-R system and has made a number of key changes to the program. However, independent studies show that the program’s cost could increase by about $2 billion more and the first launch could be delayed by at least 2 years. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the status and revised plans for the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R) procurement and to evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is adequately mitigating key technical and programmatic risks facing the GOES-R program. Furthermore, we interviewed agency officials from NOAA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and ITT Corporation to determine key dates for future GOES-R acquisition efforts and milestones and progress made on current instrument development efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), plans to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series (GOES-R). This series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) assess the status and plans for GOES-R, and (2) evaluate whether NOAA is adequately mitigating key technical and programmatic risks. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA and NASA.
What GAO Found
NOAA has made progress in planning its GOES-R procurement--which is estimated to cost $7 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2014--but cost and schedules are likely to grow. Specifically, the agency completed preliminary design studies of GOES-R and recently decided to separate the space and ground elements of the program into two separate development contracts. However, this change in the GOES-R acquisition strategy has delayed a decision to proceed with the acquisition. Further, independent estimates are higher than the program's current cost estimate and convey a low level of confidence in the program's schedule. Independent studies show that the estimated program could cost about $2 billion more, and the first satellite launch could be delayed by 2 years. As NOAA works to reconcile the independent estimate with its own program office estimate, costs are likely to grow and schedules are likely to be delayed. To address cost, schedule, and technical risks, the GOES-R program has established a risk management program and has taken steps to mitigate selected risks. For example, as of July 2007, the program office identified the lack of an integrated master schedule to be its highest priority risk and established plans to bring this risk to closure. However, more remains to be done to fully address GOES-R risks. Specifically, the program has multiple risk watchlists that are not always consistent and key risks are missing from the watchlists, including risks associated with unfilled executive positions, limitations in NOAA's insight into NASA's deliverables, and insufficient funds for unexpected costs--called management reserves. As a result, the GOES-R program is at risk that problems will not be identified or mitigated in a timely manner and could lead to program cost overruns and schedule delays. |
gao_NSIAD-96-11 | gao_NSIAD-96-11_0 | Reducing the Barriers Between the Defense and Civilian Industrial Bases
The use of cooperative agreements and other transactions appears to provide some opportunities to remove barriers between the defense and civilian industrial bases, in particular by attracting firms that traditionally did not perform research for DOD. Similarly, DARPA officials commented that the added flexibility within the intellectual property provisions would assist the firms’ efforts to develop and commercialize the technology. Promoting New Relationships and Practices
The instruments appear to be fostering new relationships and practices within the defense industry, especially for those projects being undertaken by consortia. It should be noted that the government’s actual share of the projects’ costs may be higher than indicated by table 1. Participants also were allowed to propose the value of prior research as part of their cost-sharing contributions. Accepting prior research in lieu of concurrent financial or in-kind contributions may obscure each party’s relative contributions in the current project. The selection of different instruments, coupled with different treatment of specific issues among the services, has led to some confusion among firms that were negotiating agreements with both DARPA and the services. Recommendation
Because inconsistent selection of a particular instrument and treatment of specific clauses may unnecessarily increase confusion for government and industry users and may hinder their effective use, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that DOD’s revised guidance on the use of cooperative agreements and other transactions promotes increased consistency among DOD components on the selection and structure of these instruments. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of cooperative agreements and other transactions to further its objectives of: (1) helping to reduce the barriers to integrating the defense and civilian sectors of the industrial base; (2) promoting new relationships and practices within the defense industry; and (3) allowing the government to leverage for defense purposes the private sector's financial investment in research and development of commercial products and processes. GAO also discussed two emerging issues concerning the selection and structure of the instruments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) cooperative agreements and other transactions appear to have contributed to reducing some of the barriers between the defense and civilian industrial bases by attracting firms that traditionally did not perform research for DOD; (2) the instruments have enabled the use of more flexible financial management and intellectual property provisions than those typically found in contracts and grants; (3) the instruments appear to be fostering new relationships and practices within the defense industry, especially for projects being undertaken by consortia; (4) DOD has partially offset its own costs by sharing project costs with recipients, but the DOD practice of accepting the value of recipients' prior research efforts in lieu of concurrent financial or in-kind contributions may increase the actual DOD monetary share of the project's costs; (5) differences between DARPA and the military services regarding the selection of instruments and treatment of specific provisions have led to some confusion among firms that were negotiating agreements with different DOD components; and (6) DOD is revising its interim regulations to provide clearer guidance on the instruments' selection, use, and structure. |
gao_GAO-09-712 | gao_GAO-09-712_0 | EEO Practitioners Identified Factors That Impede the Prompt, Fair, and Impartial Processing of EEO Complaints
When asked to identify factors that impeded the prompt, fair, and impartial processing of EEO complaints at their agencies and describe how those factors impeded the process, selected EEO practitioners provided hundreds of responses. These factors and their rankings are (1) lack of accountability on the part of some agency management officials and EEO practitioners in carrying out their responsibilities; (2) insufficient resources for some agency EEO offices and EEOC to fulfill their responsibilities; (3) lack of independence concerning the potential conflict of having agencies conduct their own EEO complaint investigations and the undue influence of some agency legal counsel and human resources officials on the EEO process; (4) insufficient knowledge and skills by some agency officials, complainants, and EEO practitioners to fulfill their responsibilities; (5) lack of authority by some EEO officials to dismiss cases that have no merit and lack of subpoena power by EEOC AJs; (6) lack of clarity in regulation and some guidance and consistent decisions from EEOC; (7) lack of effective communication by some EEO practitioners of relevant oral and written information to participants in the process and that ADR (e.g., conciliation, facilitation, or mediation) is available; and (8) lack of a firm commitment by some agency management and EEO officials to the EEO process. These stakeholders commented that without the perception that the complaint process is fair, people may be frustrated and choose to not participate in it. We agree that this concern is important and believe it has been accounted for within the context of the discussion on factors related to accountability; independence; and clarity in regulation, guidance, and consistent EEOC decisions. EEO Practitioners and Other Stakeholders Proposed Solutions That They Believe Address the Identified Factors
EEO practitioners and other stakeholders provided potential solutions that they believe address the factors they identified as well as information on changes their agencies had made to the EEO complaint process. Further, several EEO practitioners believe that agencies should adhere more clearly to existing EEOC requirements on delineating the roles of the agency general counsels in the EEO complaint process. Because of the concern that the practice of allowing an agency to investigate a complaint against itself can represent either a clear conflict of interest or the appearance of such conflict, practitioners cited filing complaints directly with EEOC as a means of avoiding such conflicts. EEOC officials stated that having subpoena authority would further ensure that AJs have access to all relevant evidence. Improving Equal Opportunity in the Federal Workforce
Through the use of several initiatives introduced in fiscal year 2008, EEOC is seeking to help federal agencies achieve model EEO programs where they can make employment decisions that are free from discrimination and that remove barriers to free and open workplace competition. EEOC also measured agencies’ use of ADR. Finally, in June 2008, EEOC announced a proposal that brought together previous EEOC commissioners’ efforts. Among the changes contained in the notice, are the following: A requirement that agency EEO programs comply with EEOC regulations, MDs (MD-110 and MD-715), and management bulletins and that EEOC will review agency programs for compliance. The solutions that EEO practitioners and others have offered to improve the quality and timeliness of investigations may provide candidates for the pilot projects, allowing EEOC to make data-driven decisions about changes to the federal EEO complaint process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with interested congressional committees, this report provided the results of our analysis of (1) factors that practitioners identified that they believe impede the prompt, fair, and impartial processing of federal equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints and (2) actions that practitioners and other stakeholders think could be taken to address those factors. We also contacted plaintiffs’ attorneys from the private sector. We did not assess the validity of the practitioners’ views of impediments or solutions to the EEO complaint process or evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives that agency EEO practitioners said their agencies had implemented to improve their complaint processes. In addition, the practitioners’ views cannot be generalized to all federal agencies and EEO practitioners for some or all of the factors identified. The views expressed by the survey respondents do not represent the views of GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Delays in processing federal equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints, apparent or perceived lack of fairness and impartiality in complaint processing, and fear of retaliation in the workplace have been long-standing concerns of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), other federal agencies, and Congress. Based on a Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act mandate, GAO analyzed (1) factors that EEO practitioners have identified as impeding the fair, prompt, and impartial processing of federal EEO complaints and (2) actions that EEO practitioners and other stakeholders think could be taken to help address those factors. GAO also identified actions that EEOC is taking to improve the federal complaint process. GAO surveyed 65 EEO practitioners representing a wide cross section of professionals knowledgeable about the federal EEO complaint process, who were selected from 16 federal agencies that accounted for about 88 percent of complaints filed in fiscal year 2005, EEOC, and private sector attorneys' offices. GAO did not assess the validity of practitioners' views or evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives.
What GAO Found
GAO analyzed and grouped into eight, the factors that EEO practitioners identified as those they believed impeded the fair, prompt, and impartial processing of federal EEO complaints: (1) lack of accountability by some agency officials and EEOC practitioners in carrying out their responsibilities; (2) lack of sufficient resources by some EEO programs and EEOC to fulfill their responsibilities; (3) lack of independence by some agency officials, including undue interference by some agency legal counsel and human resources officials in EEO matters; (4) insufficient knowledge and skills by some agency officials and EEO practitioners; (5) lack of authority by some EEO officials to dismiss cases that have no merit and lack of subpoena power by EEOC administrative judges (AJ); (6) lack of clarity in regulation and some guidance and consistent decisions from EEOC; (7) lack of effective communication by some EEO practitioners of relevant oral and written information to participants and that alternative dispute resolution is available; and (8) lack of a firm commitment by some agency management and EEO officials to the EEO process. The practitioners' views do not represent the official views of the selected agencies and should not be generalized to conclude that all federal agencies and EEO practitioners are deficient in all factors identified. Also, a few stakeholders GAO contacted stated that without the perception that the complaint process is fair, people may choose to not participate in it; GAO believes this concern is important and has been accounted for within the discussion of several of the factors. EEO practitioners surveyed and stakeholders suggested potential solutions to address the factors practitioners identified and provided information on relevant changes their agencies had made to the process. For example, to strengthen accountability, practitioners reported establishing measures for timeliness and quality for agency EEO professionals and those contracted to perform EEO complaint functions. To strengthen EEO staff's independence, several practitioners and stakeholders offered that agencies should adhere more clearly to existing EEOC requirements on delineating the roles of the agency general counsels in the EEO process. Stakeholders offered potential advantages and disadvantages to allowing complainants to file directly with EEOC as a means to avoid real or perceived conflicts of allowing an agency to investigate a complaint against itself. Several practitioners and EEOC officials stated that providing subpoena authority to AJs could help improve the efficiency of the EEO complaint process by compelling witnesses to testify. To help agencies achieve model EEO programs, EEOC has begun to measure agencies' progress in such areas as the timeliness of investigations. In June 2008, EEOC announced a proposal that includes provisions that may address some of the factors that practitioners identified. The proposal would require that agency EEO programs comply with EEOC regulations and other guidance and that EEOC review those programs for compliance. The proposal also would permit agencies to conduct pilot projects to test new ways to process EEO complaints that are not presently included in existing regulations. |
gao_GAO-06-866T | gao_GAO-06-866T_0 | The provisions of the Privacy Act are consistent with and large based on a set of principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information, known as the Fair Information Practices, which have been widely adopted as a standard benchmark for evaluating the adequacy of privacy protections; they include such principles as openness (keeping the public informed about privacy policies and practices) and accountability (those controlling the collection or use of personal information should be accountable for taking steps to ensure the implementation of these principles). The E-Government Act of 2002 strives to enhance protection for personal information in government information systems by requiring that agencies conduct privacy impact assessments (PIA PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, st shared, and managed in a federal system. Physical security controls were inadequate. It is also developing strategic and tactical to complete a security incident response program to monitor suspicious activity and cyber alerts, events, and incidents. ince our last report in 2002, VA’s IG and independent auditors have S continued to report serious weaknesses with the department’s information security controls. Agencies Can Take Steps to Reduce the Likelihood That Personal Data Will Be Compromised
In addition to establishing a robust information security program, agencies can take other actions to help guard against the possibil that personal information they maintain is inadvertently compromised. Consider using technological controls such as encryption wh data need to be stored on portable devices. Given these potential negative effects, care is clearly needed in defining appropriate criteria for required breach notifications. The office recommends that such notifications include, among other things, a general description of what happened; the type of personal information that was involved; what steps have been taken to prevent further unauthorized acquisition of personal information; the types of assistance to be p free contact telephone number for additional information and assistance; rovided to individuals, such as a toll- information on what individuals can do to protect th identity theft, including contact information for the three cred reporting agencies; and it information on where individuals can obtain additional information on protection against identity theft, such as the Federal Trade Commission’s Identity Theft Web site (www.consumer.gov/idtheft). Given that people maybe adversely affected by a compromise of their personal information, it is critical that they fully understand the nature of the threat and the options they have to address it. In summary, the recent security breach at VA has highlighted the importance of implementing effective information security practices. Although VA has taken steps to mitigate previously reported weaknesses, it has not implemented a comprehensive, integrated information security program, which it needs in order to effectively manage risks on an ongoing basis. Only through strong leadership, sustained management commitment and effort, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight can VA address its persistent, long-standing control weaknesses. To reduce the likelihood of experiencing such breaches, agencies can take a number of actions that can help guard against the possibility that databases of personally identifiable information are inadvertently compromised: strategically, they should ensure that a robust information security program is in place and that PIAs are developed. More specific practical measures aimed at preventing inadvertent data breaches include limiting the collection of pe information, limiting data retention, limiting access to personal information and training personnel accordingly, and considering using technological controls such as encryption when data need to be stored on mobile devices. Nevertheless, data breaches can still occur at any time, and whe n they do, notification to the individuals affected and/or the public h clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to take steps to dangers of identity theft. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent information security breach at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in which personal data on millions of veterans were compromised, has highlighted the importance of the department's security weaknesses, as well as the ability of federal agencies to protect personal information. Robust federal security programs are critically important to properly protect this information and the privacy of individuals. GAO was asked to testify on VA's information security program, ways that agencies can prevent improper disclosures of personal information, and issues concerning notifications of privacy breaches. In preparing this testimony, GAO drew on its previous reports and testimonies, as well as on expert opinion provided in congressional testimony and other sources.
What GAO Found
For many years, significant concerns have been raised about VA's information security--particularly its lack of a robust information security program, which is vital to avoiding the compromise of government information, including sensitive personal information. Both GAO and the department's inspector general have reported recurring weaknesses in such areas as access controls, physical security, and segregation of incompatible duties. The department has taken steps to address these weaknesses, but these have not been sufficient to establish a comprehensive information security program. For example, it is still developing plans to complete a security incident response program to monitor suspicious activity and cyber alerts, events, and incidents. Without an established and implemented security program, the department will continue to have major challenges in protecting its information and information systems from security breaches such as the one it recently experienced. In addition to establishing robust security programs, agencies can take a number of actions to help guard against the possibility that databases of personally identifiable information are inadvertently compromised. A key step is to develop a privacy impact assessment--an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed--whenever information technology is used to process personal information. In addition, agencies can take more specific practical measures aimed at preventing data breaches, including limiting the collection of personal information, limiting the time that such data are retained, limiting access to personal information and training personnel accordingly, and considering the use of technological controls such as encryption when data need to be stored on portable devices. When data breaches do occur, notification of those affected and/or the public has clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to protect themselves from identity theft. Although existing laws do not require agencies to notify the public of data breaches, such notification is consistent with agencies' responsibility to inform individuals about how their information is being accessed and used, and it promotes accountability for privacy protection. That said, care is needed in defining appropriate criteria for triggering notification. Notices should be coordinated with law enforcement to avoid impeding ongoing investigations, and in order to be effective, notices should be easy to understand. Because of the possible adverse impact of a compromise of personal information, it is critical that people fully understand the threat and their options for addressing it. Strong leadership, sustained management commitment and effort, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight will be needed for VA to address its persistent, long-standing control weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-05-620T | gao_GAO-05-620T_0 | Background
In the 21st century the nation faces a growing fiscal imbalance. A demographic shift will begin to affect the federal budget in 2008 as the first baby boomers become eligible for Social Security benefits. This shift will increase as spending for federal health and retirement programs swells. Long-term commitments for these and other federal programs will drive a massive imbalance between spending and revenues that cannot be eliminated without tough choices and significant policy changes. Continued economic growth is critical to addressing this challenge and will help to ease the burden, but the projected fiscal gap is so great that it is unrealistic to expect that the United States will grow its way out of the problem. Early action to change existing programs and policies would yield the highest fiscal dividends and provide a longer period for prospective beneficiaries to make adjustments in their own planning. One of the potential policy changes that could address both the demographic shift and the need for robust economic growth is assisting older workers who want to stay in the workforce past retirement age. These developments will lead to significant changes in the elderly dependency ratio--the estimated proportion of people aged 65 and over to those of working age. Another concern is the possible loss of many experienced workers as the baby boomers retire. This could create gaps in skilled worker and managerial occupations, leading to further adverse effects on productivity and economic growth. Similarly, the labor force participation rate of women over 55 has continued to increase. Many Factors Influence Workers’ Retirement and Employment Decisions
Although some people can benefit by remaining in the labor force at later ages, others may be unable or unwilling to do so. For those who are able, there are many factors that influence their choices. These include the eligibility rules of both employer pension plans and Social Security, an individual’s health status, the need for health insurance, personal preference, and the employment status of a spouse. The availability of suitable employment, including part-time work or flexible work arrangements, may also affect the retirement and employment choices of older workers. By staying in the workforce, older workers could ease financial pressures on Social Security and Medicare, as well as mitigate the expected slowdown in labor force growth. We at GAO look forward to continuing to work with this Committee and the Congress in addressing this and other important issues facing our nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 21st century our nation faces a growing fiscal imbalance. A demographic shift will begin to affect the federal budget in 2008 as the first baby boomers become eligible for Social Security benefits. This shift will increase as spending for federal health and retirement programs swells. Long-term commitments for these and other federal programs will drive a massive imbalance between spending and revenues that cannot be eliminated without tough choices and significant policy changes. Continued economic growth is critical and will help to ease the burden, but the projected fiscal gap is so great that it is unrealistic to expect that we will grow our way out of the problem. Early action to change existing programs and policies would yield the highest fiscal dividends and provide a longer period for prospective beneficiaries to make adjustments in their own planning. One of the potential policy changes is assisting older workers who want to stay in the workforce past retirement age. The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked GAO to discuss demographic and labor force trends and the economic and fiscal need to increase labor force participation among older workers. This testimony will address those factors making it important to encourage those who want to work to continue doing so, as well as factors affecting older Americans' employment decisions.
