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gao_GAO-07-794T | gao_GAO-07-794T_0 | With the passage of OBRA ‘87, Congress responded to growing concerns about the quality of care that nursing home residents received by requiring major reforms in the federal regulation of nursing homes. Among other things, these reforms revised care requirements that facilities must meet to participate in the Medicare or Medicaid programs, modified the survey process for certifying a home’s compliance with federal standards, and introduced additional sanctions and decertification procedures for homes that fail to meet federal standards. Enforcement
In an effort to better ensure that nursing homes achieve and maintain compliance with the new survey standards, OBRA ‘87 expanded the range of enforcement sanctions. Quality of Care Remains a Problem for a Small but Significant Proportion of Nursing Homes Nationwide
A small but significant proportion of nursing homes nationwide continue to experience quality-of-care problems—as evidenced by the almost 1 in 5 nursing homes nationwide that were cited for serious deficiencies in 2006—despite the reforms of OBRA ‘87 and subsequent efforts by CMS and the nursing home industry to improve the quality of nursing home care. Although understatement of serious deficiencies identified by federal surveyors in five states has declined since 2004, understatement continues at varying levels across these states. Despite this national trend, significant interstate variation in the proportion of homes with serious deficiencies indicates that states conduct surveys inconsistently. CMS Has Strengthened Its Enforcement Capabilities, although Key Initiatives Still Need Refinement
CMS has strengthened its enforcement capabilities since OBRA ‘87 by, for example, implementing additional sanctions and an immediate sanctions policy for nursing homes found to repeatedly harm residents and developing a new enforcement management data system; however, several key initiatives require refinement. The immediate sanctions policy is complex and appears to have induced only temporary compliance in certain nursing homes with histories of repeated noncompliance. Finally, although CMS has developed a new data system, the system’s components are not integrated and the national reporting capabilities are incomplete, hampering the agency’s ability to track and monitor enforcement. CMS Has Strengthened Oversight, although Competing Priorities Impede Certain Key Initiatives
CMS oversight of nursing home quality and state surveys has increased significantly through several efforts, but CMS initiatives for nursing home quality oversight continue to compete with each other, as well as with other CMS programs, for staff and financial resources. Federal Comparative Surveys
CMS has increased the number of federal comparative surveys for both quality of care and fire safety and decreased the time between the end of the state survey and the start of the federal comparative surveys. Greater demand on limited resources has led to queues and delays in key initiatives. However, CMS officials recently reported that resource constraints in fiscal year 2007 threaten the planned expansion of this process beyond the five demonstration states. Concluding Observations
About 20 years ago, significant attention from the Special Committee on Aging, the Institute of Medicine, and others served as a catalyst to focus national attention on nursing home quality issues, culminating in the nursing home reform provisions of OBRA ‘87. Since then, in response to many GAO recommendations and on its own initiative, CMS has taken many important steps and invested resources to respond in a timelier, more rigorous, and more consistent manner to identified problems and improve its oversight process for the care of vulnerable nursing home residents. It is important to continue to focus national attention on and ensure public accountability for homes that harm residents. Nursing Homes: Despite Increased Oversight, Challenges Remain in Ensuring High-Quality Care and Resident Safety. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
With the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA '87), Congress responded to growing concerns about the quality of care that nursing home residents received by requiring reforms in the federal certification and oversight of nursing homes. These reforms included revising care requirements that homes must meet to participate in the Medicare or Medicaid programs, modifying the survey process for certifying a home's compliance with federal standards, and introducing additional sanctions and decertification procedures for noncompliant homes. GAO's testimony addresses its work in evaluating the quality of nursing home care and the enforcement and oversight functions intended to ensure high-quality care, the progress made in each of these areas since the passage of OBRA '87, and the challenges that remain. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work; analysis of data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) On-Line Survey, Certification, and Reporting system (OSCAR), which compiles the results of state nursing home surveys; and evaluation of federal comparative surveys for selected states (2005-2007). Federal comparative surveys are conducted at nursing homes recently surveyed by each state to assess the adequacy of the state's surveys.
What GAO Found
The reforms of OBRA '87 and subsequent efforts by CMS and the nursing home industry to improve the quality of nursing home care have focused on resident outcomes, yet a small but significant share of nursing homes nationwide continue to experience quality-of-care problems. In fiscal year 2006, almost one in five nursing homes was cited for serious deficiencies, those that caused actual harm or placed residents in immediate jeopardy. While this rate has fluctuated over the last 7 years, GAO has found persistent variation in the proportion of homes with serious deficiencies across states. In addition, although the understatement of serious deficiencies--that is, when federal surveyors identified deficiencies that were missed by state surveyors--has declined since 2004 in states GAO reviewed, it has continued at varying levels. CMS has strengthened its enforcement capabilities since OBRA '87 in order to better ensure that nursing homes achieve and maintain high-quality care, but several key initiatives require refinement. CMS has implemented additional sanctions authorized in the legislation, established an immediate sanctions policy for homes found to repeatedly harm residents, and developed a new enforcement management data system. However, the immediate sanctions policy is complex and appears to have induced only temporary compliance in some homes with a history of repeated noncompliance. Furthermore, CMS's new data system's components are not integrated and national reporting capabilities are incomplete, which hamper CMS's ability to track and monitor enforcement. CMS oversight of nursing home quality has increased significantly, but CMS initiatives continue to compete for staff and financial resources. Attention to oversight has led to greater demand on limited resources, and to queues and delays in certain key initiatives. For example, a new survey methodology has been in development for over 8 years and resource constraints threaten the planned expansion of this methodology beyond the initial demonstration states. Significant attention from the Special Committee on Aging, the Institute of Medicine, and others served as a catalyst to focus national attention on nursing home quality issues, culminating in the nursing home reform provisions of OBRA '87. In response to many GAO recommendations and at its own initiative, CMS has taken many important steps; however, the task of ensuring high-quality nursing home care for all residents is not complete. In order to guarantee that all nursing home residents receive high-quality care, it is important to maintain the momentum begun by the reforms of OBRA '87 and continue to focus national attention on those homes that cause actual harm to vulnerable residents. |
gao_GAO-09-82 | gao_GAO-09-82_0 | In contrast, USAID did not provide its PRB members and other reviewing officials with any specific information on organizational performance to help inform their senior executive appraisal recommendations for the fiscal year 2007 appraisal cycle. As required for certification, all of the selected agencies have four or five rating levels in place for assessing senior executive performance. For the fiscal year 2007 appraisal cycle, senior executives were concentrated at the top two rating levels, as shown in figure 1. While OPM officials have certified that the selected agencies’ systems are making meaningful distinctions, performance ratings at the selected agencies raise questions about the extent to which meaningful distinctions based on relative performance are being made and how OPM applies this criterion, as indicated in figure 1. OPM has an opportunity to strengthen its communication with agencies and executives regarding the importance of using a range of rating levels when assessing performance while avoiding the use of forced distributions. 2). All of the selected agencies have safeguards including higher-level reviews of performance appraisal recommendations, PRBs, and transparency in communicating the aggregate results, although agencies varied in how they implemented such safeguards. Performance review boards. While generally satisfied with OPM’s and OMB’s oversight, officials at the selected agencies said OPM could strengthen its communication with agencies and executives on how it uses the SES performance appraisal data and the correlation between ratings and performance pay in determining whether agencies are making meaningful distinctions based on relative performance. Further communication from OPM is important in order for agencies to have a better understanding of how they are being held accountable for these certification criteria and make the necessary improvements to their systems to maintain certification. Prior to receiving an extended certification coverage period, the agency officials acknowledged that their systems would have to be operating at the fully certified level. Moving forward, it will also be important for OPM and OMB to identify ways to improve the certification process and make it more streamlined while ensuring that agencies have the guidance, tools, and training they need to implement effective performance appraisal and pay systems for their senior executives. To help improve agencies’ understanding of certain aspects of the certification decisions, we recommend two areas for the Acting Director of OPM to take action to strengthen OPM’s communication with agencies and executives on the importance of making meaningful distinctions in performance while avoiding the use of forced distributions and that a fully successful rating is valued and rewarded and how it uses the SES performance appraisal data and the correlation between ratings and performance pay in determining whether agencies are making meaningful distinctions based on relative performance as measured though the pay and performance differentiation certification criteria. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines selected agencies’ policies and procedures for their career Senior Executive Service (SES) performance appraisal and pay systems in (1) factoring organizational performance into senior executive performance appraisal decisions, (2) making meaningful distinctions in assessing and rewarding senior executive performance, and (3) building safeguards into senior executive performance appraisal and pay systems. In addition, this report examines how the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are providing oversight in the certification of the senior executive performance-based pay system through their statutory roles. We selected the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies are allowed to raise pay caps for their Senior Executive Service (SES) members if the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) certifies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concurs that their appraisal systems meet applicable criteria. As requested, this report examines selected agencies' policies and procedures for (1) factoring organizational performance into SES appraisal decisions, (2) making meaningful distinctions in SES performance and (3) building safeguards into SES systems. Also, this report examines OPM and OMB oversight in certifying the pay systems through their statutory roles. GAO selected six agencies based on mission, structure, and number of career SES variations. GAO analyzed the agencies' policies and fiscal year 2007 aggregate SES appraisal data and OPM guidance.
What GAO Found
All of the selected agencies--the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and the Treasury; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and USAID--have policies in place that require senior executives' performance expectations to be aligned with organizational results and organizational performance to be factored into appraisal decisions. While almost all of the agencies provided and communicated the importance of considering organizational performance, USAID did not provide its performance review board members (PRB) and other reviewing officials with any specific information on organizational performance to help inform their executive appraisal recommendations. All of the selected agencies have multiple rating levels in place for assessing senior executive performance. For the fiscal year 2007 appraisal cycle, senior executives were concentrated at the top two rating levels, which raises questions about the extent to which meaningful distinctions based on relative performance are being made and how OPM applies this criterion. OPM has an opportunity to strengthen its communication with agencies and executives on the importance of using a range of rating levels when assessing performance while avoiding the use of forced distributions. All of the selected agencies have safeguards, including higher level reviews of performance appraisal recommendations, PRBs, and transparency in communicating the aggregate results, although agencies varied in how they implemented such safeguards. While generally satisfied with OPM's and OMB's oversight, officials at the selected agencies said OPM could strengthen its communication with agencies and executives on how it uses the SES performance appraisal data and correlation between ratings and performance pay in determining whether agencies are making meaningful distinctions based on relative performance. Further communication from OPM is important in order for agencies to have a better understanding of how they are being held accountable for these certification criteria and make the necessary improvements to their systems to maintain certification. Further, senior-level officials at the selected agencies suggested options--such as moving to an electronic submission process and lengthening the certification coverage beyond 2 years once their systems are operating at the fully certified level--to increase the efficiency of the process. Moving forward, it will be important for OPM and OMB to identify ways to improve the certification process and make it more streamlined while ensuring that agencies have the guidance, tools, and training they need to implement effective performance appraisal and pay systems for their senior executives. |
gao_GAO-06-1125T | gao_GAO-06-1125T_0 | The Regulatory Structure of the Senior Executive Performance Management System Helps Link Executives’ Performance to Organizational Results
Overall, the regulations that OPM developed to administer a performance- based pay system for senior executives serve as a substantive and positive step for agencies in holding senior executives accountable for their performance and contributions to organizational success. To qualify for these flexibilities, agencies’ performance management systems need to meet nine specified certification criteria, including demonstrating that the systems align individual performance expectations with the mission and goals of the organization and that its appraisal system as designed and applied makes meaningful distinctions in performance. To receive a full 2-calendar-year certification, an agency must provide documentation that its senior executive performance management system meets all nine of the criteria. Otherwise, agencies can meet four of nine criteria and demonstrate that their system in design meets the remaining certification criteria to receive 1-year provisional certification and use the higher pay rates. The certification criteria are generally consistent with our body of work identifying key practices for effective performance management. Specifically, we identified key practices, including aligning individual performance expectations with organizational goals, linking pay to individual performance, and making meaningful distinctions in performance, that collectively create a line of sight between an individual’s performance and an organization’s success. If provisionally certified, an agency’s certification is only good for the calendar year in which it applied. Once OMB concurs, the Director of OPM certifies the agency’s appraisal system and the HCO provides additional comments to the agency on their system and identifies any improvement needs. Agencies’ Experience in Implementing the Senior Executive Pay System Highlights Areas Where Improvements Might be Needed
In our ongoing work on OPM’s capacity to lead and implement human capital reform, we asked agency chief human capital officers (CHCO) and human resource (HR) directors to describe their experiences with OPM’s administration of the senior executive pay-for-performance certification process. As the Comptroller General testified before this Subcommittee in June 2006, we heard a number of concerns from agencies regarding OPM’s ability to communicate expectations, guidance, and deadlines to agencies in a clear and consistent manner. In addition, OPM can suspend certification at any time during the certification period if it determines, with OMB concurrence, that the agency’s system is not in compliance with the certification criteria. According to OPM data, 26 performance management systems at 24 agencies were certified during calendar year 2006. Of these 26, only the Department of Labor’s system received full certification. These findings are not surprising. In our April 2005 testimony before this Subcommittee, we stated that a number of agencies would be challenged in the short term to provide the necessary performance data on their senior executives in order to receive full certification or to maintain their certification (agencies must provide 2 years of performance rating and bonus data showing that meaningful distinctions in senior executive performance were made to qualify). This is because, as I have stated earlier, agencies with provisional certification can still receive the flexibilities of the new pay system, even though they do not meet all of OPM’s certification requirements. These actions will help ensure that agencies continue to make substantive progress toward modernized performance management systems, and that provisional certifications do not become the norm. Credible performance management systems, specifically those that (1) align individual, team, and unit performance to organizational results; (2) contain built-in safeguards; and (3) are effectively implemented, can help manage and direct this process. Moving forward, what will be important is how OPM works with agencies to provide the tools and resources they need to design and implement performance management systems that meet the certification criteria in as streamlined a fashion as possible. The lessons learned in implementing the senior executive pay-for- performance system will be critical to modernizing the performance management systems under which other federal employees are compensated. In particular, establishing an explicit line of sight between individual, team, and unit performance and organizational success, as well highlighting opportunities to improve guidance, communications, transparency, and safeguards, will serve the government well moving forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
The government's senior executives need to lead the way in transforming their agencies' cultures. Credible performance management systems--those that align individual, team, and unit performance with organizational results--can help manage and direct this process. In past work, GAO found that the performance management systems for senior executives fell short in this regard. In November 2003, recognizing that reforms were needed, Congress authorized a new performance-based pay system that ended the practice of giving annual pay adjustments to senior executives. Instead, agencies are to consider such factors as individual results and contributions to agency performance. If the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) certifies an agency's new performance system and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concurs, the agency has the flexibility to raise the pay of its highest performing senior executives above certain pay caps. This testimony addresses (1) the performance management system's regulatory structure, (2) OPM's certification process and agencies' views of it, and (3) OPM's role in monitoring the system, and the number of agencies that have been certified to date. This statement is based on GAO's issued work, which included interviews with senior OPM officials, agency Chief Human Capital Officers and Human Resource officers, and reviews of agency documents.
What GAO Found
Overall, the regulations that OPM and OMB developed to administer a performance-based pay system for executives serve as an important step for agencies in creating an alignment or "line of sight" between executives' performance and organizational results. To qualify for the pay flexibilities included in the statute, OPM must certify and OMB must concur that an agency's performance management system meets nine certification criteria, including demonstrating that its performance management system aligns individual performance expectations with the mission and goals of the organization and that its system as designed and applied makes meaningful distinctions in performance. The certification criteria are generally consistent with key practices for effective performance management systems GAO identified that collectively create a line of sight between an individual's performance and an organization's success. To receive a full 2-calendar-year certification, an agency must document that its senior executive performance management system meets all nine of the criteria. Agencies can meet four of nine criteria and demonstrate that their system in design meets the remaining certification criteria to receive 1-year provisional certification and use the higher pay rates. Two divisions in OPM, as well as OMB, independently review agencies' certification submissions. A number of agencies GAO contacted expressed concern over OPM's ability to communicate expectations, guidance, and deadlines to agencies in a clear and consistent manner. OPM officials agreed that agencies need better guidance and were working on improvements. In monitoring agencies' performance management systems, OPM can suspend an agency's certification at any time with OMB concurrence if an agency is not complying with the certification criteria. According to OPM data, performance management systems at 24 agencies were certified during calendar year 2006. Of these, only the Department of Labor's system received full certification; the remaining systems received only provisional certification. These findings are not surprising. As GAO has noted in its past work, agencies could find it initially difficult to provide the necessary performance data to receive full certification. Going forward, it will be important for OPM to continue to monitor the certification process to help ensure that provisional certifications do not become the norm, and agencies develop performance management systems for their senior executives that meet all of OPM's requirements. The new performance management system for the government's senior executives will help agencies align individual, team, and unit performance with organizational results. Although there have been some implementation challenges, what will be important is how OPM works with agencies to meet the certification criteria. Moreover, the lessons learned in implementing the senior executive performance management system can be applied to modernizing the performance management systems of employees at other levels. |
gao_GAO-08-675 | gao_GAO-08-675_0 | Case Study Medical Centers Had Billing Errors and Inadequate Oversight and Accountability
Our case study analysis of unbilled patient encounters at 18 medical centers, including 10 medical centers with low billing performance (based on reported days to bill) and 8 centers under VA’s CPAC initiative that were expected to have high billing performance, found billing delays; coding, billing, and documentation errors; and a lack of adequate management oversight and accountability over approximately $1.7 billion deemed to be unbillable in fiscal year 2007 by coding and billing staff. Further, because third-party insurers will not accept improperly coded amounts and in many cases have national and regional contracts with VA that bar insurer liability for payment of bills received after more than a specified period of time, usually 1 year, after the date that medical services were provided, it is important that coding for medical services is accurate and timely. Ten Medical Centers Had Billing Delays and Errors and Little or No Oversight of Their Billing Functions
The 10 medical centers with low billing performance included in our case study analysis reported average days to bill ranging from 109 days to 146 days in fiscal year 2007, compared to VA’s goal of 60 days. The 10 centers also had a total of $1.2 billion in unbilled medical services costs. In fiscal year 2007, the eight CPAC centers accounted for over $508.7 million in unbilled amounts. Coding and billing errors, documentation errors, and other reasons accounted for $37.5 million, or about 7 percent, of medical services costs that were not billed to third-party insurance companies. VA Medical Centers Failed Control Tests for Timely Follow-up on Unpaid Receivables
Our statistical tests of VA-wide data on controls for follow-up by accounts receivable personnel on unpaid amounts of $250 or more billed to third- party insurers found significantly high failure rates. VHA Has Undertaken Several Initiatives to Increase Third-Party Revenue
In response to long-standing weaknesses in third-party billing and collection processes, VA undertook several initiatives aimed at increasing revenue from third-party billings and collections. However, we did not evaluate the six ongoing initiatives, some of which are open ended or will not be completed for several years. Effective management oversight and implementation will be key to the success of these initiatives. Revenue Cycle Enhancement Reviews. Consolidated Patient Account Centers (CPAC). Unless VA effectively addresses these weaknesses, it will continue to use higher amounts of appropriations from the General Fund of Treasury to provide medical care to the nation’s veterans than otherwise would be necessary, thereby placing a higher burden on taxpayers. However, as noted in our report, although certain medical services are not billable, such as service-connected treatment, VA management has not validated reasons for these unbilled amounts to assure that all billable costs are charged to third-party insurers. However, we found that VA has not established policies and procedures for management oversight of unbilled amounts or compliance with follow-up requirements for outstanding third- party receivables. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Pursuant to requests from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, we performed a follow-up audit of controls over VA’s third-party billing and collection processes, including (1) an evaluation of the effectiveness of VA medical center billing processes at selected locations, (2) an assessment of medical centers’ adherence to VA policies for performing timely follow-up on unpaid accounts receivable and proper documentation of follow-up contacts, and (3) a determination of the adequacy of VA oversight of billing and collection processes. In addition, we summarized the status of management initiatives undertaken to improve third-party billing and collection processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO previously reported that continuing problems in billing and collection processes at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) impaired VA's ability to maximize revenue from private (third-party) insurance companies. VA has undertaken several initiatives to address these weaknesses. GAO was asked to perform a follow-up audit to (1) evaluate VA billing controls, (2) assess VA-wide controls for collections, (3) determine the effectiveness of VA-wide oversight, and (4) provide information on the status of key VA improvement initiatives. GAO performed case study analyses of the third-party billing function, statistically tested controls over collections, and reviewed current oversight policies and procedures. GAO also reviewed and summarized VA information on the status of key management initiatives to enhance third-party revenue.
What GAO Found
GAO's case study analysis of unbilled patient encounters at 18 medical centers, including 10 medical centers with low billing performance and 8 medical centers under VA's Consolidated Patient Account Centers (CPAC) initiative considered to be high performers, found documentation, coding, and billing errors and inadequate management oversight for approximately $1.7 billion deemed unbillable in fiscal year 2007. Although some medical services are unbillable, such as service-connected treatment, management has not validated reasons for related unbilled amounts of about $1.4 billion to assure that all billable costs are charged to third-party insurers. Because insurers will not accept improperly coded bills and they generally will not pay bills received more than 1 year after the date that medical services were provided, it is important that coding for medical services is accurate and timely. The 10 case study medical centers reported average days to bill ranging from 109 days to 146 days in fiscal year 2007 and significant coding and billing errors and other problems that accounted for over $254 million, or 21 percent, of the $1.2 billion in unbilled medical services costs. Although GAO determined that CPAC officials performed a more thorough review of billings, GAO's analysis of unbilled amounts for the 8 CPAC centers found problems that accounted for $37.5 million, or about 7 percent, of the $508.7 million in unbilled medical services costs. In addition, GAO's VA-wide statistical tests of collections follow-up on unpaid third-party bills of $250 or more identified significant control failures related to timely follow-up and documentation of contacts with third-party insurers on outstanding receivables. VA guidance requires medical center accounts receivable staff to make up to three follow-up contacts, as necessary, on outstanding third-party receivables. GAO's tests identified high failure rates VA-wide as well as for CPAC and non-CPAC medical centers related to the requirement for timely follow up with third-party insurers on unpaid amounts. GAO's tests also found high failure rates associated with the lack of documentation of follow-up contacts. VA lacks policies and procedures and a full range of standardized reports for effective management oversight of VA-wide third-party billing and collection operations. Further, although VA management has undertaken several initiatives to enhance third-party revenue, many of these initiatives are open-ended or will not be implemented for several years. Until these shortcomings are addressed, VA will continue to fall short of its goal to maximize third-party revenue, thereby placing a higher burden on taxpayers. |
gao_GAO-16-686 | gao_GAO-16-686_0 | However, 14 agencies had not defined the CISO’s role for all required activities, potentially limiting these officials’ ability to effectively oversee these agencies’ information security programs. Incident response: FISMA requires that agency security programs include procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents and that agencies report incidents to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team. However, four agencies—the Departments of Energy, the Interior, and the Treasury; and the Environmental Protection Agency—did not define the CISO’s role in ensuring that systems were authorized in their policies:
Although DOE delegated the authority to carry out the responsibilities of the CIO under FISMA, including developing and maintaining the DOE-wide information security program, to the DOE CISO, the department’s cybersecurity program order did not describe any specific roles or responsibilities for the CISO in ensuring that information systems are authorized to operate. Federal CISOs Identified Challenges to Their Authority That Limit Their Ability to Effectively Manage Agency-Wide Information Security Programs
Agency CISOs identified a number of challenges to their authority. CISOs Reported That Other Factors Presented Challenges
The 24 CISOs also reported that other factors posed challenges to their ability to carry out their responsibilities effectively, including the following examples:
Lack of sufficient staff. CISOs identified challenges with having insufficient personnel to oversee security activities effectively. Recruiting, hiring, and retaining security personnel. Expertise of security personnel. Federal Efforts Are Under Way to Address Selected Challenges, but OMB Has Not Issued Guidance Addressing Challenges to CISOs’ Authority
In accordance with their statutory responsibilities under FISMA, OMB and NIST have taken steps to assist federal agencies in implementing information security activities, and have instituted initiatives that can assist federal agencies in addressing challenges related to human and financial resources. In July 2016, OMB issued its update to Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource. Additional guidance from OMB addressing how agencies should ensure that officials carry out their responsibilities and personnel are held accountable for complying with the agency-wide information security program could assist CISOs in more effectively carrying out their duties in the face of numerous challenges. We are also making 33 recommendations to 13 of the 24 departments and agencies in our review to ensure that the role of the CISO is defined in agency policy in accordance with FISMA. One agency, DOD, did not concur or partially concurred with the three recommendations we made to it. We disagree that existing guidance and oversight mechanisms provide sufficient clarity for agencies on how to implement the new FISMA 2014 provisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the key responsibilities of federal chief information security officers (CISO) established by federal law and guidance and determine the extent to which federal agencies have defined the role of the CISO in accordance with this law and guidance and (2) describe key challenges of federal agency CISOs in fulfilling their responsibilities to ensure that agency-wide information security programs are developed, documented, and implemented. Appendix II: Recommendations to Departments and Agencies
Department of Commerce
To ensure that the role of the chief information security officer (CISO) is defined in department policy in accordance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA 2014), we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce take the following action:
Define the CISO’s role in department policy for ensuring that plans and procedures are in place to ensure recovery and continued operations of the department’s information systems in the event of a disruption. DOD did not concur with four of these draft recommendations and partially concurred with one of them. We therefore continue to believe that our recommendation is warranted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies face an ever-increasing array of cyber threats to their information systems and information. To address these threats, FISMA 2014 requires agencies to designate a CISO—a key position in agency efforts to manage information security risks.
GAO was asked to review current CISO authorities. This report identifies (1) the key responsibilities of federal CISOs established by federal law and guidance and the extent to which federal agencies have defined the role of the CISO in accordance with law and guidance and (2) key challenges of federal CISOs in fulfilling their responsibilities. GAO reviewed agency security policies, administered a survey to 24 CISOs, interviewed current CISOs, and spoke with officials from OMB.
What GAO Found
Under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA 2014), the agency chief information security officer (CISO) has the responsibility to ensure that the agency is meeting the requirements of the law, including developing, documenting, and implementing the agency-wide information security program. However, 13 of the 24 agencies GAO reviewed had not fully defined the role of their CISO in accordance with these requirements. For example, these agencies did not always identify a role for the CISO in ensuring that security controls are periodically tested; procedures are in place for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; or contingency plans and procedures for agency information systems are in place. Thus, CISOs' ability to effectively oversee these agencies' information security activities can be limited.
The 24 CISOs GAO surveyed identified challenges that limited their authority to carry out their responsibilities to oversee information security activities. These challenges can impact agencies' ability to effectively manage information security risk. The table below shows the factors that CISOs reported as being the most challenging to their authority.
The 24 CISOs also reported that other factors posed challenges to their abilities to carry out their responsibilities effectively, including difficulties related to having sufficient staff; recruiting, hiring, and retaining security personnel; ensuring that security personnel have appropriate expertise and skills; and a lack of sufficient financial resources. Several government-wide activities are under way to address many of these challenges. However, while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has a statutory responsibility under FISMA 2014 to provide guidance on information security in federal agencies, it has not issued such guidance addressing how agencies should ensure that officials carry out their responsibilities and personnel are held accountable for complying with the agency-wide information security program. As a result, agencies lack clarity on how to ensure that their CISOs have adequate authority to effectively carry out their duties in the face of numerous challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 33 recommendations to 13 agencies to fully define the role of their CISOs in accordance with FISMA 2014. Twelve of the 13 agencies concurred with the recommendations addressed to them. One agency partially concurred or did not concur with the recommendations directed to it. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are valid and should be implemented as discussed in this report. GAO also recommends that OMB issue guidance for clarifying CISOs' roles in light of identified challenges. OMB partially concurred with the recommendation. GAO maintains that action is needed as discussed further in the report. |
gao_GAO-02-1103T | gao_GAO-02-1103T_0 | Nonprofit research corporations exist solely to support VA research and education, using their funds to support local VA medical centers’ research environments. Flexibility Allows Nonprofit Corporations to Enhance VA Research
Nonprofit corporations provide a flexible funding mechanism to support the indirect cost of VA’s research environment. Investigators on research projects administered by VA nonprofit corporations must follow federal statutes and regulations applicable to federal employees concerning conduct and conflicts of interest. Because investigators design and control the research, they may also be subject to additional federal conflict of interest regulations. These regulations require investigators to disclose their financial interests. In contrast, VA nonprofit research corporations cannot own stock, have an equity interest in private companies, or own patents. Consequently, these types of institutional conflicts are unlikely to occur. VA Headquarters Does Not Monitor or Oversee Nonprofit Corporations’ Financial Activities
The Secretary of VA has delegated responsibility for overseeing and evaluating nonprofit corporations to the directors at local medical centers. While each nonprofit corporation submits its financial statements and management letters to VA, VA headquarters does not use this information to oversee and monitor the nonprofits’ financial activities and ensure that identified deficiencies are corrected. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) nonprofit research corporations, which receive funds primarily from non-VA sources to conduct medical research at VA facilities.
What GAO Found
Since VA's nonprofit corporations were first established, there has been limited oversight of their operations and contributions to VA research. Nonprofit corporations support VA's research environment by funding a portion of the department's research needs, such as laboratory equipment and improvements to infrastructure, and by providing flexible personnel and contracting arrangements to respond to investigators' needs. To detect conflict of interest, investigators on research projects administered by VA's nonprofit corporations are subject to federal statutes and regulations applicable to federal employees concerning conduct and conflicts of interest and may be required to disclose their financial interests. Institutional conflicts of interest are unlikely to occur in VA's nonprofit research corporations because they cannot own stock, have an equity interest in private companies, or obtain intellectual property rights. VA has delegated responsibility for monitoring and overseeing the activities of nonprofit corporations to the directors of VA medical centers; however, VA headquarters does not oversee and monitor corporations' financial activities and ensure that identified deficiencies are corrected. |
gao_GAO-17-657 | gao_GAO-17-657_0 | The Army did not have complete data for the operating costs of its reserve bands from fiscal year 2012 through 2015, but reported declines in total operating costs for its active-duty and National Guard bands. From fiscal year 2012 through 2016, according to military-service data and officials, total military personnel authorizations dedicated to bands decreased by 7.5 percent—from 7,196 in fiscal year 2012 to 6,656 in fiscal year 2016 (see table 4). Future Changes to the Number of Bands and Total Band Personnel
The Army plans to reduce the number of bands and military band personnel from fiscal year 2017 through 2019. Trends in Total Reported Operating Costs Varied across the Military Services, and Active-Duty Military Personnel Costs Have Decreased Consistent with Personnel Reductions Reported Operating Costs for Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016
The Navy and Air Force reported that the total operating costs of their bands increased from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, and the Marine Corps reported decreased costs over this period. Military Services Have Tracked and Used Information on Band Events but They Have Not Developed Objectives and Measures to Assess How Bands Are Addressing Their Missions
The military services have tracked and used information on band events; however, the services have not developed objectives and measures to assess how their bands are addressing the bands’ missions, such as inspiring patriotism, enhancing the morale of troops, and promoting U.S. interests abroad. Each military service categorizes the types of events performed by its bands differently. Military bands perform at a variety of events, such as military ceremonies, community events or parades, and funerals for service members. Table 9 shows the missions for the military bands, according to military-service guidance. Band program officials cited several examples of how they can determine that their bands are addressing their missions. We also acknowledge that evaluating how the bands are addressing their missions is difficult. DOD and the services are taking steps to improve how they track information on events to measure the effectiveness of military bands. DOD’s and the services’ actions represent key steps that can inform and guide efforts to establish measurable objectives and performance measures that include important attributes. Developing and implementing measurable objectives and performance measures for their band programs that demonstrate linkage to the bands’ missions, include an established baseline of data, and have measurable targets could provide DOD and congressional decision makers with the information they need to assess the value of the military bands relative to resource demands for other priorities. Conclusions
DOD uses military bands to inspire patriotism, enhance the morale of the troops, and promote public awareness by supporting a range of activities, including funerals for military service members, events where high-level officials such as the President are in attendance, and community-relations activities such as parades in local communities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that each service can provide information to decision makers as they assess the value of the military bands relative to resource demands for other priorities, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, direct the Chief of Army Music, Commanding Officer of the U.S. Navy Band, Chief of the Air Force Bands Division, and Director of Marine Corps Communications, respectively, each to develop and implement measurable objectives and performance measures for their respective services’ bands. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses military bands to enhance the morale of the troops, provide music for ceremonies, and promote public awareness. Bands across the military services support a range of activities, including funerals for military service members, events attended by high-level officials, and community-relations activities such as parades. In fiscal year 2013, DOD restricted its community-relations activities, including placing travel restrictions on bands, as a result of the sequestration ordered in March 2013. DOD reinstated community-relations activities at a reduced capacity in fiscal year 2014.
House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's requirement for military bands. This report (1) describes the trends in personnel and costs for bands from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services have evaluated how the bands are addressing their missions, among other objectives.
GAO analyzed data from the military services on military band personnel and reported operating costs of bands. GAO also reviewed the military services' guidance and approaches to evaluating their bands and interviewed band program officials at the military services.
What GAO Found
All of the military services reported reducing the number of military band personnel from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, but trends in total reported operating costs for the bands, such as travel and equipment expenses, varied across the services. Total military personnel dedicated to bands decreased from 7,196 in fiscal year 2012 to 6,656 in fiscal year 2016, or 7.5 percent (see figure). The Navy and Air Force reported that their total operating costs for bands over this period increased by $4.1 million and $1.6 million, respectively, and the Marine Corps reported that its costs declined by about $800,000. The Army did not have complete cost data for its reserve bands, but reported that the operating costs of its active-duty and National Guard bands declined by $3.6 million and about $500,000, respectively, from fiscal year 2012 through 2016.
The military services have not developed objectives and measures to assess how their bands are addressing the bands' missions, such as inspiring patriotism and enhancing the morale of troops. All four military services have tracked information, such as the number and type of band events. Further, military-service officials cited the demand for band performances, anecdotal examples, and support from senior leadership, as ways to demonstrate the bands are addressing their missions. However, the military services' approaches do not include measurable objectives or performance measures that have several important attributes, such as linkage to mission, a baseline, and measurable targets, that GAO has found are key to successfully measuring a program's performance. Military band officials cited the difficulty and resources required to quantify how the bands are addressing their missions, but the military services are taking steps to improve how they track information on band events to measure the bands' effectiveness. GAO believes these key steps could inform and guide the services' efforts to develop and implement measurable objectives and performance measures. Doing so could provide decision makers with the information they need to assess the value of the military bands relative to resource demands for other priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force each develop and implement measurable objectives and performance measures for their bands. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-98-237 | gao_AIMD-98-237_0 | As shown in table 1, VBA has six of these areas and VHA has two. Progress Made in VBA Yet Concerns Remain Regarding Applications, COTS Products, and Contingency Planning
VBA has made progress in addressing the recommendations in our May 1997 report and in making its information systems Year 2000 compliant. Unless these issues are addressed, the issuance of benefits to veterans and their dependents could be delayed or interrupted. For example, it changed its Year 2000 strategy from developing new systems to converting existing ones. Second, a single VBA Year 2000 project office now oversees and coordinates all VBA Year 2000 activities. It also has reported completing renovation for its vocational rehabilitation and insurance systems, and making significant progress in its education system. According to VBA’s Year 2000 Project Manager, one of its largest vendors, which initially informed VBA that its products were Year 2000 compliant, recently told VBA that some of its products were not compliant and announced that it was beginning to assess and test its product line for Year 2000 compliance. Only VBA’s Insurance Service has developed such a plan. VHA Has Made Progress in Renovating Mission-Critical Systems, but Concerns Remain
VHA has made progress in assessing and renovating its two mission-critical systems for Year 2000 compliance. Also, VHA’s medical facilities have not completed Year 2000 business continuity and contingency plans. This appears to be a viable solution since VHA has reportedly renovated 100 percent of its VISTA applications, and 93 percent of these have been validated. VHA also relies on information provided by the manufacturers. However, it also faces several remaining risks because it has not completed Year 2000 assessments of software applications developed or modified by its medical facilities. Recommendations
To reduce the likelihood of delayed or interrupted benefits, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, with support from VBA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), ensure that VBA:
Reassesses its Year 2000 mission-critical efforts for the compensation and pension online application and the Beneficiary Identification and Record Location Sub-System, as well as other information technology initiatives, such as special projects, to ensure that the Year 2000 efforts have adequate resources, including contract support, to achieve compliance in time. VA stated that it is committed to ensuring that its benefit and health care services to veterans will not be adversely affected by the Year 2000 problem and it has applied dedicated resources to address these issues. The report raises concerns surrounding the renovation of two key VBA mission-critical applications, COTS software products, and contingency planning, and the Year 2000 compliance status of VHA’s locally developed software applications, COTS products, facility-related systems, and biomedical devices. 2. 4. We modified the report to delete the word “considerable.” Our statement that VHA has not completed its assessment and that it does not know the full extent of the Year 2000 problem at its medical facilities is accurate and consistent with the findings in the report. 8. 9. 10. 12. 15. 16. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the status of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) corrective action to prevent computer system failures at the turn of the century, focusing on: (1) the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) Year 2000 program; and (2) the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Year 2000 program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VBA has made progress in addressing the recommendations in GAO's May 1997 report and making its information systems year 2000 compliant; (2) it has changed its year 2000 strategy from developing new applications to fixing the current ones and established a year 2000 project office to oversee and coordinate all VBA year 2000 projects; (3) it has also reportedly renovated 75 percent of its mission-critical applications as of June 1998, and completed renovation of two specific mission-critical systems--vocational rehabilitation and insurance; (4) despite this progress, concerns remain; (5) for example, VBA has made limited progress in renovating two key mission-critical software applications: (a) compensation and pension online, which processes claims benefits and updates benefit information; and (b) the Beneficiary Identification and Record Locator Sub-System; (6) VBA also has to reassess its commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products because one of its largest vendors, which initially informed VBA that its products were year 2000 compliant, recently informed VBA that some of its products were not compliant and that others were being assessed and tested; (7) this problem is not unique to VBA--it applies to all consumers of these products; (8) except for its Insurance Service, VBA has not developed year 2000 business continuity and contingency plans for its core business processes; (9) these issues could affect the timely processing of benefits to veterans and their dependents; (10) VHA has also made progress in addressing the year 2000 problem; (11) since September 1997, it has reported having assessed all and renovated the vast majority of its mission-critical information systems and having completed 98 percent of its renovation by June 1998; (12) however, concerns also remain; (13) for example, VHA does not know the full extent of its year 2000 problem because it has not yet completed its assessment of: (a) locally developed software applications or customized versions of national applications used by its medical facilities; (b) COTS products; (c) facility systems; and (d) biomedical devices; (14) VHA's efforts on several of these issues are complicated by the fact that it, like other consumers of these products, has to receive compliance information from the manufacturers, some of which have been slow to respond to VHA's requests for compliance information; (15) like VBA, VHA has not developed year 2000 business continuity and contingency plans; and (16) failure to adequately address these issues could result in disruptions in patient care at VHA medical facilities. |
gao_NSIAD-96-179 | gao_NSIAD-96-179_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Information Agency’s (USIA) missions are to explain and advocate U.S. policy, provide information about the United States, build lasting relationships and mutual understanding among the peoples of the world, and advise U.S. decisionmakers on foreign public opinion and its implications for the United States. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget asked us to examine USIA’s reform and cost-cutting efforts and identify options that could enable USIA to adjust to reduced budgets. Reducing the Number of Countries in Which USIA Operates Is an Option to Reduce Costs
USIA’s philosophy has been to maintain a public diplomacy presence where a State Department mission is located. USIA has closed some posts. Individual posts may be losing one or more positions based on a 1993 USIA system that ranks countries by importance and other characteristics, such as population and size, and USIA’s potential to affect U.S. interests there. For example, one USIA official stated that USIA management recognizes that the post in Germany will be too large even after downsizing, as it reflects the structure established after World War II. A more comprehensive approach would be required if there were a major funding reduction. Expanding Innovative Management Approaches May Permit USIA to Absorb Additional Reductions
If after assessing the impact of its overseas programs USIA believes they remain critical to U.S. foreign policy goals, USIA would still be in a position to reduce costs. Reducing Concentration of Exchanges in Certain Countries Is an Option to Reduce Costs
Some officials believe USIA could decrease funding for exchanges with western industrialized countries. Both the U.S. Increased Foreign Government Support for Exchanges Could Reduce Costs
USIA could reduce its costs by requiring more support from partner foreign governments. Additionally, USIA stated that (1) it continues to curtail or eliminate programs that must be sacrificed to address foreign policy priorities; (2) it has moved resources from Central America to Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union; and (3) it encourages host government and private sector cost-sharing of academic exchange programs and has been able to raise the level of funding from partner countries. U.S. international broadcasting has undergone significant downsizing and restructuring. Eliminating Language Services Would Reduce Costs but Require Clear Broadcasting Strategy
Eliminating a language service or broadcast hours offers an immediate reduction in costs. The BBG is developing a plan to extensively review all language services and broadcast entities to determine their continued need and effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Information Agency's (USIA) reform and cost-cutting efforts and options that could enable USIA to adjust to reduced budgets.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) USIA believes that reaching out to foreign publics and telling America's story remains critical to U.S. foreign policy goals, and agency officials believe that further significant reductions could greatly hamper USIA's mission; (2) USIA believes it has undergone an extensive reorganization and downsizing, responsive to both U.S. foreign policy priorities and needs, as well as budget constraints; (3) new fiscal realities may force USIA to make additional choices about resource priorities and eliminate certain programs or locations of activities; (4) GAO believes that USIA could take steps to further reduce its costs, while continuing to protect U.S. interests, if fiscal conditions require; (5) to sustain a major reduction, USIA may have to consider closing more posts than it presently plans in countries where USIA has determined that the United States has limited public diplomacy goals; (6) another option would be to reconfigure USIA's overseas presence, which is currently based on a structure established after World War II; (7) Congress has already scaled back funding for some exchanges, but eliminating one or more exchanges, which would require Congress' approval, is also an option to reduce costs; (8) USIA exchanges permit the U.S. government to target potential leaders overseas, and consideration should be given to the potential impact that cutting exchanges would have on bilateral relationships with foreign countries; (9) soliciting increased foreign government and private-sector support is also an option to lessen USIA's costs; (10) Congress has reduced funding for all nonmilitary international broadcasting activities and mandated their consolidation; (11) modest economies are possible by eliminating overlap among broadcasters; and (12) any substantial funding cuts, however, would require major changes to the number of language services and broadcast hours, and past experience has shown that eliminating even one language is a difficult process, requiring concurrence from a wide range of interest groups and members of Congress. |
gao_GAO-01-927 | gao_GAO-01-927_0 | DOE’s implementation of its authority to conduct discretionary research evolved over the years. DOE’s three largest multi-program national laboratories—Lawrence Livermore in California, and Los Alamos and Sandia in New Mexico— account for nearly three-quarters of all LDRD spending. The number of categories ranged from one to five. LDRD Projects Met DOE’s Guidelines
All of the randomly selected LDRD projects we reviewed at the five laboratories we visited met DOE’s guidelines for selection. Additionally, the reports present performance information in varying formats, making it difficult to focus on the most relevant performance information. The same issue surrounds the tabulation of awards as performance indicators. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how much the Department of Energy’s (DOE) multi-program national laboratories have spent on Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) projects since 1992 (when the LDRD program was created), we reviewed program information, including annual reports, budgets and other financial information provided by DOE and laboratory officials for the nine DOE multi-program national laboratories. | What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) created the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program in fiscal year 1992. This program formalized a long-standing policy of giving its multi-program national laboratories discretion to conduct self-initiated, independent research and development (R&D). Since then, DOE's multi-program national laboratories have spent more than $2 billion on LDRD projects. DOE's three largest multi-program national laboratories account for nearly three-quarters of laboratory-wide LDRD spending. All LDRD projects GAO reviewed at the five laboratories met DOE's guidelines for selection. In addition, each of the five laboratories created the internal controls necessary to reasonably ensure compliance with DOE's guidelines. Each laboratory issues annual LDRD reports that contain performance indicators, such as the numbers of patents obtained, publications, copyrights, awards, and relevance of the research to DOE's missions. The reports present performance information in various formats, making it difficult to focus on the most relevant performance information. |
gao_GAO-02-368 | gao_GAO-02-368_0 | The type of institution that a student attends will affect the cost of attendance. Depending on the aid program, GI benefits may or may not be considered as another source of financial assistance for veteran students, thus affecting veterans’ eligibility for these programs. With regard to various federal tax incentives available for postsecondary education, receiving GI benefits does not prevent veterans from claiming such benefits, but may affect the amount they would be eligible to claim. Generally Veteran Students Receive the Same or More Federal Assistance than Nonveteran Students with the Same Characteristics
On average, veterans and nonveterans with similar characteristics are awarded about the same amount of federal Title IV aid, and when GI benefits are included, the total amount of federal assistance for postsecondary education is greater for veterans than nonveterans. When GI benefits are combined with Pell grant and Stafford loan aid, veterans receive aid packages that include a lower proportion of loans than nonveterans. Veterans receive smaller campus-based aid awards than nonveteran dependents, but more than nonveteran independent students at 4-year institutions. Although the actual amount claimed in HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax credits by veteran and nonveteran students is unknown, there are several factors that affect the amount a student may be eligible to claim. The amount of HOPE or Lifetime Learning tax credit one may be eligible to claim is affected by several factors, including the amount of tuition and fees paid, amount of GI benefits and grant aid received, and family income and taxes owed. Appendix I: Estimated Federal Title IV Aid Awarded to Students
The following three tables provide estimates of the amount of Pell grant, subsidized Stafford loan, and unsubsidized Stafford loan aid awarded to veteran and nonveteran students at public 2-year, public 4-year, and private 4-year institutions and the amount of GI benefits available in academic year 1999-2000. | What GAO Found
The Montgomery GI Bill provides a monthly stipend to pay postsecondary education expenses for veterans and eligible service members. Concerns have been raised about whether GI benefits adequately cover educational costs and whether the receipt of GI benefits affects other federal financial assistance available to postsecondary students under Title IV of the Higher Education Act and the Internal Revenue Code. Under Title IV, GI benefits do not affect the amount of aid veterans receive under the Pell grant and subsidized Stafford loan programs but may affect the amount they receive in unsubsidized loans and through campus-based aid programs. Depending on the program, GI benefits may be considered as another source of financial assistance for students, which may decrease a veteran student's financial need and thus the amount of need-based aid provided. With regard to available federal tax incentives, the receipt of GI benefits does not preclude veterans from claiming such benefits but may affect the amount they would be eligible to claim. On average, veterans and nonveterans with comparable characteristics are awarded similar amounts of federal Title IV aid. When GI benefits are included, the total amount of federal assistance is greater for veterans than it is for nonveterans. Moreover, veterans' total aid, including Pell Grants, Stafford loans, and GI benefits has a lower proportion of loans compared with nonveterans' packages. On average, veteran students received slightly lower average campus-based aid awards than did nonveteran dependent students, but they received more than nonveteran independent students at four-year institutions. The actual amount of HOPE and Lifetime Learning tax credits by veteran and nonveteran students is unknown. However, the amount of tuition and fees paid, amount of GI benefits and grant aid received, and family income and taxes owed will affect the amount of tax credit one may claim. |
gao_GAO-13-115 | gao_GAO-13-115_0 | EPA proposed the Next Generation Compliance initiative in fiscal year 2012 to capitalize on advanced technical capabilities and efficiencies in enforcement and compliance. In developing this new initiative, EPA stated that it wanted to go beyond its traditional enforcement approach of inspecting individual entities and make available, among other things, new and more complete enforcement and compliance information. EPA Has Taken Steps under Next Generation Compliance to Increase Transparency and Accountability
Since introducing its Next Generation Compliance initiative in fiscal year 2012, EPA has taken four primary steps to increase transparency and accountability in enforcement and compliance. According to EPA documents and officials, these steps provide greater access to data under EPA-regulated programs and make regulated entities more accountable to the public. First, EPA formed an electronic reporting task force in December 2011 to provide recommendations for converting from existing paper-based reporting requirements to electronic reporting. Second, the agency formed a work group in April 2012 to identify advanced emissions and pollutants monitoring technology and evaluate how the agency can better use such technology. In September 2012, EPA formed a work group to advance the use of Next Generation compliance tools in EPA settlement agreements. Fourth, the agency has increased the public availability of the enforcement and compliance information it currently has available. For example, in January 2012, EPA released a Clean Water Act Discharge Monitoring Report Pollutant Loading Tool on its ECHO website to provide the public with information about pollutants that are released into local waterways. EPA Has Not Developed a Strategic Plan for Its Next Generation Compliance Initiative
EPA has not developed a strategic plan to integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program. EPA has prepared a brief overview document and some slides that provide basic information on the initiative’s five components, but these documents are general in nature and provide little specificity regarding EPA’s plans, goals, or performance measures related to Next Generation Compliance. We have previously reported that strategic planning for activities below the agencywide level— such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or initiatives— is a leading practice for successful agencies. Table 1 lists five selected leading practices in federal strategic planning and their characteristics. For example, without proper planning, EPA may pursue emissions monitoring technologies that not all regulated entities—especially the growing numbers of smaller facilities— can fully utilize, thereby requiring EPA to rely on costly individual facility inspections with its limited resources. Without a strategic plan incorporating selected leading practices, EPA may face challenges in helping ensure that the initiative will achieve its long-term goals of improving compliance and obtaining greater health and environmental benefits from the agency’s regulations. Also, without such a plan to direct its Next Generation Compliance initiative, EPA could waste valuable resources, time, and effort and cannot be certain that it effectively integrates the initiative into its overall enforcement and compliance program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better integrate Next Generation Compliance into its overall enforcement and compliance program and ensure that the initiative will achieve the goals EPA envisions for it, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA direct the Assistant Administrator of OECA to take the following two actions:
Develop a schedule for completing, in a timely manner, a strategic plan for Next Generation Compliance; and
Ensure that this strategic plan incorporates selected leading practices in federal strategic planning, as appropriate, and describes how Next Generation Compliance is to be integrated into the enforcement and compliance program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees many environmental programs that seek to protect public health and the environment. Substantial noncompliance with these regulations and increasing budget pressures, among other things, led EPA to propose a new enforcement and compliance initiative in fiscal year 2012. This new initiativeNext Generation Complianceattempts to capitalize on advances in emissions and pollutants monitoring and information technology. Among other things, EPA expects Next Generation Compliance to provide new and more complete enforcement and compliance information and promote greater public transparency and accountability.
GAO was asked to review (1) actions EPA has undertaken in Next Generation Compliance to increase enforcement and compliance transparency and accountability and (2) the extent to which EPA is developing a strategic plan to integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed Next Generation Compliance documents and interviewed selected EPA officials.
What GAO Found
Since introducing its Next Generation Compliance initiative in fiscal year 2012, EPA has taken four primary steps to increase transparency and accountability in enforcement and compliance. According to EPA documents and officials, these actions will provide greater access to data under EPA-regulated programs and make regulated entities more accountable to the public. In this regard, EPA
formed an electronic reporting task force in December 2011 to provide recommendations for converting from existing paper-based reporting requirements to electronic reporting;
established a work group in April 2012 to identify advanced emissions and pollutants monitoring technology and evaluate how the agency can better use such technology;
formed a work group in September 2012 to advance the use of new compliance tools in its enforcement activities, such as in settlement agreements with entities that are found in noncompliance with regulations; and
increased the public availability of the enforcement and compliance information it currently has available by, among other actions, placing a tool on its enforcement website that allows the public to obtain information about pollutants that are released into local waterways.
EPA has not developed a strategic plan to integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program. EPA has prepared some documents on the initiative and its components, but these documents are general in nature and provide little specificity regarding EPA's plans related to Next Generation Compliance. GAO has previously reported that strategic planning for activities below the agencywide level is a leading practice for successful agencies. EPA acknowledges the need for an overall plan for Next Generation Compliance. Developing a plan that incorporates selected leading practices for federal strategic planning could help EPA more effectively integrate Next Generation Compliance into its enforcement and compliance program and promote greater public transparency. Without a strategic plan incorporating these leading practices, EPA may face challenges in helping to ensure that its initiative will achieve its long-term goals of improving compliance and obtaining greater health and environmental benefits from the agency's regulations. Additionally, without a strategic plan to direct its Next Generation Compliance initiative, EPA could waste valuable resources, time, and effort. For example, without proper planning, EPA may pursue emissions monitoring technologies that not all regulated entities--especially the growing numbers of smaller facilities--can fully utilize, thereby requiring EPA to rely on costly individual facility inspections with its limited resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA (1) develop a schedule for completing a strategic plan for its Next Generation Compliance initiative in a timely manner and (2) incorporate selected leading practices in federal strategic planning in the plan. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-423 | gao_GAO-01-423_0 | Background
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction governs how international parental child abduction disputes are adjudicated. German Initiatives to Improve Handling of Hague Convention Cases
Since July 1999, Germany has taken steps designed to improve its handling of parental child abduction cases under the 1980 Hague Convention. These changes may not affect cases already decided by German courts. Facilitating the Resolution of Difficult Cases and Monitoring Reforms
Germany established a special task force in October 2000 to lead German efforts to improve its handling of Hague Convention cases. We identified two cases where left- behind parents in the United States were seeking the enforcement of their German court-ordered visitation rights. Conclusions
Germany’s initiatives to enhance judicial expertise and accelerate case processing are steps that have potential to (1) positively affect German application of the provisions of the Hague Convention and (2) reduce the time taken to adjudicate cases. Germany has not acted, however, to improve its enforcement of visitation orders. Moreover, we believe that the failure to address the German courts’ reluctance to enforce visitation orders could undermine Germany’s efforts to improve its handling of Hague Convention cases. To identify what actions Germany has taken or plans it has under way to address U.S. concerns about Germany’s handling of parental child abduction cases, we reviewed State Department reports from May 1999 to January 2001 that documented systemic problems with Germany’s implementation of the Hague Convention and identified German actions taken or planned. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the last several years, the United States has criticized Germany's handling of international parental child abduction cases that have been filed by U.S. parents. Both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have criticized Germany for not fully and consistently following the criteria and procedures established under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which governs such cases. The primary criticisms include the inappropriate use by German courts of certain provisions of the Hague Convention to justify retaining abducted children in Germany, the length of time it has taken to adjudicate cases, and the failure to enforce left-behind parents' visitation rights. GAO examined the actions that Germany has taken or plans to take to reform its handling of international parental child abduction cases and how these actions may affect U.S. cases.
