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gao_NSIAD-95-59 | gao_NSIAD-95-59_0 | Its measure of concurrency is the amount of initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) completed before entering production of a system. At that time, the Air Force planned to acquire 648 F-22 operational aircraft at a cost of $86.6 billion. We found that development flight tests of critical F-22 technology advances are not scheduled to begin until about 1 year after LRIP is scheduled to start and over $2 billion will have been committed to procure F-22 aircraft. Production of 36 aircraft a year under LRIP represents 75 percent of the planned full-production rate. Plan for F-22 Low-Rate Production Compared With 1994 Congressional Guidelines
For programs entering the engineering and manufacturing phase of the acquisition cycle, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 requires the Secretary of Defense to explain to the Congress any plans to procure more than 10 percent of the total procurement quantity in the LRIP phase. Commitments to Production of F-22s Prior to IOT&E Completion Is Higher Than Most Prior Fighter Programs
The Air Force’s planned commitment to production of F-22’s prior to completion of IOT&E, as a percentage of total production, exceeds the commitments made for recent fighter programs except the F-15, in which the percent is about the same as the F-22. Development Risks With High Technology Systems and Subsystems
The Air Force plans to use advances in technologies and innovations to provide high performance and increased reliability and maintainability for the F-22. Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reduce the degree of concurrency in the program because independent testing of technology advances (IOT&E), will not be completed before significant commitments are made to produce F-22s; the percentage of planned F-22s to be committed to production before completion of IOT&E is higher than most recent fighter programs; and the need for the F-22 is not urgent. By that measure, the F-22 program clearly has a high degree of concurrency. 3. We believe that exceeds the minimum needed to successfully complete the LRIP phase of the program and that the production rates should be restricted during LRIP. 4. 9. 10. 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO assessed the concurrency between the development and production phases of the Air Force's F-22 fighter program and the risks associated with that concurrency.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the F-22 program has a high degree of concurrency because it will enter production before initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) is completed; (2) F-22 concurrency poses substantial production and operational risks because the aircraft may be procured before technological advances are flight-tested; (3) the Air Force plans to procure 80 F-22 aircraft at a cost of $12.4 billion before completing IOT&E; (4) the F-22 low-rate initial production (LRIP) quantities substantially exceed the 10-percent guideline included in federal acquisition streamlining requirements; (5) the percentage of F-22 committed to production before IOT&E is higher than most recent fighter programs; (6) the Air Force plans to accelerate F-22 production rates in the LRIP phase of the program so that 75 percent of the full production rate will be achieved; (7) the planned rate of acceleration appears to exceed the amount that is needed to complete the program's LRIP phase and represents a plan to commit to a full-rate production schedule before IOT&E is completed; (8) the Air Force should limit LRIP quantities each year given the program's high degree of concurrency; (9) technology advances and innovations are critical to F-22 operational success; (10) the need for F-22 aircraft is not urgent and its procurement could be deferred; and (11) existing operational and technological problems need to be addressed before significant commitments are made to F-22 production. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-97 | gao_T-HEHS-97-97_0 | In 1989, the Department of Veterans Affairs was established as a cabinet-level agency. VA has made significant progress in improving the efficiency of its health care system. Under the leadership of the Under Secretary for Health, VA has a new emphasis on both economy and efficiency and customer service. The VA Health Care System Continues to Face Major Challenges
In our testimony 2 years ago, we focused on four major challenges facing VA because of a rapidly changing health care marketplace. VISN 5 (Baltimore), for example, uses its reviews primarily for data collection, evaluation, and monitoring. This older group raises particular concerns because the need for nursing home and other long-term care services increases with the age of the beneficiary population. VBA Faces Multiple Challenges
VA, like other federal agencies, could be unable to issue compensation and pension checks at the beginning of the year 2000 unless it is able to reprogram its computers to recognize the next century; veterans frequently wait over 2 years for resolution of disability compensation and pension claims; and hundreds of millions of dollars in overpayments of compensation and pension benefits are made because VBA does not focus on prevention. This framework includes
GPRA, which is designed to improve federal agencies’ performance by requiring them to focus on their missions and goals, and on the results they provide to their customers—for veterans and their families; the CFO Act of 1990, as amended by the Government Management Reform Act, designed to improve the timeliness, reliability, usefulness, and consistency of financial information in federal agencies; and the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which are intended to improve agencies’ ability to use information technology to support their missions and improve performance. While VA has not yet completed its GPRA strategic plan, its fiscal year 1998 budget submission to the Congress includes some of the elements of the GPRA planning process. The Inspector General’s audit of VA’s fiscal year 1996 financial statement disclosed six internal control weaknesses that expose VA to significant financial risks: errors in accounting for property, plant, and equipment, which could result in a future qualification of opinion if not corrected; errors by medical facilities in recording estimated amounts of unbilled services and in estimating uncollectible amounts; failure to cancel approximately $69 million in open obligations that should have been cancelled before the end of the fiscal year—funds that could have been reprogrammed and used for other valid needs if they had been identified before the appropriations expired; an outdated data processing system for VA’s life insurance programs that has the potential to adversely affect the complete and accurate processing of insurance transactions and the integrity of the financial information generated by the system; insufficient VA management emphasis on, and oversight of, VA data processing facilities to ensure that data processing systems are protected from unauthorized access and modification of data; and lack of an integrated financial accounting system for VA’s Housing Credit Assistance Program which, when coupled with the complexities of accounting requirements under credit reform, increases the risk of financial reporting error. Develop a plan to achieve a higher level of software development maturity. Others, however, would require fundamental policy changes in veterans’ benefits, including changes in entitlement programs. Limit Enrollment in VA Health Care System
Recently enacted legislation expands eligibility for VA health benefits to make all veterans eligible for comprehensive inpatient and outpatient services, subject to the availability of resources. enrollment system. VA’s progress in strengthening its management should help it address the multiple challenges facing its health and benefits programs. In addition, actions to expand eligibility, make it easier for VA to buy services from and sell services to the private sector, improve access, and reduce waiting times place VA in a better position to compete with private sector providers for declining numbers of veterans. Veterans’ Health Care: Facilities’ Resource Allocations Could Be More Equitable (GAO/HEHS-96-48, Feb. 7, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed some of the major challenges facing the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and some of the options for deficit reduction through changes in VA benefits and programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) significant improvements have occurred in the efficiency of the VA health care system; (2) VA's new management and Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) structure clearly values efficiency and customer service; (3) in addition, legislation was enacted: (a) expanding eligibility for VA health care; (b) making it easier for VA to contract for and sell services to the private sector; and (c) requiring VA to develop a plan for more equitably allocating resources to its VISNs; (4) these decisions bring with them both solutions to old problems and significant new challenges, such as developing an enrollment process consistent with the priorities established under the eligibility reform legislation and determining when to buy services from the private sector rather than provide them in VA facilities; (5) the Veterans Benefits Administration also faces major challenges; for example: (a) the disability rating schedule has not been updated for over 45 years; (b) VA faces the prospect of late or inaccurate compensation and pension payments to millions of veterans if it is unable to resolve the "year 2000" computer problem; (c) veterans often wait over 2 years for resolution of compensation and pension claims by the time the appeals process has been completed; and (d) VA could avoid millions of dollars in overpayments of compensation and pension benefits by strengthening its ability to prevent such payments; (6) recent legislation, including the Government Performance and Results Act, the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, and the Paperwork Reduction Act, provides a basis for addressing long-standing management challenges; (7) VA has begun to use the legislation to improve its mission performance and results, its financial reporting, and its information resources management; (8) for example, VA included strategic plans for its health and benefits programs in its fiscal year 1998 budget submission, and it has been preparing audited financial statements since 1986, well in advance of the requirements imposed by the CFO Act; (9) multiple options exist for supporting deficit reduction through changes in VA benefits and programs; (10) although some of the changes could be achieved through administrative action, others would require legislation; and (11) the options include: (a) redefining compensation benefits to eliminate compensation for diseases that are not related to military service; (b) imposing higher cost sharing for nursing home and other long-term care services; (c) limiting enrollment in the VA health care system; and (d) closing underused hospitals. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-144 | gao_T-HEHS-98-144_0 | New Deficit: The Shortage of Information Technology Workers, examining the potential for shortages of IT workers. Information Technology: Assessment of the Commerce Department’s Report on Worker Demand and Supply 2005 (projected)
Supply of IT Workers
Commerce identifies the supply of potential IT workers as the number of students graduating with bachelor’s degrees in computer and information sciences. The introduction to the report stated that evidence suggests that job growth in information technology fields now exceeds the production of talent. Commerce reported that between 1994 and 2005, an annual average of 95,000 new systems analysts, computer scientists and engineers, and computer programmers will be required to satisfy the increasing demand for IT workers and that only 24,553 students earned bachelor’s degrees in computer and information sciences in 1994. Because there is a disparity between these two numbers, Commerce concluded that it will be difficult to meet the demand for IT workers. Commerce’s Conclusions in the Report
Commerce’s conclusions about the IT workforce are inconsistently reported in separate segments of its report. First, the title of the report states that America’s new deficit is a shortage of information technology workers. However, the report notes that current statistical frameworks and mechanisms for measuring labor supply do not allow for precise identification of IT worker shortages and, in its summary chapter, Commerce concludes that more information is needed to fully characterize the IT labor market. We agree with Commerce’s conclusion that more information and data are needed about the current and future IT labor market. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Commerce's report on the demand and supply of information technology (IT) workers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Commerce's report has serious analytical and methodological weaknesses that undermine the credibility of its conclusion that a shortage of IT workers exists; (2) however, the lack of support presented in this one report should not necessarily lead to a conclusion that there is no shortage; (3) instead, as the Commerce report states, additional information and data are needed to more accurately characterize the IT labor market now and in the future; (4) the report appears to appropriately establish that the demand for IT workers is expected to grow, but it does not adequately describe the likely supply of IT workers; (5) although Commerce reported that only 24,553 U.S. students earned bachelor's degrees in computer and information sciences in 1994, Commerce also stated the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects increasing job growth--an annual average of 95,000 new computer programmers, systems analysts and computer scientists and engineers will be required to satisfy the increasing demand for IT workers between 1994 and 2005; (6) pointing to the disparity between these two numbers and referring to evidence from other sources, Commerce concludes in the report's title and introduction that there is a shortage of IT workers; (7) Commerce did not, however, consider other likely sources of workers, such as college graduates with degrees in other areas; and (8) as a result, rather than supporting its conclusion that a shortage of IT workers exists, the data and analysis support the report's observation that more needs to be known about the supply and demand for IT workers. |
gao_GAO-02-727T | gao_GAO-02-727T_0 | Application of environmental statutes to military munitions. Competition for frequency spectrum. Competition for airspace. Urban growth. Because most encroachment problems are caused by population growth and urban development, these problems are expected to increase in the future. Below are brief descriptions of some of the problems as reported by the installations and organizations we visited in the continental United States. Recently, about 10 percent of the installation has been designated as critical habitat for endangered species. DOD and military service officials said that many encroachment issues are related to urbanization around military installations. Effects of Encroachment on Training Readiness Are Not Reflected in Reported Data
Despite the loss of some training range capabilities, service readiness data do not indicate that encroachment has significantly affected training readiness. In fact, it rarely cites training range limitations at all. Although readiness reporting can and should be improved to address training degradation due to encroachment and other factors, it will be difficult for DOD to fully assess the impact of encroachment on its training capabilities and readiness without (1) obtaining more complete information on both training range requirements and the assets available to support those requirements and (2) considering to what extent other complementary forms of training may help mitigate some of the adverse impacts of encroachment. A full assessment of the effects of encroachment on training capabilities and readiness will be limited without better information on the services’ training range requirements and limitations and on the range resources available to support those requirements. Although DOD has not yet finalized a comprehensive plan of actions for addressing encroachment issues, it has made progress in several areas. According to DOD, the legislative proposals seek to “clarify” the relationship between military training and a number of provisions in various conservation statutes, including the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Clean Air Act. | What GAO Found
The following eight "encroachment" issues are hampering the military's ability to carry out realistic training: endangered species' critical habitat, unexploded ordnance and munitions, competition for radio frequency spectra, protected marine resources, competition for airspace, air pollution, noise pollution, and urban growth around military installations. Officials at all the installations and major commands GAO visited in the continental United States reported that encroachment had affected some of their training range capabilities, requiring work-arounds that are unrealistic. Service officials believe that population growth is responsible for current encroachment problems in the United States and is likely to cause more training range losses in the future. Despite concerns about encroachment, military readiness reports do not indicate the extent to which encroachment is harming training. Improvements in readiness reporting can better reveal shortfalls in training, but the ability to fully assess training limitations and their impact on capabilities and readiness will be limited without (1) more complete baseline data on training range capabilities, limitations, and requirements and (2) consideration of how live training capabilities may be complemented by training devices and simulations. Progress in addressing individual encroachment issues has been made, but more will be required to comprehensively plan for encroachment. Legislation proposed by the Department of Defense to "clarify" the relationship between military training and various environmental statues may require trade-offs between environmental policy and military training objectives. |
gao_GAO-01-834 | gao_GAO-01-834_0 | Annual performance reports are to subsequently report on the degree to which performance goals were met. Assessment of DOT’s Progress and Strategies in Achieving Selected Key Outcomes
This section discusses our analysis of DOT’s performance in achieving selected key outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place, particularly strategic human capital management and information technology, for accomplishing these outcomes. DOT provides a clear and comprehensive discussion of the performance data. DOT did not indicate why the agency failed to meet the 2000 goal. Comparison of DOT’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in DOT’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report, and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. We found that DOT’s performance report discussed the agency’s progress in resolving many of these challenges. Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Transportation | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to produce annual performance reports. GAO reviewed the Department of Transportation's (DOT) performance reports for fiscal years 2000 and 2002 to assess its progress in achieving selected key outcomes in important mission areas.
What GAO Found
This report (1) assesses the progress DOT has made in accomplishing these outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place to achieve them and (2) compares DOT's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan with the agency's prior year performance report and plan for these outcomes. DOT's consolidated performance report makes it clear that DOT achieved only limited progress in fiscal year 2000 toward achieving the selected outcomes and that the agency directly indicated that its current strategies are not likely to result in achievement of the goals. DOT provided a clear, well-organized discussion of performance goals, measures, and data in both fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2002 performance plans. |
gao_T-RCED-97-130 | gao_T-RCED-97-130_0 | NIST manages federal funding of this type of program through its Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program, or MEP. The Advanced Technology Program
In our work on ATP, our objective was to examine, as one way to assess the program’s impact, whether research projects would have been funded by the private sector if they had not received funds from ATP. We found that ATP had funded research projects that would have been funded by the private sector as well as those that would not. The winners were nearly evenly divided when asked if they would have pursued their projects even if they had not received ATP funding. Of the 123 applicants we surveyed, 77, or 63 percent, did not look for funding from other sources before requesting it from ATP. Furthermore, of the 45 applicants that tried to find funding elsewhere before turning to ATP, about half were told by prospective funders that their projects were either too risky or precompetitive—characteristics that fulfill the aims of ATP funding. Most manufacturers responding to our questionnaire—about 73 percent—reported that they believed the programs’ assistance had positively affected their overall business performance. About 15 percent of the respondents reported that they believed the assistance had not affected their overall business performance. Whether the focus is on basic research, applied research, or development, the amount of money spent in that area is taken as an indication of how much research is being performed. We also found that because of the difficulties in identifying the impacts of research, quantitative and qualitative indicators have been developed as proxies to assess R&D results. Quantitative indicators focus mainly on return on investment, patenting rates, and bibliometrics—the study of publication-based data. While varying in the types of indicators they collect, they emphasized the difficulties in measuring R&D’s specific contribution to a company’s overall performance. All of the companies interviewed have increased their expectation that R&D contribute directly to their profitability. Many of the R&D output measures tracked by the private sector do not apply directly to the federal government. Although this is not the only approach that can be taken, this response to the challenges in measuring the impacts of research shows that some progress is being made in response to GPRA. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work related to the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Advanced Technology Program (ATP), Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) Program, and research and development (R&D) performance measures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted: (1) ATP has funded research projects that would have been funded by the private sector as well as those that would not; (2) the award recipients were nearly evenly divided when asked if they would have pursued their projects if they had not received such funding; (3) GAO also found that in most cases, the participants in its survey did not look for funding from other sources, private or public, before trying to obtain funding from ATP; (4) about half of the 45 applicants that tried to find funding elsewhere before turning to ATP were told by prospective funders that their projects were either too risky or "precompetitive", characteristics that fulfill the aims of ATP; (5) manufacturers viewed the manufacturing extension programs' services positively, as was demonstrated in GAO's national survey of manufacturers who had received substantive services from the programs in 1993; (6) most manufacturers responding to GAO's questionnaire, about 73 percent, reported that they believed that the type of assistance they had received from these programs had positively affected their overall business performance; (7) about 15 percent of the respondents reported that they believed the programs' assistance had not affected their overall business performance; (8) the amount of money spent on R&D, the primary indicator of research investment, is useful as an input measure of how much research is being performed; (9) however, the level of spending is not a reliable indicator of research results; (10) GAO found that there is no primary indicator of R&D results; (11) the companies that GAO spoke with collect data on various output indicators, such as return on investment and patents granted, but in general make limited use of them in their investment decisions; (12) instead, they emphasized that R&D contributes directly to the bottom line; (13) because companies are profit oriented, many of the indicators tracked by the private sector cannot be directly applied to the federal government; (14) determining the specific outcomes resulting from federal R&D is a challenge that will not be easily resolved; and (15) however, in response to recent legislation requiring agencies to report on program results, some progress is being made in measuring the impacts of research. |
gao_GAO-16-811 | gao_GAO-16-811_0 | Broadband Use Is Associated with Lower Use of First- Class Mail, Though Less So in Rural Areas; Extent of Future Decreases in All Areas Is Unclear
Broadband Use Is Associated with Reduced Use of Some First-Class Mail but Continued Mail Volume Declines Are Uncertain
Broadband access to various Internet services, especially online bill paying, has in recent years been associated with reduced of use transaction mail, a subset of First-Class Mail. Our analysis of USPS’s HDS data from 2007 to 2014 found a negative relationship between broadband use and the volume of transaction mail sent, after adjusting for available demographic and other factors that might be associated with the use of postal services. In other words, controlling for age, income, and education, households that used broadband to access Internet services tended to send less transaction mail than other households. Correspondence mail, another subset of First-Class Mail, has been in decline for over a decade, but we found that broadband use may not have had a significant effect on that trend in recent years. As one expert we spoke with suggested, the lack of a relationship between broadband and correspondence mail in our analysis could reflect that individual communication choices are no longer significantly influenced by broadband in the home. However, although USPS has said that they anticipate that First-Class Mail volume will continue to decline with the migration to electronic alternatives resulting from technological changes, experts we spoke with had mixed views on the future of First-Class Mail and its relationship to broadband use. Only 4 of the 11 experts we spoke with said that First-Class Mail was likely to continue decreasing at least in the short-term. Four experts, as well as officials from six of the groups we spoke with for our case studies, also suggested that Internet privacy and security concerns could be contributing to a slowed rate of electronic diversion. Specifically, our analysis of USPS HDS data found that among households without broadband, households in rural areas tended to send more correspondence and more transaction mail than did non-rural households, after adjusting for demographic and other factors that might be associated with the use of postal services. In other words, after adjusting for demographic and other factors, rural households with broadband Internet access were not statistically different in the volume of correspondence mail sent compared to non-rural households. The USPS, ISP, and business officials we interviewed for our case studies generally agreed that overall, residents of rural areas value mail and postal services for a variety of reasons. E-Commerce Continues to Drive Package and Shipping Business, but USPS Could Face Increased Competition and Challenges in the Package Delivery Market
E-commerce continues to have a strong effect on USPS package volumes. In other words, broadband use in the home was associated with sending and receiving more packages with USPS. We found that households in rural areas made greater use of package and shipping services. Overall Effect of Broadband Use on Post Office Visits Is Unclear, though Data Is Limited; Rural Residents Value the Presence and Services Provided by USPS
While access to Internet services has had a major effect on other postal services, as described above, it is unclear what role the Internet has played in the nationwide reduction in post office visits in recent years. Our analysis of USPS’s HDS data found no statistically significant relationship between broadband use and post office visits. With regard to rural households, however, we found that rural households tended to visit post offices more than non-rural households, independent of broadband use. Rural residents may also use USPS services and post offices at higher rates because of the special role of USPS in rural communities. As a result, post offices serve as a valuable social space in these small communities, where even the bulletin board can be a valuable communication tool. To balance the benefits of its retail network with the high costs and decreasing revenue generated by those retail facilities, USPS is undertaking various initiatives. Irrespective of these efforts, balancing the benefits of a robust retail network with the costs of maintaining that network, especially in rural areas, will continue to be challenging for USPS. USPS did not have any comments on the draft report. Postal Service’s (USPS) (1) mail services, (2) package and shipping services, and (3) post offices, particularly in rural areas. We also used our literature review to identify research on the role of post offices in rural America. Household Diary Survey Analysis
To assess the relationship between broadband use and the use of postal services, as well as how use of postal products differs in urban and rural areas, we conducted regression analyses using data from the USPS’s Household Diary Survey (HDS). We therefore are not reporting the results of this analysis for rural areas specifically. | Why GAO Did This Study
As broadband availability grows, Americans—including those in rural areas—increasingly partake in communications and services offered via the Internet. Some of these Internet services have changed how individuals use USPS. Though many factors influence use of postal services, understanding the relationship between broadband use and the use of postal services is critical to both the future of postal services overall and the communication options available to rural residents. GAO was asked to examine the relationship between broadband and postal use, particularly in rural areas.
This report addresses the relationship between broadband use and the use of USPS's (1) mail services, (2) package and shipping services, and (3) post offices, particularly in rural areas. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed literature on broadband and mail trends, factors associated with postal and broadband use, and the role of post offices in rural America. GAO conducted regression analyses using 2007-2014 data, the most recent available, from the USPS HDS, which collects information from a nationally representative sample of households. GAO interviewed local stakeholders, such as officials from post offices and Internet service providers, in five rural areas, chosen based on recent deployment of broadband and other factors. GAO also interviewed 11 postal experts, chosen based on participation in previous GAO work and postal conferences.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. USPS did not have any comments on the draft report.
What GAO Found
Broadband use has in recent years been associated with reduced use of First-Class Mail. Continued declines as a result of broadband, however, are uncertain. Broadband access to various Internet services, especially online bill paying, is associated with reduced use of transaction mail, a subset of First-Class Mail. GAO analysis of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) Household Diary Survey (HDS) data from 2007-2014 found that households using broadband to access Internet services tended to send less transaction mail than other households, controlling for age, income, and education. However, GAO found that in recent years broadband use may not have had a statistically significant effect on correspondence mail, a subset of First-Class Mail that includes letters and greeting cards. Experts GAO spoke with had mixed views on the future of First-Class Mail as a result of broadband use, with only 4 of the 11 experts expecting decreases in First-Class Mail in the short term. Several experts and officials suggested that Internet privacy and security concerns, as well as many individuals having already changed postal habits in response to the Internet, are among the factors that could be contributing to a slowed rate of “electronic diversion” from mail. With regard to rural areas, GAO analysis of HDS data suggests that rural households without broadband tended to send more transaction and correspondence mail than non-rural households without broadband in recent years. The officials in rural areas GAO interviewed generally agreed that residents of rural areas value mail and postal services for a variety of reasons, including that they have fewer retail alternatives and trust USPS services. Despite this relationship, GAO found that the subset of rural households with broadband were not statistically different in the volume of correspondence mail sent compared to non-rural households. In rural areas, two groups of businesses that GAO spoke with also noted that improved Internet access could result in mail volume declines.
E-commerce continues to have a strong effect on USPS package and shipping volumes. GAO analysis of HDS data found that broadband use in the home was associated with sending and receiving more packages with USPS in recent years. This analysis also found that households in rural areas made greater use of package and shipping services, a view echoed in interviews with officials in rural areas. While research and experts interviewed by GAO generally agreed that USPS's package business will grow in the short term, USPS is likely to face longer-term challenges, such as increased competition in the delivery market.
It is unclear what role broadband use has played in the reduction in post office visits in recent years. GAO analysis of HDS data found no statistically significant relationship between broadband use and post office visits. However, GAO found that rural households tend to visit post offices more regardless of broadband use. Local stakeholders GAO interviewed said that rural residents may use post offices at higher rates because post offices play a valuable social role in small communities and that alternatives for certain services, such as money orders, are lacking. To balance the benefits of its postal retail network with the high costs of some facilities, USPS is undertaking various initiatives. Despite these efforts, balancing the benefits of a robust network with the costs of maintaining that network, especially in rural areas, will remain a challenge for USPS. |
gao_GAO-13-25 | gao_GAO-13-25_0 | Apprehensions Have Decreased across the Southwest Border; However, Other Data on Illegal Migration, Drug Seizures, and Terrorism Also Provide Insights into Border Security
Border Patrol apprehensions have decreased in the Tucson sector and across the southwest border, and DHS has reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. While changes in apprehension levels provide useful insight on activity levels, other types of data may also inform changes in the status of border security, including changes in the percentage of estimated known illegal entries who are apprehended and who repeatedly cross the border illegally (recidivist rate), increases in seizures of drugs and other contraband, and increases in apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries (ASIC) that have been determined to be at a potential increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. Apprehensions Decreased at about the Same Rate as Estimated Known Illegal Entries in the Tucson Sector and across the Southwest Border
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim measure for border security as reported in its Annual Performance Report. These data show that Border Patrol apprehensions within each southwest Border Patrol sector decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring the decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each sector. These officials stated that greater use of these data in assessing border security at the national level may occur as the agency transitions to the new strategic plan. Our analysis of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who were apprehended by the Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years. Specifically, the number of drug and contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions of ASICs across the southwest border increased each fiscal year from 239 in fiscal 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011. In contrast, ASIC apprehensions within 1 mile of the border in Tucson sector decreased from 26 percent in fiscal 2010 to 8 percent in fiscal year 2011. Southwest Border Sectors Scheduled Agents Differently across Border Zones and Enforcement Activities; Data Limitations Preclude Comparison of Overall Effectiveness
The Tucson sector scheduled a higher percentage of agent workdays to enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other southwest border sectors in fiscal year 2011. However, until recently sectors have differed in how they collect and report data that Border Patrol used to assess its overall effectiveness in using resources to secure the border, precluding comparison across sectors. In September 2012, Border Patrol issued new guidance on standardizing data collection and reporting practices that could increase data reliability and allow comparison across locations. Border Patrol Has Not Established Milestones and Time Frames for Developing Performance Goals and Measures
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Moreover, milestones and time frames could better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border between POEs and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Recommendations for Executive Action
To support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the nation’s strategic goal for securing the border, we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection ensure that the Chief of the Office of Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, for border security between the POEs that defines how border security is to be measured and a performance measure, or measures—linked to a performance goal or goals—for assessing progress made in securing the border between POEs and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. To assess trends in apprehensions, seizures, and other types of data Border Patrol uses to inform changes in the status of border security across the southwest border and in the Tucson sector, we obtained Border Patrol data for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 from DHS and Border Patrol databases—apprehensions and seizure data from the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and estimated cross-border illegal activity data from the Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS). To determine how the Tucson sector scheduled agent deployment compared with other southwest border sectors and to what extent the data showed these deployments had been effective in securing the border, we analyzed Border Patrol BPETS data regarding the scheduled deployment of agents, by sector, from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. To assess to what extent Border Patrol has identified mechanisms for assessing resource needs under the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan), we analyzed key elements of the strategic plan defined by Border Patrol. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between ports of entry, and reported that with its 18,500 agents it apprehended over 327,000 illegal entrants at the southwest border in fiscal year 2011. Across Border Patrol's nine southwest border sectors, most apprehensions occurred in the Tucson sector in Arizona. GAO was asked to review how Border Patrol manages resources at the southwest border. This report examines (1) apprehension and other data Border Patrol collects to inform changes in border security for the southwest border and the Tucson sector, in particular; (2) how the Tucson sector compares with other sectors in scheduling agent deployment and to what extent data show that deployments have been effective; and (3) the extent to which Border Patrol has identified mechanisms to assess resource needs under its new strategic plan. GAO analyzed DHS documents and data from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and interviewed officials in headquarters and five southwest border sectors selected based on cross-border illegal activity, among other things. Results cannot be generalized across the southwest border, but provided insights into Border Patrol operations.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions; our data analysis showed that apprehensions decreased within each southwest border sector and by 68 percent in the Tucson sector from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, due in part to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border Patrol strategic objectives. These data generally mirrored the decrease in estimated known illegal entries across locations. Other data are used by Border Patrol sector management to assess efforts in securing the border against the threat of illegal migration, drug smuggling, and terrorism; and Border Patrol may use these data to assess border security at the national level as the agency transitions to a new strategic plan. Our analysis of these data indicated that in the Tucson sector, there was little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years, and the percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined across the southwest border by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. Additionally, the number of drug seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011, and apprehensions of aliens from countries determined to be at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism increased from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 309 in fiscal year 2010, but decreased to 253 in fiscal year 2011.
The Tucson sector scheduled more agent workdays in fiscal year 2011 for enforcement activities related to patrolling the border than other sectors; however, data limitations preclude comparison of overall effectiveness in how each sector has deployed resources to secure the border. In fiscal year 2011 the Tucson sector scheduled 73 percent of agent workdays for enforcement activities, and of these activities, 71 percent were scheduled for patrolling within 25 miles of the border. Other sectors scheduled from 44 to 70 percent of agent enforcement workdays for patrolling the border. Border Patrol sectors assess how effectively they use resources to secure the border, but differences in how sectors collect and report the data preclude comparing results.
Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 to improve the consistency of sector data collection and reporting, which may allow future comparison of performance. Border Patrol is developing key elements of its 2012-2016 Strategic Plan needed to define border security and the resources necessary to achieve it, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing performance goals and measures in accordance with standard practices in program management. Border Patrol officials stated that performance goals and measures are in development for assessing the progress of agency efforts to secure the border between the ports of entry, and since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border as an interim goal and measure. However, as GAO previously testified, this interim measure does not inform program results and therefore limits DHS and congressional oversight and accountability. Milestones and time frames could assist Border Patrol in monitoring progress in developing goals and measures necessary to assess the status of border security and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. Border Patrol expects to implement other key elements of its strategic plan over the next 2 fiscal years.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP ensure Border Patrol develops milestones and time frames for developing border security goals and measures to assess progress made and resource needs. DHS concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-687 | gao_GAO-04-687_0 | Background
Since 1998 VA and DOD have been trying to achieve the capability to share patient health care data electronically. The Two-Way Exchange Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Project Management
While VA and DOD are making progress in agreeing to and adopting standards for clinical data, they continue to face significant challenges in providing a virtual medical record based on the two-way exchange of data as part of their HealthePeople (Federal) initiative. VA and DOD lack an explicit architecture that provides details on what specific technologies they will use to achieve the exchange capability, or just what they will be able to exchange by the end of 2005—their projected date for having this capability operational. However, the departments are currently operating without a project management plan for HealthePeople (Federal) that describes the specific responsibilities of each department in developing, testing, and deploying the interface and addressing security requirements. These critical components are currently lacking; thus, the departments risk investing in a capability that could fall short of expectations. The continued absence of these components elevates concerns about exactly what capabilities VA and DOD will achieve—and when. Recommendations for Executive Action
To encourage significant progress on achieving the two-way exchange of health information, we recommend that the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense instruct the Acting Chief Information Officer for Health and the Chief Information Officer for the Military Health System, respectively, to develop an architecture for the electronic interface between their health systems that includes system requirements, design specifications, and software descriptions; select a lead entity with final decision-making authority for the initiative; establish a project management structure to provide day-to-day guidance of and accountability for their investments in and implementation of the interface capability; and create and implement a comprehensive and coordinated project management plan for the electronic interface that defines the technical and managerial processes necessary to satisfy project requirements and includes (1) the authority and responsibility of each organizational unit; (2) a work breakdown structure for all of the tasks to be performed in developing, testing, and implementing the software, along with schedules associated with the tasks; and (3) a security policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
A critical element of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) information technology program is its continuing work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve the ability to exchange patient health care information and create electronic medical records for use by veterans, active-duty military personnel, and their health care providers.
What GAO Found
While VA and DOD continue to move forward in agreeing to and adopting standards for clinical data, they have made little progress since last winter toward defining how they intend to achieve an electronic medical record based on the two-way exchange of patient health data. The departments continue to face significant challenges in achieving this capability. VA and DOD lack an explicit architecture--a blueprint--that provides details on what specific technologies will be used to achieve the electronic medical record by the end of 2005. The departments have not fully implemented a project management structure that establishes lead decision-making authority and ensures the necessary day-to-day guidance of and accountability for their investment in and implementation of this project. They are operating without a project management plan describing the specific responsibilities of each department in developing, testing, and deploying the electronic interface. In seeking to provide a two-way exchange of health information between their separate health information systems, VA and DOD have chosen a complex and challenging approach--one that necessitates the highest levels of project discipline. Yet critical project components are currently lacking. As such, the departments risk investing in a capability that could fall short of what is expected and what is needed. Until a clear approach and sound planning are made integral parts of this initiative, concerns about exactly what capabilities VA and DOD will achieve--and when--will remain. |
gao_GAO-13-444T | gao_GAO-13-444T_0 | Government-wide 2013 High Risk Update
High-Risk Designation Removed
For our 2013 high risk update, we determined that two areas warranted removal from the High Risk List due to the progress that had been made—Management of Interagency Contracting and IRS Business Systems Modernization. New High-Risk Areas
This year, we added two new areas to the High Risk List—Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks and Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data. In 2003, we designated implementing and transforming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one department. Further, failure to effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. Recognizing DHS’s progress in transformation and mission implementation, our 2011 high risk update focused on the continued need to strengthen DHS’s management functions (acquisition, information technology, financial management, and human capital) and integrate those functions within and across the department, as well as the impact of these challenges on the department’s ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its missions. While challenges remain for DHS to address across its range of missions, the department has made considerable progress in transforming its original component agencies into a single cabinet-level department and positioning itself to achieve its full potential. As a result, we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area and changed the name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security Management Functions. Additionally, in the financial management area, DHS has reduced the number of material weaknesses in internal controls and obtained a qualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2012 financial statements. We identified 42 programs that experienced cost growth or schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs’ costs increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011—an aggregate increase of 166 percent. Further, while DHS has defined and begun to implement a vision for a tiered governance structure to improve information technology (IT) management, we reported in July 2012 that the governance structure covers less than 20 percent (about 16 of 80) of DHS’s major IT investments and 3 of its 13 portfolios. DHS has also been unable to obtain an audit opinion on its internal controls over financial reporting, and needs to obtain and sustain unqualified audit opinions for at least two consecutive years on the department-wide financial statements. In doing so, it will be important for DHS to: make continued progress in addressing the 31 actions and outcomes and demonstrate that systems, personnel, and policies are in place to ensure that progress can be sustained over time; maintain its current level of top leadership support and sustained commitment to ensure continued progress in executing its corrective actions through completion; continue to implement its plan for addressing this high-risk area and periodically report its progress to Congress and GAO; closely track and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective actions and make midcourse adjustments, as needed; and monitor the effectiveness of its efforts to establish reliable resource estimates at the department and component levels, address and work to mitigate any resource gaps, and prioritize initiatives as needed to ensure it has the capacity to implement and sustain its corrective actions. Sustaining Attention on High-Risk Programs
Overall, the government continues to take high-risk problems seriously and is making long-needed progress toward correcting them. Congress has acted to address several individual high-risk areas through hearings and legislation. OMB is required to provide clear milestones and periodic status reports on progress being made and actions needed for additional progress. Moving forward, congressional oversight and sustained attention by top administration officials will be essential to ensure further improvement in the management and performance of federal programs and operations and addressing high-risk areas. IRS Business Systems Modernization
We are removing the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program from the High Risk List because of IRS’s progress in addressing the significant weaknesses in information technology (IT) and financial management capabilities that led to the high-risk designation, and its commitment to sustaining progress in the future. Because of the significant progress made in addressing this high-risk area over the years, starting in fiscal year 2012, Congress did not require the submission of an annual expenditure plan. FEMA concurred with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is a large and complex entity, with about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2012 funding a broad array of programs and operations. GAO maintains a program to focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Since 1990, more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have been removed from the list because sufficient progress was made to address the problems identified.
The biennial high risk update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2011 and identifies any new high-risk area needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen the performance and accountability of the U.S. government.
What GAO Found
In the past 2 years, notable progress has been made in the vast majority of areas that were on GAO's 2011 High Risk List. Congress passed several laws and took oversight actions to help address high-risk areas. Top administration officials at the Office of Management and Budget and the individual agencies have continued to show their commitment to ensuring that high-risk areas receive attention and action. Additional progress is both possible and needed in all the high-risk areas on GAO's 2013 list.
Sufficient progress has been made to remove the high-risk designation from two high-risk areas on the 2011 list, Management of Interagency Contracting and Internal Revenue Service Business Systems Modernization . While these two areas have been removed from the list, GAO will continue to monitor them.
This year, GAO also has added two areas, Limiting the Federal Government's Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks , and Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data .
In 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies--several with major management challenges--into one department, and failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences. While challenges remain across its missions, DHS has made considerable progress in transforming its original component agencies into a single department. As a result, GAO narrowed the scope of the high-risk area and changed the name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security Management Functions .
To more fully address this high-risk area, DHS needs to further strengthen its acquisition, information technology, and financial and human capital management functions. Of the 31 actions and outcomes GAO identified as important to addressing this area, DHS has fully or mostly addressed 8, partially addressed 16, and initiated 7. Moving forward, DHS needs to, for example, do the following:
Acquisition management . Validate required acquisition documents in a timely manner, and demonstrate measurable progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance metrics for its major programs. GAO reported in September 2012, for example, that 42 major programs experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, and most programs lacked foundational documents needed to manage risk and measure performance.
Information technology management . Demonstrate for at least two consecutive investment increments that actual cost and schedule performance is within established baselines, and that associated mission benefits have been achieved. DHS has begun to implement a governance structure to improve program management consistent with best practices, but the structure covers less than 20 percent of DHS's major information technology investments.
Financial management . Achieve clean opinions for at least two consecutive years on departmentwide financial statements, and implement new or upgrade existing components' financial systems. DHS received a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 2012 financial statements, and is in the early planning stages of its financial systems modernization efforts.
What GAO Recommends
The high risk report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving progress. GAO is dedicated to continue working with Congress and the executive branch to help ensure additional progress is made. |
gao_GAO-06-787T | gao_GAO-06-787T_0 | Background
Title IV-B of the Social Security Act authorizes funds to states to provide an array of child welfare services to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, and need to place children in foster care. States Used Subparts 1 and 2 to Support Similar Services and Populations, but Funding Emphasis Differed
States Emphasized Different Services under Subparts 1 and 2
While states funded similar services under subparts 1 and 2, most states reported using subpart 1 funds primarily to pay for costs associated with operating child welfare programs, while most states reported using subpart 2 funds for family services as shown in table 1. Overall, states reported that nearly half of Title IV-B funds used for staff salaries supported social worker positions in child protective services. These services included mentoring programs to help pregnant adolescents learn to be self-sufficient, financial assistance to low- income families to help with rent and utilities, parenting classes, child care, and support groups provided by community-based resource centers. In contrast, states used 44 percent of subpart 2 funds for children at risk of child abuse and neglect and/or their parents. Federal Oversight Insufficient to Ensure State Compliance with Title IV-B Spending Requirements under Subpart 1
HHS provided relatively little oversight specific to state spending under subpart 1. We also found that HHS regional offices had paid little attention to statutory limits in states’ planned use of subpart 1 funds. In response to our survey, 10 states reported actual 2002 subpart 1 expenditures that exceeded the spending limits by over $15 million in total. Little Research Existed on the Effectiveness of Title IV-B Services
Research on the effectiveness of services provided under subpart 1of Title IV-B was limited, and HHS evaluations of subpart 2 services showed no or little effect on children’s outcomes. In our survey, 22 states reported providing services other than maintenance payments, staff salaries, or administration under subpart 1; however, none of these states had evaluated the outcomes of these services. Similarly, our literature review showed that few evaluations had been conducted, and evaluations that had been conducted produced mixed results. Overall, the findings were similar across all evaluation sites showing subpart 2 services provided no or little effect in reducing out-of-home placement, maltreatment recurrence, or improved family functioning beyond what normal casework services achieved. GAO-03-956. | Why GAO Did This Study
For federal fiscal year 2004, state and local child protective services staff determined that an estimated 872,000 children have been victims of abuse or neglect. Title IV-B subparts 1 and 2 authorize a wide array of child welfare services with some restrictions on states' use of funds. This testimony discusses: (1) how states used Title IV-B dollars to serve families under subparts 1 and 2; (2) the extent that federal oversight ensured state compliance with spending requirements under subpart 1; and (3) what the research said about the effectiveness of service states have provided to families using Title IV-B funds. This testimony was primarily based on a 2003 report (GAO-03-956).
What GAO Found
States used Title IV-B funds to provide a broad range of services to prevent the occurrence of abuse, neglect, and foster care placements in addition to other child welfare services. While there was some overlap, states reported using Title IV-B subpart 1 funds primarily to operate child welfare programs and serve families in the foster care system, while states reported using subpart 2 funds primarily for family services targeted to families at risk of child removal due to abuse or neglect. For example, nearly half of subpart 1 staff costs paid salaries for social worker positions in child protective services. Family services under subpart 2 included those to support, preserve, and reunify families by providing mentoring programs, financial assistance to help with rent and utilities, parenting classes, child care, and support groups. HHS provided relatively little oversight specific to state spending under subpart 1. HHS did not collect data on subpart 1 expenditures and regional officials paid little attention to statutory limits in states' planned use of funds. In response to GAO's survey, 10 states reported actual 2002 subpart 1 expenditures that exceeded the sending limits by over $15 million in total. Research is limited assessing the effectiveness of services provided under Title IV-B. In GAO's survey, 22 states reported providing services other than foster care and adoption assistance payments, staff salaries, or administration under subpart 1; however, none of these states had sufficiently evaluated the outcomes of these services. Similarly, GAO's literature review showed that few evaluations had been conducted, and evaluations that had been conducted showed mixed results. HHS evaluations of subpart 2 services also have shown no or little effect in reducing out-of-home placement, maltreatment recurrence, or improved family functioning beyond what normal casework services achieved. |
gao_GAO-11-925T | gao_GAO-11-925T_0 | Prepurchase counseling generally refers to counseling for potential homebuyers to learn about whether and when to buy a home and how to manage a mortgage, budget for repairs, and fulfill other financial responsibilities of being a homeowner. Postpurchase counseling primarily refers to foreclosure mitigation counseling, which focuses on helping financially distressed homeowners avoid foreclosure by working with lenders to cure mortgage delinquency but can also include subjects such as home maintenance. The federal government funds homeownership counseling through a number of programs at HUD, Treasury, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Findings from the Limited Research Available on Homeownership Counseling Are Mixed
The limited body of literature on homeownership counseling does not provide conclusive findings on the impact of all types of homeownership counseling. However, findings on prepurchase counseling are less clear. Although Research on Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Suggests Benefits, Results on Other Types of Counseling Are Mixed
Recent research on foreclosure mitigation counseling suggests that it can help struggling mortgage borrowers avoid foreclosure and prevent them from lapsing back into default, especially if the counseling occurs early in the foreclosure process. Additional empirical research on the impact of housing counseling is under way at HUD and Fannie Mae. We did not identify any published studies that evaluated homeownership counseling using an experimental design. Establishing meaningful measures of the impact of homeownership counseling programs is also a significant challenge. Our Work Has Identified Shortcomings in the Implementation of Some Homeownership Counseling Requirements
In prior work, we found shortcomings in HUD’s and Treasury’s implementation of homeownership counseling requirements for the HECM and HAMP programs. In 2009, we evaluated HUD’s implementation of the counseling requirements associated with the HECM program and found that HUD’s internal controls did not provide reasonable assurance that counseling providers were complying with the program requirements. We recommended in 2009 that Treasury consider methods of monitoring whether borrowers required to receive housing counseling as part of HAMP modifications did receive it and seek to determine whether the counseling did limit redefaults. Treasury staff said in 2010 that they had considered options for monitoring the proportion of borrowers that obtained counseling but had determined that implementing a monitoring process would be too burdensome for Treasury and mortgage servicers. Additionally, Treasury officials said they had no plans to assess the effectiveness of counseling in limiting redefaults, in part because they believed that the benefits of counseling on the performance of borrowers with high debt burdens were well documented. We continue to believe that monitoring the extent to which borrowers receive counseling and the redefault rates for counseled and noncounseled borrowers would provide valuable information about whether the counseling requirement is having its intended effect. HUD is Creating a New Office for Its Housing Counseling Activities, but Funding Is Uncertain
To enhance consumer protections for homebuyers and tenants, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act) requires HUD to establish an Office of Housing Counseling. According to a HUD official, HUD is still developing its proposal for the new counseling office and is unable to estimate when it will be submitted to Congress. Budget constraints could affect the establishment of the new counseling office and reduce the scale of HUD’s housing counseling activities. Although the Dodd-Frank Act authorized $45 million per year through 2012 for the operations of the new office, HUD had not received any appropriations for this purpose as of August 2011. In addition, appropriations for fiscal year 2011 eliminated HUD’s housing counseling assistance funds, which are primarily grant funds for approved counseling agencies. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable Modification Program More Transparent and Accountable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Homeownership counseling can help consumers learn about buying a home and give them tools to deal with setbacks that could keep them from making timely mortgage payments. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) approves and provides grants to housing counseling agencies and has also implemented a requirement that borrowers seeking federally insured reverse mortgages through the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program receive counseling before taking out a HECM. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has also implemented a counseling requirement as part of its mortgage modification efforts under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). This statement discusses (1) what research suggests about the effectiveness of homeownership counseling and the challenges of conducting such research, (2) shortcomings that prior GAO work found in federal agencies' implementation of homeownership counseling requirements, and (3) the status of efforts to establish an Office of Housing Counseling within HUD. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its past work on homeownership counseling, including a review of research and interviews with federal agency staff on implementing and evaluating counseling programs.
What GAO Found
The body of literature on homeownership counseling does not provide conclusive findings on the impact of all types of counseling. Recent research on foreclosure mitigation counseling--which helps financially distressed homeowners who are delinquent on payments--suggests that it can help homeowners avoid foreclosure and prevent them from lapsing back into default. Findings on prepurchase counseling--which helps potential homebuyers learn about buying a home and explains the financial responsibilities of homeownership--are less clear. One study concluded that such counseling lowered the default rate for new homeowners, but other studies showed no effect. Efforts to measure the impact of homeownership counseling have been hampered by a lack of data, as well as by challenges in designing studies and creating effective performance measures. Further studies are under way at HUD and Fannie Mae that are designed to overcome some of these limitations. Prior GAO work identified shortcomings in the implementation of homeownership counseling requirements for two federal programs. A 2009 study of the HECM program found that HUD's internal controls did not ensure that counselors were complying with program requirements. HUD later made improvements to the HECM program to address GAO's recommendations. Another GAO study from 2009 found that Treasury did not effectively track whether borrowers required to seek counseling under HAMP actually received it or whether counseling reduced the rate of redefaults. Treasury officials said that they had not implemented a monitoring process because it would be too burdensome for Treasury and mortgage servicers. They also did not plan to assess the effectiveness of counseling in limiting redefaults, in part because they believed that the benefits of counseling on the performance of borrowers with high debt burdens were well documented. GAO continues to believe that monitoring and assessment would provide valuable information on whether the counseling requirement is having its intended effect. HUD is establishing a new Office of Housing Counseling, as required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act). According to HUD, the agency is developing a reorganization plan but is unable to estimate when it will be submitted to Congress. Budget constraints could affect the new counseling office. Although the Dodd-Frank Act authorized $45 million per year through fiscal year 2012 for the operations of the new office, HUD has not received appropriations for this purpose. In addition, appropriations for fiscal year 2011 eliminated HUD's housing counseling assistance funds, which are primarily grant funds for approved counseling agencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to HUD and Treasury to improve oversight and evaluation of their homeownership counseling requirements. HUD implemented the recommendations, while Treasury said that implementation would be too burdensome. |
gao_RCED-97-34 | gao_RCED-97-34_0 | Directors Generally Consider the Reorganization a Success
The majority of field directors we surveyed considered the September 1995 field office reorganization successful and believed that it achieved most of HUD’s intended goals. 1 and 2.) As noted in figure 2, opinions differed by program area. Directors Believed That Staffs’ Skills and Training Have Improved, but Problems Remain
Most directors said they were satisfied with the skills of their staffs. Overall, more than a third of the directors said they consider the quality of HUD’s current training only fair. Consistent with the fact that most directors said that they had fewer staff members than they needed, most also reported that their workloads had increased over the last 2 years. The directors’ overall satisfaction with HUD’s information systems varied by program area. In contrast, the single-family and multifamily housing directors were least satisfied with their systems. 4.) When asked whether or not their systems had changed over the past 2 years, most directors said that the accuracy of the data had improved, while about one-half said that the ease of reporting, the usefulness of information systems for monitoring and other job duties, and the ability to share data with other HUD systems had stayed about the same. Directors Had Mixed Views on the Adequacy of Internal Controls
Although most directors believed HUD’s overall system of internal controls was good or excellent, a significant percentage said some specific internal controls were only fair or poor. 5). However, their responses varied by program area and type of control. Ninety-two percent of the single-family housing and 89 percent of the multifamily housing directors rated these activities as good or excellent. The public housing directors were somewhat less satisfied than the other directors with the internal controls in place to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. Scope and Methodology
We obtained information for this report from a telephone survey of directors of HUD’s major programs in the field. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO surveyed Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) field directors in four of HUD's major program areas to obtain the directors' perspectives on the corrective actions HUD has undertaken over the past 2 years.
What GAO Found
GAO found that its survey showed: (1) most field directors considered HUD's field office reorganization, completed in September 1995, an overall success, but there were differences of opinion among the directors and program areas concerning HUD's success in meeting certain reorganization goals; (2) a majority of the directors said that: (a) they were satisfied with the skills of their staffs and that staff training had increased over the last 2 years; (b) training needed to be further increased in all areas; and (c) they did not have enough staff members to effectively administer their programs; (3) the satisfaction with information and financial management systems differed by program area; (4) almost three-quarters of the community planning and development and public housing directors were satisfied with their systems, whereas only one-third of the multifamily housing directors were satisfied; and (5) although a majority of the directors rated HUD's overall internal control system as good or excellent, a substantial number said that their systems were only fair or poor for certain activities, such as ensuring data reliability and compliance with laws and regulations, and HUD's programs have not received adequate monitoring. |
gao_GAO-05-898 | gao_GAO-05-898_0 | Subsequently, in 1989, the administration set a national goal of no net loss of wetlands to ensure that these valuable resources are protected. Section 404 generally prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material in waters of the United States, which include certain wetlands, without a permit from the Corps. To replace lost wetland functions, the Corps can require compensatory mitigation as a condition of issuing a permit when damage or degradation of wetlands is unavoidable. However, we found that parts of the guidance are vague or internally inconsistent, thus limiting their usefulness. Corps Guidance Establishes Two Primary Oversight Activities for Compensatory Mitigation
The Corps has three primary guidance documents that establish requirements for overseeing compensatory mitigation performed by permittees, mitigation banks, or in-lieu-fee arrangements: (1) The 1999 Army Corps of Engineers Standard Operating Procedures for the Regulatory Program; (2) The Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks; and (3) The Federal Guidance on the Use of In-Lieu-Fee Arrangements for Compensatory Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Although the Corps’ standard operating procedures call for district officials to require and review monitoring reports for mitigation banks and “other substantial mitigation,” it does not define substantial mitigation. The Corps required permittees to submit monitoring reports for 89 of the 152 permit files that we reviewed. However, we found only 21 files contained evidence that the Corps actually received these required reports, ranging from a low of zero in two districts to a high of 69 percent in Jacksonville. Furthermore, only 15 percent, or 23 of the 152 permit files, showed that the Corps had conducted a compliance inspection. The file contained no evidence that the Corps had received any monitoring reports or conducted compliance inspections to determine the status of the required mitigation. Moreover, even when Corps officials conducted oversight, they did not always perform suggested follow-up. Of the 85 mitigation banks that we reviewed, the Corps required that 71 percent, or 60 of the 85 mitigation bank sponsors, submit monitoring reports and 70 percent, or 42 mitigation bank files, contained evidence that at least one monitoring report had been received. In addition, the files contained evidence that the Corps had conducted at least one compliance inspection for 5 of the 12 arrangements. Corps Districts Can Take a Variety of Enforcement Actions to Resolve Violations but Rely Primarily on Negotiation
The Corps can take a variety of enforcement actions if required compensatory mitigation is not performed. In cases where the permittee was to perform the mitigation, the Corps may issue a compliance order, assess administrative penalties, require the permittee to forfeit a bond, suspend or revoke a permit, and/or refer the case to the Department of Justice for legal action. Corps Sometimes Limits Its Own Enforcement Ability
On occasion, district officials wanting to pursue enforcement actions after detecting instances of noncompliance may not be able to do so because they have limited their enforcement capabilities; that is, they have not specified the requirements for compensatory mitigation in permits and failed to establish agreements with third parties. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the importance of compensatory mitigation to the section 404 program and its contribution to achieving the national goal of no net loss of wetlands, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Corps of Engineers to establish an oversight approach that ensures required mitigation is being performed throughout the nation. As part of this oversight approach, the Corps should develop more specific guidance for overseeing compensatory mitigation performed by permittees, mitigation banks, and in-lieu-fee sponsors; in particular, the guidance should define key terms such as “substantial mitigation” and specify the actions Corps officials should take if required monitoring reports are not received; clarify expectations for oversight of mitigation, including establishing goals for the number of monitoring reports that should be reviewed and the number of compliance inspections that should be conducted; and review existing mitigation banks and in-lieu-fee arrangements to ensure that the sponsor has an approved agreement with the Corps, as called for in federal guidance; if such agreements are not in place, they should be developed and the Corps should ensure that future mitigation banks and in-lieu-fee arrangements have these approved agreements. Districts will inspect a relatively high percentage of compensatory mitigation to ensure compliance with permit conditions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because wetlands provide valuable functions, the administration set a national goal of no net loss of wetlands in 1989. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act generally prohibits the discharge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States, which include certain wetlands, without a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). To help achieve the goal of no net loss, the Corps can require compensatory mitigation, such as restoring a former wetland, as a condition of a permit when the loss of wetlands is unavoidable. Permittees can perform the mitigation or pay a third party--a mitigation bank or an in-lieu-fee arrangement--to perform the mitigation. GAO was asked to review the (1) guidance the Corps has issued for overseeing compensatory mitigation, (2) extent to which the Corps oversees compensatory mitigation, and (3) enforcement actions the Corps can take if required mitigation is not performed and the extent to which it takes these actions.