What GAO Found
The aging of the baby boom generation (those born between 1946 and 1964), increased life expectancy, and falling fertility rates pose serious challenges for our nation. These trends will affect the size and productivity of the U.S. labor force and its output and will have real and important impacts on employers and the economy. With the impending retirement of the baby boom generation, employers face the loss of many experienced workers and possibly skill gaps in certain occupations. This could have adverse effects on productivity and economic growth. Furthermore, the expected increasing ratio of the elderly to those of working ages will place added pressure on Social Security and Medicare, both of which face long-term financial problems. Increasing the labor force by encouraging Americans to work longer may be one part of solutions to these problems. Although some people can benefit by remaining in the labor force at later ages, others may be unable or unwilling to do so. For those who are able, there are many factors that influence their choices. These include the eligibility rules of both employer pension plans and Social Security, an individual's health status, the need for health insurance, personal preference, and the employment status of a spouse. The availability of suitable employment, including part-time work or flexible work arrangements, may also affect the retirement and employment choices of older workers. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-148 | gao_T-HEHS-98-148_0 | States Are Expanding Child Care Subsidy Programs for Low-Income Families
In response to welfare reform, the seven states we reviewed are expanding funding for child care programs. States’ ability to meet the anticipated increased demand for child care will depend on future levels of state child care funding as well as on changes in demand for child care subsidies resulting from welfare reform’s work participation requirements. States Are Initiating Efforts to Ensure Adequate Supply of Providers
Welfare and child care program officials in six of the seven states report that with the additional funds available under the CCDF, the supply of child care appears so far to have kept pace with increases in demand. Most States Are Maintaining or Increasing Standards for Child Care Providers
At the same time that states are expanding their programs and attempting to increase supply, they appear to be maintaining child care standards and enforcement practices. Conclusions
deciding who will be served through the programs. In addition, although the seven states have many initiatives under way to expand their supply of child care providers, the outcomes of their efforts are not yet known. Moreover, it is too soon to know what kinds of child care states and parents will rely on as more parents are expected to support themselves through work. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed how child care programs are changing at the state level through the revisions in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, focusing on: (1) how much federal and state funds states are spending on child care subsidy programs and how they are allocating these resources; (2) how states are trying to increase the supply of child care to meet the projected demand under welfare reform; and (3) the extent to which states are changing standards for child care providers in response to the anticipated increased demand under welfare reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its findings provide an early indication that the seven states it reviewed are using additional federal dollars and their own funds to expand their child care programs to serve increasing numbers of welfare recipients required to work and at least some of the working poor; (2) in addition, states are making efforts to further increase the supply of child care by funding initiatives to support and encourage the entrance of new child care providers into the market; (3) at the same time, the states that are expanding their programs and attempting to increase supply appear to be maintaining child care standards and enforcement practices; and (4) however, it is too early to know how effective these efforts will be in meeting the child care needs of low-income families. |
gao_GAO-17-434T | gao_GAO-17-434T_0 | Management and Oversight of Indian Energy Resources and Development
In our prior work, we identified concerns associated with BIA management of energy resources and categorized them into five broad areas: (1) oversight of BIA activities; (2) collaboration and communication; (3) BIA workforce planning; (4) technology; and (5) BIA’s data. In the past 2 years, we issued three reports on Indian energy resources and development in which we made 14 recommendations to BIA. BIA agreed with most of these recommendations, and has identified steps it will take to address some of the recommendations. Oversight of BIA Activities
In a June 2015 report, we found that BIA review and approval is required throughout the development process, including the approval of leases, right-of-way (ROW) agreements, and appraisals. However, BIA does not have a documented process or the data needed to track its review and response times—such as data on the date documents are received, the date the review process is considered complete by the agency, and the date documents are approved or denied. We recommended in our June 2015 report that Interior direct BIA to develop a documented process to track its review and response times. Interior agreed with the recommendation and stated it would try to implement a tracking and monitoring mechanism by the end of fiscal year 2017 for oil and gas leases. However, Interior did not indicate whether it intends to track and monitor its review of other energy-related documents that must be approved before tribes can develop resources. In a November 2016 report, we reported that Interior has recognized the need for collaboration in the regulatory process and described the creation of the Indian Energy Service Center as a center point of collaboration for permitting that will break down barriers between federal agencies. We found that BIA had taken steps to form an Indian Energy Service Center that was intended to, among other things, help expedite the permitting process associated with Indian energy development. However, we found that BIA did not coordinate with other key regulatory agencies, including Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Environmental Protection Agency. We recommended that BIA include other regulatory agencies in the Service Center so that it can act as a single point of contact or a lead agency to coordinate and navigate the regulatory process. Interior agreed with our recommendations and described its plans to address them. BIA Workforce Planning
In our June 2015 report, we found that BIA’s long-standing workforce challenges, such as inadequate staff resources and staff at some offices without the skills needed to effectively review energy-related documents, were factors hindering Indian energy development. We recommended in our November 2016 report that BIA assess critical skills and competencies needed to fulfill its responsibilities related to energy development and identify potential gaps. We also recommended BIA establish a documented process for assessing BIA’s workforce composition at agency offices taking into account BIA’s mission, goals, and tribal priorities. Interior agreed with our recommendations and stated it was taking steps to implement them. In conclusion, our reviews have identified a number of areas in which BIA could improve its management of Indian energy resources. Interior has stated that it intends to take some steps to implement our recommendations, and we will continue to monitor its efforts. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indian tribes and their members hold considerable energy resources and may decide to use these resources to provide economic benefits and improve the well-being of their communities. However, according to a 2014 Interior document, these resources are underdeveloped relative to surrounding non-Indian resources. Development of Indian energy resources is a complex process that may involve federal, tribal, and state agencies. Interior's BIA has primary authority for managing Indian energy development and generally holds final decision-making authority for leases, permits, and other approvals required for development.
GAO's 2017 biennial update to its High Risk List identifies federal management of programs that serve tribes and their members as a new high risk area needing attention by Congress and the executive branch.
This testimony highlights the key findings of three prior GAO reports ( GAO-15-502 , GAO-16-553 , and GAO-17-43 ). It focuses primarily on BIA's management of Indian energy resources and development. For the prior reports, GAO analyzed federal data; reviewed federal, academic, and other literature; and interviewed tribal, federal and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
In three prior reports on Indian energy development, GAO found that the Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has inefficiently managed Indian energy resources and the development process and thereby limited opportunities for tribes and their members to use those resources to create economic benefits and improve the well-being of their communities. GAO has also reported numerous challenges facing Interior's Bureau of Indian Education and BIA and the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Services in administering education and health care services, which put the health and safety of American Indians served by these programs at risk. For the purposes of this testimony, GAO is focusing on the concerns related to Indian energy.
GAO categorized concerns associated with BIA management of energy resources and the development process into several broad areas, including oversight of BIA activities, collaboration, and BIA workforce planning.
Oversight of BIA activities . In a June 2015 report, GAO found that BIA review and approval is required throughout the development process. However, BIA does not have a documented process or the data needed to track its review and response times—such as data on the date documents are received, the date the review process is considered complete, and the date documents are approved or denied. GAO recommended that BIA develop a documented process to track its review and response times. Interior generally agreed and stated it would try to implement a tracking and monitoring mechanism by the end of fiscal year 2017 for oil and gas leases. Interior did not indicate whether it intends to track and monitor its review of other energy-related documents that must be approved before tribes can develop resources.
Collaboration . In a November 2016 report, GAO found that BIA has taken steps to form an Indian Energy Service Center that is intended to, among other things, help expedite the permitting process associated with Indian energy development. However, BIA did not coordinate with key regulatory agencies, including Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service, the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. GAO recommended that BIA include other regulatory agencies in the Service Center so that it can act as a single point of contact or lead agency to coordinate and navigate the regulatory process. Interior agreed with our related recommendation and described plans to address it.
BIA workforce planning . In June 2015 and in November 2016, GAO reported concerns associated with BIA's long-standing workforce challenges, such as inadequate staff resources and staff at some offices without the skills needed to effectively review energy-related documents. GAO recommended that BIA assess critical skills and competencies needed to fulfill its responsibilities related to energy development, and that it establish a documented process for assessing BIA's workforce composition at agency offices. Interior agreed with our recommendations and stated it is taking steps to implement them.
What GAO Recommends
In the past 2 years, GAO issued three reports and made 14 recommendations to BIA to improve its management of Indian energy resources, such as to track its review process, improve collaboration, and conduct workforce planning. BIA agreed with most recommendations and identified some steps it intends to take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-08-895T | gao_GAO-08-895T_0 | In a 1997 interim rule, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) reduced the number of acceptable work eligibility documents from 29 to 27. As of April 2008, more than 61,000 employers have registered to use the program, about 28,000 of whom were active users, according to USCIS. If participation in the E-Verify program were made mandatory, the program would have to accommodate all of the estimated 7.4 million employers in the United States. USCIS has developed cost and staffing estimates for operating a mandatory E-Verify program. Although DHS has not prepared official cost figures, USCIS officials estimated that a mandatory E-Verify program could cost a total of about $765 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2012 if only newly hired employees are queried through the program and about $838 million over the same 4-year period if both newly hired and current employees are queried. Mandatory implementation of E-Verify would also require additional USCIS staff to administer the program, but USCIS was not yet able to provide estimates for its staffing needs. SSA has estimated that implementation of a mandatory E-Verify program would cost a total of about $281 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and require hiring 700 new employees for a total of 2,325 additional workyears over the same 5-year period. USCIS and SSA Are Implementing Plans to Reduce Delays and Improve Efficiency in the E-Verify Process
In prior work, we reported that secondary verifications lengthen the time needed to complete the employment verification process. The majority of E-Verify queries entered by employers—about 92 percent—confirm the employee is authorized to work within seconds. With regard to the SSA tentative nonconfirmations, USCIS officials told us that the majority of erroneous tentative nonconfirmations occur because employees’ citizenship status or other information, such as name changes, is not up to date in the SSA database, generally because individuals have not notified SSA of information changes that occurred. If the employee’s information matched information in DHS’s databases and the databases showed that the person was a naturalized U.S. citizen, E-Verify would confirm the employee as work authorized. In addition USCIS and SSA are exploring options for updating SSA records with naturalization information from DHS records. Although this could help to further reduce the number of SSA tentative nonconfirmations, USCIS and SSA are still in the planning stages, and implementation of this initiative may require significant policy and technical considerations, such as how to link records in SSA and DHS databases that are stored according to different identifiers. These efforts may help improve the efficiency of the verification process. USCIS has Identified Areas where E-Verify is Vulnerable to Fraud, but Proposed Actions Do Not Address All Types of Fraud and Raise Privacy Concerns
In our prior work, we reported that E-Verify enhances the ability of participating employers to reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility. However, the current E-Verify program cannot help employers detect forms of identity fraud, such as cases in which an individual presents genuine documents that are borrowed or stolen because the system will verify an employee when the information entered matches DHS and SSA records, even if the information belongs to another person. The use of the photograph screening tool is currently limited because newly hired employees who are queried through the E-Verify system and present documentation other than green cards or employment authorization documents to verify work eligibility—about 95 percent of E- Verify queries—are not subject to the tool. Expansion of the photograph screening tool would require incorporating other forms of documentation with related databases that store photographic information, such as passports issued by the Department of State and driver’s licenses issued by states. USCIS reported that it is working to address these issues by, for example, conducting education and outreach activities about the E-Verify program. USCIS and ICE are also negotiating an MOU to define roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for sharing and using E-Verify information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, now within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) began operating a voluntary pilot program, recently named the E-Verify program, to provide participating employers with a means for electronically verifying employees' work eligibility. Legislation has been introduced in Congress to require all employers to electronically verify the work authorization status of their employees. In this statement GAO provides observations on the E-Verify system's capacity and costs, options for reducing delays and improving efficiency in the verification process, ability to detect fraudulent documents and identity theft, and vulnerability to employer fraud and misuse. This statement is based on GAO's products issued from August 2005 through June 2007 and updated information obtained from DHS and SSA in April 2008. We analyzed data on employer use, E-Verify guidance, and other reports on the employment verification process, as well as legislative proposals and regulations.