What GAO Found
GAO found that German authorities have pledged their commitment to take steps to improve the handling of Hague Convention cases and Germany has taken action to address two of the three primary criticisms. Germany has established a task force to monitor German reforms and active cases, initiated efforts to build expertise among judges deciding Hague Convention cases, and changed its processes to accelerate case handling. Despite these reforms, Germany has not acted to improve enforcement of visitation rights granted by German courts. The German courts' reluctance to enforce visitation orders is hampering Germany's efforts to improve its handling of Hague Convention cases. |
gao_GAO-02-513T | gao_GAO-02-513T_0 | We provided information on these schools to Education for follow-up. We identified over $32 million of other potentially improper grant and loan payments. Ineffective Controls over Third Party Drafts Led to Their Elimination
As we testified in April and July 2001, significant internal control weaknesses over Education’s process for third party drafts markedly increased the department’s vulnerability to improper payments. We also found that Education employees circumvented a key computer system application control designed to prevent duplicate payments. Poor Controls over Government Purchase Cards Resulted in Some Fraudulent, Improper, and Questionable Purchases
In our July 2001 testimony before this subcommittee, we described internal control weaknesses over Education’s purchase card program, including lack of supervisory review and improper authorization of transactions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Education has a history of financial management problems, including serious internal control weaknesses, that have affected the Department's ability to provide reliable financial information on its operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that significant internal control weaknesses in payment processes and poor physical control over its computer assets led to fraud, improper payments, and lost assets. GAO also identified instances of grant and loan fraud and pervasive control breakdowns and improper payments in other areas, particularly involving purchasing cards. |
gao_GAO-02-117 | gao_GAO-02-117_0 | We confirmed that 45 of the 221 sites, with estimated cleanup costs of $61 million, were included in DERP reporting by the installations. The remaining 176 sites were not included in DERP reporting, and of the $259 million in estimated cleanup costs, $198 million, or 76 percent, was not reported through DERP and therefore likely not reported in DOD’s financial statements. Of the 176 unreported sites, 149 involved ongoing operations with total estimated cleanup costs of $91 million. The remaining 27 unreported sites were inactive and/or closed operations with total estimated cleanup costs of $107 million. Real Property Records and Cost Estimating Methodologies Are Not Reliable
Installation environmental offices at the six installations we visited maintain comprehensive records for their own sites and operations subject to cleanup requirements for regulatory purposes and have demonstrated that cleanup costs for ongoing and inactive/closed operations can be estimated. We also found that policies regarding the recording of land-related assets were not consistently applied by the installations. These issues exist primarily because DOD does not have adequate guidance and leadership to ensure that: (1) all future cleanup costs are identified and reported as part of an overall approach to managing all of its environmental liabilities, and (2) real property records are properly maintained and coordinated with environmental site records. Our objectives at each of the six DOD installations visited were to: substantiate and supplement the information and insight gained at the determine the scope of ongoing and inactive/closed operations requiring cleanup at each installation, determine the estimated cleanup costs for these operations, and determine the extent to which these cleanup costs are currently being reported for budgetary planning and financial statement purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the environmental cleanup costs of ongoing operations of the Department of Defense (DOD). These include general property, plant, and equipment facilities or other assets that are being operated or are in use at DOD installations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD has not developed policies, procedures, and methodologies to ensure that cleanup costs required for all of its ongoing and inactive or closed operations are identified, consistently estimated, and appropriately reported. As a result, DOD's financial statements and environmental reports continue to underreport environmental liabilities and related long-term budgetary needs. The military installations GAO visited had a total of 221 sites with estimated cleanup costs of $259 million. Of these, only 45 sites with estimated cleanup costs of $61 million were being reported for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program Annual Report to Congress, and only that amount was likely included in DOD's financial statements. GAO found DOD was not reporting 149 sites related to ongoing operations with estimated cleanup costs of $91 million and 27 inactive and closed operations with estimated cleanup costs of $107 million. The environmental offices at the six installations GAO visited had comprehensive records for the installation sites subject to cleanup requirements. Although these records were reasonably accurate, the records used to maintain accountability over related land, buildings, and structures were significantly flawed. If properly maintained, the real property records should play a significant role in ensuring the accuracy of environmental site records. |
gao_GAO-01-1021 | gao_GAO-01-1021_0 | Background
Since 1991, DynCorp Aerospace Technology has provided support services for State’s counternarcotics program in the Andean region and, occasionally, in Central America. The Office of Aviation and DynCorp fly aerial eradication missions from several locations in Colombia. The Office of Aviation and DynCorp are collocated with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade in Tolemaida. Office of Aviation’s Contractor Oversight and Evaluation Measures Met Requirements
The Office of Aviation’s oversight of DynCorp met both State’s overall contracting requirements and requirements specified in the contract with DynCorp. The Office of Aviation is collocated with DynCorp at the main operating base and in each country, thus allowing Office of Aviation officials to monitor DynCorp’s operations on a daily basis. Office of Aviation Ensured Safe Operations but Needs to Address Certain Safety and Security Concerns
To oversee and evaluate the safety of contractor operations and physical security of the aviation program’s facilities, Office of Aviation officials relied on daily interaction with DynCorp’s country managers and forward operating location managers, frequent site visits, periodic reports as part of the trimester performance evaluation, and internal and external reviews. Overall, these assessments judged aviation program operations to be safe and physically secure; however, some concerns have not been resolved. In addition, the Colombia National Police have increased the number of staff assigned to the airfield. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the safety and security of the Office of Aviation’s forward operating locations and headquarters office in Colombia, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to document what remains to be done to address the suggestions and recommendations made by ICAP and RSO and when action is expected to be completed. It stated that the report findings are essentially factual and correct and that it will continue to pursue improvements where needed. | What GAO Found
The Andean region continues to cultivate, produce, and export almost all of the world's cocaine as well as an increasing amount of heroin, according to the State Department. Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States and about two-thirds of the heroin found on the East Coast. Although coca cultivation estimates have fallen by about two-thirds in Bolivia and Peru since 1996, increases in coca cultivation in Colombia have offset much of these successes. Under State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Office of Aviation, through a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology, supports foreign governments' efforts to locate and eradicate illicit drug crops in the Andean region. In recent years, DynCorp has maintained and operated aircraft to locate and eradicate drug crops in Colombia, trained pilots and mechanics for the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, and provided logistical and training support for the aerial eradication programs of the Colombian National Police and manual eradication programs in Bolivia and Peru. The Office of Aviation met both State's overall contracting oversight requirements and more specific oversight and evaluation requirements in the DynCorp contract. Office of Aviation officials interacted daily with DynCorp managers at the main operating base and in each country, made regular site visits to each country, and reviewed DynCorp's internal reports. The Office of Aviation ensured that its aviation program operated safely and was physically secure, but it can do more. The Office relied on monthly reports and the trimester performance evaluations, as well as periodic surveys and independent assessments of DynCorp's operations and facilities. Overall, these reports have concluded that the aviation program was safe and that physical security was adequate. However, several matters of concern have not been resolved. |
gao_GAO-07-159 | gao_GAO-07-159_0 | Ineffective competition and overuse and misuse of sole-source contract awards. Knowledge and information management—Technologies and tools that help managers and staff make well-informed acquisitions decisions. The District’s Procurement Law Does Not Promote Transparency, Accountability, and Competition
The District lacks a uniform procurement law that applies to all District entities and that provides the CPO with adequate authority and responsibility for the entire acquisition function—an essential component to promoting transparency, accountability, and competition. In addition, the law has been amended to exempt certain District entities and procurements from following the law’s competition and other requirements. According to current and former District procurement officials, District entities are seeking to expand independent procurement authority—a move that would undermine attempts to establish a central authority. For example, although the law allows the CPO to delegate procurement authority to employees of District entities covered under the law and to the CPO’s own staff in the Office of Contracting and Procurement, the council, with the Mayor’s approval, has used its authority to pass emergency laws exempting entities and procurement actions from the CPO’s authority. The District’s Procurement System Does Not Reflect Sound Management and Oversight Practices
In addition to generally lacking a uniform procurement law that applies to all entities, promotes competition, and provides the CPO the authority to ensure sound procurement outcomes, the District’s management and oversight of its procurements have lacked the rigor needed to protect against fraud, waste, and abuse. At the same time, the District’s contracting managers and staff, agency heads and program personnel, and other key procurement stakeholders do not have the basic tools for ensuring sound acquisition outcomes, including written guidance on the District’s procurement policies and procedures, a professional development program and certification requirements for contracting staff, and an integrated procurement data system. Low-Level Position of the Office of Contracting and Procurement Undermines Management and Oversight
The low-level placement of the Office of Contracting and Procurement undermines the office’s ability to effectively manage and oversee the District’s procurements across dozens of agencies and departments. According to District procurement officials, PASS does not provide full information on completed or ongoing procurements across all agencies, nor does it provide CPO and District agency and financial managers reports and other information they need to manage and oversee the procurement system. Conclusion
To better ensure every dollar of the District’s more than $1.8 billion procurement investment is well spent, it is critical that the District have an effective procurement system that follows generally accepted key principles and is grounded in a law that promotes transparency, accountability, and competition, and helps to ensure effective management and oversight and sustained leadership. To effectively address the District’s long-standing procurement deficiencies, it is clear that high-level attention and commitment from multiple stakeholders—including Congress—are needed. Reconsider appropriateness of high dollar thresholds for small purchases to maximize competition. As part of this review, we examined and discussed with chief procurement officers reform efforts in other cities. | Why GAO Did This Study
To improve acquisition outcomes, in 1997 the District established the Office of Contracting and Procurement under the direction of a newly created chief procurement officer (CPO). Since then, the District's inspector general and auditor have identified improper contracting practices. This report examines whether the District's procurement system is based on procurement law and management and oversight practices that incorporate generally accepted key principles to protect against fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO's work is based on a review of generally accepted key principles identified by federal, state, and local procurement laws, regulations, and guidance. GAO also reviewed District audit reports and discussed issues with current and former District officials as well as select state and local officials.
What GAO Found
The District's procurement law generally does not apply to all District entities nor does it provide authority to the CPO to effectively carry out and oversee the full scope of procurement responsibilities across all agencies. A lack of uniformity in its procurement law and the CPO's limited authority not only undermines transparency, accountability, and competition but also increases the risk of preferential treatment for certain vendors and ultimately drives up costs. The current law exempts certain entities and procurements from following the law's competition and other requirements, and according to current and former District procurement officials, there is a push to expand independent procurement authority--a move that would reverse action taken by the District a decade ago. Other provisions of current law further erode competition. Notably, the law provides broad authority for sole source contracting and establishes high-dollar thresholds for small purchases, which are generally not subject to full and open competition. Also, in implementing the law, sufficient management oversight is lacking to ensure employees do not make unauthorized commitments. The District has been challenged to effectively manage and oversee its procurement function, due in large part to the low-level position of the procurement office in the governmental structure, the rapid turnover of CPOs, and multiple players having authority to award contracts and affect contract decisions. At the same time, the District does not have the basic tools that contracting and agency staff and financial managers need to effectively manage and oversee procurements--including a procurement manual, a professional development program, and an integrated procurement data system. In summary, the District's procurement system does not incorporate a number of generally accepted key principles and practices for protecting taxpayer resources from fraud, waste, and abuse. Specifically, the District lacks a comprehensive procurement law that applies to all District entities over which the CPO has sole procurement authority and promotes competition; an organizational alignment that empowers its procurement leadership; an adequately trained acquisition and contracting workforce; and the technology and tools to help managers and staff make well-informed acquisition decisions. To better ensure every dollar of its more than $1.8 billion procurement investment is well spent, it is critical that the District have a procurement system grounded in a law that promotes transparency, accountability, and competition, and helps to ensure effective management and oversight and sustained leadership. High-level attention and commitment from multiple stakeholders--including Congress--are needed if the District's procurement law is to provide the right structure and authority and if procurement reforms are to succeed. |
gao_GAO-04-835 | gao_GAO-04-835_0 | Under traditional bilateral agreements, air services can only be offered by airlines that are licensed and designated by the two countries that sign the agreement. While they granted more rights to airlines of the signatory countries, Open Skies agreements, through the nationality clause, allow the U.S. government to block airlines of other countries from these rights. The United States Has Open Skies Agreements with the Majority of EU Nations
Since signing the first Open Skies agreement with the Netherlands in 1992, the United States has entered into agreements with 15 of the 25 EU nations (see fig. In addition, consumers in most U.S.-EU markets have a choice of service from more than one competing airline or alliance. Addressing the European Court of Justice Decision Will Affect Commercial Aviation in Four Key Ways
Industry and government officials with whom we spoke generally said that the Court of Justice decision–particularly as it relates to likely changes in the existing nationality clause in the Open Skies agreements and the bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom–will affect commercial aviation in at least four key ways, depending on the eventual outcome of negotiations between the United States and EU. While a new U.S.-EU agreement could eliminate the legal restrictions on the number of U.S. airlines permitted to operate into Heathrow, capacity limitations would affect the extent to which U.S. airlines would be able to operate there. EU Airlines Would Be Able to Establish Transatlantic Routes between the United States and Other EU Countries
Like U.S. airlines, EU airlines would have greater access to international markets. Creating subsidiary operations—EU airlines could set up subsidiary operations outside of their home countries that could provide transatlantic service. U.S. Consumers, Airlines, and Labor Groups May All Benefit from Changes in Agreements, Although Extent of Benefits Is Uncertain and Gains May Not Be Realized Immediately
Eliminating the nationality clause restrictions from the new U.S.-EU agreement would likely provide new benefits to consumers, airlines, and labor groups. New Entry by U.S. Airlines Into Restricted Markets Would Benefit Consumers, but Access to London’s Heathrow Airport May Be Limited by Current Slot Allocation Process
Officials at some U.S. airlines said a major potential benefit of a new agreement would be the opportunity for access to markets restricted by the existing bilateral agreements. As in the United States, major European gateway airports also tend to be dominated by a single carrier or alliance. With a new agreement that removed the nationality clause restrictions and expanded the Open Skies framework, U.S. consumers and airlines could benefit from increased access to new destinations within the EU, lower fares from more efficient route networks, and potentially more competitive routes. The net effect on airlines and consumers will depend on (1) when and to what extent U.S. airlines might gain access to markets that are now restricted, and (2) the business strategies that U.S. and EU airlines adopt. Specifically, our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) how prevalent are Open Skies agreements between the United States and EU nations, and what has been their effect on airlines and consumers; (2) what are the key ways that commercial aviation between the United States and EU could be changed by the Court of Justice decision; and (3) how might the elimination of nationality clause restrictions in any new U.S.-EU agreement affect airlines and consumers? | Why GAO Did This Study
Transatlantic airline operations between the United States and European Union (EU) nations are currently governed by bilateral agreements that are specific to the United States and each EU country. Since 1992, the United States has signed so-called "Open Skies" agreements with 15 of the 25 EU countries. A "nationality clause" in each agreement allows only those airlines designated by the signatory countries to participate in their transatlantic markets. In November 2002, the European Court of Justice ruled that existing Open Skies agreements were illegal under EU law, in part because their nationality clauses discriminated against airlines of other EU nations. The United States and the EU have been negotiating revisions to these agreements. Experts agree that removing the nationality clause is central to any new agreement. GAO was asked to report on (1) how prevalent Open Skies agreements are and what their effects on airlines and consumers are, (2) what the key ways that commercial aviation between the United States and the EU could be changed by the Court of Justice decision are, and (3) how the elimination of nationality clause restrictions might affect airlines and consumers. GAO's work included both analyzing data on transatlantic air service and evaluating information from and positions of industry officials, subject-matter experts, and stakeholder groups. GAO is making no recommendations.
What GAO Found
Open Skies agreements have benefited airlines and consumers. Airlines benefited by being able to create integrated alliances with foreign airlines. Through such alliances, airlines connected their networks with that of their partner's (e.g., by code-sharing agreements), expanded the number of cities they could serve, and increased passenger traffic. Consumers benefited by being able to reach more destinations with this "on-line" service, and from additional competition and lower prices. GAO's analysis found that travelers have a choice of competitors in the majority of the combinations of U.S.-EU destinations (such as Kansas City-Berlin). The Court of Justice decision could alter commercial aviation in four key ways. First, it would essentially create one Open Skies agreement for the United States and EU, thereby extending U.S. airline access to markets that are now restricted under traditional bilateral agreements. Notably, more U.S. airlines would gain legal access to London's Heathrow airport, which is restricted by the U.S. agreement with the United Kingdom. Second, it would also allow EU airlines to operate into the United States from airports outside their own countries. Third, for EU airlines, a revised agreement could alleviate some obstacles to merging with other EU carriers or creating subsidiary operations in other countries. Finally, the possibility that EU airlines might move some operations into other EU nations raises concerns about which EU nations' regulatory and legal systems would govern. U.S. airlines and consumers are likely to benefit from the elimination of the nationality clause, but the benefits may not be realized in the near term. Both U.S. consumers and airlines would benefit from gaining access to markets restricted under bilateral agreements, especially London's Heathrow airport, though capacity considerations there are likely to postpone and limit such access. Consolidation within the EU aviation industry could occur, with the effect on U.S. consumers varying, depending on whether consolidation creates additional competition or reduces it in particular markets. EU airlines could begin new transatlantic service in countries other than the airline's own, which would provide consumers with additional competitive choices. However, those airlines would likely face difficulties in competing successfully at another airline's hub. |
gao_GAO-08-572T | gao_GAO-08-572T_0 | Contractors can play an important part in helping agencies accomplish their missions. Federal Agencies Have Faced Challenges with Increased Reliance on Contractors to Perform Agency Missions
While there are benefits to using contractors to perform services for the government—such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs— GAO and others have raised concerns about the increasing reliance on contractors to perform agency missions. Our work shows that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core agency missions, especially in contingency or emergency situations or in cases where sufficient government personnel are not available. As I have previously stated, prior to making the decisions to use contractors, agency officials should focus greater attention on which functions and activities should be contracted out and which should not. Finally, once contractors are in place, agencies must ensure appropriate oversight of contractors, including addressing risks, ethics concerns, and surveillance needs. Workforce Planning: Agencies Face Challenges in Developing an Appropriate Mix of Contractor and Government Personnel to Meet Current and Future Needs
Along with determining the functions and activities to be contracted out, agencies face challenges in developing a total workforce strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of contractor and civilian and military personnel. DOD Faces Challenges in Managing the Increased Role of Contractors Performing Support Functions for Military Operations and Weapons Systems
DOD’s increasing use of contractors to perform mission-support functions, including contractors who support forces deployed for military operations and contractors who perform maintenance and other logistic support for weapon systems, has highlighted several challenges that DOD faces in managing the increased role of this component of its total force. With regard to contractor support to deployed forces, DOD’s primary challenges have been to provide effective management and oversight. With respect to weapon system support, the challenges have been to resolve questions about how much depot maintenance and other logistic work needs to be performed in-house and about to what extent outsourcing for DOD logistics has been cost-effective. DOD has Experienced Long-Standing Problems with its Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, But Has Taken Some Actions to Address these Problems
Since 1997, we have reported on DOD’s management and oversight challenges related to its use of contractor support to deployed forces. Those problems included issues regarding visibility of contractors, numbers of contract oversight personnel, lessons learned, and training of military commanders and contract oversight personnel. This database implements recommendations we made in 2003 and 2006 to enhance the department’s visibility over contractors in locations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Although DOD has taken these and other steps to address these issues, we recently testified that many of these issues remain a concern and additional actions are needed. Having an inadequate number of contract oversight personnel has hindered DOD’s ability to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting deployed forces and has had monetary impacts as well. Several military commanders we met with in 2006 said their pre-deployment training did not provide them with sufficient information on the extent of contractor support that they would be relying on in Iraq and were therefore surprised by the substantial number of personnel they had to allocate to provide on-base escorts, convoy security, and other force protection support to contractors. DOD Has Increasingly Relied on Contractors for Maintenance and Other Logistic Support of Weapon Systems
DOD has increasingly relied on contractors for maintenance and other logistic support of weapon systems. Uncertainties Exist About Projected Cost Effectiveness of Outsourcing Initiatives for DOD Logistics
Although DOD justified its logistics outsourcing initiatives based on the assumption that there would be significant cost savings, it is uncertain to what extent cost savings have occurred or will occur. 10. Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on Department of Defense Service Contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), is increasingly relying on contractors to carry out its missions. Governmentwide spending on contractor services has more than doubled in the last 10 years. DOD has used contractors extensively to support troops deployed abroad. The department recently estimated the number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to be about 196,000. DOD also relies heavily on contractors for various aspects of weapon system logistics support. While contractors, when properly used, can play an important role in helping agencies accomplish their missions, GAO has identified long-standing problems regarding the appropriate role and management of contractors, particularly at DOD. This testimony highlights the challenges federal agencies face related to the increased reliance on contractors and the specific challenges DOD has had in managing its increased reliance on contractors who support deployed troops and who provide logistics support for weapons systems. This testimony also highlights some of the recommendations GAO has made over the past several years to improve DOD's management and oversight of contractors, as well as DOD's actions in response to those recommendations.
What GAO Found
While there are benefits to using contractors to perform services for the government--such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs--GAO and others have raised concerns about the increasing reliance on contractors to perform agency missions. GAO's body of work shows that agencies face challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core agency missions, and these challenges are accentuated in contingency operations such as Iraq, in emergency situations such as Hurricane Katrina, or in cases where sufficient government personnel are not available. In making the decision to use contractors, agencies have experienced challenges such as: determining which functions and activities should be contracted out and which should not to ensure institutional capacity; developing a total workforce strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel; identifying and distinguishing the roles and responsibilities of contractors and civilian and military personnel; and ensuring appropriate oversight, including addressing risks, ethics concerns, and surveillance needs. DOD's increased reliance on contractors to support forces deployed for military operations and to perform maintenance and other logistic support for weapon systems has highlighted challenges that DOD faces in managing this component of its total force. With regard to contractor support for deployed forces, DOD's primary challenges have been to provide effective management and oversight, including failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of contract oversight personnel, failure to systematically capture and distribute lessons learned, and a lack of comprehensive training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel. These challenges have led to negative operational and monetary impacts at deployed locations. For example, several military commanders GAO met with in 2006 said their pre-deployment training did not provide them with sufficient information on the extent of contractor support that they would be relying on in Iraq and were therefore surprised by the substantial number of personnel they had to allocate to provide on-base escorts, convoy security, and other force protection support to contractors. Although DOD has taken some steps to address these issues, many of these issues remain a concern and additional actions are needed. With respect to weapon system support, the challenges have been to resolve questions about how much depot maintenance and other logistics work needs to be performed in-house and to what extent outsourcing for DOD logistics has been cost-effective. While DOD has a process for defining core maintenance capability, GAO has identified shortcomings with this process and found that core maintenance capability has not always been developed. Finally, although increased contractor reliance for maintenance and other logistics activities was justified by DOD based on the assumption that there would be significant cost savings, it is uncertain to what extent cost savings have occurred or will occur. |
gao_GAO-15-247 | gao_GAO-15-247_0 | FAA’s Assistant Administrator for Finance and Management serves as the agency official for process change management and provided leadership for FAA’s Section 812 effort through the Office of Finance and Management (AFN). As of January 2015, FAA considered 33 of the 36 initiatives implemented. For the five initiatives that FAA classified as “in- progress,” we assessed FAA’s efforts against two additional key practices—dedicate an implementation team and set implementation goals and a timeline. FAA’s Actions to Carry Out Initiatives Were Generally Consistent with Selected Key Practices but Were Less Consistent with Results-Oriented Reporting
FAA’s actions to carry out its initiatives were generally consistent with our selected key practices for organizational transformations; however, FAA’s actions were less consistent with the key practice to adopt leading practices for results-oriented reporting, as shown in figure 2. Establish a Communication Strategy
FAA’s actions were consistent with the key practice of establishing a communication strategy for 30 of the 36 initiatives and partially consistent for 6 of the 36 initiatives. Adopt Leading Practices for Results-Oriented Strategic Planning and Reporting
FAA’s actions were consistent with the key practice of adopting leading practices for results-oriented strategic planning and reporting for 21 of the 36 initiatives, partially consistent for 12 of the 36 initiatives, and inconsistent for 3 of the 36 initiatives. Initiatives that were consistent with this key practice established a basis for comparing results and used or were planning to use performance measures to assess results. For example, the Office of Airports’ initiative to develop standard operating procedures to standardize its regional processes, such as grant reviews, was partially consistent with the key practice. Until those performance measures are developed, officials said they will only measure the degree to which Airports employees use the new standard operating procedures. As stated previously, FAA used a decentralized approach to respond to the Section 812 mandate. Moreover, for federal agency consolidation efforts, we have found that agencies should have implementation plans that include measures that show an organization’s progress toward achieving an intended level of performance, such as quality, timeliness, cost of service, or customer service that the consolidation was intended to achieve. Without a more coordinated effort to encourage offices to track performance measures that can be aggregated across multiple initiatives, FAA and Congress as well as other stakeholders cannot have confidence that the agency’s efforts met or will meet the intent of Section 812 to streamline and reform the agency. FAA, through its Community of Practice for Process Improvement, is creating a database to track information on its process improvement efforts. Lastly, Section 812 required FAA to submit a report to Congress on the actions taken to streamline and reform the agency but did not require that FAA track or report to Congress on the results of these actions. If Congress directs FAA to undertake a similar review to streamline and reform the agency in the next authorization of FAA, Congress could help ensure that FAA provides information on any realized efficiencies and improvements by requiring tracking and reporting. For example, FAA and its offices, if asked to undertake and report on the results of a streamlining and reform review in the next authorization for FAA, could take necessary steps, such as collecting baseline information, to establish performance measures and a basis for comparing the results in line with key practices for organizational transformations. AFN, which led the agency’s response to the Section 812 mandate, collected and reported information on the 36 streamlining and reform initiatives but provided limited guidance on measuring performance and expectations to offices leading the initiatives. As a result, the offices leading the initiatives determined the status of the initiatives in different ways. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better enable FAA to track, aggregate, and report on the results of its streamlining and reform initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to develop a mechanism to capture the results of its efficiency initiatives in its planned database for process improvements. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Information Related to the Status of the FAA Streamlining and Reform Initiatives
Table 3 provides a list of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) 36 streamlining and reform initiatives that the agency identified in response to Section 812 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. FAA identified these 36 initiatives in response to Section 812 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. In particular, this report provides information on (1) how FAA determined the status of the streamlining and reform initiatives that the agency reported on in response to Section 812 and (2) the extent to which FAA’s efforts to carry out these initiatives were consistent with selected key practices for organizational transformations. We did not assess the appropriateness of the initiatives FAA identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
As fiscal pressures facing the federal government continue, so too does the need for federal agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of programs and activities. Section 812 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 mandated that FAA review its programs, offices, and organizations to, among other things, identify and address inefficient processes, wasteful practices, and duplication. In response, FAA identified 36 initiatives, including centralizing administrative functions and modernizing records management.
GAO was asked to examine FAA's progress to streamline and reform the agency as Congress considers reauthorizing FAA in fiscal year 2015. GAO examined how FAA determined the status of initiatives and the extent to which its efforts to implement initiatives were consistent with selected key practices for organizational transformations. Since each initiative sought to streamline or reform FAA, GAO identified four key practices for organizational transformations as applicable to these initiatives. GAO assessed FAA's efforts by comparing FAA documents to the selected key practices and interviewing agency officials leading each initiative.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) used a decentralized process to track the status of streamlining and reform initiatives identified in response to the Section 812 mandate in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. FAA's actions to implement the initiatives were mostly consistent with three key practices for organizational transformations but were less consistent with the key practice of adopting leading practices for results-oriented reporting, which includes using performance measures to show progress toward achieving results. Without information on the results of the initiatives, FAA and Congress cannot have confidence that FAA's efforts streamlined and reformed the agency.
Decentralized process: The Office of Finance and Management (AFN)—which led FAA's response to the Section 812 mandate—used a decentralized process to track initiatives. Individual offices responsible for the initiatives determined their status using varied definitions for “implemented.” For example, FAA considered an initiative to centralize leadership training “implemented” after officials created a plan for developing a series of courses, while FAA will consider an ongoing initiative to create standard procedures for the Office of Airports “implemented” after officials develop and deploy 24 new, standard procedures. As of January 2015, FAA considered 33 of the 36 initiatives implemented.
FAA's actions generally consistent with three key practices: GAO found that FAA's actions to implement the initiatives were mostly consistent for three key practices for organizational transformations—dedicate an implementation team, set implementation goals and a timeline, and establish a communication strategy. For example, FAA's actions were consistent with establishing a communication strategy for 30 of 36 initiatives and partially consistent for 6 of 36 initiatives.
FAA's actions less consistent with key practice regarding results-oriented reporting: GAO found that FAA's actions were inconsistent with this key practice for 3 of 36 initiatives, partially consistent for 12 of the 36, and consistent for 21 of 36. For example, for an initiative that was partially consistent, officials said that until they develop performance measures for the effect of the initiative, they would measure only whether staff use the new procedures. FAA's limited efforts to measure performance or outcomes of the initiatives hinder its ability to assess the initiatives' results. AFN has neither required offices to track performance measures nor made a specific effort to track any common measures across initiatives. As a result, offices used a range of performance measures to report results. GAO has previously found that information on results is critical for improving program performance and that agencies should have measures for the intended results of streamlining efforts—like cost savings and customer service—to help decision makers improve program performance. Actions to implement most of the 36 initiatives are continuing, and FAA plans to create a database to track these initiatives. Moving forward, FAA also plans to use the database to track other process improvement activities. To date, FAA has not decided what information to capture in the database but initially plans to include only descriptive information on each initiative. Lastly, Section 812 did not require FAA to track or report to Congress on the initiatives' results. By requiring such tracking and reporting, Congress could help ensure that FAA provides information on the results of a reform mandate, if required of FAA in the next authorization.
What GAO Recommends
As Congress considers FAA reauthorization, GAO suggests that Congress consider requiring FAA to track and report on the actual results of future agency-reform efforts. GAO recommends that FAA take steps to capture the results of improvement initiatives in its planned database for process improvements. The Department of Transportation agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-415 | gao_GAO-08-415_0 | Little is known about the effectiveness of access approaches due to a lack of reported research. Studies Show Financial Incentives and Nutrition Education Can Positively Affect the Consumption of Targeted Foods, but Little Is Known about Efforts to Improve Access
Several nutrition promotion studies have demonstrated positive effects on the purchase or consumption of targeted foods. All four studies demonstrated short-term positive effects on the purchases of targeted foods, consumption, or weight loss. The review compared the results of studies that used similar outcome measures and found that most studies reported that the approaches had statistically significant effects on consumption, as shown in figure 4. Factors to Consider Include the Selection of Targeted Foods, Incentive Amount, Participant Education, and Monitoring and Evaluation
There are several factors that must be taken into consideration in designing a program that provides financial incentives for the purchase of targeted foods in the FSP. Selection of Foods to Promote Could Be Controversial and Challenging
Selecting the foods an incentive program is designed to promote could be controversial. Amount of the Incentive Will Affect Participant Response and Program Costs
Although financial incentives could take many forms, the amount would need to be large enough to motivate FSP participants to change their purchasing patterns by buying more of the targeted foods. Measuring results: Researchers could measure changes in participants’ food purchases, consumption, or health outcomes to determine the effects of a financial incentive program. FNS officials suggested that a study could compare FSP participants’ purchases with federal dietary guideline recommendations before and after an incentive program was piloted. Financial Incentives Could Be Implemented Electronically or Using Paper Methods, but Each Option Has Potential Implications for Ease of Implementation, Program Integrity, and Cost
An incentive program—delivered in the form of an additional FSP allotment tied to the purchase of certain foods targeted for promotion— could be implemented through electronic or paper methods, and each of the options would have implications for ease of implementation, program integrity, and cost. Electronic options include providing additional FSP benefits to the EBT cards currently used by FSP participants or to a separate card on the basis of the amount participants spend on the foods targeted for promotion. Electronic Delivery of Incentives to Existing EBT Cards May Be Easy for Participants to Use, but Would Require Several Changes to the EBT System
Incentives provided electronically by using existing EBT cards would build on the current checkout technology and process, may not require as much time to check out as using a separate card, and could minimize the risk of fraud. Calculating and applying the incentive: To apply incentives to participants’ EBT accounts, EBT contractors would need to develop software for calculating and applying the incentives and to modify their software to include a new transaction type that tracks the amount spent on the targeted foods. Paper Delivery of Incentives Would Not Require Changes to the EBT System, but Could Increase State Administrative Costs and Fraud Risk
Delivering incentives using paper methods, such as vouchers or coupons, may be easier and less costly for some retailers to pilot because these methods would not require changes to the EBT system, according to a few of the retailers we interviewed. In general, the officials agreed with our findings and concluding observations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to identify (1) what is known about the effectiveness of financial incentives and other approaches intended to increase purchases of targeted foods that could contribute to a healthy diet; (2) the key factors to consider in designing a program that provides Food Stamp Program (FSP) participants with financial incentives to purchase certain foods; and (3) options available to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) for implementing financial incentives, and the advantages and challenges involved in implementing such options. To further explore targeted food incentive options and implementation issues, we convened a panel of 17 experts representing USDA, states, retailers, EBT contractors, and manufacturers of retailer check out systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2007, the Food Stamp Program provided about $30.4 billion in nutrition assistance benefits to 26.5 million individuals. Benefits are issued through Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, similar to debit cards, to purchase eligible foods at authorized retail stores. The diets of many low-income individuals, like the U.S. population overall, do not meet federal dietary guidelines. One potential strategy for increasing the purchases of targeted foods that contribute to a healthy diet is to incorporate into the program financial incentives for purchasing these foods. GAO was asked to identify (1) what is known about the effectiveness of financial incentives and other approaches intended to increase the purchase of targeted foods, (2) the key factors to consider in designing a financial incentive program, and (3) options available to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) for implementing financial incentives. GAO interviewed agency and state officials, retailers and associations, private EBT contractors, and other stakeholders; convened a panel of 17 experts; and conducted a literature review. In commenting on this report, FNS generally agreed with GAO's findings and concluding observations.
What GAO Found
A variety of approaches, including financial incentives and nutrition education, can increase the consumption of targeted foods, but little is known about the effectiveness of efforts to increase access to targeted foods. A few studies examining the effectiveness of financial incentives have demonstrated short-term positive effects on purchases, consumption, or weight loss. A study that reviewed 92 nutrition education studies found that most studies reported significant positive effects on consumption. Because of a lack of reported research, little is known about the effectiveness of approaches intended to improve access to targeted foods. Factors to consider in designing a program that delivers financial incentives through an additional food stamp allotment tied to the purchase of targeted foods include the following: (1) Selection of foods: Selecting which foods to promote could be a controversial and challenging part of designing an incentive program. (2) Incentive amount: The amount of the incentive will affect participant response and program costs. (3) Informing participants: Participants must be informed of the availability of incentives to take full advantage of a new incentive program. (4) Program monitoring and evaluation: Monitoring and evaluating the incentive program is critical to maintaining program integrity and determining the effects of the program. An incentive program could be implemented through either electronic or paper methods, and the different options would have implications for ease of implementation, program integrity, and cost. Electronic options include adding food benefits to the EBT cards currently used or to a separate card on the basis of the amount that participants spend on targeted foods. Providing incentives using existing EBT cards would build on the current checkout technology and process, and could require less time to complete transactions compared with using a separate card. However, delivering financial incentives to participants' EBT accounts on the basis of their purchases of certain foods would require several changes to the EBT system, such as modifications to retailer and EBT contractor software to separately track the amount spent on the targeted food items. Administering incentives using a separate card, such as an additional EBT card, may be more costly and complicated to implement. Alternatively, providing participants with paper vouchers for the purchase of targeted foods would not require changes to the EBT system, but could be more burdensome to use, increase fraud risk, and increase state administrative costs. With the new authority provided as part of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, FNS will have the opportunity to develop and administer a pilot incentive program and to determine both its effects on participant purchasing and consumption patterns and the costs associated with such a program. |
gao_GAO-09-127 | gao_GAO-09-127_0 | No Nationally Representative Data on OCB’s Audience Exists, but the Best Available Audience Research Suggests That Radio and TV Martí’s Audience Size Is Small
Despite the lack of reliable nationally representative data, BBG has determined that telephone surveys conducted from outside Cuba are among the best available and most cost-effective methods of estimating audience size for Radio and TV Martí. Regarding radio broadcasting, less than 2 percent of respondents to IBB’s telephone surveys in 2003, 2005, and 2006 said they listened to Radio Martí during the past week. While this process provides some useful information, we identified several weaknesses in the process. The main mechanism for assessing broadcasts’ compliance with journalistic standards is IBB’s program review process, which is designed to improve the content and production value of programming and ensure quality control. IBB’s Annual Reviews Identified Problems with Broadcasts’ Adherence to Certain Journalistic Standards
While IBB officials report that the quality of OCB programming has improved in recent years, IBB’s internal as well as external reviews identified problems with OCB broadcasts’ adherence to certain journalistic standards, particularly in the area of balance and objectivity. Steps Taken to Ensure U.S. Broadcasting to Cuba Adheres to Domestic and International Broadcasting Standards, but Some Concerns Remain
U.S. law generally prohibits the domestic dissemination of public diplomacy information intended for foreign audiences. Some domestic dissemination of OCB programming is authorized by law, and IBB and OCB have taken a variety of steps to minimize U.S. audiences’ access to such material. However, both Radio and TV Martí broadcasts reach U.S. audiences in several ways. Furthermore, the Cuban government has complained that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba violates international broadcasting standards, and the international body that serves as a forum for such disputes—the ITU—has found that U.S. television broadcasts (but not radio broadcasts) cause harmful interference with Cuban broadcasts. Oversight efforts by these various groups have identified three categories of concerns in recent years: poor communication by OCB management, low employee morale, and allegations of fraud and abuse. In responding to recent audit reports, BBG and OCB have taken steps to address nearly all of the audit recommendations. Conclusions
Broadcasting to Cuba has been an important part of U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba for more than two decades. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist decisionmakers and improve OCB’s strategy, we recommend that the Broadcasting Board of Governors take the following two steps: Conduct an analysis of the relative success and return on investment of broadcasting to Cuba, showing the cost, nature of the audience, and challenges—such as jamming and competition—related to each of OCB’s transmission methods. Direct IBB to develop guidance and take steps to ensure that political and other inappropriate advertisements are not shown during OCB broadcasts. Direct OCB to establish formal mechanisms for disseminating information to and obtaining views from employees to help improve communication and morale. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s (OCB) approach for broadcasting to Cuba and what is known about the size of its audience, we reviewed and analyzed strategic, programmatic, budget, and audience research documents from the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), OCB, and Department of State (State). Furthermore, we interviewed BBG, IBB, and OCB officials regarding oversight and management challenges and the steps taken to address those challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than two decades, the U.S. government has been broadcasting to Cuba to break the Cuban government's information blockade and promote democracy in Cuba. Over this period, questions have been raised regarding the quality and effectiveness of these broadcasts. GAO was asked to examine (1) the Office of Cuba Broadcasting's (OCB) broadcasting approach and what is known about its audience; (2) how the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)--which oversees U.S. government broadcasting--and OCB ensure compliance with journalistic principles; (3) steps taken to ensure adherence to domestic and international broadcasting laws, agreements, and standards; and (4) steps BBG and OCB have taken to address management challenges. GAO analyzed documentation related to strategic planning, audience research, oversight, and operations and interviewed officials from BBG, BBG's International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), OCB, State, and other agencies.
What GAO Found
OCB broadcasts Radio and TV Marti through multiple transmission methodsthat face varying levels of jamming by the Cuban government. While there are no nationally representative data and some surveys of recent Cuban emigres suggest a larger audience, the best available research suggests that Radio and TV Marti's audience is small. Specifically, less than 2 percent of respondents to telephone surveys since 2003 reported tuning in to Radio or TV Marti during the past week. Despite the importance of audience research, we found minimal sharing of such research among available sources. Because of limitations in the audience research data, decisionmakers lack basic information to help assess the relative success or return on investment from each of OCB's transmission methods. BBG's IBB--which directly oversees OCB--has established an annual program review process that serves as the main mechanism for assessing OCB's compliance with journalistic standards. While IBB officials report that the quality of OCB programming has improved in recent years, IBB reviews since 2003 have recommended improving adherence to certain journalistic standards, particularly in the areas of balance and objectivity. IBB's process provides useful feedback, but we found weaknesses such as limited training and operational guidance for staff conducting the reviews. OCB and IBB have taken steps to ensure that U.S. broadcasting adheres to relevant laws and standards, but some concerns remain. To comply with U.S. law, they have taken steps to minimize the domestic dissemination of OCB programming; however, OCB broadcasts reach U.S. audiences in several ways, such as through the Internet. In addition, a commercial TV station contracted to broadcast OCB programming showed some inappropriate advertisements during OCB programs. Furthermore, an international body found that OCB's TV broadcasts cause harmful interference to Cuban broadcasts, but the U.S. government has not taken steps to address this issue. Despite some efforts by BBG and OCB, oversight entities have identified problems such as poor communication by OCB management and low employee morale. For example, OCB lacks formal mechanisms for communicating with or obtaining information from employees. |
gao_HEHS-98-42 | gao_HEHS-98-42_0 | Background
Social Security is a retirement income program whose benefits are based, in part, on an individual’s earnings. A spouse’s receiving dependent benefits does not reduce the size of the worker’s own benefit. Women’s Benefits Differ From Men’s Because of Labor Market Differences
Women’s Social Security benefits are currently lower, on average, than men’s because their labor force participation rates and earnings are lower. The gaps are not expected to disappear entirely, even in the long term. The difference in labor force participation has implications for women’s level of Social Security benefits relative to men’s, since under the current rules Social Security calculates monthly benefits on the basis of lifetime taxable earnings averaged over a worker’s 35 years of highest earnings. Even if earnings for men and women and their labor force participation behavior were equalized starting today, women would continue to have lower benefits than men until the 2030s because earnings are averaged over 35 years; it would take that long for benefits to be equalized. Since retirement income benefits are based on both amount of earnings and number of years in the labor force, the gap will continue to produce lower benefits, on average, for women than for men. With Individual Accounts, Women May Fare Worse Than Men Because They Are More Risk Averse
Many of the reform proposals call for the creation of mandatory savings accounts that allow workers to make their own investment decisions. Although proponents argue that privatization could allow for higher retirement benefits for both men and women, a too-conservative investment strategy could leave women with lower final account balances than men, even if both make the same contributions to their accounts. Thus, even though women could be better off under a privatized system, compared to the current Social Security system, the gap between men’s and women’s benefits could increase. Our analysis, using different data and focusing on individuals in their prime working and saving years, increases the robustness of this conclusion. By investing less in these riskier assets, women benefit less from the potentially greater rates of return that, in the long run, stocks could generate. Costs of and Rules on Annuitization and the Effect on Women’s Benefits
Some proposals for reforming Social Security would not require retirees to purchase an annuity with the funds in their retirement income accounts. That is, insurance companies take into account women’s longer life expectancy and either provide a lower monthly benefit to women or charge women more for the same level of benefits given to men.Insurance companies also pay lower benefits for a joint and survivor annuity that covers both husband and wife than for a single life annuity that covers only the worker during his or her lifetime, again because the total time in which the benefits are expected to be paid is longer. The effect of individual changes in the reform proposals could be relatively minor. Some groups of women may be at risk of receiving lower retirement income benefits under some of the Social Security reform proposals, and other groups may lose their eligibility for benefits entirely. Nevertheless, investor education that covers general investment principles and financial planning advice might help both men and women to better manage their investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the issue of social security reform and women's retirement income, focusing on: (1) why women's benefits are lower than men's under the current social security system; (2) the possible differential effects on women of the new privatization reform proposals; and (3) what can be done to minimize the possibly negative effect on women of certain elements of the social security reform proposals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) women's average social security benefits are lower than men's for a number of reasons, most of which relate to women's lower rates of labor force participation and lower earnings levels; (2) although the labor market differences between men and women have narrowed over time, the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not project that they will disappear entirely, even in the long term; (3) the reform proposals that would create individual private savings accounts and change the way benefits would be distributed from those accounts are the most likely to affect women and men differently; (4) a retirement income system that is based in large part on mandatory contributions of a fixed percentage of earnings and on individuals' making their own investment decisions could lead to women's receiving relatively lower benefits than man; (5) working women earn less than men, on average, and therefore would have fewer funds to invest in their individual accounts; (6) GAO's analysis of women in their prime earning and saving years suggests that they are less likely than men to invest in potentially higher yielding, though riskier, assets such as stocks, which would generally leave them at risk of having accumulated relatively less in their accounts at retirement; (7) even if men and women enter retirement with equal amounts in their individual accounts, women may receive a lower monthly benefit if they buy an individual annuity--a monthly benefit for the life of the worker or the worker and a spouse--because it is adjusted for their greater longevity; (8) changes over time in women's labor force behavior and experience are projected to reduce, but not completely eliminate, the differences in men's and women's labor force participation rates and earnings; (9) any reform of the system that bases benefits on earnings will continue to produce different benefit levels for men and women; (10) if a reformed Social Security system were to rely largely on individual investment, better education about investment strategies and general financial principles might help women workers increase their retirement benefits; (11) in addition, requiring that retirement savings be annuitized would be better protect dependent spouses; and (12) annuities purchased with individual account balances might give rise to differential benefit levels for men and women with the same level of lifetime earnings because women are charged higher annuity prices, based on their longer average lifespan. |
gao_GAO-06-905T | gao_GAO-06-905T_0 | Accordingly, we recommended that the departments develop an architecture for the electronic interface between their health systems that includes system requirements, design specifications, and software descriptions; ● select a lead entity with final decision-making authority for the establish a project management structure to provide day-to guidance of and accountability for their inv estments in and implementation of the interface capability; and create and management plan for the electronic interface that defines the technical and managerial processes necessary to satisfy project requirements and includes (1) the authority and responsibility of each organizational unit; (2) a work breakdown structure for all o the tasks to be performed in developing, testing, and implemen the software, along with schedules associated with the tasks; and (3) a security policy. Besides pursuing their long-term goals for future systems through the HealthePeople (Federal) strategy, the departments are working on two demonstration projects that focus on exchanging information between existing systems: (1) Bidirectional Health Information Exchange, a project to exchange health information on shared patients, and (2) Laboratory Data Sharing Interface, an application used to transfer laboratory work orders and results. These demonstration projects were planned in response to provisions of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, which mandated that VA and DOD conduct demonstration projects that included medical information and information technology systems to be used as a test for evaluating the feasibi advantages, and disadvantages of measures and programs designed to improve the sharing and coordination of health care and health care resources between the departments. The Benefits Delivery Network, parts of which were developed in the 1960s, contains over 3 million veterans benefits records, including compensation and pension, education, and vocational rehabilitation and employment. In 1996, after experiencing numerous false starts and spending approximately $300 million on the overall modernization of BDN, VBA revised its strategy and narrowed its focus to modernizing the compensation and pension payment system. This application exchanges data between VA’s VistA system and DOD’s CHCS system (and AHLTA where implemented). The primary benefit of BHIE is near-real-time access to patient medical information for both VA and DOD, which is not available through FHIE. It has now been deployed to six sites. VA and DOD Are Taking Action to Achieve a Virtual Medical Record, but Much Work Remains
Besides the near-term initiatives just discussed, VA and DOD continue their efforts on the longer term goal: to achieve a virtual medical record based on the two-way exchange of computable data between the health information systems that each is currently developing. According to VA, the integrated master plan is to be completed by the end of August 2006. VA and DOD have made progress in the electronic sharing of patient health data in their limited, near-term demonstration projects, and have taken a important step toward their long-term goals by improving the management of the CHDR program. While the departments have ma progress in developing a project management plan, it is not yet complete. VA has also been working to modernize the delivery of benefits through its development of VETSNET, but the pace of progress has been discouraging. Until VBA develops an integrated project plan that addresses the long-stan management weaknesses that we and others have identified, it will be uncertain when and at what cost VETSNET will be delivered. It also needed to develop and implement action plans to move VBA from the current to the replacement system and to ensure that the Benefits Delivery Network would be able to continue accurately processing benefits payments until the new system was deployed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is engaged in an ongoing effort to share electronic medical information with the Department of Defense (DOD), which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active duty military personnel and veterans. Also important, in the face of current military responses to national and foreign crises, is ensuring effective and efficient delivery of veterans' benefits, which is the focus of VA's development of the Veterans Service Network (VETSNET), a modernized system to support benefits payment processes. GAO is testifying on (1) VA's efforts to exchange medical information with DOD, including both near-term initiatives involving existing systems and the longer term program to exchange data between the departments' new health information systems, and (2) VA's ongoing project to develop VETSNET. To develop this testimony, GAO relied on its previous work and followed up on agency actions to respond to GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
VA and DOD are implementing near-term demonstration projects that exchange limited electronic medical information between their existing systems, and they are making progress in their longer term effort to share information between the new health information systems that each is developing. Two demonstration projects have been implemented at selected sites: (1) a project to achieve the two-way exchange of health information on patients who receive care from both departments and (2) an application to electronically transfer laboratory work orders and results. According to VA and DOD, these projects have enabled lower costs and improved service to patients by saving time and avoiding errors. In their longer term effort, VA and DOD have made progress, in response to earlier GAO recommendations, by designating a lead entity with final decision-making authority and establishing a project management structure. However, VA and DOD have not yet developed a clearly defined project management plan that gives a detailed description of the technical and managerial processes necessary to satisfy project requirements, as GAO previously recommended. Moreover, the departments have experienced delays in their efforts to begin exchanging patient health data; they have not yet fully populated the repositories that will store the data for their future health systems. As a result, much work remains to be done before the departments achieve their ultimate goal of sharing virtual medical records. VA has also been working to modernize the delivery of benefits through its development of VETSNET, but the pace of progress has been discouraging. Originally initiated in 1986, this program was prompted by the need to modernize VA's Benefits Delivery Network--parts of which are now 40-year-old technology--on which the department relies to make benefits payments, including compensation and pension, education, and vocational rehabilitation and employment. In 1996, after experiencing numerous false starts and spending approximately $300 million, VBA revised its strategy and narrowed its focus to modernizing the compensation and pension system. In earlier reviews, GAO has made numerous recommendations to improve the program's management, including the development of an integrated project plan. In response to GAO's recommendations as well as those of an independent evaluator, VA is now developing an integrated master plan for the compensation and pension system, which it intends to complete in August. Until VA addresses the managerial and program weaknesses that have hampered the program, it is uncertain when VA will be able to end its reliance on its aging benefits technology. |
gao_GAO-12-818 | gao_GAO-12-818_0 | In support of its diverse missions, DHS plans to spend about $5.6 billion in fiscal year 2012 to deploy and maintain over 360 IT programs to perform both mission-critical and support functions, which frequently must be coordinated among components, as well as among external entities. DHS’s New IT Governance Process Is Generally Consistent with Best Practices
DHS has defined a vision for its new IT governance process, which includes a three-tiered oversight structure that defines distinct roles and responsibilities from the program through the department. While it is important to conduct pilots to test processes and identify lessons learned, until DHS finalizes its procedures associated with the new IT governance, it will have less assurance that the governance will be consistent with best practices and address previously identified weaknesses in investment management. The program health assessments look at individual programs’ health in executing and carrying out the program. Specifically, consistent with OMB guidance calling for the CIO to play a significant role in the oversight of the portfolio of IT programs, DHS’s draft procedures note that ESCs overseeing IT programs must include the DHS CIO, a component CIO, or a designated executive representative from a CIO office. In addition, DHS’s new IT governance framework and the associated policies and procedures are generally consistent with best practices for managing projects and portfolios identified in GAO’s ITIM framework, with two practices partially addressed and seven others fully addressed; however, the procedures have not been finalized. According to officials, the policies and procedures supporting DHS’s new IT governance have not been finalized because the focus has been on piloting the new governance process. While the use of pilots is valuable in testing processes and identifying lessons learned, until DHS finalizes the policies and procedures associated with the new IT governance, the department will have less assurance that its new IT governance will be consistent with best practices and address previously identified weaknesses in investment management. DHS Has Implemented Aspects of Its New Structure, but Has Not Fully Followed Best Practices
DHS has begun to implement components of the IT governance framework. However, the department has not yet developed an implementation plan. DHS Has Yet to Fully Define Processes for Evaluating Its Implementation Efforts
According to best practices, when implementing an IT governance framework, it is important to evaluate the implementation efforts by, among other things, developing measures to assess progress in meeting objectives. To the department’s credit, the vision is generally consistent with guidance and with best practices for managing projects and portfolios. Recommendations for Executive Action
To implement an effective IT governance strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the appropriate officials to finish defining the new IT governance process by finalizing the IT governance policies and procedures and ensuring they fully address or reference existing documents that address the following: how the IRB is to maintain responsibility for lower-level board activities; and investment selection and prioritization criteria. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DHS’s Director for the Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office provided written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in appendix II). He also stated that the department concurred with the recommendations and estimated it would address them by September 30, 2013. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) new information technology (IT) governance process and associated policies and procedures, and assess them against best practices; and (2) determine progress made in implementing the new approach and how DHS’s implementation efforts comport with relevant best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has one of the largest IT budgets in the federal government. In fiscal year 2012, DHS plans to spend about $5.6 billion to, among other things, acquire, implement, and operate approximately 360 IT programs, including about 83 major programs, which are intended to assist in carrying out its diverse missions. With such a large portfolio of IT programs, it is important to ensure that the appropriate governance exists so that the programs meet their cost, schedule, and performance goals and continue to support the departments strategies and objectives. In line with this, DHS has been working to define and implement a new IT governance process.
GAO was asked to (1) describe DHS's new IT governance process and associated policies and procedures, and assess them against best practices; and (2) determine progress made in implementing the new process and how DHSs implementation efforts comport with relevant best practices. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant documentation and interviewed DHS officials responsible for defining and implementing the new governance process.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has defined a vision for its new information technology (IT) governance process, which includes a tiered oversight structure that defines distinct roles and responsibilities throughout the department. The new governance framework and the associated policies and procedures are generally consistent with recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and with best practices for managing projects and portfolios identified in GAOs IT Investment Management framework, with two practices partially addressed and seven others fully addressed. For example, consistent with OMB guidance calling for the Chief Information Officer (CIO) to play a significant role in overseeing programs, DHSs draft procedures require that lower-level boards overseeing IT programs include the DHS CIO, a component CIO, or a designated executive representative from a CIO office. In addition, consistent with practices identified in GAOs IT Investment Management framework, DHSs draft procedures identify key performance indicators for gauging portfolio performance. However, DHSs policies and procedures have not yet been finalized, because, according to officials, the focus has been on piloting the new governance process. While it is important to conduct pilots to test processes and identify lessons learned, until the department finalizes the policies and procedures associated with the new IT governance, it will have less assurance that its new IT governance will be consistent with best practices and address previously identified weaknesses in investment management.
DHS has begun to implement aspects of its new governance process. For example, it has established several governance entities and conducted program health assessment reviews for all of its major IT programs. In implementing its new governance, the department has generally followed key industry best practices, such as establishing an implementation team; however, the department has not fully followed other practices, including developing a mechanism to capture lessons learned. The table below summarizes GAOs assessment of DHSs implementation efforts. Until the department fully addresses these practices, its implementation approach may be less effective than intended.
What GAO Recommends
To implement an effective IT governance process, GAO recommends that DHS finalize associated policies and procedures, and fully follow best practices for implementing the process. In comments on a draft of this report, DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations and estimated it would address them by September 2013. |
gao_GAO-02-697 | gao_GAO-02-697_0 | The program also serves to stabilize the economy in times of economic recession. In contrast, the states reported that $650 million in overpayments were made in 2001, of which $370 million was actually recovered. 2.) For example, some states may include overpayments resulting from unreported earnings as fraud, while other states do not. Overpayments Caused by Management and Operational Practices at the State and Federal Level
We identified various management and operational practices at both the state and federal level that contribute to UI overpayments. In addition, while some of the states we visited use automated data sources to determine if claimants are working or obtaining other benefits while receiving UI, others rely heavily on self-reported information from claimants to make payment decisions. States also tend to establish UI program policies and priorities in response to direction from the Department of Labor, which in some instances may contribute to overpayments. The NDNH is a comprehensive source of unemployment insurance, wage, and new hires data for the whole nation. The vulnerabilities that we have identified are partly attributable to a management approach in Labor and many states that does not adequately balance the need to quickly process and pay UI claims with the need to control program payments. | What GAO Found
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) program is a federal-state partnership to help replace the lost earnings of unemployed persons and to stabilize the economy during a recession. The Department of Labor estimates that $2.4 billion in overpayments were made in 2001, including $577 million attributed to fraud or abuse. Overpayments in the UI program result from management and operational practices at the state and federal level. At the state level, many states do not sufficiently balance the need to quickly process and pay UI claims with the need to control program payments. Moreover, states rely heavily on self-reported information from claimants for other important data, such as a claimant's receipt of other federal or state program benefits and whether they are citizens of the United States. At the federal level, policies and directives from the Department of Labor affect states' priorities and procedures in a manner that makes overpayments more likely. |
gao_GAO-06-745 | gao_GAO-06-745_0 | Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but Its Ability to Meet Near- and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear
The Army has made progress in creating active component modular combat brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these brigades and has yet to complete the development of its rotational equipping strategy, which raises concerns about the extent to which brigades will be equipped in the near and longer term. As such, National Guard combat units will enter into the Army’s new force rotational model in which, according to the Army’s plans, Guard units would be available for deployment 1 year out of 6 years. To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipment among Units Based on Their Movement through Training, Readiness, and Deployment Phases
Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment in the near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades at 100 percent of their requirements, the Army is developing a new equipping strategy as part of its force rotation model; however, this strategy is not yet completed because the Army has not finalized equipping requirements for this new strategy or assessed the operational risk of not fully equipping all units. Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure
The Army has made some progress toward meeting modular personnel requirements in the active component, but faces significant challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the QDR. The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall end strength is an ambitious undertaking that will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. As a result, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its overall end-strength goals and what risks exist if these goals are not met. Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but Lacks a Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and Monitor Implementation
While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach to effectively measure its progress against stated modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and monitor implementation plans. Without such an approach, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into the capabilities of the modular force and the Army’s implementation plans. GAO and DOD, among others, have identified the importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable, results-oriented metrics, which in turn provide accountability for results. Third, to improve information available for decision makers on progress of the Army’s modular force implementation plans, we recommend that the Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a comprehensive plan for assessing the Army’s progress toward achieving the benefits of modularity to include specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan; and plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide sufficient capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and 2006 QDR objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional and irregular security challenges. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army’s plans for creating modular forces, Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide the information outlined in our recommendations including; details about the Army’s equipping strategy and an assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping strategy; the status of the Army’s personnel initiatives and an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force and manage the risk to its noncombat force structure; and the Army’s plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the benefits of modularity, plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit designs, and a testing plan for conducting comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented. II). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army. Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and the need for further changes to designs or implementation plans.