What GAO Found
The Corps has developed guidance that establishes two primary oversight activities for compensatory mitigation: requiring the parties performing mitigation to periodically submit monitoring reports to the Corps and conducting compliance inspections of the mitigation. However, parts of the guidance are vague or internally inconsistent. For example, the guidance suggests that the Corps place a high priority on requiring and reviewing monitoring reports when "substantial mitigation" is required, but it does not define substantial mitigation. Furthermore, one section of the guidance directs district officials to conduct compliance inspections of a relatively high percentage of compensatory mitigation sites, while another section designates these inspections as a low priority, leading to confusion by Corps officials. Overall, the seven Corps districts GAO visited performed limited oversight to determine the status of compensatory mitigation. The Corps required monitoring reports for 89 of the 152 permit files reviewed where the permittee was required to perform compensatory mitigation. However, only 21 of these files contained evidence that the Corps received these reports. Moreover, only 15 percent of the 152 permit files contained evidence that the Corps had conducted a compliance inspection. The Corps districts provided somewhat more oversight for mitigation performed by the 85 mitigation banks and 12 in-lieu-fee arrangements that GAO reviewed. For the 60 mitigation banks that were required to submit monitoring reports, 70 percent of the files contained evidence that the Corps had received at least one monitoring report. However, only 36 percent of the mitigation bank files that GAO reviewed contained evidence that the Corps conducted an inspection. For the 6 in-lieu-fee arrangements that were required to submit monitoring reports to the Corps, 5 had submitted at least one report. In addition, the Corps had conducted inspections of 5 of the 12 arrangements. The Corps can take a variety of enforcement actions if required compensatory mitigation is not performed. These actions include issuing compliance orders, assessing administrative penalties of up to $27,500, requiring the permittee to forfeit a bond, suspending or revoking a permit, implementing the enforcement provisions of agreements with third parties, and recommending legal actions. District officials rarely use these actions and rely primarily on negotiation to resolve any violations. In some cases, GAO found district officials may not be able to use enforcement actions after detecting instances of noncompliance because they have limited their enforcement capabilities. For example, because they did not always specify the requirements of compensatory mitigation in the permits, they had no legal recourse for noncompliance. |
gao_GAO-16-11 | gao_GAO-16-11_0 | Background
OSHA and State Responsibilities for Worker Safety and Health
OSHA is responsible for protecting the safety and health of the nation’s workers under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act). OSHA Enforcement and Guidelines Related to Workplace Violence Prevention
OSHA does not require employers to have workplace violence prevention programs; however, the agency issued voluntary guidelines in 1996 to help employers establish them. Workers in Health Care Facilities Experience Higher Estimated Rates of Nonfatal Workplace Violence than Workers Overall, though the Full Extent of the Problem and Its Costs Are Unknown
Federal Data Show That Workers in Health Care Facilities Have Higher Estimated Rates of Nonfatal Injury Due to Workplace Violence than Workers Overall
Workers in health care facilities experience substantially higher estimated rates of nonfatal injury due to workplace violence compared to workers overall, according to data from three federal data sets we reviewed (see fig. II for more information on these studies). According to NEISS-Work data from 2011, hitting, kicking, and beating were the most common types of nonfatal physical violence reported by workers in health care facilities. OSHA Increased Enforcement and Education Efforts, but Inspectors Face Challenges Taking Enforcement Actions and Following up on Hazard Alert Letters
OSHA Increased Its Workplace Violence Inspections of Health Care Employers
OSHA increased its inspections of health care employers for workplace violence from 11 in 2010 to 86 in 2014 (see fig. 5). From 1991 through October 2014, OSHA issued 18 general duty clause citations to health care employers for failing to address workplace violence. Staff from all 10 OSHA regional offices said it was challenging to cite employers for violating the general duty clause when workplace violence is identified as a hazard and staff from 4 OSHA regional offices said it was challenging to develop these cases within the 6-month statutory time frame required to develop a citation. When inspectors identify workplace violence hazards during an inspection, but all the criteria for issuing a general duty clause citation are not met and a specific standard does not apply, inspectors have the option of issuing warning letters to employers, known as Hazard Alert Letters (HAL). Without this additional information, inspectors may continue to experience difficulties in addressing challenges they reported facing in developing these citations. However, without a policy requiring inspectors to follow-up on hazard alert letters, OSHA will not know whether employers have taken steps to address the safety hazards identified in these letters or whether a follow up inspection is needed. However, OSHA has done little to assess the results of its efforts. Without assessing the results of these efforts, OSHA is not in a position to know whether the efforts are effective or if additional action, such as development of a specific workplace violence prevention standard, may be needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help reduce the risk of violence against health care workers, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to take the following actions:
Provide additional information to assist inspectors in developing general duty clause citations in cases involving workplace violence. To help determine whether current efforts are effective or if additional action may be needed, such as development of a workplace violence prevention standard for health care employers, the Secretary of Labor should direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to:
Develop and implement cost-effective ways to assess the results of the agency’s efforts to address workplace violence. In its written comments, DOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) said it agreed with all three of our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) what is known about the degree to which workplace violence occurs in health care facilities and its associated costs, (2) steps OSHA has taken to protect health care workers from workplace violence and assess the usefulness of its efforts, (3) how selected states have addressed workplace violence in health care facilities, and (4) research on the effectiveness of workplace violence prevention programs in health care facilities. To address these objectives, we: analyzed federal data used by three federal agencies to estimate workplace violence-related injuries and deaths in health care facilities; reviewed related studies identified in a literature review; interviewed federal officials, analyzed enforcement data, and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, inspection procedures, and guidelines; reviewed selected state workplace violence prevention laws from nine selected states and visited four of the states where we interviewed state officials, health care employers, and workers; and interviewed researchers and others knowledgeable about workplace violence prevention in health care facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Workplace violence is a serious concern for the approximately 15 million health care workers in the United States. OSHA is the federal agency responsible for protecting the safety and health of the nation's workers, although states may assume responsibility under an OSHA-approved plan. OSHA does not require employers to implement workplace violence prevention programs, but it provides voluntary guidelines and may cite employers for failing to provide a workplace free from recognized serious hazards. GAO was asked to review efforts by OSHA to address workplace violence in health care.
GAO examined the degree to which workplace violence occurs in health care facilities and OSHA's efforts to address such violence.
GAO analyzed federal data on workplace violence incidents, reviewed information from the nine states GAO identified with workplace violence prevention requirements for health care employers, conducted a literature review, and interviewed OSHA and state officials.
What GAO Found
According to data from three federal datasets GAO reviewed, workers in health care facilities experience substantially higher estimated rates of nonfatal injury due to workplace violence compared to workers overall. However, the full extent of the problem and its associated costs are unknown. For example, in 2013, the most recent year that data were available, private-sector health care workers in in-patient facilities, such as hospitals, experienced workplace violence-related injuries requiring days off from work at an estimated rate at least five times higher than the rate for private-sector workers overall, according to data from the Department of Labor (DOL). The number of nonfatal workplace violence cases in health care facilities ranged from an estimated 22,250 to 80,710 cases for 2011, the most recent year that data were available from all three federal datasets that GAO reviewed. The most common types of reported assaults were hitting, kicking, and beating. The full extent of the problem and associated costs is unknown, however, because according to related studies GAO reviewed, health care workers may not always report such incidents, and there is limited research on the issue, among other reasons.
DOL's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) increased its education and enforcement efforts to help employers address workplace violence in health care facilities, but GAO identified three areas for improvement in accordance with federal internal control standards.
Provide inspectors additional information on developing citations . OSHA has not issued a standard that requires employers to implement workplace violence prevention programs, but the agency issued voluntary guidelines and may cite employers for hazards identified during inspections—including violence in health care facilities—under the general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. OSHA increased its yearly workplace violence inspections of health care employers from 11 in 2010 to 86 in 2014. OSHA issued general duty clause citations in about 5 percent of workplace violence inspections of health care employers. However, OSHA regional office staff said developing support to address the criteria for these citations is challenging and staff from 5 of OSHA's 10 regions said additional information, such as specific examples of issues that have been cited, is needed. Without such additional information, inspectors may continue to experience difficulties in addressing the challenges they reported facing.
Follow up on hazard alert letters . When the criteria for a citation are not met, inspectors may issue warnings, known as hazard alert letters. However, employers are not required to take corrective action in response to them, and OSHA does not require inspectors to follow up to see if employers have taken corrective actions. As a result, OSHA does not know whether identified hazards have been addressed and hazards may persist.
Assess the results of its efforts to determine whether additional action, such as development of a standard, may be needed . OSHA has not fully assessed the results of its efforts to address workplace violence in health care facilities. Without assessing these results, OSHA will not be in a position to know whether its efforts are effective or if additional action may be needed to address this hazard.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OSHA provide additional information to assist inspectors in developing citations, develop a policy for following up on hazard alert letters concerning workplace violence hazards in health care facilities, and assess its current efforts. OSHA agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that it would take action to address them. |
gao_GAO-11-888 | gao_GAO-11-888_0 | 1). EPA and DOE Hav Made Progress in Their Ongoing to Implement Significant Chan the Energ y Star Program
Since agreeing to the MOU in 2009, EPA and DOE have made considerable progress in their ongoing efforts to implement significant changes to the Energy Star program, including expanding product te updating program requirements, and establishing a pilot progr am to promote the most efficient Energy Star products. EPA Has Significantly Expanded Product Testing
EPA and DOE have taken steps to significantly expand product tes qualify products for the Energy Star label and verify that marketedting to products continue to meet program requirements. cted not to renew their partnerships as In 2010, EPA developed and instituted new testing procedures for products to qualify for Energy Star recognition, as called for in the MOU. The new procedures took effect on January 1, 2011. Unlike the verification testing program administered by EPA-recognized certification bodies, DOE’s verification testing program is agency-funded. EPA Has Taken Initial Steps to Update the Program
As the lead agency responsible for managing the Energy Star brand, EPA has taken steps to update program requirements by broadening the number of included product categories as well as updating performance specifications for existing products. EPA has developed a schedule to review and update, as necessary, performance specifications for all Energy Star product categories by calendar year 2013. EPA Is Conducting a Pilot Program to Promote the Most Efficient Energy Star Products
Under the 2009 MOU, EPA and DOE agreed to explore a SuperStar program that would identify the most energy-efficient Energy Star-labeled products in given categories. EPA will evaluate the program to determine whethe should continue beyond 2012, and if so, whether to include additional products, EPA is still developing the specific evaluation criteria and its plans for obtaining consumer feedback about the pilot program. Program Partne Generally Had Favorable Views ar the Energy St Program but Identified Several Areas of Concern
Program partners we contacted generally had positive views of the Energy Star program and recently implemented changes but raised primary concerns about the program’s ongoing changes. In particular, program partners raised three areas of concern: that the program may become less voluntary in nature, that EPA’s ongoing pilot program to promote the most highly efficient products could diminish the value of Star label, and that the cost of participating in the program is Energy rising. The foremost strengths these and other program partners identified were the overall strength of the Energy Star brand itself and its wide recognition by American consumers. Most retail and manufacturing partners also told us that the loss of the Energy Sta businesses. r program would be detrimental to their Many of the program partners we spoke with also viewed the changes being implemented as a result of the MOU favorably, although their perceptions varied. For example, many retail, state, and utility partners told us they believe the new third-party testing and certification procedures increase the program’s credibility. In addition, most program partners we contacted told us they generally supported steps taken in the MOU to clarify agencies’ roles and establish a single agency as the brand manager. First, program partners and other interested parties expressed concern that the ongoing changes are shifting the voluntary nature of the program to include elements of some of traditional regulatory programs but without the procedural safeguards such programs. Given the importance of participating in the program, representatives from a manufacturing association a raised concerns that the Energy Star program does not have an independent administrative review process where adverse agency actions lso related to setting specifications and disqualifications can be reviewed prior to seeking judicial review. Second, program partners we spoke with differed on their views of EPA’s new pilot program to promote the most efficient products. Some of these partners raised concerns that creating two classes of Energy Star products could diminish the value of the Energy Star label for manufacturing partners whose products meet the standard Energy Star specification but may not rank among the most efficient products. The Energy Star program’s success in promoting energy-efficient products is widely recognized, and consum manufacturers, utilities, and federal and state agencies rely on it. Regarding our recommendation that the Administrator of E PA assess the need to develop a process for independent review of adverse agency decisions for the Energy Star program as it relates to setting specifications and disqualifications to ensure decisions of the program are fair and transparent, EPA neither agreed nor disagreed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) and Department of Energy’s (DOE) implementation of changes to the Energy Star program under its 2009 memorandum of understanding (MOU), we reviewed the program’s authorizing legislation. | Why GAO Did This Study
American consumers, businesses, utilities, and federal and state agencies rely on the Energy Star product labeling program to identify more efficient products that lower their energy costs. Even with the program's successes, several reports by GAO and others have identified weaknesses in the Energy Star program. The program, which began in 1992 and was reauthorized in 2005, has been jointly administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE). In 2009, the agencies signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that outlined changes to address these weaknesses. The changes included identifying EPA as the lead agency, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each agency, as well as instituting third-party testing of products. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of EPA's and DOE's implementation of changes to the Energy Star program under the MOU and (2) program partners' views of the Energy Star program and changes that are under way. To examine the status of the changes, GAO reviewed guidance and eligibility criteria and interviewed various program partners to gather their views. The results of these interviews are not generalizable, but provided insights on changes to the Energy Star program.
What GAO Found
EPA and DOE have made considerable progress in their ongoing efforts to implement significant changes to the Energy Star program agreed to in the 2009 MOU. These changes include expanding product qualification and verification testing, updating program requirements, and piloting a program to promote the most efficient Energy Star products. In 2010, EPA developed and instituted new third-party certification procedures to qualify products for the Energy Star label. The new procedures took effect on January 1, 2011. As of May 2011, EPA had received about 10,000 new product submissions. In addition, EPA and DOE expanded their testing programs to verify that labeled products continue to meet program requirements. As part of these efforts, EPA is finalizing standard procedures for disqualifying products that fail the verification testing. EPA has also taken steps to update program requirements by broadening the number of product categories covered by the program and updating performance specifications for products that are already part of the program. Since 2009, EPA and DOE have finalized specifications for two new residential product categories and EPA is working on five additional product categories. EPA has a schedule to review and update the specifications for all existing product categories by 2013. In May 2011, EPA established a pilot program to recognize the most efficient products among those that qualify for the Energy Star label in seven product categories. As of August 2011, 78 models in five categories had received recognition as the most efficient products. The pilot program will run into 2012, when EPA will evaluate whether it should continue beyond 2012. Program partners we interviewed--including manufacturers, retailers, and utilities--generally had positive views of the Energy Star program but raised key concerns about the program's ongoing changes. Program partners cited the overall strength of the Energy Star brand itself and its wide recognition by American consumers and said that the loss of the program would be detrimental to their business. Further, these program partners told us they generally supported MOU steps taken to clarify agencies' roles and establish a single agency as the brand manager. However, program partners also raised three key concerns. First, program partners expressed concern that the ongoing changes are shifting the voluntary nature of the program to include elements of a more traditional regulatory program, but without the procedural safeguards of such programs. Specifically, many program partners told us that the Energy Star label is necessary to sell in many markets. Unlike traditional regulatory programs, however, Energy Star does not have an independent administrative review process where adverse agency decisions related to setting specifications and disqualifications can be reviewed prior to seeking judicial review. Program partners also identified a lack of transparency in EPA's key decisions, including how it sets performance specification levels. Second, many program partners told us the pilot program to identify the most efficient products may undermine the value of the Energy Star label and the program as a whole by creating two classes of Energy Star products. Third, some program partners raised concerns about the rising cost of participating in the program because of third-party certification testing, and some manufacturing partners said they are considering decreasing their participation because of the cost.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Administrator of EPA assess the need to develop a process for independent review of adverse decisions related to setting specifications and disqualifications. EPA neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-611 | gao_GAO-15-611_0 | However, in an exception to this rule, Ex-Im was granted authority to facilitate the financing of U.S. exports of defense articles and services, provided that it determines that these items are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian end use. These three transactions accounted for $1.03 billion in Ex-Im financing, or just under 3 percent of Ex-Im’s financing for fiscal year 2012 of $35.8 billion. Ex-Im Revised and Implemented Guidance to Address Weaknesses in Monitoring the End Use of Dual-Use Items
Ex-Im addressed weaknesses in monitoring the end use of dual-use items by revising and implementing its guidance for monitoring these items, consistent with our August 2014 recommendation. The revised guidance clarified the responsibilities of Ex-Im staff for monitoring the end use of exported dual-use items after the bank’s board of directors authorizes an export transaction. As a result of implementing the revised guidance, Ex-Im has received in a timely manner all documents required through June 2015 since our last report, issued in August 2014. Ex-Im Revised Its Guidance for Monitoring End Use
Ex-Im revised its 1997 memorandum on the implementation of its dual- use policy for military applications–-which had not been updated prior to our 2014 review–-and disseminated the revised memorandum to relevant staff on March 11, 2015. The engineer is to make an annual determination as to whether information received during the previous year was adequate to demonstrate that the transaction complied (or failed to comply) with the requirements of the bank’s dual-use policy, as set forth in the financing agreement and the bank’s charter. Ex-Im Did Not Finance Any New Dual-Use Export Transactions in 2014, According to Application Data and Ex-Im Reviews
Ex-Im did not finance any new exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2014, according to Ex-Im officials and our review of relevant data on Ex-Im authorizations. We also received technical comments from Ex-Im officials. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine how the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) addressed weaknesses in monitoring the end uses of the dual-use exports it continued to finance in fiscal year 2013, and to identify what dual-use exports, if any, Ex-Im reported it financed in fiscal year 2014, we reviewed Ex-Im documentation regarding its dual-use policy, including a 1997 memorandum on implementing that policy; a revised 2015 memorandum; Ex-Im documentation associated with each of the three dual-use transactions Ex-Im financed in fiscal year 2012; and data on dual-use determinations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1994, Ex-Im has had the authority to facilitate the financing of dual-use exports, which include construction equipment used by foreign militaries to build roads. After a 9-year hiatus, Ex-Im financed three dual-use exports in fiscal year 2012, accounting for $1.03 billion, or just under 3 percent of Ex-Im's $35.8 billion financing for that year. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, extends a provision for GAO to report annually on the end uses of dual-use exports financed by Ex-Im during the second preceding fiscal year.
In August 2014, GAO reported that monitoring-related documents from borrowers required by the financing agreements were missing or late and that Ex-Im's dual-use monitoring policy did not specify what actions Ex-Im officials should take if the bank did not receive the required documents. GAO recommended that Ex-Im establish steps staff should take in cases where borrowers do not submit required end- use documentation within the time frames specified in their financing agreements and ensure that these efforts are well documented. Ex-Im agreed with GAO's recommendation and revised its guidance.
This report (1) examines how Ex-Im addressed weaknesses in monitoring the end uses of the dual-use exports it finances and (2) identifies what dual-use exports, if any, Ex-Im reported it financed in fiscal year 2014. GAO reviewed Ex-Im documents and interviewed Ex-Im officials.
What GAO Found
The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) addressed weaknesses in monitoring the end use of exported “dual-use” items by revising and implementing its guidance for monitoring these items, as GAO recommended in August 2014. Dual-use items are defense articles and services that Ex-Im has determined are nonlethal and primarily meant for civilian use. Specifically, Ex-Im revised its 1997 memorandum on the implementation of its dual-use policy for military applications and disseminated it to relevant staff on March 11, 2015. The updated memorandum clarified the responsibilities of Ex-Im staff for monitoring end use, and GAO found that bank staff have now taken the following steps:
made determinations , in what is to be an annual process, as to whether the information received was adequate to demonstrate that the transaction complied or failed to comply with the bank's dual-use policy.
As a result, Ex-Im has received in a timely manner all documents required since GAO's last report, issued in August 2014.
Ex-Im did not finance any new exports under its dual-use authority in fiscal year 2014, according to Ex-Im authorizations data and Ex-Im officials. |
gao_GAO-02-1121 | gao_GAO-02-1121_0 | Background
Long-term care includes many types of services needed when a person has a functional disability, whether physical or cognitive. Limits may also be placed on the costs of services that will be covered by Medicaid. Medicare spending accounted for 14 percent (about $19 billion) of total long-term care expenditures in 2000. Selected States Varied in Expenditures for and Design of Medicaid Home and Community Services
Each of the states we reviewed—Kansas, Louisiana, New York, and Oregon—covered home and community-based services in their Medicaid programs, but differed in how much of their Medicaid spending for long- term care for the elderly they dedicated to home and community-based care and how they designed their programs for these services. Oregon spent $604 on Medicaid long-term care services per elderly individual. The number of hours of in-home care that the case managers offered and the types of residential care settings recommended depended in part on the availability of services and the amount of informal family care available. States differ, however, in how they designed their Medicaid programs to offer home and community-based long-term care options for elderly individuals and the level of resources they devoted to these services. As a result, as demonstrated by the care plans offered by case managers for our hypothetical elderly individuals in four states, the same individual with certain identified disabilities and needs would often receive different types and intensity of home and community-based care for their long-term care needs across states and even within the same community. These differences often stemmed from case managers’ attempts to leverage the availability of both publicly financed long-term care services as well as the informal care and support provided to individuals by their own family members. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the baby boomers age, spending on long-term care for the elderly could quadruple by 2050. The growing demand for long-term care will put pressure on federal and state budgets because long-term care relies heavily on public financing, particularly Medicaid. Nursing home care traditionally has accounted for most Medicaid long-term care expenditures, but the high costs of such care and the preference of many individuals to stay in their own homes has led states to expand their Medicaid programs to provide coverage for home- and community-based long-term care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that a Medicaid-eligible elderly individual with the same disabling conditions, care needs, and availability of informal family support could find significant differences in the type and intensity of home and community-based services that would be offered for his or her care. These differences were due in part to the very nature of long-term care needs--which can involve physical or cognitive disabling conditions--and the lack of a consensus as to what services are needed to compensate for these disabilities and what balance should exist between publicly available and family-provided services. The differences in care plans were also due to decisions that states have made in designing their Medicaid long-term care programs and the resources devoted to them. The case managers GAO contacted generally offered care plans that relied on in-home services rather than other residential care settings. However, the in-home services offered varied considerably. |
gao_GAO-10-499 | gao_GAO-10-499_0 | No specific requirements exist for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation in support of the registrations or reports they file. The registration and subsequent LD-2 reports must disclose the name of the organization, lobbying firm, or self-employed individual that is lobbying on that client’s behalf; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served as covered executive branch or legislative branch officials in the previous 20 years; the name of and further information about the client, including a general description of its business or activities; information on the general issue area and specific lobbying issues; any foreign entities that have an interest in the client; the client’s status as a state or local government; information on which federal agencies and house(s) of Congress the lobbyist contacted on behalf of the client during the reporting period; the amount of income related to lobbying activities received from the client (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) during the quarter rounded to the nearest $10,000; and a list of constituent organizations that contribute more than $5,000 for lobbying in a quarter and actively participate in planning, supervising, or controlling lobbying activities, if the client is a coalition or association. For example, most lobbyists were able to provide documentation to support income or expenses related elements of their reports. We estimate that lobbyists could provide written documentation for income or expenses for an estimated 88 percent of the disclosure reports for the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2009. Additionally, 15 lobbyists indicated that they planned to amend their disclosure reports after our review. As of March 18, 2010, 7 of the 15 lobbyists had amended their disclosure reports. Most Contribution Reports Could Be Supported by FEC Data or Documentation
Individual lobbyists and lobbying organizations are required to file federal campaign and political contributions reports, even if they did not make any contributions during the reporting period. All of the lobbyists said that they did not report the information listed in the FEC database because of an oversight and plan to amend the reports. We could not readily identify corresponding reports of lobbying activity for 695 (approximately 11 percent) of the 6,184 new registrations, likely because either a report was not filed or reports that were filed contained information, such as client names, that did not match. The Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate routinely review the completeness of registrations and reports and follow up with lobbyists. The system allows officials from the Office to track referral and enforcement actions and to monitor lobbyists who continually fail to file the required disclosure reports. To enforce LDA compliance, the Office has primarily focused on sending letters to lobbyists who have potentially violated the LDA by not filing disclosure reports as required. Because there is a time lapse between when the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House send the first contact letters and when they make referrals to the Office, lobbyists may have responded to the contact letters from the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House after referrals have been received by the Office. Since then no additional settlements or civil actions have been pursued, although the Office is following up on hundreds of referrals each year. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Consistent with the requirements of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance by providing support for information on registrations and reports filed in response to requirements of the amended Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA); identify the challenges and potential improvements to compliance by lobbyists, lobbying firms, and registrants; and describe the efforts the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) has made to improve its enforcement of the LDA, including identifying trends in past lobbying disclosure compliance. While we determined that both the House and Senate disclosure data were sufficiently reliable for identifying a sample of quarterly disclosure reports (LD-2 reports) and for assessing whether newly filed registrants also filed required reports, we chose to use data from the Clerk of the House for sampling LD-2 reports from the last quarter of 2008, first three quarters of 2009, as well as for year-end 2008 and midyear 2009 contributions reports (LD-203 reports), and finally for matching quarterly registrations with filed reports. The first sample contains 100 reports of the 10,928 reports with political contributions and the second contains 100 reports from the 22,572 reports listing no contributions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 amended the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA). This is GAO's third report in response to the LDA's requirement for GAO to annually (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with the LDA by providing support for information on their registrations and reports, (2) identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance for registered lobbyists, and (3) describe the efforts the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) has made to improve its enforcement of the LDA. GAO reviewed a random sample of 134 lobbying disclosure reports filed from the fourth quarter of calendar year 2008 through the third quarter of calendar year 2009. GAO also selected two random samples of federal political campaign contributions reports from year-end 2008 through midyear 2009. GAO sampled 100 reports listing contributions and 100 reports listing no contributions. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 53,756 disclosure reports, 10,928 contributions reports, and 22,572 reports with no contributions. GAO also met with officials from the Office regarding efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply with the LDA.
What GAO Found
While there are no specific requirements for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation related to disclosure reports they file under the LDA, GAO's review showed that lobbyists were generally able to provide documentation, although in varying degrees, to support items in their disclosure reports. This finding is similar to GAO's results from last year's review. For income and expenses, two key elements of the reports, GAO estimates that lobbyists could provide written documentation for approximately 89 percent of the disclosure reports. After GAO's review, 15 lobbyists stated that they planned to amend their disclosure reports to make corrections on one or more data elements. As of March 18, 2010, 7 of the 15 amended their disclosure reports to make these corrections. For political contribution reports, GAO estimates that 82 percent of the reports listing contributions could be supported by Federal Elections Commission (FEC) data or documentation provided by lobbyists. Among reports with no contributions listed, an estimated minimum of 3 percent of reports omitted one or more contributions that should have been reported. All of the lobbyists said that they did not report the information listed in the FEC database because of an oversight and plan to amend their reports. The majority of lobbyists who newly registered with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives in the last quarter of 2008 and first three quarters of 2009 filed required disclosure reports for the period. GAO could not identify corresponding reports on file for lobbying activity for about 11 percent of the registrants, likely because either reports were not filed or the reports that were filed contained information, such as client names, that did not match the registrations. The Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House routinely review the completeness of registrations and reports and follow up with lobbyists. Most lobbyists felt that existing guidance for filing required registrations and reports was sufficient. However, GAO's review of documentation and lobbyists' statements indicates some opportunities to strengthen lobbyists' understanding of the requirements. The Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House update guidance periodically to respond to issues and comments as they arise. In response to an earlier GAO recommendation, the Office developed a system to help monitor and track enforcement efforts. The Office continues to refine the system to meet the requirements conveyed in GAO's recommendation. To enforce compliance, the Office primarily focuses on sending letters to lobbyists who potentially violated the LDA by not filing disclosure reports. No civil actions or settlements with lobbyists have been pursued by the Office since 2005, although it is following up on hundreds of referrals each year. |
gao_GAO-10-48 | gao_GAO-10-48_0 | Most of these costs are up-front capital costs. When DOE missed its 1998 deadline to begin taking custody of the waste, owners of spent fuel with contracts for disposal services filed lawsuits asking the courts to require DOE to fulfill its statutory and contractual obligations by taking custody of the waste. Based on DOE’s Cost Estimates, Yucca Mountain Will Likely Cost from $41 Billion to $67 Billion for 153,000 Metric Tons of Nuclear Waste, but Costs Could Increase
Our analysis of DOE’s cost estimates found that (1) a 70,000 metric ton repository is projected to cost from $27 to $39 billion in 2009 present value over 108 years and (2) a 153,000 metric ton repository is projected to cost from $41 to $67 billion and take 35 more years to complete. In addition, the Department of the Treasury’s judgment fund will pay the government’s liabilities for not taking custody of the nuclear waste in 1998, as required by DOE’s contract with industry. Centralized Storage Would Provide a Near- Term Alternative, Allowing Other Options to Be Studied, but Faces Implementation Challenges
Centralized storage would provide a near-term alternative for managing nuclear waste, allowing the government to begin taking possession of the waste within approximately the next 30 years, and giving additional time for the nation to consider long-term waste management options. However, centralized storage does not preclude the need for final disposal of the waste. The estimated cost of implementing centralized storage for 100 years ranges from $15 billion to $29 billion for 153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste, and the total cost ranges from $23 billion to $81 billion if the nuclear waste is centrally stored and then disposed in a geologic repository. Over time, the storage systems may degrade and institutional controls may be disrupted, which could result in increased risk of radioactive exposure to humans or the environment. In addition, NWPA provided authority for DOE to site, construct, and operate a centralized storage facility, but such a facility could not be constructed until NRC authorized construction of the Yucca Mountain repository, and the facility could only store up to 10,000 metric tons of nuclear waste until the repository started accepting spent nuclear fuel. On-Site Storage Would Provide an Intermediate Option with Minimal Effort but Poses Challenges that Could Increase Over Time
On-site storage of nuclear waste provides an intermediate option to manage the waste until the government can take possession of it, requiring minimal effort to change from what the nation is currently doing to manage its waste. The estimated cost to continue storing 153,000 metric tons of nuclear waste on site for 100 years range from $13 billion to $34 billion, and total costs would range from $20 billion to $97 billion if the nuclear waste is stored on site for 100 years and then disposed in a geologic repository. The additional time in on-site storage may also make the waste safer to handle because older spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste has had a chance to cool and become less radioactive. As a result, on-site storage could reduce transportation risks, particularly in the near-term, since the nuclear waste would be cooler and less radioactive when it is finally transported to a repository. For every year after 2020 that DOE fails to take custody of the waste in accordance with its contracts with the reactor operators, DOE estimates that the government will continue to accumulate up to $500 million per year beyond the estimated $12 billion in liabilities that will have accrued up to that point; however, the outcome of pending litigation could substantially affect the government’s total liability. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For this report we examined (1) the key attributes, challenges, and costs of the Yucca Mountain repository; (2) alternative nuclear waste management approaches; (3) the key attributes, challenges, and costs of storing the nuclear waste at two centralized sites; and (4) the key attributes, challenges, and costs of continuing to store the nuclear waste at its current locations. To obtain comments from a broad group of nuclear waste management experts, we compiled the initial assumptions and component costs that we gathered from a small group of experts into a data collection instrument that included a description of the Yucca Mountain repository and our proposed nuclear waste management alternatives—on-site storage and centralized storage— and attributes and challenges associated with them; our initial assumptions that would identify and define the processes, time frames, and major components used to bound our hypothetical centralized and on-site storage alternatives; the major component costs of each alternative, including definitions and initial cost data; and components associated with each alternative with a high degree of uncertainty that we did not attempt to quantify in terms of costs. Using these steps, we discounted all annual costs to 2009 present value. | Why GAO Did This Study
High-level nuclear waste--one of the nation's most hazardous substances--is accumulating at 80 sites in 35 states. The United States has generated 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste and is expected to generate 153,000 metric tons by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires the Department of Energy (DOE) to dispose of the waste in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, about 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. However, the repository is more than a decade behind schedule, and the nuclear waste generally remains at the commercial nuclear reactor sites and DOE sites where it was generated. This report examines the key attributes, challenges, and costs of the Yucca Mountain repository and the two principal alternatives to a repository that nuclear waste management experts identified: storing the nuclear waste at two centralized locations and continuing to store the waste on site where it was generated. GAO developed models of total cost ranges for each alternative using component cost estimates provided by the nuclear waste management experts. However, GAO did not compare these alternatives because of significant differences in their inherent characteristics that could not be quantified.
What GAO Found
The Yucca Mountain repository is designed to provide a permanent solution for managing nuclear waste, minimize the uncertainty of future waste safety, and enable DOE to begin fulfilling its legal obligation under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to take custody of commercial waste, which began in 1998. However, project delays have led to utility lawsuits that DOE estimates are costing taxpayers about $12.3 billion in damages through 2020 and could cost $500 million per year after 2020, though the outcome of pending litigation may affect the government's total liability. Also, the administration has announced plans to terminate Yucca Mountain and seek alternatives. Even if DOE continues the program, it must obtain a Nuclear Regulatory Commission construction and operations license, a process likely to be delayed by budget shortfalls. GAO's analysis of DOE's cost projections found that a repository to dispose of 153,000 metric tons would cost from $41 billion to $67 billion (in 2009 present value) over a 143-year period until the repository is closed. Nuclear power rate payers would pay about 80 percent of these costs, and taxpayers would pay about 20 percent. Centralized storage at two locations provides an alternative that could be implemented within 10 to 30 years, allowing more time to consider final disposal options, nuclear waste to be removed from decommissioned reactor sites, and the government to take custody of commercial nuclear waste, saving billions of dollars in liabilities. However, DOE's statutory authority to provide centralized storage is uncertain, and finding a state willing to host a facility could be extremely challenging. In addition, centralized storage does not provide for final waste disposal, so much of the waste would be transported twice to reach its final destination. Using cost data from experts, GAO estimated the 2009 present value cost of centralized storage of 153,000 metric tons at the end of 100 years to range from $15 billion to $29 billion but increasing to between $23 billion and $81 billion with final geologic disposal. On-site storage would provide an alternative requiring little change from the status quo, but would face increasing challenges over time. It would also allow time for consideration of final disposal options. The additional time in on-site storage would make the waste safer to handle, reducing risks when waste is transported for final disposal. However, the government is unlikely to take custody of the waste, especially at operating nuclear reactor sites, which could result in significant financial liabilities that would increase over time. Not taking custody could also intensify public opposition to spent fuel storage site renewals and reactor license extensions, particularly with no plan in place for final waste disposition. In addition, extended on-site storage could introduce possible risks to the safety and security of the waste as the storage systems degrade and the waste decays, potentially requiring new maintenance and security measures. Using cost data from experts, GAO estimated the 2009 present value cost of on-site storage of 153,000 metric tons at the end of 100 years to range from $13 billion to $34 billion but increasing to between $20 billion to $97 billion with final geologic disposal. |
gao_GAO-14-299 | gao_GAO-14-299_0 | Committee on the Marine Transportation System and Arctic Maritime Infrastructure
A Presidential Directive in the U.S. However, industry representatives we spoke with from five key industries— commercial shipping, cruises, commercial fishing, oil, and mining—stated that their level of commercial activity in the U.S. Arctic is expected to remain limited over the next 10 years due to a variety of contributing factors. Factors included general challenges related to operating in the Arctic such as geography, extreme weather, and hard-to-predict sea ice movement,and other industry-specific factors. According to representatives from a cruise association, the primary reason for the limited number of Arctic cruises is a lack of demand from the mainstream cruise consumer base. Some government actions help to address the factors that some industry representatives identified as limiting their current and expected activity in U.S. Arctic. For example, the USACE, in collaboration with the State of Alaska, has taken steps to study the development of an Arctic deepwater port, a factor identified by mining representatives as contributing to the industry’s limited activity. The USACE and the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities have reported on this issue and are currently conducting an additional study to identify potential port sites in the U.S. Arctic region. The USCG operates the nation’s two functioning icebreakers, which are used in the Arctic for emergency response, research assistance, and patrols. Mapping, Charting, and Weather Information
In response to increasing demand, NOAA has taken several steps to improve mapping, charting, and weather information for the U.S. Arctic. The CMTS Prioritized U.S. Arctic MTS Infrastructure and Plans to Monitor Agencies’ Progress
The CMTS Prioritized Future Federal Arctic MTS Infrastructure Development
In July 2013, the federal interagency CMTS published the U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action (Arctic Report), which identified and prioritized actions for developing Arctic maritime infrastructure and identified the lead agency for each of those actions, among other things. Specifically the Arctic Report prioritized two broad categories of MTS infrastructure—information infrastructure, such as mapping and charting, and response services, such as search and rescue—to be addressed by agencies in the near term.were selected as near-term priorities because, according to the Arctic Report, they: were identified as requirements by expert reports; can be achieved with existing resources; were deemed to be regionally significant; are interdependent, building on each other to develop the Arctic MTS; would help establish a foundation for sustainable federal Arctic can immediately increase safety for the mariner; and support and safe operations. Furthermore, since implementing recommended actions is at the discretion of the agencies and the Arctic Report is considered a “living document” with potentially changing priorities and actions, monitoring agencies’ progress in addressing recommended actions is an important step in planning, developing, and investing in Arctic maritime infrastructure. USCG, NOAA, DOT, and DOI provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. USACE did not have any comments on this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) identify what is known about the extent of commercial maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic and anticipated activity in the next 10 years; (2) identify actions government entities have taken in support of planning and developing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure and unique challenges that may exist; and (3) describe federal interagency efforts that have been taken to identify and prioritize Arctic maritime infrastructure investments. The results of these interviews are not generalizable, but do provide insights regarding current and planned maritime activities in the U.S. Arctic. To describe what is known about commercial activity in the U.S. Arctic, we interviewed companies and industry trade associations from the commercial-shipping, cruise, commercial-fishing, oil, and mining industries. We conducted site visits to Nome, Barrow, and Anchorage, Alaska, from July 21, 2013, to July 27, 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decreasing seasonal sea ice has opened up Arctic waters for longer periods with resulting potential economic opportunities in commercial shipping, cruises, commercial fishing, oil, and mining. In light of the importance of U.S. efforts to effectively manage Arctic issues, GAO was asked to examine U.S. actions related to developing and investing in Arctic maritime infrastructure.
This report discusses (1) current commercial maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic and anticipated activity in the next 10 years, (2) actions taken by government entities in support of planning and developing U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure, and (3) federal interagency efforts to identify and prioritize Arctic maritime-infrastructure investments. GAO interviewed representatives from the commercial-shipping, cruise, commercial-fishing, oil, and mining industries and government entities involved in the U.S. Arctic. Site visits were conducted to Nome, Barrow, and Anchorage, Alaska. These sites were selected based on factors such as geographic location and infrastructure activity.
What GAO Found
Commercial U.S. Arctic maritime activities are expected to be limited for the next 10 years, according to industry representatives, due to a variety of factors. Interviews with industry representatives highlighted a variety of general challenges related to operating in the Arctic, such as geography, extreme weather, and hard-to-predict ice floes. Industry-specific factors were also cited as contributing to limited commercial activity. For example, shipping companies noted higher costs with Arctic transit; cruise industry groups noted a lack of demand for Arctic cruises from the mainstream cruise-consumer base, and oil companies last drilled offshore exploratory wells in the U.S. Arctic in 2012.
Although the activity will likely be limited, federal, state, and local stakeholders have taken some actions to plan for future maritime-infrastructure investments. Some of these actions address factors that, as identified by industry representatives, contribute to the current and expected limited maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), in collaboration with the State of Alaska, has taken steps to study the development of an Arctic deepwater port; the lack of which is a factor identified by mining representatives as contributing to the expected limited mining activity in the U.S. Arctic. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is in the preliminary phase of seeking to acquire a new polar icebreaker, which could be used for emergency response, research assistance, or patrols. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Alaska government are working to improve mapping, charting, and weather information for the U.S. Arctic.
The Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) published the U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation System: Overview and Priorities for Action in July 2013, which prioritized actions for developing Arctic maritime infrastructure and identified the lead agency for each action. This report prioritized two broad categories to be addressed in the near term: information infrastructure, such as mapping and charting, and response services, such as search and rescue. Implementation of the report's actions is at the discretion of each federal agency; however, according to CMTS officials, CMTS is currently developing a process to regularly monitor agencies' progress in addressing the recommended actions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. USCG, NOAA, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Interior sent GAO technical comments on this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. USACE did not have any comments on this report.
View a video of GAO's review of U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. |
gao_GAO-15-651 | gao_GAO-15-651_0 | MCPP-N Is Changing Its Equipment Mix to Address U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command Requirements
The Marine Corps is changing its mix of equipment to address the U.S. European and U.S. Africa commands’ strategic and theater-specific operational requirements. Although those U.S. Africa Command plans that reference a need for access to prepositioned equipment do not specifically identify MCPP-N as an asset to meet that need, both Marine Corps and U.S. Africa Command officials stated that MCPP-N has served and can continue to serve as a global support asset to meet combatant command requirements. Marine Corps’ Cost Estimates for Funding MCPP-N’s Equipment Sustainment May Not Be Fully Reliable
Marine Corps cost estimates for sustaining the equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability may not be fully reliable, in that they do not fully meet the four general characteristics for reliable cost estimating—that is, being accurate, well-documented, credible, and comprehensive—as identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We found that estimates did not meet the characteristic for credibility. As of May 2015 the draft guidance had not been finalized, but Marine Corps officials stated they had no plans for the new guidance, which they expect to issue in the fall of 2015, to address the four characteristics of reliable cost estimates. Marine Corps Reliance on the Norwegian System Poses Management Challenges and Data Reliability Risks, and Quality Assurance Procedures Do Not Include a Review of the System
The Marine Corps relies upon the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System for data needed to manage its equipment inventory at MCPP-N due to long-standing limitations in the Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps. The reliance on two different information systems, one of which is owned and operated by a foreign government, creates several management challenges and risks to data reliability for the Marine Corps. For example, it results in a time lag in the accuracy of information in the Marine Corps system until that system is manually updated with information from the Norwegian system—a process that is time- consuming and vulnerable to the risk of introduction of errors. However, the Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate these risks for the interim until the Marine Corps system is capable of replacing the Norwegian system. Additionally, relying on the Norwegian system for management information makes the Marine Corps vulnerable to any weaknesses that may exist within the Norwegian system. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has not conducted a quality assurance review of the Norwegian system. Performing such a review would be consistent with Marine Corps regulations and federal internal control standards, and it would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential weaknesses in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System. As part of its quality assurance program for ensuring that the Marine Corps has accurate and reliable information on inventory data for stored assets used to support combatant commanders’ requirements, we recommend that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, take steps to update the Technical Manual on Logistics Support for the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway and the Local Bilateral Agreement, to incorporate guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance review that assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Senate Report 113-176, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision that we review MCPP-N and determine the extent to which (1) MCPP-N addresses U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command requirements; (2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N’s sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability; and, (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in place to monitor the management of MCPP-N.
To determine the extent to which MCPP-N addresses U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command requirements, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed plans, policies, and guidance on MCPP-N detailing the program and its support to the Marine Corps and combatant commands, such as the January 2012 Commandant of the Marine Corps Planning Guidance for Marine Corps Prepositioning Program—Norway. We focused our review on ground equipment stored at MCPP-N because the program is transforming the equipment set from an engineering and transportation to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability. | Why GAO Did This Study
MCPP-N was established in 1981 as part of a DOD agreement to support the defense of Norway and global U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary operations. In 2012 the Marine Corps began transforming MCPP-N from an engineering and transportation capability to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, which includes combat vehicles and other tactical equipment, and it expects to complete the transformation in 2016.
Senate Report 113-176 included a provision that GAO review MCPP-N. This report determines the extent to which (1) MCPP-N addresses U.S. European and U.S. Africa command requirements;(2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N's sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability; and (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in place to monitor the management of MCPP-N. GAO reviewed agency guidance and plans, analyzed budget estimates, and interviewed Marine Corps, Department of State, and Norwegian Defence officials.
What GAO Found
The Marine Corps is changing its mix of equipment at Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway (MCPP-N) to address the U.S. European and U.S. Africa commands' strategic and theater-specific operational requirements. U.S. European Command's posture plan identifies MCPP-N as a key program that can respond to contingencies. While U.S. Africa Command plans that refer to a need to access prepositioned equipment do not specifically identify MCPP-N as an asset to meet that need, both Marine Corps and U.S. Africa Command officials stated that MCPP-N has served and can continue to serve as a global support asset to meet combatant command requirements. The Marine Corps reported that it routinely uses MCPP-N equipment sets to support European and Africa training and exercises.
Marine Corps cost estimates for sustaining the equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability at MCPP-N may not be fully reliable, in that they do not fully meet the four general characteristics for reliable cost estimating—that is, being accurate, well-documented, credible, and comprehensive. For example, the Marine Corps documented its cost estimates, but the documentation did not include the source data used to develop the estimates or the calculations performed and estimating methodologies used. Marine Corps officials stated that they are drafting guidance for developing cost estimates for budget plans and plan to issue it in the fall of 2015, but this guidance will not address the four general characteristics for reliable cost estimating. Without ensuring that this guidance fully addresses those characteristics, the Marine Corps will not be positioned to know whether its budget proposals will meet the goal of sustaining equipment for a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability at MCCP-N.
The Marine Corps could improve its quality assurance procedures for monitoring MCPP-N. Specifically, the service relies upon the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System for data needed to manage its equipment inventory due to limitations in its own system, such as the lack of a warehousing application to effectively manage MCPP-N equipment.The reliance on two different information systems, one of which is owned and operated by a foreign government, creates several management challenges and risks to data reliability for the Marine Corps. For example, it results in a time lag in the accuracy of information in the Marine Corps system until it is manually updated with information from the Norwegian system—a time-consuming process that introduces a vulnerability to errors. The Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate these risks for the interim until the Marine Corps system is capable of replacing the Norwegian system. Additionally, relying on the Norwegian system for management information makes the Marine Corps vulnerable to any weaknesses that may exist within the Norwegian system. However, the Marine Corps has not conducted a quality assurance review of the Norwegian system. Performing such a review would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential weaknesses in the Norwegian system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Marine Corps (1) incorporate the four characteristics of reliable cost estimates in the forthcoming prepositioning programs budget development policy; and (2) develop, in consultation with the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, a means to conduct a quality assurance review of the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System. The Marine Corps concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-44 | gao_GAO-16-44_0 | DLA Disposition Services receives, classifies, segregates, demilitarizes, accounts for, and disposes of personal property that has been identified as “excess” to the military services’ needs. Figure 2 illustrates this process. DLA officials explained that, in accordance with DLA guidance and policy, the disposal process is a four-stage process that includes 42 days (known as the “screening cycle”) during which potential recipients may screen, request, and obtain excess property at the stages in which they are eligible to do so, after which any remaining property may be sold. Measured in terms of original acquisition value, DOD disposes of most of its excess personal property in this stage. DOD’s Implementation of the Disposal Process Has Given Some Non- Federal Entities Priority over Some Federal Agencies for Obtaining Property
DOD’s Program for Law Enforcement Agencies Allows Some State and Local Agencies to Take Priority over Some Federal Agencies
DOD’s disposal process has evolved over time as new laws have authorized non-federal program recipients to obtain property from DOD that DOD no longer needs. As new laws have added special programs to the list of eligible recipients for DOD’s excess property, DOD has exercised its statutory authority to implement these special programs by allowing certain non-federal recipients (such as state and local law enforcement agencies) to screen and request property in the first stage of the disposal process—reutilization—before federal civilian agencies and state and local governments, which obtain property in later stages— transfer or donation. As a result, in some cases, federal agencies that may also have a need for such property for their missions may not be able to obtain it through the disposal process, because the excess property that was available has already been claimed by or provided to state or local law enforcement agencies. During calendar years 2013 and 2014, 150 law enforcement agencies obtained 285 pieces of earth-moving and excavating equipment through the 1033 program, with original acquisition values totaling just over $25 million. We could not determine whether any specific item that DLA Disposition Services provided to state and local law enforcement agencies would have filled the need that one of those federal agencies met by using appropriated funds for a new procurement. Such property could potentially be transferred to federal civilian agencies to meet their needs or donated to states, municipalities, schools, or nonprofit organizations. Unless DOD further reassesses its disposal process to determine if it needs to make additional changes to its guidance governing the priorities of the disposal process—specifically for property obtained by special programs such as the 1033 program—and revises its guidance reflecting those priorities, the risk remains that federal civilian agencies may spend additional appropriated federal funds to procure equipment, rather than pursue obtaining equal or similar items at little or no additional cost to the federal government through DOD’s disposal process. DOD Has Encountered Challenges in Its Capacity to Manage Excess Property in Need of Disposal
Some Disposition Services Sites Have Extended Waits for Turn-In Appointments and Backlogs of Unprocessed Property
DLA Disposition Services faces challenges in processing the current levels of excess property that the military services are turning in for disposal, and these challenges may affect DOD’s ability to handle any increases in the amount of property for disposal in an efficient manner. Conclusions
For fiscal year 2014, DOD reported that it had reutilized, transferred, or donated excess and surplus property with a total original acquisition value of approximately $3.18 billion in nominal dollars. Recommendation for Executive Action
Recognizing that DOD has recently revised its disposition guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, DLA, to further reassess DOD’s disposal process to determine whether additional changes are needed in the priority given to recipients within the process, including potential changes to the categories and quantities of property that special programs may obtain, and revise its guidance reflecting those priorities accordingly to better enable DOD to fulfill the disposal program’s objectives. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the process for disposing of Department of Defense (DOD) excess personal property in the United States, we reviewed key documentation of guidance DOD provides to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Disposition Services and DOD components on the disposition of excess personal property, such as the Defense Materiel Disposition Manual and the DOD Demilitarization Manual. To assess how DOD’s priorities in its disposal process affect the distribution of excess property, we reviewed key guidance, manuals, and policies; legal authorities; and reports and other documents related to the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year the military services identify thousands of items of personal property—including military equipment and materiel—that they need to dispose of because it is obsolete, not repairable, or excess to their requirements. For fiscal year 2014, DOD reported that excess and surplus property with a total original acquisition value of approximately $3.18 billion in nominal dollars was reutilized, transferred, or donated. DOD reported total revenues of almost $128 million from items sold in fiscal year 2014.
Congress included provisions in reports accompanying legislation for GAO to review DOD's current process for disposing of excess personal property. This report (1) describes the process for disposing of DOD's excess personal property in the U.S.; (2) assesses how DOD's priorities in its disposal process affect the distribution of excess property; and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD has encountered challenges in its capacity to manage excess personal property to be processed. GAO reviewed guidance; obtained the most recently available calendar year (2013-2014) data on property obtained by law enforcement agencies, wait times, and backlogs; and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
Disposing of Department of Defense (DOD) property that is excess to a military service's needs is a multi-stage process, executed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The process includes a 42-day period during which potential recipients may screen, request, and obtain excess property at the stages in which they are eligible to do so (see figure). First, usable property may be reutilized within DOD or provided to special programs (such as the program that provides excess DOD property to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies) identified in statutes or by DOD. If not reutilized, this property may be transferred to federal civilian agencies, after which it becomes surplus and may be donated to other parties, such as state governments. Remaining property may be sold to the general public, if appropriate and safe, or rendered useless for its original military purpose (demilitarized) and sold as scrap or destroyed.
Overview of DOD's Disposal Process
The priorities outlined in DOD's disposal process guidance place special program recipients in the first stage of the process (reutilization) versus the later stages (transfer or donation), giving some non-federal entities priority for excess property over some federal civilian agencies that may have similar needs. For instance, in calendar years 2013-2014, the special program for law enforcement agencies mentioned above provided 150 of those agencies with 285 pieces of earth-moving and excavating equipment, while at least 9 federal agencies also purchased equipment in this category for their mission needs. GAO could not definitively conclude that any specific item provided to state or local law enforcement agencies would have filled the need any federal agencies met using appropriated funds for new procurement, but the possibility exists. In October 2015, DOD revised its process so that DOD components will obtain its excess property before special programs. Still, special programs could obtain such property before most federal civilian agencies and non-federal entities. DOD is not planning to further assess its priorities to see if additional changes may be needed in the priorities of property recipients. Thus, the risk remains that federal agencies could spend federal funds to procure property that they might have been able to obtain through the DOD disposal process.
DLA Disposition Services faces challenges processing excess property that has been turned in for disposal. DLA has established goals for processing times and modified some of its practices for processing this property, but some military customers still face long waits to turn in property and thus may incur costs for moving, storing, and maintaining property they no longer need. DLA officials said they plan to study this issue to identify and make needed improvements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD further reassess its disposal process to determine whether additional changes are needed in the priorities of recipients within the process and revise its guidance reflecting those priorities, accordingly, to better fulfill the disposal program's objectives. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-841 | gao_GAO-03-841_0 | Claims are denied for a variety of reasons. BIPA’s changes to the appeals process were to apply with respect to initial determinations—that is, claims denials—made on or after October 1, 2002. QICs have not yet been implemented and there is insufficient information to predict their ability to meet BIPA’s performance measures. For example, at the first level of appeals— the carrier review—while carriers completed about 91 percent of their reviews within CMS’s current 45-day time frame, this is insufficient by BIPA’s standards. More than 95 percent of OHA appeals and about 85 percent of MAC appeals did not meet BIPA time frames in fiscal year 2001, suggesting that a number of cases would be eligible for escalation. The first uncertainty concerns funding for HHS. Conclusions
BIPA demands a level of performance—especially regarding timeliness— that the appeals bodies have not demonstrated they can meet. In addition to lengthy processing times, OHA and the MAC have developed sizable backlogs of unprocessed cases. Greater coordination could enable them to resolve the barriers that currently preclude successful management of the appeals process as a whole. The lack of a single entity that sets priorities and addresses operational problems at all four levels of the process makes it imperative that all bodies work closely together. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of HHS and the Commissioner of SSA create an interagency steering committee with representatives from CMS, the carriers, OHA, and the MAC to serve as an advisory body to the Secretary of HHS and the Commissioner of SSA with the following responsibilities: make administrative processes, such as file tracking and transfer, compatible across all appeals bodies; negotiate responsibilities and strategies for reducing the backlog of pending cases, especially at OHA and the MAC, and establish the priority for adjudicating pre-BIPA cases relative to BIPA-governed cases; and establish requirements for reporting specific and comparable program and performance data to CMS, SSA, and HHS so that management can identify opportunities for improvement, and determine the resource requirements necessary to ensure that all appeals bodies will be able to meet BIPA’s requirements. To gain a better understanding of the process for Part B appeals at the time the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) was passed and the changes it mandated, we reviewed agency procedures for completing Part B appeals regulations and agreements guiding Medicare appeals and other laws. We also analyzed appeals workload data and interviewed officials at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and at all levels of the administrative appeals process—the carriers, the Office of Hearing and Appeals (OHA), and the Medicare Appeals Council (MAC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Appellants and others have been concerned about the length of time it takes for a decision on the appeal of a denied Medicare claim. In December 2000, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA), required, among other things, shorter decision time frames. BIPA's provisions related to Medicare appeals were to be applied to claims denied after October 1, 2002, but many of the changes have not yet been implemented. GAO was asked to evaluate whether the current Medicare appeals process is operating consistent with BIPA's requirements and to identify any barriers to meeting the law's requirements.
