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gao_GAO-10-691 | gao_GAO-10-691_0 | 1). Although the U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate U.S. Resettlement of North Korean Refugees, Processing Times Did Not Improve
The USRAP opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from fiscal years 2005 to 2010, as of March 29, 2010. However, the policies of some host countries affect U.S. processing times for North Korean refugees. From fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most current year for which complete data were available, U.S. processing times did not improve. The U.S. Government Has Taken Actions to Facilitate the U.S. Resettlement Process for North Korean Refugees
The U.S. government, particularly State, has taken actions to facilitate the U.S. resettlement process for North Korean refugees by placing a high priority on North Korean cases and providing additional resources to process these cases. Conducting and clearing security checks involve a number of federal agencies, and this stage in USRAP can create delays in U.S. processing times, according to U.S. officials. Processing of North Korean Refugees
Some host countries’ policies affect the processing of North Korean refugee cases, according to officials from the U.S. government and international organizations. For example: Some host countries delay granting exit permission for North Korean refugees, which can add months to overall processing times, according to U.S. officials. Processing Times for North Korean Refugees Did Not Improve from Fiscal Year 2006 to 2008, and Were Generally Comparable to Those of Some Other Refugee Populations in Fiscal Year 2008
Overall, average processing times did not improve for the 85 cases created in fiscal years 2006 to 2008 that arrived in the United States. State officials said that one host country limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, which resulted in longer average processing times for cases created in those years. At Least 33 North Koreans Have Applied for Asylum Status in the United States, but the Number Is Likely Higher
In the United States, North Koreans have applied for asylum protection through two processes—the affirmative and the defensive. Defensive Asylum Process
Through the defensive asylum process, applicants, including North Koreans, request asylum as a defense against removal from the United States and can be held in detention while their case is processed. The Number of North Koreans Who Have Sought Asylum in the United States Is Likely Higher than 33
DHS/USCIS identified 33 North Koreans—including their dependents (some of whom may not be North Korean)—who have sought asylum in the United States since fiscal year 2005 through either the affirmative asylum or credible fear process. Of the 33 North Korean asylum seekers, 9 have been granted asylum, 15 are pending, as of March 2, 2010, and 9 individual cases were closed or resolved for other reasons (“other decisions”). Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services. State, DHS, and DOJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) assess the U.S. government’s efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees overseas for resettlement in the United States, and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so. Citizenship and Immigrations Services (USCIS). We requested data on North Korean asylum cases in the defensive process from EOIR. Affirmative Asylum Process
In the affirmative asylum process, individuals who are physically in the United States, regardless of how they arrived or their current immigration status, may present an asylum application to DHS/USCIS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Famine killed hundreds of thousands of North Koreans in the 1990s and compelled a large number of others to leave in search of food, economic opportunities, and escape from a repressive regime. This migration continues. Some North Koreans seek resettlement in other countries, such as South Korea and the United States. To promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean refugees, Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004. In reauthorizing the Act in 2008, Congress found that delays in processing North Korean refugees have led refugees to abandon their quest for U.S. resettlement. GAO was asked to (1) assess the U.S. government's efforts to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees who request resettlement in the United States from overseas, and (2) determine the number of North Koreans who have sought asylum to remain in the United States and the process by which they may do so. GAO is issuing a separate classified annex to this report. GAO analyzed data on North Korean refugees and asylees, interviewed agency officials, and conducted fieldwork in Asia. This report does not contain recommendations. The Departments of State (State), Homeland Security, and Justice provided technical comments and GAO incorporated these comments, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government has taken actions to facilitate the U.S. resettlement of North Korean refugees from overseas, but processing times did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008 due in part to some host countries' policies. The United States opened cases for 238 North Korean refugee applicants from October 2004 through March 2010, and 94 of these North Koreans arrived in the United States. As part of its recent actions to facilitate the processing of North Korean refugees, State has placed a high priority on these cases and provided additional staff time and resources to process these cases. However, according to U.S. officials, some U.S. requirements, such as conducting and clearing security checks, can delay U.S. processing. According to officials from the U.S. government and international organizations, the policies of some host countries also can affect U.S. processing of North Korean refugees. For example, some host countries delay granting North Korean refugees permission to leave their countries. Average processing times for North Koreans did not improve from fiscal years 2006 to 2008, the most recent year for which complete data were available. State officials said that one host country limited U.S. government access to North Koreans in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, resulting in longer average processing times for cases created in those years. While processing times for North Koreans were lower in fiscal year 2006 than those of some other refugee populations, the processing times were generally comparable in fiscal year 2008. From October 1, 2004, through March 2, 2010, at least 33 North Koreans have sought asylum protection to remain in the United States, but the actual number is likely higher. Of the 33 North Koreans, 9 individuals have been granted asylum, 15 are still pending, and 9 are categorized as "other decisions," meaning their cases have been denied, dismissed, or withdrawn, according to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) data. The actual number of individuals is likely higher for several reasons including agencies' difficulties in compiling information. North Koreans can seek asylum protection through two processes--the affirmative or the defensive. In the affirmative process, individuals who are physically in the United States may present an asylum application to USCIS and undergo a non-adversarial interview to determine their eligibility for asylum. In the defensive process, applicants request that the Department of Justice grant them asylum as a defense against removal from the United States. USCIS data do not include information on North Koreans who first claimed asylum before an Immigration Judge in the defensive process. |
gao_GAO-15-668T | gao_GAO-15-668T_0 | DHS Has Enhanced Its Resource Alignment, but Could Better Assure Resources Deployed Abroad Support Highest Priorities
In September 2013, we reported on actions DHS has taken to align its programs abroad with its resource use and with other U.S. governmental strategic priorities. We found that DHS had taken actions toward increasing organizational and programmatic alignment for its resource use abroad consistent with requirements set forth in law. For example, we found that DHS had established an intradepartmental governance board to provide a formal organizational mechanism for DHS component heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate crosscutting policy issues related to international engagement. We also found that DHS reviewed its international footprint—the complete set of resources and efforts DHS has deployed abroad—with the intention of enhancing organizational and programmatic alignment. Although DHS has a broad mission set and decision making about resource use abroad is decentralized to the components, we found that DHS had not established specific department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for resource use abroad to help promote organizational alignment in resource decision making. DHS concurred, and as of May 2015, has started to draft an international engagement strategy to identify specific department-wide priorities. We also found that although OIA conducted a one-time exercise from 2011 to early 2012 to evaluate the department’s international footprint to try to bring it into better organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS had not established a routine or ingrained process that would continually assess the alignment between strategic goals and resource decisions. To address these concerns, we recommended that DHS establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department’s resource use abroad with the highest department-wide and government- wide strategic priorities. DHS concurred, and as of May 2015, OIA plans to use the international engagement plan as the foundation of a footprint review, starting with a specific international region, to identify opportunities to realign resources with priorities and to identify crosscutting management efficiencies for the department’s fiscal year 2017 budget request. In addition, in 2013, we found that DHS did not have comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and had not established a standardized framework to capture these data to help inform resource decision making and to achieve management efficiencies when addressing issues that are common across the department. We recommended that DHS establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department- wide cost data for resource use abroad. DHS Carries Out Activities Abroad That Help Prevent High- Risk Passengers and Cargo from Traveling to and Entering the United States
DHS conducts various programs and mission activities abroad to prevent people and cargo posing a threat to the United States from reaching the homeland. These include, among other things, efforts to ensure visa security, inspect international passengers prior to boarding a flight bound for the United States, and identify and target high-risk maritime containerized cargo shipments before being loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels. Visa Security
In March 2011, we reported on ICE’s efforts to strengthen visa issuance procedures. We found that ICE, through the Visa Security Program (VSP), works to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible travelers from attempting to enter the United States by screening visa applicants before the travel process begins. Under VSP, ICE deploys personnel to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to assist the Department of State’s consular officers with security reviews of visa applications and investigations of passport and visa fraud, among other things. We made several recommendations to help DHS better manage VSP at posts overseas. DHS did not concur with this recommendation and has taken no action to implement it. From 2008 to January 2015, we reported on DHS’s efforts to assess potentially risky foreign ports, and target, screen, and interdict vessels and cargo container shipments destined for the United States.global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailer— and cargo destined for the United States—the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT), and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). According to CBP officials, CBP plans to complete the necessary steps to implement this recommendation by the end of December 2015. Specifically, in January 2015, we found, among other things, that CBP did not have accurate data on the number and disposition of each high-risk maritime cargo shipment scheduled to arrive in the United States. DHS concurred with our recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them. Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO-13-764. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid and coordinated effort that uses U.S. government resources to mitigate threats to homeland security. DHS contributes to the U.S. government's efforts to combat terrorism and works to prevent inadmissible travelers and cargo from entering the United States. DHS's overseas efforts include ensuring visa security, inspecting passengers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights, and identifying high-risk cargo shipments.
This statement addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities and (2) selected DHS programs abroad aimed at preventing high-risk travelers and maritime containerized cargo from entering the United States. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from 2008 through January 2015, along with selected updates conducted in May 2015 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
In September 2013, GAO reported on actions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had taken to align its programs abroad with its resource use and with other U.S. governmental strategic priorities. GAO found that DHS had taken actions to better align its resource use with its programs abroad consistent with requirements set forth in law. Specifically, from 2011 to early 2012, DHS conducted a onetime review of its international footprint—the complete set of DHS resources and efforts it has deployed abroad—and created a department-wide international engagement plan. However, DHS had not established specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use abroad. Specifically, DHS (1) had not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) did not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) did not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and had not established a standardized framework to capture these data. GAO recommended that DHS establish department-wide strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data to provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions. DHS concurred and, as of May 2015, has taken steps to implement GAO's recommendations, such as drafting an international engagement strategy to identify specific department-wide priorities and establishing a common cost framework. DHS plans to finalize this strategy by early summer 2015 and use it a mechanism to facilitate additional footprint reviews in future budget years.
DHS deploys multiple screening and targeting programs designed to help interdict high-risk travelers, such as potential terrorists, and otherwise inadmissible passengers and cargo shipments before they board U.S.-bound commercial vessels. For example, in March 2011, GAO reported on the Visa Security Program (VSP) through which DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys personnel to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to conduct security reviews of visa applications, among other things. GAO found that ICE had limited guidance for the program and could improve its program expansion planning. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations to issue guidance and strengthen its planning and took steps to address them. GAO also found that DHS did not collect comprehensive data on all VSP performance measures and track the time officials spent on visa security activities; DHS did not concur with GAO's recommendations to address these limitations. Further, since 2008, GAO has reported on CBP's programs intended to secure the maritime global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailer—and cargo destined for the United States. For example, in September 2013, GAO found that CBP had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risks to since 2005. While CBP took steps to rank ports for risks in 2009, CBP did not use this information to modify where CBP staff were posted. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation to periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports and has plans to conduct such assessments by the end of 2015.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made recommendations to DHS to inform its resource deployment abroad and strengthen screening and targeting programs. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations to inform resource deployment abroad and has actions planned or underway to address them. DHS did not agree with some of GAO's recommendations related to VSP; GAO continues to maintain that all of these recommendations should be addressed. |
gao_AIMD-96-63 | gao_AIMD-96-63_0 | Reconciliation Reports
In January 1996, BIA provided to each tribe a report package on the results of the reconciliation procedures performed by its contractor for fiscal years 1973 through 1992, BIA’s reconciliations for fiscal years 1993 through 1995, and a transmittal letter which described the information provided and BIA’s plans to meet with tribes to discuss the reconciliation results. In addition, for the procedures which were performed, BIA did not fully disclose scope limitations or changes in methodologies, such as accounts and time periods that were not covered and alternative source documents used. In addition, on March 8, 1996, OTFM issued reports to 112 tribes on their portions of multitribe judgment awards. These judgment awards resulted from claims against the federal government. However, OTFM’s Reconciliation Project Manager told us that OTFM may not be able to issue reports to all of the tribes involved in multitribe awards because some are no longer federally recognized as tribal entities, and BIA may not be able to locate the tribes or their descendants. Project Objectives and Scope
Tribal concerns about the reconciliation project’s objectives and scope included the following: the lack of an audit and how this affected the reliability of the reconciled account balances, the failure to include fraud as a reconciliation objective, the reliability of portions of the reconciliations that BIA rather than the independent contractor had performed and adjustments that BIA had proposed, and the fact that the effort seemed to consist mainly of a reconciliation of BIA accounts with BIA-generated documents. Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Efforts to Reconcile and Audit the Indian Trust Funds (GAO/T-AFMD-91-2, April 11, 1991). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) efforts to reconcile and certify tribal trust fund accounts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) BIA has spent over $21 million over 5 years in its attempts to reconcile and certify Indian trust fund accounts; (2) BIA and its reconciliation and certification contractors modified their contracts and procedures numerous times because of missing records, lack of an audit trail, and cost and time constraints; (3) in January 1996, BIA provided each tribe with a report package on the results of the reconciliation procedures performed; (4) BIA did not fully disclose in the report which procedures specified in the reconciliation contract were not performed, scope limitations, or changes in methodologies for procedures that were performed; (5) BIA issued reports to 112 tribes regarding their portions of multitribe judgment awards for claims against the federal government, but may not issue reports to all tribes involved because some are no longer recognized by the federal government and it may not be able to locate the tribes or their descendants; and (6) at a February 1996 meeting with BIA, tribal representatives expressed concerns about the adequacy of the reconciliation objectives and scope, the effect of missing documents on account balance accuracy, and the thoroughness of procedures for accuracy testing. |
gao_GGD-99-153 | gao_GGD-99-153_0 | A prospectus was not submitted to GSA’s Senate and House authorizing committees at the time the lease was signed. Section 7(a) of the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended, 40 U.S.C. We also contacted regional officials in 9 of GSA’s 10 other regions to determine whether they had guidance in place specifying how to calculate the lease costs to be used to determine if a prospectus is needed for an acquisition, and whether the decision that a lease is not prospectus-level is revalidated when space requirements or market rental rates change. A Prospectus Should Have Been Prepared for the SSUD Lease
NCR reviewed this acquisition after the lease was awarded and questions were raised by a congressional staffer about whether it should have had a prospectus. Also, there is still no requirement to revalidate the prospectus decision when space requirements and/or market rental rates change during the course of the acquisition. Conclusions
The lack of adequate internal controls over the leasing process at NCR resulted in PBS’ signing a prospectus-level lease for the SSUD space on August 5, 1998, without first preparing and submitting a prospectus for the lease to GSA’s authorizing committees. While NCR has instituted a new policy requiring its Portfolio Management Division to verify all leases before they are awarded, written guidance on how to calculate the average annual rental to be used to determine whether a prospectus is needed still does not exist. Event The General Services Administration’s (GSA) National Capital Region (NCR) and SSUD began discussing relocation from 1310 L Street. A prospectus for the SSUD lease at 1111 18th Street was prepared and transmitted to GSA’s authorizing committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on new leased space acquired for the Secret Service's Uniformed Division (SSUD) at 1111 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., by the Public Buildings Service (PBS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a lack of adequate internal controls over the leasing process at the General Services Administration's (GSA) National Capital Region (NCR) resulted in PBS' awarding a lease for SSUD on August 5, 1998, above the prospectus dollar threshold without first preparing and submitting a prospectus for the lease to GSA's Senate and House authorizing committees; (2) there was confusion about the costs that were to be considered in determining whether a prospectus was needed; (3) specific written guidance on how to calculate the cost did not exist; (4) although the space requirements increased about 40 percent--from about 50,000 square feet to about 70,000 square feet--during the acquisition process, procedures did not call for the revalidation of the decision that a prospectus was not needed when the space requirements or market rental rates used to make the decision changed during the acquisition process; (5) after a congressional staffer asked questions about the lease on August 31, 1998, NCR officials reviewed the award of the lease and determined that a prospectus should have been prepared and submitted to GSA's Senate and House authorizing committees as provided for in section 7(a) of the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended, 40 U.S.C. 606(a), and PBS' policy and procedures; (6) subsequently, NCR has instituted a new policy requiring its Portfolio Management Division to verify all leases before they are awarded; and (7) still, GSA has not developed specific guidance on how to calculate the cost to be used to determine whether a prospectus should be prepared, nor has GSA determined that it needs to revalidate prospectus decisions when space requirements or market rental rates change. |
gao_NSIAD-99-12 | gao_NSIAD-99-12_0 | The demonstration program began in September 1996, when the Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia (DSCP), competitively contracted with Profit Recovery Group International (PRGI). It requires PRGI to identify and document overpayments and to make recommendations to reduce future overpayments. Success of the Methods Used to Identify Overpayments
PRGI’s methodology involves four key steps. About 20 percent of the vendors responded, resulting in the recovery of $1.2 million. As of August 14, 1998, according to PRGI, it had audited about 80 percent of the $7.2-billion audit base and identified about $19.1 million in overpayments. Table 1 shows the types and amounts of overpayments identified by PRGI and recovered by DOD. Factors Limiting the Identification or Recovery of Overpayments
A number of factors have inhibited the identification or recovery of overpayments. Foremost, vendors disagreed with DSCP claims that it did not receive most favored customer status because it was not offered cash discounts offered to commercial customers. PRGI also had considerable difficulty identifying potential duplicate payments because its proprietary software was incompatible with the payment systems. Finally, according to PRGI, even though the contract was awarded in September 1996, PRGI could not begin audit work in earnest until June 1997, due to delays in obtaining computerized payment files. Time Between Payment and Audit Recovery Efforts Create Documentation Problems
The time between the years the payments were made by DSCP (fiscal years 1993-95) and the date of the recovery audit (fiscal years 1997-98) made finding supporting documentation difficult for both PRGI and the vendors. Further, PRGI personnel needed time to understand DOD’s unique procurement and payment processes, according to PRGI. Vendor responses surfaced an estimated $1.75 million in overpayments that were outside the scope of the PRGI contract either because they were not within the contractual review period ($484,000) or the overpayments were related to another government contract (estimated by PRGI to be $1.27 million). Both DFAS and DSCP officials said they had not taken action to pursue recovery or to inform the other government agencies so that they could pursue recovery and take steps to avoid future overpayments for a number of reasons. Conclusions
PRGI, through its methodology, has identified overpayments of $19.1 million and is continuing its efforts to identify additional overpayments. However, government efforts to collect these overpayments have been slow—only $1.9 million has been recovered—largely because the recovery process virtually stopped for 8 months, while DSCP reviewed the merits of the vendors’ complaints. While DSCP has concluded the government’s claims are valid, it has not yet issued letters notifying vendors of the final decision regarding amounts owed. To develop recommendations for improving the process by which overpayments are recovered by DOD, we reviewed the private sector practices for identifying and recovering overpayments and the recommendations PRGI made, and considered the factors limiting the identification or recovery of overpayments. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated November 4, 1998. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the results of the Department of Defense's (DOD) demonstration program evaluating the feasibility of using private contractors to identify overpayments made to vendors, focusing on: (1) assessing the success of the methods used to identify overpayments; (2) determining the types of overpayments identified and the amounts recovered; and (3) identifying factors limiting the identification or recovery of overpayments and developing recommendations for improving the process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the methods used by the Profit Recovery Group International (PRGI) to perform recovery auditing resulted in the identification of $19.1 million in overpayments, as of August 14, 1998, and efforts to identify additional amounts continue; (2) however, recoveries of overpayments amounted to only $1.9 million, in large part, because vendors took issue with some of the overpayments identified by PRGI; (3) this caused the recovery process to virtually stop for 8 months while the Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia reviewed the merits of the vendors' issues; (4) the Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia has concluded that the claims of overpayment are valid, but it has not yet notified vendors of the final decision regarding their indebtedness; (5) of $19.1 million in overpayments, $12.4 million was related to cash discounts not taken or received or deducted at the wrong rate, $2.2 million related to most favored customer terms not received, $1.3 million related to duplicate payments made, and $1.2 million related to credits for returned merchandise not taken; (6) as of August 14, 1998, according to PRGI, it had audited about 80 percent of the $7.2 billion audit base; (7) the fact that the overpayments were made 4 to 6 years before audit recovery began also made overpayment identification or recovery challenging; (8) documentation was difficult to retrieve for both PRGI and vendors, and sometimes it was not available; (9) PRGI also had considerable difficulty identifying duplicate payments because the needed information was not retained in the Defense Finance and Accounting Service payment files; (10) according to PRGI, even though its contract was awarded in September 1996, it was slow to begin audit work because of delays in obtaining Defense Finance and Accounting Service computerized payment files and the time PRGI needed to understand DOD's procurement and payment processes; (11) PRGI has made recommendations to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia to reduce future overpayments, but none have been implemented; (12) PRGI identified about $1.8 million in overpayments that were outside the scope of its contract, either because they were not within the fiscal year 1993-95 contractual review period or because they involved other government agencies; and (13) neither the Defense Finance and Accounting Service or the Defense Supply Center, Philadelphia chose to pursue payment recovery or inform the other government agencies of the overpayments so that they could pursue recovery and take steps to avoid future overpayments. |
gao_GAO-06-219 | gao_GAO-06-219_0 | DOD had not developed a well-defined architecture. For example, the latest versions of the architecture did not include products describing the “As Is” business and technology environments. DOD did not have an effective departmentwide management structure for controlling its business investments. DOD has partially satisfied the four legislative provisions relating to architecture development, transition plan development, budgetary disclosure, and investment review; it has satisfied the provision concerning designated approval authorities; and it is in the process of satisfying the provision for systems costing in excess of $1 million. According to DOD, the requirements of each provision will be fully implemented under its incremental approach to developing the architecture and transition plan, and its tiered accountability approach to business system investment management. Until they are, the department’s business systems modernization program will continue to be a high-risk endeavor. Version 3.0 also identifies some, but not all, system interface requirements. Version 3.0 of the architecture includes a “To Be” architecture and a transition plan; however, it does not include an “As Is” architecture, which is essential to performing a gap analysis to identify capability and system performance shortfalls that the transition plan is to address. However, it does not include all business processes. Transition Plan Partially Satisfies the Act, but Improvements Are Needed
The defense authorization act for fiscal year 2005 requires that DOD develop, by September 30, 2005, a transition plan for implementing its business enterprise architecture, and that this plan meet three requirements. However, the plan does not fully comply with the act’s requirements. Act’s Requirement for Delegating IT System Responsibilities and Accountabilities to Designated Approval Authorities Has Been Satisfied
The defense authorization act for fiscal year 2005 directs DOD to put in place a specifically defined structure that is responsible and accountable for controlling business system investments to ensure compliance and consistency with the business enterprise architecture. DOD has satisfied this requirement under the act. Act’s Requirements for Certain IT Investment Review Structures and Processes Have Been Partially Satisfied
The defense authorization act for fiscal year 2005 also required DOD to establish investment review structures and processes, including a hierarchy of investment review boards, each with representation from across the department, and a standard set of investment review and decision-making criteria for these boards to use to ensure compliance and consistency with the business enterprise architecture. Among other things, it has done the following. The remaining 44 have yet to be approved. The department’s actions to review and approve business systems investments can be viewed as work in process. This progress provides a foundation upon which to build. Therefore, we are not making additional recommendations at this time. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In its written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) and reprinted in appendix II, the department recognized that our analysis, recommendations, guidance, and educational activities have made us a constructive player in DOD’s business transformation efforts. While not commenting on most of the findings in the report, the department also stated that it disagreed with us on two points—the level of development of an “As Is” architecture and consistency within and between the business enterprise architecture and the transition plan. Consistent with the act and as agreed with congressional defense committees’ staffs, we evaluated DOD’s efforts relative to six provisions in the act: (1) development of an enterprise architecture that includes an information infrastructure enabling DOD to support specific capabilities, such as data standards and system interface requirements; (2) development of a transition plan for implementing the enterprise architecture that includes specific elements, such as the acquisition strategy for new systems; (3) inclusion of business system information in DOD’s fiscal year 2006 budget submission; (4) establishment of a business system investment approval and accountability structure; (5) establishment of a business system investment review process; and (6) approval of defense business system investments in excess of $1 million. To determine whether the transition plan addresses the requirements specified in the act, we reviewed the transition plan approved on September 28, 2005. List of the DOD Architecture Framework Products
Executive-level summary information on the scope, purpose, and context of the architecture Architecture data repository with definitions of all terms used in all products High-Level Operational Concept Graphic High-level graphical/textual description of what the architecture is supposed to do, and how it is supposed to do it Graphic depiction of the operational nodes (or organizations) with needlines that indicate a need to exchange information Information exchanged between nodes and the relevant attributes of that exchange Command structure or relationships among human roles, organizations, or organization types that are the key players in an architecture Operations that are normally conducted in the course of achieving a mission or a business goal, such as capabilities, operational activities (or tasks), input and output flows between activities, and input and output flows to/from activities that are outside the scope of the architecture One of three products used to describe operational activity—identifies business rules that constrain operations One of three products used to describe operational activity—identifies business process responses to events One of three products used to describe operational activity—traces actions in a scenario or sequence of events Documentation of the system data requirements and structural business process rules of the operational view Identification of systems nodes, systems, and systems items and their interconnections, within and between nodes Specific communications links or communications networks and the details of their configurations through which systems interface Relationships among systems in a given architecture; can be designed to show relationships of interest (e.g., system-type interfaces, planned versus existing interfaces)
Mapping of relationships between the set of operational activities and the set of system functions applicable to that architecture Characteristics of the system data exchanged between systems Systems Performance Parameters Matrix Quantitative characteristics of systems and systems hardware/software items, their interfaces, and their functions Planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of systems to a more efficient suite, or toward evolving a current system to a future implementation Emerging technologies and software/hardware products that are expected to be available in a given set of time frames and that will affect future development of the architecture One of three products used to describe system functionality—identifies constraints that are imposed on systems functionality due to some aspect of systems design or implementation One of three products used to describe system functionality—identifies responses of a system to events One of three products used to describe system functionality—lays out the sequence of system data exchanges that occur between systems (external and internal), system functions, or human role for a given scenario Physical implementation of the Logical Data Model entities (e.g., message formats, file structures, and physical schema)
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Acknowledgments
In addition to the contacts named above, key contributors to this report were Cynthia Jackson and Darby Smith, Assistant Directors, and Beatrice Alff, Barbara Collier, Francine DelVecchio, Neelaxi Lakhmani, Anh Le, Mai Nguyen, Tarunkant Mithani, Freda Paintsil, Randolph Tekeley, and William Wadsworth. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been attempting to modernize its business systems, and GAO has made numerous recommendations to help it do so. To further assist DOD, Congress included provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 aimed at ensuring that DOD develop a well-defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan by September 30, 2005, as well as establish and implement effective structures and processes for managing information technology (IT) business system investments. In response to the act's mandate, GAO is reporting on DOD's compliance with requirements relating to DOD's architecture, transition plan, budgetary disclosure, and business system review and approval structures and processes. Given GAO's existing recommendations, it is not making additional recommendations at this time. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD recognized that GAO has been a constructive player in its business transformation efforts. While not specifically commenting on most of the report's findings and its conclusions, DOD also said that it disagreed with two points: the level of development for its "As Is" architecture and instances of nonintegration within the architecture and transition plan. However, it also commented that it is committed to addressing what GAO views to be the underlying basis of both points.
What GAO Found
In its efforts to comply with the act's provisions, DOD has made important progress in establishing needed modernization management capabilities. However, much more remains to be done. The latest version of the business enterprise architecture (Version 3.0), which the department approved on September 28, 2005, partially satisfies the conditions of the act, but not entirely. For example, while Version 3.0 includes a target or "To Be" architecture, as required, it does not include a current ("As Is") architecture. Without this element, DOD could not analyze the gaps between the two architectures--critical input to a comprehensive transition plan. However, this version of the architecture represents significant progress and provides a foundation upon which the department can build. The transition plan associated with the current version of the architecture partially satisfies the act, but improvements are needed. Specifically, although it includes certain required information (such as milestones for major projects), it is inconsistent with the architecture in various ways. For instance, it identifies target systems (those that are to be included in the "To Be" architecture), but these are not always the same as those identified in the architecture itself. In addition, the transition plan does not include system performance metrics aligned with the plan's strategic goals and objectives. The department's fiscal year 2006 budget discloses some but not all required information. For example, it does not identify the approval authority for all business systems investments. DOD has satisfied some of the act's requirements regarding its business systems investments, but it either has not satisfied or is still in the process of satisfying others. For example, the department has fulfilled the act's requirement for delegating IT system responsibility and accountability to designated approval authorities as specified. In addition, DOD has largely satisfied the act's requirement to establish certain structures and define certain processes to review and approve IT investments. However, some of these structures are not yet in place, and some reviews and approvals to date have not followed the criteria in the act. DOD agrees that additional work is required and states that under its incremental approach to developing the architecture and transition plan, and under its tiered accountability structure for reviewing and approving business system investments, improvements will occur in its architecture, transition plan, budgetary disclosure, and investment management and oversight. If these improvements do not occur, DOD's business systems modernization will continue to be a high-risk program. |
gao_T-GGD-96-79 | gao_T-GGD-96-79_0 | GPRA provides a legislatively based mechanism for Congress and the executive branch to jointly engage in that reassessment. GPRA Provides Opportunity to Clarify Agencies’ Missions and Better Focus Programs
As I noted in an appearance before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs last May, in large measure, problems arising from unclear agency missions and goals and overlap and fragmentation among programs can best be solved through an integrated approach to federal efforts. A further important step toward sharpening agencies’ focus on outcomes would be for congressional committees of jurisdiction to hold comprehensive oversight hearings—annually or at least once during each Congress—using a wide range of program and financial information. Nevertheless, measuring outcomes is a critical aspect of GPRA, particularly for informing the decisions of congressional and high-level executive branch decisionmakers as they allocate resources and determine the need for and the efficiency and effectiveness of specific programs. How Are GPRA Performance Goals and Information Being Used to Drive the Agency’s Daily Operations? How Is the Agency Using Performance Information to Improve Its Effectiveness? What Steps Is the Agency Taking to Align Its Core Business Processes to Support Mission-Related Outcomes? Agencies’ efforts to focus on achieving results are leading a number of them to recognize the need to change their core business processes to better support the goals they are trying to achieve. Managing for Results: Status of the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/T-GGD-95-193, June 27, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the Government Performance and Results Act's (GPRA) potential contributions to congressional and executive branch decisionmaking; and (2) Congress' role in implementing GPRA.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) more federal agencies are recognizing the benefits of focusing on outcomes rather than activities to improve their programs' efficiency and effectiveness; (2) agencies cannot quickly and easily shift their focus because outcomes can be difficult to define and measure and major changes in services and processes may be required; (3) strong and sustained congressional attention is needed to ensure GPRA success; (4) GPRA provides a mechanism for reassessing agencies' missions and focusing programs while downsizing and increasing efficiency; (5) unclear goals and missions have hampered the targeting of program resources and caused overlaps and duplications; (6) Congress needs to hold periodic comprehensive oversight hearings and to gather information on measuring outcomes and determine how GPRA performance goals and information drive agencies' daily operations, how agencies use performance information to improve their effectiveness, agencies' progress in improving their financial and information systems and staff training and recruitment, and how agencies are aligning their core business processes to support mission-related outcomes. |
gao_GAO-14-356 | gao_GAO-14-356_0 | With regard to OPT, in particular, USCIS is responsible for adjudicating employment authorization requests from the foreign students who have obtained DSOs’ recommendations to participate in OPT. ICE Has Not Identified or Assessed Risks in OPT
SEVP has not identified or assessed risks associated with OPT, such as potential fraud or noncompliance with ICE regulations. Senior SEVP officials told us they consider OPT to be a low-risk employment benefit for foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign students under OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their foreign student visa status and future legal status to stay and work in the United States. However, SEVP has not developed a process to determine the extent to which schools that recommend and foreign students approved for OPT may pose risks. For example, CTCEU officials identified that a certain threshold, or percentage, of a school’s foreign student population approved for OPT may be a potential indicator of fraud involving OPT.According to our analysis of SEVIS data, as of August 2013, of the approximately 2,650 SEVP-certified schools with at least 1 foreign student approved for OPT, the percentage of each school’s registered foreign students approved for OPT met or exceeded the threshold identified by CTCEU at 193 schools. As part of these efforts, SEVP officials have not identified and assessed potential risks specific to OPT posed by schools and foreign students or determined the extent to which the office will include potential OPT risks as part of their efforts to assess risks SEVP-wide. Further, obtaining and assessing risk information from CTCEU and ICE field offices from prior noncompliance and fraud cases involving OPT throughout the development of its process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, to include OPT, could better position SEVP to manage any risks associated with OPT. ICE Cannot Fully Ensure Foreign Students Working under Optional Practical Training Are Maintaining Their Legal Status in the United States
ICE Does Not Consistently Collect Information Needed to Oversee OPT Requirements
ICE does not consistently collect information needed to oversee OPT requirements related to the type and timing of foreign students’ employment, as ICE regulations do not specifically require the collection of information on foreign students’ places and dates of employment in SEVIS. As indicated in table 3, SEVIS data on foreign students approved for the three types of OPT show that 38 percent of student records (48,642 of 126,796) do not contain an employer name, as of August 2013. Conclusions
OPT, which is an employment benefit, provides certain eligible foreign students with the opportunity to seek temporary work to gain practical experience in their major areas of study during and after completing an academic program. ICE has taken initial actions to identify risks across SEVP-certified schools; however, ICE has not analyzed available information to identify and assess potential risks specific to OPT posed by schools and foreign students. By collecting the appropriate information in SEVIS and monitoring such information for compliance, ICE may better position itself to determine whether foreign students approved for OPT are maintaining their legal student visa status while supplementing their education with employment directly related to their areas of study in the United States. To better ensure DSOs’ and students’ compliance with OPT requirements, and strengthen efforts to identify and assess potential risks in OPT, we recommend that the Director of ICE direct SEVP to take the following five actions: require that pre-completion and 12-month post-completion OPT students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS, students’ employer information, including the employer’s name and address; develop and distribute guidance to DSOs on how to determine whether a job is related to a student’s area of study and require DSOs to provide information in SEVIS to show that they took steps, based on this guidance, to help ensure that the student’s work is related to the area of study; require that students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS, students’ initial date of employment and any periods of unemployment; develop and provide guidance to DSOs and USCIS on how much time constitutes 1 full academic year for the purposes of recommending and authorizing OPT; and develop and implement a mechanism to monitor available information in SEVIS to determine if foreign students are accruing more OPT than allowed by ICE regulations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with optional practical training (OPT), and (2) collected information and developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States. To determine the extent to which DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has identified and assessed risks in ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) specifically related to OPT, we analyzed program documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed officials from DHS and its relevant components, including U.S. As we did not select a probability sample of ICE field offices to interview, the results of these interviews cannot be projected to all of ICE’s 26 field offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of November 2013, about 100,000 of the approximately 1 million foreign students in the United States were approved to participate in OPT—an employment benefit that allows foreign students to obtain temporary work in their areas of study during and after completing an academic program. ICE is responsible for certifying schools; monitoring foreign students and schools, including their compliance with OPT requirements; and enforcing immigration laws for those that fail to comply.
GAO was asked to review the management of OPT. This report examines the extent to which DHS has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with OPT, and (2) collected information and developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with OPT requirements and maintain their legal status. GAO analyzed ICE regulations and policies and data on schools that recommend and foreign students approved for OPT, as of August 2013. GAO interviewed ICE and USCIS officials, including those from 7 of 26 ICE field offices selected based on factors such as OPT-related fraud investigations. Interview results cannot be generalized, but they provided insights about OPT risks.
What GAO Found
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has not identified or assessed fraud or noncompliance risks posed by schools that recommend and foreign students approved for optional practical training (OPT), in accordance with DHS risk management guidance. ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) officials consider OPT to be a low-risk employment benefit for foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign students approved for OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their legal status in the United States. However, SEVP has not determined potential risks in OPT. Further, officials from the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), ICE's investigative unit, and ICE field agents GAO interviewed have identified potential risks involving OPT based on prior and ongoing investigations. For example, ICE field agents identified cases where school officials recommended OPT for foreign students to work outside of their major areas of study, which is not allowed under ICE regulations. In response to a June 2012 GAO recommendation, ICE has taken initial actions to identify risks across SEVP-certified schools but has not identified and assessed OPT risks or determined the extent to which potential OPT risks will be part of its efforts to assess risks SEVP-wide. Further, SEVP has not coordinated with CTCEU, including obtaining and assessing information from CTCEU and ICE field offices regarding OPT risks, as part of its efforts. Identifying and assessing OPT risks, in coordination with CTCEU, could better position SEVP to manage risks in OPT.
ICE has not consistently collected the information and developed the monitoring mechanisms needed to help ensure foreign students comply with OPT requirements, thereby maintaining their legal status in the United States. Foreign students can participate in OPT while attending classes and after graduation for up to 12 months; students studying in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics fields may be eligible for an additional 17 months (29 months total). However, ICE does not have complete information on which foreign students approved for OPT are actively working and whether employment is related to their studies, per ICE regulations. For example, GAO's analysis of ICE data on students engaged in all types of OPT indicates that 38 percent (48,642 of 126,796) of student records do not contain an employer's name. Furthermore, the data do not include the date on which students granted authorization began working. ICE does not require that students and school officials report this information. Without these data, ICE cannot determine whether students with employment authorization are working in jobs related to their studies and not exceeding regulatory limits on unemployment. Collecting and monitoring complete information on foreign students approved for OPT would better position ICE to determine whether these students are maintaining legal status in the United States.
This is a public version of a For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in January 2014. Information DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ICE, among other things, identify and assess OPT-related risks and require additional employment information from students and schools. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-187 | gao_GAO-01-187_0 | Conclusions
Effective coordination of the many agencies that participate in a criminal justice system is key to overall success. Although any criminal justice system faces coordination challenges, the unique structure and funding of the D.C. criminal justice system, in which federal and D.C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are blended, creates additional challenges. Almost every stage of D.C.’s criminal justice process presents such challenges, and participating agencies are sometimes reluctant to coordinate because the costs of implementing needed changes may fall on one or more federally funded agencies, while any savings accrue to one or more D.C. funded agencies, or vice versa. CJCC was established and staffed as an independent entity to improve systemwide coordination and cooperation. During its 2 ½-year existence, CJCC has served as a useful, independent discussion forum at a modest cost. It has had notable success in several areas where agencies perceived a common interest, such as developing technology that permits greater information sharing. It has been less successful in other areas, such as papering, where forging consensus on the need for and the parameters of change has been difficult. These factors notwithstanding, on balance, CJCC has achieved some successes at a modest cost and served as a useful, independent forum for discussing issues that affect multiple agencies. CJCC’s future is uncertain because its funding source, the D.C. Control Board, is scheduled to disband and key CJCC officials have departed. | What GAO Found
Effective coordination of the many agencies that participate in a criminal justice system is key to overall success. Although any criminal justice system faces coordination challenges, the unique structure and funding of the District of Columbia (D.C.) criminal justice system, in which federal and D.C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are blended, creates additional challenges. Almost every stage of D.C.'s criminal justice process presents such challenges, and participating agencies are sometimes reluctant to coordinate because the costs to implement needed changes may fall on one or more federally funded agencies, while any savings accrue to one or more D.C. funded agencies, or vice versa. The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) was established and staffed as an independent entity to improve systemwide coordination and cooperation. During its two and a half-year existence, CJCC has served as a useful, independent, discussion forum at a modest cost. It has had notable success in several areas in which agencies perceived a common interest, such as developing technology that permits greater information sharing. It has been less successful in other areas, such as papering, in which forging consensus on the need for and the parameters of change has been difficult. CJCC has achieved some successes at a modest cost and served as a useful, independent forum for discussing issues that affect multiple agencies. CJCC's future is uncertain because its funding source, the D.C. Control Board, is scheduled to disband and key CJCC officials have left. |
gao_GAO-05-164 | gao_GAO-05-164_0 | These approaches are similar to each others and to those used by organizations with comparable workforces. NNSA has supported its contractors by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the contractors and providing additional funding to help them recruit workers to fill critically skilled positions. Contractors’ Approaches for Recruiting and Retaining a Critically Skilled Workforce Have Been Generally Effective
The efforts of NNSA’s contractors to recruit and retain a critically skilled workforce have been generally effective, according to our analysis of the contractors’ data, our review of the contractors’ workforce planning processes, and information gathered from stockpile stewardship program managers. The average retirement age for critically skilled workers at Y-12 is approximately 59 years, and 364 of its critically skilled workers as of fiscal year 2003, or about 23 percent, are over the age of 55. To ensure that they will be in a position to meet their future critical skill needs, all eight nuclear weapons facilities have incorporated to some degree into their planning processes the five key principles we have identified as essential to strategic workforce planning: (1) involving management and employees in developing and implementing the strategic workforce plan, (2) determining critical skill needs through workforce gap analysis, (3) developing workforce strategies to fill gaps, (4) building needed capabilities to support workforce strategies, and (5) monitoring and evaluating progress in achieving goals. NNSA Contractors and Organizations with Comparable Workforces Face Ongoing Challenges but Have Developed Strategies to Mitigate Most of Them
NNSA contractors face ongoing challenges in recruiting and retaining a critically skilled workforce and are using a number of strategies to mitigate them. Beyond their challenges, NNSA contractors face future uncertainties that could affect their ability to recruit and retain a critically skilled workforce in the years ahead. In addition to the amount of time it takes to obtain security clearances, most of NNSA’s contractors also face the ongoing challenge of recruiting from a declining pool of technically skilled potential employees. Conclusion
While NNSA contractors have been generally effective in recruiting and retaining the critically skilled workforce needed currently, are well poised to maintain the critically skilled workforce that will be needed in the near future, and have successfully mitigated many of the challenges they have already faced, the future will almost certainly bring additional challenges and uncertainties the contractors will need to continue to stay aware of and address. To assess the extent to which the remaining challenges, and the strategies used to mitigate these challenges, are similar to those of organizations with comparable workforces, we spoke with human resource representatives from the six research and advanced technology organizations with comparable workforces and the two industry associations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Responsibility for ensuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile rests upon a cadre of workers at eight contractor-operated National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons facilities. Many of these workers--including scientists, engineers, and technicians--have "critical" skills needed to maintain the stockpile. About 37 percent of these workers are at or near retirement age, raising concern about whether these specialists will have time to pass on their knowledge and expertise to new recruits. In this context, Congress asked us to (1) describe the approaches that NNSA, its contractors, and organizations with similar workforces are using to recruit and retain critically skilled workers; (2) assess the extent to which these approaches have been effective; and (3) describe any remaining challenges, strategies to mitigate these challenges, and the similarity of these challenges and strategies to those of organizations with comparable workforces.
What GAO Found
NNSA contractors have each developed and implemented a multifaceted approach to recruit and retain critically skilled workers. These approaches are similar to those used by six organizations with comparable workforces with whom GAO spoke and consist of combinations of activities tailored to meet the specific needs of each facility. These activities include offering internships and providing knowledge transfer opportunities. NNSA has supported the contractors' efforts by, for example, providing additional funding to help them recruit workers to fill critically skilled positions. The efforts of NNSA's contractors to recruit and retain a critically skilled workforce have been generally effective. The contractors' fiscal year 2000 through 2003 data show that all eight facilities have maintained the critically skilled workforce needed to fulfill its current mission. In addition, our review of the workforce planning processes of each facility shows that they have incorporated, to varying degrees, the five principles GAO has identified as essential to strategic workforce planning. Finally, most of the program managers GAO spoke with believe their facilities have, and are well poised to maintain, the critically skilled workforce needed to fulfill their mission. NNSA contractors and the six organizations with comparable workforces face ongoing challenges in recruiting and retaining a critically skilled workforce, but are using a number of similar strategies to mitigate most of these challenges. These challenges include the amount of time it takes new staff to obtain security clearances and a shrinking pool of technically trained potential employees. Beyond such identifiable challenges, NNSA contractors also face future uncertainties, such as the possibility that a new contractor might be awarded the contract and shifts in their mission that could affect their ability to recruit and retain a critically skilled workforce in the future. |
gao_GAO-13-226 | gao_GAO-13-226_0 | And most recently, NFIP was amended by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. Some Indian reservations have a mixture of Indian and non-Indian residents. Most tribal lands are rural or remote, although some are near metropolitan areas. A Number of Factors Contribute to Indian Tribes’ Low NFIP Participation Rate
According to FEMA, as of August 2012, 37 out of 566 federally recognized tribes nationwide—roughly 7 percent—were participating in NFIP (see table 1). Many tribes lack the resources or administrative capacity to join NFIP. Many tribal representatives said that affordability would be an issue for tribal members. A tribal housing official from Alaska whose members can participate in NFIP through the surrounding borough told us that he had found that most members of his tribe dropped their homeowners insurance as soon as their homes were paid off and that he expected they would do the same with required flood insurance, which An official for another Oklahoma tribe can cost more than $1,000 a year.that was participating in NFIP but had no active individual policies said he did not believe flood insurance was a priority for members of his tribe, whose average annual household income was $6,000. FEMA Has Provided Indian Tribes with Training and Technical Assistance on Hazard Mitigation, Including Flood Insurance
FEMA’s outreach to tribes in the last few years has largely consisted of emergency management and homeland security training for tribal officials through its Emergency Management Institute (EMI), direct technical assistance to tribes in preparing their multihazard mitigation plans, and nationwide outreach for NFIP through its regional offices and the NFIP FloodSmart marketing campaign. FEMA officials told us that the agency helped to educate tribal officials about NFIP and floodplain management through courses offered by EMI under a mitigation curriculum that includes courses for floodplain managers on their roles and responsibilities, flood insurance, and NFIP rules and regulations. HUD and USDA Work with Tribes on Housing Issues and May Provide Some Information on NFIP
HUD and USDA Rural Development provide assistance in the form of housing and infrastructure grants, loans, and loan guarantees to Indian tribes. They suggested, among other things, more emphasis on educating tribes on the importance of flood insurance, as at least one tribe had been experiencing more rain each year; more outreach to tribes, including those without flood hazard maps, to help them understand their vulnerability to floods and the advantages of NFIP participation; meetings that brought together FEMA officials and elected tribal councils that could make decisions on behalf of their tribes; federal grants to help tribes develop elevation certificates and to retrofit older properties to lower risk and make the policies more affordable for members; a simulation exercise that included the host tribe, FEMA officials, and other government officials with whom tribes would need to coordinate in a flood-related disaster; and an amendment to the NFIP statute to address issues specific to tribes’ limited ability to adopt and enforce land use ordinances. As we have seen, for example, the FloodSmart campaign sent thousands of pamphlets to individual residents on Indian lands. Other private sector insurance options may offer tribes an alternative to NFIP. Microinsurance is a relatively new product that allows insurers to offer low-premium policies with small coverage limits in developing areas. Recommendation
To help increase Indian tribes’ participation in NFIP, we recommend that the Administrator of FEMA examine the feasibility of making mapping of tribal lands a higher priority. A letter from the Director of the Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office within the Department of Homeland Security stated that FEMA will take steps to make mapping of tribal lands a higher priority. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) factors contributing to the current low levels of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) participation by Indian tribes, (2) the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to increase tribes’ participation in NFIP, and (3) administrative and legislative actions that could encourage Indian tribes and their members to increase their participation in NFIP and potentially other flood insurance programs. We reviewed FEMA data on communities participating in NFIP, including those designated as tribal communities, and on tribes that had flood hazard maps but were not participating in NFIP for various reasons. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indian tribes' participation in NFIP is extremely low, even though some Indian lands are at high risk of flooding. In response to a Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act mandate, GAO examined (1) factors affecting Indian tribes' participation in NFIP, (2) FEMA's efforts to increase tribes' participation in NFIP, and (3) administrative and legislative actions that could increase tribes' participation. GAO reviewed FEMA data on community participation in NFIP and prior GAO reports on flood insurance and Indian tribes, interviewed officials from selected Indian tribes and insurance companies, and collected information from relevant agencies and industry officials.
What GAO Found
As of August 2012, just 37 of 566 federally recognized tribes (7 percent) were participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and 3 tribes accounted for more than 70 percent of policies. A number of factors have affected tribes' participation. First, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has not placed a high priority on mapping rural areas, including many Indian lands, for flood risk, and most tribal lands remain unmapped. Without flood hazard maps, tribal communities may be unaware of their flood risk, even in high-risk areas. Partly for this reason, the risk of flooding is perceived as relatively low on many tribal lands. Further, tribes may lack the resources and administrative capacity needed to administer NFIP requirements, and NFIP premiums are often too high for low-income tribal members. Finally, unique tribal issues can make participation difficult. For example, some Indian tribes do not have reservations over which they can enact and enforce the land use ordinances that are required for NFIP participation. Instead, many have lands that were allotted to individuals rather than to a tribal entity, limiting the tribes' jurisdiction.
FEMA has done some outreach to tribes, largely through emergency management and homeland security training for tribal officials, technical assistance to tribes that are preparing their multihazard mitigation plans, and marketing through the NFIP FloodSmart campaign. FEMA officials told us that the courses offered through its Emergency Management Institute helped to educate tribal officials about NFIP and floodplain management and that its curricula included courses for floodplain managers on their roles and responsibilities, flood insurance, and NFIP rules and regulations. One tribal representative told us that he was participating in an ongoing curriculum and several tribes had developed multihazard mitigation plans. Finally, both the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Development may provide NFIP information to Indian tribes as they provide assistance in the form of housing and infrastructure grants, loans, and loan guarantees.
Tribal representatives suggested steps that FEMA could take to encourage participation in NFIP--for example, placing a higher priority on mapping Indian lands and increasing FloodSmart marketing to tribal leaders rather than individuals. Given ongoing congressional interest in private sector alternatives to NFIP, GAO also explored whether private alternatives exist that could offer affordable coverage to low-income tribal members--for example, by expanding access to risk-pooling programs that could help insure more tribal households. One such program already insures thousands of Indian properties. Another relatively new product, microinsurance, would involve insurers offering less expensive policies with relatively low coverage limits but coverage for all tribes. FEMA said that its NFIP privatization study mandated by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 would include an assessment of these alternatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the FEMA Administrator examine ways to make mapping of tribal lands in flood-prone areas a higher priority. FEMA agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-497 | gao_GAO-12-497_0 | 1). Number of Children Applying for and Receiving SSI Benefits Due to Mental Impairments Has Increased
The number of children applying for and receiving SSI benefits due to a mental impairment has increased for more than a decade, and these children comprise a growing majority of all child recipients on the SSI disability rolls. Examiners Rely on a Combination of Key Information Sources to Determine Medical Eligibility
DDS examiners rely on a combination of key medical and nonmedical information sources—such as medical records, effects of prescribed medications, school records, and teacher and parent assessments—in determining a child’s medical eligibility for benefits. Based on our case file review, we estimate that examiners generally cited four to five information sources as support for their decisions in fiscal year 2010 for the three most prevalent mental impairments. In addition, several DDS officials told us medication is considered in the context of other sources of information as “just one piece of the puzzle.” Our case file review confirmed that information on medication and treatment was never the sole source of support for an allowance or denial. 6). By comparison, 47 percent of cases were denied and 53 percent were allowed when medication was not reported as present. Examiners Sometimes Lack Complete Information to Inform Their Decision Making and Identify Potential Threats to Program Integrity
Despite the importance of nonmedical information in determining a child’s medical eligibility, examiners sometimes face challenges obtaining complete information. In addition to the challenges they sometimes face in obtaining information from schools, DDS examiners said that they do not routinely receive information from SSA field offices on multiple siblings receiving SSI benefits within the same household even though they are directed to be alert for such cases. Without information on such children, DDS examiners may be limited in their ability to identify potential fraud or abuse in the program and elevate these cases to the attention of SSA’s fraud investigations unit. SSA Has Conducted Few Childhood CDRs in Recent Years
SSA has conducted significantly fewer CDRs for children receiving SSI benefits since 2000, even though SSA is generally required to perform CDRs at least every 3 years on child recipients under age 18 whose impairments are likely to improve, as well as certain other individuals (see fig 7). Childhood CDRs overall fell from more than 150,000 in fiscal year 2000 to about 45,000 reviews in fiscal year 2011 (a 70 percent decrease). More specifically, CDRs for children under age 18 with mental impairments declined from more than 84,000 to about 16,000 (an 80 percent decrease). From fiscal years 2000 to 2011, the number of adult CDRs fell from 584,000 to 179,000.proportion of childhood CDRs conducted has remained much lower than the proportion of adult CDRs conducted. because DDS offices have not consistently collected secondary impairment data. However, because SSA considers SSI childhood CDRs a lower priority than other CDRs, it is unclear whether the agency will use this funding to review children most likely to medically improve—reviews that could yield a high return on investment. If SSA continues to rely heavily on the use of waivers to conduct fewer CDRs than would otherwise be required by law, SSA will potentially forgo future program savings. 3. Direct the Deputy Commissioner of Quality Performance and Deputy Commissioner of Operations to take actions to ensure that SSA’s CDR waiver process is open, transparent, and public. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) the trends in the rate of children receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits due to mental impairments; (2) the role that medical and nonmedical information, such as medication and school records, play in the initial determination of a child’s medical eligibility; and (3) the steps the Social Security Administration (SSA) has taken to monitor the continued medical eligibility of these children. Our work included site visits to 9 field offices within these regions, as well as 11 state disability determination services (DDS) offices (state agencies under the direction of SSA that perform medical eligibility determinations and continuing disability reviews of SSI applicants). In addition, we interviewed numerous external experts from the medical and disability advocacy communities and reviewed relevant studies to identify factors that may be currently affecting the growth and composition of the childhood disability applicants and recipients, especially for those children with mental impairments. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. Appendix III: Trends on the Three Most Prevalent Primary Impairments among Children with Mental Impairments in the Supplemental Security Income Program
Social Security Administration (SSA) data show that the three most prevalent primary mental impairments among those children allowed for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits in fiscal year 2011 were for (1) attention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), (2) speech and language delay, and (3) autistic disorder and other pervasive development disorders (autism). From fiscal years 2000 to 2011, applications for this condition as a primary impairment more than doubled, from about 55,204 to 124,217, while allowances have also doubled from 13,857 to 29,872 (see fig. Autism. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSAs SSI program provides cash benefits to eligible low-income individuals with disabilities, including children. In 2011, SSA paid more than $9 billion to about 1.3 million disabled children, the majority of whom received benefits due to a mental impairment. GAO was asked to assess (1) trends in the rate of children receiving SSI benefits due to mental impairments over the past decade; (2) the role that medical and nonmedical information, such as medication and school records, play in the initial determination of a childs eligibility; and (3) steps SSA has taken to monitor the continued medical eligibility of these children.
To do this, GAO analyzed program data; interviewed SSA officials; conducted site visits to 9 field offices and 11 state DDS offices across the nation; reviewed a generalizable sample of 298 claims for select impairments from fiscal year 2010; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and interviewed external experts, among others.
What GAO Found
The number of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) child applicants and recipients with mental impairments has increased substantially for more than a decade, even though the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied, on average, 54 percent of such claims from fiscal years 2000 to 2011. Factors such as the rising number of children in poverty and increasing diagnosis of certain mental impairments have likely contributed to this growth. In fiscal year 2011, the most prevalent primary mental impairments among children found medically eligible were (1) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, (2) speech and language delay, and (3) autism, with autism claims growing most rapidly since fiscal year 2000. State disability determination services (DDS) examiners also consider the impact of additional, or secondary, impairments when making a decision, and when present, these impairments were used to support 55 percent of those cases GAO reviewed that were allowed in fiscal year 2010. However, SSA has not consistently collected those impairment data, limiting its understanding of how all impairments may affect decisions.
DDS examiners generally rely on a combination of key medical and nonmedical informationsuch as medical records and teacher assessmentsto determine a childs medical eligibility for SSI. In its case file review, GAO found that examiners usually cited four to five information sources as the basis for their decision, and that being on medication was never the sole source of support for decisions. Moreover, examiners cited medication and treatment information, such as reports of improved functioning, as a basis for denying benefits in more than half of cases that GAO reviewed, despite a perception among some parents that medicating their child would result in an award of benefits. Examiners also reported they sometimes lacked complete information to inform their decision making. For example, several DDS offices reported obstacles to obtaining information from schools, which they believe to be critical in understanding how a child functions. Examiners also do not routinely receive information from SSA field offices on multiple children who receive benefits in the same household, which SSAs fraud investigations unit has noted as an indicator of possible fraud or abuse. Without such information, examiners may be limited in their ability to identify threats to program integrity.