What GAO Found
A mandatory E-Verify program would necessitate an increased capacity at both U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and SSA to accommodate the estimated 7.4 million employers in the United States. According to USCIS, as of April 2008, more than 61,000 employers have registered for E-Verify, and about half are active users. Although DHS has not prepared official cost figures, USCIS officials estimated that a mandatory E-Verify program could cost a total of about $765 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2012 if only newly hired employees are queried through the program and about $838 million over the same 4-year period if both newly hired and current employees are queried. USCIS has estimated that it would need additional staff for a mandatory E-Verify program, but was not yet able to provide estimates for its staffing needs. SSA has estimated that implementation of a mandatory E-Verify program would cost a total of about $281 million and require hiring 700 new employees for a total of 2,325 additional workyears for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. USCIS and SSA are exploring options to reduce delays and improve efficiency in the E-Verify process. The majority of E-Verify queries entered by employers--about 92 percent--confirm within seconds that the employee is work-authorized. About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed as work authorized by SSA, and about 1 percent cannot be immediately confirmed as work authorized by USCIS because employees' information queried through the system does not match information in SSA or DHS databases. The majority of SSA erroneous tentative nonconfirmations occur because employees' citizenship or other information, such as name changes, is not up to date in the SSA database, generally because individuals do not request that SSA make these updates. USCIS and SSA are planning to implement initiatives to help address these weaknesses and reduce delays. E-Verify may help employers detect fraudulent documents thereby reducing such fraud, but it cannot yet fully address identity fraud issues, for example when employees present genuine documents that may be stolen. USCIS has added a photograph screening tool to E-Verify through which an employer verifies the authenticity of certain documents, such as an employment authorization document, by matching the photograph on the document with the photograph in DHS databases. USCIS is exploring options to expand this tool to include other forms of documentation, such as passports, with databases that store photographic information, but these efforts are in the planning stages and require decisions about data sharing and privacy issues. E-Verify is vulnerable to acts of employer fraud and misuse, such as employers limiting employees' pay during the E-Verify process. USCIS has established a branch to review employers' use of E-Verify. In addition, information suggesting employers' fraud or misuse can be useful to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in targeting worksite enforcement resources. USCIS and ICE are negotiating a memorandum of understanding to define roles and responsibilities for sharing information. |
gao_GAO-09-430T | gao_GAO-09-430T_0 | Census data are used to apportion seats in the Congress, redraw congressional districts, allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance to state and local governments, and for numerous other public and private sector purposes. Finally, the decennial census is a shared national undertaking, where Congress; other federal agencies; state, local, and tribal governments; nonprofit and private organizations; and, ultimately, the American public, all play vital roles in securing a complete and accurate population tally. Providing Reliable Cost Estimates and Justifications for Spending as 2010 Approaches Presents a Major Challenge for the Bureau
Accurate cost estimates are essential to a successful census because they help ensure that the Bureau has adequate funds, and so that Congress, the administration, and the Bureau itself can have reliable information on which to base or advise decisions. However, as we have reported before, the Bureau has insufficient policies and procedures and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-quality cost estimation for the decennial census. The Bureau goes to great lengths to develop a quality address list and maps, working with the U.S. The Bureau will send thousands of temporary census workers, known as listers, into the field to collect and verify address information and update maps on-site, including verifying address updates provided through the LUCA program. Performance of Handheld Computers Have Improved in Field Testing, but More Information Is Needed to Evaluate Readiness for Address Canvassing
A nationwide address canvassing operation for the 2010 Census is scheduled to begin this spring, when listers will use handheld computers for the first time to collect address data. This is an important and noteworthy development. Nonetheless, more information is needed to determine the Bureau’s overall readiness for address canvassing as the field test was not an end- to-end systems evaluation, did not validate all address canvassing requirements, such as training and help desk support, and did not include urban areas. The Bureau was to conduct a review of the readiness of the handheld computers in January 2009, but has not yet reported the results of that review. Bureau Needs to Finalize Field Data Collection Plans
The Bureau’s largest and most costly field operation is nonresponse follow-up. In May 2008, the Bureau issued a plan that covered major components of the paper-based nonresponse follow-up. Because this plan serves as a road map for monitoring the development and implementation of nonresponse follow-up, it will be important for the Bureau to complete this plan. Although the Bureau has carried out a paper-based follow-up operation in past decennials, the 2010 Census includes new procedures and system interfaces that have not been tested under census-like conditions because they were dropped from the dress rehearsal. The Bureau has strengthened aspects of its risk management process. For example, in July 2008, the Bureau identified 31 nonresponse follow-up risks, such as lower than expected enumerator productivity. 3). Further, the Bureau has not yet fully defined how OCS will work together with other systems. Managing and Testing of Information Technology Systems Remain a Concern
Since 2005, we have reported on weaknesses in the Bureau’s management of its IT acquisitions, and we remain concerned about the Bureau’s IT management and testing of key 2010 Census systems. At your request, we reviewed the status and plans of testing of key 2010 Census systems. As stated in our report, which we are releasing today, we found that the Bureau has made progress in conducting systems, integration, and end-to-end testing, but critical testing still remains to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 Census, and the planning, execution, and monitoring of its testing needs much improvement. Concluding Observations
In summary, little more than a year remains until Census Day. Addressing these risks and challenges will be critical to the timely completion of a cost-effective census, and it will be essential for the Bureau to develop plans for testing systems and procedures not included in the dress rehearsal, and for Congress to monitor the Bureau’s progress. 2010 Census: The Bureau’s Plans for Reducing the Undercount Show Promise, but Key Uncertainties Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of problems with the performance of handheld computers used to collect data. The U.S. Census Bureau has since strengthened its risk management efforts and made other improvements; however, the Bureau curtailed a dress rehearsal scheduled for 2008 and was unable to test key operations under census-like conditions. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for 2010 and covers: (1) importance of reliable cost estimates; (2) building a complete and accurate address list; (3) following up on missing and conflicting responses to ensure accuracy; (4) targeting outreach to undercounted populations; and (5) designing, testing, and implementing technology for the census. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
The decennial census is an inherently fragile undertaking, requiring many moving parts to come together in a short time frame. For example, accurate cost estimates help ensure that the Bureau has adequate funds, and that Congress, the administration, and the Bureau itself have reliable information on which to base advice and decisions. However, as GAO has reported before, the Bureau has insufficient policies and procedures and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-quality cost estimation for the decennial census. A successful census requires a complete and accurate address list. The Bureau sends thousands of census workers (listers) into the field to collect and verify address information, and this year for the first time, listers will use handheld computers to collect data. During the dress rehearsal there were significant technical problems. A small-scale field test showed that these problems appear to have been addressed; however, the test was not carried out under full census-like conditions and did not validate all address canvassing requirements. Nonresponse follow-up, the Bureau's largest and most costly field operation, was initially planned to be conducted using the handheld computers, but was recently changed to a paper-based system due to technology issues. The Bureau has not yet developed a road map for monitoring the development and implementation of nonresponse follow-up under the new design. Such a plan is essential to conducting a successful nonresponse follow-up. Furthermore, the system that manages the flow of work in field offices is not yet developed. Lacking plans for the development of both nonresponse follow-up and this management system, the Bureau faces the risk of not having them developed and fully tested in time for the 2010 Census. In an effort to reduce the undercount, the Bureau is implementing a program of paid advertising integrated with other communications strategies, such as partnerships with state, local, and tribal governments and community organizations. Moving toward 2010, the Bureau faces long-standing challenges with the nation's linguistic diversity and privacy concerns, which can contribute to the undercounting of some groups. Since 2005, GAO has reported concerns with the Bureau's management and testing of key IT systems. GAO is reviewing the status and plans for the testing of key 2010 Census systems, and while the Bureau has made progress in conducting systems, integration, and end-to-end testing, critical testing still remains to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 Census, and the planning for the testing needs much improvement. In short, while the Bureau has made some noteworthy progress in gearing up for the enumeration, with just over a year remaining until census day, uncertainties surround the Bureau's overall readiness for 2010. |
gao_GAO-01-924 | gao_GAO-01-924_0 | Almost Half of the States Have Some Type of Family Cap Policy; Goals of the Family Cap Policy Include Reducing Out-of-Wedlock Births and Increasing Self- Sufficiency
Twenty-three states, covering approximately 52 percent of the TANF caseload nationwide, have adopted the family cap policy in some form. In these states a family’s cash grant is not increased by any amount with the birth of an additional child. Additional Resources Are Available to Capped- Benefit Families in Some States
Four states with a family cap on benefits give families vouchers equal to the traditional cash benefit increase they would have received in the absence of a cap. About 108,000 Families Had Their Cash Benefits Capped in an Average Month
Based on responses of 20 states with family cap policies, about 108,000 families receiving TANF had their benefits affected by the family cap, in an average month during 2000. Several factors, including family earnings and other resources, such as receipt of child support, influence the amount of cash benefits a family receives. These families had more than one child whose benefits were affected by the cap. Existing Studies Cannot Be Used to Cite Conclusive Evidence About the Impact of the Family Cap on Out-of- Wedlock Births
Due to limitations of the existing research, we cannot conclude that family cap policies reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births, affect the number of abortions, or change the size of the TANF caseload. The Effects of Welfare Policy and the Economic Expansion on Welfare Caseloads: An Update. | What GAO Found
To reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies among welfare recipients, some states have imposed family caps on welfare benefits. One factor that determines the amount of cash benefits a family receives is the family's size--larger families receive more benefits. In states with a family cap policy, however, no additional cash benefits are provided with the birth of another. Twenty-three states have implemented some variation of a family cap, breaking the traditional link between a family's size and the amount of its monthly welfare check. Generally, these states implemented family cap policies as part of their welfare reforms to reduce out-of-wedlock births and to encourage self-sufficiency. During an average month in 2000, 20 of the 23 family cap states reported that about 108,000 families received less in cash benefits than they would have in the absence of state-imposed family cap policies. In an average month, about nine percent of welfare families in these states had their benefits affected by the family cap. A family's welfare benefits are affected by several factors, including earnings and receipt of child support. Therefore, states were unable to report the precise effect of the family cap on benefits. Because of limitations of the existing research, GAO cannot conclude that family cap policies reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births, affect the number of abortions, or change the size of the welfare caseload. |
gao_GAO-14-119 | gao_GAO-14-119_0 | Background
DHS and DOJ Components in Our Review with Firearm- Carrying Personnel
DHS and DOJ have several components with law enforcement functions whose personnel are authorized to carry firearms in support of accomplishing their respective missions. As of October 2013, DHS said these plans are in the development stage. DHS’s Ammunition Purchases Have Declined in Recent Years and Vary Based on Numerous Factors; Annual Ammunition Purchases are Comparable to DOJ’s
In fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased 84 million rounds of ammunition for its authorized firearm-carrying workforce, which is less than DHS’s ammunition purchases each year over the past 5 fiscal years. DHS ammunition purchases are driven primarily by the firearms training and qualification requirements for the firearm-carrying workforce, though other factors are also considered by DHS when making ammunition purchase decisions. DHS’s ammunition purchases over the 6-year period equate to an average of 1,200 rounds of ammunition purchased per agent or officer per year.The annual total cost for these ammunition purchases ranged from $19 million to $34 million per year, with an average of $29 million for the 6- year time period. Other factors that account for changes in ammunition purchases year to year include qualification and training requirements and amount of ammunition in inventory, as discussed later in this report. We analyzed DHS data on ammunition purchases and the size of the firearm-carrying workforce for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 and found the average number of rounds of ammunition purchased per year per firearm-carrying agent or officer by component for this time period ranged between approximately 1,000 and 2,000 rounds, as shown in table 2. Training and qualification requirements vary for the components in our review, as do the number of rounds of ammunition typically used for training and qualification purposes. DHS Qualification and Training Requirements
DHS’s more than 70,000 firearm-carrying personnel have qualification requirements they must fulfill to ensure firearms proficiency. According to our analysis of estimated ammunition usage data provided by DHS components, for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, DHS components in our review estimated using, on average, approximately 110 million rounds of ammunition per fiscal year, with a high of about 141 million rounds in fiscal year 2009 to a low of about 89 million rounds in fiscal year 2013 (see figure 4). As stated earlier, there can be months-long delays between placing an order for ammunition and receiving it. To help ensure components have sufficient ammunition on hand to support the training and operational needs of their officers, DHS components maintain inventories of ammunition. For DOJ components, the average number of rounds of ammunition purchased per authorized firearm-carrying agent or officer per year across fiscal years 2011 through 2013 was approximately 1,300 rounds. Ammunition inventory data provided by two of the three DOJ components indicated that inventory ranged from about 13 months’ worth to about 20 months’ worth.DHS components. What are the trends in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, what factors affect its purchase decisions, and how do DHS’s purchases compare with those of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)? What policies and guidance does DHS have for managing firearms and ammunition inventories? To determine any trends in DHS’s ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, we obtained available data from DHS law enforcement components with firearm-carrying personnel regarding their ammunition purchases, costs, usage, and the size of the authorized firearm-carrying workforce for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS and its components have homeland security and law enforcement missions that require agents and officers to carry and be proficient in the use of firearms. DHS has more than 70,000 firearm-carrying personnel—the most of any department. DOJ has the next largest with approximately 69,000 firearm-carrying personnel. GAO was asked to examine DHS's ammunition purchases and management of ammunition and firearms. This report addresses trends in DHS's ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, how DHS's purchases compare with DOJ's, and what factors affect DHS's purchase decisions. GAO analyzed data from six DHS and three DOJ components that have law enforcement missions, require agents and officers to carry firearms, and purchase ammunition themselves or through their respective departments. Specifically, GAO analyzed data on ammunition purchases, usage, costs, and inventories, among other things, for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 for DHS, and for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 for DOJ. GAO assessed the reliability of these data and found them sufficiently reliable. Data on DOJ ammunition purchases prior to fiscal year 2011 were not readily available; therefore, GAO excluded them, as discussed in the report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) annual ammunition purchases have declined since fiscal year 2009 and are comparable in number to the Department of Justice's (DOJ) ammunition purchases. In fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased 84 million rounds of ammunition, which is less than DHS's ammunition purchases over the past 5 fiscal years, as shown in the figure below. DHS component officials said the decline in ammunition purchases in fiscal year 2013 was primarily a result of budget constraints, which meant reducing the number of training classes, and drawing on their ammunition inventories. From fiscal years 2008 through 2013, DHS purchased an average of 109 million rounds of ammunition for training, qualification, and operational needs, according to DHS data. DHS's ammunition purchases over the 6-year period equates to an average of 1,200 rounds purchased per firearm-carrying agent or officer per year. Over the past 3 fiscal years (2011-2013), DHS purchased an average of 1,000 rounds per firearm-carrying agent or officer and selected DOJ components purchased 1,300 rounds per firearm-carrying agent or officer.
DHS ammunition purchases are driven primarily by firearm training and qualification requirements. Most DHS firearm-carrying personnel are required to qualify four times per year, though requirements vary by component, as do the number of rounds of ammunition typically used for training and qualification. DHS components also reported considering other factors when making ammunition purchase decisions, such as changes in firearms, usage rates, and ammunition inventories. DHS components maintain inventories of ammunition to help ensure they have sufficient ammunition for the training and operational needs of their officers, as there can be months-long delays between placing an order for ammunition and receiving it. As of October 2013, DHS estimates it had approximately 159 million rounds in inventory, enough to last about 22 months to meet the training and operational needs of its firearm-carrying personnel. Ammunition inventory data provided by DOJ components indicated that inventory ranged from about 13 months' worth to about 20 months' worth.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-749 | gao_GAO-04-749_0 | Breaches of the fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries with respect to proxy voting could arise when a fiduciary has a conflict of interest. Business Relationships and Limited Disclosure of Votes Can Make Proxy Voting Vulnerable to Conflicts
Some experts we interviewed said that conflicts of interest exist in the proxy voting system and limited disclosure makes proxy voting vulnerable to conflicts of interest. Because of this lack of transparency, participants do not have the information needed to raise questions regarding whether proxy votes were cast solely in their interest. When a portion of a company’s pension plan assets are invested in its own company stock, the proxy voter may be particularly vulnerable to conflicts of interest because management has the ability to directly influence its voting decisions and, since company stock held in the company’s own pension plan is typically managed internally, the proxy voter may at times be more concerned about their own interests. Some plans also disclose a record of all their votes cast to participants and the public. Some pension plans also put additional procedures and structural protections in place to help manage conflicts. As a result, proxy voters have clear direction on how to vote on a specific voting issue. Some Fiduciaries Have Voluntarily Taken Additional Steps to Manage Conflicts of Interest
Some plan fiduciaries have voluntarily taken additional steps to help manage conflicts of interest that may lead to breaches of fiduciary duty, including implementing structural protections and special proxy voting procedures. In other cases, some fiduciaries use independent proxy-voting firms for research and analysis or to cast proxy votes on their behalf. First, participant complaints about voting conflicts are infrequent, at least in part, because votes cast by a fiduciary or proxy voter generally are not disclosed; therefore, participants and others are not likely to raise questions regarding whether a vote may not have been cast solely in their interest. In addition, for the department, ERISA presents legal challenges for bringing proxy voting cases. Furthermore, even if such evidence could be obtained, monetary damages are difficult to value and, because the department has no statutory authority to impose a penalty without assessing damages, fiduciary penalties are difficult to impose. In part, because of these challenges, but also because of its limited resources, DOL’s reviews of proxy voting in recent years have been limited. Because a plan fiduciary’s vote requires judgment, determining what influenced his or her vote can be difficult. Proving a fiduciary breach requires evidence that the plan fiduciary was influenced in the voting by something other than the interests of plan participants. Likewise, a few plan sponsors have hired independent fiduciaries to manage company stock in their pension plans. DOL’s role in enforcing ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, including proxy voting requirements, is essential to ensuring that plan fiduciaries are voting solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. Matters for Congressional Consideration
If the Congress wishes to better protect the interest of plan participants and increase the transparency of proxy voting practices by plan fiduciaries, it should amend ERISA to require that plan fiduciaries develop and maintain written proxy-voting guidelines; include language in voting guidelines on what actions the fiduciaries will take in the event of a conflict of interest; and given SEC’s proxy vote disclosure requirements for mutual funds, annually disclose votes as well as voting guidelines to plan participants, beneficiaries, and possibly also to the public. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, about 100 million Americans were covered in private pension plans with assets totaling about $4 trillion. The retirement security of plan participants can be affected by how certain issues are voted on during company stockholders meetings. Fiduciaries, having responsibility for voting on such issues on behalf of some plan participants (proxy voting), are to act solely in the interest of participants. Recent corporate scandals reveal that fiduciaries can be faced with conflicts of interest that could lead them to breach this duty. Because of the potential adverse effects such a breach may have on retirement plan assets, we were asked to describe (1) conflicts of interest in the proxy voting system, (2) actions taken to manage them, and (3) DOL's enforcement of proxy voting requirements.