What GAO Found
The Army is making progress in creatingactive and National Guard modular combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not completed development of an equipping strategy for its new force rotation model. This raises uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades will be equipped both in the near and longer term as well as the ultimate equipping cost. The Army plans to employ a force rotation model in which units nearing deployment would receive required levels of equipment while nondeploying units would be maintained at lower readiness levels. However, because the Army has not completed key details of the equipping strategy--such as defining the specific equipping requirements for units in various phases of its force rotation model--it is unclear what level of equipment units will have, how this strategy may affect the Army's equipment funding plans, and how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises. While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular force personnel requirements in the active component, it faces challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to increase its active combat force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall active end strength will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat positions by converting some to civilian positions and pursuing other initiatives, but Army officials believe future initiatives may be difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Without information on the progress of these initiatives and what risks exist if the Army's goals are not met, Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the information they need to understand challenges and risks. Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to modular designs, and monitor implementation plans. While GAO and DOD have identified the importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics that in turn provide accountability for results, the Army has not established outcome-related metrics linked to most of its modularity objectives. Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and training events, the Army does not have a long-term comprehensive plan for further analysis and testing of its modular combat brigade designs and fielded capabilities. Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into how the modular force is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. As a result, decision makers lack sufficient information to assess the capabilities, cost, and risks of the Army's modular force implementation plans. |
gao_GAO-08-57 | gao_GAO-08-57_0 | Since the program’s inception in 1997, ONDCP has delegated certain grant administration activities to other agencies through inter-agency agreements. In fiscal year 2005, ONDCP administered the program with SAMHSA. Furthermore, ONDCP instituted procedures for screening grant applications that did not ensure that all renewal grantees met statutory eligibility requirements. Because ONDCP did not conduct ongoing monitoring, the agency increased its risk that it could not provide reasonable assurance that SAMHSA was conducting grant activities, such as eligibility screening, according to ONDCP’s expectations. Documentary evidence was missing from 47 of the 66 grant files (71 percent) we reviewed. Specifically, our review of an example of eligibility screening sheets used for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and our file review of 19 initial grantee applications for fiscal year 2005 where eligibility screening sheets were present, found that the eligibility criteria delineated in the screening sheets used by ONDCP and SAMHSA officials to determine whether an applicant was an eligible coalition omitted some of the statutory eligibility criteria. ONDCP implemented a separate screening process, not described in the funding announcement, for initial and renewal grant applicants 1 month before the fiscal year 2005 grant awards were to be announced, including the introduction of a criterion that grant applicants could not propose to use over a certain percentage of grant funds for direct services. Lack of fully defined roles and responsibilities and documented procedures to follow for eligibility screening hampered the efforts of ONDCP and SAMHSA to effectively manage the grant-making process. However, the inter-agency agreement for fiscal year 2005 did not fully articulate roles and responsibilities for ONDCP’s management of SAMHSA, such as the role of SAMHSA in screening renewal grant applicants for eligibility, and for the grant program overall. ONDCP Has Taken Steps to Better Manage the Grant- Making Process, but These Efforts Can Be Strengthened
Since fiscal year 2006, ONDCP has taken steps to strengthen its management of the grant-making process by establishing senior-level management groups to address collaboration and monitoring issues, eliminating its use of the direct services eligibility criterion in response to reauthorizing legislation, and clarifying grant program roles and responsibilities. However, as of fiscal year 2007, ONDCP had not yet put in place mechanisms to ensure that documentation of eligibility screening were included in grant files, as called for by internal control standards. Without doing so, confusion over managing the program could continue to occur. Conclusions
For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, ONDCP and SAMHSA did not adhere to key federal internal controls standards in the federal government and did not meet all statutory requirements in administering the Drug-Free Communities Support grant program. Develop and document its approach to monitoring and overseeing SAMHSA and the program as a whole. 2. 3. We continue to believe that this recommendation remains valid because, without defined oversight activities for ensuring successful completion of the work across all activities, ONDCP increases its risk that it cannot provide reasonable assurance that required tasks are being performed in accordance with its directives. Concerning our second recommendation that ONDCP ensure that the coalitions receiving an initial grant or a renewal grant satisfy all of the statutory eligibility criteria for each fiscal year and that these decisions are fully documented, the ONDCP Director noted that they have taken steps to ensure that all renewal applicants are screened for eligibility, consistent with our recommendation, and documentation related to screening applicants is maintained in grant files. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the extent to which Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) conducted its screening and grant-related activities for the Drug-Free Communities Support Program in accordance with standards for internal control in the federal government, established laws, and leading practices for collaborating agencies, we reviewed available program documents, including, but not limited to, the Request for Applications funding announcements; the inter-agency agreements between ONDCP and SAMHSA, and the documented outcomes of specific review activities and recommendations for grant funding decisions. Internal controls and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123 are based on GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Twenty-five percent of American students ages 13-17 reported using illicit drugs in 2007. The Drug-Free Communities Support Program provides grants to community coalitions involved in reducing youth substance abuse. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) administers the program. ONDCP selected the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) to operate the grant program in fiscal year 2005. In 2005, ONDCP did not award grants to some coalitions who had previously received grant funds (renewal grantees). GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which ONDCP and SAMHSA administered grant-related activities for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 consistent with federal internal control standards, statutory requirements, and other guidance and (2) the steps ONDCP has taken since 2006 regarding its administration of grant-related activities. GAO analyzed and compared program documents and grant activities to established guidance, such as federal internal control standards and statutory requirements, and interviewed key program management officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, ONDCP and SAMHSA did not always adhere to applicable federal internal control standards, statutory requirements, and other guidance during the grant-making process. Standards for internal control in the federal government call for agencies to conduct ongoing monitoring of a program's performance, but ONDCP did not conduct such monitoring of SAMHSA or the program overall. Thus, ONDCP increased its risk of not providing reasonable assurance that SAMHSA conducted grant activities, such as eligibility screening. Internal control standards also require that agencies maintain documentation that grant applicants met eligibility requirements each fiscal year. While SAMHSA officials said that they screened all renewal grantees for eligibility in 2005 and ONDCP officials said they screened all initial grantees in 2006, documentation indicating that such screening had occurred was missing from 47 of the 66 grantee files GAO reviewed. ONDCP also lacked a process to ensure that all renewal applicants met statutory eligibility requirements. For example, ONDCP used a separate screening process in fiscal year 2005 that included a criterion that grantees limit funding for direct services, such as enrolling individuals in a drug prevention program. Only renewal grant applicants that met this or one of two other criteria underwent further screening for statutory eligibility. As a result, ONDCP funded about 86 percent of renewal grantees in 2005 without ensuring that they met the statutory eligibility criteria. Leading practices for collaborating agencies call for strategies to ensure common outcomes. However, the inter-agency agreement between ONDCP and SAMHSA did not fully define roles and responsibilities and lacked specific guidance to SAMHSA on eligibility screening. As a result, confusion occurred over issues, such as the eligibility criteria to apply, hampering the two agencies in their efforts to effectively manage the grant-making process. Since 2006, ONDCP has addressed some of the issues described above, by (1) clarifying its role for the program in its 2007 agreement with SAMHSA, (2) establishing management groups to address monitoring issues, and (3) eliminating its use of the direct services eligibility criterion. However, some internal control and other challenges remain. For example, ONDCP has not yet put a mechanism in place to ensure that documentation confirming eligibility is maintained in the grant files. ONDCP also has not documented its approach to overseeing SAMHSA and the program. Without defined oversight activities for ensuring completion of the work, ONDCP lacks reasonable assurance that required tasks are being performed in accordance with management's directives. Also, roles and responsibilities for key elements of grant administration remain largely undefined in that the agencies have not clarified certain services SAMHSA is to provide related to awarding grants or the role of the program Administrator. Without defining these roles, confusion on the steps to follow in managing the program could continue to occur. Finally, as in 2006, ONDCP officials told GAO that they did not screen renewal grant applicants for eligibility in 2007 because the screening that applicants undergo when they first receive a grant is sufficient. |
gao_GAO-06-9 | gao_GAO-06-9_0 | The agency’s revenues exceed its expenses, which reduces the federal budget deficit. Ginnie Mae Securities Finance Most Government-Backed Housing Loans, but Represent a Declining Share of the Total MBS Market
Ginnie Mae securities finance the great majority of FHA and VA loans, suggesting that the agency is fulfilling its basic mission, and faces relatively little competition in the market for government-backed mortgage loans. As shown in figure 4, Ginnie Mae securities represented 42 percent of all new MBS issued in 1985, but only 7 percent in 2004. Changes in Ginnie Mae’s Share and Volume Could Have Implications for Borrowers, the Liquidity of Its Securities, and Federal Revenue
Ginnie Mae’s share of the government-backed mortgage market has been fairly constant. The officials said that if volume continued to decline, liquidity could become a significant concern in the future, although it is unknown at what levels of volume this would occur. In fiscal year 2004, this amount was $295 million. First, it must respond to changes in the marketplace and meet the needs of its stakeholders. To meet this challenge, the agency has expanded its product offerings and taken other initiatives to maintain its viability. Ginnie Mae Is in the Process of Expanding Disclosure on Loan Information to Help Investors Better Predict Prepayment
Investors in Ginnie Mae securities do not face credit risk, since the mortgages underlying these securities are federally insured or guaranteed and because Ginnie Mae guarantees timely payment of principal and interest. Further, 99 percent of Ginnie Mae’s portfolio is made up of loans backed by FHA and VA, and the agency now matches the loans in its data systems against those in FHA’s and VA’s databases. Observations
Despite its declining share of the overall MBS market, Ginnie Mae continues to serve its key public policy goal of providing a strong secondary market outlet for federally insured and guaranteed housing programs, helping to improve their access and affordability for low- to moderate-income borrowers. This may be especially challenging for Ginnie Mae because it operates with a small staff of about 66 and contracts out most of its operations. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our report objectives were to evaluate (1) the state of Ginnie Mae’s market share and guarantee volume, (2) the potential implications of changes in Ginnie Mae’s market share and guarantee volume, and (3) challenges Ginnie Mae faces in fulfilling its mission and the steps that have been or could be taken to address these challenges. We also compared loan data provided by Ginnie Mae with data maintained by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Rural Housing Service (RHS), and the Office of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government National Mortgage Association, commonly known as Ginnie Mae, is a wholly owned government corporation that guarantees mortgage-backed securities (MBS) backed by pools of federally insured or guaranteed mortgage loans. The agency supports federal housing programs by facilitating the securitization of loans backed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Rural Housing Service, and the Office of Public and Indian Housing within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Concerned that Ginnie Mae's share of the overall MBS market has declined significantly, Congress asked us to address (1) the state of Ginnie Mae's market share and guarantee volume, (2) the potential implications of changes in its share and volume, and (3) the challenges Ginnie Mae faces and steps it is taking and could take to address these challenges.
What GAO Found
Despite its declining share of the overall MBS market, Ginnie Mae continues to serve its key public policy goal of providing a strong secondary market outlet for federally insured and guaranteed housing loans. Ginnie Mae MBS financed more than 90 percent of new FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans in fiscal year 2004, and the agency appears to face relatively little competition in this market. Ginnie Mae's total volume has declined in recent years, however, and its share of the overall MBS market has fallen from 42 percent of new securities in 1985 to 7 percent in 2004. This drop is largely the result of the decline in the market share of the FHA and VA loan programs and the concurrent rise in the securitization of non-government-backed mortgages. Further declines in Ginnie Mae's volume could potentially have implications for borrowers, the liquidity of its securities, and federal revenues. For example, Ginnie Mae's securities could become less liquid, although it is unclear at what levels of volume this would occur. In addition, Ginnie Mae's program revenues could decline if its volume decreased. In fiscal year 2004, program revenues exceeded expenses by $295 million, which helped reduce the federal budget deficit. Ginnie Mae faces a number of challenges in responding to changes in the marketplace, meeting stakeholders' needs, and managing its operations, and the agency has been taking steps to address these challenges. For example, it has expanded its product mix to reach more borrowers and has begun disclosing more information on loans underlying its securities to help investors better predict risk. GAO and others have identified opportunities for improvement in Ginnie Mae's data integrity and internal controls. The agency has begun addressing these issues, but it contracts out most of its operations, so ensuring that it has sufficient staff capabilities to plan, monitor, and manage its contracts is essential. |
gao_GAO-17-169 | gao_GAO-17-169_0 | Medicaid spending on long-term services and supports provided in home and community settings has increased dramatically over time—to about $80 billion in 2014—while the share of spending for care in institutions has declined, and HCBS spending now exceeds long-term care spending for individuals in institutions (see fig. 1). According to numerous HHS OIG reviews and CMS’s annual review of Medicaid improper payments, the provision of Medicaid personal care services is at high risk for improper payments. Two CMS Systems Collect Data on the Provision of and Spending on Personal Care Services, and the Data Suggest Wide Variations among States
Two CMS data systems collect Medicaid data from providers’ records of services rendered and total Medicaid expenditures by broad Medicaid categories of service, including for personal care services. The Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) was established to collect detailed information on the services rendered to individual Medicaid beneficiaries. The Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System (MBES) was established for states to report total aggregate expenditures for Medicaid services across broad service categories. Limitations in Data Hinder CMS Oversight of Personal Care Services, and Planned Improvements May not Address Data Limitations
CMS’s two data systems provide some basic and aggregate information on the provision of and spending on personal care services. However, in order to provide effective oversight, CMS needs detailed data on personal care services that are timely, complete, consistent, and accurate, including data on who provided the service, the type and amount of services provided, when services were provided, and the amount the state paid for services. We found that the detailed data collected by the two systems were not always timely, complete, consistent, or accurate, which limits the usefulness of these data for CMS oversight. This happens for two reasons. More than 400 unique procedure codes were used by the 35 states. As illustrated in figure 11, nearly two-thirds of the reporting errors were a result of states not separately identifying and reporting personal care services expenditures using the correct reporting lines, as required by CMS. First, CMS is developing an enhanced Medicaid claims data system—called the Transformed-Medicaid Statistical Information System (T-MSIS)—that will replace MSIS. According to CMS officials, the new division is intended to: work with states to help ensure the completeness and consistency of claims data as states transition to T-MSIS, improve the quality of the data by analyzing the data for anomalies and errors that can be corrected, build the agency’s capacity to use the data for program monitoring, oversight, and reporting, and provide data analysis support for different CMS program offices, including the offices that oversee states’ personal care services programs. Timely, relevant, and reliable data are needed for decision making, external reporting, and monitoring program operations—for example, to conduct management functions such as tracking the growth in use of and spending on specific Medicaid services; to identify trends related to utilization and payments per service, provider, and beneficiary; and to identify areas at higher risk for fraud, waste, and abuse. Without complete and consistent federal data collected from states, CMS is unable to conduct effective oversight and perform key management functions specific to personal care services, such as ensuring that states report personal care services expenditures correctly; claims for enhanced federal matching funds are accurate, verifying states’ historical spending levels for determining maintenance of expenditure requirements, linking payments from claims with reported expenditures, or providing technical assistance to states to identify improper personal care services payments. We found that the data collected from states were often incomplete, inconsistent, or inaccurately reported. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the collection of complete and consistent personal care services data and better ensure CMS can effectively monitor the states’ provision of and spending on Medicaid personal care services, we recommend CMS take the following four steps:
Establish standard reporting guidance for personal care services collected through T-MSIS to ensure that key data reported by states, such as procedure codes, provider identification numbers, units of service, and dates of service, are complete and consistent;
Better ensure, for all types of personal care services programs, that data on provision of personal care services and other HCBS services collected through T-MSIS claims can be specifically linked to the expenditure lines on the CMS-64 that correspond with those particular types of HCBS services;
Better ensure that personal care services data collected from states through T-MSIS and MBES comply with CMS reporting requirements; and
Develop plans for analyzing and using personal care services data for program management and oversight. HHS did not explicitly agree or disagree with the two other recommendations—that the agency establish standard reporting guidance and improve the linkages between CMS-64 and T-MSIS data on personal care services. | Why GAO Did This Study
A growing share of long-term care spending under Medicaid, a joint federal-state health care program, is for services provided in home and community settings. Medicaid spending on these services—about $80 billion in 2014—now exceeds spending on institutional long term care. Personal care services are key components of long-term, in-home care, providing assistance with basic activities, such as bathing, dressing, and toileting, to millions of individuals seeking to retain their independence and to age in place. However, these services are also at high risk for improper payments, including fraud.
Given the expected increase in the demand for and spending on personal care services and risk of improper payments, GAO was asked to examine available data on personal care services and CMS's use of the data. This report: (1) describes the CMS systems that collect data on personal care services and what the data reveal, and (2) examines the extent to which data from these systems can be used for oversight. GAO reviewed information from two CMS data systems, reviewed relevant federal guidance and documents, and interviewed officials and researchers.
What GAO Found
Two data systems managed by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the federal agency that oversees Medicaid—collect information from states on the provision of and spending on personal care services:
The Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) collects detailed information from provider claims on services rendered to individual Medicaid beneficiaries and state payments for these services.
The Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System (MBES) collects states' total aggregate Medicaid expenditures across 80 broad service categories.
Information from these two CMS data systems can be used in the aggregate to describe broadly the provision of and spending on Medicaid personal care services. For example, MBES data show that total fee-for-service spending on these services was at least $15 billion in 2015—up $2.3 billion from 2012.
However, the usefulness of the data collected from these two systems for CMS oversight is limited because of data gaps and errors. To provide effective oversight, including decision making, external reporting, and monitoring program operations, CMS needs timely, relevant and reliable data on personal care services rendered and the amount paid. GAO found that the data collected did not always meet these standards. For example:
MSIS data were not timely, complete, or consistent. The most recent data available at the time of GAO's audit were for 2012 and only included data for 35 states. Further, 15 percent of claims lacked provider identification numbers, over 400 different procedure codes were used to identify the services, and the quantity and time periods varied widely. Without good data, CMS is unable to effectively monitor who is providing personal care services or the type, amount, and dates of services. CMS may also face challenges determining whether beneficiaries were eligible for services and assessing the reasonableness of the amount of services claimed.
MBES data were not always accurate or complete. From 2012 through 2015, GAO found that 17 percent of expenditure lines were not reported correctly. Nearly two-thirds of these errors were due to states not separately identifying personal care services expenditures, as required by CMS. Inaccurate and incomplete reporting limits CMS's ability to ensure federal matching funds are provided consistent with states' approved programs.
CMS is developing a new Medicaid claims system to replace MSIS and recently established a new office to support CMS's use of Medicaid data for program management and monitoring. However, CMS has not issued guidance related to reporting of personal care services that addresses the gaps GAO identified, or developed plans to use the data for oversight purposes. Without improved data and plans for how it can be used for oversight, CMS could continue to lack critical information on personal care service expenditures.
HHS agreed with two of GAO's recommendations to ensure state compliance with reporting requirements and develop plans to use the data. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with two others.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS improve personal care services data by: establishing standard reporting guidance for key data; ensuring linkage between data on the provision of services and reported expenditures; ensuring state compliance with reporting requirements; and developing plans to use data for oversight. |
gao_GAO-05-41 | gao_GAO-05-41_0 | DOI Supported Government Operations and Infrastructure Improvements
In fiscal years 1999-2003, DOI provided grants that supported government operations and infrastructure improvements in American Samoa. In particular, the LBJ Hospital building had persistent fire-safety deficiencies that jeopardized the hospital’s ability to maintain the certification required for continued Medicaid funding. LBJ Hospital officials reported that they did not have an adequate number of U.S.-certified medical doctors or registered nurses, despite incentive programs to attract them. Limited Local Funds Hampered Service Delivery and Slowed Project Completion
Limited local resources also affected some of the programs in our review. Grants Had Limited Accountability, and U.S. The American Samoa government did not comply with the Single Audit Act during fiscal years 1998-2003. In addition, two grants had instances of theft and fraud, and the accountability of almost all of the grants was potentially compromised by fraud in the American Samoa Government’s Office of Procurement. The single audit reports for fiscal years 1998-2001 cited pervasive governmentwide and program-specific accountability problems. Examples of theft or fraud are as follows: In May 2004, the Chief Procurement Officer of the American Samoa Government was found guilty of illegal procurement practices. These challenges included a shortage of adequately trained professionals, such as accountants and teachers, as well as inadequate facilities and limited local funds. To improve fiscal accountability of federal grants to American Samoa, we recommend that the Secretary coordinate with other federal awarding agencies to designate the American Samoa government as a high-risk grantee, according to the Grants Management Common Rule, at least until it has completed all overdue single audits; take steps designed to ensure that the American Samoa government completes its overdue single audits in compliance with the Single Audit Act; and take steps designed to ensure that current and future single audits are completed in compliance with Single Audit Act requirements. Delegate from American Samoa, we (1) examined the uses of key federal grants to American Samoa, (2) identified local conditions that affected the grants, and (3) assessed accountability for the grants. Examining the Uses of Key Federal Grants
To examine the uses of key federal grants to American Samoa, we collected and reviewed grant data from the federal and local agencies responsible for overseeing the selected programs in fiscal years 1999-2003; interviewed federal and American Samoa program officials to obtain knowledge of program activity and operations; conducted site visits to observe programs and projects funded by federal grants; and compared data in single audit reports for fiscal years 1998-2001 with agency data for selected grants and background on total federal grants reported by the American Samoa government. Territorial Highway subprogram. Early Childhood Education, the territory’s only Head Start grantee, is part of the American Samoa Department of Education. | Why GAO Did This Study
American Samoa, a U.S. territory, relies on federal funding to support government operations and deliver critical services. The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility for coordinating federal policy in the territory. Under the Single Audit Act of 1996, American Samoa is required to perform a yearly single audit of federal grants and other awards to ensure accountability. To better understand the role of federal funds in American Samoa, GAO (1) examined the uses of 12 key grants in fiscal years 1999-2003, (2) identified local conditions that affected the grants, and (3) assessed accountability for the grants.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 1999-2003, 12 key federal grants supported essential services in American Samoa. These services included support for government operations, infrastructure improvements, nutrition assistance, the school system, special education, airport and highway infrastructure improvements, Medicaid, and early childhood education. A shortage of adequately trained professionals, such as accountants and teachers, as well as inadequate facilities and limited local funds hampered service delivery or slowed project completion for many of the grants. For example, American Samoa's only hospital lacked an adequate number of U.S.-certified medical staff. Further, the hospital had persistent and serious fire-safety code deficiencies that jeopardized its ability to maintain the certification required for Medicaid funding. American Samoa's failure to complete single audits, federal agencies' slow reactions to this failure, and instances of theft and fraud limited accountability for the 12 grants to American Samoa. The American Samoa government did not comply with the Single Audit Act during fiscal years 1998-2003. The 1998-2000 audit reports, completed in 2003, and the 2001 audit report, completed in 2004, cited pervasive governmentwide and program-specific accountability problems. Despite the audits' delinquency, federal agencies were slow, or failed, to communicate concern to the American Samoa government or to take corrective action. In addition, accountability for all of the grants was potentially undermined by instances of theft and fraud. For example, the American Samoa Chief Procurement Officer, whose office handles procurements for most of the grants GAO reviewed, was convicted of illegal procurement practices. |
gao_T-AIMD-97-84 | gao_T-AIMD-97-84_0 | In 1996, when we last looked at this data, 8 states had biennial legislative cycles and hence necessarily biennial budget cycles.As the table below shows, the 42 states with annual legislative cycles present a mixed picture in terms of budget cycles: 27 describe their budget cycles as annual, 12 describe their budget cycles as biennial, and 3 describe their budget cycles as mixed. Perhaps most significant is the fact that most states that describe their budget cycles as biennial or mixed are small and medium sized. Of the 10 largest states in terms of general fund expenditures, Ohio is the only one with an annual legislative cycle and a biennial budget. In addition, the Ohio legislature typically passes a “budget corrections bill.”
A few preliminary observations can be made from looking at the explicit design of those states that describe their budget cycles as “mixed” and the practice of those that describe their budget cycles as “biennial.” Different items are treated differently. In general, budgeting for those items that are predictable is different from budgeting for those items subject to great volatility whether due to the economy or changes in federal policy. Existing provisions of law requiring GAO to assist the Congress are sufficiently broad to encompass requests such as those envisioned in Section 8 of S. 261. The bill explicitly modifies the rules for the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) scorecard in the Senate by specifying three time periods during which deficit neutrality is required: the biennium covered by the budget resolution, the first 6 years covered by the budget resolution, and the 4 fiscal years after those first 6 years. S. 261 makes a number of changes to GPRA—most designed to make the requirements of GPRA consistent with the proposed biennial budget cycle, but others that seek to make substantive revisions to GPRA. Other changes in timelines proposed in S. 261 also appear consistent with GPRA requirements. S.261 also proposes several substantive changes to GPRA, including revised requirements for agency performance plans and new requirements for preliminary agency performance plans and governmentwide performance reports. This bill proposes adding several new requirements to the annual agency performance plans currently required by GPRA beyond changing them to a biennial cycle, including (1) adding an executive summary focusing on the most important goals of an agency, but limited to a maximum of 10 goals and (2) requiring that the Congress be consulted during the preparation of these plans. The bill also adds a new reporting requirement for draft preliminary performance plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the provisions of S. 261, focusing on: (1) state experiences with biennial budgeting; and (2) provisions regarding GAO, the Budget Enforcement Act, and the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1996, when GAO last looked at this data, 8 states had biennial legislative cycles and hence necessarily biennial budget cycles; (2) the 42 states with annual legislative cycles present a mixed picture in terms of budget cycles; (3) 27 describe their budget cycles as annual, 12 describe their budget cycles as biennial, and 3 describe their budget cycles as mixed; (4) perhaps significant is the fact that most states that describe their budget cycles as biennial or mixed are small and medium sized; (5) of the 10 largest states in terms of general fund expenditures, Ohio is the only with an annual legislative cycle and a biennial budget; (6) a few preliminary observations can be made from looking at the explicit design of those states which describe their budget cycle as "mixed" and the practice of those which describe their budget cycle as "biennial"; (7) in general, budgeting for those items which are predictable is different than for those items subject to great volatility whether due to the economy or changes in federal policy; (8) existing provisions of law requiring GAO to assist the Congress are sufficiently broad to encompass requests such as those envisioned in Section 8 of S. 261; (9) the bill explicitly modifies the rules for the pay-as-you-go scorecard in the Senate by specifying three time periods during which deficit neutrality is required: (a) the biennium covered by the budget resolution; (b) the first 6 years covered by the budget resolution; and (c) the 4 fiscal years after those first six; (10) S. 261 makes a number of changes to GPRA, most designed to make the requirements of GPRA consistent with the proposed biennial budget cycle, but others which seek to make substantive revisions to GPRA; (11) other changes in timelines proposed in S. 261 also appear consistent with GPRA requirements; (12) S. 261 also proposes several substantive changes to GPRA, including revised requirements for agency performance plans and new requirements for preliminary agency performance plans and governmentwide performance reports; (13) this bill proposes adding several new requirements to the annual agency performance plans currently required by GPRA beyond changing them to a biennial cycle, including: (a) adding an executive summary focusing on the most important goals of an agency, but limited to a maximum of 10 goals; and (b) requiring that the Congress be consulted during the preparation of these plans; and (14) the bill also adds a new reporting requirement for draft performance plans. |
gao_GAO-11-486T | gao_GAO-11-486T_0 | Then, in accordance with its regulations, Labor calculates the prevailing wage by determining if the same wage rate is paid to the majority (more than 50 percent) of workers employed in a specific job classification on similar projects in the area. Recent Efforts to Improve Data Collection and Processing Have Not Yet Addressed Key Issues with Survey Quality
Labor has taken several steps over the last few years to address issues with its Davis-Bacon wage surveys. Officials said completing these surveys will allow them to focus on more recent surveys. For highway surveys, Labor officials said they began using certified payrolls as the primary data source because certified payrolls provide accurate and reliable wage information and eliminate the need for Labor to verify wage data reported in surveys. However, while it is too early to fully assess the effects of Labor’s 2009 actions, our review found that changes to data collection and processing may not achieve expected results. Beyond concerns with processes and timelines, we also found that critical problems with Labor’s wage survey methodology continue to hinder its survey quality. 1).24, 25 Moreover, in 1997, Labor’s OIG reported that issuing rates by county may cause wage decisions to be based on an inadequate number of responses. In the four surveys we reviewed, more than one-quarter of the wage rates were based on data reported for six or fewer workers (see fig. 2). Contractors may lack the necessary resources, may not understand the purpose of the survey, or may not see the point in responding because they believe the prevailing wages issued by Labor are inaccurate, stakeholders told us. Both contractor associations and union officials said improving transparency in how the published wage rates are set could enhance understanding of the process and result in greater participation in the survey. Conclusions and Recommendations
While Labor has made some changes to improve the wage determination process, further steps are needed to address longstanding issues with the quality of wage determinations and enhance their transparency. In our report, we suggested that Congress consider amending its requirement that Labor issue wage rates by civil subdivision to provide the agency with more flexibility. To improve the quality and timeliness of the wage surveys, we recommended that Labor enlist an independent statistical organization to evaluate and provide objective advice on the survey, including its methods and design; the potential for conducting a sample survey instead of a census survey; the collection, processing, tracking and analysis of data; and the promotion of survey awareness. We also recommended that Labor take steps to improve the transparency of its wage determinations, which could encourage greater participation in its survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of Labor's (Labor) procedures for determining prevailing wage rates under the Davis-Bacon Act. Davis-Bacon wages must be paid to workers on certain federally funded construction projects, and their vulnerability to the use of inaccurate data has long been an issue for Congress, employers, and workers. More recently, the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, focused attention on the need for accurate and timely wage determinations, with more than $300 billion estimated to provide substantial funding for, among other things, federally funded building and infrastructure work potentially subject to Davis-Bacon wage rates. In the 1990s, we issued two reports that found process changes were needed to increase confidence that wage rates were based on accurate data. A third report found that changes then planned by Labor, if successfully implemented, had the potential to improve the wage determination process. However, in 2004, Labor's Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that wage data errors and the timeliness of surveys used to gather wage information from contractors and others, continued to be issues. The testimony will discuss (1) the extent to which Labor has addressed concerns regarding the quality of the Davis-Bacon wage determination process and (2) additional issues identified by stakeholders regarding the wage determination process. This testimony is based on our recently issued report, titled "Davis-Bacon Act: Methodological Changes Needed to Improve Wage Survey."
What GAO Found
In summary, we found that recent efforts to improve the Davis-Bacon wage survey have not yet addressed key issues with survey quality, such as the representativeness and sufficiency of survey data collected. Labor has made some data collection and processing changes; however, we found some surveys initiated under these changes were behind Labor's processing schedule. Stakeholders said contractors may not participate in the survey because they do not understand its purpose or do not believe the resultant prevailing wages are fully accurate. In addition, they said addressing a lack of transparency in how the published wage rates are set could result in a better understanding of the process and greater participation in the survey. We suggest Congress consider amending its requirement that Labor issue wage rates by civil subdivision to allow more flexibility. To improve the quality and timeliness of the Davis-Bacon wage surveys, we recommend Labor obtain objective expert advice on its survey design and methodology. We also recommend Labor take steps to improve the transparency of its wage determinations. |
gao_GAO-13-755 | gao_GAO-13-755_0 | Background
A long-standing challenge for federal agencies has been developing credible and effective performance management systems that can serve as a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve results. The GEAR Framework Generally Addresses Key Performance Management Practices; Refinements Could Improve Future Government-wide Implementation
The GEAR Framework Generally Addresses Key Performance Management Practices
We have previously identified a set of key practices for modern, effective performance management, which appear with summary descriptions in table 1. OPM has taken several steps to help the pilot agencies implement GEAR. However, beyond its completion in September 2013, the CHCO Council has no stated plans to update the toolkit, such as collecting lessons learned on an ongoing basis from the pilot agencies, or including additional promising practices as needed. While the toolkit shows promise for refining the future implementation of GEAR, its utility in this regard could be limited because neither the CHCO Council nor OPM have stated plans to broadly disseminate it. Pilot Agencies Adopted Various Approaches to Implementing GEAR; Opportunities Exist to Capture Lessons Learned
Pilot Agencies Adopted Various Approaches to Implementing GEAR
The five pilot agencies adopted various approaches to implementing all five of the GEAR recommendations based on their needs and available resources. Thus, three of the five agencies – DOE, HUD, and OPM – implemented GEAR agency-wide, while two agencies – Coast Guard and NCA– established pilots in single units. Early stakeholder involvement with employees, management, executive team and unions resulted in greater transparency and fewer obstacles during implementation. Administer employee surveys prior to implementation to identify the greatest needs and to establish a baseline to better track results. Each of the pilot agencies developed a GEAR project plan that outlined specific actions. For example, DOE’s GEAR project plan was the most thoroughly documented of the five plans we assessed and included project planning best practices for all five elements we assessed. The other four agency plans did not include all project planning best practices. Recommendations for Executive Action
Recognizing that moving toward a more performance-oriented culture within federal agencies is likely to be a continuous effort and to ensure that the opportunity GEAR recommendations offer to improve performance management is not lost, we recommend the Acting Director of OPM, in collaboration with the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, define roles and responsibilities of OPM, the CHCO Council, and participating federal agencies going forward as the GEAR framework is implemented government-wide. In addition, to improve agencies’ GEAR implementation plans, we recommend that: the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following two actions to update the agency’s GEAR implementation plan to include: (1) performance measures that permit comparison between desired outcomes and actual results and (2) additional information on schedules that are linked to specific actions; the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development take the following two actions to update the agency’s GEAR implementation plan to: (1) include objectives describing the goals the agency plans to achieve and (2) identify roles and responsibilities for specific actions and stakeholders; the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs take the following three actions to update the National Cemetery Administration’s GEAR implementation plan to include: (1) performance measures that permit comparison between desired outcomes and actual results, (2) additional information on roles and responsibilities for specific actions and stakeholders, and (3) additional information on schedules that are linked to specific actions; and the Acting Director of OPM to take the following two actions to update the agency’s GEAR implementation plan to: (1) include objectives describing the goals the agency plans to achieve and (2) identify roles and responsibilities for specific actions and stakeholders. In their written responses, OPM, DHS, and VA officials agreed with our recommendations. APPENDIX I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) analyzes how the Goals-Engagement-Accountability- Results (GEAR) framework addresses key practices for effective performance management and identifies opportunities, if any, to improve GEAR implementation government-wide; (2) describes the status of each pilot agency’s GEAR implementation and any lessons learned to date; and (3) assesses the extent to which each agency’s GEAR implementation plan includes selected best practices for project planning. The GEAR framework is currently being piloted in five departments and agencies – the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security/United States Coast Guard (DHS/Coast Guard), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Veterans Affairs/National Cemetery Administration (VA/NCA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). VA officials project the implementation to be complete by 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
A longstanding challenge for federal agencies has been developing credible and effective performance management systems that can serve as a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve results. In 2011, various federal agencies, labor unions, and other organizations developed the Goals-Engagement-Accountability-Results (GEAR) framework to help improve performance management.
GAO was asked to evaluate GEAR. This report (1) analyzes how the GEAR framework addresses key practices for effective performance management and identifies opportunities to improve GEAR implementation government-wide; (2) describes the status of GEAR implementation at pilot agencies and lessons learned to date; and (3) assesses the extent to which each pilot agency's GEAR implementation plan includes selected best practices for project planning. The report is based on GAO's analysis of GEAR documents, agency project plans, and interviews with agency officials.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the GEAR framework generally addresses previously identified key practices for effective performance management, such as aligning individual performance expectations with organizational goals, but refinements could improve future government-wide implementation. Five federal agencies are piloting GEAR--the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security/Coast Guard (DHS/Coast Guard), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Veterans Affairs/National Cemetery Administration (VA/NCA), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)--with the intention to expand GEAR government-wide. The Chief Human Capital Officers Council (CHCO Council) is developing a toolkit based, among other things, on the experience of the pilot agencies. The toolkit is intended to help additional agencies implement the GEAR framework; CHCO Council representatives expect the toolkit to be complete by the end of September 2013. However, beyond the toolkit, neither the CHCO Council nor OPM have identified next steps to implement GEAR government-wide, such as identifying roles and responsibilities. Further, neither OPM nor the CHCO Council has plans to regularly update the GEAR framework or toolkit to include additional lessons learned, or to make such information available more broadly to key stakeholders, such as human resource professionals who may be responsible for future implementation. Without taking these steps, agencies that have already begun implementing GEAR risk losing their momentum; in addition, it may be challenging to implement GEAR government-wide.
The five pilot agencies adopted various approaches to implementing GEAR -DOE, HUD, and OPM implemented GEAR agency-wide, while Coast Guard and NCA adopted GEAR in single units - based on agency needs, available resources, and GAO's lessons learned to date. For example, early stakeholder involvement, including engagement between those representing labor and management, resulted in greater transparency and fewer obstacles. In addition, administering employee surveys to identify the greatest needs before implementing GEAR helped establish a baseline to better track results.
Each of the pilot agencies developed a GEAR project plan that outlined specific actions. DOE's GEAR plan was the most thoroughly documented. The other four agency plans did not include all project planning best practices. Without these elements, agencies may be limited in their ability to determine what needs to be done, when it should be done, who should do it, and how to measure progress towards achieving objectives.
What GAO Recommends
As GEAR is adopted government-wide, GAO recommends that the Director of OPM, in collaboration with the CHCO Council, define roles and responsibilities for OPM, the CHCO Council, and individual agencies, in such areas as updating the toolkit (as needed) and disseminating information on GEAR more broadly. GAO also recommends that OPM, Coast Guard, HUD, and NCA update their GEAR project plans to be consistent with best practices for project planning. OPM, DHS, HUD, and VA agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-122 | gao_GAO-02-122_0 | We also statistically controlled for the state in which counties are located. State Differences Accounted for More Variation in Uncounted Presidential Votes Than Voting Equipment and Demographic Variables Combined
We next determined the incremental effects of voting equipment, county demographics, and state differences on counties’ percentage of uncounted presidential votes. Differences across states were of considerable importance in determining the prevalence of uncounted presidential votes and accounted for more of the variability (26 percent) in uncounted presidential votes across counties than demographic characteristics and type of voting equipment used combined. The following factors for which we had no data are among those that may have contributed to differences among states: 1. voter education efforts, such as making sample ballots available prior 2. the use of straight party ballots that enable voters to make one entry to cast votes for all offices on the ballot; 3. the number of candidates on the ballot (including presidential, gubernatorial, or congressional candidates); 4. the number of provisional ballots cast, and percentage of provisional ballots that were not counted; and 5. the extent to which absentee and/or early voting occurred and if such ballots were counted using a different voting equipment than ballots cast on election day. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the 2000 presidential election, concerns were raised about the election process, including the ability of some voting equipment to render a complete and accurate vote count. Furthermore, minorities and disadvantaged voters were seen as more likely to have their votes not counted because they may have used less reliable voting equipment than affluent white voters.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although the state in which counties are located had more of an effect on the number of uncounted presidential votes than did counties' demographic characteristics or voting equipment, there were statistically significant effects on uncounted presidential votes. State differences accounted for 26 percent of the total variation in uncounted presidential votes across counties. State differences may have included such factors as statewide voter education efforts, state standards for determining what is a valid vote, the use of straight party ballots, the number of candidates on the ballot, the use of provisional ballots, and the extent to which absentee or early voting occurred. |
gao_T-RCED-97-218 | gao_T-RCED-97-218_0 | The United States’ share was about $174 million, or about 25 percent of the total. The United States’ share of the new assessment is about $39 million for each of these 3 years. We estimate that based on current U.S. Treasury borrowing rates and the Fund’s general practice for cashing the notes over time, the U.S. government could save between $2 million and $3 million on each of its annual contributions to the Multilateral Fund by using the promissory notes. Multilateral Fund Recipients
Since the establishment of the Multilateral Fund in 1991 through May 1997, the Fund’s Executive Committee has approved a total of 1,810 projects in more than 100 countries and allocated about $570 million to fund these projects. China has been the Fund’s largest recipient with almost $150 million, or 26 percent, of all approved funding. Purposes for Which the Multilateral Fund Has Been Used
There are seven broad purposes or categories for which the projects have been funded: (1) country program preparation, (2) institutional strengthening, (3) technical assistance, (4) training, (5) demonstration projects, (6) project preparation, and (7) investment projects. Accomplishments in Phasing Out Ozone-Depleting Substances
When fully implemented, projects approved to date are expected to phase out the annual use of almost 84,000 metric tons of ozone-depleting potential. This is about 40 percent of the estimated ODP-weighted consumption of ozone-depleting substances in Article 5 countries. Mechanisms to Ensure the Proper Use of Funds
The Multilateral Fund has a number of mechanisms in place that are designed to ensure that funds are properly accounted for and that the amount of funds allocated to specific projects is reviewed and verified. Administrative Support Costs Paid to the Implementing Agencies
In addition to funds allocated for projects of various types, the Multilateral Fund pays the implementing agencies for administrative support costs associated with project implementation. In November 1996, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol directed the Executive Committee to work toward the goal, over the next 3 years, of reducing agency support costs to an average of below 10 percent to make more funds available for other activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund, focusing on: (1) principal contributors to the Fund; (2) principal recipients of disbursements made from the Fund; (3) the purposes for which disbursements were made; (4) what has been accomplished with these disbursements; and (5) the controls and accountability mechanisms in place to ensure proper use of money disbursed from the Fund.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the United States is the largest contributor to the Multilateral Fund, accounting for about 25 percent of the contributions; (2) for 1997 through 1999, the United States is expected to contribute about $39 million per year; (3) GAO estimates that the United States could avoid interest expenses of between $2 million and $3 million associated with its annual contributions by using an alternative payment method; (4) from its establishment in 1991 through May 1997, the Multilateral Fund has allocated about $570 million for projects in more than 100 Article 5 countries; (5) China has been the largest recipient, accounting for almost $150 million or 26 percent of the total; (6) there are seven broad purposes for which projects have been funded, but over 80 percent of the funds have been for investment projects, which help businesses to convert their operations from the use of ozone-depleting substances and to cease the production of goods containing them; (7) projects approved to date are projected to phase out the annual use of about 84,000 ozone-depleting potential-weighted metric tons of ozone-depleting substances, or about 40 percent of the estimated consumption of ozone-depleting substances, in Article 5 countries; (8) the Multilateral Fund has a number of mechanisms in place that are designed to ensure that funds are properly accounted for and that the amounts of funds allocated to specific projects are reviewed and verified; (9) the Multilateral Fund currently pays a 13-percent administrative fee to the implementing agencies for their costs associated with project implementation; and (10) however, efforts are under way to evaluate the appropriateness of the fees, with the goal of reducing the support costs to about 10 percent over the next 3 years. |
gao_GAO-10-480 | gao_GAO-10-480_0 | The Army transferred $2.1 billion out of AWCF during the 25 months to pay for unfunded operational expenses associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom. Billions of Dollars Transferred out of AWCF Did Not Result in a Cash Balance below the Minimum Cash Requirement Except for a 6-Month Period
To fund other critical Army requirements, or as directed by Congress, the Army transferred $4.8 billion out of AWCF from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2009. 3). 3). For Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, AWCF- Projected Monthly Cash Balances Generally Exceed the Minimum Cash Requirement
Our analysis of the AWCF fiscal year 2011 budget and cash plan showed that the projected monthly cash balances are expected to generally exceed the minimum cash requirement for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 under the Army’s assumptions. However, using the current DOD guidance, our analysis shows that the Army’s projected cash balance is expected to be above the minimum cash requirement for 22 out of 24 months. The actions are (1) limiting the AWCF Supply Management Activity Group’s obligations to less than the total amount of inventory sold to customers, (2) reducing the AWCF industrial operations’ inventory, (3) collecting funds from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for consumable inventory items transferred from AWCF to DLA, and (4) retaining the AWCF’s accumulated gains instead of returning the amounts to customers. These actions are discussed below. While the Army does not expect a cash shortfall in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 due primarily to an increase in military build-up activities (sending more troops to Afghanistan), a cash shortfall may occur if (1) the Supply Management Activity Group’s sales are significantly lower than the wartime assumptions, or (2) the Army’s management actions to improve the AWCF cash position are not implemented and monitored effectively. Further, the relevant DOD Financial Management Regulation lacks sufficient clarity to determine the appropriate level of inventory to be held at industrial operations activities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) monthly cash balances fell within Department of Defense’s (DOD) cash requirements for fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2009, we (1) obtained the DOD regulation on calculating the minimum and maximum cash requirements, (2) calculated the cash requirements for the period based on the regulation, and (3) obtained monthly cash balances for the period. To determine whether the cash transfers for fiscal years 2000 through 2009 resulted in the AWCF’s monthly cash balances falling below the minimum cash requirement, we (1) analyzed DOD budget and accounting reports to determine the dollar amount of transfers made for the period, and (2) obtained journal vouchers from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service that documented the dollar amount of the cash transfers. Most of the financial information in this report was obtained from official Army budget documents and accounting reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) collected over $16 billion for goods and services provided to customers in fiscal year 2009. Cash generated from sales is used by AWCF to cover its expenses such as paying employees. In light of the Army's changing role in the Middle East, GAO was asked to determine whether (1) AWCF's monthly cash balances fell within the Department of Defense's (DOD) cash requirements for fiscal years 2000 through 2009, (2) the cash transfers resulted in AWCF's monthly cash balances falling below the minimum amount required by DOD, and (3) the AWCF's projected monthly cash balances are expected to fall below DOD's minimum cash requirement for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 and actions the Army can take to manage those balances. To address these objectives, GAO (1) reviewed relevant DOD guidance, (2) obtained and analyzed AWCF budget and accounting reports containing cash information, and (3) interviewed DOD and Army officials.
What GAO Found
GAO analysis showed that the AWCF monthly cash balance fluctuated significantly between fiscal years 2000 and 2009 and exceeded the maximum cash requirement prescribed by DOD regulation for 94 out of 120 months. The fluctuations were due to differences between receipts and disbursements, including the (1) receipt of collections from AWCF operations, (2) appropriations received in support of the wars, (3) disbursements made to pay for AWCF expenses, and (4) transfers made to fund other Army requirements. The Army transferred $4.8 billion out of AWCF from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. Most of the transfers funded requirements of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, or military personnel costs. These transfers helped to reduce the cash balance, but also resulted in the AWCF cash falling below the minimum cash requirement for a 6-month period in fiscal year 2006. GAO analysis of the AWCF fiscal year 2011 budget and cash plan showed that the projected monthly cash balances for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 would exceed DOD's minimum cash requirement for 22 out of 24 months. While the Army does not expect a cash shortfall due primarily to an increase in military build-up activities in Afghanistan, a cash shortfall may occur if certain Army actions are not implemented and monitored effectively. These actions include (1) reducing AWCF obligations to less than the amount of inventory sold, (2) collecting funds from Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for inventory items transferred from AWCF to DLA, and (3) reducing the amount of inventory at industrial operations activities. Further, the relevant DOD Financial Management Regulation lacks sufficient clarity to determine the appropriate level of inventory to be held at these activities. |
gao_GAO-04-483T | gao_GAO-04-483T_0 | Specifically, this program is to include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; risk-based policies and procedures that cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each information system; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems; security awareness training for agency personnel, including contractors and other users of information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. OMB’s Report to Congress Notes Progress and Challenges
In its FY 2003 Report to Congress on Federal Government Information Security Management, published this month, OMB concludes that the federal government has made significant strides in identifying and addressing long-standing problems, but that challenging weaknesses remain. The report also presents a plan of action that OMB is pursuing with agencies to close these gaps and improve the security of federal information and systems. This plan is intended to resolve information and security challenges through both management and budgetary processes. 2. 3. 4. The report emphasizes that even with the strong focus of both GISRA and FISMA on the responsibilities of agency officials regarding security, there continues to be a lack of understanding, and therefore, accountability within the federal government. FISMA Reports Highlight Overall Increases in Performance Measures, But Individual Agency Results Vary Widely
Overall, fiscal year 2003 data reported by the agencies for a subset of OMB’s performance measures show increasing numbers of systems meeting the requirements represented by these measures. For example, as shown in table 1, the reported percentage of systems authorized for processing following certification and accreditation increased from 47 percent for fiscal year 2002 to 62 percent for fiscal year 2003—an increase of 15 percentage points. Also as discussed later, we noted opportunities to improve the usefulness of agency-reported data. However, according to their fiscal year 2003 FISMA reports, only 13 of the 24 agencies reported that they had completed their system inventories. Performance measurement data are reported on the total number of agency systems and do not indicate the relative importance or risk of the systems for which FISMA requirements have been met. Status of NIST Efforts
Since FISMA was enacted in December 2002, NIST has taken a number of actions to develop required security-related standards and guidance. Current budget constraints may, however, affect NIST’s future work. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, GAO has reported on the widespread negative impact of poor information security within federal agencies and has identified it as a governmentwide high-risk issue since 1997. Legislation designed to improve information security was enacted in October 2000. It was strengthened in December 2002 by new legislation, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), which incorporated important new requirements. This testimony discusses (1) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) recent report to the Congress required by FISMA on the government's overall information security posture, (2) the reported status of efforts by 24 of the largest agencies to implement federal information security requirements, (3) opportunities for improving the usefulness of performance measurement data, and (4) progress by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop related standards and guidance.
What GAO Found
OMB reports significant strides in addressing long-standing problems, but at the same time cites challenging weaknesses that remain. One governmentwide weakness OMB emphasizes is a lack of understanding--and therefore accountability--on the part of agency officials regarding their responsibilities for ensuring the security of information and systems. The report presents a plan of action to close these gaps through both management and budgetary processes. Fiscal year 2003 FISMA data showed that, overall, the 24 federal agencies reported increasing numbers of their systems met the information security requirements represented by key OMB performance measures. For example, of the total number of systems reported by these agencies, the reported number assessed for risk climbed from 65 percent to 78 percent, those having a contingency plan jumped from 55 to 68 percent, and those authorized for processing following certification and accreditation rose from 47 to 62 percent. However, reported results varied widely among individual agencies, with some reporting that less than half of their systems met certain requirements. Further, GAO noted opportunities to improve the usefulness of reported performance management data, including independent validation of these data and completion of system inventories. Reported Performance Measurement Data for Selected Information Security Requirements for 24 Large Federal Agencies NIST made progress in developing security-related standards and guidance required by FISMA. These include standards to categorize systems according to potential impact in the event of a security breach and recommended controls for such systems. However, according to NIST, current and future funding constraints could threaten its information security work. |
gao_GAO-10-525 | gao_GAO-10-525_0 | The Recovery Act also made two additional funding modifications to TANF, as well as a temporary modification to the caseload reduction credit. National Work Participation Rates Changed Little after DRA, and States’ Rates Reflected Both Recipients’ Work Participation and States’ Policy Choices
Nationally, the proportion of families receiving TANF cash assistance who met their individual work requirements by participating in one of 12 work activities for a minimum number of hours each week changed little after DRA, as did the types of work activities in which they most frequently participated. For example, among families that met their work requirements, the majority participated in unsubsidized employment in the years both before and after DRA. State and Local Off Reported That the Economic Recess Decreased TANF Resources and Challenge TANF Service Delivery
Due to the economic recession, many states have faced large budget deficits in 2009 and 2010 that have required states to make difficult budget decisions about the use of state resources for TANF programs. Most States Have Applied for Recovery Act TANF Funds, Which They Are Using Primarily to Maintain Their Programs
In response to the recent economic recession, the Recovery Act’s $5 billion Emergency Contingency Fund for state TANF programs has provided additional federal funding to qualifying state TANF programs that have had increases in the number of families receiving cash assistance or in two specific types of expenditures. Some states have also used Recovery Act TANF funds to expand existing or create new programs or services for low-income families, including short-term, nonrecurrent benefits and subsidized employment positions. While most states reported that HHS assistance with applying for and utilizing Recovery Act TANF funds had been useful, some expressed frustration with the amount of time it had taken to receive guidance and responses to questions. Finally, states also reported concerns about the expiration date for the Emergency Contingency Fund, which is currently September 30, 2010. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain information about changes to state Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs after the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), economic recession, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), we reviewed available TANF data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance, work participation rates, federal and state expenditures, and states’ applications for the Emergency Contingency Fund for state TANF programs; conducted a nationwide survey of state TANF administrators; visited three states and selected localities within each state and interviewed officials administering TANF; interviewed officials from HHS and reviewed pertinent federal laws, regulations, and agency guidance; and interviewed researchers knowledgeable about TANF from a range of organizations. The survey included questions about: changes made to TANF programs and policies since DRA, challenges related to complying with DRA, cash assistance programs funded with solely state funds, use of the Emergency Contingency Fund for state TANF programs, changes to TANF service delivery related to the economic recession, and HHS assistance to states after DRA and the Recovery Act. Appendix II: Numbers of TANF Families Meeting Work Requirements in Recent Years
Appendix III: Factors Affecting States’ Ability to Meet Work Participation Rates
As discussed in this report, each state’s ability to meet the required work participation rates reflects not only the number of its TANF families sufficiently engaged in countable work activities, but also changes in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance in the state, and the state’s policy choices that (1) lower their required work participation rates, (2) keep working families in the calculation of their rates, and (3) remove certain families from the calculation of these rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) reauthorized the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant and made modifications expected to strengthen work requirements for families receiving cash assistance through state TANF programs. Both the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and states were required to take steps to implement these changes. Work participation rates, or the proportion of families receiving TANF cash assistance that participated in work activities, are the key performance measure HHS uses to assess state TANF programs. In response to the economic recession that began in 2007, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), provided additional TANF funding to eligible states and made additional modifications to TANF. GAO examined (1) How did DRA affect state TANF programs, including work participation rates? (2) How has the recent economic recession affected state TANF programs? (3) How did the Recovery Act affect state TANF programs? To address these questions, GAO analyzed federal TANF data, as well as relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed HHS officials; surveyed all state TANF administrators; and conducted site visits to meet with state and local officials in Florida, Ohio, and Oregon. GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Nationally, TANF work participation rates changed little after DRA was enacted, though states' rates reflect both recipients' work participation and states' policy choices. Although federal law generally requires that a minimum of 50 percent of families receiving TANF cash assistance in each state participate in work activities, both before and after DRA, about one-third of TANF families nationwide met their work requirements. However, after DRA, many states were able to meet federally required work participation rates because of additional factors. For example, 29 states funded cash assistance for certain families that may be less likely to meet the work requirements with state dollars unconnected to the TANF program, as this removed these families from the rate calculation. Further, DRA required other changes to state TANF programs, and states reported challenges with some of DRA's changes to the TANF work rules, such as verifying participants' actual work hours. From the beginning of the economic recession, in December 2007, to September 2009, the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance, particularly two-parent families, increased in the majority of states but went down in others. At the same time, many states have faced budget deficits and difficult decisions about the use of state resources for TANF programs. Thirty-one states reported that budget constraints led to changes in local TANF service delivery, such as reductions in available services and the number of staff. Forty-six states have applied for the Recovery Act's Emergency Contingency Fund for state TANF programs since it was made available in 2009. More states reported using these funds to maintain their TANF programs rather than expand or create programs and services. Some states reported challenges accessing the funds. For example, some expressed frustration with the amount of time it has taken to receive guidance and responses to questions from HHS, particularly related to qualifying subsidized employment and short-term, nonrecurrent benefit expenditures. State officials also expressed concern about the September 30, 2010, expiration date for the Recovery Act TANF funds. |
gao_GAO-12-506 | gao_GAO-12-506_0 | Background
USPS’s current field-office structure includes 7 area offices and 67 district offices. Mail-processing network: USPS plans to downsize its mail- processing network and reduce costs in its transportation network for potential savings of $4.1 billion annually beginning in 2016.this effort, USPS anticipates closing or consolidating about half of its mail-processing facilities and reducing the number of its employees. As part of this effort, USPS plans to eliminate and consolidate approximately 20,000 out of its 144,000 city routes. Since 2006, USPS has taken several actions to reduce its costs by improving the operational efficiency of its mail-processing network. Area and district employees have key roles in realigning city delivery routes. Revenue-Generating Efforts
As with USPS’s cost reduction efforts, area and district employees have a significant role in several aspects of USPS’s efforts to generate additional revenue through three of the Postmaster General’s four core business strategies: (1) strengthening the value of mail to businesses, (2) improving its retail customers’ experience, and (3) competing for the package business. Improving the retail customer experience means maintaining and growing the customer base through improved customer service. Overall, USPS reduced its field offices positions by 1,946, or 26 percent. Area and District Officials’ Concerns about the 2011 Consolidation
Concerns about the Ability to Carry Out Key USPS Efforts
Several area and district officials expressed concern about how staff reductions and the allocation of field resources could affect their ability to manage ongoing and planned cost-reduction and revenue-generation efforts. In particular, OIG officials told us that the document addresses recommendations to USPS to develop a plan which (1) periodically evaluates area and district offices for possible consolidation, (2) guides decisions on future field- office consolidations, and (3) considers factors such as an office’s mail volume, workload, and proximity to other offices. USPS’s December 2011 plan specifies that it will take numerous steps to evaluate field offices for possible consolidation, including: conducting periodic evaluations of area and district offices to assess the need for consolidations; developing a business case, which includes expected cost savings and benefits, for proposed field-office consolidations: using reliable data sources to evaluate area and district offices for adequately documenting all analyses and data used to make conducting post-consolidation reviews to identify key achievements and actual cost savings, and document lessons learned. According to headquarters officials, USPS does not plan to initiate these evaluations until after the completion of cost-reduction efforts in its retail, mail-processing, and delivery networks, efforts that USPS intends to complete in 2016. If USPS decides to move forward with future field-office evaluations, its plan for doing so should address past concerns about inadequate documentation and transparency and lead to postconsolidation reviews to assess lessons learned and to measure actual savings. USPS had no comments. According to USPS officials at the center, centralizing this work resulted in about $13 million in cost savings as of fiscal year 2011. Postal Service’s (USPS) cost-savings and revenue-generation efforts and (2) USPS’s actions to consolidate its field office structure in 2011 and the impact of these actions. To describe the role of field office employees in implementing USPS’s cost-savings and revenue-generation efforts, we reviewed USPS documents describing USPS’s strategic goals and the role of area and district employees in carrying out potential consolidations of retail, mail- processing, and delivery networks. To describe USPS’s actions to consolidate its area and district offices in 2011 and the impact of this consolidation we reviewed a 2010 OIG report on the 2009 consolidation, which included recommendations for USPS related to future field-office consolidation actions, and a variety of USPS documents, including USPS’s (1) statements on the expectations and goals for the 2011 consolidation, (2) 2011 Annual Report, (3) Form 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission on its 2011 Annual Report, (4) plan issued in December 2011 entitled Area and District Office Structure Evaluations Strategy, Policy and Process, and (5) 5-Year Business Plan issued in February 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS has lost $25.3 billion over the last 5 years and expects to lose another $83.2 billion through fiscal year 2016 unless it takes action to reduce its costs and improve its operational efficiency. USPS has cut costs in its retail, mail processing, and delivery networks, as well as in its field office structure, which includes 7 area offices and 67 district offices, and plans other cost-cutting actions throughout the organization. As requested, this report discusses (1) the role of area and district employees in implementing USPSs cost-savings and revenue-generation efforts and (2) USPSs actions to consolidate its field office structure in 2011, and the impact of this consolidation.