SSA has conducted fewer continuing disability reviews (CDR) for children since 2000, even though it is generally required by law to review the medical eligibility of certain children at least every 3 years. From fiscal year 2000 to 2011, childhood CDRs overall fell from more than 150,000 to about 45,000 (a 70 percent decrease), while CDRs for children with mental impairments dropped from more than 84,000 to about 16,000 (an 80 percent decrease). The most recent data show that more than 400,000 CDRs were overdue for children with mental impairments, with some pending by as many as 13 years or more. Of the more than 24,000 CDRs found to be 6 or more years overdue, 25 percent were for children expected to medically improve within 6 to 18 months of their initial allowance. SSA acknowledged the importance of conducting such reviews, but said that due to resource constraints and other workloads, such as initial claims, most childhood CDRs are a lower priority. SSAs process for issuing waivers from the CDR legal requirement lacks transparency, and without these reviews, SSA could continue to forgo significant program savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SSA take steps to ensure needed information, such as secondary impairment data and school records, is consistently collected; make its CDR waiver process more transparent; and conduct additional childhood CDRs. SSA agreed with four recommendations and disagreed with one that the agency conduct additional childhood CDRs, citing resource constraints. The GAO recommendation acknowledges resource constraints, as discussed more fully within the report. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-249 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-249_0 | Challenges in Stemming the Flow of Illegal Drugs Into the United States
Over the past 10 years, the U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs in the United States through the implementation of successive drug control strategies. Drug-Trafficking Organizations Have Substantial Resources, Capabilities, and Operational Flexibility
A primary challenge that U.S. and foreign governments’ counternarcotics efforts face is the power, influence, adaptability, and capabilities of drug-trafficking organizations. Drug source and transiting countries face long-standing obstacles that limit the effectiveness of their drug control efforts. Our more recent reports have discussed corruption problems in the Caribbean, Colombia and Mexico. Inadequate Resources and Institutional Capabilities Limit Arrests and Convictions of Drug Traffickers
Effective law enforcement operations and adequate judicial and legislative tools are key to the success of efforts to stop the flow of drugs from the source and transiting countries. These problems still exist. Efforts to Improve Counternarcotics Capabilities
Some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. For example, in June 1998, we reported that Mexico had taken efforts to (1) increase the eradication and seizure of illegal drugs, (2) enhance counternarcotics cooperation with the United States, (3) initiate efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States, (4) pass new laws on organized crime, money laundering, and chemical control, (5) institute reforms in law enforcement agencies, and (6) expand the role of the military in counternarcotics activities to reduce corruption. Obstacles Inhibit Success in Fulfilling U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts
Our work over the past 10 years has identified obstacles to implementing U.S. counternarcotics efforts, including (1) organizational and operational limitations, and (2) planning and management problems. Over the years, we have criticized ONDCP and U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics activities for not having good performance measures to help evaluate program results. Many of these challenges are long-standing. ONDCP is in the process of reviewing U.S. counternarcotics intelligence efforts. Our recent reports on Colombia and Mexico have shown that the delivery of U.S. counternarcotics assistance was poorly planned and coordinated. Ways to Improve the Effectiveness of U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts
We recognize that there is no easy remedy for overcoming all of the obstacles posed by drug-trafficking activities. International drug control efforts aimed at stopping the production of illegal drugs and drug-related activities in the source and transit countries are only one element of an overall national drug control strategy. Alone, these efforts will not likely solve the U.S. drug problem. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Caribbean, Colombia, and Mexico, focusing on the: (1) challenges of addressing international counternarcotics issues; and (2) obstacles to implementing U.S. and host-nation drug control efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its work over the past 10 years indicates that there is no panacea for resolving all of the problems associated with illegal drug trafficking; (2) despite long-standing efforts and expenditures of billions of dollars, illegal drugs still flood the United States; (3) although U.S. and host-nation counternarcotics efforts have resulted in the arrest of major drug traffickers and the seizure of large amounts of drugs, they have not materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United States; (4) a key reason for the lack of success of U.S. counternarcotics programs is that international drug-trafficking organizations have become sophisticated, multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control efforts; (5) as success is achieved in one area, the drug-trafficking organizations quickly change tactics, thwarting U.S. efforts; (6) other significant long-standing obstacles also impede U.S. and source and transit countries drug control efforts; (7) in the drug-producing and -transiting countries, counternarcotics efforts are constrained by corruption, limited law enforcement resources, institutional capabilities, and internal problems such as insurgencies and civil unrest; (8) moreover, drug traffickers are increasingly resourceful in corrupting the countries' institutions; (9) some countries, with U.S. assistance, have taken steps to improve their capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States; (10) among other things, these countries have taken action to extradite criminals, enacted legislation to control organized crime, money laundering, and chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, and instituted reforms to reduce corruption; (11) while these actions represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact, and challenges remain; (12) U.S. counternarcotics efforts have also faced obstacles that limit their effectiveness; (13) these include: (a) organizational and operational limitations; and (b) planning and management problems; (14) over the years, GAO has reported on problems related to competing foreign policy priorities, poor operational planning and coordination, and inadequate oversight over U.S. counternarcotics assistance; (15) GAO has also criticized the Office of National Drug Control Policy and U.S. agencies for not having good performance measures to evaluate results; and (16) GAO's work has identified ways to improve U.S. counternarcotics efforts through better planning, sharing of intelligence, and the development of measurable performance goals. |
gao_GAO-12-11 | gao_GAO-12-11_0 | Responsibility for VA’s medical facilities, including CLCs, rests with both VA’s networks and VA headquarters. VA Headquarters Established a Process for Responding to LTCI-Identified Deficiencies, but Cannot Provide Reasonable Assurance That Deficiencies Have Been Resolved
VA headquarters established a process for responding to deficiencies identified at CLCs during the 2007 and 2008 reviews. This process, which requires CLCs to submit corrective action plans addressing LTCI- identified deficiencies—such as how CLCs will address a lack of competent nursing staff and a failure to provide a sanitary and safe living environment—is also being used during the 2010 and 2011 LTCI reviews. After LTCI’s 2010 and 2011 reviews of VA’s CLCs are complete, VA headquarters plans to analyze the deficiencies identified by LTCI. Without the ability to determine whether CLCs appropriately responded to feedback, fully implemented their corrective action plans from the 2007 and 2008 LTCI reviews, or fully complied with requirements of the national training and education initiative, and without the ability to determine the status of corrective action plans that CLCs are implementing during LTCI’s 2010 and 2011 reviews, VA headquarters does not have reasonable assurance that LTCI-identified deficiencies are resolved. VA Headquarters Receives Information about CLCs from Multiple Sources, but Does Not Analyze It to Assess and Manage Risks
In addition to LTCI reviews, VA headquarters obtains information about CLCs from a variety of other sources that could be used to more comprehensively identify risks associated with the care and quality of life of CLC residents. As a result, VA headquarters’ current approach to identifying risks in CLCs may result in missed opportunities to detect patterns and trends in information about the quality of care and quality of life within a CLC or across many CLCs. Without considering information from all available sources and comparing it across different sources, VA headquarters cannot adequately identify and manage risks in CLCs. OIG. VA Office of the Medical Inspector (OMI). Quality Measures and Quality Indicators. VA Headquarters Does Not Consider the Potential Usefulness of All Available Information to Assess and Manage Risks in CLCs
VA headquarters’ approach for identifying risks associated with the quality of care and quality of life of CLC residents is deficient in two respects—it does not comprehensively analyze information from all available sources, and it does not compare findings across these sources. VA headquarters’ current approach relies significantly on the analysis of findings from LTCI reviews of CLCs. However, it does not compare the findings from one source to the findings from the other sources. However, VA headquarters cannot provide reasonable assurance of resolution of deficiencies because it does not (1) clearly document the feedback that it provides to CLCs about corrective action plans for LTCI-identified deficiencies, (2) require VA networks to report on the status of CLCs’ implementation of action plans, and (3) verify CLCs’ self-reported information about their implementation of the requirements of the national training and education initiative. Unaddressed, these weaknesses in VA headquarters’ process for responding to LTCI-identified deficiencies may compromise the quality of care and quality of life of veterans in CLCs. Without comprehensively analyzing information from all available sources, VA headquarters cannot fully identify risks in CLCs, estimate the significance of the risks, or take actions to mitigate them. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide reasonable assurance that LTCI-identified deficiencies are resolved and that veterans receive quality care and maintain their quality of life in VA CLCs, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions: For reviews conducted by LTCI under the current contract and any similar future contracts, (1) clearly and completely document the feedback provided to CLCs about their corrective action plans, (2) require VA networks to provide periodic reports on the status of CLCs’ implementation of their corrective action plans, and (3) develop and implement a process for verifying any information reported directly to VA headquarters by CLCs. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In its comments on a draft of this report, VA concurred with our recommendations and described the department’s planned actions to implement them. We believe it is important for VA to document feedback provided to CLCs as part of its process To address our recommendation that VA headquarters develop and implement a process to comprehensively identify, estimate, and mitigate risks in CLCs by analyzing and comparing all available information regarding quality of care and quality of life, VA stated that it plans to design a process that will use all available information about the quality of care and quality of life in CLCs. Identify the total number of deficiencies per community living center (CLC). Related GAO Products
VA Long-Term Care: Trends and Planning Challenges in Providing Nursing Home Care to Veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) annually provides care to more than 46,000 elderly and disabled veterans in 132 VA-operated nursing homes, called community living centers (CLC). After media reports of problems with the care delivered to veterans in CLCs, VA contracted with the Long Term Care Institute, Inc. (LTCI), a nonprofit organization that surveys nursing homes, to conduct in-depth reviews of CLCs in 2007-2008 and again in 2010-2011. GAO was asked to evaluate VA's approach to managing veterans' quality of care and quality of life in CLCs. This report examines (1) VA's response to and resolution of LTCI-identified deficiencies and (2) information VA collects about the quality of care and quality of life in CLCs and how VA uses it to identify and manage risks. To do this work, GAO interviewed officials from VA headquarters, examined all 116 2007-2008 and 67 2010-2011 LTCI reviews, and analyzed 50 CLCs' corrective action plans for 2007-2008 and 23 such plans for 2010-2011.
What GAO Found
VA headquarters established a process for responding to deficiencies identified at CLCs during the 2007 and 2008 LTCI reviews. VA is using the process, which requires CLCs to submit corrective action plans addressing LTCI-identified deficiencies--such as how CLCs will address a lack of competent nursing staff and a failure to provide a sanitary and safe living environment--during the 2010 and 2011 LTCI reviews. On the basis of its analysis of the deficiencies identified in 2007 and 2008, VA headquarters also developed a national training and education initiative. VA headquarters officials told GAO that they plan to analyze the deficiencies identified during the 2010 and 2011 reviews and identify national areas for improvement. However, GAO found weaknesses in VA's process for responding to and resolving LTCI-identified deficiencies. First, VA headquarters does not maintain clear and complete documentation of the feedback it provides to CLCs regarding their corrective action plans. Second, VA headquarters does not require VA's networks, which oversee the operations of VA medical facilities, including CLCs, to report on the status of CLCs' implementation of corrective action plans or to verify CLCs' self-reported compliance with the requirements of the national training and education initiative. Because of these weaknesses, VA headquarters cannot provide reasonable assurance that LTCI-identified deficiencies are resolved. For example, without requiring networks to report on the status of CLCs' implementation of their corrective action plans, VA headquarters cannot determine whether CLCs' corrective action plans are fully implemented. Unaddressed, weaknesses in VA headquarters' process for responding to LTCI-identified deficiencies may compromise the quality of care and quality of life of veterans in CLCs. VA headquarters' current approach to identifying risks associated with the quality of care and quality of life of CLC residents does not comprehensively analyze information from all available sources, and for the sources VA does analyze, it does not compare findings across sources. VA's approach relies significantly on the analysis of findings from LTCI reviews of CLCs. However, in addition to LTCI reviews, VA headquarters obtains information about CLCs from a variety of other sources, such as VA's Office of Inspector General (OIG), but does not analyze the information from all these other sources. Further, for the sources it does analyze, VA headquarters evaluates each source in isolation and does not compare the findings from one source with findings from the other sources. Therefore, VA headquarters' current approach to identifying risks in CLCs may result in missed opportunities to detect patterns and trends in information about the quality of care and quality of life within a CLC or across many CLCs. For example, in comparing findings from VA's Office of the Medical Inspector, OIG, LTCI, and VA's quality indicator and quality measure data for one CLC, GAO found a pattern of deficiencies related to pain management. Without considering information from all available sources and comparing it across sources, VA headquarters cannot fully identify risks in CLCs, estimate the significance of the risks, or take actions to mitigate them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA document feedback to CLCs and require periodic status reports about corrective action plan implementation, and implement a process to comprehensively identify and manage risks to residents in CLCs by analyzing and comparing information about residents' quality of care and quality of life. In its comments on a draft of this report, VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-801T | gao_GAO-12-801T_0 | However, CMS has not completed other actions that could help prevent individuals intent on fraud from enrolling, including implementation of some relevant PPACA provisions. Past CMS Efforts to Strengthen Provider Enrollment
Our previous work found persistent weaknesses in Medicare’s enrollment standards and procedures that increased the risk of enrolling entities intent on defrauding the Medicare program. CMS designated three levels of risk—high, moderate, and limited—with different screening procedures for categories of Medicare providers at each level. CMS Has Not Completely Implemented Some PPACA Enrollment Provisions
Implementation of other enrollment screening actions authorized by PPACA that could help CMS reduce the enrollment of providers and suppliers intent on defrauding the Medicare program remains incomplete, including:
Surety bond—PPACA authorizes CMS to require a surety bond for certain types of at-risk providers, which can be helpful in recouping erroneous payments. On April 13, 2012, CMS issued a request for information regarding the potential solicitation of a single contract for Medicare provider and supplier fingerprint-based background checks. Providers and suppliers disclosure—CMS officials said the agency is reviewing options to include in regulations for increased disclosures of prior actions taken against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating enrollment in Medicare, such as whether the provider or supplier has been subject to a payment suspension from a federal health care program. Additional Action May Help Better Identify Potential Fraud through Pre- and Post- Payment Claims Review
Increased efforts to review claims on a prepayment basis can better prevent payments that should not be made, while improving systems used to review claims on a post-payment basis could better identify patterns of fraudulent billing for further investigation. The Medicare program has defined categories of items and services eligible for coverage and excludes from coverage items or services that are determined not to be “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness or injury or to improve functioning of a malformed body part.” its contractors set policies regarding when and how items and services will be covered by Medicare, as well as coding and billing requirements for payment, which also can be implemented in the payment systems through edits. While the PSCs were responsible for program integrity for specific parts of Medicare, such as Part A, the ZPICs are responsible for Medicare’s fee-for-service program integrity in their geographic zones. In our prior work on DMEPOS, we recommended that CMS require its contractors to develop thresholds for unexplained increases in billing and use them to develop pre-payment controls that could suspend these claims for further review before payment. Actions Needed to Improve Use of Systems Intended for Post-payment Claims Review
Further actions are needed to improve use of two CMS information technology systems that could help CMS and program integrity contractors identify fraud after claims have been paid. GAO recommended that CMS take steps to finalize plans and reliable schedules for fully implementing and expanding the use of both IDR and One PI. A Robust Process to Address Identified Vulnerabilities Could Help Reduce Fraud
Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to improper payments is critical to effective program management and could help address fraud. However, our work and the work of OIG have shown weaknesses in CMS’s processes to address vulnerabilities identified by these contractors. CMS’s Recovery Audit Contractors (RAC) are specifically charged with identifying improper payments and vulnerabilities that could lead to such payment errors. recommended that CMS develop and implement a corrective action process that includes policies and procedures to ensure the agency promptly (1) evaluates findings of RAC audits, (2) decides on the appropriate response and a time frame for taking action based on established criteria, and (3) acts to correct the vulnerabilities identified. We are currently examining aspects of CMS’s vulnerability tracking process and will be reporting on it soon. In particular, we have found CMS could do more to strengthen provider enrollment screening to avoid enrolling those intent on committing fraud, improve pre- and post- payment claims review to identify and respond to patterns of suspicious billing activity more effectively, and identify and address vulnerabilities to reduce the ease with which fraudulent entities can obtain improper payments. Medicare: Program Remains at High Risk Because of Continuing Management Challenges. High-Risk Series: An Update. Washington, D.C.: February 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program. Since 1990, every two years GAO has provided Congress with an update on this program, which highlights government operations that are at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse mismanagement or in need of broad reform. Medicare has been included in this program in part because its complexity makes it particularly vulnerable to fraud. Fraud involves an intentional act or representation to deceive with the knowledge that the action or representation could result in gain. The deceptive nature of fraud makes its extent in the Medicare program difficult to measure in a reliable way, but it is clear that fraud contributes to Medicares fiscal problems. Reducing fraud could help rein in the escalating costs of the program.
This statement focuses on the progress made and important steps to be taken by CMS and its program integrity contractors to reduce fraud in Medicare. These contractors perform functions such as screening and enrolling providers, detecting and investigating potential fraud, and identifying improper payments and vulnerabilities that could lead to payment errors. This statement is based on relevant GAO products and recommendations issued from 2004 through 2012 using a variety of methodologies, such as analyses of Medicare claims, review of relevant policies and procedures, and interviews with officials.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)the agency that administers Medicarehas made progress in implementing several key strategies GAO identified in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from fraud; however, important actions that could help CMS and its program integrity contractors combat fraud remain incomplete.
Provider Enrollment : GAOs previous work found persistent weaknesses in Medicares enrollment standards and procedures that increased the risk of enrolling entities intent on defrauding the program. CMS has strengthened provider enrollmentfor example, in February 2011, CMS designated three levels of riskhigh, moderate, and limitedwith different screening procedures for categories of providers at each level. However, CMS has not completed other actions, including implementation of some relevant provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Specifically, CMS has not (1) determined which providers will be required to post surety bonds to help ensure that payments made for fraudulent billing can be recovered, (2) contracted for fingerprint-based criminal background checks, (3) issued a final regulation to require additional provider disclosures of information, and (4) established core elements for provider compliance programs.
Pre- and Post-payment Claims Review : GAO had previously found that increased efforts to review claims on a prepayment basis can prevent payments from being made for potentially fraudulent claims, while improving systems used by CMS and its contractors to review claims on a post-payment basis could better identify patterns of potentially fraudulent billing for further investigation. CMS has controls in Medicares claims-processing systems to determine if claims should be paid, denied, or reviewed further. These controls require timely and accurate information about providers that GAO has previously recommended that CMS strengthen. GAO is currently examining CMSs new Fraud Prevention System, which uses analytic methods to examine claims before payment to develop investigative leads for Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPIC), the contractors responsible for detecting and investigating potential fraud. Additionally, CMS could improve its post-payment claims review to identify patterns of fraud by incorporating prior GAO recommendations to develop plans and timelines for fully implementing and expanding two information technology systems it developed.
Robust Process to Address Identified Vulnerabilities : Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to erroneous payments is critical to effective program management and could help address fraud. Such vulnerabilities are service- or system-specific weaknesses that can lead to payment errorsfor example, providers receiving multiple payments as a result of incorrect coding. GAO has previously identified weaknesses in CMSs process for addressing identified vulnerabilities and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General recently reported on CMSs inaction in addressing vulnerabilities identified by its contractors, including ZPICs. GAO is evaluating the current status of the process for assessing and developing corrective actions to address vulnerabilities. |
gao_GAO-02-551T | gao_GAO-02-551T_0 | Financial Audit Results
After five years of receiving an unqualified opinion on its financial statements, on February 22, 2002, NASA’s new independent auditordisclaimed an opinion on the agency’s fiscal year 2001 financial statements. The report also states that NASA’s financial management systems do not substantially comply with federal financial management systems requirements and applicable federal accounting standards. Based on this work, we questioned NASA management’s and its auditor’s determination that NASA’s systems were in substantial compliance with the requirements of FFMIA. In part to address concerns regarding the escalating space station costs, section 202 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. The stakes are particularly high, considering this is NASA’s third attempt since 1988 to implement a new system. The first two attempts were abandoned after 12 years and after spending about $180 million. NASA expects to complete the current systems effort by 2006 at a cost of $475 million. These elements, which will be key to any successful approach to financial management reform, include: addressing NASA’s financial management challenges as part of a comprehensive, integrated, NASA-wide business process reform; providing for sustained leadership by the Administrator to implement needed financial management reforms; establishing clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability for such reform tied to the Administrator; incorporating results-oriented performance measures and monitoring tied to financial management reforms; providing appropriate incentives or consequences for action or inaction; establishing an enterprisewide system architecture to guide and direct financial management modernization investments; and ensuring effective oversight and monitoring. | What GAO Found
In fiscal years 1996 to 2000, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was one of the few agencies that received an unqualified opinion on its financial statements and was in substantial compliance with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA). This suggested that NASA could generate reliable information for annual external financial reporting and could provide accurate, reliable information for day-to-day decision-making. In contrast with the unqualified or "clean" audit opinions of its previous auditor, Arthur Andersen, NASA's new independent auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, disclaimed an opinion on the agency's fiscal year 2001 financial statements because of significant internal control weaknesses. PricewaterhouseCoopers also concluded that NASA's financial management systems do not substantially comply with the requirements of FFMIA. Modernizing NASA's financial management system is essential to providing accurate, useful information for external financial reporting as well as internal management decision-making. NASA is working on an integrated financial management system that it expects to have fully operational in fiscal year 2006 at an estimated cost of $475 million. This is NASA's third attempt to implement a new financial management system. The first two efforts were abandoned after 12 years and $180 million. Given the high stakes involved, NASA's top management must provide the necessary direction, oversight, and sustained attention to ensure the project's success. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-170 | gao_T-AIMD-98-170_0 | Computer Security Is an Increasing Threat to Critical Government Operations
The dramatic increase in computer interconnectivity and the popularity of the Internet are offering government agencies unprecedented opportunities to improve operations by reducing paper processing, cutting costs, and sharing information. At the same time, however, malicious attacks on computer systems are increasing at alarming rates and are posing serious risks to key government operations. In conjunction with our financial statement audit focus and high-risk reviews, this work has revealed a disturbing picture of our government’s lack of success in protecting federal assets from fraud and misuse, sensitive information from inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations from disruption. State relies on a variety of decentralized information systems and networks to help it carry out its responsibilities and support business functions, such as personnel, financial management, medical, visas, passports, and diplomatic agreements and communications. They demonstrated that State’s computer systems and the information contained within them are very susceptible to hackers, terrorists, or other unauthorized individuals seeking to damage State operations or reap financial gain by exploiting the department’s information security weaknesses. FAA’s air traffic control (ATC) computer systems provide information to air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to ensure safe and expeditious movement of aircraft. Failure to adequately protect these systems, as well as the facilities that house them, could cause nationwide disruptions of air traffic or even loss of life due to collisions. To determine whether computer security at FAA is effective, we were asked to assess (1) whether FAA was effectively managing physical security at ATC facilities, (2) whether FAA was effectively managing systems security for its current operational systems, (3) whether FAA was effectively managing systems security for future ATC modernization systems, and (4) the effectiveness of its management structure and implementation of policy for computer security. Furthermore, we found that FAA did not know if other facilities were similarly vulnerable because it had not assessed the physical security controls at 187 facilities since 1993. FAA also was ineffective in managing systems security for its operational systems and was in violation of its own policy. We have found that many problems contribute to agencies’ difficulties in successfully balancing the trade-offs necessary to establish effective computer security. The organizations we studied managed their information security risks by implementing a continuing cycle of monitoring business risks, maintaining policies and controls, and monitoring operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work on computer security, focusing on the results of its recent reviews of the Department of State and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the dramatic increase in computer interconnectivity and the popularity of the Internet are offering government agencies unprecedented opportunities to improve operations by reducing paper processing, cutting costs, and sharing information; (2) at the same time, however, malicious attacks on computer systems are increasing at alarming rates and are posing serious risks to key government operations; (3) in conjunction with GAO's financial statement audit focus and high-risk reviews, this work has revealed a disturbing picture of the government's lack of success in protecting federal assets from fraud and misuse, sensitive information from inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations from disruption; (4) State relies on a variety of decentralized information systems and networks to help it carry out its responsibilities; (5) GAO's tests demonstrated that State's computer systems and the information contained within them are susceptible to hackers, terrorists, or other unauthorized individuals seeking to damage State operations or reap financial gain by exploiting the department's information security weaknesses; (6) FAA's air traffic control (ATC) computer systems provide information to air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to ensure safe and expeditious movement of aircraft; (7) failure to adequately protect these systems, as well as the facilities that house them, could cause nationwide disruptions of air traffic or even loss of life due to collisions; (8) GAO found that FAA was not effectively managing physical security at ATC facilities; (9) furthermore, GAO found that FAA did not know if other facilities were similarly vulnerable because it had not assessed the physical security controls at 187 facilities since 1993; (10) FAA was also ineffective in managing systems security for its operational systems and was in violation of its own policy; (11) additionally, FAA had not been effectively managing systems security for future ATC modernization systems; (12) FAA's management structure and implementation of policy for ATC computer security was not effective; (13) GAO found that many problems contribute to agencies' difficulties in successfully balancing the tradeoffs necessary to establish effective computer security; and (14) the organizations with superior security programs managed their information security risks by implementing a continuing cycle of monitoring business risks, maintaining policies and controls, and monitoring operations. |
gao_GAO-01-782 | gao_GAO-01-782_0 | The Air Force and contractors have entered into memoranda of understanding that relate the affordability of F-22 production to contract prices that will be negotiated for low-rate initial production. Potential Cost Reductions Identified by Contractors Have Increased
In an effort to offset production cost increases, F-22 contractors have been developing production cost reduction plans to enhance production technology, improve manufacturing techniques, and improve acquisition strategies and subcontract agreements for buying materials. Latest F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceed Cost Limitation by a Greater Margin
In late 2000, the Air Force cost estimators projected, in an estimate supporting the fiscal year 2002 budget request, that production costs of 333 F-22s were likely to exceed the $37.6 billion congressional cost limitation by $2 billion. While the status of individual cost reduction plans are tracked by contractors and the F-22 Program Office, we believe regular reporting by the Air Force to the Under Secretary of Defense on the status of these plans is necessary to continuously assess their impact on the estimated cost of F-22 production. To compare the latest F-22 production cost estimates of the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary with the congressional production cost limitation and to determine the extent to which cost reductions plans were considered in establishing these estimates, we reviewed the Joint Estimating Team's report and various Air Force briefings. Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-156, June 4, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force F-22 Raptor, an air superiority aircraft with an air-to-ground attack capability is set for completion in September 2003. However, contracts to begin 10 low-rate initial production aircraft for fiscal year 2001 have been delayed until after completion of the President's review of Department of Defense (DOD) programs. The Air Force plans to procure 333 production aircraft through 2013. The cost of F-22 production is limited by law, but the total number of aircraft to be procured is unspecified. This report (1) identifies the cost reduction plans by F-22 contractors, (2) compares the military's latest F-22 production cost estimates with the congressional cost limitation and determines the extent to which cost reduction plans were considered in establishing these estimates, and (3) provides the status of DOD's actions to implement GAO's earlier recommendations on production cost estimates and cost reduction plans for the F-22 program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that enhancing production technology, improving manufacturing techniques, and improving acquisition practices have contributed to cost reductions. Both the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary cost estimators projected that F-22 production costs would exceed the congressional cost limitation if the Air Force were to procure 333 F-22s. DOD and the Air Force have partially responded to the recommendations in GAO's August 2000 report on the F-22. |
gao_GAO-01-464 | gao_GAO-01-464_0 | Conclusions
The states and EPA cannot ensure that all active tanks have the required leak-, spill-, and overfill-protection equipment installed, nor can they guarantee that the installed equipment is being properly operated and maintained. While the states and EPA regions focus most of their limited resources on monitoring active tanks, empty or inactive tanks require attention to ensure that no soil and groundwater contamination has occurred. Half of the states have not physically inspected all of their tanks and several others have not conducted frequent enough inspections to ensure the tanks’ compliance with program requirements. Moreover, most states and EPA lack authority to use the most effective enforcement tools and many state officials acknowledged that additional enforcement tools and resources were needed to ensure tank compliance. EPA has the opportunity to correct these limitations within its own regions and to help states correct them through its new tank program initiatives. However, the agency has yet to define many of the implementation details, so it is difficult to determine whether the proposed actions will be sufficient to ensure more inspection coverage and more effective enforcement, especially within the states. The Congress has an opportunity to help alleviate the states’ resource shortages by providing additional funding for inspections and enforcement or more flexibility to use existing funds to improve these activities. | What GAO Found
The states and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cannot ensure that all active underground storage tanks have the required leak-, spill-, and overfill-protection equipment installed, nor can they guarantee that the installed equipment is being properly operated and maintained. Although the states and EPA regions focus most of their limited resources on monitoring active tanks, empty or inactive tanks can also potentially contaminate soil and groundwater. Half of the states have not physically inspected all of their tanks, and several others have not done inspections often enough to ensure the tanks' safety. Moreover, most states and EPA lack authority to use the most effective enforcement tools, and many state officials acknowledge that additional enforcement tools and resources were needed to ensure tank safety. EPA has the opportunity to correct these limitations within its own regions and to help states correct them through its new tank program initiatives. However, the agency has yet to define many of the implementation details, so it is difficult to determine whether the proposed actions will ensure more inspection coverage and more effective enforcement, especially within the states. Congress could help alleviate the states' resource shortages by providing additional funding for inspections and enforcement or greater flexibility to use existing funds to improve these activities. |
gao_GAO-17-574 | gao_GAO-17-574_0 | Students can transfer for different reasons, depending on their goals and the type of transfer involved. About a Third of College Students Transferred Schools from 2004 to 2009; Students May Face Challenges in Transferring Credits
An Estimated 35 Percent of College Students Transferred, with Most Transferring Between Public Schools from 2004 to 2009
An estimated 35 percent of first-time students transferred schools over a 6-year period, according to Education’s most recent BPS data on students who started in academic year 2003-04 (2004 cohort). Students can also face challenges transferring credits between public and private schools. Credits Lost in a School Transfer Could Result in Additional Tuition Costs and Limited Financial Aid Eligibility for Students
Almost Half of Credits Earned Were Lost During Transfer from 2004 to 2009, and the Extent of Loss Varied by Type of School
Students lost an estimated 43 percent of college credits when they transferred, or an estimated 13 credits, on average, according to our analysis of BPS data on students who started in academic year 2003-04 and were tracked over a 6-year period. In comparison, students who transferred from private for-profit schools to public schools—which accounted for 4 percent of students who transferred—lost an estimated 94 percent of their credits, on average. Students who took some of the less frequent transfer paths lost a relatively higher percentage of their credits. Potential Tuition Cost for Transfer Students Depends, in Part, on Number of Credits Lost and Tuition Rates
Stakeholders from about half of the higher education organizations and schools we interviewed said some students may seek to save on tuition costs by starting at a less expensive school and then transferring to a more expensive school to complete a degree. Stakeholders we spoke with from one school said that students who are transferring between 4-year schools may not have been planning to transfer, and it is more difficult to advise students about which credits will transfer laterally. Many Transfer Students Received Federal Financial Aid from 2004 to 2009, and Credit Loss Can Limit Students’ Eligibility and Result in Additional Costs to the Federal Government
Almost half of transfer students received Pell Grants and almost two- thirds received Federal Direct Loans, according to our analysis of BPS data collected between 2004 and 2009. Almost All Schools Provided Credit Transfer Policies on Websites, but Comprehensiveness of Information Varied
Almost All School Websites Disclosed Credit Transfer Policies, but Not All Were Clear About Agreements with Other Schools on Transfers
Under federal law, schools participating in any Title IV program are required to publicly disclose the transfer of credit policies established by the school, including a list of schools with which they have articulation agreements. An estimated 29 percent of websites did not provide such a list, while an estimated 4 percent explicitly stated that the school did not have any articulation agreements. Based on targeted follow-up with officials at 10 schools, we found that some did not have articulation agreements while others had articulation agreements but their partner schools were not listed on the website. We found that the transfer information was neither focused nor targeted toward transfer students. Finally, according to student complaint data, Education officials sometimes provided general information on the transferability of credits in response to complaints about transfer issues. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should externally communicate the necessary quality information to help achieve their goals. Transfers can affect the time and cost of completing a degree. Knowledge of key considerations could help students and their families make better-informed transfer decisions. When schools make information about these agreements accessible on their websites, students can more easily understand their transfer options. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve students’ access to information so that they can make well-informed transfer decisions, we recommend the Secretary of Education take the following two actions:
Require schools to (1) disclose the list of schools with which they have articulation agreements online if the school has a website, and (2) clearly inform students, on the school’s website if it has one, when no articulation agreements on credit transfer are in place. (2) What are possible financial implications associated with transferring credits? Interviews
To understand what challenges, if any, students face in transferring credits, we interviewed stakeholders from a non-generalizable sample of 25 higher education organizations and schools. For example, students may not ask to have their credits evaluated or they may decide to change majors, which would make it difficult to attribute the costs of lost credits to the transfer process. We also assume that credits that are transferred will count toward graduation requirements. The calculations for the financial implications for students do not account for how students may use financial aid to offset out-of-pocket tuition costs, so the identified costs may not all be borne by the students. Website Review
To determine the extent to which schools provide students with information on transfers to help them plan their college path, we reviewed websites from a nationally-representative sample of 214 schools participating in federal student aid programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
College students sometimes opt to transfer schools in response to changing interests or for financial reasons. The extent to which students can transfer previously earned course credits can affect the time and cost for completing a degree. Given the federal government's sizeable investment in student aid—$125 billion in fiscal year 2016—and potential difficulties students may face in transferring credits, GAO was asked to examine the college transfer process.
GAO examined (1) transfer rates and challenges students face in transferring credits, (2) the possible financial implications of transfer, and (3) the extent to which students are provided with transfer information to help them plan their college path. GAO analyzed Education's data, including its most recent available transfer data from the 2004-2009 student cohort, interviewed a non-generalizable sample of stakeholders from 25 schools and higher education organizations, and reviewed a nationally-representative sample of 214 school websites.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's analysis of the Department of Education's (Education) most recently available data, an estimated 35 percent of college students transferred to a new school at least once from 2004 to 2009, and GAO found that students may face challenges getting information or advice about transferring course credits. An estimated 62 percent of these transfers were between public schools. According to stakeholders GAO spoke with, students can face challenges transferring credits between schools that do not have statewide polices or articulation agreements, which are transfer agreements or partnerships between schools designating how credits earned at one school will transfer to another. Stakeholders also said that advising and information may not be adequate to help students navigate the transfer process.
The possible financial implications of transferring depend in part on the extent of credits lost in the transfer. Using Education's transfer data, GAO estimated that students who transferred from 2004 to 2009 lost, on average, an estimated 43 percent of their credits, and credit loss varied depending on the transfer path. For example, students who transferred between public schools—the majority of transfer students—lost an estimated 37 percent of their credits. In comparison, students who took some of the less frequent transfer paths lost a relatively higher percentage of their credits. For example, students who transferred from private for-profit schools to public schools accounted for 4 percent of all transfer students but lost an estimated 94 percent of their credits. Transferring can have different effects on college affordability. Students seeking to obtain a bachelor's degree at a more expensive school may save on tuition costs by transferring from a less expensive school. On the other hand, transfer students may incur additional costs to repeat credits that do not transfer or count toward their degree. Transfer students can receive federal financial aid. GAO's analysis showed that almost half of the students who transferred from 2004 to 2009 received Pell Grants and close to two-thirds received Federal Direct Loans. Students who lose credits may use more financial aid to pay for repeated courses at additional cost to the federal government, or they may exhaust their financial aid eligibility, which can result in additional out-of-pocket costs.
While GAO estimated that the websites for almost all schools nationwide provided credit transfer policies, as required by Education, about 29 percent did not include a list of other schools with which the school had articulation agreements. Among those schools, GAO found that some did not have any articulation agreements, while others did but did not list partner schools on their websites. Schools must provide such listings, but they are not required to do so specifically on their website. As a result, students may not have ready access to this information to fully understand their transfer options. Moreover, Education provides limited transfer information to students and their families, contrary to federal internal control standards that call for agencies to provide adequate information to external parties. General information on key transfer considerations that are applicable across schools and more complete information on schools' articulation agreements can help students avoid making uninformed transfer decisions that could add to the time and expense of earning a degree.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education (1) require schools to disclose on their websites (a) the list of other schools with which they have articulation agreements and (b) when no such agreements are in place; and (2) provide general transfer information to students and families. Education disagreed with the first and agreed with the second recommendation. GAO maintains that students can more easily understand transfer options if information is accessible on a school's website, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-14-588 | gao_GAO-14-588_0 | 1.) Contractors, NNSA, DOE, and other organizations manage and oversee operations through a multitiered approach. This includes on-site monitoring and evaluating contractor work activities. Clear contractor goals and meaningful incentives. NNSA and KCP Identified Key Factors As Helping Reform Implementation
Reviews of the reforms, as well as NNSA and KCP Field Office and contractor officials, cited several important factors that assisted with implementation of the reforms at the site. Key factors included having (1) high-level support from leadership for reforms, (2) site specific conditions and operations, and (3) a cooperative federal-contractor partnership. High-level support from NNSA and field office leadership and key stakeholders. According to a 2008 KCP Field Office review of lessons learned from implementing the reforms, gaining and maintaining the support of the NNSA Administrator and buy-in from some of the KCP federal staff for changes was critical to their implementation. Unique site conditions and operations. In selecting KCP to implement the reforms in 2006, the NNSA Administrator noted that, in comparison to NNSA’s other sites, unique conditions existed at the site that enabled implementation of the proposed reforms. These conditions included (1) KCP operations, which are largely manufacturing, were comparable to those of commercial industry, most notably the aerospace industry; (2) activities at the site were largely lower-risk, nonnuclear, and generally did not involve or potentially affect nuclear safety and security; and (3) the site contractor was owned by a single corporate parent—Honeywell—that has, according to a Field Office official, well-developed corporate management systems and a commitment to quality. The KCP Field Office noted in its April 2008 review of lessons learned from implementing the reforms that development of the reforms was enabled because of a cooperative relationship between the field office and the contractor. NNSA Has Implemented Some KCP-Like Reforms at Its Other Sites, but Applicability and Future Plans Are Still Being Determined
Since the 2007 implementation of reforms at KCP, NNSA has taken steps to extend some elements of the site’s reforms at other NNSA sites and to integrate the reforms into subsequent agency-wide initiatives to improve contractor performance and accountability. However, NNSA is revisiting the reforms following a July 2012 security breach at one of its sites, and NNSA’s future plans to continue extending KCP-like reforms at its other sites are currently uncertain. These two sites were to, among other things, (1) streamline operating requirements by identifying opportunities to eliminate some agency requirements and make greater use of industry standards; (2) refocus federal oversight by, among other things, making greater use of the contractor’s management system; and (3) set clear contractor goals and meaningful incentives following the KCP approach. This new policy—called “transformational governance”—directed, for example, site oversight staff to focus greater efforts on assessing contractor performance in higher- risk activities, such as security, and for lower-risk activities, rely more heavily on monitoring contractor assurance systems. Specifically, in March 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced an initiative to revise DOE’s safety and security directives by streamlining or eliminating duplicative requirements, revising federal oversight and encouraging greater use of industry standards. Although some opportunities may exist for implementing KCP-like reforms at other NNSA sites, since the Y-12 security breach, NNSA officials and studies we reviewed noted that key factors enabling implementation of the reforms at KCP may not be present across the nuclear security enterprise. Diminished trust between NNSA and its sites was also highlighted in a recently issued report by a congressional advisory panel, which described the relationship as “dysfunctional.”
During the course of our work, in December 2013, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 was enacted. act required the NNSA Administrator to develop a feasibility study and plan for implementing the principles of the KCP pilot to additional facilities in the national security enterprise by June 2014. We agree that further study of the applicability, costs, and benefits of the KCP reforms is warranted, and, in light of the congressional direction to NNSA, we are not making recommendations at this time. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to NNSA for its review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, has had long-standing problems managing its contracts and projects, which GAO has identified as being at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Both DOE and, specifically, NNSA, undertook initiatives in 2002 and 2003 to improve contractor performance through revised federal oversight and greater contractor accountability. In 2006, concerned that efforts were moving too slowly, the NNSA Administrator tasked its KCP Field Office and contractor with implementing reforms at that site.
House Report 113-102, accompanying H.R. 1960, an early version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to review the KCP reforms and issues with extending them to other NNSA sites. This report, among other things, (1) identifies key reforms implemented at KCP and reported benefits; (2) describes key factors NNSA and others identified as helping the site implement reforms; and (3) provides information on how NNSA has implemented and plans to implement similar reforms at other sites. GAO reviewed relevant documents prepared by NNSA, DOE, contractors, and others; visited KCP; and discussed the reforms with cognizant federal officials and contractor staff.
During GAO's review, Congress required NNSA to develop a study and plan for implementing the principles of the Kansas City reforms at its other sites. In light of the congressional requirement, GAO is not making additional recommendations at this time. NNSA generally agreed with the findings of this report.
What GAO Found
Key reforms at the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Kansas City Plant (KCP)—a site in Missouri that manufactures electronic and other nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons—included (1) streamlining operating requirements by replacing Department of Energy (DOE) requirements with industry standards, where appropriate; (2) refocusing federal oversight to rely on contractor performance data for lower-risk activities; and (3) establishing clear contractor goals and incentives. A 2008 review of the reforms reported nearly $14 million in cost reductions were achieved at the site by implementing these reforms.
NNSA and KCP federal and contractor staff identified key factors that facilitated implementation of reforms at KCP, including the following:
High-level support from NNSA and field office leadership . Gaining and maintaining the support of the NNSA Administrator and buy-in of some KCP Field Office staff for changes from the reforms was critical.
Unique site conditions and operations . Conditions at KCP enabled implementation of the proposed reforms, including (1) the comparability of the site's activities and operations to those of commercial industry; (2) the site's relatively low-risk, nonnuclear activities generally did not involve or potentially affect nuclear safety and security; and (3) the site was managed by a contractor owned by a single corporate parent with a reputation for quality.
A cooperative federal-contractor partnership . A cooperative relationship between the KCP Field Office and the contractor facilitated implementation of the reforms.
NNSA has extended to other sites some elements of the reforms, including (1) encouraging greater use of industry standards, where appropriate; (2) directing field office oversight staff to rely more on contractor self-assessment of performance for lower-risk activities; and (3) setting clearer contractor goals by revising how the agency evaluates annual contractor performance. However, NNSA and DOE are re-evaluating implementation of some of these reforms after a July 2012 security breach at an NNSA site, where overreliance on contractor self-assessments was identified by reviews of the event as a contributing factor. Moreover, NNSA officials and other studies noted that key factors enabling implementation of reforms at KCP may not exist at NNSA's other sites. For example, most NNSA sites conduct high-hazard activities, which may involve nuclear materials and require higher safety and security standards than KCP. NNSA is evaluating further implementation of such reforms and expects to report to Congress its findings later in 2014. |
gao_GAO-13-81 | gao_GAO-13-81_0 | Most Key Aerostat and Airship Efforts Underway or Initiated Since 2007 Have Been Fielded or Completed
We identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway or had been initiated since 2007, and DOD had or has primary responsibility for all of these efforts. Over the past 6 years, DOD’s overall investment has increased, and the estimated total funding of these efforts was almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. However, funding estimates for aerostat and airship efforts under development beyond fiscal year 2012 decline significantly, although there is an expectation that investment in the area will continue. However, according to DOD officials, investment in this area is expected to continue in the future. Aerostat and Airship Efforts under Development Are Experiencing Technical Challenges
Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant technical challenges, leading to cost overruns and schedule delays. DOD Has Provided Limited Oversight to Ensure Coordination of Its Aerostat and Airship Efforts
DOD has not provided effective oversight to ensure coordination of its aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. Consequently, these efforts have not been effectively integrated into strategic frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the time of our review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on all its efforts nor its entire investment in aerostats and airships. Additionally, DOD’s coordination efforts have been limited to specific technical activities, as opposed to having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is effective. DOD has recently taken steps to bolster oversight. Whether these steps are sufficient largely depends on the direction DOD intends to take with aerostat and airship programs. If it decides to make significant future investments in efforts, more steps may be needed to shape these investments. As of August 2012, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was defining the details relating to the authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new position. If DOD decides to curtail future investment, focus on ensuring that it has an inventory and knowledge of all current and planned efforts in the short term. If DOD decides to significantly increase future investment, include aerostat and airship capabilities in strategic frameworks to ensure visibility into and coordination with relevant efforts, guide innovation, and prioritize investments. Ensure the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, as the senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of various airship- related programs, are defined and commensurate with the level of future investment. To determine how effectively the various key aerostat and airship efforts are being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any potential for duplication, we assessed aerostat and airship investments, acquisitions, capabilities, and operations by analyzing documents and interviewing officials from the organizations listed above, analyzing the inventory of key efforts developed under our first objective, and reviewing prior GAO work for relevant criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
Use of lighter-than-air platforms, such as aerostats, which are tethered to the ground, and airships, which are freeflying, could significantly improve U.S. ISR and communications capabilities, and move cargo more cheaply over long distances and to austere locations. DOD is spending about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012 to develop and acquire numerous aerostats and airships.
GAO was asked to determine (1) what key systems governmentwide are being developed and acquired, including funding, purpose, and status; (2) any technical challenges these key efforts may be facing; and (3) how effectively these key efforts are being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any potential for duplication. To address these questions, GAO reviewed and analyzed documentation and interviewed a wide variety of DOD and civil agency officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway or had been initiated since 2007, and the Department of Defense (DOD) had or has primary responsibility for all of these efforts. None of the civil agency efforts met GAO's criteria for a key effort. Most of the aerostat and airship efforts have been fielded or completed, and are intended to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. The estimated total funding of these efforts was almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. However, funding estimates beyond fiscal year 2012 decline precipitously for aerostat and airship efforts under development, although there is an expectation that investment in the area will continue.
Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant technical challenges, such as overweight components, and difficulties with integration and software development, which, in turn, have driven up costs and delayed schedules.
DOD has provided limited oversight to ensure coordination of its aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. Consequently, these efforts have not been effectively integrated into strategic frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the time of GAO's review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on all its efforts nor its entire investment in aerostats and airships. Additionally, DOD's coordination efforts have been limited to specific technical activities, as opposed to having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is effective. DOD has recently taken steps to bolster oversight, including the appointment of a senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of airship-related programs. However, as of August 2012, DOD has not defined the details relating to the authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new position. Whether these steps are sufficient largely depends on the direction DOD intends to take with aerostat and airship programs. If it decides to continue investing in efforts, more steps may be needed to shape these investments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take actions based on the extent of its future investments in this area: (1) if investments are curtailed, ensure it has insight into all current and planned efforts in the short term; (2) if investments increase significantly, include the efforts in strategic frameworks to ensure visibility and coordination, guide innovation, and prioritize investments; and (3) ensure the roles and responsibilities of the senior official responsible for the oversight and coordination of airshiprelated programs are defined. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-100 | gao_GAO-07-100_0 | The act specifies certain areas the Commission shall emphasize—such as consumer awareness of budgeting, credit, investment, and banking—and requires the Commission to undertake certain activities, including providing not later than 18 months after the date of the first meeting of the Commission a report to Congress on the Commission’s progress, which must include, among other things, a national strategy to promote financial literacy and education for all Americans; establishing and maintaining a financial education Web site to provide a coordinated point of entry for information about federal financial literacy education programs and grants; establishing a toll-free hotline available to the public seeking information about issues pertaining to financial literacy and education; identifying areas of overlap and duplication among federal financial literacy and education activities and coordinating federal efforts to implement the national strategy; assessing the availability, utilization, and impact of federal financial literacy and education materials; and promoting partnerships among federal, state, and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private enterprises. National Strategy Is Descriptive Rather Than Strategic, Limiting Its Value in Guiding the Nation’s Financial Literacy Efforts
The National Strategy for Financial Literacy serves as a useful first step in focusing attention on financial literacy but is largely descriptive rather than strategic. However, its recommendations are presented as “calls to action” that generally do not include a plan for implementation and the strategy only partially addresses most of the characteristics—such as full discussion of performance measures, resource needs, and roles and responsibilities—that we have previously identified as desirable for any effective national strategy. The strategy is comprehensive in its scope. For example, it does not identify the sectors or populations most in need of additional resources. However, the strategy is limited in identifying linkages between itself and these initiatives, and it does not address how it might integrate with the overarching plans and strategies of these state, local, and private sector entities. The volume of calls to the Commission’s telephone hotline—which serves as an order line for a free “tool kit”—has been limited, possibly because of a lack of publicity. From May through September 2006, the site averaged about 57,000 visits per month. However, the Commission has not formulated specific goals or performance measures for the Web site. Without usability testing or measures of customer satisfaction, the Commission does not know whether the Web site’s content is organized in a manner that makes sense to the public, or whether the site’s visitors are able to find the information they are looking for efficiently and effectively. The Commission Has Taken Steps to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Efforts and Promote Partnerships but Faces Challenges
The Commission has helped coordinate federal financial literacy efforts by, among other things, bringing together federal agencies on a regular basis and centralizing information from multiple federal agencies through its Web site and hotline. Web site. The Commission could benefit from conducting a more independent review of duplication and overlap, and from an evaluation of federal activities that does not rely solely on agencies’ self-assessments. Further, given the wide array of state, local, nonprofit, and private organizations providing financial literacy programs, the involvement of the nonfederal sectors is important in supporting and expanding Commission efforts to increase financial literacy. As the Commission continues to implement the strategy, it should consider expanding its activities and work to develop mutually beneficial and lasting partnerships that will be sustainable over the long term. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the National Strategy for Financial Literacy serves its goal of improving the nation’s financial literacy and education, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, in concert with other agency representatives of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, incorporate into the national strategy the following elements: a concrete definition for financial literacy and education to help define the scope of the Commission’s work; clear, specific goals and performance measures that would serve as indicators of the nation’s progress in improving financial literacy and benchmarks for what the Commission sets out to achieve; actions needed to accomplish these goals, so that the strategy serves as a a description of the resources required, which would help provide policymakers information on allocating resources and directing implementation of the strategy; and a discussion of appropriate roles and responsibilities for federal agencies and others, to help promote a coordinated and efficient effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Financial Literacy and Education Improvement Act created, in December 2003, the Financial Literacy and Education Commission. Responding to the act's mandate that GAO assess the Commission's effectiveness, this report reviews its progress in (1) developing a national strategy; (2) developing a Web site and hotline; and (3) coordinating federal efforts and promoting partnerships among the federal, state, local, nonprofit, and private sectors. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Commission documents, interviewed financial literacy representatives, and benchmarked the national strategy against GAO's criteria for such strategies.
What GAO Found
The National Strategy for Financial Literacy serves as a useful first step in focusing attention on financial literacy, but it is largely descriptive rather than strategic and lacks certain key characteristics that are desirable in a national strategy. The strategy provides a clear purpose, scope, and methodology and is comprehensive in identifying the breadth of issues involved and the challenges in addressing them. However, it does not serve as a plan of action designed to achieve specific goals, and its recommendations are presented as "calls to action" that generally are either descriptions of existing initiatives or broad pronouncements that do not include a specific implementation plan. The strategy also does not fully address some of the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO has previously identified. For example, it does not set clear and specific goals or performance measures by which to benchmark progress, address the resources needed to accomplish these goals, or fully discuss appropriate roles, responsibilities, and accountability. As a result of these factors, most organizations that GAO spoke with said the strategy would not play a meaningful role in guiding or informing their efforts. The Commission's Web site and telephone hotline offer financial education information from numerous federal agencies. The Web site generally serves as an effective portal to existing federal financial literacy sites. Use of the site has been growing, and it averaged about 57,000 visits per month from May through September 2006. The volume of calls to the hotline--which serves as an order line for a free tool kit of federal publications--has been limited. The Commission has not tested the Web site for usability or measured customer satisfaction with it; these are recommended best practices for federal public Web sites. As a result, the Commission does not know if visitors are able to find the information they are looking for efficiently and effectively. The Commission has taken steps to coordinate the financial literacy efforts of federal agencies and has served as a useful focal point for federal activities. However, coordinating federal efforts has been challenging, in part because the Commission must achieve consensus among 20 federal agencies, each with its own viewpoints, programs, and constituencies, and because of the Commission's limited resources. A survey of overlap and duplication and a review of the effectiveness of federal activities relied largely on agencies' self-assessments rather than the independent review of a disinterested party. The Commission has taken steps to promote partnerships with the nonprofit and private sectors through various public meetings, outreach events, and other activities. The involvement of state, local, nonprofit, and private organizations is important in supporting and expanding Commission efforts to increase financial literacy. As the Commission continues to implement its strategy, it should consider expanding its activities and work to develop mutually beneficial and lasting partnerships that will be sustainable over the long term. |
gao_GAO-03-369 | gao_GAO-03-369_0 | In 15 of the 25 MAA cities, GSA awarded these contracts to two or more telecommunications providers; such contracts are referred to as multiple-award contracts. Under multiple-award contracts, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that contractors be afforded “a fair opportunity to be considered” in the subsequent award of task orders issued to meet specific agency needs under these contracts. Because GSA headquarters has not developed or implemented a uniform method to be followed by its regional offices in conducting the fair consideration process, approaches vary among cities and, in some cases, within cities. Further, because GSA did not oversee the application of this process, in some instances regional offices violated the FAR by incorrectly using agency preference as a basis, in part or as a whole, for selecting a higher priced contractor for an MAA task order. Although the FAR gives contracting officers broad latitude in administering the fair consideration process, GSA recognizes that the MAA program and its contracts should be consistently managed and administered. The effect of using different time frames in price comparisons is illustrated in table 3. As a result, variations occur in the application of the fair consideration process, contrary to GSA’s stated interest in ensuring the consistency of the MAA program. Numerous Fair Consideration Decisions Were Not Adequately Documented
About one-fifth of GSA’s fair consideration decisions were not adequately documented. According to the FAR, documentation of all contractual actions must be maintained in a manner sufficient to provide a basis for decisions reached in the acquisition process, and to provide information for subsequent reviews of those decisions. Out of 483 fair consideration decisions from regional GSA offices in the 11 cities that we assessed, the documentation furnished for 91 (19 percent) did not adequately support the task order award that was made. The price analysis did not support the decision reached. Contract documentation for these 20 decisions included a statement that both price and technical factors were considered. These problems were permitted to occur because GSA did not establish uniform guidelines to ensure that all regional offices were documenting fair consideration decisions in a manner consistent with the FAR. As a result, in 19 percent of the cases we reviewed, GSA, customer agencies, MAA contractors, and the Congress do not have assurance that the procedure followed by GSA to award MAA task orders was properly applied. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In our review of the Metropolitan Area Acquisition (MAA) contracts managed by the General Services Administration (GSA), our objectives were to determine (1) whether GSA’s fair consideration process varies within or among cities, and if so, whether or not variations affect the process results; (2) whether GSA’s documentation properly and appropriately supports its fair consideration decisions; and (3) whether the use of Requests for Quotations in the fair consideration processes followed by GSA is cost-effective. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Metropolitan Area Acquisition (MAA) program, managed by the General Services Administration (GSA), provides local telecommunications services to government agencies in selected metropolitan areas. Of the 25 cities in which MAA contracts were awarded as of January 2003, 15 were awarded to two or more providers. Such multiple-award contracts are a means of promoting competition. To ensure equity in the award of task orders under these contracts, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that the government provide contractors a fair opportunity to be considered. GAO was asked to review, among other things, whether GSA's implementation of the fair consideration process is consistent and the effect of any inconsistency, as well as the adequacy of GSA's documentation to support the decisions reached.
What GAO Found
GSA field offices take different approaches to awarding task orders under multiple-award MAA contracts, leading to variations both among cities and within cities. Although the FAR gives contracting officers broad latitude in ensuring that this process offers contractors a fair opportunity to be considered, GSA recognizes that consistency is important within the nationwide MAA program. However, GSA headquarters has not developed or implemented a uniform fair consideration process. As a result, GAO found variations in the processes used: principally, in the time frames used in contractor price comparisons. Such inconsistencies frequently influenced the choice of contractor. Further, because oversight was not provided, in six cases agency preference was used as a criterion for selecting a contractor, which is a violation of the FAR. Because GSA did not consistently follow a common process that ensured compliance with the FAR, it cannot ensure the fairness of its decisions. Further, the documentation for about one-fifth of GSA's fair consideration decisions was not adequate for determining how these decisions were reached. According to the FAR, sufficient documentation of all contractual actions must be maintained to provide (1) a basis for decisions reached and (2) information for subsequent reviews. Out of 483 fair consideration decisions from regional GSA offices in the 11 cities that GAO assessed, the documentation furnished for 91 (19 percent) was not adequate. Weaknesses observed include lack of stated rationale for decisions reached, price comparisons that did not support the choice of contractor selected by GSA, and lack of support for technical factors used in making the decisions. These weaknesses occurred because GSA did not establish and implement uniform guidelines for documenting its MAA fair consideration decisions. As a result, MAA stakeholders (GSA, agencies, and MAA contractors) do not have assurance that the fair consideration process was properly administered. |
gao_GAO-08-188 | gao_GAO-08-188_0 | Table 1 presents these objectives in five categories of assistance—emergency humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resources, governance, and security. U.S. Programs and Activities Support the Act’s Policy Objectives
U.S. programs and activities provide support to the Act’s policy objectives. Most recently, in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, U.S. agencies allocated the largest share of their funds for the DRC to programs that supported the Act’s humanitarian and social development goals. Although the U.S. government has not acted on the Act’s policy objective that it bilaterally urge nations contributing UN peacekeepers to prosecute abusive peacekeeping troops, it has taken other steps to address this objective. Seven U.S. agencies allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, as shown in table 2. They allocated about 30 percent of the funds for programs and activities that would support the Act’s economic, governance, and security objectives. These challenges include (1) the unstable security situation, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. The DRC’s unstable security situation has worsened the DRC’s humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address these problems, according to NGO representatives, agency officials, and other sources. Governance problems have also hindered efforts to implement economic reforms required for debt relief and promote economic growth. U.S. Government Has Not Assessed Its Overall Progress toward Achieving the Act’s Policy Objectives
The U.S. government has not established a process to assess agencies’ overall progress toward achieving the Act’s policy objectives in the DRC. Under DFA’s guidance, State and USAID have begun to develop a joint planning and budgeting process that, according to State officials, may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. The NSC interagency group, intended to help coordinate certain agencies’ activities, does not systematically assess these activities and does not include several relevant agencies. Recommendation for Executive Action
To provide a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral actions, we recommend that the Secretary of State, through the Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the U.S. government’s overall progress toward achieving the Act’s objectives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) U.S. programs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), (2) major impediments hindering accomplishment of the policy objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), and (3) U.S. government efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act’s policy objectives. These agencies included the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury (Treasury); the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). | Why GAO Did This Study
In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives to address the DRC's humanitarian, development, economic and natural resource, governance, and security issues and mandated that GAO review actions taken by U.S. agencies to achieve these objectives. In this report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward the objectives. GAO obtained and analyzed agencies' program documents and met with officials of agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.
What GAO Found
U.S. programs and activities support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, State, and the Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of the funds were allocated for programs that support the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives, while the remainder was allocated for programs and activities that support the Act's economic, governance, and security objectives. Although U.S. agencies have not acted on the Act's objective of bilaterally urging nations contributing peacekeeping troops to prosecute abusive peacekeepers, U.S. multilateral actions address this issue. The DRC's unstable security situation, weak governance, mismanagement of its vast natural resources, and lack of infrastructure are major interrelated challenges that impede efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. For example, the unstable security situation in the eastern DRC has worsened humanitarian and social problems and forced U.S. and NGO staff to curtail some efforts. The lack of roads has prevented deliveries of needed aid. DRC's weak governance structures prevent the country from meeting the requirements for debt relief and discourage private-sector investment, thus hindering economic growth. The U.S. government has not established a process for systematically assessing its progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives. While some U.S. agencies collect information about their respective activities in the DRC, no mechanism exists for assessing overall progress. State and USAID are developing a joint planning and budgeting process that may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, State's Director of Foreign Assistance has yet to complete the fiscal year 2007 DRC operations plan, which does not include a comprehensive assessment of the collective impact of State and USAID programs and does not address activities funded by other agencies. While a National Security Council-sponsored interagency group discusses DRC policies and helps coordinate some activities, it does not include several relevant agencies and, according to key officials, does not systematically assess progress in the DRC. |
gao_GAO-05-755T | gao_GAO-05-755T_0 | A Number of Initiatives to Reduce Flight Delays and Enhance Capacity Are Ongoing
Several initiatives to reduce flight delays and enhance capacity are ongoing. These initiatives which FAA, the airlines, and the airports are implementing are incorporated into FAA’s major capacity-enhancing effort: the Operation Evolution Plan (OEP). The OEP is a rolling 10-year plan to increase capacity and efficiency of the national airspace system and focuses on airport surface infrastructure, and technological and procedural initiatives at 35 of the busiest airports in the United States. To help expedite the process for building runways, Congress and FAA streamlined the environmental review phase of the runway process. Seven more runways and one runway extension are included in the OEP and are scheduled to open by the end of 2008. To reduce flight delays at some of the delay- prone airports, such as New York La Guardia and Chicago O’Hare, FAA is exploring administrative and market based options. For example, FAA is considering auctioning off landing and take off rights at New York La Guardia and is currently limiting the number of scheduled arrivals during peak periods at New York La Guardia and Chicago O’Hare. For domestic flights, Domestic Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum was implemented in fiscal year 2005 in the contiguous United States and Alaska and adds six additional flight levels between existing flight levels. Challenges in Reducing Flight Delays and Enhancing Capacity Remain
A number of challenges in reducing flight delays and enhancing capacity remain. A daunting challenge that FAA and other aviation stakeholders will have to address is funding the various initiatives that are designed to address flight delays and enhance capacity. The successful implementation of many of these initiatives is predicated on the availability of funding However, since 2000, which is to date the worst year in history for delays, the financial condition of the aviation industry has changed significantly. Another important challenge is reducing flight delays and enhancing capacity at delay-prone airports, such as those shown in table 1, some of which have little capacity to physically expand and would find it difficult to build even one more runway, either because they lack the space or would face intense opposition from adjacent communities. In addition to addressing the capacity needs of the most delay-prone airports, FAA, airlines, and airports will also have to address the emerging capacity needs of new metropolitan areas in the South and Southwest. The second category includes developing alternative modes of intercity travel other than air transportation, such as high-speed rail. For example, the last major new airport—the Denver International Airport completed in 1995—cost almost $5 billion to build. Chief among them is funding these initiatives during a time when the federal government and the aviation industry are experiencing significant fiscal problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the unprecedented flight delays in 2000, a year in which one in four flights were delayed, our aviation system has been adversely affected by many unanticipated events--such as the September 11th terrorist attacks, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)--that significantly reduced the demand for air travel. However, demand for air travel is rebounding. For example, the number of passengers traveling by air increased from 642 million in 2003 to 688 million in 2004. Flight delays have been among the most vexing problems in the national transportation system and are defined by the Department of Transportation as instances when aircraft arrive at the gate 15 minutes or more after scheduled arrival time. In 2004, one in five flights were delayed primarily at New York La Guardia and Chicago O'Hare. Delays at these airports have consequences for the rest of the system. GAO's testimony addresses the following questions that pertain to flight delays and enhancing capacity: (1) What initiatives are ongoing by the federal government, airlines, and airports to address flight delays and enhance capacity? (2) What are some of the challenges in reducing flight delays and enhancing capacity? (3) What other options are available for reducing flight delays and enhancing capacity?
