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gao_GAO-03-919 | gao_GAO-03-919_0 | In order to carry out the various missions of the federal government, federal agencies collect and maintain personal information such as name, date of birth, address, and SSNs to distinguish among individuals and ensure that people receive the services or benefits they are entitled to under the law. SSA’s Disclosure Policy Allows Information Sharing with Law Enforcement under Certain Conditions, but is More Restrictive than the Privacy Act
While SSA’s policy permits the sharing of nontax information with law enforcement, it does so only under certain conditions and is more restrictive than both the law enforcement exception specified under the Privacy Act and the disclosure policies of most federal agencies. However, like SSA’s disclosure policy, the disclosure policies of the IRS and the Bureau of the Census, which have disclosure requirements prescribed in their statutes, are more restrictive than the Privacy Act and the disclosure policies of most federal agencies. SSA will provide information necessary to investigate or prosecute fraud or other criminal activity in Social Security programs. Violent and serious crimes. Tax information is disclosed consistent with IRC 6103. The law enforcement exception of the Privacy Act permits all federal agencies to disclose personal information to law enforcement agencies upon written request from the law enforcement agency. SSA Views Restrictions as Integral to Carrying Out Its Mission
SSA maintains that it must have a restrictive disclosure policy to protect individuals’ personal information, even from law enforcement requests, because much of the information the agency collects is especially personal and was initially obtained under the pledge of confidentiality. SSA Has Provided Information to Law Enforcement Officials, but Confusion about the Disclosure Policy May Cause Inconsistent Application
Although SSA’s policy supports sharing limited information with law enforcement under certain conditions, we found evidence that some SSA field office staff are confused about the policy that could result in staff applying it inconsistently. For example, one SSA field office manager told us that nothing could be disclosed to law enforcement if the request for information pertained to an individual suspected of misusing an SSN because the individual had not been indicted or convicted of this crime. However, SSA’s policy would appear to permit disclosure in this situation. Most Law Enforcement Officials Found Shared Information Useful but Many Believed More Information Was Needed
Officials from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies we spoke with were generally satisfied with the information provided by SSA although most would like more information on individuals. Law enforcement officials indicated that, although in most cases SSA only verified a name and SSN, the information received was useful to their investigations and, in some cases, was enough to help convict an individual of a crime. SSA places a high priority on privacy, and its policy for disclosure to law enforcement agencies goes beyond the requirements of the Privacy Act. As a possible consequence of SSA staff and local law enforcement’s confusion about SSA’s policy, law enforcement may be denied requested information even though SSA’s policy permits its disclosure or law enforcement may receive information that SSA’s policy does not permit. As we reported, SSA’s disclosure policy, as well as those of IRS and the Census Bureau is more restrictive than most federal agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Law enforcement agencies' efforts to investigate the events of September 11th increased awareness that federal agencies collect and maintain personal information on individuals such as name, social security number, and date of birth that could be useful to law enforcement. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is one of the country's primary custodians of personal information. Although the Privacy Act protects much of this information, generally, federal agencies can disclose information to law enforcement. However, determining when the need for disclosure takes priority over an individual's privacy is not clear. GAO was asked to describe (1) SSA's disclosure policy for law enforcement and how it compares with the Privacy Act and those of other federal agencies, (2) SSA's experience sharing information with law enforcement, and (3) law enforcement's experience obtaining information under SSA's policy.
What GAO Found
Although SSA's disclosure policy permits the sharing of information with law enforcement entities, it is more restrictive than the Privacy Act and the disclosure policies of most federal agencies. While the Privacy Act permits disclosures to law enforcement for any type of crime, SSA only allows disclosures under certain conditions. For example, for serious and violent crimes, SSA will disclose information to law enforcement if the individual whose information is sought has been indicted or convicted of that crime. Even when information is disclosed, it might be limited to results obtained from verifying a social security number and name unless the investigation concerns fraud in SSA or other federal benefit programs, then the agency can work with law enforcement officials as part of a task force or joint investigation. However, the disclosure policies for law enforcement of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Census Bureau, both of which have requirements prescribed in their statutes, are also more restrictive than the Privacy Act and the policies of most federal agencies. SSA officials consider SSA's disclosure policy integral to carrying out the agency's mission. The various restrictions in SSA's disclosure policy create a complex policy that is confusing and could cause inconsistent application across the agency's more than 1,300 field offices. This could result in uneven treatment of law enforcement requests. Because aggregated data were not available, GAO was unable to assess the extent to which SSA does not consistently apply its policy. However, GAO was told of instances in which SSA officials in some field offices did not give law enforcement information that appeared to be permitted under the policy as well as instances in which they gave them more than what appeared to be allowed. Generally, law enforcement officials find the limited information SSA shares useful to their investigation, but many law enforcement officials, particularly state and local law enforcement officials, are not familiar with the policy or the process for requesting information from SSA. Most law enforcement officials expressed a desire for more information than is currently permitted under SSA's policy, but SSA maintains that providing more information would hurt its ability to carry out its primary mission. |
gao_GAO-07-280 | gao_GAO-07-280_0 | 3. For example, states may disregard certain types or amounts of income and may elect not to count certain resources. Income. Over 70 percent of all elderly nursing home residents had nonhousing resources of $70,000 or less at the time they entered the nursing home, which is less than the estimated average annual cost for nursing home care. Approximately 90 percent of Medicaid-covered elderly nursing home residents had annual incomes of $20,000 or less compared to approximately 53 percent of non- Medicaid-covered residents. Majority of Medicaid Applicants in Selected Counties in Three States Had Few Nonhousing Resources and Were Approved upon Initial Application
Similar to the nationwide results, the majority of the 540 applicants whose Medicaid nursing home application files we reviewed in selected counties in three states (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) had few nonhousing resources. For about one-third of these applicants who were initially denied for financial reasons and were subsequently approved, at least part of the decrease in their nonhousing resources could be attributed to spending on medical or nursing home care. These individuals had been living in facilities for an average of a little over 4 months at the time of application. About 90 percent—488 applicants—had total nonhousing resources of $30,000 or less. 3.) The median annual income of all applicants was $11,382. 4.) Almost half of the denied applicants (56 of 122) were denied only for financial reasons—having income or resources that exceeded the standards, most having to do with resources exceeding the standards. 6.) Few Transfers below FMV Identified for Applications Reviewed and Penalties Rarely Delayed Eligibility
Few of the approved applicants whose files we reviewed in selected counties in three states were found to have transferred assets for less than FMV during the 36-month look-back period, and those who did transfer assets for less than FMV rarely experienced a delay in eligibility for Medicaid coverage for nursing home care as a result. At the time these applicants applied for Medicaid—state fiscal year 2005 or earlier—none of the three states reviewed imposed penalties for partial months, and the penalty period began at the time of the asset transfer; under these circumstances, only two of the applicants received a penalty that delayed their eligibility for Medicaid coverage for nursing home care as a result of transferring assets for less than FMV. 10.) Extent to Which Some DRA Long-Term Care Provisions May Affect Eligibility Is Uncertain
The extent to which some DRA long-term care provisions may affect applicants’ eligibility for Medicaid coverage for long-term care is uncertain. Our review of a sample of Medicaid applications indicated that the DRA penalty period provisions could increase the likelihood that individuals who transfer assets for less than FMV on or after the date of enactment will experience a delay in eligibility for Medicaid coverage for long-term care. However, the extent of the delay is uncertain. The effects on eligibility of other DRA provisions—specifically those related to annuities, home equity, the allocation of assets to community spouses, and life estates—may be limited because they only apply to a few applicants, affect applicants in some states but not in others, or both. First, the DRA changes the beginning date of a penalty period from approximately the date of the transfer—which could precede the date of a Medicaid application by days, months, or years—to the later of (1) generally the first day of a month during or after which an asset has been transferred for less than FMV or (2) the date on which the individual is eligible for Medicaid and would otherwise be receiving coverage for long-term care services, were it not for ineligibility due to the imposition of the penalty period. The DRA added requirements for states regarding the treatment of annuities. Home Equity. Maryland and South Carolina generally agreed with our findings. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the financial characteristics of elderly nursing home residents nationwide, including the extent to which they transferred cash, we analyzed data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). To analyze the demographic and financial characteristics of elderly individuals who applied for Medicaid coverage for nursing homes and if they applied more than once, as well as the extent to which they transferred assets for less than fair market value (FMV) and were subject to penalty periods, we reviewed Medicaid eligibility determination practices and Medicaid nursing home application files in three states. 3. To assess the potential effect of provisions of the DRA, we used (1) HRS data and (2) data from our application file reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicaid program paid for nearly one-half of the nation's total long-term care expenditures in 2004. To be eligible for Medicaid long-term care, individuals may transfer assets (income and resources) to others to ensure that their assets fall below certain limits. Individuals who make transfers for less than fair market value (FMV) can be subject to a penalty that may delay Medicaid coverage. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) changed the calculation and timing of the penalty period and set requirements for the treatment of certain types of assets. GAO was asked to provide data on the extent to which asset transfers for less than FMV occur. GAO examined (1) the financial characteristics of elderly nursing home residents nationwide, (2) the demographic and financial characteristics of a sample of Medicaid nursing home applicants, (3) the extent to which these applicants transferred assets for less than FMV, and (4) the potential effects of the DRA provisions related to Medicaid eligibility for long-term care. GAO analyzed data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a national panel survey, and from 540 randomly selected Medicaid nursing home application files from 3 counties in each of 3 states (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina). State and county selections were based on the prevalence of several factors, including population, income, and demographics.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, HRS data showed that, at the time most elderly individuals entered a nursing home, they had nonhousing resources of $70,000 or less--less than the average cost for a year of private-pay nursing home care. Overall, nursing home residents covered by Medicaid had fewer nonhousing resources and lower annual incomes, and were less likely to have reported transferring cash than non-Medicaid-covered nursing home residents. Similar to the nationwide results, GAO's review of 540 Medicaid nursing home applications in three states showed that over 90 percent of the applicants had nonhousing resources of $30,000 or less and 85 percent had annual incomes of $20,000 or less. One-fourth of applicants owned homes, with a median home value of $52,954. Over 80 percent of applicants had been living in long-term care facilities for an average of a little over 4 months at the time of their application. Of the 540 applicants, 408 were approved for Medicaid coverage for nursing home services the first time they applied and 122 were denied. Of the denied applicants, 56 were denied for having income or resources that exceeded the standards, 41 of whom submitted subsequent applications and were eventually approved, primarily by decreasing the value of their nonhousing resources. For about one-third of these applicants, at least part of the decrease in nonhousing resources could be attributed to spending on medical or nursing home care. Approximately 10 percent of approved applicants in the three states (47 of 465) transferred assets for less than FMV, with a median amount of $15,152. The average length of the penalty period assessed for the 47 applicants was about 6 months. However, only 2 of these applicants experienced a delay in Medicaid eligibility as a result of the transfers because many applicants' assessed penalties had expired by the time they applied for coverage. The extent to which DRA long-term care provisions will affect applicants' eligibility for Medicaid is uncertain. DRA provisions regarding changes to penalty periods could increase the likelihood that applicants who transfer assets for less than FMV will experience a delay in Medicaid eligibility, but the extent of the delay is uncertain. Several factors could affect the extent to which DRA penalty period provisions actually delay eligibility for Medicaid. These factors include whether an applicant transferred assets for less than FMV before or after the DRA was enacted and a potential increase in requests for waived penalty periods due to undue hardship--circumstances under which individuals are deprived of medical care, food, clothing, shelter, or other necessities of life. Other DRA provisions may have limited effects on eligibility. For example, provisions pertaining to home equity may have limited impact because few applicants whose files GAO reviewed had home equity of sufficient value to be affected. CMS, Maryland, and South Carolina generally agreed with the report's findings; Pennsylvania did not provide comments. |
gao_GAO-08-794 | gao_GAO-08-794_0 | Selected Countries Have a Comprehensive, Risk- Based Approach to Import Safety
The selected countries have a comprehensive, risk-based approach to ensuring the safety of imported food that focuses on the entire food supply chain, from “farm to table.” The selected countries emphasize prevention, placing primary responsibility for food safety on food producers, with government bodies providing oversight. The selected countries also take steps to ensure certain food imports meet equivalent food safety standards. The Selected Countries’ Food Safety Systems Are Based on Farm-To-Table Oversight
The selected countries have generally adopted a farm-to-table approach, under which the entire food production process is regulated, starting with how animals are raised on the farm and ending when food reaches the final consumer. In the EU, for example, food products of animal origin imported from non-EU countries must meet standards at least equivalent to those of the EU for food quality and hygiene. Selected Countries and the EU Cite Key Elements of Food Systems as Critical to Effectively Responding to Outbreaks of Foodborne Illness
The selected countries reported that three elements of their food safety systems are critical in helping them respond to outbreaks of foodborne illness. These elements include traceback procedures, cooperative arrangements between government veterinarians and public health officials, and mandatory recall authority. EU Requirement That All Foods Be Traceable May Accelerate the Identification of an Outbreak Source
All food must be traceable “one step forward and one step back” in EU member states, allowing industry and national governments to quickly track any questionable food products to minimize harm to public health and reduce the economic impact on industry. All of the Selected Countries Have Mandatory Recall Authority
All of the selected countries have mandatory recall authority—the legal authority to remove, or require another party to remove, a product from the market. The Selected Countries Have Not Evaluated Their Reorganized Food Safety Systems, but Proxy Measures Indicate Improvements
None of the countries we reviewed had comprehensively evaluated the effectiveness of its reorganized food safety system, but most of the selected countries track certain indicators, such as the number of inspections conducted, enforcement actions taken, and foodborne illness outbreaks. Most of these countries had also assessed specific aspects of the country’s food safety system. Furthermore, most of these countries use proxy measures, such as public opinion surveys, to assess effectiveness. In the UK, the National Audit Office (GAO’s UK counterpart) conducted an audit of the Food Standards Agency in 2003 and found that the agency had made progress in its stated objective of improving public confidence in food safety and standards. Several of the countries, including Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK, have surveyed their consumers on their views of the food safety system. Food Safety Officials in Other Countries Identified Issues of Future Concern
Experts in the six countries and the EU identified a number of challenges related to food safety that they expect to face over the next decade, with climate change the most frequently identified challenge. This official also said that mandatory recall is rarely used precisely “because it is there.” According to a Canadian industry representative, the mandatory food recall process is an important part of the food safety system because it is the last stop in the supply chain. Specifically, the operator must be able to document the names and addresses of the suppliers and customers, as well as the nature of the product and date of delivery. Recent incidents. Member states have more leeway on how they define risk. The reorganization separated risk assessment from risk management. The EU’s Food and Veterinary Office has also conducted a number of audits of various aspects of the Irish food safety system. In 2005, for example, the office audited Irish import controls and border inspection posts. Foodborne Illness Outbreaks
Response. Japanese officials did not identify any major outbreaks of foodborne illness. The industry representative told us that a 2006 reorganization of VWA that moved meat inspectors out of VWA and into private, accredited inspection firms that VWA audits has been successful, in that “people with the right qualifications are doing their job well.”
Other Relevant Issues
According to VWA documents, the agency is concerned with the following ongoing and future challenges to the country’s food safety system: climate change, including the potential for new foodborne viruses, mycotoxins (molds), new pathogens, and new plants and insects that can lead to threats to the food chain; demographic change, such as immigration, and the impact of age on risks (children and the elderly tend to be more susceptible to illness than others); sociocultural trends, including changes in lifestyle and behavior and the globalization (large-scale movements of humans, animals, and goods increase the risk of the introduction and rapid spread of pathogens); and changes in production and processing based on new technologies, such as nanotechnology, genetically modified organisms, and decontamination technologies. Inspections. Public opinion surveys. | Why GAO Did This Study
Like other nations, the United States faces growing food safety challenges resulting from at least three major trends. First, imported food makes up a growing share of the food supply. Second, consumers are increasingly eating foods that are raw or have had minimal processing and that are often associated with foodborne illness. Third, changing demographic patterns mean that more of the U.S. population is, and increasingly will be, susceptible to foodborne illness. In 2005, GAO reported on the approaches and challenges seven countries faced in reorganizing and consolidating food safety functions. Since then, the European Union (EU) has taken on a larger role in overseeing food safety within its 27 member states. GAO was asked to describe how Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) (1) ensure the safety of imported food, (2) respond to outbreaks of foodborne illness, and (3) measure the effectiveness of their reorganized food safety systems. GAO also asked experts in these countries and the EU to identify emerging food safety challenges that they expect to face over the next decade. In doing this work, GAO did not evaluate the countries' management of their food safety systems or explicitly compare their efforts with those of the United States.
What GAO Found
The countries GAO examined have a comprehensive approach to ensuring the safety of imported food. Specifically, they focus on the entire food supply chain, from "farm to table;" place primary responsibility for food safety on producers; separate risk assessment and risk management; use a risk-based inspection system; and take steps to ensure that certain food imports meet equivalent safety standards. Under the farm-to-table approach, for example, food safety laws cover every stage of the food production process, starting with how animals are raised and ending when food reaches the consumer. All countries GAO reviewed focus import inspections on the foods likeliest to pose the greatest risk. The EU, for example, requires that all imports of live animals and products of animal origin--which are considered high risk--enter the EU through approved border inspection posts. Several of the selected countries reported that three elements of their food safety systems are critical in helping them respond to outbreaks of foodborne illness. These elements are traceback procedures, cooperative arrangements between government veterinarians and public health officials, and mandatory recall authority. In EU member states, all food must be traceable "one step forward and one step back" so industry and government can quickly track any food products to minimize harm to public health and reduce the economic impact on industry. Food and feed business operators must be able to document the names and addresses of the supplier and customer, as well as the nature of the product and date of delivery. Officials in several countries told GAO that mandatory recall authority--the legal authority to remove, or require another party to remove, a product from the market--is rarely used but is an important part of the food safety system because it is the last stop in the supply chain. None of the selected countries had comprehensively evaluated its reorganized food safety system, although several track certain indicators, such as the number of inspections, enforcement actions, and foodborne illness. However, some countries' national audit offices (GAO's counterparts) have evaluated specific aspects of their countries' systems. For example, the UK audit office found that the country's Food Standards Agency had improved public confidence, a stated objective. The EU's Food and Veterinary Office has conducted numerous reviews of aspects of all EU countries' food safety systems and identified areas needing improvement. Most of the selected countries use proxy measures, such as public opinion surveys, to assess their effectiveness. Public opinion in several countries has improved in recent years. Countries' industry and consumer stakeholders also generally had positive views of the reorganized food safety systems. Experts identified food safety challenges that they expect to face over the next decade. These include climate change; demographic change, with increases in elderly people and immigration; and new types of foods, such as ready-to-eat salads, that may result in more incidents of foodborne illness. |
gao_HEHS-96-136 | gao_HEHS-96-136_0 | Applying Managed Care to Disabled Beneficiaries Poses Additional Challenges
Interest in using prepaid managed care programs for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries has prompted concerns about whether this approach is suitable to meet the needs of disabled beneficiaries. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Medicaid and Health Care for Low-Income Families of the Senate Committee on Finance asked us to examine (1) the extent to which states are implementing prepaid Medicaid managed care for disabled beneficiaries and (2) what steps states have taken to safeguard the interests of the three major stakeholder groups—disabled beneficiaries, prepaid health care plans, and the government—with a focus on quality assurance and rate-setting mechanisms. States Are Moving Toward Managed Care for Disabled Medicaid Recipients
Of the 17 states that enrolled some portion of their disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in prepaid managed care plans, enrollment ranged from less than 1 percent to all of a state’s disabled beneficiaries. In addition to the 17 states currently enrolling disabled beneficiaries, more states have plans under way to include them in prepaid managed care. For beneficiaries with Medicare eligibility, 12 states open their Medicaid prepaid programs to participation and 5 do not. Important aspects of states’ quality assurance activities can fall into two main categories: (1) building safeguards into the programs through adequate planning and consensus-building and (2) tailoring various aspects of the program (such as enrollment and monitoring) to meet the specific needs of disabled individuals. These goals and specifications have included developing capacity to serve disabled individuals. Health plans can avoid high-cost recipients by dropping providers that attract high-cost patients. In their provider contracts, plans may limit the incentives to reduce services when their profits will be limited. To date, few states have significant, long-term experience with programs that mandate enrollment by their disabled population. We believe, instead, that given the limited state and health plan experience with serving disabled individuals in prepaid care and the medical complexity of their health care needs, careful attention is required in designing, implementing, and monitoring programs for this population. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined state efforts to include disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in prepaid managed care programs, focusing on the: (1) extent to which states are implementing Medicaid prepaid managed care programs for disabled beneficiaries; and (2) steps that have been taken to safeguard the interests of the stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) few states have significant experience with prepaid care programs for disabled Medicare beneficiaries; (2) 13 states have submitted proposals to enroll their disabled beneficiaries in prepaid care, and 12 of these states intend to make this enrollment mandatory; (3) half of the states with prepaid enrollment programs rely on disabled individuals to inform them of their dissatisfaction with their plans; (4) states that mandate the enrollment of their disabled beneficiaries in prepaid managed care plans develop more appropriate quality assurance mechanisms; (5) these states build safeguards into health care programs by incorporating adequate planning and consensus-building, and tailoring programs to meet the specific needs of disabled Medicare beneficiaries; (6) it is difficult for states to maintain a financially sound managed care system for disabled individuals; (7) some disabled groups have substantially higher medical costs than other groups; (8) individuals with high-cost disabilities find it more difficult to enroll in managed health care programs and experience limited health care services; (9) a few states are adopting an approach to limit the amount of profit a plan can earn or lose; (10) this approach lessens the incentive to limit service to high-cost beneficiaries; and (11) careful attention should be given when including the disabled population in prepaid health care plans, given their complex health care needs and states' limited experience with serving disabled individuals in prepaid settings. |
gao_GAO-14-817T | gao_GAO-14-817T_0 | States may, subject to certain requirements, also receive funds to finance Medicaid payments from health care providers, for example, through provider taxes—taxes levied on providers such as hospitals or nursing facilities. We have previously made recommendations to CMS—including recommendations to require states to report the amounts of UPL supplemental payments that they make to individual providers—to review all state supplemental payment programs, and enhance the oversight of payments made to government providers.CMS has not implemented all of these recommendations. CMS also tracks and reviews states’ total Medicaid expenditures on a quarterly basis. States’ Reliance on Funds from Providers and Local Governments to Finance Medicaid Has Increased in Recent Years, with Implications for Federal Costs
States Used Funds from Providers and Local Governments to Finance over $46 Billion, or 26 Percent, of the Nonfederal Share of Payments in 2012, an Increase from 2008
In the report that is being released today, we found that states used funds from health care providers and local governments to finance 26 percent, or over $46 billion, of the $180 billion in the total nonfederal share of Medicaid payments—both regular and supplemental—in state fiscal year 2012. States’ reliance on funds from health care providers and local governments to finance the nonfederal share of Medicaid payments increased by over 21 percent from state fiscal years 2008 through 2012, in large part due to increases in revenues from health care provider taxes. Changes in Financing Arrangements in Selected States Illustrate How the Arrangements Can Shift Medicaid Costs to the Federal Government
In the report being released today, we present information on recent changes in financing arrangements involving funds from providers and local governments in three selected states that illustrates how such changes can shift Medicaid costs from the state to the federal government. And from the providers’ perspective, the use of funds from providers to finance an increase in Medicaid payments results in a net payment to the provider that is less than the amount used for purposes of claiming federal funds. For these arrangements, we estimated the effect on the federal and state shares of new payments the state was making. For example, one state increased regular Medicaid payments for nursing facilities in May 2011, and financed these payments with a provider tax on nursing facilities. Preliminary Results Suggest That Data Needed to Oversee Medicaid Payments to Government and Private Providers Are Lacking
Our ongoing work has identified two major gaps in federal data necessary for overseeing Medicaid payments. At the state level, our ongoing work has found that the state payment data needed to understand provider-specific payments can be challenging to obtain and assess, and are not always reliable. In one state for which we have determined that data were sufficiently reliable to report today, our preliminary analysis of the state’s payments for inpatient hospitals in state fiscal year 2011 suggests the need for and value of having complete data to analyze Medicaid payments by provider ownership. When the state’s supplemental payments were factored in, local government hospitals replaced state government hospitals as receiving the highest average, and the gap between the local government hospitals’ and private hospitals’ averages increased further. According to the state’s Medicaid officials, these hospitals served higher needs patients. The state’s estimate of what Medicare would have paid the hospitals for the Medicaid services provided was about $100 million, compared to the $416 million those two facilities received. In reviewing information on the state’s payments to the two hospitals, our preliminary analysis found that the state did not contribute any state general funds to finance the nonfederal share of the two hospitals’ supplemental payments, as the nonfederal share of the payments was financed by a local government that operated the two hospitals. We will continue to complete our ongoing work and will issue a final report later this year including any suggested actions needed by CMS, as appropriate. We believe even more can be done to improve the transparency of Medicaid financing and payments, including previous recommendations that have not been implemented, such as facility specific reporting of supplemental payments and review of all state supplemental payment programs, and the recommendation from the report we are issuing today that CMS take steps to ensure states report accurate and complete data on all sources of funds to finance the nonfederal share. Appendix I: Abbreviations
Related GAO Products
Medicaid Financing: States’ Increased Reliance on Funds from Health Care Providers and Local Governments Warrants Improved CMS Data Collection. GAO-14-627. Medicaid Financing: States’ Use of Contingency-Fee Consultants to Maximize Federal Reimbursements Highlights Need for Improved Federal Oversight. Medicaid: Improved Federal Oversight of State Financing Schemes Is Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is a joint federal and state program for which the federal government matches state Medicaid expenditures. Total program costs were about $432 billion in federal fiscal year 2012. States use various sources of funds to finance the nonfederal share, such as state funds and funds from health care providers and local governments. Medicaid has been on GAO's list of high-risk programs since 2003, in part, because of concerns about federal oversight of complex state Medicaid financing arrangements where states seek funds from the providers for the nonfederal share of the payments, and oversight of large supplemental payments that states often make to government providers. States may have incentives to overpay providers that help finance the nonfederal share to maximize federal matching funds.
This statement highlights (1) findings from GAO's report being issued today on how states' reliance on health care providers and local governments to finance Medicaid changed from state fiscal years 2008 through 2012, and implications of these changes; and (2) preliminary results from GAO's ongoing work on what is known about data to oversee state Medicaid payments to government and private providers. For this work, GAO surveyed states, interviewed CMS and state officials, and reviewed information in three states selected, in part, on the basis of size, Medicaid payments, and geographic diversity. GAO shared information on its preliminary observations with CMS and incorporated comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
In its report being issued today ( GAO-14-627 ), GAO found that states' reliance on funds from health care providers and local governments to finance Medicaid has increased in recent years, with implications for federal costs. In state fiscal year 2012, while most of the nonfederal share was from state general funds, states used funds from health care providers and local governments to finance 26 percent, or over $46 billion, of the total nonfederal share of Medicaid payments. States' reliance on funds from health care providers and local governments to finance the nonfederal share increased by over 21 percent from state fiscal years 2008 through 2012. States' increasing use of funds generated from health care provider taxes was one main contributing factor to this increase. States' increasing reliance on providers and local governments to finance Medicaid can effectively shift costs from the state to the federal government, as illustrated by GAO's work in three selected states. For example, in one state, a $220 million payment increase for private nursing facilities funded by a tax on private nursing facilities resulted in an estimated $110 million increase in federal matching funds and no increase in state general funds, and a net payment increase to the facilities, after paying the taxes, of $105 million.
GAO's preliminary results from ongoing work related to state Medicaid payments to government providers shows that data needed for overseeing Medicaid payments are lacking. Federal payment data do not capture on a provider-specific basis certain large supplemental payments states often make and generally lack information on provider ownership. At the state level, preliminary results in three selected states suggest that payment data primarily maintained by states are not always reliable and can be challenging to obtain and assess. GAO's preliminary analysis of Medicaid payments to government hospitals in one state suggests the need for and value of better data for oversight. GAO estimates that on an average per day basis, the state's 2011 inpatient hospital payments were higher for local government hospitals than for private hospitals. For local government hospitals, the higher average payment was largely due to supplemental Medicaid payments the state made to two local government hospitals. State officials said these hospitals served patients with greater needs. However, the state's own estimate of what Medicare would have paid these hospitals for similar services was $100 million, much less than the $416 million in supplemental Medicaid payments and $70 million in regular payments that the hospitals received. Documentation from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) payment review process did not identify the actual supplemental payments these hospitals received. GAO plans to issue its final report later this year.
In GAO's past reports and the report being released today ( GAO-14-627 ), GAO has made recommendations to CMS to improve Medicaid payment oversight and develop a data collection strategy to improve the transparency of state financing methods. CMS has taken steps to improve the transparency and oversight of Medicaid financing and payments but has not implemented all of GAO's prior recommendations, and has generally disagreed with GAO's new recommendation. CMS believes that additional action is not needed. As discussed in the statement, GAO continues to believe that provider-specific information on state Medicaid financing and payments is needed. |
gao_NSIAD-97-66 | gao_NSIAD-97-66_0 | 1.1.) The Army’s risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003. This is consistent with defense guidance. However, TAA 2003 found that about 79,000 of the more than 188,000 support force positions required in the first 30 days of the first MRC do not arrive on time because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active support forces to meet these requirements and must rely on reserve forces instead. Only 12 percent of the support forces needed in the second MRC are active, compared with 47 percent in the first MRC. High reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may not entail greater risk assuming there is adequate warning time and mobilization has already occurred. The same risk of late arrival would apply if mobilization was delayed. Finally, TAA results reveal that the Army will have few active support forces—about 12 percent of total support forces required—available to support the second MRC and that 19,200 required active support positions in existing units are not authorized to be filled. For example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional information on which to base its assessment of risk; rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size on mobility requirements; and determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians can be used to fill some support force requirements. The Army has reviewed some TDA functions and identified a potential to reduce its TDA by up to 4,000 military positions as a result of its initial streamlining efforts. The Army is evaluating several options to consolidate its major commands, which could further reduce TDA requirements for active military personnel and introduce more efficient business practices. The Assistant Secretary’s office is also increasing its review of major commands’ requirements determination processes. Recommendations
To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the institutional Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue and ensure action is taken and closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event that these savings do not materialize. A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be Possible in the Future
Reducing active Army support forces does not appear feasible now based on TAA 2003 results, which show that the Army cannot meet its early deployment needs. Conclusions
OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with detailed analysis. However, given the risks the Army has accepted in its active support forces, we do not believe it is feasible for the Army to reduce its active support forces at this time. The Quadrennial Defense Review provides an opportunity for such new concepts to be considered. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed how the Army determines its support force requirements, and the results of its most recent process for allocating support forces, known as Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2003.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) it does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support force at this time, but a smaller active combat force and institutional force may be possible in the future; (2) a smaller active support force today would certainly increase the Army's risk of carrying out current defense policy; (3) current initiatives being explored by the Army regarding its institutional force could lead to greater efficiencies and thus a smaller active force; (4) improvements in the requirements determination process for both support forces and institutional forces could provide greater assurance that the size and composition of the Army is appropriate to meet war-fighting needs; (5) on the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy sufficient support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) with moderate risk; (6) because it lacks adequate active support forces and must rely on reserve forces that take more time to be readied to deploy, an estimated 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days would arrive late; (7) support forces needed for the second conflict would consist of only 12 percent active forces; (8) high reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or if mobilization is delayed; (9) existing active support units are short another 19,200 required positions and some required support units exist only on paper; (10) TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army's risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003; (11) the Army used many favorable assumptions that, although consistent with defense guidance, understated risk; (12) the Army's recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army by identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient business practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions that the Army plans to use to offset active support shortfalls; (13) the Army may reduce the number of major commands, which could result in some additional force savings in the future; (14) however, the Army's efforts to make its institutional force more efficient and potentially smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its process to determine institutional force requirements; (15) GAO's analysis indicates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not supported its proposal to reduce the active Army to 475,000 by 1999 with sound analysis; and (16) DOD has an opportunity to explore these and other alternatives during its Quadrennial Defense Review. |
gao_GAO-11-166 | gao_GAO-11-166_0 | Near the end of the same fiscal year, OHS awarded the balance of all funds for the final, second fiscal year of the expansion grants. Grantees Report Expanding Program Options, Staff, and Enrollment, but Enrollment Figures May Be Unreliable
Grantees Expanded Program Options and Staff to Serve More Children and Families, Although Teachers Hired Did Not Always Meet Qualification Requirements
Head Start and Early Head Start grantees received $744 million in first- year Recovery Act funding to expand services from about 890,100 to about an additional 60,600 children and families, often by initiating home-based services. FTE data provide insight into the use and impact of the Recovery Act funds, but recipient reports cover only direct jobs funded by the Recovery Act. Apart from challenges in expanding enrollment, differences in grantees’ interpretation of OHS’s enrollment policies suggest that reported enrollment figures may not always be reliable. Grantees use different interpretations of enrollment for two reasons. Because OHS has not established a consistent definition for enrollment reporting and does not verify during routine monitoring how grantees are reporting enrollment, the grantee-reported enrollment numbers may be an unreliable measure of grantee performance. Following Low Expenditure Rates in the First Year, Mixed Messages from OHS about Spending Policy Led to Varied Spending Practices
Delays, Facilities Issues, and Other Challenges Slowed Expenditure Rates
By the end of the first year of Recovery Act funding, expansion grantees had expended at least 60 percent of awards, and about 1 month later, grantees had expended about 70 percent (see figure 6), using a conservative estimate, which is explained below. However, regional offices did not consistently communicate a clear policy for Recovery Act funds. Grantees’ uncertainty about whether to “use or lose” Recovery Act grant funds contributed to varied spending practices that may not always have targeted expansion funds toward meeting programs’ highest current priorities. OHS Hired a Contractor to Both Prepare for and Conduct On-Site Reviews, but Has Not Incorporated Some Risk Indicators in Planning for Reviews
OHS Has Contracted to Help Prepare for and Conduct On-Site Reviews
As required by the Head Start Act, OHS plans to conduct “1-year” monitoring visits to 626 Early Head Start expansion grantees by expanding its use of an existing contractor. HHS’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified some financial management risks among grantees, including a few that received Recovery Act expansion grants. OHS plans to scope and staff its 1-year reviews of Recovery Act grantees primarily according to their prior experience with Head Start and Early Head Start and whether the grantees have recently received a triennial review. HHS and contractor officials have stated that all monitoring visits to new grantees will be implemented as “surprise” visits in response to GAO findings of fraudulent enrollment and attendance and enrollment discrepancies among some Head Start grantees as reported in May 2010. These efforts include initial on-site visits and reviewing grantee reports. For example, we continued to find a small number of reports for which there were potential linkage issues across quarters. As part of our additional analysis, we found that a previously identified concern with FTE calculations for Head Start reports is being addressed. On September 24, 2010, OMB issued updated guidance to federal agencies and recipients that included guidance on, among other topics, improving the transparency of narrative descriptions in recipient reporting. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We took a number of steps to address our objectives, which were to determine (1) how Head Start and Early Head Start grantees have used American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds, including expanding enrollment; (2) what challenges grantees have encountered in spending Recovery Act funds; (3) how the Office of Head Start (OHS) has monitored the use of Recovery Act funds; and (4) how the quality of jobs data reported by Recovery Act recipients, particularly Head Start grantees, has changed over time. The recipient reporting section of this report responds to the Recovery Act’s mandate that we comment on the estimates of jobs created or retained by direct recipients of Recovery Act funds. Due to the limited number of recipients reviewed and the judgmental nature of the selection, GAO’s full- time equivalent findings are limited to those Head Start programs and time periods examined and are not generalizable to any other program’s FTE reporting..