What GAO Found
BIPA demands a level of performance, especially regarding timeliness, that the appeals bodies--the contract insurance carriers responsible for the first two levels of appeals, the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Medicare Appeals Council (MAC)--have not demonstrated they can meet. While the carriers have generally met their pre-BIPA time requirements, in fiscal year 2001, they completed only 43 percent of first level appeals within BIPA's 30-day time frame. In addition to average processing times more than four times longer than that required by BIPA, OHA and the MAC--the two highest levels of appeal--have accumulated sizable backlogs of unresolved cases. Delays in administrative processing due to inefficiencies and incompatibility of their data systems constitute 70 percent of the time spent processing appeals at the OHA and MAC levels. The appeals bodies are housed in two different agencies--HHS and SSA. The lack of a single entity to set priorities and address operational problems--such as incompatible data and administrative systems--at all four levels of the process has precluded successful management of the appeals system as a whole. Uncertainty about funding and a possible transfer of OHA's Medicare appeals workload from OHA to HHS has also complicated the appeals bodies' ability to adequately plan for the future. |
gao_GAO-03-1007T | gao_GAO-03-1007T_0 | Background
The 1986 Compact of Free Association between the United States, the FSM, and the RMI provided a framework for the United States to work toward achieving its three main goals: (1) to secure self-government for the FSM and the RMI, (2) to assist the FSM and the RMI in their efforts to advance economic development and self-sufficiency, and (3) to ensure certain national security rights for all of the parties. In the fall of 1999, the United States and the two Pacific Island nations began negotiating economic assistance and defense provisions of the Compact that were due to expire. Immigration issues were also addressed. According to the Department of State, the aims of the amended Compacts are to (1) continue economic assistance to advance self-reliance, while improving accountability and effectiveness; (2) continue the defense relationship, including a 50-year lease extension (beyond 2016) of U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI; (3) strengthen immigration provisions; and (4) provide assistance to lessen the impact of Micronesian migration on Hawaii, Guam, and the CNMI. If the trust funds established in the amended Compacts earn a 6 percent rate of return, the FSM trust fund would be insufficient to replace expiring annual grants. Amended Compacts Could Cost the U.S. Government $6.6 Billion
Under the amended Compacts with the FSM and the RMI, new congressional authorizations of approximately $6.6 billion could be required for U.S. payments from fiscal years 2004 to 2086, of which $3.5 billion would be required for the first 20 years of the Compacts (see table 1). This new authorized funding would be provided to each country in the form of (1) annual grant funds targeted to priority areas (such as health, education, and infrastructure); (2) contributions to a trust fund for each country such that trust fund earnings would become available to the FSM and the RMI in fiscal year 2024 to replace expiring annual grants; (3) payments the U.S. government makes to the RMI government that the RMI transfers to Kwajalein landowners to compensate them for the U.S. use of their lands for defense sites; and (4) an extension of federal services that have been provided under the original Compact but are due to expire in fiscal year 2003. Nevertheless, the RMI trust fund would become insufficient for replacing grant funding by fiscal year 2040. The United States could withhold payments if either country fails to comply with grant terms and conditions. The successful implementation of the many new accountability provisions will require a sustained commitment by the three governments to fulfill their new roles and responsibilities. Appropriate resources from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI represent one form of this commitment. While the U.S. government had already secured access to Kwajalein until 2016 through the 1986 MUORA, the newly revised MUORA would grant the United States access until 2066, with an option to extend for an additional 20 years to 2086. In addition, the Attorney General would have the authority to issue regulations that specify the time and conditions of a Compact nonimmigrant’s admission into the United States (under the original Compact, regulations could be promulgated to establish limitations on Compact nonimmigrants in U.S. territories or possessions). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1986, the United States entered into a Compact of Free Association with the Pacific Island nations of the Federated States of Micronesia, or FSM, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or RMI. The Compact provided about $2.1 billion in U.S. funds, supplied by the Department of the Interior, over 17 years (1987-2003) to the FSM and the RMI. These funds were intended to advance economic development. In a past report, GAO found that this assistance did little to advance economic development in either country, and accountability over funding was limited. The Compact also established U.S. defense rights and obligations in the region and allowed for migration from both countries to the United States. The three parties recently renegotiated expiring economic assistance provisions of the Compact in order to provide an additional 20 years of assistance (2004-2023). In addition, the negotiations addressed defense and immigration issues. The House International Relations and Resources Committees requested that GAO report on Compact negotiations.
What GAO Found
The amended Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the FSM and the RMI to renew expiring U.S. assistance could potentially cost the U.S. government about $6.6 billion in new authorizations from the Congress. Of this amount, $3.5 billion would cover payments over a 20-year period (2004-2023), while $3.1 billion represents payments for U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI for the years 2024 through 2086. While the level of annual grant assistance to both countries would decrease each year, contributions to trust funds--meant to eventually replace grant funding--would increase annually by a comparable amount. Nevertheless, at an assumed annual 6 percent rate of return, earnings from the FSM trust fund would be unable to replace expiring grant assistance in 2024, while earnings from the RMI trust fund would encounter the same problem by 2040. The amended Compacts strengthen reporting and monitoring measures that could improve accountability over assistance, if diligently implemented. These measures include the following: assistance grants would be targeted to priority areas such as health and education; annual reporting and consultation requirements would be expanded; and funds could be withheld for noncompliance with grant terms and conditions. The successful implementation of the many new accountability provisions will require appropriate resources and sustained commitment from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI. Regarding defense, U.S. military access to Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI would be extended from 2016 through 2066, with an option to extend through 2086. Finally, Compact provisions addressing immigration have been strengthened. For example, FSM and RMI citizens entering the United States would need to carry a passport, and the U.S. Attorney General could, through regulations, specify the time and conditions of admission to the United States for these citizens. |
gao_GAO-10-452T | gao_GAO-10-452T_0 | According to Bureau data nationwide, more than 7.7 million people, or approximately 3 percent of the population, lived in group quarter facilities during the 2000 Census. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, counting the group quarters population can be difficult. Operational Changes Made for 2010 Position the Bureau to More Accurately Classify and Identify Group Quarters
The Bureau developed and tested new procedures to address the difficulties it had in identifying and counting this population during the 2000 Census. For example, the Bureau moved from manual to GPS- generated map spots, which should reduce the chance of human error and of group quarters populations being counted in the wrong jurisdiction; moved from a telephone interview to a field verification approach, which should increase accuracy; and combined the housing unit and group quarters address lists into a single address list, which should reduce the chance of double counting. The Bureau’s three-pronged approach had temporary census workers visit each group quarters and interview its manager or administrator using a short questionnaire during Group Quarters Validation. As stated above, the goal was to determine whether the dwelling was a group quarters or some other type of residence. If the dwelling was in fact a group quarters, it was then determined what category it fit under (e.g., boarding school, correctional facility, health care facility, military quarters, residence hall or dormitory, etc. ), and its correct geographic location was confirmed. This is followed by the Group Quarters Advance Visit operation, which is currently underway. During the advance visit, census workers verify the location of the group quarters and identify contact officials, schedule the date and time of the actual enumeration, and collect other information to help conduct the actual enumeration. The actual count of group quarters residents is conducted during Group Quarter Enumeration. The effort includes an operation known as Service- Based Enumeration, during which people commonly referred to as homeless are counted. Military bases and military/maritime vessels are also enumerated as part of group quarters. To further ensure an accurate group quarters count, the Bureau employs a number of quality assurance procedures. Challenges and Opportunities for Counting Group Quarters Residents in Brooklyn
Nationally, the enumeration of group quarters is a difficult task for the Bureau, and Brooklyn presents its own challenges as well as opportunities. For example, a planning database the Bureau developed to help it target its resources placed Brooklyn third on a list of top 50 U.S. counties with the highest number of people living in hard-to-count areas, based on data from the 2000 Census. Demographic factors that contribute to the hard-to-count designations include poverty levels, low educational attainment, unemployment, and complex household arrangements, as well as housing indicators such as a high percentage of renters and vacant units, multi-unit buildings, and crowded housing. In light of these demographic and housing challenges, a successful group quarters count will, at a minimum, depend on how well the Bureau executes the following activities: Complete remaining group quarters activities on schedule. Implement the group quarters quality assurance procedures as planned, and closely monitor key performance metrics to ensure that the group quarters count proceeds on track and quickly address any glitches. Ensure that census workers have knowledge of neighborhood culture and living arrangements and possess the language skills to reach out to residents with limited English proficiency. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is tasked with conducting an accurate count of people living in dwellings known as group quarters as part of the 2010 Census. Group quarters consist of college dormitories, prisons, nursing homes, and other facilities typically owned or managed by an entity providing housing, services, or both for the residents. During the 2000 Census, for a variety of reasons, group quarters were sometimes counted more than once, missed, or included in the wrong location. As requested, this testimony will focus on (1) the extent to which the Bureau has strengthened its procedures for counting group quarters compared to the 2000 Census, and (2) particular challenges and opportunities for an accurate group quarters count in Brooklyn. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work in New York and elsewhere.
What GAO Found
The Bureau developed and tested new procedures to address the difficulties it had in identifying and counting group quarters during the 2000 Census. For example, the Bureau moved from manual to GPS-generated map spots, which should reduce the chance of human error and of group quarters populations being counted in the wrong jurisdiction; moved from a telephone interview to a field verification approach, which should increase accuracy; and combined the conventional housing unit and group quarters address lists into a single address list, which should reduce the chance of double counting. Moreover, the Bureau implemented a three-pronged approach to locate and count group quarters. The approach consisted of Group Quarters Validation, where temporary census workers visited each group quarter and interviewed its manager or administrator to determine whether the dwelling was a group quarters or some other type of residence. If the dwelling was in fact a group quarters, it was then determined what category it fit under, and its correct geographic location was confirmed. This was followed by the Group Quarters Advance Visit, which is currently under way. Census workers are to verify the location of the group quarters; identify contact officials; and schedule the date, time and other information to help conduct the actual enumeration. The actual count of group quarters residents is conducted during the third phase of the approach, Group Quarter Enumeration from the end of March to mid-May. The effort includes an operation known as Service-Based Enumeration, during which people commonly referred to as homeless are counted. Additional procedures to ensure a complete count of group quarters include a series of quality assurance procedures, such as supervisory review of workers' assignments. Brooklyn presents challenges as well as opportunities. For example, a planning database the Bureau developed to help it target its resources placed Brooklyn on a list of top 50 U.S. counties with the highest number of people living in hard-to-count areas, based on data from the 2000 Census. Factors that contribute to the hard-to-count designation include poverty levels, high levels of non-English speakers, complex household arrangements, as well as a high percentage of rental and vacant units, multi-unit buildings, and crowded housing. In light of these demographic and housing challenges, a successful group quarters count will, at a minimum, depend on how well the Bureau executes the following activities: (1) complete remaining group quarters activities on schedule, (2) implement the group quarters quality assurance procedures as planned, and (3) closely monitor key performance metrics to ensure that the group quarters count proceeds on track and quickly address any glitches. It will also be important for the Bureau to ensure that census workers have knowledge of neighborhood culture and living arrangements, and possess the language skills to reach out to residents with limited English proficiency. |
gao_GAO-02-650 | gao_GAO-02-650_0 | Army Industrial Base Assessments Do Not Use Current Industry Data
The Army’s approach for assessing wartime spare parts industrial base capability still does not use current data from industry. It stopped this practice primarily because of the poor response rates. We were told that command officials themselves do not believe that collecting current data from industry is cost-effective. Partly in response to the recommendation in our prior report, the Army has several initiatives underway to improve its industrial base capability assessments, but these initiatives continue to focus on historical, rather than current industry data. Benefits of DLA’s Assessment Program
Although DLA’s industrial base assessment program is relatively new, it provides a number of examples that illustrate the effectiveness of collecting current data directly from the industrial base. | What GAO Found
The Army's approach to assessing wartime spare parts industrial base capability does not use current data from industry. Instead, the Army uses historical parts procurement data because its prior efforts to collect current data from industry were not successful due to poor response rates. GAO identified a program in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) that has several attributes reflecting sound management practices for reliable industrial base capability assessments. Although DLA's program is in its early stages of implementation, DLA has been able to successfully collect current data directly from private industry on thousands of parts. Further, DLA is analyzing that data to identify actual or potential parts availability problems. |
gao_GGD-98-12 | gao_GGD-98-12_0 | Also, under the FWRA, buyout recipients who were obligated to repay their buyouts could do so after an agency hired them. “(1) performance on site; (2) the principal tools and equipment are furnished by the government; (3) the services are applied directly to the integral effort of agencies or agency components to further their assigned function or mission; (4) the performance of comparable services and the meeting of comparable needs in the same or similar agencies using civil service personnel; (5) the need for the type of service provided can reasonably be expected to last beyond 1 year; (6) the requirement of government direction or supervision of contractor employees because of the inherent nature of the service, or the manner in which it is provided, in order to adequately protect the government’s interest, retain control of the function involved, or retain full personal responsibility for the function supported in a duly authorized federal officer or employee.”
The FAR also states that the key question to consider in determining whether a personal services contract exists is the following: Will the government exercise relatively continuous supervision and control over the contract personnel performing the contract? We asked the OIGs whether the buyout recipients had returned to federal employment and, if so, whether they had repaid the buyout or met DOD’s reemployment policy. The remaining 12 cases were not violations, but they were identified in the CPDF because of inaccurate data. In addition, OPM found FWRA repayment provision violations in two other research efforts it undertook, but it is unclear whether these violations are in addition to the violations that we found. Selected Agencies Found Nine Cases Violated the Repayment Provision, and Two Cases Violated DOD’s Reemployment Policy
The 9 federal agencies identified in the CPDF data as employing the 23 buyout recipients provided information showing that a violation of FWRA’s repayment provision or DOD’s policy had occurred in 11 of the 23 cases. The agencies reported that in 9 of the 11 cases, FWRA’s repayment provision was violated. Selected Agencies Lacked Adequate Internal Control Procedures to Help Ensure Compliance With the FWRA Repayment Provision
Federal agencies have an obligation to ensure that the FWRA repayment provision is met when buyout recipients are reemployed as civil servants, or when they work under contract expressly identified or administered as personal services contracts for the government. However, none of the 9 agencies that we asked to provide the status of the 23 buyout recipient cases had adequate internal control procedures in place to provide reasonable assurance that the FWRA repayment provision was met. Such certification was not required by the other 8 agencies from which we requested information on the 23 buyout recipient cases. The Department of Justice and Treasury Did Not Have Internal Control Procedures
Neither the Department of Justice nor Treasury had internal control procedures to help ensure that buyout recipients who return to federal employment comply with the FWRA repayment provision. OPM is also conducting these checks through the Central Personnel Data File.”
For Buyout Recipients Returning as Contract Employees
“Review agency’s contract agreements. Comments From the Office of Personnel Management
The following are GAO’s comments on the Office of Personnel Management’s letter dated August 15, 1997. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether: (1) the 23 buyout recipients returned to federal employment and, if so, whether they repaid the buyout or met the Department of Defense (DOD) reemployment policy; and (2) the 9 agencies that were identified as employing these 23 buyout recipients and other selected agencies, which may have buyout recipients under contract, had internal procedures in place to help ensure that buyout recipients repay buyouts when required to do so.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the information provided to GAO by the appropriate agencies' Office of Inspector General (OIG) and personnel office showed that a violation of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act (FWRA) repayment provision or the DOD reemployment policy occurred in 11 of 23 cases; (2) the FWRA repayment provision was violated in 9 of the 11 cases, and the DOD reemployment policy was violated in the 2 other cases; (3) the remaining 12 cases were not violations, although they had originally appeared to be questionable because of discrepancies between agency reports and data in the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Central Personnel Data File (CPDF), which GAO used as a source of information; (4) in addition, while researching 1 of the 23 cases, an agency OIG found that the agency employed an additional buyout recipient who had not repaid the buyout; (5) regarding internal control procedures, none of the 9 agencies that GAO contacted for information on the 23 buyout recipient cases had adequate internal control procedures in place to provide reasonable assurance that the FWRA repayment provision was met; (6) two other agencies notified their personnel officers of the FWRA repayment provision; however, only one component of each agency developed additional procedures to help ensure compliance with the provision; (7) in addition to buyout recipients who return directly to federal employment, some buyout recipients work under contract for the federal government; (8) some of these contract personnel are employed under contracts that are expressly identified as personal services contracts and, thus, are subject to the FWRA repayment provision; and (9) in addition to these personnel, other contract personnel who are subject to relatively continuous supervision and control by agency officials are, in effect, working under personal services contracts and are subject to the FWRA repayment provision. |
gao_GAO-17-97 | gao_GAO-17-97_0 | Process for Feasibility Studies and Construction Projects Led by Nonfederal Sponsors
Alternatively, when a nonfederal sponsor undertakes a feasibility study or construction project, the sponsor typically manages and funds the total cost of the feasibility study or construction project and may later seek reimbursement or credit for the federal share of the work it conducts. Nonfederal Sponsors May Conduct Feasibility Studies and Construct Water Resources Projects under Various Statutory Authorities
The authorities that allow nonfederal sponsors to undertake feasibility studies and construction projects have been included in various federal statutes since 1968. The Number of Federal Water Resources Projects Undertaken by Nonfederal Sponsors and the Amounts Reimbursed to Them Cannot Be Reliably Determined
Corps headquarters could not provide the exact number of, or specific information about, projects undertaken by nonfederal sponsors because it has delegated the responsibility for overseeing such projects to the districts. In addition, the information that Corps headquarters collected from the districts on the number of such projects and reimbursements to nonfederal sponsors did not match the information that districts provided to us. For example, Corps districts reported that from 1986 through 2014, 28 nonfederal sponsors undertook 32 water resources projects: 11 feasibility studies and 21 construction projects. However, according to Corps headquarters data, the Corps reimbursed nonfederal sponsors for the federal share of 20 projects. Corps headquarters officials stated they were not aware of Corps policies or procedures that provide guidance to the districts on the type of information to collect and maintain on projects led by nonfederal sponsors, in general, including what information to record; how, when, and where to record it; and how long to maintain it. Federal standards for internal control call for internal controls and all transactions and other significant events to be clearly documented in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals and for accurate and timely recording of transactions and events. Without developing documented guidance for districts to have procedures for accurate recordkeeping for transactions and other relevant information related to projects led by nonfederal sponsors, the Corps does not have reasonable assurance that districts will consistently record information on such projects and that the information districts provide to headquarters on such projects will be accurate and reliable. Corps District Officials and Nonfederal Sponsors Identified Partnerships and Communication As Areas That Worked Well on Projects Led by Nonfederal Sponsors
In discussing what worked well on projects led by nonfederal sponsors, Corps district officials and nonfederal sponsors we interviewed identified various factors. Eight of the 20 nonfederal sponsors we interviewed said the Corps does not have clear guidance on the project implementation process, which in some cases hindered the nonfederal sponsors’ ability to efficiently implement projects. In February 2016, the Corps issued implementation guidance for feasibility studies led by nonfederal sponsors under WRRDA 2014. In this guidance, the Corps clarified that it is generally not authorized to provide assistance to nonfederal sponsors undertaking feasibility studies, except in certain circumstances in which the Corps is permitted to provide limited technical assistance under the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. However, the number of federal water resources projects undertaken by nonfederal sponsors and the amounts reimbursed to them cannot be reliably determined because the Corps does not have guidance for districts— which are responsible for overseeing such projects—on how to collect, record, and maintain accurate information about these projects. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has accurate information about federal water resources feasibility studies and construction projects led by nonfederal sponsors, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to establish documented guidance for accurate recording of transactions and other relevant information related to these projects. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) the authorities that enable nonfederal sponsors to undertake a feasibility study or construct an authorized water resources project, (2) the extent to which nonfederal sponsors have undertaken federal water resources projects and the information the Corps has about them, and (3) Corps officials’ and nonfederal sponsors’ views on the lessons learned from these projects. We administered the data collection instrument to all 38 Corps districts responsible for civil works projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through its Civil Works program, the Corps designs, constructs, and maintains federal water resources projects, such as levees for flood risk management. Under certain authorities, nonfederal sponsors, such as states and local governments, may undertake studies or construct projects and may be eligible for reimbursement or credit for the federal share of costs.
GAO was asked to examine federal water resources projects undertaken by nonfederal sponsors. This report examines (1) the authorities enabling nonfederal sponsors to undertake studies or projects, (2) the extent to which such sponsors have undertaken federal projects and the information the Corps has about them, and (3) the Corps' and sponsors' views on lessons learned from projects. GAO reviewed federal laws and agency guidance; collected information about studies and projects led by nonfederal sponsors from 1986 through 2014 from all 38 Corps districts responsible for civil works; and interviewed Corps officials in 16 districts that have overseen at least one such study or project, as well as 20 nonfederal sponsors that have undertaken projects.
What GAO Found
Authorities that allow nonfederal sponsors to undertake federal water resources projects, including feasibility studies and construction projects, have been included in various federal statutes since 1968. Until June 2014, when Congress enacted the Water Resources Reform and Development Act, five federal statutory authorities allowed nonfederal sponsors to undertake studies or construction of federal water resources projects such as flood control projects. The 2014 act amended and consolidated prior statutory provisions authorizing water resources projects.
The number of federal water resources projects nonfederal sponsors have undertaken and the amounts they have been reimbursed for the federal share of these projects cannot be reliably determined. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) does not track this information at the headquarters level and has delegated the responsibility for tracking and overseeing such projects to the districts. While Corps headquarters collects information from the districts on reimbursements, the information that headquarters provided GAO did not match the information that the districts provided to GAO. For example, the number of reimbursed projects and the amount of reimbursements made to nonfederal sponsors were inconsistent in the two data sets. Corps headquarters officials could not fully explain why differences existed and could not identify any Corps policies or procedures that provide guidance to the districts on the type of information to collect and maintain on projects led by nonfederal sponsors. Federal standards for internal control call for all transactions and other significant events to be clearly documented, and for accurate and timely recording of transactions and events. Without documented guidance for districts regarding recordkeeping for projects led by nonfederal sponsors, the Corps does not have reasonable assurance that districts will consistently record information on such projects and that the information districts provide to headquarters on these projects will be accurate and reliable.
Corps district officials and nonfederal sponsors GAO interviewed identified several lessons learned from projects undertaken by nonfederal sponsors. For example, officials and nonfederal sponsors frequently cited enhanced partnerships and communication as areas that worked well on projects led by nonfederal sponsors. In contrast, both Corps district officials and nonfederal sponsors cited various challenges in existing Corps guidance. For example, officials noted that Corps guidance does not clearly establish roles and responsibilities for these projects, and nonfederal sponsors said the Corps does not have clear guidance on the project implementation process. The Corps issued implementation guidance for feasibility studies led by nonfederal sponsors in February 2016 in which it clarified that it is generally not authorized to provide assistance to nonfederal sponsors undertaking feasibility studies, except in certain circumstances in which the Corps is permitted to provide limited technical assistance to nonfederal sponsors. The Corps has also developed draft guidance for construction projects led by nonfederal sponsors, which it estimates it will issue later in 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps develop guidance for accurate recording of transactions and other relevant information about projects undertaken by nonfederal sponsors. The agency agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-98-24 | gao_NSIAD-98-24_0 | The Navy has initiated a restructuring of the business area that, according to the Secretary of the Navy, is “akin to placing it in receivership.”
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our audit of the Navy ordnance business area was to assess the Navy’s efforts to reduce costs and streamline its operations. These comments are reprinted in appendix I.
Navy’s Proposed and Ongoing Actions
The Navy has incorporated a goal to reduce annual costs by $151 million into its ordnance business area’s budget estimate and has identified the major actions that will be taken to achieve this goal. Specifically, the budget estimate indicated that between fiscal years 1996 and 1999, the business area’s civilian and military fiscal year end strengths will decline by 18 percent and 23 percent, respectively, and its annual costs will decline by $151 million, or 25 percent. Additional Cost Reductions Are Possible
The Navy’s planned restructuring of its ordnance business area will reduce overhead costs and is an important first step toward the elimination of the redundant capability both within the business area and between the business area and other organizations. The Army and Air Force do not believe they should subsidize the operations of a Navy base. Our analysis of available data indicates that, in general, the planned actions should result in substantial cost reductions and more streamlined Navy ordnance operations. We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy incorporate into the NOC’s detailed cost reduction plan (1) specific actions that need to be accomplished, (2) realistic assumptions about the savings that can be achieved, (3) milestones, and (4) clearly delineated responsibilities for performing the tasks in the plan; evaluate the cost-effectiveness of (1) consolidating all or most of the business area’s missile maintenance workload at one location and/or (2) transferring all or some of this work to public depots or the private sector; develop and implement policies and procedures for charging customers for ammunition storage services; evaluate the appropriateness of converting military guard positions to direct the NOC Commander to determine if it would be cost-beneficial to convert non-guard military positions to civilian status; and eliminate the excess ordnance engineering capability that previous studies have identified both within the NOC and between the NOC and other Navy organizations. However, Navy records show that 51,231 tons, or about 43 percent, of ammunition stored at weapons stations was not needed as of May 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed financial and management issues related to the ordnance business area of the Navy Working Capital Fund, focusing on: (1) the Navy's proposed and ongoing actions to reduce the business area's costs; and (2) additional cost reduction opportunities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy is in the process of developing the cost reduction plan GAO recommended in its March 1997 report and has proposed and begun implementing a number of actions to reduce its ordnance business area's annual operating costs by $151 million, or 25 percent, between fiscal year 1996 and 1999; (2) this is a significant step in the right direction and should result in substantial cost reductions and more streamlined operations; (3) GAO's review of the business area's operations and discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Navy ordnance officials indicate that the Navy has both an opportunity and the authority to further reduce Navy ordnance costs; (4) specifically: (a) redundant ordnance engineering capability exists within the business area and other Navy organizations; (b) military personnel are performing work that could be performed by less expensive civilian employees; (c) redundant missile maintenance capability exists; and (d) no financial incentive exists for customers to store only needed ammunition (the business area's inventory records show that 43 percent of the ammunition stored was unneeded as of May 1, 1997) since they do not directly pay for storage costs; (5) while most of the planned cost reduction actions appear to be appropriate, it remains to be seen whether the business area will reduce costs by $151 million; (6) in addition, GAO's review of available data indicates that one of the cost reduction actions--the planned personnel reductions--may adversely affect the Concord Naval Weapons Station's ability to load ships during mobilization, thus creating potential readiness problems; and (7) these personnel reductions are likely to have little impact on the Navy, but could have a significant impact on the Army and Air Force, which would rely heavily on Concord during a major contingency operation. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-88 | gao_T-HEHS-98-88_0 | 1). Labor’s Decentralized Organization Presents Challenges for Strategic Planning
Labor’s decentralized structure makes it both more important and more difficult to ensure a system of accountability as envisioned in the Results Act. Labor’s September 30, 1997, strategic plan reflects Labor’s decentralized approach and the difficulty it presents for establishing departmentwide goals and monitoring their attainment. However, it also makes adopting the better management practices envisioned by the Results Act more challenging. That is, articulating a comprehensive departmentwide mission statement, which is linked to results-oriented goals, objectives, and performance measures, is difficult because of the historical lack of central planning and the existing decentralized organizational structure. Labor chose to present individual plans for 15 of its 24 component offices along with a strategic plan overview. Labor’s overview contains six departmentwide goals. A mission-focused rather than organizationally focused planning process would improve Labor’s ability to examine its operations to find a less costly, more effective means of meeting its mission. Effective Information Management Is Essential
Realizing the benefits of strategic planning will require that Labor has effective information management systems. Labor appointed a chief information officer in August 1996. In 1996, OMB raised a question regarding this individual also serving as the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management, since the Clinger-Cohen Act requires that information resources management be the primary function of the chief information officer. The annual performance plans are to include performance goals for an agency’s program activities as listed in the budget, a summary of the necessary resources to conduct these activities, the performance indicators that will be used to measure performance, and a discussion of how the performance data will be validated and verified. Some Challenges of Information Resource Management Are Common to Labor and Other Federal Agencies
Information management is the subject of two new areas we have added this year to our list of areas at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement: information security and the year 2000 problem, both of which apply to Labor as well as to all other government agencies. Information security generally involves an agency’s ability to adequately protect the information it collects from unauthorized access. The second area involves the need for computer systems to be changed to accommodate dates beyond the year 1999. challenge to obtain complete, reliable, and consistent information throughout the Department is formidable. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the: (1) Department of Labor's progress in strategic planning as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; and (2) challenge Labor faces in ensuring the effective information management necessary for Labor to fully realize the benefits of that planning.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Labor's decentralized management structure makes adopting the better management practices envisioned by the Results Act--that is, articulating a comprehensive departmentwide mission statement linked to obvious results-oriented goals, objectives, and performance measures--more challenging; (2) Labor's September 30, 1997, strategic plan reflected its decentralized approach and the difficulty it presents for establishing departmentwide goals and monitoring their attainment; (3) Labor chose to present individual plans for 15 of its 24 component offices along with a strategic plan overview; (4) the overview contained five departmentwide goals that are generally results-oriented and a departmentwide management goal; (5) however, GAO is concerned that the lack of a departmentwide perspective in the development of Labor's strategic plan makes it organizationally driven rather than focused on mission; (6) several of the goals of the component units responsible for ensuring safe and healthful workplaces are similar yet listed separately for each unit; (7) a more mission-focused approach would improve Labor's ability to identify ways in which its operations might be improved to minimize potential duplication and promote efficiencies; (8) in order to measure performance--the next step required under the Results Act--Labor will need information that is sufficiently complete, reliable, and consistent to be useful in decisionmaking; (9) GAO's work has raised questions about how well Labor is meeting this management challenge; (10) GAO has found data to be missing, unreliable, or inconsistent in agencies throughout the Department; (11) Labor, as well as all other federal agencies, must also address two information management issues GAO has described this year as high risk because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement; (12) the first, information security, involves the agency's ability to protect information from unauthorized access; (13) the second requires Labor to rapidly change its computer systems to accomodate dates in the 21st century; and (14) while Labor has appointed a chief information officer, as required under the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, to oversee these and other information management issues, questions remain as to whether or not other duties required of the individual appointed will allow her to devote the attention necessary to ensure success in this critical management area. |
gao_GAO-02-30 | gao_GAO-02-30_0 | Budget Variances Were at Least $415 Million
Of the $4.5 billion appropriated to the U.S. Census Bureau for fiscal year 2000, lower expenditures and obligations than planned resulted in available balances of at least $415 million. Fiscal Year 2000 Funds Available for Fiscal Year 2001 Were $360 Million
On September 27, 2000, the bureau reported to the Congress that it had “at least $305 million of budget savings” out of its $4.5 billion fiscal year 2000 appropriation for the 2000 decennial census. This resulted in about $348 million of lower salary and benefit costs for over 11,000 fewer support staff than planned. Higher Enumerator Costs Partially Offset Budget Variances
Enumerator workload is largely determined by the initial mail response rate for returned census questionnaires. However, budget variances from the higher mail response rate and the lower support staff workload were partially offset by over $100 million of higher salary and benefit costs than planned for enumerators in framework 3, including a higher workload for unanticipated recounts. According to recent bureau data, enumerator productivity did not have a significant impact on budget variances for the 2000 decennial census because the actual national average time to visit a household and complete a census questionnaire was about the 1 hour estimated by the bureau. Weaknesses in Key Internal Controls
For fiscal year 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau had significant internal control weaknesses that resulted in an inability to develop and report complete, accurate, and timely information for management decision- making. The specific control weaknesses for fiscal year 2000 were related to the lack of controls over financial reporting and financial management systems. Financial reporting issues included (1) the inability to produce accurate and timely financial statements and other financial management reports needed for oversight and day-to-day management, (2) the lack of timely and complete reconciliations needed to validate the balances of key accounts, and (3) unsupported and inaccurate reported balances for accounts payable and undelivered orders, two key accounts needed to manage and report on unliquidated obligations. | What GAO Found
In September 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau told Congress that it had at least $305 million in budget savings out of its $4.5 billion fiscal year 2000 no-year appropriations for the 2000 decennial census. Of the $4.5 billion appropriated to the U.S. Census Bureau in fiscal year 2000, lower-than-expected expenditures and obligations resulted in available balances of at least $415 million. A lower-than-expected support staff workload reduced salary and benefit costs by about $348 million. Enumerator workload is largely determined by the initial mail response rate for returned census questionnaires. The initial mail response of 64 percent meant that Census enumerators did not have to visit more than three million American households. However, the available balances from the higher mail response rate and the lower support staff workload were partially offset by about $100 million of higher salary and benefit costs for enumerators, including a higher workload for unanticipated recounts. According to Bureau data, enumerator productivity did not significantly affect budget variances for the 2000 decennial census. The Bureau reported the national average time to visit a household and complete a census questionnaire was about the one hour estimated. Because of significant internal control weaknesses, the Bureau was unable to develop and report complete, accurate, and timely information for managing decision-making. Specific control weaknesses for fiscal year 2000 were related to the lack of controls over financial reporting and financial management systems. Financial reporting issues included (1) the inability to produce accurate and timely financial statements and other financial management reports needed for oversight and day-to-day management; (2) the lack of timely and complete reconciliations needed to validate the balances of key accounts; and (3) unsupported and inaccurate reported balances for accounts payable and undelivered orders--two key accounts needed to manage and report on unliquidated obligations. |
gao_NSIAD-95-180 | gao_NSIAD-95-180_0 | Background
Backup aircraft account for about 35 percent of the Air Force’s and Navy/Marine Corps’ fighter/attack aircraft inventory. Operations and maintenance funds appropriated to support these aircraft are allocated based on the number of combat-designated aircraft, and the test and evaluation, and training aircraft in the backup force. The Bottom-Up Review specified 20 Air Force wings, 11 Navy air wings, and 4 Marine Corps air wings. Backup Aircraft Criteria
The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps used standard planning factors or percentages to determine the number of backup aircraft required to support the combat force. However, the Air Force operates and maintains those aircraft in the same manner as combat-designated aircraft. Attrition aircraft operating and maintenance costs are difficult to determine. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to (1) develop and use supportable and consistent criteria to justify backup aircraft inventories and future procurement of backup aircraft as the Navy is doing and (2) report the lack of valid backup fighter/attack aircraft requirements criteria as a material management weakness, in compliance with FMFIA, until these criteria are developed and put in use. DOD concurred with our description of the trends in the number of backup aircraft maintained by the services, but commented there were inaccuracies in the report, apparently referring to the process we describe that arrived at the specific number of combat-designated aircraft in the forces. Opportunities to Reduce the Number of Combat Aircraft Purchased for Noncombat Purposes (GAO Testimony, June 2, 1983). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the trend in the number of backup aircraft maintained by the Air Force and Navy, focusing on the: (1) actions that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken in response to prior recommendations to validate backup aircraft requirements; and (2) opportunities to remove unneeded backup aircraft from the force to minimize the cost of operating and maintaining combat-designated aircraft.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps operate and maintain about one backup aircraft for every two combat-designated fighter aircraft; (2) the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps will achieve the Bottom-Up Review's goals to reduce the size of the combat-designated aircraft forces by the end of fiscal year(FY) 1996; (3) the Air Force has not developed supportable plans for structuring and managing backup forces and justifying the procurement of backup aircraft; (4) realistic criteria are needed prior to the procurement of backup aircraft systems to prevent the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps from buying more aircraft than needed; and (5) if attrition aircraft in excess of short-term needs are stored until needed, the Air Force could reduce operation and maintenance costs. |
gao_GAO-13-539 | gao_GAO-13-539_0 | Table 1 lists the 23 qualifying countries. Titanium metals are important metals in the aircraft industry, in part because they are lightweight, strong, and corrosion resistant, making them common for use in structural airframe and jet engine components. As described above, when selling components to DOD, the specialty metals domestic source restriction limits the U.S. prime contractors’ and aircraft component manufacturers’ purchase of titanium to one of the U.S. or other qualifying country sources. U.S. and Foreign Titanium Price Differences Varied By Product Type
Census data from calendar years 2003 to 2012 show variations in U.S. and foreign produced titanium prices for ingot, bar, billet, and sheet. The import price of bar—used to make engine blade components—has consistently remained significantly lower than the export price over the last 8 years. While price differences between U.S. and foreign titanium can be large— for example, in 2005, Census bar import price was $25.02 per kilogram and export price more than twice that at $50.37 per kilogram—officials from prime contractors and aircraft component manufacturers told us that price differences have not been large enough to have a significant impact on the cost of a DOD aircraft. In addition, industry officials noted that U.S. produced titanium has been competitively priced relative to foreign produced titanium. U.S. Manufacturers Have the Majority of DOD’s Aircraft Component Business
DOD can either directly contract for aircraft components or contract with prime contractors that in turn buy them from component manufacturers. DOD awarded the majority of aircraft component contracts to U.S. manufacturers from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Factors Other Than Titanium Price Affect the Ability of U.S. Aircraft Component Manufacturers to Compete for DOD Business
Industry officials told us that prime contractors’ long term agreements, prime contractors’ approval of titanium producers, and industry consolidation—rather than titanium price—are major factors affecting the ability of U.S. aircraft component manufacturers to compete for DOD contracts. Prime contractors generally manage titanium sourcing decisions for their DOD component manufacturers through long term agreements for titanium that include pre-negotiated prices. In addition, many officials from aircraft component manufacturers identified industry consolidation as a factor that could affect their ability to compete. Lastly, many of the officials from DOD titanium aircraft component manufacturers that we spoke with identified consolidation between the titanium production and aircraft component manufacturing industries as affecting their ability to compete more than competition from manufacturers in qualifying countries that may have titanium pricing advantages. Thus, component manufacturers had relatively equal access to titanium producers. However, they have not yet seen the impact of industry consolidation on their companies. Agency and Third- Party Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, Commerce, Interior, and Labor for their review and comment. Interior provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. We determined that U.S. Census Foreign Trade Statistics titanium export and import values were the best available proxy for U.S. and foreign produced titanium prices. To identify qualifying country manufacturers’ market share of Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft component contracts, we analyzed available data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) from fiscal years 2008, the year DOD started collecting data on the use of the qualifying country exception, through 2012. To identify the factors that affect the ability of U.S. aircraft component manufacturers to compete for DOD contracts, we reviewed relevant industry studies and interviewed government and industry officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Titanium is used in airframe components and jet engines, in part because it provides greater strength at lower weight than other metals. It is produced in a number of shapes, including bars, billets, and sheets. By law, U.S. manufacturers are generally required to use U.S. produced titanium for DOD aircraft components, unless an exception applies. One exception allows companies in 23 "qualifying countries" to use foreign produced titanium when manufacturing aircraft components for DOD. There is concern that U.S. manufacturers are losing market share to qualifying country manufacturers that are able to use foreign produced titanium.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO assess the ability of U.S. aircraft component manufacturers to compete for DOD contracts. In this report, GAO assessed (1) available data on titanium prices, (2) available data on U.S. and foreign manufacturers' market share of DOD aircraft component contracts, and (3) the factors that affect the ability of U.S. aircraft component manufacturers to compete for DOD contracts. GAO reviewed Census foreign trade data, the best proxy for titanium prices; federal procurement data; and relevant industry studies; and interviewed a broad range of government and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Census data show that U.S. and foreign produced titanium prices varied from 2003 through 2012 depending on the product. For example, in 2012, the export price (the proxy for the U.S. price) for titanium bar--used to make engine blades--was higher than the import price (the proxy for the foreign price), while the export price for titanium sheet--used to make wing components--was less than the import price. Industry officials noted that these differences may be due to varying operating costs and titanium production capabilities in different countries and to titanium producers' negotiated agreements with prime contractors or aircraft component manufacturers.
U.S. aircraft component manufacturers receive the majority of Department of Defense (DOD) business, whether through direct purchases by the department or through purchases made by its prime contractors. Based on obligation of procurement money, 98 percent of DOD's purchases of aircraft components went to U.S. manufacturers from fiscal years 2008 to 2012. The remainder went to foreign manufacturers, primarily from qualifying countries. DOD prime contractors reported that over the past 10 years they have bought 70 to 100 percent of DOD titanium aircraft components from U.S. manufacturers.
Industry officials identified management of titanium sourcing and industry consolidation, rather than titanium price, as factors affecting competition between aircraft component manufacturers for DOD business. Prime contractors generally manage titanium sourcing decisions for their DOD component manufacturers through long term agreements and an approval process that often directs competing manufacturers to the same titanium source, thereby potentially reducing pricing advantages available to aircraft component manufacturers in qualifying countries. Many officials from aircraft component manufacturers also identified industry consolidation of the titanium producers and component manufacturers as a factor that could affect their access to titanium for DOD contracts, although they have not yet seen any adverse impacts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Agencies and third parties reviewed GAO's draft report and technical comments received were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-294 | gao_GAO-12-294_0 | Ex-Im Differs from the Other G-7 ECAs in Several Important Ways, Including Its Explicit Mission to Promote Domestic Employment
Ex-Im is different from other G-7 ECAs in several significant ways, including its mission, which is explicitly focused on creating domestic jobs through exports. As an independent government agency, Ex-Im’s governance and organization type differ from those of other ECAs, which range from government departments to private companies contracted by governments. Ex-Im Has Specific Mandates on Small Business and Environmentally Beneficial Exports where Other G-7 ECAs Have Broad Directives
Ex-Im receives mandates from Congress that include specific targets in the areas of small business and environmentally beneficial exports, whereas some other G-7 ECAs have been given broad directives to focus on these areas by their governments or ministries. Ex-Im Has Additional Mandates and Legal Requirements that Other ECAs Generally Do Not Have
Ex-Im has additional mandates and legal requirements that other ECAs generally do not. Requirement to ship certain exports on U.S.-flagged carriers. Other G-7 ECAs generally require between zero to 51 percent domestic content. Several ECAs have modified their policies in recent years, often citing the increasingly global content of industrial production as a primary reason for the change. While Ex-Im has modified its method for calculating the amount of domestic content in a transaction, its minimum threshold for receiving full financing for medium- and long-term transactions has not changed since 1987. However, Ex-Im has not conducted a systematic review of its policy in recent years to assess to what extent the overall impact of the policy is consistent with Ex-Im’s mission of supporting U.S. jobs. The OECD Arrangement Has Decreased Export Credit Subsidies, but the Increasing Importance of Nonmembers Threatens Its Future Effectiveness
While the scope of the OECD Arrangement has expanded to cover additional aspects of officially supported export credit terms among member ECAs, the increasing activities of nonmembers, particularly China, threaten the future ability of the agreement to provide a level playing field for exporters. However, these agreements apply only to officially supported activities of participant ECAs. Several countries, including Brazil, China, and India, have growing ECA financing activity but are not part of the Arrangement. Engagement with China and Other Emerging Economies Presents Challenges for the OECD Arrangement
According to officials from the OECD and several G-7 ECAs, engagement with emerging economies, especially China, on practices related to export credit financing is increasingly important and presents challenges for the OECD Arrangement and its participants. Treasury provided a statement concerning its full support of engaging market economy countries on export credit issues, but did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation. Ex-Im’s competitiveness reports have consistently identified its content policy as a major competitive barrier, with Ex-Im stating in its latest report, published in June 2011, that “Ex-Im Bank’s content requirements and implementation of those requirements are significantly more restrictive than those of its G-7 counterparts” and that “in cases where foreign content exceeds 15 percent Ex-Im Bank’s policy and practice can have a negative impact on U.S. competitiveness because it may deter exporters from using Ex-Im’s products.” Ex-Im reported that its exporters and lenders identified foreign content as their “most significant impediment to competitiveness.” In terms of changes made to Ex-Im’s policy over time, our report states that Ex-Im last changed its level of minimum domestic content required for receiving full financing for medium- and long-term transactions (85 percent) in 1987 and in 2001 changed its method for calculating the percentage of domestic content in a transaction. Treasury provided the following response: “Treasury fully supports and encourages emerging market economy countries with major medium/long-term export credit programs to join in discussions and agreements on export credit support, and is actively engaged in that endeavor.” We describe in the report that member countries, including the United States, have taken some steps within the OECD and beyond it to engage emerging market economy countries on export credit issues, and that the issue of export credits was raised at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a high-level forum between U.S. and Chinese government officials, including the Treasury Secretary. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) Ex-Im’s mission, organization, market orientation, and product offerings compared with those of other Group of Seven (G-7) export credit agencies (ECAs), (2) Ex-Im’s policy requirements compared with those of other G-7 ECAs, (3) Ex-Im’s domestic content policy compared with those of the other G-7 ECAs, and (4) the role of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Arrangement in governing ECA activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), the United States official export credit agency (ECA), helps U.S. firms export goods and services by providing a range of financial products. Ex-Im, whose primary mission is to support jobs through exports, has a range of policy requirements, including support of small business. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Arrangement governs aspects of U.S. and some foreign countries ECAs. GAO examined (1) Ex-Ims mission and organization compared with ECAs from other Group of Seven (G-7) countries (major industrialized countries that consult on economic issues), (2) Ex-Ims policy requirements compared with other G-7 ECAs, (3) Ex-Ims domestic content policy compared with other G-7 ECAs, and (4) the OECD Arrangements role in governing ECA activities.
What GAO Found
The United States and other G-7 countries have ECAs that support domestic exports, but Ex-Im differs from other ECAs in several important ways, including its explicit mission to promote domestic employment. The G-7 ECAs range from government agencies to private companies contracted by governments. Most of these ECAs, including Ex-Im, are expected to supplement, not compete with, the private market. Ex-Im offers direct loans, which were increasingly utilized during the recent financial crisis, while European ECAs do not.
Ex-Im has specific mandates in areas where other G-7 ECAs have broad directives. Ex-Im has specific mandates to support small business and environmentally beneficial exports, while other ECAs are broadly directed to support such exports. In addition, Ex-Im has other mandates and legal requirements, such as shipping certain exports on U.S.-flagged carriers and conducting economic impact assessments for large transactions, which other G-7 ECAs do not.
Ex-Ims requirements for the level of domestic content in the exports it fully finances are higher and generally less flexible than those of other G-7 ECAs. Ex-Im requires 85 percent domestic content for medium- and long-term transactions to receive full financing, while other ECAs domestic content requirements generally range between zero and 51 percent. Ex-Ims policy on supporting local costs can result in more foreign content support in some transactions. While Ex-Im has modified its method for calculating domestic content, its threshold for receiving full financing for medium- and long-term transactions has not changed since 1987, and the policy and its overall impact on jobs has not been studied systematically. Other ECAs have modified their policies in recent years, citing increasing global content of industrial production. In its charter, Ex-Im is directed to provide financing competitive with that of other ECAs, as well as to support U.S. jobs.
The OECD Arrangement has expanded to regulate additional aspects of officially supported export credits, but increasing activity of nonmembers threatens its ability to provide a level playing field for exporters. Several agreements have been made that decrease subsidies and increase transparency among ECAs. However, these agreements apply only to participant ECAs, and important emerging countries, including China, are not part of the Arrangement. Officials from several G-7 ECAs and other institutions identified effective engagement with these countries on export credit issues as being increasingly important and presenting challenges for the OECD Arrangement and its participants.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends (1) that Ex-Im conduct a systematic review to assess how well its domestic content policy continues to support Ex-Ims mission, and (2) that the Department of the Treasury, with Ex-Im and international counterparts, develop strategies for further engagement on export credit issues with emerging economy countries. Ex-Im stated it considers content policy in its annual competitiveness assessments, but did not comment directly on the recommendation. Treasury stated it supports encouraging emerging market economies participation concerning export credit issues and is engaged in that activity, but did not state whether it agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_HEHS-99-30 | gao_HEHS-99-30_0 | HCFA’s New Methodology Is Acceptable for Establishing Practice Expense Relative Values
HCFA’s new methodology is an acceptable approach for revising Medicare’s practice expense payments. The new methodology has much in common with HCFA’s original methodology. Further, the new methodology explicitly recognizes differences in practice expenses among specialties. Both used the CPEP data to identify the specific resources associated with individual procedures. Concerns About Data and Methodological Issues Can Be Addressed During the Phase-in Period
Even though HCFA used the best available data and developed a generally acceptable methodology for establishing practice expense RVUs, specific questions about both the data and methodology need to be reviewed and addressed, a position supported by virtually all the physicians’ groups we contacted. The data contain certain weaknesses such as small sample sizes. Assumptions and Adjustments in HCFA’s Methodology Need to Be Validated During Refinement
HCFA’s revised methodology includes certain assumptions and adjustments that were prompted by limitations in the available data relative to the difficult task of estimating and ranking practice expenses for thousands of medical procedures. HCFA found that the drug reimbursement significantly exceeded the supply costs that oncologists reported on the SMS. However, more data are needed to determine the appropriate adjustment. The Most Critical Issues Need to Be Identified and Addressed During the Phase-in Period
It is important that HCFA develop a plan for ensuring that the most critical issues associated with the new methodology and data are addressed first. HCFA has done little in the way of conducting such analyses and therefore does not know where to most effectively target its refinement efforts. Finally, it is essential that HCFA continue monitoring indicators of beneficiaries’ access to physicians’ care to determine whether access is compromised by changes to Medicare’s physician fee schedule payments. HCFA does not yet have a plan for identifying the issues that have the greatest effect on the new RVUs. Such monitoring is crucial to ensure that Medicare’s payments to physicians are adequate to maintain beneficiaries’ access to care. Recommendations
We recommend that the Administrator of HCFA
Use sensitivity analysis to identify issues with the methodology that have the greatest effect on the new practice expense RVUs and to target additional data collection and analysis efforts. Develop plans for updating the practice expense RVUs that address how to (1) assign practice expense RVUs to new codes, (2) revise the RVUs for existing codes, and (3) meet the legislative requirement for a comprehensive 5-year review of the resource-based practice expense RVUs. The legislation also required the adjustment of each component of the fee schedule to reflect geographic differences in costs, the elimination of specialty-specific payment differentials for providing the same procedure, the implementation of a process for calculating the annual payment update, and the establishment of volume performance standards to track changes in the volume or intensity of procedures Medicare pays for. Process to Refine the RVUs and Create New RVUs
Before the phase-in of the physician work RVUs could begin in 1992, HCFA had to create a process to both refine the existing values and create values for new procedure codes in the future. 2. Step 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) ongoing efforts to develop resource-based practice expense relative value units (RVUs), focusing on: (1) whether the new methodology is an acceptable approach for revising Medicare's fee schedule; (2) questions about the data, assumptions, and adjustments underlying the new methodology that need to be addressed during the 3-year phase-in period; and (3) the need for future updates to the practice expense RVUs to reflect changes in health care delivery and for ongoing assessments of the fee schedule's effect on Medicare beneficiaries' access to physicians' care.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HCFA's new methodology represents an acceptable approach for calculating RVUs; (2) HCFA relied on the best data available for creating the new values: (a) a nationally representative survey of physicians' practice costs; and (b) data developed by panels of experts that identify the specific resources associated with individual procedures; (3) HCFA's original and new proposals use these data in similar ways to create the new RVUs; (4) a critical difference is that the new methodology more directly recognizes the variation in practice expenses among physicians' specialities in computing the RVUs; (5) additionally, this methodology responds to several concerns GAO had with the original one; (6) while HCFA's new methodology is acceptable overall, certain questions about the data and underlying methodology need to be addressed before the new RVUs are completely phased in; (7) for example, the national practice expense survey database contains limited data for some specialties and may lead to imprecise estimates of their practice expenses; (8) for other specialities not included in the survey database, HCFA had to use proxy information, the appropriateness of which needs to be verified; (9) also, HCFA made certain assumptions and adjustments without confirming their reasonableness; (10) for example, HCFA adjusted the supply cost estimates for oncologists to avoid paying them twice for chemotherapy drugs but HCFA has not yet collected data to determine the appropriate size of the adjustment; (11) to address these issues, HCFA needs a strategy for refining the practice expense RVUs during the 3-year phase-in period that focuses on the data and methodology weaknesses that have the greatest effect on the RVUs; (12) however, HCFA has done little in the way of sensitivity analysis to effectively target its refinement efforts; (13) additionally, HCFA has not developed permanent processes for future updates and revisions to the practice expense RVUs as new procedures are developed or methods of performing existing procedures shift; and (14) finally, HCFA needs to continue monitoring beneficiaries' access to physicians' care to ensure that access is not compromised by past and ongoing changes to Medicare's payments to physicians. |
gao_GAO-08-956 | gao_GAO-08-956_0 | About Half of Individual Taxpayers with Rental Real Estate Activities Misreported, Often Because of Overstated or Unsubstantiated Expenses
Based on the unadjusted NRP results, at least an estimated 53 percent of taxpayers with rental real estate activity (about 4.8 million out of 8.9 million taxpayers) misreported their rental real estate activities for tax year 2001. Individual taxpayers misreported an estimated $12.4 billion of net income from rental real estate, before adjusting for tax gap purposes. IRS knows that it does not detect all misreporting during its examinations. After these adjustments, IRS estimated that the tax gap for rental real estate and royalty activities was $13 billion for tax year 2001. Other types of misreporting of expenses. Limited Information Reporting and Complexity Hinder Compliance, and Various Options Exist for Improving Compliance
Limited information reporting, complexity, and the number of taxpayers misreporting are challenges IRS faces in ensuring compliance with rental real estate reporting. Various Options Exist for Improving Rental Real Estate Reporting Compliance
Although as previously discussed, implementing broad, new third-party information reporting requirements for rental real estate activities is not practical, changing existing requirements is one of various options that could improve rental real estate reporting compliance. However, the law for filing information returns does not clearly spell out how to determine whether taxpayers’ rental real estate activity should be considered a trade or business, and IRS must make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Given the magnitude of misreporting for taxpayers who could not substantiate some rental real estate expenses they deducted, even small improvements in compliance could yield substantial revenue. Fourth, improving outreach efforts could also improve compliance. To elicit more accurate information from taxpayers on their rental real estate activities, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue require taxpayers to report on the individual tax return the basis amount attributed to land versus structure when depreciating rental real estate; determine if IRS uses property type information that taxpayers currently report on Schedule E in its efforts to enforce rental real estate reporting compliance, and if it is determined that IRS uses the information, the Commissioner should require taxpayers to provide specific information on Part I of Schedule E about the type of properties for which they are reporting activity, for example by answering a check-the-box question, and if it is determined that IRS does not use the information, the Commissioner should not require taxpayers to report any property type information; and require taxpayers to report the exact “address” of their rental real estate properties on Part I Schedule E instead of property “location,” as currently worded, and require taxpayers to report property zip codes. To enhance IRS’s outreach efforts, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue evaluate whether sending notices to some or all taxpayers who report rental real estate activity would be a cost-effective way to reduce misreporting of some types of rental real estate activity and expand outreach efforts to external stakeholders, such as paid tax return preparers, tax return preparation software providers, and industry groups related to rental real estate, to include common types of misreporting for rental real estate activity, such as those identified in this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To provide information on the extent and primary types of individual taxpayer misreporting of rental real estate activities, we relied on data and examination case files from the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) most recent National Research Program (NRP) study of individual taxpayers. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its most recent estimate of the tax gap, for tax year 2001, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated that individuals underreported taxes related to their rental real estate activities by as much as $13 billion. Given the magnitude of underreporting, even small improvements in taxpayer compliance could result in substantial revenue. GAO was asked to provide information on rental real estate reporting compliance. This report (1) provides information on the extent and primary types of taxpayer misreporting of rental real estate activities and (2) identifies challenges IRS faces in ensuring compliance and assesses options for increasing compliance. For estimates of taxpayer misreporting, GAO analyzed a probability sample of examination cases for tax year 2001 from IRS's most recent National Research Program (NRP) study of individual taxpayer compliance.