What GAO Found
Several initiatives to address flight delays and enhance capacity are ongoing. Many of these initiatives are reflected in FAA's February 2005 Operation Evolution Plan, which is a 10-year plan to increase capacity and efficiency of the national airspace system at 35 of the busiest airports in the United States. New runways opened in the last 6 years at the Phoenix, Detroit, and 5 other airports. Seven more runways are scheduled to open by the end of 2008. Congress and FAA also streamlined the process for building runways. In addition to building runways, several other initiatives were implemented. For example, in January 2005, FAA implemented the Domestic Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum which is designed to increase high altitude routes in the contiguous United States and Alaska. To reduce flight delays at some of the delay-prone airports, FAA is limiting the number of takeoffs and landings during peak periods at New York La Guardia and Chicago O'Hare and is considering auctioning off landing and take off rights at New York La Guardia. A number of challenges in reducing flight delays and enhancing capacity remain. Chief among them is obtaining funding for the initiatives mentioned above; their successful implementation is predicated on the availability of funding from several sources, including FAA, airlines, and airports. Another challenge is reducing flight delays and enhancing capacity at delay-prone airports, such as New York La Guardia, which have little capacity to expand and would find it difficult to build even one more runway. Other options to address delay problems include adding new capacity by building new airports. According to FAA, airport authorities in Chicago, Las Vegas, and San Diego are evaluating the need for new airports. Another option is to develop other modes of intercity travel, such as high-speed rail, where metropolitan areas are relatively close together. These options may conflict with the interests of one or more key stakeholder groups; and, in many cases, would be costly. |
gao_GAO-11-736T | gao_GAO-11-736T_0 | This office is the department-level VA office responsible for developing policies and procedures for VA’s law enforcement programs at local VA medical facilities. Nearly 300 Sexual Assault Incidents Reported to VA Police, but Many Were Not Reported to VHA or the VA OIG
We found that there were nearly 300 sexual assault incidents reported to the VA police from January 2007 through July 2010—including alleged incidents that involved rape, inappropriate touching, forceful medical examinations, forced or inappropriate oral sex, and other types of sexual assault incidents. Many of these sexual assault incidents were not reported to officials within the management reporting stream and to the VA OIG. Sexual Assault Incidents Are Underreported to VISNs, VHA Central Office, and the VA OIG
VISN and VHA Central Office officials did not receive reports of all sexual assault incidents reported to VA police in VA medical facilities within the four VISNs we reviewed. VHA Guidance and Oversight Weaknesses May Contribute to the Underreporting of Sexual Assault Incidents
Several factors may contribute to the underreporting of sexual assault incidents to VISNs, VHA Central Office, and the VA OIG—including VHA’s lack of a consistent sexual assault definition for reporting purposes; limited and unclear expectations for sexual assault incident reporting at the VHA Central Office, VISN, and VA medical facility levels; and deficiencies in VHA Central Office oversight of sexual assault incidents. VHA Central Office, VISNs, and VA Medical Facilities’ Expectations for Reporting Are Limited and Unclear
In addition to failing to provide a consistent definition of sexual assault for incident reporting, VHA also does not have clearly documented expectations about the types of sexual assault incidents that should be reported to officials at each level of the organization, which may also contribute to the underreporting of sexual assault incidents. 2.) While VHA has, through its National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS), developed systems for routinely monitoring and tracking patient safety incidents that occur in VA medical facilities, these systems do not monitor sexual assaults and other safety incidents. In general, physical security precautions were used as a measure to prevent a broad range of safety incidents, including sexual assaults. For example, at some VA medical facilities we visited, closed-circuit surveillance cameras were installed to allow VA staff to monitor areas and to help detect potentially threatening behavior or safety incidents as they occur. Significant Weaknesses Existed in the Use and Implementation of Certain Physical Security Precautions at Selected VA Medical Facilities
While security precautions have been established in most cases to prevent patient safety incidents, including sexual assaults, these precautions had not been effectively implemented by VA medical facility staff in the five facilities we visited. Inadequate monitoring of closed-circuit surveillance cameras. Alarm malfunctions. However, we found that at two of these three medical facilities, these alarms failed to properly alert VA police when tested. Alarms failed to alert both police and unit staff. In conclusion, weaknesses exist in the reporting of sexual assault incidents and in the implementation of physical precautions used to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents in VA medical facilities. In responding to a draft of the report on which this testimony is based, VA generally agreed with the report’s conclusions and concurred with our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
During GAO's recent work on services available for women veterans (GAO-10-287), several clinicians expressed concern about the physical safety of women housed in mental health programs at a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facility. GAO examined (1) the volume of sexual assault incidents reported in recent years and the extent to which these incidents are fully reported, (2) what factors may contribute to any observed underreporting, and (3) precautions VA facilities take to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents. This testimony is based on recent GAO work, "VA Health Care: Actions Needed To Prevent Sexual Assaults and Other Safety Incidents," (GAO-11-530) (June 2011). For that report, GAO reviewed relevant laws, VA policies, and sexual assault incident documentation from January 2007 through July 2010. In addition, GAO visited five judgmentally selected VA medical facilities that varied in size and complexity and spoke with the four Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) that oversee them.
What GAO Found
GAO found that many of the nearly 300 sexual assault incidents reported to the VA police were not reported to VA leadership officials and the VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Specifically, for the four VISNs GAO spoke with, VISN and Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Central Office officials did not receive reports of most sexual assault incidents reported to the VA police. Also, nearly two-thirds of sexual assault incidents involving rape allegations originating in VA facilities were not reported to the VA OIG, as required by VA regulation. GAO identified several factors that may contribute to the underreporting of sexual assault incidents. For example, VHA lacks a consistent sexual assault definition for reporting purposes and clear expectations for incident reporting across its medical facility, VISN, and VHA Central Office levels. Furthermore, VHA Central Office lacks oversight mechanisms to monitor sexual assault incidents reported through the management reporting stream. VA medical facilities GAO visited used a variety of precautions intended to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents. However, GAO found some of these measures were deficient, compromising medical facilities' efforts to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents. For example, medical facilities used physical security precautions--such as closed-circuit surveillance cameras to actively monitor areas and locks and alarms to secure key areas. These physical precautions were intended to prevent a broad range of safety incidents, including sexual assaults. However, GAO found significant weaknesses in the implementation of these physical security precautions at the five VA medical facilities visited, including poor monitoring of surveillance cameras, alarm system malfunctions, and the failure of alarms to alert both VA police and clinical staff when triggered. Inadequate system configuration and testing procedures contributed to these weaknesses. Further, facility officials at most of the locations GAO visited said the VA police were understaffed. Such weaknesses could lead to delayed response times to incidents and seriously erode VA's efforts to prevent or mitigate sexual assaults and other safety incidents. GAO reiterated recommendations that VA improve both the reporting and monitoring of sexual assault incidents and the tools used to identify risks and address vulnerabilities at VA facilities. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided an action plan to address them. |
gao_T-GGD-99-131 | gao_T-GGD-99-131_0 | Executive Order and UMRA Had Little Effect on Agencies’ Rulemaking Actions
During the past 20 years, state, local, and tribal governments as well as businesses have expressed concerns about congressional and regulatory preemption of traditionally nonfederal functions and the costs of complying with federal regulations. The executive and the legislative branch have each attempted to respond to these concerns by issuing executive orders and enacting statutes requiring rulemaking agencies to take certain actions when they issue regulations with federalism or intergovernmental relations effects. Two prime examples of these responses are Executive Order 12612 (“Federalism”) and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA). Also, if an agency prepared a federalism assessment for a final rule, it would be logical for the agency to describe the assessment in the preamble to the rule. Agencies Prepared Few Federalism Assessments During Review Timeframe
Our work showed that Executive Order 12612 had relatively little visible effect on federal agencies’ rulemaking actions during this time frame. To summarize the nearly 3 years of data depicted in figure 1, agencies covered by the order mentioned it in the preambles to about 26 percent of the 11,414 final rules they issued between April 1996 and December 1998. Many of the final rules that federal agencies issue are administrative or routine in nature, and therefore unlikely to have significant federalism implications. However, that does not appear to have been the case. As figure 3 shows, of the 117 major final rules issued by covered agencies between April 1996 and December 1998, the preambles indicated that only 1 had a federalism assessment. OMB Has Taken Little Recent Action to Ensure Implementation of Executive Order 12612
OMB officials told us that they had taken little specific action to ensure implementation of the executive order, but said the order is considered along with other requirements as part of the regulatory review process under Executive Order 12866. not have federalism implications or prepare a federalism impact assessment. The Results Act already requires agencies developing their strategic plans to “solicit and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially affected by or interested in the plan.” The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee report on the Results Act noted that the strategic plan “is intended to be the principal means for obtaining and reflecting, as appropriate, the views of Congress and those governmental and nongovernmental entities potentially affected by or interested in the agencies’ activities.”
In that regard, we believe that working with state and local governments or their representative organizations to develop goals and performance measures in federal grant-in-aid programs can strengthen the intergovernmental partnerships embodied in those programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed House Resolution (H.R.) 2245, the Federalism Act of 1999, focusing on the agency rulemaking and performance measurement requirements of the bill.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the past 20 years, state, local, and tribal governments as well as businesses have expressed concerns about congressional and regulatory preemption of traditionally nonfederal functions and the costs of complying with federal regulations; (2) the executive and the legislative branch have each attempted to respond to these concerns by issuing executive orders and enacting statutes requiring rulemaking agencies to take certain actions when they issue regulations with federalism or intergovernmental relations effects; (3) two prime examples of these responses are Executive Order 12612 and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA); (4) GAO's work showed that Executive Order 12612 had relatively little visible effect on federal agencies' rulemaking actions during this timeframe; (5) agencies covered by the order mentioned it in the preambles to about 26 percent of the 11,414 final rules they issued between April 1996 and December 1998; (6) however, mentioning the order in the preamble to a rule does not mean the agency took any substantive action; (7) the agencies usually just stated that no federalism assessment was conducted because the rules did not have federalism implications; (8) the preambles to only 5 of the 11,414 final rules that the agencies issued between April 1996 and December 1998 indicated that a federalism assessment had been done; (9) many of the final rules that federal agencies issue are administrative or routine in nature, and therefore unlikely to have significant federalism implications; (10) the criteria the agencies used to determine whether federalism assessments were needed varied among the agencies; (11) Office of Management and Budget officials told GAO that they had taken little specific action to ensure implementation of the executive order, but said the order is considered along with other requirements as part of the regulatory review process under Executive Order 12866; (12) GAO reported that requirements in title II of UMRA appeared to have had only limited direct impact on agencies' rulemaking actions in the first 2 years of the act's implementation; (13) as introduced, H.R. 2245 would require federalism impact assessments for all proposed and final rules; and (14) GAO believes that working with state and local governments or their representative organizations to develop goals and performance measures in federal grant-in-aid programs, as required by H.R. 2245, can strengthen the intergovernmental partnerships embodied in those programs. |
gao_GAO-14-40 | gao_GAO-14-40_0 | In addition, in states where the base-benchmark plan did not include coverage for pediatric dental or vision services, the state (or HHS, in the case of a federally established default benchmark plan) was required to supplement coverage with the addition of the entire category of pediatric dental or vision benefits from either (i) the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP) dental or vision plan with the largest national enrollment of federal employees, or (ii) the benefits available under the plan in the state’s separate CHIP program with the highest enrollment, if a separate CHIP program existed. In Five States, Coverage in CHIP and Benchmark Plans Was Generally Comparable; These States Expect Minimal Changes to CHIP and QHPs to Reflect PPACA Requirements in 2014
In our five selected states, CHIP and benchmark plans generally covered the services we reviewed and were similar in terms of the services on which they imposed day, visit, or dollar limits. Coverage in CHIP and Benchmark Plans Was Generally Comparable, with Some Variation in Hearing and Outpatient Therapy Services in Five States
We determined that the CHIP and benchmark plans in our five selected states were comparable in that they included some level of coverage for nearly all the services we reviewed. Exceptions were hearing-related services, such as tests or hearing aids, where both were not covered by the benchmark plan in Kansas, and outpatient therapies for habilitation, which were not covered by CHIP plans in Kansas and Utah or by the (See app. For example, the plans we reviewed were similar in that they typically did not impose any such limits on ambulatory patient services, emergency care, preventive care, or prescription drugs, but commonly did impose limits on outpatient therapies and pediatric dental, vision, and hearing services. While the benchmark plans in four states imposed day or visit limits on these services, only one state’s CHIP plan did so. While CHIP officials said that they expect CHIP costs to consumers to remain largely unchanged in 2014, the cost of QHPs to consumers is less certain, since benchmarks are not models for QHP cost-sharing. Instead, PPACA includes provisions that will standardize QHP costs and reduce cost- sharing for certain individuals. Costs to Consumers in Five States Were Almost Always Less in CHIP Plans than in Benchmark Plans
Based on the review of plan Evidences of Coverage in our five selected states, costs to consumers were almost always less in the CHIP plans than in the states’ benchmark plans. These cost differences were particularly pronounced for certain services we reviewed, such as primary care and specialty physician office visits, prescription drugs, and outpatient therapies. For example, depending on income, the copayment for primary care and specialist physician visits ranged from $2 to $10 per visit for Colorado CHIP enrollees, but was $30 and $50 per visit, respectively, for benchmark plan enrollees in the state. Our review of CHIP premiums and other sources of premium data suggest that CHIP premiums were also likely lower than benchmark plans. Five States Expect CHIP Costs to Consumers to Remain the Same; QHP Costs to Consumers Will Be Subject to PPACA Provisions that Limit Consumers’ Costs in 2014
According to state CHIP officials in all five states, CHIP costs to consumers, including premiums, copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles, are expected to remain largely unchanged in 2014. National Survey Data Suggest that CHIP Access to Care is Comparable to Medicaid and Lower than Private Insurance for Some Services
When asked a series of questions about access to care, MEPS respondents with children covered by CHIP reported positive responses to nearly all questions regarding their ability to obtain care and at levels that were generally comparable to those with other types of insurance. Additional MEPS questions related to respondents’ use of certain medical and dental visits also provide insight on respondents’ access to services and suggest that, for most services, access to care for individuals covered by CHIP is comparable to that of those with Medicaid and lower than that of the privately insured, particularly for dental care. A higher proportion of CHIP respondents reported using health care services compared to those who were uninsured. Congress will face decisions concerning CHIP funding as current funding has been appropriated only through federal fiscal year 2015. Beginning in October 2015, if CHIP funding is insufficient, states will need to have procedures in place to enroll CHIP-eligible children in Medicaid, if eligible, and, if not, in QHPs as long as the Secretary of HHS has certified the QHPs are comparable to CHIP in covered services and cost-sharing protections. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for comment to HHS. HHS officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix III: Copayments, Coinsurance, and Annual Coverage Limits for Selected Services in CHIP and Benchmark Plans in Five States
Tables 8 through 12 provide information on copayments, coinsurance, and annual coverage limits for selected services in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and benchmark plans in each of the five states we reviewed: Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, New York, and Utah. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 8 million children were enrolled in CHIP--the federal and state children's health program that finances health care for certain low-income children--in 2012. PPACA appropriated funding for CHIP through federal fiscal year 2015. Beginning in October 2015, any state with insufficient CHIP funding must establish procedures to ensure that children who are not covered by CHIP are screened for Medicaid eligibility, and if ineligible, are enrolled into a QHP that has been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) as comparable to CHIP. Exchanges are marketplaces for QHP coverage effective in 2014. GAO was asked to review issues related to CHIP. This report provides a baseline comparison of coverage and costs to consumers in separate CHIP plans and benchmark plans in select states; describes how coverage and costs might change in 2014; and describes how access to care by CHIP children compares to other children nationwide.
For the coverage and cost comparison, GAO reviewed Evidences of Coverage from separate CHIP plans and benchmark plans (base and supplemental) from five states--Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, New York, and Utah--selected based on variation in location, program size, and design. GAO reviewed documents and spoke to officials from states' CHIP programs, exchanges, and benchmark plans, and from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. To describe access to care by children in CHIP compared to others with Medicaid, private insurance or without insurance, GAO analyzed nationwide data from HHS's MEPS from 2007 through 2010.
What GAO Found
In five selected states, GAO determined that the separate State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) plans were generally comparable to the benchmark plans selected by states in 2012 as models for the benefits that will be offered through qualified health plans (QHP) in 2014. The plans were comparable in the services they covered and the services on which they imposed limits, although there was some variation. For example, in coverage of hearing and outpatient therapy services, the benchmark plan in one of the five states--Kansas--did not cover hearing aids nor hearing tests, while the CHIP plans in all states covered at least one of these services. Similarly, two states' CHIP plans and three states' benchmark plans did not cover certain outpatient therapies--known as habilitative services--to help individuals attain or maintain skills they had not learned due to a disability. States' CHIP and benchmark state plans were also similar in terms of the services on which they imposed day, visit, or dollar limits. Plans most commonly imposed limits on outpatient therapies and pediatric dental, vision, and hearing services. Officials in all five states expect that CHIP coverage, including limits on these services, will remain relatively unchanged in 2014, while QHPs offered in the exchanges will be subject to certain Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requirements, such as the elimination of annual dollar limits on coverage for certain services.
Consumers' costs for these services--defined as deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and premiums--were almost always less in the five selected states' CHIP plans when compared to their respective benchmark plans. For example, the CHIP plan in the five states typically did not include deductibles while all five states' benchmark plans did. Similarly, when cost-sharing applied, the amount was almost always less for CHIP plans, and the cost difference was particularly pronounced for physician visits, prescription drugs, and outpatient therapies. For example, an office visit to a specialist in Colorado would cost a CHIP enrollee $2 to $10 per visit, depending on their income, compared to $50 per visit for benchmark plan enrollees. GAO's review of premium data further suggests that CHIP premiums are also lower than benchmark plans' premiums. While CHIP officials in five states expect consumer costs to remain largely unchanged in 2014, the cost of QHPs to consumers is less certain. These plans were not yet available at the time of GAO's review. However, PPACA includes provisions that seek to standardize QHP costs or reduce cost-sharing amounts for certain individuals.
When asked about access to care in the national Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), CHIP enrollees reported positive responses regarding their ability to obtain care, and the proportion of positive responses was generally comparable to those with Medicaid--the federal and state program for very low-income children and families--or with private insurance. Regarding use of services, the proportion of CHIP enrollees who reported using certain services was generally comparable to Medicaid, but differed from those with private insurance for certain services. Specifically, a higher proportion of CHIP enrollees reported using emergency room services, and a lower proportion of CHIP enrollees reported visiting dentists and orthodontists. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-212T | gao_GAO-08-212T_0 | Federal policy also recognizes the need to be prepared for the possibility of debilitating disruptions in cyberspace and, because the vast majority of the Internet infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, tasks DHS with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. In the event of a major Internet disruption, multiple organizations could help recover Internet service. Although Cyber and Physical Incidents Have Caused Disruptions, the Internet Has Not Yet Suffered a Catastrophic Failure
The Internet’s infrastructure is vulnerable to disruptions in service due to terrorist and other malicious attacks, natural disasters, accidents, technological problems, or a combination of these things. Disruptions to Internet service can be caused by cyber and physical incidents—both intentional and unintentional. Over the last few years, physical and cyber incidents have caused localized or regional disruptions, highlighting the importance of recovery planning. Existing Laws and Regulations Apply to the Internet, but Numerous Uncertainties Exist in Using Them for Internet Recovery
Several federal laws and regulations provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet infrastructure, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption because some do not specifically address Internet recovery and others have seldom been used. Pertinent laws and regulations address critical infrastructure protection, federal disaster response, and the telecommunications infrastructure. DHS Initiatives Supporting Internet Recovery Planning Are Under Way, but Much Remains to Be Done and the Relationships Among the Initiatives Are Not Evident
As of our June 2006 report, DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts were not complete or comprehensive. Specifically, DHS had developed high-level plans, including the National Response Plan and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, for infrastructure protection and national disaster response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure were not complete. As a result, the nation was not prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Multiple Challenges Exist to Planning for Recovery from Internet Disruptions
Although DHS has various initiatives to improve Internet recovery planning, there are key challenges in developing a public/private plan for Internet recovery, including (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to a disruption difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS’s role and on when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS’s ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as a focal point for recovering the Internet from a major disruption. Additionally, to improve DHS’s ability to facilitate public/private efforts to recover the Internet in case of a major disruption, we recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security implement nine actions (see table 1). GAO-06-672. As a result, the exact role of the government in helping to recover the Internet infrastructure following a major disruption remains unclear. We also made recommendations to DHS to establish clear milestones for completing key plans, coordinate various Internet recovery-related activities, and address key challenges to Internet recovery planning. While DHS has made progress in implementing these recommendations, full implementation could greatly enhance our nation’s ability to recover from a major Internet disruption. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 1990s, growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our nation communicates and conducts business. While the Internet originated as a U.S. government-sponsored research project, the vast majority of its infrastructure is currently owned and operated by the private sector. Federal policy recognizes the need to prepare for debilitating Internet disruptions and tasks the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with developing an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery. GAO was asked to summarize its report on plans for recovering the Internet in case of a major disruption (GAO-06-672) and to provide an update on DHS's efforts to implement that report's recommendations. The report (1) identifies examples of major disruptions to the Internet, (2) identifies the primary laws and regulations governing recovery of the Internet in the event of a major disruption, (3) evaluates DHS plans for facilitating recovery from Internet disruptions, and (4) assesses challenges to such efforts.
What GAO Found
A major disruption to the Internet could be caused by a physical incident (such as a natural disaster or an attack that affects key facilities), a cyber incident (such as a software malfunction or a malicious virus), or a combination of both physical and cyber incidents. Recent physical and cyber incidents, such as Hurricane Katrina, have caused localized or regional disruptions but have not caused a catastrophic Internet failure. Federal laws and regulations that address critical infrastructure protection, disaster recovery, and the telecommunications infrastructure provide broad guidance that applies to the Internet, but it is not clear how useful these authorities would be in helping to recover from a major Internet disruption. Specifically, key legislation on critical infrastructure protection does not address roles and responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. Other laws and regulations governing disaster response and emergency communications have never been used for Internet recovery. As of 2006, DHS had begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its responsibility to develop an integrated public/private plan for Internet recovery, but these efforts were not yet comprehensive or complete. For example, the department had developed high-level plans for infrastructure protection and incident response, but the components of these plans that address the Internet infrastructure were not complete. As a result, the risk remained that the government was not adequately prepared to effectively coordinate public/private plans for recovering from a major Internet disruption. Key challenges to establishing a plan for recovering from Internet disruptions include (1) innate characteristics of the Internet that make planning for and responding to disruptions difficult, (2) lack of consensus on DHS's role and when the department should get involved in responding to a disruption, (3) legal issues affecting DHS's ability to provide assistance to restore Internet service, (4) reluctance of many in the private sector to share information on Internet disruptions with DHS, and (5) leadership and organizational uncertainties within DHS. Until these challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving results in its role as a focal point for helping the Internet to recover from a major disruption. DHS has made progress in implementing GAO's recommendations by revising key plans in coordination with private industry infrastructure stakeholders, coordinating various Internet recovery-related activities, and addressing key challenges to Internet recovery planning. However, further work remains to complete these activities, including finalizing recovery plans and defining the interdependencies among DHS's various working groups and initiatives. Full implementation of these recommendations should enhance the nation's ability to recover from a major Internet disruption. |
gao_GAO-03-912 | gao_GAO-03-912_0 | Background
Prescription drug discount cards are a relatively new option for consumers. Consumers can have as many different cards as they like. A card program would have to be open to all Medicare beneficiaries. Negotiation of discounts. Information for beneficiaries. Characteristics of Drug Discount Cards Vary Based on Their Sponsor
PBM-administered drug discount cards differ from pharmaceutical- manufacturer-sponsored cards with respect to eligibility, the range of drugs they cover, the extent to which the retail pharmacy is paid for all or part of the difference between the price a person pays without a discount card and the discount card price for a particular drug, and the prices available with a card. The discount card programs administered by PBMs are available to any adult, while the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ cards are available only to Medicare-eligible individuals and couples with incomes below a certain level who do not have prescription drug coverage. Each PBM-administered card covers most outpatient prescription drugs, while the cards sponsored by pharmaceutical manufacturers generally provide discounts only on the outpatient prescription drugs that company produces. Unlike the PBM-administered cards, which are available to any individual, the drug company-sponsored cards are available only to Medicare-eligible individuals and couples with no prescription drug coverage who earn less than a certain amount. For purchases with the Medco Health Solutions and WellPoint Health PBM-administered cards, there is no such payment. Drug prices available with pharmaceutical manufacturer-sponsored cards are typically lower than the prices available with PBM-administered cards because a manufacturer-sponsored card’s price is either a percentage off the manufacturer’s list price to wholesalers, which is generally lower than average wholesale price, or a dollar amount for a specified amount of a drug. Savings achieved through a PBM- administered card would be reduced by the annual or one-time fee that the card charges. Cards Used at Retail Pharmacies
The range of savings achieved using a PBM-administered drug discount card at a retail pharmacy for a 30-day supply of the nine drugs we examined varied within and across geographic areas, primarily because of differences in the usual prices charged by the pharmacies. Median savings available with a PBM-administered card in the Washington, D.C. pharmacies ranged from $2.09 to $20.95 for the nine drugs. All 14 of the surveyed pharmacies offered a 10 percent senior discount. Median savings in North Dakota ranged from $0.54 to $7.72 for the nine drugs or from 1.3 percent to 42.3 percent off the median pharmacy price. In California, Medi-Cal, the state’s Medicaid program, requires retail pharmacies that participate in the program to offer the Medi-Cal price to Medicare beneficiaries who do not have prescription drug coverage. At the 10 Medi-Cal-participating pharmacies, savings for seven of the nine drugs ranged from $0.44 to $13.06 or from 0.7 percent to 11.1 percent off the median pharmacy price. The Medi-Cal prices for the other two drugs at these pharmacies were lower than the median drug card prices for these drugs so the use of the card offered no savings. In California, mail order prices using a PBM-administered drug card were lower than the Medi-Cal price for eight of the nine drugs we examined, resulting in savings ranging from $1.03 to $19.67; the Medi-Cal price was lower than the mail order drug card prices for the other drug. | Why GAO Did This Study
While prescription drugs have become an increasingly important part of health care for the elderly, more than one-quarter of all Medicare beneficiaries have no prescription drug coverage. Over the past decade, private companies and not-for-profit organizations have sponsored prescription drug discount cards that offer discounts from the prices the elderly would otherwise have to pay for their prescriptions. These cards are typically administered by pharmacy benefit managers (PBM). Pharmaceutical manufacturers also sponsor and administer their own discount cards. The Administration has been interested in endorsing specific drug cards for Medicare beneficiaries to make the discounts more widely available. Legislative proposals in the Senate and House of Representatives have included drug cards as a means to lower prescription drug prices for Medicare beneficiaries. GAO was asked to examine how existing drug discount cards work and the prices available to card holders. Specifically, GAO evaluated the extent to which PBM-administered drug discount cards offer savings off non-card prices at 40 pharmacies in California, North Dakota, and Washington, D.C., and the differences between PBM-administered cards and cards sponsored by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
What GAO Found
Medicare beneficiaries can receive prices with prescription drug discount cards at retail pharmacies that are generally lower than those available to seniors without cards. Prices available for a particular drug tend to be similar across PBM-administered cards. Savings from PBM-administered cards, however, can differ because retail pharmacy prices vary widely. For example, in Washington, D.C., which had the highest median retail pharmacy prices of the three areas GAO surveyed, median savings using a PBM-administered card ranged from $2.09 to $20.95 for a 30-day supply of the nine drugs frequently prescribed for the elderly that GAO examined. This was after accounting for the 10 percent discount for senior citizens given by each of the 14 surveyed pharmacies. Savings in California with the use of a card tended to be lower because 10 of the 13 California pharmacies GAO surveyed participated in the state's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal) and are required to give Medicare beneficiaries the Medi-Cal price. For seven of the nine drugs, savings ranged from $0.44 to $13.06. For the other two drugs the cards offered no savings at Medi-Cal-participating pharmacies because the Medi-Cal prices were lower than the median price available with a PBM-administered card. Savings in North Dakota for the nine drugs ranged from $0.54 to $7.72 even though 10 of the 13 pharmacies there did not offer a senior discount. Any savings achieved with a card are reduced by the annual or one-time fee charged by the PBM-administered cards. Prices available with a pharmaceutical-manufacturer-sponsored card for a particular drug are typically lower than prices obtained using PBM-administered cards, and are often a flat price of $10 or $15. PBM-administered cards differ from pharmaceutical-manufacturer-sponsored cards with respect to eligibility and the range of drugs they cover, as well as the price available with the card. PBM-administered discount cards are available to all adults and can be used to purchase most outpatient prescriptions. Pharmaceutical-manufacturer-sponsored cards are available only to Medicare beneficiaries with incomes below a certain level who have no prescription drug coverage and can be used to purchase only outpatient prescription drugs produced by the sponsoring manufacturers. |
gao_GAO-11-9 | gao_GAO-11-9_0 | Gaps in the Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Some Live Animal Imports May Contribute to Disease Risks, according to Experts and Agency Officials
The statutory and regulatory framework governing live animal imports has gaps that could allow the introduction and spread of zoonotic diseases and diseases affecting wildlife, according to the experts we surveyed, our discussions with agency officials, and scientific studies on zoonotic and animal diseases. APHIS Has Regulations to Protect U.S. Agriculture from Live Animal Imports That Could Carry Disease
APHIS has regulations to prevent the importation of live animals that it has determined could pose a disease risk to agricultural animals. CDC Has Regulations for Some Live Animal Imports but Does Not Prevent the Importation of Many Animals That May Pose a Risk of Zoonotic Diseases
CDC has regulations to prevent the importation of certain live animals that may pose a previously identified disease risk to humans for some diseases, such as rabies, but, according to agency officials, CDC’s regulations are limited to specific species and regions and do not comprehensively prevent the importation of animals that are known to present a high risk of zoonotic diseases. To address this problem, in 2007, CDC issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on live animal imports to take steps to better prevent the introduction of zoonotic disease into the United States. In addition to reviewing the petition to restrict amphibian imports, in January 2010, the Secretary of the Interior directed FWS to comprehensively review statutory authorities and regulations to address existing invasive species problems and to recommend potential tools to more effectively prevent the introduction of new invasive threats. Agencies Have Collaborated to Meet Their Responsibilities, but Experts and Agency Officials Identified Barriers to Further Collaboration
APHIS, CBP, CDC, and FWS have collaborated to meet their responsibilities by taking actions in five areas—strategic planning, joint strategies, written procedures, leveraging resources, and sharing data— but experts responding to our survey and agency officials we interviewed identified barriers to further collaboration on live animal imports. Experts also identified the need for an entity to help the agencies overcome these barriers. In particular, experts responding to our survey noted that because each of the agencies is focused on a different aspect of live animal imports, no single entity has comprehensive responsibility for the zoonotic and animal diseases risks posed by live animal imports. Joint strategies to reduce disease risk from imported live animals. In addition, while the agencies participating in ITDS have formed workgroups for some types of trade data, APHIS, CBP, CDC, and FWS have yet to jointly determine which data elements are needed for them to effectively oversee live animal imports, according to CBP officials. As a result, it is unclear whether the data in the completed system will meet interagency needs. These barriers—such as different program priorities and unclear roles and responsibilities—are inherent when multiple agencies have related responsibilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better prevent the importation of live animals carrying zoonotic and animal diseases and improve the responsible agencies’ collaboration, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and the Interior take the following two actions: Develop and implement, in coordination with the relevant federal agencies, a strategy for their collaboration in preventing the importation of animals that may be carrying zoonotic and animal diseases into the United States. The Department of Health and Human Services only provided technical comments, which we included as appropriate. The Department of the Interior agreed with our findings and recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the (1) potential gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework governing live animal imports, if any, that may allow the introduction and spread of zoonotic and animal diseases; (2) extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (CDC), and Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) collaborate to meet their responsibilities and face barriers, if any, to collaboration; and (3) the performance information that the responsible agencies have reported on live animal imports. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States legally imported more than 1 billion live animals from 2005 through 2008. With increased trade and travel, zoonotic diseases (transmitted between animals and humans) and animal diseases can emerge anywhere and spread rapidly. The importation of live animals is governed by five principal statutes and implemented by four agencies. GAO was asked to examine, among other things, (1) potential gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework governing live animal imports, if any, that may allow the introduction and spread of zoonotic and animal diseases and (2) the extent to which the agencies collaborate to meet their responsibilities, and face barriers, if any, to collaboration. GAO reviewed statutes, met with agency officials, visited ports of entry, and surveyed experts on animal imports.
What GAO Found
The statutory and regulatory framework for live animal imports has gaps that could allow the introduction of diseases into the United States, according to the experts GAO surveyed, discussions with agency officials, and scientific studies. Specifically, (1) The Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has regulations to prevent the importation of live animals that may pose a previously identified disease risk to humans for some diseases, but gaps in its regulations may allow animals presenting other zoonotic disease risks to enter the United States. CDC has solicited comments in advance of a rulemaking to better prevent the importation of animals that pose zoonotic disease risks. (2) The Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has regulations to prevent imports of nonnative live animals that could become invasive. However, it has not generally emphasized preventing the introduction of disease through importation. FWS is taking some initial steps to address disease risks. For example, in January 2010, the department directed FWS to review statutory authorities and regulations to address existing problems concerning nonnative live animals and recommend tools to better prevent the introduction of new threats. In contrast, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has regulations to prevent importing live animals it finds may pose a disease risk to agricultural animals. In 2008, APHIS issued a long-term strategy that would broaden its oversight of live animal imports. APHIS, the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), CDC, and FWS have collaborated to meet their responsibilities related to live animal imports by taking actions in five areas--strategic planning, joint strategies, written procedures, leveraging resources, and sharing data. However, experts GAO surveyed and agency officials GAO interviewed identified barriers to further collaboration on live animal imports, such as different program priorities and unclear roles and responsibilities, which are inherent when multiple agencies have related responsibilities. For example, experts noted that because each of the agencies is focused on a different aspect of live animal imports, no single entity has comprehensive responsibility for the zoonotic and animal disease risks posed by live animal imports. Experts also reported the need for an entity to help the agencies overcome these barriers to collaboration. Furthermore, the agencies have largely incompatible data systems, and a completion date for CBP's planned data system, which would provide the agencies with full operational access to information on incoming shipments of live animals, has not been established. In addition, APHIS, CBP, CDC, and FWS have yet to jointly determine which data elements on live animal imports are needed in this system for them to effectively oversee these imports, according to CBP officials. As a result, it is unclear whether the data elements in the completed system will meet interagency needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and the Interior develop a strategy to address barriers to agency collaboration that may allow potentially risky imported animals into the United States and jointly determine data needs to effectively oversee imported animals. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Homeland Security generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments only. |
gao_GAO-06-714T | gao_GAO-06-714T_0 | There Was Inadequate Planning and Preparation in Anticipating Requirements for Needed Goods and Services
The need for strong planning is one of the themes identified by the Comptroller General in regard to the government’s overall response to the hurricanes. We found that some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. We also noted the competing tensions between the selection of national contractors and the requirement under the Stafford Act for a preference for contractors from the affected area. While contracts for some items were in place prior to the storm, FEMA did not adequately anticipate needs for such services as providing temporary housing and public buildings. Examples of Federal, State, and Private Sector Practices for Improving Planning and Preparation
Officials that we talked to in the public and private sectors considered pre- identification of commodities, scalable operations, and pre-established vendor relationships to be essential for ensuring adequate planning and preparation for providing needed goods and services following a disaster. There Was a Lack of Clearly Communicated Responsibilities across Agencies and Jurisdictions
We also found that processes for executing contracts were hindered by poor communication of responsibilities. In some instances, the local or state officials determine the requirements and communicate them to FEMA; FEMA may write and award the contract or communicate the requirements to another agency that writes and awards the contract; and then FEMA or another agency oversees contract performance. Our fieldwork identified examples where unclear responsibilities and poor communications resulted in poor acquisition outcomes. The process for ordering and delivering ice heavily depends on effective communications between FEMA and the Corps. However, according to Corps officials, FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach used by the Corps and ordered at least double the amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites available to handle the volume ordered. Examples of State and Private Sector Practices for Establishing and Communicating Responsibilities
To clearly establish and communicate disaster-related responsibilities, public and private sector officials told us they use such practices as conducting joint disaster response training for agency employees and contractors and formally assigning their employees specific disaster- related responsibilities. There Were Insufficient Numbers and Inadequate Deployment of Personnel to Provide for Effective Contractor Oversight
The purpose of agencies’ monitoring processes is to ensure that contracted goods and services are delivered in accordance with the agreed-upon schedule, cost, quality, and quantity provisions stated in the contract. For example: FEMA’s contracts for installing temporary housing in four states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that had been determined necessary to oversee contractor performance. These teams include specialists with the authority needed to provide on the ground procurement support to meet mission needs. Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The devastation experienced throughout the Gulf Coast region in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has called into question the government's ability to effectively respond to such disasters. The government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons to strengthen its disaster response and recovery operations. The federal government relies on partnerships across the public and private sectors to achieve critical results in preparing for and responding to natural disasters, with an increasing reliance on contractors to carry out specific aspects of its missions. This testimony discusses how three agencies--the General Services Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)--conducted oversight of 13 key contracts awarded to 12 contractors for hurricane response, as well as public and private sector practices GAO identified that provide examples of how the federal government could better manage its disaster-related procurements.
What GAO Found
Agency acquisition and contractor personnel have been recognized for their hard work in providing the goods and services required to be responsive. The response efforts nonetheless suffered from three primary deficiencies. First, there was inadequate planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and services. Some key agencies did not always have adequate plans for contracting in a major contingency situation. For example, FEMA did not adequately anticipate needs for temporary housing and public buildings. Tensions also existed between selecting national contractors and the Stafford Act requirement for a preference for contractors from the affected area. Second, there was a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities for contracting activities across agencies and jurisdictions. When disasters occur, local or state officials sometimes determine contract requirements and send them to FEMA, which writes and awards the contract or passes that responsibility on to another agency. FEMA or another agency may then oversee contract performance. Although this process requires clear alignment of responsibilities and good communications, our fieldwork found examples that did not meet that standard. Although the process for ordering and delivering ice depends on good communications between FEMA and the Corps, for example, Corps officials said FEMA did not fully understand the contracting approach they used and ordered at least double the amount of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of distribution sites to handle the volume ordered. Third, there were insufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight. For example, FEMA's contracts to install temporary housing in four states had only 17 of the 27 technical monitors that were needed for oversight. GAO has identified practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how federal agencies can better manage their disaster-related procurements, including: developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices by identifying commodities and services and establishing vendor relationships before they are needed; establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity required to effectively respond to needs; formally assigning and communicating disaster-related responsibilities, with joint training for government and contractor personnel; and providing sufficient numbers of field-level contracting staff with the authority needed to meet mission requirements. |
gao_GAO-15-40 | gao_GAO-15-40_0 | Saltcake comprises 24 million gallons of the waste in the Hanford tanks and about 20 percent of the radioactivity. Leak detection. To address these RCRA requirements, DOE conducts a variety of assessments and monitoring activities. Condition of Tanks Is Worse than Assumed under DOE’s Current Schedule for Retrieving Tank Waste
DOE’s recent assessments of the SSTs and DSTs determined that they are in worse condition than DOE had assumed when developing its 2011 System Plan schedule for emptying the tanks.series of assessments in 2013 and 2014, DOE concluded that water is intruding into at least 14 SSTs and that at least 1, T-111, is actively leaking. For DSTs, DOE concluded in 2012 that waste was leaking from the primary shell in tank AY-102 and subsequently found that 12 other DSTs have construction flaws similar to those that contributed to the leak in AY-102. According to a DOE report on intrusions, water intrusion creates additional liquid waste in the tanks as the new water becomes contaminated by the waste in the tanks. According to DOE officials, waste is leaking at a rate of approximately 640 gallons annually, and DOE continues to monitor the leak in tank T-111. DOE reported in October 2012 that tank construction flaws and corrosion in the bottom of the tank stemming from the type of waste and the sequence in which it was loaded into the tank AY-102 were the likely causes for the According to a 2014 expert panel reviewing the leak, leak in AY-102.corrosion was among the likely causes of the leak. Beginning in 2013, DOE examined the other 27 DSTs to determine the extent to which they had construction flaws similar to AY-102. DOE Has Taken and Planned Several Actions to Respond to Recent Leaks and Intrusions, Including Modifying Its Tank Monitoring and Inspection Procedures
Following the discovery of the leaks in tanks T-111 and AY-102, and water intrusions in some SSTs, DOE has undertaken or planned several actions. For the SSTs, DOE has, among other things, performed additional inspections and temporarily increased the frequency of monitoring the tank waste levels from annually or quarterly to monthly. In addition, in April 2014, DOE formally modified its inspection procedures by shortening the time between inspections from every 5 to 7 years to every 3 years. DOE’s Current Waste Retrieval Schedule Does Not Account for the Worsening Condition of the Tanks or WTP Delays
DOE’s current schedule for retrieving the waste from the tanks (developed in 2011), which includes transferring waste from SSTs to DSTs and treating the waste in the DSTs, does not take into account the worsening conditions of the tanks or the delays in the construction of the WTP. The leak in AY-102 combined with planned waste transfers has reduced the available DST space, and DOE’s plans to create additional space remain uncertain. Future leaks and intrusions, which become more likely as the tanks’ conditions worsen, would place additional demands on the limited available DST space, and it is unclear how DOE would respond. According to DOE, recent efforts to evaporate some of the water from the waste have already freed up 750,000 gallons of DST space. As a result, it is unclear how long waste will remain in the tanks. However, without an analysis of the extent to which the factors which may have led to the leak in AY-102 are present in the other DSTs, DOE cannot be sure how long its DSTs will be able to safely store the waste. DOE has not estimated the impact of the WTP delay on its tank management plans, but delays in the schedule to retrieve waste from the SSTs are already occurring. DOE further reported in March 2014 that delays in the WTP will affect the schedule for retrieving waste from the tanks but that, until the technology it is developing to treat the tank waste in the WTP can be demonstrated to work as intended, it is impossible to estimate what the impact will be on the retrieval of waste from the tanks. members of DOE’s 2014 expert panel, convened to examine the integrity of the DSTs, have stated that corrosion is a threat to DST integrity, and the expert panel also highlighted deficiencies in DOE’s understanding of corrosion in all of the DSTs. However, as noted previously, DOE has not examined the other DSTs for the same corrosion factors that may have lead to corrosion in AY-102 and therefore lacks information about the extent to which the other 27 DSTs may also be susceptible to similar corrosion. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DOE’s long-term plans for storing waste in the existing SSTs and DSTs at Hanford consider the condition of the tanks and the WTP construction delay, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following three actions:
Assess the extent to which the factors that may have led to corrosion in AY-102 are present in any of the other 27 DSTs. Update the schedule for retrieving waste from the tanks, taking into the impact of the delays in the WTP, the risks associated with continuing to store waste in aging tanks, and an analysis of available DST space. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DOE agreed with the report and its recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE recently reported that nuclear waste is leaking from two of its underground storage tanks (T-111 and AY-102) at Hanford and that water was intruding into AY-102 and other tanks. Also, DOE has been experiencing delays in the construction of the WTP, a collection of facilities that are to treat the tank waste for disposal. These recently reported leaks and intrusions, combined with construction delays, have raised questions among regulators, the public, and Congress about the risks posed by continuing to store waste in the aging tanks.
GAO was asked to report on the tank waste cleanup program. This report examines: (1) the condition of the tanks, (2) actions DOE has taken or planned to respond to the recent tank leaks and water intrusions, and (3) the extent to which DOE's tank management plans consider the condition of the tanks and the delays in completing construction of the WTP. GAO obtained and reviewed relevant reports concerning the leaks, the status of the tanks, and the volumes of waste and available space in the tanks. GAO toured the site and interviewed DOE officials and responsible contractors.
What GAO Found
From 2012 to 2014, the Department of Energy (DOE) assessed the physical condition of the 177 storage tanks at its Hanford, Washington, site in which it stores about 56 million gallons of nuclear waste and found them to be in worse condition than it assumed in 2011 when developing its schedule for emptying the tanks. For the 149 single-shell tanks (SST), DOE previously pumped nearly all of the liquid waste out of the SSTs into the 28 newer double-shell tanks (DST) to reduce the likelihood of leaks. However, after detecting water intruding into several SSTs, DOE reexamined them all and found that water was intruding into at least 14 SSTs and that 1 of them (T-111) had been actively leaking into the ground since about 2010 at a rate of about 640 gallons annually. Regarding the DSTs, in 2012, DOE discovered a leak from the primary shell in tank AY-102. DOE determined that the leak was likely caused by construction flaws and corrosion in the bottom of the tank. DOE found that 12 DSTs have similar construction flaws but has not determined the extent to which the other 27 DSTs are subject to the same corrosion that likely contributed to the leak in AY-102.
In response to the waste leaks and water intrusion, DOE has taken or planned several actions. For SSTs, DOE conducted additional tank inspections and temporarily increased the frequency of monitoring the tank waste levels from annually or quarterly to monthly. In addition, after finding flaws in its methods to monitor for leaks and intrusions, DOE modified its methods, which it believes may lead to more effective monitoring. For DSTs, DOE increased the frequency (from every 5 to 7 years to every 3 years) and scope of its tank inspections and convened a panel of experts to evaluate existing tank monitoring and inspection procedures. DOE also plans an independent assessment of the integrity of the DSTs (scheduled to be completed no later than 2016).
DOE's current schedule for managing the tank waste does not consider the worsening conditions of the tanks or the delays in the construction of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), a facility being constructed to treat the waste and prepare it for final, long-term disposal. First, the leak in AY-102 combined with planned waste transfers from SSTs has reduced the available DST tank storage capacity. Future leaks and intrusions, which become more likely as the tanks' condition worsens, would place additional demands on the already limited DST storage space, and it is unclear how DOE would respond. According to DOE, recent efforts to evaporate some of the water from the waste have already freed up 750,000 gallons of DST space. Second, in March 2014, DOE announced further delays in the construction of the WTP and that these delays will affect the schedule for removing waste from the tanks. However, DOE has not estimated the impact of the WTP delays on its schedule to remove the waste from the tanks. As a result, DOE cannot estimate how long the waste will remain in the aging tanks. Also, DOE officials and members of a 2014 expert panel convened to examine the integrity of the DSTs have said that corrosion is a threat to DST integrity, and, according to the panel, that there are deficiencies in DOE's understanding of corrosion in all of the DSTs. DOE lacks information about the extent to which the other 27 DSTs may also be susceptible to corrosion similar to AY-102. Without determining the extent to which the factors that contributed to the leak in AY-102 were similar to the other 27 DSTs, DOE cannot be sure how long its DSTs can safely store waste.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE assess the extent to which other DSTs have corrosion factors similar to AY-102, update its schedule for removing waste from the tanks, and assess the alternatives for creating additional DST space. DOE agreed with this report and its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-862T | gao_GAO-10-862T_0 | A Lack of Transparency and Limited Governmentwide Policy May Result in Duplication and Inefficient Contracting
Interagency and enterprisewide contracts should provide an advantage to government agencies when buying billions of dollars worth of goods and services, yet OMB and agencies lack reliable and comprehensive data to effectively leverage, manage, and oversee these contracts. More specifically, The total number of MACs and enterprisewide contracts currently approved and in use by agencies is unknown because the federal government’s official procurement database is not sufficient or reliable for identifying these contracts, Departments and agencies cite a variety of reasons to establish, justify, and use their own MACs and enterprisewide contracts rather than use other established interagency contracts—reasons that include avoiding fees paid for the use of other agencies’ contracts, gaining more control over procurements made by organizational components, and allowing for the use of cost reimbursement contracts, Concerns remain about contract duplication—vendors and agency officials expressed concerns about duplication of effort among these contracts, and in our review we found many of the same vendors provided similar products and services on many different contract vehicles. This could be resulting in duplication of products and services being offered, increased costs to both the vendor and the government, and missed opportunities to leverage the government’s buying power, Limited governmentwide policy is in place for establishing and overseeing MACs and enterprisewide contracts. Recent legislation and OFPP initiatives are expected to strengthen oversight and management of MACs, but no similar initiatives are underway to strengthen oversight of enterprisewide contracts. In April 2010, we made five recommendations to OMB to improve data, strengthen policy, and better coordinate agencies’ awards of MACs and enterprisewide contracts, and OMB concurred with all of our recommendations. Both involve enterprisewide contracts used for information technology products and services. Management and Pricing Issues Hinder MAS Program Effectiveness
Our work identified a number of challenges GSA faces in effectively managing the MAS program, the federal government’s largest interagency contracting program. More specifically, GSA
Lacks transactional data about its customers’ use of MAS contracts, which would provide GSA insight to facilitate more effective management of the program;
Makes limited use of selected pricing tools that make it difficult for GSA to determine whether the program achieves its goal of obtaining the best prices for customers and taxpayers;
Uses a decentralized management structure for the MAS program in conjunction with deficient program assessment tools, which create obstacles for effective program management. GSA Needs Transactional Data to Strategically Manage MAS Contracts and Negotiate Pricing
GSA lacks data about the use of the MAS program by customer agencies that it could use to determine how well the MAS program meets its customers’ needs and to help its customers obtain the best prices in using MAS contracts. The program office’s charter provides it broad responsibility for MAS program policies and strategy. We also found that performance measures were inconsistent across the GSA organizations that manage MAS contracts, including inconsistent emphasis on competitiveness of pricing, making it difficult to have a programwide perspective of MAS program performance. Finally, GSA’s MAS customer satisfaction survey has had a response rate of one percent or less in recent years that limits its utility as a means for evaluating program performance. Furthermore, departments and agencies may be unknowingly contracting for the same goods and services across a myriad of contracts—MACs, GWACs, the MAS program, and enterprisewide contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies can use several different types of contracts to leverage the government's buying power for goods and services. These include interagency contracts--where one agency uses another's contract for its own needs--such as the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs multiple award schedule (MAS) contracts, multiagency contracts (MAC) for a wide range of goods and services, and governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWAC) for information technology. Agencies spent at least $60 billion in fiscal year 2008 through these contracts and similar single-agency enterprisewide contracts. GAO was asked to testify on the management and oversight of interagency contracts, and how the government can ensure that interagency contracting is efficient and transparent. GAO's testimony is based on its recent report, Contracting Strategies: Data and Oversight Problems Hamper Opportunities to Leverage Value of Interagency and Enterprisewide Contracts ( GAO-10-367 , April 2010). In that report, GAO made recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to strengthen policy, improve data, and better coordinate agencies' awards of MACs and enterprisewide contracts, and to GSA to improve MAS program pricing and management. Both agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
Interagency and enterprisewide contracts should provide an advantage to government agencies when buying billions of dollars worth of goods and services, yet OMB and agencies lack reliable and comprehensive data to effectively leverage, manage, and oversee these contracts. More specifically, the total number of MACs and enterprisewide contracts currently approved and in use by agencies is unknown because the federal government's official procurement database is not sufficient or reliable for identifying these contracts. Departments and agencies cite a variety of reasons to establish, justify, and use their own MACs and enterprisewide contracts rather than use other established interagency contracts--reasons that include avoiding fees paid for the use of other agencies' contracts, gaining more control over procurements made by organizational components, and allowing for the use of cost reimbursement contracts. However, concerns remain about contract duplication--under these conditions, many of the same vendors provided similar products and services on multiple contracts, which increases costs to both the vendor and the government and can result in missed opportunities to leverage the government's buying power. Furthermore, limited governmentwide policy is in place for establishing and overseeing MACs and enterprisewide contracts. Recent legislation and OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy initiatives are expected to strengthen oversight and management of MACs, but no initiatives are underway to strengthen approval and oversight of enterprisewide contracts. GSA faces a number of challenges in effectively managing the MAS program, the federal government's largest interagency contracting program. GSA lacks data on orders placed under MAS contracts that it could use to help determine how well the MAS program meets its customers' needs and help its customers obtain the best prices in using MAS contracts. In addition, GSA makes limited use of selected pricing tools, such as pre-award audits of MAS contracts, which make it difficult for GSA to determine whether the program achieves its goal of obtaining the best prices for customers and taxpayers. In 2008, GSA established a program office with broad responsibility for MAS program policy and strategy, but the program continues to operate under a decentralized management structure that some program stakeholders are concerned has impaired the consistent implementation of policies across the program and the sharing of information among the business portfolios. In addition, performance measures were inconsistent across the GSA organizations that manage MAS contracts, including inconsistent emphasis on pricing, making it difficult to have a programwide perspective of MAS program performance. Finally, GSA's MAS customer satisfaction survey has had a response rate of 1 percent or less in recent years that limits its utility as a means for evaluating program performance. |
gao_GAO-04-323 | gao_GAO-04-323_0 | These memorandums instructed selected agencies to (1) cease temporarily new IT infrastructure and business systems (i.e., financial management, procurement, and human resources systems) investments above $500,000 pending a review of the investment plans of all proposed DHS component agencies; (2) identify and submit to OMB information on any current or planned spending on these types of initiatives; and (3) participate in applicable IT investment review groups co-chaired by OMB and the Office of Homeland Security. In fulfilling this role, the review group relied on an informal process, which was not documented. Although the review group reviewed the few investments that component agencies submitted, according to OMB and DHS IT officials, the group generally addressed broader issues related to the transition to the new department. However, it is not known whether, or the extent to which, savings have resulted from the memorandums. In particular, OMB did not track the savings associated with the July memorandums because, according to OMB IT representatives, budgetary savings had not occurred when the review group was in place. DHS’s CIO agreed that savings are expected to result from the department’s consolidation and integration of systems. Moreover, he stated that DHS will be tracking such savings and has established a mechanism for doing so. DHS Has Initiated Reviews of Component Agency IT Investments, but Its Processes Are Still Evolving
Once DHS became operational and the investment review group established by the July memorandums no longer existed, the department established an IT investment management process that includes departmental reviews of component agency IT investments meeting certain criteria. In addition, as of January 26, 2004, the department’s highest level investment management board had performed control reviews of nine investments that had reached key decision points. In particular, as of January 2, 2004, the department had identified about 100 IT programs that were eligible for review by its two top-level departmental boards and, according to IT officials, is having difficulty in bringing all of these programs before the boards in a timely manner. Moreover, DHS has not established a process to ensure that control reviews of component agency IT investments are performed in a timely manner. Conclusions
OMB took a prudent step in issuing its July memorandums directing federal agencies that were expected to be part of the new department to temporarily cease funding for new IT infrastructure and business systems investments in anticipation of the establishment of DHS. Nevertheless, according to OMB IT representatives, budgetary savings as a result of the July memorandums had not occurred at the time that the review group was in place. Although DHS has begun to establish a mechanism to track such savings in the future, until savings resulting from the consolidation and integration of systems and services are identified, tracked, and reported, it will remain unknown whether OMB’s July memorandums and the subsequent establishment of DHS have achieved the millions of dollars in potential economies identified by OMB. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2002, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued two memorandums directing agencies expected to be part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to temporarily cease funding for new information technology (IT) infrastructure and business systems investments and submit information to OMB on current or planned investments in these areas. GAO was asked to (1) explain OMB's implementation of these memorandums, (2) identify any resulting changes to applicable IT investments, and (3) ascertain if DHS has initiated its own investment management reviews and, if so, what the results of these reviews have been.
What GAO Found
The July 2002 memorandums established an investment review group cochaired by OMB and the Office of Homeland Security to review submitted investments and estimated that millions of dollars potentially could be saved as a result of consolidating and integrating component agency investments. The investment review group relied on an informal, undocumented process to fulfill its responsibilities. Nevertheless, according to OMB and DHS IT officials, the review group both reviewed five component agency investments that were submitted and addressed long-term IT strategic issues related to the transition to the new department. OMB and DHS IT officials cited some changes to agency IT infrastructure and business systems investments because of the July memorandums. In addition, DHS IT officials cited other benefits that resulted from the memorandums. However, it is not known whether, or the extent to which, savings have resulted from the memorandums. In particular, OMB did not track savings associated with the July memorandums because, according to OMB IT staff, anticipated budgetary savings had not occurred at the time the review group was in place. DHS's chief information officer stated that the department plans to track savings related to the consolidation and integration of systems and has established a mechanism for doing so. However, until such savings are identified, tracked, and reported it will remain unknown whether the July memorandums and the subsequent establishment of DHS have achieved the potential economies identified by OMB. Once DHS became operational and the investment review group no longer existed, the department established its own IT investment management process, which is still evolving. As part of this process, between May 2003 and late January 2004, the DHS's highest level investment management board performed reviews of nine investments that had reached key decision points. Even with this progress, the department has identified about 100 IT programs that are eligible for review by its two top department-level boards. However, DHS has not established a process to ensure that key reviews of such IT investments are performed in a timely manner. |
gao_GAO-11-44 | gao_GAO-11-44_0 | Specifically, the order stated that all executive departments and agencies that provide significant services directly to the public shall provide customer service equal to the best in business and shall take the following actions: identify the customers who are, or should be, served by the agency survey customers to determine the kind and quality of services they want and their level of satisfaction with existing services post service standards and measure results against them benchmark customer service performance against the best in business survey frontline employees on barriers to, and ideas for, matching the provide customers with choices in both the sources of service and the make information, services, and complaint systems easily accessible provide means to address customer complaints On March 23, 1995, President Clinton issued a presidential memorandum on improving customer service, which stated that the standards agencies had begun issuing in response to Executive Order 12862 had told the federal government’s customers for the first time what they had a right to expect when they asked for services. The services’ standards varied in their form. Other standards were structured quantitatively and based on daily, monthly, or annual averages. Nearly All Surveyed Services Have Measures of Customer Service and Customer Satisfaction
All 13 of the surveyed services reported having measures of customer service, and 11 of the services reported having measures of satisfaction. The National Park Service (NPS), for instance, reported using a visitor survey card program to survey visitors at over 320 of its points of service. All five had customer service standards. We found that the standards were often either not made available to the public at all or were made available in a way that would not be easy for customers to find and access. These services made their standards available in long, detailed documents mostly focused on other topics, such as Annual Performance Plans, Performance and Accountability Reports, and budget justifications. However, most services did not post service results in government offices. As required by the presidential memorandum, all services report results to customers at least annually. CBP officials said land border, and airport wait time patterns have been studied, which led to facility enhancements and staff assignment changes. The officials told us that changes at one port of entry, the Detroit Ambassador Bridge reduced wait times and recurring traffic delays by more than half. Finally, 11 surveyed services reported that performance appraisals for all employees in contact with customers were based in part on customer service performance measures. Three services reported comparing the results to customer service standards, and two reported comparing results to the private sector. Some of these are already being used by some federal agencies, but OMB’s initiative to gather and share customer service ideas through the President’s Management Advisory Board, established in April 2010, and meetings with GSA’s Office of Citizen Services, agencies, and other groups offers an opportunity to evaluate the benefits of applying these tools and practices on a more widespread basis and to share those that are found to be beneficial. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director of OMB take the following two actions, building on the progress OMB has already made as part of its customer service initiative: Direct agencies to consider options to make their customer service standards and results more readily available to customers using documents or Web pages specifically intended for customers, or the dashboard once it is more fully developed. Collaborate with the President’s Management Advisory Board and agencies to evaluate the benefits and costs of applying the tools and practices related to understanding customers’ needs, facilitating improved customer decision making, and providing citizens with the information necessary to hold government accountable for customer service, and include those that are found beneficial to the federal government in the initiative on gathering and sharing customer service ideas. OMB had no comments on the recommendations. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our study were to (1) assess the extent to which federal agencies are setting customer service standards and measuring results against these standards, (2) assess the extent to which federal agencies are reporting standards and results to customers and using the results to improve service, and (3) identify some customer service management tools and practices used by local, state, federal, and non-U.S. national governments. In addition, we examined steps the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is taking to facilitate federal agency use of tools and practices to improve customer service. Based on the literature review, we selected and interviewed six knowledgeable individuals in the area of customer service. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has set a goal of providing service to the public that matches or exceeds that of the private sector. Executive Order 12862 (September 11, 1993) and a related 1995 memorandum require agencies to post customer service standards and report results to customers. As requested, this report (1) assesses the extent to which federal agencies are setting customer service standards and measuring related results, (2) assesses the extent to which agencies are reporting standards and results to customers and using the results to improve service, and (3) identifies some customer service management tools and practices used by various governments. The report also examines the steps the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is taking to facilitate agency use of tools and practices. GAO surveyed 13 federal services among those with the most contact with the public, reviewed literature and interviewed agency officials as well as knowledgeable individuals in the area of customer service.