GAO analyzed USPS documents describing the role of field staff in carrying out USPSs cost-saving and revenue-generation efforts; information on the impact of the 2011 consolidation, including anticipated cost savings; and USPSs plan, issued in December 2011, for evaluating and implementing possible field office consolidations. GAO also interviewed USPS officials at headquarters and at four area and six district offices selected based on several factors, including geographic dispersion throughout the U.S.
What GAO Found
Field employees have key roles in the U.S. Postal Services (USPS) efforts to reduce costs and generate revenue. For example, these employees evaluate the feasibility of closing or consolidating facilities, such as post offices and mail- processing facilities; carry out the closures and consolidations of these facilities; and evaluate and consolidate delivery routes. These roles support USPSs plans to save, by 2016, about $9 billion annually by improving its operational efficiency and realigning its retail, mail processing, and delivery networks with declining mail use. These plans include evaluating about half of its approximately 31,000 post offices to identify cost-reduction opportunities, closing or reducing operations at about half of its 461 mail-processing facilities, and consolidating about 20,000 of its 144,000 city delivery routes. Area and district employees also have a significant role in USPSs efforts to generate additional revenue by (1) promoting the value of mail to businesses, (2) maintaining and increasing its customer base through customer service, and (3) growing the package business.
In 2011, USPS consolidated its field office structure by, among other actions, closing one area office and seven district offices and eliminating 1,946 positionsactions that it estimated would save about $150 million annually. However, several area and district officials expressed concern that this consolidation could lessen their ability to carry out ongoing and future cost-savings and revenue-generation initiatives, and to recruit and retain future managers. In December 2011, USPS issued a plan on how it would evaluate additional field offices for possible consolidation and address concerns that the USPS Office of Inspector General identified in past field office consolidations. These concerns included the need to develop a plan to guide future field office consolidations and to consider factors such as workload and proximity to other offices. According to USPS officials, the plan also addressed past concerns about inadequate documentation and transparency and will lead to post-consolidation reviews to assess lessons learned and measure actual savings. Although USPS has a plan to guide future consolidations, according to USPS officials, it does not plan additional field office consolidations until it has completed ongoing cost-reduction efforts in its retail, mail processing, and delivery networks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. USPS had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-02-57 | gao_GAO-02-57_0 | Background
The Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Act of 1997 established a program to provide assistance in securing federal contracts to small businesses located in HUBZones. The purpose of the HUBZone program is to increase employment opportunities, investment, and economic development in these areas. Reported HUBZone Program Contracting Achievements Are Inaccurate
The data that federal agencies reported on fiscal year 2000 HUBZone contracting achievements is significantly inaccurate. The inaccuracies were due to data entry errors and insufficient guidance for federal contracting personnel on how to complete the forms used to submit data to FPDC. First, there is a relatively small number of certified HUBZone firms. SBA cited a letter the agency sent to Senator Bond dated August 17, 2001, which states that there is parity between the 8(a) program and the HUBZone program, although “regulatory language could be read to give priority to awards to the 8(a) program over HUBZone awards.” We noted in our report that regulations allow contracting officer’s discretion in deciding on whether to use the 8(a) or HUBZone programs when awarding contracts. To determine whether federal agencies are having difficulty implementing the HUBZone program to award contracts to certified HUBZone firms, and if so, the reasons for the difficulty, we reviewed the HUBZone Act of 1997 and other pertinent legislation; and HUBZone program implementation guidance contained in Title 13, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 126 (13 CFR 126), contracting guidance contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR Chapter 1), and other relevant guidance issued by SBA, FPDC, and the ten program implementing agencies (listed in appendix I). Appendix II: Comments From the Small Business Administration | What GAO Found
Congress created the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program to stimulate economic development and create jobs in distressed urban and rural areas. To achieve these goals, the HUBZone program provides small businesses with greater access to federal contracting opportunities. Reported HUBZone program achievements for fiscal year 2000 were inaccurate because of data entry errors and insufficient guidance on how to report agency data. Federal agencies are having difficulty implementing the HUBZone program. The primary reasons that federal contracting personnel gave for not using the HUBZone program to award contracts were (1) the small number of Small Business Administration (SBA) certified HUBZone firms, (2) difficulty identifying certified firms with the capabilities needed by federal agencies, (3) SBA's guidance that emphasizes the 8(a) program over the HUBZone program, and (4) easier and quicker procedures to award contracts under the 8(a) program. |
gao_GAO-12-193 | gao_GAO-12-193_0 | Organization of IRS User Fees
IRS charges user fees for various services that assist taxpayers in complying with their tax liabilities, clarify the application of the tax code to particular circumstances, and ensure the quality of paid preparers of tax returns, among others. Each division provides at least one service to taxpayers for which it charges a fee. IRS User Fee Collections, Associated Service Volume, and Carryover Amounts Have Increased with Most of the Revenue Used to Fund Taxpayer Services
IRS User Fee Revenue and the Volume of User Fee Services Have Increased in Recent Years
In fiscal year 2010, IRS collected and retained $290 million in user fees and transferred an additional $62 million of user fee collections to the U.S. Treasury General Fund (General Fund). In fiscal year 2010, they accounted for approximately 68 percent ($198 million of $290 million) of IRS’s total retained user fee collections. IRS Reviews User Fees Biennially but Does Not Clearly Document Some Processes or Decisions
IRS Conducts a Biennial Review of User Fees and Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Cost Estimates
As directed by the CFO Act of 1990 and OMB Circular A-25, IRS conducts a general review of its user fees on a biennial basis. IRS has made efforts to improve its cost estimation process in support of its user fees, with particular attention given to its largest fee by amount collected. According to an IRS official, the cost estimate used to support the advance art determination letter user fee has not been reviewed or updated since fiscal year 1996 because of very low demand (fewer than 20 per year from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2010).also omitted from the biennial review the user fees for reproduction of tax returns and special statistical studies and compilations because it interpreted these fees as not being covered by the biennial review requirement. Assumptions Used to Estimate Cost of Some User Fee Programs Were Not Always Correct or Well Documented
According to IRS officials, the CFO’s office works closely with business divisions and program offices to develop cost estimates, provides guidance on data to include in the cost estimates, and develops Internal Revenue Manual guidelines to document IRS’s process for setting and reviewing user fees. IRS Does Not Always Document Factors Considered or Decisions Made during Biennial Review of Existing User Fee Rates
In setting user fee rates, IRS officials said they consider taxpayer burden, administrative costs, and potential effects on taxpayer compliance, among other factors, when determining whether to recover full cost. As described above, IRS officials consider factors other than cost recovery in setting fee rates. However, we found that IRS has not thoroughly documented these factors, corroborated anecdotal support with data analysis, or studied the effect of user fees on taxpayer behavior. assist staff in identifying potential new user fees. However, IRS may not be taking full advantage of its process for identifying new user fees. For example, officials in some divisions or offices said that they had no formal process for soliciting suggestions from employees on new user fee proposals. We were unable to determine the extent to which IRS staff considered these guidelines, and in our survey of division commissioners, we identified variation in the criteria considered across the operating divisions and offices. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following five actions to: Include certain fees in the biennial review that were previously omitted. Provide clear, specific, and direct guidelines for IRS employees and managers to follow in identifying potential fee opportunities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the types and amounts of user fees collected and how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collects and uses fees, (2) assess how IRS sets and reviews existing user fees, and (3) assess how IRS identifies additional areas where new user fees could be justified. To meet these objectives, we reviewed user fee legislation and guidance, agency and budget documents, literature on user fee design and implementation characteristics, and cost estimates for user fees that were included in IRS’s biennial review process. Income verification express service (IVES): This service provides 2- business-day processing and electronic delivery of tax return transcripts for users, such as mortgage lenders and other financial market entities, to confirm the income of a borrower (or taxpayer) during the processing of a loan application. IRS charges a user fee of $2.00 for each IVES transcript request. Installment agreement (IA): An IA is a payment option or payment plan that allows a taxpayer to pay his or her full tax liability with smaller monthly payments over a period of time for up to 60 months. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget proposal requests $13.6 billion to fund the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), including $204 million in spending funded through user fee collections. Well-designed and well-implemented user fees can reduce taxpayer burden by funding portions of IRS services that provide special benefits to users beyond what is normally provided to the public. As such, GAO was asked to (1) describe the types and amounts of IRS user fees and how IRS collects and uses them, (2) assess how IRS sets and reviews existing user fees, and (3) assess how IRS identifies additional areas where new fees could be justified. GAO reviewed relevant laws, guidance, and literature on user fee design and implementation. GAO reviewed IRS documents and cost estimates and interviewed IRS officials in the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) office and program divisions.
What GAO Found
Although user fee collections fund less than 2 percent of IRS's budget, fee collections are expected to reach $309 million in fiscal year 2012 and recently involved nearly 20 million transactions with taxpayers. IRS charges user fees for various activities that include assisting taxpayers in complying with their tax liabilities, clarifying the application of the tax code to particular circumstances, and ensuring the quality of paid preparers of tax returns, among others. In fiscal year 2010, two fees accounted for more than 80 percent of total retained user fee collections: (1) Installment agreements (IA): Provides taxpayers who cannot pay their full tax liability the option to pay their full tax liability with smaller monthly payments over a period of time for up to 60 months. This service is offered to most taxpayers for $105 with lower rates for low-income taxpayers and those who opt for a direct debit agreement. This service generated $198 million, or 68 percent of IRS's total retained user fee collections. (2) Income verification express services (IVES): Provides 2-business-day processing and electronic delivery of tax return transcripts for users, such as mortgage lenders and other financial market entities, to confirm the income of a borrower (taxpayer) during the processing of a loan application. IRS charged a fee of $2.25 for each IVES transcript request. This service generated $40 million, or 14 percent of total retained fee collections. IRS conducts a review of its user fees biennially (or every 2 years) and has taken steps to improve its estimates of the cost of providing its user fee services, with particular attention to its largest fee. For example, IRS hired a contractor to evaluate, update, and simplify the IA user fee cost estimate. However, for a few of IRS's smaller fee programs, GAO found that IRS omitted fees from its biennial review, did not clearly document assumptions to be used in some cost estimates, and lacked documentation of factors considered in setting some fees. For example, one user fee has not been reviewed or updated since fiscal year 1996, while program managers for another user fee were uncertain about salary assumptions. GAO also found that while officials stated that they consider factors other than cost (such as potential effects on taxpayer compliance and administrative burden) in setting fee rates, they did not thoroughly document these factors or corroborate anecdotal support with analysis. Finally, GAO found that IRS did not fully document final decisions made on fee rates as a result of its biennial review. IRS has implemented several new user fees in recent years, but it may not be taking full advantage of its process for identifying new user fees. As directed by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-25, IRS's CFO requests that each division review its programs and provide proposals for new user fees on a biennial basis. However, officials in some divisions or offices said that they had no formal solicitation process for employees to suggest new user fee proposals. Further, IRS does not clearly refer staff to consider established guidelines identified in the Internal Revenue Manual or other resources when identifying potential new user fees during its biennial review. GAO was unable to determine the extent to which IRS staff considered these guidelines.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take steps to include certain additional fees in IRS's biennial review, improve guidance on estimating costs of user fees, and improve the documentation of assumptions used, factors considered, and decisions made during the setting and reviewing of existing fees. In addition, steps should be taken to provide clear, specific, and direct guidelines for IRS employees and managers to follow in identifying potential new fee opportunities. In written comments, IRS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-69 | gao_GAO-07-69_0 | The U.S. government’s controls on the export of defense-related items are primarily divided between the departments of Commerce and State, with the assistance of the Department of Defense (DOD). Agency Processes Provide Limited Oversight of Export- Controlled Information and Rely on Companies for Its Protection
U.S. government export control agencies have less oversight on exports of controlled information than they do on exports of controlled goods. Commerce’s and State’s export control requirements and processes—such as export documentation, reporting requirements, and monitoring— provide physical checkpoints on the means and methods companies use to export controlled goods to help them ensure such exports are made under their license terms, but the agencies cannot easily apply these same requirements and processes to exports of controlled information. Officials from one third of the companies we interviewed told us they do not have internal control plans to protect their export-controlled information. Companies Use a Variety of Practices to Protect Export-Controlled Information
Under the U.S. export control system, companies are responsible for implementing procedures to protect export-controlled information regardless of how it is exported. Almost two thirds of the company officials we interviewed told us their companies use internal control plans, which establish procedures to protect proprietary and export-controlled information and also set requirements for access to such material by foreign employees and visitors. Government Lacks Sufficient Knowledge of the Risks Associated with the Protection of Export- Controlled Information to Identify the Minimal Safeguards
The lead government agencies have not fully assessed the risks of protecting export-controlled information to help identify the minimal level of protection for such exports. Improved knowledge of the risks associated with such exports could improve agency outreach and training efforts, which now offer limited assistance to companies to mitigate risks when protecting such information. Improved Knowledge of the Risks Associated with the Protection of Export- Controlled Information Could Improve Agency Outreach and Training
Government export control agencies use a variety of means—including Internet Web sites, advisory opinions, and company training to communicate information on export controls to industry. To assess steps the government has taken to identify and mitigate risks in protecting export-controlled information, we analyzed Commerce’s and State’s use of existing resources, such as licensing data, to identify trends and vulnerable areas within company transfers of controlled information and assessed each agency’s export control training and outreach programs. To further assess our objectives, we interviewed officials from 46 U.S. companies. Commerce’s and State’s industry outreach, training, and advisory committee membership lists. Held both Commerce and State export licenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government controls exports of defense-related goods and services by companies and the export of information associated with their design, production, and use, to ensure they meet U.S. interests. Globalization and communication technologies facilitate exports of controlled information providing benefits to U.S. companies and increase interactions between U.S. and foreign companies, making it challenging to protect such exports. GAO assessed (1) how the government's export control processes apply to the protection of export-controlled information, and (2) steps the government has taken to identify and help mitigate the risks in protecting export-controlled information. To do this, GAO analyzed agency regulations and practices and interviewed officials from 46 companies with a wide range of exporting experiences.
What GAO Found
U.S. government export control agencies, primarily the departments of Commerce and State, have less oversight on exports of controlled information than they do on exports of controlled goods. Commerce's and State's export control requirements and processes provide physical checkpoints on the means and methods companies use to export controlled goods to help the agencies ensure such exports are made under their license terms, but the agencies cannot easily apply these same requirements and processes to exports of controlled information. For example, companies are generally required to report their shipments of export controlled goods overseas with Customs and Border Protection for exports made under a license, but such reporting is not applicable to the export of controlled information. Commerce and State expect individual companies to be responsible for implementing practices to protect export-controlled information. One third of the companies GAO interviewed did not have internal control plans to protect export-controlled information, which set requirements for access to such material by foreign employees and visitors. Commerce and State have not fully assessed the risks of companies using a variety of means to protect export-controlled information. The agencies have not used existing resources, such as license data, to help identify the minimal protections for such exports. As companies use a variety of measures for protecting export-controlled information, increased knowledge of the risks associated with protecting such information could improve agency outreach and training efforts, which now offer limited assistance to companies to mitigate those risks. GAO's internal control standards highlight the identification and management of risk as a key element of an organization's management control program. GAO also found that Commerce's and State's communications with companies do not focus on export-controlled information. For example, Commerce's and State's Internet Web sites do not provide specific guidance on how to protect electronic transfers of export-controlled information, a point raised by almost one fourth of the company officials GAO interviewed. |
gao_GAO-11-876T | gao_GAO-11-876T_0 | Federal, State, and Local Authorities Are Beginning to Take Steps to Adapt to Climate Change
Our October 2009 report on climate change adaptation found no coordinated national approach to adaptation, but our May 2011 report on climate change funding cited indications that federal agencies were beginning to respond to climate change more systematically. The task force was formed to develop federal recommendations for adapting to climate change impacts both domestically and internationally and to recommend key components to include in a national strategy. Individual agencies are also beginning to consider adaptation actions. For example, in May 2009, the Chief of Naval Operations created Task Force Climate Change to address the naval implications of a changing Arctic and global environment. In October 2009, we reported that some state and local authorities were beginning to plan for and respond to climate change impacts. These and other efforts are described in DEP’s 2008 Climate Change Program Assessment and Action Plan. The flood control zone district planned to use the funds, in part, to upgrade flood protection facilities to increase the county’s resilience to future flooding. In addition to more severe winter storms, the county expected that climate change would lead to sea level rise; reduced snowpack; and summertime extreme weather such as heat waves and drought, which can lead to power shortages because hydropower is an important source of power in the region. As part of this effort, the Maryland Department of Natural Resources (DNR) chaired an Adaptation and Response Working Group, which issued a report on sea level rise and coastal storms. Government Officials Face Numerous Challenges When Considering Adaptation Efforts, and Further Federal Action Could Help Them Make More Informed Decisions
In our prior work, we found that the challenges faced by federal, state, and local officials in their efforts to adapt to climate change fell into several categories: Focusing on immediate needs. Without sufficient site-specific data, such as local projections of expected changes, it is hard to predict the impacts of climate change and thus hard for officials to justify the current costs of adaptation efforts for potentially less certain future benefits. Based on information obtained from studies, visits to sites pursuing adaptation efforts, and responses to a Web-based questionnaire sent to federal, state, and local officials knowledgeable about adaptation, our October 2009 report identified three categories of potential federal actions for addressing challenges to adaptation efforts: First, training and education efforts could increase awareness among government officials and the public about the impacts of climate change and available adaptation strategies. Second, actions to provide and interpret site-specific information could help officials understand the impacts of climate change at a scale that would enable them to respond. Some of our other recent climate change-related reports offer additional examples of the types of actions federal agencies and the Congress could take to assist states and communities in their efforts to adapt. Furthermore, our May 2008 report on the economics of policy options to address climate change identified actions Congress and federal agencies could take, such as reforming insurance subsidy programs in areas vulnerable to hurricanes or flooding. Funding for Adaptation and Other Federal Climate Change Activities Could be Better Tracked, Reported, and Aligned with Strategic Priorities
Our May 2011 report on federal climate change funding found that (1) agencies do not consistently interpret methods for defining and reporting the funding of climate change activities, (2) key factors complicate efforts to align such funding with strategic priorities, and (3) options are available to better align federal funding with strategic priorities, including governmentwide strategic planning. Our work suggests that existing methods for defining and reporting climate change funding are not consistently interpreted and applied across the federal government. In addition, our work identified two key factors that complicate efforts to align federal climate change funding with strategic priorities across the federal government. First, federal officials lack a shared understanding of priorities, partly due to the multiple, often inconsistent messages articulated in different sources, such as strategic plans. The multiple sources for communicating priorities across the climate change enterprise may result in conflicting messages and confusion. The second key factor that complicates efforts to align federal funding with priorities is that existing mechanisms intended to do so are nonbinding, according to respondents, available literature, and stakeholders. Specific options are discussed in detail in our May 2011 report and include a governmentwide strategic planning process that promotes a shared understanding among agencies of strategic priorities by articulating what they are expected to do within the overall federal response to climate change. | Why GAO Did This Study
A 2009 assessment by the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) found that many types of extreme weather events, such as heat waves and regional droughts, have become more frequent and intense during the past 40 to 50 years. According to the assessment, changes in extreme weather and climate events will affect many aspects of society and the natural environment, such as infrastructure. In addition, the Department of Defense found that climate change may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on militaries around the world. According to the National Academies, USGCRP, and others, greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. This testimony addresses (1) the actions federal, state, and local authorities are taking to adapt to climate change; (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt and actions federal agencies could take to help address these challenges; and (3) the extent to which federal funding for adaptation and other climate change activities is consistently tracked and reported and aligned with strategic priorities. The information in this testimony is based on prior work, largely on GAO's recent reports on climate change adaptation and federal climate change funding.
What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local authorities are beginning to take steps to adapt to climate change. Federal agencies are beginning to respond to climate change systematically through an Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force formed to recommend key components for inclusion in a national adaptation strategy. Individual agencies are also beginning to consider adaptation actions. For example, in May 2009, the Chief of Naval Operations created Task Force Climate Change to address the naval implications of a changing Arctic and global environment. Some state and local government authorities were beginning to plan for and respond to climate change impacts, GAO reported in 2009. For example, the state of Maryland had a strategy for reducing vulnerability to climate change, which focused on protecting habitat and infrastructure from future risks associated with sea level rise and coastal storms. In another example, King County, Washington, established a countywide flood control zone district to upgrade flood protection facilities and increase the county's resilience to future flooding, among other things. Federal, state, and local officials face numerous challenges in their efforts to adapt to climate change, and further federal action could help them make more informed decisions. These challenges include a focus of available attention and resources on more immediate needs and insufficient site-specific data--such as local projections of expected climate changes. The lack of such data makes it hard to understand the impacts of climate change and thus hard for officials to justify the cost of adaptation efforts, since future benefits are potentially less certain than current costs. GAO's October 2009 report identified potential federal actions for improving adaptation efforts, including actions to provide and interpret site-specific information, which could help officials understand the impacts of climate change at a scale that would enable them to respond. In a May 2008 report on the economics of policy options to address climate change, GAO identified actions Congress and federal agencies could take, such as reforming insurance subsidy programs in areas vulnerable to hurricanes or flooding. Funding for adaptation and other federal climate change activities could be better tracked, reported, and aligned with strategic priorities. GAO's report on federal climate change funding suggests that methods for defining and reporting such funding are not consistently interpreted and applied across the federal government. GAO also identified two key factors that complicate efforts to align funding with priorities. First, officials across a broad range of federal agencies lack a shared understanding of priorities, partly due to the multiple, often inconsistent messages articulated in different policy documents, such as strategic plans. Second, existing mechanisms intended to align funding with governmentwide priorities are nonbinding and limited when in conflict with agencies' own priorities. Federal officials who responded to a Web-based questionnaire, available literature, and stakeholders involved in climate change funding identified several ways to better align federal climate change funding with strategic priorities. These include a governmentwide strategic planning process that promotes a shared understanding among agencies of strategic priorities by articulating what they are expected to do within the overall federal response to climate change. |
gao_GAO-16-288 | gao_GAO-16-288_0 | The Domestic Field Office Structure Costs Over $500 Million Annually, but the Secret Service Does Not Accurately Record Cost Data for Some Offices
The Domestic Field Office Structure Costs Over $500 Million per Year
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, annual domestic office costs ranged from a low of $500 million in fiscal year 2010 to a high of $549 million in fiscal year 2012 (see fig. 5). Secret Service Did Not Accurately Record Salaries and Benefits Cost Data for Some Offices
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the Secret Service did not accurately record salary and benefit data at the individual office level, but the data are reasonably reliable at the district level and in the aggregate. On the basis of our analysis, salaries and benefits costs may not have been accurately recorded for 21 of 73 resident offices and agencies from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Specifically,
13 resident offices and resident agencies likely had their salaries and benefits costs attributed to their “parent” field offices. By implementing a review process to ensure time and attendance codes for cost data are correctly established and appropriately attributed to the correct office, the Secret Service could reliably determine the cost of each of its domestic offices to assist in assessing their cost-effectiveness. Domestic Offices Enable the Secret Service to Carry Out Its Investigative and Protective Missions, but Contributions Vary by Office
Secret Service’s Domestic Offices Investigate Financial and Electronic Crimes and Play an Integral Role in Providing Protection and Recruiting Agents
Electronic and Financial Crime Investigations
The Secret Service’s domestic offices predominately carry out the agency’s investigative mission by investigating financial crimes, which include access device fraud; financial institution fraud; identity theft; mortgage fraud; bank fraud; and electronic crimes, including cyber fraud and computer-based attacks on financial, banking, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure. 6) and $18.3 million to $28.3 million per year in counterfeit funds removed from circulation (see fig. The Secret Service also provides training for state and local law enforcement partners. The Secret Service Uses Data to Adjust Staffing, but Could Do More to Ensure That Its Domestic Field Office Structure Best Meets Mission Needs
The Secret Service Uses Performance Data to Adjust Staffing, but Does Not Fully Use Available Cost, Performance, and Travel Data to Analyze Its Field Office Structure
According to senior Office of Investigations officials, the Secret Service has an ongoing process for evaluating and adjusting staffing levels among its domestic offices. However, the Secret Service has not conducted an analysis of its domestic field office structure, including an assessment of office location and size. This comparison measures how efficiently special agents are meeting the agency’s mission needs. For example, our analysis of frequent investigative travel patterns may indicate the need for the agency to establish a permanent Secret Service presence at certain non-Secret Service office locations. Specifically, a comparative analysis using cost and performance and travel data could, among other things, help the Secret Service identify inefficiencies in its domestic field office structure, including the cost relative to the performance of particular offices and the location and size of offices, and serve as a basis for allocating personnel. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Secret Service accurately records salaries and benefits cost data for its domestic offices, we recommend that the Director of the Secret Service implement a review process to ensure time and attendance codes used for recording cost data at each domestic office are correctly established and appropriately attributed to the correct office. To better ensure that the Secret Service’s domestic field office structure is enabling the Secret Service to best meet its mission needs, we recommend that the Director of the Secret Service conduct an analysis using cost and performance data and consider using other data, such as travel data, to assess and inform its domestic field office structure, and maintain a record of the analyses performed and the results. 2. How do the domestic offices contribute to accomplishing the Secret Service’s missions? To what extent does the Secret Service use available data to ensure that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs, and what data reliability challenges, if any, exist? To determine the costs of the Secret Service’s domestic field office structure, we obtained data from the Secret Service on the costs for each domestic field office, resident office, and resident agency by cost category. We found that the Secret Service’s performance metrics align with the agency’s investigative and protective missions. Since we determined the Secret Service had not used its available data to analyze its field office structure, we analyzed Secret Service–provided cost, performance, and travel data to demonstrate how such analyses could position the Secret Service to better ensure that its domestic field office structure is responsive to changing conditions and that the agency is able to identify specific actions that need to be taken to meet mission needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Commonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a role in investigating and preventing a variety of financial and electronic crimes (e.g., counterfeiting). To execute its dual investigative and protective missions, the Secret Service operates a domestic field office structure of 115 offices in 42 districts.
GAO was asked to review the Secret Service's domestic field office structure. This report evaluates (1) the costs of the Secret Service's domestic field office structure and to what extent the data are reliable, (2) how domestic offices enable the Secret Service to accomplish its missions, and (3) the extent to which the Secret Service uses available data to ensure that its domestic field office structure meets its mission needs and what data reliability challenges, if any, exist.
GAO analyzed the Secret Service's cost, performance, and travel data for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, including a regression analysis of cost to performance. GAO also interviewed Secret Service headquarters officials; officials from 12 domestic offices selected based on size, performance and mission focus; and 15 of the agency's law enforcement partners.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the annual cost of the U.S. Secret Service's domestic field office structure—including 115 field offices, resident offices, and resident agencies—ranged from $500 million to $549 million, but the Secret Service did not accurately record cost data for some offices. GAO determined that although the Secret Service's cost data were reasonably reliable in the aggregate, salary and benefit costs may not have been accurately recorded in the agency's time and attendance system for 21 of 73 of the agency's smaller offices. Specifically,
thirteen resident offices and resident agencies likely had their salaries and benefits costs attributed to the field offices in their districts, and
eight had higher than expected salaries and benefits costs that may include the salaries and benefits of personnel in field offices.
By implementing a review process to ensure time and attendance charge codes for cost data are correctly established, the Secret Service could reliably determine the cost of each of its domestic offices.
The Secret Service's domestic offices predominately carry out the agency's investigative mission of various financial and electronic crimes and play an integral role in providing protection. GAO's analysis of Secret Service data from fiscal years 2009 through 2014 found that domestic offices removed at least $18 million in counterfeit funds from circulation annually, and coordinated with state and local partners to support between 5,597 and 6,386 protective visits each year. The Secret Service has developed a performance system, which aligns with its missions, to assess domestic office contributions to the agency's missions, which vary by office.
GAO also found that the Secret Service uses data to adjust staffing for the domestic offices, but the agency does not fully use all available data to analyze its domestic field office structure. For example, the Secret Service has not compared domestic field office districts' costs relative to performance or used personnel travel data to analyze whether the domestic offices are optimally located and sized to best meet the agency's mission needs. GAO's analyses of cost, performance, and travel data indicated that some field office districts were more efficient than others and personnel from four domestic offices frequently traveled to non-Secret Service office locations for investigations, potentially indicating the need for a Secret Service presence in these locations. This type of analysis could help the Secret Service determine if its field office structure is responsive to changing conditions and if an adjustment to the structure is warranted. By conducting an analysis of its domestic offices using cost and performance data, among other data as appropriate, the Secret Service could be better positioned to ensure that its domestic field office structure is meeting its mission needs.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2015. Information that the Secret Service deemed sensitive has been removed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Secret Service implement a review process to ensure it accurately records cost data, and conduct an analysis of its domestic field office structure using cost and performance data. The Department of Homeland Security concurred. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-136 | gao_T-AIMD-96-136_0 | First, 8 states have biennial legislative cycles and hence necessarily have biennial budget cycles. As we noted in our review of state balanced budget practices, state budgets fill a different role, may be sensitive to different outside pressures, and are otherwise not directly comparable. In Arizona “major budget units”—the agencies with the largest budgets—submit annual requests; these budgets are also the most volatile and the most dependent on federal funding. In Kansas the 20 agencies that are on a biennial cycle are typically small, single-program or regulatory-type agencies that are funded by fees rather than general fund revenues. Budget agreements, authorizations, budget resolutions, and appropriations need not cover the same time period. Biennial budgeting proposals seek to change the frequency with which decisions are made—from annual to biennial budget decisions. Even within that 36 percent of the budget on an annual appropriation cycle, not all appropriations were for 1-year funds. Although preparation and analysis for the annual budget preparation and submission process is time-consuming and burdensome for program managers, they are likely to have a greater interest in how long money is available for use. A 2-year appropriation cycle could lessen congressional influence or control over program and spending matters, largely because the process would afford fewer scheduled opportunities to affect agency programs and budgets. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed several proposals to change the budget process from an annual to a biennial cycle.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) many congressional members believe a biennial budget cycle would streamline the budget process, provide longer-term funding levels, enhance agencies' ability to manage their programs, and provide more time for congressional oversight; (2) preparation and analysis for the annual budget process is time-consuming and burdensome for program managers; (3) although eight states have biennial budget cycles, state budgets fill a different role and are sensitive to different outside pressures; (4) the state agencies with the largest budgets submit annual budget requests, since these budgets are the most volatile and dependent on federal funding; (5) the state agencies that are on biennial budget cycles are typically small, single-program agencies that are funded by fees rather than general fund revenues; (6) budget agreements, authorizations, and budget resolutions do not have to cover the same time period; (7) Congress has routinely provided multiyear appropriations for those programs on the annual appropriation cycle; and (8) a 2-year budget cycle could lessen congressional control over program and spending matters. |
gao_GAO-13-101 | gao_GAO-13-101_0 | In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act created FSOC. Development of proposed rule. Dodd-Frank Act Regulations
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, federal financial regulatory agencies are directed or have the authority to issue hundreds of regulations to implement the act’s provisions. Regulatory Analyses Provide Limited Information about Benefits and Costs of Chosen or Alternative Approaches
Federal agencies conducted the regulatory analyses required by various federal statutes for all 54 Dodd-Frank Act regulations that we reviewed. As part of their analyses, the agencies generally considered, but typically did not quantify or monetize, the benefits and costs of these regulations. As independent regulatory agencies, the federal financial regulators are not subject to executive orders that require comprehensive benefit-cost analysis in accordance with guidance issued by OMB. While most financial regulators said that they attempt to follow OMB’s guidance in principle or spirit, we found that they did not consistently follow key elements of the guidance in their regulatory analyses. We previously recommended that regulators should more fully incorporate the OMB guidance into their rulemaking policies. Regulators Were Not Required to Assess Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Alternatives
As part of their rulemakings, federal agencies generally must conduct regulatory analysis pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), among other statutes.RFA require federal agencies to assess various impacts and costs of their rules, but do not require the agencies to formally assess the benefits and costs of alternative regulatory approaches or the reason for selecting one alternative over another. 12 U.S.C. Agencies issued 19 major rules. Regulators Generally Developed Selected Major Rules in Ways Consistent with the Principles, but not Certain Key Elements, of the OMB Guidance
Although independent federal financial regulators are not required to follow OMB’s Circular A-4 when developing regulations, they told us that they try to follow this guidance in principle or spirit. For example, CFTC and SEC did not evaluate the benefits and costs of regulatory alternatives they considered for key provisions compared to their chosen approach. In our previous review, we found that the policies and procedures of these regulators did not fully reflect OMB guidance and recommended that they incorporate the guidance more fully in their rulemaking policies and procedures. Regulators Continue to Coordinate Informally on Rulemakings, but Differences among Related Rules Still Exist
Federal financial regulators have continued to coordinate on rulemakings informally, but coordination may not eliminate the potential for differences in related rules. Regulators have coordinated on 19 of the 54 substantive regulations that we reviewed, in some cases voluntarily coordinating their activities and also extending coordination internationally. According to agency staff, most interagency coordination during rulemaking largely was informal and conducted at the staff level. Regulators Coordinated as Required, and Such Coordination Involved Around One-Third of Their Dodd-Frank Regulations
We found documentation of coordination among the rulemaking agency and other domestic or international regulators for 19 of the 54 substantive regulations that were issued and became effective between July 21, 2011, and July 23, 2012. The act stipulated coordination for 10 other regulations. We also reiterated our previous recommendation by stating that FSOC should establish formal collaboration and coordination policies for rulemaking. Although the indicators may be suggestive of the act’s impact, our indicators do not identify causal links between their changes and the act. Further, many other factors can affect SIFIs and, thus, the indicators. Such provisions include (1) establishing FSOC to identify and respond to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system; (2) authorizing FSOC to designate a nonbank financial company for Federal Reserve supervision if FSOC determines it could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States based on the company’s size, leverage, interconnectedness, or other factors; and (3) directing the Federal Reserve to impose enhanced prudential standards and oversight on bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets (referred to as bank SIFIs in this report) and nonbank financial companies designated by FSOC (referred to as nonbank SIFIs in this report). We developed indicators to monitor changes in some of these SIFI characteristics. In their comments, the agencies neither agreed nor disagreed with the report’s findings. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to examine (1) the regulatory analyses, including benefit-cost analyses, federal financial regulators have performed to assess the potential impact of selected final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act; (2) how federal financial regulators consulted with each other in implementing selected final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act to avoid duplication or conflicts; and (3) what is known about the impact of the final Dodd-Frank Act regulations on the financial markets. Appendix IV: Econometric Analyses of the Impact of Enhanced Regulation and Oversight on SIFIs
Methodology
We conducted an econometric analysis to assess the impact of the Dodd- Frank Act’s new requirements for bank SIFIs on (1) the cost of credit they provide and (2) their safety and soundness. Liquidity. These estimates suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act’s new requirements for SIFIs have had little effect on bank SIFIs’ funding costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Act requires or authorizes various federal agencies to issue hundreds of rules to implement reforms intended to strengthen the financial services industry. GAO is required to annually study financial services regulations. This report examines (1) the regulatory analyses federal agencies performed for rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act; (2) how the agencies consulted with each other in implementing the final rules to avoid duplication or conflicts; and (3) what is known about the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act rules. GAO identified 66 final Dodd-Frank Act rules in effect between July 21, 2011, and July 23, 2012. GAO examined the regulatory analyses for the 54 regulations that were substantive and thus required regulatory analyses; conducted case studies on the regulatory analyses for 4 of the 19 major rules; conducted case studies on interagency coordination for 3 other rules; and developed indicators to assess the impact of the acts systemic risk provisions and regulations.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies conducted the regulatory analyses required by various federal statutes for all 54 regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) that GAO reviewed. As part of their analyses, the agencies generally considered, but typically did not quantify or monetize, the benefits and costs of these rules. Most of the federal financial regulators, as independent regulatory agencies, are not subject to executive orders that require comprehensive benefit-cost analysis in accordance with guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Although most financial regulators are not required to follow OMB's guidance, they told GAO that they attempt to follow it in principle or spirit. GAO's review of selected rules found that regulators did not consistently follow key elements of the OMB guidance in their regulatory analyses. For example, while some regulators identified the benefits and costs of their chosen regulatory approach in proposed rules, they did not evaluate their chosen approach compared to the benefits and costs of alternative approaches. GAO previously recommended that regulators more fully incorporate the OMB guidance into their rulemaking policies, and the Office of Comptroller of the Currency and the Securities and Exchange Commission have done so. By not more closely following OMB's guidance, other financial regulators continue to miss an opportunity to improve their analyses.
Federal financial agencies continue to coordinate on rulemakings informally in order to reduce duplication and overlap in regulations and for other purposes, but interagency coordination does not necessarily eliminate the potential for differences in related rules. Agencies coordinated on 19 of the 54 substantive regulations that GAO reviewed. For most of the 19 regulations, the Dodd-Frank Act required the agencies to coordinate, but agencies also voluntarily coordinated with other U.S. and international regulators on some of their rulemakings. According to the regulators, most interagency coordination is informal and conducted at the staff level. GAO's review of selected rules shows that differences between related rules may remain even when coordination occurs. According to regulators, such differences may result from differences in their jurisdictions or the markets. Finally, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has not yet implemented GAO's previous recommendation to work with regulators to establish formal interagency coordination policies.
Most Dodd-Frank Act regulations have not been finalized or in place for sufficient time for their full impacts to materialize. Recognizing these and other limitations, GAO took a multipronged approach to assess the impact of some of the act's provisions and rules, with an initial focus on the act's systemic risk goals. First, GAO developed indicators to monitor changes in certain characteristics of U.S. bank holding companies subject to enhanced prudential regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act (U.S. bank SIFIs). Although the indicators do not identify causal links between their changes and the act--and many other factors can affect SIFIs--some indicators suggest that since 2010 U.S. bank SIFIs, on average, have decreased their leverage and enhanced their liquidity. Second, empirical results of GAO's regression analysis suggest that, to date, the act may have had little effect on U.S. bank SIFIs' funding costs but may have helped improve their safety and soundness. GAO plans to update its analyses in future reports, including adding indicators for other Dodd-Frank Act provisions and regulations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report but reiterates its 2011 recommendations that the federal financial regulators more fully incorporate OMBs guidance into their rulemaking policies and that FSOC work with federal financial regulators to establish formal interagency coordination policies for rulemaking. The agencies provided written and technical comments on a draft of this report, and neither agreed nor disagreed with the reports findings. |
gao_GAO-15-250 | gao_GAO-15-250_0 | GLAAS also provides data, such as award value and whether awards were competed, for reports to Congress on contract support for contingency operations outside the United States. DOD guidance also provides policy that data will be made visible and trusted, among other things, for all authorized users. USAID Has Assessed Resources Needed to Sustain GLAAS, but DOD Has Not Fully Assessed All Resources Needed to Sustain SPOT-ES
USAID has assessed resources that it needs to sustain GLAAS, but DOD has not fully assessed all future resources that it needs to sustain SPOT- ES. DOD and USAID use the budget process to identify resources they project they will need in the next budget year to modernize and operate their systems. DOD Has Not Updated Its Cost Estimates or Fully Defined and Assessed Its Plans for SPOT-ES
DOD has identified resources for fiscal years 2013 through 2015 that it needs to operate SPOT-ES; however, since 2010, DOD has not updated its life-cycle cost estimate or fully defined and assessed its plans to identify all the resources it needs to achieve the system’s objectives. Figure 2 illustrates SPOT-ES’s schedule delays. However, DOD has not defined some of its plans that involve cost elements that need to be incorporated into SPOT-ES life- cycle cost estimate. Without defining and assessing plans to provide a full accounting for the system, thereby fully accounting for life-cycle costs, management will have difficulty planning program resource requirements and making decisions. DOD Has Developed Business Rules for Entering Data about Contracts and Contractor Personnel, but Lacks Reasonable Assurance that SPOT is Timely and Reliable
DOD has developed SPOT business rules for entering data about contracts and contractor personnel; however, DOD’s process does not provide reasonable assurance that the business rules are followed and SPOT data are timely and reliable. In the context of operational contract support, various provisions in DOD guidance and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) relate to the accuracy and timeliness of information in SPOT. These mechanisms include the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), which contracting officers can use to report on contractors’ performance. DOD Has Not Fully Registered or Approved SPOT-ES Data
The SPOT-ES program office has not ensured that the system’s data are visible and trusted because it has not fully registered the system’s data in the Data Services Environment (DSE). DOD Instruction 8320.02 requires heads of DOD components to register all authoritative data sources, information technology services, and required metadata in the DSE and further states as policy that data will be made visible and trusted, among other things, for all authorized users.According to the guidance, data is made visible by creating and associating metadata. DOD has not used existing mechanisms for tracking contractor performance that could help provide reasonable assurance that contractors have abided by business rules to provide timely and reliable data, and relieve DOD officials of the need to continue to devote resources to conducting the quarterly manual census. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve DOD, State, and USAID’s ability to track contracts and contractor personnel in contingency operations, we are making the following five recommendations to DOD:
To ensure SPOT-ES cost estimates are accurate and comprehensive, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics direct the system’s program office to regularly update its life-cycle cost estimate to include defining and assessing its plans for SPOT-ES. If DOD uses available mechanisms to improve compliance with contract requirements, that would address the intent of the recommendation and improve timeliness and reliability of data in SPOT-ES. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have assessed resources needed to sustain the systems used to track contracts and contractor personnel, we reviewed and compared agencies’ funding information, cost estimates, systems plans and schedule for DOD’s Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker–Enterprise Suite (SPOT-ES) and USAID’S Global Acquisition and Award System (GLAAS) to accepted cost-estimating guidance and internal- control standards. To determine the extent to which DOD has completed interoperability testing and registered and approved SPOT-ES data, we reviewed DOD guidance on sharing data and information in the department, as well as guidance on interoperability. | Why GAO Did This Study
SPOT-ES contains data on almost 1 million contractor personnel who have supported DOD, State, and USAID in contingency operations. Also, USAID's GLAAS provides data, such as award value, for reports to Congress on contract support. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that GAO review the data systems of DOD, State, and USAID related to certain contract support.
This report evaluates the extent to which, among other things, (1) DOD and USAID have assessed resources needed to sustain the systems used to track contracts and contractor personnel; (2) DOD has developed business rules and processes to help ensure the timeliness and reliability of SPOT-ES data; and (3) DOD has completed interoperability testing and registered and approved data for SPOT-ES. GAO reviewed DOD and USAID documents, such as cost schedules, business rules, and user manuals, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has assessed resources that it needs to sustain its contract data system, the Global Acquisition and Assistance System (GLAAS), but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not assessed all resources that it will need to sustain the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker–Enterprise Suite (SPOT-ES). DOD, the Department of State (State) and USAID use SPOT-ES as a repository of information on contracts and contractor personnel in contingency operations; USAID also uses GLAAS to record information about contracts. DOD uses the budget process to identify resources it projects it will need in the next budget year to modernize and operate its systems, but DOD has not updated its life-cycle cost estimate or fully defined and assessed its plans to determine all resources needed to sustain SPOT-ES. For example, DOD has not updated its life-cycle cost estimate since 2010, despite changes to costs due to schedule delays, because officials said the system has proven stable. Also, DOD has not defined some of its plans that involve cost elements that need to be included in the estimate because it accepted the system's previous program management estimates as reported. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that cost estimates should be current and comprehensive. Without regularly updating life-cycle costs and defining and assessing plans to provide a full accounting for the systems' costs, management will have difficulty planning program resource requirements and making decisions.
DOD has business rules for the entry of contract and contractor personnel data in SPOT—the database component of SPOT-ES—but lacks reasonable assurance that SPOT provides personnel data that are consistently timely and reliable because the department does not use its available mechanisms for assessing contractor performance to track whether contractors enter data in accordance with the business rules. The business rules, DOD guidance, and an applicable Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement clause describe how contractors and contracting officers are to enter data in SPOT. Using existing mechanisms for tracking contractor performance could provide DOD reasonable assurance that contractors have abided by business rules to enter and provide timely and reliable data.
DOD has completed SPOT-ES interoperability testing, but has not fully registered or approved the system's data. DOD Instruction 8320.02 directs heads of DOD components to register authoritative data sources and metadata in DOD's Data Services Environment (DSE), its primary online repository for technical descriptions related to information technology and systems for all authorized users, and provides policy that data will be visible and trusted. GAO found that registration for SPOT-ES data was not completed, although program officials thought they had completed all the steps needed to register the system. Full registration and approval in the DSE would help ensure that data are visible and trusted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD regularly update its lifecycle cost estimate for SPOT-ES to include defining and assessing its plans for SPOT-ES; use mechanisms to track contractor performance of SPOT-ES data entry; and complete SPOT-ES registration in the DSE. DOD concurred with these recommendations, and described planned steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-11-655T | gao_GAO-11-655T_0 | Background
FECA is administered by Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) and currently covers more than 2.7 million civilian federal employees from more than 70 different agencies. FECA benefits are paid to federal employees who are unable to work because of injuries sustained while performing their federal duties. Proposals to Change Benefits for Older Beneficiaries
Concerns that beneficiaries remain in the FECA program past retirement age have led to several proposals to change the program. Because returning to work could mean giving up a FECA benefit for a reduced pension amount, concerns have been raised by some that the program may provide incentives for beneficiaries to continue on the program beyond retirement age. In 1996, we reported on two alternative proposals to change FECA benefits once beneficiaries reach the age at which retirement typically occurs: (1) converting FECA benefits to retirement benefits, and (2) changing FECA wage-loss benefits to a newly established FECA annuity. Labor’s proposal would still keep the changed benefit within the FECA program. In our 1996 report, however, we identified a number of issues with both alternative proposals. Questions and Issues to Consider if Crafting FECA Changes
We also discussed in our 1996 report a number of issues that merit consideration in crafting legislation to change benefits for older beneficiaries. Going forward, Congress may wish to consider the following questions as it assesses and considers current reform proposals: (1) How would benefits be computed? (2) Which beneficiaries would be affected? (3) What criteria, such as age or retirement eligibility, would initiate changed benefits? (4) How would other benefits, such as FECA medical and survivor benefits, be treated and administered? (5) How would benefits, particularly retirement benefits, be funded? There is also the question of whether changes will focus on current or future beneficiaries. Deciding on the criteria that would initiate change in benefits might require developing benchmarks. For example, the 1981 Reagan administration proposal would have ended survivor benefits under FECA for those beneficiaries whose benefits were converted to the retirement system. Although FECA’s basic structure has not significantly been amended for many years, there continues to be interest in reforming the program. Proposals to change benefits for older beneficiaries raise a number of important issues, with implications for both beneficiaries and federal agencies. Federal Employees’ Compensation Act: Issues Associated With Changing Benefits for Older Beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses issues related to possible changes to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program, a topic that we have reported on in the past. At the end of chargeback year 2010, the FECA program, administered by the Department of Labor (Labor) paid more than $1.88 billion in wage-loss compensation, impairment, and death benefits, and another $898.1 million for medical and rehabilitation services and supplies. Currently, FECA benefits are paid to federal employees who are unable to work because of injuries sustained while performing their federal duties, including those who are at or older than retirement age. Concerns have been raised that federal employees on FECA receive benefits that could be more generous than under the traditional federal retirement system and that the program may have unintended incentives for beneficiaries to remain on the FECA program beyond the traditional retirement age. Over the past 30 years, there have been various proposals to change the FECA program to address this concern. Recent policy proposals to change the way FECA is administered for older beneficiaries share characteristics with past proposals we have discussed in prior work. In August 1996, we reported on the issues associated with changing benefits for older beneficiaries. Because FECA's benefit structure has not been significantly amended in more than 35 years, the policy questions raised in our 1996 report are still relevant and important today. This statement will focus on (1) previous proposals for changing FECA benefits for older beneficiaries and (2) questions and associated issues that merit consideration in crafting legislation to change benefits for older beneficiaries. This statement is drawn primarily from our 1996 report in which we solicited views from selected federal agencies and employee groups to identify questions and associated issues with crafting benefit changes. In that report, we also reviewed relevant laws and analyzed previous studies and legislative proposals that would have changed benefits for older FECA beneficiaries..
What GAO Found
In summary, we have reported that the perception that many retirement-age beneficiaries were receiving more generous benefits on FECA had generated two alternative proposals to change benefits once beneficiaries reach the age at which retirement typically occurs: (1) converting FECA benefits to retirement benefits and, (2) changing FECA wage-loss benefits by establishing a new FECA annuity. We also discussed a number of issues to be considered in crafting legislation to change benefits for older beneficiaries. Going forward, Congress may wish to consider the following questions in assessing current proposals for change: (1) How would benefits be computed? (2) Which beneficiaries would be affected? (3) What criteria, such as age or retirement eligibility, would initiate changed benefits? (4) How would other benefits, such as FECA medical and survivor benefits, be treated and administered? (5) How would benefits, particularly retirement benefits, be funded? |
gao_GAO-10-873 | gao_GAO-10-873_0 | Agencies and Relevant Laws
As the federal government’s landlord, GSA designs, builds, manages, and safeguards buildings to support the needs of other federal agencies. Limited Risk Information and Lack of Control Over Common Areas and Public Access Pose Challenges to Protecting Leased Space
Leasing Officials Sometimes Lack the Information Needed to Employ a Risk Management Approach
Before a lease is signed, early risk assessments can help agencies allocate resources using a risk management approach, a key practice of facility protection. Leasing officials primarily rely on security officials to supply information on physical security requirements for federally leased space. While FPS is expected under the MOA to uniformly conduct early risk assessments for GSA-acquired space greater than or equal to 10,000 square feet, FPS and GSA officials agree that FPS is not expected to conduct early risk assessments for spaces under 10,000 square feet unless it has the resources to do so. Tenant Agencies’ Lack of Control Over Common Areas in Leased Space Can Hamper Their Ability to Mitigate Risks
Balancing public access with physical security and implementing security measures in common areas of federally leased space are major challenges. For example, a multitenant facility security level IV building we visited, housing the United States Forest Service among other federal agencies, experienced difficulty installing X-ray machines and magnetometers in the main lobby. Overall, the negative effects of these challenges are significant because GSA, FPS, and tenant agencies can be poorly positioned to implement the practices that we have identified as key to protecting the physical security of leased spaces. The 2010 Standards Show Potential for Addressing Some Challenges with Leased Space
The 2010 Standards’ Focus on Decision Making and Documentation Aligns with Some Key Facility Protection Practices
In April 2010, ISC issued the Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities, also known as the 2010 standards. The 2010 standards align with some key practices in facility protection because these standards focus on allocating resources using a risk management approach and measuring performance. We agree that if the standards succeed in moving agencies to track and document such information at a building level, then tenant agency, leasing, and security officials will be better able to determine if the most critical risks are being prioritized and mitigated across an entire real property portfolio and to determine the gaps and efficacy of agency-level security programs. Specifically, language within the standards directing agencies to uniformly perform and use early risk assessments as part of the prescribed decision-making process is useful, because it provides a baseline for agencies to consider as they develop protocols and allocate resources for protecting leased space. ISC Standards Lack Guidance for Working with Lessors
A shortfall within the 2010 standards is that they do not fully address the challenge of not controlling common areas and public access in leased space. Given the critical role that lessors play, guidance for tenant agencies, leasing officials, and security officials—such as best practices—from ISC could be helpful for agencies as they attempt to meet the baseline level of protection prescribed within the 2010 standards for protecting leased space. As the government’s central forum for exchanging information and guidance on facility protection, ISC is well positioned to develop and share best practices. In contrast, the standards’ lack of discussion on working with lessors is notable, given the significant role these entities have in implementing countermeasures that could mitigate risks from public access, particularly in common areas, such as lobbies and loading docks. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance the value of ISC standards for addressing challenges with protecting leased space, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the Executive Director of the ISC, in consultation, where appropriate, with ISC member agencies to (1) establish an ISC working group or other mechanism to determine guidance for working with lessors, which may include best practices to secure common areas and public access, and (2) subsequently incorporate these findings into a future ISC standard or other product, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's reliance on leased space underscores the need to physically secure this space and help safeguard employees, visitors, and government assets. In April 2010 the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), comprised of 47 federal agencies and departments and chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities (the 2010 standards) which supersede previous ISC standards. In response to Congress' direction to review ISC standards for leased space, this report (1) identifies challenges that exist in protecting leased space and (2) examines how the 2010 standards address these challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed federal officials from ISC, four federal departments selected as case studies based on their large square footage of leased space, and the Federal Protective Service (FPS). GAO also consulted prior work on federal real property and physical security, including key practices in facility protection.