To update the status of open recommendations from previous bimonthly and recipient reporting reviews, we obtained information from agency officials on actions taken in response to the recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report responds to two mandates for GAO under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). First, it is the latest report on the uses of and accountability for Recovery Act funds in selected states and localities. Second, it comments on recipients' reports of the jobs created and retained. The Recovery Act provided $2.1 billion for Head Start and Early Head Start, primarily to expand services. GAO addressed four questions: (1) How have Head Start and Early Head Start grantees used Recovery Act funds, including for expanding enrollment? (2) What challenges have grantees encountered in spending Recovery Act funds? (3) How has the Office of Head Start (OHS) monitored the use of Recovery Act funds? (4) How has the quality of jobs data reported by Recovery Act recipients, particularly Head Start grantees, changed over time? In this report, GAO also updates the status of open recommendations from previous bimonthly and recipient reporting reviews. To address these questions, GAO interviewed grantees, analyzed federal agency and recipient reported data, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
Grantees reported using Recovery Act funds to expand enrollment and staff in a variety of ways, but new enrollment was lower than anticipated and reported enrollment numbers may not always be reliable. Grantees received funds to increase enrollment from about 890,100 to an additional 60,600; reported enrollment increased by 55,100 by the end of September 2010. Grantees GAO interviewed used different definitions of "enrollment," which OHS does not verify, introducing some unreliability in reporting. Grantees nationwide reported adding significant numbers of staff, but the portion of teachers who met recently increased standards slightly declined. Grantees experienced challenges in spending first-year Recovery Act funds, including delays in receiving grants and preparing facilities for expanded services, and received mixed messages about what to do with unobligated funds. By the end of the first year of Recovery Act funding, expansion grantees had expended at least 60 percent of their awards. Also, more than half of the grantees GAO interviewed said they were unclear about the policy regarding unobligated first-year funds. Because OHS did not clearly communicate its policy to regional offices, grantees adopted varied spending practices that may not always have directed expansion funds toward programs' highest, current priorities. OHS has engaged a contractor to conduct the large volume of monitoring visits required 1 year after expanded operations begin, but has not always incorporated some risk indicators in planning reviews. OHS has also been conducting other monitoring efforts, including mandatory 1-year visits for Early Head Start expansion grantees. These 1-year reviews include additional coverage of grantee governance and financial management. In response to prior GAO findings of fraudulent enrollment and attendance and enrollment discrepancies among some Head Start grantees, all monitoring visits to new grantees will be implemented as "surprise" visits. A few grantees awarded expansion funds had been earlier identified as high risk by their regional offices, and the HHS Inspector General identified several financial management deficiencies among four of the expansion grantees it reviewed. However, information on identified risks was not always available to OHS reviewers. OHS plans to scope and staff its 1-year reviews of Recovery Act grantees based primarily on their prior experience with Head Start and Early Head Start and whether the grantees have recently received a triennial review. GAO's analysis of the data reported by recipients in Recovery.gov, including jobs funded, shows results similar to previous reporting periods. For example, GAO continued to see a small number of reports for which data issues could prevent linking related reports across quarters. Analysis of Head Start recipient data showed that an earlier concern with calculating full-time equivalent jobs is being addressed. Further, in response to September 2010 Office of Management and Budget guidance on transparency of narrative descriptions, OHS reported that additional agency reviews resulted in recipients clarifying their reports.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends OHS verify the definition of enrollment, clearly communicate it to grantees along with policies for extending the use of Recovery Act funds, and incorporate known risks into review planning. HHS generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-114 | gao_GAO-06-114_0 | More than 200 Federal Education Programs Are Designed to Increase the Numbers of Students and Graduates or Improve Educational Programs in STEM Fields, but Most Have Not Been Evaluated
Officials from 13 federal civilian agencies reported having 207 education programs funded in fiscal year 2004 that were specifically established to increase the numbers of students and graduates pursuing STEM degrees and occupations, or improve educational programs in STEM fields, but they reported little about the effectiveness of these programs. These 13 federal agencies reported spending about $2.8 billion for their STEM education programs. Agency Officials Reported That Evaluations Were Completed or Under Way for About Half of the Federal Programs
Evaluations had been completed or were under way for about half of the STEM education programs. Numbers of Students, Graduates, and Employees in STEM Fields Generally Increased, but Percentage Changes Varied
While the total numbers of students, graduates, and employees have increased in STEM fields, percentage changes for women, minorities, and international students varied during the periods reviewed. The increase in the percentage of students in STEM fields was greater than the increase in non-STEM fields, but the change in percentage of graduates in STEM fields was less than the percentage change in non-STEM fields. Further, changes in the percentages of minority students varied by race or ethnic group, international graduates continued to earn about a third or more of the advanced degrees in three STEM fields, and there was no statistically significant change in the percentage of women employees. From academic year 1994-1995 to academic year 2002-2003, the percentage of graduates with STEM degrees decreased from 32 percent to 28 percent of total graduates. Table 16 shows the numbers and percentages of men and women employed in the STEM fields for calendar years 1994 and 2003. Specifically, university officials said and researchers reported that the quality of teachers in kindergarten through 12th grades and the levels of mathematics and science courses completed during high school affected students’ success in and decisions about STEM fields. International students’ decisions about participating in STEM education and occupations were affected by opportunities outside the United States and the visa process. However, before making changes, it is important to know the extent to which existing STEM education programs are appropriately targeted and making the best use of available federal resources. In commenting on a draft of this report, Commerce, HHS, and NSTC commended GAO for this work. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
The objectives of our study were to determine (1) the number of federal civilian education programs funded in fiscal year 2004 that were specifically designed to increase the number of students and graduates pursuing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) degrees and occupations, or improve educational programs in STEM fields, and what agencies report about their effectiveness; (2) how the numbers, percentages, and characteristics of students, graduates, and employees in STEM fields have changed over the years; and (3) factors cited by educators and others as influencing people’s decisions about pursuing STEM degrees and occupations, and suggestions to encourage greater participation in STEM fields. Also participating were the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the National Science Foundation. We also interviewed officials from the National Science and Technology Council to discuss coordination efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has long been known as a world leader in scientific and technological innovation. To help maintain this advantage, the federal government has spent billions of dollars on education programs in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields for many years. However, concerns have been raised about the nation's ability to maintain its global technological competitive advantage in the future. This report presents information on (1) the number of federal programs funded in fiscal year 2004 that were designed to increase the number of students and graduates pursuing STEM degrees and occupations or improve educational programs in STEM fields, and what agencies report about their effectiveness; (2) how the numbers, percentages, and characteristics of students, graduates, and employees in STEM fields have changed over the years; and (3) factors cited by educators and others as affecting students' decisions about pursing STEM degrees and occupations, and suggestions that have been made to encourage more participation. GAO received written and/or technical comments from several agencies. While one agency, the National Science Foundation, raised several questions about the findings, the others generally agreed with the findings and conclusion and several agencies commended GAO for this work.
What GAO Found
Officials from 13 federal civilian agencies reported spending about $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2004 for 207 education programs designed to increase the numbers of students and graduates or improve educational programs in STEM fields, but agencies reported little about their effectiveness. The National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation had most of the programs and spent most of the funds. Officials also reported that evaluations were completed or under way for about half of the programs. While the total numbers of students, graduates, and employees in STEM fields increased, changes in the numbers and percentages of women, minorities, and international students varied during the periods reviewed. From academic year 1995-1996 to 2003-2004, the percentage of students in STEM fields increased from 21 to 23 percent. Changes in the percentages of domestic minority students varied by group. From academic year 1994-1995 to 2002-2003, the number of graduates in STEM fields increased 8 percent, but this was less than the 30 percent increase in graduates in non-STEM fields. International graduates continued to earn about one-third or more of the advanced degrees in three STEM fields. Between calendar years 1994 and 2003, employment in STEM fields increased 23 percent compared to 17 percent in non-STEM fields, and there was no statistically significant change in the percentage of women employees. Educators and others cited several factors that affected students' decisions about pursuing STEM degrees and occupations, and made suggestions to encourage more participation. They said teacher quality at the kindergarten to 12th grades, the mathematics and science courses completed in high school, and a mentor, especially for women and minorities, influenced domestic students' decisions. Also, these sources said that opportunities outside the United States and the visa process affected international students' decisions. To encourage more participation in STEM fields, educators and others made several suggestions. But before adopting any of them, it is important to know the extent to which existing STEM education programs are appropriately targeted and making the best use of available federal resources. |
gao_GAO-08-133T | gao_GAO-08-133T_0 | Ensuring that only workers who are not known to pose a terrorism security risk are allowed unescorted access to secure areas is important in helping to prevent an attack. In October 2006, the SAFE Port Act was enacted and required, among other things, the issuance of regulations to begin implementing the TWIC program and issuing TWIC cards to workers at the 10 highest-risk ports by July 1, 2007, conduct a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies in the maritime environment, issue regulations requiring TWIC card readers based on the findings of the pilot, and periodically report to Congress on the status of the program. TSA Has Made Progress Since September 2006 in Implementing the TWIC Program and Addressing GAO Recommendations
Since we reported on the TWIC program in September 2006, TSA has made progress in implementing the program. Although we have not yet independently assessed the effectiveness of these efforts, TSA has taken actions to address legislative requirements to implement and test the program and our recommendations regarding conducting additional systems testing to ensure that TWIC technologies work effectively, strengthening contractor oversight, and improving communication and coordination efforts with maritime stakeholders. In January 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a TWIC rule that sets forth the requirements for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards to workers in the maritime sector, and awarded a $70 million contract for enrolling workers in the TWIC program. However, TSA recently announced that this testing is complete, and began enrolling and issuing TWIC cards to workers at the port of Wilmington, Delaware on October 16, 2007. TSA also plans to begin enrolling workers at 11 additional ports by November 2007. TSA and Industry Stakeholders Will Need to Address Challenges to Ensure the TWIC Program Is Implemented Successfully
As we reported in September 2006 and April 2007, TSA and maritime industry stakeholders will need to address several challenges to help ensure that the TWIC program will be implemented successfully. As we reported in September 2006, TSA and its enrollment contractor must transition from testing of the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,200 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels. In addition, maritime stakeholders with whom we spoke in September and October 2007 identified the need for TSA and its enrollment contractor to educate workers on the new TWIC requirements, ensure that the contractor conducts enrollments in a timely manner, and process numerous background checks, appeals, and waiver applications. Furthermore, TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure that TWIC access control technologies work effectively in the maritime environment, will be compatible with TWIC cards that will be issued soon, and balance security requirements while facilitating maritime commerce. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to help ensure that only workers who are not known to pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of the nation's transportation facilities. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2006 report on the TWIC program, and interviews with TSA and maritime industry officials conducted in September and October 2007 to obtain updates on the TWIC program. Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) the progress TSA has made since September 2006 in implementing the TWIC program and addressing GAO recommendations; and (2) some of the remaining challenges that TSA and the maritime industry must overcome to ensure the successful implementation of the program.
What GAO Found
Since GAO reported on TWIC in September 2006, TSA has made progress in implementing the program. Although GAO has not yet independently assessed the effectiveness of these efforts, TSA has taken actions to address legislative requirements to implement and test the program as well as address GAO's recommendations related to conducting additional systems testing, strengthening contractor oversight, and improving coordination with stakeholders. Specifically, TSA has issued a rule in January 2007 that sets forth the requirements for enrolling maritime workers in the TWIC program and issuing cards to these workers, and awarded a $70 million dollar contract to begin enrolling workers; reported conducting performance testing of the technologies that will be used to enroll workers in the TWIC program to ensure that they work effectively before implementation; begun planning a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies at 5 maritime locations in accordance with the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act; begun enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at the port of Wilmington, Delaware on October 16, 2007, and plans to do so at 11 additional ports by November 2007; added additional staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract; and stated that they have taken actions to improve communication and coordination with maritime stakeholders. As TSA moves forward with TWIC, it and maritime industry stakeholders will be faced with addressing the following key challenges that can affect the programs' successful implementation. TSA and its contractor will need to transition from testing of the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,200 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels. TSA and its contractor will need to educate workers on new TWIC requirements, ensure that enrollments begin in a timely manner, and efficiently process background checks, appeals, and waivers. TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure that TWIC access control technologies work effectively in the maritime environment, and balance new security requirements while facilitating maritime commerce. |
gao_T-GGD-97-185 | gao_T-GGD-97-185_0 | H.R. 716 Provides a Tool but Not a Substitute for a Political Champion
The history of government reform has demonstrated that new policies, whether based in law or in administrative directives, are not self-implementing. H.R. 716 Would Establish a Flexible Implementation Structure
To implement their privatization initiatives, the governments we visited reported the need to establish an organizational and analytical structure. Implementation of H.R. 716 Would Be Helped by Integrating It With Agencies’ Strategic and Performance Planning Activities
The experiences of other governments as well as of major private firms indicate that, when the outsourcing of functions is contemplated, answers to fundamental questions about the purpose and mission of an organization should precede any major outsourcing activities. The Relationship of H.R. 716 to Other Relevant Laws Is Unclear
In our state and local work, we found that all five states and the city of Indianapolis used some combination of legislative changes and resource cuts as part of their privatization initiatives. These actions were taken to encourage greater use of privatization. Reliable and Complete Cost Information Needed for Privatization Decisions
In the governments we visited, reliable and complete cost data on government activities were deemed essential in assessing the overall performance of activities targeted for privatization, in supporting informed privatization decisions, and in making these decisions easier to implement and justify to potential critics. H.R. H.R. 716 Recognizes Federal Workforce Transition Needs
We found that governments we visited needed to develop strategies to help their workforces make the transition to a private-sector environment. Effective Monitoring and Oversight of Contractor Performance Are Essential
When a government’s direct role in the delivery of services is reduced through privatization, we found that, at least among the state and local governments we visited, the need for aggressive monitoring and oversight grew. The Freedom From Government Competition Act would redirect current policy, which does not now have the weight of legislative authority and significantly affect the operation and management of the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed H.R. 716, the Freedom From Government Competition Act, as a potential vehicle for competitive contracting, using the results of GAO's recent work on privatization initiatives at the state and local government levels.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of GAO's literature review, privatization experiences and lessons learned by state and city governments in implementing privatization efforts, the views of a panel of privatization experts, and GAO's work in Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Virginia, as well as the city of Indianapolis, GAO identified six lessons that were generally common to all six governments; (2) in general, the governments found that they needed to: (a) have committed political leaders to champion the privatization initiative; (b) establish an organizational and analytical structure to implement the initiative; (c) enact legislative changes and/or reduce resources available to government agencies to encourage greater use of privatization; (d) develop reliable and complete cost data on government activities to assess their performance, support informed privatization decisions, and make these decisions easier to implement and justify to potential critics; (e) develop strategies to help their workforces make the transition to a private-sector environment; and (f) enhance monitoring and oversight to evaluate compliance and performance and ensure that the government's interests are fully protected; (3) H.R. 716 provides a tool but not a substitute for a political champion; (4) H.R. 716 would establish a flexible implementation structure; (5) implementation of H.R. 716 would be helped by integrating it with agencies' strategic and performance planning activities; (6) incentives may be needed for implementing change; (7) the relationship of H.R. 716 to other relevant laws is unclear; (8) reliable and complete cost information is needed for privatization decisions; (9) H.R. 716 recognizes federal workforce transition needs; (10) effective monitoring and oversight of contractor performance are essential to successful privatization; and (11) the Freedom From Government Competition Act would redirect current policy, which does not now have the weight of legislative authority and significantly affect the operation and management of the federal government. |
gao_RCED-98-20 | gao_RCED-98-20_0 | NPGS’ major activities are (1) acquiring germplasm, (2) developing and documenting information on the germplasm in its collections, and (3) preserving the germplasm. NPGS is responsible for developing characterization information—data on traits such as plant structure and color that are little influenced by the environment. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We surveyed the members of the 40 CGCs for their views on the sufficiency of NPGS’ principal activities—acquiring germplasm to ensure the diversity of the collections in order to reduce crop vulnerability, developing and documenting information on germplasm, and preserving germplasm. Specifically, we surveyed the 680 members of the CGCs—including 38 additional experts identified by USDA. For the NPGS collections alone, just over half the CGCs reported that the genetic diversity of their NPGS collections is sufficient to reduce crop vulnerability. CGCs Believed That Germplasm Acquisition Should Be a Top Priority for NPGS
While over half the CGCs believed that the genetic diversity of their NPGS germplasm collections for their crops is sufficient, they all reported that it is moderately to extremely important to increase the diversity of their NPGS collections. Obsolete and current cultivars are sufficient for reducing the vulnerability of their crops, according to most CGCs. USDA’s Management of Quarantine Program Has Hampered Acquisition of Some Germplasm
A number of problems related primarily to USDA’s overall management of the germplasm quarantine program have hampered the program’s effectiveness and resulted in delays in the release of some germplasm. Many NPGS Germplasm Collections Lack Information Needed for Crop Breeding
According to most CGCs, NPGS collections for their crops lack sufficient information on germplasm traits to facilitate the germplasm’s use in crop breeding. 3.2.) Preservation Activities Have Not Kept Pace With Needs of the Collection
Preservation activities—including viability testing, germplasm regeneration, and secure, long-term backup storage of germplasm—have not kept pace with the preservation needs of the collections. First, only minimal viability testing—testing that determines the amount of live germplasm in a sample—has been conducted at some sites, including two plant introduction stations that account for over one-fourth of NPGS’ germplasm samples. Viability testing is needed to determine when germplasm should be reproduced to prevent the loss of the sample. Second, NPGS has significant backlogs for regenerating germplasm at all four plant introduction stations. Third, over one-third of NPGS’ germplasm is not backed up in NPGS’ National Seed Storage Laboratory (NSSL), which provides secure, long-term storage for the system. NPGS officials from two plant introduction stations told us that, generally, their sites’ germplasm that is low in viability or quantity should be regenerated within 2 to 5 years in order to minimize the loss of diversity in their collections over the long term. Several factors contribute to these backlogs. Thus, in case of a natural disaster, disease, or other catastrophe, both the active and backup samples could be destroyed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO surveyed the 680 members of the 40 crop germplasm committees (CGC) for their views on the sufficiency of the National Plant Germplasm System's (NPGS) principal activities focusing on: (1) acquiring germplasm to ensure the diversity of the collections in order to reduce crop vulnerability; (2) developing and documenting information on germplasm; and (3) preserving germplasm.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) just over half of the CGSs reported that the genetic diversity contained in NPGS' collections is sufficient to reduce the vulnerability of their crops; (2) considering both this collection and all other freely available collections, almost three-quarters of the committees said that the diversity in these collections is sufficient for reducing their crops' vulnerability; (3) at the same time, the committees identified several concerns affecting the diversity of their collections, and they ranked the acquisition of germplasm as the highest priority for the germplasm system if more funding becomes available; (4) current acquisition efforts are hindered by problems in obtaining germplasm from some countries and by the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) management of the quarantine system, which has contributed to the loss of germplasm and delays in its release for certain plants; (5) according to the crop committees, many of the system's collections lack sufficient information on germplasm traits to facilitate the germplasm's use in crop breeding; (6) officials of the germplasm system acknowledged that some information on plant traits, such as resistance to disease or plant structure, has not been developed because it is considered to be a lower priority than preserving germplasm; in other instances, the information has been developed by scientists outside of the system and has not been provided for entry into the database; (7) preservation activities--viability testing, regeneration, and the long-term backup storage of germplasm--have not kept pace with the preservation needs of the collections; (8) only minimal viability testing--testing the seeds in a sample to determine how many are alive in order to prevent the loss of the sample--has occurred at two of four major locations; (9) in addition, the system has significant backlogs for regenerating (that is, replenishing) germplasm at the four major locations; and (10) over one-third of the system's germplasm is not stored in the system's secure, long-term storage facility, thereby increasing the risk that samples located around the nation could be lost through environmental damage or other catastrophes. |
gao_GAO-12-852 | gao_GAO-12-852_0 | HSPD-7 designated DHS as the agency responsible for coordinating the nation’s efforts to protect critical infrastructure. Additionally, the NIPP sector partnership model calls on FPS to form and chair a government coordinating council comprised of representatives from different levels of government to share activities, policy, and FPS also participates in or interacts with the following communications.cross-sector councils, which facilitate relationships within and among the 18 sectors:
The State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC), which coordinates with non-federal government organizations across all 18 sectors; the Regional Consortium Coordinating Council, which represents a variety of distinct collaborative efforts between state, local, and private sector partners focused on critical infrastructure found in multistate regions or within a given city; the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership Council, which is a DHS-chaired council that consists of federal department and agency representatives from lead agencies named in HSPD-7; and the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, which is a partnership between government and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure to effectively coordinate federal protective programs. FPS Is Not Effectively Leading the Sector
FPS’s leadership has not resulted in implementation of a risk management approach for the sector, as called for under the NIPP framework. However, FPS officials said that they have not identified or obtained data on federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government facilities for the sector. The plan and annual reports provide information about the principles of threat, vulnerability, and consequence as well as discuss different types of risks and threats faced by government facilities, but no standardized tool for performing risk assessments exists at the federal level, much less the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels. FPS Has Not Built Effective Partnerships across Different Levels of Government
To effectively implement the NIPP and achieve the goals of the sector, partnerships are essential. Consequently, this key coordination goal of the 2010 plan has not been met, and as a result, FPS is limited in its ability, as lead agency for the sector, to productively contribute to the larger DHS effort to prioritize and safeguard the nation’s most critical infrastructure. Furthermore, while FPS chairs the Council, the principle mechanism for engaging partners, FPS has not involved the full spectrum of sector partners. Officials from all 5 state and local government and non-governmental organizations told us that they were either unaware or did not consider themselves to be members of the Council. FPS’s Capacity to Lead the Sector Hindered by Its Fee Structure and Lack of Action Plan
FPS has identified its limited resources as a significant challenge to leading a sector as large and diverse as the government facilities sector. The 2010 plan states that the sector includes more than 900,000 federal assets, as well as assets from 56 states and territories; more than 3,000 counties; 17,000 local governments; and 564 federally recognized tribal nations. We have previously reported that FPS’s involvement in homeland security activities not directly related to facility protection is inconsistent with a requirement in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that FPS use funding from the fees it collects solely for the protection of federal government buildings and grounds. Notwithstanding issues related to how its fees may be used, FPS has not fully assessed the resource requirements for serving as the lead sector agency, because it has not completed an action plan or cost estimate for carrying out the 2010 plan. Such changes may affect FPS’s workload and resources as the lead agency. Conclusions
FPS is responsible for leading efforts to identify, prioritize, and protect critical government facilities across all levels of government under the NIPP. An action plan could serve as a valuable tool for FPS and DHS to identify, in tandem with any structural changes, priorities that can be feasibly achieved and the associated resource requirements given FPS’s fee-based revenue structure. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance the effectiveness of the government facilities sector, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS, in partnership with IP and Council members, to develop and publish an action plan that identifies sector priorities and the resources required to carry out these priorities. With consideration of FPS’s resource constraints, this plan should address FPS’s limited progress with implementing a risk management approach and developing effective partnerships within the sector. The plan should address, at a minimum, steps needed to: 1. develop appropriate data on critical government facilities; 2. develop or coordinate a sector-wide risk assessment; 3. identify effective metrics and performance data to track progress toward the sector’s strategic goals; and 4. increase the participation of and define the roles of non-federal Council members. DHS concurred with our recommendation to develop and publish an action plan for the sector. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) leadership of the government facilities sector, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and the 2010 Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan (the 2010 plan). | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. government facilities have been the target of foreign and domestic terrorists. Government facilities are one of 18 critical infrastructure sectors designated under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of critical infrastructure that, if destroyed, could have a debilitating impact on governance, the economy, national morale, or public health and safety. DHS defines critical infrastructure sector responsibilities in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is the lead agency for the government facilities sector. As such, FPS is to develop and implement a government facilities sector-specific plan, which was first issued in 2007 and updated in 2010, in coordination with governmental partners. In this report, GAO assesses FPSs efforts as the lead agency for the government facilities sector. To do this, GAO reviewed HSPD-7, the NIPP, the 2010 plan and other related documents to compare FPSs actions and the goals for the sector. GAO also interviewed DHS agency officials and 16 selected sector partners about activities for, and coordination with, the sector.
What GAO Found
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has not been effective as the lead agency for the government facilities sector, which includes facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level. Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the 2010 sector-specific plan, FPS is responsible for establishing a risk management approach and developing effective partnerships for the sector. However, FPS has not implemented a risk management approach. According to FPS, it has not identified or obtained data on facilities at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial level, which are fundamental for employing a risk management approach. In addition, despite providing information on the principles of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, FPS has not coordinated or assessed risk across government facilities, another key element of risk management. FPS also lacks effective metrics and performance data to track progress toward implementing a risk management approach and for the overall resilience or protection of government facilities. Consequently, FPS does not have a risk management approach for prioritizing and safeguarding critical government facilities. Furthermore, FPS has not built effective partnerships across different levels of government. While FPS chairs the Government Coordinating Council (the Council)a mechanism intended to help share activities and policy across different levels of governmentthe Councils membership lacks a full spectrum of sector partners, particularly non-federal. All five state and local government and non-governmental members of the Council that GAO contacted were unaware of, or did not consider themselves to be part of, the Council. FPS also has not leveraged the State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, an existing mechanism to coordinate with non-federal government organizations, although FPS officials reported recent efforts aimed at enhancing this partnership.
As the lead agency for the sector, FPS faces challenges associated with funding and its lack of an action plan. According to FPS officials, FPS has no dedicated line of funding for its activities as the lead agency and resource constraints hinder FPSs capacity to lead this large and diverse sector, which is comprised of more than 900,000 federal assets, as well as assets from 56 states and territories; over 3,000 counties; 17,000 local governments; and 564 federally recognized tribal nations. FPSs use of fee-based revenue to perform homeland security activities not directly related to federal facility protection is inconsistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002. FPS does not have a full understanding of the resource requirements for serving as the lead agency, because it has not completed a cost estimate or an action plan to guide implementation of the 2010 plan. According to DHS officials, HSPD-7 will be updated, which may result in structural changes to the sector that could affect the lead agencys responsibilities and available resources. An action plan could serve as a valuable tool for FPS and DHS to identify priorities that can be feasibly achieved and the resources required, in tandem with any potential structural changes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct FPS, in partnership with others, to develop and publish an action plan that identifies sector priorities and resource requirements, and addresses steps needed to implement a risk management approach and develop effective partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_RCED-96-202 | gao_RCED-96-202_0 | It does not have a national inventory of internal threats that integrates information it already has, and many of its individual units do not have a readily available database on the extent and severity of the threats arising within their borders. Threats Identified by Managers at the Eight Parks We Reviewed
At the eight parks studied, the managers identified 127 internal threats that directly affected natural and cultural resources. Most of these threats fell into one of five broad categories: the impact of private inholdings or commercial development within the parks, the results of encroachment by nonnative wildlife or plants, the damage caused by illegal activities, the adverse effects of normal visits to the parks, and the unintended adverse effects of the agency’s or park managers’ actions (see fig. 1). Overall, the park managers we visited said that the most serious threats facing the parks were shortages in staffing, funding, and resource knowledge. 3). 5). Threats Have Damaged Cultural Resources More Permanently Than Natural Resources
Park managers estimated that about 82 percent of the direct threats they identified in the eight parks we reviewed have caused more than minor damage to the parks’ resources. 6 and 7.) Scientific research will generally provide more concrete evidence identifying the number and types of threats, the types and relative severity of damage, and any trends in the severity of the threat. They believed that about 61 percent of the threats had worsened during the past decade, 27 percent were about the same, and only 11 percent had grown less severe (see fig. At Arches National Park, actions ranged from taking steps to remediate some threats to studying how to deal with others. Without systemwide data on these threats to the parks’ resources, the Park Service is not fully equipped to meet its mission of preserving and protecting these resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed internal threats to the national parks' resources, focusing on the: (1) National Park Service's (NPS) information on the number and types of internal threats; (2) damage these threats have caused; (3) change in the severity of these threats over the past decade; and (4) NPS actions to mitigate these threats.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) because NPS does not have a national inventory of internal threats to the park system, it is not fully equipped to meet its mission of preserving and protecting park resources; (2) park managers at the eight parks studied have identified 127 internal threats to their parks' natural and cultural resources; (3) most of these threats are due to the impact of private inholdings or commercial development within the parks, the impact of nonnative wildlife or plants, damage caused by illegal activities, increased visitation, and unintended adverse effects of management actions; (4) park managers believe the parks' most serious threats are caused by shortages in staffing, funding, and resource knowledge; (5) 82 percent of the internal threats have already caused more than minor damage, and cultural or archeological resources have suffered more permanent damage than natural resources in many parks; (6) 61 percent of internal threats, particularly those from increased visitation and serious fires, have worsened over the past decade, 27 percent have stayed about the same, and 11 percent have diminished; (7) park managers lack baseline data needed to judge trends in the severity of internal threats; and (8) some parks are closing trails to reduce erosion, installing more rugged equipment to reduce vandalism, revoking uncooperative operators' permits, and posting signs to inform visitors of the damage from their inappropriate activities. |
gao_GAO-06-491 | gao_GAO-06-491_0 | Figure 1 illustrates the major services provided by the CSE program. The CSE program is financed by federal and state funds. Generally, federal matching funds reimburse state agencies 66 percent of the administrative costs for their CSE programs. Child support collections for families that receive benefits from the TANF and Foster Care programs are deducted from the total federal and state expenditures and paid to these programs as reimbursements. Net Federal Expenditures, Collections, and the Nationwide Cost- Effectiveness Ratio Increased
Overall from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, total net federal expenditures for administrative costs increased about 23 percent. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, total net federal expenditures increased from about $2.2 billion to nearly $2.8 billion. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, total collections increased about 12 percent from $19 billion to about $22 billion. All State Agencies Reported That Personnel Costs Were a Major Contributor to Their Administrative Costs, and Most State Agencies Also Cited Cooperative Agreements, Automated Data Systems, and Contracts as Major Costs
All 49 state agencies cited personnel costs as one of their largest cost categories during fiscal years 2002 to 2004. OCSE officials also stated that OCSE has not reviewed state agencies’ FTEs or developed guidelines to help state agencies manage the number of FTEs and the related costs. State Agencies Reported Implementing Cost- Saving Initiatives, and While OCSE Has Helped State Agencies, It Has Not Conducted Administrative Cost Audits in Most States
State agencies reported they had implemented cost-saving initiatives identified in our survey, and while OCSE has provided assistance to help state agencies, it has not conducted administrative cost audits in most states to help ensure that federal funds have been used appropriately. However, OCSE has completed a limited number of administrative cost audits from March 2004 to March 2006, even though all of the completed audits raised questions about inappropriate expenditures. State agencies reported savings and other benefits after implementing the 10 initiatives listed in our survey. Nonetheless, most of the completed and planned audits are focused on incentive payment data and indicators, and although OCSE expects to have more resources available to conduct audits, it does not plan to use these resources to conduct more administrative cost audits. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Directors of state child support enforcement agencies in the states we visited, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) how total net federal expenditures for administrative costs have changed from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, (2) the categories of cost that have contributed most to federal expenditures for administrative costs in recent years, and (3) steps state agencies have taken to manage costs and steps the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) has taken to help state agencies and to ensure federal funds have been used appropriately. We (1) analyzed program data for all 54 state agencies for fiscal years 2000 to 2004; (2) conducted a survey of state agencies; (3) visited 6 state agencies; (4) interviewed OCSE and state agency officials as well as child support experts; and (5) reviewed relevant laws and regulations, pertinent reports and studies, and applicable OCSE policy and guidance documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established federal standards for the child support enforcement program (CSE) in 1975. State agencies administer the program and the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) oversees it. The CSE program provides several services, including collecting child support payments from noncustodial parents--those who are not the primary caregivers--and distributing these payments to families. Generally, the federal government reimburses state agencies 66 percent of their costs for administering the CSE program. GAO determined (1) how total net federal expenditures for administrative costs changed from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004; (2) the categories of costs that contributed most to administrative costs in recent years; and (3) steps state agencies have taken to manage costs, and steps OCSE has taken to help state agencies and ensure federal funds have been used appropriately. GAO analyzed program data, surveyed all 54 state agencies and visited 6, interviewed program officials, and reviewed laws, policies, and reports.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2004, total net federal expenditures for administrative costs (the cost after deducting child support collections for families receiving benefits from other government programs) increased by about 23 percent. After adjusting for inflation, total net federal expenditures increased from about $2.2 billion to $2.8 billion. Also, during this period, collections increased by about 12 percent from about $19 billion to $22 billion, and the program's cost effectiveness measure (the ratio of collections to total administrative expenditures) increased about 4 percent. Personnel costs were cited as a major contributor to federal expenditures for administrative costs in fiscal years 2002 to 2004 by the 49 state agencies that responded to the relevant question in our survey. Most state agencies also cited as major costs cooperative agreements under which staff from other state agencies are paid to perform CSE program duties, automated data systems, and contracts with private firms. Several of these categories involve labor costs, and from fiscal years 2000 to 2004, the number of full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees funded by the CSE program increased about 2,200. Yet, OCSE has not developed guidelines to help state agencies manage their FTEs and related labor costs. State agencies reported implementing cost-saving initiatives, and while OCSE has helped state agencies manage costs, it has conducted a limited number of administrative cost audits to help ensure the appropriate use of federal funds. At least one-half of the state agencies reported implementing 7 of the 10 cost-saving initiatives listed in our survey, and many reported cost savings. To help state agencies manage their programs, OCSE issued guidance, created federal/state work groups, and sponsored conferences. OCSE is required to conduct audits of state agencies' administrative costs, and from March 2004 to March 2006, OCSE issued eight administrative cost audit reports. All of these audit reports raised questions about inappropriate expenditures. Although OCSE expects to have more resources available to conduct audits, it does not plan to use these resources to conduct more administrative cost audits. |
gao_GAO-03-460 | gao_GAO-03-460_0 | Emergency Department Crowding Is More Pronounced in Some Hospitals and Certain Types of Communities
Although most emergency departments across the country reported some degree of crowding on one or more of the three indicators, the problem is much more pronounced in some hospitals than in others. In addition, hospitals in the largest metropolitan areas (those with populations of 2.5 million or more), communities with high population growth, and communities with above average percentages of people without health insurance had higher levels of crowding. Of the 248 MSAs for which data were available, 171 (69 percent) had no hospitals reporting being on diversion more than 10 percent of the time. Availability of Inpatient Beds for Emergency Patients Cited as a Key Factor Contributing to Crowding, but Other Factors Also Contribute
No single factor stands out as the reason why crowding occurs. In both the opinion of hospitals we surveyed and of hospital officials we interviewed, the factor most commonly associated with crowding was the inability to transfer emergency patients to inpatient beds once decisions had been made to admit them as hospital patients rather than to release them after treatment. department patients to building new, larger emergency departments. In these locations, diversion systems are used to provide a structure to systematically try to spread the ambulance volume during times of peak demand by redirecting ambulances to hospitals that are presumably less crowded. It is clear that, as a key part of the health care safety net, emergency departments in many of the nation’s largest communities are under strain. To address communitywide factors contributing to crowding, hospitals may need to work collaboratively with other facilities in their communities. Comments from External Reviewers
Representatives from the American College of Emergency Physicians and American Hospital Association and an independent reviewer provided comments on a draft of this report. This reviewer and the American Hospital Association provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Each hospital was asked to report for the emergency department located at its main campus. The survey included questions on the emergency department, such as (1) whether the hospital went on diversion and, if so, the number of hours on diversion in the hospital’s fiscal year 2001, (2) whether the hospital boarded patients for 2 hours or more in the past 12 months and, if so, the percentage of boarded patients who boarded 2 hours or more and the average number of hours boarded, and (3) the number of emergency department visits and the number of patients who left after triage but before a medical evaluation in the hospital’s fiscal year 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospital emergency departments are a major part of the nation's health care safety net. Emergency departments report being under increasing pressure, with the number of visits nationwide increasing from an estimated 95 million in 1997 to an estimated 108 million in 2000. GAO was asked to provide information on emergency department crowding, including the extent hospitals located in metropolitan areas are experiencing crowding, the factors contributing to crowding, and the actions hospitals and communities have taken to address crowding. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed over 2,000 hospitals and about 74 percent responded. The survey collected information on crowding, such as data on diversion--that is, the extent to which hospitals asked ambulances that would normally bring patients to their hospitals to go instead to other hospitals that were presumably less crowded.