What GAO Found
At least an estimated 53 percent of individual taxpayers with rental real estate misreported their rental real estate activities for tax year 2001, resulting in an estimated $12.4 billion of net misreported income. This amount of misreporting is understated because IRS knows it does not detect all misreporting during its NRP examinations and adjusts the amount of misreporting it detects to estimate the tax gap. Also, the rate of misreporting of rental real estate activity was substantially higher than for some other sources of income, such as wages, a disparity that undermines the fairness of the tax system. Misreporting of rental real estate expenses was the most common type of rental real estate misreporting. Limited third-party information reporting for rental real estate activity is among the challenges IRS faces in ensuring compliance for rental real estate reporting. While information reporting, such as financial institutions sending information to IRS about taxpayers' mortgage interest payments, improves compliance, it is not practical to implement and enforce broad, new information reporting requirements for rental real estate activities. However, improving existing information reporting requirements is one of various options that could improve compliance. For example, based on current law, whether rental real estate property owners must file information returns for certain expenses they incur depends on whether the owners' rental activities are considered a trade or business, but the law does not define how to make this determination. Another approach to improving compliance is to require taxpayers to report additional detail about their rental real estate activities on tax returns. For example, requiring taxpayers to report complete property address information, which GAO found that some taxpayers did not report, could help IRS address misreporting. Requiring additional detail on tax returns could also compel paid tax return preparers, used by about 80 percent of individual taxpayers who report rental real estate activity, to obtain more accurate information from taxpayers. Enhanced IRS guidance, such as on required recordkeeping, and additional IRS outreach to paid preparers and others about rental real estate misreporting could also improve compliance. |
gao_GAO-09-466T | gao_GAO-09-466T_0 | The Secretary also directed MDA to manage the Ballistic Missile Defense System as an evolutionary program, and to develop and field increasingly effective ballistic missile defense capabilities. Key Management Challenges Have Not Been Fully Addressed
MDA’s exemption from traditional DOD processes allowed it the flexibility to quickly develop and field an initial ballistic missile defense capability; however, we have previously reported that DOD’s implementation of this approach has resulted in several management challenges that have not been fully addressed. These challenges include immature processes for incorporating combatant command priorities, inadequate baselines to measure progress, and incomplete planning for long-term operations and support. With the start of a new administration and the appointment of a new MDA Director, DOD now has an opportunity to better balance the flexibility inherent in MDA’s unique roles and missions with the need for effective management and oversight of ballistic missile defense programs, and to more fully address the challenges that affect its ability to plan and resource ballistic missile defenses. The process has not yet resulted in effective methodologies for the combatant commands to clearly identify and consistently prioritize their capability needs. Lacking such senior-level involvement, MDA has not benefited from receiving a broader perspective on which of the commands’ needs is the most significant. MDA’s Approach Limits Decision Makers’ Ability to Measure Progress on Cost, Schedule, and Testing, but New Initiatives Could Improve Acquisition Accountability
MDA’s approach to establishing baselines has limited the ability for DOD and congressional decision makers to measure MDA’s progress on cost, schedule, and testing; however, new DOD initiatives could help improve acquisition accountability. Planning for Long-Term Operations and Support Is Underway, But Efforts Are Incomplete
DOD has taken some initial steps to plan for long-term operations and support of ballistic missile defense operations, but planning efforts to date are incomplete because of difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from MDA to the services and in establishing operation and support cost estimates. DOD has not required that full cost estimates for ballistic missile defense operations and support be developed, validated, and reviewed. As a result, the Future Years Defense Plan—DOD’s 6-year spending plan—does not fully reflect these costs. Prior GAO work has shown that operations and support costs are typically 70 percent of a weapon’s life cycle costs. DOD Is Taking Actions to Establish Greater Oversight, but Obstacles Remain
DOD has recently taken some steps to improve oversight of the development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, such as the creation of both the Missile Defense Executive Board and its life cycle management process, but obstacles remain. For example, DOD’s actions do not yet provide comprehensive information for acquisition oversight; and have not yet clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of MDA and the services, including how defensewide accounts will be used to fund the ballistic missile defense program over the long term. Additionally, as DOD seeks to improve transparency and accountability, sustained top leadership will be needed to build upon this recent progress. One step the board has taken to improve transparency and accountability was its adoption of its life cycle management process, a process designed to clarify the ballistic missile defense roles of MDA, the services, combatant commands, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. While DOD has recently been taking positive steps to improve transparency and accountability for ballistic missile defense programs, long-term success will require sustained involvement by top DOD leadership. Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
To more quickly field ballistic missile defenses, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been exempted from traditional Department of Defense (DOD) requirements development, acquisition, and oversight processes since its creation in 2002. Instead, MDA has unique roles and missions to develop and field weapon systems that address a variety of ballistic missile threats. To date, MDA has spent about $56 billion and plans to spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System. The system consists of a layered network of capabilities that includes defensive components such as sensors, radars, interceptors, and command and control. In reviews of DOD's approach to acquire, operate, and maintain ballistic missile defense systems, GAO has previously reported on several challenges that have stemmed from the broad flexibilities provided to MDA. This testimony summarizes the challenges facing DOD in acquiring and operating its ballistic missile defense systems and describes DOD's efforts to improve transparency and accountability. This statement is based primarily on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed key officials to update past work and identify DOD and MDA efforts to address previous recommendations.
What GAO Found
While MDA's exemption from traditional DOD processes allowed it to quickly develop and field an initial ballistic missile defense capability, this approach has led to several challenges. DOD now has an opportunity to better balance the flexibility inherent in MDA's unique roles with the need for effective management and oversight of ballistic missile defense programs. Furthermore, the start of a new administration and the appointment of a new MDA Director offer DOD the chance to more fully address the challenges identified in GAO's prior work. These include the following: (1) Incorporating Combatant Command Priorities: While DOD established a process in 2005 to address the combatant commands' needs for ballistic missile defense capabilities, GAO reported in 2008 that the process was evolving and had yet to overcome key limitations to its effectiveness, including the need for more effective methodologies to clearly identify and prioritize the combatant commands' needs. Additionally, when developing ballistic missile defenses, MDA lacked a departmentwide perspective on which of the commands' needs were most significant. (2) Establishing Adequate Baselines to Measure Progress: MDA's flexible acquisition approach has limited the ability for DOD and congressional decision makers to measure MDA's progress on cost, schedule, and testing. Specifically, as GAO reported in March 2009, MDA's baselines have been inadequate to measure progress and hold MDA accountable. However, GAO also reported that new MDA initiatives to improve baselines could help improve acquisition accountability. (3) Planning for Long-Term Operations and Support: DOD has taken initial steps to plan for ballistic missile defense support, but efforts to date are incomplete as difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from MDA to the services have complicated long-term planning. Additionally, although operation and support costs are typically 70 percent of a weapon system's life cycle costs, DOD has not required that full cost estimates for ballistic missile defense operations and support be developed and validated, and DOD's 6-year spending plan does not fully reflect these costs. DOD has recently taken some steps to improve transparency and accountability of ballistic missile defense programs, such as the creation of a Missile Defense Executive Board to provide top level oversight and a life cycle management process that established defensewide funding accounts. Although these are positive steps, they do not yet provide comprehensive information for acquisition oversight; and have not yet clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of MDA and the services, including how the defensewide account will be used to fund the ballistic missile defense program over the long term. As DOD seeks to improve transparency and accountability, sustained top leadership will be needed to build upon this recent progress. |
gao_GAO-10-1033 | gao_GAO-10-1033_0 | Background
The Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are responsible for enforcing many of the country’s most comprehensive federal labor laws ranging from occupational health and safety to minimum wage, overtime pay, and the rights of employees to bargain collectively with their employers. Federal Government Awards Contracts to Companies with Wage Assessments and Health and Safety Citations
The federal government has awarded contracts to companies that had been cited for large back-wage liabilities by Labor. Restricting our analysis to the 50 largest WHD assessments from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, we found that over 60 percent of these assessments were made against companies that subsequently received contracts in fiscal year 2009. Specifically, we found that 25 out of the 50 largest WHD assessments were charged to 20 federal contractors. According to FPDS-NG, the federal government awarded over $9 billion in federal contract obligations to these 20 contractors during fiscal year 2009. Further, we do not know the extent, if any, that contracting officers considered WHD assessments in the awarding of the federal contracts. The federal government has also awarded contracts to companies that Labor has assessed large fines against for violating health and safety regulations. From our analysis of the 50 largest OSHA fines for health and safety violations for closed investigations from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, we found that almost 40 percent of these fines were made against companies that subsequently received federal contracts in fiscal year 2009. Specifically, we found that 8 of the 50 largest OSHA fines were made against 7 other federal contractors for safety violations. Currently, the inspection databases maintained by OSHA, WHD, and NLRB do not contain DUNS numbers for all their cases. As such, the full extent of the federal government’s contracts awarded to companies with wage, health and safety, and collective bargaining violations is unknown. Examples of Federal Contractors That Were Cited for Violating Federal Labor Laws
Each of the 15 companies we reviewed were cited for failing to follow wage, health and safety, or collective bargaining laws enforced by WHD, OSHA, and NLRB, respectively. Seven of these companies also had other types of violations, such as hiring undocumented workers, violating environmental standards, fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid, and billing for services not rendered. According to FPDS-NG, these 15 companies received over $6 billion in federal contract obligations in fiscal year 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2009, the federal government obligated over $500 billion on government contracts. Some in Congress are concerned that private companies may be awarded federal contracts even though they had been cited for violating federal laws that are meant to ensure that employees receive proper wages, have the right to bargain collectively, and are not subject to work-site hazards. GAO was asked to (1) investigate the extent to which companies that received federal contracts during fiscal year 2009 had been assessed the 50 largest monetary penalties for closed inspections of occupational safety, health, and wage regulations for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, and (2) develop case studies of federal contractors that have been assessed occupational safety, health, wage, and collective bargaining penalties. To perform this work, GAO obtained and analyzed concluded wage and health and safety inspections from the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for fiscal years 2005 to 2009. GAO also obtained labor union organization and bargaining violations from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). To determine the value of contracts awarded to GAO's case-study companies, GAO analyzed Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data for fiscal year 2009
What GAO Found
The federal government awarded contracts to companies that previously had been cited for violating wage regulations enforced by WHD and health and safety regulations enforced by OSHA. GAO did not evaluate whether federal agencies considered or should have considered these violations in the awarding of federal contracts, thus no conclusions on that topic can be drawn from this analysis. Of the 50 largest WHD wage assessments during fiscal years 2005 through 2009, 25 wage assessments were made against 20 companies that received federal contracts in fiscal year 2009. From GAO's analysis of OSHA data, GAO also found that 8 of the 50 largest workplace health and safety penalties assessed during the same time frame of fiscal years 2005 through 2009 were assessed against 7 other companies that received federal contracts in fiscal year 2009. Because OSHA and WHD databases do not contain Data Universal Numbering System numbers, GAO's analysis was limited to the 50 largest WHD assessments and OSHA penalties, which GAO manually searched. Because of this, the full extent of the federal government's contracts awarded to companies cited for labor violations is not known. GAO investigated 15 federal contractors cited for violating federal labor laws enforced by WHD, OSHA, and NLRB. The federal government awarded these 15 federal contractors over $6 billion in government contract obligations during fiscal year 2009. Several of these companies also had other types of violations, such as hiring undocumented workers, violating environmental standards, and fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid. |
gao_GAO-17-130 | gao_GAO-17-130_0 | PHMSA, through its Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, regulates shippers and railroads transporting hazardous materials by rail and other modes. Immediate hazards to health. Risks of fire or explosion. 7. Selected Railroads Carry the ERG and Train Documents; Responders Use This Information and Additional Sources to Determine How to Take Action
All Selected Railroads Told Us They Carry the ERG, While Some Also Carry Supplemental Information
Selected railroads typically carry two sources of emergency response information—the train documents and the ERG—to meet the emergency response information requirements in federal regulations. According to FRA and PHMSA officials, the ERG’s use is not required by regulation, but is viewed by the rail industry as a national standard for emergency response information requirements. Our review of selected train documents showed that the selected railroads included this information in their train documents. This information includes a basic description of each hazardous material being transported on that train, including the identification number and proper shipping name, as well as an emergency response telephone number, which is provided by the shipper of the regulated hazardous material (see fig. Six of the 7 Class I railroads and 5 of the 11 selected Class II and III railroads included this supplemental information in their trains’ documents. According to Emergency Response Stakeholders, Emergency Responders Primarily Use the Train Documents and the ERG in the First 30 Minutes of a Rail Incident before Obtaining More Specific Emergency Response Information
According to the four emergency response associations we spoke to, when responding to a rail accident involving hazardous materials, emergency responders primarily rely on information from the train documents and the ERG during the first 30 minutes. The NTSB report on the Paulsboro, New Jersey, incident highlighted inconsistencies between recommended evacuation distances in the supplemental emergency response information in the train documents and the ERG for two of the hazardous materials on the train, chlorine and vinyl chloride. NTSB provided a technical comment about AAR’s response to their recommendation to revise discrepancies between emergency response information found in AAR’s database and the ERG, which we incorporated. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) what emergency response information is carried on trains by selected railroads that transport hazardous materials and how responders use it and (2) how the supplemental emergency response information carried on trains of these railroads compares to the information in the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG). We selected seven Class II and seven Class III railroads that carry hazardous materials and are ASLRRA members, using PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety Incident Reports Database and a member list provided by ASLRRA. We determined that the supplemental emergency response information associated with the sample of hazardous materials in the reviewed train documents from the 10 railroads was reliable for the purposes of our report and objectives because all of the information came from the AAR Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2012, a train derailed in Paulsboro, New Jersey, releasing about 20,000 gallons of vinyl chloride, a hazardous material. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found, among other issues, that the supplemental information in the train's documents on responding to emergencies involving vinyl chloride was inconsistent with and less protective than emergency response guidance in the ERG . Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to evaluate the differences between the emergency response information carried by trains transporting hazardous materials and the ERG guidance. This report examines (1) what emergency response information is carried on trains by selected railroads transporting hazardous materials and how responders use it, and (2) how selected railroads' supplemental emergency response information compares to information in the ERG .
GAO reviewed the ERG and other relevant literature and met with DOT and NTSB officials, among others. GAO interviewed all 7 larger Class I railroads and 11 smaller Class II and III railroads that carried hazardous materials in 2015. GAO compared the supplemental emergency response information with ERG information for 72 frequently shipped hazardous materials from a nonprobability sample of train documents provided by 10 of the 18 selected railroads.
What GAO Found
To help emergency responders safely handle rail accidents involving hazardous materials, selected railroads transporting hazardous materials typically carry two sources of information: the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Emergency Response Guidebook ( ERG ) and information in the trains' documents. Federal Hazardous Material Regulations require railroads and other hazardous material transporters to carry emergency response information that describes immediate hazards to health and risks of fire or explosion, among other things. Representatives from all 18 railroads GAO interviewed told us that they carry the ERG on their trains. According to DOT officials, the ERG's use is not required by regulation, but the rail industry views it as a national standard for emergency response information. Our review of selected train documents showed that they always have a basic description of each hazardous material being transported, including the identification number and proper shipping name, as well as an emergency response telephone number. Six of the 7 Class I railroads and 5 of the 11 selected Class II and III railroads also included emergency response information in these documents. According to four emergency response associations, in the first 30 minutes after a rail incident, emergency responders primarily use the train documents to locate and identify hazardous materials and use the ERG to identify potential response actions.
ERG differed from the supplemental emergency response information which is provided by the Association of American Railroads' (AAR) Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Database. AAR decided in August 2016 to discontinue the database, removing the potential for discrepancies between the ERG and the supplemental emergency response information from AAR going forward.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. DOT and NTSB provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated. |
gao_GAO-12-147 | gao_GAO-12-147_0 | Among other things, ASC is responsible for (1) monitoring and reviewing the practices, procedures, activities, and organizational structure of the Appraisal Foundation—including making grants to the Foundation in amounts that it deems appropriate to help defray costs associated with its Title XI activities; (2) monitoring the requirements established by the states and their appraiser regulatory agencies for the certification and licensing of appraisers; (3) monitoring the requirements established by the federal financial institutions regulators regarding appraisal standards for federally related transactions and determinations of which federally related transactions will require the services of state-licensed or - certified appraisers; and (4) maintaining a national registry of state- licensed and -certified appraisers who may perform appraisals in connection with federally related transactions. Among other responsibilities and authorities, the Dodd-Frank Act requires ASC to implement a national appraiser complaint hotline and provides ASC with limited rulemaking authority. Several Weaknesses Have Potentially Limited ASC’s Effectiveness in Performing Its Title XI Functions
ASC has been performing its monitoring role under Title XI, but several weaknesses have potentially limited its effectiveness. As of October 2011, ASC had completed several tasks that required no rulemaking or creation of new programs and was in various stages of progress on the others. ASC has not fully addressed this requirement but has researched how other agencies operate hotlines and make complaint referrals. These included giving appraisers a central place to report when they feel they are being pressured, providing a conduit to forward complaints to appropriate entities, promoting the development of more uniform complaint and complaint follow-up procedures, and providing ASC with information that could be useful for its state and appraiser enforcement efforts. For example, some state appraiser regulatory agencies report to other agencies that control budget and policy decisions. According to ASC officials, revenue from registry fees allowed ASC to carry out its Title XI responsibilities and accumulate approximately $6 million in reserves by fiscal year 2008. Most Recent Mortgages Were Below the Threshold for Appraisal Exemption, and Stakeholder Views on the Threshold Vary
Our analysis of HMDA data found that approximately 71 percent of first- lien mortgages for single-family (one- to four-unit) homes originated from calendar years 2006 through 2009 were less than or equal to $250,000— the regulatory threshold at or below which appraisals are not required for federally related transactions. Despite the sizable proportion of residential mortgages at or below $250,000, the threshold has had limited impact in recent years on the percentage of mortgages with an appraisal because mortgage lenders, investors, and insurers generally require them for mortgages, regardless of amount. However, whether the private market will require appraisals for mortgages below the threshold is unclear at this time. A few of these stakeholders stated that lowering the threshold would potentially require more homebuyers to pay for appraisals, which are generally more expensive than other valuation methods. appraisal industry participant said that lower thresholds could subject more real estate-related transactions for which an appraisal is not necessary to appraisal requirements. First, ASC could improve how it assesses and reports on states’ overall compliance with Title XI. The limited rulemaking and enhanced enforcement authorities the act provides to ASC address prior weaknesses in its ability to promote states’ compliance with Title XI. To help address these challenges, ASC has for the first time undertaken a strategic planning process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure effective implementation of ASC’s Title XI and Dodd- Frank Act responsibilities and improve compliance with federal internal control standards, we recommend that the Chairman of ASC direct the ASC board and staff to take the following three actions: clarify the definitions used to categorize states’ overall compliance with Title XI and include them in ASC’s compliance review and policy and procedures manuals, compliance review reports to states, and annual reports to Congress; develop specific policies and procedures for monitoring the appraisal requirements of the federal financial institutions regulators and include them in ASC’s policy and procedures manual; and develop specific criteria for assessing whether the grant activities of the Appraisal Foundation are Title XI-related and include these criteria in ASC’s policy and procedures manual. FHFA and HUD did not provide comments on the draft report. In their written comments, ASC, NCUA, and OCC agreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act) requires GAO to examine the Appraisal Subcommittee’s (ASC) ability to carry out its functions, as well as related issues, including regulatory exemptions to appraisal requirements, state disciplinary actions against appraisers, and the extent to which a national appraisal repository would benefit ASC. Our objectives were to examine (1) how ASC is performing its functions under Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) that existed prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, (2) ASC’s plans and actions to implement provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, and (3) analysis and stakeholder views on existing dollar-based exemptions to appraisal requirements for federally related transactions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Real estate appraisals have come under increased scrutiny in the wake of the recent mortgage crisis. Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 created an oversight structure for appraisals and appraisers that involves state, federal, and private entities. This structure includes ASC, a federal agency responsible for monitoring these entities’ Title XI-related activities. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) expanded ASC’s Title XI role and required GAO to examine ASC’s activities and exemptions to federal appraisal requirements. This report discusses (1) how ASC is carrying out its original Title XI responsibilities, (2) ASC’s actions and plans to implement Dodd-Frank Act provisions, and (3) regulatory dollar thresholds for determining when an appraisal is required. To do this work, GAO reviewed ASC records and reports, surveyed state appraiser regulatory agencies, analyzed government mortgage data, and interviewed industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) has been performing its monitoring role under Title XI, but several weaknesses have potentially limited its effectiveness. For example, Title XI did not originally provide ASC rulemaking and enforcement tools that could be useful in promoting state compliance. In addition, ASC has not reported or clearly defined the criteria it uses to assess states’ overall compliance levels. Title XI charges ASC with monitoring the appraisal requirements of the federal financial institutions regulators, but ASC has not defined the scope of this function—for example, by developing policies and procedures—and its monitoring activities have been limited. ASC also lacks specific policies for determining whether activities of the Appraisal Foundation (a private nonprofit organization that sets criteria for appraisals and appraisers) that are funded by ASC grants are Title XI-related. Not having appropriate policies and procedures is inconsistent with federal internal control standards designed to promote effectiveness and efficiency and limits the accountability and transparency of ASC’s activities.
ASC faces potential resource and planning challenges in implementing some Dodd-Frank Act provisions. ASC has only 10 staff and is funded by appraiser registration fees that totaled $2.8 million in fiscal year 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act expands ASC’s responsibilities and authorities. For example, the act requires ASC to establish a national appraiser complaint hotline and provide grants to state appraiser regulatory agencies, and it gives ASC limited rulemaking and enhanced enforcement authorities to help address prior weaknesses. As of October 2011, ASC had completed several implementation tasks that required no rulemaking or creation of new programs and was in various stages of progress on the others. The potentially resource-intensive nature of some remaining tasks will require careful planning. For example, operating a complaint hotline may require investments in information technology and the creation of screening and follow-up procedures. Also, implementing a grant program will require ASC to set aside funds, develop funding criteria, and oversee grantees. ASC is in the process of developing a strategic plan to help carry out these efforts with available resources.
GAO found that more than 70 percent of residential mortgages made from 2006 through 2009 were $250,000 or less—the regulatory threshold at or below which appraisals are not required for transactions involving federally regulated lenders. In recent years, however, the threshold has had a limited impact on the proportion of mortgages with appraisals because mortgage investors and insurers such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration have generally required appraisals for mortgages both above and below the threshold. While these entities currently dominate the mortgage market, federal plans to scale them back could lead to a more privatized market, and whether this market would impose similar requirements is not known. None of the appraisal industry stakeholders GAO spoke with argued for increasing the threshold. Some stakeholders said the threshold should be lowered or eliminated, citing potential benefits to risk management and consumer protection. Others noted potential downsides to lowering the threshold, such as requiring more borrowers to pay appraisal fees and requiring appraisals on more transactions for which cheaper and quicker valuation methods may be sufficient.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure effective implementation of ASC’s original Title XI and additional Dodd-Frank Act responsibilities, ASC should clarify and report the criteria it uses to assess states’ overall compliance with Title XI and develop specific policies and procedures for its other monitoring functions. GAO provided a draft of this report to ASC and seven other agencies. ASC and two other agencies agreed with the report’s recommendations. One agency did not comment on the recommendations, and the others did not provide written comments. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-240 | gao_T-AIMD-00-240_0 | H.R. 4401: The Health Care Infrastructure Investment Act of 2000
H.R. 4401 would establish a Health Care Infrastructure Commission within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to design, construct, and implement an immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system that would initially be used by the Medicare part B program.This system would (1) immediately advise each provider and supplier of coverage determination; (2) immediately notify each provider and supplier of any incomplete or invalid claims, including the identification of missing data and coding errors; (3) immediately process clean claimsso that a provider or supplier may provide a written explanation of medical benefits, including costs and coverage to any beneficiary at the point of care; and (4) allow electronic payment of claims for which payment is not made on a periodic payment basis. 4401 would affect FEHBP—the federal government’s health benefits program for employees and retirees—which is run by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). H.R. 4401 calls for the establishment of an advanced informational infrastructure for “ederal health benefits programs which consists of an immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system . Actions to Minimize Risks Necessary Before Developing an Immediate Claim, Administration, Payment Resolution, and Data Collection System
While the development of an immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system to be used by the Medicare part B program might be feasible, it would significantly change the government’s current processes because it would require the real-time processing of certain elements of the claims process that are currently performed in batch mode or manually.In the abstract, a real-time Medicare part B claims process could be achievable if appropriate systems development policies and techniques are used. H.R. Developing a Single Real-Time Claims Processing System for Both Medicare Part B and FEHBP Would Be Challenging
Because Medicare part B and FEHBP are substantially different programs, it would be difficult to design and implement a single system to process claims under both programs, as called for by H.R. 4401 requires that (1) OPM adapt the immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system for use by the FEHBP and (2) carriers participating in FEHBP use the system to satisfy certain minimum requirements for claim submission, processing, and payment. Although all plans offer inpatient hospital and outpatient medical coverage as well as certain OPM-required services, specific benefits vary. These differences would make it challenging and costly to design and implement a real-time claims processing system for both programs. If a real-time claims processing system is to be developed, as envisioned by the bill, consideration should be given to including key HCFA and carrier officials with health care claims processing, program integrity, and financial management expertise on the commission. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Health Care Infrastructure Investment Act of 2000 (H.R. 4401), which calls for the development of an immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system, focusing on the: (1) effects of the system on the claims process of both the Medicare part B program and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP); and (2) the role and composition of a proposed Health Care Infrastructure Commission.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) H.R. 4401 would establish an Infrastructure Commission within the Department of Health and Human Services to design, construct, and implement an immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system that would initially be used by the Medicare part B program; (2) this system would: (a) immediately notify each provider and supplier of coverage determination; (b) immediately notify each provider and supplier of any incomplete or invalid claims, including the identification of missing data and coding errors; (c) immediately process clean claims so that a provider or supplier may provide a written explanation of medical benefits, including costs and coverage to any beneficiary at the point of care; and (d) allow electronic payment of claims for which payment is not made on a periodic payment basis; (3) one outcome of developing an immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system would be faster Medicare part B claims payments; (4) while the development of an immediate claim, administration, payment, resolution, and data collection system to be used by the Medicare part B program might be feasible, it would significantly change the government's current processes because it would require the real-time processing of certain elements of the claims process that are performed in batch mode or manually; (5) H.R. 4401 would also affect FEHBP, which is run by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); (6) H.R. 4401 requires that: (a) OPM adapt the immediate claim, administration, payment resolution, and data collection system for use by the FEHBP; and (b) carriers participating in FEHBP use the system to satisfy certain minimum requirements for claim submission, processing, and payment; (7) because Medicare part B and FEHBP are substantially different programs, it would be difficult to design and implement a single system to process claims under both programs, as called for by H.R. 4401; (8) although all health plans offer inpatient hospital and outpatient medical coverage as well as certain OPM-required services, specific benefits vary; (9) these differences would make it challenging and costly to design and implement a real-time claims processing system for both programs; and (10) if a real-time claims processing system is to be developed, consideration should be given to including key Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and carrier officials with health care claims processing, program integrity, and financial management expertise on the Infrastructure Commission, as well as OPM and providers, since the system would affect HCFA, OPM, and the providers. |
gao_GAO-08-964T | gao_GAO-08-964T_0 | Ineffective Program Eligibility Controls Enabled GAO to Obtain HUBZone Certification for Bogus Firms
Our proactive testing found ineffective HUBZone program eligibility controls, exposing the federal government to fraud and abuse. For the principal office address, our investigators used a Starbucks coffee store located in a HUBZone. Selected HUBZone Firms Do Not Meet Program Eligibility Requirements
We were also able to identify 10 firms from the Washington, D.C., metro area that were participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly did not meet eligibility requirements. Since 2006, federal agencies have obligated a total of more than $105 million to these firms for performance as the prime contractor on federal contracts. Of the 10 firms, 6 did not meet both the principal office and employee residency requirements while 4 met the principal office requirement but significantly failed the employee residency requirement. We also found other HUBZone firms that use virtual office suites to fulfill SBA’s principal office requirement. We investigated two of these virtual office suites and identified examples of firms that could not possibly meet principal office requirements given the nature of their leases. Further, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires all prospective contractors to update ORCA— the government’s Online Representations and Certifications Application— which includes certifying whether the firm is currently a HUBZone firm and that there have been “no material changes in ownership and control, principal office, or HUBZone employee percentage since it was certified by the SBA.” However, we found that all 10 of these case-study firms continued to represent themselves to SBA, ORCA, GAO, and the general public as eligible to participate in the HUBZone program. Case 1: Our investigation clearly showed that this firm represented itself as HUBZone-eligible even though it did not meet HUBZone requirements at the time of our investigation. Our site visits to the address identified by the firm as its principal office found that it was a small room that had been rented on the upper floor of a dentist’s office where no more than two people could work comfortably. No employees were present, and the only business equipment in the rented room was a computer and filing cabinet. The building owner stated that the president of the firm used to conduct some business from the office, but that nobody had worked there “for some time.” Moreover, the president indicated that instead of paying rent at the HUBZone location, she provided accounting services to the owner at a no-cost exchange for use of the space. Our site visit determined this location to be where the firm’s president and all qualifying employees worked. For example: One HUBZone firm that claimed its principal office was a virtual office address had a lease agreement providing only mail-forwarding services. They were concerned about the vulnerabilities to fraud and abuse we identified. They were also open to suggestions to improve fraud prevention controls over the HUBZone application process, such as performing steps to identify addresses of virtual office suites and mailboxes rented from postal retail centers. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To proactively test whether the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) controls over the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) application process were operating effectively, we applied for HUBZone certification using bogus firms, fictitious employees, fabricated explanations, and counterfeit documents to determine whether SBA would certify firms based on fraudulent information. We selected 16 for further investigation based on indications that they either failed to operate a principal office in a HUBZone or ensure that at least 35 percent of employees resided in a HUBZone, or both. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program is intended to provide federal contracting opportunities to qualified small business firms in order to stimulate development in economically distressed areas. As manager of the HUBZone program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) is responsible for certifying whether firms meet HUBZone program requirements. To participate in the HUBZone program, small business firms must certify that their principal office (i.e., the location where the greatest number of employees work) is located in a HUBZone and that at least 35 percent of the firm's employees live in HUBZones. Given the Committee's concern over fraud and abuse in the HUBZone program, GAO was asked to (1) proactively test whether SBA's controls over the HUBZone application process were operating effectively to limit program certification to eligible firms and (2) identify examples of selected firms that participate in the HUBZone program even though they do not meet eligibility requirements. To perform its proactive testing, GAO created four bogus businesses with fictitious owners and employees and applied for HUBZone certification. GAO also selected 17 HUBZone firms based on certain criteria, such as receipt of HUBZone contracts, and investigated whether they met key program eligibility requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO identified substantial vulnerabilities in SBA's application and monitoring process, clearly demonstrating that the HUBZone program is vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Considering the findings of a related report and testimony issued today, GAO's work shows that these vulnerabilities exist because SBA does not have an effective fraud-prevention program in place. Using fictitious employee information and fabricated documentation, GAO easily obtained HUBZone certification for four bogus firms. For example, to support one HUBZone application, GAO claimed that its principal office was the same address as a Starbucks coffee store that happened to be located in a HUBZone. If SBA had performed a simple Internet search on the address, it would have been alerted to this fact. Further, two of GAO's applications used leased mailboxes from retail postal services centers. A post office box clearly does not meet SBA's principal office requirement. We were also able to identify 10 firms from the Washington, D.C., metro area that were participating in the HUBZone program even though they clearly did not meet eligibility requirements. Since 2006, federal agencies have obligated a total of more than $105 million to these 10 firms for performance as the prime contractor on federal contracts. Of the 10 firms, 6 did not meet both principal office and employee residency requirements while 4 met the principal office requirements but significantly failed the employee residency requirement. For example, one firm that failed both principal office and employee residency requirements had initially qualified for the HUBZone program using the address of a small room above a dentist's office. GAO's site visit to this room found only a computer and filing cabinet. No employees were present, and the building owner told GAO investigators that nobody had worked there "for some time." During its investigation, GAO also found that some HUBZone firms used virtual office suites to fulfill SBA's principal office requirement. GAO investigated two of these virtual office suites and identified examples of firms that could not possibly meet principal office requirements given the nature of their leases. For example, one firm continued to certify it was a HUBZone firm even though its lease only provided mail forwarding services at the virtual office suite. |
gao_GAO-02-614 | gao_GAO-02-614_0 | DOD officials have identified eight encroachment issues of concern. These problems are expected to increase over time. Examples of How Encroachment Is Affecting Training Capabilities
We visited four installations and two major commands and found that each has lost some capability in terms of (1) the time training ranges were available or (2) the types of activities that could be conducted. Impact of Encroachment on Readiness and Training Costs Is Not Well Reflected in DOD’s Reported Data
Service readiness data do not indicate to what extent encroachment has significantly affected training readiness or costs, even though officials in congressional testimonies and other forums cited examples of encroachment at times preventing the services from training as they would like to. At the same time, fully assessing the impact may be difficult because the services lack information on (1) their training range requirements and (2) the training range assets available to support these requirements. However, the services have not documented the overall impact of encroachment on training costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
While the Congress considers the department’s legislative proposals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) require the services to develop and maintain inventories of their training ranges, capacities, and capabilities, and fully quantify their training requirements considering complementary approaches to training; (2) create a DOD data base that identifies all ranges available to the department and what they offer, regardless of service ownership, so that commanders can schedule the best available resources to provide required training; (3) finalize a comprehensive plan for administrative actions that includes goals, timelines, projected costs, and a clear assignment of responsibilities for managing and coordinating the department’s efforts to address encroachment issues on military training ranges; and (4) develop a reporting system for range sustainability issues that will allow for the elevation of critical training problems and progress in addressing them to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council for inclusion in Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress as appropriate. Appendix II: Membership of DOD Encroachment-Related Groups
Appendix III: DOD’s Draft Sustainable Ranges Action Plans for Addressing Encroachment Issues
Between June 2000 and November 2001, DOD drafted sustainable ranges action plans for addressing range sustainability issues associated with endangered species habitat on military installations, environmental legislation covering unexploded ordnance and munitions, competition for the radio frequency spectrum, protected marine resources, competition for airspace, air pollution, noise pollution, and urban growth around military installations. | What GAO Found
Senior Department of Defense (DOD) and military service officials have testified that they face increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic training at military installations. There are eight "encroachment" issues that affect or have the potential to affect military training and readiness. The eight encroachment issues are: endangered species habitat on military installations, unexploded ordnance and munitions constituents, competition for radio frequency spectrum, protected marine resources, competition for airspace, air pollution, noise pollution, and urban growth around military installations. Whenever possible, the services work around these issues by modifying the timing, tempo, and location of training, as well as the equipment used. However, these workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and they compromise the realism essential to effective training. Over time, the military services report they have increasingly lost training range capabilities because of encroachment. Each of the four installations and two major commands GAO visited reported having lost some capabilities in terms of the time training ranges were available or the types of training that could be conducted. Higher-than-average population growth around installations makes further encroachment losses likely. Despite the loss of some capabilities, service readiness data do not indicate the extent to which encroachment has significantly affected reported training readiness. Although encroachment workarounds may affect costs, the services have not documented the overall impact of encroachment on training costs. The services face difficulties in fully assessing the impact of training ranges on readiness because they have not fully defined their training range requirements and lack information on the training resources available to support those requirements. DOD officials recognize the need for a comprehensive plan of administrative actions and legislative proposals to address encroachment issues but have not yet finalized a plan for doing so. |
gao_GAO-09-78 | gao_GAO-09-78_0 | Marine mammals can become entangled in fishing equipment such as nets or hooks, although specific threats vary by the fishing techniques used. NMFS officials said that funding constraints limit their ability to gather sufficient data, although the agency has taken steps to identify its data needs. Under the MMPA, marine mammal species are treated as stocks—populations located in a common area that interbreed when mature. NMFS Has Not Established Teams for Many Marine Mammals That Have Met the Statutory Requirements of the MMPA for a Variety of Reasons
On the basis of NMFS’s available information, we identified 30 marine mammal stocks that met the MMPA’s requirements for establishing a team, and NMFS has established six teams that cover 16 of them. NMFS has not established teams for the 14 other marine mammals that have met the MMPA’s requirements for establishing a team for several reasons: (1) the agency lacked sufficient funds to establish a team, (2) information about the stock’s population size or mortality is outdated or incomplete and the agency lacks funds to obtain better information, (3) commercial fisheries account for little or no incidental take, or (4) the population size is increasing; therefore establishing a team for the stock is a lower priority. False killer whales found in the waters off the Hawaiian Islands have met the MMPA’s requirements for establishing a team since 2004 because the stock has been strategic and interacts with a Category I longline fishery. Outdated or incomplete data. However, NMFS did not meet the statutory deadlines for establishing three teams—the Atlantic Large Whale, Pelagic Longline, and Bottlenose Dolphin. Bottlenose Dolphin: NMFS lacked information about population size and mortality for bottlenose dolphins that take reduction team members need to consider before they can propose changes to fishing practices in a draft take reduction plan, and NMFS scientists recommended that the agency obtain better information before establishing a team. As a result, when incidental takes occur in fisheries covered by take reduction regulations, it is difficult for NMFS to determine whether the regulations were not effective in meeting the MMPA’s goals or whether the fisheries were not complying with the regulations. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To facilitate the oversight of NMFS’s progress and capacity to meet the statutory requirements for take reduction teams, Congress may wish to consider taking the following three actions: direct the Assistant Administrator of NMFS to report on major data, resource, or other limitations that make it difficult for NMFS to accurately determine which marine mammals meet the statutory requirements for establishing take reduction teams; establish teams for stocks that meet these requirements; and meet the statutory deadlines for take reduction teams; amend the statutory requirements for establishing a take reduction team to stipulate that not only must a marine mammal stock be strategic and interacting with a Category I or II fishery, but that the fishery with which the marine mammal stock interacts causes at least occasional incidental mortality or serious injury of that particular marine mammal stock; and amend the MMPA to ensure that its deadlines give NMFS adequate time to publish proposed and final take reduction plans and implementing regulations while meeting all the requirements of the federal rulemaking process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine the extent to which (1) available data allow the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to accurately identify the marine mammal stocks that meet the Marine Mammal Protection Act’s (MMPA) requirements for establishing take reduction teams, (2) NMFS has established take reduction teams for those marine mammal stocks that meet the statutory requirements, (3) NMFS has met the statutory deadlines established in the MMPA for the take reduction teams subject to the deadlines and the reasons for any delays, and (4) NMFS has developed a comprehensive strategy for evaluating the effectiveness of the take reduction plans that have been implemented. To determine the extent to which NMFS has met the MMPA’s deadlines for the five take reduction teams subject to the deadlines and the reasons for any delays, we identified five key deadlines listed in the MMPA for NMFS and take reduction teams and interviewed officials from NOAA’s Office of General Counsel to confirm the deadlines; obtained and reviewed documentation, such as take reduction plans, Federal Register notices announcing the establishment of teams, and NMFS’s proposed and final take reduction plans and implementing regulations published in the Federal Register; analyzed the dates published in the Federal Register documents to determine whether each of the five take reduction teams had met their statutory deadlines; and, met with NMFS officials to confirm the accuracy of our analysis of information published in Federal Register notices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because marine mammals, such as whales and dolphins, often inhabit waters where commercial fishing occurs, they can become entangled in fishing gear, which may injure or kill them--this is referred to as "incidental take." The 1994 amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) require the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to establish take reduction teams for certain marine mammals to develop measures to reduce their incidental takes. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which NMFS (1) can accurately identify the marine mammal stocks--generally a population of animals of the same species located in a common area--that meet the MMPA's requirements for establishing such teams, (2) has established teams for those stocks that meet the requirements, (3) has met the MMPA's deadlines for the teams subject to them, and (4) evaluates the effectiveness of take reduction regulations. GAO reviewed the MMPA, and NMFS data on marine mammals, and take reduction team documents and obtained the views of NMFS officials, scientists, and take reduction team members.
What GAO Found
Significant limitations in available data make it difficult for NMFS to accurately determine which marine mammal stocks meet the statutory requirements for establishing take reduction teams. For most stocks, NMFS relies on incomplete, outdated, or imprecise data on stocks' population size or mortality to calculate the extent of incidental take. As a result, the agency may overlook some marine mammal stocks that meet the MMPA's requirements for establishing teams or inappropriately identify others as meeting them. NMFS officials told GAO they are aware of the data limitations but lack funding to implement their plans to improve the data. On the basis of NMFS's available information, GAO identified 30 marine mammal stocks that have met the MMPA's requirements for establishing a take reduction team, and NMFS has established six teams that cover 16 of them. For the other 14 stocks, the agency has not complied with the MMPA's requirements. For example, false killer whales, found off the Hawaiian Islands, have met the statutory requirements since 2004, but NMFS has not established a team for them because, according to NMFS officials, the agency lacks sufficient funds. NMFS officials told GAO that the agency has not established teams for the other stocks that meet the MMPA's requirements for reasons such as the following: (1) data on these stocks are outdated or incomplete, and the agency lacks funds to obtain better information and (2) causes other than fishery-related incidental take, such as sonar used by the U.S. Navy, may contribute to their injury or death, therefore changes to fishing practices would not solve the problem. For the five take reduction teams subject to the MMPA's deadlines, the agency has had limited success in meeting the deadlines for establishing teams, developing draft take reduction plans, and publishing proposed and final plans and regulations to implement them. For example, NMFS established three of the five teams--the Atlantic Large Whale, Pelagic Longline, and Bottlenose Dolphin--from 3 months to over 5 years past the deadline. NMFS officials attributed the delays in establishing one of the teams to a lack of information about stock population size and mortality, which teams need to consider before developing draft take reduction plans. NMFS does not have a comprehensive strategy for assessing the effectiveness of take reduction plans and implementing regulations that have been implemented. NMFS has taken some steps to define goals, monitor compliance, and assess whether the goals have been met, but shortcomings in its approach and limitations in its performance data weaken its ability to assess the success of its take reduction regulations. For example, without adequate information about compliance, if incidental takes continue once the regulations have been implemented, it will be difficult to determine whether the regulations were ineffective or whether the fisheries were not complying with them. |
gao_AIMD-96-70 | gao_AIMD-96-70_0 | Critical Data Lacking to Assess DOE Information Systems
As part of its strategy for streamlining information systems, the Department plans to eliminate or consolidate systems which have the same or similar capabilities and analyze requirements for new systems to prevent additional purchases of duplicate systems. Currently, however, the baseline inventory is substantially incomplete and lacks information describing systems’ functional capabilities. We believe that OIM’s baseline inventory of software systems will not be adequate to support the Department’s streamlining efforts because the SRIS data is incomplete and inconsistently reported. OIM’s analyses showed that only two-thirds of the Department’s management and operating contractors responded to its request for updated SRIS information in 1995. The data deficiencies that we noted exist largely because the Department has allowed its contractors wide latitude in developing and implementing software inventory procedures and standards, and has not required them to follow the Department’s software management guidance. Recommendations
We recommend that you direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Management to develop, and include in the draft consolidated information resources management order, (1) specific standards for classifying software systems according to their functional capabilities and (2) procedures for ensuring that the data included in software system inventories are complete and reliable; and require all management and operating contractors to immediately evaluate their software system inventories for completeness and accuracy, address any weaknesses identified, and create and provide OIM a database which is consistent with the Department’s standards. The Department of Energy provided comments on a draft of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) software systems that support its Environmental Management Program, focusing on problems that could significantly impair DOE ability to eliminate duplicate information systems while it tries to streamline its information environment and achieve savings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOE is basing its streamlining efforts on a baseline inventory of data on specific software systems, but the inventory is incomplete and lacks critical information on the systems' functional capabilities; (2) the inventory will not help to eliminate duplicate information systems; (3) only two-thirds of the DOE management and operating contractors responded to the 1995 DOE data request; (4) the data deficiencies are due to contractors' inconsistent development and implementation of software inventory procedures and standards and classification of systems, and DOE failure to require them to comply with DOE software management guidance; (5) DOE is developing new guidance for information resources management, but it still does not specify standards for classifying systems according to their functional capabilities or procedures for ensuring data integrity; and (6) contractors will still have wide latitude in their development and maintenance of software system inventories and DOE will not have an effective method for eliminating duplicate systems. |
gao_GAO-12-748 | gao_GAO-12-748_0 | We reported in June 2009 that the HSC requested that federal agencies certify to the council that they were addressing applicable elements of the Because Key Elements checklist in December 2006 and October 2008.the certification process, as implemented, did not provide for monitoring and reporting as envisioned in the Implementation Plan, we recommended in our June 2009 report that the HSC request that the Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and report to the Executive Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue their operations while protecting their employees in the event of an influenza pandemic. Agencies Reported Progress in Planning to Protect Employees during an Influenza Pandemic
Additional Agencies Reported Completing Influenza Pandemic Plans to Protect Their Federal Workers
As shown in figure 1, almost all of the agencies we surveyed—or an increase of three agencies since 2009—reported in 2012 that they have completed influenza pandemic plans that address the operational approach for how they would protect their federal employees in the event of an influenza pandemic. Specifically, all of the agencies reported that they developed policies or procedures consistent with this strategy such as telework and avoiding all unnecessary travel. They have also planned for the distribution of hygiene supplies to protect employees whose duties require their presence at an assigned workplace during an influenza pandemic. Employees who must work onsite during an influenza pandemic will face varying levels of exposure risk. However, according to two agencies’ officials, the HSC has not asked agencies to certify their plans since then. The four agencies we selected are responsible for providing guidance, policy, or influenza pandemic-related expertise to other agencies. Each of these agencies is responsible for providing influenza pandemic continuity of operations (COOP) guidance, which includes elements such as COOP planning, personnel protection, or workplace options for federal departments and agencies. The DHS Secretary provides biennial assessments of department and agency continuity capabilities and reports the results to the President, through the NCC, and to agency heads as required by Federal Continuity Directive 1. Consequently, the evaluation tool, for example, does not include pandemic preparedness- related questions such as whether federal workers’ influenza pandemic risk assessments are regularly updated and whether agencies have planned to provide protective measures to mitigate exposure risks. However, the agencies also reported uneven status in some key areas suggesting some oversight targeted to bring attention to these areas is needed. For example, only nine agencies reported that they have classified all or most jobs for onsite mission essential functions by exposure risk level. Adequate oversight could help in ensuring that, by classifying jobs by exposure risk level, agencies have appropriate measures in place to protect those employees who must carry out mission essential functions that cannot be performed remotely during an influenza pandemic. While agencies have reported in 2012 they have made significant progress in planning for protecting workers during an influenza pandemic, additional oversight targeted to those areas in which reported progress is uneven could help focus attention on those areas. Recommendation For Executive Action
To provide additional oversight of agencies’ progress in their preparedness to protect workers, help focus attention on areas of uneven progress reported in our survey, and build upon the efforts FEMA has underway, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to include in its biennial assessments of agencies’ continuity capabilities consideration of agencies’ progress in assessing exposure risk levels, identifying appropriate protective measures, and establishing operational plans to provide such protections. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies
Appendix II: List of Agencies and Selected Components
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) determine what progress federal agencies report they have made since our 2009 report and identify challenges federal agencies report they face in protecting their workforce during an influenza pandemic, and (2) determine the extent to which oversight of agencies’ progress was being conducted and how the oversight information is being used. We reviewed agency and component pandemic plans and conducted interviews with agency officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies must plan to protect federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the countrys critical operations in the event of a pandemic. GAO reported in 2009 that agencies had made uneven progress in developing operational influenza pandemic plans and some agencies were not close to having plans. In addition, there was no real mechanism to monitor agencies progress.
GAO was asked to (1) determine what progress federal agencies report they have made since GAOs 2009 report and identify challenges federal agencies report they face in protecting their workforce during an influenza pandemic, and (2) determine the extent to which oversight of agencies progress is being conducted and how the oversight information is being used.
GAO surveyed the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, conducted a follow-up case study review, and interviewed agency officials responsible for providing guidance to other federal agencies in planning for an influenza pandemic.
What GAO Found
In 2012, federal agencies reported they had made progress in planning to protect their federal employees during an influenza pandemic. For example:
Twenty-three of 24 federal agencies reported they had completed influenza pandemic plans that address the operational approach they would use to protect their employees in the event of an influenza pandemic. In 2009, 20 agencies reported completing such plans.
All 24 agencies reported that, to reduce employees risk of exposure to influenza, they developed policies or procedures such as telework and avoiding all unnecessary travel. In the 2009 survey, 22 agencies reported developing the former policy and 18 the latter.
All of the agencies reported that they planned for the distribution of hygiene supplies to protect employees whose duties require them to work onsite during an influenza pandemic. In 2009, 18 agencies reported taking this planning step.
However, the agencies reported uneven status in some key areas suggesting some additional oversight is needed. For example, only nine agencies reported they have classified all or most jobs for onsite mission essential functions by exposure risk level. Additional oversight could help in ensuring that, by classifying jobs by exposure risk level, agencies have appropriate measures in place to protect those employees who must carry out mission essential functions that cannot be performed remotely during an influenza pandemic.
There is limited oversight of agencies progress to protect their employees during a pandemic. In 2008, the Homeland Security Council required agencies to certify their pandemic planning status, but according to agencies officials, has not done so since then. As in 2009, GAO interviewed four agenciesDepartment of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Labor, and Office of Personnel Management. Each of these agencies is responsible for providing influenza pandemic continuity of operations guidance, which includes elements such as planning, personnel protection, or workplace options to federal departments and agencies. DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported they conduct biennial assessments of department and agency continuity capabilities and report the results to the President through the National Continuity Coordinator. However, this assessment does not include planning elements specific to influenza pandemic planning, such as whether federal workers influenza pandemic risk assessments are regularly updated and whether agencies have planned to provide protective measures to mitigate exposure risks. Including such information in the biennial assessment process could provide monitoring, evaluation, and reporting of progress and help focus attention on those areas in which reported progress is uneven.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS provide additional oversight of agencies pandemic preparedness and help focus attention on areas of uneven progress reported in GAOs survey by directing FEMA to include in its biennial assessments of agencies continuity capabilities consideration of agencies progress in assessing exposure risk levels of occupational exposure, identifying appropriate protective measures, and establishing operational plans to provide such protections for federal workers during an influenza pandemic. DHS concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-95-23 | gao_AIMD-95-23_0 | As it evolves, the superhighway will become an increasingly tempting target for intruders with the technical expertise and resources to cause great harm, including insiders, hackers, foreign governments conducting political and military intelligence operations, domestic and foreign enterprises engaged in industrial espionage, and terrorist groups seeking to disrupt our society or cripple our economy.Unauthorized disclosure, theft, modification, or malicious destruction of such information could bankrupt a business, interrupt vital public service, or destroy lives. Significant effort will be needed to define, develop, test, and implement measures to overcome the security challenge posed by the increasing complexity, interconnectivity, and the sheer size of the evolving superhighway. These measures include identifying the superhighway’s security and privacy requirements and developing tools and techniques to satisfy the requirements. However, critics of federal involvement argue that the current federal strategy represents a danger to civil liberties and that individuals should be free to choose the technical means for achieving information security. As a result, the challenge will be establishing a reasonable level of consensus among the major players—the government, the computer and communications industry, the business community, and civil liberty groups—on how to ensure information security and privacy on the information superhighway. Cryptography will play a key role in the development of five of the six security services for the information superhighway. To address this dilemma, the federal and private sectors have initiated interoperability efforts, including the assessment of various “open network” architectures. Network Reliability Is Emerging as a Key Challenge
Ensuring the reliability of the information superhighway will be essential. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the technical issues associated with protecting the information superhighway from unauthorized access.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the information superhighway poses technical challenges concerning the security, privacy, and reliability of personal and proprietary information; (2) a large proportion of the information that will traverse the superhighway will be sensitive and a tempting target for hackers, foreign governments conducting political and military intelligence operations, domestic and foreign enterprises engaged in industrial espionage, or terrorist groups seeking to disrupt society or the economy; (3) significant effort will be needed to define, develop, test, and implement measures to prevent unauthorized access to the superhighway; (4) although the federal government could play a leading role in ensuring the superhighway's security, critics argue that individuals should be free to choose the technical means for meeting their security requirements; (5) a major challenge facing the development of the information superhighway will be creating a consensus between the federal government, computer and communications industry, business community, and civil liberties groups on how to ensure information security and privacy; (6) federal and private sectors have begun establishing uniform standards to ensure the superhighway's interoperability; and (7) questions remain about how to protect the superhighway from large network failures and encourage the telecommunications industry to develop a secure and reliable infrastructure. |
gao_GAO-16-413T | gao_GAO-16-413T_0 | The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) established the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) within DHS. NBIC was specifically tasked with integrating and analyzing information from human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems across the federal government and supporting the interagency biosurveillance community. Senior NBIC officials agreed that these three roles—analyzer, coordinator, and innovator—are consistent with the center’s responsibilities. To contribute to this national capability, in 2003, DHS created the BioWatch program to provide early warning, detection, or recognition of a biological attack. DHS Has Faced Challenges, Some Persistent, In Its Efforts to Carry Out Biosurveillance Programs
NBIC Has Faced Difficulty Demonstrating Value to Interagency Partners
In December 2009, we reported that NBIC was not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacked key resources—data and personnel— from its partner agencies, which may have been at least partially the result of collaboration challenges it faced. For example, some partners reported that they did not trust NBIC to use their information and resources appropriately, while others were not convinced of the value that working with NBIC provided because NBIC’s mission was not clearly articulated. In order to help NBIC enhance and sustain collaboration, including the provision of data, personnel, and other resources, in 2009, we recommended that NBIC develop a strategy for addressing barriers to collaboration and develop accountability mechanisms to monitor these efforts. In August 2012, NBIC issued the NBIC Strategic Plan, which is intended to provide NBIC’s strategic vision, clarify the center’s mission and purpose, articulate the value that NBIC seeks to provide to its partners, and lay the groundwork for setting interagency roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Although NBIC had made efforts to collaborate with interagency partners to create and issue a strategic plan that would clarify its mission and the various efforts to fulfill its three roles, we reported a variety of challenges that remained when we surveyed NBIC’s interagency partners for our 2015 report. Notably, many of these partners continued to express uncertainty about the value NBIC provided. We also reported in September 2015 that NBIC faces challenges prioritizing developmental efforts to identify and address needs for new biosurveillance tools. We identified options in our 2015 report for policy or structural changes that could help better fulfill the biosurveillance integration mission, which are summarized below. BioWatch’s Ability to Detect Attacks Uncertain Because It Lacks Performance Requirements that Correspond to a Clearly Defined Mission
Since 2003, DHS has focused on acquiring an autonomous detection system to replace the current BioWatch Gen-2, but has faced challenges in clearly justifying the BioWatch program’s need and ability to reliably address that need. In September 2012, we found that DHS approved the Gen-3 acquisition in October 2009 without fully developing critical knowledge that would help ensure sound investment decision making, pursuit of optimal solutions, and reliable performance, cost, and schedule information. To help ensure DHS based its acquisition decisions on reliable performance, cost, and schedule information developed in accordance with guidance and good practices, in our September 2012 report, we recommended that before continuing the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and possible alternatives based on cost- benefit and risk information. In April 2014, DHS canceled the acquisition of Gen-3 because the AoA did not confirm an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost of a full technology switch to Gen-3. Having canceled the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS continues to rely on the Gen-2 system for early detection of an aerosolized biological attack. However, we found DHS lacks reliable information about BioWatch Gen- 2’s technical capabilities to detect a biological attack, in part, because in the 12 years since BioWatch’s initial deployment, DHS has not developed technical performance requirements for Gen-2. DHS has commissioned tests of Gen-2’s technical performance characteristics, but DHS has not developed performance requirements that would enable it to interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the system’s ability to detect attacks. In our September 2015 report, to help ensure that biosurveillance-related funding is directed to programs that can demonstrate their intended capabilities, and to help ensure sufficient information is known about the current Gen-2 system to make informed cost-benefit decisions about possible upgrades and enhancements to the system, we recommended that DHS not pursue upgrades or enhancements to the current BioWatch system until it establishes technical performance requirements necessary for a biodetection system to meet a clearly defined operational objective for the BioWatch program; assesses the Gen-2 system against these performance requirements; and produces a full accounting of statistical and other uncertainties and limitations in what is known about the system’s capability to meet its operational objectives. DHS concurred and is taking steps to address the recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The potential threat of a naturally occurring pandemic or a terrorist attack with a biological weapon of mass destruction underscores the importance of a national biosurveillance capability—that is, the ability to detect biological events of national significance to provide early warning and information to guide public health and emergency response. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 addresses this capability, in part by creating NBIC. The center was tasked with integrating information from human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems across the federal government, to improve the likelihood of identifying a biological event at an earlier stage. Similarly, DHS's BioWatch program aims to provide early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack.
GAO has published a series of reports on biosurveillance efforts spanning more than a decade. This statement describes progress and challenges GAO has reported in DHS's implementation of NBIC and BioWatch and considerations for the future of biosurveillance efforts at DHS.