What GAO Found
All 13 government services GAO surveyed had established customer service standards, which varied in their form from quantitative standards based on hourly, daily, monthly or annual averages to general commitments to qualitative standards. All 13 services reported having measures of customer service, such as measures of wait times or accuracy of service and 11 services had measures of customer satisfaction. For example, the National Park Service surveys visitors at over 320 points of service through a survey card program. All services had methods to receive customer complaints, and all had methods of gathering ideas from front line employees to improve customer service. Although standards exist, GAO found that the surveyed services' standards were often made available in a way that would not be easy for customers to find and access or, in the case of two services, were not made available to the public at all. For example, five services made standards available in long, detailed documents mostly focused on other topics, such as annual performance plans, performance and accountability reports, and budget justifications. About half of the services reported customer service results in similar types of documents. All services reported comparing customer service results to the standards and using the results to improve internal processes. For example, Customs and Border Protection officials told GAO that after they studied wait times at land borders and airports, they made facility enhancements and staff assignment changes. At one port of entry, these changes reduced wait times by more than half. However, some services have not compared performance to the private sector, as required by the Executive Order. Most services reported considering customer service measures in employee performance appraisals. For example, according to IRS officials, the performance appraisals for all employees who provide taxpayer assistance are based in part on critical job elements related to customer satisfaction. GAO identified several customer service tools and practices government agencies have used to improve customer service, such as engaging customers through social media, providing self service options and offering redress for unmet standards. Additionally, OMB has begun an initiative to identify and share private sector best practices among federal agencies and to develop a dashboard where agencies can make customer service standards available. Building on the progress made under this initiative, OMB could evaluate the benefits and costs of applying these tools and practices on a more widespread basis and share those that are found to be beneficial.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB (1) direct agencies to consider options to make customer service standards and results more readily available and (2) collaborate with the President's Management Advisory Board and agencies to evaluate the benefits and costs of applying the tools and practices identified in this report, and include those found beneficial in its related initiative. OMB had no comments on the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-151 | gao_GAO-05-151_0 | FCC Established an Unusual Program Structure without Comprehensively Addressing the Applicability of Governmental Standards and Fiscal Controls
FCC established an unusual structure for the E-rate program but has never conducted a comprehensive assessment of which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to the program, to USAC, or to the Universal Service Fund itself. FCC Did Not Develop Useful Performance Goals and Measures for Assessing and Managing the E-Rate Program
Although $13 billion in E-rate funding has been committed to beneficiaries during the past 7 years, FCC did not develop useful performance goals and measures to assess the specific impact of these funds on schools’ and libraries’ Internet access and to improve the management of the program, despite a recommendation by us in 1998 to do so. The percentages, therefore, do not directly measure the impact of E-rate funds, as opposed to other sources of funding, on increases in the percentage of schools connected to the Internet. However, management-oriented goals have not been a feature of FCC’s performance plans, despite long-standing concerns about the program’s effectiveness in key areas. FCC Is Currently Considering E-Rate Goals in Response to OMB’s Concerns
OMB also has raised concerns about FCC’s lack of E-rate performance goals and measures. While recognizing that E-rate funding is generally going to the intended beneficiaries of the program, OMB concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services for schools and libraries. OMB also noted that there was little oversight to ensure that the program beneficiaries were using the funding appropriately and effectively. We found weaknesses with FCC’s implementation of each of these mechanisms, limiting the effectiveness of FCC’s oversight of the program and the enforcement of program procedures to guard against waste, fraud, and abuse of E-rate funding. Beneficiary audits are the most robust mechanism available to the commission in the oversight of the E-rate program, yet FCC generally has been slow to respond to audit findings and has not made full use of the audit findings as a means to understand and resolve problems within the program. Because appeals decisions are used as precedent, this slowness adds uncertainty to the program and impacts beneficiaries. It is particularly important that efforts to protect the program from fraud, waste, and abuse do not result in a program that is excessively burdensome on program participants. The assessment should include, but not be limited to the implications of FCC’s determination that the Universal Service Fund constitutes an appropriation by identifying the fiscal controls that apply and do not apply to the Universal Service Fund, including the collection, deposit, obligation, and disbursement of funds; and an evaluation of the legal authority for the organizational structure for carrying out the E-rate program, including the relationship between FCC and USAC and their respective authorities and roles in implementing the E-rate program. Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to review and evaluate: (1) the effect of the current structure of the E-rate program on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) management of the program, (2) FCC’s establishment of and use of goals and performance measures in managing the program, and (3) the effectiveness of FCC’s oversight mechanisms—rulemaking proceedings, beneficiary audits, and reviews of the Universal Service Administrative Company’s (USAC) decisions (appeals)—in managing the program. However, FCC’s conclusions concerning the status of USF raise further issues related to the collection, deposit, obligation, and disbursement of those funds—issues that FCC needs to explore and resolve. Thus, USF is subject to the Antideficiency Act. Our report states that prior to fiscal year 2000, FCC had no specific goals and measures for the program; that for fiscal years 2000 through 2002, the goals and measures set by FCC were not useful for assessing the impact of E-rate program funding because the measures used did not directly measure the impact of E-rate funding; and that since fiscal year 2002 there have been no E-rate performance goals and measures at all. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) E-rate program has committed more than $13 billion to help schools and libraries acquire Internet and telecommunications services. Recently, however, allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse by some E-rate program participants have come to light. As steward of the program, FCC must ensure that participants use E-rate funds appropriately and that there is managerial and financial accountability surrounding the funds. GAO reviewed (1) the effect of the current structure of the E-rate program on FCC's management of the program, (2) FCC's development and use of E-rate performance goals and measures, and (3) the effectiveness of FCC's oversight mechanisms in managing the program.
What GAO Found
FCC established the E-rate program using an organizational structure unusual to the government without conducting a comprehensive assessment to determine which federal requirements, policies, and practices apply to it. The E-rate program is administered by a private, not-for-profit corporation with no contract or memorandum of understanding with FCC, and program funds are maintained outside of the U.S. Treasury, raising issues related to the collection, deposit, obligation, and disbursement of the funding. While FCC recently concluded that the Universal Service Fund constitutes an appropriation and is subject to the Antideficiency Act, this raises further issues concerning the applicability of other fiscal control and accountability statutes. These issues need to be explored and resolved comprehensively to ensure that appropriate governmental accountability standards are fully in place to help protect the program and the fund from fraud, waste, and abuse. FCC has not developed useful performance goals and measures for assessing and managing the E-rate program. The goals established for fiscal years 2000 through 2002 focused on the percentage of public schools connected to the Internet, but the data used to measure performance did not isolate the impact of E-rate funding from other sources of funding, such as state and local government. A key unanswered question, therefore, is the extent to which increases in connectivity can be attributed to E-rate. In addition, goals for improving E-rate program management have not been a feature of FCC's performance plans. In its 2003 assessment of the program, OMB noted that FCC discontinued E-rate performance measures after fiscal year 2002 and concluded that there was no way to tell whether the program has resulted in the cost-effective deployment and use of advanced telecommunications services for schools and libraries. In response to OMB's concerns, FCC is currently working on developing new E-rate goals. FCC's oversight mechanisms contain weaknesses that limit FCC's management of the program and its ability to understand the scope of any waste, fraud, and abuse within the program. According to FCC officials, oversight of the program is primarily handled through agency rulemaking procedures, beneficiary audits, and appeals decisions. FCC's rulemakings have often lacked specificity and led to a distinction between FCC's rules and the procedures put in place by the program administrator--a distinction that has affected the recovery of funds for program violations. While audits of E-rate beneficiaries have been conducted, FCC has been slow to respond to audit findings and make full use of them to strengthen the program. In addition, the small number of audits completed to date do not provide a basis for accurately assessing the level of fraud, waste, and abuse occurring in the program, although the program administrator is working to address this issue. According to FCC officials, there is also a substantial backlog of E-rate appeals due in part to a shortage of staff and staff turnover. Because appeal decisions establish precedent, this slowness adds uncertainty to the program. |
gao_GAO-06-801T | gao_GAO-06-801T_0 | NTSB’s principal responsibility is to promote transportation safety by investigating transportation accidents, determining the probable cause, and issuing recommendations to address safety issues identified during accident investigations. NTSB lacks the resources to conduct on-scene investigations of all aviation accidents. NTSB Has Made Recent Progress in Following Leading Management Practices, But Overall Record Remains Mixed
Through our work government wide we have identified a number of key functional areas and leading practices in areas that are important for managing an agency. NTSB has begun to develop a performance management system that should eventually link each individual’s performance throughout the agency to the agency’s strategic goals and objectives. In recent years, NTSB has made significant progress in improving its financial management. For example, NTSB restructured its purchase card system and guidelines to address problems, such as unrestrained and unapproved purchases on government credit cards. NTSB Is Accomplishing Its Accident Investigation Mission, but Opportunities Exist to Gain Efficiencies
While NTSB is accomplishing its accident investigation mission, it faces challenges that affect the efficiency of the report production and recommendation close-out processes. NTSB routinely takes longer than 2 years to complete major aviation investigations. Safety Recommendations Close-out Process Is Time Consuming for Several Reasons
The processes for federal transportation agencies to implement NTSB’s safety recommendations, and for NTSB to change the status of recommendations it has made, are also lengthy because of complex processes involving many players. Federal officials with whom we spoke at DOT, which receives the bulk of NTSB recommendations, indicated that they have been working with NTSB to find acceptable means of implementing recommendations. Academy Costs Have Exceeded Revenues
For the first 2 full years of operation, fiscal years 2004 and 2005, NTSB’s academy did not generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of providing training, as shown in table 1. As a result, those portions of the academy’s costs that were not covered by the revenues from tuition and other sources—approximately $6.3 million in fiscal year 2004 and $3.9 million in fiscal year 2005—were offset by general appropriations to the agency. In addition, NTSB lacks a full cost-accounting system that would facilitate doing so. According to NTSB officials, it has explored this option with other organizations, but has not found others who will pay a yearly retainer for the service.While NTSB has taken action to generate revenue from other sources, it does not have a business plan or marketing strategy that seeks to optimize opportunities for additional revenues. To improve agency performance in the key functional management areas of strategic planning, human capital planning, financial management, and communications, we recommend that the Chairman implement the following three recommendations: Improve strategic planning by developing a revised strategic plan that follows performance-based practices; developing a strategic training plan that is aligned with the revised strategic plan and identifies skill gaps that pose obstacles to meeting the agency’s strategic goals and curriculum that would eliminate these gaps; and aligning their organizational structure to implement the strategic plan and eliminate unnecessary management layers. In addition the plan should consider the feasibility of subleasing a portion of the academy space. To determine the extent to which NTSB is generating sufficient revenues to cover costs at its academy, we reviewed financial data on NTSB’s academy, including the revenues and expenses for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a relatively small agency that plays a vital role in transportation safety and has a worldwide reputation for investigating accidents. With a staff of about 400 and a budget of $76.7 million in fiscal year 2006, NTSB investigates all civil aviation accidents in the United States, and significant accidents in railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline; and issues safety recommendations to address issues identified during accident investigations. To support its mission, NTSB built a training academy, which opened in 2003 and provides training to NTSB investigators and others. It is important that NTSB use its resources efficiently to carry out its mission and maintain its preeminence. This testimony, based on ongoing work for this committee, addresses the extent to which NTSB follows leading practices in selected management areas, addresses challenges in completing accident investigations and closing safety recommendations, and generates sufficient revenues to cover costs at its academy.
What GAO Found
NTSB has recently made progress in following leading management practices, but overall has a mixed record. For example, NTSB has improved its financial management by hiring a Chief Financial Officer and putting controls on its purchasing activities, which should address past problems with unapproved purchases. However, NTSB lacks a full cost accounting system, which would inform managers of the resources spent on individual investigations and provide data to balance office workload. NTSB has also begun to develop a performance management system that should eventually link each individual's performance to the agency's strategic goals and objectives. However, the performance management system will not be fully functional until NTSB has developed a strategic plan with results-oriented goals and objectives and specific strategies for achieving them, which are lacking in the current strategic plan. Other areas, such as human capital and communications, partially follow leading practices. While NTSB is accomplishing its accident investigation mission, it faces challenges that affect the efficiency of the report production and recommendation close out processes. NTSB routinely takes longer than 2 years to complete major investigations. Several factors may affect the length of report production, including several revisions of draft reports through multiple layers of the organization. In addition, the processes for federal transportation agencies to implement NTSB's safety recommendations and for NTSB to change the status of recommendations are lengthy, paper-based, and labor intensive. While Department of Transportation officials have been working with NTSB to find acceptable means of implementing its recommendations, they cite the lengthy rule-making process as a challenge to speedy implementation. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, NTSB's academy did not generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of providing training. As a result, those portions of the academy's costs that were not covered by the revenues from tuition and other sources--approximately $6.3 million in fiscal year 2004 and $3.9 million in fiscal year 2005--were offset by general appropriations to the agency. While NTSB has taken action to generate revenue from other sources, such as renting academy space for conferences, it does not have a marketing plan that seeks to optimize opportunities for additional revenues at the academy. |
gao_GAO-07-349 | gao_GAO-07-349_0 | According to FRPC’s sample asset management plan and guidance, the major sections of the asset management plan are supposed to describe how the agency: addresses its mission and real property support in implementing its missions and strategic goals, human capital and organizational structure, decision-making framework, and owner’s objectives; plans for and acquires real property assets, develops its capital plan, prioritizes its list of acquisitions each fiscal year, measures the effectiveness of its acquisition results, and identifies key initiatives to improve financial management and acquisition performance; operates its real property assets (including its inventory system, operations and maintenance plans, asset business plans, or “building block” plans, and periodic evaluation of assets), utilizes operational measures, and implements key initiatives to improve operational performance; and disposes of unneeded real property assets, measures the effectiveness of its redeployment actions, and identifies key initiatives to improve the pace of disposition as well as its ability to dispose of difficult, environmentally challenged properties. Energy, NASA, GSA, Interior, State, and VA reported repair and maintenance backlogs for buildings and structures that total over $16 billion. In addition, DOD reported a $57 billion restoration and modernization backlog. Five of the nine largest real property-holding agencies—Energy, Interior, GSA, State, and VA—reported an increased reliance on operating leases to meet new space needs over the past 5 years. Governmentwide Real Property Data Inventory Is in Early Stages, and Data Reliability Is Still a Problem at the Agency Level
While the administration and agencies have made progress in collecting standardized data elements needed to strategically manage real property, the long-term benefits of the new real property inventory have not yet been realized, and this effort is still in the early stages. All of the nine agencies reported using risk-based approaches to some degree to prioritize facility security needs, as we have suggested; but some agencies cited challenges, including a lack of resources for security enhancements and issues associated with securing leased space. Underlying Obstacles Hamper Agency Real Property Reform Efforts Governmentwide
In past high-risk reports, we called for a transformation strategy to address the long-standing problems in this area. While the administration’s current approach is generally consistent with what we envisioned and the administration’s central focus on real property management is a positive step, certain areas warrant further attention. Specifically, problems are exacerbated by underlying obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests and legal and budgetary limitations. For example, some agencies cited local interests as barriers to disposing of excess property. In addition, agencies’ limited ability to pursue ownership often leads them to lease property that they could more cost-effectively own over time. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what progress the administration and major real property-holding agencies have made in addressing long- standing problems and (2) what problems and obstacles, if any, remain to be addressed. These agencies are the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (Energy), Homeland Security (DHS), the Interior (Interior), State (State), and Veterans Affairs (VA); the General Services Administration (GSA); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). We also interviewed officials from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) because it oversees the implementation of Executive Order 13327, which addresses federal real property management. Our January 2003 high-risk work identified five long-standing problems in federal real property management, including excess and underutilized property, deteriorating facilities, reliance on costly leasing, and unreliable real property data. We prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continued effort to assist Congress with oversight of real property issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative to assist Congress. Federal real property is a high-risk area due to excess and deteriorating property, reliance on costly leasing, unreliable data, and security challenges. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) what progress the administration and major real property-holding agencies have made in strategically managing real property and addressing long-standing problems and (2) what problems and obstacles, if any, remain to be addressed. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and nine agencies that hold 93 percent of federal property.
What GAO Found
The administration and real property-holding agencies have made progress toward strategically managing federal real property and addressing long-standing problems. In response to the President's Management Agenda real property initiative and a related executive order, agencies have, among other things, established asset management plans; standardized data reporting; and adopted performance measures. Also, the administration has created a Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) and plans to work with Congress to provide agencies with tools to better manage real property. These are positive steps, but underlying problems still exist. For example, the Departments of Energy (Energy) and Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported during this review that over 10 percent of their facilities are excess or underutilized. Also, Energy, NASA, the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Departments of the Interior (Interior), State (State), and Veterans Affairs (VA) reported repair and maintenance backlogs for buildings and structures that total over $16 billion. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported a $57 billion restoration and modernization backlog. Also, Energy, Interior, GSA, State, and VA reported an increased reliance on leasing to meet space needs. While agencies have made progress in collecting and reporting standardized real property data, data reliability is still a challenge at DOD and other agencies, and agencies lack a standard framework for data validation. Finally, agencies reported using risk-based approaches to prioritize security needs, which GAO has suggested, but some cited obstacles such as a lack of resources for security enhancements. In past high-risk updates, GAO called for a transformation strategy to address the long-standing problems in this area. While the administration's approach is generally consistent with what GAO envisioned, certain areas warrant further attention. Specifically, problems are exacerbated by underlying obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests, legal and budgetary limitations, and the need for improved capital planning. For example, agencies cited local interests as barriers to disposing of excess property, and agencies' limited ability to pursue ownership leads them to lease property that may be more cost-effective to own over time. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-91 | gao_T-HEHS-98-91_0 | DCPS’ Enrollment Count Process in School Year 1996-97
We reported that even though DCPS changed parts of its enrollment process in school year 1996-97 to address prior criticisms, the process remained flawed. In addition, DCPS’ enrollment procedures allowed multiple records to be entered into SIS for a single student, and its student transfer process may have allowed a single student to be enrolled in at least two schools simultaneously. Furthermore, DCPS’ practice of allowing principals to enroll unlimited out-of-boundary students increased the possibility of multiple enrollment records for one student. Nevertheless, DCPS did not routinely check for duplicate records. Furthermore, even though the District of Columbia Auditor has suggested that students unable to document their residency be excluded from the official enrollment count, whether they pay tuition or not, DCPS included these students in its enrollment count for school year 1996-97. Problems persisted, however, in the critical area of residency verification. In addition, the pupil accounting system failed to adequately track students. Other school districts report that they use several approaches to control errors, such as the ones we identified, and to improve the accuracy of their enrollment counts. the enrollment count. Because the enrollment count will become the basis for funding DCPS and is even now an important factor in developing DCPS’ budget and allocating its resources, we recommended in our report that the Congress consider directing DCPS to report separately in its annual reporting of the enrollment count those students fully funded from other sources, such as Head Start participants and tuition-paying nonresidents; above and below the mandatory age for compulsory public education, such as those in prekindergarten or those aged 20 and above; and for whom District residency cannot be confirmed. Institute internal controls in the student information database, including database management practices and automatic procedures and edits to control database errors. Reported Responses to Our Recommendations
DCPS has made some changes in response to our recommendations. For example, it dropped the enrollment card. DCPS officials believe SIS’ residency verification status field also serves as a safeguard against including both duplicate records and inactive students in the enrollment count. DCPS considers the form alone, however, the only required proof of residency for the 1997-98 count. Until DCPS students are required to provide substantial proofs of residency, doubts about this issue will remain. Furthermore, DCPS staff told us that the school district has not yet monitored and audited the schools’ residency records but plans to do so shortly. DCPS has proposed modifications to the Board of Education’s rules governing residency to strengthen these rules. Finally, as noted earlier, the count includes students who have not completed residency verification. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its recent report on the enrollment count process that District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) used in school year 1996-97.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in spite of some changes in DCPS' enrollment count process in response to criticisms, the 1996-97 count process remained flawed in several respects; (2) for example, the Student Information System (SIS) continued to have errors, such as multiple enrollment records for a single student and weaknesses in the system's ability to track students; (3) in addition, verification of student residency remained problematic; (4) although DCPS made some changes in its enrollment count process for the 1997-98 school year in response to GAO's recommendations and plans to make more, the larger systemic issues appear to remain mostly uncorrected; (5) consequently, fundamental weaknesses still remain in the enrollment count process, making it vulnerable to inaccuracy and weakening its credibility; (6) for example, DCPS staff report that although an important internal control--duplicate record checks--has been implemented for SIS, additional internal controls are still lacking; (7) several DCPS enrollment and pupil accounting procedures continue to increase the possibility of multiple enrollment records for a single student; (8) GAO is concerned that duplicate record checks alone may not be sufficient to protect the integrity of SIS, given the many possiblities for error; (9) furthermore, the enrollment count may still include nonresident students; (10) more than half of DCPS' students have either failed to provide the residency verification forms or have provided no proofs of residency to accompany their forms; (11) GAO questions the appropriateness of including students who have failed to prove residency in the official count, particularly students who have not even provided the basic form; (12) in addition, because DCPS has not yet monitored and audited residency verification at the school level, additional problems may exist that are not yet apparent; (13) proposed new rules governing residency will help DCPS deal with residency issues; (14) until these issues are fully addressed and resolved, however, the accuracy and credibility of the enrollment count will remain questionable; (15) in GAO's more recent discussions with DCPS officials, they acknowledge that more needs to be done to improve the enrollment count process, particularly in the areas of further strengthening DCPS' automated internal controls and addressing the nonresident issue; and (16) they have expressed concern, however, that GAO has failed to recognize fully the improvements DCPS made in the enrollment count process for school year 1997-98. |
gao_GAO-11-791 | gao_GAO-11-791_0 | In recent years, many public and private price transparency initiatives have been initiated to provide consumers with information about the price of their health care services. Health Care Pricing
Determining the price of a health care service often involves coordination between providers, insurers, and consumers. For consumers with health insurance, their out-of-pocket costs for a health care service is determined by the amount of cost sharing specified in the benefits of their health insurance plan for services covered by the insurer. Though both public and private price transparency initiatives have become more widespread in the last 5 years, some research suggests that even if consumers have access to price information, such as price information made available by these initiatives, they may not use such information in their decision making. Various Factors, Such as the Difficulty of Predicting Health Care Services in Advance, Billing from Multiple Providers, and the Variety of Insurance Benefit Structures, Can Make Estimates of Consumers’ Complete Costs Difficult to Obtain
One factor that may make it difficult for consumers to obtain estimates of their complete costs for a health care service is that it may be difficult for providers to predict which services a patient will need in advance. For example, when we anonymously contacted 20 physicians’ offices to obtain information on the price of a diabetes screening, several representatives said the patient needs to be seen by a physician before the physician would know what tests the patient would need. Lastly, consumers may have difficulty obtaining complete cost estimates from providers because providers are often unaware of these costs due to the variety of insured consumers’ health benefit structures. For example, officials stated that for physicians to inform a patient about the price of a health care service in advance they have to know the status of consumers’ cost sharing under their specific health benefit plan, such as how much consumers have spent in out-of-pocket costs or towards their deductible at any given time. Researchers and Officials Identify Legal Factors That May Prevent the Disclosure of Negotiated Rates, Which Can Be Used to Estimate Consumers’ Complete Costs
Researchers and officials we interviewed identified several legal factors that may prevent providers and insurers from sharing negotiated rates, which can be used to estimate consumers’ complete costs. For example, some insurance company officials we interviewed told us that these contractual obligations prohibited the sharing of specific information on negotiated rates between providers and insurers on their price transparency initiatives’ websites. Second, some of the officials and researchers we spoke with reported that providers and insurers may be concerned with sharing their negotiated rates, considered proprietary information, which may be protected by law from unauthorized disclosure. Selected Initiatives Vary in the Information They Make Available, and Few Initiatives Provide Estimates of Consumers’ Complete Costs
The price information made available to consumers by the eight selected price transparency initiatives varies, in large part due to differences in the price data available to each initiative. In addition to providing the price of a service, most selected initiatives also provide a wide range of nonprice information, such as information on quality of care measures or patient volume. Five of the eight selected initiatives provide quality information for consumers to consider along with price when making decisions about a provider. Like the federal initiative, all of the selected state initiatives’ websites are publicly available, although they include price information only for their particular state. Few Selected Initiatives Provide Estimates of Complete Costs to Consumers
Few of the selected initiatives provide estimates of consumers’ complete costs, which is price information that incorporates any negotiated discounts; is inclusive of all costs associated with a particular health care service, such as hospital, physician, and lab fees; and identifies consumers’ out-of-pocket costs. The two initiatives are able to provide this information in part because they have access to and use price data—negotiated rates and claims data, respectively—that allow them to provide consumers with a price for the service by each provider that is inclusive of any negotiated discounts or reduced payments made to the billed charge. Specifically, Aetna bases its price data on its contractual rates with providers, which include negotiated discounts. To promote health care price transparency, HHS is currently supporting various efforts to make price information available to consumers—including the CMS initiative in our review—and the agency is expected to do more in this area in the future. In total, HHS has several opportunities to promote greater health care price transparency for consumers. Recommendations for Executive Action
As HHS implements its current and forthcoming efforts to make transparent price information available to consumers, we recommend that HHS take the following two actions: Determine the feasibility of making estimates of complete costs of health care services available to consumers through any of these efforts. Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, consumers have become responsible for a growing proportion of the costs of their health care. Health care price information that is transparent--available before consumers receive care--may help consumers anticipate these costs. Research identifies meaningful types of health care price information, such as estimates of what the complete cost will be to the consumer for a service. GAO defines an estimate of a consumer's complete health care cost as price information on a service that identifies a consumer's out-of-pocket cost, including any negotiated discounts, and all costs associated with a service or services. GAO examined (1) how various factors affect the availability of health care price information for consumers and (2) the information selected public and private health care price transparency initiatives make available to consumers. To do this work, GAO reviewed price transparency literature; interviewed experts; and examined a total of eight selected federal, state, and private insurance company health care price transparency initiatives. In addition, GAO anonymously contacted providers and requested the price of selected services to gain a consumer's perspective.
What GAO Found
Several health care and legal factors may make it difficult for consumers to obtain price information for the health care services they receive, particularly estimates of what their complete costs will be. The health care factors include the difficulty of predicting health care services in advance, billing from multiple providers, and the variety of insurance benefit structures. For example, when GAO contacted physicians' offices to obtain information on the price of a diabetes screening, several representatives said the patient needs to be seen by a physician before the physician could determine which screening tests the patient would need. According to provider association officials, consumers may have difficulty obtaining complete cost estimates from providers because providers have to know the status of insured consumers' cost sharing under health benefit plans, such as how much consumers have spent towards their deductible at any given time. In addition to the health care factors, researchers and officials identified several legal factors that may prevent the disclosure of negotiated rates between insurers and providers, which may be used to estimate consumers' complete costs. For example, several insurance company officials GAO interviewed said that contractual obligations with providers may prohibit the sharing of negotiated rates with the insurer's members on their price transparency initiatives' websites. Similarly, some officials and researchers told GAO that providers and insurers may be concerned with sharing negotiated rates due to the proprietary nature of the information and because of antitrust law concerns. The eight public and private price transparency initiatives GAO examined, selected in part because they provide price information on a specific health care service by provider, vary in the price information they make available to consumers. These initiatives include one administered by HHS, which is also expected to expand its price transparency efforts in the future. The price information made available by the selected initiatives ranges from hospitals' billed charges, which are the amounts hospitals bill for services before any discounts are applied, to prices based on insurance companies' contractually negotiated rates with providers, to prices based on claims data that report payments made to a provider for that service. The price information varies, in large part, due to limits reported by the initiatives in their access or authority to collect certain price data. In addition to price information, most of the selected initiatives also provide a variety of nonprice information, such as quality data on providers, for consumers to consider along with price when making decisions about a provider. Lastly, GAO found that two of the selected initiatives--one publicly available with information only for a particular state and one available to members of a health insurance plan--are able to provide an estimate of a consumer's complete cost. The two initiatives are able to provide this information in part because of the type of data to which they have access--claims data and negotiated rates, respectively. For the remaining initiatives, they either do not use more meaningful price data or are constrained by other factors, including concerns about disclosing what providers may consider proprietary information. As HHS continues and expands its price transparency efforts, it has opportunities to promote more complete cost estimates for consumers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) determine the feasibility of making estimates of complete costs of health care services available to consumers, and, as appropriate, identify next steps. HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-366 | gao_GAO-17-366_0 | As part of FAA’s process for issuing a license for a commercial launch or reentry, the agency determines the amount of insurance a launch company is required to purchase so the launch company can compensate third parties and the federal government for any claims for damages that occur as a result of activities carried out under the license. The amount of insurance coverage that FAA requires launch companies to purchase is intended to reflect the greatest dollar amount of loss to third parties and the federal government for bodily injury and property damage that can be reasonably expected to result from a launch or reentry accident. This amount is known as the maximum probable loss (MPL). FAA-contracted experts and others have found that FAA’s estimates of the number of casualties have tended to be too high, that estimates of losses from property damage may have been too high in some cases and too low in others, and that the $3 million cost-of-casualty amount was likely too low because it is based on outdated information. FAA implemented a revised process for estimating the number of casualties and reduced the 50 percent factor it uses to estimate losses due to property damage by half, and these revisions have tended to reduce insurance requirements, with some exceptions. However, FAA has not addressed the identified weakness of an outdated cost-of- casualty amount, which may indicate that FAA is not requiring launch companies to have insurance coverage for losses that can be reasonably expected and therefore may be exposing the government to excess risk. 1). FAA Has Revised Its Methodology for Estimating the Number of Casualties and Property Damage
In April 2016, FAA implemented a new MPL calculation methodology that incorporates revisions to the processes for estimating the number of casualties and losses due to property damage to address the weaknesses identified in these elements of the MPL calculation. In 2016, ACTA completed the design of a method for estimating the number of casualties that uses computer software to simulate a range of possible launch accidents that are intended to be more realistic than the scenario used in FAA’s previous method. FAA has revised the factor it uses to estimate losses from property damage in the MPL calculation and is also testing a new process. Unaddressed Weakness in FAA’s Cost-of-Casualty Amount May Expose the Federal Government to Excess Liability Risk
FAA has not addressed the weakness identified in the cost-of-casualty amount used in the MPL calculation, and, as of January 2017, it had not determined when it would do so. However, FAA has faced challenges in identifying reliable information because each of the sources that its contractor reviewed had significant limitations. Federal internal control standards require that agency management identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the entity’s objectives, and use current data. These standards also require that agency management define how to achieve objectives and the time frames for achieving them. Further, because FAA’s contractors have concluded that the cost-of-casualty amount is likely too low, the current MPL calculation may not account for all damages to third parties and federal government property and personnel that can reasonably be expected to result from a launch accident, as required by FAA regulations. However, FAA’s identified steps to update the cost-of-casualty amount remain incomplete because the agency has not prioritized this issue. FAA officials said that they have prioritized other work, such as reviewing launch license applications, ahead of addressing the weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount. Conclusions
FAA’s mission includes promoting the development of the commercial space launch industry as well as managing risk to the public and the federal government. While there is substantial uncertainty in the MPL calculation, the use of outdated data as the basis of the cost-of-casualty amount represents a risk that the current MPL calculation may not account for damages to third parties and federal property and personnel that can reasonably be expected from a launch accident, as required by FAA regulations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that the government is not exposed to more liability risk than intended, the Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the FAA Administrator prioritizes the development of a plan to address the identified weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount, including setting time frames for action, and update the amount based on current information. Agency Comments and Third-Party Views
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for its review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assist in the development of the commercial space launch industry, the federal government shares liability risks for losses from damages to third parties or federal property. This risk-sharing arrangement requires space launch companies to have a specific amount of insurance for damages to third parties and federal property. The federal government is potentially liable for third-party claims above that amount, up to an estimated $3.1 billion in 2017, subject to appropriations.
The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act enacted in 2015 required the Department of Transportation—of which FAA is a part—to study the methodology used to determine launch companies' insurance requirements. The law also contains a provision for GAO to evaluate the study's conclusions and any planned revisions.
This report discusses the extent to which FAA has revised its methodology for calculating insurance requirements to address previously cited weaknesses and the potential effect of any changes on financial liabilities for the government. GAO reviewed documents from FAA and its contractors on alternative methods for calculating insurance requirements, interviewed FAA officials and a contractor involved in designing alternative methods, and reviewed GAO's prior work and relevant laws.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has revised its method for calculating insurance requirements to address some known weaknesses. FAA is the part of the Department of Transportation that determines the amount of insurance that commercial space launch companies must purchase to cover damages from accidents that harm third parties—that is, the uninvolved public—or federal property and personnel, unless companies otherwise demonstrate sufficient financial resources to cover the same calculated damages. The amount of insurance required is based on FAA's calculation of the maximum loss that can be reasonably expected. FAA contractors found the following:
FAA's estimates of the number of casualties (serious injuries and deaths) that could result from a launch accident have likely been too high, and have been based on an unrealistic scenario;
FAA's estimates of losses due to property damage may be too high in some cases, and too low in others;
FAA's estimate of the average cost of a casualty —referred to as the cost-of-casualty amount—is based on outdated information and is likely too low. The amount has been fixed at $3 million since 1988.
FAA implemented a new method for estimating the number of casualties in April 2016 that uses computer software to simulate a range of possible launch accidents that are intended to be more realistic than FAA's previous scenarios. FAA has also reduced the factor it uses to estimate losses due to property damage, based on tests of a new process for estimating such losses that showed the previous factor was too high. Both of these revisions have tended to reduce insurance requirements. In addition, FAA assigned one of its two contractors examining elements of the methodology to study potential improvements in estimating average casualty losses, but that contractor found significant limitations in each alternative approach that it reviewed.
Because FAA has not yet addressed the identified weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount used in its calculation, the federal government may be exposed to excess risk. FAA has identified potential steps to update the information the cost-of-casualty amount is based on, including seeking public input on whether and how to revise the amount, but the agency does not have a complete plan for updating the cost-of-casualty amount. Federal internal control standards require that agency management respond to risks related to achieving the entity's objectives, define how to achieve objectives, and set time frames for achieving them. FAA has not responded to the risk identified in using outdated data as the basis of the cost-of-casualty amount because FAA has prioritized other work, such as reviewing launch license applications, ahead of this issue. Further, because the weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount indicates that the amount is likely too low, the current calculation may not account for damages to third parties and federal property and personnel that can reasonably be expected from a launch accident, as required by FAA regulations. By leaving this weakness unaddressed, FAA's insurance requirements may not account for damages that can be reasonably expected, and may expose the government to more liability risk than intended under the risk-sharing arrangement.
What GAO Recommends
FAA should prioritize planning for addressing the identified weakness in the cost-of-casualty amount and update the amount based on current information. The agency did not comment on this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-74 | gao_GAO-04-74_0 | In addition, federal executive agencies must report all payments for services provided by vendors, including payments made to corporations. The PMF is a database that includes all entities that make payments subject to information return reporting. If there is a match, the information is entered in the IRMF without the need for additional action. This enables IRS to determine whether the vendor has reported all of the income on the tax return. For 2000 and 2001, about 152,000 information returns for federal payments totaling about $5 billion were not filed with IRS, while about 170,000 information returns, including $20 billion in federal payments that were filed, included invalid TINs. With Some Exceptions, Federal Agencies File Forms 1099 MISC
While most federal agencies filed information returns for vendors, some did not. About 8,800 of these payees who collectively received payments totaling about $421 million dollars—an average of about 48,000 each—failed to file an income tax return for these 2 years, according to IRS’s records. Almost $3.0 billion in payments made via purchase cards by DOD between 2000 and 2001 had not been reported to IRS due to incorrect or missing vendor TINs. Federal Agencies Do Not Consistently Use IRS’s TIN- Matching Program
Although the TIN-matching program is available, most federal agencies do not consistently use this program to ensure that the TINs included on information returns are valid. IRS Has No Program to Identify Federal Agencies That Fail to File Forms 1099 MISC and the CCR Does Not Now Serve as a Central Source of Valid TINs
Although IRS can identify whether Forms 1099 MISC filed by federal agencies include a valid TIN, IRS does not have a program to identify and follow up with agencies that fail to file Forms 1099 MISC. Conducting a survey of all payers included in this file would be a way for IRS to update this information, thus ensuring that all federal payers are correctly coded as federal in the Payer Master File. We commend these efforts to address the long- standing problem of obtaining necessary vendor information from payment card companies. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which federal agencies file required Forms 1099 MISC, take steps to ensure that information on the returns, particularly Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN), are valid, and initiate backup withholding if vendors provide invalid TINs; (2) recent actions the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken to help improve federal agency Form 1099 MISC (Miscellaneous Income) filing compliance; and (3) whether any additional measures could further improve federal agency compliance with Form 1099 MISC filing requirements. To determine whether federal agencies take steps to ensure that information on the returns, particularly TINs, is valid, by using IRS’s TIN- matching program to validate vendor TINs or initiate backup withholding on future payments to vendors that have submitted invalid TINs, we sent a survey to the 14 federal departments about their policies and practices for obtaining vendor TINs and filing Forms 1099 MISC. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) matches information returns filed by third parties, including federal agencies, with taxpayers' income tax returns to determine whether taxpayers have filed a return and/or reported all of their income. A correct taxpayer identification number (TIN) is necessary to enable IRS to match these returns. Prior GAO reviews have shown that federal agency payment records often include invalid TINs, particularly for vendors. GAO was asked to study federal agencies' compliance with filing information returns for service payments made to vendors, IRS's efforts to improve agencies' compliance, and whether additional measures could improve their compliance.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies do not always adhere to information return reporting requirements. About $5 billion in payments to 152,000 payees made during 2000 and 2001 by agencies within three federal departments were not reported to IRS. About 8,800 of these payees had received $421 million in payments, yet had failed to file a tax return for these years. In addition, about $20 billion in payments that were reported to IRS on 170,000 information returns for 2000 and 2001 included invalid vendor TINs. This was due in part to the fact that few federal agencies use IRS's TIN-matching program, as use of this program is optional. IRS has acted to aid federal agencies in complying with annual information return filing requirements. In August 2003, IRS notified federal agencies about information returns filed for 2001 that included invalid vendor TINs and the need for agencies to withhold a portion of future payments if the vendors fail to provide a valid TIN. IRS is also in the process of making the TIN-matching program available online. IRS does not currently have a program to identify and follow up with federal agencies that fail to file required annual information returns for vendor payments. Improvements to IRS's Payer Master File, which contains general information on all payers who file information returns, would be necessary for such a program. In addition, although the Central Contractor Registration is intended for use as a central source of valid vendor information by all federal agencies, it contains some invalid TINs. Due to statutory restrictions, all vendor TINs in this database cannot currently be validated through the IRS TIN-matching program, but options exist to address this problem. |
gao_AIMD-98-53 | gao_AIMD-98-53_0 | To determine the status of the Army’s Year 2000 program and the appropriateness of its strategy and actions for ensuring successful completion, we evaluated DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (OASD/C3I) efforts to provide Year 2000 support to the Army. The Army’s CIO requested that AAA help evaluate component needs and identify areas that could cause Year 2000 failures. First, it lacks complete and accurate information on systems, interfaces, Year 2000 costs, and the progress of remediation efforts. As a result, there is increased risk that key interfaces will not be corrected prior to the year 2000. Without these plans, it will not be able to minimize the impact of Year 2000 problems on operations. Fourth, the Army has not assessed how much testing capacity is needed and available. Cost Information Is Both Incomplete and Unreliable
At the time of our review, the Army reported that it expected to spend about $429 million to correct its Year 2000 problem. For example, 328 of the 505 AMC systems needing Year 2000 remediation did not have repair cost estimates. All of these data problems seriously impair the Army’s ability to effectively manage Year 2000 remediation efforts. Without complete interface information, the Army cannot ensure that Year 2000 errors are not propagated from one organization’s system to another’s. Without documentation on certification, the Army cannot assess whether systems have been verified as compliant. Thus, it will increase the risk of being unprepared to carry out operational missions after the Year 2000 deadline. In view of these problems, the Army has supplemented its efforts with AAA, the Army Inspector General, and contractor services. Also, until the Army provides increased oversight of components’ efforts to plan for contingencies, prepare interface agreements, and acquire needed testing facilities, it cannot be assured that its mission-critical operations will not be severely degraded or disabled as a result of the Year 2000 problem. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Army CIO to do the following:
Require by July 30, 1998, that all Army components (1) correct their inventory databases, ensuring that they are accurate and complete, (2) certify all claims of Year 2000 compliance and submit completed certification checklists to the Army Year 2000 Project Office, (3) provide reliable Year 2000 cost estimates that are based on a comprehensive inventory and completed assessments of all mission-critical and major systems so that priorities can be established and informed resource trade-off decisions can be made, (4) prepare contingency plans that include specific actions for ensuring the continuity of the Army’s critical operations at the Year 2000, (5) prepare memorandums of agreement for all identified interfaces, and (6) develop test plans and identify the need for additional testing resources. For example, the CIO noted that, in a February 1998 policy memorandum, he had directed components to (1) provide more complete and accurate data on their systems, (2) ensure that all mission-critical and major systems reported as compliant in the Army Year 2000 database are certified and copies of the certification are provided to the Army Year 2000 Project Office, (3) ensure that all noncompliant mission-critical and major systems are certified following renovation and testing, (4) complete contingency plans for all noncompliant mission-critical and major systems and core business areas, and (5) inventory all system interfaces and coordinate interface agreements with interface partners. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's program for solving its year 2000 computer system problem, focusing on the: (1) status of the Army's efforts to identify and correct its systems; and (2) appropriateness of the Army's strategy and actions to remediate its year 2000 problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army relies on computer systems for virtually every aspect of its operations including strategic and tactical operations, sophisticated weaponry, and routine business functions; (2) failure to successfully address the year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disable Army mission-critical operations; (3) the Army has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote sharing of information, and encourage components to make year 2000 remediation efforts a high priority; (4) it has also enlisted the services of the Army Audit Agency, the Army Inspector General, and various contractors to help evaluate component needs and identify areas that could impact the successful completion of the Army's Year 2000 program; (5) it lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce good management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture of its progress in remediating systems; (6) for example, at the time of GAO's review, the Army: (a) did not have complete and accurate information on systems, interfaces, and the costs and progress of remediation efforts; (b) had not completed interface agreements and contingency plans; and (c) had not determined how much testing capacity was needed and available; (7) each of these problems seriously endangers the Army's chances of successfully meeting the year 2000 deadline for mission-critical systems; (8) for example, without good status and cost information, the Army cannot effectively: (a) ensure that all its mission-critical systems are being corrected; (b) identify areas where additional resources are needed; (c) ensure that year 2000 errors are not propagated from one organization to another; or (d) assess whether systems have been certified as compliant; (9) without prompt attention to interface agreements and contingency plans, there is an increased risk that key interfaces will not work and that core business processes will be adversely impacted; (10) without knowing at the department level how much testing capacity is needed and available, the Army will not be able to help acquire additional resources in the event that insufficient capacity is available to meet its needs; (11) together, these problems greatly increase the risk of failure of some mission-critical systems and operations unless corrective actions are taken; and (12) Army officials recognize that improvements in the year 2000 program are needed and have recently taken actions directed at ensuring that the year 2000 does not pose a threat to the Army's ability to execute its mission. |
gao_GAO-08-34 | gao_GAO-08-34_0 | The following is a summary of five criteria that can be used to determine the appropriate type of COO/CMO position in a federal agency. Depending on these five criteria, there could be several types of COO/CMO positions, including the types shown below. The existing deputy position could carry out the integration and business transformation role. This type of COO/CMO might be appropriate in a relatively stable or small organization. A senior-level executive who reports to the deputy, such as a principal under secretary for management, could be designated to integrate key management functions and lead business transformation efforts in the agency. This type of COO/CMO might be appropriate for a larger organization. A second deputy position could be created to bring strong focus to the integration and business transformation of the agency, while the other deputy position would be responsible for leading the operational policy and mission-related functions of the agency. For a large and complex organization undergoing a significant transformation to reform long- standing management problems, this might be the most appropriate type of COO/CMO. Statutory term appointments currently exist for various senior-level positions in a number of agencies, bureaus, commissions, and boards in the federal government. In doing so, the implementation of any approach should be determined within the context of the specific facts and circumstances that relate to each individual agency. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this study were to identify criteria that can be used to determine the type of chief operating officer (COO)/chief management officer (CMO) or similar position that ought to be established in federal agencies and strategies for implementing COO/CMO positions to elevate, integrate, and institutionalize key management functions and business transformation efforts in federal agencies. To identify these criteria and strategies, we (1) gathered information on the experiences and views of officials at four organizations with COO/CMO-type positions and (2) convened a Comptroller General’s forum to gather insights from individuals with experience and expertise in business transformation, federal and private sector management, and change management. 21st Century Challenges: Transforming Government to Meet Current and Emerging Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies across the federal government are embarking on large-scale organizational transformations to address 21st century challenges. One proposed approach to address systemic federal governance and management challenges involves the creation of a senior-level position--a chief operating officer (COO)/chief management officer (CMO)--in selected federal agencies to help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize responsibility for key management functions and business transformation efforts. GAO was asked to develop criteria and strategies for establishing and implementing COO/CMO positions in federal agencies. To do so, GAO (1) gathered information on the experiences and views of officials at four organizations with COO/CMO-type positions and (2) convened a forum to gather insights from individuals with experience in business transformation.
What GAO Found
A number of criteria can be used to determine the appropriate type of COO/CMO position in a federal agency. These criteria include the history of organizational performance, degree of organizational change needed, nature and complexity of mission, organizational size and structure, and current leadership talent and focus. Depending on these five criteria, there could be several types of COO/CMO positions, including: (1) the existing deputy position could carry out the integration and business transformation role--this type of COO/CMO might be appropriate in a relatively stable or small organization; (2) a senior-level executive who reports to the deputy, such as a principal under secretary for management, could be designated to integrate key management functions and lead business transformation efforts in the agency--this type of COO/CMO might be appropriate for a larger organization; and (3) a second deputy position could be created to bring strong focus to the integration and business transformation of the agency--this might be the most appropriate type of COO/CMO for a large and complex organization undergoing a significant transformation to reform long-standing management problems. Because each agency has its own set of characteristics, challenges and opportunities, the implementation of any approach should be determined within the context of the agency's specific facts and circumstances. Once the type of COO/CMO is selected, six key strategies can be useful in implementing such positions in federal agencies. |
gao_GAO-11-812 | gao_GAO-11-812_0 | Veterans More Often Choose the DRO Review, but Some May Not Fully Understand Their Options
Since fiscal year 2003, when VA started tracking DRO involvement in appeals, data show more veterans have chosen a DRO review than a traditional review for appeals of decisions on their disability compensation claims. From fiscal years 2003 through 2010, veterans chose a DRO review in 534,439 appeals, or 61 percent of all appeals filed over this time period, according to Board data. 2). Some VA officials and VSO representatives said veterans may not be able to make an informed decision based on the letter alone. The DRO Review More Often Results in Additional Benefits, but Does Not Reduce Appeals Going to the Board
DRO Reviews More Often Resulted in Additional Benefits than Traditional Reviews
Veterans who chose a DRO review were more likely than those who chose a traditional review to get additional disability compensation benefits after initial review of their notices of disagreement. The negligible difference between appeal resolution rates at the regional office level for DRO and traditional reviews in part reflects veterans’ decisions on how to proceed if they do not receive a full grant of requested benefits. Board data show that for appeals filed from fiscal years 2003 through 2008 the most common reason for resolution at the regional office level was a veteran’s failure to return a form to continue the appeal (failure to respond) after receiving VA’s explanation of its decision and of what steps to take to move the appeal to the Board (see fig. The second most common reason for appeal resolution at the regional level was a full grant of benefits, which automatically ends the process. In contrast to the first issue, DRO reviews were somewhat more likely than traditional reviews to be resolved through a full grant of benefits—21 percent versus 17 percent, respectively. Fifty-nine percent of appeals which received no additional benefits at the initial appeal stage and in which the veteran had no representative were ended by the veteran without going on to the Board, compared to 52 percent of such appeals in which the veteran had a representative. Time spent on different tasks varies across regional offices. Since the implementation of the DRO review process in 2001, there have been differing opinions within VA about the proper balance between processing appeals and performing other DRO tasks. About half the regional office managers surveyed said an appeal resolution goal at the regional office level would somewhat or greatly enhance DROs’ effectiveness. VA Provides No Nationwide Specialized Training for New DROs
VA has not developed a nationwide training curriculum for DROs to help them learn the duties of the position. However, looking more broadly, VA has not achieved its original goal for the DRO review process of reducing the number of appeals continuing to the Board and thereby shortening the time that veterans wait for appeal decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To clarify information for veterans and ensure the most effective use of DROs, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Veterans Benefits Administration to take the following three actions: revise the sample appeals election letter in its policy manual to define unfamiliar terms and emphasize key deadlines, and test any revised letter’s clarity with veterans before implementing it; establish national and regional office performance measures related to appeal resolution at the regional level and ensure that sufficient quality review procedures are in place to prevent DROs from granting unjustified benefits; and assess the knowledge and skills that DROs need to perform their varied responsibilities, determine if any gaps exist in the training currently available, and, if necessary, develop a training curriculum or program tailored to DROs. III), VA concurred fully with two of our recommendations and partially with our recommendation regarding an appeal resolution performance measure. However, it also stated that resolution of appeals at the regional level should not be a performance measure used to assess the impact of the DROs, for several reasons including (1) the DROs also play an important role in training, mentoring, and quality review, so an appeal resolution measure does not capture their full impact; (2) each veteran has a right to continue an appeal to the Board if dissatisfied with the regional office decision, and whether a veteran continues is beyond a DRO’s control; and (3) establishing an appeal resolution performance measure could encourage the granting of benefits that are not justified. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to examine (1) the extent to which veterans choose a Decision Review Officer (DRO) review as opposed to a traditional review, (2) outcomes for veterans who choose a DRO review, and (3) challenges the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces in managing DROs. We interviewed managers, DROs, and veteran service organization (VSO) staff in 4 regional offices, and we conducted a web- based survey of managers in all of VA’s 57 regional offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has struggled to provide timely reviews for veterans who appeal decisions on their disability compensation claims. A veteran appeals to the VA regional office that made the initial decision, and if still dissatisfied, to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board). An appeal to the Board adds more than 2 years, on average, to the wait for a decision on the appeal. To resolve more appeals at the regional level and avoid waits at the Board, VA, in 2001, established the Decision Review Officer (DRO) review as an alternative to the traditional regional office appeal review. A DRO is given authority to grant additional benefits after reviewing an appeal based on a difference of opinion with the original decision. In contrast, under the traditional review, new evidence is generally required for a grant of additional benefits. GAO examined (1) the extent to which veterans choose a DRO review, (2) outcomes for DRO reviews, and (3) VA's challenges in managing DROs. GAO analyzed Board data, surveyed managers in all 57 regional offices, visited 4 offices, and interviewed veterans.
What GAO Found
According to VA data, which has only tracked DRO involvement since 2003, veterans chose a DRO review in 61 percent (534,439) of all appeals filed from 2003 to 2010. Veterans who sought assistance with their appeal from a veteran service organization or other qualified representatives were more likely to choose a DRO review than those without a representative. Without assistance, veterans may not fully understand their two appeal options. GAO found that the letter VA uses to inform veterans of their options does not highlight key deadlines or differences between the two options. According to more than half of surveyed regional office managers, most veterans could not make an informed choice on the options based just on the letter. The DRO review process has helped some veterans get additional benefits at the regional office level, but has not reduced the percentage of appeals continuing on to the Board--the primary purpose of the program. In fiscal years 2003 through 2008, 21 percent of DRO reviews resulted in a full grant of benefits compared to 17 percent of traditional reviews. A full grant of benefits ends, or resolves, the appeal at the regional level. However, appeals may also be resolved at the regional level if veterans who do not receive full grants decide not to continue their appeal to the Board. VA gave DROs the flexibility to interact informally with veterans in part so they could explain when the benefits already granted are appropriate given the law. However, while DRO reviews led to the grant of full benefits at a higher rate, a higher percentage of veterans not granted benefits through traditional review voluntarily ended their appeals. As a result, in fiscal years 2003 through 2008 the overall percentage of appeals resolved at the regional level was about the same for DRO and traditional reviews--about 70 percent for both. VA faces challenges in how to most effectively use and train DROs. Since the DRO process and position were established, DRO duties have expanded beyond reviewing appeals to performing additional tasks such as quality review. However, VA officials have not reached consensus on how to balance DROs' time among different tasks. VA has no performance goal or measure for appeal resolution at the regional level that could help it determine whether it is achieving the most effective balance between different tasks. In addition, VA headquarters offers no nationwide, standardized training for new DROs, which according to managers and DROs would be beneficial, as they often lack experience with other tasks that DROs frequently perform such as conducting hearings. Ninetythree percent of surveyed regional managers said a nationally standardized training for new DROs would be beneficial.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends VA (1) revise its appeals election letter, (2) develop an appeal resolution goal at the regional level, and (3) develop a training curriculum on DRO duties. In its comments, VA concurred fully with GAO's first and third recommendations but only partially with the second. VA expressed concerns about an appeal resolution goal, including that it could encourage the unjustified granting of benefits. GAO feels that VA's quality control process minimizes this risk. |
gao_GAO-15-221 | gao_GAO-15-221_0 | This system, known as the National Airspace System (NAS), includes air traffic control systems, ATC procedures, operational facilities, aircraft, and the people who certify, operate, and maintain them. Our previous reports, and Recent federal guidance demonstrates that securing critical infrastructures from internal and external threats is a national priority. The order also directed the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a technology-neutral voluntary framework for improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity. Security Weaknesses Place Air Traffic Control Systems at Risk
Although FAA has taken steps to safeguard its air traffic control systems, significant security control weaknesses remain in NAS systems and networks, threatening the agency’s ability to adequately fulfill its mission. Additionally, significant interconnectivity exists between non-NAS systems and the NAS operational environment, increasing the risk from these weaknesses. A key reason for both the technical control weaknesses and the security management weaknesses is that FAA had not fully established an integrated, organization-wide approach to managing information security risk that is aligned with its mission. An agency can accomplish this by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computer resources (e.g., data, programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them from unauthorized disclosure, modification, and loss. Although FAA had issued security policies, it did not consistently protect its network boundary from possible intrusions; identify and authenticate users; authorize access to resources; ensure that sensitive data are encrypted; or audit and monitor actions taken on NAS systems and networks. FAA Did Not Fully Implement Its Information Security Program, Limiting the Effectiveness of Information Security Controls
An entity-wide information security program is the foundation of a security control structure and a reflection of senior management’s commitment to addressing security risks. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in information security policies, procedures, or practices; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Inadequate Agency-Wide Information Security Risk Management Processes Contribute to Weaknesses in Security Controls and Security Management
One important reason for many of the weaknesses in security controls as well as the security program shortcomings identified in our review is that FAA has not yet fully established an integrated, organization-wide approach to managing information security risk. Specifically, the FAA Chief Information Security Officer stated that in November 2013, the agency established a risk executive function at the agency level in the form of a Cyber Security Steering Committee. However, FAA has not yet fully established the governance structures and practices necessary for ensuring that its information security risk management decisions are aligned strategically with its mission. Specifically: FAA has not clearly and consistently established roles and responsibilities for information security for NAS systems. Significant changes in the NAS environment, such as the increased reliance on IP networks, increased connectivity between systems, the introduction of NextGen systems, and the designation of the NAS as part of the nation’s critical infrastructure, have changed the level and nature of the information security risks facing air traffic control systems. Until FAA establishes stronger agency-wide information security risk management processes, fully develops its NAS information security program, and ensures that remedial actions are addressed in a timely manner, the weaknesses that we identified are likely to continue, placing the safe and uninterrupted operation of the nation’s air traffic control system at increased and unnecessary risk. We are also making 168 recommendations to address 60 findings in a separate report with limited distribution. Using the requirements identified by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, which establishes key elements for an effective agency-wide information security program, and associated NIST guidelines and agency requirements, we evaluated the FAA’s information security program by analyzing processes and documentation that were part of FAA’s information security risk management processes to determine the extent to which the process sufficiently supported the agency’s mission and operations; examining system security plans to determine whether they described the security controls in place or planned for meeting the security requirements of the system; examining security awareness training records to determine whether employees and contractors had received training according to FAA policy and federal guidance; analyzing security testing and evaluation results for four systems to determine whether testing of management, operational, and technical controls was sufficient to conclude that controls were in place and operating effectively; examining remedial action plans for four systems to determine whether FAA addressed identified vulnerabilities in a timely manner; examining contingency plans and contingency test results for selected systems to determine whether those plans were appropriately documented and had been sufficiently tested; and reviewing FAA’s processes for identifying and responding to information security incidents to determine whether FAA has implemented an effective incident response capability for its air traffic control systems. These included FAA’s employee background investigation data. | Why GAO Did This Study
In support of its mission, FAA relies on the NAS—one of the nation's critical infrastructures—which is comprised of air traffic control systems, procedures, facilities, aircraft, and people who operate and maintain them. Given the critical role of the NAS and the increasing connectivity of FAA's systems, it is essential that the agency implement effective information security controls to protect its air traffic control systems from internal and external threats.
GAO was asked to review FAA's information security program. Specifically, the objective of this review was to evaluate the extent to which FAA had effectively implemented information security controls to protect its air traffic control systems. To do this, GAO reviewed FAA policies, procedures, and practices and compared them to the relevant federal law and guidance; assessed the implementation of security controls over FAA systems; and interviewed officials. This is a public version of a report containing sensitive security information. Information deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
While the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken steps to protect its air traffic control systems from cyber-based and other threats, significant security control weaknesses remain, threatening the agency's ability to ensure the safe and uninterrupted operation of the national airspace system (NAS). These include weaknesses in controls intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computer resources, such as controls for protecting system boundaries, identifying and authenticating users, authorizing users to access systems, encrypting sensitive data, and auditing and monitoring activity on FAA's systems. Additionally, shortcomings in boundary protection controls between less-secure systems and the operational NAS environment increase the risk from these weaknesses.
FAA also did not fully implement its agency-wide information security program. As required by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, federal agencies should implement a security program that provides a framework for implementing controls at the agency. However, FAA's implementation of its security program was incomplete. For example, it did not always sufficiently test security controls to determine that they were operating as intended; resolve identified security weaknesses in a timely fashion; or complete or adequately test plans for restoring system operations in the event of a disruption or disaster. Additionally, the group responsible for incident detection and response for NAS systems did not have sufficient access to security logs or network sensors on the operational network, limiting FAA's ability to detect and respond to security incidents affecting its mission-critical systems.
The weaknesses in FAA's security controls and implementation of its security program existed, in part, because FAA had not fully established an integrated, organization-wide approach to managing information security risk that is aligned with its mission. National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance calls for agencies to establish and implement a security governance structure, an executive-level risk management function, and a risk management strategy in order to manage risk to their systems and information. FAA has established a Cyber Security Steering Committee to provide an agency-wide risk management function. However, it has not fully established the governance structure and practices to ensure that its information security decisions are aligned with its mission. For example, it has not (1) clearly established roles and responsibilities for information security for the NAS or (2) updated its information security strategic plan to reflect significant changes in the NAS environment, such as increased reliance on computer networks.