What GAO Found
While many emergency departments across the country reported some degree of crowding, the problem is more pronounced in certain hospitals and communities. For example, while 2 of every 3 hospitals reported asking ambulances to be diverted to other hospitals at some point in fiscal year 2001, a smaller portion--about 1 of every 10--reported being on diversion status for more than 20 percent of the year. Hospitals in areas with larger populations, areas with high population growth in recent years, and areas with higher-than-average percentages of people without health insurance reported higher levels of crowding. While no single factor stands out as the reason why crowding occurs, GAO found the factor most commonly associated with crowding was the inability to transfer emergency patients to inpatient beds once a decision had been made to admit them as hospital patients rather than to treat and release them. When patients "board" in the emergency department due to the inability to transfer them elsewhere, the space, staff, and other resources available to treat new emergency patients are diminished. Hospitals and communities reported a variety of actions to address crowding, including expanding their emergency departments and developing ways to transfer emergency patients to inpatient beds more efficiently. For the most part, these actions have not been extensively evaluated, so their effect is unknown. However, the widely varying characteristics between hospitals mean that no one approach is likely to emerge as a way to address this ongoing concern. Representatives from the American College of Emergency Physicians and the American Hospital Association and an independent reviewer provided comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-601T | gao_GAO-02-601T_0 | The issues currently being raised about the effectiveness of the accounting profession’s self-regulatory system are not unique to the collapse of Enron. Other business failures, restatements of financial statements, and the proliferation of pro forma earnings assertions over the past several years have called into question the effectiveness of the current system. In addressing these issues, proposals should consider whether overall the system creates the right incentives, transparency, and accountability, and operates proactively to protect the public interest. Specifically, we believe that the Congress should create an independent statutory federal government body to oversee financial audits of public companies. | What GAO Found
In the wake of the Enron collapse and the proliferation of earnings restatements and pro forma earnings assertions by other companies, questions are being raised about the soundness of private sector financial reporting, auditor independence, and corporate governance. In addressing these issues, the government's role could range from direct intervention to encouraging non-governmental and private-sector entities to adopt practices that would strengthen public confidence. GAO believes that Congress should consider a holistic approach that takes into account the many players and interrelated issues that brought about the Enron situation. |
gao_GAO-01-914 | gao_GAO-01-914_0 | Cleveland and Milwaukee Voucher Programs Have Similar Student and Private School Eligibility Criteria
In accordance with state laws and regulations for student and school participation in the Cleveland and Milwaukee voucher programs, both programs target students from low-income families residing within the city or school district. Participating private schools must be located within the city or school district, comply with state requirements for private schools—such as those covering health and safety—and randomly select students when applications exceed available slots. The research team reported that 70 percent of voucher families were headed by a single mother, compared to 62–65 percent for public school families. Minority Group Members Predominate in School Populations, but Whether Voucher Programs Have Changed Schools’ Racial Composition is Unclear
Some information about the racial and ethnic composition of Cleveland’s and Milwaukee’s public school and voucher student populations is available, but whether the composition has changed as a result of the voucher programs is unclear. States Fund Voucher Programs Differently and Spend Less on Each Voucher Student Than on Each Public School Student
Ohio and Wisconsin use different methods to fund their school voucher programs and spend less on each voucher student than on each public school student. Ohio funds the Cleveland voucher program with Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid moneys appropriated from the state’s general revenue funds and reduces the Cleveland school district’s state revenues by the amount of the voucher program appropriation. Contract Researchers Found Little or No Significant Improvement in Voucher Students’ Achievement, but Other Investigators Found Some Positive Effects
The contract researcher teams for Cleveland and Milwaukee found little or no statistically significant differences in voucher students’ achievement test scores compared to public school students, but other investigators found that voucher students did better in some subject areas tested. Fourth Year Report, The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Cleveland and Milwaukee school voucher programs, which provide money for low-income families to send their children to private schools.
What GAO Found
Both programs require participating private schools to be located within the city or the city's school district and to adhere to state standards for private schools, such as those covering health and safety. In both Cleveland and Milwaukee, voucher students were more likely than public school students to come from poorer families that were headed by a single parent. Some information about the racial and ethnic composition of Cleveland's and Milwaukee's public school and voucher students is available, but it is unclear whether the composition changed as a result of the voucher programs. Ohio and Wisconsin use different methods to provide state funds for the voucher programs and spend less on voucher students than on public school students. The Cleveland voucher program is funded with Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid funds up to a limit set by the Ohio Legislature. Wisconsin funds the Milwaukee voucher program with general state aid funds on the basis of number of students participating in the program in a given year. The contracted evaluations of voucher students' academic achievement in Cleveland and Milwaukee found little or no difference in voucher and public school students' performance, but other studies found that voucher students did better in some of the subject areas tested. |
gao_GAO-06-655 | gao_GAO-06-655_0 | To address the concerns raised in our February 13, 2006, testimony, we recommend that DHS and FEMA do the following: Establish an identity verification process for Individuals and Households Program (IHP) registrants applying via both the Internet and telephone, to provide reasonable assurance that disaster assistance payments are made only to qualified individuals. Within this process establish detailed criteria for registration and provide clear instructions to registrants on the identification information required, create a field within the registration that asks registrants to provide their name exactly as it appears on their Social Security Card in order to prevent name and Social Security Number (SSN) mismatches, fully field test the identity verification process prior to ensure that call center employees give real-time feedback to registrants on whether their identities have been validated, and establish a process that uses alternative means of identity verification to expeditiously handle legitimate applicants that are rejected by identity verification controls. Such duplicate payments include the payments made to IHP recipients who improperly received the $2,000 debit cards and an additional $2,000 EA check or Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) and the thousands of duplicate EA payments made to the same IHP registration number. The primary findings of our work relate to weak or nonexistent controls that leave the government vulnerable to substantial fraud and abuse in the IHP. However, we continue to believe that accepting registrations for individuals using invalid identity and damaged property information subjects the federal government to a high risk of fraud and abuse beyond EA payments. FEMA and DHS further noted that we made several references to isolated incidents where debit cards were used for purchases that did not appear to be for disaster needs, and FEMA questioned whether highlighting those examples was appropriate. We also clearly stated that over 60 percent of debit card transactions were used to obtain cash and could not be tracked further to identify the final use of the IHP funds. Testimony on FEMA’s Control Weaknesses over Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Highlights
A result of wdespred congressinaanpubinterein the federl respnse to hrranKtrina anRi, GAO cocted an aut of the Iua and Household Prom (IHP) under Comtroller Geerl of the United Ste tory authory. However, the manuarocess used to revew thee registrnsot revet EA and other payme from ing issued. Thousan of registranisused SSN, i.., used SSN tht were ever issued or elonged to deceased or other inuas. For exale, or visi to over 200 of the casaged roert in Texas and Louisiana howed tht least 80 of theroert were gus—inclingant lot anxisteapartmes. were in eed of helter. of the $5. FEMA Did Not Validate Identity of Registrants Who Applied for Assistance via Telephone
FEMA lemeted dffererocedre whe rocessingisaster registrns subtted via the Iteret and telehoe clls. Data Mining Indicates Potential Fraud and Abuse Beyond Our Case Studies
The cas we deed and reorted re ot isolted insance of oteial frauanabus. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) faced the challenge of providing assistance quickly while having sufficient controls to provide assurance that benefits were paid only to those eligible under the Individuals and Households Program (IHP). On February 13, 2006, GAO testified on the initial results of its ongoing work related to whether (1) controls are in place and operating effectively to limit assistance to qualified applicants, (2) indications exist of fraud and abuse in the application for and receipt of assistance payments, and (3) controls are in place and operating effectively over debit cards to prevent duplicate payments and improper usage.
What GAO Found
GAO identified significant flaws in the process for registering disaster victims that leave the federal government vulnerable to fraud and abuse of expedited assistance (EA) payments. For Internet applications, limited automated controls were in place to verify a registrant's identity. However, there was no independent verification of the identity of those who applied for disaster assistance via the telephone. GAO demonstrated the vulnerability inherent in the call-in applications by using falsified identities, bogus addresses, and fabricated disaster stories to register for IHP. FEMA's automated system frequently identified potentially fraudulent registrations, such as multiple registrations with identical social security numbers (SSN) but different addresses. However, the manual process used to review these flagged applications did not prevent EA and other payments from being issued. Other control weaknesses include the lack of any validation of damaged property addresses for both Internet and telephone registrations. Given these weak or nonexistent controls, it is not surprising that GAO's data mining and investigations showed substantial potential for fraud and abuse of EA. Thousands of registrants misused IHP by applying for assistance using SSNs that were never issued or belonged to deceased or other individuals. GAO's case study investigations of several hundred registrations also indicate the use of bogus damaged property addresses. Visits to over 200 of these damaged properties in Texas and Louisiana showed that at least 80 of these addresses were bogus--including vacant lots and nonexistent apartments. FEMA also made duplicate EA payments to about 5,000 of the nearly 11,000 debit card recipients--once through the distribution of debit cards and again by check or electronic funds transfer. In addition, while debit cards were used predominantly to obtain cash, food, clothing, and personal necessities, a small number were used for adult entertainment, bail bond services, and weapons purchase, which do not appear to be items or services required to satisfy disaster-related needs. |
gao_GAO-06-832 | gao_GAO-06-832_0 | Other measurable factors in our statistical model—gender, veteran’s status, race, English proficiency, age, disability status, school attendance (enrolled or not enrolled), employment status (full or part-time), and geography (state where employed)—had a more limited or almost no effect on the likelihood of Hispanics being in the federal workforce. The federal workforce contains a greater percentage of occupations that require higher levels of education than the CLF. In addition to federal government initiatives, Hispanic-serving organizations also have ongoing efforts to improve the educational attainment of Hispanics. EEOC and OPM Have Taken Steps in Their Oversight Roles to Address Hispanic Representation
In their respective oversight roles, both EEOC and OPM report representation levels of racial, ethnic, and gender groups overall and in subsets of the federal workforce and require that agencies conduct analyses of their own workforces. However, the benchmarks that EEOC, OPM, and agencies use to compare federal workforce representation levels to the CLF do not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens, and therefore do not identify how citizenship affects the pool of persons qualified to work for the federal government. Where differences in representation occur, such as within occupations or by grade, agencies are to determine if there are barriers to participation and, if so, develop strategies to address any barriers. OPM provides human resource guidance and resources to agencies to assist agencies in implementing these strategies. Upon completion of their degree program and SCEP requirements, agencies may noncompetitively convert participants to permanent employment. In partnership with vocational-technical schools, the program includes both on-the-job training and classroom education. OPM currently provides guidance to federal agencies on recruiting at colleges and universities. Such analyses could provide OPM with valuable information to help agencies maximize their use of these programs as part of their overall strategic workforce planning. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify and analyze the factors that are affecting Hispanic representation in the federal workforce, (2) examine the steps that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in their oversight roles, are taking related to Hispanic representation, and (3) illustrate the efforts within selected federal agencies related to Hispanic representation. In addition, we analyzed Hispanic representation in the federal workforce governmentwide (1) compared to the Civilian Labor Force (CLF), including and excluding noncitizens; (2) in federal occupations compared to similar occupations in the CLF; and (3) by pay plan/grade. We used logistic regression models to estimate likelihood of federal employment. The Effect of Citizenship on the Difference between Hispanics’ and Non- Hispanics’ Likelihood of Employment in the Federal Workforce versus the Nonfederal Workforce
We examined the effect of citizenship on the difference in the likelihood of Hispanics and non-Hispanics being employed in the federal workforce, relative to the nonfederal workforce, before examining the effect of all other factors because the federal government has a general policy and practice of restricting hiring to U.S. citizens and nationals. Effect of All Factors Considered Simultaneously on the Difference between Hispanics’ and Non- Hispanics’ Likelihood of Employment in the Federal Workforce versus the Nonfederal Workforce
When we estimated the difference in the likelihood of being in the federal workforce between Hispanics and non-Hispanics using a multivariate model that accounted for all of the factors simultaneously among citizens, we found that the odds of being a federal rather than a nonfederal employee were higher for Hispanic citizens than for non-Hispanic citizens, by a factor of 1.24. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hispanic representation in the federal workforce has historically been lower than in the Civilian Labor Force (CLF). Understanding factors affecting representation is important to developing and maintaining a high-quality and inclusive workforce. In this report, GAO identifies and analyzes factors affecting Hispanic representation in the federal workforce, examines oversight roles of EEOC and OPM, and provides illustrations of selected federal agencies' efforts with respect to Hispanic representation. GAO constructed a multivariate logistic regression model, with advice from experts, to determine how factors affected the likelihood of Hispanics and non-Hispanics being in the federal versus nonfederal workforce. GAO's analyses are not intended to and do not show the existence or absence of discrimination in the federal workforce.
What GAO Found
U.S. citizenship and educational attainment had the greatest effect, of the measurable factors we identified, on Hispanic representation in the federal workforce. Our statistical model showed that when accounting for citizenship, required for most federal employment, Hispanics were nearly as likely as non-Hispanics to be employed in the federal workforce, relative to the nonfederal workforce (the portion of the CLF excluding federal employees). In addition, the federal workforce has a greater proportion of occupations that require higher levels of education than the CLF. When we compared citizens with similar levels of education, Hispanics were more likely than non-Hispanics to be employed in the federal workforce relative to the nonfederal workforce. Other factors in our model, including age, gender, race, veteran's status, English proficiency, and geography (state where employed), had a more limited or almost no effect on the likelihood of Hispanics being in the federal workforce. In addition to reporting and comparing representation levels overall and in subsets of the federal workforce to the CLF, EEOC and OPM require that agencies analyze their own workforces. However, the CLF benchmarks of representation that EEOC, OPM, and the agencies use do not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens, and therefore do not identify how citizenship affects the pool of persons qualified to work for the federal government. Where these analyses identify differences in representation, EEOC, for example, requires agencies to determine if there are barriers to participation and develop strategies to address them. OPM provides resources and guidance to assist agencies in implementing human capital strategies. Through these efforts, OPM has promoted the use of student employment programs as a source of qualified candidates. Analyzing agency use of these programs, including the extent to which agencies convert participants to permanent employment, could provide OPM with valuable information to assist agencies in maximizing the use of these programs in their strategic workforce planning. The agencies we reviewed use a variety of approaches to address Hispanic representation, including recruiting at colleges and universities with large Hispanic populations, publicizing employment opportunities in Hispanic media, reaching out to Hispanic communities and Hispanic-serving organizations, and using student employment, internship, career development, and training programs. For example, the U.S. Air Force partners with vocational-technical schools to develop aircraft maintenance technicians, and staff at selected National Aeronautics and Space Administration facilities mentor and tutor students to encourage careers in science, technology, engineering, and math. |
gao_GAO-09-250 | gao_GAO-09-250_0 | FDA Has Made Changes in Response to the New Serious Adverse Event Reporting Requirements and Has Received an Increased Number of Reports
FDA has made several changes in response to the new serious adverse event reporting requirements established by law in 2006 and has subsequently received an increased number of reports. FDA has also issued draft guidance and conducted outreach to industry regarding the new reporting requirements. FDA Has Received an Increased Number of Adverse Event Reports Since Mandatory Reporting Went into Effect
Since mandatory reporting requirements went into effect, the agency has seen a threefold increase in the number of all adverse events reported compared with the previous year. For example, from January through October 2008, FDA received 948 adverse event reports, compared with 298 received over the same time period in 2007. Although FDA Has Taken Some Steps to Identify and Act on Concerns about the Safety of Dietary Supplements, Several Factors Limit Its Oversight
FDA has taken some steps—such as analyzing adverse event reports and detaining certain potentially unsafe imported products—to identify and act upon safety concerns related to dietary supplements. However, several factors limit the agency’s ability to detect concerns and efficiently and effectively remove products from the market. For example, FDA has limited information on the number and location of dietary supplement firms, the identity and ingredients of products currently available in the marketplace, and mild and moderate adverse events reported to industry. Additionally, FDA dedicates relatively few resources to dietary supplement oversight activities compared with other FDA-regulated products. FDA’s Lack of Authority Limits Its Ability to Remove Products from the Market
Once FDA has identified a safety concern, the agency’s ability to efficiently and effectively remove a product from the market is hindered by a lack of mandatory recall authority. While FDA Has Taken Some Actions When Foods Contain Unsafe Dietary Ingredients, Certain Factors May Allow Unsafe Products to Reach Consumers
Although FDA has taken some actions, such as issuing warnings, when foods contain unsafe dietary ingredients, certain factors may allow unsafe products to reach consumers. FDA may not know when a company has made an unsupported or incorrect GRAS determination about an added dietary ingredient in a product until after the product becomes available to consumers because companies are not required to notify FDA of their self- determinations. In addition, the boundary between dietary supplements and foods containing added dietary ingredients is not always clear, and some food products could be marketed as dietary supplements to circumvent the safety standard required for food additives. FDA Has Taken Limited Steps to Educate Consumers about Dietary Supplements, and Consumers Remain Largely Uninformed
While FDA has conducted some consumer outreach, these initiatives have reached a relatively small proportion of consumers using dietary supplements. Additionally, surveys and experts indicate that consumers are not well-informed about the safety and efficacy of dietary supplements and have difficulty interpreting labels on these products. Without a clear understanding of the safety, efficacy, and labeling of dietary supplements, consumers may be exposed to greater health risks associated with the uninformed use of these products. Specifically, we were asked to examine FDA’s (1) actions to respond to the new serious adverse event reporting requirements; (2) ability to identify and act on concerns about the safety of dietary supplements; (3) ability to identify and act on concerns about the safety of foods with added dietary ingredients; and (4) actions to educate consumers about the safety, efficacy, and labeling of dietary supplements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dietary supplements and foods with added dietary ingredients, such as vitamins and herbs, constitute multibillion dollar industries. Past reports on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) regulation of these products raised concerns about product safety and the availability of reliable information. Since then, FDA published draft guidance on requirements for reporting adverse events--which are harmful effects or illnesses--and Current Good Manufacturing Practice regulations for dietary supplements. GAO was asked to examine FDA's (1) actions to respond to the new serious adverse event reporting requirements, (2) ability to identify and act on concerns about the safety of dietary supplements, (3) ability to identify and act on concerns about the safety of foods with added dietary ingredients, and (4) actions to ensure that consumers have useful information about the safety and efficacy of supplements.
What GAO Found
FDA has made several changes in response to the new serious adverse event reporting requirements and has subsequently received an increased number of reports. For example, FDA has modified its data system, issued draft guidance, and conducted outreach to industry. Since mandatory reporting went into effect on December 22, 2007, FDA has seen a threefold increase in the number of all adverse event reports received by the agency compared with the previous year. For example, from January through October 2008, FDA received 948 adverse event reports--596 of which were mandatory reports submitted by industry--compared with 298 received over the same time period in 2007. Although FDA has received a greater number of reports since the requirements went into effect, underreporting remains a concern, and the agency has further actions planned to facilitate adverse event reporting. FDA has taken some steps to identify and act upon safety concerns related to dietary supplements; however, several factors limit the agency's ability to detect concerns and remove products from the market. For example, FDA has limited information on the number and location of dietary supplement firms, the types of products currently available in the marketplace, and information about moderate and mild adverse events reported to industry. Additionally, FDA dedicates relatively few resources to oversight activities, such as providing guidance to industry regarding notification requirements for products containing new dietary ingredients. Also, once FDA has identified a safety concern, the agency's ability to remove a product from the market is hindered by a lack of mandatory recall authority and the difficult process of demonstrating significant or unreasonable risk for specific ingredients. Although FDA has taken some actions when foods contain unsafe dietary ingredients, certain factors may allow potentially unsafe products to reach consumers. FDA may not know when a company has made an unsupported or incorrect determination about whether an added dietary ingredient in a product is generally recognized as safe until after the product becomes available to consumers because companies are not required to notify FDA of their self-determinations. In addition, the boundary between dietary supplements and conventional foods containing dietary ingredients is not always clear, and some food products could be marketed as dietary supplements to circumvent the safety standard required for food additives. FDA has taken limited steps to educate consumers about dietary supplements, and studies and experts indicate that consumer understanding is lacking. While FDA has conducted some outreach, these initiatives have reached a relatively small proportion of dietary supplement consumers. Additionally, surveys and experts indicate that consumers are not well-informed about the safety and efficacy of dietary supplements and have difficulty interpreting labels on these products. Without a clear understanding of the safety, efficacy, and labeling of dietary supplements, consumers may be exposed to greater health risks associated with the uninformed use of these products. |
gao_GAO-07-1078 | gao_GAO-07-1078_0 | FEMA Management and Oversight. Payments to WYO Insurance Companies Comprised Up to Almost Two-Thirds of Total Premium Revenue in Recent Years Based on Payment Methodologies Established in 1983
FEMA’s payments to WYO insurance companies for operating costs ranged from more than a third to almost two-thirds of the total premiums paid by policyholders to the NFIP for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. FEMA establishes a schedule of operating costs for WYO insurance companies participating in the NFIP based on industry averages for operating expenses for other lines of insurance, such as homeowners, commercial and fire; past practices; and discussions with WYO insurance company participants and other insurance industry representatives. FEMA negotiated these payment methodologies with insurance industry representatives when it established the WYO program in 1983. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, payments were larger than for fiscal year 2004 because the WYO insurance companies received payments in these years for settling the unprecedented number and amount of claims for damages resulting from flood events including Hurricanes Charley, Ivan, Frances, and Jeanne in Florida and other East Coast and Gulf Coast states in 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Wilma, and other flood events in 2005. FEMA’s Long-standing Approach for Establishing a Schedule of Operating Costs Cannot Ensure That WYO Insurance Company Payments Are Based on Reasonable Estimates of Actual Expenses
FEMA’s methodologies for determining WYO’s operating costs, rooted in policies established about 25 years ago, cannot provide assurance that payments are based on reasonable estimates of actual expenses because actual expenses incurred by the companies for their services to the NFIP are not considered. Although FEMA has the authority to collect expenses information and FEMA officials said that they have considered alternative methodologies for paying WYO insurance companies, the officials raised concerns about collecting expense information from WYO insurance companies. The methodologies FEMA currently uses to determine payment amounts for the WYO insurance companies for services rendered do not meet the federal internal control standard that agencies be held accountable for, among other things, stewardship of government resources. Although it has authority to do so, FEMA does not collect data on actual WYO flood insurance expenses that could provide a basis for ensuring that the WYO schedule of operating costs is based on a reasonable estimate of expenses. Financial Management Controls Did Not Provide Assurance That Payments to WYO Insurance Companies Were Proper and in Accordance with Program Requirements
Biennial financial statement audits—FEMA’s primary management control mechanism to provide assurances that it receives complete and accurate financial management information from the WYO insurance companies— were not performed on a consistent basis as required by regulation. However, many insurance companies participating in the WYO program did not comply with the schedule. Nonetheless, without having the biennial audits conducted as required by regulation, FEMA lacks assurance that WYO insurance companies have financial systems in place to ensure that proper payments are made and controls are in place for the services of the WYO insurance companies. Biennial financial statement audits were not completed as required by FEMA regulation. 2. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess how much the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) paid in recent years to the Write Your Own (WYO) insurance companies that sell and service NFIP policies and adjust claims and how FEMA determines the amount of these operating costs, we analyzed data on amounts paid to WYO insurance companies for fiscal years 2004-2006. Flood Insurance: Information on the Financial Condition of the National Flood Insurance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Extraordinary recent flood events raise serious questions about the solvency of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The NFIP is largely implemented by private insurance companies that sell and service policies and adjust claims under the Write Your Own (WYO) Program. This report, prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General, examines (1) how much FEMA paid the WYO companies in recent years for operating costs and how FEMA determined payment amounts; (2) how FEMA's approach to determining operating costs assures that payments are reasonable estimates of companies' expenses; and (3) how FEMA assures that financial and management controls are in place for the WYO program and operate as intended. To do these assessments, GAO interviewed FEMA and insurance officials, and analyzed statutes, regulations, payment data, methodologies, and audits of WYO companies.
What GAO Found
FEMA's payments to WYO insurance companies for operating costs ranged from more than a third to almost two-thirds of the total premiums paid by policyholders to the NFIP for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, larger payments to WYO insurance companies were the result of settling an unprecedented number and dollar amount of claims for damages resulting from major hurricanes and flood events including Hurricane Katrina. To determine the amount of these payments, FEMA negotiated payment approaches with insurance industry representatives when it established the current WYO program in 1983 based on industry averages for operating expenses for other lines of insurance (such as homeowners, commercial, and fire), past practice, and discussion. The approach FEMA uses to determine operating costs for WYO insurance companies, rooted in policies negotiated and established about 25 years ago, cannot ensure that payments are based on reasonable estimates of actual expenses because actual expenses incurred by the companies for their services to the NFIP are not considered. Although it has authority to do so, FEMA does not collect data on actual WYO flood insurance expenses that could provide a basis for insuring that the WYO payments are based on a reasonable estimate of actual expenses. FEMA officials said that they have not asked WYO insurance companies to provide expense information due to concerns that the approach would increase FEMA's administrative costs and cause a decline in WYO program participation. However, some data on expenses WYO insurance companies allocate to flood insurance are available. FEMA officials said that they cannot use this information due to reporting inconsistencies. Also, there is some precedent in two similar public-private insurance partnerships for collecting actual expense information. FEMA's decision to rely on long-standing practices does not meet federal internal control standards that agencies be held accountable for, among other things, stewardship of government resources. Biennial financial statement audits--FEMA's primary mechanism to provide assurance that it receives complete and accurate financial management information from the WYO insurance companies--were not performed consistently as required by regulation. FEMA regulations require each participating company to arrange and pay for these audits by independent certified public accounting firms. However, many WYO insurance companies did not comply with the schedule in recent years. For example, for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 5 of 94 participating companies had biennial financial statement audits performed. FEMA officials said they allowed some companies to delay having the audits done because they were in the process of contracting with new subcontractors to perform their financial reporting responsibilities. Nonetheless, without the required biennial audits, FEMA lacks an appropriate internal control mechanism for effective program oversight. |
gao_GAO-02-111 | gao_GAO-02-111_0 | The Securities Industry Is Viewed as a Potential Target, but the Extent of Actual Money Laundering Is Unknown
Although the extent to which broker-dealers and mutual funds are being used to launder money is not known, law enforcement officials were concerned that the securities industry would increasingly be a target for potential money launderers. Broker-Dealer and Mutual Fund Firms Are Not Subject to All Anti- Money Laundering Regulatory Requirements
Broker-dealers and the firms that receive and process customer payments on behalf of mutual fund groups (hereinafter referred to as mutual fund service providers) can be held criminally liable if they are found to be involved in money laundering. In 1996, Treasury issued a rule requiring banks to report suspicious activities involving possible money laundering to FinCEN using a SAR form. Efforts to Develop a Securities SAR Rule Renewed
Treasury is engaged in renewed efforts to develop a SAR rule for the securities industry and anticipates that a proposed rule will be issued for public comment before the end of 2001. These standards call for participating countries to require their financial institutions, including securities firms, to take steps to prevent money laundering. In general, however, FATF reports that few members have applied such sanctions. Table 9 provides a list of criminal cases in which proceeds from illegal activities were laundered through brokerage or mutual fund accounts. Eight of these members have enacted legislation requiring their securities firms to report suspicious transactions to relevant authorities (fig. Suspicious Banking Activities: Possible Money Laundering by U.S. | What GAO Found
To disguise illegally obtained funds, money launderers have traditionally targeted banks, which accept cash and arrange domestic and international fund transfers. However, criminals seeking to hide illicit funds may also be targeting the U.S. securities markets. Although few documented cases exist of broker-dealer or mutual fund accounts being used to launder money, law enforcement agencies are concerned that criminals may increasingly try to use the securities industry for that purpose. Most broker-dealers or firms that process customer payments for mutual funds are subject to U.S. anti-money laundering requirements. However, unlike banks, most of these firms are not required to report suspicious activities. The Treasury Department is now developing a rule requiring broker-dealers to report suspicious activities. Treasury expects that the rule will be issued for public comment by the end of this year. Various intergovernmental groups, such as the Financial Action Task Force, have been working on recommendations that call for member nations to take various steps to combat money laundering through their financial institutions, including requiring securities firms to report suspicious activities. Although many members countries report that they have issued all or many of these recommendations and have applied them to their securities firms, it is difficult to determine how well the measures are being implemented and enforced. |
gao_GAO-05-179 | gao_GAO-05-179_0 | Initiatives to Leverage Buying Power and Small Business Program Have Helped Foster Collaboration among DHS Organizations
In the 2 years since its creation, DHS has realized some successes in opening the lines of communication among the various organizations within the department through its strategic sourcing and small business programs. In fiscal year 2004, 4 commodity councils—office supplies, boats, energy, and weapons—reported approximately $14.1 million in cost savings and cost avoidances, and department officials expect the savings to continue to grow. Small business representatives have been designated in each DHS procurement office, and each office is required to submit a forecast of upcoming contract opportunities above $100,000. An integrated acquisition organization is essential to the department’s success in executing policies and processes to effectively obligate and administer billions of dollars in acquiring what DHS needs to accomplish its mission. Staffing disparities across the procurement organizations have only recently begun to be addressed. According to DHS officials, this negotiation process has been problematic. Despite Adoption of Many Best Practices, Review Process for Major Investments Lacks Key Reviews and Some Management Controls
Some DHS organizations have large, complex, and high-cost acquisition programs that need to be closely managed. For example, DHS does not require a review to ensure that an investment’s design performs as expected before investing in a prototype. However, a key practice, contractor tracking and oversight, is not fully incorporated in the policy and guidance. A list of selected acquisition management practices and required activities is in appendix V.