What GAO Found
Conflicts of interest in proxy voting can occur because various business relationships exist, which can influence a fiduciary's vote. When a portion of a company's pension plan assets are invested in its own company stock, the internal proxy voter may be particularly vulnerable to conflicts of interest because management has an enhanced ability to directly influence their voting decisions. Although situations representing conflicts will occur, limited disclosure of proxy voting guidelines and votes may make proxy voting more vulnerable to such conflicts. Because of limited transparency, concerned parties do not have the information needed to raise questions regarding whether proxy votes were cast solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. Some plan fiduciaries and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have taken steps to help manage conflicts of interest in proxy voting. Specifically, some plans voluntarily maintain detailed proxy voting guidelines that give proxy voters clear direction on how to vote on certain issues. The SEC has imposed new proxy voting regulations on mutual funds and investment advisers, requiring that specific language be included in the fund's guidelines on how fiduciaries will handle conflicts of interest. Some plan fiduciaries voluntarily make their guidelines available to participants and the public. In addition, some plans voluntarily disclose some or all of their proxy votes to participants and the public. Some plans also voluntarily put additional procedures in place to protect proxy voters from conflicts of interest in order to avoid breaches of fiduciary duty. For example, some plan sponsors hire independent fiduciaries to manage employer stock in their pension plans and vote the proxies associated with those stock. Plans may also hire proxy-voting firms to cast proxies to ensure that they are made solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries. DOL's enforcement of proxy voting requirements has been limited for several reasons. First, participant complaints about voting conflicts are infrequent, at least in part, because votes cast by a plan fiduciary or proxy voter generally are not disclosed; therefore, participants and others are not likely to have information they need to raise questions regarding whether a vote has been cast solely in their interest. Second, for DOL, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 presents legal challenges for bringing cases such that it is often difficult to obtain evidence that the fiduciary was influenced in his or her voting by something other than the sole interests of plan participants. Finally, even if such evidence existed, monetary damages are difficult to value and fines are difficult to impose. And, DOL has no statutory authority to impose a penalty without first assessing damages and securing a monetary recovery. In part, because of these challenges, DOL has devoted few resources to enforcing proxy voting by plans. |
gao_GAO-09-228 | gao_GAO-09-228_0 | SBA’s primary guidance for the 7(a) program outlines six reasons lenders can use to substantiate that a borrower cannot obtain credit elsewhere. Together, the statute, regulations, and guidance allow lenders to use their own conventional lending policies to determine which borrowers need an SBA guarantee. Lenders Cite Similar Reasons to Substantiate Credit Elsewhere Decisions
Using information collected from 238 recently approved 7(a) loan files from 18 lenders, we found that the most common reasons lenders cited to substantiate that borrowers could not obtain credit elsewhere were (1) that the business needed a longer maturity than the lender’s policy permitted, (2) that the borrower’s collateral did not meet the lender’s policies, and (3) that the lender’s policies did not normally allow loans to new businesses or businesses in the applicant’s industry (see table 1). SBA requires lenders to explain in a borrower’s loan file why the borrower could not obtain credit elsewhere on reasonable terms, but its guidance does not provide specific information on what lenders should include in their explanations. Guidance on Documenting Credit Elsewhere Decisions Is Limited
Internal control standards for federal agencies and programs state that good guidance (information and communication) is a key component of a strong internal control framework. Although SBA’s guidance requires lenders to document the reasons that borrowers cannot obtain credit elsewhere, it does not specify what exactly lenders should include in their explanations. We analyzed reports from all the on-site lender reviews SBA conducted during a six-quarter period from October 2006 to March 2008 and found that 31 of the 97 lenders reviewed did not consistently document that borrowers met the credit elsewhere requirement or personal resources test. Lenders’ Documentation of Credit Elsewhere Decisions Generally Was Not Specific Enough to Reasonably Support the Determination That Borrowers Could Not Obtain Credit Elsewhere
Although all but one of the lenders we visited documented their credit elsewhere decisions in some way, our review of documentation provided to support credit elsewhere decisions in 238 loan files showed that most lenders did not provide detailed information on why borrowers could not obtain credit elsewhere. For instance, a number of lenders we met with used a checklist to document their credit elsewhere decisions. Given the broad authority granted to lenders, more information specific to the borrower’s or the lender’s financial condition would help support the lender’s assessment that the borrower could not obtain credit elsewhere. Conclusions
The 7(a) program is intended to serve creditworthy small business borrowers who cannot obtain credit through a conventional lender at reasonable terms and do not have the personal resources to provide it themselves. Absent detailed guidance on what exactly SBA wants lenders to document in their credit elsewhere determinations, lenders will likely continue to offer limited information in their files, making meaningful oversight of compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement difficult. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) describe SBA’s criteria for determining that borrowers cannot obtain credit elsewhere and practices lenders employ to determine that borrowers cannot obtain credit elsewhere and (2) examine SBA’s efforts to ensure that lenders are complying with the credit elsewhere provision. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) 7(a) program is intended to provide loan guarantees to small business borrowers who cannot obtain conventional credit at reasonable terms and do not have the personal resources to provide financing themselves. In fiscal year 2008, SBA guaranteed over 69,000 loans valued at about $13 billion. To assist in oversight of the 7(a) program, GAO was asked to (1) describe SBA's criteria and lenders' practices for determining that borrowers cannot obtain credit elsewhere and (2) examine SBA's efforts to ensure that lenders are complying with the credit elsewhere provision. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed applicable statutes and guidance, visited 18 lenders and reviewed 238 of their loan files, reviewed 97 on-site lender review reports, and interviewed SBA officials. GAO's samples of lenders and loan files were not generalizable.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Act and 7(a) program regulations and guidance allow lenders to use their conventional lending practices to determine whether borrowers can obtain credit elsewhere at reasonable terms. On the basis of a review of 238 loan files at 18 lenders, GAO observed that the most common reasons these lenders cited to substantiate that borrowers could not obtain credit elsewhere were that the borrower needed a longer maturity than the lender's policy permitted and the borrower's collateral did not meet the lender's requirements. These factors are two of the six listed in SBA's guidance as acceptable to substantiate that a borrower could not obtain conventional credit. SBA has issued little guidance on how lenders should document in their files that borrowers could not obtain credit elsewhere. Internal control standards for federal agencies specify that good guidance (information and communication) is necessary to help ensure the proper implementation of program rules. While SBA's guidance requires lenders to explain why the borrower could not obtain credit elsewhere in the loan file, it does not specify what exactly lenders should include in their explanations. Between October 2006 and March 2008, SBA reviewed 97 lenders and determined that 31 of them had failed to consistently document that borrowers met the credit elsewhere requirement or personal resources test. All but one of the lenders with whom GAO met documented their credit elsewhere decisions in some way; however, given the broad authority granted to lenders, the explanations were generally not specific enough to reasonably support the lender's conclusion that borrowers could not obtain credit elsewhere. A number of these lenders used a checklist that simply listed the six acceptable reasons cited in SBA's guidance for substantiating that a borrower could not obtain credit elsewhere and did not prompt them to provide more information specific to the borrower--for example, details on insufficient collateral. Absent detailed guidance on what exactly SBA wants lenders to document in their credit elsewhere determinations, lenders likely will continue to offer limited information in their files, making meaningful oversight of compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement difficult. |
gao_GAO-04-191T | gao_GAO-04-191T_0 | No Comprehensive Data Were Available on the Uses and Prevalence of Business-Owned Life Insurance
Neither federal nor state regulators collected comprehensive data on the uses and prevalence of business-owned life insurance. However, businesses may choose to fund such future costs using life insurance, thereby becoming eligible for tax-free policy earnings and tax-free death benefit payments on the policies. Federal bank regulators did not collect comprehensive data on the uses and prevalence of business-owned life insurance by banks and thrifts, although they collected some financial information on such policies as part of monitoring the safety and soundness of individual institutions. Our preliminary results indicated that about one-third of banks and thrifts, including many of the largest institutions, disclosed the value of their business-owned life insurance holdings as of December 31, 2002, either voluntarily or because they met the reporting threshold. The federal securities laws that SEC administers are designed to protect investors by requiring public companies to disclose information that is “material” to investors in their financial statements—that is, according to SEC, information that an investor would consider important in deciding whether to buy or sell a security or in making a voting decision related to a security that the investor owns. IRS officials told us that the agency has not collected comprehensive information on the value of or income from business-owned life insurance policies, and agency officials said that they do not need this information. In an effort to compile more comprehensive data on business-owned life insurance, we worked with the representatives of six insurance companies and the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) to develop a survey of the uses and prevalence of business-owned life insurance sales. Although the insurance companies’ representatives cooperated in a pretest of the survey, and ACLI representatives said that they would encourage their members to participate in the survey itself, the results of the pretest led us to conclude that we would not be able to obtain sufficiently reliable data to allow us to conduct the survey. They said that insurers do not routinely summarize information on the numbers of policies and insured individuals, cash surrender value of policies, and uses of business-owned life insurance. Some businesses included anecdotal information about how they intended to use business-owned life insurance in the annual financial statements they filed with SEC. Some businesses have also provided survey responses on their uses of business-owned life insurance to fund executive benefit plans. Regulators Had Guidelines or Requirements Applicable to Business-Owned Life Insurance but Did Not Identify Significant Regulatory Concerns
The federal bank regulators, SEC, the IRS, and state insurance regulators had guidelines or requirements applicable to business-owned life insurance but did not identify significant regulatory concerns. Bank regulatory officials said that their agencies were monitoring these institutions’ levels of holdings, had conducted preliminary reviews or detailed examinations, and concluded that major supervisory concerns do not exist. SEC officials said that the agency’s regulations for public companies do not specifically address business-owned life insurance; rather, SEC has relied on its broadly applicable disclosure requirements to surface any investor protection concerns. However, they said that, to date, such problems have not arisen, and they have not had investor-protection concerns about public companies holding such insurance. The IRS had some requirements related to the tax treatment of business- owned life insurance. The Internal Revenue Code defines life insurance for tax purposes and sets out the current limitations on permissible tax deductions that businesses can claim for the interest on policy loans against life insurance policies. Federal laws and IRS regulations have changed some aspects of the tax treatment of business-owned life insurance. However, most of these states exempted group life insurance policies from consent requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Business-owned life insurance is held by employers on the lives of their employees, and the employer is the beneficiary of these policies. Unless prohibited by state law, businesses can retain ownership of these policies regardless of whether the employment relationship has ended. Generally, business-owned life insurance is permanent, lasting for the life of the employee and accumulating cash value as it provides coverage. Attractive features of business-owned life insurance, which are common to all permanent life insurance, generally include both tax-free accumulation of earnings on the policies' cash value and tax-free receipt of the death benefit. To address concerns that businesses were abusing their ability to deduct interest expenses on loans taken against the value of their policies, Congress passed legislation to limit this practice, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Justice pursued litigation against some businesses. But concerns have remained regarding employers' ability to benefit from insuring their employees' lives. This testimony provides some preliminary information from ongoing GAO work on (1) the uses and prevalence of business-owned life insurance and (2) federal and state regulatory requirements for and oversight of business-owned life insurance.
What GAO Found
GAO's preliminary work indicated that no comprehensive data are available on the uses of business-owned life insurance policies; however, businesses can purchase these policies to fund current and future employee benefits and receive tax advantages in the process. Federal bank regulators have collected some financial information on banks' and thrifts' business-owned life insurance holdings, but the data are not comprehensive and do not address the uses of the policies. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the IRS, state insurance regulators, and insurance companies told GAO that they generally have not collected comprehensive data on the sales or purchases of these policies or on their intended uses, because they have not had a need for such data in fulfilling their regulatory missions. In an effort to collect comprehensive data, GAO considered surveying insurance companies about their sales of business-owned life insurance. However, based on a pretest with six insurance companies, GAO determined that it would not be able to obtain sufficiently reliable data to allow it to conduct a survey. GAO found, however, that some insurers have voluntarily disclosed information about sales of business-owned policies and that some noninsurance businesses have included examples of their uses in annual financial reports filed with SEC. As part of their responsibility to oversee the safety and soundness of banks and thrifts, the federal bank regulators have issued guidelines for institutions that buy business-owned life insurance. Also, they told GAO that they have reviewed the holdings of many institutions with significant amounts of business-owned life insurance and concluded that major supervisory concerns do not exist. SEC officials said that the agency has not issued specific requirements for holders of business-owned life insurance, relying instead on its broadly applicable requirement that public companies disclose information material to investors in their financial statements; SEC did not have investor protection concerns about public firms holding business-owned life insurance. The IRS had some requirements related to the tax treatment of business-owned life insurance and expressed some concerns about compliance with these requirements. State laws governing business-owned life insurance differed; the four states' regulators that GAO interviewed described some limited oversight of the policies, and these regulators and NAIC reported no problems with them. |
gao_GAO-04-836 | gao_GAO-04-836_0 | Structural Changes Have Altered Historical Industry Trends
Since 1998, the U.S. airline industry has faced internal changes that have fundamentally altered the domestic airline industry. 1). 2). The decline in business fares is another factor that has contributed to the financial problems of the industry. 7). In Response to Challenges, Legacy Airlines Reduced Costs and Cut Capacity, While Low Cost Airlines’ Total Costs Increased Due to Capacity Expansion
To meet the many challenges of the last several years, airlines have sought to cut costs, enhance revenues, and obtain the assistance of the federal government. Airlines used the $2.3 billion in security assistance provided under the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act to fund their security and operating costs, with 75 percent of the assistance going to the seven legacy airlines. Legacy airlines reported that they expected to reduce operating costs by about $19.5 billion through December 31, 2003, or 96 percent of this total. Actual Cost Cutting by Airlines Differed
Legacy airlines cut operating expenses by $12.7 billion between October 1, 2001, and December 31, 2003. Legacy Airlines’ Financial Condition Has Deteriorated Relative to Low Cost Airlines
The financial condition of U.S. airlines since 2000 has followed two very different paths. Meanwhile, low cost airlines continue to expand market share, enjoy a greater unit cost advantage over legacy airlines than they did in 2000, and in all but one quarter have collectively earned a profit. The weak performance of the legacy airlines over the last 3 years has significantly diminished their financial condition; as a result, some of these airlines are vulnerable to bankruptcy, especially if there are additional shocks to the industry. While the operating margin for legacy airlines recovered in 2003 from its post- September 11 low, and losses in 2003 are not as great as in 2002, these airlines have experienced operating losses in all quarters but one since September 11, 2001.Meanwhile, low cost airlines maintained a positive operating margin between 2001 and 2003, with the exception of the fourth quarter of 2001—the immediate aftermath of September 11. Legacy carriers continued to serve nearly all of these markets, but they carried fewer passengers in 2003 than in 1998, and their overall share decreased. Increased competition in domestic air service is largely attributable to the growth of low cost airlines, which increased the number of markets served from 1,594 in 1998 to 2,304 in 2003, an increase of 44.5 percent (see fig. 26). Meanwhile, low cost airlines are using their cost advantage to expand their market share and challenge legacy airlines like never before. The total number of enplanements in the U.S. airline industry during 2003 was 647,761,545. To assess the measures taken by airlines to remain financially viable, we relied on a variety of sources. The Act and its accompanying conference report tasked airlines with providing us with a plan demonstrating how they would reduce their operating expenses by 10 percent. To determine how the competitiveness of the U.S. airline industry has changed since 1998, we obtained and stratified DOT quarterly data on the top 5,000 city-pair markets for calendar years 1998 through 2003 and then determined shifts in competitive factors overall and for markets with and without low cost airlines as well as for legacy and low cost airlines. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the U.S. airline industry has confronted financial losses of previously unseen proportions. From 2001 to 2003, the industry lost $23 billion, and two of the nation's biggest airlines have gone into bankruptcy. To assist airlines, the Congress provided U.S. airlines with $7 billion of direct financial assistance--most recently in the form of $2.4 billion of financial assistance under the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act. Under the Act and its accompanying conference report, the conferees directed GAO to review measures taken by airlines to reduce costs, improve revenues and profits, and strengthen their balance sheets. The Congress also tasked airlines receiving assistance to report their cost-cutting plans to GAO. GAO was also required to report on the financial condition of the U.S. airline industry by Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, which became law in January 2004. In consultation with the Congress, GAO agreed to satisfy these directives and report to the Congress on (1) the major challenges to the airline industry since 1998, (2) measures airlines report taking to remain financially viable, (3) the current financial and operating condition of the industry, and (4) how the competitiveness of the domestic airline industry has changed since 1998.