This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from December 2009 through September 2015 related to biosurveillance. To conduct our prior work, we reviewed relevant presidential directives, laws, policies, and strategic plans; and interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others. We also analyzed key program documents, including test plans, test results, and modeling studies.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, GAO has reported on progress and challenges with two of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) biosurveillance efforts—the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) and the BioWatch program (designed to provide early detection of an aerosolized biological attack). In December 2009, GAO reported that NBIC was not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacked key resources—data and personnel—from its partner agencies, which may have been at least partially the result of collaboration challenges it faced. For example, some partners reported that they did not trust NBIC to use their information and resources appropriately, while others were not convinced of the value that working with NBIC provided because NBIC's mission was not clearly articulated. GAO recommended that NBIC develop a strategy for addressing barriers to collaboration and develop accountability mechanisms to monitor these efforts. DHS agreed, and in August 2012, NBIC issued the NBIC Strategic Plan, which is intended to provide NBIC's strategic vision, clarify the center's mission and purpose, and articulate the value that NBIC seeks to provide to its partners, among other things. In September 2015, GAO reported that despite NBIC's efforts to collaborate with interagency partners to create and issue a strategic plan that would clarify its mission and the various efforts to fulfill its three roles—analyzer, coordinator, and innovator—a variety of challenges remained when GAO surveyed NBIC's interagency partners in 2015. Notably, many of these partners continued to express uncertainty about the value NBIC provided. GAO identified options for policy or structural changes that could help NBIC better fulfill its biosurveillance integration mission, such as changes to NBIC's roles.
Since 2012, GAO has reported that DHS has faced challenges in clearly justifying the need for the BioWatch program and its ability to reliably address that need (to detect attacks). In September 2012, GAO found that DHS approved a next-generation BioWatch acquisition in October 2009 without fully developing knowledge that would help ensure sound investment decision making and pursuit of optimal solutions. GAO recommended that before continuing the acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and possible alternatives based on cost-benefit and risk information. DHS concurred and in April 2014, canceled the acquisition because an alternatives analysis did not confirm an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost. Having canceled the next generation acquisition, DHS continues to rely on the currently deployed BioWatch system for early detection of an aerosolized biological attack. However, in 2015, GAO found that DHS lacks reliable information about the current system's technical capabilities to detect a biological attack, in part because in the 12 years since BioWatch's initial deployment, DHS has not developed technical performance requirements for the system. GAO reported in September 2015 that DHS commissioned tests of the current system's technical performance characteristics, but without performance requirements, DHS cannot interpret the test results and draw conclusions about the system's ability to detect attacks. DHS is considering upgrades to the current system, but GAO recommended that DHS not pursue upgrades until it establishes technical performance requirements to meet a clearly defined operational objective and assesses the system against these performance requirements. DHS concurred and is working to address the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-447 | gao_GAO-14-447_0 | The Navy envisioned the LCS as a ship that could operate with a much smaller crew size than other surface combatants, with preventative maintenance duties performed primarily by contractors. USS Freedom Deployment Provided Some Data on LCS Operations, but the Navy Still Lacks Key Operational Data on LCS Ships and Concepts
The USS Freedom’s deployment to Singapore was an opportunity for the Navy to learn lessons about the feasibility and sustainability of unique LCS operational support and sustainment concepts in an operational environment. The Navy was able to collect data during the deployment on items such as systems usage and reliability and crew sleep hours. Additionally, the Navy continues to lack overseas deployment data for the Independence variant ships and for additional operational and warfighting concepts—such as overseas mission-package swaps and deployment with the mine countermeasures and antisubmarine-warfare mission packages. The Navy Continues to Lack Operational Data on the Other LCS Variant
The Navy continues to lack operational data, specifically overseas deployment data, on the other LCS variant—the Independence variant— which, under current plans, is expected to comprise half of the LCS ship class (see fig. The Navy Has Not Yet Fully Addressed Risks to Its Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts That Were Identified by the USS Freedom Deployment
Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment concepts based on data collected and lessons learned during the USS Freedom deployment, it has not yet addressed some risks that remain in executing and sustaining key manning, training, maintenance, and logistics concepts. Available LCS Cost Data Are Limited, but Annual Per-Ship Costs May Be Approaching Those of Other Multimission Surface Ships with Larger Crews
Although the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframe and mission modules contain uncertainty, they indicate that the annualized per ship costs for the LCS may be approaching those of other multimission surface ships with larger crews. Although the Navy’s LCS cost estimates contain uncertainty, especially in regard to operations and support costs, and there are inherent difficulties associated with comparing the life-cycle costs of various surface ships with differing capabilities and mission sets, we found that the per ship per year cost estimates for the LCS program are nearing or may exceed the costs of other surface ships, including multimission ships with greater size and more crew members, such as guided-missile frigates and destroyers. As we noted in the report, the Navy also has used these data from other surface ship classes to build its LCS life-cycle cost estimates. Despite the known limitations, we believe our analysis uses the best available data to provide a reasonable comparison of the life-cycle costs across the ship classes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have been collected on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), we analyzed and compared the planned USS Freedom deployment schedule with the actual executed schedule. To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its operational support and sustainment concepts for the LCS in the areas of manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, we reviewed relevant data- collection and analysis plans and mid-point and final reports on the Freedom deployment to Singapore in 2013 from Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, 7th Fleet, and the Center for Naval Analyses, and we interviewed officials from organizations responsible for collecting and analyzing data from this deployment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The LCS was intended to be a low-cost surface combatant that uses innovative operational concepts, such as minimal crew size, to lower operations and support costs. In 2013, the Navy deployed USS Freedom , one of two LCS variants, to Singapore to “prove its concept,” demonstrate operational capabilities, and collect data on the ship's manning, training, maintenance, and logistics needs.
The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO analyze the Navy's sustainment plans for its LCS program—including lessons from the USS Freedom deployment. This report addressed (1) the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have been collected on LCS ships; (2) the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its operational support and sustainment concepts for LCS; and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other surface-ship classes. GAO analyzed documents from the 2013 deployment, and LCS and surface-ship life-cycle costs, and interviewed program officials and USS Freedom crews.
What GAO Found
The USS Freedom deployment provided beneficial data on operational support and sustainment concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but these data have limitations, and the Navy still lacks key data on LCS ships and concepts. The USS Freedom deployed for 10 months with a surface-warfare mission package, and the Navy collected data on items such as systems reliability and crew sleep hours. However, several factors limited the operational lessons learned. For example, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time at sea as planned. Further, the Navy continues to lack operational data for key operational and warfighting concepts, such as deployment with the other mission packages—mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare—and data on the other LCS variant which, under current plans, will comprise half the ship class.
Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment concepts, it has not yet addressed risks that remain in executing key concepts.
Manning: The crew experienced high workload and fell short of the Navy's sleep standards despite adding personnel for the deployment.
Training: Gaps remain in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment.
Maintenance: The Navy is adjusting maintenance requirements and has not yet determined the optimal mix of contractor and crew workload to perform preventative maintenance.
Logistics: The Navy is reallocating duties among crew and shore support, but the infrastructure needed to support both variants is incomplete.
Without fully analyzing risks in key concepts, the LCS may have operational limitations, deficits in personnel and materiel readiness, and higher costs.
The Navy has produced life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframes and mission modules. Although those estimates contain uncertainty and there are inherent difficulties in comparing the life-cycle costs of ships with differing capabilities and missions, the best available Navy data indicate that the annual per ship costs for LCS are nearing or may exceed those of other surface ships, including those with greater size and larger crews, such as frigates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is emphasizing its prior recommendations that, before buying more LCS ships, the Navy (1) conduct and consider the results of a risk assessment and (2) collect additional data and update cost estimates. The Department of Defense expressed concerns that its life-cycle cost data are not comparable across ship types. GAO believes the analysis provides a reasonable comparison using the best available data from the Navy, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-374 | gao_GAO-05-374_0 | These reports are submitted annually to the Congress. These concerns arise, in part, because the Forest Service’s regions and forests define their needs differently, and they do not always systematically update the data to reflect current forest conditions or review the accuracy of the data. Forest Service Data Are Inconsistent Across Regions and Inadequate to Accurately Quantify Needs
The Forest Service data, when combined with other information from Forest Service officials and nongovernmental experts—as well as data on recent increases in natural disturbances such as wildland fire—are sufficiently reliable for identifying relative trend information. Timber stand improvement needs have accumulated, in part, because some regions do not emphasize these projects and consequently, treatments have not kept pace with growing needs. Agency Officials Link Rising Reforestation Needs to Natural Causes Rather Than Timber Harvests
Forest Service officials told us that reforestation needs have been rising largely because such needs have increasingly been generated by causes other than timber harvests, and funding to address these needs has not kept pace. As the acreage affected by these natural disturbances increased, so did reforestation needs. Changing Management Practices Have Contributed to Reported Increase in Timber Stand Improvement Needs
Nationally, timber stand improvement needs have generally been increasing for the 10-year period we reviewed because (1) some Forest Service regions emphasize reforestation over timber stand improvement; (2) agency officials have identified increasingly more needs as they have expanded the scope of timber stand improvement to include work needed to meet a wider range of objectives; and (3) past forestry practices called for dense planting, leaving a legacy of thinning needs to be addressed in the timber stand improvement program, particularly on forests that had large reforestation programs within the past 2 decades. According to agency officials, the agency’s ability to achieve forest management objectives may consequently be impaired; treatment costs could increase; and forests could become more susceptible to fire, disease, and insect damage. Forest Service’s Ability to Meet Forest Management Objectives Could Be Impaired
The Forest Service’s ability to meet the management objectives defined in its forest plans—such as maintaining a variety of tree species in a forest or appropriate habitat for certain wildlife—could be impaired if reforestation or timber stand improvement treatments are delayed. One Forest Service official expressed particular concern about leaving reforestation needs unattended because, as these needs are increasingly created by natural causes such as wildland fires that burn vast areas, adverse effects have the potential to occur on a large scale. As the Forest Service has left these areas unattended, brush that must be removed before new seedlings are planted is becoming established, and removing it will be more costly as time passes. In addition, wildland fires may weaken some trees without killing them, leaving them susceptible to insect attack and diseases; and if reforestation needs are left unattended, an insect infestation can grow to epidemic proportions. However, the agency has not adjusted the program’s direction, policies, practices, and priorities in keeping with these changes, although agency officials acknowledged the need to do so. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the ability of the Forest Service to identify its reforestation and timber stand improvement needs and ensure funding for its most critical projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to take the following actions: standardize collection, reporting, and review procedures for data on reforestation and timber stand improvement needs by clarifying agency- wide guidance and developing a standard definition of need; require all regions to validate their reforestation and timber stand improvement data in time for congressional deliberation of the Forest Service’s fiscal year 2007 appropriations request; clarify the direction and policies for the reforestation and timber stand improvement program to be consistent with the agency's current emphasis on ecosystem management and appropriate for the current constrained budget environment, and require regions and forests to establish criteria for prioritizing the use of their reforestation and timber stand improvement funds in the current budget environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Forest Service reported to the Congress that it had a backlog of nearly 900,000 acres of land needing reforestation--the planting and natural regeneration of trees. Reforestation and subsequent timber stand improvement treatments, such as thinning trees and removing competing vegetation, are critical to restoring and improving the health of our national forests after timber harvests or natural disturbances such as wildland fires. GAO was asked to (1) examine the reported trends in federal lands needing reforestation and timber stand improvement, (2) identify the factors that have contributed to these trends, and (3) describe any potential effects of these trends that federal land managers have identified.
What GAO Found
The acreage of Forest Service lands needing reforestation and timber stand improvement generally has been increasing since 2000, according to Forest Service officials and data reported to the Congress, as well as other studies. While the Forest Service data are sufficiently reliable to identify this relative trend they are not sufficiently reliable to accurately quantify the agency's specific needs, establish priorities among treatments, or estimate a budget. The data's reliability is limited in part because some Forest Service regions and forests define their needs differently, and some do not systematically update the data to reflect current forest conditions or review the accuracy of the data. Forest Service officials acknowledge these problems, and the agency is implementing a new data system to better track its needs. While helpful, this action alone will not be sufficient to address the data problems GAO has identified. According to Forest Service officials, reforestation needs have been increasing in spite of declining timber harvests because of the growing acreage of lands affected by natural disturbances such as wildland fires, insect infestation, and diseases. In the past, reforestation needs resulted primarily from timber harvests, whose sales produced sufficient revenue to fund most reforestation needs. Now needs are resulting mainly from natural causes, and funding sources for such needs have remained relatively constant rather than rising in step with increasing needs. For timber stand improvement, the acreage needing attention is growing in part because high-density planting practices, used in the past to replace harvested trees, are creating needs for thinning treatments today and because treatments have not kept pace with the growing needs. Forest Service officials believe the agency's ability to achieve its forest management objectives may be impaired if future reforestation and timber stand improvement needs continue to outpace the agency's ability to meet these needs. For example, maintaining wildlife habitat--one forest management objective--could be hindered if brush grows to dominate an area formerly forested with tree species that provided forage, nesting, or other benefits to wildlife. Also, if treatments are delayed, costs could increase because competing vegetation--which must be removed to allow newly reforested stands to survive--grows larger over time and becomes more costly to remove. Further, without needed thinning treatments, agency officials said forests become dense, fueling wildland fires and creating competition among trees, leaving them stressed and vulnerable to insect attack. While agency officials expressed concern about these potential effects, the agency has not adjusted its policies and priorities for the reforestation and timber stand improvement program so that adverse effects can be minimized. Forest Service officials did, however, acknowledge the need to make such changes. |
gao_GAO-11-232T | gao_GAO-11-232T_0 | Significant Overall Progress has been Made to Improve Timeliness, but Some Agencies Continue to Face Challenges in Meeting Timeliness Objectives
As we note in our report, significant overall progress has been made to improve timeliness, largely due to DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances. IRTPA established an objective for each authorized adjudicative agency to “make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative agency” by December 17, 2009. This means that under the current statutory timeliness objective, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 10 percent and then report on an average of the remaining clearances. IRTPA includes 40 days for investigations and 20 days for adjudications within this 60-day average period. As shown in figure 2, DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency met the 60-day timeliness objective in all three quarters of fiscal year 2010. In addition, agency-specific requirements can affect timeliness. The Performance Accountability Council has focused its efforts on DOD due, in part, to the DOD security clearance program’s designation as one of GAO’s high-risk areas, as well as the fact that DOD clearances comprise the vast majority of clearance cases that are processed annually. To further improve timeliness across the federal government, we recommended that the Deputy Director of Management, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability council, collaborate with agencies that are not meeting timeliness objectives to take the following actions: (1) identify challenges to timeliness; (2) develop mitigation strategies to enable each agency to comply with the IRTPA timeliness objectives; (3) set timelines for accomplishing the required actions; (4) monitor agency progress; and (5) report on these plans and progress in the annual reports to Congress. Executive Agencies Often Grant Reciprocity, Although Challenges Exist to Measuring and Tracking Reciprocity
Agency officials stated that they routinely take steps to honor previously granted security clearances; however, there are no governmentwide metrics to comprehensively track when and why reciprocity is granted or denied. IRTPA generally requires that all security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Further, ODNI guidance signed in October 2008 amplifies this reciprocity requirement, stating that except in limited circumstances, all Intelligence Community elements are to “accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations.” Similarly, the OMB issued guidance requiring agencies to reciprocally accept clearances when the prior clearance is current, in-scope, and there is no new derogatory information, among other things. However, agency officials stated that in some cases, they find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations with available information before granting a reciprocal clearance. Moreover, because of the different types of background investigations required by individual agencies, agencies may perform additional investigative work or request a new background investigation. Without comprehensive, standardized metrics to track reciprocity, and documentation of the process, decision makers lack a complete picture of the extent to which reciprocity is granted and the challenges to honoring previously granted security clearances. Although There are No Plans to Develop a Single, Integrated Database, Steps Have Been Taken to Upgrade Existing Systems and Increase Information Sharing
Although there are no plans to develop a single, integrated database as called for in IRTPA, the Performance Accountability Council is focusing on leveraging existing systems and increasing information sharing by developing a single search capability through OPM’s system, the Central Verification System. IRTPA required that no later than 12 months after the date of its enactment, the Director of OPM and the Director of OMB establish and commence operating and maintaining a single, integrated database of security clearance information. This database was to house information regarding the granting, denial, or revocation of security clearances or access pertaining to military, civilian, and contractor personnel, from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies. However, the Performance Accountability Council is not pursuing a single, integrated database, according to our analysis of a series of recent reports that the Joint Reform Team issued from 2008 through 2010. Similarly, according to the most recent annual report to Congress, the reform efforts are focused on leveraging OPM’s existing system—the Central Verification System—to enable access to records on investigations and adjudications. Agency officials from both OPM and ODNI confirmed that there are no plans to create a new single, integrated database and explained that establishing, operating, and maintaining a single, integrated database is not a viable option because of concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Privacy concerns involve the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying information, such as names and Social Security numbers. Merging different systems into one database could result in the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying information that could compromise security. The Joint Personnel Adjudication System is a repository for security clearance information on both DOD civilian and military personnel, as well as determinations of contractor clearance eligibility and access for the National Industrial Security Program. As we noted in our report, continued personnel security clearance reform relies on strong committed executive leadership to sustain the momentum created by the current reform effort. However, while agencies are moving closer to meeting the objectives and requirements of IRTPA, continued oversight and accountability for personnel security clearance reform is still needed. Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. Personnel Clearances: Questions for the Record Regarding Security Clearance Reform. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our key findings and recommendations in our report that we are releasing today on some aspects of personnel security clearance reforms. We conducted our review in response to a congressional request. This is the fourth in a series of hearings, in which Congress has asked GAO to testify; and this Subcommittee's continued oversight has helped focus attention on the need for personnel security reform. Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. The July 2010 and subsequent October 2010 recent unauthorized leak of almost 500,000 classified documents posted to the Internet related to the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a cogent example of the inherent risks involved when granting an individual a security clearance. To ameliorate these risks, government agencies rely on a multiphased personnel security clearance process. However, with the increase in demand over the past decade for personnel with security clearances, we and others have identified problems with the security clearance process with respect to delays and incomplete documentation. As a result, we have designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program--which represents a vast majority of the initial security clearances adjudicated by the federal government--as a high-risk area since 2005. In light of longstanding concerns regarding delays in processing clearances and other issues, Congress set objectives and established requirements for improving the clearance process in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). IRTPA established objectives for timeliness, requirements for reciprocity--an agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency--and an integrated, secure database to house clearance information. In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, known as the Joint Reform Team, to transform the security clearance process governmentwide. In the following year, Executive Order 13467 was issued, establishing a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) that is responsible for driving the implementation of reform and is accountable to the President for achieving the reform effort's goals. This governance structure was put in place, in part, to sustain the momentum of clearance reforms. We have previously noted that top leadership must be committed to organizational transformation. To this end, committed executive leadership has worked to reform the personnel security clearance process by improving timeliness and developing quality measures. Congressional oversight through hearings held by this subcommittee in February, July and September 2008, and in October 2009 has helped focus attention on the need for security clearance reform. In addition, the recently passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires reports by the President on the security clearance process, including information on timeliness and quality. This statement highlights the key findings and recommendations from the report we are issuing today. Specifically, it will focus on the extent to which select executive branch agencies (1) investigate and adjudicate initial personnel security clearance applications for civilian, military, and industry personnel in a timely manner; (2) honor previously granted personnel security clearances and the challenges, if any, that exist related to reciprocity; and (3) share personnel clearance information in a single, integrated database.
What GAO Found
(1) Significant overall progress has been made to improve timeliness, largely due to DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances. IRTPA established an objective for each authorized adjudicative agency to "make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative agency" by December 17, 2009. This means that under the current statutory timeliness objective, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 10 percent and then report on an average of the remaining clearances. IRTPA includes 40 days for investigations and 20 days for adjudications within this 60-day average period. As shown in figure 2, DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency met the 60-day timeliness objective in all three quarters of fiscal year 2010. (2) Agency officials stated that they routinely take steps to honor previously granted security clearances; however, there are no governmentwide metrics to comprehensively track when and why reciprocity is granted or denied. IRTPA generally requires that all security clearance investigations and determinations be accepted by all agencies, with limited exceptions when necessary for national security purposes. Further, ODNI guidance signed in October 2008 amplifies this reciprocity requirement, stating that except in limited circumstances, all Intelligence Community elements are to "accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations." Similarly, the OMB issued guidance requiring agencies to reciprocally accept clearances when the prior clearance is current, in-scope, and there is no new derogatory information, among other things. However, agency officials stated that in some cases, they find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations with available information before granting a reciprocal clearance. Moreover, because of the different types of background investigations required by individual agencies, agencies may perform additional investigative work or request a new background investigation. (3) Although there are no plans to develop a single, integrated database as called for in IRTPA, the Performance Accountability Council is focusing on leveraging existing systems and increasing information sharing by developing a single search capability through OPM's system, the Central Verification System. IRTPA required that no later than 12 months after the date of its enactment, the Director of OPM and the Director of OMB establish and commence operating and maintaining a single, integrated database of security clearance information. This database was to house information regarding the granting, denial, or revocation of security clearances or access pertaining to military, civilian, and contractor personnel, from all authorized investigative and adjudicative agencies. However, the Performance Accountability Council is not pursuing a single, integrated database, according to our analysis of a series of recent reports that the Joint Reform Team issued from 2008 through 2010. Similarly, according to the most recent annual report to Congress, the reform efforts are focused on leveraging OPM's existing system--the Central Verification System--to enable access to records on investigations and adjudications. Agency officials from both OPM and ODNI confirmed that there are no plans to create a new single, integrated database and explained that establishing, operating, and maintaining a single, integrated database is not a viable option because of concerns related to privacy, security, and data ownership. Privacy concerns involve the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying information, such as names and Social Security numbers. Merging different systems into one database could result in the unintentional disclosure of personal identifying information that could compromise security. |
gao_GAO-17-428 | gao_GAO-17-428_0 | PACOM Does Not Fully Account for Contractor Personnel in a Steady-State Environment and Does Not Have a Process to Vet Foreign Vendors
PACOM does not fully account for contractor personnel in a steady-state environment, and does not have a process to vet foreign vendors. DOD guidance requires accountability for certain contractor personnel during contingency operations, but contractor accountability guidance in steady- state environments is unclear. Additionally, PACOM does not have a process in place to vet foreign vendors in contingency operations due to a lack of DOD guidance that clarifies what foreign-vendor vetting steps or process should be established at each combatant command. PACOM Uses Multiple Mechanisms to Account for Contractor Personnel, Which Has Resulted in Inconsistent Reporting
PACOM and some of its components use multiple mechanisms to account for contractor personnel in a steady-state environment. However, the number of contractor personnel accounted for by U.S. U.S. While the establishment of a foreign-vendor vetting cell may not be appropriate for all operations or circumstances, published DOD guidance specifying under what circumstances and how a vetting cell should be established would better position PACOM and other combatant commands to avoid contracting with the enemy in high-threat areas. PACOM Established an Interim Organizational Structure to Manage and Oversee OCS, but the Future Organizational Structure Is Focused in the Logistics Directorate
In June 2014, PACOM established an interim organizational structure to oversee and manage OCS in its area of responsibility. The intent of the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration is to establish OCS as an enduring capability to provide the combatant command, subordinate unified commands, and service components a central entity to integrate OCS across joint functions—in effect, to operationalize OCS within PACOM—in steady-state and contingency environments. DOD, Joint Staff, and PACOM guidance indicate the important role directorates beyond logistics should play as stakeholders in OCS. Moreover, as we reported in 2013, DOD has faced challenges integrating OCS in functional areas beyond logistics. PACOM Has Integrated OCS Annexes into Operational and Concept Plans, but the Information Lacks Details on Contractor Management and Support Estimates
PACOM has integrated OCS into 6 of its 11 operational, concept, and campaign plans for potential contingencies by developing OCS annexes—known as Annex Ws— that are required by DOD guidance for certain plans, but the annexes lack details on contractor management and support estimates in required appendixes. PACOM officials stated that they face several challenges with regard to including this detail in appendixes. Without guidance that clarifies roles and responsibilities as well as the process for requirements development to inform the development of Annex Ws and their appendixes, the annexes will continue to lack important details that are needed to determine OCS requirements and adequately plan for future operations. PACOM also has not established a foreign-vendor vetting process to preemptively identify vendors that support criminal, terrorist, or other sanctioned organizations due in part to a lack of DOD guidance specifying under what conditions a vendor vetting process or cell should be established. To enable OCS to be fully embedded in the command structure at the command and continue to build upon the progress of integrating OCS into the command, we recommend that as PACOM updates OCS guidance, the Secretary of Defense direct the PACOM Commander to consider ways to ensure all joint staff functions beyond the logistics area are fully integrated into its OCS organizational structure and OCS Integration Cell. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD and PACOM concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with four recommendations. Without updated guidance to clarify what types of contractor personnel are to be accounted for in Phase 0 operations, as well as the identification of a system of record for contractor personnel accountability information, PACOM may not have a comprehensive and consistent accounting of contractor personnel in its area of responsibility, which could potentially limit PACOM’s visibility over contractor personnel for whom it may be responsible in the event of a contingency operation or an emergency. In addition, PACOM service component officials told us that the OCS Mission Integrator Demonstration might have been more effective if it integrated individuals from all joint staff functions, including other directorates beyond logistics. However, as discussed in the report, PACOM officials also stated that some key details are not included in the completed Annex W appendixes, which the command expects requirements generators within the service components to provide. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has: (1) accounted for contractor personnel and has a process to vet foreign vendors in its area of responsibility; (2) an organizational structure to manage and oversee operational contract support (OCS); and (3) integrated OCS into key planning documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
A key element of DOD military strategy since 2012 has been a rebalance of U.S. presence and capabilities toward the Asia-Pacific region, PACOM's area of responsibility. U.S. military personnel in this region rely on contracted services to provide support to military operations. PACOM's humanitarian and disaster-relief efforts in response to a May 2015 earthquake in Nepal highlighted the importance of OCS in the Asia-Pacific region.
GAO was asked to assess PACOM's processes to plan for, manage, and oversee contractors that support military operations in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which PACOM (1) has accounted for contractor personnel and has a process to vet foreign vendors; (2) has established an organizational structure to manage and oversee OCS; and (3) has integrated OCS into key planning documents. GAO reviewed documents and data, interviewed relevant officials involved in OCS activities in the region, and analyzed OCS annexes to certain plans.
What GAO Found
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) does not fully account for contractor personnel in a steady-state, or peacetime, environment and lacks a process to vet foreign vendors. Department of Defense (DOD) guidance requires the accounting of certain contractor personnel during contingency operations, but is unclear for steady-state environments. PACOM issued limited guidance in November 2016 to address accountability processes in contingency and steady-state environments, and PACOM and some of its components use multiple mechanisms to account for contractor personnel, resulting in inconsistencies in the numbers of contractor personnel accounted for, which could present difficulties in an emergency or contingency operation. Additionally, PACOM lacks a foreign vendor vetting process due to a lack of DOD guidance identifying what vendor vetting processes should be established at combatant commands. PACOM has taken some action on vendor vetting, such as including vetting in exercises and screening some contractor personnel, but it lacks a process that includes details, such as under what circumstances a vetting cell should be established. DOD guidance specifying under what circumstances a vetting cell should be established would better position PACOM to avoid contracting with the enemy in high-threat areas.
PACOM established an interim operational contract support (OCS) organizational structure through a pilot program that ends in June 2017. PACOM officials stated that, upon completion of the pilot, they intend to establish the structure as an enduring OCS capability within the command's logistics directorate. The intent is to provide the combatant command, subordinate unified commands, and service components a central entity to integrate OCS across joint functions, such as directorates dealing with personnel or intelligence. However, service component officials stated that PACOM's OCS organizational structure might have been more effective if it engaged all joint staff functions, including directorates beyond logistics. DOD, Joint Staff, and PACOM guidance identify the important role that directorates beyond logistics should play as stakeholders in OCS. Similarly, GAO has previously reported on the challenges DOD has faced integrating OCS in functional areas beyond logistics. By considering ways to expand its OCS organizational structure beyond the logistics directorate and better integrate the equities of other directorates, PACOM could be better positioned to build on the progress made during the pilot program.
PACOM has integrated OCS into key planning documents, as required by guidance, by developing OCS annexes for 6 of its 11 operational, concept, and campaign plans. Officials added that they will continue to update the remaining plans as planning cycles and resources allow. However, the annex appendixes generally lack key details, such as contractor management and support estimates. PACOM officials told GAO that such details are determined through requirements development at the service component commands, but challenges exist related to these issues due to unclear guidance. Without guidance that clarifies the requirements-development process for OCS annexes, PACOM will continue to lack important details that are needed to determine OCS requirements for operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD and PACOM develop or update guidance related to contractor personnel accountability, vendor vetting, and OCS organizational structure; and that PACOM develop guidance that clarifies requirements development for plans. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with four. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-564T | gao_GAO-05-564T_0 | Background
Long-term care includes many types of services needed when a person has a physical or mental disability. Absent Reform, Spending for Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security Will Put Unsustainable Pressure on the Federal Budget
Before focusing on the increased burden that long-term care will place on federal and state budgets, it is important to look at the broader budgetary context. Federal spending for Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security is expected to surge—nearly doubling by 2035—as people live longer and spend more time in retirement. 2.) 3.) As the baby boom generation retires and the Medicare-eligible population swells, the imbalance between outlays and revenues will increase dramatically. Over the longer term, the increase in the number of elderly will add considerably to the strain on federal and state budgets as governments struggle to finance increased Medicaid spending. Baby Boom Generation Will Greatly Expand Demand for Long- Term Care
In coming decades, the sheer number of aging baby boomers will swell the number of elderly with disabilities and the need for services. The increased number of disabled elderly will exacerbate current problems in the provision and financing of long-term care services. CBO projected in 1999 that long-term care spending for the elderly could increase by more than two-and-a-half times from 2000 to 2040. If private long-term care insurance is expected to play a larger role in financing future generations’ long-term care needs, consumers need to be better informed about the costs of long-term care, the likelihood that they may need these services, and the limits of coverage through public programs and private health insurance. Without fundamental financing changes, Medicaid can be expected to remain one of the largest funding sources for long-term care services for aging baby boomers, with Medicaid expenditures for long-term care for the elderly reaching as high as $132 billion by 2050. As noted earlier, this increasing burden will strain both federal and state governments. Considerations for Reforming Long-Term Care Financing
Given the anticipated increase in demand for long-term care services resulting from the aging of the baby boom generation, the concerns about the availability of services, and the expected further stress on federal and state budgets and individuals’ financial resources, some policymakers and advocates have called for long-term care financing reforms. Indeed, we identified options for rethinking the federal, state, and private insurance roles in financing long-term care as one of the key questions that our nation needs to face as it addresses 21st century challenges. Some long-term care services are akin to other health care services, such as personal assistance with activities of daily living or monitoring or supervision to cope with the effect of dementia. These include: Determining societal responsibilities. Considering the potential role of social insurance in financing. Encouraging personal preparedness. Becoming disabled is a risk. Recognizing the benefits, burdens, and costs of informal caregiving. Assessing the balance of federal and state responsibilities to ensure adequate and equitable satisfaction of needs. Adopting effective and efficient implementation and administration of reforms. Developing financially sustainable public commitments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Long-term care relies heavily on financing by public payers, especially Medicaid, and has significant implications for state budgets as well as the federal budget. It includes an array of health, personal care, and supportive services provided to persons with physical or mental disabilities. As the baby boom generation ages, the number of elderly with disabilities will greatly expand the demand for long-term care services and will impose greater burdens on federal and state budgets. GAO was asked to discuss the budgetary and other challenges resulting from the anticipated increase in demand for long-term care services. This testimony addresses (1) the pressure that entitlement spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security is expected to exert on the federal budget in coming decades; (2) how the aging of the baby boom population will increase the demand for long-term care services; and (3) how these trends will affect the current and future financing of long-term care services, particularly in federal and state budgets. The testimony also highlights several considerations for any possible reforms of long-term care financing. This testimony updates prior GAO work, particularly Long-Term Care: Aging Baby Boom Generation Will Increase Demand and Burden on Federal and State Budgets, GAO-02-544T (Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2002).
What GAO Found
Over the coming decades, entitlement spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security is expected to absorb larger shares of federal revenue and threatens to crowd out other spending as the baby boom generation enters retirement age. The increasing demand for long-term care services fueled in part by the baby boom generation will also further strain federal and state budgets. Estimates suggest the future number of disabled elderly who cannot perform basic activities of daily living without assistance may as much as double from 2000 through 2040, resulting in a large increase in demand for long-term care services. Spending on long-term care services just for the elderly is estimated to increase by more than two-and-a-half times between 2000 and 2040, and could nearly quadruple in constant dollars between 2000 and 2050 to $379 billion, according to some estimates. Without fundamental financing changes, Medicaid can be expected to remain one of the largest funding sources, straining both federal and state governments. Financing the increasing demand for long-term care services will be a significant 21st century challenge for the nation. A key question for policymakers will be to consider what options exist for rethinking the federal, state, and private roles in financing long-term care. In considering options for reforming long-term care financing, GAO notes that long-term care is not just about health care. It also comprises a variety of services an aged or disabled person requires to maintain quality of life--including housing, transportation, nutrition, and social support to help maintain independent living. Given the challenges in providing and paying for these myriad and growing needs, GAO has identified several considerations for shaping reform proposals that include: determining societal responsibilities; considering the potential role of social insurance in financing; encouraging personal preparedness; recognizing the benefits, burdens, and costs of informal caregiving; assessing the balance of state and federal responsibilities to ensure adequate and equitable satisfaction of needs; adopting effective and efficient implementation and administration of reforms; and developing financially sustainable public commitments. |
gao_GAO-05-343 | gao_GAO-05-343_0 | Head Start is administered by HSB within ACF. Figure 1 provides information on the numbers of Head Start grantees, delegate agencies, centers and classrooms. Since the inception of Head Start, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of the program. The Framework covers a broad range of child skill and development areas and incorporates each of the legislatively mandated goals, such as that children “use and understand an increasingly complex and varied vocabulary” and “identify at least 10 letters of the alphabet.”
Since 2000, HSB has required every Head Start grantee to include each of the areas in the Framework in the child assessments that each grantee adopts and implements. Grantees are permitted to determine how to assess children’s progress in these areas. The results of the assessments are used for the purposes of individual program improvement and instructional support and are not aggregated across grantees or systematically shared with federal officials. The NRS, prompted by the April 2002 announcement of President Bush’s Good Start, Grow Smart initiative, builds on the 1998 legislation by requiring all Head Start programs to implement the same assessment, twice a year, to all 4- and 5-year-old Head Start participants who will attend kindergarten the following year. The contractor, working closely with HSB, was responsible for the design and field testing of the NRS, including developing training materials to support national implementation of the reporting system by grantees. Among the most important concepts in test development are validity and reliability. This process generally takes more than 1 year, especially if the test is designed to measure changes in performance. In the remainder of the report, we will discuss how the focus of the NRS was determined and the assessment was developed, HSB’s response to problems in initial implementation as well as some implementation issues that remain unaddressed, and the extent to which the assessment meets the professional and technical standards to support specific purposes identified by HSB. NRS Assesses Selected Skills Using Adaptations of Other Assessments
The NRS assesses vocabulary, letter recognition, simple math skills, and screens for understanding of spoken English. As initially conceived by HSB, the NRS was to gauge the progress of Head Start children in 13 congressionally mandated indicators of learning. However, time constraints and technical matters precluded HSB from assessing children on all of the indicators and led HSB to consider, and eventually adopt, portions of other assessments for use in the NRS. The field test also included a Spanish version of the NRS. Figures 3 and 4 are examples from the letter naming and early math skills components of the NRS. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2003, the Head Start Bureau, in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF), implemented the National Reporting System (NRS), the first nationwide skills test of over 400,000 4- and 5-year-old children. The NRS is intended to provide information on how well Head Start grantees are helping children progress. Given the importance of the NRS, this report examines: what information the NRS is designed to provide; how the Head Start Bureau has responded to concerns raised by grantees and experts during the first year of implementation; and whether the NRS provides the Head Start Bureau with quality information.
What GAO Found
The Head Start Bureau developed the NRS to gauge the extent to which Head Start grantees help children progress in specific skill areas, including understanding spoken English, recognizing letters, vocabulary, and early math. Due to time constraints and technical matters, the Head Start Bureau adapted portions of other assessments for use in the NRS. Head Start Bureau officials have responded to some concerns raised during the first year of NRS implementation, but other issues remain. For example, the Head Start Bureau has modified training materials and is exploring the feasibility of sampling. However, it is not monitoring whether grantees are inappropriately changing instruction to emphasize areas covered in the NRS. Head Start Bureau officials have said NRS results will eventually be used for program improvement, targeting training and technical assistance, and program accountability; however, the Head Start Bureau has not stated how NRS results will be used to realize these purposes. Currently, results from the first year of the NRS are of limited value for accountability purposes because the Head Start Bureau has not shown that the NRS meets professional standards for such uses, namely that (1) the NRS provides reliable information on children's progress during the Head Start program year, especially for Spanish-speaking children, and (2) its results are valid measures of the learning that takes place. The NRS also may not provide sufficient information to target technical assistance to the Head Start centers and classrooms that need it most. |
gao_GAO-03-624T | gao_GAO-03-624T_0 | Our latest long-term budget simulations reinforce the need for change in the major cost drivers—Social Security and health care programs. In response to the emerging trends and long-term fiscal challenges the government faces in the coming years, we have an opportunity to create highly effective, performance-based organizations that can strengthen the nation’s ability to meet the challenges of the 21st century and reach beyond our current level of achievement. The federal government cannot accept the status quo as a “given”—we need to reexamine the base of government programs, policies, and operations. Balancing the Roles of the Congress and the Executive Branch in Developing Restructuring Proposals
Given the obvious case for reexamining the government’s structure, the major issue for debate today is the question of whether and how to change the Congress’ normal deliberative process for reviewing and shaping executive branch restructuring proposals. The process may vary depending on the significance of the changes sought. Therefore, in contrast to the past “one-size-fits-all” approaches, in again granting expedited reorganization authority to the President, the Congress may wish to consider different tracks that allow for a longer period for review and debate of proposals that include significant policy elements as opposed to operational elements. Modern Management Practices Provide a Framework for Restructuring Proposals
Three years ago, I testified that the challenge for the federal government at the start of the 21st century is to continue to improve and to translate the management reforms enacted by the Congress in the 1990s into a day-to- day management reality across government. Process-oriented ways of doing business will need to yield to results-oriented ones. There are six important elements to consider for a successful reorganization—establishing clear goals, taking an integrated approach, developing a comprehensive human capital strategy, selecting appropriate service delivery mechanisms, managing the implementation, and providing effective oversight. This is true for both the initial design and the implementation. In considering restructuring, it is important to focus on not just the present but the future trends and challenges. The Congress has an important role to play—both in its legislative and oversight capacities—in establishing, monitoring, and maintaining progress to attain the goals envisioned by government transformation and reorganization efforts. With changes in the executive branch, the Congress should adapt its own organization in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Further, the President and the Congress may wish to consider establishing a process (e.g., a commission), that provides for the involvement of the key players and a means to help reach consensus on any specific restructuring proposals that would be submitted for consideration by the Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has sought to assist the Congress and the executive branch in considering the actions needed to support the transition to a more high performing, results-oriented, and accountable federal government. At the Committee's request, GAO provided perspective on the proposal to reinstate the authority for the President to submit government restructuring plans to the Congress for expedited review.
What GAO Found
In view of the overarching trends and the growing fiscal challenges facing our nation, there is a need to consider the proper role of the federal government, how the government should do business in the future, and in some instances, who should do the government's business in the 21st century. The fundamental issue raised by the proposal to grant reorganization authority to the President is not whether the government's organization can and should be restructured, but rather, whether and how the Congress wishes to change the nature of its normal deliberative process when addressing proposals to restructure the federal government. Given current trends and increasing fiscal challenges, a comprehensive review, reassessment, and reprioritization of what the government does and how it does it is clearly warranted. This is especially vital in view of changing priorities and the compelling need to examine the base of government programs, policies, and operations since, given GAO's long-term budget simulations, the status quo is unsustainable over time. While the intent of such a review is desirable and some expedited congressional consideration may well be appropriate for specific issues, the Congress also has an important role to play in government reform initiatives, especially from an authorization and oversight perspective. In contrast to the past "one-size-fits-all" approaches in developing new executive reorganization authority, the Congress may want to consider different tracks for proposals that propose significant policy changes versus those that focus more narrowly on government operations. Further, Congress may want to consider establishing appropriate processes to ensure the involvement of key players, particularly in the legislative and executive branches, to help facilitate reaching consensus on specific restructuring proposals that would be submitted for consideration, should the Congress enact a new executive reorganization authority. Modern management practices can provide a framework for developing successful restructuring proposals. Such practices include: establishing clear goals, following an integrated approach, developing an effective human capital strategy, considering alternative program delivery mechanisms, and planning for both initial and long-term implementation issues to achieve a successful transformation. Furthermore, successful implementation will depend in part on continuing congressional oversight. The Congress could significantly enhance its efficiency and effectiveness by adapting its own organization to mirror changes in the executive branch. |
gao_GAO-13-370T | gao_GAO-13-370T_0 | DHS Continues to Implement and Strengthen Its Mission Functions, but Key Operational and Management Challenges Remain
Progress Implementing and Strengthening DHS’s Mission Functions
Since DHS began operations in March 2003, it has developed and implemented key policies, programs, and activities for implementing its homeland security missions and functions that have created and strengthened a foundation for achieving its potential as it continues to mature. We reported in our assessment of DHS’s progress and challenges 10 years after the September 11 attacks, as well as in our more recent work, that the department has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals in many areas. These included developing strategic and operational plans across its range of missions; hiring, deploying, and training workforces; establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs; and developing and issuing policies, procedures, and regulations to govern its homeland security operations. DHS issued the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles, including major roles and responsibilities of government, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities for response to disasters of all sizes and causes. After initial difficulty in fielding the program, DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a passenger prescreening program through which the federal government now screens all passengers on all commercial flights to, from, and within the United States. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data indicating it had met its interim goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. Border Patrol officials attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of Border Patrol strategic objectives. We found that DHS could reduce the costs to the federal government related to major disasters declared by the President by updating the principal indicator on which disaster funding decisions are based and better measuring a state’s capacity to respond without federal assistance. DHS Can Strengthen the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Its Operations by Continuing to Address Cross-cutting Issues That Have Impacted Its Progress
Our work on DHS’s mission functions and crosscutting issues has identified three key themes—leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts—that have impacted the department’s progress since it began operations. For example, DHS can help reduce cost overruns and performance shortfalls by strengthening the management of its acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland security by improving its research and development (R&D) management. DHS made progress and has had successes in all of these areas, but our work found that these themes have been at the foundation of DHS’s implementation challenges, and need to be addressed from a department-wide perspective to effectively and efficiently position the department for the future. Although DHS has made important progress, more work remains. However, DHS has not always effectively executed or integrated these functions. DHS concurred with our recommendations and reported taking actions to address some of them. In addition, DHS has made efforts to improve employee morale, such as taking actions to determine the root causes of morale problems. | What GAO Found
Since the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003, it has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts. In its assessment of DHS's progress and challenges 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as its more recent work, GAO reported that DHS had, among other things, developed strategic and operational plans across its range of missions; established new, or expanded existing, offices and programs; and developed and issued policies, procedures, and regulations to govern its homeland security operations. However, GAO also identified that challenges remained for DHS to address across its missions. Examples of progress made and work remaining include the following:
Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program through which the federal government now prescreens all passengers on all commercial flights to, from, and within the United States. However, DHS did not validate the science supporting its behavior detection program before deploying behavior detection officers at airports, including determining whether such techniques could be successfully used to detect threats.
Border security/immigration enforcement. DHS reported data indicating it had met its goal to secure the land border because of a decrease in apprehensions, attributed in part to changes in the U.S. economy and achievement of DHS strategic objectives. However, DHS has not developed a process to identify and analyze program risks, such as a process to evaluate prior and suspected cases of fraud, in its Student and Exchange Visitor Program, a program intended to, among other things, ensure that foreign students studying in the United States comply with the terms of their admission into the country.
Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles. However, GAO reported that DHS could reduce the costs to the federal government related to major disasters declared by the President by updating the principal indicator on which disaster funding decisions are based and better measuring a state's capacity to respond without federal assistance.
GAO has identified three key themes--leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts--that DHS needs to address from a departmentwide perspective to effectively and efficiently position the department for the future. DHS has made progress in all three areas by, among other things, providing leadership and coordination. However, DHS has continued to face challenges in all of these areas. For example, GAO reported that improving research and development could help DHS reduce, among other things, cost overruns and performance shortfalls by reducing inefficiencies and costs for homeland security.
What GAO Recommends
While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has previously made about 1,800 recommendations to DHS designed to strengthen its programs and operations. DHS has addressed more than 60 percent of them, has efforts underway to address others, and has taken additional action to strengthen the department. |
gao_GAO-06-855T | gao_GAO-06-855T_0 | Intermodal transportation refers to a system that connects the separate transportation modes—such as mass transit systems, roads, aviation, maritime, and railroads—and allows a passenger or freight to complete a journey using more than one mode. Several Significant Challenges Affect the Development and Use of Intermodal Capabilities
According to transportation research, planning officials, and our prior work, a number of financing, planning, and other challenges play important roles in shaping transportation investment decisions and the development of intermodal capabilities. Significant challenges to the development of intermodal capabilities are the lack of specific national goals and funding programs. Federal funding is often tied to a single transportation mode; as a result it may be difficult to finance projects, such as intermodal projects, that do not have a source of dedicated funding. In addition to the limits on the use of federal funds, federal transportation projects, including intermodal projects, face a number of planning challenges including the following: Decision makers must ensure that wide-ranging public participation is reflected in their deliberations and that their choices take into account numerous views. Finally, intermodal capabilities, while offering benefits to mobility, may need to develop a demand over time. Two General Strategies Could Help Address Intermodal Financing and Planning Challenges
Two general strategies could help public decision makers improve intermodal options. These strategies are based on a systematic framework that has the following three components: Set national goals for the system. In the first strategy, Congress could encourage the development of intermodal capabilities by increasing the flexibility with current federal transportation programs, which are largely focused on individual transportation modes, to a more systemwide approach across all modes and types of travel. While this strategy would involve changes in federal transportation policy, it would most likely not involve a major shift in the federal role, which would continue to be focused on funding and oversight of locally determined and developed transportation projects. However, since this strategy would include the goal of establishing a more systemwide approach to transportation planning, the federal government would need to determine the scope of its involvement in encouraging such an approach. The second strategy is a fundamental shift in federal transportation policy’s long-time encouragement of state and local decision making by increasing the role of the federal government in planning and funding intermodal projects in order to develop more integrated intermodal networks, either nationwide or along particularly congested corridors. Concluding Observations
Increasing passenger travel and freight movement have led to growing congestion, and decision makers face the challenge of maintaining the nation’s mobility while preventing congestion from overwhelming the transportation system. Provides grants to airports for planning and development projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mobility--that is, the movement of passengers and goods through the transportation system--is critical to the nation's economic vitality and the quality of life of its citizens. However, increasing passenger travel and freight movement has led to growing congestion in the nation's transportation system, and projections suggest that this trend is likely to continue. Increased congestion can have a number of negative economic and social effects, including wasting travelers' time and money, impeding efficient movement of freight, and degrading air quality. U.S. transportation policy has generally addressed these negative economic and social effects from the standpoint of individual transportation modes and local government involvement. However, there has been an increased focus on the development of intermodal transportation. Intermodal transportation refers to a system that connects the separate transportation modes--such as mass transit systems, roads, aviation, maritime, and railroads--and allows a passenger to complete a journey using more than one mode. This testimony is based on GAO's prior work on intermodal transportation, especially intermodal ground connections to airports, and addresses (1) the challenges associated with developing and using intermodal capabilities and (2) potential strategies that could help public decision makers improve intermodal capabilities.
What GAO Found
A number of financing, planning, and other challenges play significant roles in shaping transportation investment decisions and the development of intermodal capabilities. Significant challenges to the development of intermodal capabilities are the lack of specific national goals and funding programs. Federal funding is often tied to a single transportation mode; as a result it may be difficult to finance projects, such as intermodal projects, that do not have a source of dedicated funding. In addition, federally funded transportation projects, including intermodal projects, face a number of planning challenges. These challenges include limits on the uses of federal funds, ensuring that widespread public participation is reflected in decisions, physical and geographic land constraints, and the difficulty coordinating among multiple jurisdictions in transportation corridors. Finally, intermodal capabilities, while offering benefits to mobility, may need to develop a demand over time. Two general strategies developed from GAO's prior work would help public decision makers improve intermodal capabilities. Both strategies are based on a systematic framework that includes identifying national goals, defining the federal role, determining funding approaches, and evaluating performance. The first strategy would increase the flexibility of current federal transportation programs to encourage a more systemwide approach to transportation planning and development, but would leave project selection with state and local decision makers. The second strategy is a fundamental shift in federal transportation policy's focus on local decision making by increasing the role of the federal government in order to develop more integrated transportation networks. While the first strategy would most likely lead to a continued focus on locally determined and developed transportation projects, the second strategy could develop more integrated transportation networks, either nationwide or along particularly congested corridors. The second strategy could be costly, and high benefits, which may be difficult to achieve, would be needed to justify this investment. |
gao_GGD-96-35 | gao_GGD-96-35_0 | The 20 panelists—current or former federal officials and academicians—joined the presenters for the symposium’s group discussions. Value people as assets rather than as costs. 3. 4. Use different organizational models as appropriate. 6. 7. 8. Assuming these barriers were overcome, many of the principles could be put into practice without changing any laws. Barriers Exist to Putting Some of These Principles Into Practice
Some symposium participants agreed that in the federal government, a number of barriers do exist to the sort of thinking embodied in the eight principles for managing people. It takes persistence. But some symposium participants considered this approach a barrier to the creation of high-performance organizations for three reasons: it puts constraints on innovation and flexibility; it transfers the real responsibility for managing people from agency managers to agency personnel staff and OPM; and it ignores the differences among federal agencies in their missions, cultures, sizes, and other characteristics. “Basically, the principles and values were that we should have an apolitical public service, that we should continue to have merit-based staffing, that we should maintain high standards of honesty and integrity among public servants, that there should be a very strong focus on efficiency and results, and that should continue to be accountable to the government of the day while it maintains the capacity to provide it with high quality advice.”
If Congress should decide to comprehensively decentralize the civil service, it could do so by revising Title 5 to articulate guiding values and principles but omit detailed rules of implementation. We have a mission. How Do Public Managers Manage? Innovative Approaches to Human Resources Management, August 1995. Perry, James L. “Transforming Federal Civil Service: Strategic Human Resource Management”, Review of Public Personnel Administration, Vol. Leadership and the New Science: Learning About Organization from an Orderly Universe. Management Reform: Implementation of the National Performance Review’s Recommendations (GAO/OCG-95-1, December 5, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO sponsored a symposium on transforming the civil service.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the symposium brought together leading private and public sector employers and former federal officials to discuss new human resource management approaches; (2) there were eight overlapping personnel management principles that focused on people as assets, organizational missions, accountability, appropriate organizational structures, integrating personnel management into an organization's mission, continuous learning, integrated information management, and sustained leadership; (3) symposium participants found that a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal approach to human resources management was more effective; (4) although some federal agencies have adopted some of these management principles, attitudinal, political, and structural barriers hamper wider acceptance; (5) although some of the principles could be adopted without changing any laws, others would require congressional action and increased civil service decentralization; (6) recent legislation and the National Performance Review have recognized the value of these management principles; (7) the federal government should retain its merit system core values while allowing federal agencies more flexibility to meet their disparate needs; and (8) Congress must take into consideration the fundamental differences between government and private sector functions in applying these management principles. |
gao_GAO-04-839T | gao_GAO-04-839T_0 | Among these items are prescription drugs ordered by consumers over the Internet, the importation of which is prohibited under current law, with few exceptions. Two acts—the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act—specifically regulate the importation of prescription drugs into the United States. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended, FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety, effectiveness, and quality of domestic and imported drugs and may refuse to admit into the United States, any drug that appears to be adulterated, misbranded, or unapproved for the U.S. market as defined in the act. II for general description of controlled substances.) Volume of Prescription Drug Imports Is Said to be Large and Increasing, and the Health and Safety of these Drug Imports is Not Assured
CBP and FDA officials said that the volume of unapproved prescription drugs illegally imported through the IMBs or carrier facilities is large and steadily increasing. However, complete data do not exist to document this observation. FDA officials have stated that they cannot provide assurance to the public regarding the safety and quality of drugs purchased from foreign sources, which are largely outside of their regulatory system. We found fewer problems among 47 samples purchased from U.S. and Canadian Internet pharmacies. Some Packages Containing Prescription Drugs Are Interdicted, but Others Are Released
Our work thus far shows that while CBP and FDA interdicted some packages that contain prescription drugs, other similar packages were released—either not inspected and released or released after inspection. However, packages that were not targeted typically bypass inspection and are released to the addressee without an assessment of their contents or admissibility. FDA has acknowledged that tens of thousands of packages have been released, although they may contain drug products that violate current laws and pose health risks to consumers. Packages Not Targeted for Inspection and Released
According to CBP and FDA officials at the IMBs we visited, CBP and FDA use various approaches to target certain incoming international mail packages for inspection. These include targeting packages from certain countries and/or packages suspected of containing certain prescription drugs. Officials said that this requirement applies to all drug imports with few exceptions. Agency Efforts to Address the Importation of Prescription Drugs Are Evolving
Our preliminary work revealed a number of efforts, including interagency initiatives that are being undertaken in response to concerns raised about the importation of prescription drugs. CBP and FDA are inspecting and interdicting some of the unapproved prescription drugs that are entering the country, but others bypass inspection and are sent to consumers who purchased them, often because, according to CBP and FDA officials, time-consuming processing requirements and staffing constraints limit their ability to perform more inspections. Although agencies like CBP, FDA, and DEA have begun initiatives to deal with various aspects of the drug importation issue, it is too early to tell whether these efforts will adequately address every dimension of the law enforcement and safety issues associated with the importation of prescription drugs. Postal Service, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and DEA. | Why GAO Did This Study
American consumers are increasingly drawn to the convenience, privacy, and cost advantages that might be accrued by purchasing prescription drugs over the Internet. However, there is growing concern about the safety of the drugs and the lawfulness of shipping the drugs into the United States through international mail and private carriers. Under current law, the importation of prescription drugs for personal use is illegal, with few exceptions. All prescription drugs offered for import must meet the requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and those that are controlled substances also must meet the requirements of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. According to the agencies responsible for enforcing these laws, prescription drugs imported for personal use generally do not meet these requirements. The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Health and Human Service's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are responsible for inspecting and interdicting unapproved prescription drugs that are being illegally imported via the U.S. mail or private carrier. This testimony reflects our preliminary observations from ongoing work to assess federal efforts to enforce the prohibitions on personal importation of prescription drugs.