As Review Process Matures, Some Mechanics Still to Be Worked Out
The investment review process has been under revision for many months. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS receives the goods and services it needs at the best value to the government, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following six actions: establish a structure to ensure continued support for commodity councils, such as appointing full-time dedicated commodity managers, to ensure that the commodity councils develop long-term strategies, maintain momentum, and continue to realize savings; provide the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer with sufficient resources and enforcement authority to enable effective, departmentwide oversight of acquisition policies and procedures; conduct a departmentwide assessment of the number of contracting staff and, if a workload imbalance is found, take steps to correct it by re-aligning resources; direct higher-level management attention to the implementation of the working capital fund (which is to be used to fund contracting staff for the Office of Procurement Operations) by, for example, determining the level of contracting support needed by the organizations relying on this office, ensuring that appropriate funds are committed to hire needed contracting staff, and ensuring that funds are available on an ongoing basis for continuity; revise the October 2004 management directive “Acquisition Line of Business Integration and Management” to eliminate reference to the Coast Guard and Secret Service being statutorily exempt from complying; and ensure that DHS’s management directive on interagency agreements is followed and that fees paid to other agencies are tracked. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the areas where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been successful in promoting collaboration among its various organizations, we interviewed senior acquisition officials at DHS headquarters and analyzed pertinent documents. To determine areas where DHS faces challenges in integrating the acquisition function, we reviewed DHS organizational charts to gain insight into where the procurement offices fall in the hierarchy and to determine the lines of responsibility and authority between the various stakeholders in the acquisition process. To assess the department’s progress in implementing a review process for major, complex systems, we compared DHS’s acquisition policies for major acquisitions to our knowledge-based approach. Our analysis focused on whether DHS’s policies contained the measurable criteria and management controls necessary for minimizing cost, schedule, and performance risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) organizations are expected to work together to protect the United States from terrorism. To support this primary mission, DHS has been acquiring billions of dollars worth of goods and services. DHS also has been working to integrate the disparate acquisition processes and systems that organizations brought with them when DHS was created 2 years ago. GAO was asked to identify (1) areas where DHS has been successful in promoting collaboration among its various organizations and (2) areas where DHS still faces challenges in integrating the acquisition function across the department. GAO was also asked to assess DHS's progress in implementing an effective review process for major, complex investments.
What GAO Found
DHS's disparate organizations have quickly established collaborative relationships to leverage spending for various goods and services without losing focus on small businesses. DHS is using strategic sourcing, that is, formulating purchasing strategies to meet departmentwide requirements for specific commodities, such as office supplies, boats, energy, and weapons. By fostering collaboration, DHS has leveraged its buying power and savings are expected to grow. Also off to a good start is the small business program, whose reach is felt across DHS. Representatives have been designated in each DHS procurement office to help ensure that small businesses have opportunities to compete for DHS's contract dollars. In contrast, lack of clear accountability is hampering DHS's efforts to integrate the acquisition functions of its numerous organizations into an effective whole. DHS remains a collection of disparate organizations, many of which are performing functions with insufficient oversight, giving rise to an environment rife with challenges. Some of DHS's organizations have major, complex acquisition programs that are subject to a multitiered investment review process to help reduce risk and increase chances for successful outcomes in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. Part of the review process features a knowledge-based acquisition approach pioneered by successful commercial firms. DHS's adaptation of this best practices approach, however, does not require two critical management reviews and is missing some key information before decisions are made to invest additional resources. In addition, contractor tracking and oversight is not fully incorporated into DHS policy and guidance. Finally, some aspects of the review process--which has been under revision for many months--need clarification. |
gao_GAO-12-229 | gao_GAO-12-229_0 | While Many TARP Programs Continue to Wind Down, Others Remain Active
TARP programs continue to wind down, and some programs have ended. In an upcoming report, we plan to describe the financial condition of the remaining CPP institutions and compare them with institutions that already exited and those that never participated. Treasury’s timing of its exit from GM and Ally Financial—and ultimate return on its investment—will depend on how it balances its competing goals of maximizing taxpayer returns and selling its shares as soon as practicable. Treasury officials said that the agency would work to avoid economic losses during this exit. Treasury Continues to Address Staffing Needs While Also Relying on Financial Agents and Contractors to Support TARP Administration and Programs
OFS Staffing Declined Slightly for the First Time and Treasury Is Addressing Turnover-Related Staffing Issues
As we have identified in previous reports, Treasury still faces staffing challenges, including recent turnover stemming from the departure of term-appointed staff, but it has been addressing these challenges. For example, in the Chief Investment Office—which includes staff working on various TARP programs, such as CPP—more than half of the staff departed from June 2010 to September 2011 (a decrease of 20 staff from 2010). OFS also plans to conduct succession planning for other staff below the management level. Through fiscal year 2011, Treasury awarded 17 financial agency agreements, of which 14 remain active. Although Estimated Lifetime TARP Costs Have Decreased Significantly, Treasury Could Enhance Its Communication about the Costs of TARP
While lifetime cost estimates for TARP have decreased since the government first provided assistance in 2008, the lifetime cost and income estimates for specific TARP programs have fluctuated with changes in program activity and the market value of Treasury’s TARP investments. Moreover, indirect costs such as moral hazard are also associated with TARP and remain a concern. In 2009, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that TARP could cost $356 billion. Treasury’s fiscal year 2011 financial statement, audited by GAO, reported that TARP would cost around $70 billion as of September 30, 2011, a decrease from about $78 billion estimated as of September 2010. Furthermore, it appears that over the last 2 years Treasury has included lifetime cost estimates in some of its program-specific press releases for programs expected to result in a lifetime income, while excluding these estimates for programs expected to result in a cost for taxpayers. investment in the programs and revenues received. However, by improving the clarity of its communication on the costs of TARP through consistently incorporating lifetime cost estimates into its program press releases, Treasury could reduce potential confusion and misunderstanding of TARP’s results. Such communications about specific programs include information about estimated lifetime costs and income only when programs are expected to result in lifetime income and not when they are expected to result in a lifetime cost. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance transparency about the costs of TARP programs as Treasury unwinds its involvement, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury enhance Treasury’s communications with the public, in particular Treasury’s press releases, about TARP programs and costs by consistently including information on estimated lifetime costs, especially when reporting on program results. For example, Treasury should consider including lifetime cost estimates, or references to Treasury reports that include such information, in its press releases about specific programs. Treasury stated that it will implement our recommendation by including a link to its Monthly 105(a) Report, which contains cost estimates for each TARP program, in its future program-specific press releases. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the condition and status of all programs initiated under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we collected and analyzed data about program utilization and assets held, as applicable, focusing primarily on financial information that we had audited in the Office of Financial Stability’s (OFS) financial statements, as of September 30, 2011. We also examined Treasury documentation such as program terms, decision memos, press releases, and reports on TARP programs and costs. To update the status of the American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
Investment Program (formerly the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program) we reviewed relevant documents from Treasury and other parties. To assess OFS’s progress in strengthening its infrastructure for managing and overseeing the performance of TARP financial agents and contractors and addressing conflicts of interest that could arise with the use of private sector firms, we reviewed various documents and interviewed OFS officials about changes in fiscal year 2011 to its policies and procedures regarding (1) management and oversight of TARP financial agents and contractors and (2) monitoring and oversight activities by the OFS team responsible for financial agent and contractor compliance with TARP conflicts-of-interest requirements. To ascertain what is known about TARP costs, we reviewed the cost reporting of CBO, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Treasury, including the credit reform accounting methods used to develop cost estimates for TARP programs. Targeted Investment Program
The Targeted Investment Program was designed to foster market stability and thereby strengthen the economy by investing in institutions on a case-by-case basis that Treasury deemed critical to the functioning of the financial system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 authorized the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to create the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion program designed to restore the liquidity and stability of the financial system. The act also requires that GAO report every 60 days on TARP activities. This report examines (1) the condition and status of TARP programs; (2) Treasurys management of TARP operations, including staffing for the Office of Financial Stability (OFS) and oversight of contractors and financial agents; and (3) what is known about the direct and indirect costs of TARP. To do this work, GAO analyzed audited financial data for various TARP programs; reviewed documentation such as program terms and internal decision memos; analyzed TARP cost estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget, and Treasury; and interviewed CBO and OFS officials.
What GAO Found
Many TARP programs continue to be in various stages of unwinding and some programs, notably those that focus on the foreclosure crisis, remain active. The figure provides an overview of selected programs and the amount disbursed and outstanding, as applicable. Treasury has articulated broad principles for exiting TARP, including exiting TARP programs as soon as practicable and seeking to maximize taxpayer returns, goals that at times conflict. Some of the programs that Treasury continues to unwind, such as investments in American International Group, Inc. (AIG), require Treasury to actively manage the timing of its exit as it balances its competing goals. For other programs, such as the Capital Purchase Program (CPP)which was created to provide capital to financial institutionsTreasurys exit will be driven primarily by the financial condition of the participating institutions. Consequently, the timing of Treasurys exit from TARP remains uncertain.
Treasury continues to manage the various TARP programs using OFS staff, financial agents, and contractors. Overall OFS staffing has declined slightly for the first time as staff responsible for managing TARP investment programs and those in term-appointed leadership positions have departed. However, staff in some offices within OFS have increasedfor example, in the Office of Internal Review, which helps to ensure that financial agents and contractors comply with laws and regulations. Through September 30, 2011, about half of Treasurys 116 contracts remained active, along with 14 of the 17 financial agency agreements. Treasury has continued to strengthen its management and oversight of contractors and financial agents and conflict-of-interest requirements. In response to a GAO recommendation, OFS has finalized a plan to address staffing levels and expertise that includes identifying critical positions and conducting succession planning, in light of the temporary nature of its work.
Treasury and CBO project that TARP costs will be much lower than the amount authorized when the program was initially announced. Treasurys fiscal year 2011 financial statement, audited by GAO, estimated that the lifetime cost of TARP would be about $70 billionwith CPP expected to generate the most lifetime income, or net income in excess of costs. OFS also reported that from inception through September 30, 2011, the incurred cost of TARP transactions was $28 billion. Although Treasury regularly reports on the cost of TARP programs and has enhanced such reporting over time, GAOs analysis of Treasury press releases about specific programs indicate that information about estimated lifetime costs and income are included only when programs are expected to result in lifetime income. For example, Treasury issued a press release for its bank investment programs, including CPP, and noted that the programs would result in lifetime income, or profit. However, press releases for investments in AIG, a program that is anticipated to result in a lifetime cost to Treasury, did not include program-specific cost information. Although press releases for programs expected to result in a cost to Treasury provide useful transaction information, they exclude lifetime, program-specific cost estimates.
Consistently providing greater transparency about cost information for specific TARP programs could help reduce potential misunderstanding of TARPs results. While Treasury can measure and report direct costs, indirect costs associated with the moral hazard created by the governments intervention in the private sector are more difficult to measure and assess.
What GAO Recommends
Treasury should enhance its program-specific press releases to the public by consistently including lifetime cost estimates when reporting on program activities and results. Treasury agreed with our recommendation and plans to implement it by including a link to its cost reporting in future TARP program-specific press releases. |
gao_GAO-12-839 | gao_GAO-12-839_0 | Offerings under Regulation A
Regulation A represents an exercise by SEC of its authority under section 3(b) of the Securities Act to exempt offerings of securities from registration if it finds that registration “is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering….” SEC has previously stated that the primary purpose in adopting Regulation A was to provide a simple and relatively inexpensive procedure for small business use in raising limited amounts of needed capital. A business that relies on Regulation A must (1) file for SEC staff review an offering statement that includes an offering circular and financial statements, and (2) provide the offering circular to investors. We discuss the review process in more detail later in this report. While these laws can vary from state to state, they require securities issuers (including businesses making small offerings) to register their offerings with the state before the offerings can be sold in that state unless state registration for the offering has been preempted by federal law or a state registration exemption applies. Regulation A Use Has Decreased Since 1997
Trends in Regulation A Offerings
The number of Regulation A offerings filed and qualified has declined significantly after peaking in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 respectively (see fig. However, since 1997, the number of initial Regulation A offerings filed decreased significantly—from 116 in 1997 to 19 in 2011. The number of qualified offerings also dropped dramatically after 1998, decreasing from 57 in 1998 to 1 in 2011. Securities attorneys with whom we met stated that the decrease in filings after 1997 could be attributed to a number of different factors, including the increased attractiveness of Regulation D. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 preempted state registration requirements for certain other categories of securities offerings (including Rule 506 of Regulation D)—potentially making these other options more attractive to businesses. Businesses have used Regulation D exemptions and registered initial public offerings to a greater extent than Regulation A in recent years. More specifically, staff review filings to determine whether disclosures appear to be consistent with SEC rules and applicable accounting standards. States’ Methods of Registering Regulation A Securities Offerings Vary
Although states employ a limited number of methods for registering securities offerings, specific requirements and processes vary. Registration by qualification is similar to a securities registration with SEC under the Securities Act. Registration by coordination is available to issuers that have registered their offerings with SEC.copies of their SEC registration statement and any amendments with the state agency for review. Under this method, issuers file While all states conduct disclosure reviews of Regulation A securities offerings, most states also conduct merit reviews. These factors included the type of investors businesses sought to attract, the process of filing the offering with SEC, state securities laws, and the cost- effectiveness of Regulation A relative to other SEC exemptions. Views vary on whether use of Regulation A will increase, with some stakeholders stating that interest will increase as a result of the $50 million ceiling, and others stating that the requirement for issuers to register the securities at the state level will continue to deter small businesses from using the exemption. Factors That May Have Affected Regulation A Use
Multiple factors appear to have influenced whether small businesses used Regulation A to raise equity capital, according to recent issuers and other stakeholders with whom we met. Identifying and addressing the securities registration requirements of individual states is both costly and time-consuming for small businesses, according to research, an advocate for small businesses, and securities attorneys with whom we met. For example, we met with securities attorneys who had experience obtaining Regulation A exemptions for small businesses. As noted earlier, according to NASAA officials, most states perform merit reviews. SEC staff stated that for Regulation D, businesses are required to notify SEC of the offerings, and that SEC does not generally provide comments on the notifications. Views on Future Growth of Regulation A Filings Were Mixed
The number of small business that seek exemption through Regulation A may increase as a result of the JOBS Act’s requirement for SEC to increase the maximum offering amount to $50 million, according to staff from some state securities administrators’ offices, a small business advocate, and securities attorneys whom we interviewed. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to SEC and NASAA for their review and comment. Both provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its letter, NASAA concurred with our finding that multiple factors have affected use of Regulation A, and suggested that the primary reason for its limited use is the “mini-public offering” process that businesses must complete. As noted in the report, NASAA stated that it will be working to develop model state registration requirements for the larger Regulation A offerings allowed under the JOBS Act, and NASAA suggested that further changes to federal securities laws, particularly Regulation A, should be withheld until states implement a new system to address the JOBS Act's changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Businesses seeking to use public offerings of securities to raise capital must comply with federal and state securities laws. Businesses must register offerings with SEC unless they qualify for an exemption. Regulation A exempts a securities offering that does not exceed $5 million from SEC registration if certain requirements are met. However, businesses still must file an offering statement that includes an offering circular and financial statements with SEC, and SEC staff review filings for consistency with applicable rules and accounting standards. In addition, Regulation A does not exempt offerings from states registration requirements, which are also intended to protect investors. Concerned about the decline in the number of public offerings, the JOBS Act requires SEC to amend Regulation A (or to adopt a new regulation) to raise the threshold for use of that registration exemption from $5 million to $50 million, and requires GAO to study the impact of state securities laws on Regulation A offerings. This report examines (1) trends in Regulation A filings, (2) how states register Regulation A filings, and, (3) factors affecting the number of Regulation A filings and how the number of filings may change in the future. GAO analyzed SEC data related to financial regulatory filings, reviewed published research, and interviewed academics, SEC staff, state securities regulators, and small businesses. SEC and NASAA provided technical comments on a draft copy of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. In its letter, NASAA concurred with our finding that multiple factors have influenced the use of Regulation A.
What GAO Found
The number of Regulation A offerings filed and qualified (that is, cleared) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has declined significantly after peaking in fiscal years 1997 and 1998, respectively. In particular, offerings filed since 1997 decreased from 116 in 1997 to 19 in 2011. Similarly, the number of qualified offerings dropped from 57 in 1998 to 1 in 2011. Securities attorneys GAO interviewed suggested that the decrease in filings after 1997 could be attributed to a number of factors, including the increased attractiveness of Regulation D. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 preempted state registration requirements for other categories of securities including certain Regulation D offerings, which are also exempt from SEC registration. In contrast, Regulation A offerings are generally subject to state securities laws and must go through a federal filing and review process. In recent years, businesses have used Regulation D and registered public offerings to a greater extent than Regulation A.
States methods for registering and reviewing securities vary. One method used by states is registration by qualification, which is similar to registering securities with SEC, as issuers are required to submit certain documents to the responsible state securities agency for review and approval. All states conduct disclosure reviews of the Regulation A offerings, meaning that they ensure that all material information is disclosed in the offering. According to the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) officials, most states additionally conduct a merit reviewan analysis of the fairness of the offering to investorsalthough some states use stricter standards in their merit reviews than others. NASAA officials have encouraged states to take steps to streamline their requirements and make them more uniform, including adopting a standard form for registering securities. NASAA plans to work with states to determine what changes in their registration methods will be needed in light of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).
Multiple factors appear to have influenced the use of Regulation A and views vary on whether raising the offering threshold will increase its use. The factors included the type of investors businesses sought to attract, the process of filing the offering with SEC, state securities laws, and the cost-effectiveness of Regulation A relative to other SEC exemptions. For example, identifying and addressing individual states securities registration requirements can be both costly and time-consuming for small businesses, according to research, an organization that advocates for small businesses, and securities attorneys that GAO interviewed. Additionally, another SEC exemption is viewed by securities attorneys that GAO met with as more cost-effective for small businesses. For example, through certain Regulation D filings small businesses can raise equity capital without registering securities in individual states, as long as other requirements are met. State securities administrators, a small business advocate, and securities attorneys with whom GAO met had mixed views on whether the higher maximum offering amount ($50 million) under the JOBS Act would lead to increased use of Regulation A. For example, some thought that the higher threshold could encourage greater use of Regulation A, while others told us that many of the factors that have deterred its use in the past likely will continue to make other options more attractive. |
gao_GAO-04-683 | gao_GAO-04-683_0 | 2.) The Children’s Health Act of 2000 required SAMHSA to submit a plan to the Congress by October 2002 describing the flexibility the performance partnership grants would give the states, the performance measures that SAMHSA would use to hold states accountable, the data that SAMHSA would collect from states, definitions of the data elements, obstacles to implementing the grants and ways to resolve them, the resources needed to implement the grants, and any federal legislative changes that would be necessary. SAMHSA’s Strategic Planning Efforts Are Incomplete
SAMHSA has operated without a strategic plan since October 2002. For example, SAMHSA’s priorities do not identify the approaches and resources needed to achieve the long-term goals; the results expected from the agency’s grant programs and a timetable for achieving those results; and an assessment of key external factors, such as the actions of other federal agencies, that could affect SAMHSA’s ability to achieve its goals. Without a strategic plan that includes the expected results against which the agency’s efforts can be measured, it is unclear how the agency or the Congress will be able to assess the agency’s progress toward achieving its long-term goals or the adequacy and appropriateness of SAMHSA’s grant programs. Specifically, SAMHSA has not developed a detailed succession strategy to prepare for the loss of essential expertise and to ensure that the agency can continue to fill key positions. SAMHSA did not include a succession strategy in its strategic workforce plan, and the agency has not yet developed such a strategy. Another shortcoming in SAMHSA’s strategic workforce planning is that the agency has not fully developed hiring and training strategies to ensure that its project officers will have the appropriate expertise to manage the proposed performance partnership grants. In contrast, other aspects of SAMHSA’s performance management system do not reinforce individual accountability for results. In addition, SAMHSA’s performance management system does not assess staff performance in relation to specific competencies. SAMHSA’s funds are directed toward the provision of substance abuse and mental health services for homeless people. SAMHSA Could More Effectively Manage Partnerships with State and Local Grantees
Officials from state mental health and substance abuse agencies and community-based organizations identified opportunities for SAMHSA to better manage its block and discretionary grant programs. Grantees Have Raised Concerns about SAMHSA’s Grant Processes
Officials from states and community-based organizations told us that SAMHSA could improve administration of its grant programs, citing concerns related to the agency’s grant application review processes, site visits to review states’ compliance with block grant requirements, and the availability of information on technical assistance opportunities. Discretionary Grant Applications
Grantees we talked to expressed concern that SAMHSA rejects discretionary grant applications without reviewing them for merit if they do not comply with administrative requirements. SAMHSA Is Preparing States for Performance Partnership Grants, but Has Not Finalized States’ Reporting Requirements
To prepare for the mental health and substance abuse performance partnership grants—which SAMHSA plans to implement in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, respectively—SAMHSA has worked with states to develop performance measures and improve states’ ability to report performance data. In addition, SAMHSA has not completed plans to ensure that its workforce has the appropriate expertise to manage the proposed performance partnership grants, which would represent a significant change in the way SAMHSA holds states accountable for achieving results. Finally, as SAMHSA makes efforts to increase program accountability, it is in the agency’s interest to fund state and local programs that show the most promise for improving the quality and availability of prevention and treatment services. While early evidence indicates that the new procedures are reducing the proportion of applications rejected for administrative reasons, these procedures have not eliminated such rejections. SAMHSA also provided technical comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) is the lead federal agency responsible for improving the quality and availability of prevention and treatment services for substance abuse and mental illness. The upcoming reauthorization review of SAMHSA will enable the Congress to examine the agency's management of its grant programs and plans for converting its block grants to performance partnership grants, which will hold states more accountable for results. GAO was asked to provide the Congress with information about SAMHSA's (1) strategic planning efforts, (2) efforts to manage its workforce, and (3) partnerships with state and community-based grantees.
What GAO Found
SAMHSA has not completed key planning efforts to ensure that it can effectively manage its programs. The agency has operated without a strategic plan since October 2002, and although SAMHSA officials are drafting a plan, they do not know when it will be completed. SAMHSA developed long-term goals and a set of priority issues that provide some guidance for the agency's activities, but they are not a substitute for a strategic plan. In particular, they do not identify the approaches and resources needed to achieve the agency's long-term goals and the desired results against which the agency's programs can be measured. SAMHSA also has not fully developed strategies to ensure it has the appropriate staff to manage the agency's programs. Although the proportion of SAMHSA's staff eligible to retire is increasing, the agency has not developed a detailed succession strategy to prepare for the loss of essential expertise and to ensure that the agency continues to have the ability to fill key positions. In addition, the proposed performance partnership grants will change the way SAMHSA administers its largest grant programs, but the agency has not completed hiring and training strategies to ensure that its workforce will have the skills needed to administer the grants. Finally, SAMHSA's system for evaluating staff performance does not distinguish between acceptable and outstanding performance, and the agency does not assess staff performance in relation to specific competencies--practices that would help reinforce individual accountability for results. SAMHSA has opportunities to improve its partnerships with state and community-based grantees. For example, grantees objected to SAMHSA's practice of rejecting discretionary grant applications that do not comply with administrative requirements--such as those that exceed page limitations--without reviewing them for merit. Rejecting applications solely on administrative grounds potentially prevents SAMHSA from supporting the most effective programs. SAMHSA's recent changes to the review process should reduce such rejections, but have not eliminated them. State officials are also concerned that SAMHSA has not finalized the performance data that states would be required to report under the proposed performance partnership grants. To comply, states will need to change their data systems, but they cannot complete these changes until SAMHSA finalizes the requirements. The Congress directed SAMHSA to submit a plan by October 2002 describing the final data reporting requirements and any legislative changes needed to implement the grants, but SAMHSA has not yet completed the plan. This delay could prevent the agency from meeting its current timetable for implementing the mental health and substance abuse performance partnership grants in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, respectively. |
gao_HEHS-97-31 | gao_HEHS-97-31_0 | Wealthy Districts Had More Education Funding per Weighted Pupil Than Poor Districts in Most States
Although most states pursued strategies to supplement the local funding in their poorest districts, the strategies generally did not offset the advantage of wealthy districts in raising local funds. Targeting State Funds to Poor Districts Helped Reduce Funding Gap
State targeting efforts typically helped to reduce but did not eliminate the gap in total funding between wealthy and poor districts. These results occurred even after adjusting for geographic differences in education costs and student need. State School Finance Policies Reflected in Implicit Foundation Level and Equalization Effort
To determine the effects of state school finance policies on the funding gap between poor and wealthy districts, we analyzed states’ school finance data. In 14 states, the implicit foundation level was less than half the state average. Twenty-Five States Reported Making Little or No Changes Since School Year 1991-92
We contacted state education officials to determine the extent to which the states had changed their targeting effort and state share between school years 1991-92 and 1995-96. States that want to further reduce the funding gap between poor and wealthy districts would have to continue to increase the state share of total funding, increase their targeting effort to poor districts, or increase both. Scope and Methodology Overview
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) the size of the gap in total (state and local combined) funding between poor and wealthy school districts for each state, (2) the key factors that affect the size of states’ funding gaps, and (3) the effect of states’ school finance policies on the funding gaps. On average, wealthy districts had about 24 percent more total funding per weighted pupil than poor districts. Under this assumption, the funding gap occurs because wealthy districts can generate more local funding than poor districts when the tax effort for all districts is equal. To estimate the extent to which the three factors—elasticity of local tax effort, state share, and state targeting (see table III.6)—accounted for the variation in the funding gap between wealthy and poor districts, we constructed a regression model that used these three factors to explain cross-state differences in fiscal neutrality scores: fiscal neutrality score = a state’s elasticity of total funding per weighted pupil relative to income per weighted pupil state funding percentage = state funding as a percentage of total (state and local) funding state targeting effort = a state’s elasticity of state funding per weighted pupil relative to income per weighted pupil elasticity of local tax effort = a state’s elasticity of local tax effort relative to income per weighted pupil = an error term that reflects the variation in funding gaps that cannot be accounted for by the other variables in the model. In 35 states, poor districts made a higher tax effort than wealthy districts. Results
States’ implicit foundation levels varied widely. In addition, each profile provides information in tabular and graphic form on (1) the actual distribution of state and local funding to regular school districts in school year 1991-92 and (2) how the funding would have been distributed if the state share of total funding had remained the same and the targeting of state funding had been changed so that districts could spend the state average of total funding on each student with an average tax effort. These two factors affect the implicit foundation level that all districts in a state can finance with the same minimum tax effort—the greater the targeting effort to low-wealth districts or the greater the state share, or both, the greater the implicit foundation level. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed funding gaps between poor and wealthy school districts, focusing on the: (1) size of the gap in total (state and local combined) funding between poor and wealthy school districts for each state; (2) key factors that affect the size of states' funding gaps; (3) effect of states' school finance policies on the funding gap; and (4) implications of this information for state policies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although most states pursued strategies to supplement the local funding of poor school districts, wealthier districts in 37 states had more total (state and local combined) funding than poor districts in the 1991-92 school year; (2) this disparity existed even after adjusting for differences in geographic and student need-related education costs; (3) on average, wealthy districts had about 24 percent more total funding per weighted pupil than poor districts; (4) three factors affected the funding gap between a state's poor and wealthy districts; (5) first, the extent to which a state targeted funding to poor districts affected the funding gap; (6) although targeting efforts typically reduced funding gaps, they did not eliminate them; (7) second, a state's share of total funding can reduce the funding gap, even when the targeting effort is low; (8) finally, the local tax effort to raise education funding affected the funding gap; (9) at the local level, the greater the tax effort that poor districts were willing to make compared with wealthy districts, the smaller the gap in funding between these two types of districts; (10) poor districts in 35 states made a greater tax effort than wealthy districts; (11) because all three of these factors can affect the funding gap, analyzing the effects of state school finance policies required excluding the effects of the local tax effort; (12) to do this, GAO estimated the foundation level each state's school finance policies implicitly supported, which estimates the minimum total funding per pupil that districts could finance if they were to make the same local tax effort; (13) GAO's resulting analysis showed wide variations in the implicit foundation level that state school finance policies supported in school year 1991-92; (14) the implicit foundation levels of almost all states were less than their state average funding levels; (15) in 14 states, the implicit foundation level was less than half the state average funding level; (16) although the relative tax effort of poor and wealthy districts greatly affects the funding gaps between these districts, higher implicit foundation levels can help reduce the gaps; (17) therefore, states can further reduce the funding gaps by increasing their targeting effort to poor districts, increasing the state share of total funding, or increasing both; and (18) officials in a number of states reported making such changes between school years 1991-92 and 1995-96, although 25 states reported making little or no changes in their targeting of poor districts or state share. |
gao_GAO-08-995 | gao_GAO-08-995_0 | Under its new Administrator, SBA’s leadership took steps to increase transparency in the agency’s actions and improve its communication efforts. Actions to Address Effects of Transformation on Employees Have Had Some Success, but SBA’s Plan for Training and Development Is Limited
After the centralization of loan liquidation and purchase guaranty functions in 2003, employee morale at SBA declined significantly, as indicated by employee survey results in 2004 and 2006. SBA officials acknowledged that SBA University was a first step in developing a training program. District offices also now have a formal role in providing disaster assistance. SBA further defined the roles and responsibilities of district office employees through the development of position descriptions and personal business commitment plans. However, the SBA OIG has found in past audits that inadequate purchase reviews by SBA employees have resulted in improper payments and continues to express concern about the quality of SBA purchase reviews. Moreover, though SBA has measures in place to track the timeliness of its purchase decisions, it has not yet developed performance measures to track quality assurance that would help to ensure that the focus on process efficiency does not come at the expense of the quality of the purchase reviews. Additionally, neither estimate incorporates reviews of purchase decisions completed under the recently re-engineered guaranty purchase process. However, in the past 2 years SBA has made progress in addressing these negative effects—by applying key practices that support successful transformations to improve agency operations and taking actions to address the recommendations we made in our 2003 report. The Administrator appointed in 2006 emphasized the importance of transparency in his reform agenda, made a concerted effort to improve communications across the agency, and engaged employees in improving the agency. Our meetings with employees affirmed that these efforts had a positive effect on many employees. We also found that though SBA had also taken some actions to obtain feedback and ideas from employees, many employees we interviewed, including union officials, continued to feel that SBA’s management did not sufficiently consider their ideas and concerns. SBA recently conducted focus groups to better understand employee concerns, specifically explored the concerns about employee involvement, and plans to implement pilot initiatives to address them. SBA’s 2007 employee survey results suggest that recent actions, such as improving communication and training, have had a positive impact on employees, but also point to continuing concerns about these issues. Specifically, the creation of SBA University in 2007 was an important action not only in terms of providing training and demonstrating that the agency was willing to commit resources to invest in the development of employees. SBA officials also have been developing a training program that includes core curriculums for different staff positions. However, SBA has not developed a strategic training plan that lays out goals, strategies, and milestones. For instance, SBA recently determined that district offices still could have a role in the guaranty purchase review process, despite the centralization of this function. Specifically, we focused on (1) SBA’s progress in transforming agency operations and addressing GAO’s recommendations on key practices for successful transformation, (2) how SBA has addressed the impacts of transformation on its employees, (3) how SBA has defined the roles and responsibilities of its district offices, and (4) SBA’s efforts to assess its initiatives for centralization of its loan functions and how its approach for implementing centralization has changed since transformation began. In addition, we obtained and analyzed SBA documents related to its new performance management system; current and previous scorecards that track the performance of agency components relative to the specific goals on which they are measured; operating plans that lay out strategies to achieve goals; information illustrating lines of communication and areas covered (for example, press, marketing, Web development, speechwriting, strategic alliances with external parties such as trade groups, and multimedia); and the agency’s communications plan that discusses its approach for addressing internal and external communication, along with descriptions of the responsibilities of its Office of Communication and Public Liaison, Office of Management and Administration, the Office of the Congressional Liaison, and the intergovernmental group. We analyzed the information we obtained from these document reviews and interviews to determine what actions SBA has taken to incorporate key practices and implementation steps for organizational transformations, whether SBA’s transformation laid out goals for the transformation, what communication strategies SBA used to promote frequent two-way communication at all levels of the agency and with stakeholders, what actions SBA has taken to involve employees and ensure that their concerns and ideas are considered, how SBA has aligned its transformation activities to achieve agency performance and strategic goals, and how SBA’s performance management system linked overall agency goals to individual goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 6 years, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has sought to transform the agency and improve its operations. A major focus of transformation was to centralize the remaining loan functions performed by 68 district offices. SBA's implementation of early transformation efforts did not reflect key practices GAO recommended in a 2003 report as important for successful transformations. Consequently, its centralization of the guaranty purchase process for one of its loan programs resulted in backlogs and other problems reported by SBA's Inspector General. Some of SBA's actions also led to a reduction in staff at district offices and a decline in employee morale. GAO was asked to assess how SBA has (1) responded to GAO's 2003 recommendations, (2) addressed the impacts of transformation on employees, (3) defined the roles and responsibilities of district offices, and (4) assessed the centralization of loan functions. GAO reviewed documents related to SBA's transformation and reform efforts, interviewed SBA officials, and analyzed SBA employee survey data. GAO also visited 10 district offices and two centers and interviewed groups of employees.