What GAO Found
U.S. airlines, particularly major network or "legacy" airlines, have faced an unprecedented set of challenges since 1998 that are reshaping the industry and demand for air travel. The decline in business travel, followed by the September 11, 2001, attacks, caused a significant loss of operating revenue for many airlines. In response to these new challenges, the legacy airlines reported a goal of $19.5 billion in cost-cutting measures to restore their profitability through 2003. As a group, legacy airlines actually reduced their operating costs by $12.7 billion over the last 2 years. For legacy airlines, cost cutting was greatest in labor and commission costs. Meanwhile, low cost airlines, which as a group grew 26.1 percent during the last 2 years, reported little cost cutting. Since 2000, legacy airlines financial performance has deteriorated significantly, while low cost airlines have used their comparative cost advantage to expand their market share. Low cost airlines maintained their unit cost advantage over legacy airlines between 2000 and 2003, despite concerted cost cutting efforts by legacy airlines. For several of the legacy airlines, their weakened financial condition combined with significant future financial obligations makes their recovery uncertain. Competition in the domestic airline industry has increased since 1998, primarily owing to the growth and expansion of low cost airlines. Between 1998 and 2003, low cost airlines expanded their presence from 1,594 to 2,304 of the top 5,000 domestic markets and now have a presence in markets that serve about 85 percent of passengers. Legacy airlines, despite financial problems and reduced capacity, continued to serve nearly all of the markets in 2003 as in 1998, but carried fewer passengers as they lost market share to low cost airlines. |
gao_GAO-06-1031 | gao_GAO-06-1031_0 | Background
In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by numerous federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a consistent and uniform approach to sharing information on individuals with possible links to terrorism. During the 26- month period we studied—from December 2003 (when the Terrorist Screening Center began operations) to January 2006—the center received tens of thousands of screening-encounter referrals from frontline- screening agencies and determined that approximately half involved misidentified persons with names the same as or similar to someone whose name was contained on the terrorist watch list. Nonetheless, although the full universe of such misidentifications may be substantial in absolute terms, the total number likely represents a small fraction of all persons who are subject to terrorist watch list screening procedures, as in the following examples: U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that its officers managed a total of 431 million border crossings into the United States at land, air, and sea ports of entry in fiscal year 2005. Misidentified Individuals Can Experience Delays and Other Effects
People who are misidentified to the terrorist watch list can be affected in various ways, most commonly experiencing delays and related inconveniences, including being subjected to more intensive questioning and searches. Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on the Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the Incidence of Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate Individuals through the Screening Process
The most common cause of misidentifications is similarity of the names of persons being checked to names on the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated watch list, for which there is no complete remedy, but agencies are taking actions to minimize the effect on frequently misidentified persons. For instance, the computerized algorithms may account for differences in names due to misspellings or transcription errors. Operationally, for each name that is screened against the watch list, the computerized algorithm may return a list of possible matches. For instance, watch list records may be based on intelligence gathered by electronic wire taps or other methods that involve no opportunity to obtain biometric data. Nonetheless, center officials anticipate that biometric information, if available, can be especially useful for confirming matches to watch list records when individuals use false identities or aliases. Most watch-list- related redress concerns usually involve misidentified persons— individuals who are not on the watch list but have name similarities with known or suspected terrorists. To help ensure that opportunities for redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities are clear, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to develop an interagency memorandum of understanding. As mentioned previously, all aggrieved individuals may seek redress, including persons who express concerns or complaints that they are being misidentified and adversely affected because they have a name similar to someone whose name is on the terrorist watch list and persons who actually are on the terrorist watch list. According to Department of Justice officials, a final draft of the memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for interagency clearances by fall 2006. Concluding Observations
Homeland security measures affect all travelers to some extent. We are not making recommendations at this time because the agencies have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and otherwise either reduce the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects and to provide more effective redress. The Department of Justice provided technical comments only, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate. We will also make copies available to others on request. To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed persons, what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist Screening Center and frontline-screening agencies established? Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur, and Actions the Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are Taking to Reduce the Number of Misidentified Persons or Expedite Them through the Screening Process
Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur
Regarding why misidentifications occur, our work focused on interviewing officials at and reviewing documentation obtained from the Terrorist Screening Center and three frontline-screening agencies—the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Department of State. An individual can voluntarily provide TSA with additional personal-identifying information, which the agency will use to decide whether the person’s name should be put on a cleared list—that is, a list that contains the names and other personal-identifying information of individuals who have been checked and cleared as being persons not on the No Fly and Selectee lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
A consolidated watch list managed by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) contains the names of known or suspected terrorists, both international and domestic. Various agencies whose missions require screening for links to terrorism use watch list records. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens travelers at ports of entry. Because screening is based on names, it can result in misidentifications when persons not on the list have a name that resembles one on the list. Also, some names may be mistakenly included on the watch list. In either case, individuals can be negatively affected and may express concerns or seek agency action, or redress, to prevent future occurrences. This report addresses: (1) the extent to which the numbers of misidentified persons are known and how they could be affected, (2) the major reasons misidentifications occur and the actions agencies are taking to reduce them or minimize their effects, and (3) the opportunities for redress available to individuals with watch list-related concerns. In conducting work at TSC and the principal federal agencies that use watch list data, GAO reviewed standard operating procedures and other relevant documentation and interviewed responsible officials. GAO makes no recommendations at this time because the agencies have ongoing initiatives to improve data quality, reduce the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects, and enhance redress efforts.
What GAO Found
Annually, millions of individuals--from international travelers to visa applicants--are screened for terrorism links against the watch list. At times, a person is misidentified because of name similarities, although the exact number is unknown. In some cases, agencies can verify the person is not a match by comparing birth dates or other data with watch list records, but agencies do not track the number. In other cases, they ask TSC for help. From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) to January 2006, agencies sent tens of thousands of names to TSC, and about half were misidentifications, according to TSC. While the total number of people misidentified may be substantial, it likely represents a fraction of all people screened. Even so, misidentifications can lead to delays, intensive questioning and searches, missed flights, or denied entry at the border. Misidentifications most commonly occur with names that are identical or similar to names on the watch list. To rapidly screen names against the watch list, agencies use computerized programs that account for differences due to misspellings and other variations. TSC has ongoing initiatives to improve computerized matching programs and the quality of watch list records. Also, CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have established procedures designed to expedite frequently misidentified persons through screening, after confirming they are not on the watch list. Because security measures regrettably may cause personal inconveniences, TSA and CBP, with the support of TSC, provide opportunities for people who have been misidentified or mistakenly included on the watch list to seek redress. Most of these are misidentified persons who are not on the watch list but have a similar name and, therefore, may be repeatedly misidentified. Thus, TSA, for example, provides redress that relies heavily on efforts to expedite frequently misidentified persons through screening by allowing them to submit personal information that helps airlines more quickly determine that they are not on the watch list. If TSA and CBP cannot resolve questions from the public, they ask TSC for help. For 2005, TSC reported that it processed to completion 112 redress referrals and removed the names of 31 mistakenly listed persons from the watch list. To ensure that opportunities for redress are formally documented across agencies and that responsibilities are clear, the Justice Department is leading an effort to develop an interagency memorandum of understanding and expects a final draft to be ready for approval by fall 2006. TSC and frontline-screening-agency officials recognize that, after the agreement is finalized, the public needs to clearly understand how to express concerns and seek relief if negatively affected by screening. So, these officials have committed to making updated information on redress publicly available. GAO provided a draft copy of this report to the departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State. They provided technical clarifications that GAO incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-465 | gao_GAO-17-465_0 | DFAS: During fiscal year 2016, DFAS reported total revenue of $1.4 billion. The DWWCF’s Reported Monthly Cash Balances Were Outside Upper and Lower Cash Requirements for More Than 12 Consecutive Months Three Times during Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016
The monthly cash balances were above or below the cash requirements more than 12 consecutive months on three separate occasions from fiscal years 2007 through 2016. Without this guidance, DOD risks not taking prompt action to bring the monthly cash balances within the cash requirements. Fourth, in fiscal year 2008, DLA disbursed about $1.3 billion more for, among other things, the purchase, refinement, transportation, and storage of fuel than it collected for the sale of fuel to its customers because of higher fuel costs. Specifically, DOD transferred $1.4 billion into the DWWCF from various defense appropriations accounts to mitigate cash shortfalls that resulted from DLA Energy Management paying higher costs for refined fuel products. As a result, DLA Energy Management collected about $3.7 billion more than it disbursed for fuel during the year. The DWWCF’s Revised Monthly Cash Balances Are Projected to Be within the Upper and Lower Cash Requirements for Fiscal Year 2017
Initially, the DWWCF monthly cash plan that supports the fiscal year 2017 President’s Budget, dated February 2016, showed the monthly cash balances were projected to be above the upper cash requirement for most of fiscal year 2017. According to DOD officials, the DWWCF changed its plan after the President’s Budget was issued because (1) DOD made unplanned cash transfers out of the DWWCF in the second half of fiscal year 2016 and (2) DOD reduced the fiscal year 2017 standard fuel price in September 2016, leading to lower projected cash balances. Although the DOD Financial Management Regulation provides guidance on tools DOD managers can use to help bring the monthly cash balances within the upper and lower cash requirements, the regulation does not provide guidance on the timing of when DWWCF managers should use these tools to help ensure that the monthly cash balances are within the cash requirements. When DWWCF monthly cash balances are below the lower cash requirements for long periods of time, the DWWCF is at greater risk of either (1) not paying its bills on time or (2) making a disbursement in excess of available cash, which would potentially result in an Antideficiency Act violation. In cases of cash balances above the upper requirement, the DWWCF may restrict funds that could be used for other higher priorities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine to what extent the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund’s (DWWCF) reported monthly cash balances were within the Department of Defense’s (DOD) upper and lower cash requirements from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, we (1) obtained the DWWCF’s reported monthly cash balances for fiscal years 2007 through 2016, (2) used the DOD Financial Management Regulation that was in effect at that time to determine the upper and lower cash requirements, and (3) compared the upper and lower cash requirements to the month-ending reported cash balances. If the cash balances were not within the upper and lower requirement amounts, we met with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) officials and reviewed DWWCF budgets and other documentation to ascertain the reasons. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and DLA use the DWWCF to charge for goods and services provided to the military services and other customers. The DWWCF relies primarily on sales revenue rather than annual appropriations to finance its continuing operations. The DWWCF reported total revenue of $45.7 billion in fiscal year 2016 from (1) providing finance, accounting, information technology, and energy solution services to the military services and (2) managing inventory items for the military services.
GAO was asked to review issues related to DWWCF cash management. GAO's objectives were to determine to what extent (1) the DWWCF's reported monthly cash balances were within DOD's upper and lower cash requirements from fiscal years 2007 through 2016 and (2) the DWWCF's projected monthly cash balances were within the upper and lower cash requirements for fiscal year 2017. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant DOD cash management guidance, analyzed DWWCF actual reported and projected cash balances and related data, and interviewed DWWCF officials.
What GAO Found
The Defense-wide Working Capital Fund's (DWWCF) reported monthly cash balances were outside the upper and lower cash requirements as defined by the Department of Defense's (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR) for 87 of 120 months, and more than 12 consecutive months on three separate occasions during fiscal years 2007 through 2016. Reasons why the balances were outside the requirements at selected periods of time include the following:
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) disbursed about $1.3 billion more in fiscal year 2008 for, among other things, the purchase of fuel than it collected from the sale of fuel because of higher fuel costs.
DOD transferred $1.4 billion to the DWWCF in fiscal year 2013 because of cash shortfalls that resulted from DLA paying higher costs for fuel.
DLA collected about $3.7 billion more from the sale of fuel than it disbursed for fuel in fiscal year 2015 because of lower fuel costs.
Although the DOD FMR contains guidance on tools DOD managers can use to help ensure that the monthly cash balances are within the requirements, the regulation does not provide guidance on when to use the tools. Without this guidance, DOD risks not taking prompt action to bring the monthly cash balances within requirements. When monthly cash balances are outside requirements for long periods of time, the DWWCF is at further risk of not paying its bills on time or holding funds that could be used for other higher priorities.
Initially, the DWWCF's cash plan that supports the fiscal year 2017 President's Budget, dated February 2016, showed the monthly balances were projected to be above the upper cash requirement for most of fiscal year 2017. However, its October 2016 revised plan showed that the monthly cash balances were projected to be within the requirements for all 12 months. The plan changed because (1) DOD made unplanned cash transfers out of the DWWCF in the second half of fiscal year 2016 and (2) DOD reduced the standard fuel price in September 2016, leading to lower projected cash balances for fiscal year 2017.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD update the FMR to include guidance on the timing of when DOD managers should use available tools to help ensure that monthly cash balances are within the upper and lower cash requirements. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation and cited related actions planned. |
gao_GAO-07-833T | gao_GAO-07-833T_0 | DHS’s Transformation
We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003 based on three factors. For example, many of the major components that were merged into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital, information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s national security mission was of such importance that the failure to effectively address its management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, the health and safety of our citizens, and our economy. DHS Must Address Key Management Challenges
Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital and acquisition efforts. DHS has also not completed other important planning-related activities. However, DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and accountability determinations, and a dedicated team to support its management integration efforts. Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage them. Since 2005, DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships and has undertaken a number of coordination efforts with private sector entities. Acquisition Management
DHS has made some progress but continues to face challenges in creating an effective, integrated acquisition organization. Transportation Security
Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in effectively executing transportation security efforts. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. We also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS’s Transformation and Integration Efforts
To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure their progress. According to an official at OMB, this is one of the few high-risk areas that have not produced a final corrective action plan. Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security
Implementation and Transformation
High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plays a key role in leading and coordinating--with stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private sectors--the nation's homeland security efforts. GAO has conducted numerous reviews of DHS management functions as well as programs including transportation and border security, immigration enforcement and service delivery, and disaster preparation and response. This testimony addresses: (1) why GAO designated DHS's implementation and transformation as a high-risk area, (2) specific management challenges that DHS continues to face, (3) examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and (4) actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and transformation efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 because DHS had to transform and integrate 22 agencies--several with existing program and management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management functions that will likely span a number of years. DHS has made some progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure sustainable success. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and accountability determinations, and a dedicated team to support its efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS's financial statements showed that its financial management systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information management, and its human capital and acquisition systems require further attention to ensure that DHS allocates resources economically, effectively, ethically, and equitably. Since GAO's 2007 high-risk update, DHS has continued to strengthen program activities but still faces a range of programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to such issues as cargo, transportation, and border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct advance contracting for emergency response goods, supplies, and services. DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will address its many management challenges. Such a plan should define the root causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. DHS may require a chief management official, with sufficient authority, dedicated to the overall transformation process to help ensure sustainable success over time. |
gao_GAO-04-916 | gao_GAO-04-916_0 | 1.) States Chose Some Farm Bill Options More Frequently than Others to Simplify Program Rules and Ease the Administrative Burden for Participants and Caseworkers
States chose four of the Farm Bill options with greater frequency than the others. 2. Local Food Stamp Officials Reported Mixed Results for Farm Bill Options; These Results Ranged from Improvements to Complications
Local food stamp officials, who often have day-to-day contact with frontline caseworkers and food stamp participants, reported mixed results from implementing the Farm Bill options; the results ranged from improvements to complications. Many Local Food Stamp Officials Reported That Certain Options Introduced Complications in Program Rules for Participants and Caseworkers
Many local officials reported on our surveys that three options—Expanded Simplified Reporting, Transitional Benefits, and Simplified Determination of Deductions—introduced complications in program rules for participants and caseworkers. Officials told us that adopting the Expanded Simplified Reporting option resulted in Food Stamp Program reporting rules that differed in important ways from the reporting rules of other assistance programs, such as Medicaid and TANF, depending on how their states have structured these programs. However, the extent to which program costs might increase as a result of alignment is unclear, and in two of the three states we visited, state officials had little or no information on possible costs associated with implementing such changes. Although they reported some improvements for both caseworkers and participants from some options, no option received consistently positive reports in all the areas where state officials expected improvements when they selected the option. In fact, in many cases, officials were as likely to report that an option resulted in no change as they were to report improvements. Of all the options, the Expanded Simplified Reporting option offered the most promise because it was selected by the most states, affects a large number of participants, and has the potential to significantly streamline the participant reporting process. The fact that local officials reported that adopting this option actually complicated program rules in many states reflects the challenge of trying to simplify requirements for one program without efforts by states to adjust the rules of other related assistance programs. Concerns regarding whether there are costs associated with aligning participant reporting requirements may hinder a state’s decision to make program changes that increase alignment. To view selected results of GAO’s Web-based survey of food stamp adminstrators, go to www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1058SP. GAO-04-346. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many individuals familiar with the Food Stamp Program view its rules as unnecessarily complex, creating an administrative burden for participants and caseworkers. In addition many participants receive benefits from other programs that have different program rules, adding to the complexity of accurately determining program benefits and eligibility. The 2002 Farm Bill introduced new options to help simplify the program. This report examines (1) which options states have chosen to implement and why, and (2) what changes local officials reported as a result of using these options. Selected results from GAO's web-based survey of food stamp administrators are provided in an e-supplement to this report, GAO-04-1058SP . Another e-supplement, GAO-04-1059SP , contains results from the local food stamp office surveys.