Until FAA effectively implements security controls, establishes stronger agency-wide information security risk management processes, fully implements its NAS information security program, and ensures that remedial actions are addressed in a timely manner, the weaknesses GAO identified are likely to continue, placing the safe and uninterrupted operation of the nation's air traffic control system at increased and unnecessary risk.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 17 recommendations to FAA to fully implement its information security program and establish an integrated approach to managing information security risk. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending that FAA take 168 specific actions to address weaknesses in security controls. In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-242 | gao_GAO-02-242_0 | Differences in Title I funding per poor child among school districts is due, in part, to hold-harmless provisions. By 1997, California had 16 percent of the nation’s poor children, but received just 12 percent of all Title I dollars. Our review of the Title I statute and regulations found no formal monetary, statutory, or regulatory incentives for states to target their funds in this way. In the aggregate, relatively few poor children and Title I funds were associated with districts whose allocations differed widely from their formula-calculated amounts in the 1999-2000 school year. Enacting any of the policy options— using less restrictive hold-harmless provisions, funding targeted grants, using an alternative cost factor, or raising the eligibility threshold—would result in changes for many states and school districts in terms of their formula calculations. 305), we designed our study to provide information on (1) the extent to which Title I funds are allocated to states, school districts and schools with the greatest numbers and percentages of school-age children from low-income families; (2) the extent to which allocations of such funds adjust to shifts in numbers of children from low-income families; (3) the extent to which the allocation of Title I funds encourages the targeting of state funds to school-age children from low-income families; and (4) what options might improve targeting of funds, especially to states and school districts with higher numbers and percentages of poor children, to more effectively serve those children. | What GAO Found
The Title I program spends $8 billion each year on elementary and secondary education. Although state and local funds account for more than 90 percent of national education expenditures, Title I has been an important source of funding for many poor school districts and schools since 1965. In the 1999-2000 school year, Title I funds were targeted on the basis of numbers and percentages of poor children, but the complex allocation process resulted in differences in actual funding per poor child. When the numbers of children from low-income families shift among states, Title I allocations adjust, but not completely, and a state whose share of the nation's poor children changed from year to year would not necessarily see a corresponding change in its Title I allocation amount. The following two factors account for this: lack of current poverty data and various hold-harmless provisions. GAO found no monetary, statutory, or regulatory incentives for states to target their own funds to children from low-income families. Several policy options could increase Title I funds allocated to states and school districts with high numbers and percentages of poor children. These options include changing the appropriations hold-harmless provisions, funding the targeted grant, using an alternative cost factor, and raising the basic grant eligibility threshold. |
gao_GAO-06-865T | gao_GAO-06-865T_0 | Coordination between the U.S. Military and Private Security Providers Continues to Be a Problem
Despite improvements in coordination between private security providers and the U.S military, military officials we met with in Iraq in May 2006 and those who recently returned from Iraq said that coordination continues to be a problem. U.S. military and contractor officials we spoke with prior to issuing our July 2005 report had indicated that coordination had improved. If private security providers do not coordinate their movements with military units, it places both the U.S. military and the private security providers at risk. Although the Department of Defense agreed with our recommendation and tasked the Joint Staff to develop the training package, no action had been taken. Missing or Inaccessible Data May Make Criminal Background Screening of Private Security Provider Employees Difficult
Private security providers and DOD have difficulty conducting comprehensive criminal background screening when data are missing and inaccessible. In addition, DOD’s program to biometrically screen all Iraqi private security provider employees as well as most third country nationals who are private security provider employees seeking access to U.S. installations is not as effective as it could be because of the limited number of international and foreign databases available for screening. The Effectiveness of DOD’s Biometric Screening in Iraq Is Limited Because of Missing Data
DOD conducts biometric screening of most non-U.S. private security provider employees needing access to installations in Iraq; however, the value of the screening process is limited because the databases used to screen the applicants have little international biometric data. As we reported in our 2005 report, reconstruction contractors had difficulty hiring suitable security providers. Contractors replaced their security providers on five of the eight reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that we reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including their lack of knowledge of the security market and of the potential security providers and the absence of useful agency guidance in this area. In our report, we recommended that the State Department, USAID, and DOD explore options that would enable contractors to obtain security services quickly and efficiently. Rather, they determined that they could best assist contractors by providing access to information related to industry best practices and other security-related material. Specifically, we believe private security provider operations would be improved by (1) developing a training package for deploying units to Iraq that would provide information on the ROC, private security providers operating procedures, and any MNF-I or MNC-I guidance on private security providers and (2) further exploring options to assist contractors in obtaining suitable security providers. Additionally, based on our preliminary observations, incomplete criminal background screenings may contribute to an increased risk to military forces and civilians in Iraq. The military would benefit by reviewing the installation security measures in place in Iraq to ensure that the risk private security contractors may pose has been minimized. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to address (1) the extent to which coordination between the U.S. military and private security providers has improved since GAO's 2005 report, (2) the ability of private security providers and the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct comprehensive background screenings of employees, and (3) the extent to which U.S. or international standards exist for establishing private security provider and employee qualifications. For this testimony, GAO drew from its July 2005 report on private security providers, and its preliminary observations from an ongoing engagement examining contractor screening practices.
What GAO Found
Coordination between the U.S. military and private security providers still needs improvement. First, private security providers continue to enter the battle space without coordinating with the U.S. military, putting both the military and security providers at a greater risk for injury. Second, U.S. military units are not trained, prior to deployment, on the operating procedures of private security providers in Iraq and the role of the Reconstruction Operations Center, which is to coordinate military-provider interactions. While DOD agreed with our prior recommendation to establish a predeployment training program to help address the coordination issue, no action has been taken. Many private security providers and DOD have difficulty completing comprehensive criminal background screenings for U.S. and foreign nationals when data are missing or inaccessible. For example, a DOD policy requires biometric screening of most non-U.S. private security providers accessing U.S. bases in Iraq. Biometric screening (e.g., fingerprints and iris scans) measures a person's unique physical characteristics. Biometric screening is not as effective as it could be because the databases used to screen contractor employees include limited international data. Based on its work to date, GAO believes that incomplete criminal background screening may contribute to an increased risk to military forces and civilians in Iraq, and the military would benefit by reviewing the base security measures to ensure that the risk private security contractors may pose has been minimized. A report on screening will be issued in Fall 2006. No U.S. or international standards exist for establishing private security provider and employee qualifications. Reconstruction contractors told GAO during its review for its July 2005 report that they had difficulty hiring suitable security providers. Contractors replaced their security providers on five of the eight reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that were reviewed by GAO. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including their lack of knowledge of the security market and of the potential security providers and the absence of useful agency guidance in this area. In our report, we recommended that the State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and DOD explore options that would enable contractors to obtain security services quickly and efficiently. In response to our recommendation, the agencies met in November 2005 and agreed that our recommendation was not practical. They determined that they could best assist contractors by providing access to information related to industry best practices and other security-related material. |
gao_NSIAD-98-9 | gao_NSIAD-98-9_0 | The United Nations has both internal and external accountability and oversight mechanisms. For 1996-97, OIOS had oversight authority over $7 billion. While our examination of the U.N. resolution creating OIOS, the Secretary General’s Bulletin establishing OIOS, and OIOS’ operating procedures showed that OIOS is in a position to be operationally independent, we could not test whether OIOS exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an independent manner because OIOS would not provide us access to certain audit and investigation reports and its working papers. Availability of OIOS Reports
An area of concern is how OIOS has implemented its reporting mechanism. Its mandate states that OIOS “shall submit to the Secretary General reports that provide insight into the effective utilization and management of resources and the protection of assets” and that “all such reports are made available to the General Assembly as submitted by the Office.” The USG for Internal Oversight Services determines which reports are provided to the Secretary General, and we noted that OIOS has provided seven of eight inspection reports to the Secretary General and the General Assembly and that all six in-depth evaluation reports it has done were provided to the Committee for Programme and Coordination—a committee of the General Assembly. Since the establishment of OIOS, its regular U.N. budget has increased by 55 percent and its authorized positions have increased by 18.However, this did not happen without some difficulty. The Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation Unit do not have comparable manuals. According to OIOS officials, the units’ staff are responsible for tracking corrective actions managers take in response to recommendations and for determining when they have fully implemented recommendations. Conclusions and Observations
OIOS has established itself as the internal oversight mechanism for the U.N. Secretary General. It is in position to be operationally independent, has overcome certain start-up problems, and has developed policies and procedures for much of its work. To this end, we discussed with the USG for Internal Oversight Services several ways to enhance OIOS’ future operations. To determine whether OIOS has the necessary resources to carry out its mission, we reviewed the overall U.N. budget, budget and staffing documents for the Office for Inspections and Investigations and OIOS, and OIOS annual reports. To determine whether OIOS had written policies and procedures in place for conducting its work, following up on its recommendations, and providing confidentiality to informants and protecting whistleblowers from possible reprisal, we reviewed the audit and investigations manuals and other written guidance made available to us. However, as previously noted, we were not provided access to OIOS working papers or other records and files related to specific audits, investigations, or inspections. It meets twice yearly for about 3 weeks each time and is serviced by a secretariat in New York. OIOS Organization and Unit Functions, Budget, and Staffing
OIOS consists of four operational units—the Audit and Management Consulting Division, the Investigations Section, the Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit, and the Central Evaluation Unit. It also has an office of the Under Secretary General (USG) for Internal Oversight Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the United Nations (U.N.) Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), focusing on whether OIOS: (1) is operationally independent; (2) has the necessary resources to carry out its mission; and (3) has written policies and procedures in place for conducting its work, following up on its recommendations, and providing confidentiality to informants and protecting whistleblowers from possible reprisal. GAO noted that its lack of direct audit authority resulted in certain limitations and restricted its ability to fully address the review objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OIOS is the internal oversight mechanism for the U.N. Secretary General; (2) although OIOS had some start-up and early operational problems, many of these seem to have been resolved; (3) this was difficult to do in an organizational environment that operated without effective internal oversight mechanisms for almost half a century; (4) in less than 3 years, OIOS has assimilated four preexisting, internal oversight units from the Office for Inspections and Investigations and, for the first time, hired professional investigators and provided other resources for an investigations unit in the United Nations; (5) OIOS' mandate, the Secretary General's Bulletin establishing OIOS, and OIOS' implementing procedures provide the framework for an operationally independent, internal oversight mechanism for the U.N. Secretariat; (6) however, without access to all its audit, inspection, and investigation reports, working papers, and other records and files related to OIOS work, GAO could not test whether OIOS exercised its authority and implemented its procedures in an independent manner; (7) one issue that may affect the appearance of OIOS' independence involves how it has implemented its reporting mechanism; (8) OIOS has provided only 39 of its 162 various reports to the Secretary General and the General Assembly or its committees; (9) initial concerns about inadequate budget and staff levels have been addressed; (10) since its establishment, OIOS' regular U.N. budget has increased from $12 million to $18.6 million (proposed for 1998-99), and its authorized positions have increased by 18, to a total of 123; (11) OIOS' audit division and the Investigations Section have developed written auditing and investigative policies and procedures; (12) however, the Central Monitoring and Inspection Unit and the Central Evaluation Unit do not have comparable manuals; (13) each OIOS unit tracks its recommendations and is responsible for determining when they should be closed out; (14) in its 1995 and 1996 annual reports, the Under Secretary General (USG) for Internal Oversight Services estimated OIOS had identified $35.5 million in potential recoveries and realized $19.8 million in savings and recoveries; (15) OIOS' Investigations Section has established procedures and developed guidance, which it has publicized throughout the United Nations, for ensuring informants' confidentiality and protecting whistleblowers from reprisal; and (16) in discussions with the USG for Internal Oversight Services, GAO suggested several ways to enhance OIOS' future operations. |
gao_GAO-03-1044 | gao_GAO-03-1044_0 | P&As Filed, Joined, or Intervened in Few Lawsuits Relating to Deinstitutionalization
National data sources indicate that, from 1975 through 2002, P&As filed, joined, or intervened in approximately 24 lawsuits related to deinstitutionalization on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities. Most but not all of these lawsuits were intended to be class actions against large public institutions for persons with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities. Although most of the suits were settled a number of years ago, the impact of the suits can be ongoing. P&As’ Communications in Three States Were Consistent with Federal Rules but Not as Comprehensive as Some Parents Desired
P&As in the three states communicated with parents and guardians as required by federal rules in the lawsuits we reviewed. In the three cases settled as class actions, P&As provided notice to all class members at the time settlement was proposed to the court, as required by federal rules. Such notice was not required in the other three cases we reviewed, which were not class actions. P&As in the three states reviewed indicated that they did not try to communicate with all individuals potentially affected by the six lawsuits, including parents and guardians, but did communicate with organizations representing some parents and guardians during these stages of the lawsuits. However, even if P&As had provided notification during the stages specified by the parents and guardians, under the applicable federal rule of civil procedure an individual has no explicit right to opt out of a class in this type of case. Representatives of some parent groups told us they were not satisfied with the extent of P&A communication because they believed that P&As should have communicated with parents and guardians in the six lawsuits we examined before filing or intervening in the suits and prior to class certification by the court. P&As in the Three States Assumed Various Roles in Monitoring Individuals Transferred to Community Settings
P&As assumed various roles in monitoring the health and well-being of individuals with developmental disabilities transferred from institutions to community settings in four of five lawsuits we reviewed in California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania that had been resolved. In these three states, P&A roles and responsibilities varied with the circumstances of the lawsuits and initiatives P&As undertook as part of their general role to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities. State developmental disabilities services agencies, however, continue to have the primary responsibility for ensuring the health and well-being of individuals, including monitoring these individuals when they receive services in the community. Representatives of some parent groups told us that parents and guardians have been dissatisfied with the adequacy of P&As’ monitoring role in community placements, while representatives of other parent groups told us they generally supported the P&A monitoring role. With respect to the three lawsuits filed and settled as class actions, the settlement agreements did not specify a monitoring role for the P&As, but the P&As assumed specific roles in monitoring individuals transferred to the community. Regarding the other three lawsuits not settled as class actions, the P&A also undertook a role in monitoring affected individuals in one of these suits. Of the three other lawsuits we reviewed, one was settled, one was dismissed, and the third is ongoing litigation. ACF said it was a thorough analysis of the three P&As’ involvement in deinstitutionaliation lawsuits for the population examined. The three P&As stated that the report is accurate, and provided technical comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the extent to which Protection and Advocacy agencies (P&As) engage in litigation related to deinstitutionalization on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities, (2) how P&As have communicated with parents and legal guardians in deinstitutionalization lawsuits, and (3) the role, if any, that P&As have played in monitoring the health and well-being of individuals transferred from institutions to community settings within the context of these lawsuits. From the national list we identified six lawsuits in three states—California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania—to study in more detail. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the Protection and Advocacy system in 1975 to protect the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities, most of whom have mental retardation. Protection and Advocacy agencies (P&A) use investigative and legal activities to advocate on behalf of these individuals. Deinstitutionalization has refocused delivery of care to this population over the last several decades from large public institutions to community settings. Refocusing service delivery resulted from (1) the desire to deliver care in the most integrated setting and to control costs and (2) the outcomes of deinstitutionalization lawsuits brought by P&As and others. Some parents have raised concerns that P&As emphasize these suits over other activities, inadequately inform them of family members' inclusion in the suits, and do not adequately monitor individuals after their transfer to the community. GAO was asked to review the extent to which P&As engage in lawsuits related to deinstitutionalization of these individuals, how P&As communicate with affected parents and guardians in these suits, and the role P&As have played in monitoring the well-being of individuals transferred to the community. GAO compiled a national list of lawsuits related to deinstitutionalization involving P&As and reviewed the suits and related activities in three states--California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.
What GAO Found
Lawsuits related to deinstitutionalization brought on behalf of persons with developmental disabilities are a small part of P&As' overall activities for this population. GAO identified 24 such lawsuits that P&As filed, joined, or intervened in from 1975 through 2002. During the same period, P&As filed or intervened in 6 of these lawsuits in the three states GAO reviewed--California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Three of the 6 were settled as class actions; the other 3 were intended, but not settled, as class actions. One is ongoing, one was dismissed, and one was settled by multiparty agreement. P&As' communications with parents and guardians regarding the lawsuits in the three states were consistent with federal rules. For the three suits settled as class actions, P&As complied with the requirement to provide notice to all class members when a settlement agreement is proposed to the court. Such notice was not required in the other three cases, which were not class actions. Representatives of some parent groups told GAO that parents and guardians were dissatisfied with the extent of P&A communication with them before a settlement was proposed, citing problems such as not receiving notice of a family member's inclusion in the class, which the parent or guardian opposed. P&As in the three states told GAO they did not communicate with every person potentially affected by the six lawsuits before a proposed settlement agreement, although they did communicate with organizations representing some parents and guardians during that time. However, even if P&As had made such notification, under the applicable federal rule of civil procedure, an individual has no explicit right to opt out of the class in this type of case. P&As in the three states assumed various roles in monitoring the health and well-being of individuals transferred to community settings in four of the five resolved lawsuits we reviewed, although state developmental disabilities services agencies have the primary responsibility for ensuring the quality of services provided to these individuals. P&As' roles varied with the circumstances of the lawsuits and the initiatives P&As in the three states undertook using their authority to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities. For example, although the three class action settlement agreements did not specify monitoring roles, the P&As assumed roles, such as reviewing information about the quality of community services that the settlement agreements required the states to develop and reviewing care plans of individuals who had been transferred. Representatives of some parent groups told GAO that parents and guardians have been dissatisfied with the adequacy of the P&As' monitoring role in community placements, while representatives of other parent groups said they generally supported the P&A monitoring role. The Administration for Children and Families said GAO's analysis of the three P&As' involvement in deinstitutionalization lawsuits is thorough and the P&As GAO reviewed said that the report is accurate. |
gao_GAO-13-482T | gao_GAO-13-482T_0 | These missions are managed by organizations within DOE and largely carried out by M&O contractors at various DOE sites. To address this issue, in March 2010 the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE’s safety and security directives and modify the department’s oversight approach to “provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement safety and security programs without excessive federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements.” In the memorandum announcing this effort, the Deputy Secretary noted that burdensome safety requirements were affecting the productivity of work at DOE’s sites and that reducing this burden on contractors would lead to measurable productivity improvement. In response to the Y-12 security incident and these findings, DOE and NNSA took a number of immediate actions, including repairing security equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 protective force contractor. As we and others have reported, DOE has a long history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting responses and remedies to “fix” these problems. As noted in table 1, 10 years ago we reported on very similar problems, and since that time DOE has undertaken numerous security initiatives to address them. DOE’s and NNSA’s work with nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, nuclear weapons and their components, and large amounts of classified data require extremely high security, however, as we and DOE have reported, NNSA and DOE have a long history of poor security performance across the nuclear security enterprise, most notably at Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, as well as ongoing struggles to sustain security improvements, including information security. DOE and NNSA’s Oversight of Safety Performance Continues to Face Challenges
DOE and NNSA have experienced significant safety problems at their sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and processes have not demonstrated sustained improvements. As we testified in September 2012 before this Subcommittee, long-standing DOE and NNSA management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems at NNSA’s national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, we reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at NNSA’s national laboratories since 2000. DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to address persistent safety concerns. However, as we noted in September 2012 before this Subcommittee, DOE’s safety reforms did not fully address safety concerns that we, as well as others, have identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and federal oversight and, in fact, these reforms may have actually weakened independent oversight. DOE and NNSA Have Made Progress but Further Improvements Needed on Project and Contract Management
A basic tenet of effective management is the ability to complete projects on time and within budget. DOE has taken a number of actions to improve management of projects, including those overseen by NNSA. DOE has made progress in managing nonmajor projects—those costing less than $750—million and in recognition of this progress, we narrowed the focus of our high-risk designation to major contracts and projects. In addition, in December 2012, we reported that EM and NNSA were making some progress in managing the 71 nonmajor construction and cleanup projects that we reviewed and are expected to cost an estimated $10.1 billion in total. For example, we identified some NNSA and EM nonmajor projects that used sound project management practices, such as the application of effective acquisition strategies, to help ensure the successful completion of these projects. More recently, in September 2011, NNSA estimated that increases.the facility would cost from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion to construct—a nearly seven-fold cost increase from the original estimate. For example, in March 2009, we reported that NNSA and the Department of Defense had not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks for the B61 nuclear bomb and the W76 nuclear warhead refurbishments. We will continue to monitor DOE’s and NNSA’s implementation of actions to resolve its safety, security, and contract and project management difficulties and to assess the impact of these actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE and NNSA are responsible for managing nuclear weapon- and nonproliferation-related national security activities in national laboratories and other sites and facilities, collectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. Major portions of NNSA's mission are largely carried out by contractors at each site. GAO has designated contract management of major projects (i.e., those $750 million or more) at DOE and NNSA as a high risk area. Progress has been made, but GAO continues to identify security and safety problems at DOE and NNSA sites as well as project and contract management problems related to cost and schedule overruns on major projects.
This testimony addresses DOE's and NNSA's oversight of (1) security performance, (2) safety performance, and (3) project and contract management in the nuclear security enterprise. It is based on prior GAO reports issued from August 2000 to December 2012.
DOE and NNSA continue to act on the numerous recommendations GAO has made to improve management of the nuclear security enterprise. GAO will continue to monitor DOE's and NNSA's implementation of these recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of security activities is effective. For example, in July 2012, after three trespassers gained access to the protected security area directly adjacent to one of the nation's most critically important nuclear weapon-related facilities, the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE and NNSA took a number of immediate actions. These actions included repairing security equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 protective force contractor. As GAO and others have reported, DOE has a long history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting remedies to fix these problems. For example, 10 years ago, GAO reported on inconsistencies among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors' security activities and, since that time, DOE has undertaken security initiatives to address these issues. GAO is currently evaluating these security reform initiatives.
DOE and NNSA continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of safety performance activities is effective. DOE and NNSA have experienced significant safety problems at their sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and processes have not demonstrated sustained improvements. Long-standing DOE and NNSA management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems at NNSA's national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, GAO reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at NNSA's national laboratories since 2000. DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to address persistent safety concerns. For example, in March 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE's safety and security directives. However, GAO reported in September 2012 that DOE's safety reforms did not fully address continuing safety concerns that GAO and others identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and federal oversight and, in fact, may have actually weakened independent oversight.
DOE and NNSA have made progress but need to make further improvements to their contract and project management efforts. DOE has made progress in managing nonmajor projects--those costing less than $750 million--and in recognition of this progress, GAO narrowed the focus of its high-risk designation of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and NNSA to major contracts and projects. Specifically, as GAO noted in its December 2012 report on 71 DOE EM and NNSA nonmajor projects, GAO found the use of some sound management practices that were helping ensure successful project completion. However, major projects continue to pose a challenge for DOE and NNSA. For example, in December 2012, GAO reported that the estimated cost to construct the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Washington State had tripled to $12.3 billion since its inception in 2000, and the scheduled completion date had slipped by nearly a decade to 2019. Also, in March 2012, GAO reported that a now-deferred NNSA project to construct a new plutonium facility in Los Alamos, New Mexico, could cost as much as $5.8 billion, a nearly six-fold cost increase. |
gao_RCED-95-238 | gao_RCED-95-238_0 | Nonetheless, we found cause for concern about the health of the park system in terms of both visitor services and resource management. The scope and quality of visitor services provided by the Park Service are deteriorating, and a lack of sufficient data on the condition of many natural and cultural resources in the parks raises questions about whether the agency is meeting its mission of preserving and protecting the resources under its care. Visitor Services Are Being Cut Back
Of the 12 parks included in our review, 11 had recently cut back the level of visitor services. Information on the Condition of Many Park Resources Is Insufficient
Park Service policy directs that parks be managed on the basis of knowledge of their natural and cultural resources and their condition. These factors were additional operating requirements and increased visitation. Choices for Addressing Park Conditions Center on Three Alternatives
The choices available to deal with the conditions within the national park system center on three alternatives: (1) increasing the amount of financial resources for the parks, (2) limiting or reducing the number of units in the park system, and (3) reducing the level of visitor services. Regardless of which, if any, of these choices or combination of choices is made, the Park Service needs to continue to look for ways to stretch its resources by operating more efficiently and improving its financial management and performance measurement systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the current condition of 12 national park units, focusing on: (1) whether any deterioration in visitor services or park resources is occurring at the 12 units; (2) what factors contribute to the degradation of visitor services and parks' natural and cultural resources; and (3) the National Park Service's efforts in dealing with these problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there is cause for concern about the condition of national parks for both visitor services and resource management; (2) the overall level of visitor services is deteriorating at most parks; (3) services are being cut back and the condition of many trails, campgrounds, and other facilities are declining; (4) effective resource management is difficult because most park managers lack sufficient data to determine the overall condition of their parks' natural and cultural resources; (5) parks have difficulty meeting additional operating requirements and accomodating increased visitation; and (6) the Park Service is considering increasing the amount of financial resources going to parks, limiting or reducing the number of units in the park system, and reducing the level of visitor services to improve its financial management and performance measurement systems. |
gao_RCED-97-32 | gao_RCED-97-32_0 | Twenty-Four States Are Implementing All Systems; Remaining States Are Implementing Some Systems
As of September 1996, about half the states reported they were moving forward with all six systems even though they were no longer mandatory. The remaining states reported they were developing or implementing at least three of the transportation management systems originally mandated by ISTEA. Congestion management systems were being developed by state or local agencies for all transportation management areas. New York, for example, had existing management systems for pavement, bridges, safety, congestion, and public transportation. Three states that we visited recognized that marketing the systems to potential users—such as planners, engineers, and executives—is critical to ensuring the optimal use of the systems. In addition, some states have realized that to obtain the most uses from the systems, they need to be integrated with one another so that, for example, users can combine information from several systems to analyze the overall transportation needs in a geographic area. A Variety of Factors Has Influenced Implementation of Management Systems
Several factors have affected the states’ development and implementation of the transportation management systems, including (1) the high-level support and top priority that the systems received after they were mandated and (2) the potential benefits expected to accrue from the systems. For instance, in New York we were told that the mandate provided a “jump start” to the overall development and implementation of the systems. Removal of Mandate and Lack of Clear Federal Guidance Hindered Systems’ Implementation in Several States
In several states, the removal in 1995 of the ISTEA mandate lessened support for the development and implementation of transportation management systems and resulted in some systems’ being dropped. Some states reported that DOT’s failure to issue a clear and timely rule following the enactment of ISTEA on developing and implementing the management systems has caused difficulties, particularly in terms of the congestion, public transportation, and/or intermodal management systems. States are generally proceeding with the systems because they believe that the systems are beneficial to the decision-making process by providing more objective and timely information for decisionmakers than is otherwise available. Recommendations
To better assist the states and metropolitan planning organizations in addressing the issues they are encountering as they further implement the transportation management systems and to better communicate the availability of the assistance provided within and outside of DOT, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrators, Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration, to work with the states to more fully determine the types of technical assistance needed by the states and establish an information clearinghouse on (1) training, conferences, and workshops being offered, regionally and nationally; (2) the status of and the states’ experience with the implementation and integration of the six management systems; (3) the available software applications and technology; (4) the systems’ performance measures; (5) examples of the “best practices” of the states that are effectively implementing and integrating the systems; and (6) other issues identified by the states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed: (1) the status of the states' development and implementation of transportation management systems; (2) how the states expect to use the systems; and (3) the factors that have facilitated or hindered the development and implementation of the systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of September 1996, about half the states were moving forward with all six transportation management systems even though they were no longer mandatory; (2) the remaining states were developing or implementing at least three of the systems originally mandated by the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991; (3) all states were implementing the pavement management system, and nearly all states were implementing the bridge, safety, and congestion management systems; (4) congestion management systems were being developed for all transportation management areas, where they are still mandatory; (5) about 30 states were implementing the public transportation and intermodal management systems; (6) the states were developing the systems for use by decisionmakers in the planning process and to help transportation officials conduct daily operations; (7) three states that GAO visited recognized that marketing the systems to potential users, such as executives, planners, and engineers, is critical to ensuring the optimal use of the systems; (8) some states have realized that to obtain the most uses from the systems, each needs to be integrated with the others; (9) nationwide, over half the states plan to integrate the systems; (10) three states that GAO reviewed indicated that the 1991 mandate provided a catalyst, or "jump start," to developing and implementing the new systems; (11) the mandate resulted in the systems' receiving high-level support and top priority status in these states; (12) although implementing the systems is now optional, several states are continuing this effort because they view the systems as beneficial to the decision-making process in that they provide more accurate, timely information than was previously available; (13) on the other hand, the removal of the federal mandate lessened support for developing certain systems; (14) some states reported that the Department of Transportation's (DOT) failure to issue a clear and timely rule on management systems following the 1991 mandate had caused difficulties in implementing the public transportation, congestion, and intermodal management systems; (15) several states told GAO that the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) was helpful in providing initial workshops and training to develop the systems; and (16) officials in all seven states that GAO reviewed indicated that they continue to need federal assistance in solving technical problems with software and learning from other states' experiences in implementing and integrating the systems. |
gao_GAO-04-40 | gao_GAO-04-40_0 | Importance of Enterprise Architectures
The importance of enterprise architectures is a basic tenet of IT management, and their effective use is a recognized hallmark of successful public and private organizations. Stage 3: Developing the EA. Our 2001 Survey Showed the Immature State of Federal Agency Architecture Management
We first surveyed enterprise architecture management maturity across the federal government in 2001, and we reported in February 2002 that about 52 percent of federal agencies reported having at least the management foundation that is needed to begin successfully developing, implementing, and maintaining an enterprise architecture, and that about 48 percent of agencies had not yet advanced to that basic stage of maturity. These challenges were (1) overcoming limited executive understanding, (2) inadequate funding, (3) insufficient skilled staff, and (4) organizational parochialism. Agencies Are Making Limited Architecture Management Progress; Most Programs Remain Immature
Our 2003 survey results indicate that while some individual agencies have made progress in improving their enterprise architecture management maturity, progress for the federal government as a whole has not occurred. Although progress for agencies in the aggregate continued to be limited, departments as a group made the most progress: the average maturity for the 14 departments that responded to both the 2001 and 2003 surveys increased from 1.93 to 2.00 against Version 1.0 of the framework. One agency, the Executive Office of the President, provided responses placing it at a stage of enterprise architecture management maturity that can be considered mature and effective. One possible reason for this situation, which is discussed later in this report, is that OMB’s oversight of agency enterprise architecture efforts focuses on departments and major independent agencies—not on component agencies. To achieve Stage 5, the GIG architecture needs to satisfy the Stage 4 element “EA products describe both the ‘as-is’ and the ‘to-be’ environments of the enterprise, as well as a sequencing plan for transitioning from the ‘as-is’ to the ‘to-be’ ” and the Stage 5 elements “Return on EA investment is measured and reported” and “Organization head has approved current version of EA.” IRS could become a Stage 5 agency by satisfying the Stage 4 elements “Business, performance, information/data, application/service, and technology descriptions address security” and “EA products and management processes undergo independent verification and validation” and the Stage 5 element “Return on EA investment is measured and reported.” Table 7 shows the agencies that need to satisfy 5 or fewer elements to achieve Stage 5 under Version 1.1. However, despite OMB’s actions, the same management challenges facing agencies 2 years ago have increased in prevalence, and agencies report mixed results from OMB’s efforts to address these challenges. OMB expects agencies to use the model, as part of their capital planning and investment control processes, to help identify opportunities to consolidate IT investments across the federal government. Accordingly, the level of resources that an agency invests in its architecture is likely to vary. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what progress federal agencies have made in effectively developing, implementing, and maintaining their enterprise architectures and (2) the actions of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to advance the state of enterprise architecture development and use across the federal government. If model or framework is being used, are you . Does your agency/department permit waivers to its requirement that IT investments comply with the enterprise architecture? How satisfied is your agency/department with OMB’s efforts to address the following enterprise architecture management challenges GAO reported in its February 2002 report (GAO-02-6)? | Why GAO Did This Study
A well-defined enterprise architecture (EA) is a blueprint for institutional modernization and evolution that consists of models describing how an entity operates today and how it intends to operate in the future, along with a plan for how it intends to transition to this future state. Such architectures are essential tools whose effective development and use are recognized hallmarks of successful organizations. Because of the importance of these architectures, GAO was asked to determine (1) what progress federal agencies have made in effectively developing, implementing, and maintaining their EAs and (2) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) actions to advance the state of EA development and use across the federal government.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies' progress toward effective EA management is limited. GAO surveyed federal agencies on their EA programs and compared the results with those of a similar survey that GAO conducted in 2001 (GAO-02-6). To assign a maturity level to agencies, GAO used its EA management maturity framework, which is a five-stage model that defines criteria that govern where an EA program stands in its progression toward being effectively managed (with Stage 1 being ineffective and Stage 5 being highly effective). Comparing the 2001 and 2003 survey results revealed a very similar overall picture, in which slight increases in agencies achieving Stage 3 status were offset by slight increases in agencies being at Stage 1. In addition, when GAO assessed the 2003 survey results against a recent update of the framework (GAO-03-584G), agencies' average maturity was slightly lower. An exception to this is the Executive Office of the President, which is a Stage 5 agency under the latest version of the framework. Part of the reason for this limited progress across the federal government is that agencies continue to face long-standing EA challenges, such as limited executive understanding of EA and a scarcity of skilled architecture staff. Since 2001, more agencies now report these as significant challenges. OMB has undertaken a variety of actions to advance the state of EA use across the federal government, such as collecting and analyzing architectures for major departments and agencies and requiring that major information technology (IT) investments comply with them. Additionally, OMB has developed parts of a governmentwide EA, and by requiring a mapping of agency architectures to this federal EA as part of the budget review process, it has called attention to the need for agencies to further their own architecture efforts. However, despite OMB's actions, the agencies' responses indicate that only about one-half are satisfied with OMB's leadership in addressing long-standing EA challenges. Until these challenges are effectively addressed, agencies' maturity levels as a whole are likely to remain stagnant, limiting their ability to effectively invest in IT. |
gao_GAO-04-695 | gao_GAO-04-695_0 | In recent months, we have issued two reports that have raised concern about the Coast Guard’s initial management of the Deepwater program and the potential for escalating costs. In fact, by law, DOD’s major defense acquisition programs have to report cost, schedule, and performance updates to the Congress at least annually and whenever cost and schedule thresholds are breached. In practice, schedules on DOD’s major defense acquisitions are continually monitored and reported to management on a quarterly basis. Although maintaining a current integrated schedule is a best practice for ensuring adequate contract oversight and management and is a requirement for DOD acquisitions, Coast Guard officials said they have not done so because of the numerous changes the Deepwater Program experiences every year and because of the cost, personnel, and time involved in crafting a revised master plan with the systems integrator on an annual basis. Our analysis indicates that several Deepwater assets and capabilities have experienced delays and are at risk of being delivered later than anticipated in the original implementation plan. The $168 million appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for the Deepwater program above the President’s request of $500 million will allow the Coast Guard to conduct a number of projects that had been delayed or would not have been funded in fiscal year 2004, but it will not fully return the program to its original 2002 acquisition schedule. Third, the delivery of some assets has fallen so far behind schedule that it is impossible to ensure their delivery according to the original 2002 implementation schedule by simply providing more money. As evolving mission requirements are translated into decisions about what assets are needed and what capabilities they will need to have, it becomes even more imperative that Coast Guard officials update the acquisition schedule on a more timely basis, so that budget submissions by the Coast Guard can allow DHS and Congress to base decisions on accurate information. The scope of our review was to determine the impact of the additional $168 million in fiscal year 2004 on returning Deepwater to its original 2002 schedule, not to determine effects of receiving appropriations that were less than requested in previous years. Status of Acquisition Schedule
The degree to which the program is on track with regard to its original 2002
acquisition schedule is difficult to determine, because the Coast Guard does not maintain and update the acquisition schedule. Status of Acquisition Schedules for Selected Assets (cont’d)
Part of the additional $168 million in funding allowed the Coast Guard to start work delayed from fiscal year 2003 or to start work originally scheduled for fiscal year 2004. Reason 2: The additional amount did not fund all work planned for fiscal year 2004; some will be delayed to fiscal year 2005 or beyond. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Coast Guard began its $17 billion, 20-year Integrated Deepwater System acquisition program to replace or modernize its cutters, aircraft, and communications equipment for missions generally beyond 50 miles from shore. During fiscal years 2002-03, Deepwater received about $125 million less than the Coast Guard had planned. In fiscal year 2004, Congress appropriated $668 million, $168 million more than the President's request. GAO has raised concern recently about the Coast Guard's initial management of Deepwater and the potential for escalating costs. GAO was asked to review the status of the program against the initial acquisition schedule and determine the impact of the additional $168 million in fiscal year 2004 funding on this schedule.
What GAO Found
The degree to which the Deepwater program is on track with its original 2002 integrated acquisition schedule is difficult to determine because the Coast Guard has not updated the schedule. Coast Guard officials said they have not updated it because of the numerous changes Deepwater experiences every year and the cost, personnel, and time involved. However, in similar acquisitions--those of the Department of Defense (DOD)--cost, schedule, and performance updates are fundamental to congressional oversight. DOD is required to update the schedule at least annually and whenever cost and schedule thresholds are breached. In practice, DOD continually monitors and reports schedules for management on a quarterly basis. Updating the acquisition schedule--including phases such as design and fabrication, interim phase milestones, and critical paths linking assets-- on a more timely basis is imperative so that annual Coast Guard budget submissions can allow Congress to base decisions on accurate information. GAO used available data to develop the current acquisition status for a number of selected Deepwater assets and found that they have experienced delays and are at risk of being delivered later than anticipated. The additional $168 million in fiscal year 2004, while allowing the Coast Guard to conduct a number of Deepwater projects that had been delayed or would not have been funded in fiscal year 2004, will not fully return the program to its original 2002 acquisition schedule. Reasons include: all work originally planned for fiscal year 2004 was not funded and some will have to be delayed to fiscal year 2005; delivery of some assets has fallen so far behind schedule that ensuring their original delivery dates is impossible; and nonfunding reasons have caused delays, such as greater than expected hull corrosion of patrol boats delaying length extension upgrades. |
gao_GAO-02-959 | gao_GAO-02-959_0 | The Air National Guard does not have any management responsibilities for GuardNet. In addition, while they provided us with a list of 130 DOD and bureau applications that GuardNet supports, they did not know whether this list was complete, and other sources of information suggest that the list is not complete. For example, NGB’s fiscal year 2003 funding request states that the network supports 135 applications. For example, after last year’s terrorist attacks, NGB officials used GuardNet to communicate with states, territories, and the District of Columbia on the use of National Guard units to coordinate airport security activities. According to NGB officials, formally managing GuardNet requirements has not been an area of management attention or a priority. As a result, NGB does not know what its network is being used for, what its users’ needs are, or whether GuardNet is satisfying these needs. NGB also has not developed a network security plan. NGB is not performing critical monitoring activities to ensure that implemented controls are operating as intended. However, GuardNet is not ready to meet this challenge because NGB does not fully know the network’s requirements and is not effectively managing the network. In addition, we recommend that the requirements management improvement plan provide for establishing a process that includes (1) developing a requirements management plan, (2) involving network users in developing and changing requirements, (3) developing requirements management baseline documentation, such as a mission needs statement and an operational requirements document, and (4) establishing controls for assessing and approving proposed changes to the baseline; the configuration management improvement plan provide for establishing a process that includes (1) identifying and documenting the network’s components/subcomponents (hardware and software), (2) creating a baseline configuration (development, test, and production environments) of these component parts, (3) controlling changes to these configuration baselines through a formal change process that allows only the NGB-AIS Configuration Control Board to approve changes to GuardNet, (4) ensuring that network documentation remains current to enable accurate reporting of changes as the network evolves, and (5) periodically auditing to ensure that the documentation is complete and accurate; and the security management improvement plan provide for establishing a process that includes (1) assessing risks to determine security needs, (2) implementing needed controls in accordance with applicable policy and guidance, (3) monitoring existing controls to ensure that they are operating as intended, and (4) ensuring that the network is certified and accredited in accordance with DOD policy. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the current and potential requirements of the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) GuardNet and (2) the effectiveness of the processes for managing current and potential network requirements, the network’s configuration, and network security. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act required GAO to review GuardNet, the National Guard's wide-area network, which is used to support various Defense applications and was used to support homeland security activities after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. GAO was asked to determine the current and potential requirements for GuardNet and the effectiveness of the processes for managing the network's requirements, configuration, and security.
What GAO Found
The National Guard does not fully know the current or potential requirements for GuardNet or how it is being used, because it has not fully documented requirements. Guard officials provided GAO with a list of applications that the network supports, but they would not attest to the list's completeness, and GuardNet users identified other applications. The processes for managing GuardNet are not effective in three key areas: Requirements: For example, the Guard has not developed a requirements management plan or clearly established users' roles in developing and changing requirements. Configuration: For example, the Guard has not documented the network's configuration and is not controlling changes to configuration components. Security: For example, the Guard has not implemented needed security controls, such as firewalls, to protect GuardNet and does not monitor controls on an ongoing basis to ensure that implemented controls are working as intended. According to Guard officials, establishing these management processes has not been a priority. Without these basic processes, the Guard cannot ensure that GuardNet will perform as intended and provide its users with reliable and secure services. GuardNet is thus a dubious option for further support of critical mission areas such as homeland security. |
gao_GAO-15-518 | gao_GAO-15-518_0 | Off-Base Transition Training
The Dignified Burial Act required DOL to provide TAP to veterans and their spouses at locations other than military installations for the purposes of assessing the feasibility and advisability of providing such a program. The act required the workshops to be piloted for 2 years starting in January 2013: in three to five states (at least two of which had to have high levels of veteran unemployment); at a sufficient number of locations to meet the needs of veterans and spouses within each pilot state; anywhere except military installations (could, however, include National Guard or reserve facilities not on active duty military installations); and, in a manner that generally follows the content of TAP. DOL Used the Same Employment Workshops for Veterans It Provides to Servicemembers, Citing Time and Resource Constraints for Pilot’s Design
In response to the Dignified Burial Act, DOL provided the same employment workshops—including the same curriculum delivered by the same contractor—for the veterans’ employment workshop pilot as it uses for active servicemembers as part of on-base TAP. DOL officials said they selected the pilot states using a number of factors, including selecting two states with high veteran unemployment rates—Georgia and West Virginia—as DOL also considered states’ veteran population, required by law. While each state held the workshops at locations other than military installations, the three state workforce agencies used different approaches in selecting locations for the workshops. Officials noted that DOL implemented the pilot within its existing TAP budget and spent about $52,000 on costs for the pilot. State Officials Reported That the Workshops Enhanced Veterans’ Job Search Skills but Attracted Few Participants
Some Officials Said the Pilot Helped Veterans Write Resumes and Improve Interviewing Skills
Officials in all three pilot states reported that the workshops benefitted veterans by enhancing their job search capabilities, including helping them (1) write resumes, (2) build interviewing skills, and (3) translate their military experience into civilian job skills. In 21 workshops across the three states, a total of 250 veterans participated in the pilot, according to DOL data. DOL instructed states to have a minimum of 10 participants enrolled in order to schedule a workshop and a maximum of 50 participants—the same guidelines as for DOL’s TAP workshops—with a preferred class size of 30-35 participants. DOL’s Design of the Pilot Constrains the Ability to Inform Congressional Deliberation about the Pilot’s Future
DOL’s Annual Reports Address Attendance, Participant Satisfaction, and Noteworthy State Practices
DOL has published information about the veterans’ employment workshop pilot in two annual reports required by the Dignified Burial Act. 3. Identifying the Need
Sound pilot design practices call for a needs assessment to better identify the population best served by the program or services being piloted as well as those populations that might not need the services. DOL officials also said that there was not enough time and financial resources to conduct a needs assessment, pointing, as noted earlier, to the fact that DOL received no additional funding for this pilot and had to complete it within 2 years.information without expending significant time or resources. For example, officials from two veteran service organizations said they would have helped DOL market the workshops in an effort to increase attendance. Conclusions
The federal government has created a number of programs that assist veterans and servicemembers transitioning to civilian life, including the employment workshop pilot for veterans and their spouses. Specifically, questions about the need for offering the workshops to veterans and their spouses, the program’s role amid other existing federal programs, and specific goals and objectives against which program performance could be measured remain unanswered. Recommendation for Executive Action
To inform decisions on any potential future iterations of the veterans’ employment workshop, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor assess and report to Congress the extent to which further delivery of employment workshops to veterans and their spouses could fill a niche not fully served by existing federal programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how the Department of Labor (DOL) implemented the veterans’ employment workshop pilot program, (2) what state officials reported regarding the benefits and challenges of the workshops in the pilots, and (3) how the pilot informs decisions about its possible expansion. To provide information on how DOL designed the pilot, how it planned to evaluate it, and the extent to which DOL collaborated with other organizations during the pilot’s design, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations and e-mail correspondence between DOL officials on the steps they took to design the pilot and documents describing DOL’s plan for collecting data to determine the pilot performance. To provide information on how the pilot was implemented and what state officials reported regarding the benefits and challenges of the workshops in the pilots, we conducted telephonic interviews with DOL and state workforce agency officials in each of the pilot states: Georgia, Washington, and West Virginia. We reviewed guidance from federal agencies on program design and evaluation found during the course of our research and guidance identified by subject matter experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has long offered programs that assist veterans with finding employment. In 2013, the Dignified Burial and Other Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of 2012 was enacted, which required DOL to provide employment workshops to veterans and their spouses at locations other than military facilities through a 2-year pilot that ended in January 2015. The act also included a provision for GAO to report on the training and possible expansion of the pilot.
This report addresses: (1) how DOL implemented the pilot, (2) what state officials reported regarding the benefits and challenges of the pilot, and (3) how the pilot informs decisions about its possible expansion.
GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; identified leading practices on pilot design from federal agencies, subject matter experts, and GAO's standards for internal control; and interviewed officials from DOL, the Department of Veterans Affairs, state workforce agencies in each of the three pilot states, and veteran service organizations. GAO also obtained information on the pilot from DOL data and a DOL survey of workshop participants.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor (DOL) was required by law to provide employment workshops to veterans and their spouses in a pilot program. In response, DOL used the same 3-day employment workshops for the pilot that it provides to servicemembers on military bases as part of the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) in order to implement the pilot within time and resource constraints, according to DOL officials. DOL selected three states for the pilot—Georgia, Washington, and West Virginia—based on a number of factors, including two states with a high veteran unemployment rate, as required by law. DOL instructed each of the states to conduct five workshops—West Virginia held an additional seven and Washington canceled one—and delegated the responsibility for choosing locations and marketing the pilot to state workforce agencies. States held the workshops at locations other than military facilities and employed different marketing approaches to publicize the workshops, including flyers and e-mail. DOL officials said that time and resource constraints, such as implementing the pilot within its existing TAP budget, influenced the department's pilot implementation, including its decision to use the same TAP workshops, conducted over 3 consecutive days, and to offer five workshops per state.
Officials in all three pilot states reported that the workshops benefitted veterans by enhancing their job search capabilities—including resume writing and interviewing—but states had difficulty attracting participants. The workshops generally fell short of DOL's attendance goals: a minimum of 10 participants and a preferred class size of 30-35 participants. A total of 250 participants attended the workshops and fewer than half of the workshops had 10 or more participants. Several state officials noted that it was difficult for veterans to schedule 3 consecutive business days to attend the workshop, and some suggested that shortening the course or offering night or weekend alternatives could have increased attendance.
DOL's design of the pilot limits the ability to inform Congress about the feasibility and advisability of expanding the pilot. DOL's two annual reports to Congress on the pilot provided information on topics such as workshop attendance, participant demographics and satisfaction with the workshop, and noteworthy state practices and challenges. While such information is useful, DOL's pilot design leaves unanswered key questions about the need for the program, the pilot's role amid other federal programs, and the goals and objectives for measuring its progress. For example, sound pilot design practices call for agencies to conduct a needs assessment, which could have helped DOL identify the population best targeted by the pilot, given veterans' varied employment experience and limited federal resources. DOL officials said that they did not have the time and resources to do such an assessment. Additionally, DOL did not assess the extent to which such a program might fill gaps in existing federal employment programs available to veterans, as sound pilot practices suggest. As a result, it remains unclear whether, as DOL officials contend, this pilot unnecessarily duplicates other programs. Moreover, this type of information could assist congressional deliberation about the need for future employment workshops and leverage the federal investment that has already been made in implementing the now-completed pilot program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL assess and report to Congress the extent to which further delivery of the employment workshop to veterans and their spouses can fill a niche not fully served by existing federal programs. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendation and noted several actions it plans to take to address the recommendation. |
gao_RCED-99-17 | gao_RCED-99-17_0 | Prior to the amendments, the Academy’s committee procedures included some openness. Reasons the Academy Sought Relief From the Federal Advisory Committee Act
According to Academy officials, the Academy had three main concerns that caused it to seek relief from the Federal Advisory Committee Act: (1) the erosion of independence if the Academy was under the influence of sponsoring agencies, (2) the inability to recruit committee members if committee deliberations were open to the public, and (3) the burden of administrative requirements that would render the Academy unresponsive to the government. This individual would have the power to adjourn the meeting “whenever he determines it to be in the public’s interest.” According to Academy officials, the Academy could lose sole authority in appointing committee members, and the Academy and committee members could be under pressure from a sponsoring agency to change a report during the drafting process. However, the Academy opposed opening its deliberative meetings to the public because it believed that such an action could stifle open debate and criticism of ideas in those meetings. Academy Committee Procedures
Prior to the enactment of the amendments of 1997, the Academy established a number of procedures for committee work that are intended to help ensure the integrity and the openness of committee activities. The procedures consist of the following phases: project formulation, committee selection, committee work, report review, and report release and dissemination. While the Academy Has Increased Public Access to Current Project Data, the Data Are Not Always Timely or Complete
The Academy developed a web site for current project information to increase public access as a result of section 15, added by the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments. However, we found that this information is not always posted in a timely manner and is sometimes incomplete. However, the availability of timely information on current projects depends on the effective implementation of the new procedures. To identify the Academy’s procedures for providing advice to the federal government, we interviewed Academy officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the committee process at the National Academy of Sciences, focusing on the: (1) reasons the Academy sought relief from the Federal Advisory Committee Act; (2) Academy's committee procedures for providing advice to the federal government; and (3) Academy's implementation of the new requirements for providing information to the public.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to Academy officials, the Academy sought relief from the act for a number of reasons; (2) central to its concerns was the Academy's ability to maintain sole authority in appointing committee members and to conduct its work independently from sponsoring agencies' influence; (3) in addition, the Academy opposed opening deliberative meetings on the grounds that such an action could stifle open debate and could impact the Academy's ability to recruit committee members; (4) finally, the Academy was concerned about the amount of time and expense to perform the administrative requirements of the act, which could render the Academy unresponsive to the government; (5) prior to the enactment of the amendments, the Academy developed a number of procedures governing its committees' activities, including project formulation, committee selection, committee work, report review, and the release and dissemination of reports; (6) according to Academy officials, these procedures are intended to help ensure the integrity of advice provided to the federal government; (7) for example, committee selection includes procedures for identifying conflicts of interest and potential bias of committee members; (8) the committee work phase provides an opportunity for some public participation, and committee reports are reviewed by an Academy review committee before they are released to the sponsoring agency and the public; (9) in response to section 15, the Academy developed a web site to increase public access to current project information, however, GAO found that some descriptive information on current projects was not always posted in a timely manner and was not always complete; and (10) during this audit, the Academy addressed these problems and developed additional written guidelines regarding the posting of committee information as well as additional quality assurance procedures. |
gao_GAO-08-1126T | gao_GAO-08-1126T_0 | VA has faced questions about the timeliness, accuracy, and consistency of its disability decisions. Training Complies with Some Accepted Practices, but VBA Does Not Adequately Evaluate Training and May Be Falling Short in Training Design and Implementation
To prepare newly hired staff to perform the tasks associated with processing disability claims, VBA has developed a highly structured, three- phase program designed to deliver standardized training. For example, VBA has taken steps to align training with the agency’s mission and goals. Further, we found that VBA’s training program for new claims processing staff appears well-designed, in that it conforms to adult learning principles by carefully defining all pertinent terms and concepts and providing abundant and realistic examples of claims work. However, while VBA has developed a system to collect feedback from new claims processing staff on their training, the agency does not consistently collect feedback on all of the training it provides. Moreover, both new and experienced claims processing staff we interviewed reported some issues with their training. A number of staff told us the TPSS was difficult to use, often out-of-date, and too theoretical. Some claims processing staff with more experience reported that they struggled to meet the annual training requirement because of workload pressures or that training topics were not always relevant for staff with their level of experience. Because it does not hold staff accountable, VBA is missing an opportunity to clearly convey to staff the importance of managing their time to meet training requirements, as well as production and accuracy goals. VA’s Performance Management System Generally Conforms with Accepted Practices, but May Not Clearly Differentiate among Staff’s Performance Levels
VA’s performance management system for claims processors is consistent with a number of accepted practices for effective performance management systems in the public sector. For example, the elements used to evaluate individual claims processors—such as quality, productivity, and workload management—appear to be generally aligned with VBA’s organizational performance measures. Systems that do not make meaningful distinctions in performance fail to give (1) employees the constructive feedback they need to improve and (2) managers the information they need to reward top performers and address performance issues. In fact, at least 90 percent of all claims processors in the regional offices we visited ended up in only two of the five performance categories in fiscal year 2007: fully successful and outstanding (see fig. It needs to devote more attention, however, to ensuring that its training and performance management systems are better aligned to equip both new and experienced staff to handle a burgeoning workload. Specifically, in our May 2008 report, we recommended that VA should collect feedback from staff on training provided in the regional offices in order to assess issues such as the appropriateness of the 80-hour annual training requirement and the usefulness of TPSS. GAO-08-473T. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans’ Benefits: Claims Processing Timeliness Performance Measures Could Be Improved. Veterans’ Benefits: Training for Claims Processors Needs Evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) disability claims process has long been a subject of concern because of long waits for decisions and large backlogs of claims pending decisions. To address these issues, VA has hired almost 3,000 new claims processors since January 2007. However, adequate training and performance management are essential to developing highly competent disability claims processors and ensuring that experienced staff maintain the skills needed to issue timely, accurate, and consistent decisions. The Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs, House Veterans' Affairs Committee asked GAO to present its views on 1) VA's training for its claims processors and 2) VA's performance management of this staff. This statement is based on a May 2008 report on VA's training and performance management (GAO-08-561) and has been updated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Training for VA disability claims processors complies with some accepted training practices, but VA does not adequately evaluate its training and may have opportunities to improve training design and implementation. VA has a highly structured, three-phase training program for new staff and an 80-hour annual training requirement for all staff. GAO found that VA has taken steps to plan this training strategically and that its training program for new staff appears well-designed and conforms to adult learning principles. However, while VA collects some feedback on training for new staff, it does not collect feedback on all the training conducted at its regional offices. Moreover, both new and experienced staff reported problems with their training. Some new staff told us a computer-based learning tool is too theoretical and often out of date. More experienced staff said they struggled to meet the annual 80-hour training requirement because of workload pressures or could not always find courses relevant given their experience level. Finally, the agency does not hold claims processors accountable for meeting the annual training requirement. VA's performance management system for claims processing staff generally conforms to accepted practices. For example, individual performance measures, such as quality and productivity, are aligned with the agency's organizational performance measures, and VA provides staff with regular performance feedback. However, the system may not clearly differentiate among staff performance levels. In each of the regional offices we visited, at least 90 percent of claims processors were placed in just two of five overall performance categories. Broad, overlapping performance categories may deprive managers of the information they need to reward top performers and address performance issues, as well as deprive staff of the feedback they need to improve |
gao_GAO-11-411 | gao_GAO-11-411_0 | Background
Process for Gaining Admission to the United States
Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis. Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population, but Strengthening Prioritization and Assessment of Overstay Efforts Could Improve Enforcement
ICE CTCEU is the primary federal entity responsible for taking enforcement action to address in-country overstays, but it investigates and arrests a small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to, among other things, ICE’s competing priorities. These cases resulted in approximately 8,100 arrests, relative to a total estimated overstay population of 4 million to 5.5 million. Data completeness. For example, 8 U.S.C. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations, as shown in figure 4. By developing a time frame for completing a resource and funding assessment and utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE would be better positioned to hold its staff accountable for completion of efforts as management intended, thereby strengthening its planning efforts for executing its overstay enforcement activities moving forward. CTCEU Could Benefit from Establishing Mechanisms for Assessing Performance to Address Overstays
CTCEU has not yet established mechanisms for assessing its performance in meeting program goals. DHS creates lookouts for certain categories of overstays, and expanding the categories of overstays assigned these lookouts could help improve CBP’s ability to determine if these nonimmigrants should be re-admitted to the United States. Improved Data Reliability Could Strengthen DHS Processes to Identify Overstays
DHS Identifies Overstays Primarily Based on Biographic Entry and Exit Data
In the absence of a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for identifying and tracking overstays, US-VISIT and CTCEU primarily analyze biographic entry and exit data collected at land, air, and sea POEs to identify overstays. First, CBP requires nonimmigrants leaving the United States through land POEs to remit their I-94/I-94W arrival and departure forms to record their exit if they do not plan to return within 30 days. While CBP studied a technological mechanism for recording biographic departure information at land POEs, CBP officials stated that the agency has not studied the costs and benefits of providing a mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States at land POEs to turn in their forms, such as a drop box. However, this program does not help ICE assess the extent to which the leads it identifies as viable for investigation ultimately result in an enforcement outcome, such as arrests. Electronic lookouts are one of the primary mechanisms DHS uses to share information about out-of-country overstays, but the current scope of the population to which these lookouts are assigned does not include certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by less than 90 days. According to US-VISIT officials, the decision to focus US-VISIT’s efforts on nonimmigrants who overstayed their authorized period of admission under these visas by greater than 90 days was reached in accordance with its customers—CBP and the State Department—in 2006 in order to focus lookout creation on more egregious overstay violators. By establishing a mechanism to collect biographic I- 94/I-94W exit documentation at land POEs to the extent that benefits outweigh costs, CBP could better ensure the completeness of alien departure data. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ICE’s execution of overstay enforcement efforts; and improve assessment of ICE programs that identify and address overstays so that program adjustments can be made, if necessary; we recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement take the following three actions: establish a target time frame for assessing the funding and resources ERO would require in order to assume responsibility for civil overstay enforcement and use the results of that assessment; develop outcome-based performance measures—or proxy measures if program outcomes cannot be captured—and associated targets on CTCEU’s progress in preventing terrorists and other criminals from exploiting the nation’s immigration system; and develop a performance measure for assessing the quality of leads CTCEU assigns to ICE field offices for investigations, using performance information already collected by CTCEU. To improve information sharing in support of efforts to identify and take enforcement action against overstays, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, the Under Secretary of the National Protection and Programs Directorate, and the Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to assess the costs and benefits of creating biometric and biographic lookouts for (1) out-of-country overstays of 90 days or less who entered the country using nonimmigrant business and pleasure visas, and (2) in-country overstay leads sent to ERO, and create these lookouts, to the extent that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. DHS concurred with our five recommendations and described actions under way or planned to address them. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To determine the extent to which DHS identifies overstays and shares overstay information among its components and with federal, state, and local agencies, we analyzed the processes DHS uses to (1) evaluate suspected overstay records, (2) collect nonimmigrant arrival and departure information, and (3) share information on overstays among its component entities and with other federal, state, and local agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to Pew Hispanic Center estimates, approximately 4 million to 5.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission--referred to as overstays. As requested, GAO examined the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) takes action to address overstays and its reported results; and (2) identifies overstays and shares this information among its border security and immigration enforcement components. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as standard operating procedures, DHS guidance, and overstay investigations data from fiscal years 2006 through 2010; interviewed officials from DHS components; and visited 6 DHS field offices and 12 ports of entry based on geographic dispersion, among other factors. The results of these visits are not generalizable, but provided insights into DHS operations.