What GAO Found
In the past 2 years, SBA has applied key practices that support successful transformations to improve agency operations and, thereby, has taken actions to address recommendations GAO made in its 2003 report, including improving communication, performance management, and employee involvement. The Administrator appointed in 2006 emphasized the importance of transparency in his reform agenda and took actions to improve communications across the agency. The development of a performance management framework was a key step in linking the agency's reforms with strategic goals and employee roles. The Administrator also made a concerted effort to engage SBA's employees in improving the agency, and meetings with employees affirmed that these efforts had a positive effect. Some employees continued to feel that management does not consider their ideas and concerns. SBA recently conducted focus groups to understand these concerns and plans to implement initiatives to address them. SBA senior officials also said that they are taking steps to institutionalize these improvements. SBA leadership's commitment will be important to ensure that the agency's transformation and reforms are successful. SBA took some actions to address its low employee morale, which had declined significantly following the centralization efforts, as shown in the 2004 and 2006 Federal Human Capital Surveys. SBA's 2007 survey results suggest that these recent actions, such as improving communication and training, have had a positive impact on employees. The creation of SBA University in 2007 was an important action since it provided training and also showed that the agency was willing to invest resources in the development of employees. SBA officials said they are developing a core training program. However, SBA has not developed a training plan that lays out goals, strategies, and milestones. Such a plan would help to establish priorities and could assure employees that SBA remains committed to developing its employees. SBA continues to define the roles and responsibilities of the district offices, as evidenced by its recent determination that district offices should retain a role in loan processes that have been centralized. District directors and employees made positive comments about the flexibility they had in using resources to meet office goals. But they also said that they still were adjusting to new responsibilities and the reduction of staff in their offices. SBA recently re-engineered its guaranty purchase process. Its measures to track progress have emphasized the timeliness of the process, completeness of packages lenders submit, and customer service. SBA reviews each purchase decision and is developing a new quality assurance review process, but has not yet developed performance measures to track the quality of its purchase reviews. SBA Inspector General audits have noted concerns about the quality of purchase reviews and found that the center's purchase reviews do not adequately prevent improper payments. Performance measures could provide more attention to the quality of reviews. |
gao_GAO-05-397T | gao_GAO-05-397T_0 | Acting soon would also allow changes to be phased in so that the individuals who are most likely to be affected, namely younger and future workers, will have time to adjust their retirement planning while helping to avoid related “expectation gaps.” On the other hand, failure to take remedial action will, in combination with other entitlement spending, lead to a situation unsustainable both for the federal government and, ultimately, the economy. The Nature of Social Security’s Long-Term Financing Problem
As you all know, Social Security has always been a largely pay-as-you-go system. Now, however, people are living longer, and spending more time in retirement. Taken together, these trends threaten the financial solvency and sustainability of Social Security. If we did nothing until 2042—the year SSA estimates the Trust Funds will be exhausted—achieving actuarial balance would require changes in benefits of 30 percent or changes in taxes of 43 percent for the period 2042-2078. However, these changes do not achieve sustainable solvency, they only achieve solvency through 2078. Social Security Reform is Part of a Broader Fiscal and Economic Challenge
As I have already discussed, reducing the relative future burdens of Social Security and health programs is essential to a sustainable budget policy for the longer term. Accordingly, substantive reform of Social Security and our major health programs remains critical to recapturing our future fiscal flexibility. Social Security remains the foundation of the nation’s retirement system. It is also much more than just a retirement program; it pays benefits to disabled workers and their dependents, spouses and children of retired workers, and survivors of deceased workers. Our criteria aim to balance financial and economic considerations with benefit adequacy and equity issues and the administrative challenges associated with various proposals. Proposals also differ in the manner in which accounts would be financed, the extent of choice and flexibility concerning investment options, the way in which benefits are paid out, and the way the accounts would interact with the existing Social Security program—individual accounts could serve either as an addition to or as a replacement for part of the current benefit structure. Social Security Reform Should be Considered in the Context of Broader Challenges
Other broader concerns for Social Security reform include evaluating a proposal’s effect on national saving and a proposal’s implications for other sources of retirement income, access to long-term care and retirement security generally. In addition to the issues I have discussed regarding the financing challenges that Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid face, the nation also faces serious challenges associated with the private pension system and long-term care financing. Given the broader fiscal challenges that our nation faces and the potential future changes to Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, as well as the state of private pensions and long-term care trends, it is even more important that individuals are educated about what to expect in retirement. The fact is, compared to addressing our long-range health care financing problem, reforming Social Security should be easy lifting. Furthermore, absent reform, younger workers will face dramatic benefit reductions or tax increases that will grow over time. We at GAO look forward to continuing to work with this Committee and the Congress in addressing this and other important issues facing our nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security is the foundation of the nation's retirement income system, helping to protect the vast majority of American workers and their families from poverty in old age. However, it is much more than a retirement program, also providing millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivors' benefits. Over the long term, as the baby boom generation retires and as Americans continue to live longer and have fewer children, Social Security's financing shortfall presents a major program solvency and sustainability challenge that is widening as time passes. The House Committee on Ways and Means asked GAO to discuss the need for Social Security reform. This testimony addresses the nature of Social Security's long-term financing problem and why it would be prudent for Congress to take action sooner rather than later. This testimony also notes the broader context in which reform proposals should be considered and the criteria that GAO has recommended as a basis for analyzing any Social Security reform proposals.
What GAO Found
Although the Social Security system is not in crisis, it faces a serious solvency and sustainability challenge that is growing as time passes. If we do nothing until 2042, achieving actuarial balance would require a 30-percent reduction in benefits or a 43-percent increase in payroll taxes for the period 2042-2078. Furthermore, Social Security's problems are a subset of the grave fiscal challenge facing our nation. Absent changes in budget policy, the nation will ultimately have to choose among escalating federal deficits and debt, huge tax increases and/or dramatic budget cuts. As GAO's long-term budget simulations show, substantive reform of Social Security and our major federal health programs (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) is critical to saving our nation's fiscal future. Taking action soon would serve to reduce the magnitude of changes needed to ensure that Social Security is solvent, sustainable, and secure for current and future generations. It would also allow time to phase in certain changes and time for individuals to adjust to any such changes. Acting sooner would also serve to improve the federal government's credibility with financial markets and bolster the confidence of the American people in our government's ability to address long-range financial challenges. However, financial solvency and sustainability should not be the only consideration when evaluating Social Security reform proposals. Other key objectives, such as balancing the adequacy and equity of the benefit structure and various administrative and operational issues need to be considered. Furthermore, any changes to Social Security should be considered in the context both of the whole program--including disability and survivors' benefits--and of the broader challenges facing our nation, such as the changing nature of the private pension system, long-term care needs, escalating health care costs, and the need to reform the Medicare and Medicaid programs. |
gao_T-GGD-99-47 | gao_T-GGD-99-47_0 | INS Still Failed to Identify All Deportable Criminal Aliens, Including Aggravated Felons
As was the case when we reported to this Subcommittee in July 1997, we again found that INS had not identified all potentially deportable imprisoned criminal aliens. This is important because federal law requires INS to initiate removal proceedings for aggravated felons while they are incarcerated and, to the extent possible, complete deportation proceedings for these felons before their release from prison. According to the INS and EOIR databases, none of the 1,903 potentially deportable criminal aliens had been in removal proceedings while they were in prison or afterward, had been taken into INS custody, or had been deported. We asked LESC to provide us with information on the nature of the crimes for which the 80 criminal aliens were rearrested. INS Did Not Complete the IHP For About Half of the Released Criminal Aliens, Incurring Millions in Avoidable Detention Costs
Our analysis of data from the first 6 months of 1997 revealed that 12,495 released inmates were, according to INS and EOIR databases, potentially deportable. We found that about 45 percent of these inmates were released from prison with a final deportation order (having completed the IHP), about 3 percent were released from prison without a deportation order but with INS’ having completed the removal hearing process, and about 36 percent were released from prison before INS completed the process. Not completing removal proceedings during incarceration means that INS has to use its limited detention space to house released criminal aliens rather than using the space to detain other aliens. INS Has Not Fully Implemented Our Recommendations
At the 1997 hearing, the Chairman urged INS to fully implement GAO’s recommendations for improving the IHP. In 1997, we recommended that the Commissioner of INS give priority to aliens serving time for aggravated felonies by establishing controls to ensure that these aliens (1) are identified from among the universe of foreign-born inmates provided by BOP and the states, (2) are placed into removal proceedings while in prison, and (3) are taken into custody upon their release. INS had not resolved the problem of high attrition among immigration agents, who are considered the backbone of the IHP. Conclusions
Despite its assertions at last year’s hearing, INS generally showed limited improvement in its IHP performance based on our analysis of INS’ 1997 program performance. This, coupled with INS’ slow response to our recommendations, suggests that INS still does not know whether it has identified all potentially deportable criminal aliens in the BOP and state prison systems. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) efforts to initiate and complete removal proceedings for criminal aliens in state and federal prisons through its Institutional Hearing Program (IHP).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the IHP is a cooperative program involving the INS, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), and federal and state correctional agencies; (2) it was formally established in 1988 to enable INS and EOIR to complete removal proceedings for criminal aliens while they were still serving their sentences, thus eliminating the need for INS agents to locate aliens after their release, and freeing up INS detention space for other cases; (3) with the proceedings complete, expeditious removal of criminal aliens upon completion of their sentences can occur; (4) federal law requires the Attorney General to initiate and, to the extent possible, complete removal proceedings for aggravated felons before their release from incarceration; (5) INS has been delegated the authority to enforce immigration laws; (6) in 1997, GAO reported that INS needed to improve its efforts to identify potentially deportable criminal aliens in federal and state prisons and complete the IHP for the aliens before they were released; (7) this conclusion is based on GAO's analysis of data provided by the Federal Bureau of Prisons and five states on foreign-born inmates who were released from prison between April and September, 1995; (8) INS' Executive Associate Commissioner for Programs told the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and claims that INS had improved program operations since 1995; (9) in response, the Subcommittee asked GAO to review program performance during 1997; (10) although GAO's results indicated that INS' performance had shown some improvement, GAO continues to have the same concerns about the IHP; (11) in 1997, INS still had not identified many potentially deportable aliens while they were in prison; (12) the majority of these released criminal aliens were aggravated felons, some of whom were reconvicted for new felonies; (13) INS completed the IHP for about half of the released criminal aliens it identified as potentially deportable while they were in prison; (14) because INS had to detain aliens who did not complete the hearing process in prison, INS incurred approximately $40 million in avoidable detention costs; and (15) in addition, INS had not fully implemented the recommendations GAO made in the 1997 report to improve the IHP. |
gao_GAO-07-1108T | gao_GAO-07-1108T_0 | VA and DOD Have Been Working to Exchange Health Information Since 1998
For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share data in their health information systems and create comprehensive electronic records. However, the departments have faced considerable challenges, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates for accomplishment. As shown in figure 1, the departments’ efforts have involved a number of distinct initiatives, both long-term initiatives to develop future modernized solutions, and short-term initiatives to respond to more immediate needs to share information in existing systems. A longer term initiative was to develop a common health information architecture that would allow the two-way exchange of health information. These were two demonstration projects: the Laboratory Data Sharing Interface, aimed at allowing VA and DOD facilities to share laboratory resources, and the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange (BHIE), aimed at allowing both departments’ clinicians access to records on shared patients (that is, those who receive care from both departments). In addition, the two departments have undertaken ad hoc activities to accelerate the transmission of health information on severely wounded patients from DOD to VA’s four polytrauma centers. VA and DOD Have Begun Deployment of a Modernized Data Interface
In their long-term effort to share health information, VA and DOD have completed the development of their modernized data repositories, agreed on standards for various types of data, and begun to populate the repositories with these data. The first release has enabled the seven sites to share limited medical information: specifically, computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy information for shared patients. Besides being a milestone in the development of the departments’ modernized systems, the interface implementation provides benefits to the departments’ current systems. Once in the repositories, these computable data can be used by DOD and VA at all sites through their existing systems. Although implementing this interface is an important accomplishment, the departments are still a long way from completion of the modernized health information systems and comprehensive longitudinal health records. Consequently, it is essential for the departments to develop a comprehensive project plan to guide these efforts to completion, as we have previously recommended. VA and DOD Are Exchanging Limited Health Information through Short-Term Projects
In addition to the long-term effort described above, the two departments have made some progress in meeting immediate needs to share information in their respective legacy systems by setting up short-term projects, as mentioned earlier, which are in various stages of completion. DOD staff also pointed out that this laborious process is feasible only because the number of polytrauma patients is small (about 350 in all to date); it would not be practical on a large scale. Although these various efforts to transfer medical information on seriously wounded patients are working, and the departments are to be commended on their efforts, the multiple processes and laborious manual tasks illustrate the effects of the lack of integrated health information systems and the difficulties of exchanging information in their absence. However, these exchanges are as yet limited, and significant work remains to be done to fully achieve the goal of exchanging interoperable, computable data, including agreeing to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populating the data repositories with all this information, completing the development of HealtheVet VistA and AHLTA, and transitioning from the legacy systems. Further, it is not clear how all the initiatives we have described today are to be incorporated into an overall strategy toward achieving the departments’ goal of comprehensive, seamless exchange of health information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in ongoing efforts to share medical information, which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active-duty military personnel and veterans. These efforts include a long-term program to develop modernized health information systems based on computable data: that is, data in a format that a computer application can act on--for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies. In addition, the departments are engaged in short-term initiatives involving existing systems. GAO was asked to summarize its recent testimony on the history and current status of these long- and short-term efforts to share health information. To develop that testimony, GAO reviewed its previous work, analyzed documents, and interviewed VA and DOD officials about current status and future plans.
What GAO Found
For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share health information and create comprehensive electronic medical records. However, they have faced considerable challenges in these efforts, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates. In prior reviews of the departments' efforts, GAO noted management weaknesses, including the lack of a detailed project management plan to guide their efforts. Currently, the two departments are pursuing both long- and short-term initiatives to share health information. Under their long-term initiative, the modern health information systems being developed by each department are to share standardized computable data through an interface between data repositories associated with each system. The repositories have now been developed, and the departments have begun to populate them with limited types of health information. In addition, the interface between the repositories has been implemented at seven VA and DOD sites, allowing computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data to be exchanged. Implementing this interface is a milestone toward the departments' long-term goal, but more remains to be done. Besides extending the current capability throughout VA and DOD, the departments must still agree to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populate the data repositories with this information, complete the development of the two modernized health information systems, and transition from their existing systems. While pursuing their long-term effort to develop modernized systems, the two departments have also been working to share information in their existing systems. Among various short-term initiatives are a completed effort to allow the one-way transfer of health information from DOD to VA when service members leave the military, as well as ongoing demonstration projects to exchange limited data at selected sites. One of these projects, building on the one-way transfer capability, developed an interface between certain existing systems that allows a two-way view of current data on patients receiving care from both departments. VA and DOD are now working to link other systems via this interface and extend its capabilities. The departments have also established ad hoc processes to meet the immediate need to provide data on severely wounded service members to VA's polytrauma centers, which specialize in treating such patients. These processes include manual workarounds (such as scanning paper records) that are generally feasible only because the number of polytrauma patients is small. These multiple initiatives and ad hoc processes highlight the need for continued efforts to integrate information systems and automate information exchange. However, it is not clear how all the initiatives are to be incorporated into an overall strategy focused on achieving the departments' goal of comprehensive, seamless exchange of health information. |
gao_GAO-05-428T | gao_GAO-05-428T_0 | The Army has determined that it needs more agile forces. FCS is a family of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an information network. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that strategy, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; the Program Manager for the Unit of Action (previously known as Future Combat Systems); the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator; and LSI One Team contractors. The FCS Program Is An Unprecedented Challenge
The FCS program faces significant challenges in setting requirements, developing systems, financing development, and managing the effort. The Requirements Challenge
The Army wants the FCS-equipped unit of action to be as lethal and survivable as the current heavy force, but to be significantly more responsive and sustainable. For example: First-of-a-kind network will have to be developed that will entail development of unprecedented capabilities—on-the-move communications, high-speed data transmission, dramatically increased bandwidth, and simultaneous voice, data and video; The design and integration of 18 major weapon systems or platforms has to be done simultaneously and within strict size and weight limitations; At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving FCS’ critical performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated into the system-of-systems; Synchronizing the development, demonstration, and production of as many as 157 complementary systems with the FCS content and schedule. Yet, even with these improvements, the FCS is still at significant risk for not delivering planned capability within budgeted resources. This risk stems from the scope of the program’s technical challenges and the low level of knowledge demonstrated thus far. Key decisions, such as its planned 2007 production decision, are expected to occur before critical knowledge is captured. It may be several years before the program reaches the level of knowledge it should have had at program start. The Army employed lower standards than recommended by best practices or DOD policy in determining technologies acceptable for the FCS program. While DOD has found it acceptable to accommodate such problems over the years, this will be a difficult proposition for the FCS given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly competitive environment for investment funds. They are separate programs from the FCS, and their costs are not included in the costs of the FCS. Consequently, the Cluster 5 radios are not likely to be available for the first FCS spiral either. Manned Ground Vehicles
FCS includes eight manned ground vehicles, which require critical individual and common technologies to meet required capabilities. In 2004, GAO reported a similar situation with the Stryker vehicles. Although the program restructuring provides more time to resolve risk and to demonstrate progress, the knowledge base for making a confident estimate is still low. For example, a one-year delay late in FCS development, not an uncommon occurrence for other DOD programs, could cost over $3 billion. Such a spiral should meet the standards of providing a worthwhile military capability, having mature technology, and having firm requirements. Other capabilities currently in the FCS program could be moved out of system development and demonstration and instead be bundled into advanced technology demonstrations that could develop and experiment with advanced technologies in the more conducive environment of “pre- acquisition” until they are ready to be put into a future spiral. Advancing technologies in this way will enable knowledge to guide decisions on requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future spirals. | Why GAO Did This Study
FCS is the core of Army efforts to create a lighter, more agile, capable force: a $108 billion investment to provide a new generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by an information network. Although system development and demonstration began in May 2003, the program was restructured in July 2004, including processes to make FCS capabilities available to current forces. GAO has been asked to assess (1) FCS technical and managerial challenges; (2) prospects for delivering FCS within cost and scheduled objectives; and (3) options for proceeding.
What GAO Found
In its unprecedented complexity, FCS confronts the Army with significant technical and managerial challenges in its requirements, development, finance, and management. Technical challenges include the need for FCS vehicles to be smaller, weigh less, and be as lethal and survivable as current vehicles, which requires (1) a network to collect and deliver vast amounts of intelligence and communications information and (2) individual systems, such as manned ground vehicles, that are as complex as fighter aircraft. Its cost will be very high: its first increment--enough to equip about 1/3 of the force--will cost over $108 billion, with annual funding requests running from $3 billion to $9 billion per year. The program's pace and complexity also pose significant management challenges. The Army is using a Lead System Integrator to manage FCS and is using a contracting instrument--Other Transaction Agreement--that allows for more flexible negotiation of roles, responsibilities, and rights with the integrator. The FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources. Currently, about 9.5 years is allowed from development start to production decision. DOD typically needs this period of time to develop a single advanced system, yet FCS is far greater in scope. The program's level of knowledge is far below that suggested by best practices or DOD policy: Nearly 2 years after program launch and with $4.6 billion invested, requirements are not firm and only 1 of over 50 technologies are mature. As planned, the program will attain the level of knowledge in 2008 that it should have had in 2003, but things are not going as planned. Progress in critical areas--such as the network, software, and requirements--has in fact been slower, and FCS is therefore likely to encounter problems late in development, when they are very costly to correct. Given the scope of the program, the impact of cost growth could be dire. To make FCS an effective acquisition program different approaches must be considered, including (1) setting the first stage of the program to demonstrate a worthwhile military capability, mature technology, and firm requirements; and (2) bundling its other capabilities into advanced technology demonstrators until they can be put in a future stage, which will provide guidance for decisions on requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future stages. |
gao_GAO-09-57 | gao_GAO-09-57_0 | DHS is the cabinet level department with primary responsibility for helping to secure highway infrastructure. Within the transportation sector, IP works with TSA to identify nationally critical highway assets. Federal Entities Have Initiated Efforts to Assess Risks to Highway Infrastructure, But Coordination of These Efforts is Limited
Several federal entities have efforts underway to assess threat, vulnerability, and consequence—the three elements of risk—for highway infrastructure; however, these assessments have not been systematically coordinated among key federal partners. While TSA has stated that it intends to conduct individual assessments on all bridge and tunnel properties that it has identified as critical, TSA does not plan to begin those assessments until our review is completed. Federal Risk Assessment Activities Have Been Hampered by Limited Coordination
While federal entities are conducting a number of individual efforts to assess highway infrastructure risks, they have not systematically coordinated these efforts or shared the results. DHS’s Highway Modal Annex Does Not Fully Incorporate Risk Assessment Results
In May 2007, TSA published the Highway Modal Annex which documents DHS’s strategy for securing the nation’s highway infrastructure; however, while both the NIPP and the TSSP outline a framework whereby infrastructure protection efforts are to be guided by risk assessments of critical assets, the TSSP Highway Modal Annex is not fully informed by available vulnerability and consequence information. Without considering the results of available risk assessments, TSA is limited in its ability to assist highway infrastructure operators in prioritizing investments based on risk, and target resources towards security measures that will have the greatest impact. Government and Industry Stakeholders Have Efforts Underway to Enhance the Security of Highway Infrastructure, but TSA Lacks a Mechanism to Monitor Implementation of Voluntary Security Measures
Government and industry highway sector stakeholders have taken actions to mitigate the risks to highway infrastructure through a combination of efforts, including developing publications and conducting seminars, sponsoring research and development activities, and implementing specific infrastructure protection measures. TSA is tasked with assessing and evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of current federal government surface transportation security initiatives. Lacking a mechanism to monitor what protective security measures are being implemented to protect the nation’s critical highway infrastructure assets, TSA is unable to determine, with any degree of certainty, the level of overall security preparedness of these assets. To help ensure that highway infrastructure stakeholders are provided with useful information to identify and prioritize potential infrastructure security measures, enhance future planning efforts, and determine the extent to which specific protective security measures have been implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration, in consultation with the Highway Government Coordinating Council and the Highway Sector Coordinating Council, to take the following actions: (1) for the upcoming revision to the Highway Modal Annex: in addition to the results of threat assessment information, incorporate the results of available vulnerability, and consequence assessment information into the strategy for securing highway infrastructure; consistent with Executive Order 13416 and desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, identify existing guidance developed by other federal and state highway infrastructure stakeholders; indicate timeframes or milestones for its overall implementation for which entities can be held responsible; more clearly define security-related roles and responsibilities for highway infrastructure security activities for itself and other federal stakeholders, state and local government, and the private sector; establish a timeframe for developing performance goals and measures for monitoring the implementation of the Annex’s goals, objectives, and activities; and provide more guidance on resources, investments and risk management to help implementing parties allocate resources and investments according to priorities and constraints; and (2) develop a cost-effective mechanism to monitor the implementation of voluntary protective security measures on highway infrastructure assets identified as nationally critical. Toward this goal, DHS stated that TSA has convened representatives of both DHS and DOT agencies to produce the “National Strategy for Highway Bridge Security,” which is currently under review by agencies and offices within both Departments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
You asked us to assess the progress DHS has made in securing the nation’s highway infrastructure. To what extent has DHS developed a risk-based strategy, consistent with applicable federal guidance and characteristics of an effective national strategy, to guide its highway infrastructure security efforts? This study seeks approaches to address critical vulnerabilities in U.S. transportation tunnels. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's highway transportation system is vast and open--vehicles and their operators can move freely and with almost no restrictions. Securing the U.S. highway infrastructure system is a responsibility shared by federal, state and local government, and the private sector. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has primary responsibility for ensuring the security of the sector. GAO was asked to assess the progress DHS has made in securing the nation's highway infrastructure. This report addresses the extent to which federal entities have conducted and coordinated risk assessments; DHS has developed a risk-based strategy; and stakeholders, such as state and local transportation entities, have taken voluntary actions to secure highway infrastructure -- and the degree to which DHS has monitored such actions. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed risk assessment results and TSA's documented security strategy, and conducted interviews with highway stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Federal entities have several efforts underway to assess threat, vulnerability, and consequence--the three elements of risk--for highway infrastructure; however, these efforts have not been systematically coordinated among key federal partners and the results are not routinely shared. Several component agencies and offices within DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) are conducting individual risk assessment efforts of highway infrastructure vulnerabilities, and collectively have completed assessments of most of the critical highway assets identified in 2007. However, key DHS entities reported that they were not coordinating these activities or sharing the results. According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, TSA is responsible for coordinating risk assessment programs. Establishing mechanisms to enhance coordination of risk assessments among key federal partners could strengthen and validate assessments and leverage limited federal resources. DHS, through TSA, has developed and implemented a strategy to guide highway infrastructure security efforts, but the strategy is not informed by available risk assessments and lacks some key characteristics GAO has identified for effective national strategies. In May 2007, TSA issued the Highway Modal Annex, which is intended to serve as the principal strategy for implementing key programs for securing highway infrastructure. While its completion was an important first step to guide protection efforts, GAO identified a number of limitations that may influence its effectiveness. For example, the Annex is not fully based on available risk information, although DHS's Transportation Systems -Sector Plan and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan call for risk information to be used to guide all protection efforts. Lacking such information, DHS cannot provide reasonable assurance that its current strategy is effectively addressing security gaps, prioritizing investments based on risk, and targeting resources toward security measures that will have the greatest impact. GAO also identified a number of additional characteristics of effective national strategies that were missing or incomplete in the current Highway Modal Annex. Federal entities, along with other highway sector stakeholders, have taken a variety of actions to mitigate risks to highway infrastructure; however, DHS, through TSA, lacks a mechanism to determine the extent to which voluntary security measures have been employed to protect critical assets. Specifically, highway stakeholders have developed publications and training, conducted research and development activities, and implemented specific voluntary protective measures for infrastructure assets, such as fencing and cameras. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to monitor protective measures implemented for critical highway infrastructure assets, although TSA is tasked with evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of federal initiatives to secure surface transportation modes. Without such a monitoring mechanism, TSA cannot determine the level of security preparedness of the nation's critical highway infrastructure. |
gao_GAO-15-448 | gao_GAO-15-448_0 | We identified weaknesses in two of the four screening procedures CMS implemented to prevent and detect ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers and suppliers from enrolling in PECOS: the verification of practice location and of licensure status. CMS’s procedures to screen for providers and suppliers listed as deceased or excluded from participating in federal programs or health care–related programs appear to be working, but we identified a few instances of ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers and suppliers that we referred to CMS for further review. On the basis of our additional analysis of the generalizable sample of 496 addresses, we estimate the following:
About 23,400 (22 percent) of the 105,234 addresses that we initially identified as a CMRA, vacant, or invalid address are potentially ineligible for Medicare providers and suppliers. This provider was not paid by Medicare from September 2013 through December 2013 data. However, by being enrolled in PECOS, this provider may be eligible to bill Medicare in the future. Limitations Exist in Verifying Applicants’ Licensure Information
All physicians applying to enroll in the Medicare program must hold an active license in the state in which they plan to practice. Further, CMS only requires MACs to verify final adverse actions that the applicant self-reported on the application. To improve oversight of the provider-license review process, in March 2014 CMS began providing the License Continuous Monitoring (LCM) report to MACs. Further, the LCM report is limited to only those license numbers used to enroll into the Medicare program. Some licenses of providers with multiple medical licenses would not appear in the LCM report because they were not used to enroll into Medicare. We found that 321 out of about 1.3 million physicians with active PECOS profiles as of March 29, 2013 (the most-current data available at the time of our review) had received an adverse action from a state medical board related to conduct such as crimes against persons (e.g., battery, rape, or assault), financial or related crimes (e.g., extortion, embezzlement, income-tax evasion, or insurance fraud), and felony crimes outlined in section 1128 of the Social Security Act (e.g., substance abuse, health-care fraud, or patient abuse) that resulted in a revocation or suspension of their licenses sometime between March 29, 2003, and March 29, 2013. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the Medicare provider and supplier enrollment-screening procedures, we recommend that the Acting Administrator of CMS take the following three actions: 1. modify the CMS software integrated into PECOS to include specific flags to help identify potentially questionable practice location addresses, such as Commercial Mail Receiving Agency (CMRA), vacant, and invalid addresses; 2. revise CMS guidance for verifying practice locations to include, at a minimum, the requirements contained in CMS’s guidance in place prior to March 2014 so that MACs conduct additional research, beyond phone calls to applicants, on the practice location addresses that are flagged as a CMRA, vacant, or invalid to better ensure that the address meets CMS’s practice location criteria; and 3. collect information on all licenses held by providers that enroll in PECOS by using data sources that contain this information, including licenses obtained from other states, and expand the License Continuous Monitoring (LCM) report to include all licenses, and at least annually review databases, such as that of the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), to check for disciplinary actions. In its comments, HHS concurred with two of our three recommendations, but disagreed with the recommendation to revise its guidance. We continue to believe this action is needed, as discussed below. HHS did not agree with the recommendation to revise its guidance for verifying practice locations to include, at a minimum, the requirement contained in CMS’s guidance in place prior to March 2014 so that MACs conduct additional research, beyond phone calls to applicants, on the practice location addresses that are flagged as a CMRA, vacant, or invalid. Without obtaining all licenses from a provider, as we did, CMS does not have the ability to verify whether all final adverse actions were reported. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
GAO was asked to assess Medicare’s provider and supplier enrollment- screening procedures to determine whether the Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS) was vulnerable to fraud. To assess the extent to which CMS’s enrollment-screening procedures are designed to prevent and detect the enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent Medicare providers, suppliers, and DMEPOS suppliers into PECOS, we reviewed CMS procedural manuals and directives including the Program Integrity Manual that outlines the procedures that Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC) and the National Supplier Clearinghouse (NSC) should use to determine provider and supplier enrollment eligibility. Of the 321 physicians, 147 were either not revoked from the Medicare program until months after the adverse action or never removed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, Medicare paid $554 billion for health care and related services. CMS estimates that $60 billion (about 10 percent) of that total was paid improperly. To establish and maintain Medicare billing privileges, providers and suppliers must be enrolled in a CMS database known as PECOS. About 1.8 million providers and suppliers were in PECOS as of December 2014, according to CMS.
GAO was asked to assess Medicare's provider and supplier enrollment-screening procedures to determine whether PECOS was vulnerable to fraud. This report examines the extent to which CMS's enrollment-screening procedures are designed and implemented to prevent enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent Medicare providers. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed CMS officials, and contacted the 12 CMS contractors that evaluate provider applications. GAO matched providers and suppliers in PECOS, as of March 2013, to several databases to identify potentially ineligible providers and suppliers, and used 2005–2013 Medicare claims data to verify whether they were paid during this period.
What GAO Found
GAO examined the implementation of four enrollment screening procedures that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) uses to prevent and detect ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers and suppliers from enrolling into its Provider Enrollment, Chain and Ownership System (PECOS). Two of CMS's procedures appear to be working to screen for providers and suppliers listed as deceased or excluded from participating in federal programs or health care–related programs. However, GAO identified the following weaknesses in the other two procedures: CMS's verification of provider practice location and physician licensure status.
First, Medicare providers are required to submit the address of the actual practice location from which they offer services. GAO's examination of 2013 data found that about 23,400 of 105,234 (22 percent) of practice location addresses are potentially ineligible. The computer software CMS uses as a method to validate applicants' addresses does not flag potentially ineligible addresses, such as those that are of a Commercial Mail Receiving Agency (such as a UPS store mailbox), vacant, or invalid addresses. In addition, CMS's March 2014 guidance has reduced the amount of independent verification conducted by contractors, thereby increasing the program's vulnerability to potential fraud. For example, the figure below shows a mailbox located within a UPS store that an applicant reported as a practice location, which CMS contractors inaccurately verified as an authentic practice location under CMS's new guidance, which allows contractors to use phone calls as the primary means for verifying provider addresses.