What GAO Found
Limited information about risks and the inability to control common areas and public access pose challenges to protecting leased space. Leasing officials do not always have the information needed to employ a risk management approach for allocating resources--a key practice in facility protection. Early risk assessments--those conducted before a lease is executed--can provide leasing officials with valuable information; however, FPS, which is the General Service Administration's (GSA) physical security provider, generally does not perform these assessments for leased space under 10,000 square feet--which constitutes a majority of GSA's leases. Under its memorandum of agreement (MOA) with GSA, FPS is not expected to perform these assessments and does not have the resources to do so. Another challenge in protecting leased space is tenant agencies' lack of control over common areas (such as elevator lobbies, loading docks, and the building's perimeter) which hampers their ability to mitigate risk from public access to leased space. In leased space, lessors, not tenant agencies, typically control physical security in common areas. To implement measures to counter risks in common areas, tenant agencies must typically negotiate with and obtain consent from lessors, who may be unwilling to implement countermeasures because of the potential burden or undue effect on other, nonfederal tenants. For example, tenant agencies in a high-risk, multitenant leased facility we visited have been unable to negotiate changes to the common space, including the installation of X-ray machines and magnetometers, because the lessor believed that the proposed countermeasures would inconvenience other tenants and the public. The 2010 standards show potential for addressing some challenges with leased space. These standards align with some key practices in facility protection because they prescribe a decision making process to determine, mitigate, and accept risks using a risk management approach. Further, by requiring that decision making be tracked and documented, the standards facilitate performance measurement that could help enable agency officials to determine if the most critical risks are being prioritized and mitigated. With its emphasis on the uniform use of early risk assessments, the 2010 standards provide a baseline requirement for agencies to consider as they develop protocols and allocate resources for protecting leased space. For example, GSA and FPS must now consider this requirement, which represents an expansion of the services currently expected of FPS, as they renegotiate their MOA. In contrast, a shortfall within the 2010 standards is that they offer little means for addressing tenant agencies' lack of control over common areas and public access. While the 2010 standards outline specific countermeasures for addressing public access, they lack in-depth discussion and guidance--such as best practices--that could provide a framework for working with lessors to implement these countermeasures. Given the critical role that lessors play, such guidance is warranted. As the government's central forum for exchanging information on facility protection, ISC is well positioned to develop and share this guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS instruct ISC to establish a working group or other mechanism to determine guidance for working with lessors, and to incorporate this guidance into a future ISC standard or other product, as appropriate. DHS concurred with the report's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-42 | gao_GAO-05-42_0 | 1). Overall Medicare Hospice Payment Rate Higher Than Freestanding Hospices’ Estimated Average Costs, but Relationship Varied by Payment Category and Hospice Characteristics
We determined that for freestanding hospices, the unadjusted per diem payment rate across the four payment categories was about 8 percent higher than estimated average per diem costs in 2000, and over 10 percent higher in 2001. For the payment categories, we estimate that the home care (RHC and CHC) per diem payment rate was almost 10 percent higher than average home care per diem costs in 2000, and over 12 percent higher in 2001. With the exception of average GIC per diem costs in 2000, small hospices also had higher average per diem costs than medium or large hospices for each payment category. Unlike those for other providers, Medicare’s hospice cost reports do not include Medicare payment information. In 2001, IRC accounted for 0.2 percent of hospice days of care. Finally, the annual aggregate cap was intended to help limit Medicare spending for all hospices, but it was not based on actual hospice costs, and for each year from 1999 through 2002, few hospices reached it. Relative Costs of Services Provided during RHC Differ from When Payment Rate Was Developed
The relative costs of services in 2001 have changed considerably since the payment rate was developed in 1983, suggesting that the services delivered or the resources necessary for those services have changed over time. Our analysis of the 2002 patient-specific visit data showed that patients have a higher mean number of visits per day during the first, and especially the last, week of a stay. In 1982, the Congress required HCFA to calculate a cap that limited a hospice’s total payments to a specific per-patient amount based on the Medicare costs incurred for patients with cancer during the last 6 months of life. Conclusions
CMS has not evaluated the hospice per diem payment rates and methodology since they were developed to determine the relationship between payments and costs and whether the per diem methodology is consistent with current patterns of care. There are several indications that hospice payments may not be appropriately distributed across days of care or types of providers. The type of care provided during a hospice stay appears to be different than when the hospice per diem payment rates and methodology were developed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare hospice benefit provides care to patients with a terminal illness. For each patient, hospices are paid a per diem rate corresponding to one of four payment categories, which are based on service intensity and location of care. Since implementation in 1983, the payment methodology and rates have not been evaluated. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 directed GAO to study the feasibility and advisability of updating Medicare's payment rates for hospice care. In this report, GAO (1) compares freestanding hospices' costs to Medicare payment rates and (2) evaluates the appropriateness of the per diem payment methodology. Because of Medicare data limitations, it was not possible to compare actual payments to costs or examine the services provided to each patient.
What GAO Found
Using Medicare cost reports from freestanding hospices, GAO determined that the per diem payment rate for all hospice care was about 8 percent higher than the estimated average per diem cost of providing care in 2000, and over 10 percent higher in 2001. However, the relationship between payment rates and costs varied across the payment categories and types of hospices. For all hospice care provided in the home, which accounted for about 97 percent of care in 2001, GAO estimates that the per diem payment rate was almost 10 percent higher than average per diem costs in 2000, and over 12 percent higher in 2001. Small hospices, however, had higher estimated average per diem costs than medium or large hospices overall and for each of the four per diem payment categories in 2001. GAO's analysis indicates that the hospice payment methodology, with rates based on the historical mix and cost of services, a per diem amount that varies only by payment category, and a cap on total Medicare payments, may not reflect current patterns of care. For example, GAO determined that the relative costs of services, such as nursing care, provided during routine home care (RHC) have changed considerably since the rates were calculated. Using limited patient-specific hospice visit data, GAO found that more visits were provided during the first, and especially last, week of a hospice stay than during other times in the stay. Finally, few hospices reached the payment cap, which was intended to limit Medicare hospice spending. |
gao_GAO-14-9 | gao_GAO-14-9_0 | Key Aspects of DC Systems in the United States and Selected Countries
In addition to the United States, the selected countries for this review— Australia, Canada, Chile, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—each have extensive or growing DC retirement systems. Countries Used Multiple Approaches to Broaden Participants’ Retirement Options for the Spend-down Phase
Instituting Multiple Spend- down Options Helped Participants Address Varied and Changing Risks
Although DC systems in countries we reviewed often varied in their features, structure, and regulatory oversight, all six countries ensured that participants have institutionally-facilitated access to a mix of spend- down options through their plans to help them manage retirement risks. U.S. Regulators Have Begun to Explore the Spend-down Phase, but Have Not Yet Strengthened Access to a Mix of Spend- down Options
In the United States, as shown in figure 4, similar to the steps taken by some of the other countries, DOL and Treasury have recently begun to explore the possibility of expanding 401(k) participants’ access to spend- down options through their plans that offer lifetime income, but they have not yet made a concerted effort to help plan sponsors offer a mix of options to their participants. Strategies Used by the Countries We Studied Helped Participants Make More Informed Decisions
Several Approaches Used by Other Countries to Increase Participants’ Knowledge and Understanding of Spend- down Options Could Help DOL’s Efforts to Provide Information
Most of the countries we reviewed used various mechanisms such as communicating simple and consistent information in a timely manner to help participants make more informed spend-down decisions. In particular, two of the six countries—Chile and the United Kingdom—help participants see how their savings would translate into a stream of retirement income by requiring plans to provide participants with monthly or yearly projections in their benefit statements, a comparison which can be useful for making retirement decisions. DOL has begun to consider including lifetime income projections in benefit statements, which may yield positive outcomes for participants. Currently, 401(k) plan benefit statements generally only show a participant’s account balance, and according to DOL officials participants may have difficulty predicting how long their savings will last. Countries’ Regulation and Oversight of Spend-down Options Offer Lessons for U.S. Regulators
Most of the Countries We Reviewed Used Withdrawal Rules to Help Protect Participants from Outliving Their Savings
Most of the countries we reviewed imposed income requirements or withdrawal limits on lump sum payments to help those who take this option mitigate retirement risks. For example, in three of the six countries, participants must meet retirement income requirements if they wish to withdraw all or part of their DC plan assets as a lump sum. DOL Continues to Look at Barriers Plan Sponsors Face in Offering Annuities to 401(k) Plan Participants, Which Do Not Exist in the Countries We Reviewed
DOL is in the process of reviewing regulatory barriers that may prevent or discourage 401(k) plan sponsors from offering annuities to participants. Even with this safe harbor, according to some U.S. retirement experts and plan service providers, sponsors of 401(k) plans may be hesitant to offer an annuity to their participants because of the additional burden and the potential liability sponsors may incur. In its written response, DOL generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it will take steps to address these recommendations in its ongoing efforts. Finally, with respect to our third recommendation that DOL consider other countries’ approaches as it reviews regulatory barriers to lifetime income options to 401(k) plan participants, DOL stated that it will evaluate the available regulatory approaches to address our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to examine selected countries’ (1) approaches to offering retirement spend-down options; (2) key strategies to help participants make sound decisions; and (3) approaches to regulating and overseeing options. Defined Contribution Plans: Approaches in Other Countries Offer Beneficial Strategies in Several Areas, GAO-12-328. | Why GAO Did This Study
American workers are primarily saving for retirement through their 401(k) plans and will likely need assistance making complicated decisions about how to spend their money throughout retirement. Other countries with defined contribution (DC) systems are also dealing with this spend-down challenge. To identify lessons for the U.S. from the experiences of other countries, GAO examined selected countries' (1) approaches to offering retirement spend-down options; (2) strategies to help participants make sound decisions; and (3) approaches to regulating and overseeing options. An initial review of countries with established DC systems indicated that some countries including the six GAO selected--Australia, Canada, Chile, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom--have developed innovative spend-down policies that have the potential to yield useful lessons for the U.S. experience. GAO reviewed reports on DC plans; and interviewed experts and government officials in the U.S. and selected countries.
What GAO Found
The six countries GAO reviewed can offer U.S. regulators lessons on how to expand access to a mix of spend-down options for 401(k) participants that meet various retirement needs. Five of the six countries generally ensure that participants can choose among three main plan options: a lump sum payment, a programmed withdrawal of participants' savings, or an annuity. In the last several decades, all the countries took steps to increase participant access to multiple spend-down options, with some first conducting reviews of participants' retirement needs that resulted in policy changes, as shown below. In the United States, 401(k) plans typically offer only lump sums, leaving some participants at risk of outliving their savings. The U.S. Departments of Labor (DOL) and the Treasury (Treasury) have begun to explore the possibility of expanding options for participants, but have not yet helped plan sponsors address key challenges to offering a mix of options through their plan.
Countries reviewed used various strategies to increase participants' knowledge and understanding of spend-down options, which may be useful to DOL in its ongoing efforts. Strategies used by other countries include (1) communicating spend-down options to participants in an understandable and timely manner, and (2) helping participants see how their savings would translate into a stream of income in retirement by providing them with projections of retirement income in their annual benefit statements. Currently, 401(k) participants have difficulty predicting how long their savings will last because most benefit statements do not focus on the stream of income it can generate. DOL is currently considering including income projections in statements, which may help participants better understand what their balance could provide on a monthly basis once they retire.
Regulators in the countries GAO reviewed employed several approaches to overseeing the spend-down phase aimed at helping participants sustain an income throughout retirement. For example, most of the countries used withdrawal rules and restrictions for lump sums and programmed withdrawals to help protect participants from outliving their savings. With respect to annuities, DOL continues to consider current regulatory barriers that may prevent 401(k) plan sponsors from offering annuities, which do not exist in other countries. Looking at what other countries require may help DOL in its efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL and Treasury, as part of their ongoing efforts, consider other countries' approaches in helping 401(k) plan sponsors expand access to a mix of spend-down options for participants. GAO also recommends that DOL consider other countries' approaches in providing information about options and regulating the selection of annuities within DC plans. In response, DOL generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and will evaluate approaches. |
gao_T-RCED-97-83 | gao_T-RCED-97-83_0 | DOT’s Leadership Role in Surface Transportation Research
ISTEA expressed the need for a new direction in surface transportation research, finding that despite an annual federal expenditure of more than $10 billion on surface transportation and its infrastructure, the federal government lacked a clear vision of the role of federally funded surface transportation research and an integrated framework for the fragmented surface transportation research programs dispersed throughout the government. While the Department has established councils and committees to coordinate its research, the lack of a departmental focal point and an inadequate strategic plan may limit its leadership role. Until all these issues are addressed, the Department may not be able to respond to ISTEA’s call for an integrated framework for surface transportation research and assume a leadership role in surface research. ITS Program Holds Potential for Innovation If Deployment Obstacles Can Be Resolved
ISTEA also reflected congressional concerns about the adequacy of the funding for advanced transportation systems, suggesting that too little funding would increase the nation’s dependence on foreign technologies and equipment. Since 1992, the ITS program has received through contract authority and the annual appropriations process about $1.3 billion. The national architecture, which identifies the components and functions of an ITS system, was completed in July 1996. We also found that the lack of widespread deployment of integrated ITS systems results from insufficient knowledge of ITS systems among state and local transportation agencies; limited data on the costs and benefits of ITS; and inadequate funding in light of other transportation investment priorities. Second, it will take time for state and local transportation officials to understand the architecture and supplement their traditional approach to solving transportation problems through civil engineering strategies with the information management and telecommunications focus envisioned by an integrated ITS approach. Innovative Financing Through State Infrastructure Banks
Until recently, states have generally not been able to tailor federal highway funding to a form other than a grant. Thus projects with potential revenue streams will be needed to make a SIB viable. SIB financial assistance is intended to complement, not replace, traditional transportation grant programs and provide states increased flexibility to offer many types of financial assistance. DOT has not yet selected additional states for the program. Of particular note is FHWA’s special project to test and evaluate the use of design-build contracting methods under the agency’s authority to conduct research. Proponents of design-build have identified several benefits. One difficulty in implementing design-build lies in state laws limiting its use. The survey identified 17 states that did not permit the use of combined design and construction contracts. In addition, a 1995 Study by the Building Futures Council noted that some states indirectly preclude design-build by requiring separation of design and construction services—construction services being awarded to the lowest bidder only after the design is complete. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed how innovation in federal research, financing and contracting methods has the potential for improving the performance of the nation's surface transportation system, focusing on three reports it completed for the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works' deliberations on the reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) investments in surface transportation research have provided benefits to users and the economy; (2) the Department of Transportation (DOT) has a critical role to play by funding research, establishing an overall research mission with objectives for accomplishment and priorities for allocating funds, and acting as a focal point for technology transfer; (3) DOT's organizational structure and lack of both a strategic plan and a departmental focal point may limit its impact on research; (4) until these issues are addressed, DOT may not be able to respond to ISTEA's call for an integrated framework for surface transportation research; (5) DOT's Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) Program has received $1.3 billion to advance the use of computer and telecommunications technology that will enhance the safety and efficiency of surface transportation; (6) although the program envisioned widespread deployment of integrated multimodal ITS systems, this vision has not been realized for several reasons: (a) the ITS national architecture was not completed until July 1996 and ITS technical standards will not be completed until 2001; and (b) the lack of knowledge of ITS technologies and systems integration among state and local officials, insufficient data documenting the cost effectiveness of ITS in solving transportation problems and competing priorities for limited transportation dollars will further constrain widespread ITS deployment; (7) before DOT can aggressively pursue widespread deployment of integrated ITS, it must help state and local official overcome these obstacles; (8) State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs) offer the promise of helping to close the gap between transportation needs and available resources by sustaining and potentially expanding a fixed sum of federal capital, often by attracting private investment; (9) specifically, these banks provide states increased flexibility to offer may types of financial assistance; (10) some state officials and industry experts that GAO talked with remain skeptical that SIBs will produce the expected benefits; (11) the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) is testing and evaluating the use of an innovative design-build contracting method for highway construction; (12) proponents of design-build see several advantages to the approach; however, FHwA's authority to implement design-build is limited and 17 states have laws which, in effect, prevent the use of design-build; and (13) while design-build may result in the faster completion of projects, it may also require an accelerated revenue stream to pay for construction. |
gao_GAO-15-319 | gao_GAO-15-319_0 | Key Proposed Uses for Electronically Readable Cards
Electronically readable cards could be implemented for a number of different purposes in Medicare. Smart Cards Can Provide More Rigorous Authentication, but All Cards Could Electronically Convey Beneficiary Identity and Insurance Information
The type of electronically readable card most appropriate for Medicare would depend on how the cards would be used. Three common types of electronically readable cards that could be used to replace the current printed Medicare card are smart cards, magnetic stripe cards, and bar code cards. Our analysis found that smart cards could provide substantially more rigorous authentication of the identities of Medicare beneficiaries and providers than magnetic stripe or bar code cards (see fig. The Use of Electronically Readable Cards Would Provide Limited Benefits for Reducing Fraud, but Could Aid Administrative Processes
Using electronically readable cards to authenticate beneficiary and provider presence at the point of care could potentially curtail certain types of Medicare fraud, but would have limited effect since CMS has stated that it would continue to pay claims regardless of whether a card was used. told us that requiring cards to be used would not be feasible because of concerns that doing so would limit beneficiaries’ access to care. According to CMS officials and stakeholders, there are legitimate reasons why a card may not be present at the point of care, such as when beneficiaries or providers forget their cards or during a medical emergency. Exchanging Medical Information with Electronically Readable Cards Is Not Part of Current Health Information Exchange Initiatives, and Would Likely Present Challenges
Using electronically readable cards to store and exchange beneficiary medical information is not part of current federal efforts to facilitate electronic health information exchange and would likely present challenges. Using Electronically Readable Cards to Convey Beneficiary Identity and Insurance Information Could Reduce Reimbursement Errors and Improve Medical Record Keeping
Using electronically readable cards to convey identity and insurance information to auto-populate and retrieve information from provider IT systems could reduce errors in the reimbursement process and improve medical record keeping and health information exchange. CMS and Providers Could Face Challenges Implementing Cards for Authentication, but Conveying Identity and Insurance Information Would Be Less Complex
CMS would need to update its claims processing systems to use electronically readable cards to authenticate beneficiary and provider presence at the point of care, while using the cards to convey beneficiary identity and insurance information might not require CMS to make IT updates. Authentication Would Involve Costs and Updates to CMS’s IT Systems, but Conveying Identity and Insurance Information Might Not Require Updates
Using electronically readable cards to authenticate beneficiaries and providers would require updates to CMS’s claims processing systems to verify that the cards were swiped at the point of care. Medicare currently does not issue cards to providers, and therefore CMS would need to implement a new program to issue and manage provider cards and to develop standards and procedures for card use. For example, CMS would have to disseminate information on the different functions and features of any card and information on what to do if the electronically readable functions of the card are not working. Providers Could Incur Costs and Face Challenges Updating Their IT Systems to Implement Electronically Readable Cards
For all potential uses of electronically readable cards, Medicare providers could incur costs and face challenges updating their IT systems to read and use information from the cards. The experiences of both countries also demonstrate that the implementation of an electronically readable card system can be a long process. In both France and Germany, the government established independent organizations to address stakeholders’ needs. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: List of Organizations Interviewed
To examine the potential benefits and limitations associated with the use of electronically readable cards in Medicare and the steps CMS and Medicare providers would need to take to implement and use electronically readable cards, we interviewed officials from the agencies and organizations listed in table 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Proposals have been put forward to replace the current paper Medicare cards, which display beneficiaries' Social Security numbers, with electronically readable cards, and to issue electronically readable cards to providers as well. Electronically readable cards include cards with magnetic stripes and bar codes and “smart” cards that can process data. Proponents of such cards suggest that their use would bring a number of benefits to the program and Medicare providers, including reducing fraud through the authentication of beneficiary and provider identity at the point of care, furthering electronic health information exchange, and improving provider record keeping and reimbursement processes.
GAO was asked to review the ways in which electronically readable cards could be used for Medicare. This report (1) evaluates the different functions and features of electronically readable cards, (2) examines the potential benefits and limitations associated with the use of electronically readable cards in Medicare, (3) examines the steps CMS and Medicare providers would need to take to implement and use electronically readable cards, and (4) describes the lessons learned from the implementation and use of electronically readable cards in other countries. To do this, GAO reviewed documents, interviewed stakeholders, and conducted visits to two countries with electronically readable card systems.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that administers Medicare—could use electronically readable cards in Medicare for a number of different purposes. Three key uses include authenticating beneficiary and provider presence at the point of care, electronically exchanging beneficiary medical information, and electronically conveying beneficiary identity and insurance information to providers. The type of electronically readable card that would be most appropriate depends on how the cards would be used. Smart cards could provide substantially more rigorous authentication than cards with magnetic stripes or bar codes, and provide greater security and storage capacity for exchanging medical information. All electronically readable cards could be used to convey beneficiary identity and insurance information since they all have adequate storage capacity to contain such information.
Using electronically readable cards to authenticate beneficiary and provider presence at the point of care could curtail certain types of Medicare fraud, but would have limited effect since CMS officials stated that Medicare would continue to pay claims regardless of whether a card was used due to legitimate reasons why a card may not be present. CMS officials and stakeholders told us that claims should still be paid even when cards are not used because they would not want to limit beneficiaries' access to care. Using electronically readable cards to exchange medical information is not part of current federal efforts to facilitate health information exchange and, if used to supplement current efforts, it would likely involve challenges with interoperability and ensuring consistency with provider records. Using electronically readable cards to convey identity and insurance information to auto-populate and retrieve information from provider information technology (IT) systems could reduce reimbursement errors and improve medical record keeping.
To use electronically readable cards to authenticate beneficiaries and providers, CMS would need to update its claims processing systems to verify that the cards were swiped at the point of care. CMS would also need to update its current card management processes, including issuing provider cards and developing standards and procedures for card use. Conversely, using the cards to convey beneficiary identity and insurance information might not require updates to CMS's IT systems or card management practices. For all potential uses, Medicare providers could incur costs and face challenges updating their IT systems to use the cards.
The experiences of France and Germany demonstrate that an electronically readable card system can be implemented on a national scale, though implementation took years in both countries. It is unclear if the cost savings reported by both countries would be achievable for Medicare since the savings resulted from using the cards to implement electronic billing, which Medicare already uses. Both countries have processes in place to manage competing stakeholder needs and oversee the technical infrastructure needed for the cards.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-97-192 | gao_HEHS-97-192_0 | NCS has a strategic plan for addressing the demand for veterans’ burials up to fiscal year 2000, but the plan does not tie its strategic and performance goals to external factors such as veterans’ mortality rates and preferences for burial options—that is, caskets, in-ground cremains, or columbaria niches. Beyond the year 2000, NCS officials said they will continue using the basic strategies contained in the current 5-year plan. Five-Year Plan Has Multiple Strategies
According to its 5-year strategic plan (1996-2000), one of NCS’ primary goals is to ensure that burial in a national or state veterans’ cemetery is an option for all eligible veterans and their family members. First, NCS plans to establish, when feasible, new national cemeteries. Fourth, NCS plans to encourage states to provide additional burial sites for veterans through participation in the State Cemetery Grants Program. According to NCS’ Chief of Planning, NCS will encourage states to locate cemeteries in areas where it does not plan to operate and maintain national cemeteries. Traditional Casket Cemetery Would Be Twice as Expensive as Cremains Cemeteries
As demand for burial benefits increases, cemeteries become filled, thus reducing the burial options available to veterans and their families. Costs Vary Slightly for Columbarium and In-Ground Cremains Interments
Over 30 years, it would cost about the same to plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain a columbarium and an in-ground cremains cemetery with 50,000 burial spaces: $23 and $21 million, respectively. Casket burials would be the most expensive per burial and would have the shortest service period. Columbarium Burial Offers Most Efficient Option for Extending the Service Period of Existing Cemeteries
As less burial space is available, columbarium burial offers the most efficient interment option for extending the service period of existing cemeteries. While historical data imply that the majority of veterans and eligible dependents prefer a casket burial, NCS national data show that the demand for cremation at national cemeteries is increasing. Recommendation
To better serve the American veteran, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans’ Affairs instruct the director of the National Cemetery System to extend its strategic plan to address veterans’ long-term burial demand during the peak years of 2005 to 2010; collect and use information on veterans’ burial preferences to better plan for future burial needs; and identify opportunities to construct columbaria in existing cemeteries, for the purpose of increasing burial capacity and extending the cemeteries’ service periods. Our Analysis of the Long-Term Costs of Alternative Modes of Interment: Methodology and Data
Introduction
In this appendix we discuss the methodology, data sources, and principal assumptions that we used to characterize the relative long-term cost of each of three modes of interment: casket, in-ground cremains, and columbarium; project the outlays that would be required to construct and operate a cemetery that offers each of these modes of interment over a period of 30 years or more; and estimate the cost of these three types of interment on the basis of the development of a total of 1 acre of land composed of parcels of land not contiguous to each other in a cemetery nearing depletion of available burial sites. Site development. For phases 2 and 3, costs would be lower. Information on the Costs of Three Types of National Cemeteries
We provided information on a cemetery providing only casket interment, another providing only interment of cremated remains in columbarium niches, and a third providing interment of in-ground cremated remains. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) National Cemetery System (NCS), focusing on: (1) NCS' plans for addressing veterans' future burial demands; (2) the relative 30-year costs of three types of cemeteries: casket-only internment, cremated internment in columbarium niches, and in-ground internment of cremated remains; and (3) what NCS can do to extend the service period of existing national cemeteries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NCS projects that demand for veterans' burial benefits will increase; (2) NCS has adopted a 5-year strategic plan with the goal of ensuring that burial in a national or state veterans' cemetery is an available option for all veterans and their eligible family members; (3) strategies outlined in NCS' plan include: (a) establishing five new national cemeteries; (b) developing available space for cremated remains; (c) acquiring contiguous land at existing cemeteries; and (d) encouraging states to provide additional burial sites through participation in the State Cemetery Grants Program; (4) the strategic plan does not tie its goals to external factors, such as the mortality rate for veterans and veterans' relative preferences for burial options, that will affect the need for additional cemetery capacity; (5) it is unclear how NCS will address burial demand during the peak years when pressure on it will be greatest, since NCS has not developed a strategic plan for beyond 2000; (6) according to NCS' Chief of Planning, beyond 2000, NCS will continue using the basic strategies outlined in its current 5-year plan; (7) NCS plans to encourage states to establish veterans' cemeteries in areas where it does not plan to operate national cemeteries; (8) fewer than half of the states have established veterans' cemeteries; (9) states also have shown limited interest in a legislative proposal to increase state participation by increasing the share of federal funding; (10) GAO estimated the present value of the costs of three types of cemeteries, each with 50,000 burial sites, over a 30-year period; (11) planning, designing, constructing, and operating a cemetery of casket grave sites and no other burial options would be the most expensive interment option available; (12) the costs for a cemetery that offered only a columbarium and one that offered only in-ground cremains sites would be about the same; (13) while the cost of a casket-only cemetery would be over $50 million, the cost of a cremains-only cemetery would be about $21 million; (14) while the majority of veterans and eligible family members prefer a casket burial, cremation is an acceptable interment option for many, and the demand for cremation continues to increase; (15) as annual internments increase, cemeteries will reach their burial capacity, increasing the importance of making the most efficient use of available cemetery space; and (16) GAO's analysis of three interment options showed that columbaria offer the most efficient interment option because they would involve the lowest average burial cost and would significantly extend a cemetery's service period. |
gao_GAO-02-382 | gao_GAO-02-382_0 | The medical record review includes determining whether the HHA has a current and appropriate plan of care for each patient as ordered by the patient’s physician, whether the ordered care and services are provided and coordinated by the personnel who furnish them, and whether the patient’s physician is notified of changes in medical condition. Weaknesses in Survey Process and Inconsistencies in How States Conduct Surveys Mask Potential Quality Problems
Shortcomings in the HHA survey process as well as inconsistencies in how states conduct surveys make it difficult to assess the quality of care provided. In addition, surveyors did not always conduct on-site revisits to ensure that the COP deficiencies identified had been corrected. Although CMS requires HHAs with a good survey track record to be surveyed every 3 years, some must be surveyed annually, such as those with COP-level deficiencies and those with 3 or fewer years in the Medicare program and thus little practical experience in providing home health services. This could present a gap in state oversight with respect to complaints, since they may be filed directly with an HHA rather than with the state. Moreover, CMS oversight of state activities is too limited to identify the significant problems we have reported. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and to the Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. V) and indicate that serious quality problems are likely understated. | What GAO Found
The 6,900 Home Health Agencies (HHAs) that serve Medicare beneficiaries must meet federal requirements, known as conditions of participation (COP), to ensure that they have the appropriate staff, are following the plan of care specified by a physician, maintain medical records to document the care provided, and periodically reassess each patient's condition. Although nationwide surveys done at HHAs since 1998 have identified a small proportion of agencies with serious deficiencies, the extent of the problem may be understated, and dangerous situations affecting home health patients may occur more often than documented. Shortcomings in the survey process and inconsistencies in state surveys make it difficult to assess the quality of care delivered and may mask potential problems. The ability to lodge complaints about an HHA and have them resolved promptly is important to protecting patient health and safety. HHA oversight by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been too limited to identify the problems GAO found in the survey process. CMS does not review state compliance with requirements for conducting HHA surveys, such as whether HHAs with COP-level deficiencies are surveyed annually rather than every 3 years or whether minimum patient visit and medical record review samples are adhered to. |
gao_RCED-96-147 | gao_RCED-96-147_0 | As shown in table 1, this increase was the result of construction problems, new construction requirements, and enhancements of the project. The project’s cost could increase beyond the $5.9 billion estimate. Pending lawsuits could also increase costs. However, about $380 million in financing commitments may not be realized. Therefore, to cover current and future funding shortfalls, the Authority may have to make difficult decisions, such as reducing the funding or scope of other rail capital projects; deferring or cancelling planned transit projects; or extending the schedule for completing the Red Line, which could further increase the project’s cost. Financing the Project’s Current Estimated Cost
The Authority plans to fund $3.1 billion of the project’s $5.9 billion total cost with federal funds and the remainder from state and local funding sources. FTA’s Oversight of the Project’s Quality Control and Quality Assurance Practices
In November 1994, the Authority and FTA agreed to a plan to improve the overall management of construction of the Red Line project. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided copies of a draft of this report to FTA and Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority officials for their review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority's Red Line subway project, focusing on the: (1) project's estimated cost; (2) Authority's financing plans; and (3) Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) oversight of the project's quality control and assurance practices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of February 1996, the project's estimated total cost was $5.9 billion; (2) project costs have increased due to construction problems, new construction requirements, and project enhancements; (3) additional design problems and pending lawsuits may further increase project costs; (4) the Authority plans to use $3.1 billion in federal funds and $2.8 billion in state and local funds to finance the project, but it may not realize about $380 million of the total; (5) the Authority may have to reduce the funding or scope of other rail projects, defer or cancel planned projects, or extend the project's construction schedule to cover current or future funding shortfalls, but extending the project's construction schedule could also increase costs; (6) in response to FTA actions, the Authority is reorganizing its quality control and assurance programs and increasing program staff; and (7) FTA has increased the number of on-site oversight personnel to improve project monitoring. |
gao_GAO-06-558T | gao_GAO-06-558T_0 | U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries Face Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Challenges
One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which began installing equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2005, the program had spent about $130 million to complete installations at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. Ultimately, DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570 million. In addition to DOE’s efforts, other U.S. agencies also have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign governments. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could compromise their programs’ effectiveness, including (1) corruption of foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of equipment at some foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of handheld equipment, and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at some border sites. We also reported that State’s ability to carry out its role as lead interagency coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan for interagency coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance. For example, according to information we received from program managers at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment had been provided to 36 foreign countries through the end of fiscal year 2005. DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain
Through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors nationwide— about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy—at international mail and express courier facilities, land border crossings, and seaports in the United States. DHS plans to deploy 3,034 portal monitors by September 2009 at a cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. CBP’s guidance does not specifically require officers to open containers and inspect their interiors, even when their external examination cannot unambiguously resolve the alarm. We found that CBP inspectors lack access to NRC license data that could be used to authenticate a license at the border. Related GAO Products
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain. Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. Together with the March 2005 report on the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, these reports represent GAO's analysis of the U.S. effort to deploy radiation detection equipment worldwide. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made and challenges faced by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign countries and (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges it faces.
What GAO Found
Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since fiscal year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36 countries. For example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's Second Line of Defense program had completed installation of equipment at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could compromise their efforts, including corruption of foreign border security officials, technical limitations and inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. To address these challenges, U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating corruption by installing multitiered communications systems that establish redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. State coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication of effort. However, State's ability to carry out this role has been limited by deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to other countries. Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors through December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to install a total of 3,034 radiation portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers have made progress in using radiation detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines, but CBP's secondary inspection procedures could be improved. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require its officers to open containers and inspect them for nuclear and radioactive materials when they cannot make a determination from an external inspection and that DHS work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute procedures by which inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports of entry. |
gao_GAO-17-653 | gao_GAO-17-653_0 | DOD’s Strategic Policy Does Not Address 5 of the 6 Required Elements, and the Department Has Not Issued an Implementation Plan
On March 7, 2017, DOD issued its strategic policy for managing its prepositioned stocks in DOD Directive 3110.07, Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel (PWRM) Strategic Policy, and included information that addresses one of the six reporting elements enumerated in section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014. Table: GAO’s Assessment of DOD’s Strategic Policy Compared to the Six Reporting Elements Required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 GAO Assessment of DOD’s Strategic Policy Addressed (1) Overarching strategic guidance concerning planning and resource priorities that link the Department of Defense’s current and future needs for prepositioning stocks, such as desired responsiveness, to evolving national defense objectives. However, we assessed the remaining elements as not addressed because DOD did not provide the required information in its strategic policy. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the strategic policy does not include this information because it is intended to serve as a directive for developing policies and assigning key responsibilities, which can be used as a mechanism for addressing required elements at a later time. Specifically:
Element 2 (Description of the Department’s Vision and Desired End State) and Element 3 (Specific Interim Goals): DOD’s strategic policy does not include a description of the department’s vision and the desired end state for its prepositioning programs, as required by element 2, or specific interim goals for achieving the department’s vision and desired end state, as required by element 3. Further, DOD has not yet issued an implementation plan for managing its prepositioned stock programs, which was also required by Section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014. The NDAA required DOD to complete the plan by April 24, 2014. They anticipated that a plan would be finalized by September 30, 2017. It will be important for DOD to address the elements that were omitted from its strategic policy as it creates the implementation plan to ensure that the plan is linked to a complete strategy on prepositioned stocks for the department. We have reported for the past 6 years on the importance of DOD having a department-wide strategic policy and joint oversight of the services’ prepositioned stock programs, and Congress has required DOD to take action in this area. In the cases of a description of the strategic environment and challenges, metrics, and a framework for joint departmental oversight, DOD’s policy appropriately assigns responsibility for the development of such information, and therefore we are not making recommendations related to those elements because the department has already directed their implementation. Without either revising its strategic policy or including in other guidance the department’s vision, end state, and goals for its prepositioned stock programs, DOD will continue to be ill positioned to recognize potential duplication, achieve efficiencies, and fully synchronize the services’ prepositioned stock programs across the department. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s management of its prepositioned stocks and reduce potential duplication among the services’ programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to revise DOD’s strategic policy or include in other department-wide guidance: a description of the department’s vision and the desired end state for its prepositioned stock programs, and specific interim goals for achieving that vision and desired end state. DOD concurred with our recommendations and noted it is taking steps to implement them. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD positions billions of dollars worth of assets–including combat vehicles, rations, medical supplies, and repair parts—at strategic locations around the world to use during early phases of operations. Each of the military services maintains its own prepositioned stock program. For the past 6 years, GAO has reported on the risk of duplication and inefficiencies in the services' programs due to the absence of a department-wide strategic policy and joint oversight. Section 321 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 required DOD to maintain a strategic policy and develop an implementation plan to manage its prepositioned stocks.
The NDAA for fiscal year 2014 also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's strategic policy and implementation plan. This report assessed the extent to which DOD's strategic policy addresses mandated reporting elements and describes the status of DOD's implementation plan. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD's strategic policy against the elements required in the NDAA and discussed the status of the implementation plan with DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) strategic policy on its prepositioned stock programs, issued in March 2017, addressed one of the six mandated reporting elements (see table). Specifically, DOD's policy describes strategic planning and resource guidance (element 1), as required.
GAO assessed the remaining five reporting elements as not addressed because DOD did not provide the required information in its policy. For three of the five elements that were not addressed—a description of the strategic environment and challenges (element 4), metrics (element 5), and a framework for joint oversight (element 6)—DOD's policy assigns responsibility for the development of such information, and therefore GAO is not making recommendations related to those elements because DOD has already directed their implementation. However, for two of the five elements that were not addressed—a description of the department's vision and desired end state (element 2) and specific interim goals (element 3)—DOD's strategic policy does not include the required information and instead directs the development of component's (rather than the department's) vision, end state, and goals.
DOD officials stated that the strategic policy does not include required information such as a department-wide vision, end state, and interim goals because it is intended to serve as a directive for assigning responsibilities. Without revising its strategic policy or including required information in other department-wide guidance, DOD will not be positioned to fully synchronize the services' prepositioned stock programs to avoid unnecessary duplication and achieve efficiencies.
DOD has not yet issued an implementation plan for managing its prepositioned stock programs, which the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required by April 24, 2014. DOD officials anticipated that a plan would be finalized by September 30, 2017. It will be important for DOD to address the elements that were omitted from its strategic policy as it creates the implementation plan to ensure that the plan is linked to a complete strategy on prepositioned stock programs for the department.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD revise its prepositioned stocks strategic policy or include in other department-wide guidance (1) a description of the department's vision and the desired end state, and (2) specific interim goals for achieving this vision and end state. DOD concurred with the recommendations, noting that it is taking steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-730 | gao_GAO-06-730_0 | The act directs the services, to the maximum extent practicable, to incorporate in each recovery plan (1) a description of site-specific management actions necessary to achieve the plan’s goal for the conservation and survival of the species; (2) objective, measurable criteria that will result in a determination that the species can be removed from the list of threatened and endangered species (i.e., delisted); and (3) estimates of the time and cost required to carry out those measures needed to achieve the plan’s goal. To do this, recovery plans aim to identify threats to the species’ survival and the actions needed to mitigate those threats. The services’ biologists report that 19 of these species are likely to be delisted within the next 25 years because (1) the primary threats faced by the species have been or are being mitigated; (2) the species are more prevalent than thought at the time they were listed and/or habitat has been secured for the species; or (3) they are the beneficiaries of extensive recovery efforts and are expected to respond relatively quickly to those efforts. In contrast, the remaining 12 species are far from recovery because (1) they respond slowly to recovery actions; (2) the services have not been successful in protecting essential habitat; or (3) there are gaps in knowledge about the threats challenging their survival, or how to mitigate these threats. The remaining 5 of the 19 species are expected to recover and be delisted within 25 years, because they are expected to respond relatively quickly to recovery efforts involving significant resources and a wide range of stakeholders. The services’ biologists believe that four of these species will likely recover, but not for many decades—they respond slowly to recovery efforts. For the three remaining species, not enough is known about the threats they face, or how to mitigate those threats, to predict whether or when a successful recovery is possible. Some Species’ Habitats Are Difficult to Protect
Recovery efforts for five of the species we reviewed are far from complete because FWS is unable to protect the habitat necessary to recover these species. Recovery Plans Play an Important Role in Recovering Certain Threatened and Endangered Species
We found that recovery plans have played an important role in the recovery efforts of all but one of the 31 species we reviewed. Although not all of these species are nearing recovery, the services’ biologists report that the success that these species have had can be attributed, in large part, to implementation of actions in the species’ recovery plans. In some cases, historic and legal events outside the purview of the recovery plan— such as the banning of DDT, which set the stage for the bald eagle’s recovery—have been critical to the species recovery. The species declined significantly because logging eliminated much of the woodpecker’s habitat of old-growth pine. The plan also identified measures to protect existing woodpecker habitat on private land, for example, through conservation agreements. Interior generally agreed with the information presented in this report; its letter is presented in appendix III. Scope and Methodology
In response to a request from 10 members of Congress, we (1) identified factors affecting the length of time to recover 31 selected species listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act, and (2) described the role that recovery plans have played in recovering these species. First, we used three criteria to identify species that were nearing recovery or had significant attention devoted to them, and thus would be expected to be making progress towards recovery. The information provided is based primarily on species’ recovery plans, Federal Register notices associated with the species, and information provided by the biologists at the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) who are responsible for recovering the species we reviewed. Building artificial cavities is necessary because most existing trees are not suitable for the red-cockaded woodpecker to carve cavities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (the services) are responsible for administration and implementation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. The act generally requires the services to develop recovery plans for endangered and threatened species--species facing extinction or likely to face extinction, respectively. Recovery plans identify threats to the species' survival and the actions needed to mitigate those threats. Proposed amendments to the act are under consideration and GAO was asked to provide information to facilitate this effort. In April 2006, GAO issued a report providing high-level information on the extent to which recovery plans contain estimates of when species are expected to be recovered, among other things. This follow-on report provides more detailed information on the factors that affect species recovery and the importance of recovery plans in recovery efforts. For 31 species--selected because they were nearing recovery, or had significant attention devoted to them and thus would be expected to be making progress towards recovery--GAO (1) identifies factors affecting the length of time to recover the species and (2) describes the role recovery plans have played in recovering these species. The Department of the Interior agreed with the facts presented in this report. The Department of Commerce declined to comment.
What GAO Found
Many factors affect the length of time it takes to recover the 31 species GAO reviewed. Specifically, 19 of these species have been recently delisted (removed from the list of endangered and threatened species) or are likely to be delisted within the next 25 years either because (1) they faced a primary threat that has been or is being mitigated; (2) they were found to be more prevalent than biologists thought at the time they were listed and/or habitats have been secured for the species; or (3) they are expected to respond relatively quickly to recovery efforts because, for example, they reproduce quickly in the presence of good habitat. The remaining 12 species are much farther away from being delisted, and for some, recovery is uncertain. Some of these species are not expected to recover for many decades because they respond relatively slowly to recovery efforts, for example, because they reproduce slowly. Recovery for the remaining species is uncertain either because their habitat is difficult to protect, or because not enough is known about the threats facing the species or how to mitigate those threats. Recovery plans have played an important role in the recovery efforts of nearly all of the species GAO reviewed by identifying many of the actions the services' biologists deemed most important to the species' recovery. The services' biologists report that these actions have contributed, at least in part, to the progress made in recovering these species. For example, recovery of the red-cockaded woodpecker is dependent on having sufficient habitat--the species nests in cavities that they peck out of old pine trees, but logging largely eliminated these trees from the woodpecker's range. The recovery plan identifies measures to protect the habitat, including land acquisition and conservation agreements with landowners, as well as steps to provide artificial nest boxes until pines mature enough to provide natural habitat for the birds. The services' biologists told us that these actions have significantly improved this species' prospects for recovery. However, for about one-half of the species GAO reviewed, actions beyond those in the recovery plans also played an important role in progress toward the species' recovery. For example, the banning of the insecticide dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1972--a year before the Endangered Species Act was enacted--has been critical to recovery of the bald eagle. |
gao_GAO-03-21 | gao_GAO-03-21_0 | In 1999, the Assistant Secretary of the Army certified the system as fully operational for the maintenance mission at the five maintenance depots. Report Does Not Contain Adequate Information to Assess Progress
The Army’s May 2002 report on its workload and performance system does not contain the information that Congress needs to assess the Army’s progress in implementing the system. In our analysis of the Army’s 2002 plan, we found that, while it addresses some of these elements, it does not provide the detailed or complete data that is needed to adequately assess the Army’s progress in implementing the workload and performance system. Specifically, the report lacked schedules that include implementation and completion dates and interim milestones. Army Has Not Sufficiently Tested the Interface between AWPS and the Logistics Modernization Program
Although the Army has begun developing an interface between AWPS and the Logistics Modernization Program, it has not sufficiently tested the interface to ensure that data can be shared between the two systems and that the AWPS capability will not be adversely affected. The Army has not demonstrated to Congress how well the system has helped it thus far to determine future civilian workload requirements based on projected workloads. | What GAO Found
At the direction of the House Committee on National Security, the Army began developing the Army Workload and Performance System (AWPS) in 1996. This automated system was intended to address a number of specific weaknesses highlighted in several GAO and Army studies since 1994 regarding the Army's inability to support its civilian personnel requirements by using an analytically based workload forecasting system. Army's May 2002 report on AWPS does not provide Congress with adequate information to assess the Army's progress in implementing the system. Specifically, the 2002 plan does not include (1) a detailed summary of all costs that the Army has incurred, or the expenditures that it anticipates in the future, to develop and implement the system; (2) a list of the milestones that the Army has, or has not, achieved in the previous year and a list of milestones that are projected for the future; and (3) an evaluation of how well the system has performed to date in fulfilling its primary function--that is, of matching manpower needs with depot workloads. Although the Army has begun developing an interface between AWPS and the Logistics Modernization Program, it has not sufficiently tested the interface to ensure that data can be shared between the two systems and that the capability of the workload and performance system will not be adversely affected. |
gao_RCED-97-16 | gao_RCED-97-16_0 | In addition to the special-use permit fees that are specifically for the use of the land, the Forest Service is authorized to recover the direct and indirect costs incurred in providing services that support the permitted activity. GRFS, which calculates fees for commercial recreational activities, limits the Forest Service’s fees to generally less than 3 percent of the permittees’ gross revenues while states receive 5 to 15 percent of gross revenues for similar uses of state lands. GRFS is a formula-based fee system that the agency has been using for decades. Accordingly, the fees are frequently lower than what they should be because they are based on out-of-date information. The costs incurred in reviewing and processing these recreation special-use applications were estimated to be about $6.5 million. As a result, these costs are not being recovered. Because of the lack of a cost-accounting system, Forest Service officials were not able to provide us with information on the overall cost of administering the recreation special-use permit program, which would not only include processing and reviewing applications for permits, but also include activities such as annual billing, conducting inspections, and training staff. As a result, these weaknesses have not been addressed. Even though the Forest Service has had the authority to recover costs since 1952, it has not developed the needed regulations to do so. In addition to a lack of priority, there is a lack of incentives for forest managers to seek higher permit fees. However, the Forest Service’s recreation special-use program is not receiving fair market value or recovering the costs of the program. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Government Affairs to determine (1) whether the fees currently charged for recreation special-use permits reflect fair market value; (2) whether permit processing and review costs are recovered; and (3) if fees do not reflect fair market value and costs are not being recovered, why not. As agreed, we focused our review on the Forest Service’s management of commercial and noncommercial recreation special-use permits because these permits account for approximately 73 percent of the annual fee revenue received from all Forest Service special-use permits. To assess the fair market value of fees for noncommercial activities, we limited our review and comparison to recreation residence permit sites. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Forest Service's management of the recreation special-use program, focusing on whether: (1) the fees currently charged for recreation special-uses reflect fair market value; (2) application processing and review costs are recovered; and (3) fees reflect fair market value and costs are not being recovered, and if not, why.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in many instances, the Forest Service is not getting fair market fees for commercial and noncommercial recreation special-use permits; (2) the Forest Service's fee system that sets fees for most commercial uses has not been updated in nearly 30 years and generally limits fees to less than 3 percent of a permittee's gross revenues; (3) in comparison, fees for similar commercial uses of nearby state-held land average 5 to 15 percent of a permittee's gross revenues; (4) fees for holders of recreation residence permits are based on out-of-date assessments of the value of the land and, as a result, fees for many of these permit holders are lower than they should be on the basis of current market conditions; (5) while the Forest Service has been authorized to recover costs incurred in reviewing and processing all types of special-use permit applications since as far back as 1952, it has not done so; (6) on the basis of Service-provided information, GAO estimated that in 1994 the costs to review and process special-use permits were about $13 million, but this would not represent the cost to run the entire program, which also includes activities such as annual billing, conducting inspections, and training staff; (7) Service officials acknowledge that because they do not have a cost accounting system, they do not know the cost of administering all aspects of the special-use permit program; (8) the lack of priority given to the program by agency management and the lack of incentives to correct known problems contribute to the Service's problems in collecting fees and recovering costs; (9) as a result, resources needed to improve known program weaknesses have not been made available; and (10) since additional fees collected would generally be returned to the U.S. Treasury and not benefit the forest, there is a lack of incentive for the Service to dedicate the additional resources to address these issues. |
gao_GAO-11-468 | gao_GAO-11-468_0 | Initiating and Classifying the Recall
During this phase of a device recall, a firm initiates a recall, while FDA classifies the recall based on health risks presented by use of the device. For class II recalls, FDA recommends effectiveness checks with 10 percent of such customers and device users, and 2 percent for class III recalls. As part of its assessment, FDA may review a corrective and preventive action plan submitted by the recalling firm that describes the firm’s actions to prevent a recurrence of the problem that led to the recall. Thus, this phase of the recall process is important because it provides FDA with the opportunity to determine whether the firm has taken sufficient corrective and preventive actions. Firms Initiated Several Thousand Medical Device Recalls, but FDA Has Not Routinely Analyzed This Information to Aid Its Oversight of Recalls
From 2005 through 2009, firms initiated 3,510 medical device recalls. Several Thousand Device Recalls Were Initiated; Most Were Class II and Involved Cardiovascular and Radiological Devices
Between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2009, firms initiated 3,510 device recalls, an average of just over 700 per year. FDA classified the vast majority of all recalls—nearly 83 percent—as class II, meaning use of these devices may cause temporary adverse health consequences (moderate risk). The number of class I recalls initiated between 2005 and 2009 ranged from 17 to 41. On average, over 420 days passed between initiation of a recall and FDA’s termination. FDA Has Not Routinely Analyzed Data to Identify Systemic Problems Underlying Device Recalls
Although RES contains numerous data elements that would allow for analyses of recall data, FDA is not effectively using these data to identify whether there are systemic problems underlying recalls. Gaps in the Medical Device Recall Process Limit the Effective Implementation and Termination of the Highest-Risk Recalls
Gaps in the medical device recall process limit firms’ and FDA’s ability to ensure that the highest-risk recalls are implemented effectively and terminated in a timely manner. However, FDA did not always follow its own procedures and some procedures are unclear. FDA has also not established criteria, such as thresholds, based on the nature of devices, for assessing whether firms effectively completed recalls by correcting or removing a sufficient number of recalled devices. Further, we found that firms face challenges, such as locating specific devices or users of devices, and often could not correct or remove all devices. In addition, for a majority of the class I recalls we reviewed, FDA’s actions to ensure that recalls were complete were inconsistent with its procedures for overseeing recalls. Also, we found that FDA termination decisions were frequently not made in a timely manner—within 3 months of the completion of the recall— increasing the risk that unsafe or defective devices remained available for use. By addressing these weaknesses, FDA could reduce the risk that defective or unsafe medical devices remain on the market, potentially endangering public health. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance FDA’s oversight of medical device recalls, and in particular, those medical device recalls that pose the highest risk, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following four actions: Create a program to routinely and systematically assess medical device recall information, and use this information to proactively identify strategies for mitigating health risks presented by defective or unsafe devices. Develop explicit criteria for assessing whether recalling firms have performed an effective correction or removal action. Document the agency’s basis for terminating individual recalls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recalls are an important tool to mitigate serious health consequences associated with defective or unsafe medical devices. Typically, a recall is voluntarily initiated by the firm that manufactured the device. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees implementation of the recall. FDA classifies recalls based on health risks of using the recalled device--class I recalls present the highest risk (including death), followed by class II and class III. FDA also determines whether a firm has effectively implemented a recall, and when a recall can be terminated. This report identifies (1) the numbers and characteristics of medical device recalls and FDA's use of this information to aid its oversight, and (2) the extent to which the process ensures the effective implementation and termination of the highest-risk recalls. GAO interviewed FDA officials and examined information on medical device recalls initiated and reported from 2005 through 2009, and reviewed FDA's documentation for a sample of 53 (40 percent) of class I recalls initiated during this period.
What GAO Found
From 2005 through 2009, firms initiated 3,510 medical device recalls, an average of just over 700 per year. FDA classified the vast majority--nearly 83 percent--as class II, meaning use of these recalled devices carried a moderate health risk, or that the probability of serious adverse health consequences was remote. Just over 40 percent of the recalls involved cardiovascular, radiological, or orthopedic devices. FDA has used recall data to monitor individual recalls and target firms for inspections. However, it has not routinely analyzed recall data to determine whether there are systemic problems underlying trends in device recalls. Thus, FDA is missing an opportunity to use recall data to proactively identify and address the risks presented by unsafe devices. Several gaps in the medical device recall process limited firms' and FDA's abilities to ensure that the highest-risk recalls were implemented in an effective and timely manner. For many high-risk recalls, firms faced challenges, such as locating specific devices or device users, and thus could not correct or remove all devices. FDA's procedures for overseeing recalls are unclear. As a result, FDA officials examining similar situations sometimes reached opposite conclusions on whether recalls were effective. FDA had also not established criteria, based on the nature or type of devices, for assessing whether firms corrected or removed a sufficient number of recalled devices. Additionally, FDA's decisions to terminate completed recalls--that is, assess whether firms had taken sufficient actions to prevent a recurrence of the problems that led to the recalls--were frequently not made within its prescribed time frames. Finally, FDA did not document its justification for terminating recalls. If unaddressed by FDA, the combined effect of these gaps may increase the risk that unsafe medical devices could remain on the market. To aid its oversight of the medical device recall process, FDA should routinely assess information on device recalls, develop enhanced procedures and criteria for assessing the effectiveness of recalls, and document the agency's basis for terminating individual recalls. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-724T | gao_GAO-07-724T_0 | Case Studies Illustrate Fraudulent and Abusive Activity Associated with Federal Transit Benefit Program
Despite signing certifications stating that they will only use their transit benefits to cover actual out-of-pocket commuting costs, federal employees in the National Capital Region are committing fraud or violating the False Statements Act by requesting benefits they do not need and then selling or using these benefits for personal gain. In subsequent interviews with 13 of the 20 eBay sellers, we found instances where federal employees received parking benefits in addition to Metrocheks, were on extended leave from work, or did not even use public transportation to commute to work. The husband admitted to selling his transit benefits on eBay on multiple occasions (61 lots of Metrocheks valued at a total of $6,000). Investigations Show Federal Employees Fraudulently Sold Metrocheks on Craigslist
Posing as buyers, our investigators purchased $840 worth of benefits from three federal employees fraudulently selling their Metrocheks via Craigslist, a popular community Web site. Employee has participated in the transit benefits program since 2003 and admitted to knowingly providing false information on his transit benefit application by claiming the maximum benefit of $105 per month when his actual commuting cost is $60 per month. Neither of these individuals returned any of their unused benefits to Treasury. Weaknesses in Program Controls May Contribute to Fraud and Abuse
Weaknesses in the design of program controls at Commerce, Transportation, State, Homeland Security, Defense, Treasury, IRS, Patent and Trademark, and the Coast Guard can be associated with the fraudulent and abusive activity we identified. Although we did not conduct a comprehensive review of each agency’s controls, the results from our interviews and data mining illustrate flaws in the design of the controls. Figure 4 details the critical elements included in each agency’s written policies and procedures. Four employees admitted to us that they continued to receive transit benefits even though they were on extended absences from work. However, none of the agencies use information that employees provide in the normal course of working for the government—such as changes of address on their W-2 forms, taking annual leave, or traveling on business— to adjust benefits because of leave or travel. Federal Employees Likely Made More than $17 Million in Potentially Fraudulent Transit Benefit Claims
Using limited employee data and transit benefit records, we determined that the amount of potentially fraudulently transit benefits claimed during 2006 in the National Capital Region was at least $17 million and likely millions more. This magnitude is based on the roughly $70 million in transit benefits claimed by employees at Commerce, Transportation, Homeland Security, Defense, Treasury, IRS, and the Coast Guard. Given the number of agencies not covered by our analysis, it is likely that this amount is significantly understated and could be millions more. We similarly referred the individuals who provided inaccurate and inflated commuting cost information on their applications, the individuals who have received transit benefits from federal agencies even though they do not appear to work for the agencies, the individuals who left their agencies but did not return their unused benefits, and the former federal employees who continued to received benefits after leaving their respective agencies. Appendix I: Potential Magnitude of Fraudulent Payments
To provide an order of magnitude of the employees fraudulently claiming transit benefits within the National Capital Region, we identified a selection of federal employees who met a specific set of criteria and evaluated the validity of their transit benefit application data. We interviewed these participants and confirmed that the individuals we selected were not entitled to the maximum benefit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the federal transit benefits program, federal employees receive transit benefits (e.g., Metrocheks) to encourage them to commute to work via public transportation. Based on information provided by the Department of Transportation, as of July 2006, the National Capital Region had 120,000 participants claiming roughly $140 million in benefits. Recently, inspectors general (IG) of various agencies have found numerous prior instances of fraud, waste, and abuse in this federal program. Based on both the significance of these IG findings and the amount of federal money spent on transit benefits, GAO was asked to (1) investigate allegations that federal employees in the National Capital Region are involved in fraud and abuse related to the transit benefits program, (2) identify the potential causes of any fraud or abuse that is detected, and (3) estimate the magnitude of fraud and abuse in the National Capital Region in 2006. To address these objectives, GAO identified federal employees selling their transit benefits on the Internet and obtained additional data from these sellers' employing agencies to determine whether more widespread problems existed. GAO also obtained the policies and procedures governing the transit benefits program at each of the employing agencies.