What GAO Found
DHS takes actions to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population due to, among other things, competing priorities; however, these efforts could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. Since fiscal year 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the principle DHS component responsible for overstay enforcement, has allocated about 3 percent of its investigative work hours to overstay investigations and its Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), which prioritizes and investigates possible overstays, has arrested approximately 8,100 overstays. ICE is considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing illegal aliens from the United States. However, ERO does not plan to assume this responsibility until ICE assesses the funding and resources doing so would require. ICE has not established a time frame for completing this assessment. By developing such a time frame and utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable for completing the assessment. In addition, CTCEU does not have mechanisms to assess program performance in accordance with leading performance management practices. By establishing such mechanisms, CTCEU could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making decisions for strengthening overstay enforcement efforts and assessing performance against CTCEU's goals. In the absence of a biometric entry and exit system, DHS uses various methods for identifying overstays, primarily biographic data, and sharing of overstay information; however, DHS faces challenges in collecting departure data and does not share information about all categories of suspected overstays among its components. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS component charged with inspecting all people who enter the United States, does not provide a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms. These forms contain information, such as arrival and departure dates, used by DHS to identify overstays. CBP officials stated that establishing such a mechanism could help the agency increase its collection of departure data, but could also result in costs related to, for example, physical modifications to land ports of entry. If the benefits outweigh the costs, such a mechanism could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable departure data for identifying overstays. DHS also shares overstay information among its components through various mechanisms. For example, DHS creates electronic alerts for certain categories of overstays, such as those who overstay by more than 90 days, but does not create alerts for those who overstay by less than 90 days to focus efforts on more egregious overstay violators, as identified by CBP. Expanding the categories of overstays assigned an alert to the extent that benefits outweigh costs could improve the chance that these individuals are identified as overstays during subsequent encounters with federal officials, such as when they apply for readmission to the United States.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS establish a time frame for completing overstay enforcement planning, performance measurement mechanisms, and, if benefits outweigh costs, a mechanism for collecting departure forms at land borders and alerts for additional categories of overstays. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-1025 | gao_GAO-03-1025_0 | The agency’s mission is to maintain the health, diversity, and productivity of public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. BLM’s estimated IT expenditures are $146.45 million for fiscal year 2003. This framework identifies critical processes for successful IT investments organized into a framework of five increasingly mature stages. The bureau has also initiated efforts to manage its projects as a portfolio and performed two postimplementation reviews to learn lessons to improve its investment management process. The bureau has satisfied all the key practices associated with establishing the governing boards responsible for managing IT investments and ensuring that IT projects support organizational needs and meet users’ needs. For example, in 1998, the bureau established an IT Investment Board (the ITIB) to manage national investments. BLM has initiated efforts to manage its investments as a portfolio. Compared with the progress at stage 2, BLM’s progress to date in defining practices for higher level maturity stages has been limited because, according to its officials, the ITIB first focused its resources on establishing the processes associated with building the IT investment management foundation. According to the CIO, this is because BLM intends to develop a plan integrating improvements for IT investment management and other IT management areas, and the results of the comprehensive assessment to be used as a basis for this integrated plan were not received until June 2003. Until BLM develops this plan, the bureau risks losing the momentum it has gained in implementing its ITIM process. By establishing most of the key practices associated with building the investment foundation, the bureau has strengthened its basic capabilities for selecting and controlling projects and positioned itself to develop the processes for managing its investments as a portfolio. Without this plan, BLM risks not being able to sustain the progress made to date in establishing its investment management process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen BLM’s IT investment management capability and address the weaknesses discussed in this report, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of the Interior direct the BLM Director to develop and implement a plan for improving its IT investment management process that is based on GAO’s ITIM stage 2 and 3 critical processes. We also reviewed an improvement plan developed about 3 years ago based on strengths and weaknesses of BLM’s IT investment management process at that time, and the results of the comprehensive IT management assessment BLM officials stated they plan to use as a basis for an integrated plan for improving IT investment management and other IT management areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is to maintain the health, diversity, and productivity of the public lands for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. BLM employs about 11,000 people, with information technology (IT) playing a critical role in helping BLM perform its responsibilities. The bureau estimates that it will spend about $146 million on IT initiatives in fiscal year 2003. GAO was asked to evaluate BLM's IT investment management (ITIM) capabilities and determine the bureau's plans for improving these capabilities. GAO's evaluation was based on applying its ITIM maturity framework, which identifies critical processes for successful IT investment management.
What GAO Found
BLM has made progress in establishing its ITIM capabilities. Specifically, BLM has established most of the key practices associated with building an investment foundation. For example, the bureau has established a board for managing IT investments, implemented processes to ensure that IT projects support business needs and meet users' requirements, and established a process for selecting IT proposals. In addition, the bureau has efforts under way to address the key practices it has not yet established. BLM has also initiated efforts to manage its investments as a portfolio. For example, it has established a council to support portfolio management activities and begun defining portfolio selection criteria. BLM has also begun performing postimplementation reviews to learn lessons that will help define and implement an IT investment evaluation process. However BLM's progress to date in defining practices for managing its investments as a portfolio has been limited because, according to its officials, its investment board first focused its resources on establishing the processes associated with building the IT investment management foundation. Although BLM has made progress in developing its IT investment process, it has not yet developed a plan to guide its efforts in this area and, as a result, may not be able to successfully establish more mature ITIM processes. According to the chief information officer, this is because BLM wanted to develop an ITIM plan that is integrated with improvement plans for other IT management areas, and the results of the comprehensive assessment that were to be used as the basis for such a plan were obtained only in June 2003. BLM officials agree that this plan is necessary for guiding improvement efforts and stated their intention to develop one. Developing such a plan will help BLM sustain progress made to date. |
gao_HEHS-99-35 | gao_HEHS-99-35_0 | VBA Has Improved Its Measurement of Claims-Processing Accuracy
The new STAR system represents an important step forward by VBA in measuring the accuracy of compensation and pension claims processing and in providing data to identify error-prone cases and correct the causes of errors, including those that result in reversals and remands by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Compared with the previous accuracy measurement system that VBA had been using since 1992, the STAR system is a step forward because it focuses more on RO decisions that are likely to contain claims-processing errors, uses a stricter method for computing accuracy rates, provides more data on the performance of additional organizational levels within VBA, collects more data on errors, and stores the results of more accuracy reviews in a centralized database for further review and analysis. These data on deficiencies in evidence are entered in the STAR database. VBA Can Further Address Vulnerabilities in the Integrity of Performance Data
To ensure integrity in the operation of government programs, standards for internal controls call for separation of key duties, and standards for performance audits call for those who review and evaluate a program’s performance to be organizationally independent of the program’s managers. VBA Faces Challenges in Meeting Its Goal for Improving Claims-Processing Accuracy
VBA has set a goal of achieving a claims-processing accuracy rate of 93 percent by fiscal year 2004. Beyond any improvements that VBA might make in the STAR system, VBA acknowledges that there are challenges it must address successfully in order to meet its goal for improving accuracy. Such training is important not only for current employees but also for the many new employees whom VBA will have to hire to replace retiring employees. Whether these training efforts will enable VBA to meet its accuracy goal cannot yet be determined. To further strengthen VBA’s ability to identify error-prone cases, ensure the integrity of accuracy rate-related performance data reported under the Results Act, and keep the Congress informed about VBA’s progress in addressing challenges that must be met in order to improve accuracy, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to take the following actions. The intent was for STAR to collect additional data that would help VA better identify (1) specific types of medical conditions that RO adjudicators have difficulty evaluating correctly and (2) specific types of inadequacies in medical evidence that are most prevalent in incorrect decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) regional offices' (RO) accuracy in processing disability claims, focusing on: (1) the extent of improvements made by the Systematic Technical Accuracy Review (STAR) system in measuring claims-processing accuracy; (2) additional efforts needed to strengthen the system; and (3) challenges the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) faces in meeting goals for improving claims-processing accuracy.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the new STAR system represents an important step forward by VBA in measuring the accuracy of compensation and pension claims processing; (2) compared with the previous system, STAR focuses more on RO decisions that are likely to contain processing errors, uses a stricter method for computing accuracy rates, provides more data on the performance of organizational levels within VBA, collects more data on processing errors, and stores more accuracy review results in a centralized database; (3) even so, VBA can further strengthen STAR's ability to identify error-prone cases and claims-processing weaknesses so that it can take corrective actions; (4) VBA needs to better pinpoint error-prone cases and weaknesses in the development of evidence by collecting more specific data on the types of medical characteristics and deficiencies in medical evidence that are most prevalent in incorrect decisions; (5) VBA can also better address vulnerabilities in the integrity of accuracy data; (6) STAR reviewers in ROs do not have sufficient separation of duties or adequate independence to meet government standards for internal controls or program performance audits; (7) these shortcomings raise concern about the integrity of STAR accuracy data, which are a key factor in the performance measurement system designed by VBA to meet the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993; (8) while such system improvements are necessary, they alone are not sufficient for VBA to meet its goal for improving accuracy; (9) using the STAR pilot test's 64-percent accuracy rate as a baseline, VBA's goal is to achieve a 93-percent accuracy rate by fiscal year 2004; (10) VBA faces management challenges that it must address successfully in order to meet its accuracy improvement goal; (11) to do this, VBA recognizes that: (a) its newly implemented performance measurement system must hold program managers accountable for performance; and (b) the training program under development must effectively train the current RO workforce as well as the many new employees who will have to be hired in the coming decade to replace those who retire; and (12) it is too early to determine whether VBA's efforts to meet these challenges will be successful. |
gao_GAO-06-166 | gao_GAO-06-166_0 | As in the original pilot program contracts, the new contracts require private screening contractors to adhere to several ATSA provisions, including that: the level of screening services and protection provided at the airport under the contract will be equal to or greater than the level that would be provided at the airport by federal government personnel; the private screening company be owned and controlled by a citizen of the United States; the private screening company, at a minimum, meet employment standards, compensation and benefits rates, and performance requirements that apply to federal screeners; and all private screener candidates meet the same minimum qualifications as federal screeners, including U.S. citizenship (or being a national of the United States), high school diploma or equivalent, English proficiency, and pass a criminal background check. Specifically, the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations act shields airports from, among other things, virtually all liability related to negligence or wrongdoing by private screening contractors, their employees, or federal screeners. TSA has also taken steps to clarify SPP roles and responsibilities between federal and private sectors, but the four private screening contractors we interviewed still had questions about the roles and responsibilities of TSA staff at the airports they served. The contractors’ views about the hiring process were mixed. TSA Has Taken Steps to Clarify SPP Roles and Responsibilities between Federal and Private Sectors, but Questions about Division of Labor Remain
While TSA has defined the roles and responsibilities for FSDs, FSD staff, and private screening contractors, among others, in its August 2005 SPP transition plan, the details contained in this plan have not been communicated to or shared with private screening contractors. TSA plans to shift more cost risk to contractors by competitively awarding fixed-price-award fee contracts for screening services at the four smallest airports that will participate in the SPP. TSA officials said they also plan to competitively award fixed-price contracts for screening services at larger airports, but will not do so for another 1 to 2 years— when they believe that screening costs at larger airports will be better known. TSA Plans to Transition from Cost-Reimbursement to Fixed-Priced Contracts, but Stated That an Additional 1 to 2 Years Was Needed to Do So at Larger Airports
TSA expects that the SPP will operate at a cost that is competitive with equivalent federal operations and will achieve cost-savings, where possible. Specifically, over the last 3 years, TSA has awarded cost-reimbursement contracts with an award fee component for screening services at four of the five airports currently using private screeners. Despite TSA’s use of cost-savings as a basis for a portion of the award fees, opportunities for government cost-savings may be limited in part because under the cost-reimbursement contracts the government bears most of the cost risk—the risk of paying more than it expected. In our November 2004 report, we stated that TSA had begun drafting performance measures for this purpose. According to TSA, the five goals for the SPP in the areas of security, customer service, costs, workforce management, and innovation, are: Ensure security. TSA officials stated that DHS must approve the draft performance goals, measures, and targets before they can be finalized, but as of January 2006, DHS had not yet done so, and had not set a deadline for doing so. Further, the draft measures and targets TSA developed for the SPP will also be used by DHS to determine whether to award private screening contractors certification status under the SAFETY Act. Until the SPP measures and targets are finalized, DHS officials stated that they cannot determine whether contractors will perform as intended—criteria that must be satisfied before awarding certification status. Since then, TSA has provided additional operational flexibilities to private screening contractors, such as granting contractors and FSDs more input and flexibility in the screener hiring process. However, DHS did not specify a time frame for completing its review. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to implement the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), we analyzed (1) the status of federal efforts to determine whether and to what extent liability protection will be provided to private screening contractors and airports, and actions taken on other stakeholder concerns related to participation in the SPP; (2) how TSA has determined it will achieve cost-savings goals for screener operations through the SPP, specifically through choice of contract used and contract terms; and (3) TSA’s progress in developing and implementing performance goals, measures, and targets to assess the performance of the private screening contractors who will be participating in the SPP. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2004, as required by law, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began allowing all commercial airports to apply to use private screeners in lieu of federal screeners as part of its Screening Partnership Program (SPP). GAO's prior work found that airports and potential private screening contractors had concerns about the SPP, including whether they would be liable in the event of a terrorist attack and how roles and responsibilities would be divided among TSA airport staff and private screening contractors. This report addresses TSA's efforts to (1) provide liability protection to private screening contractors and airports and address other SPP stakeholder concerns; (2) achieve cost-savings through the SPP; and (3) establish performance goals and measures for the SPP.
What GAO Found
DHS and Congress have begun to address whether liability protection may be offered to current and prospective private screening contractors and airports using private screeners. DHS has already provided some liability protection to three of the four current private screening contractors. However, DHS officials stated that they cannot provide additional coverage, which would render contractors virtually immune from all pertinent claims, because TSA has not finalized performance standards that would allow DHS to determine if contractors will perform as intended--a criterion that must be satisfied before providing such additional protection. Recently enacted legislation shields airports from virtually all liability resulting from the negligence or wrongdoing committed by a private screening company or its employees. TSA has also taken action to improve the screener hiring process by granting contractors and TSA airport officials more input and flexibility in the hiring process. Additionally, TSA has defined the roles and responsibilities for SPP stakeholders--TSA airport staff and private screening contractors, among others--in its August 2005 SPP transition plan. However, the details in this plan have not been shared with private screening contractors, and all four contractors we interviewed were unclear about TSA staff roles and responsibilities at the airports they served. TSA has stated that the SPP will operate at a cost that is competitive with equivalent federal operations and will achieve cost-savings where possible. Over the last 3 years, TSA has awarded cost-reimbursement contracts with an award fee component for screening services at four of the five airports currently using private screeners. The award fee is based, in part, on contractor cost-savings. However, opportunities for TSA cost-savings may be limited because under the cost-reimbursement contracts TSA bears most of the cost risk--the risk of paying more than it expected. TSA plans to shift more cost risk to contractors by competitively awarding fixed-price-award fee contracts for screening services at the four smallest airports that will participate in the SPP. TSA also plans to competitively award fixed-price contracts for screening services at larger airports, but stated that they cannot do so for up to 2 years--when officials believe that screening costs at larger airports will be better known. TSA has developed performance goals and has begun drafting related measures and targets to assess the performance of private screening contractors under the SPP in the areas of security, customer service, costs, workforce management, and innovation. For example, one of the measures would require contractors to ensure that new hires receive required training. TSA's related target for this measure is that 100 percent of new hires will complete required training. These same measures and targets will also be used by DHS to assess whether to award full liability coverage under the SAFETY Act. TSA officials stated that DHS must approve the draft performance measures and targets before they can be finalized. As of January 2006, DHS had not yet completed its review. |
gao_GAO-05-369 | gao_GAO-05-369_0 | 2.) Facility Conditions Have Generally Had Limited Effects on Access and Collections, but Some Chronic Problems Present Ongoing Risks
Facilities-related problems at the Smithsonian have resulted in a few building closures and access restrictions and, in some cases, harm to the collections. In addition to structural deterioration, problems with asbestos have restricted researchers’ access to certain collections. To date, no major damage to the collections has occurred. Poor ventilation at the Smithsonian Institution Archives caused high humidity, resulting in mold damage that made some records unreadable. The Smithsonian is working to address these situations. Smithsonian Has Centralized Its Facilities Management Organization and Budget to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Its Operations
The Smithsonian has recently reorganized its facilities management function to improve its operational effectiveness and make more efficient use of limited staffing and funding resources. Many of the directors, as well as OFEO officials, noted that reductions in OFEO’s staffing and budget have hindered fully implementing the reorganization. According to NAPA, this centralization would promote uniform policies and procedures, improve accountability, and avoid overlap and duplication. OFEO assumed responsibility for all facility- related programs and budgets that had been divided among four offices the National Zoo, and each museum or other major facility. Estimated Costs of Facilities Projects Have Grown, Posing Serious Funding Challenge
The Smithsonian currently estimates that it will need about $2.3 billion for fiscal years 2005 through 2013 for its planned revitalization, construction, and maintenance projects, but this estimate could change as information is updated and new facilities are opened or authorized. As of April 2005, of the 13 funded major revitalization and construction projects that are active or were completed in fiscal year 2004, most were on time and within budget. Of this total amount, about $184.4 million was designated for facilities revitalization, construction and maintenance. In our High Risk Series report on federal real property, we highlighted the importance of ensuring credible, long-term budget planning for sustaining and modernizing facilities. Such planning involves key stakeholders in government—the property-holding agency, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress—in examining viable funding options. Officials told us that various funding approaches and options have been discussed by the staff, the Board of Regents, and with congressional leaders but said that no consensus for dealing with this issue has emerged. The reorganization appears to be going in the right direction, though it is still in an early stage of implementation and its long-term effectiveness has yet to be determined. Still, the estimated $2.3 billion in costs for facilities needs over the next 9 years is beyond the current level of the Smithsonian’s annual operating revenues from its trust funds and federal appropriations. 1.3. Office of Facilities Engineering and Operations established. Scope and Methodology
To determine how the condition of the Smithsonian’s facilities affects public and scientific access to the collections, and the collections themselves, we toured 11 facilities—the Arts and Industries Building, the Smithsonian Administration Building, the Garber Center, the Cultural Resource Center, the National Air and Space Museum, the National Museums of American History and Natural History, National Zoological Park, the Renwick Gallery, the Smithsonian Environmental Research Center, and the Victor Building. To determine how the Smithsonian has changed its facilities management and prioritizes its revitalization, construction, and minor repair and maintenance programs, we reviewed a variety of documents including the National Academy of Public Administration’s (NAPA) 2001 report on the Smithsonian, the facility organizational chart, Facilities Project Management Handbook, drafts of the Operation and Maintenance Handbook, Construction Procedural Guidelines, and Cost Management Guide (for estimating costs), Facility Revitalization and Construction Project Code Assignment Matrix, the Flow Chart of the Prioritization Decision-Making Process for Minor Repairs and Maintenance, minutes of the Capital Planning Board meetings and the Smithsonian Regents meetings for 2002 through 2004, the National Research Council’s Committing to the Cost of Ownership: Maintenance and Repair of Buildings, Federal Facilities Council’s Budgeting for Facilites Maintenance and Repair Activities and the Construction Industry Institute Best Practices Guide. To determine the cost and status of the Smithsonian’s major (more than $5 million) construction and revitalization projects and minor repair and maintenance projects, we toured 11 facilities (as previously identified) to view the Smithsonian’s facility problems; we reviewed the NAPA report, three Smithsonian Inspector General reports on the construction of the National Museum of the American Indian, the Patent Office Building, and the Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center, the 2006 to 2010 Facility Capital Program Summary, minutes of the Capital Planning Board meetings and the Smithsonian Board of Regents meetings for 2002 through 2004, individual project operational reports, monthly executive reports, contractor progress reports, facility assessments, and other appropriate reports; and interviewed the OFEO director, the directors of all OFEO offices, and project executives and project managers responsible for oversight of projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Smithsonian is the world's largest museum complex and research organization, with 18 museums and galleries, 10 science centers, and a zoological park. The age of the structures, past inattention to maintenance needs, and high visitation have left its facilities in need of revitalization and repair. Currently, the Smithsonian estimates $2.3 billion in costs for revitalization, construction, and maintenance projects between 2005 and 2013. This report addresses (1) how the current condition of the Smithsonian's facilities has affected access to the collections, and the collections themselves; (2) what changes the Smithsonian has made to its organization, practices, and prioritization processes to improve its facilities management; and (3) the estimated costs and status of the Smithsonian's facilities projects and their funding sources.
What GAO Found
To date, facilities-related problems at the Smithsonian have resulted in a few building closures and access restrictions and some cases of damage to the collections. For example, structural deterioration has caused closure of the 1881 Arts and Industries Building on the National Mall pending major repair and revitalization, as well as some facilities at the National Zoo. Concern over asbestos in a number of storage buildings has led to restricted access to the items within them. Some artifacts, such as two historic aircraft, have been damaged by water leaks from deteriorated pipes and roofing elements. Stopgap measures, such as draping plastic sheeting over artifacts in areas experiencing leaks, have prevented or minimized damage in other cases. Maintaining desired humidity and temperature levels for conserving the collections is a pervasive problem in some older Smithsonian facilities. These problems are indicative of a broad decline in the Smithsonian's aging facilities and systems that pose a serious long-term threat to the collections. The Smithsonian recently centralized its facilities organization, adopted industry best practices to maximize the effectiveness of its resources, reviewed its operating procedures, standardized its cost-estimating practices, and established processes for prioritizing work and allocating funds. These changes resulted from an internal review and a 2001 report by the National Academy of Public Administration, which recommended that the Smithsonian centralize its then highly decentralized approach to facilities management and budgeting in order to promote uniform policies and procedures, improve accountability, and avoid duplication. The Smithsonian created the Office of Facilities Engineering and Operations (OFEO) in 2003 to assume responsibility for all facilities-related programs and budgets--formerly divided among four administrative offices and the individual museums and centers. Most of the museum and center directors were either positive or neutral about the effectiveness of the reorganization so far. Overall, the reorganization appears to be moving in the right direction, though it has been hindered by reductions in OFEO's staffing and budget. The Smithsonian currently estimates that its planned capital and maintenance projects for 2005 through 2013 will cost about $2.3 billion, though this could grow because it is largely based on preliminary assessments. Of 13 revitalization and construction projects active during our review, most were on time and within budget. The Smithsonian's annual operating and capital program revenues come from its own trust fund assets and its federal appropriation (totaling $904.0 million in fiscal year 2004, with $184.4 million for facilities). Funding at this level would not be sufficient to cover the facilities projects planned for the next 9 years. Ensuring credible, long-term budget planning for sustaining and modernizing facilities involves the Smithsonian, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress in examining viable funding options. While Smithsonian officials have discussed funding options internally and with various stakeholders, no consensus has emerged on how to deal with this funding challenge. |
gao_NSIAD-96-100 | gao_NSIAD-96-100_0 | Reported Readiness of the M1 Tank Fleet Is High
We used the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) report to assess the readiness of M1 tanks. Our analysis of the SORTS data as of March 1995 showed that over 94 percent of the units with M1 tanks reported that their tanks were C-3 (can accomplish the majority of the assigned wartime missions) or higher and that about 56 percent of the units reported that their tanks were C-1 (can accomplish all of the assigned wartime missions). Discussions with officials at three Army divisions that have 834 M1 tanks confirmed that they were not experiencing any major readiness-related maintenance or supply problems with their tanks. As a result of the high operating tempo, the NTC M1 tanks have experienced many more maintenance problems than the tanks in the tactical units. Another factor that has enabled NTC to meet its training requirements is that its tanks are cycled through the Anniston Army Depot under the Army’s inspection and repair only as needed (IRON) program. NTC officials and officials from a unit that was training at NTC at the time of our visit said that the condition of the tanks and the maintenance problems had not detracted from the realism of the training. Change in Repair Parts Funding Has Not Adversely Affected Unit Maintenance
Some Army officials have expressed concern that the change in repair parts funding could lead unit commanders to delay maintenance because they may not have the funds to buy the needed repair parts. The commanders said that the shortages they experienced were not caused by a lack of repair parts funds, but rather by a lack of repair parts in the supply system. Cost and Benefits of Army’s Proposed M1 Tank Overhaul Program Are Uncertain
Some Army officials in the maintenance community believe that an M1A1 overhaul program is needed because of the fleet’s age and because there is no new tank production planned. To address the potential latent deficiencies, the officials proposed a joint proof of principle test program with General Dynamics (the M1 manufacturer) to essentially overhaul the M1A1 tanks. The estimated cost of this effort is $559,000 per tank, about $9.5 million total. Additionally, the Army does not have a predictive readiness system to demonstrate that if the tanks are not overhauled, the tanks will not be able to maintain a high rate of operational readiness. Therefore, if the AIM XXI program would result in M1A2 fielding delays, they would opt for the M1A2 tanks. To determine whether the change in repair parts funding had affected the units’ ability to maintain the M1 tank, we interviewed Army division officials at the three divisions. We interviewed Army and contractor officials and reviewed documentation relating to the proposed AIM XXI overhaul program for the M1 tank fleet. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the absence of a procurement program to modernize the M1 tank fleet beyond the upgrade of existing tanks and to address new tank threats, focusing on: (1) whether the current readiness level of the M1 tank is adequate to meet its war-fighting requirements; (2) whether the operating condition of the tanks at the National Training Center (NTC) is adequate to meet training requirements; (3) whether the change in repair parts funding has adversely affected unit maintenance; and (4) the status of the Army's proposed M1 tank overhaul program, referred to as the Abrams Integrated Management XXI (AIM XXI) program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of March 31, 1995, over 94 percent of the active and reserve Army units reported that their M1 tanks were ready to perform the majority of the assigned wartime missions, and about 56 percent of the units reported that their M1 tanks were ready to perform all of their assigned wartime missions; (2) because of the high operating tempo of the training tanks, the M1 tanks at NTC are experiencing more maintenance problems than tanks in active Army units; (3) however, in spite of the maintenance problems, NTC has fielded the required number of tanks to meet all of its training requirements; (4) on average, the NTC M1 fleet maintained an operational readiness rate of about 82 percent for the 8-month period that ended December 1995; (5) commanders at three Army divisions that have 834 M1 tanks told GAO that the change in repair parts funding had not caused them to alter their maintenance approach; (6) the commanders cited some instances in which they had experienced repair parts shortages; (7) however, they emphasized that lack of funds to buy the parts was not the reason for the shortages; (8) the parts were generally not available in the supply system; (9) notwithstanding, some Army officials have proposed a M1 overhaul program, at a cost of $559,000 a tank, because they were concerned that latent deficiencies that do not show up during routine readiness inspections could show up during wartime and affect the tanks' performance; (10) other Army officials, however, are resistant to the overhaul program because of concerns that the program would take funds away from the ongoing M1A2 upgrade program; (11) the Army does not maintain data that show the extent, if any, of the latent deficiencies, nor does the Army have a predictive readiness system that would show what would happen to operational readiness if there were no depot overhaul program; and (12) at the time GAO completed its review, the Army had not made a decision concerning the proposed overhaul program. |
gao_GAO-04-758 | gao_GAO-04-758_0 | 1.) The process for developing the 2000 standards began even before OMB had published the 1990 standards. Changes in Terminology Accompanied Definitional Changes
The 2000 standards differ from the 1990 standards in many ways, and the Census Bureau and OMB have stated that the new standards are simpler and more transparent than the previous standards. The 2000 standards define certain important concepts differently from those used in the 1990 standards. One of the most notable differences between 1990 and 2000 is the introduction of a new designation for less populated areas—micropolitan statistical areas. Another change in the 2000 standards was in how an outlying county could link to a central county (or counties) and become part of a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area. 2000 Standards Affected How and Whether Many Counties Were Included in New Statistical Areas
When OMB issued its June 6, 2003, newly configured statistical areas using the 2000 standards for the United States, five counties that had been part of metropolitan statistical areas, no longer qualified for this designation. 2 and 3.) Impact of Revised Standards on Four Selected Federal Programs Varied
Some federal agencies are required by statute to use metropolitan statistical areas to allocate program funds and implement other aspects of their programs. More specifically, OMB urges agencies, organizations, and policymakers to carefully review program goals to ensure that appropriate geographic entities are used to determine eligibility and allocation of federal funds for these programs. As a result of changes in the standards in 2000, eligibility under CDBG has already expanded; eligibility under the locality pay program is expected to be expanded in January 2005; HHS anticipates under its proposal that hospital payments for fiscal year 2005 will be affected, but with no net increase in funding; and eligibility under the Ryan White CARE Program is unaffected by the standards because the boundaries for providing services are set by statute. Under current law, HUD uses designated metropolitan statistical areas, in part, to determine the eligibility of city and county governments to receive CDBG formula entitlement funds. According to HUD officials, OMB’s 2000 standards resulted in new eligibility for 60 cities that would provide them under the GDBG formula with a total of $36.2 million in CDBGs. OMB’s process for reviewing and revising statistical areas was undertaken without regard to their effect on any federal programs (that is, for nonstatistical purposes). Micropolitan statistical area: A CBSA associated with at least one urban cluster that has a population of at least 10,000, but less than 50,000. Two adjacent metropolitan statistical areas are combined as a single metropolitan statistical area if: (A) the total population of the combination is at least one million and (1) the commuting interchange between the two metropolitan statistical areas is equal to at least 15% of the employed workers residing in the smaller metropolitan statistical area, or equal to at least 10% of the employed workers residing in the smaller metropolitan statistical area and the urbanized area of a central city of one metropolitan statistical area is contiguous with the urbanized area of a central city of the other metropolitan statistical area or a central city in one metropolitan statistical area is included in the same urbanized area as a central city in the other metropolitan statistical area; AND (2) at least 60% of the population of each metropolitan statistical area is urban. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 50 years, the federal government has had a metropolitan area program designed to provide a nationally consistent set of standards for collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal statistics for geographic areas in the United States and Puerto Rico. Before each decennial census, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews the standards to ensure their continued usefulness and relevance and, if warranted, revises them. While designed only for statistical purposes, various federal programs use the statistical areas to determine eligibility and to allocate federal funds. OMB advises agencies to carefully review program goals to ensure that appropriate geographic entities are used in making these decisions. GAO was asked to examine the process used for developing the OMB standards issued in 2000 and their effects on certain federal programs. Specifically, GAO agreed to report on (1) the process used to develop the 2000 standards, (2) how the 2000 standards differed from the 1990 standards, (3) how the application of the standards affected the geographic distribution of counties into statistical areas, and (4) the effect of standards on the eligibility and funding allocations for four federal programs.
What GAO Found
The new standards for federal statistical recognition of metropolitan areas issued by OMB in 2000 differ from the 1990 standards in many ways. One of the most notable differences is the introduction of a new designation for less populated areas--micropolitan statistical areas. These are areas comprised of a central county or counties with at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 but fewer than 50,000 people, plus adjacent outlying counties if commuting criteria is met. The 2000 standards and the latest population update have resulted in five counties being dropped from metropolitan statistical areas, while another 41counties that had been a part of a metropolitan statistical area have had their statistical status changed and are now components of micropolitan statistical areas. Overall, the 2000 standards have resulted in changes in every state and nationwide statistical coverage has increased. Under the 1990 standards, 847 counties were in metropolitan statistical areas. Now, there are 1090 counties in metropolitan statistical areas and 690 counties in micropolitan statistical areas. Of the four federal programs GAO reviewed to determine the impact of the 2000 standards, eligibility under one has expanded; eligibility under another is expected to expand in January 2005; the agency overseeing another anticipates under its proposal that program payments for fiscal year 2005 will be affected, but with no net increase in funding; and eligibility under another program is unaffected because the geographic boundaries used to determine eligibility are set by statute. For example, the standards have resulted in new eligibility in fiscal year 2004 for 60 cities to receive a total of $36.2 million in Community Development Block Grants, which provide funds to revitalize neighborhood infrastructure. This funding increase required a 1.2 percent funding cut for all other grantees because a cut is required to offset increases due to expanded eligibility. |
gao_GAO-02-314 | gao_GAO-02-314_0 | For fiscal year 2002, DLA’s IT budget is about $654 million. These groups are primarily responsible for implementing investment management process improvements. DLA’s Capabilities to Effectively Manage IT Investments Are Limited
In order to have the capabilities to effectively manage IT investments, an agency should (1) have basic, project-level control and selection practices in place and (2) manage its projects as a portfolio of investments, treating them as an integrated package of competing investment options and pursuing those that best meet the strategic goals, objectives, and mission of the agency. To properly focus and target IT investment process improvements, an organization should fully identify and assess current process strengths and weaknesses (that is, create an investment management capability baseline) as the first step in developing and implementing an improvement plan. Without such a plan that allows the agency to systematically prioritize, sequence, and evaluate improvement efforts, DLA jeopardizes its ability to establish a mature investment process that includes selection and control capabilities that result in greater certainty about future IT investment outcomes. Conclusions
Until recently, IT investment management has not been an area of DLA management attention and focus. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) relies extensively on information technology (IT) to carry out its logistics support mission. This report focuses on DLA's processes for making informed IT investment decisions.
What GAO Found
Because IT investment management has only recently become an area of management focus and commitment at DLA, the agency's ability to effectively manage IT investments is limited. The first step toward establishing effective investment management is putting in place foundational, project-level control and selection processes. The second step toward effective investment management is to continually assess proposed and ongoing projects as an integrated and competing set of investment options. Accomplishing these two steps requires effective development and implementation of a plan, supported by senior management, which defines and prioritizes investment process improvements. Without a well-defined process improvement plan and controls for implementing it, it is unlikely that the agency will establish a mature investment management capability. As a result, GAO continues to question DLA's ability to make informed and prudent investment decisions in IT. |
gao_GAO-07-98 | gao_GAO-07-98_0 | Similarly, of all the compensation appeals cases decided by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals during November 2004–January 2006, the board remanded less than 3 percent of these cases to VBA for rework due to deficiencies in obtaining military service records. However, because VBA does not systematically evaluate the quality of the research done on behalf of regional offices by the VBA unit at the National Personnel Records Center, VBA does not know the extent to which the information that this unit provides to regional offices is reliable and accurate. STAR data from reviews of regional office decisions made during the first half of fiscal year 2006 showed that less than 4 percent of the cases reviewed contained any type of error related to the law’s requirements for developing evidence. Thus, regional offices rely on the VBA unit at the National Personnel Records Center to do thorough and complete searches of records, do reliable analyses of records, and provide accurate and clear narrative reports on the results. VBA potentially could improve its procedures to reduce the time required to process some veterans’ PTSD claims. To verify the occurrence of claimed stressors, regional offices sometimes cannot find needed evidence in the veteran’s personal service records and must turn to information contained in the military historical records of DOD. While regional offices are able to directly access and search an electronic library of such records for many Marine Corps veterans, they must rely on a DOD research organization—the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC)—to research such records for all other service branches. JSRRC’s average response time to regional office requests for such research approaches 1 year; by contrast, VBA’s average processing time strategic goal for claims involving disability compensation issues is 125 days. The opportunity may exist for VBA to establish an electronic library of DOD military historical records for the other service branches and greatly reduce the time required to process the PTSD claims of many veterans. While VA’s internal assessments indicate that its regional offices generally comply with the requirements of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act for obtaining military service records, VA does not have a systematic quality review program for ensuring the reliability and accuracy of records research done on behalf of regional offices by the VBA unit located at the National Personnel Records Center. To gain an operational context for the information obtained from these sources and to obtain stakeholders’ views on the effectiveness of VBA’s procedures for obtaining relevant military service records, we interviewed officials of VA’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals and Office of Inspector General; VBA’s Compensation and Pension Service, Office of Field Operations, Appeals Management Center, Records Management Center, VA Liaison Office at the National Personnel Records Center, and regional offices located in Atlanta, Georgia, Baltimore, Maryland, Oakland, California, and St. Petersburg, Florida; custodians of military records and organizations that research military records on behalf of VBA’s regional offices, including Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DOD Joint Requirements and Integration Office, and National Personnel Records Center, which is operated by the National Archives and Records Administration; and veterans’ advocacy groups, including Disabled American Veterans, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Paralyzed Veterans of America, AMVETS, National Veterans Legal Services Program, and state and county veterans service agencies. 1). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Ranking Democratic Member, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, asked GAO to determine (1) whether VA's internal assessments indicate its regional offices are complying with the requirements of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) of 2000 for obtaining military service records for veterans' disability compensation claims and (2) whether VBA could improve its procedures for obtaining military service records for claims involving post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) internal assessments indicate its regional offices generally comply with VCAA's requirements for obtaining military service records for veterans' compensation claims. For example, of the decisions made by regional offices on compensation claims during the first half of fiscal year 2006, Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) quality reviewers found that less than 4 percent contained errors involving failure to obtain military service records. Similarly, of the appealed compensation cases decided by the Board of Veterans' Appeals during November 2004-January 2006, the board remanded less than 3 percent to VBA for rework due to deficiencies in obtaining military service records. However, VBA does not systematically evaluate the quality of research done on behalf of regional offices by a VBA unit at the National Personnel Records Center, where the service records of many veterans are stored. Regional offices rely on this unit to do thorough and reliable searches and analyses of records and provide accurate reports on the results. Without a systematic program for assessing the quality of this unit's work, VBA does not know the extent to which the information that this unit provides to regional offices is reliable and accurate. VBA potentially could improve its procedures and reduce the time required to process some veterans' claims for PTSD, which may result after a veteran participates in, or is exposed to, stressful events or experiences (stressors). Regional offices sometimes must turn to information contained in the military historical records of the Department of Defense (DOD) to verify the occurrence of claimed stressors. While regional offices are able to directly access and search an electronic library of such records for many Marine Corps veterans, they must rely on DOD's U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) to research such records for all other service branches. The JSRRC's response time to regional office requests approaches an average of 1 year. However, by building on work already done by several regional offices to establish and use an electronic library of DOD military historical records for the other service branches, VBA may be able to greatly reduce the time required to process many veterans' PTSD claims. |
gao_GAO-09-911 | gao_GAO-09-911_0 | Education also provides states with technical assistance in meeting the academic assessment requirements. States Reported That Assessment Spending Has Increased Since NCLBA Was Enacted and Test Development Has Been the Largest Assessment Cost in Most States
Assessment Expenditures Have Grown in Nearly Every State since 2002, and Most States Reported Spending More for Vendors than State Staff
State ESEA assessment expenditures have increased in nearly every state since the enactment of NCLBA in 2002, and the majority of these states reported that adding assessments was a major reason for the increased expenditures. Forty-eight of 49 states that responded to our survey said their states’ overall annual expenditures for ESEA assessments have increased, and over half of these 48 states indicated that adding assessments to their state assessment systems was a major reason for increased expenditures. Similarly, states reported that test and item development was the largest assessment cost for alternate assessments, followed by scoring. Rhode Island state officials also reported that alternate assessments cost much more than general assessments. As of January 2009, 19 states said their state’s total ESEA assessment budget had been reduced as a result of state fiscal cutbacks. States Have Considered Cost and Time in Making Decisions about Assessment Item Type and Content
States Used Primarily Multiple Choice Items in Their ESEA Assessments Because They Are Cost- Effective and Can Be Scored within Tight Time Frames for Reporting Results
States have most often chosen multiple choice items over other item types on assessments. State assessment officials also told us that they used multiple choice items because they can be scored quickly, and assessment vendors reported that states were under pressure to release assessment results to the public before the beginning of the next school year in accordance with NCLBA requirements. State officials and their technical advisors told us that they have faced significant trade-offs between their efforts to assess highly cognitively complex content and their efforts to accommodate cost and time pressures. Moreover, open/constructed response items do not always assess highly complex content, according to an alignment expert. States Faced Several Challenges in Their Efforts to Ensure Valid and Reliable ESEA Assessments, including Staff Capacity, Alternate Assessments, and Assessment Security
States Varied in Their Capacity to Guide and Oversee Vendors
State officials are responsible for guiding the development of the state assessment program and overseeing vendors, but states varied in their capacity to fulfill these roles. Officials in Texas and other states said that having high assessment staff capacity—both in terms of number of staff and measurement-related expertise—allows them to research and implement practices that improve student assessment. In our work, we identified several gaps in state assessment security policies. Education Has Provided Assistance to States, but the Peer Review Process Did Not Allow for Sufficient Communication
Education Provided Technical Assistance with Assessments, including Those for Students with Disabilities and LEP Students
Education provided technical assistance to states in a variety of ways. In our survey, states reported they most often used written guidance and Education-sponsored meetings and found these helpful. The Education official who manages the standards and assessments peer review process said that in some cases the differences between decision letters and peer reviewers’ written comments led to state officials being unclear about whether they were required to address the issues in Education’s decision letters, comments from peer reviewers, or both. However, Education has not made assessment security a focus of its peer review process and has not incorporated best practices in assessment security into its peer review protocols. Education agreed with our recommendations to develop methods to improve communication during the review process and to identify for states why its peer review decisions in some cases differed from peer reviewers’ written comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to answer the following questions: (1) How have state expenditures on assessments required by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) changed since the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) was enacted in 2002, and how have states spent funds? (3) What challenges, if any, have states faced in ensuring the validity and reliability of their ESEA assessments? Describing the Extent to Which Education Has Supported State Efforts to Comply with ESEA Assessment Requirements
To address the extent of Education’s support of ESEA assessment implementation, we reviewed Education guidance, summaries of Education assistance, peer review training documents, and previous GAO work on peer review processes. 2. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) requires states to develop high-quality academic assessments aligned with state academic standards. Education has provided states with about $400 million for NCLBA assessment implementation every year since 2002. GAO examined (1) changes in reported state expenditures on assessments, and how states have spent funds; (2) factors states have considered in making decisions about question (item) type and assessment content; (3) challenges states have faced in ensuring that their assessments are valid and reliable; and (4) the extent to which Education has supported state efforts to comply with assessment requirements. GAO surveyed state and District of Columbia assessment directors, analyzed Education and state documents, and interviewed assessment officials from Maryland, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Texas and eight school districts in addition to assessment vendors and experts.
What GAO Found
States reported their overall annual expenditures for assessments have increased since passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA), which amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), and assessment development was the largest expense for most states. Forty-eight of 49 states that responded to our survey said that annual expenditures for ESEA assessments have increased since NCLBA was enacted. Over half of the states reported that overall expenditures grew due to development of new assessments. Test and question--also referred to as item--development was most frequently reported by states to be the largest ESEA assessment expense, followed by scoring. State officials in selected states reported that alternate assessments for students with disabilities were more costly than general population assessments. In addition, 19 states reported that assessment budgets had been reduced by state fiscal cutbacks. Cost and time pressures have influenced state decisions about assessment item type--such as multiple choice or open/constructed response--and content. States most often chose multiple choice items because they can be scored inexpensively within tight time frames resulting from the NCLBA requirement to release results before the next school year. State officials also reported facing trade-offs between efforts to assess highly complex content and to accommodate cost and time pressures. As an alternative to using mostly multiple choice, some states have developed practices, such as pooling resources from multiple states to take advantage of economies of scale, that let them reduce cost and use more open/constructed response items. Challenges facing states in their efforts to ensure valid and reliable assessments involved staff capacity, alternate assessments, and assessment security. State capacity to provide vendor oversight varied, both in terms of number of state staff and measurement-related expertise. Also, states have been challenged to ensure validity and reliability for alternate assessments. In addition, GAO identified several gaps in assessment security policies that were not addressed in Education's review process for overseeing state assessments that could affect validity and reliability. An Education official said that assessment security was not a focus of its review. The review process was developed before recent efforts to identify assessment security best practices. Education has provided assistance to states, but issues remain with communication during the review process. Education provided assistance in a variety of ways, and states reported that they most often used written guidance and Education-sponsored meetings and found these helpful. However, Education's review process did not allow states to communicate with reviewers during the process to clarify issues, which led to miscommunication. In addition, state officials were in some cases unclear about what review issues they were required to address because Education did not identify for states why its decisions differed from the reviewers' written comments. |
gao_GAO-09-708 | gao_GAO-09-708_0 | Some of these international gangs can be linked to gangs in the United States. 1). At the headquarters level, DOJ and FBI have established several coordinating entities to share information on gang- related investigations and intelligence across agency boundaries. Collaborating agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities and can use a number of possible mechanisms, such as memoranda of understanding, to clarify who will do what, organize joint and individual efforts, and facilitate information sharing. Use of these investigative tools and equipment allow state and local agencies to work with federal agencies in conducting investigations that target gangs as criminal enterprises, types of cases which state and local agencies would generally not be able to conduct in the absence of federal resources and assistance. Lack of a Shared Definition for Gangs Hinders Measurement of Gang Crime Enforcement across Federal Departments and Agencies
Gangs vary in size, ethnic composition, membership, and organizational structure, which makes it challenging to develop a uniform definition of “gang.” Federal law enforcement agencies have developed and used different working definitions of a “gang” and other associated terms, such as “gang-related.” However, these agencies lack a common or shared definition for “gang” and related terms, hindering federal agencies’ efforts to accurately measure and report on gangs, gang crime, and enforcement activities. Agency officials said lack of a common definition did not adversely affect law enforcement activity. Performance measures help federal agencies to assess progress made on anti-gang efforts over time and provide decision makers with key data to facilitate the resource allocation process. Among other gang-related measures, ATF also reports the number of gang- related convictions by fiscal year. Third, attorneys, historically, have not viewed data entry as a priority, so they have not always been diligent about being sure that it is done correctly. Given that USAOs have not consistently and accurately entered data on gang-related cases into their case and time management systems as required by EOUSA’s 2006 guidance, in the absence of periodic monitoring of USAOs’ gang- related data, EOUSA cannot be certain that USAOs have followed the guidance and accurately recorded gang-related data. Grant programs for which DOJ-sponsored evaluations were completed reported mixed results for achieving reductions in gang crime with benefits for grant recipients but little evidence that the programs effectively reduced youth gang crime. DOJ Has Supported Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement Programs through Grant Programs That Emphasize Coordination and Collaboration
DOJ, the department with responsibility for administering anti-gang grants, has pursued a strategy to assist communities in combating gang crime that involves not only law enforcement efforts, but also efforts to prevent young people from joining gangs, intervene and provide alternatives to gang membership for youth who are gang-affiliated, and offer support through re-entry activities for former gang members who are released from prison and returning to their communities. OJJDP Grants Tested a Communitywide Gang Program Model
DOJ has provided grant funding to localities across the nation under the Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program, Gang Reduction Program, and the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program primarily to test models for communities to follow in implementing approaches for addressing gang problems. Federal agencies have taken positive actions to coordinate their anti-gang programs and initiatives and share information about gang threats and multijurisdictional investigations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen federal agencies’ coordination of anti-gang efforts; help reduce gaps or unnecessary overlaps in federal entities’ roles and responsibilities; and assist the department, Congress, and other stakeholders in assessing federal gang enforcement efforts, we recommend that the Attorney General take the following three actions: direct DOJ law enforcement agencies that lead or participate in the headquarters-level anti-gang coordination entities—including GangTECC, NGIC, the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force—to, in consultation with DHS, reexamine and reach consensus on the entities’ roles and responsibilities, including identifying and addressing gaps and unnecessary overlaps; develop a departmentwide, strategic-level performance measure for the department’s anti-gang efforts; and direct EOUSA to periodically review gang-related case information entered by USAOs into the case and time management systems to ensure more accurate and complete reporting of USAOs’ gang-related cases. Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology
To examine the roles of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in gang enforcement efforts and the extent to which the efforts are coordinated with each other and state and local partners, we reviewed federal agencies’ strategies and plans to combat gang crime and interviewed headquarters DOJ and DHS officials involved in gang crime enforcement activities. Other criteria considered in selecting these localities included the location of the USAO and federal law enforcement agency field offices, the presence of federally led task forces to combat gang crime, and recommendations of officials of DOJ and DHS components during our preliminary interviews. We compared DOJ and DHS efforts to measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts to our prior work on effective interagency collaboration and results oriented government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates that the United States has about a million gang members. While state and local agencies have primary responsibility for combating gang crime, the federal government has key roles to enforce laws and help fund programs to provide alternatives to gang membership for at-risk youth. GAO was asked to examine federal efforts to combat gang crime. This report addresses (1) the roles of DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in combating gang crime and the extent to which DOJ and DHS agencies coordinate their efforts with each other and state and local agencies; (2) the extent to which DOJ and DHS measure their gang enforcement efforts; and (3) how federal grant funding is used to administer or support activities to reduce gang-related crime. GAO reviewed federal agencies' plans, resources, and measures and interviewed federal, state, and local officials in 15 localities with federally led anti-gang task forces representing varying population sizes and locations.
What GAO Found
Various DOJ and DHS components have taken distinct roles in combating gang crime, and at the headquarters level, DOJ has established several entities to share information on gang-related investigations across agencies. However, some of these entities have not differentiated roles and responsibilities. For example, two entities have overlapping responsibilities for coordinating the federal response to the same gang threat. Prior GAO work found that overlap among programs can waste funds and limit effectiveness, and that agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and facilitate information sharing. At the field division level, federal agencies have established strategies to help coordinate anti-gang efforts including federally led task forces. Officials GAO interviewed were generally satisfied with the task force structure for leveraging resources and taking advantage of contributions from all participating agencies. Federal agencies have taken actions to measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts, but these efforts have been hindered by three factors. Among other measures, one agency tracks the number of investigations that disrupted or shut down criminal gangs, while another agency tracks its gang-related convictions. However, agencies' efforts to measure results of federal actions to combat gang crime have been hampered by lack of a shared definition of "gang" among agencies, underreporting of information by United States Attorneys Offices (USAOs), and the lack of departmentwide DOJ performance measures for anti-gang efforts. Definitions of "gang" vary in terms of number of members, time or type of offenses, and other characteristics. According to DOJ officials, lack of a shared definition of "gang" complicates data collection and evaluation efforts across federal agencies, but does not adversely affect law enforcement activity. DOJ officials stated that USAOs have underreported gang-related cases and work, in part because attorneys historically have not viewed data collection as a priority. In the absence of periodic monitoring of USAO's gang-related case information, DOJ cannot be certain that USAOs have accurately recorded gang-related data. Further, DOJ lacks performance measures that would help agencies to assess progress made over time on anti-gang efforts and provide decision makers with key data to facilitate resource allocation. DOJ administers several grant programs to assist communities to address gang problems; however, initiatives funded through some of these programs have had mixed results. A series of grant programs funded from the 1980s to 2009 to test a comprehensive communitywide model are nearing completion. Evaluations found little evidence that these programs reduced youth gang crime. DOJ does not plan to fund future grants testing this model; rather, DOJ plans to provide technical assistance to communities implementing anti-gang programs without federal funding. DOJ also awarded grants to 12 communities during fiscal years 2006 to 2008 under another anti-gang initiative. The first evaluations of this initiative are due in late 2009, and no additional grants will be funded pending the evaluation results. |
gao_GAO-06-170T | gao_GAO-06-170T_0 | While the Army National Guard performs both federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions. Declining Preparedness from High Pace of Operations Signifies A Need to Reexamine the Army National Guard’s Business Model
As we previously reported, the high number of Army National Guard forces used to support overseas and homeland missions since September 11, 2001, has resulted in decreased preparedness of nondeployed Guard forces which suggests the need to reassess DOD’s business model for the Army National Guard. Because its units did not have all the resources they needed to deploy at the outset of current operations, the Army National Guard has had to transfer personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to prepare deploying units. Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions
Increasing equipment shortages among nondeployed Army National Guard units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipping strategy and business model for the Army National Guard. Compounding the equipment shortages that have developed because most Army National Guard units are still structured with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy, Army National Guard units have left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion in Iraq for use by follow-on forces; however, the Army has not developed replacement plans for this equipment as required by DOD policy. Equipment Status of Nondeployed Units Has Worsened in Recent Months due to Challenges in Supporting Overseas Operations with Current Inventory Levels
While most Army National Guard combat units are typically provided from 65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime missions, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required units to deploy with 90 to100 percent of the equipment they are expected to need and with equipment that is compatible with active Army units. Retaining Army National Guard Equipment Overseas without Plans for Replacement Hinders the Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units
To address equipment requirements for current overseas operations, the Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to leave certain essential items that are in short supply in Iraq for follow-on units to use, but it has not developed plans to replace Army National Guard equipment as DOD policy requires. As of July 2005, the National Guard Bureau estimates that the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45 percent of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard units have left in theater. As a result, the Guard does not know when or whether its equipment will be returned, which challenges its ability to prepare and train for future missions. DOD and Army Have Some Initiatives to Improve Future Readiness of Army National Guard Forces but Has Not Developed Detailed Implementation and Funding Plans
DOD, and the Army have recognized the need to transform the Army National Guard to meet the new threats of the 21st century and support civil authorities, and are undertaking some initiatives to improve the Guard’s organization and readiness for these missions. In addition, while DOD has produced a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in June 2005, it has not yet completed a plan to implement that strategy, including clarifying the Army National Guard’s role and assessing what capabilities the Guard will require for domestic missions, as we previously recommended. In our report, we recommend that DOD develop and submit to the Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army National Guard into the Army’s rotational force model and modular initiatives. The current status of the Army’s equipment inventory is one symptom of the much larger problem of an outdated business model. Further, it is not clear that these initiatives will result in a comprehensive and integrated strategy for ensuring that the Army National Guard is well prepared for overseas missions, homeland security needs, and state missions such as responding to natural disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 2001, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its members since World War II. Currently, over 30 percent of the Army forces now in Iraq are Army National Guard members, and Guard forces have also carried out various homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles. However, continued heavy use of the Guard forces has raised concerns about whether it can successfully perform and sustain both missions over time. In the short term, the National Guard is seeking additional funding for emergency equipment. GAO was asked to comment on (1) the changing role of the Army National Guard, (2) whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to sustain federal and state missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD has strategies and plans to improve the Army National Guard's business model for the future.
What GAO Found
The heavy reliance on National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not sustainable over time. Therefore, the business model should be reexamined in light of the current and expected national security environment, homeland security needs, and fiscal challenges the nation faces in the 21st century. Under post-Cold War planning assumptions, the Army National Guard was organized as a strategic reserve to be used primarily in the later stages of a conflict after receiving additional personnel, equipment and training. Therefore, in peacetime Army National Guard units did not have all the equipment and personnel they would need to perform their wartime missions. However, over 70,000 Guard personnel are now deployed for federal missions, with thousands more activated to respond to recent natural disasters. To provide ready forces, the Guard transferred large numbers of personnel and equipment among units, thereby exacerbating existing personnel and equipment shortages of non-deployed units. As a result, the preparedness of non-deployed units for future missions is declining. The need to reexamine the business model for the Army National Guard is illustrated by growing equipment shortages. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units deploying overseas, exhausting its inventory of some critical items, such as radios and generators, in non-deployed units. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because: (1) prior to 2001, most Army National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their required war-time items and (2) Guard units returning from overseas operations have left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on forces. The Army National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000 items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas. However, the Army cannot account for over half of these items and does not have a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about one-third of the equipment they need for their overseas missions, which hampers their ability to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic operations. Without a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and Congress do not have assurance that the Army has an affordable plan to improve the Guard's equipment readiness. DOD is taking some steps to adapt to the new security environment and balance the Army National Guard's overseas and homeland missions. For example, the Army has embarked on reorganization to a modular, rotational force. Also, DOD issued a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in June 2005. However, until DOD develops an equipping plan and funding strategy to implement its initiatives, Congress and DOD will not have assurance that these changes will create a new business model that can sustain the Army National Guard affordably and effectively for the full range of its future missions. |
gao_GGD-96-126 | gao_GGD-96-126_0 | In fiscal year 1994, the Service recorded revenue from bulk business mail of $23.1 billion—48.4 percent of its total mail revenue. This occurred because clerks often skipped required in-depth verifications of bulk mail. The remaining verifications were either not done or not documented. With the volume of mailer-barcoded mail increasing yearly, the Postal Service recognized the need to try to ensure more standardization of mailer-applied barcodes. Postal management recognized the need for such equipment 5 years ago. The current acceptance system does not produce information on (1) the extent to which improperly prepared mailings are entering the mail stream and the related revenue losses associated with improperly prepared mailings—including mailer-applied barcodes that do not meet the Postal Service’s standards; and (2) the amount of rework required for the Postal Service to correct improperly prepared mailings that enter the mailstream. The Postal Service’s primary procedure for selecting bulk business mailings for in-depth verification is to randomly sample 1 in 10 of each mailer’s statements. Customs must determine whether goods entering the United States are properly classified and correctly valued. Additionally, they said they plan to issue a new bulk mail acceptance manual when the new acceptance system is put in place. Specifically, we recommend that the Postmaster General direct bulk mail acceptance program supervisors and managers to periodically report to appropriate Service levels on operation of the bulk mail acceptance system, initiatives, and the progress and effectiveness of related improvements so management can be reasonably assured that required mail verifications, including supervisory reviews, are done and that the results are documented as required; mailings resubmitted following a failed verification are reverified and acceptance clerks and supervisors are provided with adequate, up-to-date procedures, training, and tools necessary to make efficient and objective verification determinations; information on the extent and results of verifications, including supervisory reviews, is regularly reported to appropriate levels, including Postal Service headquarters, and that such information is used regularly to assess the adequacy of controls and staffing, training needs, and acceptance procedures; and risk becomes the prominent factor in determining mailings to be verified. The Inspection Service reported that internal controls were not effectively or consistently applied and that there was a significant risk that mail could be entered into the mailstream without payment of postage and that mailers could claim unearned discounts. Comments From the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) controls over postage paid on presorted and barcoded mail, focusing on whether USPS controls ensure that mailer-claimed discounts are earned.
What GAO Found
GAO found that during fiscal year 1994: (1) 40 percent of required bulk mail verifications were not performed and postal supervisors did less than 50 percent of required follow-up verifications; (2) rejected mailings were resubmitted and accepted into the mail stream without proper corrections or postage; (3) mail acceptance clerks were not given adequate tools to determine whether increasing volumes of mailer-applied barcodes met USPS standards; and (4) postal management was unable to make informed decisions concerning the adequacy of bulk mail acceptance controls or determine the amount of revenue lost through improperly prepared mailings. GAO also found that: (1) USPS needs to determine the management strategy and financial investment necessary to minimize revenue loss; (2) the random method of selecting bulk business mailings for in-depth verification may not result in the best use of available staff; (3) USPS could better target its verification efforts based on risk by considering such factors as mailer histories and the postage value of mailings; (4) postal managers are developing a bulk business mail acceptance system, updating acceptance handbooks, acquiring barcoding verification equipment, and requesting field units to submit verification reports; and (5) USPS is also exploring a new risk-based approach for in-depth verification, improving revenue controls, and planning to install its new bulk mail system by 1997. |
gao_GAO-11-426 | gao_GAO-11-426_0 | Prior to fiscal year 2011, VA permitted networks to develop and use their own methodologies for determining how to allocate general purpose resources to medical centers. VA’s New Allocation Process Uses a Standardized Model, but Transparency of Networks’ Allocation Decisions Is Limited
In fiscal year 2011, VA implemented a new resource allocation process that includes a standardized model for networks to use in allocating general purpose resources to their medical centers. The new process involves three steps—first, VA headquarters proposes medical center allocation amounts to networks using a standardized resource allocation model; second, network officials review these amounts and can adjust them based on the needs of their medical centers that are not reflected in the initial allocation amounts proposed by headquarters; and third, after making any adjustments, networks report final medical center allocation amounts to VA headquarters in a consistent format. Resources for Patient Care Determined by a Standardized Measure of Workload. According to VA officials, the patient weighted work measure lessens the impact of cost differences between medical centers, by recognizing the varying costs and levels of resource intensity associated with providing care for each patient at each VA medical center. According to VA headquarters officials, these adjustments allow each network the flexibility to change the allocation amounts if they believe that certain medical centers’ resource needs are not appropriately accounted for in the model. Officials said that the new network resource allocation process was not intended to be used to question networks’ decision making, but rather to increase the transparency of networks’ allocation decisions to VA headquarters while maintaining network flexibility for allocation decisions. However, absent rationales from networks for each adjustment made to medical center allocation amounts, transparency for decisions made through the new allocation process is limited. Additionally, VA officials told us that they plan to conduct an assessment of the network allocation process each subsequent year, including a review of adjustments to the model, to identify areas for improvement. VA Monitors Resources to Ensure Spending Does Not Exceed Allocations, but Lacks Written Policies Documenting Practices for Monitoring Resources
VA monitors the general purpose resources networks have allocated to medical centers to ensure spending does not exceed allocations, but does not have written policies documenting these practices for monitoring resources. VA centrally monitors the resources networks have allocated to medical centers through two primary practices—(1) automated controls in its financial management system, and (2) regular reviews of network spending. VA’s financial management system electronically tracks the amount of resources that networks and medical centers have available—that is, the resources they were allocated, less the resources already spent. VA headquarters officials told us they determine whether spending is on target with the operating plan or not, and whether any differences from the plan are significant. However, VA does not have written policies documenting the agency’s practices for monitoring the resources networks allocate to medical centers. Internal control standards state that internal controls should be documented and all documentation should be properly managed and maintained, and readily available for examination. Conclusions
Although networks make decisions about how resources are allocated to medical centers, VA headquarters retains overall responsibility for oversight and management of VA’s resources, including the process networks use to allocate resources. Understanding why networks made adjustments is key in determining if any modifications to the model are needed for subsequent years. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the transparency of the new network allocation process, and to ensure that internal control activities are performed and that the resources networks allocate to medical centers are monitored consistently and reliably, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions: require networks to provide rationales for all adjustments made to the allocation amounts proposed by the model in VA’s resource allocation process; and develop written policies, consistent with federal internal control standards, to formalize existing practices for monitoring resources networks have allocated to medical centers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through fiscal year 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) permitted its 21 health care networks to develop their own methodologies for allocating resources to medical centers. These methodologies varied considerably. Concerned that network methodologies were not fully transparent to VA headquarters, in fiscal year 2011, VA implemented a new single process for all networks to use to determine allocations to medical centers. VA headquarters retains overall responsibility for oversight of VA's resources, including ensuring networks do not spend more than the resources available. GAO was asked to review how VA networks allocate resources and how VA oversees these resources once they are allocated. In this report, GAO describes (1) VA's new process for networks to use in determining allocations to medical centers, and (2) how VA centrally monitors these resources. To do this work, GAO reviewed VA documents describing the new process and VA's monitoring efforts, in light of federal internal control standards, and interviewed VA officials..