Second, physicians applying to participate in the Medicare program must hold an active license in the state they plan to practice and self-report final adverse actions, such as a suspension or revocation by any state licensing authority. CMS requires its contractors to verify final adverse actions that the applicant self-reported on the application directly with state medical board websites. In March 2014, CMS began providing a report to its Medicare contractors to improve their oversight of physician license reviews. However, the report only includes the medical license numbers providers use to enroll into the Medicare program, but not adverse-action history or other medical licenses a provider may have in other states that were not used to enroll into Medicare. GAO found 147 out of about 1.3 million physicians listed as eligible to bill Medicare who, as of March 2013, had received a final adverse action from a state medical board for crimes against persons, financial crimes, and other types of felonies but were either not revoked from the Medicare program until months after the adverse action or never removed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS incorporate flags into its software to help identify potentially questionable addresses, revise its 2014 guidance for verifying practice locations, and collect additional license information. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with two of the three recommendations, but did not agree with the recommendation to revise its guidance. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-695T | gao_GAO-09-695T_0 | Background
The United States is the largest consumer of crude oil and petroleum products. Except for the 1998 report, DOE concluded that including refined petroleum products as part of the SPR was unnecessary and too expensive. Although this reserve is considered separate from the SPR, it is authorized to contain 2 million barrels of heating oil and currently holds nearly that amount. Some of the Arguments For and Against Including Refined Petroleum Products in the SPR
Some of the arguments for including refined petroleum products in the SPR are: (1) the United States’ increased reliance on foreign imports and resulting exposure to supply disruptions or unexpected increases in demand elsewhere in the world, (2) possible reduced refinery capacity during weather related supply disruptions, (3) time needed for petroleum product imports to reach all regions of the United States in case of an emergency, and (4) port capacity bottlenecks in the United States which limit the amount of petroleum products that can be imported quickly during emergencies. Some of the arguments against including refined petroleum products in the SPR are: (1) the surplus of gasoline in Europe, (2) the high storage costs of refined products, (3) the use of ‘boutique’ fuels in the United States, and (4) policy alternatives may diminish U.S. reliance on oil. For example, petroleum product prices still increased dramatically following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in part because many refineries are located in the Gulf Coast region and power outages shut down pipelines that refineries depend upon to supply their crude oil and to transport their refined petroleum products to consumers. Some of the Arguments Against Including Refined Petroleum Products in the SPR
First, a key impetus for global trade in petroleum products has been a structural surplus in production of gasoline and a deficit in production of diesel in Europe. According to DOE, stockpiling oil in salt caverns costs about $3.50 per barrel in capital costs. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, as amended, directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a program that includes grants to automobile manufacturers to encourage domestic production of these vehicles. Lessons Learned from the Management of the Existing SPR that May Be Relevant to Refined Petroleum Products
The following three lessons learned from the management of the existing crude oil SPR highlight some of the issues that may need to be considered in acquiring refined petroleum products. Select a cost-effective mix of products. To fill the SPR in a more cost- effective manner, we recommended in August 2006 that DOE include in the SPR at least 10 percent heavy crude oils, which are generally cheaper to acquire than the lighter oils that comprise the SPR’s volume. For example, if DOE included 10 percent heavy oil in the SPR as it expands to 1 billion barrels, that would require DOE to add 100 million barrels of heavy oil, or about one-third of the total new fill. If this price difference were to persist over the duration of the new fill period, DOE would save about $1.2 billion in nominal terms by filling the SPR with 100 million barrels of heavy oil. Similarly, refined petroleum products included as part of the SPR may comprise a number of different types of products (e.g., gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel) and possibly different blends of products (e.g., different grades and mixtures of gasoline); DOE will need to determine the most cost-effective mix of products in light of existing legal and regulatory requirements to use specific blends of fuels. Consider using a dollar-cost-averaging acquisition approach. Also in our August 2006 report, we recommended that DOE consider filling the SPR by acquiring a steady dollar value of oil over time, rather than a steady volume as has occurred in recent years. This “dollar-cost-averaging” approach would allow DOE to take advantage of fluctuations in oil prices and ensure that more oil would be acquired when prices are low and less when prices are high. We would expect a dollar-cost-averaging acquisition method to also provide positive benefits when acquiring refined petroleum products. Maximize cost-effective storage options. According to DOE, salt formations offer the lowest cost, most environmentally secure way to store crude oil for long periods of time. In comparison, storing oil in above-ground tanks can cost $15 to $18 per barrel. Similarly, for those refined petroleum products that can be stored below ground, salt formations may offer a cost-effective storage option. | Why GAO Did This Study
The possibility of storing refined petroleum products as part of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has been contemplated since the SPR was created in 1975. The SPR, which currently holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil, was created to help insulate the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions. However, the SPR does not contain refined products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to increase the SPR's capacity from 727 million barrels to 1 billion barrels, which it plans to do by 2018. With the possibility of including refined products as part of the expansion of the SPR, this testimony discusses (1) some of the arguments for and against including refined products in the SPR and (2) lessons learned from the management of the existing crude oil SPR that may be applicable to refined products. To address these issues, GAO relied on its 2006 report on the SPR (GAO-06-872), 2007 report on the globalization of petroleum products (GAO-08-14), and two 2008 testimonies on the cost-effectiveness of filling the SPR ( GAO-08-512T and GAO-08-726T). GAO also reviewed prior DOE and International Energy Agency studies on refined product reserves.
What GAO Found
Since the SPR, the largest emergency crude oil reserve in the world, was created in 1975 a number of arguments have been made for and against including refined petroleum products. Some of the arguments for including refined products in the SPR are: (1) the United States' increased reliance on imports and resulting exposure to supply disruptions or unexpected increases in demand elsewhere in the world, (2) possible reduced refinery capacity during weather related supply disruptions, (3) time needed for petroleum product imports to reach all regions of the United States in case of an emergency, and (4) port capacity bottlenecks in the United States, which limit the amount of petroleum products that can be imported quickly during emergencies. For example, the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the concentration of refineries on the Gulf Coast and resulting damage to pipelines left the United States to rely on imports of refined product from Europe. Consequently, regions experienced a shortage of gasoline and prices rose. Conversely, some of the arguments against including refined products in the SPR are: (1) the surplus of refined products in Europe, (2) the high storage costs of refined products, (3) the use of a variety of different type of blends of refined products--"boutique" fuels--in the United States, and (4) policy alternatives that may diminish reliance on oil. For example, Europe has a surplus of gasoline products because of a shift to diesel engines, which experts say will continue for the foreseeable future. Europe's surplus of gasoline is available to the United States in emergencies and provided deliveries following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. The following three lessons learned from the management of the existing SPR may have some applicability in dealing with refined products. (1) Select a cost-effective mix of products. In 2006, GAO recommended that DOE include at least 10 percent heavy crude oil in the SPR. If DOE bought 100 million barrels of heavy crude oil during its expansion of the SPR it could save over $1 billion in nominal terms, assuming a price differential of $12 between the price of light and heavy crude, the average differential from 2003 through 2007. Similarly, if directed to include refined products as part of the SPR, DOE will need to determine the most cost-effective mix of products. (2) Consider using a dollar-cost-averaging acquisition approach. Also in 2006, GAO recommended that DOE consider acquiring a steady dollar value--rather than a steady volume--of oil over time when filling the SPR. This would allow DOE to acquire more oil when prices are low and less when prices are high. GAO expects that a dollar-cost-averaging acquisition method would also provide benefits when acquiring refined products. (3) Maximize cost-effective storage options. According to DOE, below ground salt formations offer the lowest cost approach for storing crude oil for long periods of time--$3.50 per barrel in capital cost versus $15 to $18 per barrel for above ground storage tanks. Similarly, DOE will need to explore the most cost-effective storage options for refined products. |
gao_GAO-04-83 | gao_GAO-04-83_0 | To that end, we found that the demonstration projects took a variety of approaches to designing and implementing their pay for performance systems to meet the unique needs of their cultures and organizational structures. We strongly support the need to expand pay for performance in the federal government. How it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the difference in whether such efforts are successful. To this end, these demonstration projects show an understanding that how to better link pay to performance is very much a work in progress at the federal level. Additional work is needed to strengthen efforts to ensure that performance management systems are tools to help the demonstration projects manage on a day-to-day basis. In particular, there are opportunities to use organizationwide competencies to evaluate employee performance that reinforce behaviors and actions that support the organization's mission, translate employee performance so that managers can make meaningful distinctions between top and poor performers with objective and fact- based information, and provide information to employees about the results of the performance appraisals and pay decisions to ensure that reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms are in place. Agency Comments
We provided drafts of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce for their review and comment. While DOC did not submit written comments, DOC’s Classifcation, Pay, and HR Demonstration Program Manager provided minor technical clarifications and updated information. We provided a draft of the report to the Director of OPM for her information. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To meet our objective to identify the approaches that selected personnel demonstration projects have taken to implement their pay for performance systems, we chose the following demonstration projects: the Navy Demonstration Project at China Lake (China Lake), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers (NAVSEA) at Dahlgren and Newport, and the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo). We selected these demonstration projects based on our review of the projects and in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). | Why GAO Did This Study
There is a growing understanding that the federal government needs to fundamentally rethink its current approach to pay and to better link pay to individual and organizational performance. Federal agencies have been experimenting with pay for performance through the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) personnel demonstration projects. GAO identified the approaches that selected personnel demonstration projects have taken to implement their pay for performance systems. These projects include: the Navy Demonstration Project at China Lake (China Lake), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers (NAVSEA) at Dahlgren and Newport, and the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo). We selected these demonstration projects based on factors such as status of the project and makeup of employee groups covered. We provided drafts of this report to officials in the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOC for their review and comment. DOD provided written comments concurring with our report. DOC provided minor technical clarifications and updated information. We provided a draft of the report to the Director of OPM for her information.
What GAO Found
The demonstration projects took a variety of approaches to designing and implementing their pay for performance systems to meet the unique needs of their cultures and organizational structures. GAO strongly supports the need to expand pay for performance in the federal government. How it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the difference in whether such efforts are successful. High-performing organizations continuously review and revise their performance management systems. These demonstration projects show an understanding that how to better link pay to performance is very much a work in progress at the federal level. Additional work is needed to strengthen efforts to ensure that performance management systems are tools to help them manage on a day-to-day basis. In particular, there are opportunities to use organizationwide competencies to evaluate employee performance that reinforce behaviors and actions that support the organization's mission, translate employee performance so that managers make meaningful distinctions between top and poor performers with objective and fact-based information, and provide information to employees about the results of the performance appraisals and pay decisions to ensure reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms are in place. |
gao_GAO-10-364 | gao_GAO-10-364_0 | DOD Has Issued Documents to Facilitate Coordination, but Its Entities Lack Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities
While DOD has issued a number of strategies, policies, and guidance related to interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD entities lack clearly defined roles and responsibilities because key documents are outdated, are not fully integrated, or are not comprehensive. Because DOD’s law enforcement support directive has not been updated or superseded in 20 years, it is unclear which DOD office is responsible for coordinating with law enforcement agencies. By updating, integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of its strategy, policy, and guidance, DOD would be better positioned to improve and institutionalize its interagency coordination and external communication efforts for homeland defense and civil support matters. DOD Communicates with Federal Partners through Various Means, but Its Approach Could be Improved
DOD communicates with its federal interagency partners through numerous formal and informal forums, such as conferences, and documents; however, DOD has not clearly identified the roles and responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes with its federal partners through a single, readily accessible source for DOD’s federal partners that articulates such information. For example, the 2008 National Defense Strategy states that a unified “whole-of-government” approach is possible only when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners. DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Knowledge Regarding Exchanged DOD and Non- DOD Liaisons
While various DOD entities, such as NORTHCOM and ASD/HD, may be aware of the liaisons they have individually assigned to their federal partners, neither of these two entities nor any other DOD entity has comprehensive situational awareness of liaisons exchanged with other federal agencies. DOD Conducts Performance Assessments of Its Liaisons but Has Opportunities to Enhance Their Scope
DOD policy recognizes the need to conduct personnel performance assessments. However, DOD’s performance assessments of its liaisons are not focused on coordination competencies, and DOD does not consistently provide feedback to its federal partners about their liaisons’ performance. We also found that DOD did not consistently request input from its federal partners on the performance of its liaisons, nor did it provide input for the performance assessments of non-DOD liaisons working at DOD entities. Specifically, updates of such policy and guidance should include: DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support; DOD’s law enforcement support policy (or policies) that address the different missions of such support, including civil support, counterdrug, and counterterrorism support; DOD’s series of civil support policies and guidance (i.e., DOD’s directive and instruction 3025 series); DOD’s joint interagency coordination guidance (i.e., Joint Publication 3-08), ensuring sufficient and comprehensive coverage of homeland defense and civil support interagency coordination requirements and partners; and a policy document that clearly and specifically defines the relationships among ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and other combatant commanders, including interagency coordination and external communication roles and responsibilities for homeland defense and civil support. To facilitate and institutionalize a unified approach between DOD and its federal partners for interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and issue a partner guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support efforts. To determine the extent to which DOD has adopted and implemented key practices for managing homeland defense and civil support liaisons, we identified established best practices, reviewed related DOD documents, and interviewed officials from DOD and DOD’s federal partner agencies. To identify key practices for workforce management that can enhance interagency coordination, we reviewed prior GAO reports on human capital best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Numerous occurrences in the United States--both scheduled events and emergencies--require the Department of Defense (DOD) to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its homeland defense and civil support missions with a broad range of U.S. federal agencies. In response to congressional inquiry, GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1) identified clearly defined roles and responsibilities for DOD entities to facilitate interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support missions, (2) articulated to its federal partners the DOD entities' approach toward interagency coordination, and (3) adopted key practices for managing homeland defense and civil support liaisons. GAO reviewed numerous DOD policy and guidance documents and interviewed officials from DOD and its partner agencies, including the departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
What GAO Found
DOD has many strategy, policy, and guidance documents on interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil support missions; however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Key DOD documents are outdated, not integrated, or not comprehensive. Three separate directives, for example, respectively assign overlapping responsibilities related to law enforcement support to three different DOD entities. Because DOD's law enforcement support directive has not been updated or superseded since 1989, it is unclear which entity is responsible for certain coordination activities with law enforcement agencies. By updating, integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of its strategy, policy, and guidance, DOD will be better positioned to enhance and institutionalize its interagency coordination efforts for homeland defense and civil support. DOD makes great effort to communicate with its federal partners through conferences and other forums and multiple documents, but it lacks a single, readily accessible source for its interagency partners to find needed information about its processes. The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that a unified "whole-of-government" approach to national security issues requires that federal partner agencies understand core competencies, roles, and missions, and the National Response Framework highlights the value of using a common concise partner guide for this purpose. DOD's communication approach, however, relies largely on personal relationships that are subject to frequent rotation of both DOD and non-DOD personnel. DOD identified over 30 documents that embody its approach and processes for interagency coordination. A concise and readily accessible partner guide would provide incoming personnel from both DOD and other agencies information that could enhance their mutual understanding and facilitate a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency coordination. DOD has taken some actions to adopt key practices for managing homeland defense and civil support liaison personnel, but it has not fully implemented these practices. Key practices include situational awareness, staffing-needs assessments, position descriptions, training, and performance assessments. For example, while individual DOD entities may know the liaisons they have assigned to their federal partners, no single DOD entity knows the number or locations of all liaisons exchanged with other federal agencies. Also, while DOD policy recognizes the need to conduct personnel performance assessments, such assessments of its liaisons are not focused on coordination competencies, and DOD does not consistently request input from federal partners on the performance of its liaisons or provide feedback to its federal partners about their liaisons' performance. DOD could optimize its use of liaisons if it fully implemented current DOD human capital policies and issued policies and guidance for the remaining key practices identified above. |
gao_RCED-95-234 | gao_RCED-95-234_0 | The Benefits of Long-Term Batteries Are Clear, but Their Feasibility Is Uncertain
EVs with long-term batteries are expected to be competitive with gasoline-powered vehicles in terms of performance and cost. The Benefits of Mid-Term Batteries Are Unclear, but Feasibility Has Largely Been Demonstrated
According to USABC officials, batteries that achieve the mid-term goals are likely to be feasible but vehicles with them will have a much shorter driving range than gasoline-powered vehicles and are likely to cost more. The consortium’s original budget was $262 million for 1991 through 1995. USABC officials hope to extend the cooperative agreement beyond 1995 to complete the development effort. In addition, the contracting officer said that the consortium is required by the regulations governing the cooperative agreement to conduct close-out audits of battery developers’ costs and, if necessary, to request DOE’s assistance in conducting such audits. Provisions for repayment were negotiated between DOE and USABC in the cooperative agreement and subsequently between USABC and the battery development contractors. USABC’s Contracts and CRADAs
Overview
USABC has entered into eight contracts for the development of advanced battery technologies. As table VI.1 shows, as of fiscal year 1995, DOE had received appropriations of nearly $96 million for USABC. Comments From the Department of Energy
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of the review were to determine (1) the progress that the United States Advanced Battery Consortium has made toward reaching its long-term and mid-term goals; (2) the funding that has been spent thus far and the additional amounts, if any, that will be needed; and (3) DOE’s role in managing the USABC. Electric Power Research Institute
An official of the Electric Power Research Institute who represents the electric utilities on the USABC Management Committee. In addition, Saft is developing a long-term battery. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the development of advanced batteries for electric vehicles, focusing on the: (1) progress that the United States Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC) has made in reaching its long-term and mid-term research goals; (2) funding that has been spent as of fiscal year 1995 and the additional amounts, if any, that will be needed; and (3) Department of Energy's (DOE) role in managing the consortium.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the consortium's long-term goal is to develop a battery that allows electric vehicles to compete fully with gasoline-powered vehicles in terms of performance and cost, but the feasibility of such a battery has not been demonstrated; (2) USABC is developing a mid-term battery that allows an electric vehicle to travel at least 100 miles under real world conditions; (3) electric vehicles using the mid-term battery would not likely achieve much commercial success, due to the battery's high costs and low driving range; (4) the consortium's budget for 1991 through 1995 was $262 million, but USABC spent only $123 million through March 1995, because of technical problems and delays in negotiating agreements; (5) the original USABC budget should sustain USABC initial research efforts through 1997, after which USABC will seek $38 million from DOE to complete the development of batteries meeting its long-term goals; (6) DOE reviews and approves USABC contracts and agreements with battery developers and national laboratories and participates in USABC management and technical committees; and (7) DOE plans an audit of USABC and will require USABC to conduct close-out audits of the individual battery developers. |
gao_GAO-05-131 | gao_GAO-05-131_0 | 1). 3). Differences in Purpose, Price Structure, and Collateral Requirements Make Direct Comparisons between Prices of Loan Commitments and Loans Difficult
Although some investment bankers have contended that commercial banks systematically underprice loan commitments, commercial bankers and other industry observers told us that the different characteristics of loan commitments and loans—purpose, collateral requirements, and price structure—limited direct price comparisons. For example, a loan commitment gives a company the option to borrow in the future under certain terms and conditions, while a loan provides borrowers with actual funds. In addition, lenders typically charge fees for making credit available under a loan commitment and an interest rate for loans (including loans drawn under prior loan commitments). Loan commitments to investment-grade borrowers are typically unsecured—no collateral is pledged—and have few restrictive financial covenants, while leveraged loans are typically secured and have more covenants. Commercial bankers also told us that they considered the maturity of a loan commitment or loan in establishing the price of these instruments. Loan Commitments Are Rarely Traded, and Available Data from Secondary Market Does Not Support Claims of Systematic Underpricing
We were told that loan commitments rarely trade in the secondary market, primarily for two reasons. Although Commercial Banks Use Credit Default Swaps to Reduce the Credit Risk of Their Loan Commitment and Loan Portfolios, Prices of These Instruments Cannot Be Compared Directly
While some commercial banks reported that they used credit default swaps to reduce the credit risk on their loan and loan commitment portfolios, only limited information was available on the extent of this practice. Because of substantial differences between credit default swaps and loan commitments, we found that it was not possible to use credit default swap prices to determine whether loan commitments were underpriced. Commercial and Investment Banks Follow Different Accounting Models, but There Is No Evidence That Either Model Provides a Consistent Competitive Advantage
Under current accounting standards, designed to reflect their different business models, commercial and investment banks account for loan commitments differently. Further, we found that the revenue from loan commitments was relatively small compared with revenue from other bank operations and these differences would be resolved by the end of the commitment period. No Evidence That Accounting for Loan Commitments Gives Commercial Banks a Consistent Competitive Advantage over Investment Banks
Because commercial and investment banks follow different accounting models, they would likely report different values for a similar loan commitment or a loan resulting from an exercised commitment, and recognize different amounts of the related deferred revenue. An FASB staff member wrote a paper that summarized the strengths and weaknesses of fair value accounting. We did not find any evidence that the differences in accounting treatment offered the commercial banks a consistent competitive advantage over investment banks. It appears that the economic substance of loan commitments is recognized in the financial statements and related footnotes in a clear, measurable, and evident fashion under both the historic cost and fair value accounting approach. Further, both commercial and investment banks have similar fair value disclosure requirements and generally provide similar information on their financial statements about the fair value of various financial instruments, including loan commitments. Although one FASB staff member indicated that fair value accounting may offer advantages over the mixed-attribute model, in some instances, such as providing more relevant information than the historical cost model, significant implementation issues must be resolved before it can be applied to all financial instruments. Until these issues are resolved, commercial and investment banks will continue to follow different accounting models for similar financial instruments such as loan commitments. To determine the extent to which credit default swaps were used to reduce the risk of loan commitments, the similarities and differences between credit default swaps and loan commitments, and what, if anything, the prices of credit default swaps indicate about the prices of loan commitments, we analyzed data on credit default swaps compiled by federal banking regulators and a global trade association for derivatives and reviewed the financial statements of the 6 commercial banks for information on credit default swap usage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal banking regulators reported that commercial banks held about $1.6 trillion in syndicated loans in 2003. Loan commitments--a promise to make a set amount of credit available in the future--represented $1 trillion (about 64 percent) of these loans. Issues have been raised whether commercial banks systematically underprice loan commitments and whether generally accepted accounting principles provide meaningful disclosure of the economics of these commitments. This report discusses (1) differences between the pricing of loan commitments and loans, and assesses data that are available about the trading of loan commitments; (2) the extent to which credit default swaps are used to reduce the credit risk from loan commitments, and what credit default swap prices indicate about the prices of loan commitments; and (3) differences between commercial and investment banks' accounting treatment of loan commitments, and the strengths and weaknesses of fair value accounting.
What GAO Found
Loan commitments and loans have different characteristics, making it difficult to directly compare the prices of these instruments. First, a loan commitment gives a company the option to borrow a certain amount in the future, while a loan actually provides funds to the borrower. Second, lenders typically charge fees for making credit contingently available through a loan commitment but charge interest on a loan. Third, loan commitments are typically unsecured--that is, borrowers do not have to pledge collateral--while loans are typically secured. Most of those we interviewed told us that loan commitments are rarely traded in the secondary market because selling them could jeopardize relationships with borrowers and because institutional investors were reluctant to purchase them. Some investment bankers expressed concerns that loan commitments were systematically underpriced, but the available information did not support such assertions. Commercial bankers told us that they used credit default swaps--contracts that can transfer the credit risk of a loan or loan commitment to another party--to reduce credit risk on small amounts of their loan commitment portfolios. Some investment bankers contended that credit default swaps and loan commitments were similar instruments and that credit default swap prices could provide information about the appropriateness of prices for loan commitments. We found that it was not possible to use credit default swap prices to determine the appropriateness of prices for loan commitments. Specifically, they differed in triggering events, payment schedule, trading, and financial covenants. Under current accounting standards, designed to reflect their respective business models, commercial and investment banks account for loan commitments differently, causing a temporary difference in the recognition of fee income. Further, revenue from fee income appeared to be relatively small compared with revenue from other bank activity and the difference would be resolved by the end of the commitment period. As a result, we did not find any evidence that following a different accounting model offered the commercial banks a consistent competitive advantage over investment banks. Further, commercial and investment banks have similar fair value financial statement disclosure requirements and, as a result, provide similar information about the fair value of their financial instruments. It appears that the economic substance of loan commitments is recognized in the financial statements and related footnotes in a clear, measurable, and evident fashion under both the historic cost and fair value approach. While some have indicated that fair value accounting might disclose more relevant information than the historical cost model, all the conceptual and implementation issues have not been resolved. Until these issues are resolved, commercial and investment banks will continue to follow different accounting models for loan commitments. |
gao_GAO-16-20 | gao_GAO-16-20_0 | In our review of the 17 paid 7623(b) claims as of June 30, 2015, we found that claims took 4 years to 7½ years from the submission of the Form 211 to the award payment. The WO is not an exception. However, those plans were contingent on IRS’s proposed fiscal year 2015 budget, which IRS did not receive. Because the WO does not track the date collected proceeds are finalized against the date of mailing the award recommendation package, it cannot assess its performance against the timeliness target. IRS Has Collected More Than $2 Billion from Whistleblower Claims since 2007, but Some Award Payments Were Miscalculated
IRS Has Paid 17 High- Dollar Claims, Half of Which Resulted in Collected Proceeds Over $10 Million Each
Since fiscal year 2007 (when the 7623(b) program was established), IRS has collected more than $2 billion from both the 7623(a) and 7623(b) programs. WO Made Errors in Determining Collected Proceeds and Calculating Awards and Has Not Documented Corrective Actions
During the course of our case file review of the seventeen 7623(b) awards, we found that the WO made errors in calculating whistleblower awards and communicated incorrect award information to whistleblowers in five cases. In total, these award errors amounted to approximately $100,000. Whistleblower Office Communications Are Limited by Insufficient Data and Prohibitions on Disclosing Taxpayer Information
Untimely and Inconsistent Data in the Whistleblower Office Annual Reports to Congress Hinder Program Oversight
A key communication tool that the Secretary of the Treasury and IRS use to inform Congress and the public about the WO and 7623(a) and 7623(b) programs is the WO’s annual report to Congress. This report is required by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, the same legislation that established the WO and the 7623(b) program, and requires the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct an annual study of section 7623 programs, and to include in the annual report legislative or administrative recommendations for the program. Furthermore, last minute changes to the report have introduced discrepancies. Whistleblower program stakeholders have voiced concern about this limited communication. Our review of the published fact sheets found they did not include some key information relevant to whistleblowers and did not provide much new information beyond what is already available on www.irs.gov. The fact sheets state that claims can take 5 to 7 years to complete the review process without providing any additional information about why it may take longer. While the WO is taking steps to improve communication with whistleblowers, it is missing an opportunity to provide information to the whistleblower community that could potentially reduce burden on the WO and alleviate workload. While the WO has procedures and policies in place to protect whistleblower identities, we found instances of whistleblower identities being at risk for disclosure. First, in our review of closed claim files we found that the WO has sent sensitive whistleblower mail to incorrect addresses. Further, on at least one of these mailings, the IRS Whistleblower Office was named on the return address. Tax Whistleblowers Do Not Have Legal Protections from Retaliation by Employers
Unlike other whistleblower programs, there is no law protecting tax whistleblowers against retaliation from their employers. IRS officials support statutory retaliation protections for tax whistleblowers. However, IRS and the WO could make additional changes to improve timeliness, ensure the accuracy of award payments, expand communications, and increase protections for whistleblowers. Such information should include an outline of the entire claim review process, with an average time or time range for the various review steps; a description of the key taxpayer rights that a taxpayer may exercise and how much time this may add to a claim’s review; examples to illustrate common circumstances that result in denials; and items to include in a Form 211 submission, and suggestions for the types of documentation that are particularly helpful to the WO. 2. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the steps, timeframes, and staffing levels in the whistleblower claims process, including the Whistleblower Office’s (WO) staffing strategy for improving efficiency, and assesses how whistleblower claims are prioritized within Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) investigation, examination, and collections workloads; (2) describes the high-dollar 7623(b) whistleblower awards and assesses how the WO determines these awards; (3) evaluates the WO’s role in managing the whistleblower claims process and communicating with the whistleblower community; and (4) evaluates how the WO safeguards whistleblower identities and protects whistleblowers from retaliation. We also reviewed IRS’s internal and external communications plan, including WO’s two fact sheets for external communication, and interviewed WO staff involved with implementing the strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax whistleblowers who report on the underpayment of taxes by others have helped IRS collect almost $2 billion in additional revenue since 2011, when the first high-dollar claim was paid under the expanded program that pays qualifying whistleblowers a minimum of 15 percent of the collected proceeds. These revenues help reduce the estimated $450 billion tax gap—the difference between taxes owed and those paid on time.
GAO was asked to review several aspects of the whistleblower program. Among other things, this report (1) assesses the WO claim review process, (2) assesses how the WO determines awards, (3) evaluates how the WO communicates with external stakeholders, and (4) evaluates IRS's policies and procedures for protecting whistleblowers. GAO reviewed the files of all 17 awards paid under 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) through June 30, 2015; reviewed IRS data; reviewed relevant laws and regulations, and the WO's policies, procedures and publications; and interviewed IRS officials, five whistleblowers that independently approached GAO, and nine whistleblower attorneys who were recommended by IRS or other attorneys.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Whistleblower Office (WO) is responsible for processing thousands of tax whistleblower claims annually for two related whistleblower programs: for claims of $2 million or less, the 7623(a) program, and for claims over $2 million, the 7623(b) program. The whistleblower claim review process takes several years to complete, and GAO found that the WO is not using available capabilities to track and monitor key dates in its claim management system. Without available information on key dates related to award review and payments, the WO is unable to assess its performance against timeliness targets and risks unnecessarily delaying award payments.
Between fiscal year 2011 and June 30, 2015, the WO awarded over $315 million to whistleblowers—the bulk of which was for the 7623(b) claims, which were first paid in fiscal year 2011, 4 years after the program started. In a review of the 17 paid 7623(b) award claim files, GAO found that the WO made errors in determining some awards, resulting in over- and underpayments totaling approximately $100,000. In response to errors, IRS began corrective actions, including ensuring total collected proceeds are verified before making award payments. However, the WO has not documented this new procedure, putting it at risk of making additional errors in award payments.
The WO's communication with stakeholders, including whistleblowers, is limited due to delayed annual reports to Congress, incomplete data, and limited program information for whistleblowers. Delays in issuing the annual reports have resulted in last minute revisions that introduced discrepancies and inconsistent reporting periods that preclude year-over-year comparisons. The WO is addressing some data gaps and has published two fact sheets to provide more information to the whistleblower community; however, the fact sheets do not include information on key aspects of the program, such as time ranges for steps in the review process. Until changes are made to the annual report and fact sheets, the utility of these publications is limited.
IRS and the WO take steps to protect whistleblowers and the information they submit, but GAO found gaps in IRS and WO procedures. For example, the WO did not have documented controls in place for sending mail, and at least once sent sensitive mail to an incorrect address that also had a return address indicating the letter was from the WO. This potentially compromised the identities of whistleblowers. The WO has said it has since changed how they label return addresses, but has not documented this policy. Further, tax whistleblowers do not have statutory protections against retaliation from employers. IRS and the whistleblower community support such protections, noting that inadequate protections may discourage whistleblowers from coming forward.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider providing whistleblowers with legal protections against retaliation from employers. GAO makes ten recommendations to IRS including, tracking dates, strengthening and documenting procedures for award payments and whistleblower protections, and improving external communications. IRS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-424 | gao_GAO-17-424_0 | In contrast to most other drinking water contaminants, lead is rarely found in the source water. Specifically, states are required to submit the following data to EPA: for large and medium water systems, all 90th percentile sample results (i.e., sample results that meet, fall below, and exceed the lead action level); for small water systems, 90th percentile sample results that exceed the lead action level; on water systems that have been designated as having achieved corrosion control because the state has determined that the source water is minimally corrosive; on water systems that were required to install corrosion control treatment, source water treatment, and lead service line replacement and have completed the applicable requirements as a result of having sample results exceed the lead action level; on water systems that have begun the process of replacing lead on water systems that have new violations of the LCR; and on enforcement actions taken in response to violations of the LCR. EPA generally agreed with our recommendation, but has not fully implemented it. Violations
The available data reported by states in EPA’s SDWIS/Fed database show that of the approximately 68,000 drinking water systems subject to the LCR, states reported that at least 6,567 water systems (about 10 percent) had at least one reported open violation of the LCR as of December 2016. Collection of Data on the Presence of Lead Pipes Was a 1991 LCR Requirement
When the LCR was promulgated in 1991, all drinking water systems were required to collect information about the infrastructure that delivered water to customers, including any known lead pipes and lead service lines. In February 2016, in light of the events in Flint, Michigan, and other U.S. cities, EPA asked states to collect information about the locations of lead service lines and publish the information on local or state websites to better inform the public. According to EPA technical guidance on corrosion control, knowledge about lead service lines is needed for studies of corrosion control treatments. We reported in March 2013 that, as the nation faces limited budgets and funding for federal programs, the importance of targeting federal funds to communities with the greatest need and spending funds efficiently increases. However, officials in 3 of the 10 regional offices said that they would ask states to provide these updates less frequently because of limited staff resources. To determine whether such factors were associated with a higher likelihood of having a reported violation of the LCR, we conducted a statistical analysis that calculated a system’s likelihood of a violation using selected factors, such as the size of the population served and source water, and currently available EPA data and found that incorporating multiple factors in the analysis may help identify water systems at a higher likelihood of violating the LCR. In addition, EPA officials we interviewed in 3 of the 10 regional offices said that they do not have the resources to sustain the agency’s current approach. Under federal standards for internal control, management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following three recommendations to EPA:
The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water should require states to report available information about lead pipes to EPA’s SDWIS/Fed (or a future redesign such as SDWIS Prime) database, in its upcoming revision of the LCR; (Recommendation 1)
The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water should require states to report all 90th percentile sample results for small water systems to EPA’s SDWIS/Fed (or a future redesign such as SDWIS Prime) database, in its upcoming revision of the LCR; (Recommendation 2) and
The Assistant Administrator for Water of EPA’s Office of Water and the Assistant Administrator of EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance should develop a statistical analysis that incorporates multiple factors—including those currently in SDWIS/Fed and others such as the presence of lead pipes and the use of corrosion control—to identify water systems that might pose a higher likelihood for violating the LCR once complete violations data are obtained, such as through SDWIS Prime. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the issue of elevated lead in drinking water and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) use of compliance data for oversight of the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR). Our objectives were to examine (1) what the available EPA data show about compliance with and enforcement of the LCR among water systems, including schools; (2) how EPA uses these data to monitor compliance; and (3) factors, if any, that may contribute to water systems’ noncompliance with the LCR. Discussion groups with state regulators. Statistical analysis. Type. Appendix V: Statistical Analysis to Identify Water Systems with a Higher Likelihood for LCR Violations
To identify any factors that may contribute to noncompliance with the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), we conducted discussion groups with a nonprobability sample of state drinking water regulators representing 41 states and 1 territory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drinking water contaminated with lead in Flint, Michigan, renewed awareness of the danger lead poses to the nation's drinking water supply. Lead exposure through drinking water is caused primarily by the corrosion of plumbing materials, such as pipes, that carry water from a water system to pipes in homes. EPA set national standards to reduce lead in drinking water with the LCR, which applies to all water systems providing drinking water to most of the U.S. population, except places where people do not remain for long, such as campgrounds. States generally have primary responsibility for enforcing the LCR, and data help EPA monitor states' and systems' compliance with the LCR.