What GAO Found
CBP and FDA officials said that the volume of imported adulterated, misbranded, or unapproved prescription drugs is large and increasing, but complete data do not exist to document these observations. FDA officials said that they cannot assure the public of the safety and quality of drugs purchased from foreign sources that are largely outside the U.S. regulatory system. GAO's recent report on a sample of drugs purchased from Internet pharmacies echoed these concerns. CBP and FDA officials at mail and private carrier facilities inspect and interdict some packages that contain prescription drugs. However, according to officials, because of resource constraints, many other packages containing prescriptions drugs are either not inspected and are released to addressees or are released after an inspection. CBP and FDA target certain packages for inspection based on the packages' countries of origin and whether the packages are suspected of containing certain prescription drugs. However, packages that are not targeted typically bypass inspection and are released to addressees without an assessment of their contents or admissibility. FDA officials have acknowledged that tens of thousands of packages, containing drug products that may violate current laws and pose health risks to consumers, have been released. They said that time-consuming processing requirements and resource constraints limit their ability to perform more inspections. Agency efforts to deal with imported prescription drugs are evolving. Two interagency task forces were established to study prescription drug importation and address related law enforcement issues, respectively. Also, to overcome differences in the way officials target and interdict shipments of unapproved prescription drugs at various mail and private carrier facilities, FDA has begun implementing new procedures to promote more uniformity across facilities. It is too soon to tell if these efforts are sufficient to address various health, safety, and law enforcement issues associated with the importation of prescription drugs. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-126 | gao_T-HEHS-98-126_0 | In addition to providing services to children and families, Head Start sees one of its roles as a national laboratory for child development. Evaluation of Past Research
In 1997, we reported the results of our work on identifying what existing studies suggest about Head Start’s impact. The current initiatives HHS describes as assessing impact include (1) the development of new performance measures, (2) a longitudinal study called FACES, and (3) a collaborative effort with NCES. assess the net impact of the Head Start program. Another HHS initiative, FACES, is a study of a representative sample of Head Start children and their families intended to show whether Head Start is reaching its goal of improving children’s social competence. Improvement on Initiatives
Head Start’s initiatives are headed in the right direction because of their increased focus on outcomes and research that could be expanded to compare outcomes for children in Head Start with those for similar children and families not served by the program. suggested that Head Start conduct randomized trials to study regular Head Start programs because this type of study provides the most conclusive information on program impact. HHS is taking steps that may help lay the groundwork for efforts to evaluate the net impact of Head Start program services. HHS efforts, however, do not include plans for a research study or set of studies that will definitively compare the outcomes achieved by Head Start children and their families with those achieved by similar non-Head Start children and families. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed Head Start's impact on children and their families, and the adequacy of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) current research plans to provide additional information on Head Start's impact.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Head Start program has provided comprehensive services to millions of low-income children and their families; (2) little is known, however, about whether the program has achieved its goals; (3) although an extensive body of literature exists on Head Start, only a small part of that involves program impact research; (4) because of these research studies' individual and collective limitations, this body of research is insufficient for use in drawing conclusions about the impact of the national program; (5) HHS has the following initiatives it describes as impact assessments: (a) development of performance measures focusing on program outcomes, rather than just processes; (b) a national longitudinal study of a representative sample of Head Start children and their families; and (c) a collaborative effort with the National Center for Educational Statistics; (6) these efforts are headed in the right direction for Head Start to evaluate the impact of its program; and (7) it is unclear, however, whether these efforts will meaningfully compare the outcomes achieved by Head Start children and their families with those achieved by non-Head Start children and families, leaving unanswered questions about Head Start's impact. |
gao_HEHS-98-5 | gao_HEHS-98-5_0 | Workers may be more willing to save for retirement if they can have access to their savings for emergencies before retirement. 1). In addition, a recent study found that the type and quality of information provided to employees on 401(k) plans may also be an important factor in encouraging employee participation in 401(k) pension plans. Employer matching also increases average contribution amounts in 401(k) plans but not to the same extent as loan provisions. 2). 3). Plan borrowers, on average, have less family income, lower net worth, and more nonhousing debt than nonborrowers. But participants who have recently been turned down for a loan from another source are almost 40-percent more likely to borrow against their pension account than other plan participants, holding all else equal. A smaller proportion of pension-plan borrowers report having housing debt than nonborrowers, but a larger proportion report having education loans (see table 2). Borrowing From Pension Account May Reduce Retirement Income
Pension-plan participants who borrow from their pension accounts risk having substantially lower pension balances at retirement. Pension-plan loans, however, generally have a favorable interest rate, which may be much lower than the return on the pension-account investments. However, pension-plan borrowing is a two-edged sword: Individuals who were prompted to participate because of the borrowing provision increase their retirement savings, but individuals who opt to borrow lose some of the tax advantages to retirement savings and risk having less income at retirement. Consequently, individual Social Security accounts would not benefit from the positive aspects of borrowing provisions, but the borrowing provisions would increase the risk of reduced retirement income. Scope and Methodology
To determine how pension-plan borrowing affects workers’ participation in and contributions to a pension plan and retirement income, we addressed the following questions:
Does the ability to borrow from defined contribution pension accounts increase participation in and contributions to 401(k) pension plans? What are the potential consequences for participants who borrow from their retirement accounts? We used the Survey of Consumer Finances to determine the effects of pension-plan borrowing on participation in and contributions to 401(k) pension plans and to describe the demographic and economic characteristics of workers who borrow from their pension accounts. For example, the coefficient estimate of 0.0591 for the borrowing variable indicates that plans that allow participant borrowing have participation rates that are about 6 percentage points higher than plans that do not allow borrowing. The results show that as long as the interest rate of the loan is less than the rate of return of the pension account balance (assumed to be 11 percent), borrowers will have a lower account balance at retirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) determined the effects of pension-plan borrowing on participation in and contributions to 401(k) pension plans; (2) described the demographic and economic characteristics of workers who borrow from their pension accounts; and (3) identified the potential consequences for participants who borrow from their pension accounts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) plans that allow borrowing have a somewhat higher proportion of employees participating than other plans, all other factors being equal; (2) in addition to employer matching, allowing borrowing increases participation among eligible employees, especially lower-income employees; (3) allowing pension-plan borrowing also significantly affects how much employees contribute; (4) participants in plans that allow borrowing contribute, on average, 35 percent more to their pension accounts than participants in plans that do not allow borrowing; (5) based on individual financial data GAO examined, relatively few plan participants--less than 8 percent--have one or more loans from their pension accounts; (6) this is true for a point in time and would not include those who had repaid a past loan or who might borrow in the future; (7) blacks and hispanics, lower-income individuals, participants who have recently been turned down for a loan, and workers who also are covered by other pension plans are more likely to borrow from their pension account than other participants; (8) plan borrowers, on average, have fewer assets than nonborrowers and have more nonhousing debt relative to income than nonborrowers; (9) while borrowing provisions may reduce retirement income, they also can encourage workers to save for their retirement; (10) loan provisions of many pension plans provide for repaying the loan at favorable interest rates, which may be lower than the investment yield that could have been earned had the money been left in the pension account; (11) consequently, the borrower will have a smaller pension balance at retirement, since the interest paid to the account is less than what the account balance could have earned form investing in equities; however, other potential effects of borrowing could outweigh these disadvantages; (12) if loan provisions influenced the employee's decision to participate in the pension plan, the employee's retirement income would likely have been even less had there not been such provisions; (13) allowing participants to borrow from their defined-contribution pension plan, therefore, may be a double-edged sword; and (13) there are both advantages and disadvantages to borrowing from other voluntary retirement savings accounts, such as individual retirement accounts, however, few of the positive effects of pension-plan borrowing would be realized in mandatory retirement programs like Social Security. |
gao_GAO-10-119 | gao_GAO-10-119_0 | Subsequently, the decision was made to conduct testing at Aberdeen Test Center, which is not NIJ-certified. 3. 4. Army Took Significant Steps during Preliminary Design Model Testing to Run a Controlled Test and Maintain Consistency but Did Not Consistently Follow Established Testing Protocols and, as a Result, Did Not Achieve the Intended Test Objective
Army Took Significant Steps to Run a Controlled Test and Maintain Consistency
Following are significant steps the Army took to run a controlled test and maintain consistency throughout Preliminary Design Model testing: The Army developed testing protocols for the hard-plate (ESAPI and XSAPI) and flexible-armor (FSAPV-E and FSAPV-X) preliminary design model categories in 2007. Of potentially greater consequence to the final test results is our observation of deviations from testing protocols regarding the clay calibration tests. During approximately the first one-third of testing, however, Army testers incorrectly measured deformation at the point of aim, rather than at the deepest point of depression. The Army then changed the test plans and modified the contract solicitation to call for measuring at the point of aim. As a result, at least two of the eight designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing and were awarded contracts would have failed if the deepest point of depression measurement had been used. During First Article Testing the Army Addressed Some of the Problems Identified in Preliminary Design Model Testing, but Army Testers Did Not Always Follow Established Testing Protocols and Did Not Maintain Some Internal Controls
During First Article Testing, the Army Addressed Some of the Problems Identified during Preliminary Design Model Testing
PEO Soldier maintained an on-site presence in the test lanes and the Army technical experts on the Integrated Product Team charged with testing oversight resolved the following problems during First Article Testing: The Army adjusted its testing protocols to clarify the required shot location for the impact test, and Army testers correctly placed these shots as required by the protocols. While we did not validate this assertion that rounding was a common industry practice, one private industry ballistics testing facility said that its practice was to always round results up, not down, which has the same effect as not rounding at all. However, the Army did not consistently maintain adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of its test data. For example, in one case bullet velocity data were lost because the lane Test Director accidentally pressed the delete button on the keyboard, requiring a test to be repeated. Army Did Not Formally Document Significant Procedures That Deviated from Established Testing Protocols or Assess the Impact of These Deviations
According to Army officials, decisions to implement those procedures that deviated from testing protocols were reviewed and approved by appropriate officials. With respect to internal control issues, Army officials acknowledged that before our review they were unaware of the specific internal control problems we identified. Furthermore, one of the remaining two designs that passed First Article Testing was a design that would have failed Preliminary Design Model testing if back-face deformation was measured in accordance with the established protocols for that test. In performing this evaluation, the independent experts should specifically evaluate the effects of the following practices observed during First Article Testing: the rounding of back-face deformation measurements; not scoring penetrations of material through the plate as a complete penetration unless broken fibers are observed in the Kevlar backing behind each plate; the use of the laser scanner to measure back-face deformations without a full evaluation of its accuracy as it was actually used during testing, to include the use of the software modifications and operation under actual test conditions; the exposure of the clay backing material to rain and other outside environmental conditions as well as the effect of high oven temperatures during storage and conditioning; and the use of an additional series of clay calibration drops when the first series of clay calibration drops does not pass required specifications. With respect to the specific inconsistencies we identified between the test practices and testing protocols, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army, based on the results of the independent expert review of the First Article Test results, take the following actions: Determine whether those practices that deviated from established testing protocols during First Article Testing will be continued during future testing and change the established testing protocols to reflect those revised practices. DOD also does not concur with what it perceives as our two overarching conclusions: (1) that Preliminary Design Model testing did not achieve its intended objective of determining, as a basis for contract awards, which designs met performance requirements and (2) that First Article Testing may not have met its objective of determining whether each of the contracted plate designs met performance requirements. We did not verify the accuracy of the Army’s test data and did not provide an expert evaluation of the results of testing. To understand the practices the Army used and the established testing protocols we were comparing the practices with, we met with and/or obtained data from officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) organizations and the industry experts listed in table 1: To determine the degree to which the Army followed established testing protocols during the Preliminary Design Model testing of body armor designs, we were present and made observations during the entire period of testing, compared our observations with established testing protocols, and interviewed numerous DOD and other experts about body armor testing. After capturing the testing data in our data collection instruments, we compared our observations of the way Aberdeen Test Center conducted testing with the testing protocols that Army officials told us served as the testing standards at the Aberdeen Test Center. 8. DOD agreed that Army testers deviated from the testing protocols by measuring back-face deformation at the point of aim. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army has issued soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan personal body armor, comprising an outer protective vest and ceramic plate inserts. GAO observed Preliminary Design Model testing of new plate designs, which resulted in the Army's awarding contracts in September 2008 valued at a total of over $8 billion to vendors of the designs that passed that testing. Between November and December 2008, the Army conducted further testing, called First Article Testing, on these designs. GAO is reporting on the degree to which the Army followed its established testing protocols during these two tests. GAO did not provide an expert ballistics evaluation of the results of testing. GAO, using a structured, GAO-developed data collection instrument, observed both tests at the Army's Aberdeen Test Center, analyzed data, and interviewed agency and industry officials to evaluate observed deviations from testing protocols. However, independent ballistics testing expertise is needed to determine the full effect of these deviations.
What GAO Found
During Preliminary Design Model testing the Army took significant steps to run a controlled test and maintain consistency throughout the process, but the Army did not always follow established testing protocols and, as a result, did not achieve its intended test objective of determining as a basis for awarding contracts which designs met performance requirements. In the most consequential of the Army's deviations from testing protocols, the Army testers incorrectly measured the amount of force absorbed by the plate designs by measuring back-face deformation in the clay backing at the point of aim rather than at the deepest point of depression. Army testers recognized the error after completing about a third of the test and then changed the test plan to call for measuring at the point of aim and likewise issued a modification to the contract solicitation. At least two of the eight designs that passed Preliminary Design Model testing and were awarded contracts would have failed if measurements had been made to the deepest point of depression. The deviations from the testing protocols were the result of Aberdeen Test Center's incorrectly interpreting the testing protocols. In all these cases of deviations from the testing protocols, the Aberdeen Test Center's implemented procedures were not reviewed or approved by the Army and Department of Defense officials responsible for approving the testing protocols. After concerns were raised regarding the Preliminary Design Model testing, the decision was made not to field any of the plate designs awarded contracts until after First Article Testing was conducted. During First Article Testing, the Army addressed some of the problems identified during Preliminary Design Model testing, but GAO observed instances in which Army testers did not follow the established testing protocols and did not maintain internal controls over the integrity and reliability of data, raising questions as to whether the Army met its First Article Test objective of determining whether each of the contracted designs met performance requirements. The following are examples of deviations from testing protocols and other issues that GAO observed: (1) The clay backing placed behind the plates during ballistics testing was not always calibrated in accordance with testing protocols and was exposed to rain on one day, potentially impacting test results. (2) Testers improperly rounded down back-face deformation measurements, which is not authorized in the established testing protocols and which resulted in two designs passing First Article Testing that otherwise would have failed. Army officials said rounding is a common practice; however, one private test facility that rounds told GAO that they round up, not down. (3) Testers used a new instrument to measure back-face deformation without adequately certifying that the instrument could function correctly and in conformance with established testing protocols. The impact of this issue on test results is uncertain, but it could call into question the reliability and accuracy of the measurements. (4) Testers deviated from the established testing protocols in one instance by improperly scoring a complete penetration as a partial penetration. As a result, one design passed First Article Testing that would have otherwise failed. With respect to internal control issues, the Army did not consistently maintain adequate internal controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of test data. In one example, during ballistic testing, data were lost, and testing had to be repeated because an official accidentally pressed the delete button and software controls were not in place to protect the integrity of test data. Army officials acknowledged that before GAO's review they were unaware of the specific internal control problems we identified. |
gao_GAO-14-746T | gao_GAO-14-746T_0 | Large Partnerships Have Grown in Number, Size, and Complexity Since 2002 with Hundreds Now Having More Than 100,000 Partners
According to IRS data, between tax years 2002 to 2011, the number of large partnerships more than tripled from 2,832 to 10,099. For comparison, our interim report on large partnerships, which defined large partnerships as those with 100 or more direct partners and $100 million or more in assets, found that over the same time period the number of large partnerships more than tripled, from 720 in tax year 2002 to 2,226 in tax year 2011. According to IRS officials and data, many of these entities are investment funds, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, which are pools of assets shared by investors that are counted legally as partners of the large partnership. Almost two-thirds of large partnerships in 2011 had more than 1,000 direct and indirect partners, although hundreds of large partnerships had more than 100,000. IRS Audits Few Large Partnerships Due to Challenges Presented by the Complexity of Both the Audit Procedures and the Large Partnership Structures
IRS Audits Large Partnerships at a Much Lower Rate than Large Corporations and the Audits Produce Minimal Results for Audit Time Spent
IRS audits few large, complex partnerships. The audit rate for large partnerships remains well below that of C corporations with $100 million or more in assets, which was 27.1 percent in fiscal year 2012. In 2013, for example, 64.2 percent of the large partnership audits resulted in no change to the reported income or losses. Several Challenges Related to Complexity Hinder IRS’s Audits of Large Partnerships
The high no change rates and minimal adjustment amounts for IRS audits of large partnerships may be due to a number of challenges that can cause IRS to spend audit time on administrative tasks, or waiting on action by a large partnership or IRS stakeholder rather than doing actual audit work. Congress enacted the TEFRA audit procedures in response to concerns about IRS’s ability to audit partnership returns. According to the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), the complexity and fragmentation of partnership audits prior to TEFRA, especially for large partnerships with partners in many audit jurisdictions, resulted in the statute of limitations expiring for some partners while other partners were required to pay additional taxes as a result of the audits. To pass through the audit adjustments to the taxable partners, IRS has to first link, or connect, the partners’ returns to the partnership return being audited. For example, IRS officials reported having difficulty in identifying the business purpose for the large partnerships or in determining the source of income or losses within their structures (i.e. They cited a number of reasons for the inefficient use of resources, such as having to collect and review information on a large number of partners and the difficulty of passing through audit adjustments to those partners. IRS Has Limited Ability to Fully Address Challenges
IRS by itself cannot fully address the tax law and resource challenges in auditing large partnership returns. Aside from closing agreements, the IRS efforts affect steps IRS takes at the beginning of an audit—such as understanding the complexity of large partnerships and selecting returns for audits. IRS provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Businesses organized as partnerships have increased in number in recent years while the number of C corporations (i.e. those subject to the corporate income tax) has decreased. The partnership population includes large partnerships (those GAO defined as having $100 million or more in assets and 100 or more direct and indirect partners). Their structure varies. Some large partnerships have direct partners that are partnerships and may bring many of their own partners into the structure. By tiering partnerships in this manner, very complex structures can be created with hundreds of thousands of direct and indirect partners. Tiered large partnerships are challenging for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to audit because of the difficulty of tracing income from its source through the tiers to the ultimate partners.
GAO was asked to study the challenges large partnerships pose for IRS. GAO describes the number of large partnerships and their assets, IRS's large partnership audit results and the challenges IRS faces in auditing these entities, and options for addressing these challenges. GAO analyzed IRS data on partnerships, reviewed IRS documentation, interviewed IRS officials, met with IRS auditors in six focus groups, and interviewed private sector lawyers knowledgeable about partnerships.
What GAO Found
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data show, from tax years 2002 to 2011, the number of large partnerships more than tripled. According to IRS officials, many large partnerships are hedge funds or other investment funds where the investors are legally considered partners. Many others are large because they are tiered and include investment funds as indirect partners somewhere in a tiered structure. According to IRS data, there were more than 10,000 large partnerships in 2011. A majority had more than 1,000 direct and indirect partners although hundreds had more than 100,000. A majority also had six or more tiers.
IRS audits few large partnerships—0.8 percent in fiscal year 2012 compared to 27.1 percent for large corporations. Of the audits that were done, about two-thirds resulted in no change to the partnership's reported net income. The remaining one-third resulted in an average audit adjustment to net income of $1.9 million. These minimal audit results may be due to challenges hindering IRS's ability to effectively audit large partnerships. Challenges included administrative tasks required by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the complexity of large partnership structures due to tiering and the large number of partners. For example, IRS auditors said that it can sometimes take months to identify the person who represents the partnership in the audit, as required by TEFRA, reducing the time available to conduct the audit. Complex large partnerships also make it difficult to pass through audit adjustments across tiers to the taxable partners.
IRS cannot resolve some of the challenges because they are rooted in tax law, such as those required by TEFRA. Congress and the Administration have proposed statutory changes to the audit procedures for partnerships, such as requiring partnerships to pay taxes on net audit adjustments rather than passing them through to the taxable partners. In addition, IRS has implemented some changes to its large partnership audit process, such as understanding the complexity of large partnerships and selecting returns for audits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations but will issue a report later in 2014 assessing IRS's large partnership audit challenges. IRS provided technical comments, which were incorporated. |
gao_GAO-17-44 | gao_GAO-17-44_0 | CCI received both federal and nonfederal funding to support the production of the 2012 through 2014 Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts. CCI received federal funding from NPS through a cooperative agreement. As shown in figure 1, funding provided through the cooperative agreement included funding that NPS received through an interagency agreement with the Department of the Army (Army) and funding from NPS’s own budget through the National Capital Area Performing Arts Program. CCI obtained nonfederal funding through corporate sponsorship agreements, grant agreements with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and license agreements from the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). CCI also received funding from other sources, such as interest revenue, but these sources represent a minor portion of total funding. CCI Disbursed from $8.3 Million to $8.9 Million Each Year for the 2012 through 2014 Concerts
CCI disbursed from $8.3 million to $8.9 million each year to produce the 2012 through 2014 Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts, approximately 1.1 to 3.7 percent less than the annual funding received. These errors occurred, in part, because CCI’s Procurement and Accounts Payable Policy has not been updated since November 2008 and does not include all internal control activities to be performed when authorized management may be out of the office and regular check authorization procedures cannot be followed. Without incorporating all control activities over payment approvals into its policy and procedures, CCI increases its risk that the control activities will not be implemented consistently and that improper payments, fraud, and abuse may not be prevented or detected. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that CCI’s Chief Financial Officer update its existing Procurement and Accounts Payable Policy to fully document CCI’s management approval controls over payments made by check, including exemptions to regular procedures. This should include approval procedures to be followed during periods when only one authorized manager is available to sign checks for payment. Nonetheless, CCI stated that its Board of Directors will take appropriate action to address our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) how much funding, federal and nonfederal, was received and used by Capital Concerts, Inc. (CCI) for the 2012 through 2014 Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts and (2) to what extent CCI’s recorded receipts and disbursements related to these concerts were supported by adequate documentation, approved by authorized management, and recorded in the appropriate year. The scope of our audit was limited to the receipts and disbursements of CCI as the majority of funding received and disbursed to produce the Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts held on U.S. Capitol Grounds rests with this organization. We obtained CCI management’s concurrence with our classifications. | Why GAO Did This Study
CCI, a private nonprofit organization in the District of Columbia, has produced the annual Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts held on the U.S. Capitol Grounds for over 25 years and over 35 years, respectively.
GAO was asked to audit all concerts hosted by CCI for the past 3 years. This report examines (1) how much funding, federal and nonfederal, was received and used by CCI for the 2012 though 2014 Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts and (2) to what extent CCI's recorded receipts and disbursements related to these concerts were supported by adequate documentation, approved by authorized management, and recorded in the appropriate year. GAO performed data reliability procedures over CCI's 2012 through 2014 receipt and disbursement transactions, classified transactions by funding sources, obtained CCI management's concurrence with the classifications, and selected transactions for each year to test key controls.
What GAO Found
Capital Concerts, Inc. (CCI) received both federal and nonfederal funding to support the production of the Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts held on the U.S. Capitol Grounds from 2012 through 2014. CCI received federal funding through a cooperative agreement with the Department of the Interior's National Park Service (NPS) that included funding that NPS received through an interagency agreement with the Department of the Army and funding from NPS's own budget through the National Capital Area Performing Arts Program. CCI obtained nonfederal funding through corporate sponsorship agreements, grant agreements with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and license agreements from the Public Broadcasting Service. CCI also received funding from other sources, such as interest revenue, but these transactions represent a minor portion of total funding.
CCI received funding for the 2012 through 2014 Memorial Day and Fourth of July concerts ranging from $8.5 million to $9.2 million each year. CCI disbursed from $8.3 million to $8.9 million each year to produce these concerts, approximately 1.1 to 3.7 percent less than the annual funding received.
Procurement and Accounts Payable Policy has not been updated since November 2008 and does not include all internal control activities over payment approvals. Without incorporating all control activities over payment approvals into its policy and procedures, CCI increases its risk that the control activities will not be implemented consistently and that improper payments, fraud, and abuse may not be prevented or detected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CCI update its existing policy to fully document CCI's management approval controls over payments made by check, including exemptions to regular procedures. The update should include approval procedures to be followed during periods when only one authorized manager is available to sign checks for payment. In commenting on a draft of this report, CCI maintained that all disbursements were properly approved but GAO disagreed as noted in the report. CCI stated it will take appropriate action to address GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-934T | gao_GAO-05-934T_0 | For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. To conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and force- on-force exercises, in which the site’s protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist
Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, we determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could impair the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. However, DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers’ participation in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual participation. Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105 protective force officers reported that they did not always have dependable radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery life, and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations on site as the two most significant problems. DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they need to take several actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an elite force, developing and deploying new security technologies, consolidating and eliminating special nuclear material, and making organizational improvements within ESE’s security program. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require a significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. It believes technologies can reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. ESE’s current strategy to meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on consolidating and eliminating special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. Specifically, there is no centralized security organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. | Why GAO Did This Study
A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed security force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the larger, revised terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.
What GAO Found
Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of protective forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. GAO also found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that related improvements were under way. To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an elite, possibly federalized, force, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites, and creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-13-302 | gao_GAO-13-302_0 | Background
VA operates one of the largest direct health-care delivery systems in the United States. VA staff at various organizational levels participate in the construction management process for major medical-facility projects. Contractors can also request changes to the contract. Cost Increases and Schedule Delays at the Four Largest Projects Occurred for a Variety of Reasons
Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
For VA’s four largest medical-facility construction projects, when comparing November 2012 construction project data with the cost and schedule estimates first submitted to Congress, cost increases ranged from 59 percent to 144 percent, representing a total cost increase of nearly $1.5 billion and an average increase of approximately $366 million per project. The schedule delays ranged from 14 to 74 months with an average delay of 35 months per project (see table 3). For example, the costs for the four projects decreased or remained unchanged, and the number of months the completion dated extended ranged from 0 to 10 months.construction contract would be more accurate for measuring schedule delays; however, using this start date would not account for how VA VA officials said that using the initial completion date from the managed these projects prior to awarding the construction contract. As discussed later in this report, VA is taking steps to address some of the council’s other recommendations. VA has taken some action to tap the experience of other federal agencies involved in constructing medical facilities. According to VA, in both Denver and New Orleans, because the contractors were not involved in the design of the projects and formulated their bids based on a design which had not been finalized, these projects required changes that increased costs and led to schedule delays. Given the complexity and sometimes rapidly evolving nature of medical technology, many health care organizations employ medical equipment planners to help match the medical equipment needed in the facility to the construction of the facility. VA officials recognized in Orlando that the procurement of medical equipment was not successful because there was no guidance on determining the need for medical equipment procurement when building a major new facility. Although we recognize that some cost increases and schedule delays result from factors beyond VA’s control, our review of VA’s four largest projects indicates that weaknesses in VA’s construction management processes also contributed to cost increases and schedule delays. As part of its action involving the council’s recommendations, VA is confronted with addressing a lack of guidance and procedures for some important aspects of construction management, specifically, guidance and procedures for using medical equipment planners on projects, clearly communicating the roles and responsibilities of VA construction staff to stakeholders, and streamlining the change-order process. Moreover, while the Construction Review Council has identified opportunities to streamline VA’s multi-layered change-order process, VA has yet to be develop guidance to ensure that change orders are approved in a prompt manner to avoid project delays. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of VA’s major construction projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should take the following three actions: develop and implement agency guidance for assignment of medical equipment planners to major medical construction projects; develop and disseminate procedures for communicating, to contractors, clearly defined roles and responsibilities of VA officials who manage major medical-facility projects, particularly the change- order process; and issue and take steps to implement guidance on streamlining the change-order process based on the findings and recommendations of the Construction Review Council. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to VA for review and comment. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine changes to costs, schedule, and scope for selected Department of Veterans Affairs’ new major medical-facility projects, we obtained and analyzed data that VA provided on the status of VA’s 50 active major medical-facility projects as of November 2012, including the original cost estimates and completion dates and the project’s current status. The information from our site visits is illustrative To identify which actions VA has taken to improve its construction management, and any opportunities that exist for VA to further improve its management, we reviewed VA’s management practices of construction projects at the three locations we visited and interviewed VA headquarters’ officials from the Veterans Health Administration, Office of Construction and Facilities Management, Office of General Counsel, as well as project managers and senior resident engineers at the construction sites we visited. | Why GAO Did This Study
The VA operates one of the nation’s largest health care delivery systems. Charged with addressing the issues of increasing medical demands and aging medical facilities, VA currently manages the construction of 50 major medical-facility projects, each costing at least $10 million, some in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As requested, GAO examined VA’s management of such projects. GAO reviewed (1) changes to costs, schedule, and scope for selected new medical-facility construction projects and (2) actions VA has taken to improve management and any opportunities that exist for VA to improve its management of costs, schedule, and scope of these construction projects. GAO analyzed documents, VA data as of November 2012 on selected major construction projects, and interviewed VA officials, architecture and engineering, and construction firms.
What GAO Found
Costs substantially increased and schedules were delayed for Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) largest medical-center construction projects in Denver, Colorado; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Orlando, Florida. As of November 2012, the cost increases for these projects ranged from 59 percent to 144 percent, with a total cost increase of nearly $1.5 billion and an average increase of approximately $366 million. The delays for these projects range from 14 to 74 months, resulting in an average delay of 35 months per project. In commenting on a draft of this report, VA contends that using the initial completion date from the construction contract would be more accurate than using the initial completion date provided to Congress; however, using this date would not account for how VA managed these projects prior to the award of the construction contract. Several factors, including changes to veterans' health care needs and site-acquisition issues contributed to increased costs and schedule delays at these sites.
Although VA has taken some actions to address problems managing major construction projects, the agency has opportunities for further improvement. For example, VA established a Construction Review Council in June 2012 to oversee the department's development and execution of its real property programs. However, construction management challenges remain, and opportunities exist for VA to avoid further cost increases and schedule delays.
Given the complexity and speed of medical advances, many health care organizations have enlisted the services of experts in planning the procurement and installation of medical equipment for new medical centers. VA has used these planners at various phases for some projects and is reviewing its overall procurement of medical equipment. However, VA has not taken full advantage of medical equipment planners on all projects, in part because there is no guidance for doing so. Not using a medical equipment planner can lead to increased design and construction changes resulting in cost increases and schedule delays.
VA has not yet clearly defined roles and responsibilities of VA construction management staff, even though the agency previously identified the need to do so. GAO found that conflicting direction from VA to contractors can cause some confusion and lead to cost increases and construction delays. For example, contractor officials at one site said that VA's project manager directed them to defer the design of specific rooms until medical equipment was selected for the facility; however, VA's central office then directed the contractor to proceed with designing the rooms. This conflicting direction from VA will require the contractor to redesign the space, further expending project resources.
The federal government's regulations and VA's policy specify that changes to construction contracts, known as change orders, should be issued in a timely manner; however, VA's change-order approval process requires time-consuming reviews at multiple organizational levels that have resulted in extensive delays and increased costs for some projects. VA is reviewing options to shorten the decision cycle for approval of construction contract modifications but has not yet streamlined the process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA (1) develop and implement agency guidance for assignment of medical equipment planners to major medical construction projects; (2) develop and disseminate procedures for communicating to contractors clearly defined roles and responsibilities of VA officials who manage major medical-facility projects, particularly the change-order process; and (3) issue and take steps to implement guidance on streamlining the change-order process. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations, but expressed concerns about the depiction of cost increases and schedule delays; GAO believes its methodology is accurate as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-02-27 | gao_GAO-02-27_0 | We also reviewed the regional MDBs’ 1997 through 2000 audited financial statements and auditors’ opinions on the financial statements and identified the accounting and auditing standards used by each MDB, analyzed and compiled information from the regional MDBs’ annual reports and their audited financial statements, analyzed the external audit reports to determine the extent of the external auditors’ reporting on internal control and compliance in conjunction with the financial statement audits, reviewed the banks’ terms of reference (charters) to identify the scope of their audit committees’ oversight and compared them to relevant guidance on widely accepted internal control frameworks and principles on banking supervision, obtained information from the U.S. Executive Directors of each MDB group on the MDBs’ audit committees, external audits, and the extent of external auditor reporting on internal control and compliance, reviewed widely accepted internal control frameworks, such as the Guidelines for Internal Control Standards developed by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, and discussed various options for external auditor reporting with representatives from three international accounting firms that were responsible for some of the MDB audits. Background
MDBs are multilateral, international entities that finance economic and social development projects and programs in developing countries and countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Congress appropriates funds for the United States’ contributions and capital subscriptions to the MDBs. All of the regional MDBs included in our report received unqualified or “clean” audit opinions on their financial statements for the 4 most recent years. The MDBs’ external financial statement audits also do not provide and are not intended to provide specific assurance about the internal control over the MDBs’ lending operations and whether the funds are spent for their intended purposes. Attestation services can cover internal control over financial reporting, operations, and compliance with laws, regulations, or key policies. 3. Based on our review of the regional MDBs’ Web sites, most of the regional MDBs that we reviewed have developed anti-corruption strategies that state that they recognize the importance of strong internal control systems. | What GAO Found
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide financial support to promote social and economic progress in developing countries and the countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2001, the United States is providing $1.3 billion to support the MDBs, with $460 million going to the regional development banks and $840 million going to the World Bank Group. All of the MDBs GAO reviewed have received unqualified or "clean" opinions on their external audits. However, none of the MDBs GAO reviewed are required to report on their internal controls over financial reporting, lending operations, or compliance with their governing charters or policies. In addition, the regional MDBs' external financial statement audits are not intended to, and do not, provide assurances about internal controls over the MDBs' lending operations and whether funds are spent as intended. Most of the regional MDBs that GAO reviewed have developed anti-corruption strategies that recognize the importance of strong internal control systems. Each of the regional MDBs GAO studied has established internal audit functions as part of their controls. |
gao_GAO-13-350 | gao_GAO-13-350_0 | IRS Is the Tax Collector for the United States
IRS collects taxes, processes tax returns, and enforces federal tax laws. IRS relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. However, IRS did not fully implement effective controls in these areas. IRS has made progress in its implementation of data encryption controls, particularly in protecting sensitive information transmitted across its internal network. For fiscal year 2012, this office continued to implement new procedures building on its initiatives. IRS Had Developed an Information Security Program but Had Not Always Effectively Implemented Elements of the Program
A key reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax-processing systems was that, although the agency has developed and documented a comprehensive agencywide information security program, it had not effectively implemented certain elements of its information security program. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that include testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. However, for one financial reporting system that we reviewed, the testing methodology did not always determine whether required authentication controls were operating effectively. Consequently, we identified control weaknesses that had not been detected by IRS. However, we determined that 13 (about 22 percent) of the 58 had actually not yet been fully resolved. Conclusions
IRS has continued to make important progress in addressing information security control weaknesses, and in improving its internal control over financial reporting. During fiscal year 2012, IRS management devoted attention and resources to addressing information security controls, and resolved a significant number of the information security control deficiencies that we have previously reported. Nevertheless, information security weaknesses remain in access and other information system controls over IRS’s financial and tax-processing systems, affecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data. These deficiencies are the basis of our determination that IRS had a significant deficiency in internal control over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2012. Continued and consistent management commitment and attention to an effective information security program will be essential to the maintenance of, and continued improvements in, the agency’s information security controls. Recommendations for Executive Action
In addition to implementing our previous recommendations, we are recommending that the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following four actions to effectively implement key components of the IRS information security program:
Update policies and procedures to ensure that they address (1) both methods available for granting all users access to mainframe resources, (2) audit and monitoring of access from one processing environment to another, (3) use of appropriate accounts by multiple databases on a single server, (4) data storage shared between systems, (5) out-of-date security standards, and (6) reconciliation of access privileges; update test and evaluation methodology to ensure that it determines whether authentication controls are operating effectively; update mainframe test and evaluation processes to improve periodic monitoring of compliance with IRS policies; and fully document a continuous monitoring strategy that includes requirements and activities definitions at each organizational tier. We are also making 30 detailed recommendations in a separate report with limited distribution. However, as we noted in this report, although IRS has continued to make important progress in addressing information security control weaknesses, it had not always effectively implemented access and other controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether controls over key financial and tax-processing systems were effective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To do this, we examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials in order to (1) assess the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by IRS to address weaknesses we previously reported and (2) determine whether any additional weaknesses existed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations and on information security controls to protect the financial and sensitive taxpayer information that resides on those systems.
As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2012 and 2011 financial statements, GAO assessed whether controls over key financial and tax-processing systems are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials at eight sites.
What GAO Found
IRS continued to make progress in addressing information security control weaknesses, improving its internal control over financial reporting. During fiscal year 2012, IRS management devoted attention and resources to addressing information security controls, and resolved a significant number of the information security control deficiencies that GAO previously reported. Notable among these efforts were the (1) formation of cross-functional working groups tasked with the identification and remediation of specific at-risk control areas, (2) improvement in controls over the encryption of data transferred between accounting systems, and (3) upgrades to critical network devices on the agency's internal network system. However, serious weaknesses remain that could affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data. For example, the agency had not always (1) implemented effective controls for identifying and authenticating users, such as enforcing password complexity on certain servers; (2) appropriately restricted access to its mainframe environment; (3) effectively monitored the mainframe environment; or (4) ensured that current patches had been installed on systems to protect against known vulnerabilities.
An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not effectively implemented portions of its information security program. The agency has established a comprehensive framework for the program, and continued to make strides with various initiatives designed to improve its controls; however, certain components of the program did not always function as intended. For example, IRS's testing procedures over a financial reporting system that GAO reviewed did not always determine whether required controls were operating effectively and consequently, GAO identified control weaknesses that had not been detected by IRS. In addition, the agency had not updated an important policy concerning security standards for IRS's main tax processing environment to include current software versions and control capabilities. Further, although IRS indicated that it had addressed 58 of the previous information system security-related recommendations GAO made, 13 (about 22 percent) of the 58 had actually not yet been fully resolved. Continued and consistent management commitment and attention to an effective information security program will be essential to the maintenance of, and continued improvements in, its information system controls. Until IRS takes additional steps to (1) more effectively implement its testing and monitoring capabilities, (2) ensure that policies and procedures are updated, and (3) address unresolved and newly identified control deficiencies, its financial and taxpayer data will remain vulnerable to inappropriate use, modification, or disclosure, possibly without being detected. These deficiencies, along with shortcomings in the information security program, were the basis of GAO's determination that IRS had a significant deficiency in its internal control over financial reporting systems for fiscal year 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS take four actions to more effectively implement portions of its information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending that IRS take 30 specific actions to address newly identified control weaknesses. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed to develop a detailed corrective action plan to address each recommendation. |
gao_RCED-96-236 | gao_RCED-96-236_0 | Implementation Remains Uneven
Two years after EPA established its peer review policy, implementation is still uneven. The Council’s interim report pointed out that “although peer review is widely used and highly regarded, it is poorly understood by many, and it has come under serious study only in recent years.” Although we agree that the issues EPA and others have raised may warrant further consideration, we believe that EPA’s uneven implementation is primarily due to (1) confusion among agency staff and management about what peer review is, what its significance and benefits are, and when and how it should be conducted and (2) ineffective accountability and oversight mechanisms to ensure that all products are properly peer reviewed by program and regional offices. EPA’s Actions to Improve the Peer Review Process
EPA has recently taken a number of steps to improve the peer review process. According to the Deputy Administrator, this expanded assessment and verification process will help build accountability and demonstrate EPA’s commitment to the independent review of the scientific analyses underlying the agency’s decisions to protect public health and the environment. Similarly, the efforts aimed at improving the accountability and oversight of peer review fall short in that they do not ensure that each office and region has considered all relevant products for peer review and that the reasons are documented when products are not selected. This process would provide upper-level managers with the necessary information to determine whether or not all products have been appropriately considered for peer review. We have grouped the cases below according to whether (1) EPA’s peer review policy was followed, (2) the policy was not fully followed, or (3) a peer review was not conducted but should have been. “The importance of this . The agency plans to have the impact statement peer reviewed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA): (1) progress in implementing its peer review policy; and (2) efforts to improve the peer review process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although EPA has made progress in implementing its peer review policy, after nearly 2 years, implementation remains uneven; (2) while GAO found cases in which the peer review policy was followed, GAO also found cases in which important aspects of the policy were not followed or peer review was not conducted at all; (3) two primary reasons for this unevenness are: (a) confusion among agency staff and management about what peer review is, what its significance and benefits are, and how and when it should be conducted; and (b) inadequate accountability and oversight mechanisms to ensure that all relevant products are properly peer reviewed; (4) EPA officials readily acknowledged this uneven implementation and identified several of the agency's efforts to improve the peer review process; (5) because of concern about the effectiveness of the existing accountability and oversight mechanisms for ensuring proper peer review, EPA's Deputy Administrator recently established procedures to help build accountability and demonstrate EPA's commitment to the independent review of the scientific analyses underlying the agency's decisions; (6) these efforts are steps in the right direction; however, educating all staff about the merits of and procedures for conducting peer review would increase the likelihood that peer review is properly implemented agencywide; and (7) furthermore, by ensuring that all relevant products have been considered for peer review and that the reasons for those not selected have been documented, EPA's upper-level managers will have the necessary information to ensure that the policy is properly implemented. |
gao_GAO-08-399 | gao_GAO-08-399_0 | VA’s Partnerships with Academic Affiliates
For decades, VA has also developed and maintained partnerships, or affiliations, with university medical schools to provide health care to veterans. Through these affiliations, VA has been able to obtain medical services for veterans and provide training and education to medical residents. The administration has also encouraged such collaboration between VA and DOD as a means to achieve more cost-effective use of health care resources. Officials Identified Potential Benefits and Concerns, but Have Not Used Performance Measures to Document and Assess the Outcomes of Joint Ventures
Officials from VA and DOD and representatives from academic affiliates identified a number of potential benefits and concerns associated with joint ventures, but have not used performance measures to routinely or comprehensively document and assess the outcomes of the joint ventures. VA also does not use performance measures at the department level to determine what is being achieved through the joint ventures. As a result, VA has only limited and anecdotal information on the results of joint ventures. Officials Acknowledge Potential Concerns Associated with Joint Ventures, but Offer Mitigation Strategies
VA and DOD officials and representatives from academic affiliates also identified a number of potential concerns associated with joint ventures, including maintaining timely access to care, potential conflicts between organizational missions and cultures, staffing uncertainties that can affect hospital operations, a loss of organizational identity or control, the potential to create dependencies, and financial risks. However, VA and DOD officials at all of the VA-DOD joint venture sites said that they do not routinely or comprehensively assess the outcomes of the joint ventures. Officials Identified Lessons Learned from Their Experiences with Existing and Proposed Joint Ventures
Officials from VA and DOD and representatives from academic affiliates identified several lessons they have learned from their experiences with the existing and proposed joint ventures. These lessons included establishing joint committees to work through issues, communicating frequently with their partner, securing leadership buy-in and support at all levels, developing contingency plans, allowing adequate time to implement change, and establishing clear roles and responsibilities. In New Orleans, VA and LSU signed a memorandum of understanding that identifies the roles and responsibilities of the parties and provides a framework for collaboration and discussion between the two organizations on a proposed joint venture. VA Has Taken Steps to Evaluate Proposed Joint Ventures, but Additional Efforts Are Needed
VA has taken steps to evaluate proposed joint ventures. For example, VA established working groups in Charleston and New Orleans to examine joint venture proposals with academic affiliates. In addition, in response to our previous recommendations, VA developed and issued criteria for evaluating joint venture proposals in November 2007. However, VA’s evaluation criteria are not sufficiently specific to ensure consistent evaluations of proposals, and are not sufficiently tailored to ensure the appropriate level of review. The handbook represents an important step toward better assessing proposed joint ventures and managing existing joint ventures in that, among other things, it details departmental policy on joint ventures, defines joint ventures, identifies the process for reviewing and approving joint venture proposals, and outlines criteria for use in evaluating joint venture proposals—none of which had previously been developed, documented, or shared with joint venture partners. The evaluation criteria are not sufficiently specific—in terms of both the definition and the application of the criteria: VA defined most of the screening and comprehensive criteria by outlining the different elements that make up each criterion. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses the (1) potential benefits and concerns associated with joint ventures and the extent to which they are documented and measured, (2) lessons learned from existing and proposed Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) joint ventures with academic affiliates and the Department of Defense (DOD), and (3) steps VA has taken to better evaluate proposed joint ventures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have a long history of partnering to achieve more cost-effective use of health care resources. Their partnerships have evolved to include joint ventures--joint efforts to construct or share medical facilities. VA has maintained eight joint ventures with DOD across the country. VA has also developed partnerships, or affiliations, with university medical schools to obtain health care services for veterans and provide training to medical residents. VA has not entered into a joint venture with an academic affiliate to date. However, several proposals for such joint ventures have surfaced in the last decade. This congressionally requested report discusses the (1) potential benefits and concerns associated with joint ventures and the extent to which they are documented and measured, (2) lessons learned from existing and proposed VA joint ventures, and (3) steps VA has taken to evaluate proposed joint ventures. To address these issues, GAO conducted site visits to and interviews with officials from all existing and proposed joint venture sites.
What GAO Found
VA and DOD officials identified a number of potential benefits and concerns associated with joint ventures, but they have not routinely or comprehensively documented and measured them. Among the potential benefits, VA and DOD officials and academic affiliate representatives cited improved access to care, lower or avoided costs, and improved training opportunities. While the identified benefits are many, these officials and representatives also cited a number of concerns associated with joint ventures, such as potential conflicts of missions and cultures, a loss of organizational identity and control, staffing uncertainties, and financial risks. Although able to provide anecdotal information of the benefits and concerns associated with joint ventures, officials at the joint ventures do not use performance measures to routinely or comprehensively document and assess the outcomes of the joint ventures. Without such efforts, it is difficult to know to what extent these benefits and concerns have materialized. VA also does not use performance measures at the department level to determine what is being achieved through the joint ventures--thereby making it difficult to determine the overall outcomes of the joint ventures and to hold joint venture partners accountable for results. Officials from VA and DOD and representatives from academic affiliates identified several lessons they have learned from their experiences with the existing and proposed joint ventures. These lessons include the importance of establishing joint committees to work through issues, communicating frequently with their partners, securing leadership buy-in and support at all levels, developing contingency plans, allowing adequate time to implement change, and establishing clear roles and responsibilities. For example, at most VA-DOD joint venture sites, officials have created jointly staffed committees to tackle specific issues, such as clinical, financial, and information management. Also, in New Orleans, Louisiana, VA and its academic affiliate signed a memorandum of understanding that, among other things, identifies the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in the proposed joint venture negotiations. VA has taken steps to enhance its process for evaluating proposed joint ventures, but additional efforts are warranted. In response to our previous recommendations, VA developed and issued criteria for evaluating joint venture proposals in November 2007. In addition, VA established working groups in Charleston, South Carolina, and New Orleans to examine joint venture proposals with academic affiliates. However, VA's criteria for evaluating joint venture proposals are not sufficiently specific, in terms of both the definition and the application of the criteria. As a result, VA's evaluations of joint venture proposals could be inconsistent and, therefore, may not serve as a reliable guide for federal investments in joint ventures. In addition, the criteria are not tailored to take into account differences in prospective joint venture partners to ensure that VA applies the appropriate level of review and scrutiny to proposals. |
gao_GAO-14-441 | gao_GAO-14-441_0 | The form is the primary source of information collected by the federal government regarding the operation, funding, expenses, and investments of employee benefit plans. Form 5500 data are made publicly available. 1). Challenges with Finding Key Information
In addition to challenges with the reporting format, Form 5500 stakeholders identified various instances where information is not collected or easily extracted from Form 5500 data. Stakeholders Cited Misalignment with Other Fee Disclosures and Inconsistent Reporting of Service Provider Fee Information as Problematic
Stakeholders identified a wide range of challenges related to Form 5500 service provider fee information. Plans with fewer than 100 participants are not required to complete a Schedule C (Service Provider Information). DOL, IRS, and PBGC Face Administrative, Statutory, and Contractual Challenges to Collecting More Useful Form 5500 Information
Agencies’ Administrative Processes for Revising the Form and Limited Efforts to Solicit Stakeholder Input Pose Challenges
DOL, IRS, and PBGC stated that the process for making form changes is lengthy and involved, and also noted that it varies by agency. Specifically IRS has: negotiated with DOL to use the form to collect some data that would be of interest to IRS (pursuant to DOL’s authority in light of the limitation on IRS’s authority), included in the past 4 years of the President’s Budget Request, a legislative proposal to provide Treasury with the authority to require additional information be included in electronically filed Form 5500 annual reports, and initiated regulatory action governing electronic filing by proposing in August 2013 regulations that would require electronic filing for plan sponsors and others who file more than 250 returns annually. For years, we and others have raised concerns regarding the data collected via the Form 5500. Despite these long-standing concerns, agency officials have made only routine changes to the plan investment and service provider fee information in the form over the last 3 years. While the rulemaking process and other informal efforts to solicit stakeholder input have provided opportunities for public reaction to proposed changes to the form, these opportunities have been limited and they have not, as OMB guidance suggests, allowed for sufficient input to help shape changes to the form. This input could reduce the agencies’ costs of making subsequent changes, improve filer comprehension, and increase the comparability and reliability of data provided. Recommendations for Executive Actions
To improve the usefulness, reliability, and comparability of Form 5500 data for all stakeholders while limiting the burden on the filing community, we recommend the Secretaries of DOL and Treasury, and the Director of PBGC consider implementing the findings from our panel when modifying plan investment and service provider fee information, including: revise Schedule H plan asset categories to better match current investment vehicles and provide more transparency into plan investments; revise the Schedule of Assets attachments to create a standard searchable format; develop a central repository for EIN and PN numbers for filers and service providers to improve the comparability of form data across filings; clarify Schedule C instructions for direct, eligible indirect, and reportable indirect compensation so plan fees are reported more consistently and, as we recommended in the past, better align with the 408(b)(2) fee disclosures; and simplify and clarify Schedule C service provider codes to increase reporting consistency. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are still valid. PBGC agreed with our second recommendation, and stated that it would work with DOL and Treasury to explore options to conduct advance testing when making revisions to the form. Treasury and DOL did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with the recommendation. Aspects of the Form 5500 information on service provider fees 3. Challenges the Department of Labor (DOL), the Department of the Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) face in collecting and revising key annual reporting information on plan investments and service provider fees needed from plan sponsors. In the first phase, we asked this sample of panelists to identify challenges with the Form 5500 plan investment and service provider fee data collection, and to suggest changes that could improve the efficiency, clarity, and usefulness of those data. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Form 5500 is the primary means of collecting information for use by the federal government and the private sector on retirement plan assets, which exceeded $6 trillion in fiscal year 2011. Stakeholders, including those who prepare and use the form, have raised concerns about the quality and usefulness of form data. GAO was asked to review Form 5500 plan investment and fee information.
In this report, GAO examined: (1) stakeholder problems with Form 5500 plan investment information; (2) stakeholder problems with Form 5500 service provider fee information, and (3) challenges DOL, IRS, and PBGC face in collecting and revising Form 5500 information. GAO surveyed a panel of plan sponsors, service providers, representatives of plan participants, and researchers; interviewed agency officials; and reviewed studies on Form 5500 data.
What GAO Found
In a two-phase online GAO survey, stakeholders identified problems with the usefulness, reliability, and comparability of data from the Form 5500 (see table). Despite longstanding concerns with the Form 5500—the annual report that employee benefit plans file with the federal government—agency officials have made only minimal changes over the last 3 years.
Key Challenges Identified with Form 5500
Stakeholders said the form's information on service provider fees was misaligned with other required fee disclosures, and also cited various exceptions and gaps in current reporting requirements as major challenges. Specifically, Form 5500 service provider fee information does not align with other information that service providers must disclose to plan sponsors, forcing providers to produce two different sets of information. Also, differences in service provider compensation types and the lack of definitions for codes designating the types of services provided can result in inconsistent and incomplete data being reported. Other exceptions and gaps in service provider information result in an incomplete picture of plan fees. For example, large plans—those with 100 or more participants—are not required to report fee information for certain types of compensation and small plans file only limited fee information.
The Department of Labor (DOL), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) face significant administrative, statutory, and contractual challenges to collecting and revising the annual reporting information required for regulating private pensions. While the rulemaking process and other informal efforts to solicit stakeholder input have provided opportunities for public reaction to proposed changes to the form, these opportunities have been limited and have not included the advance testing OMB guidance suggests. Stakeholder input could lower costs by reducing subsequent changes, improve filer comprehension, and increase the comparability and reliability of the form's data. Additionally, a statutory prohibition against requiring electronic filing caused IRS to remove certain data elements from the Form 5500 after DOL mandated electronic filing of the form. If IRS were able to require electronic filing, it could add the data elements back to the form, which would improve its compliance, restore robust information to its enforcement activities, and decrease its data collection costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOL, Treasury, and PBGC consider modifying Form 5500 plan investment and service provider fee information to address challenges identified by our panel. DOL, Treasury, and PBGC should look for options to conduct advance testing when making major revisions to the form. Congress should consider granting Treasury authority to require Form 5500 data be filed electronically. PBGC agreed with the recommendations. DOL and Treasury did not state whether they agreed or disagreed with the recommendations; however, they identified actions underway to address the first recommendation. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-01-734 | gao_GAO-01-734_0 | The PfP program was a U.S. initiative launched at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels as a way for the alliance to engage the former members of the Warsaw Pact and other former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. In July 1994, the United States launched the Warsaw Initiative to support the objectives of the Partnership. A significantly different strategic environment marked the fourth and latest expansion, wherein NATO’s goal was to extend stability eastward into the political vacuum left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Warsaw Initiative and Partnership for Peace Helped Prepare New NATO Members
According to the NATO delegations of the three newest NATO members, PfP assistance, of which the United States was their largest donor through the Warsaw Initiative, was invaluable to their preparation for joining NATO. To describe the cost and contents of Warsaw Initiative programs, we obtained comprehensive cost and program data by recipient country and year from DOD and State. Both studies evaluated the effectiveness of programs in terms of objectives associated with the Warsaw Initiative and the Partnership for Peace. | What GAO Found
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the United States sought new ways to cooperate with the political and military leadership of their former adversaries. In January 1994, NATO established the Partnership for Peace to increase defense cooperation with former Warsaw Pact members and other former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Supported by the United States through the Warsaw Initiative, the Partnership plays a key role in developing the capabilities of those states and reforming their defense establishments. Given the key role the Partnership for Peace has played in the transformation of NATO's relationship with these states, the significant U.S. involvement and investment in this program through the Warsaw Initiative, and the impending debate on potential NATO members drawn from the Partnership, this report (1) provides an historic overview of previous NATO accessions, (2) describes the cost and content of the Warsaw Initiative, and (3) describes the results and benefits of Warsaw Initiative programs. |
gao_GAO-14-680T | gao_GAO-14-680T_0 | Challenges Associated with Operating in Afghanistan
Our work has identified several challenges related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Among those we highlighted in our 2013 key issues report are a dangerous security environment, the prevalence of corruption, and the limited capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and sustain donor funded projects. Afghanistan’s security environment continues to challenge the efforts of the Afghan government and international community. This is a key issue that we noted in 2007 when we reported that deteriorating security was an obstacle to the U.S. government’s major areas of focus in Afghanistan.2009, the U.S. and coalition partners deployed additional troops to disrupt and defeat extremists in Afghanistan. 2). Prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan. Key Oversight and Accountability Issues Regarding U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan
The United States, along with the international community, has focused its efforts in areas such as building the capacity of Afghan ministries to govern and deliver services, developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure and economy, and developing and sustaining ANSF. In multiple reviews of these efforts, we have identified numerous shortcomings and have made recommendations to the agencies to take corrective actions related to (1) mitigating against the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan government, (2) oversight and accountability of U.S. development projects, and (3) estimating the future costs of ANSF. Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Development Projects
Since 2002, U.S. agencies have allocated over $23 billion dollars towards governance and development projects in Afghanistan through USAID, DOD, and State. U.S. agencies have allocated over $62 billion to support Afghanistan’s security, including efforts to build and sustain ANSF, from fiscal years 2002 through 2013. This has been the largest portion of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan. The United States and the international community have pledged to continue to assist in financing the sustainment of ANSF beyond 2014. Need for Contingency Planning as the U.S. Transitions to a Civilian-Led Presence in Afghanistan
In February 2013, we reported that while the circumstances in Iraq differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be learned from the transition from a military to civilian-led presence to avoid possible missteps and better utilize resources. As we have reported, contingency planning is critical to a successful transition and to ensuring that there is sufficient oversight of the U.S. investment in Afghanistan.particularly vital given the uncertainties of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and post-2014 presence. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government has engaged in multiple efforts in Afghanistan since declaring a global war on terrorism that targeted al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent extremists, including certain elements of the Taliban. These efforts have focused on a whole-of-government approach that calls for the use of all elements of U.S. national power to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and prevent their return to Afghanistan. This approach, in addition to security assistance, provided billions toward governance and development, diplomatic operations, and humanitarian assistance.