What GAO Found
As of January 2004, states chose four of the eight Farm Bill options with greater frequency than the others. These options provided states with more flexibility in requiring participants to report changes and in determining eligibility. The most common reasons state officials gave for choosing the eight options were to simplify program rules for participants and caseworkers. Local food stamp officials reported mixed results from implementing the Farm Bill options. Although they reported some improvements for both caseworkers and participants from some options, no option received consistent positive reports in all the areas where state officials expected improvements. In fact, in many cases, officials were as likely to report that an option resulted in no change as they were to report improvements. Moreover, many local officials reported that three options introduced complications in program rules. One option that offered the most promise because it was selected by most states and affects a large number of participants resulted in food stamp participant reporting rules that differed from Medicaid and TANF. These differences resulted in confusion for food stamp participants and caseworkers, and some changes were made that undermined the intended advantages of the option. These problems reflect the challenge of trying to simplify rules for one program without making the rules of other related programs the same. Concerns about whether there are costs associated with aligning reporting rules may hinder a state's decision to pursue alignment; yet the extent to which program costs might increase as a result of making reporting rules the same is unclear. |
gao_GAO-09-162 | gao_GAO-09-162_0 | MDRI expands upon the HIPC Initiative and represents the most recent effort to provide debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries. Approach to Financing MDRI Does Not Fully Fund Current and Future U.S. Commitments
Treasury, IDA, and ADF have agreed to a financing approach for MDRI called early encashment, under which the U.S. government earns income for early replenishment payments to IDA and ADF. Early Encashment Income Insufficient to Fully Finance Current MDRI Debt Relief Due to Arrears
Because the United States is currently in arrears on its IDA14 replenishment commitment, the early encashment income the United States earns does not fully finance the current U.S. MDRI commitment. Under the early encashment process, the World Bank first uses early encashment income to fund the present value of the shortfall in the U.S. IDA replenishment before applying early encashment income to the U.S. MDRI commitment. Treasury officials noted that if the United States ultimately pays its arrears to the IDA14 replenishment, early encashment income will then fund the U.S. MDRI commitment. However, to fully fund the U.S. MDRI commitment, (1) Treasury will need to release a withholding of $94 million from the IDA14 replenishment, by reporting to Congress that the World Bank has accomplished transparency reforms required under U.S. law, and (2) Congress will need to appropriate approximately $49 million in funds to compensate for the rescissions. The Extent to Which Countries Spend Debt Relief Resources to Reduce Poverty Is Unknown
We estimate that 41 countries are to receive nearly $44 billion in additional MDRI and HIPC resources from the four IFIs, but the degree to which the countries target these resources at poverty-reducing activities is unknown. It is difficult to establish that debt relief has led directly to increased poverty-reducing expenditures for two reasons: (1) debt relief resources are difficult to track and (2) country spending data are not comparable and also may not be reliable. However, IMF and World Bank officials told us that they are unable to link debt relief resources directly to poverty-reducing expenditures because it is difficult to separate debt relief resources from other types of financial flows, such as international assistance and fiscal revenue. The World Bank and IMF Have Improved Their Country Debt Sustainability Analyses and Identified Numerous Actions Countries Should Take to Avoid Future Unsustainable Debt Levels
The World Bank and IMF have improved their country debt sustainability analyses (DSA) since 2005, including by addressing weaknesses that GAO and others have previously identified. These objectives are ambitious and could prove difficult for these poor countries to achieve over the course of the 20-year projection period. DSAs Determine Risk Based on the Strength of Country Performance and Analysis of Numerous Possible Scenarios
In a departure from prior DSAs, the new DSAs consider the strength of a country’s policies and institutions in assessing risk and determining sustainable debt loads; countries with strong policies and institutions are considered capable of successfully carrying greater levels of debt. The African Development Bank provided comments on the U.S. costs for funding MDRI. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) analyze the U.S. financing approach for debt relief efforts, (2) review the extent to which the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) might affect resources available to countries for poverty- reducing activities, and (3) assess revisions to the analyses conducted by the World Bank and IMF to review and promote future debt sustainability. To evaluate whether the U.S. approach to funding its IDA and ADF MDRI costs was adequate to fully pay U.S. commitments, we estimated total U.S. commitments in each IDA and ADF replenishment period and then used this amount in a simulation model of the U.S. payment schedule in order to estimate the amount of early payment credits that would be earned annually if Treasury continued to use the early encashment approach. The surplus $1 million can be used to pay future MDRI obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was created to provide debt relief to poor countries that had reached unsustainable levels of debt. In 2005, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) expanded upon the HIPC Initiative by eliminating additional debt owed to four international financial institutions (IFI): the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), African Development Fund (ADF), and Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB). These four IFIs are projected to provide $58 billion in total debt relief to 41 countries. GAO (1) analyzed the U.S. financing approach for debt relief efforts; (2) reviewed the extent to which MDRI might affect resources available to countries for poverty-reducing activities; and (3) assessed revisions to the analyses conducted by the World Bank and IMF to review and promote future debt sustainability. GAO analyzed Treasury, IFI, and country documents and data, and interviewed officials at Treasury and the four IFIs.
What GAO Found
Treasury's approach to financing MDRI, known as early encashment, does not fully fund current and future U.S. commitments. The approach does not fully fund the current U.S. MDRI commitment because the United States is in arrears on its IDA replenishment. These arrears are due to requirements under U.S. law for withholdings and across-the-board rescissions. Under early encashment, the World Bank requires that the U.S. commitment to the IDA replenishment be paid in full before early encashment income can be used to fund MDRI. The World Bank deducts the U.S. arrears to IDA from any early encashment income before applying this income toward the U.S. MDRI commitment, resulting in a current MDRI shortfall of $149 million. Treasury officials said that if the United States ultimately pays its arrears to the IDA replenishment, early encashment income will then fully fund the U.S. MDRI commitment. However, to fully fund the U.S. MDRI commitment, (1) Treasury will need to release a withholding of $94 million by reporting to Congress that the World Bank has accomplished transparency reforms required under U.S. law, and (2) Congress will need to appropriate approximately $49 million to compensate for the rescissions. Moreover, GAO estimates that the early encashment approach will be insufficient to fully finance future U.S. MDRI commitments even if U.S. payments are made on time and in full because these commitments exceed projected early encashment income. GAO estimates that the HIPC Initiative and MDRI debt relief from the four IFIs combined may provide countries for which data are available with nearly $44 billion in additional resources over the next 50 years, but the extent to which countries spend these resources on activities to reduce poverty is unknown. In addition to providing debt relief, the MDRI program for IDA and ADF provides for a reallocation of assistance, based in part on a consideration of the strength of country policies and institutions. The estimated amount of this MDRI assistance individual countries receive will vary. Although IFIs and the U.S. government encourage recipient countries to spend resources generated from debt relief on efforts to reduce poverty, the extent to which such spending occurs is unknown for two reasons. First, debt relief resources are difficult to track, because these resources cannot easily be separated from other types of financial flows such as international assistance and fiscal revenues. Second, country data on poverty-reducing expenditures are not comparable across countries and also may not be reliable. The World Bank and IMF have improved their country debt sustainability analyses (DSA) since 2005, including by addressing weaknesses GAO previously reported. DSAs now consider the strength of a country's policies and institutions in determining sustainable debt loads and assess future debt sustainability under multiple scenarios that adjust economic assumptions. Furthermore, IDA and ADF now structure their assistance based on a country's risk of debt distress. While the new DSAs have identified numerous ambitious actions countries should take to avoid eroding their debt sustainability, implementing these actions could prove difficult. |
gao_GAO-08-1033T | gao_GAO-08-1033T_0 | The partners signed the most current agreement, Chesapeake 2000, on June 28, 2000. Chesapeake 2000—identified by the Bay Program as its strategic plan—sets out an agenda and goals to guide the restoration efforts through 2010 and beyond. These commitments are organized under the following five broad restoration goals: Protecting and restoring living resources—14 commitments to restore, enhance, and protect the finfish, shellfish and other living resources, their habitats and ecological relationships to sustain all fisheries and provide for a balanced ecosystem; Protecting and restoring vital habitats—18 commitments to preserve, protect, and restore those habitats and natural areas that are vital to the survival and diversity of the living resources of the bay and its rivers; Protecting and restoring water quality—19 commitments to achieve and maintain the water quality necessary to support the aquatic living resources of the bay and its tributaries and to protect human health; Sound land use—28 commitments to develop, promote, and achieve sound land use practices that protect and restore watershed resources and water quality, maintain reduced pollutant inputs to the bay and its tributaries, and restore and preserve aquatic living resources; and Stewardship and community engagement—23 commitments to promote individual stewardship and assist individuals, community- based organizations, businesses, local governments, and schools to undertake initiatives to achieve the goals and commitments of the agreement. The Bay Program Has Developed an Integrated Approach to Better Assess Overall Restoration Progress
In October 2005, we found that the Bay Program had established 101 measures to assess progress toward meeting some restoration commitments and provide information to guide management decisions. For example, the Bay Program had developed measures for determining trends in individual fish and shellfish populations, such as crabs, oysters, and rockfish. While the Bay Program had established these 101 measures, we also found that it had not developed an approach that would allow it to translate these individual measures into an overall assessment of the progress made in achieving the five broad restoration goals. The task force also identified 20 key indicators for measuring the progress of restoration efforts and categorized these indicators into 5 indices of restoration efforts. The Bay Program Has Improved Report Formats but Has Not Taken Adequate Steps to Enhance the Independence of the Reporting Process
In 2005, we determined that the Bay Program’s primary mechanism for reporting on the health status of the bay—the State of the Chesapeake Bay report—did not effectively communicate the current health status of the bay. However, the report did not provide contextual information that explained how these measures were interrelated or what the diverging trends meant about the overall health of the bay. Specifically, the reports mixed actual monitoring information on the bay’s health status with results from a predictive model and the progress made in implementing specific management actions, such as acres of wetlands restored. We believe this lack of independence in reporting led to the Bay Program’s projecting a rosier view of the health of the bay than may have been warranted. In 2005, we recommended that the Chesapeake Bay Program Office revise its reporting approach to improve the effectiveness and credibility of its reports by (1) including an assessment of the key ecological attributes that reflect the bay’s current health conditions, (2) reporting separately on the health of the bay and on the progress made in implementing management actions, and (3) establishing an independent and objective reporting process. Federal Agencies and States Provided Billions of Dollars in Both Direct and Indirect Funding for Restoration Activities
From fiscal years 1995 through 2004, we reported that 11 key federal agencies; the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and the District of Columbia provided almost $3.7 billion in direct funding to restore the bay. Sound land use ($1.1 billion)
Water quality protection and restoration ($1.7 billion)
We also reported that 10 of the key federal agencies, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia provided about $1.9 billion in additional funding from fiscal years 1995 through 2004 for activities that indirectly affect bay restoration. The Bay Program Has Established a Strategic Framework but Key Elements to More Effectively Coordinate and Manage the Restoration Effort Are Still Needed
In our 2005 report we found that although Chesapeake 2000 provides the current vision and overall strategic goals for the restoration effort, along with short- and long-term commitments, the Bay Program lacked a comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy that could provide a road map for accomplishing the goals outlined in the agreement. However, we found that these planning documents were not always consistent with each other. Even though the Bay Program had not been able to implement this work plan because personnel and funding had been unavailable, program officials told us that the plan was being revised. In response to our recommendation to develop a comprehensive and coordinated implementation strategy, the Bay Program has developed a strategic framework to unify existing planning documents and articulate how the partnership will pursue its goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chesapeake Bay Program (Bay Program) was created in 1983 when Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, the Chesapeake Bay Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) agreed to establish a partnership to restore the Bay. The partnership's most recent agreement, Chesapeake 2000, sets out five broad goals to guide the restoration effort through 2010. This testimony summarizes the findings of an October 2005 GAO report (GAO-06-96) on (1) the extent to which measures for assessing restoration progress had been established, (2) the extent to which program reports clearly and accurately described the bay's health, (3) how much funding was provided for the effort for fiscal years 1995 to 2004, and (4) how effectively the effort was being coordinated and managed. It also summarizes actions taken by the program in response to GAO's recommendations. GAO reviewed the program's 2008 report to Congress and discussed recent actions with program officials.
What GAO Found
In 2005, GAO found that the Bay Program had over 100 measures to assess progress toward meeting some restoration commitments and guide program management. However, the program had not developed an integrated approach that would translate these individual measures into an assessment of progress toward achieving the restoration goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. For example, while the program had appropriate measures to track crab, oyster, and rockfish populations, it did not have an approach for integrating the results of these measures to assess progress toward its goal of protecting and restoring the bay's living resources. In response to GAO's recommendation, the Bay Program has integrated key measures into 3 indices of bay health and 5 indices of restoration progress. In 2005, the reports used by the Bay Program did not provide effective and credible information on the health status of the bay. Instead, these reports focused on individual trends for certain living resources and pollutants, and did not effectively communicate the overall health status of the bay. These reports were also not credible because actual monitoring data had been commingled with the results of program actions and a predictive model, and the latter two tended to downplay the deteriorated conditions of the bay. Moreover, the reports lacked independence, which led to rosier projections of the bay's health than may have been warranted. In response to GAO's recommendations, the Bay Program developed a new report format and has tried to enhance the independence of the reporting process. However, the new process does not adequately address GAO's concerns about independence. From fiscal years 1995 through 2004, the restoration effort received about $3.7 billion in direct funding from 11 key federal agencies; the states of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and the District of Columbia. These funds were used for activities that supported water quality protection and restoration, sound land use, vital habitat protection and restoration, living resources protection and restoration, and stewardship and community engagement. During this period, the restoration effort also received an additional $1.9 billion in funding from federal and state programs for activities that indirectly contribute to the restoration effort. In 2005, the Bay Program did not have a comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy to help target limited resources to those activities that would best achieve the goals outlined in Chesapeake 2000. The program was focusing on 10 key commitments and had developed numerous planning documents, but some of these documents were inconsistent with each other or were perceived as unachievable by the partners. In response to GAO's recommendations, the Bay Program has taken several actions, such as developing a strategic framework to unify planning documents and identify how it will pursue its goals. While these actions are positive steps, additional actions are needed before the program has the comprehensive, coordinated implementation strategy recommended by GAO. |
gao_GAO-17-733 | gao_GAO-17-733_0 | Additionally, the majority of ASM gold miners reportedly work in the presence of elements of the Congolese army or illegal armed actors, according to a report and stakeholders. Reported Official Supply Chain for DRC-Sourced ASM Gold Involves Multiple Actors, but Almost All ASM Gold Is Reportedly Smuggled
The official supply chain for ASM gold produced in the DRC involves multiple actors, including miners, local traders, and exporters, according to USAID and UNGoE reports we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed. Those sources indicated that these key actors are required to obtain government authorization, such as official mining cards, or register with the provincial or national government to trade or export ASM gold in the DRC. However, according to these reports and stakeholders, almost all DRC-sourced ASM gold is produced and traded unofficially and smuggled from the country. DRC Government’s, USAID’s, and Other Entities’ Efforts to Encourage Responsible Sourcing of ASM Gold
The DRC government and USAID, as well as several other entities, have undertaken initiatives to encourage the sourcing of conflict-free ASM gold from the DRC. However, the limited number of mine sites that have been validated and thus licensed to operate, as well as the relatively high provincial taxes in the mining sector in the DRC compared with taxes in neighboring countries, as reported by USAID and UNGoE, continue to limit incentives for sourcing conflict-free ASM gold. In addition, since 2016, USAID has worked with Tetra Tech through the Capacity Building for Responsible Minerals Trade Program and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) through the Just Gold project to scale up pilot initiatives for the production and sale of ASM gold. Published in September 2016, the study used data collected in June and July 2016 to estimate that 31.6 percent of women and 32.9 percent of men reported exposure to some form of sexual and gender-based violence in their lifetime. UN Reports DRC Government Has Made Some Progress in Addressing Sexual Violence
Since 2013, the DRC government has made some progress in addressing sexual violence in the eastern DRC, according to a 2017 UN report. SEC did not provide comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we provide information about (1) the supply chain for gold produced through artisanal and small-scale mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); (2) efforts by the DRC and the U.S. government and others that may encourage the sourcing of conflict-free artisanal and small-scale mined (ASM) gold; and (3) sexual violence in the eastern DRC and neighboring countries that has been published since August 2016, when we last reported on this topic. We reviewed U.S. agency documents, such as a 2015 USAID- funded report related to conflict minerals in the DRC, as well as USAID internal documents that included a program implementation plan and annual and quarterly internal progress reports on responsible sourcing of ASM gold in the DRC. We discussed the collection of sexual violence-related data in the DRC and adjoining countries, including population-based survey data and case-file data, during interviews with State and USAID officials and with NGO representatives and researchers whom we interviewed for our prior review of sexual violence rates in eastern DRC and adjoining countries. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Agency for International Development, May 2015. The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo. United Nations. Letter Dated 22 January 2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council. Related GAO Products
SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: 2017 Review of Company Disclosures in Response to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule, GAO-17-517R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC, the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of “conflict minerals,” particularly gold. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. In April 2017, GAO reported on companies' disclosures, in response to the SEC regulations, of conflict minerals they used in calendar year 2015 (see GAO-17-517R ).