GAO was asked to review the issue of elevated lead in drinking water. Among other objectives, this report examines (1) what available EPA data show about LCR compliance among water systems and (2) factors that may contribute to LCR noncompliance. GAO analyzed EPA data on violations and enforcement of the LCR from July 1, 2011, through December 31, 2016, interviewed EPA officials in headquarters and the 10 regional offices; conducted a statistical analysis of the likelihood of reported LCR violations; and held discussion groups with a nonprobability sample of regulators representing 41 states.
What GAO Found
Available Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) data, reported by states, show that of the approximately 68,000 drinking water systems subject to the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), at least 10 percent had at least one open violation of the rule; however these and other data are not complete. When the LCR was promulgated in 1991, all water systems were required to collect information about the infrastructure delivering water to customers, including lead pipes (see figure). However, because the LCR does not require states to submit information on known lead pipes to EPA, the agency does not have national-level information about lead infrastructure. After the events in Flint, Michigan, and other cities, EPA asked states to collect information on the locations of lead pipes, and all but nine, which had such difficulties as finding historical documentation, indicated a plan or intent to fulfill the request. According to EPA guidance, knowledge of lead pipes is needed for studies of corrosion control. GAO reported in March 2013 that with limited funding for federal programs, the need to target such funds efficiently increases. By EPA requiring states to report data on lead pipes, key decision makers would have information about the nation's lead infrastructure.
Through discussion groups, state regulators identified 29 factors that may contribute to water systems' noncompliance with the LCR. In conducting a statistical analysis using EPA data on selected factors, such as the size of the population served and type of source water, GAO found that such factors were associated with a higher likelihood of water systems having reported violations of the LCR. EPA's current approach to oversight of the LCR targets water systems with sample results that exceed the lead action level. While this approach is reasonable because such water systems have a documented lead exposure risk, EPA officials in 3 of the 10 regional offices told GAO that it is not sustainable over time because of limited resources. Under federal standards for internal control, management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives. By developing a statistical analysis that incorporates multiple factors to identify water systems that might pose a higher likelihood for having reported violations of the LCR to supplement its current approach, EPA could better target its oversight to such water systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations, including for EPA to require states to report data on lead pipes and develop a statistical analysis on the likelihood of LCR violations to supplement its current oversight. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-760 | gao_GAO-03-760_0 | Therefore, the federal government did not generally grant state and city officials access to classified information. Current Information- Sharing Process Not Perceived As Effective
In spite of legislation, strategies, and initiatives to improve information sharing, federal agencies and state and city governments generally do not consider the current information- and intelligence-sharing process to be effective. Few of the federal agencies that responded view state information received as timely, accurate, or relevant. Our survey results support the view that preventing terrorism is still perceived generally as a federal responsibility. As shown in table 7, federal officials cited several barriers that they perceive prevent them from sharing information, including concerns over state and local officials’ ability to secure, maintain, and destroy classified information; their lack of security clearances; and the absence of integrated databases. If DHS does not effectively strengthen efforts to improve the information-sharing process, the nation’s ability to detect or prepare for attacks may be undermined. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that, in developing its enterprise architecture, the Secretary of Homeland Security work with the Attorney General of the United States; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Director, Central Intelligence; and other appropriate federal, state, and city authorities and the private sector to ensure that the enterprise architecture efforts incorporate the existing information-sharing guidance that is contained in the various national strategies and the information-sharing procedures required by the Homeland Security Act to be established by the President; establish a clearinghouse to coordinate the various information-sharing initiatives to eliminate possible confusion and duplication of effort; fully integrate states and cities in the national policy-making process for information sharing and take steps to provide greater assurance that actions at all levels of government are mutually reinforcing; identify and address the perceived barriers to federal information sharing; and include the use of survey methods or related data collection approaches to determine, over time, the needs of private and public organizations for information related to homeland security and to measure progress in improving information sharing at all levels of government. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our report and recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what initiatives have been undertaken to improve the sharing of information that could be used to protect the homeland and (2) whether federal, state, and city officials believe that the current information-sharing process is effective. We also reviewed federal, state, and city initiatives to share information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The sharing of information by federal authorities to state and city governments is critical to effectively execute and unify homeland security efforts. This report examines (1) what initiatives have been undertaken to improve information sharing and (2) whether federal, state, and city officials believe that the current information-sharing process is effective.
What GAO Found
Since September 11, 2001, federal, state, and city governments have established initiatives to improve the sharing of information to prevent terrorism. Many of these initiatives were implemented by states and cities and not necessarily coordinated with other sharing initiatives, including those by federal agencies. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has initiatives under way to enhance information sharing, including the development of a homeland security blueprint, known as an "enterprise architecture," to integrate sharing between federal, state, and city authorities. GAO surveyed federal, state, and city government officials on their perceptions of the effectiveness of the current information-sharing process. Numerous studies, testimonies, reports, and congressional commissions substantiate our survey results. Overall, no level of government perceived the process as effective, particularly when sharing information with federal agencies. Information on threats, methods, and techniques of terrorists is not routinely shared; and the information that is shared is not perceived as timely, accurate, or relevant. Moreover, federal officials have not yet established comprehensive processes and procedures to promote sharing. Federal respondents cited the inability of state and city officials to secure and protect classified information, the lack of federal security clearances, and a lack of integrated databases as restricting their ability to share information. DHS needs to strengthen efforts to improve the information sharing process so that the nation's ability to detect or prepare for attacks is strengthened. |
gao_GAO-10-450T | gao_GAO-10-450T_0 | This approach highlights a key advantage of the BDD program—that it takes less time for the veteran to receive benefits after discharge. VA officials told us the agency does not measure the timeliness of BDD claims development for three reasons: (1) VA lacks legal authority to provide compensation until a servicemember is discharged and becomes a veteran; (2) VA officials perceive most development activities, such as obtaining the separation exam and medical records, to be outside of their control; and (3) VA officials said that a primary objective of the program was to shorten the time from which the member was entitled to benefits— by definition, after discharge—to the time he or she actually received them. VA Has Not Fully Evaluated Initiatives to Improve the BDD Program
VA implemented two initiatives to improve the BDD program but did not fully evaluate either. VA also has not evaluated a second BDD initiative, known as the paperless claims processing initiative, which is intended to increase the timeliness of claims processing and security of BDD claims information. However, VA has not evaluated the extent to which this initiative improved overall timeliness or security. VA’s Review of BDD Operations Has Been Inconsistent, although VA Has Recently Taken Steps to Improve Monitoring
We identified gaps related to VA’s monitoring of the BDD program, but VA has since taken some steps to address those gaps. Furthermore, VA revised its protocol to require a review of BDD operations as part of its site visits to monitor regional offices. VA and DOD Took Steps to Increase Access to the BDD Program, but Some Servicemembers May Still Face Barriers to Participation
Some Servicemembers Have Limited Access to the BDD Program, but May Participate in the Alternative Quick Start Program
Although the BDD program is designed to provide most servicemembers with access, some members may be unable to initiate a claim 60 to 180 days prior to discharge or remain within the vicinity of the base long enough to complete their exams. In April 2007, VA established an alternative predischarge program, now known as Quick Start, to provide members who cannot participate in the BDD program an opportunity to initiate disability claims before they are discharged. We also found that, like BDD claims, timeliness measures for Quick Start claims do not include days spent developing the claim prior to discharge. However, as with BDD claims, VA told us it has no plans to measure time spent developing these particular claims, and we continue to believe it should. VA and DOD Have Coordinated to Provide Briefings with Information about BDD, but Military Duties and Other Factors May Hinder Attendance
VA and DOD have coordinated to provide servicemembers with information about the BDD program through VA benefits briefings and other initiatives, but attending these briefings is optional for most servicemembers. We recommended that DOD establish a plan with a specific time frame for meeting this goal, but DOD has not developed such a plan. We continue to believe that DOD should establish a plan for meeting its goal. DOD recently reported it is working in collaboration with DOL and VA to determine what improvements can be made in measuring servicemembers’ participation in all components of TAP. We recommended that VA and DOD identify and disseminate information on promising practices that address challenges local officials commonly face in ensuring servicemembers have full access to a cooperative exam. DOD and VA: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Care Management and Disability Evaluations for Servicemembers. GAO-08-207T. Veterans’ Disability Benefits: Processing of Claims Continues to Present Challenges. Veterans’ Disability Benefits: Claims Processing Challenges and Opportunities for Improvements. Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard. VA and DOD Health Care: Efforts to Coordinate a Single Physical Exam Process for Servicemembers Leaving the Military. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the Benefits Delivery at Discharge (BDD) program, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) collaborates with the Department of Defense (DOD) to streamline access to veterans' disability benefits by allowing some servicemembers to file a claim and undergo a single collaborative exam process prior to discharge. BDD is designed for servicemembers with conditions that, while disabling, do not generally prevent them from performing their military duties. This program can shorten the time it takes for veterans to receive benefits by several months. GAO was asked to discuss issues surrounding VA's and DOD's BDD program and related Quick Start program, and identify ways VA and DOD could improve these programs for transitioning servicemembers. This statement is based on GAO's September 2008 report (GAO-08-901) that examined (1) VA efforts to manage the BDD program and (2) how VA and DOD are addressing challenges servicemembers face in accessing the BDD program. GAO updated some information to reflect the current status of claims processing and improvement initiatives in the BDD program.
What GAO Found
Although VA awards disability benefits more quickly under BDD than through its traditional disability claims process, gaps in program management and accountability remain. For example, VA does not separately measure the total time its personnel spend developing BDD claims. As a result, VA has limited information on potential problems and improvement opportunities regarding BDD claims. GAO continues to believe that VA should measure BDD development time; however, VA told GAO it has no plans to capture this information. GAO also found that VA implemented two initiatives to improve the BDD program--i.e., consolidating BDD processing in two offices and instituting paperless processing of BDD claims to increase efficiencies and improve security of information--but did not evaluate whether or the extent to which desired improvements resulted. Finally, GAO found that VA was not completely or consistently monitoring BDD operations at all locations. VA has since taken steps to review BDD operations at more sites and has revised its protocols to ensure more consistent reviews of BDD operations. VA and DOD have taken steps to improve servicemembers' access to the BDD program; however, opportunities remain for further improvement. For servicemembers such as National Guard and Reservists who are generally unable to complete the BDD claims process within the required time frame, VA established an alternative predischarge program called Quick Start. Under this program, servicemembers may still initiate a disability application prior to discharge, but can complete the claims process, including medical exams, at another location after discharge. In response to GAO's recommendation, VA has taken steps to collect additional data to determine the extent to which the Quick Start program is helping those with limited or no access to the BDD program. However, as with BDD claims, VA told GAO it has no plans to measure time spent developing these particular claims, and GAO continues to believe it should. VA and DOD have coordinated to increase BDD program awareness through VA benefits briefings for servicemembers, and DOD established a goal that 85 percent of servicemembers attend these non-mandatory briefings. GAO continues to believe that DOD should establish a plan with a specific time frame for meeting this goal, but DOD has not developed such a plan. Finally, GAO found that some bases faced difficulties maintaining local agreements intended to prevent redundancy and inconvenience for servicemembers in obtaining required medical exams. In response to GAO's recommendation, DOD reported that it is working with VA to identify best practices to address local challenges to implementing their cooperative exam process. |
gao_GAO-02-445 | gao_GAO-02-445_0 | This study formed the basis for subsequent licensure of a modified vaccine in 1970. According to DOD and other, unclassified sources, we found that in terms of conventional battlefield use, the nature and magnitude of the anthrax threat has been stable since 1990 and has not changed materially in terms of the number of countries suspected of developing a BW capability, the types of biological agents they possess, or their ability to weaponize and deliver such agents. How the Anthrax Program Affected Aircrew Members’ Decisions to Change Military Status
The anthrax program adversely affected the retention of trained and experienced pilots and aircrew members in the guard and reserve. According to our survey, between September 1998 and September 2000, when AVIP was mandatory, about 16 percent of the guard and reserve pilots and aircrew members had transferred to another unit (primarily to nonflying positions), moved to inactive status, or left the military altogether. Although the survey disclosed that the respondents’ basic views regarding AVIP and the anthrax vaccine were quite negative, the survey did not indicate a general antivaccine bias. Respondents Reported More Adverse Events than Expected
According to our survey results, the reported rate and severity of adverse events experienced by personnel who had received the anthrax shots were considerably higher than those published in the vaccine manufacturer’s product insert in use at the time of the survey or reported by DOD. According to our survey, 37 percent of guard and reserve personnel received one or more anthrax vaccine shots. Of these, 84 percent reported side effects or adverse events—a rate more than double that expected or cited in the product insert. Our survey did not include a sufficient number of women to address this issue. We found that most of the reactions were not reported to the military chain of command through official channels (military medical personnel), informal channels (supervisors), or FDA’s VAERS. Some 49 percent cited concern about the loss of flight status, possible adverse effects on their military or civilian careers, and the fear of ridicule as reasons for not discussing vaccination shot reactions with others. Overall, there was a general and pervasive degree of dissatisfaction among guard and reserve pilots and aircrew members about the completeness and accuracy of most of the information DOD provided on the anthrax vaccine and AVIP. Further, at the time of our survey, 18 percent of those still participating indicated their intention to leave in the near future, again citing AVIP as an important factor in that decision. Questionnaire Development
We developed the survey with the assistance of discussion groups made up of pilots and other aircrew members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. 1. 2. 3. The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS). Anthrax Vaccine: Preliminary Results of GAO’s Survey of Guard/Reserve Pilots and Aircrew Members. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the views of pilots and aircrew members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve regarding the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP) of the Department of Defense (DOD).
What GAO Found
In December 1997, the Secretary of Defense announced a plan to inoculate U.S. forces against the potential battlefield use of anthrax as a biological warfare (BW) agent. In the context of the conventional battlefield, the nature and magnitude of the military BW threat has not changed materially since 1990 in terms of the number of countries suspected of developing BW capability, the types of BW agents they possess, or their ability to weaponize and deliver BW agents. In marked contrast to other mandatory DOD immunization requirements, GAO's sample survey in 2000 showed that AVIP was at that time adversely affecting the retention of trained and experienced guard and reserve pilots and aircrew members. Between September 1998 and September 2000, 16 percent of the pilots and aircrew members of the guard and reserve had (1) transferred to another unit (primarily to nonflying positions to avoid or delay receiving the anthrax shots), (2) moved to inactive status, or (3) left the military. Additionally, one in five of those still participating in or assigned to a unit in 2000 indicated their intention to leave in the near future. At the time of the survey, two-thirds of the guard and reserve pilots and aircrew members did not support DOD's mandatory AVIP or any future immunization programs planned for other BW agents. However, these negative views did not appear to indicate a general antivaccine bias. On the basis of the survey, GAO estimated that 37 percent of the guard and reserve pilots and aircrew members had received one or more anthrax shots as of September 2000. Of these recipients, 85 percent reported experiencing some type of reaction. This overall rate reported for adverse reactions following anthrax immunization was more than double the rate published in the vaccine manufacturer's product insert that was in use at the time of the survey. Respondents to the survey indicated that they had not reported most of the reactions they cited to the military chain of command through official or informal channels and that they were not reported to Food and Drug Administration's Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS). Reasons survey respondents gave for not reporting to the military chain of command included a lack of awareness of VAERS, a concern about the loss of flight status, a possibly adverse effect on military or civilian career, and a fear of ridicule. |
gao_GAO-14-134 | gao_GAO-14-134_0 | DOD officials cited various reasons why compiling and reporting on this information may not be feasible. Since initiating its initial round of initiatives for fiscal year 2012, DOD has continued to identify and implement efficiency initiatives. Specifically, DOD issued written guidance that standardizes and expands the type of information on efficiency initiatives that the military departments and SOCOM are expected to report, which may improve visibility on the progress and risks in implementation for DOD decision makers. In contrast to the way they reported before, the military departments and SOCOM were now expected to report consistently and provide the status of their efficiency initiatives, including summary information related to (1) whether original net savings projections across the Future Years Defense Program are being met, (2) risks to program(s), mission(s), or resources associated with the efficiency initiative (characterized as “low”, “medium”, or “high” risk), and (3) any risks to “milestones” or the implementation status of the efficiency initiative (e.g., characterized as “on track,” “off track but can meet major milestones,” or “off track and cannot meet major milestones”). Only in instances where the military departments and SOCOM identified programs that were not achieving original net savings estimates or where program or milestone risk had been identified, the guidance requires further detail, including how implementation would be achieved. In reviewing the military departments’ and SOCOM’s February 2013 and March 2013 reports, we observed that, consistent with the aforementioned February 2013 guidance, the military departments and SOCOM reported details associated with only those efficiency initiatives that were not achieving original net savings estimates or where program or milestone risk had been identified. Prior to the February 2013 guidance, some departments and SOCOM had previously chosen to report on all their initiatives. In reviewing the reports developed by the military departments and SOCOM in February 2013 and March 2013, we observed that information on all initiatives was now unavailable to DOD decision makers, thus hindering their ability to assess implementation progress across the full range of efficiencies. While obtaining this broader set of information, DOD stated in its written comments on a draft of this report, provided on January 6, 2014, that it will narrow the scope of efficiency initiatives that will be tracked due to the period of constrained resources it is experiencing. As a result, we continue to believe that our prior recommendation in our December 2012 report has merit and should be implemented. Military Departments and SOCOM Vary in the Extent and Nature of Their Efforts to Evaluate the Impact of Their Efficiency Initiatives
The military departments and SOCOM have taken steps to evaluate some of their efficiency initiatives, such as establishing performance measures and collecting performance data. However, these efforts have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis and vary by efficiency initiative because DOD has not established a requirement for performing such evaluations. As a result, DOD lacks a systematic basis for evaluating the impact of its efficiency initiatives on improving program efficiency or effectiveness. In setting forth the initial efficiency initiatives, the Secretary of Defense intended for DOD to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its programs and activities. The Secretary also directed that any efficiency initiative must be specific, actionable, and measurable. As previously discussed, the Comptroller’s October 2013 guidance provides direction on how the military departments and SOCOM are to approach reporting on the status of their efficiency initiatives, but does not require them to develop approaches for evaluating the impact of initiatives on achieving desired outcomes. In practice, we found that the military departments and SOCOM varied in the extent to which they evaluated individual efficiency initiatives, including whether they had established measures or indicators to gauge the impact on program efficiency or effectiveness beyond savings. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance DOD’s ability to determine whether its efficiency initiatives are having the desired effect of improving efficiency and effectiveness, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the military departments and SOCOM to develop approaches for evaluating the impact of their efficiency initiatives, such as establishing performance measures or other indicators, collecting related performance information, and using this information to measure progress in achieving intended outcomes associated with their initiatives until implemented. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the progress DOD has made in adjusting its approach to tracking and reporting on the implementation of its efficiency initiatives since we last reported in December 2012 and to assess the extent to which DOD is evaluating the impact of its efficiency initiatives on DOD programs and activities, we reviewed guidance and documentation issued at the department-wide level as well as within the military departments and SOCOM. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced a department-wide initiative with the goal of achieving efficiencies and reducing excess overhead costs while reinvesting those savings in sustaining DOD's force structure and modernizing its weapons portfolio. The Secretary tasked the military departments and SOCOM to find estimated savings of about $100 billion over the period of fiscal years 2012 to 2016. For fiscal years 2013 and 2014, DOD identified additional efficiency initiatives. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 mandated that GAO assess the extent to which DOD has tracked and realized savings proposed pursuant to the initiative to identify $100 billion in efficiencies. As the second report in response to this mandate, this report addresses 1) DOD's progress in adjusting its approach to tracking and reporting on the implementation of its efficiency initiatives since GAO's December 2012 report, and 2) the extent to which DOD is evaluating the impact of its initiatives. GAO reviewed guidance, and analyzed and discussed information developed after December 2012 with DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has refined its approach for tracking and reporting on the status of efficiency initiatives by establishing specific requirements to standardize and expand the type of information that the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) report to senior decision makers. Initially, DOD provided general direction through emails, briefings, and training, which gave the military departments and SOCOM flexibility to selectively report on the initiatives that they believed were important, resulting in inconsistencies. For example, prior to February 2013, all but the Navy had chosen to report on all their initiatives. In February 2013, the DOD Comptroller issued written guidance that specified the type of information to be reported, including 1) whether original net savings projections are being met, and 2) any associated program or milestone risks. In instances where original net savings projects were not met or risks were identified, the guidance required further detail such as how implementation would be achieved. As a result, in their March 2013 reports, the military departments and SOCOM only reported details on those initiatives that were not achieving original net savings estimates or where risk had been identified. GAO observed, during this review, that information on all initiatives was now unavailable to DOD decision makers, thus hindering their ability to assess implementation progress across the full range of initiatives. Comptroller officials agreed that such information would enhance DOD's oversight, and in October 2013, the DOD Comptroller issued updated guidance, directing that this information also be reported on initiatives on track to achieve savings or not experiencing risk. The military departments and SOCOM subsequently began submitting reports with this broader set of information.
The military departments and SOCOM have taken steps to evaluate the impact of some of their efficiency initiatives, such as establishing performance measures to assess their impact on achieving desired outcomes. However, this has largely occurred on an ad hoc basis and varies by initiative because DOD has not required such evaluations. As a result, DOD lacks a systematic basis for evaluating whether its various initiatives have improved the efficiency or effectiveness of its programs or activities. In setting forth initiatives, the Secretary of Defense intended for DOD to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its programs and activities, and that related initiatives should be specific, actionable, and measurable. While DOD has provided direction on how the military departments and SOCOM are to report on implementation status, this direction does not require them to develop approaches for evaluating the impact of their initiatives. In practice, the military departments and SOCOM varied in the extent to which they evaluated initiatives, including whether they had established measures or other indicators to assess outcomes. For example, GAO found instances where the military departments and SOCOM had established measures and assessed progress for some but not all initiatives. Developing a more systematic approach to evaluating the impact of its initiatives could provide DOD with more complete information to assess whether the initiatives are accomplishing desired outcomes, beyond achieving savings, and whether adjustments are needed in the scope of implementing the initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish a requirement for the military departments and SOCOM to develop approaches for evaluating the impact of their efficiency initiatives, such as developing performance measures or other indicators. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation, and provided additional comments that it will cease tracking initiatives that strictly call for program terminations. GAO believes this to be a reasonable approach. |
gao_GAO-08-1063 | gao_GAO-08-1063_0 | DOD Comptroller and military service financial management and comptroller officials responsible for the department’s ADA programs have stated that because of weaknesses in the department’s business processes and systems, knowledgeable personnel are critical to improving the department’s funds control processes. Efforts are under way to provide key funds control personnel classroom and Web-based training. Finally, the DOD FMR establishes a time frame of approximately 15 months and 25 days for completing an ADA investigation. The inconsistent manner in which the military services have complied with this requirement raises concerns as to whether DOD or the military services have reasonable assurance that individuals assigned to conduct ADA reviews and investigations are qualified. Based on our review of the closed ADA case files, the rosters, and other documentation provided by the military services, we were only able to determine that 6 of the 66 investigating officers assigned to the 54 ADA cases reviewed had received the required training. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Transparency of Reporting, and the Nature of Disciplinary Actions Taken Is Consistent with the ADA and the DOD FMR
The military services provided OSD the required monthly investigation summary information for the 54 ADA cases reviewed. Within DOD, the FMR specifies that such administrative discipline can range in severity from no action to the termination of the individual’s federal employment. OMB guidance notes that the report should include the title and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) symbol (including the fiscal year) of the appropriation or fund account, the amount involved, and the date on which the violation occurred; the name(s) and position(s) of the individual(s) responsible for the violation; all facts pertaining to the violation, including the type of violation, the primary reason or cause, and any statement from the responsible individual; the disciplinary action taken; a statement confirming that all information has been submitted to the Department of Justice if it is deemed that the violation was knowing and willful; a statement regarding the adequacy of the system of administrative control prescribed by the head of the agency and approved by OMB and a proposal for a regulation change, if the head of the agency determines a change is needed; statement of any additional action taken by, or at the discretion of, the a statement concerning the steps taken to coordinate the report with the other agency, if another agency is involved. For the 20 ADA cases in which DOD concluded that no ADA violation occurred, we found that 13 of those cases identified corrective actions to be taken by the DOD component. Disciplinary Actions Taken Were in Accordance with the Act and DOD Guidance
Our analysis of the 34 ADA violations reported by DOD as being closed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 found that disciplinary actions taken were in accordance with the criteria set forth in the DOD FMR and were reported to the President and the Congress, with a copy to the Comptroller General, as required by the ADA. The ADA requires that employees who are responsible for an ADA violation be subject to appropriate administrative discipline. Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following four actions: (1) implement and document processes, procedures, and controls to identify and help ensure that key funds control personnel, including funds certifying officials, are properly trained so that they can fulfill their responsibilities to prevent, identify, and report potential ADA violations; (2) implement and document processes, procedures, and controls to oversee and monitor compliance with DOD FMR provisions requiring the maintenance and use of a roster for selecting qualified ADA investigating officers; (3) develop, implement, and document policies and procedures to help ensure compliance with the DOD FMR requirements for investigating officer training; and (4) develop, implement, and document policies and procedures to help ensure compliance with the DOD FMR requirements for investigating officer independence. To assess investigating officers’ qualifications, we focused our review on whether the investigating officers had received training and if there was an internal control in place to ensure that the investigating officers did not have any personal, external, or organizational independence impairments to their ability to conduct an investigation. We did not assess the appropriateness of the conclusions reached by DOD for the 54 closed ADA cases or the disciplinary actions taken in the 34 cases for which DOD concluded that an ADA violation had occurred. For the remaining 20 ADA cases, DOD concluded that no ADA violation had occurred, and therefore these cases were not reported externally. | Why GAO Did This Study
Senate Report No. 110-77 directed GAO to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) procedures for Antideficiency Act (ADA) violations. GAO focused on whether (1) existing DOD funds control systems, processes, and internal controls provide reasonable assurance that ADA violations will be prevented or detected and whether key funds control personnel are trained; (2) investigations of ADA violations are processed in accordance with applicable DOD regulations; and (3) DOD tracks and reports metrics pertaining to its ADA investigations and what disciplinary actions are taken when ADA violations have occurred. GAO's review included all 54 ADA military service case files closed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. GAO did not assess the appropriateness of the conclusions reached or of the disciplinary actions taken for the ADA cases.
What GAO Found
DOD's complex and inefficient payment processes, nonintegrated business systems, and weak internal controls impair its ability to maintain proper funds control, leaving the department at risk of overobligating or overspending its appropriations in violation of the ADA. DOD Comptroller and military service financial management and comptroller officials responsible for the department's ADA programs have stated that because of weaknesses in DOD's business operations, knowledgeable personnel are critical to improving the department's funds control, and these officials have or are developing training courses. However, only the Army has attempted to identify and determine whether key funds control personnel have received appropriate training to provide them with the knowledge and skills to fulfill their responsibilities, including the ADA, required by DOD regulations. GAO's analysis of the 54 ADA cases and other documentation provided by the military services disclosed that the military services did not fully comply with DOD regulations intended to ensure that ADA reviews and investigations were conducted by qualified and independent personnel and were completed in a timely manner. More specifically, GAO found the following: (1) Only 6 of the 66 investigating officers assigned to the 54 ADA cases reviewed had received all of the required training. (2) Nineteen of the 54 ADA cases lacked documentation needed to determine whether the investigating officer was organizationally independent. Further, because the military services focused on organizational independence, they could not be assured that investigating officers were free of personal or external impairments to independence. ? ADA investigations were generally not completed within the 15 months and 25 days set forth by DOD. Of the 54 ADA cases reviewed, 22 cases took over 30 months to complete and only 16 were completed on time. GAO also noted that DOD, as required, reported the 34 cases in which it had concluded that an ADA violation had occurred to the President and the Congress, with a copy to GAO. For the remaining 20 cases, DOD concluded that an ADA violation had not occurred and therefore external reporting was not required. Further, DOD has taken steps to improve transparency over the ADA investigation process by requiring DOD components to report status information when an ADA investigation is initiated. Additionally, for the 34 ADA cases in which DOD concluded that an ADA violation had occurred, the nature of the disciplinary actions taken and reported to the President and the Congress was consistent with the criteria set forth in the DOD regulations. The ADA requires that employees who are responsible for ADA violations be subject to appropriate administrative discipline. The DOD regulations specify that administrative discipline can range from no action to the termination of the individual's employment. |
gao_GAO-15-663 | gao_GAO-15-663_0 | Public Service Loan Forgiveness
Beginning in 2017, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program is to offer loan forgiveness on the remaining Direct Loan balances of borrowers who complete at least 10 years of qualifying public service employment and meet other requirements. 1). Using its income tax data and Education’s student loan data, Treasury estimated that about half (51 percent) of Direct Loan borrowers were eligible for IBR as of September 2012. An additional 4 percent of these borrowers participated in ICR (see fig. 2). 3). In addition, substantially lower percentages of IBR and PAYE participants had defaulted on their loan compared to those in Standard repayment, and the great majority were in active repayment as of September 2014. Education Has Not Consistently Provided Information on Income- Driven Repayment Plans to Borrowers
Education has taken steps intended to increase borrower awareness of income-driven repayment plans, including IBR and PAYE, but has not consistently provided information about these plans to borrowers who have entered repayment. Few Borrowers Who May Be Employed in Public Service Have Had Their Employment and Loans Certified for PSLF, and Education Has Not Assessed Its Efforts to Increase Awareness about PSLF
About 147,000 Borrowers Had Employment and Loans Certified in Anticipation of PSLF, and 4 Million Borrowers May Be Employed in Public Service
Certification of Employment and Loans
While information on PSLF participation will not be available until borrowers can begin applying for loan forgiveness in October 2017, about 147,000 borrowers have had their employment and loans certified for PSLF as of September 2014, according to data from Education’s loan servicer for the program. Furthermore, if rates of public service employment are comparable among Direct Loan borrowers across repayment plans, about 643,000 Direct Loan borrowers repaying their loans through IBR, PAYE, and ICR as of September 2014 may be employed in public service. Education Has Not Assessed Its Efforts to Increase Awareness of PSLF
Education has taken some steps intended to increase borrower awareness of PSLF, but it has not notified all borrowers who have entered repayment about the program. However, Education has not examined borrower awareness of PSLF to determine how well these efforts are working. Such efforts would support Education’s goal to provide superior information and service to borrowers. Borrowers who have entered repayment and have not been notified about the program may be making decisions without complete information and might miss the opportunity to benefit from the program when it becomes available in 2017. Borrowers also need sufficient and timely information about Public Service Loan Forgiveness. As a result, borrowers employed in public service for at least 10 years may miss opportunities to benefit from the program when it becomes available in 2017, potentially forgoing thousands of dollars in loan forgiveness. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that Income-Based Repayment, Pay As You Earn, and Public Service Loan Forgiveness serve their intended beneficiaries to the greatest extent possible, we recommend that the Secretary of Education: take steps to consistently and regularly notify all borrowers who have entered repayment of income-driven repayment plan options, including Income-Based Repayment and Pay As You Earn. Beyond our recommendations, Education expressed concern that the draft report overstated the extent to which borrowers lack awareness of income- driven repayment plans. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix discusses in detail our methodology for addressing two research questions for the Direct Loan program: (1) How does borrower participation in Income-Based Repayment (IBR) and Pay As You Earn (PAYE) compare to available estimates of eligibility, and to what extent has the Department of Education (Education) taken steps to increase borrower awareness of these plans? and (2) What is known about Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) certification and eligibility, and to what extent has Education taken steps to increase awareness of this program? We reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and documentation from Education. To approximate the percentage of Direct Loan borrowers who may be eligible for PSLF, we used 2012 Bureau of Labor Statistics data—the most recent available. Interviews
To examine IBR and PAYE participation and eligibility, PSLF certification and eligibility, and determine the extent to which Education has taken steps to raise awareness of the programs, we interviewed officials from Education, Treasury, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of September 2014, outstanding federal student loan debt exceeded $1 trillion, and about 14 percent of borrowers had defaulted on their loans within 3 years of entering repayment, according to Education data. GAO was asked to review options intended to help borrowers repay their loans.