What GAO Found
After investigating just 3 days of sales, GAO confirmed that at least 20 federal employees were fraudulently selling their Metrocheks on eBay. Most of the employees GAO interviewed admitted to falsifying their transit benefit applications and fraudulently selling their benefits. One GS-14 Department of the Treasury employee drove to work, parked for free in agency-provided parking, and was still able to collect $105 per month in Metrocheks--most of which he sold on eBay. Posing as buyers, GAO investigators also purchased Metrocheks from 3 federal employees fraudulently selling their benefits on Craigslist, a popular community Web site. GAO investigations revealed additional examples of federal employees inflating their transportation expenses on their transit benefit applications. Many of them admitted to intentionally falsifying their benefit applications to receive excess benefits. For example, a GS-11 Department of Transportation employee admitted to claiming the maximum allowable benefit of $105 per month when his actual commuting cost was only $54. Weaknesses in the design of program controls at the Departments of Commerce, Transportation, State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Patent and Trademark Office, and the U.S. Coast Guard can be associated with the fraudulent and abusive activity we identified. Although GAO did not conduct a comprehensive review of each agency's controls, the results from investigations illustrate flaws in the design of the controls. For example, GAO identified four employees who continued to receive transit benefits even though they were on extended absences from work, but none of the agencies had written policies requiring adjustment of benefits because of leave or travel. Using limited transit benefit records, we found that the possible magnitude of potentially fraudulent transit benefit payments during 2006 in the National Capital Region was more than $17 million. This order of magnitude is based on employees at Commerce, Transportation, Homeland Security, Defense, Treasury, IRS, and the Coast Guard who made false statements by requesting benefits they were not entitled to. Given the number of agencies not covered by our analysis, it is likely that this amount is significantly understated. |
gao_GAO-08-198 | gao_GAO-08-198_0 | States Have Increased the Contracting Out of Highway Activities, and Consultants and Contractors Increasingly Have Substantial Responsibility for Ensuring Quality and Delivery of Highway Projects
State DOTs have increased the amount and type of highway activities that they have contracted out to consultants and contractors over the past 5 years. For example, the South Carolina DOT began to increase its use of consultants to perform construction engineering and inspection work in 2000. While some states have used these contracting techniques in their highway projects, many states reported that they did not use them very often. State DOT officials responded in the survey that their expectations for their contracting levels over the next 5 years are based on their expectations for highway program funding levels, legislative considerations, anticipated workload, and staffing levels. State DOTs Indicate That Lack of In-house Staff and Expertise Are the Most Important Drivers in States’ Contracting Decisions
State DOTs indicate that the most important factor in state DOTs’ decision to contract out highway activities is the need to access the manpower and expertise necessary to ensure the timely delivery of their highway program, given in-house resource constraints. While state DOTs consider cost issues when making contracting decisions, cost savings are rarely the deciding factor in contracting decisions, and no state we interviewed regularly performs formal assessments of costs and benefits before deciding whether to contract out work. State DOTs Use Various Controls to Protect the Public Interest, but They Face Additional Challenges Arising from Current Contracting Trends
State officials we interviewed told us that they have sufficient tools and procedures in place to monitor and oversee contractors to ensure that the public interest is protected. With current trends in contracting state DOTs face additional challenges in conducting adequate oversight and monitoring. For projects using federal-aid highway funds, FHWA requires that a state highway employee always have ultimate responsibility for successful project completion. However, when consultants and contractors have oversight or managerial roles on a project, the state highway employee may be further removed from the day-to-day project activities. On a national level, FHWA has recently conducted some reviews that touch on states’ use of consultants and contractors. While FHWA has identified risks associated with the use of consultants and contractors, the agency has not comprehensively assessed how, if at all, it needs to adjust its oversight efforts to protect the public interest, given current trends in the use of consultants and contractors. Recommendations for Executive Action
To more effectively and consistently ensure that state DOTs are adequately protecting public interests in the highway program, given current trends in the use of consultants and contractors, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, in the context of FHWA’s ongoing activities related to quality assurance programs and risk management, to work with FHWA division offices to (1) give appropriate consideration to the identified areas of risk related to the increased use of consultants and contractors as division offices work to target their oversight activities and (2) develop and implement performance measures to better assess the effectiveness of state DOTs’ controls related to the use of consultants and contractors to better ensure that the public interest is protected. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) the recent trends in the contracting out of state highway activities; (2) the factors that influence state departments of transportation (state DOT) in deciding whether to contract out activities and the extent to which state DOTs assess costs and benefits when making such decisions; (3) how state DOTs protect the public interest when work is contracted out, particularly when consultants and contractors are given substantial responsibility for project and service quality and delivery; and (4) the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) role in ensuring that states protect the public interest. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pressure on state and local governments to deliver highway projects and services, and limits on the ability of state departments of transportation (state DOT) to increase staff levels have led those departments to contract out a variety of highway activities to the private sector. As requested, this report addresses (1) recent trends in the contracting of state highway activities, (2) factors that influence state highway departments' contracting decisions, (3) how state highway departments ensure the protection of the public interest when work is contracted out, and (4) the Federal Highway Administrations' (FHWA) role in ensuring that states protect the public interest. To complete this work, GAO reviewed federal guidelines, state auditor reports, and other relevant literature; conducted a 50-state survey; and interviewed officials from 10 selected state highway departments, industry officials, and FHWA officials.
What GAO Found
State DOTs have increased the amount and type of highway activities they contract out to consultants and contractors. State DOTs are also giving consultants and contractors more responsibility for ensuring quality in highway projects, including using consultants to perform construction engineering and inspection activities as well as quality assurance activities. Many state officials reported that they expect the amount of contracted highway activities to level off over the next 5 years, due to factors such as uncertain highway program funding levels. State DOTs indicated that the most important factor in their decision to contract out highway activities is the need to access the manpower and expertise necessary to ensure the timely delivery of their highway program, given in-house resource constraints. Officials said that they must contract out work to keep up with their highway programs. Of the 50 departments that completed GAO's survey, 38 indicated that they have experienced constant or declining staffing levels over the past 5 years. While state DOTs consider cost issues when making contracting decisions, cost savings are rarely the deciding factor in contracting decisions, and none of the 10 departments that GAO interviewed had a formal process in place for systematically assessing costs and benefits before entering into contracts. State DOT officials that GAO interviewed believe that they have sufficient tools and procedures in place to select, monitor, and oversee contractors to ensure that the public interest is protected. However, implementation of these mechanisms is not consistent across states, and state auditors reported weaknesses in several states. State DOTs also face additional challenges in conducting adequate oversight and monitoring, given current trends in the use of consultants and contractors. For example, while state employees are always ultimately responsible for highway project acceptance, they are increasingly further removed from the day-to-day project oversight. Officials from all 10 state DOTs that GAO interviewed said that current trends may lead to an erosion of in-house expertise that could affect the state DOTs' ability to adequately oversee the work of contractors and consultants in the long term. Because states have broad latitude in implementing the federal-aid highway program, FHWA has a limited role in states' use of consultants and contractors. Typically, FHWA's focus is on ensuring that state DOTs are in compliance with federal regulations when contracting out, such as ensuring that federal bidding requirements are met. FHWA has conducted both local and national reviews that have also identified various risks related to the increased use of consultants, including weaknesses in state quality assurance programs and an increased potential for conflicts of interest. While FHWA has identified these risks, it has not comprehensively assessed how, if at all, it needs to adjust its oversight efforts to protect the public interest, given current trends in the use of consultants and contractors. |
gao_GAO-16-831 | gao_GAO-16-831_0 | Treasury Implemented Most of Our Recommendations, but a Few Related to CPP and MHA Have Not Been Fully Addressed
As of August 22, 2016, our performance audits of the TARP programs resulted in 74 recommendations to Treasury. Five recommendations remain open. Treasury partially implemented three of the recommendations (that is, took some steps toward implementation) and had not taken any steps to implement the remaining two recommendations. Seven recommendations have been closed as not implemented because we determined that they were outdated and no longer applicable due to the evolving nature of the programs. Three of these seven recommendations were related to CPP and two to MHA programs. However, Treasury has been winding down CPP. Treasury has taken some actions to address three of the open recommendations directed at the MHA programs: In June 2010, we recommended that Treasury expeditiously report activity under PRA, including the extent to which servicers determined that principal reduction was beneficial to investors but did not offer it, to ensure transparency in the implementation of this program feature across servicers. Thus, we continue to maintain that Treasury should take action to fully implement this recommendation. In March 2016, we recommended that Treasury deobligate funds that its review showed likely would not be expended. Treasury’s most recent estimates identified $4.7 billion in potential excess funds, of which Treasury has deobligated $2 billion as of August 22, 2016. Finally, Treasury has not taken action to address two open recommendations directed at MHA: In February 2014, we recommended that Treasury require its MHA compliance agent to take steps to assess the extent to which servicers established internal control programs that effectively monitored compliance with fair lending laws applicable to MHA programs. In July 2015, we recommended that Treasury develop and implement policies and procedures to better ensure that changes to TARP- funded housing programs are based on evaluations that comprehensively and consistently met the key elements of benefit- cost analysis. Treasury also noted that, given the scheduled application deadline for MHA on December 30, 2016, it did not anticipate making significant policy changes to the MHA programs. We will continue to assess the status of these recommendations considering program activity and actions taken by Treasury. Appendix I: Status of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Performance Audit Recommendations, as of August 22, 2016
The following table summarizes the status of our TARP performance audit recommendations as of August 22, 2016. We classify each recommendation as implemented, partially implemented (the agency took steps to implement the recommendation but more action would be required to fully implement it), open (the agency had not taken steps to implement the recommendation), and closed, not implemented (the agency decided not to take action to implement the recommendation and we no longer consider the recommendation relevant). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) authorized the creation of TARP to address the most severe crisis that the financial system had faced in decades. Treasury has been the primary agency responsible for TARP programs. EESA provided GAO with broad oversight authorities for actions taken under TARP and included a provision that GAO report at least every 60 days on TARP activities and performance.
This 60-day report describes the status of GAO's prior TARP performance audit recommendations to Treasury as of August 2016. In particular, this report discusses Treasury's implementation of GAO's recommendations focusing on two programs: CPP and MHA. GAO's methodologies included assessing relevant documentation from Treasury, interviewing Treasury officials, and reviewing prior TARP reports issued by GAO.
What GAO Found
As of August 2016, GAO's performance audits of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) activities have resulted in 74 recommendations to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Treasury has implemented 62 of the 74 recommendations, some of which were aimed at improving the transparency and internal controls of TARP. Five recommendations remain open, all pertaining to the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program, a collection of housing programs designed to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. Of the five:
Treasury has partially implemented three open MHA recommendations—that is, it has taken some steps toward implementation but needs to take more actions. For example, in March 2016, GAO recommended that Treasury deobligate funds that its review showed would likely not be expended. Treasury's most recent estimates identified $4.7 billion in potential excess funds, of which Treasury has deobligated $2 billion as of August 2016.
Two additional MHA recommendations remain open—that is, Treasury has not taken steps to implement them. GAO recommended that Treasury take steps to assess the extent to which servicers have established internal control programs that monitor compliance with fair lending laws applicable to MHA programs. GAO also recommended that Treasury establish a standard process to better ensure that changes to TARP-funded MHA programs are based on comprehensive cost-benefit analyses. Treasury told GAO they would consider this recommendation but has noted that it plans no major program policy changes given the December 30, 2016, application deadline for the MHA program.
Seven recommendations have been closed but were not implemented. Five were related to the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and MHA and two to other TARP activities. Generally, these recommendations were closed because GAO determined that the recommendations were no longer applicable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to maintain that Treasury should take action to fully implement the three partially implemented and two open MHA recommendations. GAO will continue to assess the status of these recommendations considering new program activity and any further actions taken by Treasury. |
gao_GAO-14-66 | gao_GAO-14-66_0 | Background
The President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request included plans for the federal government to spend over $82 billion on IT. Further, in addition to including amounts to be spent on IT development and O&M, the budget also further specifies how the total $76 billion budgeted for IT is to be spent on agency IT investments by the following three categories: those solely under development ($6 billion), those involving activities and systems that are in both development and O&M—known as mixed life cycle ($40 billion), and those existing operational systems—commonly referred to by OMB as steady state investments—that are solely in O&M ($30 billion). To address these areas, the guidance specifies the following 17 key factors that are to be addressed: This guidance calls for the policy to assessment of current costs against life-cycle costs; a structured schedule assessment (i.e., measuring the performance of the investment against its established schedule); a structured assessment of performance goals (i.e., measuring the performance of the investment against established goals); identification of whether the investment supports customer processes as designed and is delivering goods and services it was designed to deliver; a measure of the effect the investment has on the performing a measure of how well the investment contributes to achieving the organization’s business needs and strategic goals; a comparison of current performance with a pre-established cost areas for innovation in the areas of customer satisfaction, strategic and business results, and financial performance; indication if the agency revisited alternative methods for achieving the same mission needs and strategic goals; consideration of issues, such as greater utilization of technology or consolidation of investments to better meet organizational goals; an ongoing review of the status of the risks identified in the investment’s planning and acquisition phases; identification of whether there is a need to redesign, modify, or terminate the investment; an analysis on the need for improved methodology (i.e., better ways for the investment to meet cost and performance goals); lessons learned; cost or schedule variances; recommendations to redesign or modify an asset in advance of potential problems; and overlap with other investments. Consequently, we recommended, among other things, that the agencies conduct annual OAs and in doing, ensure they are performed for all investments and that all factors are fully assessed. In total, the investments accounted for about $7.9 billion in O&M spending for fiscal year 2012, which was approximately 14 percent of all such spending for federal IT O&M. Most of the Largest O&M IT Investments Did Not Undergo Operational Analyses
Although required to do so, seven of the eight agencies did not conduct OAs on their largest O&M investments. In doing so, the department addressed most of the required OMB factors. With regard to why DHS’s analyses did not address all OMB factors, officials from the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (who are responsible for overseeing the performance of OAs departmentwide) attributed this to the department still being in the process of updating their Management Directive 102-01 and its related guidance, which will provide additional instructions for completing OAs. Majority of Agencies’ Investments Were Mixed Life Cycle and Use of O&M Funds for Development Activities Was Limited
For the eight selected agencies, the majority of their 401 major IT investments—totaling $29 billion— were in the mixed life-cycle phase in both spending and number of investments. However, our experience at federal agencies has shown that agencies have not yet fully established effective governance and program management capabilities essential to managing IT investments. Until these agencies address these shortcomings and ensure all their large O&M investments are fully assessed, there is increased risk that these agencies will not know whether these multibillion dollar investments fully meet intended objectives, including whether there are more efficient ways to deliver their intended purpose. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, four agencies—DHS, NASA, SSA, and VA—agreed with our recommendations; two agencies—DOD and DOE—partially agreed; and two agencies—HHS and Treasury—had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the federal IT O&M investments with the largest budgets, including their responsible agencies and how each investment supports its agency’s mission; (2) determine the extent to which these investments have undergone OAs; and (3) assess whether the responsible agency’s major IT investments are in development, mixed life cycle, or steady state, and the extent to which funding for investments in O&M have been used to finance investments in development. To identify those federal IT O&M investments with the largest budgets, we used data reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget process, and focused on the 10 largest reported budgets in O&M and the responsible eight agencies (the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, the Treasury, and Veteran Affairs; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Social Security Administration) that operate these investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Of the over $82 billion that federal agencies plan to spend on IT in fiscal year 2014, at least $59 billion is to be spent on O&M, which consists of legacy systems (i.e., steady state) and systems that are in both development and O&M (known as mixed life cycle). OMB calls for agencies to perform annual OAs, which are a key method for examining the performance of O&M investments.
GAO was asked to review IT O&M investments and agency use of OAs. The objectives of this report were to among other things (1) identify the federal IT O&M investments with the largest budgets, including their responsible agencies and how each investment supports its agencys mission; (2) determine the extent to which these investments have undergone OAs; and (3) assess whether the responsible agencys major IT investments are in development, mixed life cycle, or steady state. To do so, GAO focused on the 10 IT investments with the largest budgets in O&M and their responsible eight agencies, and assessed whether OAs were conducted on the investments. In addition, GAO evaluated what agencies spent on mixed, development, and O&M investments and whether agencies were using O&M funds for development activities.
What GAO Found
The 10 federal information technology (IT) operations and maintenance (O&M) investments with the largest budgets in fiscal year 2012and the eight agencies that operate themare identified by GAO in the table below. They support agencies by providing, for example, global telecommunications infrastructure and information transport services for the Department of Defense.
Of the 10 investments, only the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) investment underwent an operational analysis (OA)a key performance evaluation and oversight mechanism required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to ensure O&M investments continue to meet agency needs. DHSs OA addressed most factors that OMB calls for; it did not address three factors (e.g., comparing current cost and schedule against original estimates). DHS officials attributed these factors not being addressed to the department still being in the process of implementing its new OA policy. The remaining agencies did not assess their investments, which accounted for $7.4 billion in reported O&M spending. Agency officials cited several reasons for not doing so, including relying on budget submission and related management reviews that measure performance; however, OMB has noted that these are not a substitute for OAs. Until the agencies ensure their operational investments are assessed, there is a risk that they will not know whether these multibillion dollar investments fully meet intended objectives.
For the eight agencies in this review, the majority of their 401 major IT investments were mixed life cycle (i.e., having activities and systems that are in both development and O&M) with regard to total spending and number of investments. Specifically, 193 (48 percent) of the investments were mixed investments, accounting for about $18 billion (61 percent) of planned spending. As such, successful oversight of such investments should involve a combination of conducting OAs to address operational portions of an investment and establishing IT governance and program management disciplines to manage those portions under development. GAOs experience at the agencies and this report have identified agency inconsistencies in conducting OAs and establishing the capabilities that are key to effectively managing IT investments; accordingly, GAO has made prior recommendations to strengthen agency efforts in these areas.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the seven agencies that did not perform OAs on their large IT O&M investments do so, and that DHS ensure that its OA is complete and addresses all OMB factors. Of the seven agencies, three agreed with GAOs recommendations; two partially agreed; and two had no comments. DHS agreed with the GAO recommendation to it. |
gao_HEHS-96-40 | gao_HEHS-96-40_0 | JTPA emphasizes state and local government responsibility for administering federally funded job training programs. The program objectives are to increase earnings and employment and to reduce welfare dependence for participants of all ages. During the fourth and fifth years, the treatment group had higher earnings than the control group, but these differences too were not statistically significant. Employment Rates of Participants Not Significantly Greater Than Control Group Employment Rates After 5 Years
As with earnings, employment rates of those assigned to receive JTPA training were not significantly greater than employment rates of control group members 5 years after assignment. Conclusions
Though both long-term earnings and employment rates for NJS treatment groups surpassed those for their respective control groups, the differences did not meet our test for statistical significance. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the long-term earnings and employment rates for Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) participants with those for non-participants.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) JTPA participants receiving training had significantly higher earnings and employment rates than non-participants during the early stages of the program; and (2) annual earnings and employment rates for adult and youth JTPA participants increased after 5 years of participation, but the differences were not statistically significant. |
gao_GAO-02-238 | gao_GAO-02-238_0 | However, due to U.S. concerns about the safety of Mexican trucks and the adequacy of Mexico’s truck safety regulatory system, the United States postponed implementation of NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions and only permitted Mexican trucks to continue to operate in designated commercial zones within Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. As of October 2001, fewer than 200 Mexican trucking companies had applied to DOT to operate in the United States beyond the border commercial zones. Regulatory and Economic Factors May Limit Mexican Carriers’ Willingness to Seek Access Beyond the Commercial Zones
A number of regulatory and economic factors may limit the number of Mexican carriers operating beyond the commercial zones in the near term. The officials noted that it would take time to develop these business relationships. Also, according to Mexican private industry representatives and U.S. researchers, congestion and delays in crossing the U.S.-Mexico border result in added operating costs for Mexican carriers. The United States and Most U.S. Border States Are Not Prepared to Ensure That Mexican Commercial Carriers Meet U.S. Safety Standards
DOT faces a number of challenges in implementing a coordinated truck safety system—including acquiring adequate infrastructure and deploying personnel—at the U.S.-Mexico border. It also has not fully integrated its inspection personnel and their activities with those of the border states. 3 and 4). The three border states without permanent truck inspection facilities at border ports of entry—Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico—are planning to build facilities at some crossings. Five of the 10 highest volume crossings must have weigh-in-motion scales, and the remaining 5 highest volume crossings must have such scales within 12 months; require federal and state inspectors to electronically verify the status and validity of the license of each Mexican commercial driver transporting certain quantities of hazardous materials, drivers undergoing specified inspections, and at least 50 percent of other Mexican commercial drivers; require Mexican commercial trucks to cross into the United States only where there is a safety inspector on duty and adequate capacity exists to conduct a sufficient number of meaningful safety inspections and accommodate out-of-service trucks; and require Level I inspections and Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) decals for all Mexican commercial vehicles that wish to operate beyond the commercial zones but do not display such decals. Mexico Has Taken Steps to Improve Commercial Vehicle Safety and Emissions, But Extent of Compliance With U.S. Standards Remains Unclear
The Mexican government has developed truck safety regulations and reports taking steps to enforce safety and air emissions standards but these efforts are relatively recent and it is too early to assess their effectiveness. With support from DOT, it has also developed key databases related to commercial vehicle safety and it has participated in trinational efforts to make U.S., Canadian, and Mexican land transportation standards more compatible. In addition, Mexico has entered into bilateral agreements with the United States on specific commercial motor vehicle safety issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allowed Mexican commercial trucks to travel throughout the United States. Because of concerns about the safety of these vehicles, the United States has limited Mexican truck operations to commercial zones near the border. Relatively few Mexican carriers are expected to operate beyond these commercial zones once the United States fully opens its highways to Mexican carriers. Specific regulatory and economic factors that may limit the number of Mexican carriers operating beyond the commercial zones include (1) the lack of established business relationships beyond the U.S. commercial zones that permit drivers to return to Mexico carrying cargo, (2) difficulties obtaining competitively priced insurance, (3) congestion and delays in crossing the U.S.-Mexico border that make long-haul operations less profitable, and (4) high registration fees. Over time, improvements in trucking and border operations may increase the number of Mexican commercial vehicles traveling beyond the commercial zones.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Transportation (DOT) lacks a fully developed or approved plan to ensure that Mexican-domiciled carriers comply with U.S. safety standards. DOT has not secured permanent space at any of the 25 southwest border ports of entry where commercial trucks enter the United States, and only California has established permanent inspection facilities. DOT also has not completed agreements with border states on how 58 federal inspectors and 89 state inspectors will share inspection responsibilities along the border. States are responsible for ensuring that Mexican trucks adhere to U.S. emissions standards. California is the only southwest border state with a truck emissions inspection program in place at the border. Although the Mexican government has developed truck safety regulations and taken steps to enforce safety and air emissions standards, these efforts are relatively recent and it is too early to assess their effectiveness. With DOT's support, Mexico has developed five databases on the safety records of its commercial drivers and motor carriers. As of October 2001, however, the commercial driver's license database covered less than one-quarter of Mexico's commercial drivers. Mexico has also participated in NAFTA-related efforts to make motor carrier safety regulations compatible across the three member nations. Mexican private industry has also sought to improve the safety of Mexican commercial vehicles. |
gao_HEHS-97-49 | gao_HEHS-97-49_0 | These state commissions, in turn, subgrant AmeriCorps funds to local community service projects. Table 1 lists the Corporation’s and the states’ responsibilities. National Service Statute Provides State Control
The National and Community Service Trust Act provides for extensive state control of AmeriCorps. Commission Budgets and Staffing Vary
State commissions’ administrative budgets and their staffing levels varied significantly among the seven states. Number of State Commission Projects Varied
During the 1995-96 program year, the number of AmeriCorps projects in the seven states varied depending on (1) the number of projects commissions financed with their allotted formula funds, (2) the number of projects that won competitive funding, and (3) the number of projects funded directly by the Corporation rather than by the state commissions. Project Expenditures
Project-level expenditures also varied widely. Officials Agree Federal Role Needed, but Differ on Degree of State Control
State commissioners and executive directors in all seven states agreed with senior Corporation officials that a federal role in the AmeriCorps program is needed. Corporation officials believed that a federal role is needed for conducting nationwide data gathering on the AmeriCorps program, evaluating the performance of AmeriCorps projects and state commissions, and providing a central repository of information on the “best practices” of individual AmeriCorps projects and state commission operations. Federal Role Needed
All seven state commission executive directors agreed that a federal role is necessary to provide the AmeriCorps program with a national identity. They told us that national identity provides AmeriCorps participants with a sense that the benefits of their service extend not only to themselves and their communities, but to the whole nation. Corporation officials agreed that a national identity for the AmeriCorps program is important and that a federal role provides it. They also noted that the federal government has a vital role in evaluating the AmeriCorps program, sharing evaluation results with others, and developing and increasing the evaluation capacity of state commissions. Federal Grant Allocation
Commission officials in the seven states disagreed on whether states should have more control over federal grant funds, particularly in terms of allocating federal funds. Officials in Maryland and Texas told us that the Corporation should allocate federal AmeriCorps grants to states on the basis of commissions’ demonstrated ability to effectively manage quality national service projects in their states. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed state commissions' capacity to absorb additional AmeriCorps program management responsibility, focusing on: (1) the statutory role of state commissions; (2) state commission operations, including project-level outputs from national service projects within their purview, such as participant enrollment and expenditure data; and (3) extending state commissions' administrative and oversight role over AmeriCorps and correspondingly decreasing the federal government's role.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) by assigning state commissions significant responsibilities, the National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, in effect, emphasizes state control of the AmeriCorps program; (2) these responsibilities include developing a statewide service infrastructure, selecting and funding AmeriCorps projects, and monitoring and evaluating projects; (3) state commissions directly control two-thirds of the federal funds available for AmeriCorps projects; (4) for fiscal year 1995, state commissions received $131 million of $192 million available in federal funding; (5) GAO's review of seven state commissions indicated that all are performing program management activities envisioned by the act, but vary in terms of their infrastructures and project outputs; (6) operational resources of the state commissions in GAO's sample varied widely; (7) for selected projects, outputs also varied both within and among the state commissions; (8) officials from the seven state commissions agreed on the need for a federal role in AmeriCorps, but disagreed on how much federal control is desirable; (9) on one hand, all officials agreed that only a federal entity can provide AmeriCorps with a national identity, which they considered essential; (10) on the other hand, they disagreed on the role the Corporation for National and Community Service should play in allocating AmeriCorps funding grants; (11) senior Corporation officials agreed with state officials that a federal role is necessary to provide the AmeriCorps program with a national identity; (12) they also stated that a federal role is necessary to conduct performance evaluations of national service projects and state commissions; (13) these officials acknowledged that changes to the funding allocation process might better achieve the Corporation's quality control objectives and said they may recommend changes to Congress when it considers reauthorization of the act; and (14) Corporation officials noted that, notwithstanding their view that the act gave the states a substantial degree of control over the program, they have initiated actions to increase state commissions' autonomy. |
gao_GAO-13-583 | gao_GAO-13-583_0 | Effects of the Crisis Were Limited Largely to Certain Products and Lines of Insurance
The financial crisis generally had a limited effect on the insurance industry and policyholders, with the exception of certain annuity products in the life insurance industry and the financial and mortgage guaranty lines of insurance in the P/C industry. However, the crisis did affect life insurers that offered variable annuities with optional guaranteed living benefits (GLB), as well as financial and mortgage guaranty insurers—a small subset of the P/C industry. Finally, the crisis had a generally minor effect on policyholders, but some mortgage and financial guaranty policyholders received partial claims or faced decreased availability of coverage. The Financial Crisis Had a Limited Effect on Most Insurers’ Operations
Insurers Experienced Some Capital and Liquidity Pressure, but Insolvencies Were Limited
Many life insurance companies experienced capital deterioration in 2008, reflecting declines in net income and increases in unrealized losses on investment assets. Actions by State Regulators, Federal Programs, and Insurance Business Practices Helped Mitigate Some Effects of the Crisis
Multiple regulatory actions and other factors helped mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis on the insurance industry. NAIC also provides services to help state regulators—for instance, maintaining a range of databases and coordinating regulatory efforts. State regulators said they used these reports during the crisis. Although this change in methodology did result in a change in RBC charges for more than half of insurers’ RMBS holdings, the change did not significantly affect insurers’ financial statements. A variety of insurance business practices may have helped limit the effects of the crisis on most insurers’ investments, underwriting performance, and premium revenues. Regulators Have Continued Efforts to Strengthen the Regulatory System since the Crisis
State regulators and NAIC efforts to strengthen the regulatory system include an increased focus on insurer risks and group holding company oversight. ORSA is an internal assessment of the risks associated with an insurer’s current business plan and the sufficiency of capital resources to support those risks under normal and severe stress scenarios. One state regulator stated that the revised Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act was expected to make group-level holding company data more transparent to state insurance regulators. Also, most states have yet to adopt revisions to the Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act. However, some insurance associations we spoke to voiced concerns about the increased oversight of holding companies, and some insurance associations and insurers also questioned the need for additional regulatory changes. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) what is known about how the insurance industry and policyholders were affected by the financial crisis, (2) the factors that affected the impact of the crisis on insurers and policyholders, and (3) the types of regulatory actions that have been taken since the crisis to help prevent or mitigate potential negative effects of future economic downturns on insurance companies and their policyholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Insurance plays an important role in ensuring the smooth functioning of the economy. Concerns about the oversight of the $1 trillion life and property/casualty insurance industry arose during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, when one of the largest holding companies, AIG, suffered severe losses that threatened to affect its insurance subsidiaries. GAO was asked to examine any effects of the financial crisis on the insurance industry.
This report addresses (1) what is known about how the financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected the insurance industry and policyholders, (2) the factors that affected the impact of the crisis on insurers and policyholders, and (3) the types of actions that have been taken since the crisis to help prevent or mitigate potential negative effects of future economic downturns on insurance companies and their policyholders.
To do this work, GAO analyzed insurance industry financial data from 2002 through 2011 and interviewed a range of industry observers, participants, and regulators.
What GAO Found
The effects of the financial crisis on insurers and policyholders were generally limited, with a few exceptions. While some insurers experienced capital and liquidity pressures in 2008, their capital levels had recovered by the end of 2009. Net income also dropped but recovered somewhat in 2009. Effects on insurers' investments, underwriting performance, and premium revenues were also limited. However, some life insurers that offered variable annuities with guaranteed living benefits, as well as financial and mortgage guaranty insurers, were more affected by their exposures to the distressed equity and mortgage markets. The crisis had a generally minor effect on policyholders, but some mortgage and financial guaranty policyholders--banks and other commercial entities--received partial claims or faced decreased availability of coverage.
Actions by state and federal regulators and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), among other factors, helped limit the effects of the crisis. First, state insurance regulators shared more information with each other to focus their oversight activities. In response to transparency issues highlighted by American International Group, Inc.'s securities lending program, NAIC required more detailed reports from insurers. Also, a change in methodology by NAIC to help better reflect the value of certain securities also reduced the risk-based capital some insurers had to hold. To further support insurers' capital levels, some states and NAIC also changed reporting requirements for certain assets. These changes affected insurers' capital levels for regulatory purposes, but rating agency officials said they did not have a significant effect on insurers' financial condition. Several federal programs also provided support to qualified insurers. Finally, insurance business practices, regulatory restrictions, and a low interest rate environment helped reduce the effects of the crisis.
NAIC and state regulators' efforts since the crisis have included an increased focus on insurers' risks and capital adequacy, and oversight of noninsurance entities in group holding company structures. The Own Risk and Solvency Assessment, an internal assessment of insurers' business plan risks, will apply to most insurers and is expected to take effect in 2015. NAIC also amended its Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act to address the issues of transparency and oversight of holding company entities. However, most states have yet to adopt the revisions, and implementation could take several years. |
gao_GAO-10-762 | gao_GAO-10-762_0 | In light of these events, the Conference Report accompanying the fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act required the DHS CFO and the Secret Service Assistant Director for Administration to brief the Appropriations Committees on the process to be implemented in fiscal year 2010 to ensure the problems related to the fiscal year 2009 shortfall did not reoccur. Prior to the briefing, DHS and Secret Service developed a corrective action plan (CAP) to address the issues surrounding the shortfall. Documenting Internal Control Procedures Could Help Improve Financial Management of Funds for Presidential Candidate Protection
Secret Service Has Not Documented Processes for Preparing Key Reports
Secret Service financial management personnel use an undocumented, manual process to prepare two key reports used to monitor obligations, manage its funds by PPA, and report to Congress: the Monthly Execution and Staffing Report, and the Presidential Campaign Cost Report. Secret Service Uses Informal Processes for Splitting Costs across PPAs
Secret Service also does not have documented procedures in place for how to split out costs for protection activities that could cut across multiple PPAs. Also, the lack of documented policies and procedures increases the risk of reporting incomplete, inaccurate information because Secret Service officials could unknowingly charge expenditures to the wrong PPA. DHS and Secret Service Lack Documented Early Warning System Benchmarks for Monitoring Obligations and Expenditures
Neither DHS nor Secret Service have documented early warning system benchmarks to use when monitoring Secret Service obligations and expenditures, and therefore these benchmarks may be inconsistently applied. Additional Guidance Could Help DHS and Secret Service Further Improve Communication in the Event of Future Funding Shortfalls
DHS and Secret Service Did Not Follow DHS’ Fiscal Year 2009 Guidance on Communicating Reprogramming Requests and Antideficiency Act Violations
At the time of the fiscal year 2009 shortfall, DHS had written guidance covering communication necessary if a funding shortfall required a reprogramming notification under section 503, or was a potential or actual Antideficiency Act violation. According to Secret Service officials, in January 2009 Secret Service communicated to DHS the fiscal year 2009 shortfall and requested assistance in covering it. DHS and Secret Service Developed CAP to Improve Communication and Implemented Some of These CAP Measures
Since the fiscal year 2009 shortfall, Secret Service and DHS developed a CAP to, among other things, improve communication about internal and external reprogrammings. DHS has developed and implemented two of the four communications- related CAP measures in accordance with this guidance. Specifically, DHS has not provided written guidance describing what needs to be done to implement the CAP measures requiring that (1) components complete internal funding reviews prior to submitting reprogramming requests and articulate the negative impact of using internal resources to cover the shortfall—such as delays in hiring or postponement of training activities, or both—or (2) DHS provide timely submission of reprogramming notifications to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Implementing these remaining communication-related measures from the CAP could help ensure that DHS and Secret Service communicate effectively with each other and Congress in the event of future funding shortfalls. Given the importance of providing the Appropriations Committees with complete and accurate financial data concerning presidential candidate protection activities, it is imperative that Secret Service have the necessary documented internal control procedures in place, including financial management policies and procedures, to help ensure it can effectively manage and report on funds for presidential candidate protection. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve financial management controls and communication related to presidential candidate protection budget execution, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS take the following five actions: direct the Director of Secret Service to develop documented procedures for preparing and reviewing its Monthly Execution and Staffing Reports and Presidential Campaign Cost Reports; direct the Director of Secret Service to develop written policies and procedures for charging costs when protection activities may be funded by multiple PPAs; direct the DHS CFO to ensure that DHS’ components, including Secret Service, have guidance and training on how to develop and document appropriate benchmarks for monitoring obligations and expenditures; direct the DHS CFO to develop and provide written guidance clarifying the elements necessary in a reprogramming request from a component to document internal funding reviews and the negative impact of using internal sources; and direct the DHS CFO to define time frames by which DHS could assess timeliness of submissions of reprogramming notifications to the Appropriations Committees. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. 31 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to the unprecedented pace and crowds of the 2008 presidential campaign, the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), exceeded its budgeted amount for fiscal year 2009 presidential candidate nominee protection funding, but did not notify Congress of this shortfall (fiscal year 2009 shortfall) until June 2009--5 months after the Inauguration. In response to the Conference Report accompanying the 2010 DHS Appropriations Act, this report addresses the extent to which, at the time of the fiscal year 2009 shortfall, (1) Secret Service had the necessary internal controls in place to help ensure it could effectively manage and report on funds for presidential candidate protection; and (2) Secret Service and DHS had policies and procedures in place to help ensure that information related to the fiscal year 2009 shortfall was communicated to DHS and Congress. To conduct the audit work, GAO reviewed appropriation laws and regulations, Secret Service financial reports, and various DHS and Secret Service policy and procedural documents. GAO also interviewed officials from DHS and Secret Service.
What GAO Found
At the time of the fiscal year 2009 shortfall, Secret Service did not have--and still does not have--all of the necessary internal controls, including policies and procedures, in place to help ensure it can effectively manage and report on funds for presidential candidate protection. For example, the agency relied on undocumented manual processes to prepare and review two key reports--the Monthly Execution and Staffing Report and the Presidential Campaign Cost Report--used to monitor obligations, manage its funds by subaccounts, and report to Congress. Documenting the processes to prepare and review these reports could decrease the risk of future reporting errors and be useful to managers in controlling operations. Secret Service also did not have documented procedures for charging costs for certain candidate protection activities that cut across multiple subaccounts. The subaccounts are not discrete, and Secret Service officials stated that they lacked clarity and procedures on which to use to cover costs for certain protection activities. Documenting policies and procedures for charging such costs could be useful in controlling operations and monitoring budget execution. Also, neither DHS nor Secret Service had documented benchmarks to serve as an early warning system when monitoring obligations and expenditures for potential future funding shortfalls. Lastly, DHS' budget guidance did not specify how to develop such benchmarks. Developing and implementing guidance on how to document benchmarks could help ensure that any future potential shortfalls in presidential candidate protection funds are identified in a timely manner. DHS and Secret Service lacked sufficient policies and procedures to ensure that information related to the fiscal year 2009 shortfall was communicated to DHS and Congress. At the time of the shortfall, DHS had written guidance on how to communicate a violation of the Antideficiency Act--which prohibits federal officials from obligating or expending funds in excess of appropriations--and notify Congress of a reprogramming, or shifting funds within an appropriation. However, because they mistakenly determined the guidance did not apply, Secret Service informed DHS of the shortfall and requested assistance in covering it. GAO issued a legal opinion determining that DHS and Secret Service violated reprogramming notification requirements and the Antideficiency Act. Further, DHS had no written guidance on communicating a reprogramming that did not require congressional notification. Since the shortfall, DHS and Secret Service developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to address issues related to the shortfall. DHS implemented two of the four communication-related CAP measures, but has not provided written guidance for implementing the other two, which require that (1) components complete internal funding reviews prior to submitting reprogramming requests and articulate the negative impact of using internal resources to cover shortfalls, and (2) DHS provide timely submission of reprogramming notifications to the Appropriations Committees.Implementing these measures could help ensure better communication among Secret Service, DHS, and Congress in the event of future shortfalls, and help DHS and the committees assess whether DHS effectively provides information about potential shortfalls.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS and Secret Service (1) document certain financial management, cost allocation, and benchmark procedures, and (2) provide guidance on remaining communications-related corrective actions. DHS concurred. |
gao_GGD-97-58 | gao_GGD-97-58_0 | These actions and decisions have added to the insurance industry’s apprehensions about the banking industry’s marketing of annuities and insurance and the possible effect it may have on the banking industry’s ability to engage in tying activities. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to provide information on (1) evidence of violations of the tying provisions by banks and their affiliates and regulatory efforts to ensure compliance with the provisions, (2) views on the tying provisions expressed by representatives of securities and insurance firms and independent insurance agents, and (3) views expressed by representatives of banks and bank regulators. We focused on the Federal Reserve and OCC because the banks or bank holding companies they regulate are more likely to offer a broader range of products and services, which are believed to be susceptible to tying.To determine how examiners implemented examination procedures for tying, we also judgmentally selected three examinations conducted in 1994 at a large, medium, and small bank by the OCC Dallas office and three inspections conducted at bank holding companies with insurance or securities activities by the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank. Evidence of Tying by Banks Has Been Limited
We found little evidence of tying by banks. Agency officials we interviewed were aware of only one instance of a tying violation identified during regulators’ routine examinations of banks or inspections of bank holding companies since 1990. Regulators’ Special Tying Investigation Found One Violation
A 1992 complaint by SIA prompted the Federal Reserve and OCC to launch a special investigation of tying abuses that ultimately identified one violation of the tying provisions. In response to the complaint, OCC and the Federal Reserve agreed to jointly investigate seven large bank holding companies and four large banks. It is also possible that the limited evidence of tying may reflect consumers’ reluctance to make formal complaints, as in instances we encountered when borrowers were reportedly reluctant to talk with us for fear of jeopardizing their relationship with a bank. Representatives of firms and agents that expressed concern about tying advocated maintaining or strengthening the tying provisions, which they said help offset banks’ competitive advantages and ensure adequate consumer protection. A banking representative also pointed out that, with the passage of the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, it is now easier for the Federal Reserve to lend directly to all types of financial firms with liquidity needs in a crisis—not just banks. Views of Bank Regulators on the Need for the Provisions
In response to our questions about the need for the tying provisions, OCC’s official view emphasized the importance of the provisions that prohibit banks from conditioning the availability of one product on the purchase of another, while the Federal Reserve chose not to provide an official position. OCC observed that the tying provisions increase banks’ awareness of their responsibilities to their customers as they expand the array of products and services offered. Other regulators believed that increased competition among credit providers makes it difficult for any particular bank to exert enough economic leverage to force a borrower into a tying arrangement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on banks' compliance with the tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, focusing on: (1) evidence of tying abuses by banks and their affiliates and regulatory efforts to ensure compliance with the provisions; (2) views on the tying provisions expressed by representatives of securities and insurance firms and independent insurance agents; and (3) views on the tying provisions expressed by representatives of banks and the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it found limited evidence of tying activity by banks; (2) Federal Reserve and OCC officials GAO interviewed were aware of only one violation identified during routine bank examinations or hold company inspections since 1990; (3) from January 1990 through September 1996, the Federal Reserve and OCC received and investigated 13 tying-related complaints, only 3 of which resulted in actions against the bank or holding company; (4) bank regulators' special investigation of seven large bank holding companies and four large banks in response to a 1992 tying complaint identified only one instance of tying that led to regulatory action; (5) GAO's interviews with state regulators, small business groups, and others identified little evidence of tying violations, although it was suggested that the limited evidence could be based, at least in part, on borrowers' reluctance to report violations for fear of jeopardizing their banking relationships; (6) those representatives of securities and insurance firms and independent insurance agents GAO contacted that expressed concern about tying advocated maintaining or strengthening the tying provisions as a way of offsetting the competitive advantages they believe banks enjoy; (7) some industry representatives and academic experts interviewed said that a more important consideration than the banking industry's share of the credit market is the availability of credit; (8) bank industry representatives viewed the tying provisions as impairing banks' ability to maximize the economic benefits they might otherwise obtain by offering complementary services; (9) some banking representatives also said that banks' evolving role as only one of many providers of credit makes them less able to coerce customers into accepting tied products or services; (10) with regard to banks' access to the discount window and federal deposit insurance, banking representatives pointed out that, with recent legislative changes, it is now easier for the Federal Reserve to lend directly to various financial firms with liquidity needs in a crisis, not just banks; (11) while the Federal Reserve chose not to take an official position on the need for the tying provisions, OCC cited the provisions' importance in making banks aware of their responsibilities to customers as they provide an increasing array of products and services; and (12) some regulatory staff expressed the belief that the tying provisions may have a deterrent effect, but others believed increased competition in the marketplace makes it difficult for banks to force a borrower into a tying arrangement. |
gao_GAO-01-629 | gao_GAO-01-629_0 | In April 2001, in response to our inquiry, NSC officials told us that the issue of international crime and the framework for the U.S. response were under review by the new administration. Nevertheless, several efforts have attempted to gauge the extent of and the threat posed by international crime to the United States and other countries. While the 1999 threat assessment was classified, a published version of the 2000 assessment provided various indicators or measures of international crime within five broad categories—(1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2) illegal immigration, trafficking of women and children, and environmental crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products across international borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. One context involves efforts to eliminate the use of bribes in transnational business activities, such as government contracting. The strategy’s other context on public corruption involves rule of law assistance, which focuses on U.S. support for legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts undertaken by foreign governments. Much of the technical assistance that the United States provides to other nations for fighting international crime involves training, particularly training at law enforcement academies established abroad. There are no standard measures of effectiveness to assess the federal government’s overall efforts to address international crime. Regarding international crime, Justice’s, Treasury’s, and State’s plans each have sections describing their efforts to combat specific types of crime, along with the performance measures to be tracked. In some cases, however, these measures do not adequately address effectiveness. U.S. efforts to combat public corruption internationally. The specific federal entities are the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State; USAID; and their respective components. Examples of the Criminal Division’s workload related to international crime include prosecuting cases involving international crime—such as organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism—often in cooperation with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; negotiating—in cooperation with State and other departments—and implementing bilateral and multilateral treaties with other countries, such as agreements for mutual legal assistance and maritime boarding agreements, and the recent United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; and providing training and other technical assistance to the law enforcement and justice sectors of foreign countries. | What GAO Found
International crimes, such as drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, and public corruption, transcend national borders and threaten global security and stability. The National Security Council (NSC) told GAO that international crime and the framework for the U.S. response are under review by the new administration. The extent of International crime is growing, but measuring its true extent is difficult. Several efforts have been made to gauge the threat posed to the United States and other countries by international crime. The 1999 threat assessment was classified, but a published version of the 2000 assessment divided the threat into the following five broad categories: (1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2) illegal immigration, trafficking of women and children, and environmental crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products across international borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. NSC identified 34 federal entities with significant roles in fighting international crime. These included the Department of Justice, Treasury, and State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The efforts to combat public corruption internationally involves two strategies: the elimination of bribes in transnational business activities, such as government contracting, and the implementation of law assistance, which focuses on U.S. support for legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts by foreign governments. Much of the technical assistance that the U.S. provides to other nations for fighting international crime involves training, particularly training at law enforcement academies established abroad. There are no standard measures of effectiveness to assess the federal government's overall efforts to address international crime. Justice's, Treasury's, and State's plans describe their efforts to combat specific types of crime, along with the performance measures to be tracked. In some cases, however, these measures do not adequately address effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-06-1132 | gao_GAO-06-1132_0 | The United States has relied heavily on private-sector contractors to provide the goods and services needed to support both the military and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. DCAA defines questioned costs as costs considered to be not acceptable for negotiating a reasonable contract price, and unsupported costs as costs that lack sufficient supporting documentation. DCAA Audit Reports Identified Billions of Dollars of Questioned and Unsupported Costs on Iraq Contracts
Between February 2003 and February 2006, DCAA issued hundreds of audit reports that collectively identified $3.5 billion in questioned and unsupported costs on Iraq-related contracts, primarily through audits of contractor proposals. Based on information provided by DCAA, contracting officials have responded to audit findings that questioned $1.4 billion. As a result, contracting officials negotiated contract cost reductions of $386 million according to DCAA. Of this total, DCAA classified $2.1 billion as questioned, and $1.4 billion as unsupported. Based on the information provided by DCAA, as of July 2006, the remaining $700 million in questioned costs is still in process. Because unsupported costs indicate a lack of contractor information that is needed to assess costs, DCAA cannot and does not render an opinion on those costs. Therefore, DCAA does not track the resolution of unsupported costs. DOD Contracting Officials Have Taken a Range of Actions to Address Audit Findings
For the 18 audit reports selected for this review, we found that DOD took a variety of actions in response to audit findings, including not allowing some contractor costs. Based on contract documentation we reviewed, the DOD contracting officials generally considered DCAA’s questioned and unsupported cost findings when negotiating with the contractor. We found that DOD contracting officials were more likely to use DCAA’s advice when negotiations were timely and occurred before contractors had incurred substantial costs. In addition to identifying questioned and unsupported costs, DCAA can also withhold funds from the contractor, which it chose to do in eight of the cases included in our review. DOD Contracting Officials Less Likely to Remove Questioned Costs Already Incurred by the Contractor
To address the more than $1 billion in questioned costs related to the audits selected, we found that the DOD contracting officials were less likely to remove questioned costs from a contractor proposal when the contractor had already incurred these costs. For example, in 5 audit reports comprising about $600 million of questioned costs reviewed, we found that the DOD contracting officials determined that the contractor should be paid for nearly all of the questioned costs (all but $38 million), but reduced the base used to calculate the contractor’s fee (by $205 million). By reducing the base, the DOD contracting official reduced the contractor’s fee by approximately $6 million. According to contract officials, urgent conditions in Iraq led the government to initiate such contract actions without first specifying their scope of work and agreeing to the contract price. For example, in 3 audit reports related to a logistics support task order, DCAA questioned $204 million. According to DCAA’s calculations, $120 million of these questioned costs was removed from the contractor’s proposal as a result of its audit findings. In some cases, DOD officials conducted additional analyses in response to DCAA’s audit findings. We requested comments from DOD on a draft of this report, but none were provided. To determine the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) in response to DCAA audit findings, including the extent to which funds were withheld from contractors, we selected 18 audit reports comprised of (1) the 10 reports with the highest dollar amounts of questioned and unsupported costs and (2) a selection of 8 of the remaining audit reports with questioned and unsupported cost dollars above $5 million. | Why GAO Did This Study
The government has hired private contractors to provide billions of dollars worth of goods and services to support U.S. efforts in Iraq. Faced with the uncertainty as to the full extent of rebuilding Iraq, the government authorized contractors to begin work before key terms and conditions were defined. This approach allows the government to initiate needed work quickly, but can result in additional costs and risks being imposed on the government. Helping to oversee their work is the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which examined many Iraq contracts and identified costs they consider to be questioned or unsupported. The Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed GAO to report on audit findings regarding contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As agreed with the congressional defense committees, GAO focused on Iraq contract audit findings and determined (1) the costs identified by DCAA as questioned or unsupported; and (2) what actions DOD has taken to address DCAA audit findings, including the extent funds were withheld from contractors. To identify DOD actions in response to the audit findings, GAO selected 18 audit reports representing about 50 percent of DCAA's questioned and unsupported costs on Iraq contracts. GAO requested comments from DOD on a draft of this report, but none were provided.
What GAO Found
Defense Contract Audit Agency audit reports issued between February 2003 and February 2006 identified $2.1 billion in questioned costs and $1.4 billion in unsupported costs on Iraq contracts. DCAA defines questioned costs as costs that are unacceptable for negotiating reasonable contract prices, and unsupported costs as costs for which the contractor has not provided sufficient documentation. This information is provided to DOD for its negotiations with contractors. Based on information provided by DCAA, DOD contracting officials have taken actions to address $1.4 billion in questioned costs. As a result, DOD contracting officials negotiated contract cost reductions of $386 million according to DCAA. Based on the information provided by DCAA, as of July 2006, the remaining $700 million in questioned costs is still in process. Because unsupported costs indicate a lack of contractor information that is needed to assess costs, DCAA cannot and does not render an opinion on those costs. Therefore, DCAA does not track the resolution of unsupported costs. For the 18 audit reports selected for this review, GAO found that DOD contracting officials took a variety of actions to address DCAA's audit findings, including not allowing some contractor costs. In the contract documentation GAO reviewed, DOD contracting officials generally considered DCAA's questioned and unsupported cost findings when negotiating with the contractor. GAO found DOD contracting officials were more likely to use DCAA's advice when negotiations were timely and occurred before contractors had incurred substantial costs. For example, in three audit reports related to a logistics support task order negotiated prior to the onset of work, DCAA questioned $204 million. According to DCAA's calculations, $120 million of these questioned costs was removed from the contractor's proposal as a result of its audit findings. In contrast, DOD officials were less likely to remove questioned costs from a contract proposal when the contractor had already incurred these costs. For example, in five audit reports comprising about $600 million of questioned costs reviewed, GAO found that the DOD contracting officials determined that the contractor should be paid for all but $38 million of the questioned costs, but reduced the base used to calculate the contractor's fee by $205 million. By reducing the base, the DOD contracting official reduced the contractor's fee by approximately $6 million. In addition to identifying questioned and unsupported costs, DCAA has the option of withholding funds from the contractor and chose to withhold a total of $236 million for eight cases included in this review. |
gao_GAO-03-513 | gao_GAO-03-513_0 | Savings bonds are an alternative for investors unable or unwilling to pay the minimum denomination of marketable Treasury securities. In March 2002 the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets testified before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government that Treasury believes that the availability of a savings vehicle with the full faith and credit of the United States should not be limited to those who can afford the minimum $1,000 denominations available in auctions of marketable Treasury securities. For Treasury, this is the value today of the future payments to investors of securities offered for sale which, in the context of the model, is the redemption value of Series EE and Series I savings bonds and the repayment stream of the alternative marketable Treasury security (that is, any coupons plus maturity value). Most notably, the interest rates and the timing of the interest payments are different. Accurate implementation of the conceptual design requires that the model address these issues in order to construct comparable present values for the costs of savings bonds and marketable Treasury securities. The administrative unit cost to Treasury from redeeming savings bonds reduces the revenues to Treasury. This additional step, according to model documentation, is intended to reflect the difference between savings bonds, which do not pay periodic interest, and marketable Treasury securities that do pay such interest in the form of coupons. However, the model calculation does not incorporate all the life cycle costs of the savings bond into the marketable Treasury security’s “present value” calculation — the initial administrative cost of issuing the savings bond (that is, unit cost to issue) is not included. Further, the redemptions do not reflect current interest rates. BPD has not independently verified the cost-effectiveness model. Conclusions
Our review of BPD’s savings bond cost-effectiveness model indicates that the model’s results do not provide BPD, Treasury, OMB, or Congress appropriate information to assess the relative costs of the savings bond program versus marketable Treasury securities as a source of raising funds. Therefore the cost-effectiveness ratio that the model creates does not provide BPD with the information it needs to assess the relative costs of the savings bond program and marketable Treasury securities to determine which financing approach offers a greater financial benefit to Treasury. Recommendations
Because of the importance of measuring the cost-effectiveness of financing mechanisms used to fund the operations of the federal government, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct that the Commissioner of the Public Debt in conjunction with Treasury’s Office of Domestic Finance revise the savings bond cost-effectiveness model to estimate the relative (or net) present value of the life cycle costs of issuing savings bonds versus marketable Treasury securities. However, the Commissioner also noted that, with Treasury’s goal of moving toward a totally electronic environment for the savings bond program, “we think it's appropriate for us to shelve the existing model, which is based on paper bonds, and focus our attention on the transition to a fully electronic program.”
The model compares the amount of funds raised by selling a given amount of Series EE and I bonds in various denominations and the present value of the future costs to Treasury in connection with issuing the bonds. A model that accurately recognizes these differences will continue to be as crucial to understanding the relative cost-effectiveness of the two debt instruments as it is in the current paper-based environment. Comments from the Bureau of the Public Debt
GAO Comments
The following are GAO's comments on the Bureau of the Public Debt's (BPD) letter dated June 4, 2003. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
While the Treasury generally pays lower interest rates on U.S. Savings Bonds than it does on other forms of borrowing from the public, it also incurs substantially higher administrative costs to issue and redeem the paper savings bond certificates. To determine whether these higher administrative costs exceed its interest rate savings, Treasury's Bureau of the Public Debt uses a spreadsheet model to compare the costs of issuing Series EE and Series I savings bonds with those of issuing marketable Treasury securities. GAO was asked to review this model to judge its reliability in measuring the relative costs of Treasury's borrowing alternatives.