What GAO Found
VA's new resource allocation process uses a standardized model, but the transparency of networks' decisions for allocating resources to medical centers is limited. The new process involves three steps. First, VA headquarters proposes medical center allocation amounts to networks using a standardized resource allocation model. The model includes a standardized measure of workload that recognizes the varying costs and levels of resource intensity associated with providing care for each patient at each medical center. Second, network officials review the proposed amounts and have the flexibility to adjust them if they believe that certain medical centers' resource needs are not appropriately accounted for in the model. Third, networks report final medical center allocation amounts to VA headquarters and any adjustments made to the allocation amounts proposed by the model. VA headquarters did not ask networks to report reasons for each adjustment made to allocation amounts; networks reported reasons for some adjustments, but not for others. VA officials said that the new network resource allocation process was not intended to be used to question networks' decision making, but to increase the transparency of networks' allocation decisions to VA headquarters while maintaining network flexibility. However, absent rationales from networks on all adjustments made to medical center allocation amounts, transparency for decisions made through the allocation process is limited. Furthermore, understanding why networks make adjustments is key in determining if any modifications to the model are needed for subsequent years. VA officials told GAO that they intend to conduct annual assessments of the new resource allocation process, including a review of adjustments to the model, to identify areas for improvement. VA centrally monitors the resources networks have allocated to medical centers to ensure spending does not exceed allocations, but does not have written policies documenting these practices for monitoring resources. VA monitors resources through two primary practices--automated controls in its financial management system and regular reviews of network spending. Specifically, VA's financial management system electronically tracks the amount of resources that networks and medical centers have available--the resources allocated, less the resources already spent--and prevents medical centers from spending more than what they have available by rejecting spending requests in excess of available resources. In addition, each month VA headquarters officials compare each network's spending with what the network planned to spend and determine whether spending is on target, and whether any differences from the plan are significant. However, VA headquarters does not have written policies documenting the agency's practices for monitoring resources, which is not consistent with federal internal control standards. These standards state that internal controls should be documented, and all documentation should be properly managed, maintained, and readily available for examination. Without written policies, there is an increased risk of inconsistent monitoring of VA network and medical center resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) require networks to provide rationales for all adjustments made to allocations proposed by VA's resource allocation model, and (2) develop written policies to document practices for monitoring resources. VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-773 | gao_GAO-01-773_0 | More than one-third of students had credit cards before they entered college, and another 46 percent acquired them during the first year. Except for charges for tuition and fees, their spending patterns resembled those of nonstudents. We did not find a uniform response to the controversial issue of on- campus credit card marketing among the universities we visited. In response to complaints about aggressive marketing techniques, a few universities had adopted policies restricting credit card solicitation on campus. The credit card issuers that responded to our inquiries participated actively in the student market, but again they did not have a uniform set of policies or practices. Credit cards offer clear advantages to college students because they provide an interest free loan for students until the payment is due and a convenient noncash payment option for both routine transactions and emergencies. If used responsibly, credit cards allow students to build up credit histories that will facilitate increased access to credit in the future. However, if college students have not learned financial management skills in their secondary education or from their parents and misuse their credit cards or mismanage their credit card debt, the disadvantages can outweigh the advantages. | Why GAO Did This Study
Credit cards offer clear advantages to college students because they provide an interest free loan until the payment is due and a convenient noncash payment option for both routine transactions and emergencies. If used responsibly, credit cards allow students to build up credit histories that will increase their access to credit in the future. However, if college students have not learned sound financial management skills in high school or from their parents, the disadvantages of credit cards can outweigh the advantages.
What GAO Found
GAO found that more than one-third of students had credit cards before they entered college, and another 46 percent acquired them during the first year. Except for charges for tuition and fees, their spending patterns resembled those of nonstudents. GAO did not find a uniform response to the controversial issue of on-campus credit card marketing among the universities GAO visited. In response to complaints about aggressive marketing techniques, a few universities have restricted credit card solicitation on campus. The credit card issuers that responded to GAO's inquiries participated actively in the student market, but they did not have a uniform set of policies or practices. |
gao_GAO-05-339 | gao_GAO-05-339_0 | Inspections may also occur in response to a specific operational problem or event that has occurred at a plant. According to NRC, the control of spent fuel is of great importance because of the potential health and safety implications. These plants were the Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Connecticut in 2000, the Vermont Yankee plant in Vermont in 2004, and the Humboldt Bay Power Plant in California in 2004. In all three cases, the missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel was in loose fuel rods or segments of fuel rods that had been removed from the fuel assemblies. Records do not indicate what happened to these rods. NRC Regulations and Oversight Activities Are Insufficient to Ensure Control of All Spent Fuel
Although NRC requires nuclear power plants to maintain an accurate record of their spent fuel and its location, agency regulations do not specify how licensees are to conduct physical inventories of this material nor how they are to control and account for loose or separated spent fuel rods and fragments. Physical inventories of special nuclear material must be performed at least annually. As a result, licensees implement the physical inventory requirement in different ways. As a result, licensees employed various methods of storing and accounting for this material. NRC Is Studying Spent Fuel Control and Accounting Problems but Has Yet to Revise Its Regulations or Oversight Policies
In light of the missing or unaccounted-for spent fuel at Millstone and subsequently at other locations, NRC has various activities under way to assess the need to revise its regulations and oversight of spent fuel. This date would be over 5 years after the spent fuel rods were first found missing at Millstone in 2000. We believe that after the more recent instances of missing spent fuel at Vermont Yankee and Humboldt Bay, the 2003 NRC Office of the Inspector General report outlining weaknesses in NRC’s oversight of special nuclear materials (including spent fuel), and information collected during its ongoing efforts, NRC has considerable information that suggests the need to address nuclear power plants’ material control and accounting problems, including compliance with NRC regulations. These are (1) a three-phase project under which NRC inspectors are collecting information on the status of material control and accounting programs at individual plants; (2) a comprehensive program review of NRC material control and accounting programs for special nuclear materials, including spent fuel, through the contract with DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory; and (3) a bulletin issued on February 11, 2005, to nuclear power plant licensees requesting information concerning their compliance with NRC material control and accounting regulations. Conclusions
The effectiveness of nuclear power plants’ efforts to control and account for their spent fuel is uneven. No. | Why GAO Did This Study
Spent nuclear fuel--the used fuel periodically removed from reactors in nuclear power plants--is too inefficient to power a nuclear reaction, but is intensely radioactive and continues to generate heat for thousands of years. Potential health and safety implications make the control of spent nuclear fuel of great importance. The discovery, in 2004, that spent fuel rods were missing at the Vermont Yankee plant in Vermont generated public concern and questions about the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) regulation and oversight of this material. GAO reviewed (1) plants' performance in controlling and accounting for their spent nuclear fuel, (2) the effectiveness of NRC's regulations and oversight of the plants' performance, and (3) NRC's actions to respond to plants' problems controlling their spent fuel.
What GAO Found
Nuclear power plants' performance in controlling and accounting for their spent fuel has been uneven. Most recently, three plants--Vermont Yankee and Humboldt Bay (California) in 2004 and Millstone (Connecticut) in 2000--have reported missing spent fuel. Earlier, several other plants also had missing or unaccounted for spent fuel rods or rod fragments. NRC regulations require plants to maintain accurate records of their spent nuclear fuel and to conduct a physical inventory of the material at least once a year. The regulations, however, do not specify how physical inventories are to be done. As a result, plants differ in the regulations' implementation. For example, physical inventories at plants varied from a comprehensive verification of the spent fuel to an office review of the records and paperwork for consistency. Additionally, NRC regulations do not specify how individual fuel rods or segments are to be tracked. As a result, plants employ various methods for storing and accounting for this material. Further, NRC stopped inspecting plants' material control and accounting programs in 1988. According to NRC officials, there was no indication that inspections of these programs were needed until the event at Millstone. NRC is collecting information on plants' spent fuel programs to decide if it needs to revise its regulations and/or oversight. In addition to reviewing specific instances of missing fuel, NRC has had its inspectors collect basic information on all facilities' programs. It has also contracted with the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee to review NRC's material control and accounting programs for nuclear material, including spent fuel. It further plans to request information from plant sites and visit over a dozen of them for more detailed inspection. These more detailed inspections may not be completed until late 2005, over 5 years after the instance at Millstone that initiated NRC's efforts. However, we believe NRC has already collected considerable information indicating problems or weaknesses in plants' material control and accounting programs for spent fuel. |
gao_GAO-08-91 | gao_GAO-08-91_0 | In 2001, an AT&L policy memorandum designated the Air Force as the Anti- Tamper Executive Agent. DOD Lacks Departmentwide Direction for Implementing its Anti- tamper Policy
DOD has recently taken several actions aimed at raising awareness about its anti-tamper policy and assisting program managers in implementing anti-tamper protection on a weapon system. Despite these actions, DOD still lacks departmentwide direction to implement its anti-tamper policy. Specifically, DOD has developed a guidebook that includes a checklist to assist program managers in identifying security, management, and technical responsibilities when incorporating anti-tamper protection on a weapons system; developed a searchable spreadsheet to assist program managers in developed a Web site for program managers to provide general anti- tamper information, policy resources, conference briefings, implementation resources, and current events; coordinated with Defense Acquisition University to design and launch an online learning module on anti-tamper protection; funded Sandia National Laboratories to study anti-tamper techniques and their general effectiveness; and sponsored research to develop generic anti-tamper techniques through Small Business Innovation Research, a research program that funds early-stage research and development projects at small technology companies. The Navy is also implementing an initiative: a database intended to capture the information that programs across DOD components have identified as critical. Many officials we spoke with pointed to this database as a potential tool to improve identification of critical program information across DOD components. The Missile Defense Agency anti-tamper point of contact stated that its information is classified at a level above what the database can support and its program managers will not submit information for the database unless DOD requires submissions by all DOD components. Program Managers Face Several Challenges in Identifying Critical Technologies, Threats, and Sufficient Anti-tamper Solutions
To determine whether anti-tamper protection is needed, program managers must identify which technologies are deemed critical, determine the potential threats and vulnerabilities to these technologies, and identify sufficient anti-tamper solutions to protect the technologies. However, program managers lack the information or tools needed to make informed assessments at these key decision points. As a result, some technologies that need protection may not be identified or may not have sufficient protection. Limited Information and Coordination on What Is Critical Increase the Risk That Some Technologies May Not Be Identified
Determining technologies that are critical is largely left to the discretion of the program managers. At the same time, there has been limited coordination across programs on technologies that have been identified as critical—creating a stove piped process—which could result in one technology being protected under one program and not protected under another. Despite the risk that some technologies that need protection may not be identified or may not be protected across programs, no formal mechanism exists within DOD to provide a horizontal view of what is critical. For the Navy, critical program information includes software, while hardware is part of what the Navy defines as critical technologies. The potential impact of contradictory intelligence reports is twofold: If the threat is deemed to be low but is actually high, the technology is susceptible to reverse engineering; conversely, if the threat is deemed to be high and is actually low, the anti-tamper solution is more robust than needed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify actions the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy since 2004, we reviewed DOD policies and guidance governing anti-tamper protection on weapon systems and obtained documents on various initiatives. To determine how program managers implemented DOD’s anti-tamper policy, we interviewed officials from 14 program offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) invests billions of dollars on sophisticated weapon systems and technologies. These may be at risk of exploitation when exported, stolen, or lost during combat or routine missions. In an effort to minimize this risk, DOD developed an anti-tamper policy in 1999, calling for DOD components to implement anti-tamper techniques for critical technologies. In March 2004, GAO reported that program managers had difficulties implementing this policy, including identifying critical technologies. This follow-up report (1) describes recent actions DOD has taken to implement its anti-tamper policy and (2) identifies challenges facing program managers. GAO reviewed documentation on actions DOD has taken since 2004 to implement its anti-tamper policy, and interviewed officials from the Anti-Tamper Executive Agent's Office, the military services, other DOD components, and a cross-section of program offices.
What GAO Found
Since 2004, DOD has taken several actions to raise awareness about anti-tamper protection and develop resources that provide program managers with general information on its anti-tamper policy. These actions include developing a Web site with anti-tamper information and events, establishing an online learning module on anti-tamper protection, and sponsoring research on generic anti-tamper techniques. However, DOD lacks departmentwide direction for implementation of its anti-tamper policy. Without such direction, individual DOD components are left on their own to develop initiatives. For example, the Navy is developing a database that is intended to provide a horizontal view of what DOD components have identified as critical program information. While many officials we spoke with pointed to this database as a potential tool for identifying critical technologies that may need anti-tamper protection, the database is currently incomplete. Specifically, the Missile Defense Agency is not providing information because its information is classified at a level above what the database can support. Also, the Air Force is not currently providing information because not all commands have provided consent to participate. At the same time, program managers face challenges implementing DOD's anti-tamper policy--due largely to a lack of information or tools needed to make informed assessments at key decision points. First, program managers have limited information for defining what is critical or insight into what technologies other programs have deemed critical to ensure similar protection across programs. Determining whether technologies are critical is largely left to the discretion of the individual program manager, resulting in an uncoordinated and stove piped process. Therefore, the same technology can be identified as critical in one program office but not another. Second, program managers have not always had sufficient or consistent information from the intelligence community to identify threats and vulnerabilities to technologies that have been identified as critical. The potential impact of inconsistent threat assessments is twofold: If the threat is deemed to be low but is actually high, the technology is susceptible to tampering; conversely, if the threat is deemed to be high and is actually low, an anti-tamper solution is more robust than needed. Finally, program managers have had difficulty selecting sufficient anti-tamper solutions--in part because they lack information and tools, such as risk and cost-estimating models, to determine how much anti-tamper protection is needed. As a result, program managers may select a suboptimal solution. Given these combined challenges, there is an increased risk that some technologies that need protection may not be identified or may not have sufficient protection. |
gao_T-GGD-96-99 | gao_T-GGD-96-99_0 | Tax Administration: IRS’ Fiscal Year 1996 and 1997 Budget Issues and the 1996 Filing Season
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to participate in the Subcommittee’s inquiry into the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) financial condition for 1996, the status of the 1996 filing season, and the administration’s fiscal year 1997 budget request for IRS. Overview of IRS’ Financial Condition in Fiscal Year 1996
IRS’ fiscal year 1996 appropriation was $7.3 billion. That amount was about $860 million less than the President requested for fiscal year 1996 and about $160 million less than IRS’ fiscal year 1995 appropriation. On June 30, 1995, IRS announced a hiring freeze. Because IRS’ cost-cutting measures for fiscal year 1996 focused on seasonal and nonpermanent staff, these two programs were significantly affected. Statistics on the number of notices sent to taxpayers in 1996 concerning SSN problems and refund delays indicate that IRS is indeed delaying fewer refunds. Telephone Accessibility
For the past several years, taxpayers have had difficulty reaching IRS by telephone. In this regard, IRS is requesting an additional $29 million for Cyberfile, an electronic filing system. (2) does IRS have reliable data on the revenue generated by its enforcement activities? | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) financial condition, focusing on the: (1) status of the 1996 filing season; and (2) IRS fiscal year (FY) 1997 budget request.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the FY 1996 appropriation for IRS was $7.3 billion, $860 million less than the President requested and $160 million less than the FY 1995 IRS appropriation; (2) to mitigate the funding shortfall, IRS initiated a hiring freeze and reduced its travel and overtime costs, cash awards, hours for seasonal staff, and nonpermanent staff; (3) IRS is delaying fewer refunds in 1996 and validating taxpayers' social security numbers and earned income credit claims; (4) taxpayers are having an easier time contacting IRS by telephone, with the accessibility rate increasing 9 percent over 1995; (5) IRS is requesting a budget increase of $647 million for FY 1997 to develop certain compliance initiatives and correct weaknesses in the Tax Systems Modernization Program (TSM); and (6) IRS is having problems ensuring data accuracy for revenue generated by its enforcement activities and correcting TSM managerial and technical weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-15-515 | gao_GAO-15-515_0 | These programs include the (1) FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (2) FEMA Public Assistance (PA), (3) HUD Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR), (4) the Department of Transportation’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) Emergency Relief Program (ERP), and (5) USACE’s Sandy Program. The NMF also established MitFLG to help coordinate hazard mitigation efforts of relevant local, state, tribal, and federal organizations. States and Localities Have Used Federal Funds to Help Plan and Implement Hazard Mitigation Projects to Enhance Resilience
States and localities have used funds appropriated to federal agencies by the Sandy Supplemental to plan and implement a variety of hazard mitigation activities, including but not limited to the following types of projects: acquiring and demolishing properties at risk for repeated flooding, elevating flood prone structures, erecting physical flood barriers such as seawalls and berms to protect protecting critical facilities against power loss. As of May 2015, FTA has allocated $9.3 billion for recovery and resilience projects to public transportation agencies affected by Hurricane Sandy. State Officials Reported Successes Using Federal Funds to Enhance Disaster Resilience, but Experienced Challenges That Limited Their Ability to Maximize Those Funds
The 16 groups of state and city officials from the Sandy-affected area that we interviewed reported successes in leveraging federal Sandy recovery efforts to enhance disaster resilience. Challenges generally fell into three categories: (1) specific challenges with the implementation of postdisaster programs where program implementation was not always consistent with agency disaster resilience priorities, (2) challenges from the broader structure of disaster resilience funding that limited a comprehensive approach to reducing overall risk, and (3) local challenges that are not directly in the federal purview but may be exacerbated by other challenges that are. Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Assistance FEMA has multiple programs to help states and localities enhance disaster resilience. In fiscal year 2014, for example, the total appropriation for the entire nation was $25 million. For example, HMGP provided approximately $1.7 billion to New York and New Jersey following Hurricane Sandy. There are advantages to making funds available in the postdisaster environment. State officials we interviewed confirmed that, in their experience, local applicants were more likely to invest their own resources in hazard mitigation activities following a disaster. In some states, state officials reported Hurricane Sandy was a catalyst to strengthen the state’s culture of resilience. State officials told us that these reviews were often time-and resource- consuming, which could dissuade individuals from pursuing hazard mitigation projects. Although there are benefits to investing in disaster-resilience in a postdisaster environment, there are challenges and tradeoffs that may limit effective risk reduction. Further, the lack of a strategic approach increases the risk that the federal government and its nonfederal partners will experience lower returns on investments or lost opportunities to effectively mitigate critical lifelines against known threats and hazards. For example, an investment strategy could: identify the most critical components of disaster resilience, such as critical infrastructure, to help target financial resources in a way that would protect those components from future disasters; identify and oversee an approach to developing the information required to more effectively and accurately determine which, and under what circumstances, investments in disaster resilience reduce overall risk, and in turn reduce federal fiscal exposures to disasters; describe the appropriate balance of federal and nonfederal investment and help to identify how policymakers and program implementers should structure incentives to help reach this balance; and consider the current balance between pre- and postdisaster resource allocation and advise the President and Congress on the benefits and challenges of the current balance, including whether the nation should seek to take a more proactive position in funding and encouraging pre-disaster mitigation activities. These challenges could result in missed opportunities to improve states’ disaster resilience when providing federal funding for that purpose. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase states’ abilities to improve disaster resilience and mitigate future damage when using federal funding in the wake of disasters, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator take the following action: Consistent with the goals of the NDRF to integrate hazard mitigation and risk reduction opportunities into all major decisions and reinvestments during the recovery process, FEMA should assess the challenges state and local officials reported, including the extent to which the challenges can be addressed and implement corrective actions, as needed. To help the federal, state, and local governments plan for and invest in hazard mitigation opportunities to enhance resilience against future disasters, we recommend that the Director of the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group, in coordination with other departments and agencies that are MitFLG members, take the following action: Supplement the National Mitigation Framework by establishing an investment strategy to identify, prioritize, and guide federal investments in disaster resilience and hazard mitigation-related activities and make recommendations to the President and Congress on how the nation should prioritize future disaster resilience investments. DHS stated that FEMA is aware of and acknowledges the challenges state and local officials reported. We also administered the structured interview and survey with officials from New York City’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, which administered some streams of relevant federal funds—including FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and Public Assistance (PA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)— and oversees strategic planning for resilience efforts, the New York Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery, which is largely responsible for administering FEMA HMGP and HUD CDBG-DR funds, and the New Jersey Governor’s Office of Recovery and Rebuilding, which coordinates the state’s recovery effort, including overseeing resilience priorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 appropriated about $50 billion for recovery from Hurricane Sandy, part of which was intended for disaster resilience and hazard mitigation. In March 2015, GAO identified the cost of disasters as a key source of federal fiscal exposure. GAO and others have advocated hazard mitigation to help limit the nation's fiscal exposure.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to strengthen disaster resilience during Hurricane Sandy recovery. This report addresses (1) how federal recovery funds were used to enhance resilience, (2) the extent to which states and localities were able to maximize federal funding to enhance resilience; and (3) actions that could enhance resilience for future disasters.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed key federal documents such as the National Mitigation Framework , interviewed federal officials responsible for programs that fund disaster resilience, and administered structured interviews and surveys to all 12 states, the District of Columbia, and New York City in the Sandy affected-region.
What GAO Found
During the Hurricane Sandy Recovery, five federal programs—the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA), Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the Federal Transit Administration's Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Hurricane Sandy program—helped enhance disaster resilience—the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to disasters. These programs funded a number of disaster-resilience measures, for example, acquiring and demolishing at-risk properties, elevating flood-prone structures, and erecting physical flood barriers.
State and local officials from the states affected by Hurricane Sandy GAO contacted reported that they were able to effectively leverage federal programs to enhance disaster resilience, but also experienced challenges that could result in missed opportunities. The challenges fell into three categories:
implementation challenges with PA and HMGP—for example, officials reported that FEMA officials did not always help them pursue opportunities to incorporate mitigation into permanent construction recovery projects;
limitations on comprehensive risk reduction approaches in a postdisaster environment—for example, officials reported difficulties with navigating multiple funding streams and various regulations of the different federal programs funded after Hurricane Sandy; and
local ability and willingness to participate—for example, officials reported that some home and business owners were unwilling or unable to bear the required personal cost share for a home-elevation or other mitigation project.
FEMA officials told us that they were aware of some of these challenges and recognize the need to further assess them. Assessing the challenges and taking corrective actions, as needed, could help enhance disaster resilience.
There is no comprehensive, strategic approach to identifying, prioritizing and implementing investments for disaster resilience, which increases the risk that the federal government and nonfederal partners will experience lower returns on investments or lost opportunities to strengthen key critical infrastructure and lifelines. Most federal funding for hazard mitigation is available after a disaster. For example, from fiscal years 2011-2014, FEMA obligated more than $3.2 billion for HMGP postdisaster hazard mitigation while the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program obligated approximately $222 million. There are benefits to investing in resilience postdisaster. Individuals and communities affected by a disaster may be more likely to invest their own resources while recovering. However, there are also challenges. Specifically, the emphasis on the postdisaster environment can create a reactionary and fragmented approach where disasters determine when and for what purpose the federal government invests in disaster resilience. The Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG) was created to help coordinate hazard mitigation efforts of relevant local, state, tribal, and federal organizations. A comprehensive investment strategy, coordinated by MitFLG, could help address some challenges state and local officials experienced.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) FEMA assess the challenges state and local officials reported and implement corrective actions as needed and (2) MitFLG establish an investment strategy to identify, prioritize, and implement federal investments in disaster resilience. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with both. |
gao_GAO-13-104 | gao_GAO-13-104_0 | A provider’s Medicare billing privileges are terminated. While the program integrity contractors have been using these systems to support CMS’s efforts to identify improper and potentially fraudulent payments of Medicare claims, they have not previously had access to information technology systems and tools from CMS that were designed specifically to identify potentially fraudulent claims before they were paid. In defining requirements for the system to address the mandate of the Small Business Jobs Act, these program officials planned to implement by July 1, 2011, system software for analyzing fee-for- service claims data, along with predictive analytic models that use historic Medicare claims and other data to identify high-risk claims and providers. In addition, the system was integrated with existing data sources and systems that process claims, but it was not yet integrated with CMS’s claims payment systems. As required by the act, CMS integrated FPS with existing data sources and systems that process claims. However, FPS program officials had not yet developed such schedules and did not indicate when they intend to do so. Until it develops reliable schedules for completing associated tasks, the agency will be at risk of experiencing additional delays in further integrating FPS with the payment processing system, and CMS and its program integrity analysts may lack the capability needed to prevent payment of potentially fraudulent claims identified by FPS until they are determined by program integrity analysts to be valid. By prioritizing these investigations, these officials told us that they intend for ZPICs to target suspect providers for investigation as soon as aberrant billing patterns that are consistent with fraud are identified, rather than targeting providers that have already received large amounts of potentially fraudulent payments. CMS’s Use of FPS Has Generally Been Consistent with Practices Identified by Private Insurers and Medicaid Programs
CMS’s use of FPS has generally been consistent with key practices for using predictive analytics technologies identified by private insurers and state Medicaid programs we interviewed. CMS has taken steps to publicize FPS among providers. CMS Has Not Defined and Measured Quantifiable Benefits and Performance Goals for FPS
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and OMB guidance emphasize the need for agencies to forecast expected financial benefits of major investments in information technology and measure actual benefits accrued through implementation. With regard to FPS, CMS had not yet defined an approach for quantifying the financial benefits expected from the use of the system. According to program officials, FPS stakeholders, such as CPI program managers, provided input into the development of these measures. In this regard, quantifiable financial benefits and measureable performance targets and goals provide information needed to conduct post-implementation reviews of systems. Until the agency conducts its post-implementation review of FPS, CMS will be unable to determine whether the use of the system is beneficial and effective in supporting program integrity analysts’ ability to prevent payment of fraudulent claims, a key component of the agency’s broader strategy for preventing fraud in the Medicare program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the implementation of FPS is successful in helping the agency meet the goals and objectives of its fraud prevention strategy, we are recommending that the Secretary of HHS direct the Administrator of CMS to define quantifiable benefits expected as a result of using the system, along with mechanisms for measuring them, and describe outcome-based performance targets and milestones that can be measured to gauge improvements to the agency’s fraud prevention initiatives attributable to the implementation of FPS. We are also recommending that the Secretary direct the Administrator of CMS to develop schedules for completing plans to further integrate FPS with the claims payment processing systems that identify all resources and activities needed to complete tasks and that consider risks and obstacles to the program, and conduct a post-implementation review of the system to determine whether it is effective in providing the expected financial benefits and supporting CMS’s efforts to accomplish the goals of its fraud prevention program. HHS also provided technical comments on the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the status of implementation and use of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Fraud Prevention System (FPS) within the agency’s existing information technology infrastructure, (2) describe how the agency uses FPS to identify and investigate potentially fraudulent payments, (3) assess how the agency’s use of FPS compares to private insurers’ and Medicaid programs’ practices, and (4) determine the extent to which CMS defined and measured benefits and performance goals for the system and has identified and met milestones for achieving those goals. We focused our analysis on the extent to which CMS implemented and used the predictive analytics system within the existing IT infrastructure. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program, in part because its complexity makes it particularly vulnerable to fraud. CMS, as the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for administering Medicare and reducing fraud, uses a variety of systems that are intended to identity fraudulent payments. To enhance these efforts, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 provided funds for and required CMS to implement predictive analytics technologies--automated systems and tools that can help identify fraudulent claims before they are paid. In turn, CMS developed FPS.
GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the implementation and use of FPS, (2) describe how the agency uses FPS to identify and investigate potentially fraudulent payments, (3) assess how the agency's use of FPS compares to private insurers' and Medicaid programs' practices, and (4) determine the extent to which CMS has defined and measured benefits and performance goals for the system. To do this, GAO reviewed program documentation, held discussions with state Medicaid officials and private insurers, and interviewed CMS officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented its Fraud Prevention System (FPS) in July 2011, as required by the Small Business Jobs Act, and the system is being used by CMS and its program integrity contractors who conduct investigations of potentially fraudulent claims. Specifically, FPS analyzes Medicare claims data using models of fraudulent behavior, which results in automatic alerts on specific claims and providers, which are then prioritized for program integrity analysts to review and investigate as appropriate. However, while the system draws on a host of existing Medicare data sources and has been integrated with existing systems that process claims, it has not yet been integrated with the agency's payment-processing system to allow for the prevention of payments until suspect claims can be determined to be valid. Program officials stated that this functionality has been delayed due to the time required to develop system requirements; they estimated that it will be implemented by January 2013 but had not yet developed reliable schedules for completing this activity.
FPS is intended by program integrity officials to help facilitate the agency's shift from focusing on recovering large amounts of fraudulent payments after they have been made, to taking actions to prevent payments as soon as aberrant billing patterns are identified. Specifically, CMS has directed its program integrity contractors to prioritize alerts generated by the system and to focus on administrative actions--such as revocations of suspect providers' Medicare billing privileges--that can stop payment of fraudulent claims. To this end, the system has been incorporated into the contractors' existing investigative processes. CMS has also taken steps to address challenges contractors initially faced in using FPS, such as shifting priorities, workload challenges, and issues with system functionality.
Program integrity analysts' use of FPS has generally been consistent with key practices for using predictive analytics identified by private insurers and state Medicaid programs. These include using a variety of data sources; collaborating among system developers, investigative staff, and external stakeholders; and publicizing the use of predictive analytics to deter fraud.
CMS has not yet defined or measured quantifiable benefits, or established appropriate performance goals. To ensure that investments in information technology deliver value, agencies should forecast expected financial benefits and measure benefits accrued. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget requires agencies to define performance measures for systems that reflect program goals and to conduct post-implementation reviews to determine whether objectives are being met. However, CMS had not defined an approach for quantifying benefits or measuring the performance of FPS. Further, agency officials had not conducted a post-implementation review to determine whether FPS is effective in supporting efforts to prevent payment of fraudulent claims. Until program officials review the effectiveness of the system based on quantifiable benefits and measurable performance targets, they will not be able to determine the extent to which FPS is enhancing CMS's ability to accomplish the goals of its fraud prevention program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS develop schedules for completing integration with existing systems, define and report to Congress quantifiable benefits and measurable performance targets and milestones, and conduct a post-implementation review of FPS. In its comments, HHS agreed with and described actions CMS was taking to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-237 | gao_GAO-16-237_0 | Small Water Utilities in Selected States Are Implementing Some Asset Management Practices, and EPA, USDA, and State Officials Have Identified Benefits and Challenges
The small water utilities we interviewed in our sample of 10 states are implementing some asset management practices, and the state SRF officials we interviewed in these states said that large water utilities are more likely to implement asset management practices than small water utilities. Officials at almost all (23 of 25) of the small water utilities in the selected states told us they had maps that identify the location of at least some of their assets. Minimum life-cycle cost. Officials from 19 of the 25 small water utilities we reviewed in the selected states told us they conduct regular maintenance, but officials from 9 of 25 said they knew the cost of rehabilitation versus the cost of replacement for all water utility’s assets. Long-term funding plan. Cost savings. Human resources. Information. Political support. EPA and USDA recognize the benefits to water utilities and their loan programs and the need for water utilities, particularly small water utilities, to increase their use of asset management, but the agencies do not collect information on asset management that would enable them to track their efforts or compile information on costs and benefits that could be used to encourage wider use. To help small water utilities implement asset management, EPA and USDA provide funding for the development of asset management plans, free or low-cost tools such as software to develop asset management programs and plans, classroom training, and one-on-one technical assistance or coaching. First, EPA and USDA do not collect information that tracks the results of the agencies’ training efforts (e.g., whether participating utilities use asset management practices). This is consistent with our January 2004 report on selected agencies’ experiences and lessons learned in designing training and development programs and our March 2004 guide on assessing strategic training and development efforts for human capital, in which we reported that evaluating training programs is key to ensuring that training is effective in contributing to the accomplishment of agency goals and objectives. In addition, both EPA and USDA collect feedback from water utilities on their experience in training. According to these officials, the agency did not receive enough responses to analyze and include the data in the final reports. EPA and USDA officials told us that they had not considered compiling information about the benefits of asset management into one source, and they are not required to. However, providing information on benefits and costs to those who have not attended the agencies’ trainings could help encourage them to adopt asset management practices. An EPA official told us that, in 2006, the agency considered compiling information on cost savings by asking a question in a potential nationwide study of water utilities’ use of asset management but did not pursue this study because, among other things, the agency did not have the resources to pay for it at that time. Existing data collection efforts such as EPA’s needs assessment surveys may be a cost-effective means of doing this. By continuing to include questions in the clean water needs assessment survey and considering questions about water utilities’ use of asset management to include in the drinking water needs assessment survey, EPA may have better assurance that it is collecting information in a cost- effective way to assess the results of its asset management training efforts with USDA. Recommendations for Executive Action
As EPA and USDA continue to consider ways to track and promote water utilities’ implementation of asset management, we recommend the following:
First, that the Administrator of EPA direct the Office of Groundwater and Drinking Water and Office of Wastewater Management to continue to include questions on water utilities’ use of asset management in the clean water needs assessment and consider including questions about water utilities’ use of asset management in future drinking water infrastructure needs assessment surveys. IV), EPA generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. Our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about the use of asset management among the nation’s water utilities—particularly small water utilities—including benefits and challenges, if any, for water utilities implementing asset management and (2) steps, if any, that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are taking to help small water utilities implement asset management. EPA’s 2011 Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey and Assessment calculated the need among small water utilities serving fewer than 10,000 people for 35 of the 50 states. During these interviews, we asked officials to estimate the use of asset management practices by water utilities’ in their state, the benefits for utilities and lenders of using asset management, the challenges small utilities experience in implementing asset management, funding and technical assistance for asset management available to water utilities in their state, and the asset management practices for which small utilities are most in need of technical assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent catastrophic breaks in water mains and sewer discharges during storms are indicators of the nation's old and deteriorating water and wastewater infrastructure. EPA estimates that small water utilities—those serving fewer than 10,000 people--may need about $143 billion for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure repairs and replacement over 20 years. EPA and USDA provide the three largest sources of federal funding for water infrastructure. In a March 2004 report, GAO found that water utilities may benefit from implementing asset management—a tool used across a variety of sectors to manage physical assets, such as roads and buildings.
GAO was asked to review water utilities' use of asset management. This report examines (1) what is known about the use of asset management among the nation's water utilities—particularly small water utilities— including benefits and challenges and (2) steps EPA and USDA are taking to help small water utilities implement asset management. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 25 water utilities in 10 states based on largest infrastructure needs and interviewed EPA, USDA, state, and water utility officials.
What GAO Found
The small water utilities GAO reviewed in 10 selected states are implementing some asset management practices, although state officials said that large water utilities are more likely to implement asset management than small utilities. The asset management practices these small utilities used include identifying key assets, such as pipelines, treatment plants, and other facilities, and assessing their life-cycle costs. For example, officials from 23 of the 25 small water utilities GAO reviewed said they had maps that identify the location of at least some of their assets. However, of the 25 small water utilities, officials from 9 said they knew the cost of rehabilitation versus replacement for all of their assets. Officials from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the 10 selected states identified benefits and challenges for small water utilities using asset management. The benefits that EPA, USDA, and state officials identified include cost savings and more efficient long-term planning. The key challenges these officials identified include the availability of funding to cover start-up and maintenance costs, the availability of human resources, information on how to implement asset management practices, and political support from elected officials to begin an asset management program or increase user rates.
EPA and USDA are taking steps to help water utilities implement asset management by providing funding, free or low-cost tools such as software, one-on-one technical assistance, and classroom training for small water utilities that plan to implement asset management practices. EPA and USDA collect feedback from training participants, but do not collect information that will help track the results of the agencies' training efforts (e.g., whether utilities participating in such training implemented asset management practices). GAO identified in a March 2004 guide that evaluating training programs is key to ensuring training is effective in contributing to the accomplishment of agency goals and objectives. EPA officials told GAO that they had considered collecting nationwide data on water utilities' use of asset management but did not have the resources to pursue it. Leveraging existing data collection methods may be a cost-effective way for the agencies to collect this information. EPA conducts periodic needs assessment surveys of water utilities and has included questions about asset management use in the wastewater survey, but not in the drinking water survey. EPA officials said they did not receive enough responses to questions in the wastewater survey, and they have not considered including them in the drinking water survey. By continuing to include questions on wastewater utilities and considering questions about drinking water utilities' use of asset management in the surveys, EPA could have better assurance that it has information on the effectiveness of its training efforts with USDA. In addition, EPA and USDA officials told GAO that the agencies share anecdotal data on the benefits of asset management through technical assistance, but had not considered compiling such information into one document to encourage water utilities to adopt it. EPA and USDA are not required to compile such information, but doing so could provide information on benefits, including cost savings, and costs to water utilities that have not received training and could help encourage them to adopt asset management practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA consider collecting information about utilities' use of asset management through its needs assessment surveys, and that EPA and USDA compile the benefits of asset management into one document. EPA and USDA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-39 | gao_NSIAD-98-39_0 | These estimates totaled nearly $7 billion for unclassified programs and activities for fiscal year 1997, and should be considered a minimum estimate of federal spending for unclassified terrorism-related programs and activities. The amounts for governmentwide terrorism-related funding and spending are uncertain because (1) definitions of antiterrorism and counterterrorism vary from agency to agency; (2) in most cases agencies do not have separate budget line items for terrorism-related activities; (3) some agency functions serve more than one purpose, and it is difficult to allocate costs applicable to terrorism alone (e.g., U.S. embassy security measures protect not only against terrorism but also against theft, compromise of classified documents, and violent demonstrations); (4) some agencies, such as the Departments of Energy and Transportation, have decentralized budgeting and accounting functions and do not aggregate terrorism-related funding agencywide; (5) programs and activities may receive funding from more than one appropriation within a given agency, which makes it difficult to track collective totals; and (6) appropriations legislation often is not clear regarding which amounts are designated to combat terrorism. Key Interagency Management Functions Are Not Clearly Required or Performed
There is no interagency mechanism to centrally manage funding requirements and requests to ensure an efficient, focused governmentwide application of federal funds to numerous agencies’ programs designed to combat terrorism. Further, because terrorism-related funding requirements and proposals have not been prioritized across agencies, OMB could not have fully considered tradeoffs among competing demands. The principles underlying the Results Act provide guidance that the many federal agencies responsible for combating terrorism can use to develop coordinated goals, objectives, and performance measures and to improve the management of individual agency and overall federal efforts to combat terrorism. Otherwise, the Economy Act would have required the FBI to reimburse DOD for the transportation costs. Conclusions
Billions of dollars are being spent by numerous agencies with roles or potential roles in combating terrorism, but because no federal entity has been tasked to collect such information across the government, the specific amount is unknown. Recommendations
We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for coordinating efforts to combat terrorism, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC, in consultation with the Director, OMB, and the heads of other executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities to implement the national counterterrorism policy and strategy are established; (2) agencies’ programs, projects, activities, and requirements for combating terrorism are analyzed in relation to established governmentwide priorities; and (3) resources are allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack. To ensure that federal expenditures for terrorism-related activities are well-coordinated and focused on efficiently meeting the goals of U.S. policy under PDD 39, we recommend that the Director, OMB, use data on funds budgeted and spent by executive departments and agencies to evaluate and coordinate projects and recommend resource allocation annually on a crosscutting basis to ensure that governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism are met and programs are based on analytically sound threat and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication. DOD commented that although PDD 39 states that support provided by a federal agency to the lead federal agency in support of counterterrorist operations is borne by the providing agency, PDD 39 is not a statute, and does not provide authority to waive reimbursement that is required by the Economy Act. 3. 4. The report acknowledges that OMB reviews agencies’ individual budget requests, and suggests that this process would be enhanced if federal funding proposals were reviewed on a crosscutting, governmentwide basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed interagency processes intended to ensure the efficient allocation of funding and resources for the federal government's efforts to combat terrorism, focusing on: (1) federal funding for unclassified programs and activities to combat terrorism; (2) whether any agency or entity has been designated to coordinate budget proposals, establish priorities, manage funding requirements, and help ensure the efficient allocation of federal resources for combating terrorism across federal agencies; (3) opportunities for agencies to expand coordination of terrorism-related programs and activities under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) principles and framework; and (4) issues concerning the reimbursement of support provided to agencies with lead counterterrorism responsibilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the amount of federal funds being spent on combating terrorism is unknown and difficult to determine; (2) identifying and tracking terrorism-related governmentwide spending with precision is difficult for several reasons; (3) information from key agencies involved in combating terrorism shows that nearly $7 billion was spent for unclassified terrorism-related programs and activities during fiscal year (FY) 1997; (4) the Department of Defense budgeted about $3.7 billion in FY 1997, or about 55 percent of the estimated spending; (5) although the National Security Council (NSC) is to coordinate counterterrorism policy issues and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to assess competing funding demands, neither agency is required to regularly collect, aggregate, and review funding and spending data relative to combating terrorism on a crosscutting, governmentwide basis; (6) neither agency establishes funding priorities for terrorism-related programs across agencies' budgets or ensures that individual agencies' stated requirements have been validated against threat and risk criteria before budget requests are submitted to Congress; (7) because governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism have not been established and funding requirements have not necessarily been validated based on an analytically sound assessment of the threat and risk of a terrorist attack, there is no basis to have reasonable assurance that: (a) agencies' requests are funded through a coordinated and focused approach to implement national policy and strategy; (b) the highest priority requirements are being met; (c) terrorism-related activities and capabilities are not unnecessarily duplicative or redundant; and (d) funding gaps or misallocations have not occurred; (8) GPRA principles and framework can provide guidance and opportunities for the many federal agencies involved in the crosscutting program to combat terrorism to develop coordinated goals, objectives and performance measures, and to enhance the management of individual agency and overall federal efforts; (9) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 directs that agencies will provide support for terrorism-related activities at their own expense unless the President directs otherwise; (10) the Economy Act generally requires reimbursement for goods and services provided to another agency; and (11) the difference between PDD 39 and the Economy Act concerning reimbursement has caused disagreements between agencies in some cases. |
gao_GAO-10-1015 | gao_GAO-10-1015_0 | WIF funding supports the participation of PfP countries in bilateral and multilateral military exercises and military contact programs, including seminars, workshops, conferences, exchanges, and visits. The PfP Has Evolved in Several Key Ways Due to Changing Political Circumstances and Security Threats
The PfP program has evolved in four key ways since July 2001, when we last reported on the program. Second, NATO has developed additional mechanisms for engaging with PfP countries, allowing partners additional opportunities to tailor their participation in the PfP based upon their individual objectives and capacities. Fourth, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe. The Number of PfP Countries Aspiring to Membership Has Declined
Since 2001, several PfP countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, resulting in a decline in the total number of PfP countries and the number of PfP countries aspiring to NATO membership. Thirteen countries participate in the Operational Capabilities Concept. NATO Has Placed an Increased Emphasis on Obtaining Support from PfP Countries for Its Operation in Afghanistan
The growing size and significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has increased both NATO’s emphasis on developing PfP countries’ capabilities for participating in NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries to NATO, given their proximity to Afghanistan. NATO Is Considering Ways to Strengthen Its Partnerships as Part of the Development of Its New Strategic Concept
NATO’s new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance of the PfP and other NATO partnerships and discuss ways to strengthen these partnerships further. Specifically, NATO is debating how to (1) strengthen its partnerships with countries outside of the PfP, (2) enhance routine and crisis consultations with PfP countries on security issues, (3) more effectively engage with PfP countries, such as those in Central Asia, that are not seeking membership, and (4) balance PfP countries’ aspirations for membership with Russian concerns about NATO expansion. Some NATO members, including the United States, have advocated for NATO to pursue a more global partnership agenda. Although Eligible Countries and the Focus of the WIF Program Have Changed, DOD Has Not Evaluated the Program since 2001
As a result of the changing composition of countries in the PfP program, total WIF funding dropped significantly in 2006, and the majority of funds are no longer distributed to countries aspiring to join NATO. DOD also established the DIB program in 2006 as a key focus of the WIF program; however, this relatively new program has faced challenges with its implementation. According to DOD officials, the decline in the number of WIF-eligible countries contributed to the decreases in WIF budgets. From fiscal years 1996 through 2005, total annual WIF funding averaged about $43 million. Approved activities in the fiscal year 2010 budget for the DIB program included assisting with strategic defense reviews; developing defense planning, budgeting, and resource management systems; developing professional military education programs; improving human resource management systems; and preparing countries to contribute to peacekeeping operations. In addition, the challenges DOD has faced in implementing the WIF-funded DIB program, including potential duplication of other U.S.-funded assistance, heighten the need to assess whether the WIF program is effectively supporting PfP countries’ goals for cooperation with NATO and NATO’s efforts to deepen its relationships with partner countries. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that, following the establishment of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which could result in changes to NATO’s PfP program, the Secretary of Defense conduct an evaluation of the U.S. WIF program to ensure that it effectively supports the goals of NATO’s PfP program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe how the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has evolved since GAO last reported on it; (2) describe options the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is considering for the future of the PfP and other partnership programs under the new Strategic Concept; and (3) analyze support to PfP countries through the U.S. Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) program. To address these objectives, we analyzed NATO, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of State (State) documents; academic literature related to PfP and WIF programs; and WIF funding data for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to increase cooperation with former Warsaw Pact members and provide many of these countries with a path to NATO membership. As NATO confronts new security challenges, including the war in Afghanistan, its relationships with partner countries have grown in scope and importance. Additionally, NATO is developing a new Strategic Concept to clarify its mission and activities, including its relationship with PfP countries and other partners. The Department of Defense (DOD)-funded Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) supports the goals of the PfP program. GAO was asked to review (1) how the PfP program has evolved since GAO last reported on it in 2001; (2) options NATO is considering for the future of the PfP and other partnership programs; and (3) support to PfP countries through the U.S. WIF program. GAO analyzed NATO, DOD, and State Department (State) documents; and WIF funding data. GAO also interviewed DOD, State, NATO, and selected country officials.
What GAO Found
The PfP program has evolved in four key ways since July 2001, when GAO last reported on it. First, several former PfP countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become NATO members, resulting in both a decline in the number of countries participating in the PfP and in the number of PfP countries seeking NATO membership. Second, NATO has developed additional mechanisms for engaging with PfP countries, allowing partners additional opportunities to tailor their participation in the PfP based upon their individual objectives and capacities. Third, the growing size and significance of the NATO operation in Afghanistan has increased NATO's emphasis on developing PfP countries' capabilities for participating in NATO military operations and the strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asian PfP countries. Fourth, as NATO has taken steps to wind down its peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, it has increasingly used the PfP to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region, marking a shift in its role in stabilizing that part of Europe. NATO's new Strategic Concept is expected to highlight the importance of the PfP and other NATO partnerships, and discuss ways to strengthen them further. First, NATO is debating how to strengthen its partnerships with a growing number of countries outside of the PfP. Some NATO members disagree about the extent to which NATO should pursue a more global partnership agenda. Second, NATO is considering options to enhance its routine and crisis consultations with PfP countries on security issues. Third, NATO is evaluating how to more effectively engage with PfP countries, such as those in Central Asia, that are not seeking NATO membership. Fourth, NATO is debating how to best balance PfP countries' aspirations for membership with Russian concerns about NATO expansion. The changing composition of countries participating in the PfP program has affected the budget and focus of the WIF program, which supports the participation of PfP countries in military exercises and military contact programs. The decline in the number of countries in the PfP program contributed to a drop in average annual WIF funding from about $43 million in fiscal years 1996 through 2005 to about $29 million in fiscal years 2006 through 2010, according to a DOD official. Moreover, WIF funding is no longer concentrated on PfP countries aspiring to join NATO, as it was in the initial years of the program. In 2006, DOD established the Defense Institution Building program as a key focus of the WIF program to help PfP countries develop more professional and transparent defense establishments. Planned activities included assisting with strategic defense reviews; and developing defense planning, budgeting, and resource management systems, among others. DOD has encountered challenges implementing this program, including potential duplication with other U.S. assistance in some countries and limited interest from other countries, which have contributed to frequent cancellations of planned activities. DOD has not formally evaluated the WIF program since 2001, although there have been changes since then in the composition of participating countries and the focus of the WIF program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, following the establishment of NATO's new Strategic Concept, which could result in changes to NATO's PfP program, the Secretary of Defense conduct an evaluation of the U.S. WIF program to ensure that it effectively supports the goals of NATO's PfP program. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-33 | gao_GAO-17-33_0 | This requirement is described in additional detail later in this report. Each of these can affect older adults with guardians, as well as those without. The Extent of Elder Abuse by Guardians Is Unknown, and Available Information Varies by State and Locality, but Some Efforts Are Under Way to Gather More Data
Courts Lack Comprehensive Data on Older Adults in Guardianships and Elder Abuse by Guardians, but Some Courts Have Limited Information
The extent of elder abuse by guardians nationally is unknown due to limited data on the numbers of guardians serving older adults, older adults in guardianships, and cases of elder abuse by a guardian. While courts are responsible for guardianship appointment and monitoring activities, among other things, court officials from the six selected states that we spoke to were not able to provide exact numbers of guardians for older adults or of older adults with guardians in their states. Court officials from the six states we spoke with described the varied, albeit limited, information they have related to elder abuse by guardians and noted the various data limitations that prevented them from providing reliable figures on the extent of elder abuse by a guardian. Detailed information on financial exploitation specifically may be available at the county level. Court officials directed us to state Adult Protective Services (APS) elder abuse complaint data. The illustrative examples of selected closed cases of elder abuse by a guardian we identified are nongeneralizable and cannot be used to make inferences about the overall population of guardians. Stakeholders we spoke to described their observations about elder abuse by a guardian. Federal, State, and Local Entities Have Some Efforts Under Way to Collect More Information on Elder Abuse by Guardians
Federal, state, and local entities have some efforts under way to try to collect better data on elder abuse and guardianship to support decision making and help prevent and address elder abuse by guardians. In 2013, HHS’s Administration on Aging began developing the National Adult Maltreatment Reporting System (NAMRS)—a national reporting system based on standardized data submitted by state APS agency information systems. According to HHS officials and the contractor developing NAMRS, this system will have the capability to collect information that could help identify cases of elder abuse where a guardian was involved. Compiling data points. Representatives from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) are using data collected from Minnesota’s Conservator Account Auditing Program to identify “red flags,”—or risk indicators—such as unusually high guardian fees or excessive vehicle or dining expenses that would help courts detect cases that need additional review or monitoring. Federal Agencies Provide Funding to Support Coordination and Sharing Information, While State and Local Entities Oversee the Guardianship Process to Help Protect Older Adults with Guardians from Abuse
Federal Agencies’ Measures to Help Protect Older Adults with Guardians Include Providing Funding to Support Coordination and Sharing Information
While the federal government does not regulate or directly support guardianship, federal agencies, such as HHS, may provide indirect support to state guardianship programs by providing funding for efforts to share best practices and facilitate improved coordination. The federal government also shares information that state and local entities can use related to guardianship. State and Local Measures Can Include Screening, Education, Monitoring, and Enforcement
State and local courts have primary responsibility over the guardianship process and, hence, have a role in protecting older adults with guardians from abuse. For example, a court official in Washington told us some reviews are paper audits where no one conducts a site visit to the person under guardianship to verify his or her well-being. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. Guardianships: Cases of Financial Exploitation, Neglect, and Abuse of Seniors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of older adults, those over age 65, is expected to nearly double in the United States by 2050. When an older adult becomes incapable of making informed decisions, a guardianship may be necessary. Generally, guardianships are legal relationships created when a state court grants one person or entity the authority and responsibility to make decisions in the best interest of an incapacitated individual—which can include an older adult—concerning his or her person or property. While many guardians act in the best interest of persons under guardianship, some have been reported to engage in the abuse of older adults.
GAO was asked to review whether abusive practices by guardians are widespread. This report describes (1) what is known about the extent of elder abuse by guardians; and (2) what measures federal agencies and selected state and local guardianship programs have taken to help protect older adults with guardians.
GAO reviewed relevant research, reports, studies, and other publications issued by organizations with expertise on elder abuse and guardianship issues. GAO also conducted interviews with various guardianship stakeholders including federal agencies such as HHS, six selected state courts, and nongovernmental organizations with expertise in guardianship-related issues. In addition, GAO identified eight closed cases of abuse by guardians in which there was a criminal conviction or finding of civil or administrative liability to use as nongeneralizable illustrative examples. GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The extent of elder abuse by guardians nationally is unknown due to limited data on key factors related to elder abuse by a guardian, such as the numbers of guardians serving older adults, older adults in guardianships, and cases of elder abuse by a guardian. Court officials from six selected states GAO spoke to noted various data limitations that prevent them from being able to provide reliable figures about elder abuse by guardians, including incomplete information about the ages of individuals with guardians. Officials from selected courts and representatives from organizations GAO spoke to described their observations about elder abuse by a guardian, including that one of the most common types appeared to be financial exploitation. Some efforts are under way to try to collect better data on elder abuse and guardianship at the federal, state, and local levels to support decision making and help prevent and address elder abuse by guardians. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) plans to launch the National Adult Maltreatment Reporting System—a national reporting system based on data from state Adult Protective Services (APS) agency information systems by early 2017. According to HHS and its contractor, this system has the capability to collect information that could specifically help identify cases of elder abuse where a guardian was involved. GAO also identified state and local initiatives to capture key data points and complaint data as well as identify “red flags” such as unusually high guardian fees or excessive vehicle or dining expenses.
The federal government does not regulate or directly support guardianship, but federal agencies may provide indirect support to state guardianship programs by providing funding for efforts to share best practices and facilitate improved coordination, as well as by sharing information that state and local entities can use related to guardianship. State and local courts have primary responsibility over the guardianship process and, as such, have a role in protecting older adults with guardians from abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Measures taken by selected states to help protect older adults with guardians vary but generally include screening, education, monitoring, and enforcement. |
gao_GAO-05-629T | gao_GAO-05-629T_0 | The expected growth combined with the fact that DOD accounted for more than half of all discretionary spending in fiscal year 2004 raises concerns about the sustainability and affordability of increased defense spending. Pervasive Business Management Weaknesses Place DOD’s Overall Business Transformation at Risk
Numerous management problems, inefficiencies, and wasted resources continue to trouble DOD’s business operations, resulting in billions of dollars of wasted resources annually at a time when our nation is facing an increasing fiscal imbalance. The 8 DOD specific high-risk areas, along with six government-wide areas that apply to DOD, mean that the department is responsible for 14 of 25 high-risk areas. We now consider DOD’s overall approach to business transformation to be a high-risk area because (1) DOD’s business improvement initiatives and control over resources are fragmented; (2) DOD lacks a clear strategic and integrated business transformation plan and an investment strategy, including a well-defined enterprise architecture, to guide and constrain implementation of such a plan; and (3) DOD has not designated a senior management official responsible and accountable for overall business transformation reform and related resources. DOD spends billions of dollars to sustain key business operations intended to support the warfighter. DOD needs to develop a plan to better guide and sustain the implementation of its diverse business transformation initiatives in an integrated fashion. To ensure these three elements are incorporated into the department’s overall business management, we believe Congress should legislatively create a full-time, high-level executive with long-term “good government” responsibilities that are professional and nonpartisan in nature. The CMO would not assume the responsibilities of the undersecretaries of defense, the services, and other DOD entities for the day-to-day management of business activities. Chief Management Official Is Essential for Sustained Leadership of Business Management Reform
As DOD embarks on large-scale business transformation efforts, we believe that the complexity and long-term nature of these efforts requires the development of an executive position capable of providing strong and sustained change management leadership across the department—and over a number of years and various administrations. The position would divide and institutionalize the current functions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense into a Deputy Secretary who, as the alter ego of the Secretary, would focus on policy-related issues such as military transformation, and a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management, the CMO, who would be responsible and accountable for the overall business transformation effort and would serve full-time as the strategic integrator of DOD’s business transformation efforts by, for example, developing and implementing a strategic and integrated plan for business transformation efforts. DOD continues to face pervasive, decades-old management problems related to its business operations and these problems affect all of DOD’s major business areas. In this time of growing fiscal constraints, every dollar that DOD can save through improved economy and efficiency of its operations is important to the well-being of our nation. Second, we believe that the implementation of two proposed legislative initiatives—establishing central control of business system funds and creating a CMO—is crucial. We believe that a CMO, serving a 7-year term with the potential for reappointment, would have the institutional clout and an adequate term in office to work with DOD’s senior leadership across administrations to make business transformation a reality. | Why GAO Did This Study
In addition to external security threats, our nation is threatened from within by growing fiscal imbalances. The combination of additional demands for national and homeland security resources, the long-term rate of growth of entitlement programs, and rising health care costs create the need to make difficult choices about the affordability and sustainability of the recent growth in defense spending. At a time when the Department of Defense (DOD) is challenged to maintain a high level of military operations while competing for resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, DOD's business management weaknesses continue to result in billions in annual waste, as well as reduced efficiencies and effectiveness. Congress asked GAO to provide its views on (1) the fiscal trends that prompt real questions about the affordability and sustainability of the rate of growth of defense spending, (2) business management challenges that DOD needs to address to successfully transform its business operations, and (3) key elements for achievement of reforms. One key element would be to establish a full-time chief management official (CMO) to take the lead in DOD for the overall business transformation effort. In this regard, we support the need for legislation to create a CMO in DOD with "good government" responsibilities that are professional and nonpartisan in nature, coupled with an adequate term in office.