To assist Congress in its oversight, GAO has issued over 70 products since 2003 including key oversight issues related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. This testimony summarizes the key findings from those products and discusses: (1) the challenges associated with operating in Afghanistan, (2) key oversight and accountability issues regarding U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and (3) the need for contingency planning as the U.S. transitions to a civilian-led presence in Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
Since 2003, GAO has identified numerous challenges related to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Among the various challenges that GAO and others have identified, are the following: the dangerous security environment, the prevalence of corruption, and the limited capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services and sustain donor-funded projects. As illustrated in the figure below, between fiscal years 2002 and 2013, U.S. agencies allocated nearly $100 billion toward U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
The United States, along with the international community, has focused its efforts in areas such as building the capacity of Afghan ministries to govern and deliver services, developing Afghanistan's infrastructure and economy, and developing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces. In multiple reviews of these efforts, GAO has identified numerous shortcomings and has made recommendations to the agencies to take corrective actions related to (1) mitigating the risk of providing direct assistance to the Afghan government, (2) oversight and accountability of U.S. development projects, and (3) estimating the future costs of sustaining Afghanistan's security forces which the United States and international community have pledged to support.
In February 2013, GAO reported that while the circumstances, combat operations, and diplomatic efforts in Iraq differ from those in Afghanistan, potential lessons could be learned from the transition from a military- to a civilian-led presence to avoid possible missteps and better utilize resources. As GAO has reported, contingency planning is critical to a successful transition and to ensuring that there is sufficient oversight of the U.S. investment in Afghanistan. This is particularly vital given the uncertainties of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and the ultimate size of the post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
What GAO Recommends
While GAO is not making new recommendations it has made numerous recommendations in prior reports aimed at improving U.S. agencies' oversight and accountability of U.S. funds in Afghanistan. U.S. agencies have generally concurred with these recommendations and have taken or plan to take steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-07-823T | gao_GAO-07-823T_0 | Additional Time Needed to Complete Offshore Tax Evasion Examinations
Examinations involving offshore tax evasion take much more time to develop and complete than examinations of other types of returns, but when offshore examinations are completed, the resulting median assessment is almost three times larger than for all other types of examinations. However, because of the 3-year statute, the additional time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS sometimes has to prematurely end offshore examinations and sometimes chooses not to open an examination at all, despite evidence of likely noncompliance. Some offshore examinations exhibit enforcement problems, such as technical complexity, which are similar to those where Congress has granted a statute change or exception in the past. IRS Does Not Pursue Some Apparent Offshore Tax Evasion Because of the 3- Year Statute of Limitations
Revenue agents and managers told us that because IRS has only 3 years from the time the taxpayer files a tax return, and offshore cases take longer than nonoffshore cases to identify and develop, some case files are not opened for examination because insufficient time remains under the statute to make the examination worthwhile. However, a low percentage of U.S source income flows through QIs. The qualified intermediary data were reported by withholding agents and edited by IRS, and do not include an unknown amount of activity that was unreported. Under the QI program, foreign financial institutions sign a contract with IRS to withhold and report U.S. source income paid offshore. The QI Program Provides Some Additional Assurance That Tax Is Properly Withheld and Reported
Compared to U.S withholding agents, IRS has additional assurance that QIs are properly withholding the correct amount of tax on U.S. source income sent offshore. Second, QIs accept enhanced responsibilities for providing assurance that customers are in fact eligible for treaty benefits and exemptions. Third, and importantly, QIs agree to contract with independent third parties to review the information contained in a sample of accounts, determine whether the appropriate amount of tax was withheld, and submit a report of the information to IRS. Source Income and Individuals May Inappropriately Receive Treaty Benefits as Owners of Corporations
Although the QI program provides IRS some assurance that treaty benefits are being properly applied, a low percentage of U.S. source income flows through QIs and U.S. taxpayers may inappropriately receive treaty benefits and exemptions as owners of foreign corporations. Source Income Flows Outside the QI System
As shown in table 1, for tax year 2003, 87.5 percent of U.S. source income reported to IRS was reported by U.S. withholding agents, not QIs. Thus, the overwhelming portion of this income flowed through channels that provide somewhat less assurance of proper withholding and reporting than exists under the QI program. However, within their limited scope, QIs’ auditors are not responsible for following up on possible indications of fraud or illegal acts that could have an impact on the matters being tested as they would under U.S. Government Auditing Standards. In addition, IRS obtains considerable data from withholding agents but does not make effective use of the data to ensure that withholding agents perform their duties properly. The remaining 2 were asked to leave the QI program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Offshore tax evasion is difficult for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to address. IRS examines tax returns to deal with offshore evasion that has occurred. IRS's Qualified Intermediary (QI) program seeks to foster improved tax withholding and reporting. GAO was asked to testify on two topics. First, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the length of, and assessments from, IRS's examination of tax returns with offshore activity and (2) the impact of the 3-year statute of limitations on offshore cases. Second, for the QI program, GAO was asked to address (1) program features intended to improve withholding and reporting, and (2) whether weaknesses exist in the U.S. withholding system for U.S. source income and QI external reviews and IRS's use of program data. GAO relied on prior work for the first topic. For the QI program, GAO used the latest data that were available and corroborated by IRS.
What GAO Found
Examinations involving offshore tax evasion take much more time to develop and complete than other examinations--a median of 500 more days for cases from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, but their resulting median assessment is almost three times larger than for all other examinations. Nevertheless, because they take more staff time, offshore examinations yielded tax assessments per hour of staff time that were about one-half of that for all other examinations. Because of the 3-year statute of limitations, the time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS sometimes prematurely ends offshore examinations or decides not to open an examination, despite evidence of likely noncompliance. Congress has granted a statute change or exception when enforcement challenges similar to those found in offshore cases have arisen in the past. QIs are foreign financial institutions that contract with IRS to withhold and report U.S. source income paid offshore to foreign customers. The QI program provides IRS some assurance that QIs are properly withholding and reporting tax on U.S. source income paid offshore. QIs (1) are more likely to have a direct working relationship with customers who claim reduced tax rates under tax treaties, (2) accept responsibilities for ensuring customers are in fact eligible for treaty benefits, and (3) agree to have independent parties review a sample of accounts and report to IRS. However, a low percentage of U.S. source income flows through QIs. For tax year 2003, about 12.5 percent of U.S. source income flowed through QIs. About 87.5 percent flowed through U.S. withholding agents, which provide somewhat less assurance of proper withholding and reporting than do QIs. In addition, U.S. persons may be able to evade taxes by masquerading as foreign corporations. The contractually required independent reviews of QIs' accounts do not require auditors to follow up on indications of illegal acts, as would reviews under U.S. Government Auditing Standards. While IRS obtains considerable data from withholding agents, it does not make effective use of the data to ensure proper withholding and reporting has been done. |
gao_GAO-06-802 | gao_GAO-06-802_0 | DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements
The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear because DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative efforts on joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such an assessment. Without a comprehensive assessment of JNTC’s enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no assurance that the money invested in the JNTC initiative will produce the desired results of providing combatant commanders with better prepared forces aligned with their joint operational needs or maximize the benefit for DOD’s investment. Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves’ Unique Training Needs
Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working relationship with them. In addition, the Training Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve components face several unique training requirements and circumstances that must be considered at each step of this process, from strategic planning through implementation. JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize Priorities Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process to facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Although the Joint Forces Command has proposed nomination guidance, its draft guidance still has not emphasized the need to accredit tasks within active service and combatant command training programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that joint tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in future service and combatant commander training events. However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone may not be able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur. However, no National Guard training programs have currently been considered for JNTC accreditation. Also, without incorporating the National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD has no assurance that the National Guard will experience realistic overseas and domestic joint operational training environments portrayed by JNTC enhancements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the benefits of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative’s implementation on joint training, including time frames, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes; direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the reserve components and include representatives from the reserve components as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning sessions; direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to establish guidelines for the services and combatant commands to follow when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists for all units participating in accredited joint training programs; and direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training programs. To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2006 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and implementation plans, to identify program guidance on the inclusion of the reserve components in training transformation initiatives and assess the level of coordination established between the JNTC initiative and the reserve components. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to invest by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will increase the level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in 2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events firsthand.
What GAO Found
The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the program's results; however, GAO's review of five JNTC-enhanced training events found indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the importance of performance metrics to gauge program success. While DOD's initial training transformation assessment set a basic framework for measuring future program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes metrics, time frames, and processes for gathering data. Without such a plan, DOD will not know whether the money invested in the initiative will produce desired results or maximize the benefit for the investment. Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve components face unique training requirements and circumstances that must be considered. However, the command has not established a liaison position for any of the reserve components and has not included the reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active service components and the combatant commands. Until the command incorporates the reserves more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint training skills. The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process to facilitate the JNTC initiative's goals, but it has not emphasized new and emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks will continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the National Guard. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares that training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission areas, such as irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass destruction. The Joint Forces Command has allowed services and combatant commands to nominate existing training programs to be accredited, but these programs may not reflect the priorities established in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report because nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit programs that will improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Further, no training programs specific to the National Guard are currently being considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not reflect DOD's training priorities, the services may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the National Guard will continue to have limited ability to enhance its joint training skills. |
gao_GAO-09-252 | gao_GAO-09-252_0 | States’ choices in structuring their SCHIP programs have important programmatic and financial implications. Assessments of the potential for crowd-out must take into account an understanding of the extent to which private health insurance is available and affordable to low-income families that qualify for SCHIP. 1.) 2). CMS Provided Guidance to States on Crowd-Out; Information It Collected Was of Limited Use in Assessing the Extent to Which Crowd-Out Should Be a Concern
CMS provided guidance to states regarding activities to minimize crowd- out in SCHIP, and the information it collected was of limited use in assessing the extent to which crowd-out should be a concern. In issuing guidance to states, CMS instituted specific requirements for program designs the agency identified as being at greater risk of crowd-out, including programs with higher income eligibility thresholds. However, each of the approaches CMS used was limited in providing information on the occurrence of crowd-out and the extent to which it should be a concern. Approaches CMS Used Did Not Address All Information Important to Assessing the Extent to Which Crowd-Out Should Be a Concern
CMS reported using a variety of approaches to assess the occurrence of crowd-out in SCHIP, including reviewing states’ SCHIP annual reports, national estimates, and CMS-commissioned studies. From this information, CMS officials said they believed that crowd-out was occurring and that the potential for crowd-out was greater at higher income levels. The questions on crowd-out that CMS asked states to answer for their annual reports did not collect certain indicators of the potential for crowd- out, such as the extent to which SCHIP applicants were offered private health insurance for their families through their employers. We reviewed SCHIP annual reports from 2007 for state responses on the percentage of applicants who dropped private health insurance to enroll in SCHIP and found that less than half of the 51 states provided a percentage in response to CMS’s question. States Used Similar Types of Policies to Minimize Crowd-Out, but Not All Collected Adequate Information to Assess whether Crowd-Out Should Be a Concern
In general, states implemented similar types of policies in their activities to minimize crowd-out, but not all states collected information adequate to assess whether crowd-out should be a concern. Our analysis found that waiting periods—required periods of uninsurance before applicants can enroll in SCHIP—were the most common policy states had in place to minimize crowd-out; premiums and other types of cost sharing were also frequently used (see fig. 5). These exemptions were mostly related to the availability rather than the affordability of insurance (see table 4). Officials from one of the two states said that they are considering reducing the state’s waiting period. Not All States Collected Information Adequate to Assess Whether Crowd- Out Should Be a Concern
All 51 states monitored crowd-out by asking applicants questions about whether they had private health insurance, but fewer states asked whether applicants were offered health insurance through their employers—a key piece of information in understanding whether crowd-out should be a concern. The majority of states made efforts to verify applicants’ responses to their questions about insurance. None of the officials in our sample of nine states viewed crowd-out as a concern, with most basing this assessment on a variety of indicators, including the availability and affordability of private health insurance for the SCHIP population in their state. In particular, asking SCHIP applicants who work whether they are offered private health insurance for their families through their employers could provide an initial assessment of the extent to which private health insurance is available to these individuals and thus better assess whether concerns about crowd-out are warranted. Overall, CMS concurred with the report’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to reduce the number of uninsured children in low-income families that do not qualify for Medicaid. States have flexibility in structuring their SCHIP programs, and their income eligibility limits vary. Concerns have been raised that individuals might substitute SCHIP for private health insurance--known as crowd-out. GAO was asked to examine the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) and states' efforts to minimize crowd-out and determine whether it should be a concern. GAO examined (1) CMS's guidance to states for minimizing crowd-out and assessment of whether it should be a concern and (2) states' policies to minimize crowd-out and how they assess whether it should be a concern. To do the work, GAO reviewed federal laws and guidance, examined state annual reports, and interviewed CMS officials. GAO also interviewed SCHIP officials from nine states.
What GAO Found
CMS provided guidance to states about activities to minimize crowd-out in SCHIP, and the information it collected was of limited use in assessing the extent to which crowd-out should be a concern. Along with this guidance, CMS instituted specific requirements for certain program designs it identified as being at greater risk of crowd-out, including programs with higher income eligibility thresholds. CMS said that among other sources, it used states' SCHIP annual reports to assess the occurrence of crowd-out, and on this basis it believed that crowd-out was occurring. Yet each of the approaches CMS used was limited in providing information about the occurrence of crowd-out and thus the extent to which it should be a concern. CMS did not collect certain indicators of the potential for crowd-out in SCHIP annual reports, such as the extent to which private health insurance was available and affordable to families. States' responses to CMS were inconsistent: GAO's review of annual reports for 2007 found that less than half of the 50 states and the District of Columbia provided a percentage in response to CMS's question on the percentage of applicants who dropped private health insurance to enroll in SCHIP. In general, states implemented similar types of policies in their activities to minimize crowd-out, but not all states collected information adequate to assess whether crowd-out should be a concern. The majority of states used policies such as waiting periods--a required period of uninsurance before an applicant can enroll in SCHIP--to try to reduce incentives for dropping private health insurance. All 39 states with waiting periods offered exemptions for involuntary loss of private health insurance. These exemptions were mostly related to whether insurance was available rather than affordable. Not all states collected information that was adequate to assess whether crowd-out should be a concern. For example, while all 50 states and the District of Columbia asked SCHIP applicants if they were currently insured, 24 states asked applicants if they had access to private health insurance, which is important to understanding the potential for crowd-out. Ofthe 9 states we interviewed, 5 states measured the occurrence of crowd-out, but they all used different methodologies to develop their estimates; the remaining 4 states did not measure crowd-out. None of the officials in the 9 states viewed crowd-out as a concern, with most basing this assessment on a variety of factors, including the lack of available and affordable private health insurance for the SCHIP population in their state. Overall, CMS concurred with the report's findings and recommendation, but raised concerns regarding the difficulty of measuring crowd-out, particularly assessing the affordability of private coverage. While GAO agrees that measuring crowd-out is complicated, the actions GAO recommends are an essential first step to better assessing whether concerns about crowd-out are warranted. |
gao_HEHS-95-150 | gao_HEHS-95-150_0 | Some Existing Arbitration Policies Would Not Meet Commission’s Recently Proposed Standards
In our review of employers’ arbitration policies, we found that some do not meet the fairness standards recently proposed by the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations. Almost All Employers Reported Using ADR Approaches, but Few Use or Plan to Use Arbitration
Almost 90 percent of employers that had more than 100 employees and filed EEO reports with EEOC in 1992 use at least one ADR approach to resolve discrimination complaints. Almost 40 percent of these employers use a trained mediator from within the company to help resolve disputes. Only about 10 percent of employers use arbitration. Arbitration Is Frequently the Final Step in a Policy Including Other ADR Approaches
A dispute resolution policy frequently has a series of steps, such as those discussed below, that can be linked to different ADR approaches. Firms With Some Workers Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements Are More Likely to Report Using Arbitration
Since arbitration has long been a feature of grievance procedures in the collective bargaining arena, employers that have collective bargaining agreements with some of their workers might be more likely to use arbitration with those not covered by collective bargaining. 1. 2. 2. This would not include formal complaint investigations by government agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) extent to which private-sector employers use alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approaches in resolving discrimination complaints of employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements; and (2) fairness of private-sector employers' arbitration policies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in fiscal year 1994, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received over 90,000 discrimination complaints from employees; (2) ADR approaches include negotiation, fact finding, peer review, internal mediation, external mediation, and arbitration; (3) almost all employers with more than 100 employees use one or more ADR approaches to resolve discrimination complaints; (4) some employers' arbitration policies do not meet the fairness standards proposed by the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations; (5) almost 40 percent of private-sector employers use a trained mediator from within the company to help resolve disputes, and only 10 percent of these employers use arbitration; (6) firms that have some workers covered by collective bargaining agreements are more likely to use arbitration; and (7) arbitration is usually the final step in a grievance policy, which includes other ADR approaches. |
gao_GAO-16-54 | gao_GAO-16-54_0 | In 2011, DOD leadership delegated responsibility for designating and overseeing Defense COEs to the Oversight Board. 1). DOD Has Established Criteria for Designating a COE, While VHA Has Not
DOD officials established criteria that COEs must meet to be designated a Defense COE and a uniform process for applicants. VHA Has Not Developed Criteria for a COE, but Service Offices Use a Peer Review Process to Designate COEs
No criteria for designating entities as COEs. VHA has not developed consistent criteria for designating an entity as a COE. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide that management should have a control environment that provides management’s framework for planning, directing, and controlling operations to achieve agency objectives, such as VHA’s objectives for how COEs are to operate and what COEs are supposed to achieve. In addition, these officials could not provide the criteria that were used to designate these centers as COEs. Process for designating entities as VHA COEs. VHA service offices use a peer review process to designate entities as VHA COEs. Both DOD and VHA Lack Written Procedures for Documenting Activities to Oversee COEs
Defense COE Oversight Board Does Not Have Written Procedures for Documenting Oversight Activities
Our review of the Oversight Board’s charter found that it does not contain procedures for how oversight of Defense COEs will be documented. Specifically, the Oversight Board charter does not explain (1) how the Oversight Board will provide and document its feedback to Defense COEs; (2) how the COEs will respond, if needed, to this feedback; and (3) how the Oversight Board will determine and document that the COEs’ actions resolved any identified problems. The acting chairman of the Oversight Board told us the board’s charter gives the board its authority to conduct oversight of Defense COEs, and if these types of procedures are needed, the Oversight Board’s charter and meeting minutes will serve this purpose. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that transactions and events should be promptly documented to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling their operations and helping make decisions. Most VHA Service Offices Lack Written Procedures for Documenting Oversight of COEs
Only one of six VHA service offices has written procedures for documenting the oversight of its COEs, including providing written critiques of findings from service office reviews to its COEs and requiring corrective actions from COEs when needed. Further, the standards state that significant events, such as in this instance the identification of problems during oversight and the actions taken to correct these problems, need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. Federal internal control standards also state that significant events should appear in management directives, policies, or operating manuals to help ensure management’s directives are carried out as intended. Conclusions
Unlike DOD, VHA has not developed standard criteria that entities must meet in order to be designated a VHA COE. Without defined criteria, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that its COEs are meeting the agency’s intended objectives for COEs, such as meeting the needs of veterans and their families throughout VA’s health care system and operating with coordinated direction. By not having written procedures that outline how the agencies will document the activities through which they monitor and oversee the performance of COEs, both DOD and VHA lack assurance that oversight activities are performed consistently over time as intended. To help improve VHA’s oversight of its COEs, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to require VHA service offices to develop written procedures on how to document their oversight activities of COEs, including requirements for documenting feedback, both positive and negative, and documenting the resolution of identified problems. In its comments, DOD concurred with our findings and recommendation and explained how it intends to implement the recommendation. Appendix II: Collaboration Efforts of Centers of Excellence in the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs
To describe the collaboration efforts of the Defense Centers of Excellence (COE) in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) COEs in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), we sent a Web-based, structured questionnaire to COE directors, identified by DOD and VHA officials, to obtain information about how their COEs collaborate. Table 6 shows the Defense COEs and their reported collaboration activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Both DOD and VA's VHA have COEs that are expected to improve certain services throughout both agencies' health care systems. To date, DOD and VHA have designated 7 and 70 COEs, respectively. Congressional hearings have raised questions about DOD's and VHA's oversight of the COEs, including the criteria used to designate them, and whether they are meeting their intended missions.
GAO was asked to review DOD and VHA COEs. GAO (1) examined the criteria and processes DOD and VHA use to designate entities as COEs and (2) assessed how DOD and VHA document the oversight activities related to their agencies' COEs. GAO compared agency criteria against federal internal control standards, and analyzed relevant laws, committee reports, and available agency documents. GAO also analyzed documents from the 7 Defense COEs and from the 6 VHA service offices responsible for the 70 VHA COEs to understand the criteria and processes used to designate them and how oversight activities are documented. GAO interviewed officials from both agencies to obtain additional information about their COEs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed criteria to designate an entity as a Defense Center of Excellence (COE), but the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has not. Health-focused COEs are intended to bring together treatment, research, and education to support health provider competencies; identify gaps in medical research and coordinate research efforts; and integrate new knowledge into patient care delivery. GAO found that DOD leadership and its Defense COE Oversight Board established and refined the definition and criteria for designating entities as Defense COEs. DOD's criteria require its Defense COEs, for example, to achieve improvements in clinical care outcomes and produce optimal value for servicemembers. The Oversight Board developed these criteria in order to have a consistent basis for designating entities as Defense COEs and to limit entities from self-identifying as Defense COEs without meeting the criteria. DOD also developed a uniform process for designating COEs. VHA service offices use a peer review process to designate their COEs. However, unlike DOD, VHA has not developed criteria for designating its COEs. Federal internal control standards provide that management should have a control environment that provides management's framework for planning, directing, and controlling operations to achieve agency objectives, such as VHA's objectives for how COEs are to operate and what COEs are supposed to achieve. Without defined criteria, VHA lacks reasonable assurance that its COEs are meeting the agency's intended objectives for COEs.
The Defense COE Oversight Board and most service offices responsible for overseeing VHA COEs lack written procedures for documenting oversight activities related to their COEs, including requirements for documenting identified problems and their resolution. GAO found that the Oversight Board's charter does not explain how (1) the board will provide and document its feedback, (2) the Defense COEs will respond to this feedback, and (3) the board will document resolution of identified issues. The Oversight Board's acting chairman told GAO the charter gives the board its authority to conduct oversight of Defense COEs and if these types of procedures are needed, the Oversight Board's charter and meeting minutes will serve this purpose. However, GAO's review of the charter and minutes found that they do not contain these types of procedures. Likewise, GAO found that five of six VHA service offices have no written procedures for documenting their findings and the corrective actions taken by COEs. VHA officials told GAO that they do not see a need to develop specific written procedures for documenting oversight of their COEs. Federal internal control standards state that transactions and events should be promptly documented to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling their operations. Further, significant events, such as the identification of problems and the actions taken to correct them, need to be clearly documented, and these events should appear in management directives, policies or operating manuals to help ensure management's directives are carried out as intended. Absent written oversight procedures, both DOD and VHA lack reasonable assurance that oversight procedures are consistently and routinely performed over time, and that issues raised during oversight are resolved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA establish criteria for designating entities as COEs. GAO also recommends that DOD and VHA develop written procedures for documenting oversight of their COEs. VA and DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided an action plan for implementing them. |
gao_GAO-04-821T | gao_GAO-04-821T_0 | To determine the validity of DOD’s and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) conclusions—based on epidemiological studies—that there was no association between Khamisiyah exposure and the rates of hospitalization or mortality, we reviewed published epidemiological studies in which hospitalization and mortality among exposed and nonexposed U.S. troops were analyzed. Information for Modeling
In addition to identifying the appropriate event to model, modeling requires several components of accurate information: the characteristics or properties of the material that was released and its rate of release (for example, quantity and purity; the vapor pressure; the temperature at which the material burns; particle size; and persistency and toxicity); temporal information (for example, whether chemical agent was initially released during daylight hours, when it might rapidly disperse into the surface air, or at night, when a different set of breakdown and dispersion characteristics would pertain, depending on terrain, plume height, and rate of agent degradation); data that drive meteorological models during the modeled period (for example, temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, dew point, wind velocity and direction at varying altitudes, and other related measures of weather conditions); data from global weather models, to simulate large-scale weather patterns, and from regional and local weather models, to simulate the weather in the area of the chemical agent release and throughout the area of dispersion; and information on the potentially exposed populations, animals, crops, and other assets that may be affected by the agent’s release. DOD’s Conclusion about U.S. Troops’ Exposure to Chemical Warfare Agents Cannot Be Adequately Supported
DOD’s conclusion about the extent of U.S. troops’ exposure to chemical warfare agents during and immediately after the Gulf War, based upon DOD and CIA plume model estimates, cannot be adequately supported. First, the models DOD and the CIA selected were in house models not fully developed for analyzing long-range dispersion of chemical warfare agents as environmental hazards. Fourth, postwar field testing at the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, in Utah, to estimate the source term data did not realistically simulate the actual conditions of the demolition operations at Khamisiyah or the effects of the bombings at any of the other sites in Iraq. The MOD estimated that the total number of British troops potentially exposed was about 9,000 and the total number of troops as “definitely” within the path of the plume, however, was about 3,800. DOD and VA Used Flawed Criteria for Determining Troops’ Exposure
In the two epidemiological studies, DOD and VA researchers used DOD’s 1997 plume model for determining which troops were under the path of the plume—who were estimated to be exposed—and which troops were not—those who were estimated to be nonexposed. DOD and VA Used an Insensitive Outcome Measure for Determining Hospitalization Rates
Hospitalization rates—the outcome measure used in the hospitalization study—were insensitive because they failed to capture the chronic illnesses that 1991 Persian Gulf War veterans commonly report, but that typically do not lead to hospitalization. Studies that rely on this type of outcome as an end point are predetermined to overlook any association between exposure and illness. Even when models with the same source term data were used, the results diverged. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, many of the approximately 700,000 U.S. veterans have experienced undiagnosed illnesses. They attribute these illnesses to exposure to chemical warfare (CW) agents in plumes--clouds released from bombing of Iraqi sites. But in 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) estimated that of the 700,000 veterans, 101,752 troops were potentially exposed. GAO was asked to evaluate the validity of DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and British Ministry of Defense (MOD) conclusions about troops' exposure.
What GAO Found
DOD's and MOD's conclusion about troops' exposure to CW agents, based on DOD and CIA plume modeling, cannot be adequately supported. The models were not fully developed for analyzing long-range dispersion of CW agents as an environmental hazard. The modeling assumptions as to source term data--quantity and purity of the agent--were inaccurate because they were uncertain, incomplete, and nonvalidated. The plume heights used in the modeling were underestimated and so were the hazard area. Postwar field testing used to estimate the source term did not realistically simulate the actual conditions of bombings or demolitions. Finally, the results of all models--DOD and non-DOD models--showed wide divergences as to the plume size and path. DOD's and VA's conclusion about no association between exposure to CW agents and rates of hospitalization and mortality, based on two epidemiological studies conducted and funded by DOD and VA, also cannot be adequately supported because of study weaknesses. In both studies, flawed criteria--DOD's plume model and DOD's estimation of potentially exposed troops based on this model--were used to determine exposure. This may have resulted in large-scale misclassification. Troops under the path of the plume were classified as exposed; those not under the path, as nonexposed. But troops classified as not exposed under one DOD model could be classified as exposed under another DOD model. Under non-DOD models, however, a larger number of troops could be classified as exposed. Finally, as an outcome measure, hospitalization rate failed to capture the types of chronic illnesses that Gulf War veterans report but that typically do not lead to hospitalization. |
gao_RCED-99-53 | gao_RCED-99-53_0 | Following this report, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act mandated that FAA (1) study and report on the current security responsibilities at airports and the potential sources of funding for these activities, (2) certify screening companies, and (3) improve the training and testing of security screeners through the development of performance standards for security-screening services. Section 301 Report Issued in January 1999
FAA issued the report required under section 301 of the Reauthorization Act of 1996 on January 5, 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in the act. FAA’s report concludes that there should be no change to the current system of shared aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators or to the current funding sources for aviation security. The study is appended to the report. FAA concluded that there appears to be a consensus in the civil aviation community to retain the current system of shared responsibilities for aviation security. Lengthy Process Involved for Implementing the Section 302 Requirement for Certifying Screening Companies
FAA is developing a regulation to comply with the mandated section 302 requirements to certify screening companies and improve the training and testing of security screeners. FAA expects the final regulation to be issued in late 2000. While the aviation industry generally agrees that national standards for security-screening operations are needed, some issues could impede the final regulation’s issuance. FAA’s Efforts to Comply With Section 302
FAA plans to issue a new regulation that would establish the requirements for certifying screening companies. One of the requirements for certification would compel screening companies and air carriers to comply with the performance standards that would be established by FAA and to implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for screeners. FAA recognizes that a critical step in the certification of screening companies is having a reliable and consistent way to measure their performance. The completion of this effort, previously projected for September 1998, had been delayed several times. During the next several months, FAA will continue to gather larger samples of TIP data that it can use to develop performance standards for screeners. Issues That Could Impede Issuance of Final Rule
The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 allows FAA 16 months from the close of the comment period of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to publish the final regulation. However, several issues could impede FAA’s efforts to complete this undertaking. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, focusing on: (1) the status of FAA's efforts to implement the requirement of section 301 of the act mandating that FAA conduct a study and report to Congress on whether aviation security responsibilities should be transferred from the airline carriers to airports or the federal government; (2) the status of FAA's efforts to implement section 302 mandating that FAA certify security screening companies and improve the training and testing of security screeners through the development of performance standards; and (3) issues that could impede FAA's implementation of section 302.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA issued the report required by section 301 of the Reauthorization Act on January 5 1999, about 2 years after the date mandated in the act; (2) the report concludes that there should be no change to the current system of shared aviation security responsibilities among FAA, the air carriers, and the airport operators or to the current funding sources for aviation security; (3) FAA's conclusions are based on the lack of any consensus in the civil aviation community for changes; (4) to comply with the requirements of section 302, FAA is developing a proposed regulation, which would require the certification of screening companies; (5) the proposed regulation would require screening companies and air carriers to comply with uniform performance standards for screeners and implement FAA-approved training and testing programs for screeners; (6) a critical step in the certification of screening companies is having a reliable and consistent way to measure the screening companies' performance; (7) in January 1999, FAA, after several delays, validated that its automated screener testing system is an accurate measurement of screener's performance; (8) over the next several months, FAA will gather additional data for use in developing performance standards for screeners; (9) the agency plans to issue a final regulation in late 2000; (10) the aviation industry generally agrees that national standards for security-screening operations are needed; (11) several issues could impede the issuance of the final regulation; and (12) for example, the completion of FAA's validation process had been delayed several times and any further delays with completing FAA's current efforts could affect the issuance of the final regulation. |
gao_GAO-15-58 | gao_GAO-15-58_0 | in the state by the participating issuers of health coverage. Enrollment for the SB-SHOPs, as of June 1, 2014 for most states, has been lower than expected, and CMS officials said they do not expect the enrollment trends for the FF-SHOPs to be significantly different, although they are still in the process of collecting enrollment data. Premiums varied across states, though were generally comparable to premiums for small group plans within the same state offered outside of the SHOPs. SHOPs Were Operational in All States, Although Many Expected Features Were Not Yet Available, Particularly for the Federally Facilitated SHOPs
All of the FF-SHOPs and most of the SB-SHOPs were operational as required—that is, accepting enrollment applications—as of October 1, 2013. Websites where employers could review plan information, including premiums and benefits, were available on October 1, 2013, for all FF- SHOPs and most SB-SHOPs. This information allows employers and employees to make meaningful comparisons about available SHOP plans in their state. CMS is currently preparing to implement online enrollment for the FF-SHOPs for 2015, and expects to launch online enrollment fully in all FF-SHOPs by November 15, 2014, when SHOP enrollment begins for 2015. According to CMS, fifteen SB-SHOPs offered employee choice in 2014 through a variety of approaches, though employee choice was delayed for the FF-SHOPs until 2015. State-Based SHOP Enrollment Was Significantly Lower than Anticipated, While Enrollment Data for Federally Facilitated SHOPs Were Not Yet Available
SB-SHOP plans had enrolled approximately 76,000 individuals—including employees, spouses, and dependent children—into plans purchased through 11,742 small employers, as of June 1, 2014 for most states, with end dates ranging from May to September 2014. Based on official estimates and stakeholders’ expectations, SB-SHOP enrollment—as of June 1, 2014 for most states, with end dates ranging from May to September 2014—was significantly lower than anticipated and, at its current pace, is unlikely to reach expectations by the end of 2014. that 2 million employees would enroll in coverage through the SB-SHOPs and FF-SHOPs in 2014, with the number of enrollees rising to 3 million in 2015 and leveling off at 4 million enrollees by 2017. Enrollment data for the FF-SHOPs was not yet available, though CMS officials reported that the agency was in the process of collecting the data from issuers. However, CMS officials said they do not have reason to expect major differences in enrollment trends for 2014 between the SB- SHOPs and the FF-SHOPs. Most SHOPs Have Multiple Plans Available in Each County, and Plan Premiums Varied Across States and Were Generally Comparable to Similar Plans Outside the SHOPs
In nearly all states, multiple issuers offered multiple plans in the SHOPs in 2014. Stakeholders Identified Several Factors That May Have Led to Current Low SHOP Enrollment and That May Affect Future Enrollment Growth
Stakeholders we interviewed reported that the primary incentive for employers to use the SHOPs has been the small business tax credit. Stakeholders also described factors that may help stimulate or detract from SHOP enrollment in the future. However, several stakeholders noted that the tax credit is too small and administratively complex to motivate many small employers to enroll. Stakeholders Identified Several Factors That May Have Hindered Current SHOP Enrollment
Although the small business tax credit may have led some employers to enroll in the SHOPs, stakeholders identified several other factors that may have hindered enrollment, thus leading to current low SHOP enrollment. Delays in key SHOP features. Limited awareness of and misconceptions about SHOP availability. Many stakeholders, including state exchange officials and national- and state-level agent, broker, and employer representatives, reported a lack of employer awareness of the ability to enroll in SHOP plans beginning October 1, 2013, largely due to misconceptions about whether the SHOPs were open for enrollment and a lack of outreach by states and CMS. Renewal of existing, noncompliant plans. Stakeholders Identified Various Factors That Have the Potential to Contribute to or Detract from Future SHOP Enrollment Growth
Despite the various factors that may have restrained SHOP enrollment to date, many stakeholders noted that certain other factors suggest that the SHOPs have the potential to experience future enrollment growth. Improved coordination with agents and brokers. Increased marketing to employers. Concluding Observations
The SHOPs are an important element of PPACA, intended to provide a new mechanism by which small employers can shop for and purchase health insurance coverage for their employees and to offer features not typically available to the employees of small employers, such as the ability to choose among multiple health plans. They point to such factors as the phase- out of the noncompliant plans, the expected availability of online enrollment and employee choice functions in many more SHOPs, and intended CMS or state efforts to improve SHOP awareness and coordination with agents and brokers. These collective factors will vary across states and continue to evolve, suggesting that a determination of the long-term impact of the SHOPs remains premature at this time. Agency Comments
We received comments from HHS on a draft of this report (see app. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required SHOPs—exchanges, or marketplaces, where small employers can shop for health coverage for their employees—to be established in all states. States may elect to establish and operate SHOPs themselves or allow CMS to do so within the state. Enrollment in SHOPs was to begin in October 2013, with coverage effective as early as January 2014. GAO was asked to examine the early implementation experiences of the SHOPs.
In this report GAO describes (1) SHOP functionality, enrollment, plan availability, and premiums and (2) stakeholders' views on key factors that have affected current SHOP enrollment or may affect future enrollment growth. GAO reviewed relevant information from CMS and states, including data on employer and employee enrollment, plan availability, and premiums generally through June 1, 2014. GAO also interviewed representatives of key stakeholders that operate SHOPs (CMS and states), offer coverage in SHOPs (health insurance issuers), obtain coverage through SHOPs (small employers), or assist in obtaining coverage through SHOPs (agents and brokers) on a national basis and, for certain stakeholders, in five states—California, Illinois, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Texas. The five states were selected based on factors including varied issuer participation levels and SHOP functionality. The experiences of these stakeholders cannot be generalized to other states or stakeholders.
GAO incorporated HHS comments on a draft of this report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Though all of the Small Business Health Options Programs (SHOPs) required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act were operational, many features were not yet available and enrollment was low as of June 2014. According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that oversees the SHOPs, all 33 of the SHOPs run by CMS (federally facilitated, or FF-SHOPs) and 14 of the 18 SHOPs run by states (state-based, or SB-SHOPs) were accepting enrollment applications as of the October 1, 2013, deadline. The remaining 4 SB-SHOPs became operational by the following May. Websites where employers could review plan information such as premiums and benefits were available on October 1, 2013, for all FF-SHOPs and most SB-SHOPs. Other key SHOP features—online enrollment and employee choice, the ability for employees to choose among multiple plans—were delayed for all FF-SHOPs, but available for most of the SB-SHOPs. CMS is currently preparing to implement online enrollment for all FF-SHOPs and employee choice for many of the FF-SHOPs for 2015. Based on official estimates and stakeholders' expectations, enrollment for the SB-SHOPs has been significantly lower than expected. The 18 SB-SHOPs had enrolled about 76,000 individuals—including employees, their spouses, and dependent children—in plans purchased through nearly 12,000 small employers, as of June 1, 2014, for most states. Enrollment data for the FF-SHOPs was not yet available, although CMS was in the process of collecting the data from issuers and expected to have complete data by early 2015. However, CMS officials said they do not expect major differences in enrollment trends for 2014 between SB-SHOPs and FF-SHOPs. Finally, most SHOPs had multiple plans available in each county, although a small number of states had counties with no plans available. Premiums for SHOP plans varied across states and were generally comparable to premiums for other small group plans offered within a state but outside of the SHOP.
Stakeholders identified several factors that may have led to current low SHOP enrollment and that may affect future enrollment growth. Many stakeholders reported that the primary incentive for employers to use the SHOPs has been the small business tax credit available to eligible employers who offer coverage through a SHOP, although some noted that the credit may be too small and administratively complex to motivate many employers to enroll. Other factors identified that may have hindered current enrollment include the ability of employers to renew plans that existed before the SHOPs—which, depending on state requirements, is permitted until October 1, 2016—and employer misconceptions about SHOP availability. Stakeholders also described factors that may help stimulate or detract from future SHOP enrollment growth. For example, the phase-out of existing pre-SHOP plans, the implementation of employee choice by an increasing number of SHOPs, improved coordination with agents and brokers, and increased marketing to small employers may help stimulate enrollment growth. Conversely, other factors, such as the 2-year limit on the availability of the small business tax credit and the likelihood, according to stakeholders, that SHOP premiums will not be lower than non-SHOP premiums, may hinder future enrollment growth. The evolving and localized nature of these factors suggests that that a determination of the SHOPs' long-term impact remains premature at this time. |
gao_GAO-06-498 | gao_GAO-06-498_0 | The CSTs are designed to support civil authorities in the event of a domestic WMD event by identifying WMD agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. CSTs Are Prepared to Conduct Their Mission, but the Role of Non- WMD Missions Causes Confusion
Based on the CSTs’ readiness measures for staffing, training, and equipment; the data we obtained from the CSTs on each of these measures; the process NGB has in place to maintain and monitor CST readiness; and the discussions we had with CSTs and state, local, and federal officials in the 14 states and territories we visited, we found that the certified CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed to conduct their mission. Further, NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational command and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will operationally respond to a WMD event. However, confusion about the types of non-WMD missions the CSTs conduct to help them prepare for WMD missions could impede coordination between state, local, and federal officials about the appropriate use of the CSTs. This confusion results from a lack of clear guidance interpreting the legislation that establishes the CST mission to “prepare for or to respond to” WMD or terrorist attacks and from DOD’s use of the term chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) in its characterization of the CSTs’ official mission. As part of their coordination efforts with state and local emergency management officials, CST members highlight the WMD and catastrophic terrorism mission limitation of the CSTs. But there remains no guidance that would assist CSTs or state and local officials in understanding what types of non-WMD missions are appropriate for the CSTs to conduct in preparing for their WMD terrorism mission. DOD has requested that Congress allow CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. Although these challenges have not yet affected the overall readiness of the CSTs, if the current efforts to address them are unsuccessful, they could impede the progress of the newer teams and increase the risk to the long-term sustainment of the program. CSTs Struggle to Fully Staff Teams
NGB faces several challenges to the CST program that could impede the progress of the newer teams as well as hinder the long-term sustainment of the CST program. CSTs Face Equipment, Training, Readiness Reporting, and Facilities Challenges
CSTs experience other challenges that NGB recognizes as important, and it has efforts under way to address them. NGB Lacks Guidance to Help State National Guard Commands Oversee and Support CSTs
NGB has made progress in issuing guidance that explains state National Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs, but this has been insufficient to fully inform the states about the unique nature and requirements of the CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into the state National Guard command structure. As a result, some states approved equipment for a CST while other states did not. Though DOD indicates that it is not planning to request that Congress expand the CSTs’ role to encompass more demanding overseas missions, to the extent missions such as regular CST support to overseas combatant commands are considered in the future, they would likely have a detrimental impact on the readiness and availability of the teams to perform their original mission to support domestic WMD response. This should help NGB and the states provide an effective long-term partnership to sustain the CST program. To assess the extent to which effective administrative mechanisms are in place for the CSTs, we compared National Guard Bureau (NGB) regulations and guidance on management of the CSTs with the practices in place at the 14 CSTs we visited. Our site visits to 14 of the 55 CSTs were conducted from August through December 2005. 2. Reported to NGB? 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Congress approved the development of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked to identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons; assess consequences; advise civil authorities on response measures; and assist with requests for additional support. Thus far, 36 of the 55 approved teams have been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is in the process of establishing, certifying, and planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) the CSTs are ready to conduct their mission and (2) effective administrative mechanisms are in place for the CSTs.
What GAO Found
The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. CSTs were created to focus on assisting civil authorities in domestic WMD events. Based on its review of the CSTs' training, equipment, and staffing criteria; analysis of CST readiness data; site visits to 14 CSTs; and discussions with state, local, and federal responders, GAO found the certified teams visited to be ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the states have a clear structure for operational command and control of the CSTs. Though current NGB guidance and the CSTs' message to state and local officials emphasize the CST mission as being focused on WMD events, some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing emergency assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. While NGB views such missions as useful preparations for WMD events, guidance has not been clarified to reflect the type of non-WMD missions that would be appropriate. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, local, and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts. Also, DOD is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. DOD and NGB are informally considering limited overseas missions for the teams, though they have no plans to request a further expansion of the CSTs' mission to encompass overseas operations. According to NGB and the CST commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable experience and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more demanding missions, such as supporting the warfighter, could be detrimental to the readiness and availability of the CSTs. Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the CST program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer teams and the long-term sustainment of the program. NGB has made progress in establishing an administrative management structure for the CSTs, including issuing a broad CST management regulation and initiating a standardization and evaluation program. However, the CSTs face challenges in personnel, coordination plans, equipment acquisition and planning, training objectives, readiness reporting and facilities. Further, insufficient NGB guidance on state National Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs has resulted in varied support at the state National Guard level. NGB is aware of the challenges and has efforts under way to address them. While these challenges have not yet undermined CST readiness, if NGB efforts are unsuccessful, the progress of newer teams could be impeded and the long-term sustainment of the CST program put at greater risk. |
gao_HEHS-98-30 | gao_HEHS-98-30_0 | In 1995, about 87 percent of AFDC households also received Food Stamp benefits and 31 percent received housing assistance. An Estimated $1.1 Billion Provided in AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits
In fiscal year 1995, an estimated $1.13 billion—$700 million under the AFDC program and $430 million in Food Stamp benefits—was provided to households in which either the head of household or his or her spouse was an illegal alien. These benefits were provided to illegal alien parents for the well-being of their U.S. citizen children. 1.) In California, households composed of an illegal alien parent and citizen children represented about 10 percent of the state’s AFDC and Food Stamp caseloads in 1995 and accounted for $720 million in AFDC and Food Stamp benefits combined. Detected Misrepresentation or Fraud Similar for Households Headed by Illegal Aliens and Other Households
Although procedures are in place to prevent and detect fraud, comprehensive national statistics on fraud perpetrated by illegal aliens serving as payees on behalf of their citizen children are not available. However, studies of AFDC households in a few California counties with large populations of illegal aliens serving as payees indicate that there is little difference in the rate and type of misrepresentation or fraud detected for them and other households receiving benefits. Incidence and Types of Misrepresentation or Fraud Detected Similar for Illegal Alien Payees and the General AFDC Population
National studies on the nature and extent of misrepresentation or fraud by illegal aliens obtaining benefits for their citizen children are not available. This study uses the term “underground economy” to refer to a source of income from which individuals are paid in cash and their earnings are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service or the state. In addition, officials in California, Texas, and New York cited the difficulties of verifying income that individuals—both illegal aliens and citizens—derived from the underground economy. For each of the selected households headed by or whose spouse was an illegal alien, we obtained from the sample case file information on the dollar amount of benefits received by the recipient household for the sample month, projected the yearly dollar amount of such benefits received by the household, and confirmed that the benefits were received on behalf of U.S. citizen children in the household. Under the Food Stamp program, these states were Arizona, California, and Texas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative mandate, GAO provided information on the extent to which means-tested public benefits are provided to illegal aliens for the use of eligible individuals, focusing on: (1) the extent and the locations that selected federal means-tested benefits are being provided to illegal aliens for use by their U.S. citizen children; and (2) the nature and extent of fraud or misrepresentation detected in connection with these benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in fiscal year (FY) 1995, about $1.1 billion in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp benefits were provided to households with an illegal alien parent for the use of his or her citizen child; (2) this amount accounted for about 3 percent of AFDC and 2 percent of Food Stamp benefit costs; (3) a vast majority of households receiving these benefits resided in a few states--85 percent of the AFDC households were in California, New York, Texas, and Arizona; (4) 81 percent of Food Stamp households were in California, Texas, and Arizona; (5) California households alone accounted for $720 million of the combined AFDC and Food Stamp caseloads; (6) although illegal aliens also received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Department of Housing and Urban Development housing assistance for their citizen children, data to develop estimates for these two programs were not available; (7) comprehensive national statistics on any misrepresentation or fraud perpetrated by illegal aliens receiving benefits on behalf of their citizen children are not available; (8) a few California counties' studies of AFDC households indicate that the rates and types of potential misrepresentation or fraud are similar both for households headed by illegal aliens and for the general welfare population; (9) in these studies, one of the most commonly cited types of misrepresentation or fraud was the underreporting of income; (10) income is a key factor in determining program eligibility and benefit amounts and, when underreported, can result in overpayment of benefits; and (11) the states visited by GAO had procedures in place to verify income, but officials said that verifying individuals' income from earnings obtained through the underground economy was very difficult--for both illegal aliens and for citizens--in part because these earnings are not documented or reported to state or federal databases used to verify employment or earnings. |
gao_GAO-11-336 | gao_GAO-11-336_0 | Paid preparers prepared almost 60 percent of all federal tax returns filed in 2008 and 2009. Revisions to the Circular 230 regulations are currently being reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), according to an official involved in the implementation of the new requirements. IRS Is Conducting an Outreach Campaign Consistent with Key Practices to Inform Paid Preparers of the New Requirements
In support of the new requirements for paid preparers, IRS established a communications team and vested in it responsibility for educating paid preparers and taxpayers about the new requirements. Officials and members of paid preparer associations we interviewed said that IRS has conducted an effective outreach campaign. IRS Is Developing Strategies for How to Ensure Paid Preparer Compliance with the New Requirements
In its strategic plan for 2009-2013, IRS established strategies designed to help it meet its objective of ensuring that paid preparers adhere to Circular 230 standards of practice and follow the law, including penalizing paid preparers who do not follow tax laws and leveraging research to identify fraudulent and noncompliant paid preparers. IRS Is Funding the New Paid Preparer Program through User Fees, Which IRS Is Setting Consistent with Established Criteria
IRS is funding the administration of the paid preparer requirements through user fees for PTIN registration, competency testing, and continuing education. IRS Has Not Documented a Framework for Using the Requirements to Improve Taxpayer Compliance and Measuring Their Effect
IRS has discussed but not documented a framework for how it plans to develop service and enforcement efforts that leverage the new paid preparer requirements to improve taxpayer compliance. For example, according to the RPO Director, IRS plans to develop a comprehensive database containing information on paid preparers and the tax returns they prepare. Likewise, as discussed previously, IRS has yet to decide how it will enforce paid preparers’ compliance with the requirements. Since the PTIN registration requirement has been implemented and IRS plans to implement the other requirements gradually, it is important for IRS to identify and collect baseline data to have a basis by which to measure the effect of the requirements, IRS’s strategies to leverage the requirements to increase taxpayer compliance, and the strategies’ relative costs. Demonstrating to paid preparers that IRS will evaluate whether the requirements provide the benefit of improved taxpayer compliance could improve preparers’ voluntary compliance with the requirements. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue document a strategic framework showing how IRS intends to use the paid preparer requirements to improve taxpayer compliance and assess their effectiveness. Agency Comments
In a letter commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with the recommendation. To assess IRS’s resource estimates to develop and implement the new requirements, we reviewed IRS documents on the preparer tax identification number (PTIN) user fee that IRS is charging paid preparers for obtaining a PTIN and interviewed officials from the Return Preparer Implementation Project Office, RPO, and IRS’s Chief Financial Officer’s office. | Why GAO Did This Study
Paid preparers prepare about 60 percent of all tax returns filed, and their actions significantly affect the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) ability to administer tax laws. Previously, GAO found that some preparers made significant errors in preparing tax returns and proposed stricter regulation of preparers. IRS is implementing new requirements for paid preparers that it believes will increase tax compliance, which will reduce the gross tax gap between taxes owed and taxes paid, last estimated at $345 billion for 2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe IRS's plans for implementing and ensuring paid preparer compliance with the requirements; (2) assess IRS's resource estimates for the requirements; and (3) assess IRS's plans to use the requirements to improve taxpayer compliance and evaluate their effect. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed IRS planning documents and interviewed IRS officials and representatives and members of paid preparer associations.