What GAO Found
Treasury has several alternative vehicles for issuing debt to the public. A substantial majority of that debt is issued in the form of marketable Treasury securities. U.S. Savings Bonds today account for about 3 percent of total Treasury securities outstanding. A majority of these bonds have lower minimum denominations or face amounts than marketable Treasury securities and generally pay lower interest rates as well, but provide the same assurance of the full faith and credit of the United States, making them an alternative for investors unable or unwilling to pay the minimum denominations of marketable Treasury securities. Savings bonds continue to be issued as paper certificates, rather than in the format of the "book entry" system for marketable Treasury securities; however, this increases the administrative costs of issuing, servicing, and redeeming savings bonds, relative to the marketable securities. The cost-effectiveness of the savings bond program depends on whether Treasury's savings--in terms of the generally lower interest payments on savings bonds relative to marketable Treasury securities--exceed the costs that Treasury incurs with processing the paper savings bond certificates. The question is complicated by the fact that the interest savings occur over the life of a savings bond, and that Treasury pays costs upfront at issuance and in the future when the savings bond is redeemed. As prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget and common financial practice, in dealing with savings or costs over time, the value of future savings or costs must be discounted to present value. Treasury has reported that its cost-effectiveness model does calculate the present values of the relative costs of savings bonds and marketable Treasury securities. However, because of flaws in the design and implementation of the spreadsheet used to calculate these present values, the cost-effectiveness model's results do not provide the Bureau of the Public Debt, Treasury, or Congress with accurate information that is needed to assess the relative costs of issuing debt through savings bonds or marketable Treasury securities, or to manage the savings bond program. Further, the bureau has not updated some key data elements in the cost-effectiveness model. In particular, citing budget considerations, the bureau uses data on the redemption patterns for savings bonds that date back to 1993, which do not reflect the effects of the wide variety of financial instruments now available to investors. |
gao_GAO-04-458T | gao_GAO-04-458T_0 | The federal government also supports preparedness efforts for an influenza pandemic. States Have Further Developed Important Aspects of Public Health Preparedness, but Additional Work Is Needed
States reported that as of the summer of 2003 they have made improvements in their preparedness to respond to major public health threats, but no aspect of preparedness has been fully addressed by all of the states. Disease Surveillance Systems
Although some states have made improvements to their disease surveillance systems, the nation’s ability to detect and report a disease outbreak is not uniformly strong across all states. Communication
Although improving, communication, both among those involved in responding to a major public health threat—such as public health officials, health care providers, and emergency management agencies—and with the public, remains a challenge. Surge Capacity
Most states lack surge capacity—that is, the capacity to respond to the large influx of patients that could occur during a public health emergency. For example, few states reported that they had the capacity to evaluate, diagnose, and treat 500 or more patients involved in a single incident. Regional Planning
Few states have regional plans in place that would coordinate the response among states during a public health emergency, and state officials remain concerned about a lack of regional planning across state borders. Few states have completed regional response plans for incidents of bioterrorism and other public health threats and emergencies. Strategic National Stockpile
Most state plans for using the Strategic National Stockpile in the event of a public health emergency have not been fully developed. The Federal Influenza Plan Has Not Been Finalized, but State Planning and Other Efforts Continue
Federal officials have not finalized plans for responding to an influenza pandemic, and state influenza pandemic response plans are in various stages of completion. In 2000, we recommended that HHS complete the national plan for responding to an influenza pandemic, but HHS reported recently that the plan was still under review within HHS. However, HHS is taking other steps to prepare for an influenza pandemic. Federal plans for the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and drugs in response to an influenza pandemic still have not been finalized, complicating the efforts of states to develop their state plans and heightening concern about our nation’s ability to respond effectively to an influenza pandemic. | Why GAO Did This Study
The anthrax incidents in the fall of 2001 and the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2002-2003 have raised concerns about the nation's ability to respond to a major public health threat, whether naturally occurring or the result of bioterrorism. The anthrax incidents strained the public health system, including laboratory and workforce capacities, at the state and local levels. The SARS outbreak highlighted the challenges of responding to new and emerging infectious disease. The current influenza season has heightened concerns about the nation's ability to handle a pandemic. GAO was asked to examine improvements in state and local preparedness for responding to major public health threats and federal and state efforts to prepare for an influenza pandemic. This testimony is based on GAO's recent report, HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs: States Reported Progress but Fell Short of Program Goals for 2002, GAO-04- 360R (Feb. 10, 2004). This testimony also updates information contained in GAO's report on federal and state planning for an influenza pandemic, Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State Response, GAO- 01-4 (Oct. 27, 2000).
What GAO Found
Although states have further developed many important aspects of public health preparedness, since April 2003, no state is fully prepared to respond to a major public health threat. States have improved their disease surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, communication capacity, and workforce needed to respond to public health threats, but gaps in each remain. Moreover, regional planning between states is lacking, and many states lack surge capacity--the capacity to evaluate, diagnose, and treat the large numbers of patients that would present during a public health emergency. Although states are developing plans for receiving and distributing medical supplies and material for mass vaccinations from the Strategic National Stockpile in the event of a public health emergency, most of these plans are not yet finalized. HHS has not published the federal influenza pandemic plan, and most of the state plans have not been finalized. In 2000, GAO recommended that HHS complete the national plan for responding to an influenza pandemic, but according to HHS, the plan is still under review. Absent a federal plan, key questions about the federal role in the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines and antiviral drugs during a pandemic remain unanswered. HHS reports that most states continue to develop their state plans despite the lack of a federal plan. |
gao_GAO-12-486 | gao_GAO-12-486_0 | Mixed Progress in Development and Delivery Efforts
MDA experienced mixed results in executing its fiscal year 2011 development goals and BMDS tests. For the first time in 5 years, we are able to report that all of the targets used in fiscal year 2011 test events were delivered as planned and performed as expected. However, none of the programs we assessed were able to fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the year. Overall, flight test failures and an anomaly forced MDA to suspend or slow production of three out of four interceptors currently being manufactured. MDA’s Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategy Magnifies the Effects of Tests and Other Problems
To meet the 2002 presidential direction to initially rapidly field and update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 presidential announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. High levels of concurrency were present in MDA’s initial efforts and are present in current efforts. Recently, the agency has begun emphasizing the need to follow knowledge-based development practices, which encourage accumulating more technical knowledge before program commitments are made and conducting more testing before production is initiated. However, because MDA continues to employ concurrent strategies, it is likely that it will continue to experience these types of acquisition problems. Highly Concurrent Acquisition Strategies Often Lead to Cost, Schedule, and Performance Consequences
Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology development and product development or between product development and production of a system. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product development before requirements are understood and technologies mature as well as committing to production and fielding before development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. Accordingly, they create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages even when problems are discovered in testing. In contrast, successful programs that deliver promised capabilities for the estimated cost and schedule follow a systematic and disciplined knowledge-based approach. For example, the flight testing cost to confirm the CE-II capability has increased from $236 million to about $1 billion. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following seven actions to reduce concurrency and strengthen MDA’s near- and long-term acquisition prospects. For the Aegis BMD program, direct MDA to 3) verify the SM-3 Block IB engagement capability through the planned three developmental flight tests before committing to additional production beyond those needed for developmental testing and 4) report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to Congress the root cause of the SM-3 Block IB developmental flight test failure, path forward for future development, and the plans to bridge production from the SM-3 Block IA to the SM-3 Block IB before committing to additional purchases of the SM-3 Block IB. In responding to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with six of our seven recommendations and commented on actions in process or planned in response. In some cases, these actions are responsive to immediate problems, but do not appear to consistently address the implications for concurrency in the future. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) cost, schedule, testing and performance progress, we reviewed the accomplishments of eight Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements that MDA is currently developing and fielding: the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) with Standard Missile-3 Block IA and Block IB; Aegis Ashore; Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block IIA; Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block IIB; Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD); Precision Tracking and Space System (PTSS); Targets and Countermeasures; and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). The complex nature of the BMDS, with its wide range of connected elements, requires integrated system-level models and simulations to assess its performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
MDA has spent more than $80 billion since its initiation in 2002 and plans to spend $44 billion more by 2016 to develop, produce, and field a complex integrated system of land-, sea-, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and battle management, known as the BMDS.
Since 2002, National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated that GAO prepare annual assessments of MDAs ongoing cost, schedule, testing, and performance progress. This report assesses that progress in fiscal year 2011. To do this, GAO examined the accomplishments of the BMDS elements and supporting efforts and reviewed individual element responses to GAO data collection instruments. GAO also reviewed pertinent Department of Defense (DOD) policies and reports, and interviewed a wide range of DOD, MDA, and BMDS officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2011, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) experienced mixed results in executing its development goals and Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) tests. For the first time in 5 years, GAO found that all of the targets used in this years tests were delivered and performed as expected. None of the programs GAO assessed were able to fully accomplish their asset delivery and capability goals for the year. Flight test failures, an anomaly, and delays disrupted the development of several components and models and simulations challenges remain. Flight test failures forced MDA to suspend or slow production of three out of four interceptors currently being manufactured while failure review boards investigated their test problems.
To meet the presidential 2002 direction to initially rapidly field and update missile defense capabilities as well as the 2009 announcement to deploy missile defenses in Europe, MDA has undertaken and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions. Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology development and product development or between product development and production. While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product development before requirements are understood and technologies mature or committing to production and fielding before development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. It can also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages. In contrast, as shown in the notional graphic below, successful programs that deliver promised capabilities for the estimated cost and schedule use a disciplined knowledge-based approach.
High levels of concurrency were present in MDAs initial efforts and are present in current efforts, though the agency has begun emphasizing the need to follow knowledge-based development practices. During 2011, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, the Aegis Standard Missile 3 Block IB, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense experienced significant ill effects from concurrency. For example, MDAs discovery of a design problem in a new variant of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense programs interceptors while production was underway increased costs, may require retrofit of fielded equipment, and delayed delivery. Flight test cost to confirm its capability has increased from $236 million to about $1 billion. Because MDA continues to employ concurrent strategies, it is likely that it will continue to experience these kinds of acquisition problems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes seven recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to reduce concurrency and strengthen MDAs near- and long-term acquisition prospects. DOD concurred with six recommendations and partially concurred with one related to reporting on the cause of the Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block IB test failure before committing to additional purchases. DOD did not agree to tie additional purchases to reporting the cause of the failure. DODs stated actions were generally responsive to problems already at hand, but did not consistently address implications for concurrency in the future, as discussed more fully in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-138 | gao_GAO-05-138_0 | While DOD has closed or realigned bases as recommended by the various BRAC Commissions, other actions, such as the cleanup of environmentally contaminated property and the subsequent transfer of unneeded property to other users, were allowed to continue beyond the 6-year implementation period for each round. These reports discussed the magnitude and precision of cost and savings estimates, the progress of environmental cleanup and property transfer, and the impact on communities and their recovery. In our April 2002 report, we concluded that most (about 58 percent) former unneeded base property had not yet been transferred to other users, the closure process was generating substantial savings (about $16.7 billion, although the savings estimates were imprecise), the total expected environmental cleanup costs were still within range of the cost estimates made in 1996, and most communities surrounding closed bases were faring well economically in relation to key national economic indicators. Most Unneeded BRAC Property Had Been Transferred
As of September 30, 2004, nearly 72 percent (364,000 acres) of the approximately 504,000 acres of unneeded BRAC property from the prior rounds had been transferred to other federal or nonfederal entities. When leased land is added to this acreage, the amount of unneeded BRAC property that is in reuse increases to 90 percent. 3). As we have previously reported, however, the cost and savings projections that DOD uses to estimate net savings are imprecise because the military services have not regularly updated their savings projections and DOD’s accounting systems do not track estimated savings. On the other hand, the estimated net savings could be greater than DOD has reported because some costs attributed to the closures, such as environmental cleanup, may have occurred even if the bases remained open. BRAC Net Savings Estimates Remain Substantial
Our analysis of DOD data shows that the department had accrued an estimated $28.9 billion in net savings or cost avoidances through fiscal year 2003 for the four prior BRAC rounds. This amount represents an increase of approximately $486 million from our prior reporting in 2002 and is attributable to inflation over that time period. DOD expected to spend an estimated $3.6 billion in fiscal year 2004 and beyond to complete environmental cleanup on BRAC properties, bringing the total BRAC environmental costs to $11.9 billion, which is still within prior estimates. Most Communities Have Recovered or Are Recovering from the Economic Impact of BRAC
Most communities have recovered or are recovering from the impact of base closures, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some negative impact from the national economic downturn of recent years. Moreover, recent economic data show that affected BRAC communities are faring well when compared to national economic indicators. 8). The other 6 locations had unemployment rates greater than the U.S. rate. Appendix IV: Average Annual Real Per Capita Income Growth Rates of BRAC-Affected Areas Compared with the U.S. Average Rate
As figure 11 shows, 11 (46 percent) of the 24 BRAC-affected localities situated west of the Mississippi River had average annual real per capita income growth rates that were greater than the U.S. average growth rate of 2.2 percent during 1999 through 2001. Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming Base Realignment and Closure Round. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the Department of Defense (DOD) prepares for the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round, questions continue to be raised about the transfer and environmental cleanup of unneeded property arising from the prior four BRAC rounds and their impact on cost and savings and on local economies. This report, which is being issued to the defense authorization committees that have oversight responsibility over defense infrastructure, describes DOD's progress in implementing prior BRAC postclosure actions. It addresses (1) the transfer of unneeded base property to other users, (2) the magnitude of the net savings accruing from the prior rounds, (3) estimated costs for environmental cleanup of BRAC property, and (4) the economic recovery of communities affected by base closures.
What GAO Found
As of September 30, 2004, DOD had transferred about 72 percent of 504,000 acres of unneeded BRAC property to other entities. This amount represents an increase over the 42 percent that GAO previously reported in April 2002 and is primarily attributable to two large property transfers. When leased acreage is added to the transferred property, the amount of unneeded BRAC property in reuse rises to 90 percent. Transfer of the remaining acreage has been delayed primarily because of environmental cleanup requirements. DOD data show that the department had generated an estimated $28.9 billion in net savings or cost avoidances from the prior BRAC rounds through fiscal year 2003 and expects to save about $7 billion each year thereafter. These savings reflect money that DOD would likely have spent to operate military bases had they remained open. Although the savings are substantial, GAO found that the estimates are imprecise because the military services have not updated them regularly despite GAO's prior reported concerns on this issue. This issue needs to be addressed in the 2005 round. Further, the estimates do not reflect all BRAC-related costs, such as $1.9 billion incurred by DOD and other federal agencies for redevelopment assistance. While estimated costs for environmental cleanup at BRAC sites remain within the range of prior estimates, these costs may increase if unknown or undetermined future cleanup liabilities, such as additional unexploded ordnance or other harmful contaminants, emerge. Through fiscal year 2003, DOD had spent about $8.3 billion on BRAC environmental cleanup. It expects to spend another $3.6 billion to complete the cleanup work. While most nearby communities have recovered or continue to recover from base closures, they, as well as other communities, have felt some impact from the recent economic downturn where the strength of the national, regional, or local economy can affect recovery efforts. Yet, key economic indicators--unemployment rates and average annual real per capita income growth rates--show that BRAC communities are generally faring well when compared with average U.S. rates. Of 62 communities that GAO studied, 69 percent had unemployment rates equal to or lower than the U.S. average and 48 percent had income growth rates higher than the national average. |
gao_GAO-06-242T | gao_GAO-06-242T_0 | CFO Act Enacted to Address Longstanding Problems
Prior to passage of the CFO Act in 1990, the seemingly never ending disclosures of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in federal programs painted a picture of a government unable to manage its programs, protect its assets, or provide taxpayers with the effective and economical services they expect. In the 1980s, many states began producing financial reports based on generally accepted accounting principles to provide a more complete picture of their financial situation. GPRA was followed by the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (GMRA), which made permanent the pilot program in the CFO Act for annual audited agency-level financial statements, expanded this requirement to all CFO Act agencies, and established a requirement for the preparation and audit of governmentwide consolidated financial statements. The CFO Act Mandated Numerous Changes
The enactment of the CFO Act represented a broad-based recognition that federal financial management was in great need of fundamental reform. The systematic measurement of performance, the development of cost information, and the integration of financial management systems are some of the financial management practices called for by the CFO Act that, if properly implemented, will significantly improve financial management throughout the federal government. Important Progress Made to Achieving CFO Act Goals
The federal government has made substantial progress in financial management in the 15 years since the enactment of the CFO Act. For example, improved financial performance is one of the six governmentwide initiatives in the President’s Management Agenda (PMA). Measured in terms of coming to the job with a proven track record in financial management, the background of individuals selected for these positions has improved tremendously over the past 15 years. Improving Financial Management Systems and Operations—Since 1990, progress has been made towards improving financial management systems in the federal government. Unqualified audit opinion for CFO Act agencies financial statements have grown from 6 in fiscal year 1996 to 18 in fiscal year 2005. Improvements in timeliness have been even more dramatic this year. The CFO Act calls for agency financial statements to be issued no later than March 31st, which is 6 months after the fiscal year end, and in the earlier years some agencies were unable to meet that timeframe. Preparing Performance and Accountability Reports—Another clear indication of progress to date is the preparation of the annual Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) by CFO Act agencies. The Department of Education’s Student Financial Aid Programs, the Federal Aviation Administration’s Financial Management, and the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service Financial Management all sustained improvements in financial management and internal control weaknesses and thus warranted removal. Challenges Remain to Fulfilling the Objectives of the CFO Act
While there has been marked progress in financial management, as I have just highlighted, a number of challenges still remain. The principal challenges remaining are (1) modernizing financial management systems, (2) improving financial reporting, (3) building a financial management workforce for the future, (4) addressing long-standing internal control weaknesses, and (5) ensuring the continuity of financial management reform. The end goal is the establishment of a fully functioning CFO operation that includes (1) modern financial management systems that provide, reliable, timely, and useful information to support day-to-day decision-making and oversight and for the systematic measurement of performance; (2) a cadre of highly qualified CFOs and supporting staff; and (3) sound internal controls that safeguard assets and ensure proper accountability. While the problems are much more severe at some agencies than at others, the nature and severity of the problems indicate that overall, management at most CFO Act agencies do not yet receive the complete range of information needed for accountability, performance management and reporting, and decision making. Given the long-term nature of the comprehensive changes needed and challenges still remaining to fully realize the goals of the CFO Act, it is unlikely they will all occur before the end of the current administration’s term. While early on some were skeptical, the CFO Act has dramatically changed how financial management is carried out and the value placed on good financial management across government. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1990, the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, heralded as the most comprehensive financial management reform legislation in 40 years, was enacted. The Act's goal is to improve management through reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information for day-to-day decisionmaking and accountability. This testimony outlines the legislative history of the CFO Act, and its key elements, progress to date in implementing the Act, and the challenges for the future. Prior to passage of the CFO Act, the seemingly never ending disclosures of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in federal programs painted a picture of a government unable to manage its programs, protect its assets, or provide taxpayers with the effective and economical services they expect. The enactment of the CFO Act represented a broad-based recognition that federal financial management was in great need of fundamental reform. The Act mandated a financial management leadership structure; required the preparation and audit of annual financial statements; called for modernized financial management systems and strengthened internal control; and required the systematic measurement of performance, the development of cost information, and the integration of program, budget, and financial systems.
What GAO Found
In the 15 years since the enactment of the CFO Act, the federal government has made substantial progress in strengthening financial management. The past 3 administrations have all made financial management reform a priority. Improved financial management has been one of the cornerstones of the President's Management Agenda from the outset of the current administration. There has been a clear cultural change in how financial management is viewed and carried out in the agencies and a recognition of the value and need for good financial management throughout government, which was not the case in 1990. There are now qualified CFOs across government, who bring to the job proven track records in financial management. Financial management systems and internal control have been strengthened. Generally accepted government accounting standards have been developed. For fiscal year 2005, 18 of 24 CFO agencies received clean audit opinions on their financial statements, up from just 6 in fiscal year 1996. This year's audited financial statements were issued in just 1 and 1/2 months after the close of the fiscal year as opposed to 5 months, which is the deadline in the Act. Agencies are also now preparing performance and accountability reports that tie together financial and performance information. Though not yet auditable, primarily because of problems in the Department of Defense, comprehensive annual consolidated financial statements are being issued in 2 and 1/2 months as opposed to the 6-month timeframe allowed in the Act. While there has been marked progress in the past 15 years and the CFO Act has proven itself as the foundation for financial accountability, GAO has identified five principal challenges to fully realizing the world-class financial management anticipated by the CFO Act. The need to: (1) modernize and integrate financial management systems to provide a complete range of financial and cost information needed for accountability, performance reporting, and decision making, with special emphasis on the Department of Defense, which has deeply-rooted systems problems, (2) build a more analytic financial management workforce to support program managers and decisionmakers, (3) solve long-standing internal control weaknesses, (4) enhance financial reporting to provide a complete picture of the federal government's overall performance, financial condition, and future fiscal outlook, and (5) ensure that financial management reform is sustained given the leadership changes that occur at the end of any administration and the long-term nature of many of the ongoing reform initiatives. The continuing strong support of the Congress has been a catalyst to the important progress that has already taken place and will be essential going forward. |
gao_GAO-10-347 | gao_GAO-10-347_0 | Nearly 40 Percent of OIA Grant Projects Have Internal Control Weaknesses That Could Increase Susceptibility to Mismanagement
On the basis of our review of grant files from a random probability sample of grant projects, we determined that previously reported internal control weaknesses still exist and estimate that 39 percent of the 1,771 grant projects in OIA’s grant management database demonstrate at least one internal control weakness that may increase the projects’ susceptibility to mismanagement. As shown in figure 2, the internal control weaknesses we identified were most often associated with grant recipient activities, followed by joint activities and OIA grant ant management activities. management activities. Internal control weaknesses associated with grant recipient activities were the most common internal control weaknesses we found, accounting for 62 percent of the weaknesses exhibited by OIA grant projects. Of the joint activities between OIA and grant recipients, project redirection, whereby grant funds may be moved between projects, can contribute to increased susceptibility to mismanagement. In addition, frequent project redirection can result in projects that are started but do not have sufficient funds to be completed. Insular Areas Face Challenges in Implementing OIA Grant Projects, as Selected Projects Illustrate
Insular areas confront both project planning and management challenges in implementing OIA grant projects as a result of decisions made by the insular area governments and external factors. Project management challenges include issues such as a limited local capacity for implementing OIA projects and poor contractor performance. External factors include issues such as declining economic conditions and various U.S. policies. While some of these challenges, which influence the insular areas’ abilities to effectively complete OIA grant projects, are beyond their control, others can be overcome. OIA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Implementation and Management of Grant Projects
Over the past 5 years, OIA has taken steps to improve project implementation and management, including implementing a competitive allocation system that establishes incentives for insular areas to make financial management improvements and complete projects; establishing grant expiration dates; and taking steps to improve administrative continuity in insular areas. This system provides incentives for financial management improvements and project completion by tying a portion of each insular area’s annual allocation to the insular governments’ efforts in these areas—such as their efforts to submit financial and status reports on time. Several Obstacles to Timely and Effective Project Completion Remain
Despite these efforts, some insular areas are still not completing their projects in a timely and effective manner, and OIA faces the following key obstacles in compelling them to do so: Lack of sanctions for delayed or inefficient projects. Current OIA grant procedures provide few sanctions for delayed or inefficient projects. OIA officials report that resource constraints impede effective project completion and proactive monitoring and oversight. The Office of Inspector General initially had insular field offices in American Samoa, the CNMI, Guam, and the USVI. Inconsistent and insufficiently documented project redirection policies. OIA’s current project redirection approval practices do little to discourage insular areas from redirecting project funds in ways that hinder project completion. OIA’s current data system for tracking grants is limited in the data elements it contains, leading to inconsistencies in the data that some grant managers rely on for monitoring and oversight activities. Such occurrences increase the susceptibility of grant funds to mismanagement. Along these lines, Interior is currently phasing in a centralized agencywide system—the Financial and Business Management System—that is scheduled to be implemented in OIA in 2011. For this review, we determined (1) whether previously reported internal control weaknesses have been addressed and, if not, to what extent they are prevalent among OIA grant projects; (2) the challenges, if any, insular areas face in implementing OIA grants; and (3) the extent to which OIA has taken action to improve grant project implementation and management. For our first objective, our review focused on OIA grants that were provided to all insular areas that receive noncompact types of grants— including American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), and three Freely Associated States (the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands). 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. insular areas of American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) face serious economic and fiscal challenges and rely on federal funding to deliver critical services. The Department of the Interior (Interior), through its Office of Insular Affairs (OIA), provides roughly $70 million in grant funds annually to increase insular area self-sufficiency. GAO and others have raised concerns regarding insular areas' internal control weaknesses, which increase the risk of grant fund mismanagement. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether previously reported internal control weaknesses have been addressed and, if not, to what extent they are prevalent among OIA grant projects; (2) the challenges, if any, insular areas face in implementing OIA grant projects; and (3) the extent to which OIA has taken action to improve grant project implementation and management. GAO reviewed a random sample of 173 OIA grant files, conducted site visits, and interviewed OIA and insular area officials.
What GAO Found
Internal control weaknesses previously reported by GAO and others continue to exist, and about 40 percent of grant projects funded through OIA have these weaknesses, which may increase their susceptibility to mismanagement. These weaknesses, including insufficient reporting and record-keeping discrepancies, can be categorized into three types of activities that may increase the possibility of mismanagement: grant recipient activities, joint activity between grant recipients and OIA, and OIA's grant management activities. Weaknesses associated with grant recipient activities were the most common issues GAO found, encompassing 62 percent of the weaknesses exhibited by OIA grant projects. The joint activity--redirection of grant funds, a practice by which OIA allows insular areas to move grant funds between projects--accounts for 24 percent of the weakness present in OIA grant projects. While project redirection can be a helpful tool, it can contribute to project mismanagement if not used appropriately. Weaknesses associated with OIA grant management activities, including discrepancies in grant management data, account for 14 percent of the weaknesses in grant projects. Insular areas confront a number of challenges in implementing OIA grants, which can be categorized into project planning challenges such as frequently changing local priorities; project management challenges such as limited local capacity for project implementation; and external risk factors, including the declining economic conditions of American Samoa and the CNMI. While some of these challenges are beyond the insular areas' control, others result from decisions made by the insular area governments. These challenges can result in implementation delays for grant projects. Over the past 5 years, OIA has taken steps to improve project implementation and management. Most notably, OIA established incentives for financial management improvements and project completion by tying a portion of each insular area's annual allocation to the insular governments' efforts in these areas--such as their efforts to submit financial and status reports on time. In addition, OIA established expiration dates for grants to encourage expeditious use of the funds. Despite these and other efforts, some insular areas are still not completing their projects in a timely and effective manner, and OIA faces key obstacles in compelling them to do so. Specifically, (1) current OIA grant procedures provide few sanctions for delayed or inefficient projects, and the office is not clear on its authorities to modify its policies; (2) resource constraints impede effective project completion and proactive monitoring and oversight; (3) inconsistent and insufficiently documented project redirection policies do little to discourage insular areas from redirecting grant funds in ways that hinder project completion; and (4) OIA's current data system for tracking grants is limited and lacks specific features that could allow for more efficient grant management. Interior is currently phasing in an agencywide database that is scheduled to be implemented in OIA in 2011, but to be effective, it will require some flexibility to address OIA's needs for grants management. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-85 | gao_T-HEHS-98-85_0 | Legislative Reforms Substantially Increase HCFA’s Authority to Manage the Medicare Program
Two recent acts grant HCFA substantial authority and responsibility to reform Medicare. Specifically, managers were concerned that because of the concentrated efforts to implement BBA and solve computer problems that could arise in the year 2000, the quality of other work might be compromised or tasks might be neglected altogether. Over the past several years, we have reported that HCFA has not adequately ensured that contractors are paying only medically necessary or otherwise appropriate claims. They noted that HCFA’s traditional approach of hiring generalist staff and training them largely on the job is no longer well suited to the agency’s need to implement recent reforms expeditiously. HCFA’s Reorganization Is in Transition
In July 1997, HCFA restructured its entire organization. The new design reflected the agency’s intent to, among other things, (1) combine activities to redirect additional resources to the growing managed care side of the program, (2) acknowledge a shift from HCFA’s traditional role as claims payer to a more active role as purchaser of health care services, and (3) establish three components focused on beneficiaries, health plans and providers, and Medicaid and other activities conducted at the state level. HCFA Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Accomplish Its Short-Term Agenda
We observed that managers appeared to be clear on top management’s expectations for completing BBA-related activities and for making sure that contractors’ claims processing systems would comply with the millennium changes. The illustration above and our discussions with agency officials suggest that while HCFA may be ready to assert its BBA-related resource needs, it is not likely to be in a position to adequately justify the resources it seeks to carry out its other Medicare program objectives. This observation calls to mind our July 1997 report on the adequacy of HHS’s draft strategic plan under the Government Performance and Results Act. Observations
HCFA is an agency facing many challenges. struggling to carry out Medicare’s numerous and challenging activities. In addition, they assert that the loss of experienced staff has further diminished HCFA’s capacity. We will also continue to monitor the progress of HCFA’s reorganization efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) ability to meet growing program management challenges, focusing on: (1) HCFA's new authorities under recent Medicare legislation; (2) HCFA managers' views on the agency's capacity to carry out various Medicare-related functions; and (3) the actions HCFA needs to take to accomplish its objectives over the next several years.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) substantial program growth and greater responsibilities appear to be outstripping HCFA's capacity to manage its existing workload; (2) legislative reforms have increased HCFA's authority to manage the Medicare program; (3) simultaneously, however, other factors have increased the challenges HCFA faces, including the need to make year 2000 computer adjustments and develop a new, comprehensive information management strategy; manage transitions in its network of claims processing contractors; and implement a major agency reorganization; (4) in addition, officials report that the expertise to carry out HCFA's new functions is not yet in place and that HCFA has experienced a loss of institutional knowledge through attrition; (5) in this environment, agency managers are concerned that some of their responsibilities might be compromised or neglected altogether because of higher-priority work; (6) HCFA's approach for dealing with its considerable workload is incomplete; (7) heretofore, the agency lacked an approach--consistent with the requirement of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to develop a strategic plan--that specified the full range of program objectives to be accomplished; (8) HCFA has developed a schedule for responding to recent legislative reforms but is still in the process of detailing the staffing and skill levels required to meet reform implementation deadlines; and (9) while addressing new mandates, the agency also needs to specify how it will continue to carry out its ongoing critical functions. |
gao_GAO-14-386T | gao_GAO-14-386T_0 | Most Rogue Internet Pharmacies Operate From Abroad and Many Violate a Variety of Federal Laws, Including by Selling Counterfeit Drugs
Although the exact number of rogue Internet pharmacies is unknown, most operate from abroad. According to LegitScript, an online pharmacy verification service that applies NABP standards to assess the legitimacy of Internet pharmacies, there were over 36,000 active rogue Internet pharmacies as of February 2014. Federal officials and other stakeholders we interviewed consistently told us that most rogue Internet pharmacies operate from abroad, and many have shipped drugs into the United States that are not approved by FDA, including counterfeit drugs. Many also illegally sell certain medications without a prescription that meets federal and state requirements. To sell drugs to their U.S. customers, foreign rogue Internet pharmacies use sophisticated methods to evade scrutiny by customs officials and smuggle their drugs into the country. The Complex and Global Nature of Rogue Internet Pharmacies Poses Substantial Challenges for Federal Investigators and Prosecutors
Rogue Internet pharmacies are often complex, global operations, and federal agencies face substantial challenges investigating and prosecuting those involved. According to federal agency officials, piecing together rogue Internet pharmacy operations can be difficult because they may be composed of thousands of related websites, and operators take steps to disguise their identities. Officials also face challenges investigating and prosecuting operators because they are often located abroad, with components of the operations scattered in several countries. However, rogue Internet pharmacies often deliberately and strategically locate components of their operations in countries that are unable or unwilling to aid U.S. agencies. As a result of competing priorities and the complexity of rogue Internet pharmacies, federal prosecutors may not always prosecute these cases. Federal Agencies Have Taken a Variety of Steps to Combat Rogue Internet Pharmacies
Despite these challenges, federal agencies and others have taken actions to combat rogue Internet pharmacies. Federal agencies have conducted investigations that have led to convictions, fines, and asset seizures from rogue Internet pharmacies as well as from companies that provide services to them. Since our report was published in July 2013, DOJ has continued to pursue those that import and traffic in counterfeit drugs, as well as those that purchase from them. Agencies have also collaborated with law enforcement agencies around the world to disrupt rogue Internet pharmacy operations. In 2013, FDA took action against 1,677 rogue Internet pharmacy websites during Operation Pangea. Federal agencies responsible for preventing illegal prescription drug imports have also interdicted rogue Internet pharmacy shipments. FDA and Others Have Taken Steps to Educate Consumers about the Risks of Purchasing Prescription Drugs from Internet Pharmacies, but Challenges Remain
FDA and others have taken steps to educate consumers about the dangers of buying prescription drugs from rogue Internet pharmacies. In September 2012, FDA launched a national campaign to raise public awareness about the risks of purchasing drugs online. Other federal agencies have also taken steps to educate consumers about the dangers of purchasing drugs online; for example, by posting information on their websites. NABP also posts information about its quarterly review of Internet pharmacies, which most recently showed that 97 percent of the over 10,000 Internet pharmacies that it reviewed were out of compliance with federal or state laws or industry standards. In particular, many rogue Internet pharmacies use sophisticated marketing methods to appear professional and legitimate, making it challenging for even well-informed consumers and health care professionals to differentiate between legitimate and rogue sites. Some rogue Internet pharmacies seek to assure consumers of the safety of their drugs by purporting to be “Canadian.” Canadian pharmacies have come to be perceived as a safe and economical alternative to pharmacies in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
While some Internet pharmacies are legitimate businesses that offer consumers a safe and convenient way to purchase their prescription drugs, the FDA and NABP have reported that thousands are fraudulent enterprises. Among other things, these rogue Internet pharmacies often sell counterfeit or otherwise substandard drugs. Consumers have experienced health problems as a result of purchasing drugs from rogue Internet pharmacies, and the proliferation and patronage of such entities has rendered them a public health threat. A number of federal and state agencies share responsibility for administering and enforcing laws related to Internet pharmacies, including FDA, DOJ, CBP, and ICE, as well as state boards of pharmacy.
This statement is based on GAO's July 2013 report, entitled Internet Pharmacies: Federal Agencies and States Face Challenges Combating Rogue Sites, Particularly Those Abroad ( GAO-13-560 ). In this report, GAO identified (1) how rogue sites violate federal and state laws, (2) challenges federal agencies face in investigating and prosecuting operators, (3) efforts to combat rogue Internet pharmacies, and (4) efforts to educate consumers about the risks of purchasing prescription drugs online. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed officials from federal agencies, reviewed federal laws and regulations, and examined agency data and documents. GAO also interviewed officials from stakeholders including NABP, drug manufacturers, and companies that provide services to Internet businesses.
What GAO Found
Although the exact number of rogue Internet pharmacies is unknown, one estimate suggests that there were over 36,000 in operation as of February 2014, and these rogue sites violate a variety of federal laws. Most operate from abroad, and many illegally ship prescription drugs into the United States that have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), including drugs that are counterfeit or are otherwise substandard. Many also illegally sell prescription drugs without a prescription that meets federal and state requirements. Foreign rogue Internet pharmacies use sophisticated methods to evade scrutiny by customs officials and smuggle drugs into the country. Their operators also often violate other laws, including those related to fraud and money laundering.
Rogue Internet pharmacies are often complex, global operations, and federal agencies face substantial challenges investigating and prosecuting those involved. According to federal agency officials, piecing together rogue Internet pharmacy operations can be difficult because they may be composed of thousands of related websites, and operators take steps to disguise their identities. Officials also face challenges investigating and prosecuting operators because they are often located abroad in countries that are unable or unwilling to aid U.S. agencies. The Department of Justice (DOJ) may not prosecute such cases due to competing priorities, the complexity of these operations, and challenges related to bringing charges under some federal laws.
Despite these challenges, federal agencies have conducted investigations that have led to convictions, fines, and asset seizures from rogue Internet pharmacies as well as from companies that provide services to them. FDA and other federal agencies have also collaborated with law enforcement agencies around the world to disrupt rogue Internet pharmacy operations. For example, FDA took action against 1,677 rogue Internet pharmacy websites in 2013 as part of a worldwide enforcement initiative. Other federal agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have also taken actions—for example, by interdicting counterfeit drug shipments from rogue Internet pharmacies at the border.
FDA and others have taken steps to educate consumers about the dangers of buying prescription drugs from rogue Internet pharmacies. FDA recently launched a national campaign to raise public awareness about the risks of purchasing drugs online, and the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) posts information on its website about how to safely purchase drugs online. However, rogue Internet pharmacies use sophisticated marketing methods to appear legitimate, making it hard for consumers to differentiate between legitimate and rogue sites. NABP's recent analysis shows that 97 percent of the over 10,000 Internet pharmacies that it reviewed were out of compliance with laws or industry standards. Some rogue sites seek to assure consumers of the safety of their drugs by purporting to be “Canadian” despite being located elsewhere or selling drugs sourced from other countries. |
gao_GAO-02-938 | gao_GAO-02-938_0 | Background
Retail payments are relatively high-volume, low-value payments. Currently, checks are settled on business days, which do not include weekends, resulting in a delay in the settlement of those checks deposited during the latter part of the week. Final settlement of ACH transfers processed by the Federal Reserve occurs through debits and credits to the accounts of depository institutions on the books of the Federal Reserve. There is no float for cash. Settlement of Financial Transactions on Weekends Would Provide Small Benefits
Weekend settlement of financial transactions would provide small benefits for retailers and consumers, and little, if any, benefit for the economy as a whole. Weekend Settlement Would Require Payment Service Providers to Open on Weekends and Could Significantly Increase Costs
Because payment system actors and processes are interdependent, weekend settlement would require payment service providers that clear and settle retail and wholesale payments to open on weekends, resulting in increased capital and operational costs. Because they have not been preempted, state closure laws applicable to state banks could interfere with the development of a uniform national weekend settlements system. | What GAO Found
The U.S. payment system is a large and complex system of people, institutions, rules, and technologies that transfer monetary value and related information. The nation's payment system transfers an estimated $3 trillion dollars each day--nearly one third of the U.S. gross domestic product. Currently, settlement--the final step in the transfer of ownership involving the physical exchange of payment or securities--occurs only during the business week. Some retailers, however, generate approximately half their weekly sales on weekends--when depository and other financial institutions generally are closed--receiving cash, checks, and electronic payments that are not credited to their accounts until at least the next business day. Weekend settlement of financial transactions would provide small benefits to retailers and consumers, and little, if any, benefit to the economy as a whole. Because payment system actors and processes are interdependent, implementing weekend settlement would require payment service providers that clear and settle retail and wholesale payments to open on weekends, resulting in significantly increased operational costs. Although there are no direct federal prohibitions against weekend settlement, state laws that are not preempted by federal laws or regulations providing for weekend settlement could interfere with development of a uniform, national 7 day settlement system. |
gao_GGD-99-80 | gao_GGD-99-80_0 | ONDCP Required to Certify Agency Drug Budgets
In developing the consolidated national drug control budget, the 1988 Act prescribes a budget review and certification process whereby ONDCP (1) receives annual drug budget submissions from each program manager, agency head, and department head with drug control responsibilities and (2) certifies in writing that these budget submissions are adequate to implement the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy for the budget request year. Finally, DOD’s fall budget was not certified because DOD did not address ONDCP’s recommended program increases. 3. Following this review, ONDCP notified each department or agency of its final certification decision. After the President’s proposed budget was submitted to Congress in February 1998, ONDCP continued to monitor the status of the drug budget during the congressional appropriations process. ONDCP’s PME System
To better evaluate the effectiveness of federal drug control efforts, in February 1998 ONDCP established its PME system—a system of goals, objectives, and targets designed to implement the National Strategy and measure the effectiveness of the nation’s drug control efforts. Each objective further consists of two to four performance targets, the measurement of which is to determine whether the objectives have been achieved. As a result, they are primarily focused on responding to the concerns of their departments and congressional oversight and appropriations committees, with respect to the Results Act. Further, ONDCP is specifically required to design the system so that it (1) monitors consistency between the goals and objectives of drug control agencies and (2) ensures that their goals and budgets support and are fully consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy. Conclusions
ONDCP’s fiscal year 1999 budget certification process appears consistent with the requirements of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The former Chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice asked us to examine the role of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in shaping the national drug control budget. In discussions with the Subcommittee staff, we specifically agreed to assess whether the process ONDCP followed to certify federal agencies’ drug control budgets for fiscal year 1999 was consistent with statutory requirements and describe the system ONDCP has developed to assess the extent to which drug control agencies and programs achieve intended results. To describe the system ONDCP has developed to assess the extent to which drug control agencies and programs achieve intended results, we interviewed officials from ONDCP and the other federal drug control agencies noted above and reviewed relevant documents provided by these agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the role of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in shaping the national drug control budget that the President ultimately proposes to Congress to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, focusing on: (1) whether the process ONDCP followed to certify federal agencies' drug control budgets for fiscal year (FY) 1999 was consistent with statutory requirements; and (2) the system ONDCP has developed to assess the extent to which drug control agencies and programs achieve intended results.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the process ONDCP used to certify FY 1999 drug budgets was generally consistent with the requirements of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; (2) ONDCP provided budget guidance to agencies and reviewed some agencies' preliminary budgets in the summer and others in the fall; (3) based on its budget reviews, ONDCP notified agencies of recommended changes to incorporate into their final budgets that were submitted to the President for approval; (4) ONDCP reviewed budgets of 14 drug control agencies specifically for certification to determine whether they were adequate to support the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy; (5) ONDCP certified all but the Department of Defense (DOD) budget; (6) DOD was not certified because DOD and ONDCP could not agree on funding levels for certain drug program initiatives; (7) later, however, DOD's budget was significantly increased following ONDCP's appeals to the Office of Management and Budget and the President; (8) ONDCP continued to monitor development of the national drug control budget during the remaining budget and congressional appropriations process; (9) to assess the extent to which agencies and programs achieve intended results, ONDCP has initiated a system known as Performance Measures of Effectiveness--a long-term effort designed to assess the effectiveness of the nation's drug control efforts; (10) although this system represents a blueprint for the first accountability in the area of drug policy, some questions remain about: (a) the availability of adequate data to measure performance; (b) how the system is to interface with the drug budget process; and (c) how agencies will link the performance expected of them by the National Strategy with the performance goals they prepare in response to the Government Performance and Results Act; and (11) ONDCP plans to continually monitor the system's operation to ensure that it is fully functional and achieving its designed purpose. |
gao_GAO-10-645 | gao_GAO-10-645_0 | We reported in September 2009 that as the threats to national security— which include the threat of bioterrorism and pandemic outbreak—have evolved over the past decades, so have the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. Although the workforce shortages threaten to diminish capacity to detect signals of potentially catastrophic biological events as they emerge, some federal agencies are planning or have taken actions to help mitigate them. In addition, USDA is using incentives, such as bonuses, to attract and maintain its veterinarian workforce. Training and accreditation programs are essential to developing a knowledgeable workforce with the skills needed to identify potential threats to human, animal, and plant health. For example, in the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health, CDC has called for the development of a national training and education framework to articulate professional roles and competencies necessary for biosurveillance. In this vein, federal agencies have taken various actions designed to promote timely detection and situational awareness by developing (1) information sharing and analysis mechanisms, (2) laboratory networks to enhance diagnostic capacity, and (3) equipment and technologies to enhance early detection and situational awareness. A National Strategy and a Focal Point Could Help Guide Development of a National Biosurveillance Capability
While some high-level biodefense strategies have been developed, there is no broad, integrated national strategy that encompasses all stakeholders with biosurveillance responsibilities that can be used to guide the systematic identification of risk, assessment of resources needed to address those risks, and the prioritization and allocation of investment across the entire biosurveillance enterprise. We have reported that developing effective national strategies and establishing a focal point with sufficient time, responsibility, authority, and resources can help ensure successful implementation of complex interagency and intergovernmental undertakings, such as providing a national biosurveillance capability. Officials from CDC, DOD, DHS, USDA, and HHS stated that having a focal point would help coordinate federal efforts to develop a national biosurveillance capability. Because the mission responsibilities and resources needed to develop a biosurveillance capability are dispersed across a number of federal agencies, efforts to establish a national biosurveillance capability could benefit from designated leadership—a focal point—that provides leadership for the interagency community. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to help build and maintain a national biosurveillance capability— an inherently interagency enterprise—we recommend the Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Staff to, in coordination with relevant federal agencies, take the following two actions: (1) Establish the appropriate leadership mechanism—such as an interagency council or national biosurveillance director—to provide a focal point with authority and accountability for developing a national biosurveillance capability. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required GAO to describe the state of federal, state, local, and tribal government biosurveillance efforts, the duplication of biosurveillance efforts, the integration of biosurveillance systems, and the effective use of resources and expertise at these levels of governments. Specifically, this report examines the following: (1) federal agency efforts to provide resources—personnel, training, equipment, and systems—that support a national biosurveillance capability; and (2) the extent to which mechanisms are in place to guide development of a national biosurveillance capability. We did not review federal efforts to enhance international disease surveillance. These plans included the National Health Security Strategy, the National Security Council’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, and the National Response Framework. In addition, we interviewed these officials on the degree to which the federal government has built a national biosurveillance capability, how specific programs could contribute to a national capability for early detection or situational awareness of biological events, the degree to which federal programs are integrated with each other, and the limitations of these programs in supporting a national biosurveillance capability. The U.S. government has a long history of monitoring human, animal, and plant health—in some cases for more than a century—to help limit malady, loss of life, and economic impact. Also posing a challenge to timely detection and situational awareness is the need for laboratory confirmation. Bioterrorism Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen Federal Agencies’ Abilities to Respond to Public Health Emergencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government has a history of employing health surveillance to help limit malady, loss of life, and economic impact of diseases. Recent legislation and presidential directives have called for a robust and integrated biosurveillance capability; that is, the ability to provide early detection and situational awareness of potentially catastrophic biological events. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directed GAO to report on the state of biosurveillance and resource use in federal, state, local, and tribal governments. This report is one in a series responding to that mandate. This report addresses (1) federal efforts that support a national biosurveillance capability and (2) the extent to which mechanisms are in place to guide the development of a national biosurveillance capability. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed federal biosurveillance programs, plans, and strategies and interviewed agency officials from components of 12 federal departments with biosurveillance responsibilities.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies with biosurveillance responsibilities--including the Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Agriculture--have taken or plan to take actions to develop the skilled personnel, training, equipment, and systems that could support a national biosurveillance capability. GAO previously reported that as the threats to national security have evolved over the past decades, so have the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those threats. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) officials stated that skilled personnel shortages threaten the capacity to detect potentially catastrophic biological events as they emerge in humans, animals, or plants. To address this issue, some federal agencies are planning or have taken actions to attract and maintain expertise using fellowships, incentives, and cooperative agreements. Moreover, CDC has called for the development of a national training and education framework to articulate professional roles and competencies necessary for biosurveillance. The Department of Agriculture has also developed training programs to help ensure that diseases and pests that could harm plants or animals can be identified. In addition, federal agencies have taken various actions designed to promote timely detection and situational awareness by developing (1) information sharing and analysis mechanisms, (2) laboratory networks to enhance diagnostic capacity, and (3) equipment and technologies to enhance early detection and situational awareness. While national biodefense strategies have been developed to address biological threats such as pandemic influenza, there is neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a focal point with the authority and resources to guide the effort to develop a national biosurveillance capability. For example, the National Security Council issued the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats in November 2009. While this strategy calls for the development of a national strategy for situational awareness, it does not meet the need for a biosurveillance strategy. In addition, this strategy includes objectives that would be supported by a robust and integrated biosurveillance capability, such as obtaining timely and accurate insight on current and emerging risks, but it does not provide a framework to help identify and prioritize investments in a national biosurveillance capability. GAO previously reported that complex interagency efforts, such as developing a robust, integrated, national biosurveillance capability, could benefit from an effective national strategy and a focal point with sufficient time, responsibility, authority, and resources to lead the effort. Efforts to develop a national biosurveillance capability could benefit from a national biosurveillance strategy that guides federal agencies and other stakeholders to systematically identify risks, resources needed to address those risks, and investment priorities. Further, because the mission responsibilities and resources needed to develop a biosurveillance capability are dispersed across a number of federal agencies, efforts to develop a biosurveillance system could benefit from a focal point that provides leadership for the interagency community.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Staff to identify, in consultation with relevant federal agencies, a focal point to lead the development of a national biosurveillance strategy to guide the capability's development. GAO provided a copy of this draft to the 12 federal departments and the National Security Staff. |
gao_RCED-98-71 | gao_RCED-98-71_0 | Of these, 3,304 are designated as part of the national airport system and are therefore eligible for federal assistance. Our estimates ranged from $1.4 billion per year to fund safety, security, noise mitigation, and reconstruction projects; $2.8 billion if other high-priority projects, primarily capacity-related projects, are added; $6.1 billion for all AIP-eligible projects; and $10.1 billion per year to fund all types of projects, including those not eligible for AIP funding. Although a difference may exist between funding and planned spending in total, there is a much closer match between funding from AIP and planned spending on FAA’s highest-priority projects (reconstruction and mandates). Current funding at the 3,233 small, nonhub, other commercial service, and general aviation airports is a little over half of the estimated cost of their total planned development, producing a difference of more than $1.4 billion (see fig. Effect of Proposals to Increase Airport Funding Varies
Evaluating the various proposals to provide additional funding for airport development involves the consideration of the trade-offs among the various funding types as well as the potential effect each proposal would have on airports. Initiatives to increase funding for airport development include increasing AIP funding, raising the ceiling on PFCs, and other initiatives, such as FAA’s pilot programs for innovative financing and privatization. 7). Increasing the PFC ceiling would not substantially benefit smaller commercial airports. Conclusions
The total funding for airport development peaked in 1992 in real terms and declined to about $7 billion in 1996. Recommendation
To help smaller airports fund some of the cost of their capital development, but to avoid undermining the level of federal support for larger airports, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation seek authority from the Congress to use Airport Improvement Program grants to capitalize state revolving funds in those circumstances where states have a demonstrated capability and desire to manage a revolving fund. Sources of Airports’ Capital Funding
Funding for airport development comes from five primary sources: federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, passenger facility charges (PFC), airport and special facility bonds, state grants, and airport revenue. Federal Grants
AIP grants are made available from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) allocates most AIP grants on the basis of (1) a legislated apportionment formula, tied to the number of passengers an airport enplanes, and (2) set-aside categories earmarked for specific types of airports and projects. The figure also shows that the amount of new finance for airport development increased from less than $1.5 billion in 1982 to more than $3.7 billion in 1996. Current Funding and Planned Development
Funding source 1996
Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Funding source 1996
Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Funding source 1996
Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Funding source 1996
Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Funding source 1996
Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Funding source 1996
Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Data on general aviation airports’ revenue are unavailable. To determine whether current funding is sufficient to meet planned development for the 5-year period from 1997 through 2001 for each airport category and overall, we compared total funding to planned future development as determined in our prior report on airport development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed airports' capacity to finance their future development, focusing on: (1) how much airports of various sizes are spending on capital development and where the money is coming from; (2) whether current funding levels will be sufficient to meet capital development planned for the 5-year period from 1997 through 2001; and (3) the potential effect of various proposals to increase airport funding, if a difference exists between current funding and planned development.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1996, the 3,304 airports that make up the national airport system obtained about $7 billion for capital development; (2) more than 90 percent of this funding came from three sources: airport and special facility bonds ($4.1 billion), funding made available from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund ($1.4 billion), and passenger facility charges paid on each airline ticket ($1.1 billion); (3) capital funding more than doubled from 1982 through 1992 and has since declined; (4) airports' 1996 capital funding of about $7 billion is less that the $10 billion per year that airports anticipate will be needed to fund the development planned for 1997 through 2001; (5) while this difference is not an absolute predictor of future funding shortfalls--both funding and planned development may change in the future--it does provide a useful indication of where funding differences may be the greatest; (6) the difference between past funding and planned development is especially acute for smaller commercial and general aviation airports, whose 1996 funding was a little over half of the estimated costs of their planned development; (7) the picture is somewhat brighter if the categories of planned development are narrowed to just those the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) gives highest priority--that is, safety, security, and noise-mitigation projects and the maintenance of existing airfields; (8) with the exception of the small commercial airports, federal grants in 1996 matched or exceeded the planned development for such projects; (9) several proposals to increase funding for airports have emerged in recent years; (10) these include increasing the size of the federal grant program, raising the ceiling on passenger facility charges, and leveraging existing funding sources; (11) each proposal varies in its magnitude and in its effect on airports and their users; (12) increasing the size of the federal grant program would mostly help smaller airports, while raising passenger facility charges would mostly help larger airports; (13) GAO believes that the FAA's current pilot programs to use grants in more innovative ways and to privatize airports are likely to yield only marginal benefits; (14) however, another means to expand airport investment would be to use federal airport grants to capitalize state revolving funds; and (15) while not a currently permitted use for federal airport grants according to FAA officials, state revolving funds have proved successful in other infrastructure sectors. |
gao_GAO-06-26 | gao_GAO-06-26_0 | Grants to states for early intervention services and special education and related services for children with disabilities and their families are provided mainly through Parts C and B of the act. Part C requires that every state make certain services available, including special therapies such as physical, occupational, or speech language therapy, and family supports such as home visits. States Have Different Eligibility Criteria and Means of Assessing Developmental Delay
Nationwide, states’ eligibility criteria for Part C services vary, with most states specifying the amount of delay in development a child must experience to be eligible for services, while a few rely exclusively on the judgment of a multidisciplinary clinical team. In 2004 the percentage of children served from state to state ranged between 1.3 and 7.1 percent. Through this program, they receive services similar to those children receive under Part C.
Majority of Children Served under Part C Are between Ages 2 and 3
While Part C funding is intended to serve infants and toddlers from birth to age 3, the majority of children receiving services are toddlers between ages 2 and 3. For example, in one of the sites we visited, posters were developed to hang in doctors’ offices across the state to help inform parents about Part C.
Despite their public awareness campaigns, the states we visited reported having difficulty reaching all eligible children. To fund early intervention services for children from birth to age 3, states relied on funding from multiple sources, including federal, state, and private funding. States Provided a Broad Array of Services to Infants and Toddlers, but States We Visited Reported Challenges Recruiting and Retaining Staff
As required under Part C, states provide a broad array of early intervention services to infants and toddlers. All 50 states reported using state general funds. Both OSEP and States Use Data to Monitor Part C Compliance, but Challenges Persist in Transitioning Children to Part B
OSEP monitors the states, which in turn oversee local Part C programs by examining data on how well programs identify, serve, and transition children to other programs when they are too old for Part C. In its oversight, OSEP tracks data on program performance submitted by states through annual performance reports and other mechanisms. OSEP found Nevada (which was the state that served the lowest percentage of infants and toddlers at 0.9 percent in 2003) out of compliance for not ensuring that all children who may be eligible for early intervention services are identified, located, referred, and evaluated in accordance with Part C. Hawaii, which serves the largest percentage of children, including children at risk of having a substantial developmental delay, was found out of compliance because it lacked procedures to ensure evaluations and assessments were conducted in all the areas required by Part C.
When states are not in compliance with Part C and do not show improvement in their performance, even after receiving technical assistance, OSEP has several options. Education noted that preliminary and unpublished data from a department study indicate that gaps occur when children are transitioned from Part C to Part B, not only during the summer, but whenever transitions occur. If Part B eligibility is not determined prior to children turning 3 during the summer months, then related decisions, including those about extended school year services, cannot be made. IDEA Part B, administered by the Department of Education, provides grants to states to provide preschool services to children with disabilities from age 3 to 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Part C of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was established to ensure that infants and toddlers with disabilities, from birth to age 3, and their families receive appropriate early intervention services. Within the Department of Education (Education), the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) is responsible for awarding and monitoring grants to states for Part C according to IDEA requirements. To address questions about how states have implemented IDEA Part C, this report provides information on (1) how Part C programs differ in their eligibility criteria and whom they serve, (2) to what extent states differ in their provision of services and funding, and (3) how Education and state lead agencies help support and oversee efforts to implement Part C, such as identifying children for services and transitioning children to follow-on programs, such as IDEA Part B.