What GAO Found
Our nation's current fiscal policy is on an imprudent and unsustainable course and the projected fiscal gap is too great to be solved by economic growth alone or by making modest changes to existing spending and tax policies. In fiscal year 2004, DOD's spending represented about 51 percent of discretionary spending, raising concerns about the affordability and sustainability of the current growth in defense spending and requiring tough choices about how to balance defense and domestic needs against available resources and reasonable tax burdens. GAO has reported that DOD continues to confront pervasive, decades-old management problems related to business operations that waste billions of dollars annually. These management weaknesses cut across all of DOD's major business areas. These areas, along with six government-wide areas that also apply to the department, mean that DOD is responsible for 14 of 25 high-risk areas. To move forward, in our view, there are three key elements that DOD must incorporate into its business transformation efforts to successfully address its systemic business management challenges. First, these efforts must include an integrated strategic plan, coupled with a well-defined blueprint--referred to as a business enterprise architecture--to guide and constrain implementation of such a plan. Second, central control of system investments is crucial for successful business transformation. Finally, a CMO is essential for providing the sustained leadership needed to achieve lasting transformation. The CMO would not assume the day-to-day management responsibilities of other DOD officials nor represent an additional hierarchical layer of management, but rather would serve as a strategic integrator who would lead DOD's overall business transformation efforts. Additionally, a 7-year term would also enable the CMO to work with DOD leadership across administrations to sustain the overall business transformation effort. |
gao_T-RCED-97-139 | gao_T-RCED-97-139_0 | In 1995, crop insurance premiums were about $1.5 billion. FCIC conducts the program primarily through private insurance companies that sell and service federal crop insurance—both catastrophic and buyup—for the federal government and retain a portion of the insurance risk. FCIC pays the companies a fee, called an administrative expense reimbursement, that is intended to reimburse the companies for the expenses reasonably associated with selling and servicing crop insurance to farmers. Current Reimbursements Exceed Delivery Expenses
In 1994 and 1995, FCIC’s administrative expense reimbursements to participating companies selling buyup insurance—31 percent of premiums—were higher than the expenses that can be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance. Furthermore, we found that a number of the reported expenses appeared excessive for reimbursement through a taxpayer-supported program and suggest an opportunity to further reduce future reimbursement rates for administrative expenses. Finally, a variety of factors have emerged since the period covered by our review that have increased companies’ revenues or may decrease their expenses, such as higher crop prices and premium rates and reduced administrative requirements. These expenses, which we believe should not be considered in determining an appropriate future reimbursement rate for administrative expenses, included expenses for acquiring competitors’ businesses, protecting companies from underwriting losses, sharing company profits through bonuses or management fees, and lobbying expenses. Among the costs reported by the crop insurance companies that did not appear to be reasonably associated with the sale and service of crop insurance to farmers were those related to costs the companies incurred when they acquired competitors’ business. Our review of companies’ expenses also showed that some companies’ entertainment expenditures appeared excessive for selling and servicing crop insurance to farmers. Crop prices and premium rates increased in 1996 and 1997, thereby generating higher premiums. This had the effect of increasing the reimbursements paid to companies for administrative expenses by about 3 percent of premiums without a proportionate increase in workload for the companies. Government’s 1995 Total Cost to Deliver Catastrophic Insurance Through USDA Was Less Than Through Private Companies
In 1995, the government’s total cost to deliver catastrophic insurance policies was less through USDA than through private companies. The basic delivery cost to the government for company delivery consisted of the administrative expense reimbursement paid to the companies by FCIC and the cost of administrative support provided by USDA’s Farm Service Agency. Companies generally prefer FCIC’s current reimbursement method because of its administrative simplicity. It also expressed concern that implementing GAO’s recommendations could destabilize the industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the: (1) adequacy of the administrative expense reimbursement paid by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) to participating insurance companies for selling and servicing crop insurance; and (2) comparative cost to the government of delivering catastrophic crop insurance through USDA and the private sector.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for the 1994 and 1995 period it reviewed, GAO found that the administrative expense reimbursement rate of 31 percent of premiums paid to insurance companies resulted in reimbursements that were $81 million more than the companies' expenses for selling and servicing crop insurance; (2) furthermore, GAO found that some of these reported expenses did not appear to be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance and accordingly should not be considered in determining an appropriate future reimbursement rate for administrative expenses; (3) among these expenses were those associated with acquiring competitors' businesses, profit sharing bonuses, and lobbying; (4) in addition, GAO found other expenses that appeared excessive for reimbursement through a taxpayer-supported program; (5) these expenses suggest an opportunity to further reduce future reimbursement rates; (6) these expenses included agents' commissions that exceeded the industry average, unnecessary travel-related expenses, and questionable entertainment activities; (7) finally, a variety of factors that have emerged since the period covered by GAO's review have increased companies' revenues or may decrease companies' expenses; (8) crop prices and premium rates increased in 1996 and 1997, generating higher premiums; (9) this had the effect of increasing FCIC's expense reimbursement to companies; (10) at the same time, companies' expenses associated with crop insurance sales and service could decrease as FCIC reduces the administrative requirements with which the companies must comply; (11) combined, all these factors indicate that FCIC could lower the reimbursement to a rate in the range of 24 percent of premiums and still amply cover reasonable company expenses for selling and servicing federal crop insurance policies; (12) regarding the cost of catastrophic insurance delivery, GAO found that, in 1995, the government's total costs to deliver catastrophic insurance were less through USDA than private companies; (13) although the basic costs associated with selling and servicing catastrophic crop insurance through USDA and private companies were comparable, total delivery costs were less through USDA because USDA's delivery avoids the need to pay an underwriting gain to companies; (14) finally, GAO identified a number of different approaches to reimbursing companies for their administrative expenses that offer the opportunity for cost savings; and (15) companies generally prefer the existing reimbursement method because of its relative administrative simplicity. |
gao_GAO-04-147 | gao_GAO-04-147_0 | When all of these steps have been completed for a given site and long-term monitoring is under way, or it has been determined that no cleanup action is needed, the services and the Corps consider the site to be “response complete.”
DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Its Program to Identify, Assess, and Clean Up Potentially Contaminated Sites
While DOD has identified 2,307 potentially contaminated sites as of September 2002, the department continues to identify additional sites, and it is not likely to have a firm inventory for several years (see table 1 for the distribution of these sites by service). Of the identified sites, DOD determined that 362 sites require no further study or cleanup action because it found little or no evidence of military munitions. For 1,387 sites, DOD either has not begun or not completed its initial evaluation, or has determined that further study is needed. The remaining 83 sites require some cleanup action, of which DOD has completed 23. For example, 241 Air Force and 105 Army sites at closed ranges on active installations have not been evaluated. DOD has completed its assessment of 558 sites, nearly all of which are ranges on formerly used defense sites or closing installations, and determined that no cleanup action was needed for 475; the remaining 83 sites required some level of cleanup action. DOD Does Not Have a Complete and Viable Plan for Assessing and Cleaning Up Potentially Contaminated Sites
In DOD’s Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Environmental Restoration Program Annual Report to Congress, DOD identified several elements integral to the success of the Military Munitions Response program: compiling a comprehensive inventory of sites; developing a new procedure to assess risk and prioritize sites; ensuring proper funding for accurate planning and program execution; and establishing program goals and performance measures. First, essential data for DOD’s plan may take years to develop. Until all three hazard types are fully assessed, DOD cannot be assured that it is using its limited resources to clean up those sites that pose the greatest risk to safety, human health, and the environment. DOD’s Plan Relies on Preliminary Cost Estimates That Can Change Significantly and a Reallocation of Funds That May Not Be Available
DOD’s plan to identify and address military munitions sites relies on preliminary cost estimates that were developed using incomplete information. As a result, the Air Force used estimated, not actual, acreage figures, including assumptions regarding the amount of acreage known or suspected of containing military munitions when preparing its cost estimates. However, these other cleanup efforts are not on schedule in all of the services and the Corps. Delays in the availability of anticipated funding from hazardous, toxic, and radioactive waste sites could greatly impair DOD’s ability to accurately plan for and make progress in cleaning up Military Munitions Response sites. DOD’s Plan Does Not Contain Goals or Measures for Site Assessment and Cleanup
DOD has yet to establish specific program goals and performance measures in its plan. Recommendations
To ensure that DOD has a comprehensive approach for identifying, assessing, and cleaning up military munitions at potentially contaminated sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD’s plan to establish deadlines to complete the identification process and initial evaluations so that it knows the universe of sites that needs to be assessed, prioritized, and cleaned up; reassess the timetable proposed for completing its reevaluation of sites using the new risk assessment procedures so that it can more timely establish the order in which sites should be assessed and cleaned up, thereby focusing on the riskiest sites first; and establish interim goals for cleanup phases for the services and Corps to target. Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to evaluate (1) DOD’s progress in implementing its program to identify, assess, and clean up sites containing military munitions and (2) DOD’s plans to clean up remaining sites in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 15 million acres in the United States are suspected of being, or known to be, contaminated with military munitions. These sites include ranges on closing military installations, closed ranges on active installations, and formerly used defense sites. Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, established in 1986, the Department of Defense (DOD) must identify, assess, and clean up military munitions contamination at these sites. DOD estimates these activities will cost from $8 billion to $35 billion. Because of the magnitude of DOD's cleanup effort, both in terms of cost and affected acreage, as well as the significant public safety, health, and environmental risks that military munitions may pose, The Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce asked us to evaluate (1) DOD's progress in implementing its program to identify, assess, and clean up military munitions sites and (2) DOD's plans to clean up remaining sites in the future.
What GAO Found
DOD has made limited progress in its program to identify, assess, and clean up sites that may be contaminated with military munitions. While DOD had identified 2,307 potentially contaminated sites as of September 2002, DOD officials said that they continue to identify additional sites and are not likely to have a firm inventory for several years. Of the identified sites, DOD had initially determined that 362 sites required no further study or cleanup action because it found little or no evidence of military munitions. For 1,387 sites, DOD either has not begun or not completed its initial evaluation or determined that further study is needed. DOD has completed its assessment of 558 sites, finding that 475 of these required no cleanup action. The remaining 83 sites required some cleanup action, of which DOD has completed 23. DOD does not yet have a complete and viable plan for cleaning up military munitions at remaining potentially contaminated sites. DOD's plan is lacking in several respects. Essential data for DOD's plan may take years to develop. Not all the potential sites have been identified, and DOD has set no deadline for doing so. Also, DOD intends to use a new procedure to assign a relative priority for the remaining 1,387 sites, but it will not complete the reassessments until 2012. Until these are done, DOD cannot be assured that it is using its limited resources to clean up the riskiest sites first. DOD's plan relies on preliminary cost estimates that can change greatly and the reallocation of funds that may not be available. For example, the Air Force used estimated, not actual, acreage to create its cost estimates, limiting the estimate's reliability and DOD's ability to plan and budget cleanup for these sites. Also, DOD expects additional funds will become available for munitions cleanup as other DOD hazardous waste cleanup efforts are completed. However, some of these efforts are behind schedule; therefore, funds may not become available as anticipated. DOD's plan does not contain goals or measures for site assessment and cleanup. DOD recently established a working group tasked with developing agencywide program goals and performance measures, but not service-specific targets, limiting DOD's ability to ensure that the services are making progress in cleaning the potentially contaminated sites and achieving the overall goals of the program as planned. |
gao_RCED-95-118 | gao_RCED-95-118_0 | Contaminants include (1) organic chemicals such as benzene and fluorene, (2) inorganic chemicals such as arsenic and mercury, and (3) radiochemicals. DOE Pays Higher Prices Than EPA
DOE pays substantially higher prices than EPA for the same types of laboratory analysis at commercial laboratories. It is difficult to quantify the overall savings resulting from a centralized approach on the basis of the differences between the average prices paid by EPA and DOE because DOE has only recently started collecting data on the number of analyses performed for the Department by commercial laboratories, and those data are not yet complete or precise. DOE’s Decentralized Contracting Results in Administrative Inefficiencies
Under DOE’s decentralized approach, the Department’s contractors duplicate many of their efforts in both awarding and managing contracts, especially as a result of redundant quality assurance evaluations at the commercial laboratories. DOE’s annual operating plan for 1994 outlines 17 initiatives designed to improve many phases of its laboratory analysis program. While this estimate uses prices obtained through centralized procurement, it does not consider any effect due to the potential for radioactivity in DOE’s samples. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) decentralized approach to laboratory analysis, focusing on: (1) the differences in prices and contracting approaches between DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for similar types of laboratory analyses; (2) whether the decentralized DOE approach has resulted in any administrative inefficiencies; and (3) key changes DOE is making in its contracting procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOE pays substantially higher prices than EPA for the same types of commercial laboratory analyses; (2) while savings could be achieved through centralization, the amount of savings is difficult to measure; (3) unlike DOE, EPA conducts two procurements for organic and inorganic analyses for Superfund sites, while the decentralized DOE approach results in numerous inefficiencies, such as contractors performing redundant quality assurance evaluations at numerous commercial laboratories; and (4) DOE has recently identified 17 initiatives designed to improve many phases of its laboratory analysis program, but it does not plan to change its decentralized approach to laboratory analyses. |
gao_GAO-02-349 | gao_GAO-02-349_0 | Available Data Indicate That the Amount of Child Support Owed Has Increased in Recent Years
Data show that the amount of child support that was legally owed but unpaid almost doubled during the 4-year period from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2000, even with increases in total collections. However, the amount owed is understated as a result of data limitations. Thousands of Private and Public Sector Entities Can Collect Child Support
Private attorneys make up the largest group of private entities. Both private firms and state agencies reported collecting amounts from about 60 percent of their cases. While private firms reported that they relied heavily on information vendors to locate noncustodial parents and their assets, state agencies reported that they primarily relied on state and federal databases for the same information. Private Firms Primarily Used Information Vendors, While State Agencies Relied on State and Federal Databases
Twenty-two of the 24 private firms that participated in our structured telephone interviews used information vendors as their primary source for locating noncustodial parents and their assets. Private Firms and State Agencies Called Noncustodial Parents, but Private Firms Also Called Third Parties
Both private firms and state agencies called noncustodial parents to collect child support, but only private firms called third parties to collect child support. Private firms also called third parties, such as friends, relatives, and neighbors, to locate noncustodial parents and to persuade the third party to prevail upon the noncustodial parent to make payments. Differing Interpretations of Law, Lack of CSE Guidance, and Agency Officials’ Concerns Influence Private Firms’ Access to FPLS Data
State agencies’ practices regarding the sharing of FPLS data with private firms were affected by differences in interpretation of whether federal law permits or requires state agencies to share FPLS data, the absence of guidance from OCSE, and state agency officials’ concerns about whether private firms would protect confidential data. Conclusion
Private firms use many enforcement tools and information sources to collect child support. While OCSE considers wage withholding to be the most effective enforcement tool, the wage withholding form and the related guidance make it difficult for employers to determine the validity of wage withholding notices that they receive from private firms. Use this FIPS code: : . | What GAO Found
To increase child support collections, Congress has considered proposals to improve the ability of private firms to gather information to help locate noncustodial parents and enforce the payment of child support. At the end of fiscal year 2000, the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) indicated that $89 billion in child support was owed but unpaid--a 96-percent increase since the end of fiscal year 1996. GAO believes that this amount is understated. Thousands of private and public sector entities can collect child support. Both private firms and state agencies reported collections from about 60 percent of their cases. Twenty-two of the 24 private firms GAO reviewed reported that they relied on private information vendors--commercial firms that sell information such as addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers--as their primary information source, whereas about one-third of state agencies reported using this source. State agencies relied heavily on state and federal automated databases to locate noncustodial parents and their assets. Additionally, private firms and the state agencies reported calling noncustodial parents to collect child support. However, only the private firms called third parties, such as relatives and neighbors of noncustodial parents to persuade them to prevail upon the noncustodial parent to make payments. The same enforcement tools are available to private firms and state agencies, but the process that they follow in using these tools often differ. Private firms, however, do not have access to federal tax refunds. Officials from both private firms and state agencies reported that the tool they most often use was wage withholding. However, the form and related guidance developed by OCSE for use in wage withholding make it difficult for employers to determine whether it is proper to begin withholding wages. Most of the state agencies had not provided information on noncustodial parents' location or assets from the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS). Practices for sharing with private firms were affected by differences in interpretation of whether federal law permits or requires state agencies to share FPLS data. |
gao_NSIAD-97-9 | gao_NSIAD-97-9_0 | How Child Survival Funds Are Used
Between fiscal years 1985 and 1995, USAID reported that it obligated over $2.3 billion for the child survival program. A total of 83 developing countries received some mission-level child survival funding during this period. As shown in table 2, of the 10 countries that have received the most child survival assistance from USAID missions, 5 were in the Latin America and Caribbean region, 4 were in the Asia and Near East region, and 1 was in the Africa region. Funding Supports Different Types of Activities
Between 1985 and 1995, activities related to the three major causes of death among young children—acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and vaccine-preventable diseases—received about $972 million, or 41 percent of the child survival funds. Identifying Amounts Used Specifically for Child Survival Is Difficult
USAID is unable to determine with any degree of precision how much funding is actually being used for child survival activities because (1) of the way Congress has directed funding; (2) USAID guidance allows considerable flexibility and variation in attributing child survival funds; (3) the amounts reported are based on estimated percentages of projected budgets, which sometimes are not adjusted at the end of the year to reflect any changes that may have occurred; and (4) the amounts reported are not directly based on specific project expenditures. USAID’s Contribution to Child Survival
USAID has made significant contributions, in collaboration with other donors, in reducing under-5 mortality rates. Five countries achieved the World Summit goal of 70 or fewer deaths per 1,000 live births. USAID’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) concluded in a 1993 report that USAID’s child survival activities had achieved many successes and made a significant contribution in expanding child survival services and reducing infant mortality in many countries. 5). 6). 7). Although the railroad bridge in Mozambique was considered a nutrition intervention, other infrastructure projects that have used child survival funding were classified as water quality/health, health systems development, and health care financing. According to USAID, the agency does not have a mission in these countries, had closed out assistance, or was in the process of closing out assistance because of budgetary or legal reasons or because sustainable development programs were not considered feasible. On the other hand, USAID attributes mission-level child survival funds to activities in 17 countries that have a mortality rate of 70 or fewer deaths per 1,000 live births. In fiscal year 1995, USAID used about $89.5 million of child survival funding for activities in these 17 countries. Agency guidance states that any of the following key factors indicate the need to consider developing strategic objectives that address family planning, child survival, maternal health, and reduction of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS: annual total gross domestic product growth less than 2 percent higher than annual population growth over the past 10 years, unmet need for contraception at or above 25 percent of married women of childbearing age, total fertility rate above 3.5 children per woman, mortality rate for children under age 5 at or above 150 per 1,000 live births, stunting in at least 25 percent of children under age 5, maternal mortality rate at or above 200 deaths per 100,000 live births, and prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases at or above 10 percent among women aged 15 to 30. Comments From the U.S. Agency for International Development
The following is GAO’s comment on USAID’s letter dated July 23, 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Agency for International Development's (AID) child survival activities and accomplishments, focusing on how child survival funds are being used to support AID objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1985, AID has classified obligations totalling over $2.3 billion for activities in at least 83 countries as child survival; however, due to the way Congress directs funding to child survival, particularly since 1992, and AID's approach to tracking and accounting for such funds, it is not possible to determine precisely how much is actually being spent on child survival activities; (2) between 1985 and 1995, AID reported that it spent about $1.6 billion, or 67 percent of the child survival funds, for four types of activities: immunizations, diarrheal disease control, nutrition, and health systems development; (3) AID also reported that about 41 percent of the total amount identified as child survival has been used to address the three major threats to children under age 5 in the developing countries: diarrheal dehydration, acute respiratory infections, and vaccine-preventable diseases; (4) during GAO's field visits, it also noted that part of the cost of rehabilitating a railroad bridge and constructing a water tower in Mozambique and carrying out urban sewerage projects in Egypt were identified as child survival expenditures; (5) AID said the projects in Mozambique were critical for reducing child mortality because they supported access to water, food, and health services; (6) AID and other donors have made important contributions toward improving child mortality rates in many countries; (7) in 9 of the 10 countries receiving the most AID mission-level child survival assistance since 1985, mortality rates for children age 5 and under have dropped; (8) in addition, 5 of these 10 countries achieved mortality rates by 1994 of 70 or fewer deaths per 1,000 live births, a goal set for the year 2000 at the World Summit for Children; (9) both AID and independent evaluations have pointed out successes, such as collaboration with other donors to immunize children and promote oral rehydration therapy in the treatment of diarrheal disease; (10) in fiscal year 1995, AID's child survival funding was used in 17 countries that had an under-5 mortality rate of 70 or fewer deaths per 1,000 live births; (11) AID mission-level funding for child survival in these countries was $89.5 million, or 31 percent of the total child survival funding obligated in that year; (12) on the other hand, many countries that were far from achieving the goal, did not receive assistance for child survival; and (13) according to AID, most of these countries did not receive assistance because AID did not have a program in the country, had closed out assistance, or was in the process of closing out assistance due to budgetary or legal reasons or because sustainable development programs were not considered feasible. |
gao_GAO-10-36 | gao_GAO-10-36_0 | CMS Took Compliance and Enforcement Actions against at Least 73 MA Organizations for Inappropriate Marketing
From January 2006 through February 2009 CMS took a range of compliance and enforcement actions against at least 73 MA organizations for inappropriate marketing. While the number of MA organizations varied during the approximately 3-year period, 192 MA organizations offered MA plans as of March 2009. II for more information about the types of inappropriate marketing that resulted in initial notices of noncompliance and warning letters.) Nineteen of the 73 MA organizations subject to compliance or enforcement actions had multiple types of actions taken against them. 1.) Some beneficiaries experienced financial liability or access-to-care problems as a result of being enrolled in an MA plan or stemming from their disenrollment and enrollment in prior or different coverage. CMS Uses Special Election Periods to Help Beneficiaries Who Experienced Inappropriate Marketing
CMS assisted MA beneficiaries who experienced inappropriate marketing by MA organizations by providing special election periods (SEP), which enable beneficiaries to disenroll from their MA plan outside of the regular enrollment periods and to enroll in prior coverage or another option, such as another MA plan, Medicare FFS, or a stand-alone Medicare prescription drug plan. Beneficiaries who stated they experienced inappropriate marketing may also have experienced problems that the SEP could not address. For example, these beneficiaries could have experienced financial or access- to-care issues prior to receiving the SEP. CMS, DOI, and SHIP officials described cases in which beneficiaries did not realize they had been switched to an MA plan until they tried to access services. These officials said some of the beneficiaries experienced disruption of their access to providers and medications because their providers did not participate in the MA plan. First, some beneficiaries who experienced inappropriate marketing may have exercised their option—available during certain times of the year—to disenroll from their MA plan and might not have notified CMS of the marketing problems they encountered. Second, CMS did not directly track the number of beneficiaries who contacted the agency and were provided a SEP. CMS did estimate the number of SEPs it provided for inappropriate marketing, but its estimates were based on data that were unreliable. CMS had the information to determine the number of beneficiaries who disenrolled during these regular enrollment periods, but during the time of our study, the agency did not collect information that would have allowed it to determine the extent to which beneficiaries disenrolled from health plans as a result of inappropriate marketing. CMS officials said that they plan to reinstitute a survey on disenrollment reasons in late summer 2010. Currently, CMS has limited information on the extent of inappropriate marketing and the number of beneficiaries affected. The agency intends to conduct a survey of beneficiaries who disenrolled from MA plans and ask about their reasons for disenrollment. Methodology by Objective
To determine the extent to which CMS has taken compliance and enforcement actions against Medicare Advantage (MA) organizations for inappropriate marketing, we analyzed CMS data on the number and types of corrective and enforcement actions taken against MA organizations for inappropriate marketing. To determine how CMS helped MA beneficiaries affected by inappropriate marketing and the types of problems beneficiaries encountered, we reviewed relevant agency documentation for the period January 2006 through February 2009 and interviewed officials at CMS’s central office and all 10 regional offices, 6 state departments of insurance (DOI), and 6 state health insurance assistance programs (SHIP). | Why GAO Did This Study
Members of Congress and state agencies have raised questions about complaints that some Medicare Advantage (MA) organizations and their agents inappropriately marketed their health plans to Medicare beneficiaries. Inappropriate marketing may include activities such as providing inaccurate information about covered benefits and conducting prohibited marketing practices. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for oversight of MA organizations and their plans. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine (1) the extent to which CMS has taken compliance and enforcement actions, (2) how CMS has helped beneficiaries affected by inappropriate marketing and the problems beneficiaries have encountered, and (3) information CMS has about the extent of inappropriate marketing. To do this work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies; analyzed Medicare data on beneficiary complaints, compliance actions and enforcement actions; and interviewed officials from CMS and selected state departments of insurance, state health insurance assistance programs, and MA organizations.
What GAO Found
CMS took compliance and enforcement actions for inappropriate marketing against at least 73 organizations that sponsored MA plans from January 2006 through February 2009. While the number of MA organizations varied during that time period, 192 MA organizations offered MA plans as of March 2009. Actions taken ranged from initial notices of noncompliance and warning letters to more punitive measures, such as civil money penalties and suspensions of marketing and enrollment. Nineteen of the 73 MA organizations had multiple types of actions taken against them. CMS helped beneficiaries who experienced inappropriate marketing by providing special election periods (SEP) through which beneficiaries could disenroll from their MA plan and enroll in new coverage without waiting for the twice yearly regular enrollment periods. However, some beneficiaries experienced financial or access-to-care problems as a result of inappropriate marketing that could not be addressed by a SEP. Financial hardships occurred, for example, when beneficiaries disenrolled from their MA plans and the withholding of premiums from Social Security for their former MA plan was not stopped promptly. In other cases, beneficiaries did not realize they had been enrolled in an MA plan until they tried to access services. Some of these beneficiaries experienced disruption of their access to providers and medications because their providers did not participate in the MA plan. CMS has limited information about the number of beneficiaries who experienced inappropriate marketing. Some beneficiaries who experienced inappropriate marketing may have exercised their option to disenroll from their MA plans during regular enrollment periods and might not have notified CMS of the marketing problems they encountered. For example, about 21 percent of beneficiaries disenrolled during the regular enrollment periods in 2007 from one type of MA plan that CMS officials acknowledged had a high incidence of inappropriate marketing. However, CMS discontinued a survey after 2005 that collected information on reasons for disenrollment and could have provided important information about the extent to which the disenrollments were the result of inappropriate marketing. CMS officials said that they plan to reinstitute a survey on disenrollment reasons in late summer 2010. CMS also has limited information about the number of beneficiaries who experienced inappropriate marketing because it did not directly track the number of SEP disenrollments. CMS did estimate the number of SEPs it provided for inappropriate marketing, but its estimates were based on data that were unreliable. |
gao_GAO-13-577 | gao_GAO-13-577_0 | The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 extended the integrity management program to gas transmission pipelines, which include about 20,000 miles of pipeline segments located in high consequence areas.subject to PHMSA’s integrity management program, operators must still meet the minimum safety standards noted above. According to the 2002 act, operators are then required to complete reassessments of these pipelines at least every 7 years. Gas transmission pipeline operators completed most baseline assessments by December 17, 2012, and reassessments are currently under way. Data Show Critical Pipeline Repairs Are Being Made, but Cannot Be Used to Determine an Appropriate Maximum Reassessment Interval for All Pipelines Nationwide
Assessments Have Resulted in Critical Pipeline Repairs
PHMSA’s baseline assessment and reassessment data from 2004 to 2011 show that pipeline operators have identified and are making critical repairs in high consequence areas, specifically for conditions requiring repairs immediately or within one year. PHMSA data show that from 2004 to 2009, pipeline operators reported making 1,080 immediate repairs and 2,261 scheduled repairs (see fig. The 7-Year Reassessment Requirement Provides a Safeguard, but Is Not Fully Consistent with Risk-Based Practices
Maximum Reassessment Intervals Provide a Safeguard
Maximum reassessment intervals—such as the 7-year reassessment requirement—provide a safeguard and allow regulators and operators to identify and address problems on a continual basis. Because the 7-year reassessment requirement is a more frequent interval than those in the industry consensus standards, it provides greater assurance that operators are regularly monitoring their pipelines to identify and address threats before they result in a leak or rupture. The 7-Year Reassessment Requirement Is Not Fully Consistent with Risk- Based Practices
Risk-based management has several key characteristics that help to ensure safety—it (1) uses information to identify and assess risks; (2) prioritizes risks so that resources may be allocated to address higher risks first; (3) promotes the use of regulations, policies, and procedures to provide consistency in decision making; and (4) monitors performance. For example, the 7- year reassessment requirement does not permit operators to apply the information that they have collected from their assessments: even though operators must determine an appropriate reassessment interval based on the threats facing their pipelines in high consequence areas, they must reassess those pipelines at least for corrosion threats every 7 years regardless of the risks identified. For instance, inspecting and evaluating risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years could create additional workload, staffing, and expertise challenges for regulators, such as PHMSA and state pipeline safety offices, for example:
PHMSA officials told us that allowing all operators to participate in risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years could add significantly to the agency’s workload in terms of inspecting operators’ integrity management programs, including review of their calculated reassessment intervals. Moreover, PHMSA has already experienced some workload problems with inspections, which could be worsened by allowing operators to use risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years. Based on our interviews, operators appear to vary in the extent to which they currently calculate reassessment intervals and use the results of the data analyses, for example:
Some operators we spoke with told us that they perform a less rigorous determination of their reassessment intervals and default to the 7-year interval if they determine that there are no problems with their pipelines. PHMSA Has Previously Considered an Approach to Implementing Risk- Based Reassessment Intervals beyond 7 Years, but More Information on Resource Requirements Is Needed
In 2008, PHMSA provided a detailed statement at the request of Congress to explain how the agency would establish and enforce risk- based criteria for extending the 7-year reassessment interval. Further, there is a lack of guidance to assist regulators and operators in developing the risk models currently used to calculate reassessment intervals. Given these potential challenges, more information might help decision- makers better understand the resource requirements needed in allowing risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years. To better identify the resource requirements needed to implement risk- based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years for gas transmission pipelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator for the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to collect information on the feasibility of addressing the potential challenges of implementing risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years, for example by preparing a report or developing a legislative proposal for a pilot program, in consultation with Congress, that studies the impact to regulators and operators of a potential rule change. The department did not agree or disagree with the recommendations, but provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. In particular, this report examines: (1) the extent to which the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) assessment data provides information on repairs made and the appropriateness of the 7-year reassessment requirement, (2) the impact of the 7-year reassessment requirement on regulators and operators, and (3) the potential challenges of implementing risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 300,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines cross the United States, carrying natural gas from processing facilities to communities and large-volume users. These pipelines are largely regulated by PHMSA. The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 established the gas integrity management program, which required gas transmission pipeline operators to assess the integrity of their pipeline segments in high consequence areas by December 2012 and reassess them at least every 7 years.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 directed GAO to examine the results of these baseline assessments and reassessments and the potential impact of making the current process more risk-based. GAO analyzed (1) PHMSAs assessment data on repairs made and the appropriateness of the 7-year reassessment requirement, (2) the impact of the 7-year reassessment requirement on regulators and operators, and (3) the potential challenges of implementing risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years. GAO analyzed assessment data; reviewed legislation and regulations; and interviewed pipeline operators, federal and state regulators, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Baseline assessment and reassessment data collected by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) since 2004 show that pipeline operators are making repairs in highly populated or frequented areas ("high consequence areas"). For example, from 2004 to 2009, operators made 1,080 immediate repairs. While operators can use assessment data to determine reassessment intervals for specific pipelines, PHMSA's data are aggregated and cannot indicate an appropriate maximum interval for all pipelines nationwide. Such a determination requires, for example, collaboration of subject matter experts and analysis of technical studies.
The current 7-year reassessment requirement provides a safeguard by allowing regulators and operators to identify and address problems on a continual basis, but is not fully consistent with risk-based practices. The 7-year reassessment requirement is more frequent than the intervals found in industry consensus standards and provides greater assurance that operators are regularly monitoring their pipelines to address threats before leaks or ruptures occur. However, this requirement--which was established in a 2002 act as part of the gas integrity management program rather than by rulemaking--is not fully consistent with risk-based management practices, which ask operators to, for example, use information to identify, assess, and prioritize risks so that resources may be allocated to address higher risks first. While operators are required to determine an appropriate reassessment interval based on the threats to their pipelines in high consequence areas, they must reassess those pipelines at least every 7 years regardless of the risks identified.
Implementing risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years would require a statutory change from Congress and could exacerbate current workload, staffing, and expertise challenges for regulators and operators. For example, PHMSA is facing workload problems with inspections, which could be worsened by allowing operators to use risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years; PHMSA has an initiative under way that could help address this issue. Further, some operators told us that extending reassessment intervals beyond 7 years would likely require additional data analyses over what is currently required. Operators GAO met with varied in the extent to which they currently calculate reassessment intervals and use the results of data analyses. Guidance to calculate reassessment intervals is lacking, and as a result, operators may perform a less rigorous determination of their reassessment intervals at this time. At Congress's request, in 2008 PHMSA described how it would establish and enforce risk-based criteria for extending the 7-year reassessment interval. PHMSA proposed retaining the current 7-year reassessment requirement, but establishing a process by which operators could use risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years if they met certain potential criteria, such as demonstrating sound risk analysis. While PHMSA and GAO have supported the concept of risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years, given the breadth of potential challenges with implementation, more information might help decision-makers better understand the resource requirements for this change. For example, PHMSA has used pilot programs to collect such information and study the effects prior to rule changes.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should (1) develop guidance for operators to calculate reassessment intervals and (2) collect information on the resources needed to implement risk-based reassessment intervals beyond 7 years. DOT did not agree or disagree with the recommendations, but provided technical comments. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-146 | gao_T-HEHS-96-146_0 | Corporation used about $149 million of its fiscal year 1994 appropriations to make about 300 grants to nonprofit organizations and federal, state, and local government agencies to operate AmeriCorps*USA programs. Most of the matching contributions AmeriCorps*USA programs received came from public as opposed to private sources. In calculating resources available on a per-participant and per-service-hour basis (see table 1), we found that the average from all sources per AmeriCorps*USA participant was about $26,654 (excluding in-kind contributions from private sources). Because most AmeriCorps*USA programs were still implementing their first year of operations, actual cost could not be determined. Non-Corporation federal funds accounted for about 50 percent of total resources available to federal grantees. Expanding Opportunities
education or job training. The Corporation also has directed grantees exceeding a program year 1995-96 cost per participant of $13,800 to reduce their proposed program year 1996-97 per-participant costs by an overall average of 10 percent. The Corporation has also increased the grantee’s share of total program operating costs from 25 to 33 percent for grants awarded for the 1996-97 program year. And it means resources available to pay for the staff and operations of the Corporation for National and Community Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Corporation for National and Community Service's AmeriCorps*USA service program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for program year 1994 to 1995, the Corporation provided almost $149 million for grantee projects; (2) about 69 percent of matching project contributions came from public sources; (3) total resources available per participant, exclusive of private in-kind contributions, averaged $26,654, of which federal sources provided 74 percent, state and local governments 14 percent, and the private sector 12 percent; (4) cost data could not be determined because most AmeriCorps programs are too new; (5) total available resources for AmeriCorps*USA grantees averaged about $16 per service hour; (6) grantees' projects are designed to meet unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs, strengthen communities, develop civic responsibility, and expand educational opportunities for program participants and others; and (7) to reduce government costs in the 1996-1997 program year, Congress has reduced program appropriations and prohibited federal agencies from receiving AmeriCorps grants, and the Corporation has required certain grantees to reduce proposed costs by 10 percent and all grantees to pay a higher share of program operating costs. |
gao_HEHS-96-105 | gao_HEHS-96-105_0 | Because the states that we reviewed made relatively few management or service delivery changes to implement their family cap provisions, this report focuses principally on approaches states used and issues they encountered in implementing time limits and work requirements. Overview of Five States’ Welfare Reform Provisions
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the five states’ time-limited benefit, work requirement, and family cap provisions. States’ Work Requirement and Time Limit Provisions Vary
The work requirements of the states’ welfare reform programs differ with regard to the time by which clients must begin engaging in work and what counts as a work activity. In implementing their family cap provisions, Indiana and Wisconsin also sought to increase clients’ access to family planning services. Increasing Staffs’ Focus on Clients’ Employability
Traditionally, staffs have been trained to focus on assuring accurate eligibility determinations and benefit payments and enrolling clients in education, training, and work activities. Indiana established annual job placement goals for each county office to help motivate staffs to follow the Work First philosophy. 3.1). The personal responsibility agreements also establish expectations of greater family responsibility for clients. Strengthening Sanctions to Encourage Client Compliance
Expanding financial incentives for clients to work and save may encourage some clients to comply with program requirements. While the states had used these resources to some extent in the past, they made a more systematic effort to solicit employer and community involvement in their welfare reforms by publicizing their welfare reform programs, establishing various types of community advisory groups, and working to improve their ability to enlist employers’ support in finding jobs for clients. The approaches states used to redesign their service delivery included creating a new staff role to improve service coordination, bringing job team members together at a single location, increasing staff interaction with clients, and developing closer links to community resources to expand the availability of child care and transportation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed five states' early experiences with implementing welfare reforms under waivers of federal law, focusing on the states' approaches in implementing time-limited benefits, work requirements, and family cap provisions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the five states made relatively few management or service delivery changes to implement their family cap provisions; (2) the states' geographic scope of implementation and work requirements varied considerably, but time limits for cash benefits were generally 24 months, followed by a longer period of ineligibility for cash assistance; (3) four states changed their welfare program operations to implement their time limits and work requirements; (4) the states encouraged staff and clients to focus on clients' employability by establishing job placement goals for each office, having clients sign personal responsibility agreements, basing benefits on how much time clients spent in work, training, or education activities, increasing clients' financial incentives as they began working, and applying sanctions for clients' failure to comply with program requirements; (5) the states disseminated information to communities and employers to increase their interest in welfare reforms and formed community advisory groups, which usually led to better client access to jobs; (6) the states redesigned their service delivery structures to provide more intensive support for clients by coordinating services, increasing staff interaction with clients, and expanding the availability of child care and transportation for their clients; and (7) the states encountered some problems in implementing welfare reforms, but they were able to resolve most of those problems. |
gao_T-GGD-96-160 | gao_T-GGD-96-160_0 | Today, four independent adjudicatory agencies can handle employee complaints or appeals: the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). For the first time, it would adjudicate discrimination complaints that were not necessarily associated with adverse actions. Under the proposed legislation, EEOC would become that gatekeeper, investigating and determining the merits of individual EEOC complaints and deciding whether to argue these cases before the new adjudicator of EEO matters, MSPB. The proposed legislation would give federal employee discrimination complainants the same opportunity as private-sector employees to take their case to U.S. district court. But it would deny them the right to first pursue formal adjudication within the federal redress apparatus, and then, if still dissatisfied, to start a new case from scratch. The intention of the proposed legislation would be to eliminate what is commonly called the “two bites of the apple.”
One significant effect of these proposed changes might be to dampen the number of discrimination complaints reaching the formal adjudicative stage. For example, changes in the adjudicatory responsibilities of EEOC and MSPB would require major organizational change in both agencies. In addition, a basic change in adjudicatory redress procedures would have repercussions in the individual federal agencies, which would likely need to develop new processes to handle discrimination complaints. Moreover, cases already in process would need to be accommodated; a transition period to ensure an orderly changeover from the old system to the new would need to be provided and carefully planned. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implications of the Omnibus Civil Service Reform Act of 1996 on the redress system for federal employees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the proposed legislation would eliminate jurisdictional overlap between the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); (2) EEOC would be in charge of investigating the merits of individual EEOC complaints and deciding whether to argue these complaints before MSPB; (3) MSPB would adjudicate discrimination complaints that are not associated with adverse actions; (4) the proposed legislation would give complainants' the opportunity to take their case before the U.S. district court, but it would deny them the right to pursue formal adjudication within the federal redress system; (5) the number of discrimination complaints reaching the formal adjudicative stage would be lessened; (6) changes in EEOC and MSPB adjudicatory responsibilities would require major organizational changes in both agencies; (7) basic changes in the adjudicatory redress system would have repercussions for individual federal agencies; (8) a transition period would be needed to ensure an orderly changeover from the old redress system to the new system; and (9) alternative dispute resolution is a good way to avoid the time and expense of employee litigation, but this procedure is in its preliminary stages of development. |
gao_GAO-14-55 | gao_GAO-14-55_0 | Because VAMCs generally have discretion in which of these processes they choose to use to respond to an adverse event, different VAMCs may choose different processes in response to experiencing similar adverse events. According to VHA policy, VAMCs can use both protected and nonprotected processes concurrently or consecutively as long as protected and nonprotected processes and data collection are kept separate. For example, if a provider meets a VAMC’s peer review triggers by receiving three peer review level of care ratings of 3—meaning that the most experienced, competent providers would have managed the cases differently—within a 12-month period, then VAMC officials would be prompted to conduct a detailed assessment of the provider’s care, and address concerns about the provider’s ability to deliver safe, quality patient care by conducting an FPPE. The FPPE is a time-limited period during which medical staff leadership assesses the provider’s professional performance and ability to improve. VA and VHA Monitoring Responsibilities
There are several VA and VHA organizational components that are involved in monitoring VAMCs’ adverse events and related processes. The VA OIG Office of Healthcare Inspections inspects individual health care issues and performs quality program assistance reviews of VAMC operations. VAMCs Did Not Adhere to Certain Policy Elements of the Protected Peer Review Process, and Monitoring by VHA Is Limited
VAMCs Did Not Adhere to Certain Policy Elements of the Protected Peer Review Process
According to VHA’s protected peer review policy, and supported by federal internal control standards for risk assessment and information and communications, VHA’s protected peer review policy requirements should ensure that identified patient safety risks are mitigated and lead to organizational improvements and optimal patient outcomes. Moreover, the delayed establishment of the peer review triggers by some VAMCs may have resulted in missed opportunities to identify providers who posed a risk to patient safety and to conduct an FPPE, which would have allowed any warranted action to be taken against the provider. Officials from the VISNs that oversee the four VAMCs we visited told us they monitor VAMCs’ protected peer review processes through quarterly data monitoring and annual site visits, as required by VHA’s protected peer review policy. However, VISNs, VHA, and VA OIG have not monitored whether the triggers have actually been implemented. Because neither VHA’s Office of Risk Management nor VA OIG review whether peer review triggers have been implemented, VHA cannot provide reasonable assurance that VAMCs are using the triggers as a risk assessment tool as intended. VAMC’s Adherence to the FPPE Process Is Unclear Due to Gaps in Policy Addressing Documentation Requirements; VHA Does Not Routinely Monitor Nonprotected Processes
Gaps in Policy Create Lack of Clarity as to How VAMCs Are to Document the FPPE Process; Requirements for AIBs Generally Are Clear
FPPEs. VHA’s FPPE policy provides a general definition of an FPPE, that it can be used for cause (when a question arises regarding a provider’s ability to provide safe, quality patient care), that the criteria for the FPPE should be defined by the VAMC in advance, and that the results of the FPPE must be documented in the provider’s profile. However, there are gaps in VHA’s policy regarding how these evaluations should be documented and what information should be included, which limited our ability to assess VAMCs’ adherence to the FPPE policy. Officials from the VAMCs we visited were generally aware that FPPEs can be used to address concerns about the quality of a provider’s care; are time limited; and are not disciplinary, but could ultimately be used to take adverse action against a provider, if necessary. The fourth VAMC initially provided us with documentation of one FPPE, including a completed template identifying the clinical service involved, the method of evaluation, the evaluator’s findings, and the service chief’s conclusions; and several documents, each with focused professional practice evaluation labeled at the top, specifying the medical records evaluated for the FPPE and the evaluator’s comments on each case. This disagreement illustrates that even within the same facility the interpretation of VHA’s policy on FPPEs differs, which can lead to potentially inappropriate use. Gaps in VHA’s policy on FPPE documentation requirements create a lack of clarity and therefore may affect VAMCs’ ability to appropriately document the evaluation of providers’ skills, support any actions initiated, and track provider-specific FPPE-related incidents over time. VHA Does Not Routinely Monitor Nonprotected Processes
FPPEs. The VISN Chief Medical Officer is responsible for oversight of the credentialing and privileging process of the VAMCs within the VISN. Although officials at the four VAMCs we reviewed generally understood the protected peer review process, we found that none of these four VAMCs adhered to all four VHA protected peer review policy elements selected for review, such as completing peer reviews within required time frames and sending the required peer-reviewed cases to the peer review committee for further assessment. As such, VHA may be missing opportunities for improvements both in the practice of individual providers and organizationally. Inadequate documentation of the FPPE process may result in VAMC officials being unable to take adverse action against a provider when necessary. To address protected peer review process requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to ensure that VAMCs send all required initial peer reviews (level of care 2 and 3) to the peer review committee; ensure VAMCs’ peer review committees complete final peer reviews within 120 calendar days; provide clear guidance and assistance on the purpose, development, and implementation of peer review triggers; and require VAMCs to periodically provide data on peer review triggers, including the number of providers that have exceeded the triggers as part of the protected peer review data VAMCs report to VISNs on a quarterly basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Adverse events--clinical incidents that may pose the risk of injury to a patient as the result of a medical intervention, rather than the patient's underlying health condition--can occur in all health care delivery settings. VAMCs can use one or more of the protected (confidential and nonpunitive) and nonprotected processes to evaluate the role of individual providers in adverse events. GAO was asked to review the extent to which processes used to respond to adverse events are carried out across VAMCs. In this report, GAO examined (1) VAMCs' adherence to VHA's protected peer review process, and the extent to which VHA monitors this process, and (2) VAMCs' adherence to VHA's nonprotected processes and the extent to which VHA monitors these processes. To conduct this work, GAO visited four VAMCs selected for variation in size, complexity of surgeries typically performed, and location. GAO reviewed VHA policies and federal internal control standards and analyzed data from the four selected VAMCs. GAO also interviewed VHA and VA OIG officials, as well as officials from VISNs of the four selected VAMCs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers GAO visited did not adhere to certain policy elements of the protected peer review process, and monitoring by VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is limited. According to policy issued by VHA, protected peer review may be used by VA medical centers (VAMC) when there is a need to determine whether a provider's actions associated with an adverse event were clinically appropriate--that is, whether another provider with similar expertise would have taken similar action. Despite VAMC officials' general understanding of the protected peer review process, none of the VAMCs GAO visited adhered to all four protected peer review policy elements selected for review, including the timely completion of reviews, and the timely development of peer review triggers that signal the need for further review of a provider's care. Failure of VAMCs to adhere to the protected peer review policy elements may result in missed opportunities to identify providers who pose a risk to patient safety. Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), responsible for oversight of VAMCs, monitor VAMCs' protected peer review processes through quarterly data submissions and annual site visits. A VHA official said that VHA monitors the process by reviewing and analyzing the aggregated quarterly data submitted by VAMCs through the VISNs. The VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also conducts oversight of the protected peer review process as part of a larger review of VAMCs' operations. While the VISNs and VA OIG have reviewed VAMCs establishment of peer review triggers to prompt further review of a provider's care, neither they nor VHA has monitored their implementation. As such, VHA cannot provide reasonable assurance that VAMCs are using the peer review triggers as intended, as a risk assessment tool. This weakens VAMCs' ability to ensure they are identifying providers that are unable to deliver safe, quality patient care.
VAMCs' adherence to the nonprotected focused professional practice evaluation (FPPE) process is unclear due to gaps in VHA's policy on documentation requirements, and VHA does not routinely monitor nonprotected processes. An FPPE for cause is a time-limited evaluation during which the VAMC assesses the provider's professional competence when a question arises regarding the provider's ability to provide safe, quality patient care. Information collected through the FPPE can be used to inform adverse actions, such as limiting the provider's scope of care. Although VAMC officials were generally aware of the FPPE process, there are gaps in VHA's policy regarding how these evaluations should be documented and what information should be included, which limited GAO's ability to assess VAMCs' adherence to the process. For example, one VAMC provided GAO with documentation labeled as an FPPE and identified by the service chief as an FPPE; however, the quality manager said a formal FPPE was not conducted and that the documentation was actually part of a protected peer review. These differing views illustrate that, even within the same facility, gaps in VHA's policy on documenting FPPEs create a lack of clarity and opportunities for misinterpretation and inappropriate use. Moreover, the gaps in VHA's policy may hinder VAMCs' ability to appropriately document the evaluation of a provider's skills, support any actions initiated, and track provider-specific incidents over time. There is no routine monitoring of FPPEs for cause by VHA, VISNs, or VA OIG.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA take action to ensure VAMCs adhere to certain elements of the peer review policy, require VAMCs to report data on implementation of peer review triggers, and develop more specific policy to help guide the FPPE process, including documentation requirements. In its written comments, VA generally concurred with GAO's conclusions and recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-95-48 | gao_HEHS-95-48_0 | Budgetary concerns and program changes have limited grant aid for low-income students. Students who received frontloaded grants had a lower dropout probability than other comparable students. Grants versus loans: Grants significantly reduced dropout probabilities for low-income students. First-year students: Grants were most effective in reducing low-income students’ dropout probabilities in the first year. Such a pilot program, moreover, would need to address several implementation issues. Although some of these students would graduate, on the whole their dropout rate could be higher than that of the current student population. Restructuring federal grant programs to feature frontloading could improve low-income students’ dropout rates without changing any student’s overall 4-year allocation of grants and loans. Recommendation to the Department of Education
We recommend that the Department of Education conduct a pilot program of frontloading federal grants at a limited number of 4-year schools to evaluate the impact of frontloading on reducing dropouts among low-income college students. Dropout probability (percent)
Change in probability from baseline (percent)
Low income (income categories 1 and 2)
Analysis of Data From a Public University
We analyzed financial aid data provided to us by a public university to examine (1) the relationship between different types of financial aid and whether students remained in college from year to year and (2) the effectiveness of a program involving an alternative form of financial aid packaging. Loans did not have a statistically significant effect. Changes in Financial Aid and Student Dropout Rates
In general, most directors said that changes in federal financial aid have not greatly affected dropout rates for the student population as a whole, but some directors were concerned about dropout rates for specific groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how student financial aid affects low-income students' dropout rates, focusing on whether: (1) the timing of loan and grant aid influences students' dropout rates; and (2) restructuring federal grant programs could improve low-income students' dropout rates.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) grants and loans do not have the same effects on reducing low-income college students' dropout rates; (2) although grant aid generally lowers low-income students' dropout rates, loans have no significant impact on these students' dropout rates; (3) the timing of grant aid greatly influences students' dropout rates; (4) grant aid to low-income students is more effective during the first school year than in subsequent years; (5) although financial aid program participants have substantially lower dropout rates than other comparable students, financial aid directors and students have mixed views on the potential efficacy of frontloading aid packages; (6) a pilot program could be valuable in evaluating the cost effects of frontloading student aid for low-income college students; and (7) Department of Education officials need to further review their legislative authority to determine whether they are authorized to conduct such a pilot project. |
gao_GAO-13-781 | gao_GAO-13-781_0 | More specifically, as stated in FSA’s handbook, to satisfy the actively engaged in farming criteria, an active personal management contribution must, among other things, be critical to the profitability of the farming operation. FSA Compliance Reviews Are Hindered by Broad and Subjective Eligibility Requirements and Difficulty Verifying Evidence of Members’ Claimed Contributions
FSA compliance reviews of farming operation members’ claims of eligibility to receive payments for being actively engaged in farming are hindered by (1) a broad definition of active personal management, (2) subjective requirements of what constitutes significant contributions of management, and (3) difficulty in verifying individuals’ evidence of claimed contributions of active personal management and personal labor. Broad Definition of Active Personal Management Makes It Difficult for FSA to Determine Significant Contributions in Compliance Reviews
Based on our review of FSA’s regulations, its handbook on payment eligibility and limitations, and a sample of 2009 and 2010 compliance review files and interviews with FSA officials, we found that the definition of active personal management is broad and makes it difficult for FSA to determine whether an individual had made a significant contribution of active personal management. According to an FSA state office official, compliance reviews find problems with management contributions more often for individuals who live significant distances from the farming operation than they find for individuals who live near the farming operation. However, it appears unlikely that FSA will change its regulatory definition of active personal management in view of its 2010 statements in the Federal Register that the “current regulatory definition of a significant contribution of active personal management has been in effect for over 20 years” and that “Congress has not mandated a more restrictive definition during that time.” In August 2013, a senior-level FSA headquarters official said that the agency does not plan to change the regulatory definition of active personal management without direction from Congress. The timeline for the reauthorization of the Farm Bill is unclear. FSA’s handbook acknowledges that it is difficult to measure what constitutes a significant active personal management contribution. Officials we interviewed from several FSA state offices said that determining whether a management contribution is critical to the profitability of a farming operation is difficult and subject to interpretation. One of the reasons for this difficulty is the extent to which compliance reviews must often rely on interviews with individual payment recipients. Most State Offices Did Not Complete and Report Compliance Reviews in a Timely Manner, and Almost Always Found That Members Made Their Claimed Contributions
Most state offices did not complete and report their assigned 2009 and 2010 compliance reviews within FSA’s expected time frame (i.e., within 12 months of being notified by FSA headquarters of which farming operations to review), according to our analysis of compliance review summary documents that state offices submitted to FSA headquarters. Similarly, FSA headquarters did not know the status of 2009 and 2010 compliance reviews assigned to several other state offices when we discussed this issue with them in November 2012. With a delayed awareness of several years, FSA cannot reasonably assess the level of recipients’ compliance with the act and may be missing opportunities to recapture payments that were made to ineligible recipients. To improve its ability to monitor the status and results of compliance reviews, in May 2013, FSA implemented the End-of-Year Review Tracking System, a database available to state and county FSA officials to electronically report their assigned compliance reviews’ status and results. In deliberations on reauthorizing the 2008 Farm Bill, both the Senate and the House of Representatives have recently considered statutory changes that would allow one person per farming operation to contribute management activities as a condition that would satisfy the criteria for actively engaged in farming. Until FSA develops a plan and time frame for using the database, including using it to generate specific queries, however, there is no guarantee that FSA will fully utilize the database and realize its intended benefits, including to generate reports from specific queries. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To reduce the risk that individuals who have little involvement in a farming operation use the active personal management provision to qualify for farm program payments, Congress should consider modifying the definition of contributions of management activities as a condition that would satisfy the criteria for being actively engaged in farming, either as both the Senate and the House of Representatives did in recent deliberations on reauthorizing the Farm Bill, or in other ways designed to make the criteria for such contributions more clear and objective. Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) FSA’s compliance reviews of farming operation members’ claims of significant active personal management and personal labor contributions to meet actively engaged in farming requirements; (2) the extent to which FSA state offices complete and report compliance reviews within expected time frames, and the results of reported reviews of management and labor contributions; and (3) the distribution and amount of payments to farming operations by type of entity and members’ claims of active personal management or personal labor contributions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agricultural producers receive about $5 billion annually in farm program payments for which being actively engaged in farming is required by the Farm Program Payments Integrity Act. GAO was asked to review FSA's processes for implementing actively engaged in farming regulations to determine payment eligibility.
This report examines, among other things, (1) FSA's compliance reviews of farming operation members' claimed contributions of active personal management and personal labor and (2) FSA state offices' timeliness in completing and reporting compliance reviews and their results. GAO reviewed FSA regulations and procedures, examined compliance review files in five states selected based on the number of assigned 2009 and 2010 compliance reviews (the latest available), analyzed compliance review data for those years, and interviewed FSA officials.
What GAO Found
Compliance reviews conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency (FSA) to determine if farming operation members (individuals and entities) meet the payment requirements for being actively engaged in farming are hindered by broad and subjective requirements and difficulty in verifying individuals' evidence of claimed contributions. To be actively engaged in farming, an individual is to make significant contributions to that operation in personal labor or active personal management (or both). However, the definition of active personal management in FSA regulations is broad and can be satisfied by an individual performing at least one of eight services representing categories such as supervision of activities necessary in the farming operation. Also, FSA regulations allow farming operation members to make contributions of management without visiting the operation, enabling individuals who live significant distances from an operation to claim such contributions. An FSA state official said that the agency finds problems with management contributions more often for those who live significant distances from an operation. FSA officials have also noted that the requirements for what constitutes a management contribution are subjective. FSA's handbook states that it is difficult to measure what constitutes a management contribution and that such a contribution must be critical to the profitability of a farming operation. FSA officials said that making such a determination is difficult and subject to interpretation. Also, officials from FSA headquarters and state offices GAO visited said that verifying evidence of management contributions is challenging, in part due to the extent to which compliance reviews must rely on interviews with payment recipients. FSA recognizes that it has the authority to change the definition of what constitutes a significant contribution of management in its regulations. However, as FSA stated in 2010 final regulations for farm program eligibility and as a senior FSA official told GAO in August 2013, FSA does not plan to change the regulatory definition of active personal management without direction from Congress. In recent congressional deliberations on reauthorizing the Farm Bill, statutory changes were considered that would allow one person per farming operation to contribute management activities satisfying the criteria for being actively engaged in farming. The timeline for Farm Bill reauthorization is unclear.
Most FSA state offices did not complete and report their assigned 2009 and 2010 compliance reviews within FSA's expected time frame (i.e., within 12 months of being notified by FSA headquarters of which farming operations to review). FSA state offices completed and reported about 24 percent of their assigned 2009 compliance reviews and 14 percent of their 2010 compliance reviews on time. In addition, FSA headquarters did not always know the status and results of the 2009 and 2010 reviews for oversight purposes when GAO discussed this issue with them in November 2012. With a delayed awareness of several years, FSA cannot reasonably assess the level of recipients' compliance with the act and may be missing opportunities to recapture payments that were made to ineligible recipients. To improve its monitoring of compliance reviews, FSA in May 2013 implemented a database for state and county FSA officials to electronically report their assigned compliance reviews' status and results. However, FSA has not developed a time frame or plan for using the database and until the agency does so it cannot fully utilize the database and realize its intended benefits.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider modifying the definition of significant contributions of management activities, either as it did in recent deliberations on reauthorizing the Farm Bill, or in other ways designed to make contributions more clear and objective. GAO recommends that FSA establish a plan and a time frame for using its new database to monitor the status of compliance reviews. FSA concurred with GAOs findings and recommendation. |
gao_GAO-06-811 | gao_GAO-06-811_0 | Research in cyber security technology can help create a broader range of choices and more robust tools for building secure, networked computer systems. Numerous Federal Entities Involved in Cyber Security Research and Development
Numerous federal agencies and organizations are involved in federally funded cyber security R&D. The Office of Science and Technology Policy oversees the National Science and Technology Council, which prepares R&D strategies that are coordinated across federal agencies. The council operates through its committees, subcommittees, and interagency working groups, which coordinate activities related to specific science and technology disciplines. Other Groups Support Coordination on Informal Basis
Participation by federal entities in other interagency groups provides opportunities for enhanced coordination of cyber security R&D efforts on an informal basis. Federal Entities Have Improved Oversight and Coordination, but Limitations Remain
Federal entities have taken several important steps to improve the oversight and coordination of federal cyber security R&D. These include (1) chartering an interagency working group to focus on this type of research, (2) publishing a federal plan for cyber security and information assurance research that is to provide baseline information and a framework for planning and conducting this research, (3) separating the reporting of budget information for cyber security research from other types of research, and (4) maintaining governmentwide repositories of information on R&D projects. According to the Interagency Working Group for Cyber Security and Information Assurance, which operates under the auspices of the Office of Science of Technology Policy and the National Science and Technology Council, the Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance Research and Development is the first step towards developing a federal agenda for cyber security research. The governmentwide repositories were incomplete and not fully populated, in part, because OMB had not issued guidance to ensure that agencies had provided all information required for the repositories. The National Science Foundation essentially relies on the researcher or grantee to disseminate information about National Science Foundation- funded research. The Department of Homeland Security has several methods for technology transfer, such as attending conferences and workshops and working with industry in several areas to share information about emerging threats and R&D needs. However, key elements of the federal research agenda called for in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace have not been developed, thereby increasing the risk that mid- and longer-term research priorities may not be achieved. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify the (1) federal agencies that are involved with cyber security research and development (R&D); (2) actions taken to improve oversight and coordination of cyber security research and development, including the development of a federal research agenda; and (3) methods used for technology transfer at the agencies with significant activities in cyber security research and development. To identify actions taken to improve oversight and coordination of federal cyber security R&D, including the development of a governmentwide research agenda, we interviewed officials at the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Security Agency, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, the Subcommittee on NITRD, the Technical Support Working Group, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Infosec Research Council. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research and development (R&D) of cyber security technology is essential to creating a broader range of choices and more robust tools for building secure, networked computer systems in the federal government and in the private sector. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace identifies national priorities to secure cyberspace, including a federal R&D agenda. GAO was asked to identify the (1) federal entities involved in cyber security R&D; (2) actions taken to improve oversight and coordination of federal cyber security R&D, including developing a federal research agenda; and (3) methods used for technology transfer at agencies with significant activities in this area. To do this, GAO examined relevant laws, policies, budget documents, plans, and reports.
What GAO Found
Several federal entities are involved in federal cyber security research and development. The Office of Science and Technology Policy and OMB establish high-level research priorities. The Office of Science and Technology Policy is to coordinate the development of a federal research agenda for cyber security and oversee the National Science and Technology Council, which prepares R&D strategies that are to be coordinated across federal agencies. The Council operates through its committees, subcommittees, and interagency working groups, which oversee and coordinate activities related to specific science and technology disciplines. The Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research and Development and the Cyber Security and Information Assurance Interagency Working Group are prominently involved in the coordination of cyber security research. In addition, other groups provide mechanisms for coordination of R&D efforts on an informal basis. The National Science Foundation and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security fund much of this research. Federal entities have taken several important steps to improve the oversight and coordination of federal cyber security R&D, although limitations remain. Actions taken include chartering an interagency working group to focus on cyber security research, publishing a federal plan for guiding this research, reporting budget information for this research separately, and maintaining repositories of information on R&D projects. However, a federal cyber security research agenda has not been developed as recommended in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the federal plan did not fully address certain key elements. Further, the repositories do not contain information about all of the federally funded cyber security research projects in part because OMB had not issued guidance to ensure that agencies provided all information required for the repositories. As a result, information needed for oversight and coordination of cyber security research activities was not readily available. Federal agencies use a variety of methods for sharing the results of cyber security research with federal and private organizations (technology transfer), including sharing information through agency Web sites. Other methods include relying on the researcher to disseminate information about his or her research, attending conferences and workshops, working with industry to share information about emerging threats and research, and publishing journals to help facilitate information sharing. |
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