In this report, GAO provides information about (1) the supply chain for ASM gold in the DRC; (2) efforts to encourage responsible sourcing of ASM gold; and (3) sexual violence in eastern DRC and neighboring countries published since August 2016, when GAO last reported on this topic. GAO reviewed U.S., UN, and nongovernment and international organizations' reports; interviewed U.S., DRC, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in Dubai, UAE.
GAO is not making any recommendations.
What GAO Found
The supply chain for artisanal and small-scale mined (ASM) gold—a significant driver of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) economy—involves multiple actors, according to reports GAO reviewed and stakeholders interviewed (see figure). Officially, these actors are required to obtain DRC government authorization and pay provincial or national taxes to mine, trade, or export ASM gold, according to these sources. However, almost all DRC-sourced ASM gold is produced and traded unofficially and smuggled from the country, according to reports and stakeholders. Further, elements of the Congolese army as well as illegal armed groups, frequently exploit ASM gold, often through illegal taxes on its production and transport, according to reports and stakeholders.
The DRC government, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and international organizations have undertaken several initiatives to encourage the responsible sourcing of ASM gold—that is, the production and traceability of gold that has not financed conflict or human rights abuses such as sexual violence. For example, since 2015, USAID has worked with the DRC government to implement a traceability scheme for ASM gold and has worked with Tetra Tech and Partnership Africa Canada to scale up pilot initiatives for the production and sale of conflict-free ASM gold. However, the limited number of mines validated as conflict free and the relatively high mining-related official provincial taxes in the DRC, compared with taxes in neighboring countries, provide few incentives for responsible sourcing of ASM gold, according to reports GAO reviewed.
In 2016, a USAID-funded, population-based study of the rate of sexual violence in parts of the eastern DRC estimated that 32 percent of women and 33 percent of men in these areas had been exposed to some form of sexual and gender-based violence in their lifetime. According to the United Nations, the DRC government has taken some steps to address sexual violence in the eastern region. |
gao_RCED-97-13 | gao_RCED-97-13_0 | To what extent has the U.S. government addressed air cargo issues in policymaking and during bilateral aviation negotiations, and what are the possibilities for separating negotiations of air cargo services from broader negotiations that include passenger services? We also provided copies of a draft of this report to the departments of Transportation and State for their review and comment. Regulation by Foreign Aviation Authorities
Burdensome legal and administrative requirements were deemed a significant problem by six airlines. These problems were cited at airports in 5 of the 10 largest U.S. international airfreight markets in 1994. Ground-Handling Restrictions Degrade the Quality of Airlines’ Services
Thirteen U.S. airlines responding to our survey reported problems with ground-handling at 31 foreign airports, most of which are located in Latin America and the Asia/Pacific region. Other attempts to resolve problems have been unsuccessful. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation develop and distribute to all U.S. airlines information on the assistance available and guidance on the procedures to be followed in requesting aid from the U.S. government in resolving problems in doing business abroad and extend DOT’s current effort to collect information on the status and severity of U.S. airlines’ problems in doing business abroad to include all U.S. all-cargo airlines that operate internationally. DOT and the State Department Have Advanced Air Cargo Issues, but All-Cargo Carriers Advocate Dedicated Negotiations
U.S. delegations have discussed air cargo issues to some extent in their negotiations with more than three-quarters of the countries with which bilateral talks have been held since 1989. Nevertheless, restrictions persist. As a remedy, most U.S. all-cargo airlines advocate separating negotiations of cargo rights from broader negotiations that include passenger services. Separate All-Cargo Negotiations Face Several Obstacles
In contrast to such arguments for separate negotiations are obstacles suggesting that this approach may not be routinely practical or appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. air cargo airlines' reported problems in doing business abroad, focusing on the: (1) nature of the airlines' problems; (2) actions the affected airlines and the Departments of Transportation (DOT) and State have taken to resolve these problems; (3) extent to which the U.S. government has addressed air cargo issues in policymaking and during bilateral aviation negotiations; and (4) possibilities for separating negotiations of air cargo services from broader negotiations that include passenger services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 22 U.S. all-cargo airlines responding to a survey reported a range of obstacles to doing business abroad which impair their competitiveness and reported that they experienced significant problems at 81 foreign airports; (2) the most pervasive problems were related to regulation by foreign governments and foreign aviation authorities, with most of these problems occurring at airports in Latin America or the Asia-Pacific region; (3) many of the carriers have attempted to resolve such problems themselves, although some have requested assistance from DOT or State, while others were unaware that assistance was available; (4) U.S. delegations have raised air cargo issues with more than three-quarters of the countries with which they have conducted bilateral talks since 1989; (5) restrictions persist in spite of the resulting expansion of opportunities for U.S. all-cargo carriers; and (6) 13 of the 22 airlines advocate separating negotiations of air-cargo rights from broader negotiations that also address passenger rights, but this approach may not be practical or appropriate on a regular basis. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-89 | gao_T-HEHS-97-89_0 | establishing a program run jointly by the Department of Justice and HHS to coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts against fraud in Medicare and other health care payers; establishing a national health care fraud data collection program; and enhancing penalties and establishing health care fraud as a separate criminal offense. In addition, many of the targeted home health agencies were decertified. One chronic problem is that HCFA has not coordinated contractors’ payment safeguard activities. However, HCFA’s leadership has been absent in this area, resulting in the loss of opportunity to avoid significant Medicare expenditures. That wrongdoers continue to find ways to dodge safeguards illustrates the dynamic nature of fraud and abuse and the need for constant vigilance and increasingly sophisticated ways to protect against gaming the system. To adequately safeguard the Medicare program, HCFA needs to meet these important challenges promptly. Related GAO Products
High Risk Series Reports on Medicare
Medicare (GAO/HR-97-10). The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed efforts to fight fraud and abuse in the Medicare program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is not surprising that because of the program's size, complexity, and rapid growth, Medicare is a charter member of GAO's high risk series; (2) in this year's report on Medicare, GAO is pleased to note that both the Congress and the Health Care Financing Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services' agency responsible for running Medicare, have made important legislative and administrative changes addressing chronic payment safeguard problems that GAO and others have identified; and (3) however, because of the significant amount of money at stake, GAO believes that the government will need to exercise constant vigilance and effective management to keep the program protected from financial exploitation. |
gao_GAO-16-723T | gao_GAO-16-723T_0 | The decisions made to date have been informed by several major field tests, including the 2014 Census test, which was conducted in the Maryland and Washington, D.C., areas to test new methods for conducting self- response and non-response follow-up; the 2015 Census Test in Arizona, which tested, among other things, the use of a field operations management system to automate data collection operations and provide real-time data and the ability to reduce the non-response follow-up workload using data previously provided to the government, as well as enabling enumerators to use their personally owned mobile devices to collect census data; and the 2015 Optimizing Self-Response test in Savannah, Georgia, and the surrounding area, which was intended to explore methods of encouraging households to respond using the Internet, such as using advertising and outreach to motivate respondents, and enabling households to respond without a Bureau-issued identification number. CEDCAP Program Structure and Relationship to the 2020 Census Program
Several of the key systems needed to support the 2020 Census redesign are expected to be provided as CEDCAP enterprise systems under the purview of the Bureau’s IT Directorate. The Bureau Lacks Processes for Effectively Managing Interdependencies between CEDCAP and 2020 Census Programs CEDCAP and 2020 Census Programs Do Not Have an Effective Process for Integrating Schedule Dependencies
Despite significant interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census Programs, our ongoing audit work determined that the Bureau is not effectively managing these interdependencies. Consequently, the two programs have been manually identifying activities within their master schedules that are dependent on each other, and rather than establishing one dependency schedule, as best practices dictate, the programs have developed two separate dependency schedules for each program, and meet weekly with the intent of coordinating these two schedules. These tests were intended to, among other things, help define requirements around critical functions. With less than a year and a half remaining before the 2018 Census end-to-end test begins, the lack of experience and specific requirements related to non-ID response validation is especially concerning, as incomplete and late definition of requirements proved to be serious issues for the 2010 Census. Census Bureau Faces Several Information Security Challenges in Implementing the 2020 Census
While the Bureau plans to extensively use IT systems to support the 2020 Census redesign in an effort to realize potentially significant efficiency gains and cost savings, this redesign introduces the following critical information security challenges. Adequately protecting mobile devices—The 2020 Census will be the first one in which the Census Bureau will provide mobile devices to enumerators to collect personally identifiable information from households who did not self-respond to the survey. For example, we reported that organizations can require that devices meet government specifications before they are deployed, limit storage on mobile devices, and ensure that all data on the device are cleared before the device is disposed of. The Bureau’s acting Chief Information Officer and its Chief Information Security Officer have acknowledged these challenges and described the Bureau’s plans to address them. We have previously reported on Census Bureau weaknesses that are related to many of these information security challenges. For example, the Bureau developed and implemented a risk management framework with a goal of better management visibility of information security risks; this framework addressed a recommendation to document acceptance of risks for management review. Additionally, while the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, it also introduces many information security challenges, including educating the public to offset inevitable phishing scams. Continued focus on these considerable security challenges and remaining open recommendations will be important as the Bureau begins to develop and/or acquire systems and implement the 2020 Census design. Our draft report, which is currently with Commerce and the Bureau for comment, includes several recommendations that, if implemented, will help address the issues we identified and improve the management of the interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs. Regarding our finding that the two programs do not have an integrated list of risks facing both programs, Bureau officials stated that they have an enterprise-wide risk management program, in which the Deputy Director has visibility into risks affecting both programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (which is part of the Department of Commerce) plans to significantly change the methods and technology it uses to count the population with the 2020 Decennial Census. The Bureau's redesign of the census relies on the acquisition and development of many new and modified systems. Several of the key systems are to be provided by an enterprise-wide initiative called CEDCAP, which is a large and complex modernization program intended to deliver a system-of-systems for all the Bureau's survey data collection and processing functions.
This statement summarizes preliminary findings from GAO's draft report on, among other things, the Bureau's management of the interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs, and key information security challenges the Bureau faces in implementing the 2020 Census design. To develop that draft report, GAO reviewed Bureau documentation such as project plans and schedules and compared them against relevant guidance; and analyzed information security reports and documents.
What GAO Found
The 2020 Census program is heavily dependent upon the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP) program to deliver the key systems needed to support the 2020 Census redesign. However, GAO's preliminary findings showed that while the two programs have taken steps to coordinate their schedules, risks, and requirements, they lacked effective processes for managing their interdependencies. Specifically:
Among tens of thousands of schedule activities, the two programs are expected to manually identify activities that are dependent on each other, and rather than establishing one integrated dependency schedule, the programs maintain two separate dependency schedules. This has contributed to misalignment in milestones between the programs.
The programs do not have an integrated list of interdependent program risks, and thus they do not always recognize the same risks that impact both programs.
Among other things, key requirements have not been defined for validating responses from individuals who respond to the census using an address instead of a Bureau-assigned identification number, because of the Bureau's limited knowledge and experience in this area. The lack of knowledge and specific requirements related to this critical function is concerning, given that there is less than a year and a half remaining before the Census end-to-end test begins in August 2017 (which is intended to test all key systems and operations to ensure readiness for the 2020 Census).
Officials have acknowledged these weaknesses and reported that they are taking, or plan to take, steps to address the issues. However, until these interdependencies are managed more effectively, the Bureau will be limited in understanding the work needed by both programs to meet milestones, mitigate major risks, and ensure that requirements are appropriately identified.
While the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. For example, the introduction of an option for households to respond using the Internet puts respondents more at risk for phishing attacks (requests for information from authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails and websites). In addition, because the Bureau plans to allow its enumerators to use mobile devices to collect information from households who did not self-respond to the survey, it is important that the Bureau ensures that these devices are adequately protected. The Bureau has begun efforts to address many of these challenges; as it begins implementing the 2020 Census design, continued focus on these considerable security challenges will be critical.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's draft report includes several recommendations to help the Bureau better manage CEDCAP and 2020 Census program interdependencies related to schedule, risk, and requirements. The draft report is currently with the Department of Commerce and the Bureau for comment. |
gao_GAO-05-486 | gao_GAO-05-486_0 | FDIC relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial operations and store the sensitive information it collects. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the progress FDIC had made in correcting or mitigating weaknesses reported in connection with our financial statement audits for calendar years 2002 and 2003 and (2) the effectiveness of the corporation’s information system controls. Of the 22 weaknesses reported in our 2003 audit, FDIC corrected 19 and is taking action to resolve the 3 that remain. In addition, the corporation corrected the one weakness still open from our 2002 audit. Weaknesses in Information System Controls
Although FDIC made substantial improvements in its information system controls, we identified 20 additional weaknesses that diminish its ability to effectively protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. Specifically, we identified weaknesses in electronic access controls, network security, physical security, segregation of computer functions, and application change controls. Although these information system control weaknesses do not pose significant risks to FDIC’s financial and sensitive systems, they warrant management’s action to decrease the risk of unauthorized modification of data and programs, inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, or disruption of critical operations. FDIC Has Made Substantial Progress Implementing Information Security Program but Has Not Completed Key Element
A key reason for FDIC’s weaknesses in information system controls is that it had not fully implemented a complete test and evaluation process, which is a key element of a comprehensive agency information security program. These elements include a central information security management structure to provide overall security policy and guidance along with oversight to ensure compliance with established policies and reviews of the effectiveness of the information security environment; periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; security awareness training to inform personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems, of information security risks and their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; and a process of tests and evaluations of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system identified in the agency’s inventories. These areas included electronic access controls, network security, and audit logging. Conclusions
FDIC has made significant progress in correcting the information system control weaknesses we previously identified and has taken other steps to improve information security. Although the corporation has made substantial progress in implementing its information security program and enhanced its process to test and evaluate its information system controls, it did not ensure that all key control areas supporting its financial environment were routinely reviewed and tested. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. As part of GAO's audit of the calendar year 2004 financial statements for the three funds administered by FDIC, GAO assessed (1) the progress FDIC has made in correcting or mitigating information system control weaknesses identified in our audits for calendar years 2002 and 2003 and (2) the effectiveness of the corporation's information system general controls.