What GAO Found
Eligibility criteria for Part C services for infants and toddlers with disabilities differ from state to state, but do not consistently explain the percentage of children served, which ranges between 1.3 and 7.1 percent. To determine eligibility, most states measure how much the child is delayed in one or more areas of early childhood development, while a few rely exclusively on a clinical team's judgment. Although IDEA Part C is intended to cover children from birth to age 3, most states provide the majority of their Part C services to children 2 to 3 years old. States have public awareness campaigns to identify more eligible infants and toddlers but cite a number of obstacles, including difficulty reaching children in rural areas or in families where English is a second language. The states we visited provide a similar set of services but vary in funding sources. States are required to make available certain early intervention services under IDEA, such as occupational, physical, and speech therapy. However, states report challenges recruiting and retaining professionals, such as speech language pathologists, to provide these services. States rely on various funding sources, but state general revenue funds were generally the largest source of early intervention funding. OSEP and state lead agencies have provided training and technical assistance and used data to monitor implementation of IDEA Part C, but OSEP has lacked some information from local officials needed to determine if children are smoothly transitioning from Part C to Part B. OSEP uses annual reports and performance indicators as part of its effort to monitor compliance with Part C and target technical assistance. For example, data on the percentage of children served help inform OSEP of states' efforts to identify all eligible children. States use similar approaches. Despite these activities, state officials cited challenges transitioning children to Part B services when they turn 3 years old. Education indicated that in preliminary and unpublished data from an ongoing study it had found that gaps occur throughout the year. Officials in the states we visited reported that some children who turn 3 during the summer experience gaps in service. If Part B eligibility is not determined prior to children turning 3 during the summer, then subsequent decisions about whether children should receive extended school year services cannot be made. |
gao_GAO-04-833T | gao_GAO-04-833T_0 | As a result, the BSA helps to provide a paper trail of the activities of money launderers for law enforcement officials in pursuit of criminal activities. Institutions file these forms with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) at Treasury. In October 2001, Congress again amended the BSA through passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, specifically through Title III of this act. The division agreed with the recommendation. Past Reports
In 1998, we issued two reports regarding FinCEN’s role in administering the BSA. In both of these reports, we discussed the Secretary of the Treasury’s mandate to delegate the authority to assess civil penalties for BSA violations to federal banking regulatory agencies and noted that this delegation had not been made. One purpose of this work was to update information on civil penalties for BSA violations. At that time, FinCEN officials told us that they were concerned that the banking regulators might be less inclined to assess BSA penalties and instead use their non-BSA authorities under their own statutes. Also in 1998, we reported on the activities of Raul Salinas, the brother of the former President of Mexico. Mr. Salinas was allegedly involved in laundering money from Mexico, through Citibank, to accounts in Citibank affiliates in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We determined that Mr. Salinas was able to transfer $90 - $100 million between 1992 and 1994 by using a private banking relationship structured through Citibank New York in 1992 and effectively disguise the funds’ source and destination, thus breaking the funds’ paper trail. In 2001, we issued a report on changes in BSA examination coverage for certain securities broker-dealers. At the time, there was no requirement that all broker-dealers file SARs; however, broker-dealer subsidiaries of depository institutions and their holding companies were required to file SARs and were examined by banking regulators for compliance. We determined that with the passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, these broker-dealers were no longer being examined to assess their compliance with SAR requirements, although they were being examined for compliance with reporting currency transactions and other requirements Treasury had specifically placed on broker-dealers. However, with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the issuance of a final rule that became effective on July 31, 2002, all broker-dealers were required to report such activity. How do the regulators’ risk-focused examinations of depository institutions assess BSA and AML program compliance? To what extent do the banking regulators identify BSA and AML program violations and take supervisory actions for such violations? How consistent are BSA examination procedures and interpretation of BSA violations across the banking regulators? We will also try to ascertain the implications of “risk- focused” examinations for BSA compliance and to determine whether and to what extent the regulators curtail such compliance reviews in their examinations. Additionally, we plan to track supervisory actions taken by the regulators to correct the violations they identified. Key legal issues we will be examining are the ramifications, if any, of the lack of delegation of authority to assess BSA penalties by Treasury to the federal banking regulators, as mandated by statute in 1994. In addition, we will meet with government officials at the federal and state levels and from the banking and credit union industries to gain their perspectives on the risk-focused BSA examination process and post- examination follow-up activities. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government's framework for preventing, detecting, and prosecuting money laundering has been expanding through additional pieces of legislation since its inception in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The purpose of the BSA is to prevent financial institutions from being used as intermediaries for the transfer or deposit of money derived from criminal activity and to provide a paper trail for law enforcement agencies in their investigations of possible money laundering. The most recent changes arose in October 2001 with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which, among other things, extends antimoney laundering (AML) requirements to other financial service providers previously not covered under the BSA. GAO was asked to testify on its previous work and the ongoing work it is doing for the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the depository institution regulators' BSA examination and enforcement process.
What GAO Found
In recent years, GAO has issued a number of reports dealing with regulatory oversight of anti-money laundering activities of financial institutions. In 1998, GAO issued a report regarding Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) role in administering the BSA, which updated information on civil penalties for BSA violations. One focus was the Secretary of the Treasury's 1994 mandate to delegate the authority to assess civil money penalties for BSA violations to federal banking regulatory agencies. GAO noted that this delegation had not been made and said that FinCEN was concerned that bank regulators may be less inclined to assess BSA penalties and may prefer to use their non-BSA authorities under their own statutes. Also in 1998, GAO reported on the activities of Raul Salinas, the brother of the former President of Mexico. Mr. Salinas was allegedly involved in laundering money from Mexico, through Citibank, to accounts in Citibank affiliates in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. GAO determined that Mr. Salinas was able to transfer $90 - $100 million between 1992 and 1994 by using a private banking relationship structured through Citibank New York in 1992 and effectively disguise the funds' source and destination, thus breaking the funds' paper trail. In 2001, GAO issued a report on changes in BSA examination coverage for certain securities broker-dealers. At the time, there was no requirement that all broker-dealers file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs); however, brokerdealer subsidiaries of depository institutions and their holding companies were required to file SARs and were examined by banking regulators for compliance. GAO determined that with the passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, these broker-dealers were no longer being examined to assess their compliance with SAR requirements. However, with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the issuance of a final rule that was effective on July 31, 2002, all broker-dealers were required to report such activity. GAO is currently studying the depository institution regulators' BSA examination and enforcement process for the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The objectives include determining how the regulators' risk-focused examinations assess BSA compliance, the extent to which the regulators identify BSA and AML violations and take supervisory actions, and the consistency of BSA compliance examination procedures and interpretation of violations across regulators. GAO plans to determine whether and to what extent regulators curtailed BSA compliance examinations and the bases for these decisions. GAO plans to track supervisory actions taken to correct violations identified. GAO will also examine the ramifications, if any, of the lack of delegation of authority to assess BSA compliance penalties by Treasury to the banking regulators, as mandated by statute. GAO will meet with government and industry officials to gain their perspective on the BSA compliance examination process. |
gao_GAO-14-361 | gao_GAO-14-361_0 | Although all five selected agencies developed policies that address incremental development, the majority of the agencies’ policies did not fully address all three components. The other four agencies did not address this policy component. Only one of the five agencies—VA—fully addressed this policy component. Agencies cited several underlying reasons that contributed to these weaknesses: (1) they were not always aware of OMB guidance, (2) they did not believe that the guidance was realistic, and (3) they said the guidance was not always clear. Although OMB issued later guidance on incremental development, it has not yet specified what agencies’ incremental development policies are to include. Until OMB explicitly issues realistic and clear guidance and Defense, HHS, DHS, and Transportation address the identified weaknesses in their incremental development policies, it will be difficult to deliver project functionality more rapidly, measure how often projects are delivering functionality, and enforce compliance with the delivery time frames called for in their policies. Most Selected Investments Do Not Plan to Deliver Functionality Every 6 or 12 Months
In its 2010 IT Reform Plan, OMB called for IT programs to deliver functionality at least every 12 months. These concerns have merit. However, OMB’s guidance does not make this distinction. The previously discussed weaknesses in agency policies have permitted the inconsistent implementation of incremental development approaches. Regarding implementation of incremental development, slightly more than one-fourth of selected investments planned to deliver functionality every 6 months—and less than one-half planned to do so every 12 months. Update, and clearly and explicitly issue incremental development guidance that addresses the following three components: requires projects associated with major IT investments to deliver incremental functionality at least every 12 months, with the exception of the three types of investments identified in this report; specifies how agencies are to define the project functionality that is to be delivered; and requires agencies to define a process for enforcing compliance with incremental functionality delivery, such as the use of TechStat sessions. OMB agreed with one recommendation and partially disagreed with the other; Defense generally concurred with the report; HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with the report’s recommendations; DHS agreed with our recommendations; Transportation did not agree with the recommendations in that it did not believe the department should be dependent on OMB first taking action; and VA generally agreed with the report’s conclusions and concurred with our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to (1) assess whether selected agencies have established policies for incremental information technology (IT) development, (2) determine whether selected agencies are using incremental development approaches to manage their IT investments, and (3) identify the key factors that enabled and inhibited the selected agencies’ abilities to effectively use incremental development approaches to manage their IT investments. Those agencies are the Departments of Defense (Defense), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (Transportation), and Veterans Affairs (VA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies plan to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014. However, prior IT expenditures have often produced disappointing results. Thus, OMB has called for agencies to deliver investments in smaller parts or increments. In 2010, it called for IT investments to deliver capabilities every 12 months and now requires investments to deliver capabilities every 6 months. GAO was asked to review agencies' incremental development approaches. Among other things, this report (1) assesses whether selected agencies have established policies for incremental IT development; and (2) determines whether selected agencies are using incremental development approaches to manage their IT investments. To do so, GAO selected five agencies—Defense, HHS, DHS, Transportation, and VA—and 89 total investments at these agencies. GAO then reviewed the agencies' incremental development policies and plans.
What GAO Found
All five agencies in GAO's review—the Departments of Defense (Defense), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (Transportation), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—have established policies that address incremental development; however, the policies usually did not fully address three key components for implementing the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance (see table). Specifically, only VA fully addressed the three components. Among other things, agencies cited the following reasons that contributed to these weaknesses: (1) the guidance was not feasible because not all types of investments should deliver functionality in 6 months, and (2) the guidance did not identify what agencies' policies are to include or time frames for completion. GAO agrees these concerns have merit. Until OMB issues realistic and clear guidance and agencies address the weaknesses in their incremental development policies, it will be difficult to deliver project capability more rapidly.
Key =Fully met =Partially met =Not met
Source: GAO analysis of agency documentation.
The weaknesses in agency policies have enabled inconsistent implementation of incremental development approaches: almost three-quarters of the selected investments did not plan to deliver functionality every 6 months, and less than half planned to deliver functionality in 12-month cycles (see table). Without consistent use of incremental development approaches, information technology (IT) expenditures are more likely to continue producing disappointing results.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that OMB develop and issue realistic and clear guidance on incremental development and that the selected agencies update and implement their incremental development policies to reflect OMB's guidance. OMB partially disagreed, believing its guidance is realistic. Four agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments, and one agency did not agree that its recommendations should be dependent on OMB first taking action. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-14-6 | gao_GAO-14-6_0 | Financial Condition of GM and Ally Financial
General Motors’s Financial Results Have Been Increasingly Positive Since Receiving Federal Assistance, but Questions Remain
Since receiving federal assistance, GM has shown increasingly positive financial results. For each of the last 3 years, GM has reported profits, a positive and growing operating cash flow, and a stable liquidity position. This improved financial performance has been reflected in GM’s credit ratings, with each of the three largest credit rating agencies increasing GM’s long-term credit rating. Furthermore, GM’s market share of vehicles sold in North America was smaller than in 2008, and it continued to carry large pension liabilities. Treasury Is Working to Exit from Its Remaining Investments in GM and Ally Financial
Treasury Plans to Exit from GM by Early 2014 but Projects a Loss on its Investment
Treasury invested over $51 billion in GM through AIFP. Through September 18, 2013, Treasury had recovered about $35.21 billion of its investments in GM and reduced its ownership stake to 7.32 percent through three major actions. The extent of the loss, however, will depend on GM’s stock price. As of September 2013, Treasury has announced the plan for unwinding its preferred stock investments in Ally Financial, though not for its common stock investment. The Federal Reserve found that Ally Financial’s tier 1 common capital ratio fell below the required 5 percent under the severely adverse scenario. Of the 18 bank holding companies reviewed in 2013, the Federal Reserve objected to Ally Financial’s and one other company’s capital plans. Ally Financial faces growing competition in both consumer lending and dealer financing from Chrysler Capital, GM Financial, and other large bank holding companies. Similar to its GM investment, the eventual amount of Treasury’s recoupment on its Ally Financial investment will be determined by the share price of Ally Financial stock. However, Ally Financial remained the leader among the four institutions for the same time period. In its written comments, Treasury describes the auto industry’s recovery and the progress Treasury has made in unwinding its investments in Ally Financial and GM. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report is based on our continuing analysis and monitoring of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) activities in implementing the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which provided GAO with broad oversight authorities for actions taken under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under TARP, Treasury established the Automotive Industry Financing Program, through which Treasury committed $51 billion to help General Motors Company (GM) and $16.3 billion to GMAC LLC, a financial services company that provides automotive financing and that later became Ally Financial, Inc. (Ally Financial). This report examines (1) the financial condition of GM and Ally Financial and (2) the status of Treasury’s investments in the companies as well as its plans to wind down those investments. To obtain information on the financial ratios and indicators used in their analyses of GM’s or Ally Financial’s financial condition, we interviewed staff from Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), GM, Ally Financial, and analysts from the three largest credit rating agencies as well as investment firms. We reviewed past GAO reports, information from GM’s and Ally Financial’s annual 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, reports and documentation from Treasury and the companies, and data from SNL Financial from 2008 through the second quarter (June 30) of 2013. We also reviewed the credit ratings from three rating agencies for each of these companies. For analyzing Treasury’s exit from Ally Financial, we reviewed Treasury and Federal Reserve documentation, such as Treasury’s monthly reports to Congress, Treasury’s contractual agreements for the mandatory convertible preferred shares, and the proposed capital plan that Ally submitted to the Federal Reserve. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its Auto Industry Financing Program (AIFP), funded through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Treasury committed $67.3 billion to automaker GM and to Ally Financial, a large bank holding company whose primary business is auto lending. TARP's authorizing legislation mandates that GAO report every 60 days on TARP activities.
This report examines (1) the current financial condition of the two companies and (2) the status of Treasury's investments in the companies and its plans to sell those investments.
To examine the financial condition of GM and Ally Financial, GAO reviewed industry, financial, and regulatory data for the time period from the beginning of 2008 through the second quarter of 2013. GAO also reviewed Treasury reports and documentation detailing Treasury's investments in GM and Ally Financial and its proposed strategies for divesting itself of the investments, as well as both companies' financial filings and reports. In addition, GAO interviewed officials from Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve), GM, Ally Financial, and financial analysts who study GM and Ally Financial.
In its written comments on a draft of this report, Treasury describes the auto industry's recovery and the progress Treasury has made in unwinding its investments in GM and Ally Financial. Treasury, the Federal Reserve, GM, and Ally Financial also provided technical clarifications, which were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since receiving federal assistance, General Motors Company (GM) has shown increasingly positive financial results. For each of the past 3 years, GM has reported profits, positive and growing operational cash flow, and a stable liquidity position. This improved financial performance has been reflected in GM's credit rating, as each of the three largest credit rating agencies has increased GM's long-term credit rating. However, GM faces continued challenges to its competitiveness. For instance, its market share of vehicles sold in North America remains smaller today than in 2008. Furthermore, GM continues to carry large pension liabilities.
With Treasury's investments in Ally Financial, the company's condition has stabilized. For example, Ally Financial's capital and liquidity positions have stabilized or improved over the last 4 years. Such improvements have been noted by the three largest credit rating agencies, each of which has upgraded Ally Financial's credit rating. However, Ally Financial's credit rating remains below investment grade and its mortgage unit--Residential Capital LLC--impacted the company's financial performance. The mortgage unit filed for bankruptcy in May 2012, and these proceedings are ongoing. Analysts with whom GAO spoke indicated that the resolution of its mortgage unit's bankruptcy will be a positive development for Ally Financial's future financial performance.
As of September 18, 2013, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has recovered about $35.21 billion of its $51 billion investment in GM and reduced its ownership stake from 60.8 percent to 7.32 percent. By early 2014, Treasury plans to fully divest its GM common shares through installments and estimates that it will lose at least 19 percent of its original investment. Treasury is working to exit from Ally Financial with a recent agreement to sell all of its preferred stock to the company for approximately $6 billion, but Treasury faces challenges. As a regulated bank holding company, Ally Financial must be well capitalized to receive its regulator's approval to repurchase shares from Treasury. Earlier this spring, Ally Financial's tier 1 common ratio fell below the required 5 percent in the Federal Reserve's "stress test," and the Federal Reserve objected to the company's capital plan. Ally Financial also faces growing competition in the consumer lending and dealer financing sectors that could impact its financial performance in the future. The extent of Treasury's recoupment on its Ally Financial investment will depend on the ongoing financial health of the company. |
gao_GAO-02-660T | gao_GAO-02-660T_0 | Background
The District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 (P.L. A proposal for the disposition or transfer to the Family Court of child abuse and neglect actions pending as of the date of enactment of the act (which were initiated in the Family Division but remain pending before judges serving in other divisions of the Superior Court as of such date) in a manner consistent with applicable federal and District of Columbia law and best practices, including best practices developed by the American Bar Association and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. The chief judge’s determination of the number of individuals serving as judges of the Superior Court who meet the qualifications for judges of the Family Court and are willing and able to serve on the Family Court. Volume III addresses the physical space the court needs to house and operate the Family Court. The plan calls for renovations under tight deadlines and all required space may not be available, as currently planned, to support the additional judges the Family Court needs to perform its work in accordance with the act, making it uncertain as to when the court can fully complete its transition. | What GAO Found
The District of Columbia Family Act of 2001 was enacted to (1) redesignate the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia as the Family Court of the Superior Court, (2) recruit trained and experienced judges to serve in the Family Court, and (3) promote consistency and efficiency in the assignment of judges to the Family Court and in its consideration of actions and proceedings. GAO found the Superior Court made progress in planning the transition of its Family Division to a Family Court, but some challenges remain. The transition requires the timely completion of a series of interdependent plans to obtain and renovate physical space for the court and its functions. Adequate space may not be available to support the additional judges the Family Court needs. Furthermore, the development of the Integrated Justice Information System will be critical for the Family Court's operational effectiveness, its ability to evaluate its performance, and to meet the judicial goals mandated by the Family Court Act. |
gao_GAO-06-271 | gao_GAO-06-271_0 | Background
CDHPs are relatively new health care benefits plan designs that are offered in various forms, including that of an HDHP coupled with an HSA. The Consumer-Directed Health Plan Concept
While insurers and employers offer several variants of CDHPs, these plans generally include three basic precepts—an insurance plan with a high deductible, a savings account to pay for services under the deductible, and enrollee decision support tools. Decision support tools. They may also provide enrollees with information to assess the quality of health care providers and the prices for health care services. In 2005, 14 HDHPs coupled with HSAs were first offered. OPM requires that the plans cover preventive health services before the deductible has been met. OPM requires all HDHP carriers to offer health care decision support tools to enrollees. About 69 percent of HDHP enrollees were male, compared to 59 percent in both the other new plan and all FEHBP plans, and about 47 percent of HDHP enrollees had individual coverage, compared to 35 and 37 percent for the other new plan and all FEHBP enrollees, respectively. HDHP Enrollees Were Younger and Included Fewer Retirees Than Enrollees in All FEHBP Plans
The average age of HDHP enrollees was younger than all FEHBP plan enrollees, but was similar to that of enrollees in another new FEHBP plan. Differences were largely due to fewer retirees selecting the HDHPs. HDHP Enrollees Had Higher Federal Salaries and Were More Likely to Select Individual Plans Than Other FEHBP Enrollees
HDHP enrollees who were actively employed by the federal government earned higher federal salaries than other active federal employees in the FEHBP. The share of enrollees earning federal incomes of $75,000 or more in 2005 was 43 percent for HDHPs, compared to 14 percent for the other new plan and 23 percent for all FEHBP plans. FEHBP HDHPs Generally Covered the Same Services as Traditional Plans, but Enrollees’ Financial Responsibilities Usually Differed
HDHPs generally covered the same services as those covered by their traditional plan counterparts; however, enrollees’ financial responsibilities usually differed. In addition, relative to traditional plans, HDHP cost sharing after the deductible was comparable or lower for preventive services and prescription drugs. Cost sharing was mixed for physician office visits and hospital stays—higher than the carriers’ traditional plans in some instances and the same or lower in others. Two of the HDHPs had higher out-of-pocket spending limits than their traditional plan counterparts, and in most cases the HDHPs had lower premiums. The Extent to Which FEHBP HDHPs Provided Online Access to Provider- Specific Quality and Cost Information Varied
The HDHPs provided varying degrees of provider quality data. Two of the three plans provided data on their Web sites for several measures to assess hospital quality, including outcomes data, procedure volumes, and patient safety ratings, and the other plan provided links to Web sites that contained this type of information. Cost information provided by the three multistate plans was limited. One of the plans provided average hospital cost estimates and two provided average physician cost estimates for a limited number of services. Two of the three plans provided access to average retail prescription drug prices and estimates of out-of-pocket costs for drugs, and all three plans provided actual prices for drugs purchased through the mail-order pharmacy services offered by the plans. None of the plans provided the actual payment rate the plan had negotiated with particular retail pharmacies. Some of this information may become available in the future. Two of the three largest HDHPs were developing physician-specific patient satisfaction ratings to help enrollees assess physician quality, and one had initiated a pilot project to provide enrollees with the actual, negotiated prices they would pay for certain services performed by a particular provider. OPM expressed interest in our findings on the differences in characteristics of first-year HDHP enrollees compared to traditional FEHBP plan enrollees, and said that it would monitor enrollment trends over time to assess whether certain individuals—such as younger or healthier individuals—disproportionately enroll in HDHPs. OPM also said that it would continue to encourage plans to expand the decision support information they provide to enrollees, including the pricing of health care services. Appendix I: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) recently began offering high-deductible health plans (HDHP) coupled with tax-advantaged health savings accounts (HSA) that enrollees use to pay for health care. Unused HSA balances may accumulate for future use, providing enrollees an incentive to purchase health care prudently. The plans also provide decision support tools to help enrollees make purchase decisions, including health care quality and cost information. Concerns have been expressed that HDHPs coupled with HSAs may attract younger, healthier, or wealthier enrollees, leaving older, less healthy enrollees to drive up costs in traditional plans. Because the plans are new, there is also interest in the plan features and the decision support tools they provide to enrollees. GAO was asked to evaluate the experience of the 14 HDHPs coupled with an HSA that were first offered under the FEHBP in January 2005. GAO compared the characteristics of enrollees in the 14 HDHPs to those of enrollees in another recently introduced (new) plan without a high deductible and to all FEHBP plans. GAO also compared characteristics of the three largest HDHPs to traditional FEHBP plans offered by the same insurance carriers, and summarized the information contained in the decision support tools made available to enrollees by these three plans.
What GAO Found
FEHBP HDHP enrollees were younger and earned higher federal salaries than other FEHBP enrollees. The average age of HDHP enrollees (46) was similar to that of the other new plan (47) and younger than that of all FEHBP enrollees (59). These differences were largely due to a smaller share of retirees enrolling in the HDHPs and the other new plan. HDHP enrollees earned higher federal salaries compared to other enrollees. Forty-three percent of HDHP enrollees actively employed by the federal government earned federal salaries of $75,000 or more, compared to 14 percent in the other new plan and 23 percent among all FEHBP plans. In addition, nonretired HDHP enrollees were more likely to be male and to select individual rather than family plans. The three largest FEHBP HDHPs generally covered the same range of services--including preventive services--as their traditional plan counterparts; however, enrollees' financial responsibilities usually differed. Compared to the traditional plans, the HDHPs had higher deductibles. HDHP cost sharing was the same or lower for preventive services and prescription drugs, and all plans covered preventive services before the deductible. Prescription drugs in the HDHPs were subject to the deductible, while they were generally exempt from the deductible in the traditional plans. HDHP cost sharing varied with respect to nonpreventive physician office visits and inpatient hospital stays. Two of the three HDHPs had higher out-of-pocket spending limits, and HDHP premiums were lower on average than the traditional plans. The extent to which the three largest FEHBP HDHPs made available provider quality and health care cost information was limited and varied. Two of the three plans provided several hospital-specific measures of quality on their Web sites, including the volumes of procedures provided by the hospitals and the outcomes of those procedures, and the other plan provided links to other Web sites containing such information. Regarding physician-specific quality data, one plan provided a single measure. One of the plans provided average hospital cost estimates and two provided average physician cost estimates for selected services, but none provided the actual rates an enrollee would pay that the plan had negotiated with providers. Regarding prescription drugs, two of the three plans provided the average retail pharmacy drug costs, but none provided the actual negotiated rates an individual would pay at a particular retail pharmacy. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) said that it would monitor enrollment trends over time to assess whether certain individuals--such as younger or healthier individuals--disproportionately enroll in HDHPs. OPM also said it would continue to encourage plans to expand the decision support information they provide to enrollees, including the pricing of health care services. |
gao_GGD-97-34 | gao_GGD-97-34_0 | The current innocent spouse provisions allow relief from the joint and several liability standard when the innocent spouse has filed a joint return with the culpable spouse; the spouse did not know and had no reason to know there was a substantial tax understatement (knowledge test); and taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the spouse liable for the additional tax attributable to the substantial understatement of the culpable spouse. To determine the potential effects of changing the current joint and several liability standard to a proportionate liability standard, we used IRS’ Statistics of Income data for tax year 1992, underreporter assessments,and the AIMS database to estimate the number of taxpayers who filed using the “married, filing jointly” status. To determine the potential effects on IRS of requiring it to be bound by divorce decrees, we analyzed the legal ramifications of binding IRS to the terms of lower court decisions. To determine the potential effects on IRS of changing the law to limit its ability to attach community property, we discussed with IRS officials the policies related to the attachment of income and assets of one taxpayer to pay the debts incurred by his or her spouse before the marriage. However, our estimate of 587,000 couples represents the maximum number of taxpayers potentially eligible for innocent spouse relief; fewer would probably actually qualify. Using a 2 percent per year divorce rate, we estimated that 35,000 divorced taxpayers might have been eligible for innocent spouse relief for additional tax assessments of more than $500. However, these publications do not provide any guidance on how to request relief. The fact that taxpayers are commonly using these two approaches to seek innocent spouse relief may indicate that taxpayers are not provided with adequate guidance for seeking relief by IRS. Modifying Tax Code Provisions Could Allow More Taxpayers to Qualify for Relief
Critics of the innocent spouse provisions, such as ABA and AICPA, contend that the current provisions do not ensure that taxpayers receive equitable relief. We estimated that if the federal innocent spouse tax code provisions had been modified to eliminate the dollar thresholds as was done by California, Iowa, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, the maximum number of couples filing tax year 1992 returns potentially eligible for innocent spouse relief would have been 710,000. However, since IRS does not maintain data on how often it collects from the culpable spouse, we could not estimate the size of the potential revenue loss. Potential Impact of Replacing the Joint and Several Liability Standard With Proportionate Liability
An alternative way to ensure that taxpayers are not held liable for their spouses’ taxes would be to replace the joint and several liability standard with a proportionate liability standard. Under the generally accepted definition of proportionate liability, taxpayers would be held responsible only for the taxes generated by their own individual incomes and assets or, for taxpayers living in community property states, for the tax associated with one-half of the community income. Binding IRS to Divorce Decrees Would Be Impractical
Divorcing couples may specify in their divorce decrees how future liabilities resulting from their prior joint returns are handled, i.e., one spouse is entirely liable, both spouses are equally liable, or some other permutation. According to certain members of ABA’s Committee on Domestic Relations, a legislative change to bind IRS to divorce decrees appears to be impractical for two major reasons. Divorce matters, however, are generally handled by state courts. Furthermore, IRS officials fear that divorce decrees would be manipulated to reduce tax liabilities. IRS Follows State Property Laws in Collecting Premarital Tax Debts
About 13 million, or 27 percent, of all taxpayers who filed joint returns in 1992 lived in community property states. IRS eventually granted innocent spouse relief for that 1 year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reported on several issues related to the joint and several liability standard that applies to jointly filed federal income tax returns, focusing on: (1) the potential universe of taxpayers that may be eligible for innocent spouse relief; (2) the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) practices and procedures for handling requests for innocent spouse relief; (3) whether the innocent spouse provisions provide the same treatment for all taxpayers; (4) the potential effects of replacing the joint and several liability standard with a proportionate liability standard; (5) the potential effects on IRS of requiring it to abide by the terms of divorce decrees when those decrees allocate tax liabilities; and (6) the potential effects on IRS of changing the law so that community income of one spouse cannot be seized to satisfy tax liabilities incurred by the other spouse before their marriage.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it estimated that about 587,000 of the 48 million couples who filed joint returns in 1992 had additional tax assessments of more than $500; (2) this estimate represents the maximum number of taxpayers potentially eligible for innocent spouse relief, however, fewer would probably actually qualify; (3) although any taxpayer signing a joint return may seek innocent spouse relief, according to IRS officials, divorced taxpayers are more likely to face the most egregious problems; (4) the limited information that was available indicated that IRS received few requests for innocent spouse relief and denied most of them; (5) GAO observed that IRS publications provide little information on how to request innocent spouse relief and that the publications covering procedures related to the need for relief have no information on relief; (6) critics of the innocent spouse provisions contend that the current provisions do not ensure that all deserving taxpayers receive equivalent relief; (7) GAO estimated that for tax year 1992, an additional 42,600 divorced taxpayers might have been eligible for innocent spouse relief if the dollar thresholds had been eliminated; (8) an alternative way to ensure that taxpayers are not held liable for their spouses' taxes would be to replace the joint and several liability standard with a proportionate liability standard; (9) under such a standard, taxpayers would be responsible only for the taxes generated by their individual incomes and assets or, for taxpayers living in community property states, for the tax associated with one-half of the community income; (10) divorcing couples may specify in their divorce decrees how future liabilities resulting from their prior joint returns are handled; (11) requiring IRS to be bound by divorce decrees is impractical for two major reasons; (12) federal tax matters are the exclusive jurisdiction of certain federal courts, while divorce matters are generally handled by state courts; (13) IRS officials also raised related concerns, such as whether their interpretation of lengthy and complex divorce decrees would increase the number of appeals and whether divorce decrees would be manipulated to reduce tax liabilities (14) IRS can treat taxpayers living in community property states differently from taxpayers living in common law states when collecting taxes; and (15) since IRS does not maintain data on how often these levy actions occur, GAO could not assess the potential impact on IRS of changing the law to treat everyone the way it treats taxpayers in common law states. |
gao_GAO-05-922T | gao_GAO-05-922T_0 | In addition, a number of local, regional, and federal organizations affect WMATA’s decision-making, including (1) state and local governments, which subject WMATA to a range of laws and requirements; (2) the National Capital Region Transportation Planning Board of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, which develops the short- and long-range plans and programs that guide WMATA’s capital investments; (3) FTA, which provides oversight of WMATA’s compliance with federal requirements; (4) the National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates accidents on transit systems as well as other transportation modes; and (5) the Tri-State Oversight Committee, which oversees WMATA’s safety activities and conducts safety reviews. WMATA also assists federal law enforcement agencies by providing security for high-profile events and other security-related expertise and services. Furthermore, the emergency transportation plans of the District of Columbia and the Washington region both rely heavily on Metrorail and Metrobus for transportation in an emergency scenario requiring evacuation. The federal employees who ride Metrorail to and from work each day represent a substantial share of federal employees in the Washington, D.C., region. Emergency personnel from across the region train at the center. The panel estimated that under its current revenue structure, WMATA would have a total funding shortfall of about $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 for maintaining and upgrading its existing system, assuming that Metro Matters was fully funded. The panel did not include the costs of providing paratransit services as required under ADA. Observing that WMATA has provided numerous benefits both to the Washington region and the federal government over the years, the Metro Funding Panel also concluded that WMATA will require a commitment of new revenue sources to sustain those benefits. In the current situation of large budget deficits, any additional federal funding for WMATA would need to be considered along with the many other competing claims for federal resources. To the extent that the federal government cannot provide significant additional support to WMATA, and WMATA’s current revenue structure continues to be insufficient to support its planned capital projects, WMATA may need to reassess its capital improvement plan to determine which projects could be undertaken within a more constrained funding level. WMATA Is Subject to Oversight from Multiple Entities Whose Reviews Address a Wide Range of Issues
WMATA is subject to oversight from multiple entities that have issued numerous reports on the agency since 2003. All of these entities included recommendations in their reports, and, in general, WMATA implemented them or has plans to implement them. Additional GAO Work Remaining on WMATA’s Oversight
As part of our ongoing work, we plan to analyze these reviews in greater detail to determine whether, taken as a whole, they point to any systemic problems and are sufficiently comprehensive to identify and address overall management and operational challenges. Congress may consider further specifying the types of projects for which federal funds could be used or including a matching requirement to ensure that some local funds continue to be used for infrastructure and capital requirements. In addition, if Congress decides to provide WMATA with the additional funding, it is important for there to be reasonable assurances that the funds will be spent efficiently and effectively. WMATA’s existing oversight could be supplemented by including safeguards in any legislation that provides additional federal funding. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s (WMATA) responsibilities for supporting the federal government, we interviewed a wide array of federal and local officials including those from WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Office of Personnel Management, the General Services Administration, the National Capital Planning Commission, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the District of Columbia Department of Transportation. To determine the current funding challenges facing WMATA and the options proposed to address these challenges, we reviewed and analyzed the budgetary shortfall estimate prepared by the Metro Funding Panel, budget documents from WMATA, and prior GAO reports. Our review included the following: FTA’s Project Management Oversight (PMO) program contractor reports FTA’s most recent Triennial Review The independent external auditor’s review of WMATA’s financial statements and internal controls as required under the Single Audit Act The American Public Transportation Association’s peer review reports Although FTA carries out a number of reviews of transit agencies in addition to the Triennial Review and the PMO reports, we selected the Triennial Review because it covers grantees’ compliance with a wide range of statutory and administrative requirements, and we selected the PMO reports because this program provides oversight of WMATA’s major capital projects, which represent a significant part of WMATA’s budget. To identify applicable examples of spending safeguards and management oversight of any additional federal assistance provided to WMATA, should Congress decide to provide such assistance, we reviewed prior GAO work on surface transportation funding and management oversight, as well as other documents on transportation planning and finance, and interviewed officials with expertise in the transit industry, transportation finance, and transportation planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) has faced serious financial and budgetary problems as well as continuing challenges related to the safety and reliability of its transit services. At the same time, ridership is at an all-time high, and WMATA continues to provide critical services and considerable benefits to the Washington region and to the federal government. This statement discusses (1) WMATA's responsibilities for serving the interests of the federal government, including the agency's role in transporting federal employees and visitors to the nation's capital and in supporting homeland security for the Washington metropolitan region; (2) the current funding challenges facing WMATA and the options proposed to address these challenges; (3) preliminary information on some of the entities that currently provide oversight of WMATA and the focus of their recent reviews; and (4) some considerations and options in instituting spending safeguards and oversight of any additional federal assistance provided to WMATA, should Congress decide to provide such assistance. GAO discussed this testimony with WMATA and FTA officials, who provided comments and additional information that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
WMATA transports a substantial share of the federal workforce and provides an important means of transportation to special events that occur in Washington, D.C., as the nation's capital. WMATA's Metro Transit Police assists federal law enforcement agencies by providing expertise in civil disturbance management and explosives detection and by training first responders in emergency management techniques specific to transit environments. WMATA's Metrorail and Metrobus are the preferred means of transportation in an emergency scenario requiring evacuation, and both the regional and the District of Columbia emergency transportation plans rely heavily on them. A regional funding panel estimated WMATA's budgetary shortfall at $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 if WMATA were to fund many of the projects in its 10-year capital improvement plan. This shortfall may be even greater because the panel's shortfall calculation did not include the costs of providing specialized transportation for persons with disabilities, as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act. To deal with WMATA's funding shortfall, the regional panel concluded that the region needs to develop a dedicated source of revenue for WMATA (e.g., local sales tax) and that the federal government needs to provide significant contributions because of the benefits it receives from WMATA. However, given the large federal budget deficit and competing claims on federal resources, GAO believes WMATA may also need to reexamine its own spending priorities. As part of its ongoing work on WMATA's oversight entities, GAO found that WMATA is subject to oversight from multiple entities that, since 2003, have issued hundreds of reports--which vary in scope--on a broad range of topics. These entities include WMATA's Auditor General, an independent external auditor, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and industry peer review panels. The entities have made recommendations to WMATA, which WMATA has generally implemented or plans to implement. As part of its ongoing work, GAO plans to analyze these reviews in more detail to determine if they comprehensively identify and address WMATA's overall management and operational challenges. GAO's ongoing work will also cover other FTA reviews and safety reviews of WMATA's operations. Congress, the administration, and GAO have long recognized the benefits of having spending safeguards and management oversight for entities that receive federal funding. If Congress decides to provide WMATA with additional federal funding, there needs to be reasonable assurance that the funds will be spent effectively. We identified several options for additional oversight that could be incorporated into legislation that provides additional federal funding to WMATA, including having WMATA officials periodically report to Congress on how the funding is being spent; specifying the types of projects for which federal funds could be used; and requiring that any additional federal funding be subject to FTA's oversight programs. |
gao_GAO-11-154 | gao_GAO-11-154_0 | To help ensure accuracy in the population count in 2000, the Bureau used telephone interviews in another operation to follow up with two types of household responses: households too large to include all their members on the form and households with apparent discrepancies on their questionnaires, such as when the number of people reported in the household population box does not match the number of people whose name and demographic information is included on the form. The Bureau completed FV at a cost of $21 million, 38 percent lower than the $33.8 million estimated for the operation. The Bureau completed CFU at an estimated cost of $267 million, about 2 percent less than the initial cost estimate for the operation. Given mandated deadlines that the Bureau faces for delivering census tabulations, completing field data collection including CFU and FV on schedule was crucial for subsequent processing activities to proceed and be completed on schedule. The Bureau’s Increase in the Number and Types of CFU Cases Should Improve Overall Census Accuracy
A key design decision the Bureau made for the 2010 CFU was to expand the scope of its coverage follow-up operation from 2000 to follow up on additional types of cases that it believed would help reduce the differential undercount. According to the Bureau, the 2010 CFU operation should result in more than 2.9 million coverage errors being removed from the census, including overcounts and undercounts, compared to more than 400,000 coverage errors being removed in 2000. The more coverage errors are removed from the official census count, the more the overall accuracy of the census is improved. The Effect of the Bureau’s Prioritization of Coverage Follow-up on Differential Undercounts Is Not Clear
A second key design decision the Bureau made for CFU was to prioritize the types of cases it would follow up on, likely increasing the overall number of coverage errors corrected but possibly affecting demographic groups differently. The Bureau’s decisions to expand the scope of CFU and prioritize the CFU cases will likely result in a greater number of coverage errors being removed from official census tabulations than were removed in 2000, increasing CFU’s effectiveness in improving overall census accuracy in 2010. Prioritization of the CFU cases to contact was a reasonable attempt to leverage the resources and time available for the operation. Furthermore, trends regarding the use of wireless telephones indicate that some households within hard-to-count populations may be harder to contact in the future using landline telephone operations. Also, better knowledge of how best to reach different groups could help identify effective sources of contact information or strategies for using them for future censuses, further helping to control costs while still working to address differential undercounts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce require the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau to take the following three actions to improve the Bureau’s planning for the 2020 Census: To help the Bureau decide which coverage probes, if any, to use and prioritize for future follow-up efforts, assess the extent to which historically overcounted and undercounted demographic groups responded to the probes the Bureau followed up on and determine the effectiveness of specific probes in reducing differential undercounts. To support the Bureau’s efforts to control costs while improving census accuracy, determine the demographic characteristics of the households for which it did and did not obtain telephone numbers and, to the extent feasible, assess the degree to which the telephone numbers were usable and led to completed contacts for households of various follow-up groups and demographic characteristics. To ensure that the design of future follow-up efforts is effective in improving census coverage, assess the implications that trends in landline and wireless usage and other modes of communication and new technology may have both on the design decisions for future CFU- like operations and on their effectiveness in improving census coverage in terms of both overall census accuracy and differential undercounts. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Secretary of Commerce provided written comments on a draft of this report on December 1, 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) puts forth tremendous effort to conduct a complete and accurate count of the nation's population and housing; yet some degree of error in the form of persons missed, duplicated, or counted in the wrong place is inevitable due to the complexity in counting a large and diverse population. The Bureau designed two operations, Coverage Follow-up (CFU) and Field Verification (FV), to reduce certain types of counting, or coverage, errors in the 2010 Census. GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which the Bureau completed CFU and FV on schedule and within estimated cost and (2) the implications of their key design elements for improving coverage. GAO reviewed Bureau evaluations, planning, and other documents on CFU and FV, and prior GAO work, and interviewed Bureau officials.
What GAO Found
The Bureau completed CFU and FV on schedule and within budget. FV cost $21 million (about 38 percent less than estimated) and CFU cost about $267 million (about 2 percent less than estimated). These operations followed up on potential errors on census returns or lists of addresses after census data had been initially collected. Their completion provided follow-up data used by subsequent data processing that removed errors from the official census tabulations. Three of the Bureau's key CFU design elements will likely improve overall census accuracy, but their effect on undercounts of different demographic groups is not clear. One key design element increased the number and types of follow-up cases. The Bureau expanded the scope of CFU from about 2 million households in the 2000 Census to more than 7 million in 2010. It also added 20 different types of households for potential follow-up. New types included households that reported members temporarily residing elsewhere, such as at college, in nursing homes, or in jail. According to the Bureau, the 2010 CFU operation should remove more than 2.7 million coverage errors from the census. Another key design element of CFU prioritized follow-up cases based on their likelihood to result in a census correction, which was a reasonable attempt to leverage the resources for the operation. However, the Bureau's evaluation plans, based on considerations of what may best reduce cost or increase accuracy in the future, do not link the demographic characteristics of households to how they responded to the additional questions or CFU results for those households. Therefore, it is unclear whether the prioritized follow-up will help reduce differences in the accuracy of census counts across demographic groups. Finally, CFU's design relied on a telephone-only approach to complete follow-up rather than personal visits. This limited costs, resulting in more follow-up and likely more coverage errors being removed from the census. But the telephone-only decision excluded about 700,000 households from CFU that could not be contacted by telephone. Prior Bureau experience indicates that some historically undercounted groups were less likely to be reachable by telephone, and more recent independent research suggests that trends in telecommunication usage may also make it harder to reach some demographic groups this way in the future. Yet the Bureau's evaluation plans do not include an assessment of either the usefulness of the telephone numbers it collected in reaching specific groups or the effect of these trends. Greater understanding of how best to reach different groups as well as the influence of trends on the effectiveness of CFU could help to control costs while working to further reduce differential undercounts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to assess (1) how well questions to help identify miscounted people on census forms helped reduce differences in the undercounts between demographic groups; (2) the degree to which telephone numbers led to completed contacts for households of various demographic characteristics; and (3) how trends in telecommunication usage and new technology may influence the effectiveness of CFU. The Secretary of Commerce concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GGD-96-174 | gao_GGD-96-174_0 | ATF identified and provided documentation on 14 national data systems and 4 subsystems relating to firearms. Also, on the basis of our review, observations, and discussions with ATF officials, we believe that ATF operates the systems consistently with their design, with one exception relating to the purging of data from the Multiple Sales System, which ATF subsequently informed us it had taken action to correct. Out-Of-Business Records System
Shortly after the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, ATF issued regulations requiring federal firearms licensees who permanently discontinued their businesses to forward their transaction records to ATF within 30 days following the discontinuance. With regard to the issue of ATF’s interpretation of the data restriction contained in the annual appropriation rider, we concluded in our draft report that given ATF’s legal interpretation that the appropriation rider had no application to its internal information practices, ATF had not analyzed its data systems and information practices to determine whether they involved the type of centralization and consolidation of records that might be affected by the rider. ATF Data Systems That Contain Retail Firearms Purchaser Data
This appendix describes the five national data systems and one subsystem that ATF identified as containing sufficient data, or automated interfaces to related databases, to readily identify the retail purchaser or possessor of a specific firearm. 926(a), we believe that ATF’s interpretation of the restriction in its annual appropriation was too narrow. However, we found that the two data systems that we reviewed did not violate the data restrictions. 18 U.S.C. With regard to the restriction in section 926(a), we agree with ATF that it is limited to prescribing rules and regulations. The appropriation rider, however, contains no language that would limit its application either to prescribing rules and regulations or to imposing additional reporting requirements on licensees. However, we believe that the appropriation rider clearly has legal effect independent of section 926. The appropriation rider applies to “consolidating or centralizing, within the Department of the Treasury, the records, or any portion thereof, of acquisition and disposition of firearms maintained by Federal firearms licensees.” However, we do not believe that the rider precludes all information practices and data systems that involve an element of “consolidating or centralizing” licensee records. 923(g)(3), (4) and (5), as well as that contained in paragraph (1), as amended, are not to be construed to authorize the United States or any state or political subdivision thereof, to use the information obtained from any records or forms which are required to be maintained for inspection or submission by licensees under Chapter 44 to establish any system of registration of firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions or dispositions.”
Therefore, to the extent that the centralization or consolidation of records is incident to carrying out a specific ATF responsibility and does not entail the aggregation of data on firearms transactions in a manner that would go beyond the purposes of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, we do not believe that the rider would be violated. 926(a) prohibits ATF from prescribing certain rules or regulations after the date of enactment of FOPA. Multiple Sales System
Since 1975, federal firearms licensees have been required by regulation and subsequently by law to report all transactions in which an unlicensed person has acquired two or more pistols and/or revolvers at one time or during any 5 consecutive business days (referred to as a multiple sale). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various aspects of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (ATF) operations, focusing on ATF compliance in meeting specific legislative restrictions in 18 U.S.C. 926(a) regarding federal firearms licensee data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) ATF identified and described 14 national data systems and 4 subsystems that relate to firearms; (2) according to ATF, five systems and one subsystem contain data that readily identify retail purchasers or possessors of specific firearms; (3) the Out-of-Business Records System contains records that federal firearms licensees are required by statute to forward to ATF within 30 days following a permanent discontinuance of their business; (4) the Multiple Sales System contains data from reports that federal firearms licensees are required by statute to send to ATF showing sales or other dispositions of two or more pistols and/or revolvers to an unlicensed person at one time or during any 5 consecutive business days; (5) the two systems, as designed, comply with the data restrictions and do not violate the appropriation rider prohibition against consolidating or centralizing licensee records; (6) on the basis of GAO's review, observations, and discussions with ATF officials, it believes that ATF operated the two systems consistently with their design, with one exception relating to the Multiple Sales System; (7) GAO agrees with ATF's view of section 926(a), but GAO believes that ATF's interpretation of the annual appropriation rider was too narrow; (8) ATF contended that both section 926(a) and the appropriation rider restricted it from issuing rules and regulations imposing additional reporting requirements on licensees but did not restrict what it did internally with information it otherwise acquired; (9) GAO agrees that the restriction in section 926(a) limits ATF only from prescribing certain rules or regulations, but the appropriation rider contains no language that would limit its application either to prescribing rules and regulations or to imposing additional reporting requirements on licensees; (10) GAO believes that the rider has legal effect independent of section 926; (11) GAO does not believe that the rider precludes all information practices and data systems that involve an element of "consolidating or centralizing" licensee records; (12) to the extent that the centralization or consolidation of firearms transaction records is incident to carrying out a specific ATF responsibility and does not entail the aggregation of data on firearms transactions in a manner that would go beyond the purposes of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, GAO does not believe that the rider would be violated; and (13) given its legal position on the limited scope of the rider, ATF had not systematically analyzed its data systems and information practices to give appropriate effect to the appropriation rider. |
gao_HEHS-95-186 | gao_HEHS-95-186_0 | Each state designs and administers its own Medicaid program, subject to federal requirements for eligibility, services covered, and provider payments. At the federal level, the program is administered by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), an HHS agency. TennCare Program Designed to Expand Coverage and Contain Costs
Tennessee’s demonstration project was designed to use a capitated managed care system to expand coverage to the uninsured population and to control total program and state costs. In addition, the waiver includes provisions to monitor and ensure enrollee access to quality care. The year before TennCare’s implementation, the increase in long-term care expenditures was over 18 percent. Actual collections to date have been less than estimated. TennCare Has Initially Met Its Objectives, but Access and Quality Assurance Measures Have Been Delayed
For the first year, TennCare essentially met its objectives of expanding coverage and controlling costs. The survey indicated that 45 percent of TennCare enrollees who had previously been on Medicaid said that the care they received under TennCare was worse than under Medicaid, citing limited choice of doctors and difficulty in finding providers as the most significant reasons. And although access and quality of care have not yet been fully analyzed, access to care will likely be inadequate if large numbers of providers choose to discontinue or drastically reduce their participation. As part of the state’s waiver agreement with HCFA, the Comptroller’s office reviewed cost reports from participating federally qualified health centers for the first 6 months of TennCare and concluded that, “it appears the clinics are not performing as well under TennCare compared to Medicaid.” However, the Comptroller’s office said that its analysis was not conclusive because it could not be sure that changes in costs were caused solely by TennCare nor that health centers accurately reported revenues, particularly pending payments. Overall, MCOs lost money in the first year, even after receiving substantial one-time supplemental payments. However, because of the recency of the changes, their impact on the problems we identify is uncertain at this time. The capitation rates are based on historical Medicaid costs and set by enrollee type; the rates are then reduced by charity care deductions and enrollee cost sharing. Although many of these problems have been addressed to some degree, the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the TennCare Bureau testified in March 1995 that TennCare continues to experience several problems as does any program in its “infancy.”
Limited Managed Care Experience Led to Confusion Among MCOs, Beneficiaries, and Providers
TennCare introduced a prepaid, capitated system, in which the TennCare Bureau makes monthly payments to MCOs for enrollee care, and the Bureau assumes responsibility for MCO oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Tennessee's Medicaid capitated managed care program (TennCare), focusing on: (1) TennCare's basic design and objectives; (2) the degree to which the program is meeting these objectives; and (3) the experiences of TennCare insurers and medical providers and their implications for TennCare's future.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) TennCare's objectives are to expand health care coverage to the state's uninsured and to control program costs by mandating that Medicaid participants enroll in managed care organizations (MCO) and covering certain uninsured, Medicaid-ineligible persons; (2) Tennessee has cut costs by setting its capitation rates below historical Medicaid costs, applying an additional discount based on the assumption that extensive insurance coverage would reduce charity care costs, and discontinuing certain supplemental payments; (3) in granting the Medicaid waiver, the Health Care Financing Administration has required Tennessee to implement measures to monitor and ensure access to quality care and has limited federal payments over the 5 years to ensure that federal costs do not exceed what they would have been without the waiver; (4) despite the increased number of participants, federal and state TennCare expenditures have increased much less than the national average for Medicaid programs and program costs have actually declined when uncapitated administrative and long-term care costs are excluded; (5) access to and quality of care could not be measured because Tennessee and MCO have not yet set up their monitoring systems, but a survey of beneficiaries revealed significant dissatisfaction with the new program because of the limited choice of doctors and difficulty in finding providers; (6) many MCO and providers lost money in 1994 despite receiving supplemental payments from TennCare; and (7) although TennCare has met its initial objectives, its long-term success is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-07-905T | gao_GAO-07-905T_0 | Over the last several years, funding for nonemergency U.S. food aid programs has declined. U.S. food aid programs also have multiple legislative and regulatory mandates that affect their operations. Multiple Challenges Hinder the Efficiency of U.S. Food Aid Programs
Multiple challenges in logistics hinder the efficiency of U.S. food aid programs by reducing the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. Factors that increase logistical costs and lengthen time frames include uncertain funding processes and inadequate planning, ocean transportation contracting practices, legal requirements, and inadequate coordination in tracking and responding to food delivery problems. While U.S. agencies are pursuing initiatives to improve food aid logistics, such as prepositioning food commodities and using a new transportation bid process, their long-term cost-effectiveness has not yet been measured. In addition, the current practice of selling commodities to generate cash resources for development projects—monetization—is an inherently inefficient yet expanding use of food aid. Despite these inefficiencies, U.S. agencies do not collect or maintain data electronically on monetization revenues, and the lack of such data impedes the agencies’ ability to fully monitor the degree to which revenues can cover the costs related to monetization. Despite these concerns, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, as they have limited staff and competing priorities and face legal restrictions on the use of food aid resources. U.S. As a result, agencies may not be accomplishing their goal of getting the right food to the right people at the right time. However, opportunities for further improvement remain to ensure that limited resources for U.S. food aid are not vulnerable to waste, are put to their most effective use, and reach the most vulnerable populations on a timely basis. To improve the efficiency of U.S. food aid—in terms of its amount, timeliness, and quality—we recommended in our previous report that the Administrator of USAID and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Transportation (1) improve food aid logistical planning through cost- benefit analysis of supply-management options; (2) work together and with stakeholders to modernize ocean transportation and contracting practices; (3) seek to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food aid transportation expenditures by updating implementation and reimbursement methodologies to account for new supply practices; (4) establish a coordinated system for tracking and resolving food quality complaints; and (5) develop an information collection system to track monetization transactions. To improve the effective use of food aid, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Agriculture (1) enhance the reliability and use of needs assessments for new and existing food aid programs through better coordination among implementing organizations, make assessments a priority in informing funding decisions, and more effectively build on lessons from past targeting experiences; (2) determine ways to provide adequate nonfood resources in situations where there is sufficient evidence that such assistance will enhance the effectiveness of food aid; (3) develop a coordinated interagency mechanism to update food aid specifications and products to improve food quality and nutritional standards; and (4) improve monitoring of food aid programs to ensure proper management and implementation. USAID stated that we did not adequately recognize its recent efforts to strategically focus resources to reduce food insecurity in highly vulnerable countries. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is the largest global food aid donor, accounting for over half of all food aid supplies to alleviate hunger and support development. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year for U.S. food aid programs, which delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of food commodities per year. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising business and transportation costs have contributed to a 52 percent decline in average tonnage delivered between 2001 and 2006. These costs represent 65 percent of total emergency food aid, highlighting the need to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness. This testimony is based on a recent GAO report that examined some key challenges to the (1) efficiency of U.S. food aid programs and (2) effective use of U.S. food aid.
What GAO Found
Multiple challenges hinder the efficiency of U.S. food aid programs by reducing the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. Factors that cause inefficiencies include (1) insufficiently planned food and transportation procurement, reflecting uncertain funding processes, that increases delivery costs and time frames; (2) ocean transportation and contracting practices that create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, resulting in increased rates; (3) legal requirements that result in awarding of food aid contracts to more expensive service providers; and (4) inadequate coordination between U.S. agencies and food aid stakeholders in tracking and responding to food and delivery problems. U.S. agencies have taken some steps to address timeliness concerns. USAID has been stocking or prepositioning food domestically and abroad, and USDA has implemented a new transportation bid process, but the long-term cost effectiveness of these initiatives has not yet been measured. The current practice of using food aid to generate cash for development projects--monetization--is also inherently inefficient. Furthermore, since U.S. agencies do not collect monetization revenue data electronically, they are unable to adequately monitor the degree to which revenues cover costs. Numerous challenges limit the effective use of U.S. food aid. Factors contributing to limitations in targeting the most vulnerable populations include (1) challenging operating environments in recipient countries; (2) insufficient coordination among key stakeholders, resulting in disparate estimates of food needs; (3) difficulties in identifying vulnerable groups and causes of their food insecurity; and (4) resource constraints that adversely affect the timing and quality of assessments, as well as the quantity of food and other assistance. Further, some impediments to improving the nutritional quality of U.S. food aid may reduce its benefits to recipients. Finally, U.S. agencies do not adequately monitor food aid programs due to limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions on the use of food aid resources. As a result, these programs are vulnerable to not getting the right food to the right people at the right time. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-122 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-122_0 | Overview
We believe that the United States generally achieved its negotiating objectives in the Uruguay Round, and most studies we reviewed projected net economic gains to the United States and the world economy. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round agreements are the most comprehensive multilateral trade agreements in history. Despite expectations for overall economic gains, we noted in recent reports that specific industry organizations and domestic interest groups had concerns that the agreement would adversely affect some U.S. interests. Nevertheless, our work highlights the following issues: (1) the WTO’s organizational structure and the secretariat’s budget have grown from 1994 to 1996 to coincid with new duties and responsibilities approved by the member countries; (2) faced with over 200 requirements, many member nations have not yet provided some of the notifications of laws or other information as called for in the agreements; (3) this year provides the first opportunity to review whether anticipated U.S. gains in agriculture will materialize, as countries begin to report on meeting their initial commitments; (4) the new agreements require that food safety measures be based on sound science, but U.S. agricultural exporters seem to be encountering more problems with other countries’ measures and a number of formal disputes have already been filed with WTO; (5) while efforts are underway to improve transparency provisions regarding state trading, these provisions alone may not be effective when applied to state-dominated economies, like China and Russia, seeking to join WTO; (6) while textile and apparel quotas will be phased out over 10 years, the United States has continued to use its authority to impose quotas during the phase-out period and will not lift most apparel quotas until 2005; (7) despite the end of the Uruguay Round, some areas, like services, are still subject to ongoing negotiations; (8) there were 25 disputes brought before WTO in 1995 by various countries, including some involving the United States. The information provided allows members to monitor each others’ activities and, therefore, to enforce the terms of the agreements. Monitoring foreign government implementation of commitments is important to ensure that the United States will receive the expected benefits. Members are debating whether to (1) push further liberalization in areas already agreed to, but not yet fully implemented; and/or (2) negotiate new issues related to international trade. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's Uruguay Round agreements and the operation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. has generally achieved its negotiating objectives in the Uruguay Round; (2) the agreements are expected to open markets by reducing trade barriers and unfair trade practices; (3) some U.S. industries and domestic interests are concerned that the agreements will have adverse effects; (4) implementation of the agreements is complex and its effects will not be known for many years; (5) the United States needs to monitor the agreements' implementation to ensure that member countries honor their commitments and the expected benefits are realized; (6) the WTO organizational structure and the secretariat's budget have grown in relation to its expanded responsibilities; (7) several import and export issues involving the service, textile, and agriculture industries continue to be disputed and are awaiting settlement; (8) many member countries have not met their notification requirements so that other member countries can monitor and enforce agreement terms; and (9) WTO members need to address how to allocate its resources, how to assimilate new countries into WTO, and whether to pursue liberalization in areas already agreed upon or initiate negotiations on new topics. |
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