What GAO Found
IRS has implemented a registration requirement for paid preparers that includes obtaining a preparer tax identification number (PTIN) and plans to implement competency testing and continuing education requirements. IRS also plans to require paid preparers to adhere to standards of practice and the revisions are currently being reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, IRS has conducted an outreach campaign consistent with key practices to inform paid preparers of the new requirements. For example, IRS developed a standardized message that it distributed in different formats. IRS is developing strategies for how to ensure that paid preparers comply with the new requirements, according to the director of IRS's Return Preparer Office. IRS is funding the paid preparer requirements through user fees, which it is setting consistent with established criteria for cost estimating. For example, in setting the PTIN user fee to ensure it covered program costs, IRS identified key costs associated with registration, estimated fixed costs, and based some variable costs on similar registration efforts. IRS has discussed but not documented a framework for how it plans to use the requirements to improve taxpayer compliance. For example, IRS plans to develop a comprehensive database containing information on paid preparers and related tax returns. Also, IRS has yet to document how it will assess the requirements' effect, for example, by identifying what baseline data IRS needs. Without a documented framework, IRS may have difficulty (1) assessing whether it has adequately planned for what data it needs to collect and (2) deciding how to allocate resources given competing priorities. A framework could also help assure paid preparers, who bear the burden of complying with the requirements, that IRS will assess whether the requirements provide their intended benefit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS document a framework for using the paid preparer requirements to improve taxpayer compliance and evaluate their effect on taxpayer compliance. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-957T | gao_GAO-02-957T_0 | In addition, GAO has said the national strategy development and implementation should include 1) a regular update of a national-level threat and risk assessment effort, 2) formulate realistic budget and resource plans to eliminate gaps, avoid duplicate effort, avoid “hitchhiker” spending, and protect against federal funds being used to substitute for funding that would have occurred anyway, 3) coordinate the strategy for combating terrorism with efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to computer-based attacks, 4) coordinate agency implementation by reviewing agency and interagency programs to accomplish the national strategy, and 5) carefully choose the most appropriate policy tools of government to best implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. The Congress faces a challenging and complex job in its consideration of DHS. Figure 1 depicts the proposed framework: With respect to criteria that the Congress should consider for constructing the department itself, the following questions about the overall purpose and structure of the organization should be evaluated: Definition: Is there a clear and consistently applied definition of homeland security that will be used as a basis for organizing and managing the new department? Communications: Effective communication strategies are key to any major consolidation or transformation effort. The people factor is a critical element in any major consolidation or transformation. With an estimated budget authority of the component parts of the new department of $37.45 billion, successfully transitioning the government in an endeavor of this scale will take considerable time and money. While national needs suggest a rapid reorganization of homeland security functions, the transition of agencies and programs into the new department is likely to take time to achieve. A comprehensive transition plan needs to be developed. More detailed implementation plans also will be necessary to address business system, processes, and resource issues. Modern human capital strategies, including implementing a credible, effective and equitable performance management system that links institutional, unit, team and individual performance measurement and reward systems to the department’s strategic plan, core values and desired outcomes will be critical to success. Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999). | What GAO Found
The government faces a unique opportunity to create an organization that is extremely effective in protecting the nation's borders and citizens against terrorism. There is likely to be considerable benefit over time from restructuring some of the homeland security functions, including reducing risk and improving the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of consolidated agencies and programs. Sorting out those programs and agencies that would most benefit from consolidation versus those in which dual missions must be balanced in order to achieve a more effective fit in the proposed Department of Homeland Security is a difficult but critical task. Moreover, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and it will take institutional continuity and additional resources to be fully effective. In the short term, issues to be resolved include the harmonization of communication systems, information technology systems, human capital systems, the physical location of people and other assets, and other factors. Given the magnitude of this task, not everything can be achieved at once, and a deliberate phasing of some operations will be necessary. The new department will need to articulate a clear overarching mission and core values, establish a short list of initial critical priorities, develop effective communication and information systems, and produce an overall implementation plan for the new national strategy and related reorganization. Effective performance and risk management systems must also be established, and threat and vulnerability assessments must be completed. |
gao_GGD-00-12 | gao_GGD-00-12_0 | Finally, to determine what PBS has done or plans to do to ensure STAR data integrity, we interviewed officials and reviewed plans addressing PBS’ efforts to ensure that STAR data are accurate, reliable, and consistent. STAR—A System for Tracking and Administering Real Property
STAR is a real estate inventory management software application that maintains data on projects, leases, buildings, and space assignments that is, who is in what space—in an integrated database environment. The data in STAR have been used to generate bills to clients for their assigned space, develop budget plans, track and manage leases, and evaluate performance. STAR’s input/output functions include direct on-screen access to the data, the ability to update the data, access to standard reports, and the ability to sort data and create ad hoc reports. Users Identified Problems and Benefits for STAR
The 128 users we interviewed identified problems they had experienced using STAR as well as several benefits they saw being derived from the use of STAR. According to the STAR project manager, each type of problem that was reported to us had been reported to the STAR project team through the STAR Help Desk and logged into 16 categories. Further, 116 of the users we interviewed saw at least 1 benefit from using STAR. This resulted in having to change STAR’s design. The nearly 8,000 service tickets handled by the Help Desk reflect PBS-wide problems and other issues reported by users. Information is current and readily accessible. PBS’ Efforts to Improve STAR
As previously mentioned, as part of the STAR project, a contractor- operated Help Desk and PBS’ CRT were set up to solve STAR problems. Further, other actions, such as additional contract help, are now available to the regions to help with STAR problems and training. The Help Desk is to record user complaints, enhancement suggestions, or other issues concerning the use of STAR on service tickets. By the end of November 1999, eight versions of STAR will have been issued. PBS said it has taken various actions to ensure that STAR has accurate, reliable, and consistent data. STAR was designed with built-in features to help ensure the reliability of some data elements. PBS ran edits against the data to be transferred to STAR and ran additional edits after data were transferred. PBS has an initiative to validate all space assignments. A special study was done that produced a report identifying data problems and made recommendations for solving the problems. A team was set up to determine how to implement the report’s recommendations. In the comments, the Commissioner also briefly summarized (1) PBS’ transition from its 1970s system to STAR; (2) the cultural changes that drove the need to provide its customers with more reliable information and to measure its own performance in hard, quantifiable terms as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act; and (3) actions being taken to improve the data in STAR and elsewhere, including a spatial validation effort using computer-assisted drawings and the development of a quality control system to validate real estate and billing data residing in STAR. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Public Buildings Service's (PBS) System for Tracking and Administering Real Property (STAR), focusing on: (1) the functions STAR performs; (2) whether users were having problems using STAR; (3) the steps PBS had taken or is taking to address any user problems; and (4) the actions PBS had taken or plans to take to ensure that STAR data are accurate, reliable, and consistent.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) STAR is a real estate inventory management software application that maintains data on projects, leases, buildings, and space assignments--that is, who is in what space--in an integrated database environment; (2) the data in STAR are used to generate bills to clients for their assigned space, develop budget plans, track and manage leases, and evaluate performance; (3) STAR's input/output functions include: (a) direct on-screen access to the data; (b) the ability to update the data; (c) access to standard reports; and (d) the ability to sort data and create ad hoc reports; (4) users identified problems with STAR as well as benefits derived from using the system; (5) the 128 users GAO interviewed identified 18 types of problems that they had experienced using STAR; (6) these problems included complaints such as taking too long to enter data and having too many steps or screens; (7) according to the STAR project manager, all of the problems that were reported to GAO by users had been reported to the STAR project team through the contractor-operated STAR Help Desk; (8) also, STAR users had submitted nearly 8,000 requests, which were recorded on service tickets, to the Help Desk between October 1997 and August 1999; (9) these tickets, many of them concerning the same issue, identified problems that users reported having when working with STAR as well as STAR enhancement suggestions and other issues related to STAR's operations; (10) further, 116 of the 128 users GAO interviewed saw at least 1 benefit from using STAR, such as data being current and readily available; (11) the STAR Help Desk and the PBS Change Review Team were set up to solve problems identified by STAR users and to resolve other issues with STAR; (12) by the end of November 1999, changes and enhancements will have resulted in eight versions of STAR; (13) further, additional contract help had been provided to assist the regions with STAR problems and training; and (14) PBS has taken various actions to try to ensure that STAR has accurate, reliable, and consistent data: (a) STAR has been designed with built-in features to help ensure the reliability of some data elements; (b) PBS ran edits against the data before they were transferred to STAR and ran additional edits after data were transferred; (c) PBS initiated an effort to validate all space assignments; (d) PBS conducted a special study and produced a report that identified data problems and made recommendations for solving the problems; (e) a team was set up to determine how to implement the report's recommendations; and (f) PBS is developing a quality control system. |
gao_GAO-14-575 | gao_GAO-14-575_0 | U.S. Agencies Have Taken Actions Related to Responsible Sourcing of Conflict Minerals, but Commerce Has Not Yet Fulfilled Its Requirements
Since the Act was passed in 2010, State, USAID, SEC, and Commerce have undertaken activities related to implementation of the Act’s conflict minerals provisions, including activities related to responsible sourcing of such minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. SEC issued its required conflict minerals rule in 2012. Standard practices in program and project management and execution include, among other things, developing a plan to execute specific projects needed to obtain defined results within a specific time frame. State and USAID Developed a Strategy, and State Produced a Conflict Minerals Map
Responding to the Act, State and USAID developed a strategy in 2011 to address the linkages among human rights abuses, armed groups, the mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products. However, Commerce officials stated that they did not have a timeframe for completing the final list for Congress. In addition, Commerce officials mentioned that some conflict minerals data may be inaccessible to the U.S. government because a large number of conflict mineral smelters are in China.timeframes could better position Commerce to report on the status of its efforts to compile a list of conflict minerals processing facilities worldwide and to hold its personnel accountable for completing its related activities. Stakeholder Initiatives Are Expanding and Provide Some Information on Sourcing of Conflict Minerals
Since we reported in July 2013, stakeholders have expanded existing initiatives and added new initiatives focused on responsible sourcing of conflict minerals in the DRC and adjoining countries, to include new mine sites, countries, and smelters. Some of these initiatives have yielded publically available information, including data on production of conflict- free minerals and export data, as well as reports on the progress and results of the initiatives. The Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) has expanded in several aspects related to responsible sourcing. The number of smelters that the program has certified as conflict-free has expanded from 26 smelters in summer 2013 to 85 smelters as of April 25, 2014 (see table 1). These reports provide production and export data for tin, tantalum, and tungsten, including amounts traced through the iTSCi program, from three provinces in the DRC and Rwanda, as well as the mineral sales in U.S. dollars (for more details, including the applicable quantitative data, see app. Recommendation for Executive Action
To give Congress a sense of Commerce’s efforts to produce a listing of all known conflict minerals processing facilities worldwide, as required by section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce provide to Congress a plan that outlines the steps, with associated timeframes, to develop and report the required information about smelters and refiners of conflict minerals worldwide. Commerce concurred with our recommendation and noted that it will submit a listing of all known conflict minerals processing facilities worldwide to Congress by September 1, 2014. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the extent, if any, to which relevant U.S. agencies have engaged in activities related to responsible sourcing of conflict minerals, we interviewed officials who are cognizant of conflict minerals issues from the Departments of Commerce and State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We reviewed Section 1502 of the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. To analyze what is known about the status of, and any information provided by, initiatives focused on responsible sourcing of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries, we interviewed officials and reviewed and analyzed documents from State, USAID, and the United Nations Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNGoE); interviewed representatives and reviewed and analyzed guidance documents, reports, and presentations from foreign government, industry associations, multilateral organizations, companies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). | Why GAO Did This Study
Armed groups in eastern DRC continue to commit severe human rights abuses and profit from the exploitation of minerals, according to reports from the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to address the trade in “conflict minerals”—tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold. Section 1502 of the Act directed several U.S. agencies to report or focus on issues related to conflict minerals.
This report examines, among other things, (1) the extent to which relevant U.S. agencies have undertaken activities related to responsible sourcing of conflict minerals and (2) what is known about the status of, and information provided by, stakeholder initiatives focused on responsible sourcing of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. GAO reviewed and analyzed documents and data covering 2003 through 2014. We interviewed representatives from State, USAID, SEC, Commerce, nongovernmental organizations, industry, and international organizations who are cognizant of conflict minerals issues.
What GAO Found
Since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Act) was passed in 2010, relevant U.S. agencies have undertaken various activities related to responsible sourcing of conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries. In response to the Act, the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a strategy in 2011 to address the linkages among human rights abuses, armed groups, and the mining of conflict minerals and are implementing various strategy objectives. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a rule in 2012 requiring certain companies to disclose the source and chain of custody of necessary conflict minerals in their products. However, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) has not yet compiled a list of all conflict minerals processing facilities—smelters and refiners—known worldwide, required by January 2013 by the Act. Commerce cited difficulties with, for example, tracking conflict minerals operations but told GAO that it had completed outreach efforts with the majority of stakeholders. Commerce did not have a plan of action, with associated time frames, for developing and reporting on the list of conflict minerals processing facilities worldwide. Standard practices in program and project management include, among other things, developing a plan to execute specific projects needed to obtain defined results within a specific time frame. An action plan with timeframes could better position Commerce to report on the status of its efforts to produce a final list to Congress and to hold its personnel accountable for completing activities.
Over the past several years, a number of stakeholders—foreign governments, multilateral organizations, and industry associations, among others—have expanded, or made plans to expand, initiatives focused on responsible sourcing of conflict minerals in the DRC and adjoining countries. These stakeholder initiatives, such as in-region tracing of conflict minerals and development of guidance documents and audit protocols, have grown to include new mine sites, countries, and smelters. For example, the Conflict-Free Smelter Program, an industry-led effort, has expanded from 26 smelters certified as conflict-free in 2013 to 85 smelters as of April 25, 2014 (see table). New stakeholder initiatives are also underway or planned in the region, including the first responsible sourcing initiative in the Congo-Brazzaville. Some initiatives have yielded publicly available information, including data on production of conflict-free minerals and export data. For example, one stakeholder has reported production data for tin, tungsten, and tantalum from three provinces in the DRC and in Rwanda.
Source: Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative data, GAO (analysis).
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Commerce provide Congress a plan that outlines the steps, with associated timeframes, to develop and report the required information about smelters and refiners of conflict minerals worldwide. Commerce concurred with GAO's recommendation and noted that it will submit a listing of all known conflict minerals processing facilities worldwide to Congress by September 1, 2014. |
gao_GAO-15-21 | gao_GAO-15-21_0 | For example, the Bureau’s Geography Division is working with USPS, other federal agencies, and state, local, and tribal governments on a new program called the Geographic Support System Initiative (GSS-I). This initiative allows government agencies at all levels to regularly share and continuously update their address lists and road data with the Bureau. The Bureau Is Considering a Variety of Sources to Meet Key Address and Mapping Needs, but Has Not Systematically Documented Its Decisions
The Bureau Has Begun Making Decisions About Data Sources to Meet Key Address and Mapping Needs
The Bureau is taking a number of actions to help it develop a better understanding of the different sources available for updating address and mapping data and to better position it for cost reduction opportunities in data acquisition while increasing the quality of the MAF/TIGER database. GSS-I partnerships. Additional data sources. The Bureau has also taken steps to work with commercial vendors to review potential sources of commercial data that the Bureau could use to augment or verify data collected through GSS-I. Federal internal control standards and Office of Management and Budget guidance on geospatial dataBureau should be supporting its significant data source decisions—such as for its address and mapping needs—in terms of both cost and quality, as well as with clear management approval for the decisions. Cost considerations. By having a systematic process to consider the quality of the data that the Bureau relies on from various sources, the Bureau can help ensure that effective choices are being made and that possible limitations in data that might affect their use are better understood. We found that at the time decisions were made, the Bureau did not document management approval in support of sourcing decisions for any of the data sources discussed above. Yet we found the Bureau does not have guidance outlining the need or the process for ensuring (1) systematic justification for decisions related to using specific data sources in terms of cost, quality, or other important considerations, and (2) documentation of management approval for such decisions. By developing more rigorous support and evidence of such decisions, the Bureau can ensure transparency to Congress, commercial vendors, and other stakeholders. However, we found that the Bureau’s approach to meeting its address and mapping needs is missing key elements that comprise a rigorous, integrated plan, including clear and measurable goals, decision milestones at a level where decisions on GSS-I data sources might be tracked, and performance data that management could use to track progress. Measurable goals. While the Bureau has taken some positive that provide steps, such as preparing a series of planning documentshigh-level examples of measurable goals, schedules, and deadlines, it has not put in place all elements integral to large complex projects. The absence of detailed goals, schedules, deadlines, metrics, or data on monitoring progress toward outcomes and the absence of a detailed integrated plan that incorporates these elements means any limitations of the GSS-I strategy may not be fully known or apparent until late in the decade. Without these elements, it will be difficult for the Bureau to ensure that it evaluates the costs and benefits of alternative data sources and measures and reports the Bureau’s progress. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Bureau more rigorously considers data sources and remains on schedule to meet its address and mapping needs, the Secretary of Commerce and Undersecretary of Economic Affairs should direct the Census Bureau to take the following three actions: In order to ensure transparency of future decision making, implement a process for documenting the support for data source decisions intended to meet key address and mapping needs and the support for assessing the cost and quality of data sources the Bureau is considering. The Department of Commerce generally agreed with our findings and recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report reviewed (1) the extent to which the Bureau is considering non-Bureau sources of data to meet its key address and mapping needs for the 2020 Census, and (2) the status of the Bureau’s plans for meeting those needs, paying particular attention to leading practices for project management. To review the Bureau’s approaches for developing its address and mapping needs for 2020 Census operations and preparing it for data sourcing decisions, we compared the Bureau’s organizational documents for its approaches–such as strategic, program management, and operational plans–to elements of project planning we identified from industry guides for project management and business process reengineering, as well as other leading management practices we identified in our prior work on establishing a coherent agency mission and integrated strategic goals, and on adopting leading practices for results- oriented strategic planning and reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
A complete and accurate address list is a key building block of a successful census, but developing such a list is costly and labor intensive. For the 2020 Census, the Bureau is reexamining approaches to control cost and maintain accuracy, including approaches to meet its address and mapping needs.
GAO was asked to examine potential private sector roles in 2020 Census address list and map development. GAO (1) evaluated the extent to which the Bureau is considering non-Bureau data source opportunities to meet such 2020 needs, and (2) reviewed the status of the Bureau's plans for meeting its key 2020 address and mapping needs.
GAO compared Bureau documentation to leading practices for planning, management, and scheduling from industry guides for project management, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed Bureau officials familiar with decennial census needs and data source decisions.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) is working with stakeholders to identify various data sources to meet its address and mapping needs. For example, the Bureau has worked with state, local, and tribal governments and with commercial vendors to identify potential data sources to augment or verify data collected through its Geographic Support System Initiative (GSS-I) program. GSS-I allows government agencies at all levels to regularly share and continuously update their address lists and road data with the Bureau. Federal internal control standards and Office of Management and Budget guidance on geospatial data suggest that the Bureau should support significant data source decisions in terms of both data cost and quality.
However, the Bureau has inconsistently documented cost and quality support for decisions already made to use address and mapping data from state, tribal, and local governments, other federal agencies, and a commercial vendor. Without a systematic consideration of the quality of the variously sourced data that the Bureau plans to rely on, it cannot ensure that effective choices are being made and that possible data limitations that might affect their use are fully understood. Further, the Bureau did not document management approval in support of its data source decisions at the time that the decisions were made; without such documentation, the Bureau lacks accountability and transparency for future sourcing decisions. The Bureau does not have guidance clearly outlining the need or process for ensuring consideration of cost and quality—primary concerns of the Bureau's reexamination—or documentation of management approval for those data sources selected. By implementing a process for documenting such steps, the Bureau can ensure that data source decisions are transparent to Congress, commercial vendors, and other stakeholders.
The Bureau's approach for meeting its address and mapping needs lacks key elements of effective project management outlined in guidance GAO reviewed. Specifically, while the Bureau prepared planning documents to guide GSS-I, it did not include
clear and measurable performance goals to help it effectively meet its address and mapping needs;
milestones detailed at a level where decisions on GSS-I data sources might be tracked; and
performance measures, data, and reporting to help guide planning and track progress toward filling gaps in the Bureau's data needs.
While the Bureau has taken some positive steps—such as preparing a series of planning documents that provide high-level examples of measurable goals, schedules, and deadlines—the absence of detailed goals, schedules, deadlines, metrics, or data on monitoring progress toward outcomes, as well as the absence of a detailed integrated plan that incorporates these elements, means any limitations of the GSS-I strategy may not be fully known or apparent until late in the decade. Without these elements, it will be difficult for the Bureau to ensure that it is adequately evaluating the costs and benefits of alternative data sources, measuring and reporting its progress, or holding managers accountable for results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Bureau implement processes for reviewing the cost and quality of data source selections and for documenting support for those decisions; document management approval of key data source decisions; and—for remaining data source decisions—develop a detailed plan with measurable goals, track performance against these goals, and set a timeline.
The Department of Commerce generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-75 | gao_NSIAD-96-75_0 | Reservists Have Volunteered When Requested
Volunteer reservists have been used in most U.S. peace operations since the Persian Gulf War. Recent studies conducted for DOD have shown that the volunteer reservists who have participated in peace operations have been qualified for their assignments and performed well. He attributed this to an aggressive Air Force effort to seek employer support. Air Force Has Had Greatest Reliance on Volunteers
We found differences among the services in their use of volunteers. The Air Force has relied extensively on volunteers to support peace operations. To date, the Marine Corps has not used volunteers to a great extent for peace operations. Funding Is Most Important Factor Affecting the Use of Volunteers
The availability of funding from the active component is the key factor determining the extent that reserve volunteers are used to support the active component. In addition to funding availability, the use of volunteers is also affected by (1) the amount of notice provided before the start of the mission, (2) the length of the deployment, and (3) whether the requirements are for units or individuals. Generally, these volunteer costs are covered by the active component. If so, funds are available for reserve volunteer support. 1-2 Mos. 3-4 Mos. 5-6 Mos. The Army relied more heavily on PSRC authority in Haiti and Bosnia than the other services. If large numbers of individuals or units are needed to support an operation, PSRC authority is a necessity, they said. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Access to Reserves
In 1994, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs expressed concerns about how much DOD could rely on volunteers. Since that time, DOD officials have taken some steps to ensure that reserves will be accessible for the range of peace operations they are likely to confront in the future. This program is intended to protect reservists from financial hardships resulting from involuntary call-up. These reservists may volunteer for active duty missions, but may not be accessed under PSRC authority. We discussed past experiences with obtaining volunteers for peace operations and obtained their views on factors affecting accessibility. We obtained information from the following Washington, D.C., area, offices:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability, Joint Staff; and the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve;
Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel;
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs, the Office of Air Force Reserve, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations;
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Bureau of Naval Personnel;
Reserve Affairs Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; and
National Guard Bureau, the Air National Guard Readiness Center, and the Army National Guard Readiness Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed reservists' participation in peace operations, focusing on: (1) whether qualified volunteers are accessible; (2) the differences among the services in their reliance on reserve volunteers; (3) factors that affect reserve volunteers' availability; and (4) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to ensure their accessibility.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) thousands of reservists have volunteered for recent peace operations when requested to assist active duty forces; (2) among the operations they have participated in are those in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia; (3) the volunteers chosen for peace operations generally have had the necessary skills and qualifications to perform their jobs and have performed well; (4) however, past success in obtaining volunteers may not be indicative of the future; (5) reservists have volunteered when needed for peace operations, but the services' demand for volunteers has varied greatly; (6) the Air Force has relied most heavily on volunteers and has been considered a model within DOD; (7) the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have had less demand for volunteers, except for certain specialists; (8) availability of funding has been a critical factor in whether reserve volunteers are used to support active component operations; (9) in most cases, the expenses of volunteer support are funded by the active component; (10) the Air Force budgets much more for these expenses than the other services; (11) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has been working through the DOD budgeting process to obtain more funds for reserve support of the active component; (12) other factors affecting the use of volunteers are the amount of lead time available before the volunteers are needed, the duration of the tour, and whether the requirements are for individuals or units; (13) Army and Navy officials expressed concerns about the extent they can rely on volunteerism if large numbers of reservists or whole units are needed; (14) DOD has been able to obtain the reservists it needs through a combination of involuntary call-up authority and volunteerism; (15) the demonstrated willingness of DOD to seek and the President to approve call-up authority has minimized the need to rely solely on volunteers to respond to peace operations; and (16) further, DOD has taken some steps to ensure continued access to and use of reserves. |
gao_GAO-14-601T | gao_GAO-14-601T_0 | Inventory Management Has Been Centralized; Rising Costs Have Not Been Analyzed
Coin Inventory Management
In 2009, the Federal Reserve centralized coin management across the 12 Reserve Banks and established national inventory targets. CPO officials noted that these targets help meet their primary goal in managing the nation’s coin inventory: ensuring a sufficient supply of all coin denominations to meet the public’s demand. Although Reserve Bank coin management costs have risen since 2008, we found in October 2013 that CPO had not taken steps to systematically assess factors influencing direct and support costs related to coin management and assess whether opportunities exist to identify elements of its coin inventory management that could lead to cost savings or greater efficiencies across the Reserve Banks. Specifically, using data provided by CPO on individual Reserve Banks’ costs, from 2008 through 2012, coin management costs increased for all Reserve Banks, with the increases ranging from a low of 36 percent to a high of 116 percent. To address this issue, in our October 2013 report we recommended that the Federal Reserve develop a process to assess the factors that have influenced increasing coin-operations costs and the large differences in costs across Reserve Banks and to use this information to identify practices that could lead to costs savings. The Federal Reserve generally agreed with the recommendations in our report, including the above recommendation as well as recommendations discussed below, and has developed a plan for addressing them. The Federal Reserve Follows Some Key Practices in Managing the Circulating-Coin Inventory but Lacks Others
In October 2013, we found that the Federal Reserve, in managing the circulating-coin inventory, follows two of five key inventory management practices we identified and partially follows three. For example, it follows the key practice of collaboration because it has established multiple mechanisms for sharing information related to coin inventory management with partner entities such as depository institutions. In the key practice area of performance metrics, we found that the Federal Reserve has developed some metrics in the form of upper and lower national coin-inventory targets. However, it has not developed other goals or metrics to measure other aspects of its coin supply-chain management—such as costs. Characteristics of this key practice include agencies’ identifying goals, establishing performance metrics, and measuring progress toward those goals. We concluded that establishing goals and metrics, such as those related to coin management costs, could aid the Federal Reserve in using information and resources to identify additional efficiencies. To address this issue, we recommended that CPO establish, document, and annually report to the Board performance goals and metrics for managing the circulating coin inventory and measure performance toward those goals and metrics. Demand for Currency Expected to Decline Gradually in the Near Term, but a Variety of Factors Make Predicting Longer- Term Change Difficult
To collect data and information on potential changes in the demand for currency, the Federal Reserve has conducted studies and outreach with groups such as depository institutions and merchants, and found a general consensus that the use of currency may decline slightly in the near term. According to the Federal Reserve, this expectation is due, in part, to an increase in alternative payment options (e.g., additional forms of electronic payments), but interrelated factors—such as technological change and economic conditions—make it difficult to predict long-term (i.e., 5 to 10 years) currency demand. In 2010, CPO began to develop a long-term strategic framework to consider potential changes to currency demand over the next 5 to 10 years and how this change could affect CPO’s operations. One component of this effort includes examining internal operations for distributing coins and processing notes as well as seeking to increase efficiency in these areas to better position the agency to adapt to future changes in demand. | Why GAO Did This Study
Efficiently managing the nation's inventory of circulating coins helps to ensure that the coin supply meets the public's demand while avoiding unnecessary production and storage costs. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2013 report on the Federal Reserve's management of the circulating-coin inventory. It addresses (1) how the Federal Reserve manages the circulating coin inventory and the related costs, (2) the extent to which the Federal Reserve follows key practices in managing the circulating-coin inventory, and (3) actions taken to respond to potential changes in demand for currency (coins and notes).
What GAO Found
In 2009, the Federal Reserve centralized coin management across the 12 Reserve Banks and established national inventory targets to track and measure the coin inventory. However, based on GAO's analysis of Federal Reserve data, from 2008 to 2012, total annual Reserve Bank coin-management costs increased by 69 percent, and more specifically, costs at individual Reserve Banks increased at rates ranging from 36 percent to 116 percent. GAO found in October 2013 that the Federal Reserve did not monitor coin management costs by each Reserve Bank—instead focusing on combined national coin and note costs—thus missing potential opportunities to improve the cost-effectiveness of coin-related operations. Furthermore, the agency had not taken steps to systematically assess factors influencing coin management costs and identify practices that could lead to cost savings.
In managing the circulating-coin inventory, the Federal Reserve followed two of five key inventory management practices GAO identified and partially followed three. For example, the agency followed the key practice of collaboration because it has established multiple mechanisms for sharing information related to coin inventory management with partner entities such as depository institutions. The Federal Reserve partially followed the key practice of performance metrics, which involves identifying goals, establishing performance metrics, and measuring progress toward goals. While the Federal Reserve had developed some performance metrics of upper and lower national coin-inventory targets, it had not developed goals or metrics to measure other aspects of its coin supply-chain management, such as costs. Establishing goals and metrics, such as those related to coin management costs, could aid the Federal Reserve in using information and resources to identify additional efficiencies.
To collect data and information on potential changes in the demand for currency (coins and notes), the Federal Reserve has conducted studies and outreach with groups such as depository institutions and merchants, and found a general consensus that the use of currency may decline slightly in the near term. This expectation is due, in part, to an increase in alternative payment options (e.g., additional forms of electronic payments), but interrelated factors—such as technological change and economic conditions—make it difficult to predict long-term currency demand. In 2010, the Federal Reserve began to develop a long-term strategic framework to consider potential changes to currency demand over the next 5 to 10 years and how this change could affect operations. This effort includes, among other things, examining internal operations for distributing coins and processing notes as well as conducting research into the use of payment types to understand currency use in the United States to better position the agency to adapt to future changes in demand.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's October 2013 report included several recommendations to the Federal Reserve to ensure the efficient management of the coin inventory and potentially to reduce costs. These included recommendations (1) to develop a process to assess factors influencing coin operations costs and identify practices that could lead to cost-savings and (2) to establish additional performance goals and metrics relevant to coin inventory management. The Federal Reserve generally agreed with the report's recommendations and, in response, has developed a plan for addressing them. |
gao_GAO-16-378 | gao_GAO-16-378_0 | DOD Has Identified Long-Standing FVAP Challenges and Needed Actions, but Has Not Established Time Frames for These Actions
DOD has taken various steps to identify challenges and needed improvements to its overseas voting assistance efforts. However, as previously noted, the results from recent studies and post-election surveys indicate that there is limited awareness of FVAP’s resources among military and overseas voters. Unpredictable Postal Delivery of Absentee Ballots
The second category of challenges identified by DOD and in our prior work relates to the unpredictable postal delivery of absentee ballots to and from UOCAVA voters. DOD’s Implementation of FVAP Exhibits Some Leading Practices of Federal Strategic Planning, but DOD Has Not Developed a Strategy to Help Ensure the Long- Term Effectiveness of the Program
DOD’s implementation of its voting assistance program exhibits some characteristics of the six selected leading practices associated with the initial stages of effective federal strategic planning but has not fully exhibited any of these practices. FVAP Has Not Developed a Long-Term Strategy to Guide Its Voting Assistance Efforts
According to officials, as of February 2016, FVAP did not have a long- term strategy, such as a strategic plan, to institutionalize ongoing practices and establish accountability for efforts still being developed, such as the partially exhibited leading practices that we have identified above. Without a strategic plan that institutionalizes a long-term vision, it will be difficult for FVAP to demonstrate progress in addressing its long-standing challenges, such as those previously discussed. While these are positive steps, some of the challenges identified, such as the limited voter and stakeholder awareness of FVAP resources and the unpredictable postal delivery of absentee ballots, are long-standing issues and continue to persist—in part because DOD has not established time frames for completing identified corrective actions. Further, while DOD’s leadership of FVAP has stabilized since 2013, DOD has not fully implemented the six selected leading practices for federal strategic planning into the day-to-day operation of the program. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, through the Defense Human Resources Activity, direct FVAP’s Director to complete the development of a strategic plan that fully exhibits the six selected leading practices of federal strategic planning, including, but not limited to: a statement of FVAP’s revised mission and goals; an identification of strategies that address management challenges and resources needed to achieve goals; a description of leadership involvement and accountability; a description of stakeholder involvement in the development of FVAP a coordination strategy to communicate the program’s mission and goals to other federal agencies; and a description of performance measures, aligned with program goals that FVAP will use to track progress toward achieving goals. Appendix I: Description of Military and Overseas Ballots in Elections Held in 2008 through 2014
We reviewed 2008-14 general election survey data from the Election Assistance Commission, which show that the turnout of voters covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act has fluctuated between the mid-term and presidential elections, and that states have received a higher number of ballots from voters covered by the Act during presidential elections. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has identified challenges associated with its military and overseas absentee voting assistance efforts and developed plans to address those challenges, we interviewed program officials at the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP); obtained relevant documents, studies, and data; and discussed their voting assistance efforts, including challenges and planned corrective actions. Elections: Action Plans Needed to Fully Address Challenges in Electronic Absentee Voting Initiatives for Military and Overseas Citizens. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act generally protects the rights of military personnel and overseas citizens to register and vote absentee in federal elections. In 2014, the most recently completed federal election, the Election Assistance Commission estimated that around 6 percent, or 8,500 of the 146,000 ballots submitted by voters covered under the act, were rejected. DOD's Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) generally implements many of the act's provisions and provides absentee voting support.
GAO was asked to review matters related to FVAP. GAO assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) identified challenges with its military and overseas voting assistance efforts and developed plans to address those challenges, and (2) implemented strategic planning practices to help ensure the long-term effectiveness of FVAP. GAO reviewed 2010-14 post-election surveys, 2014-15 DOD-commissioned studies, and compared documentation of FVAP plans with leading federal strategic planning practices; and interviewed FVAP officials and program stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD), through its Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), has taken steps to identify challenges and needed improvements to its military and overseas absentee voting assistance efforts. However, two long-standing issues—limited awareness of resources for voters and the unpredictable postal delivery of absentee ballots—continue to pose challenges. DOD-commissioned studies and post-election survey results indicate that there is limited awareness of FVAP's resources among military and overseas voters. A 2015 study found, for example, that the online availability of blank ballots led to one of the most significant improvements in military and overseas absentee voting. At the same time, the full benefits of the improvement had not been realized because voters remained unaware that ballots could be requested online. Regarding the unpredictable postal delivery of absentee ballots, the timeliness of a voter's receipt or return of an absentee ballot depends on a number of variables, such as the mode and speed of transportation used to transmit mail. DOD has identified actions that it will take to address these and other issues. However, these challenges persist, in part, because DOD has not established time frames for completing the actions it has identified.
DOD's implementation of FVAP partially exhibits six selected leading practices of federal strategic planning. As shown below, the program exhibits some, but not all, of the characteristics that make up each practice.
According to officials, as of February 2016, DOD did not have a long-term, comprehensive strategy, such as a strategic plan, for its voting assistance program, to institutionalize existing practices and establish accountability for efforts that need further development—such as those related to the partially exhibited leading practices identified. Without a comprehensive strategic plan that institutionalizes a long-term vision, it will be difficult for FVAP to respond to the dynamic nature of the voting environment and frequent turnover in program leadership, and to demonstrate progress in addressing its long-standing challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish time frames for actions FVAP identified to address challenges, fully implement the selected leading practices of federal strategic planning into its day-to-day operations, and develop a strategic plan that fully exhibits the six selected leading practices of federal strategic planning. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-98-201 | gao_GGD-98-201_0 | The Capitol Police does not authorize for official use any personally owned firearms. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts did not have aggregate data showing the number of firearms issued to or authorized for use by probation and pretrial service officers in the 94 federal judicial districts. Firearm Safety Lock Program Implementation
The following two sections, respectively, discuss (1) implementation of the presidential directive by Justice, Treasury, and the National Park Service; and (2) voluntary implementation of firearm safety lock programs by the Postal Inspection Service, the Capitol Police, and federal judicial districts, which are not subject to the presidential directive. Executive Branch Implementation of the Presidential Directive
Justice, Treasury, and the National Park Service have developed and taken actions to communicate firearms safety lock policies. In addition, Justice, Treasury, and the National Park Service require that personally owned firearms authorized for official use be equipped with safety lock devices. Generally, these organizations do not require safety lock devices for firearms that are maintained in secure agency facilities and not taken home by employees. Knowledgeable Justice and Treasury officials told us that safety lock devices generally have been issued to all appropriate employees according to the respective organization’s policies. Treasury components that authorize personally owned firearms for official use purchase safety lock devices for these firearms. Firearms Safety Lock Programs of Three Organizations Not Subject to the Presidential Directive
The Postal Inspection Service—a law enforcement component of the U.S. The agency does not require safety locks for the firearms used by its uniformed police officers because these weapons are maintained in secure agency vaults and are not taken home. At the time of our review, the Postal Inspection Service had purchased 2,500 safety locks, which represent a sufficient number for all permanently issued and personally owned firearms authorized for official use by its inspectors. However, according to the Administrative Office, each district has the discretion to establish its own firearms policy, including whether to authorize probation and pretrial service officers to carry firearms. In response to our inquiry, the Administrative Office had no readily available summary or overview of all districts’ current policies and practices. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with the requesters’ offices, our objectives were to determine (1) the number of firearms currently issued to or used in an official capacity by employees at selected federal law enforcement organizations and (2) how selected federal organizations have implemented President Clinton’s March 1997 directive regarding firearm safety locks. This directive, and a subsequent clarifying memorandum, required executive departments and agencies to (1) develop and implement a policy requiring that safety locks be provided for all firearms issued to federal law enforcement officers, (2) inform all such officers of the policy, and (3) provide instructions for the proper use of safety locks. We also sought to determine the number of firearms that were personally owned by law enforcement officers and authorized for official use. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal agencies' compliance with President Clinton's March 1997 directive regarding child safety locks for firearms, focusing on: (1) firearms that have been issued to or are used in an official capacity by employees at selected federal law enforcement organizations; and (2) selected federal law enforcement organizations' implementation of the presidential directive.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the three executive branch organizations GAO reviewed that are subject to the presidential directive--the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and the National Park Service (NPS)--have issued about 72,000 firearms to employees, with Justice issuances accounting for about 49,000 of the total; (2) additionally, these organizations have authorized for official use about 26,000 personally owned firearms; (3) of this total, Justice authorizations accounted for about 23,000; (4) the Postal Inspection Service has issued about 2,000 firearms to employees and authorized about 400 personally owned firearms for official use; (5) the Capitol Police have issued approximately 1,100 firearms to officers but does not allow personally owned firearms to be used for official duties; (6) the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts had no readily available, centralized data showing the number of firearms issued to or used by federal judicial district officers; (7) Justice, Treasury, and NPS officials told GAO their organizations have taken appropriate steps to implement the presidential directive; (8) in implementing the presidential directive, these organizations are requiring that all firearms issued to employees, as well as personally owned firearms authorized for official use, be equipped with safety lock devices; (9) generally, these organizations did not require safety lock devices for firearms that are maintained in secure agency facilities and not taken home by employees; (10) GAO's review verified that these organizations have developed and taken actions to communicate a safety lock policy to their law enforcement officers; (11) the Postal Inspection Service has voluntarily developed and taken actions to communicate a safety lock policy to its law enforcement officers and has purchased safety lock devices for all permanently issued and personally owned firearms authorized for official use by its inspectors; (12) the Postal Inspection Service does not require safety lock devices for firearms that are maintained in secure agency vaults and not taken home; (13) the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has provided the 94 federal judicial districts guidance on the use of firearms; and (14) however, according to the Administrative Office, each district has the discretion to establish its own policies, and the Administrative Office had no readily available summary or overview of current policies and practices in all districts. |
gao_GAO-05-122 | gao_GAO-05-122_0 | By fiscal year 2004, ONDCP had designated 28 drug trafficking areas (HIDTAs) as centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution within the United States with a federally funded HIDTA program budget of about $225 million. To encourage HIDTAs to conduct CPOT investigations, ONDCP utilized discretionary funding. In September 2002, at the request of the U.S. Attorney General, OCDETF issued the first CPOT list, naming international drug trafficking organizations most responsible for supplying illegal drugs to the United States. CPOT Investigations Were Not Inconsistent with the Mission of the HIDTA Program
CPOT investigations were not inconsistent with the mission of the HIDTA program because HIDTAs’ targeting of local drug traffickers linked with international organizations on the CPOT list was one possible strategy for achieving the program’s goal of eliminating or reducing significant sources of drug trafficking in their regions. However, ONDCP has developed a mission statement that reflects the legislative authority for the HIDTA program, specifically, to enhance and coordinate U.S. drug control efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences in critical regions of the United States. ONDCP Distributed Discretionary Funds to Many HIDTAs to Help Support CPOT Investigations
ONDCP distributed discretionary funds to HIDTAs to help support their investigations of drug traffickers linked with international organizations on the CPOT list by reviewing and approving HIDTA applications for funding. In fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, ONDCP distributed CPOT funds to a total of 17 of the 28 HIDTAs. Third, reducing the amount of discretionary funds available for CPOT funding in fiscal year 2004 affected the number of HIDTAs that received this funding. According to OCDETF officials, access to the full CPOT list is restricted to federal law enforcement officials. Both agencies focused their comments and clarifications on the second objective: how ONDCP distributed discretionary funds to HIDTAs for CPOT investigations and why some HIDTAs did not receive funding. For fiscal year 2004, the majority of CPOT investigations continued to be multi-agency OCDETF investigations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2002, the Attorney General called upon law enforcement to target the "most wanted" international drug traffickers responsible for supplying illegal drugs to America. In September 2002, law enforcement, working through the multi-agency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program, developed a list of these drug traffickers, known as the Consolidated Priority Organization Target List (CPOT), to aid federal law enforcement agencies in targeting their drug investigations. Also, the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) collaborated with law enforcement to encourage existing High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) to conduct CPOT investigations. According to ONDCP, the 28 HIDTAs across the nation are located in centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution. ONDCP distributed discretionary funds to supplement some HIDTAs' existing budgets beginning in fiscal year 2002 to investigate CPOT organizations. Out of concern that a CPOT emphasis on international drug investigations would detract from the HIDTA program's regional emphasis, the Senate Committee on Appropriations directed GAO to examine whether investigations of CPOT organizations are consistent with the HIDTA program's mission and how ONDCP distributes its discretionary funds to HIDTAs for CPOT investigations.
What GAO Found
The mission of the HIDTA program is to enhance and coordinate U.S. drug control efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences in HIDTAs. CPOT investigations were not inconsistent with this mission because HIDTAs' targeting of local drug traffickers linked with international organizations on the CPOT list was one possible strategy for achieving the program's goal of eliminating or reducing significant sources of drug trafficking in their regions. GAO found that in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, ONDCP distributed discretionary funds to 17 of the 28 HIDTAs for CPOT investigations. Some HIDTA officials said they did not receive CPOT funding for several reasons including unclear guidance, insufficient application information to the HIDTAs for funding, and local priorities not linking with CPOT investigations. Reduced discretionary funding in fiscal year 2004 for CPOT investigations affected the number of HIDTAs that received this funding. |
gao_GAO-02-776 | gao_GAO-02-776_0 | Customer Satisfaction with DLA Services Is Mixed
Our work showed that customers at the eight locations we visited expressed satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the services the agency provides. Usefulness of Customer Feedback Approaches Has Been Limited
DLA’s approach for obtaining customer service feedback has been of limited usefulness because it lacks a systematic integrated approach for obtaining adequate information on customer service problems. As a result of these back orders, some of the unit’s aircraft were unable to operate because of maintenance needs. Initiatives for Achieving a Better Customer Focus Could Be Enhanced Through Improved Customer Feedback Approaches
While DLA has initiatives under way to improve its customer service, there are opportunities to enhance these initiatives to provide for an improved customer feedback program. | What GAO Found
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) performs a critical role in supporting America's military forces worldwide by supplying every consumable item--from food to jet fuel--that the military services need to operate. Although customers at the eight locations GAO visited were satisfied with some aspects of routine service, such as delivery time for routine parts and certain contractor service arrangements, customers also raised a number of points of dissatisfaction, particularly with regard to the detrimental impact of DLA's service on their operations. The agency's approach for obtaining customer service feedback has been of limited usefulness because it lacks a systematic integrated approach for obtaining adequate information on customer service problems. Although DLA has initiatives under way to improve its customer service, there are opportunities to enhance these initiatives to provide for an improved customer feedback program. |
gao_GAO-02-773 | gao_GAO-02-773_0 | Program- and Market- Related Changes that Could Explain Higher Foreclosure Rates
Although economic factors such as house-price-appreciation rates are key determinants of mortgage foreclosure, a number of program- and market- related changes occurring since 1995 could also affect the performance of recently insured FHA loans. The combination of changes in FHA’s program and the increased competition in the marketplace may partly explain the higher foreclosure rates of FHA loans originated since fiscal year 1995. Performance of Recent Loans Suggests that FHA’s Portfolio May Be Riskier than Previously Estimated
The overall riskiness of FHA loans made in recent years appears to be greater than we had estimated in our February 2001 report on the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, reducing to some extent the ability of the Fund to withstand worse-than-expected loan performance. The impact of underwriting changes and changes in the conventional mortgage market on the riskiness of the portfolio is not fully understood. | What GAO Found
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans made in recent years have experienced somewhat higher foreclosure rates than loans made in earlier years. However, recent loans are performing much better than loans made in the 1980s. Although economic factors such as house price appreciation are key determinants of mortgage foreclosure, changes in underwriting requirements, as well as changes in the conventional mortgage market, may partly explain the higher foreclosure rates experienced in the 1990s. Factors not fully captured in the model GAO used may be affecting the performance of recent FHA loans and causing the overall risks of FHA's portfolio to be somewhat greater than previously estimated. Thus, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund may be somewhat less able to withstand worse-than-expected loan performance resulting from adverse economic conditions. |
gao_RCED-95-7 | gao_RCED-95-7_0 | 1.) The Fish and Wildlife Services’ (FWS) Division of Refuges provides overall direction for the management and operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System. Listed Species Often Occur on Wildlife Refuges
Of all the listed species, 215, or 24 percent, occur on wildlife refuges. Some listed species use the refuges on a temporary basis for migratory, breeding, and wintering habitat. Wildlife Refuges Contribute to the Recovery of Listed Species
Wildlife refuges and refuge staff contribute to the recovery of listed species in a variety of ways. Refuges contribute to the recovery of listed species by providing secure habitat. Funding Limitations Constrain the Contribution Wildlife Refuges Make to Species Recovery
While refuge staff have taken some actions to protect and aid the recovery of listed species on their refuges, we found that efforts were at times not undertaken. At 14 of the 15 locations we visited, refuge managers and staff said funding constraints limited their ability to fully implement recovery actions for listed species and other protection efforts. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) National Wildlife Refuge System, focusing on the extent to which wildlife refuges contribute to the protection and recovery of endangered species.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) of about 900 endangered species, 215 occur or have habitat on national wildlife refuges; (2) the endangered species found on wildlife refuges represent a diversity of wildlife; (3) although many listed endangered species inhabit wildlife refuges, many other endangered species use refuge lands temporarily for breeding or migratory rest stops; (4) FWS refuges contribute to the protection and recovery of endangered species by providing safe and secure habitats, implementing recovery projects that are tailored to each endangered species, and identifying specific actions that can contribute to species recovery; (5) FWS efforts to manage wildlife refuges have been inhibited because funding levels have not kept pace with the increasing costs of managing new or existing refuges; and (6) at 14 of the 15 locations reviewed, refuge managers and staff believed that funding constraints limited their ability to enhance habitat and facilitate the recovery of endangered species. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-107 | gao_T-HEHS-98-107_0 | Spending for the Elderly’s Long-Term Care Exceeded $90 Billion in 1995
Spending for the elderly’s long-term care was $91 billion, or about $12,000 per disabled elderly person, in 1995, the last year for which data on expenditures from all sources are available. The elderly and their families represent the largest single group of purchasers of long-term care, spending almost $36 billion dollars out of pocket, or almost 40 percent of the total $91 billion expenditures for long-term care. Studies have found that about 65 percent of disabled elderly living in the community rely exclusively on unpaid sources for their care. Public funding for long-term care comes primarily from Medicaid, which finances almost one-third of long-term care—$28.5 billion in 1995—and Medicare, which funds one-fourth—$22.7 billion. Aging Baby Boomers Will Expand Demand for Long-Term Care
The baby boom generation, about 76 million people born between 1946 and 1964, will contribute to rapid growth in the number of elderly individuals who need long-term care and the resources required to pay for it. Nonetheless, recent forecasts of the number of disabled baby boomers who will need long-term care have been developed but differ widely, ranging from 2 to 4 times the current number of disabled elderly. Shifts in Medicaid and Medicare Funding of Long-Term Care Complicate Projections
How the increased long-term care needs of the baby boom generation will be met or financed is uncertain. Most of Medicaid expenditures are for nursing home care, but in the past 15 years there has been a shift to home care. As states have become more experienced with the waivers and confident of their ability to manage these programs, they have expanded their financing of home and community-based care. Private long-term care insurance has been seen as a means of reducing the catastrophic financial risk for people needing long-term care, and relieving some of the financing burden currently falling on public programs. Nevertheless, a very small proportion of the elderly or near-elderly have purchased long-term care insurance during the past 10 years. Private long-term care insurance is a relatively new product with a growing market. In conclusion, even though we cannot know the exact numbers of the baby boom generation who will require long-term care services, we do know that the aging of the baby boomers will lead to a tremendous increase in the elderly population in the next 3 decades and an even larger increase in the 85-and-over population who are more likely to use long-term care services. Financing these services will be a challenge for the baby boomers, their families, and federal and state governments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the challenges the country will face in financing long-term care for the baby boom generation, focusing on: (1) the current spending for long-term care for the elderly; (2) the increased demand that the baby boom generation will likely create for long-term care; (3) recent shifts in Medicaid and Medicare financing of long-term care; and (4) the potential role of private long-term care insurance in help finance this care.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) spending for long-term care for the elderly totalled almost $91 billion in 1995, the most recent year for which expenditures from all sources were available; (2) almost 40 percent of these dollars were paid for by the elderly and their families and almost 60 percent by Medicaid and Medicare; (3) these amounts, however, do not include many hidden costs of long-term care, since an estimated two-thirds of the disabled elderly living in the community rely exclusively on their families and other unpaid sources for their care; (4) according to current estimates by the Congressional Research Service, nearly a quarter of the nation's elderly population--over 7 million elderly people--have some form of disability for which they require assistance, such as help with bathing, dressing, eating, preparing meals, or taking medicine; (5) as the 76-million-strong baby boom generation ages, so too will its demand for long-term care increase; (6) long-range predictions of the magnitude of the baby boomers' long-term care needs, however, vary, with estimates of the disabled elderly ranging from 2 to 4 times the current disabled elderly; (7) estimates of cost are even more imprecise due to the uncertain impact of several important factors, including who will be needing care, the types of care they will need, and who will fund it; (8) Medicaid and Medicare, which currently finance almost two-thirds of long-term care, have undergone significant changes in recent years; (9) while historically the majority of Medicaid long-term care expenditures were for nursing home care, in recent years there has been a shift toward more financing of home and community-based care; (10) at the same time, Medicare, the largest public payer for home-based care, has been paying for care that more and more resembles long-term care; (11) private long-term care insurance, seen as a means of helping reduce the catastrophic financial risk for people needing long-term care and some of the financing burden that falls to public programs, has contributed little to date; (12) it is a relatively new form of insurance with a growing market; and (13) nevertheless, after 10 years, a very small proportion of the elderly or near-elderly have coverage. |
gao_GAO-06-269 | gao_GAO-06-269_0 | CM bills allow Treasury to finance very short-term cash needs—for as little as 1 day— while providing short notice to market participants. We identified possible options to reduce the use and cost of CM bills on the basis of our analysis of CM bill use, the yield differential, and CM bill auction performance. Treasury makes large regular payments (e.g., Social Security and federal retirement) in the beginning of the month and it often receives large cash inflows in the middle of the month from income tax payments and note issuances. Because regular bills alone are not sufficient to fill this cash financing gap, Treasury has increasingly used CM bills since 2002. 2 describes these steps in more detail.) Treasury Has Increasingly Used CM Bills to Fill Frequent Cash Financing Gaps
The combination of low cash balances in the beginning of the month with large cash inflows in the middle of the month has led to a general pattern of CM bill issuance. 3). 4). CM Bills Generally Had Higher Yields than Outstanding Bills of Similar Maturity but Lower Borrowing Costs than Currently Available Alternatives
CM bills provide Treasury with flexibility to obtain cash outside its regular borrowing schedule, but Treasury generally paid a higher yield on CM bills than outstanding bills of similar maturity paid in the secondary market. These factors theoretically reduce Treasury’s borrowing costs. However, borrowing costs associated with CM bills have increased since 2003. Issuing CM Bills in Multiple Tranches Has Helped Reduce Borrowing Costs
Treasury has taken steps to borrow cash closer to the day it is needed, which contributes to smaller average issues, shorter terms to maturity, and lower borrowing costs. Treasury has made progress toward reducing the cost of CM bills, but it may be possible to do more. Our analysis indicates that the yield differential between CM bills and outstanding bills of similar maturity has increased as short-term rates have risen. While Treasury does not vary its debt management strategy in response to changing interest rates, it should be mindful that increasing rates are likely to raise the relative cost of unscheduled CM bills. As a result, Treasury should consider options, including better aligning cash flows and increasing earnings on cash balances, that may reduce the frequent use of CM bills and ultimately overall borrowing costs. Recommendation for Executive Action
We identified options that could potentially reduce the use and cost of CM bills. While we analyzed the yield differential for all CM bills issued during fiscal years 1996–2005, we focused on the 55 CM bills issued during fiscal years 2002–2005 because the introduction of the 4-week bill in 2001 led to a significant reduction in the amount and term to maturity of CM bills and caused a structural change in the CM bill market. | Why GAO Did This Study
One result of persistent fiscal imbalance is growing debt and net interest costs. Net interest is currently the fastest-growing "program" in the budget and, if unchecked, threatens to crowd out spending for other national priorities. This report was done under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO examined the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) growing use of unscheduled short-term cash management bills (CM bills). Specifically GAO (1) describes when Treasury uses CM bills and why, (2) describes the advantages and disadvantages of CM bills, (3) describes steps taken by Treasury to reduce the overall borrowing costs associated with CM bills, and (4) identifies possible options Treasury could consider to reduce the use and cost of CM bills further.
What GAO Found
Treasury makes large, regularly occurring payments, such as Social Security and federal retirement payments, in the beginning of each month but receives large cash inflows in the middle of each month from income tax payments and note issuances. Because regular bills alone are not sufficient to fill these intramonth cash financing gaps, since 2002 Treasury has increasingly issued CM bills to bridge this gap. CM bills allow Treasury to obtain cash outside of its regular borrowing schedule in varying amounts and maturities, but Treasury pays a premium for doing so. GAO's analysis found that Treasury paid a higher yield on CM bills than that paid on outstanding bills of similar maturity in the secondary market. Treasury has taken steps to reduce the use and cost of CM bills. Treasury added a 4-week bill to its regular auction schedule in 2001, which led to reduced CM bill issuance, shorter terms to maturity, and lower borrowing costs in 2002. Treasury has also fine-tuned CM bill issuance by borrowing closer to the time when it needs cash. However, borrowing costs associated with CM bills have increased since 2003. While Treasury has made progress towards reducing the cost of CM bills, it may be possible to do more. GAO's analysis indicates that the yield differential has increased as short-term rates have risen. If these rates rise further, as market participants expect, so will the yield differential. While Treasury does not vary its debt management strategy in response to changing interest rates, it should be mindful of their effect on the relative cost of unscheduled CM bills and explore options to reduce the frequent use of CM bills and ultimately overall borrowing costs. GAO identified options worth exploring such as any additional opportunities for closer alignment of large cash flows; possible options for increasing earnings on excess cash balances; and introduction of a shorter-term regular instrument. |
gao_NSIAD-98-178 | gao_NSIAD-98-178_0 | The Congress approved the new authorities, and the initiative was signed into law on February 10, 1996. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because it represents a new approach to improving military housing, we reviewed the implementation of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative to (1) measure progress to date, (2) assess issues associated with privatizing military housing, and (3) determine whether the initiative is being integrated with other elements of DOD’s housing program. To determine whether the new initiative is being integrated with other elements of DOD’s housing program, we reviewed DOD’s and the services’ housing policies, programs, initiatives, and plans. DOD officials believe that progress may speed up after the first few projects are approved; however, each project is unique and will require individualized planning and negotiation. Since the authorizing legislation was signed in February 1996 through the end of February 1998, no new agreements were finalized to build or renovate military housing. In January 1998, DOD was actively considering more than a dozen projects for privatization and many others were in the early planning stages. Reasons for Slow Progress
According to DOD officials, privatization implementation has been slower than expected primarily because the initiative represents a new way of doing business for both the military and the private sector. The servicemembers use their housing allowances to pay rent to the developer. Thus, although the exact budgetary consequences from use of the various privatization authorities are not known, it appears that privatization largely results in a shift in funding from military housing construction, operations, and maintenance accounts to military personnel accounts to pay for additional housing allowances. We reviewed the services’ life-cycle cost analyses for two proposed privatization projects at Fort Carson and Lackland Air Force Base to compare estimates of the government’s long-term costs for housing financed with Milcon funds and through the privatization initiative. Privatization Initiative Can Be Better Integrated With Other Elements of DOD’s Housing Program
The privatization initiative is only one of several tools, including housing allowances and traditional military construction, available to meet the housing needs of servicemembers and their families. For example, to maximize the advantages from the initiative and minimize total housing costs, privatization needs to be part of a strategy that ensures (1) accurate determinations of housing needs and the ability of the local communities to meet these needs at each installation, (2) maximum use of private sector housing in accordance with DOD housing policy, and (3) coordinated decisions on the structure of housing allowances and housing construction. According to Navy officials, the Navy has pursued enhanced housing referral services since 1994. However, additional steps can be taken to ensure that the military’s housing problems are addressed in an optimum manner. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Housing Privatization Initiative, focusing on DOD's efforts to: (1) measure progress to date; (2) assess issues associated with privatizing military housing; and (3) determine whether the new initiative is being integrated with other elements of DOD's housing programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD considers privatization to be a powerful new tool to help address the military housing problem; (2) two years have passed since the new authorities were signed into law, yet no new agreements have been finalized to build or renovate military housing; (3) more than a dozen projects are being considered; however, only one project is close to contract signing; (4) according to DOD, progress has been slower than expected because the initiative represents a new way of doing business for both the military and the private sector; (5) many legal, financial, contractual, and budgetary scoring issues had to be resolved to the satisfaction of parties representing the government, developers, and private lenders; (6) although DOD expects implementation to speed up after the first few privatization deals are completed, it is difficult to predict how much the program can be accelerated given the unique circumstances of individual projects; (7) in addition to potential benefits, implementation of the privatization initiative raises several concerns; (8) one concern is whether privatization will result in significant cost savings; (9) to a large degree, privatization shifts funding from military housing construction, operations, and maintenance accounts to military personnel accounts to pay for increased housing allowances used to pay rent to developers of privatized housing; (10) GAO's review of the services' life-cycle cost analyses for two privatization projects disclosed that the difference in the cost of privatization and traditional military construction financing was considerably less than the services' estimates and relatively modest; (11) the privatization initiative has not been fully integrated with other elements of an overall housing strategy to meet DOD's housing needs in an optimum manner; (12) comprehensive housing referral services could lessen the need for government housing, yet only the Navy has aggressively pursued this option; (13) better coordination between the separate offices responsible for housing allowances and military housing construction and management could ensure that their decisions on housing matters are made in concert, rather than in isolation, with each other; and (14) comprehensive, better integrated plans could tie together the elements of DOD's housing program and help maximize the advantages of the privatization initiative while minimizing total housing costs. |
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