What GAO Found
FDIC has made significant progress in correcting previously reported information system control weaknesses and has taken other steps to improve information security. Of the 22 weaknesses reported in GAO's 2003 audit, FDIC corrected 19 and is taking action to resolve the 3 that remain. In addition, it corrected the one weakness still open from GAO's 2002 audits. Although FDIC has made substantial improvements in its information system controls, GAO identified additional weaknesses that diminish FDIC's ability to effectively protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its financial and sensitive information systems. These included weaknesses in electronic access controls, network security, segregation of computer functions, physical security, and application change control. Although these do not pose significant risks to FDIC's financial and sensitive systems, they warrant management's action to decrease the risk of unauthorized modification of data and programs, inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, or disruption of critical operations. A key reason for FDIC's weaknesses in information system controls is that it had not fully implemented a complete test and evaluation process, which is a key element of a comprehensive agency information security program with effective controls. Although FDIC has made substantial progress in implementing its information security program and has enhanced its process to test and evaluate its information system controls, it did not ensure that all key control areas supporting FDIC's financial environment are routinely reviewed and tested. These control areas included electronic access, network security, and audit logging. |
gao_GAO-06-851T | gao_GAO-06-851T_0 | Corporate Income Taxes Are a Significant Source of Federal Revenue and Must Be Part of the Overall Considerations for Fiscal Reform
At about $277 billion, corporate income taxes are far smaller than the $841 billion in social insurance taxes and $998 billion in individual income taxes that OMB estimates will be paid in fiscal year 2006 to fund the federal government. Consequently, although not the largest, it remains an important source of federal revenue. Corporate tax revenues of the magnitude shown in figure 2 make them relevant to considerations about how to address the nation’s long-term fiscal imbalance. Corporate tax policy, corporate tax expenditures, and corporate tax enforcement need to be part of the overall tax review because of the amount of revenue at stake. Opportunities Exist to Improve Corporate Tax Compliance
Ensuring corporate income tax compliance is challenging because much corporate tax avoidance is legal and the true tax liability for large corporations is difficult to determine. Opportunities to pursue include simplifying the tax code, obtaining better data to the extent feasible on noncompliance, continuing to oversee the effectiveness of IRS’s efforts, continuing to leverage technology, and sending sound compliance signals through such things as increased effectiveness in collecting taxes owed. A complex tax code, complicated business transactions, and often multinational corporate structures make determining corporate tax liabilities and the extent of corporate tax avoidance a challenge. This and other opportunities to leverage modern technology can serve to help IRS deal with the complex tax issues in corporate tax returns. Capital Gains Basis Reporting
Finally, you also asked us to testify on a report—done at your request— that we are issuing today on individual taxpayers’ compliance in reporting capital gains’ income from the sale of securities. IRS also faces difficulties in ensuring that taxpayers understand their obligations for determining and reporting their capital gains and losses. Expanding information reporting to taxpayers and IRS on securities sales to include cost basis has potential to improve taxpayer voluntary compliance and help IRS verify securities gains or losses. Based on these results, our report includes matters that Congress may want to consider, including requiring brokers to report to both taxpayers and IRS the adjusted basis of sold securities and ensuring that IRS has sufficient authority to implement the requirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Corporate income taxes are expected to bring in about $277 billion in 2006 to help fund the activities of the federal government. Besides raising revenue, the tax alters investment decisions and raises concerns about competitiveness in an environment of increasing global interdependency. The complexity of the tax breeds tax avoidance, including an estimated $32 billion of noncompliance detected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This testimony provides information on trends in corporate taxes and opportunities to improve corporate tax compliance. Congress also asked that GAO discuss recent work on the misreporting of capital gains income from securities sales and options to improve compliance. This statement is based largely on previously published GAO work.
What GAO Found
The corporate income tax is an important source of federal revenue and must be considered in dealing with the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance. Reexamining both federal spending and revenues, including corporate tax policy, corporate tax expenditures and corporate tax enforcement must be part of a multi-pronged approach to address the imbalance. The total amount of corporate tax avoidance, which includes the $32 billion in noncompliance estimated by IRS, is unknown. A complex tax code, complex business transactions, and often multinational corporate structures make determining corporate tax liabilities and the extent of corporate tax avoidance a challenge. Opportunities exist to improve corporate tax compliance and include simplifying the tax code, obtaining better data on noncompliance, continuing to oversee the effectiveness of IRS enforcement, leveraging technology, and sending sound compliance signals through increased collections of taxes owed. In a companion report issued today, GAO found that many taxpayers misreport capital gains or losses, sometimes inappropriately underpaying their taxes and sometimes overpaying them. IRS has efforts in place to help ensure proper reporting of capital gains and losses, but these efforts face several obstacles. GAO found that expanding third-party information reporting on the cost basis of capital assets could help mitigate this problem if related problems are addressed. GAO suggested that Congress consider requiring brokers to report adjusted basis to taxpayers and IRS and requiring IRS to work with the securities industry to develop cost-effective ways to mitigate reporting challenges. GAO also recommended that IRS clarify its guidance on reporting capital gains and losses. |
gao_GAO-05-214 | gao_GAO-05-214_0 | Congress also passed legislation that clarifies USDA’s responsibilities over agriculture and food security. 3.) Presidential Directives Define Agency Responsibilities for Protecting against Agroterrorism
Following the creation of DHS, the President issued four directives that further define agencies’ roles and responsibilities for protecting against terrorism. USDA, in collaboration with other agencies including DHS, were tasked with writing the sections of the National Response Plan guiding U.S. efforts to respond to an attack on U.S. agriculture. Since the Terrorist Attacks of 2001, Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Manage the Risks of Agroterrorism
In carrying out their new roles and responsibilities, federal agencies have taken steps to manage the risks of agroterrorism, including the development of a comprehensive national strategy that did not exist before September 11, 2001. Exercises have also been conducted to test response capability to address plant diseases. A Number of Agency- Specific Actions Are Under Way
In addition to the broad national planning efforts discussed, other specific actions that federal agencies responsible for protecting against agroterrorism have taken since 2001 include the following: FDA and USDA are in various stages of developing vulnerability assessments of the agriculture and food sectors, as called for in HSPD-9. The United States Still Faces Complex Challenges and Management Problems in Protecting against Agroterrorism
Although many important steps have been taken to prevent or reduce the impact of agroterrorism, the United States still faces complex challenges that limit the nation’s ability to quickly and effectively respond to a widespread attack on animal agriculture. The only vaccines currently stored in the United States against foreign animal diseases are for various strains of FMD because this disease is so highly contagious. Agricultural Inspections and Interceptions Have Declined, and Fewer Inspectors Are Available to Respond to Agricultural Emergencies since the Transfer of USDA Inspectors to DHS
Since the transfer of most USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) inspectors to DHS in March 2003, government officials, reports, and data indicate that the nation may be more vulnerable to the introduction of foreign animal and plant diseases through ports of entry into the United States. Once diseases have been accurately diagnosed, the United States needs to quickly decide whether vaccines should be used to control an outbreak and have the ability to deploy ready-to-use vaccines within 24 hours. To address management problems that reduce the effectiveness of agencies’ routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism, we recommend the following seven actions: the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture work together to identify the reasons for declining agricultural inspections and to identify potential areas for improvement; the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture streamline the flow of information between USDA and DHS agricultural inspectors, and expedite the integration of the two agencies’ databases and information technology systems at the port level; the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a mechanism to promptly and effectively seek input from key stakeholders on national guidance that affects their roles in protecting agriculture and responding to an emergency; the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, and the Acting Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency compile relevant after-action reports from test exercises and real-life emergencies and disseminate the reports through the Homeland Security Information Network that DHS is developing; the Secretary of Agriculture develop a strategy to increase the number of Area and Regional Emergency Coordinator positions so that the agency faces less difficulty filling these positions and is better able to assist states in preparing for an agriculture emergency, including a terrorist attack; the Secretary of Homeland Security work to ensure that task lists for the various agencies and working groups engaged in securing agriculture are consistent with national plans and guidelines; and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop controls to better coordinate and track federally funded research efforts with other agencies to protect against agroterrorism. Finally, we interviewed numerous agency officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Justice. GAO Comments
1. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. agriculture generates more than $1 trillion per year in economic activity and provides an abundant food supply for Americans and others. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, there are new concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases (agroterrorism). Several agencies, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Defense (DOD), play a role in protecting the nation against agroterrorism. GAO examined (1) the federal agencies' roles and responsibilities to protect against agroterrorism, (2) the steps that the agencies have taken to manage the risks of agroterrorism, and (3) the challenges and problems that remain.
What GAO Found
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies' roles and responsibilities were modified in several ways to help protect agriculture from an attack. First, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS and, among other things, charged it with coordinating U.S. efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The act also transferred a number of agency personnel and functions into DHS to conduct planning, response, and recovery efforts. Second, the President signed a number of presidential directives that further define agencies' specific roles in protecting agriculture. Finally, Congress passed legislation that expanded the responsibilities of USDA and HHS in relation to agriculture security. In carrying out these new responsibilities, USDA and other federal agencies have taken a number of actions. The agencies are coordinating development of plans and protocols to better manage the national response to terrorism, including agroterrorism, and, along with several states, have conducted exercises to test these new protocols and their response capabilities. Federal agencies also have been conducting vulnerability assessments of the agriculture infrastructure; have created networks of laboratories capable of diagnosing animal, plant, and human diseases; have begun efforts to develop a national veterinary stockpile that intends to include vaccines against foreign animal diseases; and have created new federal emergency coordinator positions to help states develop emergency response plans for the agriculture sector. However, the United States still faces complex challenges that limit the nation's ability to respond effectively to an attack against livestock. For example, USDA would not be able to deploy animal vaccines within 24 hours of an outbreak as called for in a presidential directive, in part because the only vaccines currently stored in the United States are for strains of foot and mouth disease, and these vaccines need to be sent to the United Kingdom (U.K.) to be activated for use. There are also management problems that inhibit the effectiveness of agencies' efforts to protect against agroterrorism. For instance, since the transfer of agricultural inspectors from USDA to DHS in 2003, there have been fewer inspections of agricultural products at the nation's ports of entry. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-218 | gao_T-AIMD-98-218_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to Government Services Is High
Addressing the Year 2000 problem in time will be a tremendous challenge for the federal government. To complicate matters, agencies must also consider the computer systems belonging to federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; foreign countries; and international organizations that interface with their systems. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Agencies cannot afford to neglect any of these issues. If they do, the impact of Year 2000 failures could be widespread, costly, and potentially disruptive to vital government operations worldwide. Overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In addition to slow progress in fixing systems, many agencies were not adequately acting on critical steps to establish priorities, solidify data exchange agreements, and develop contingency plans. GAO Guidance on Year 2000 Testing
One of the more alarming problems we have come across in our Year 2000 reviews is that some agencies are not adequately prepared for testing their systems for Year 2000 compliance. Complete and thorough Year 2000 testing is essential to provide reasonable assurance that new or modified systems process dates correctly and will not jeopardize an organization’s ability to perform core business operations after the millennium. To address this problem, we are issuing today a new installment of our Year 2000 guidance which addresses the need to plan and conduct Year 2000 tests in a structured and disciplined fashion. In conclusion, if effectively implemented, our guide should help federal agencies successfully negotiate the complexities involved with the Year 2000 testing process. However, the success of the government’s Year 2000 remediation efforts ultimately hinges on setting governmentwide priorities; ensuring that agencies set priorities and develop contingency plans consistent with these priorities; developing an accurate picture of remediation progress; designating lead agencies for end-to-end testing efforts; and addressing other critical issues, such as recruiting and retaining qualified information technology personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the year 2000 risks facing the government; (2) major concerns with the government's progress in fixing its systems; and (3) guidance on year 2000 testing, which is designed to assist agencies in the most extensive and expensive part of remediation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) addressing the year 2000 problem in time will be a tremendous challenge for the federal government; (2) to complicate matters, agencies must consider the computer systems belonging to federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; foreign countries; and international organizations that interface with their systems; (3) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (4) if agencies neglect any of these issues, the impact of year 2000 failures could be widespread, costly and potentially disruptive to vital government operations worldwide; (5) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (6) many agencies were not adequately acting on critical steps to establish priorities, solidify data exchange agreements, and develop contingency plans; (7) some agencies are not adequately prepared for testing their systems for year 2000 compliance; (8) complete and thorough year 2000 testing is essential to provide reasonable assurance that new or modified systems process dates correctly and will not jeopardize an organization's ability to perform core business operations after the millenium; (9) since the year 2000 computing problem is so pervasive, the requisite testing is extensive and expensive; (10) to address the testing problem, GAO issued a new installment of its year 2000 guidance which addresses the need to plan and conduct year 2000 tests in a structured and disciplined fashion; (11) if effectively implemented, the guide should help federal agencies successfully negotiate the complexities involved with the year 2000 testing process; and (12) however, the success of the government's year 2000 remediation efforts ultimately hinges on setting governmentwide priorities, ensuring that agencies set priorities and develop contingency plans consistent with these priorities, developing an accurate picture of remediation progress, designating lead agencies for end-to-end testing efforts, and addressing other critical issues such as recruiting and retaining qualified information technology personnel. |
gao_GAO-04-195T | gao_GAO-04-195T_0 | Drug compounding, which has always been a part of the traditional practice of pharmacy, involves the mixing, combining, or altering of ingredients to create a customized medication for an individual patient. Actions Taken or Under Way by States and National Organizations to Strengthen State Oversight of Drug Compounding, but Affect Likely to Vary from State to State
We found efforts at the state level and among national pharmacy organizations to potentially strengthen state oversight of drug compounding. Actions among the four states we reviewed included adopting new drug compounding regulations and random testing of compounded drugs. At the national level, industry organizations are working on standards for compounded drugs that could be adopted by states in their laws and regulations. While these actions may help improve oversight, the ability of states to oversee and ensure the quality and safety of compounded drugs may be affected by their available resources and their ability to adopt new standards and enforce penalties. The pharmacy board in Missouri has taken a different approach from other states: it is in the process of implementing random batch testing of compounded drugs. North Carolina. Vermont. Wyoming. Efforts of National Organizations May Help States Strengthen Oversight of Drug Compounding
At the national level, industry organizations are working on uniform practices and guidelines for compounded drugs and a committee of national association representatives recently began work on developing a program that would include certification and accreditation for drug compounding that could be used for state oversight. For example, of the 307 complaints received and reviewed by the board of pharmacy against pharmacies and pharmacists in Missouri in fiscal year 2002, only 5 were related to drug compounding. In practice, however, the agency generally relies on the states to regulate the traditional practice of pharmacy, including the limited compounding of drugs for the particular needs of individual patients. In 1997, the Congress passed a law that exempted drug compounders from key portions of the FDCA if they met certain criteria. Their efforts, however, were nullified when the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the law’s drug compounding section as an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech, which resulted in the entire compounding section being declared invalid. FDA Modernization Act Exempted Drug Compounders from Some FDCA Requirements but Was Declared Invalid
Federal regulatory authority over drug compounding attracted congressional interest in the 1990s, as some in the Congress believed that “clarification is necessary to address current concerns and uncertainty about the Food and Drug Administration’s regulatory authority over pharmacy compounding.” The Congress addressed this and other issues when it passed the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), which included a section exempting drugs compounded on a customized basis for an individual patient from key portions of FDCA that were otherwise applicable to manufacturers. Current FDA Enforcement Focuses on Drug Compounding Outside of the Traditional Practice of Pharmacy
FDA issued a compliance policy guide in May 2002, following the Supreme Court decision, to offer guidance about when it would consider exercising its enforcement authority regarding pharmacy compounding. FDA maintains that drug compounding activities are generally subject to FDA oversight under its authority to oversee the safety and quality of new drugs, but the agency generally relies on states to provide the necessary oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug compounding--the process of mixing, combining, or altering ingredients--is an important part of the practice of pharmacy because there is a need for medications tailored to individual patient needs. Several recent compounding cases that resulted in serious illness and deaths have raised concern about oversight to ensure the safety and quality of compounded drugs. These concerns have raised questions about what states--which regulate the practice of pharmacy--and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are doing to oversee drug compounding. GAO was asked to examine (1) the actions taken or proposed by states and national pharmacy organizations that may affect state oversight of drug compounding, and (2) federal authority and enforcement power regarding compounded drugs. This testimony is based on discussions with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) and a GAO review of four states: Missouri, North Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming. GAO also interviewed and reviewed documents from pharmacist organizations, FDA, and others involved in the practice of pharmacy or drug compounding.
What GAO Found
A number of efforts have been taken or are under way both at the state level and among pharmacy organizations at the national level that may strengthen state oversight of drug compounding. Actions among the four states reviewed included adopting new regulations about compounding and conducting more extensive testing of compounded drugs. For example, the pharmacy board in Missouri is starting a program of random testing of compounded drugs for safety, quality, and potency. At the national level, industry organizations are working on standards for compounded drugs that could be adopted by the states in their laws and regulations, thereby potentially helping to ensure that pharmacies consistently produce safe, high-quality compounded drugs. While these actions may help improve oversight, the ability of states to oversee and ensure the quality and safety of compounded drugs may be affected by state-specific factors such as the resources available for inspections and enforcement. FDA maintains that drug compounding activities are generally subject to FDA oversight, including its authority to oversee the safety and quality of new drugs. In practice, however, the agency generally relies on states to regulate the limited compounding of drugs as part of the traditional practice of pharmacy. In 1997, the Congress passed a law exempting drug compounders that met certain criteria from key provisions of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), including the requirements for the approval of new drugs. These exemptions, however, were nullified in 2002 when the United States Supreme Court ruled part of the 1997 law to be an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech, which resulted in the entire compounding section being declared invalid. Following the court decision in 2002, FDA issued guidance to indicate when it would consider taking enforcement actions regarding drug compounding. For example, it said the agency would defer to states regarding "less significant" violations of the Act, but would consider taking action in situations more analogous to drug manufacturing. |
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