For Direct Loan borrowers GAO examined: (1) how participation in Income-Based Repayment and Pay As You Earn compares to eligibility, and to what extent Education has taken steps to increase awareness of these plans, and (2) what is known about Public Service Loan Forgiveness certification and eligibility, and to what extent Education has taken steps to increase awareness of this program. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; September 2014 data from Education and its loan servicer for Public Service Loan Forgiveness; Treasury's eligibility estimates; and 2012 employment data (most recent available) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. GAO also interviewed officials from three loan servicers that service about half of Education's loan recipients.
What GAO Found
Many eligible borrowers do not participate in the Department of Education's (Education) Income-Based Repayment and Pay As You Earn repayment plans for Direct Loans, and Education has not provided information about the plans to all borrowers in repayment. These plans provide eligible borrowers with lower payments based on income and set timelines for forgiveness of any remaining loan balances. While the Department of the Treasury estimated that 51 percent of Direct Loan borrowers were eligible for Income-Based Repayment as of September 2012, the most recent available estimate, Education data show 13 percent were participating as of September 2014. An additional 2 percent were in Pay As You Earn. Moreover, Education has reported ongoing concerns regarding borrowers' awareness of these plans. Although Education has a strategic goal to provide superior information and service to borrowers, the agency has not consistently notified borrowers who have entered repayment about the plans. As a result, borrowers who could benefit from the plans may miss the chance to lower their payments and reduce the risk of defaulting on their loans.
Few borrowers who may be employed in public service have had their employment and loans certified for the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program, and Education has not assessed its efforts to increase borrower awareness. Beginning in 2017, the program is to forgive remaining Direct Loan balances of eligible borrowers employed in public service for at least 10 years. As of September 2014, Education's loan servicer for the program had certified employment and loans for fewer than 150,000 borrowers; however, borrowers may wait until 2017 to request certification. While the number of borrowers eligible for the program is unknown, if borrowers are employed in public service at a rate comparable to the U.S. workforce, about 4 million may be employed in public service. It is unclear whether borrowers who may be eligible for the program are aware of it. Although Education has a strategic goal to provide superior information and service to borrowers and provides information about Public Service Loan Forgiveness through its website and other means, it has not notified all borrowers in repayment about the program. In addition, Education has not examined borrower awareness of the program to determine how well its efforts are working. Borrowers who have not been notified about Public Service Loan Forgiveness may not benefit from the program when it becomes available in 2017, potentially forgoing thousands of dollars in loan forgiveness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends Education consistently notify borrowers in repayment about income-driven repayment, and examine borrower awareness of Public Service Loan Forgiveness. Education generally agreed with GAO's recommendations, but it believed the report overstated the extent to which borrowers lack awareness of income-driven repayment. GAO modified the report to clarify this issue. |
gao_GAO-17-377 | gao_GAO-17-377_0 | Public health officials also use these systems to create the situational awareness needed to enable early detection of, and effective response to, emerging diseases and other public health events. HHS Identified Actions for Establishing the Network, but Did Not Address All PAHPRA Requirements Nor Define Measurable Steps to Guide its Efforts
PAHPRA required HHS to conduct four activities related to the establishment of the public health situational awareness network. Specifically, the plan lacks any actions to address a required activity for defining the minimal data elements needed to establish the network, and another activity for collaborating with public health officials to develop standards for interpreting and reporting on data collected by the network. Moreover, until HHS addresses all activities required by PAHPRA in its implementation plan, the department will not be able to ensure that public health situational awareness network capabilities will be established in accordance with all the requirements defined by the law. HHS’s Implementation Plan Does Not Identify Measurable Steps to Meet Requirements of PAHPRA
PAHPRA required HHS to identify measurable steps the Secretary would carry out to guide the efforts to develop, implement, and evaluate the network. Further, the law required the National Preparedness and Response Science Board to assist HHS in its planning efforts by providing expert advice and guidance, including recommendations, regarding the measurable steps the Secretary should take to modernize and enhance public health situational awareness information sharing capabilities through a biosurveillance network. However, the implementation plan that HHS developed does not identify timelines, estimates of cost and resource requirements, or performance metrics that can be used to track and measure progress made toward completing tasks and, thus, to determine whether expected progress and outcomes of the IT-related actions are being achieved. HHS officials also did not identify in the implementation plan specific resource requirements and responsibilities for taking the actions identified in the plan. However, the National Health Security Strategic Guidance Committee charter does not include any responsibilities related to defining steps or overseeing the actions for establishing the network, and, as of May 2017, the committee had not done so. Moreover, until the department defines such steps, it will not have the information and planning tools it needs to make progress toward establishing the network required by PAHPRA. HHS Reported Limited Progress in Taking Actions Defined in the Implementation Plan to Develop the Network
In the absence of an implementation plan that addresses all of the activities required by PAHPRA, the department has made limited progress toward establishing the public health situational awareness network. Further, ASPR officials did not identify and evaluate other federal agencies’ and state, local, and tribal public health entities’ existing electronic information-sharing network capabilities, as required by the law. Weaknesses in IT Planning and Management Processes Have also Contributed to the Lack of Progress toward Establishing the Network Required by PAHPRA
Beyond the deficiencies in its plans for implementing the network, HHS did not follow the department’s overall IT planning and management processes, which contributed to the lack of progress in establishing the network. In addition, the department’s IT governance organization, led by the CIO, is to be responsible for ensuring that IT projects are technically sound, follow established project management practices, and meet the business owner’s needs. However, had HHS followed its own departmental guidance for managing IT resources—such as establishing an IT resource management structure, developing a project management plan, and defining metrics for tracking performance—the department would have had the planning tools, resources, and oversight mechanisms needed to actively pursue efforts to establish the required network capabilities. Until HHS adheres to departmental guidance for managing the IT resources necessary to identify and implement enhancements needed to improve electronic information-sharing capabilities of systems and networks in use by public health entities throughout the country, its efforts to establish the nationwide public health situational awareness network required by PAHPRA will continue to be hampered. Task the integrated project team with developing a project management plan that includes measurable steps—including a timeline of tasks, resource requirements, estimates of costs, and performance metrics—that can be used to guide and monitor HHS’s actions to establish the network defined in the plans. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine what progress the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has made towards establishing electronic situational awareness network capabilities in accordance with the requirements of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA). | Why GAO Did This Study
A public health event, such as a widespread disease outbreak or health problems resulting from a weather-related emergency, could have catastrophic consequences for the nation. These potential threats can be partially mitigated by having a national public health situational awareness capability—that is, a capability for public health officials to be able to access real-time information about emerging threats to enable them to make timely, responsive decisions to prepare for and respond to emergencies. PAHPRA required HHS to establish a near real-time electronic nationwide public health situational awareness capability through an interoperable network of systems.
PAHPRA also included a provision for GAO to evaluate HHS's progress in developing such a capability. This report addresses what progress HHS has made toward establishing the network. GAO analyzed documents describing HHS's plan for enhancing public health situational awareness and evaluated evidence of actions taken by HHS to establish the network required by PAHPRA. GAO also examined the department's IT planning and management processes and guidance, and interviewed HHS officials.
What GAO Found
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA) required the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish an electronic nationwide public health situational awareness network and to develop an implementation plan to guide its efforts. The law further required HHS to include in its plan specific activities for incorporating data into the network. HHS developed an implementation plan that identified several actions related to enhancing existing information-sharing capabilities needed to establish the network. However, the actions identified in the plan did not address all of the required activities, such as defining data elements and standards. Until the department addresses all required activities, it will lack an effective tool for ensuring that public health situational awareness network capabilities have been established in accordance with all of the requirements defined by the law.
In addition, HHS did not identify measurable steps for completing and tracking the status of the activities required by the law. PAHPRA required HHS to include in its plan the measurable steps to be taken to establish the network. Federal guidance also suggests that implementation plans identify timelines of tasks, cost and resource estimates, and performance metrics that can be used to track and monitor progress toward completing tasks and delivering expected outcomes. According to HHS officials who developed the implementation plan, the department established a committee of policy and planning experts from various federal agencies to define the measurable steps for completing the actions identified in the plan. However, HHS did not assign responsibilities for defining such steps to the committee, and the committee had not done so. Until the department defines measurable steps, it will not have the information and planning tools it needs to make progress toward establishing a network that provides information-sharing capabilities needed by public health entities to prepare for and respond to emergencies, as required by PAHPRA.
GAO identified other weaknesses in HHS's planning efforts that have contributed to the department's lack of progress toward establishing the network. Specifically, HHS did not follow guidance developed by its Chief Information Officer (CIO) for managing information technology (IT) resources. According to the guidance, officials who manage IT initiatives are to involve a governance organization led by HHS's CIO and designate a project team that includes a project manager and business owner. The team is to manage and oversee initiatives according to the guidance, including the development of a project management plan that identifies timelines and schedules, estimated project resources and costs, and performance metrics for tracking any progress made toward completing tasks and delivering expected outcomes. However, HHS did not designate such a team and did not involve the CIO in its planning efforts. As such, the department lacks the structure and mechanisms needed to plan, manage, and oversee actions for establishing the network. Until HHS adheres to its own guidance for managing the IT resources necessary to improve electronic information-sharing capabilities of systems and networks in use by public health entities throughout the country, it will likely continue to fall short in its efforts to establish the nationwide public health situational awareness network required by PAHPRA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that HHS complete a plan that includes all actions for establishing the network, develop a project management plan that identifies measurable steps for completing the actions, and conduct IT management processes according to CIO guidance. HHS had no comments on the report or recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-692T | gao_GAO-05-692T_0 | Lessons Learned from SEC Not Detecting Abusive Market Timing Can Be Useful in Preventing Future Abuses
SEC did not examine for market timing abuses or test company controls in that area, largely because the agency had competing examination priorities and believed that companies had financial incentives to control frequent trading. Conducting independent testing of controls at a sample of companies, at a minimum, could serve to verify that areas, such as market timing, do in fact represent low risks and that effective controls are in place. Second, SEC must develop the institutional capacity to identify and evaluate evidence of potential risks and deploy examination staff as necessary to review controls and potentially detect violations in these areas. For example, academic studies indicated that market timing, while legal, remained a persistent risk prior to September 2003 and by one estimate was costing mutual fund shareholders approximately $5 billion annually in certain funds. Third, ensuring the independence and effective operation of mutual fund companies’ compliance staff is central to preventing violations of the securities laws, regulations, and fund policies. We also found that routine communication with compliance staff could potentially enhance SEC’s capacity to detect potential violations at an earlier stage if such staff are forthcoming with relevant information. SEC Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Mutual Fund Oversight, but It Is Too Soon to Assess the Effectiveness of Some Initiatives
SEC has taken several steps over the past two years to strengthen its oversight of the mutual fund industry and improve company practices. With increased appropriations over recent years, SEC also has hired additional staff to carry out its mutual fund and other oversight programs, potentially enhancing the agency’s capacity to test a variety of controls. Further, SEC adopted rules that require mutual fund companies and investment advisers to appoint chief compliance officers (CCO) who are responsible for monitoring compliance with laws and regulations. SEC also requires mutual fund company CCOs to prepare annual reports on company policies and violations. We also pointed out that while SEC examiners planned to review CCO annual reports as part of examinations, the agency has not established a process to receive and review such reports on an ongoing basis. Penalties in Mutual Fund Trading Abuse Cases Are Among SEC’s Highest and Are Consistent with Penalties in Similarly Egregious Cases
Since NYSOAG announced its discovery of the trading abuses in the mutual fund industry in September 2003, SEC has brought 14 enforcement actions against investment advisers primarily for market timing abuses and 10 enforcement actions against broker-dealer, brokerage-advisory, and financial services firms for market timing abuses and late trading. SEC has entered into settlements in all 14 investment adviser cases and obtained penalties ranging from $2 million to $140 million (see fig. These penalties are among the highest SEC has obtained for securities laws violations in its history. Before January 2003, penalties SEC obtained in settlement were generally under $20 million. Inadequate Documentation Procedures Limit SEC’s Capacity to Effectively Manage the Criminal Referral Process
SEC staff said that as state and federal criminal prosecutors were already aware of and generally evaluated the mutual fund trading abuse cases for potential criminal violations on their own initiative, SEC staff did not need to make specific criminal referrals to bring these cases to their attention. Without proper documentation, SEC cannot readily determine and verify whether staff make appropriate and prompt referrals. SEC Efforts to Encourage Staff Compliance with Federal Conflict-of-Interest Laws On New Employment Do Not Include Tracking Post-SEC Employment Plans
SEC provides training and guidance to its staff on federal laws and regulations regarding employment with regulated entities, and also requires former staff to notify it if they plan to make an appearance before the agency. However, SEC does not require departing staff to report where they plan to work as do other financial regulators. However, before 2003, SEC did not identify the undisclosed arrangements between investment advisers and favored customers through the agency’s oversight process. Several lessons can be drawn from the experience in regard to regulators (1) performing independent assessments of internal controls, (2) having the capacity to identify and evaluate evidence of potential risks, and (3) ensuring the independence of the compliance function at mutual fund companies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Trading abuses--including market timing and late trading violations--uncovered among some of the most well-known companies in the mutual fund industry permitted favored customers to profit at the expense of long-term shareholders. Questions have also been raised as to why the New York State Office of the Attorney General identified the trading abuses in September 2003 before the industry's primary regulator: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Based on two recently issued GAO reports, this testimony discusses (1) the reasons SEC did not detect the abusive practices at an earlier stage and lessons learned from the agency not doing so, (2) steps the agency has taken to strengthen its mutual fund oversight program, and (3) enforcement actions taken by SEC and criminal prosecutors in response to these abuses and SEC management procedures for making criminal referrals and ensuring staff independence.
What GAO Found
Prior to September 2003, SEC did not examine mutual fund companies for trading abuses such as market timing violations because agency staff viewed other activities as representing higher risks and believed that companies had financial incentives to establish effective controls. While SEC has competing examination priorities, it can draw lessons from not detecting the trading abuses earlier. First, by conducting independent assessments of controls in areas such as market timing (through interviews, reviews of exception reports, reviews of independent audit reports, or transaction testing as necessary), SEC could reduce the risk that violations may go undetected. Second, SEC could further develop its capacity to identify and evaluate evidence of potential risk (for example, academic studies completed between 2000 and 2002 identified certain market timing concerns as a persistent risk to mutual fund customers). Third, ensuring the independence of company compliance staff is critical and SEC staff could better assess company risks and controls through routine interactions with such staff. SEC has taken several steps to strengthen its mutual fund oversight program and the operations of mutual fund companies, but it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of several key initiatives. For example, SEC has instructed its staff to make additional assessments of company controls and established a new office to identify and assess potential risks. SEC also adopted a rule that requires mutual fund companies to appoint independent compliance officers who are to prepare annual reports on their companies' policies and violations. However, SEC has not developed a plan to receive and review these annual reports on an ongoing basis and thereby enhance its capacity to detect potential violations. Since September 2003, SEC has brought 14 enforcement actions against mutual fund companies and 10 enforcement actions against other firms for mutual fund trading abuses. Penalties obtained in settlements with mutual fund companies are among the agency's highest--ranging from $2 million to $140 million and averaging $56 million. In contrast, penalties obtained in settlements for securities law violations prior to 2003 were typically under $20 million. In reviewing a sample of investment adviser cases, GAO found that SEC followed a consistent process for determining penalties and that it coordinated penalties and other sanctions with interested states. However, GAO found certain weaknesses in SEC's management procedures for making referrals to criminal law enforcement and ensuring staff independence. In particular, SEC does not require staff to document whether a criminal referral was made or why. Without such documentation, SEC cannot readily determine whether staff make appropriate referrals. Further, SEC does not require departing staff to report where they plan to work, information gathered by other financial regulators to assess staff compliance with federal laws regarding employment with regulated entities. In the absence of such information, SEC's capacity to ensure compliance with these conflict-of-interest laws is limited. |
gao_GAO-05-86 | gao_GAO-05-86_0 | To determine whether the Bureau has since developed Bureau-wide data quality standards, and, if so, whether they would likely address for the 2010 Census the data quality problems raised after the 2000 Census, we interviewed census officials responsible for developing agencywide standards, examined documents related to the development of new standards on data quality review, and reviewed the agency’s Internet site for information on data quality review standards available to the public. Instead of agencywide, written guidance, professionals within the different parts of the Bureau primarily used their judgment and program-specific practices to decide when and whether data should be released and what supporting information, if any, should accompany them. The Bureau Lacked Agencywide, Written Standards and Guidelines on the Quality of Census Data Disseminated to the Public
At the time the Bureau was making decisions about disseminating data from the 2000 Census, it did not have written, agencywide guidelines or standards to help inform its decisions on whether the data were of sufficient quality to be released. Lack of Data Quality Review Guidelines Led to Inadequate Analysis of Potential Errors and Release of Data without Adequate Disclosure
As noted earlier, decennial census data are used to apportion and redistrict Congress. Faced with similar quality problems in data from the 2000 Census, Bureau officials made different decisions about disseminating data and did not explain the reasons for their decisions. The Bureau Has Made Limited Progress in Publicly Issuing New Standards on the Quality of Data Disseminated to the Public since the 2000 Census
Since the first results of the 2000 Census were released, the Bureau has publicly issued a set of information quality guidelines and one new standard on the quality of data disseminated to the public. Also as required by the Information Quality Act and the OMB guidelines, the Bureau published a standard that described a procedure allowing individuals to seek correction of certain errors in data disseminated by the Bureau. However, the Bureau has not provided information on the scope or the time frame for developing these standards. Bureau Working Group Has Begun Developing Additional Standards on Data Quality Review, but None Have Been Issued
In response to our recommendations from reports on both homeless and Hispanic subgroup data from the 2000 Census, the Bureau established an interdirectorate working group on March 3, 2003, with the broad mandate to develop Bureau-wide standards for quality in data releases. Greater Commitment to New Standards for Public Dissemination of Data Could Help Bureau Avoid Problems in Disseminating 2010 Census and Other Data
The standards that the Bureau has under development and activities of the working group are steps in the right direction. Until spring 2004, no additional resources were provided to support the working group, and a year and a half after it began, the group has not developed any new standards or guidelines or indicated when it will be ready to do so. A publicly issued, comprehensive, Bureau-wide data quality framework, with interrelated standards, and specific procedures (as evident in NCES, ESS, and Statistics Canada) could help ensure consistency of decisions about the quality of data from the next decennial census and the conditions under which the data will be disseminated. The benefits the Bureau can achieve by implementing data quality review standards should not be limited to the decennial census. Because the standards could apply to all of the data publicly distributed by the Bureau, the sooner they are developed and implemented across the Bureau, the sooner the Bureau will begin to reap their benefits. Because the cooperation and trust of the public is essential to a successful census, the Bureau must work to avert any loss of public confidence in the quality of data and in the integrity and objectivity of the Bureau. | Why GAO Did This Study
Data from the decennial census are used to apportion and redistrict seats in the House of Representatives, distribute billions of dollars of federal funds, and guide the planning and investment decisions of the public and private sectors. Given the importance of these data, it is essential that they meet high quality standards before they are distributed to the public. After questions arose about the quality of certain data from the 2000 Census, the requesters asked GAO to review U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) standards on the quality of data disseminated to the public.
What GAO Found
The Bureau did not have detailed agencywide standards for the review of data from the 2000 Census to determine if the data were of sufficient quality for public dissemination. Instead, analysts and managers in different parts of the Bureau primarily used their own judgment and unwritten, program-specific guidance to decide when and whether data should be released and what supporting information should accompany the data. The lack of sufficient data quality review standards led to a variety of problems, including missed opportunities for correcting data before release, inconsistent decisions on disseminating data with similar quality issues, and inadequate communication to users about the reasons for dissemination decisions. As a result, some users of data from the 2000 Census lost confidence in the quality of the data and in the Bureau's review procedures. In the 4 years since the 2000 Census, the Bureau has publicly issued general information quality guidelines, including eight performance principles, and one new standard that allows individuals to request correction of certain errors in data disseminated by the Bureau. Both of these documents resulted from the enactment of the Information Quality Act in 2000 and the subsequent guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget in 2002. However, except for the one standard, the Bureau did not provide any specific guidelines or procedures on the implementation of the general guidelines. The Bureau also began work on other standards, including one on minimal information that must be provided with data and another on discussion of errors in data released to the public. Neither has been issued in final form. In response to our earlier recommendations, the Bureau created an interdirectorate working group charged with developing and publicly issuing Bureau-wide standards for quality in data releases. The working group has taken some steps, but the Bureau has not provided information on the scope or the time frame for its efforts to develop these standards. The standards that the Bureau has under development and the activities of the working group are encouraging. However, it will be important for the Bureau to proceed with greater urgency to ensure that fully tested standards are in place for the 2010 Census. Until spring 2004, no additional resources were provided to support the working group, and over a year after it began, it has not issued any new standards or said when it will be ready to do so. A comprehensive, Bureau-wide data quality framework, with interrelated standards, and specific implementing procedures could help ensure consistent decisions about the quality of the data from the next decennial census and conditions under which the data will be disseminated. Moreover, the benefits the Bureau can achieve by developing and effectively implementing comprehensive data quality standards would not be limited to the decennial census. Because they would apply to all data disseminated by the Bureau, it will be important for any new standards to be developed promptly, implemented across the Bureau, and released to the public. |
gao_GAO-08-1006 | gao_GAO-08-1006_0 | State Anticipates Significant Increases in Mission Mexico’s Nonimmigrant Visa and Passport Workload during Fiscal Years 2007 to 2011
Mission Mexico will experience substantial growth in its NIV workload due to the need to renew millions of Border Crossing Cards, issued 10 years prior, that began expiring in fiscal year 2008. Though various factors may reduce the accuracy of State’s NIV demand forecasts, these forecasts nonetheless provide a reasonable basis for planning for the anticipated surge in NIV demand. Mission Mexico Is Forecast to Experience a Significant Increase in NIV Demand Due to Renewals of Millions of Expiring Border Crossing Cards
State anticipates a surge in NIV demand in Mexico as Border Crossing Cards expire and millions of card holders are likely to apply for renewals at U.S. consulates. Assuming a 75 percent renewal rate among card holders, the forecasts show missionwide NIV demand peaking at slightly less than 3 million applications in fiscal year 2011, which represents a 94 percent increase in demand from fiscal year 2007. Mission Mexico Will Experience an Increase in Passport Workload Due to WHTI Implementation, Although the Magnitude Is Difficult to Predict
In addition to the surge in NIV workload, Mission Mexico has begun to experience a surge in its passport workload as a result of the implementation of WHTI at air ports of entry in January 2007 and its subsequent, planned implementation at land and sea ports in June 2009. According to State officials, the mission has already seen a significant increase in its passport workload as U.S. citizens living in Mexico have begun to apply for passports in response to the new documentary requirements. Additionally, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the number of U.S. citizens living in Mexico and the number of these citizens who are potential passport applicants. According to State’s estimates, Mission Mexico’s WHTI workload is projected to peak in fiscal year 2009 with the intended implementation of WHTI at land ports of entry. State Is Adding Interviewing Windows and Temporary Adjudicators to Posts in Mexico to Keep Pace with Projected Workload Increases
In anticipation of the surge in demand for NIVs and U.S. passports in Mexico, State is adding hardened interview windows to several high- demand posts. State has also developed plans to hire about 100 temporary adjudicating officers to add to its existing staff at the posts in Mexico. Several posts in Mexico will rely heavily on these additional staff to keep pace with expected demand for NIVs and avoid excessive wait times for interviews of applicants. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen internal controls and enhance State’s evaluation of the pilot program to outsource part of the NIV application process to a private contractor at off-site facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of State include in the evaluation an assessment of the potential risks related to fraud and security. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the State Department’s (State) estimates of the workload for consulates in Mexico through 2012 resulting from, in particular, new travel requirements and the reissue of Border Crossing Cards; and (2) State’s efforts to ensure that consulates in Mexico keep pace with projected workload increases through 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2007, the U.S. Mission in Mexico (Mission Mexico) processed 1.5 million of the 8 million nonimmigrant visas (NIV) that the Department of State (State) handled worldwide. This workload is expected to increase dramatically in the coming years as millions of NIV Border Crossing Cards issued in Mexico during fiscal years 1998 to 2002 expire and need to be renewed. Consulates will also face increased workloads due to implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which will require U.S. citizens to carry passports, or other approved documentation, when traveling between the United States and Mexico, including by land. GAO was asked to review State's (1) estimates of the workload for consulates in Mexico through 2012 and (2) efforts to help ensure consulates keep pace with expected workload increases. GAO analyzed State's workload forecasts and forecast methodology, interviewed State officials, and visited five posts in Mexico.
What GAO Found
According to State forecasts, Mission Mexico's NIV demand will likely peak at slightly less than 3 million applications in fiscal year 2011, almost twice the number in fiscal year 2007. Though State acknowledges there are uncertainties regarding the number of Border Crossing Card holders who will renew their cards and the number of first-time NIV applicants, the forecasts provide a reasonable basis for planning for the anticipated surge in NIV demand. In addition to its increase in NIV workload, Mission Mexico will be facing increases in its passport workload due to the implementation of WHTI. The magnitude of the increase in passport workload is more difficult to forecast than for NIVs because there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how many U.S. citizens live in Mexico and the number of these citizens likely to apply for a passport. Mission Mexico has already seen a significant increase in its passport workload as U.S. citizens living in Mexico have begun to apply for passports in response to the new documentary requirements. State forecasts that passport workload will peak in fiscal year 2009 with WHTI's anticipated implementation at land ports of entry. State is taking steps to help ensure U.S. consulates in Mexico keep pace with anticipated demand for NIVs and U.S. passports, including adding interviewing windows to several high-demand posts and planning to hire about 100 temporary adjudicating officers. Consular officials at several posts generally agreed these efforts to expand resources should be adequate for Mission Mexico to keep pace with expected workload increases, and GAO's analysis indicates the mission will generally have enough interviewing windows during the surge. Several posts will rely on additional temporary adjudicators to keep pace with increased demand. State is confident it has an adequate pool of potential applicants. Mission Mexico may also gain additional capacity from a pilot program, under way at two posts, outsourcing a portion of the NIV application process to off-site facilities. State has said it intends to evaluate the pilot program but has not indicated if its evaluation plans include an assessment of risks related to fraud and security. |
gao_GAO-14-801 | gao_GAO-14-801_0 | At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Departments of the Navy and Air Force developed this multiservice concept focused on gaining and maintaining freedom of action in the global commons, that is, the areas of air, sea, In April 2014, the space, and cyberspace that belong to no one state.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the Joint Concept for Entry Operations, a supporting concept to JOAC focused on how forces will enter onto foreign territory and immediately conduct operations in the face of adversaries with increasingly effective area-denial strategies and capabilities. Army and Marine Corps Are Undertaking Efforts to Prepare for Operational Access Challenges
The Army and Marine Corps are undertaking multiple efforts to address operational access challenges, which impact a broad range of their existing missions. Further, the Army and Marine Corps have identified several areas where they have important roles in overcoming access challenges, including engagement activities and entry operations, as well as logistics and missile defense for the Army. Army and Marine Corps Are Incorporating Operational Access Challenges into Service Concepts and Wargames
The Army and the Marine Corps have begun examining the impact of operational access challenges on existing missions by revising their concepts and incorporating such challenges into their wargames. These officials stated that eventually this will inform Marine Corps assessments of capability needs, gaps, and solutions. According to the JOAC, such activities include multinational exercises, basing and support agreements, improving overseas facilities, prepositioning supplies, and forward-deploying forces. The JOAC states that maintaining or expanding operational access may require entry of Army or Marine Corps forces into hostile territory to accomplish missions, such as eliminating land-based threats or initiating sustained land operations, and identifies the ability to conduct forcible entry operations as a required capability. By pursuing increasingly advanced missiles, adversaries are able to impose costs on the United States. DOD Is in the Early Stages of Developing the JOAC Implementation Plan, but Has Not Fully Established Specific Measures and Milestones to Assess Progress
DOD is developing an implementation plan for the JOAC in order to bring coherence to the department’s many simultaneous efforts to overcome A2/AD challenges but has not fully established measures and milestones to gauge progress.effort to coordinate, oversee, and assess the department’s implementation of the JOAC. DOD is planning to issue the first iteration of the plan in 2014 and intends to assess and update the plan annually. DOD Is in the Early Stages of Developing the Joint Operational Access Concept Implementation Plan
The Joint Staff is leading a multiyear DOD-wide effort, initiated in June 2013, to coordinate, oversee, and assess the department’s implementation of the JOAC. While DOD has stated its intent to assess progress in the future, its current planning lacks specifics about the measures it will employ and how it will set milestones to gauge that progress. Without establishing specific measures and milestones in future iterations of the JOAC Implementation Plan, DOD will not be able to gauge JOAC implementation progress and assess whether efforts by the joint force, to include the Army and the Marine Corps, will achieve DOD’s goals in desired time frames in the near and long terms. Specifically, if DOD does not have a means to assess implementation progress, it may lack assurance that Army and Marine Corps efforts to address areas such as engagement activities, entry operations, logistics support, and expeditionary missile defense fully align with the JOAC. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to assess Joint Operational Access Concept implementation, including the contribution of the Army and the Marine Corps, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Army, the Marine Corps, and other members of the working group, to establish specific measures and milestones in future iterations of the JOAC Implementation Plan to gauge how individual implementation actions contribute in the near and long terms to achieving the required capabilities, operational objectives, and end state envisioned by the department. 2. The ability to interdict enemy forces and materiel deploying to an operational area. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to DOD, its ability to deploy military forces from the United States to a conflict area is being increasingly challenged as potential adversaries pursue capabilities designed to deny access. Access can be denied by either preventing an opposing force from entering an operational area or limiting an opposing force's freedom of action within an operational area. DOD has a joint concept that broadly describes how DOD will operate effectively in such access-denied environments. DOD's initial efforts have emphasized the roles of the Air Force and Navy.
GAO was mandated to review the role of the Army and Marine Corps in access-denied areas. This report (1) describes Army and Marine Corps efforts to address operational access challenges and (2) analyzes the extent to which DOD is able to gauge how its efforts support implementation of its concept for future operations in access-denied environments. GAO analyzed DOD, Army, and Marine Corps concepts; reports on service-level exercises; DOD policy and guidance on concept implementation; and documents specifically related to the joint concept. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps are undertaking multiple efforts to address operational access challenges—challenges that impede a military force's ability to enter and conduct operations in an area—that impact a broad range of their existing missions. For example, they are incorporating operational access challenges into their wargames and revising their service concepts, which inform their assessments of capability needs, gaps, and solutions. In addition, the Army and the Marine Corps have identified important roles they play in overcoming operational access challenges and are examining ways to carry them out in access-denied environments, including
engagement activities—improving access conditions through such activities as multinational exercises, prepositioning supplies, and forward presence, and
entry operations—deploying forces onto foreign territory to conduct missions such as eliminating land-based threats to access.
In addition, the Army has identified areas specific to its role, including
logistics—sustaining forces despite increased vulnerabilities from access threats and challenges associated with new operational approaches, and
missile defense—providing defense against increasingly accurate, lethal, and available ballistic and cruise missiles.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is unable to gauge the extent to which its efforts to overcome operational access challenges support the implementation of the 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). The JOAC describes how the department will operate effectively in future operating environments with access challenges and is intended to guide the development of capabilities for the joint force of 2020. The Joint Staff is leading a multiyear DOD-wide effort, initiated in June 2013, to coordinate, oversee, and assess the department's implementation of the JOAC. DOD plans to issue the first iteration of the JOAC Implementation Plan in 2014 and to assess and update the plan annually. The draft plan focuses on the highest-priority JOAC-required capabilities and identifies related actions, but does not fully establish specific measures and milestones to gauge progress. While DOD has stated its intent to assess progress in the future, its current planning lacks specific details about the measures it will employ and the milestones it will use to gauge that progress. Until DOD establishes specific measures and milestones in future iterations of its implementation plan, the department will not be able to gauge implementation progress and assess whether efforts by the joint force, to include the Army and the Marine Corps, will achieve DOD's goals in desired time frames. As a result, DOD may lack assurance that efforts, including those currently being undertaken by the Army and the Marine Corps to address areas such as engagement activities, entry operations, logistics, and expeditionary missile defense, will fully align with the JOAC.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish specific measures and milestones in future iterations of the JOAC Implementation Plan to improve DOD's ability to gauge implementation progress. DOD agreed with the importance of assessing the plan and said it is developing measures and milestones and will continue to refine these tracking tools in the future. |
gao_GAO-06-897T | gao_GAO-06-897T_0 | The provisions of the Privacy Act are consistent with and large based on a set of principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information, known as the Fair Information Practices, which have been widely adopted as a standard benchmark for evaluating the adequacy of privacy protections; they include such principles as openness (keeping the public informed about privacy policies and practices) and accountability (those controlling the collection or use of personal information should be accountable for taking steps to ensure the implementation of these principles). The E-Government Act of 2002 strives to enhance protection for personal information in government information systems by requiring that agencies conduct privacy impact assessments (PIA PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, st shared, and managed in a federal system. ● Physical security controls were inadequate. VA’s Efforts to Address Information Security Weaknesses Have Been Limited
The department has taken steps to address the weaknesses that we described, but these have not been sufficient to fully implement a comprehensive information security program. It is also developing strategic and tactical plans to complete a security incident response program to monitor suspicious activity and cyber alerts, events, and incidents. Agencies Can Take Steps to Reduce the Likelihood That Personal Data Will Be Compromised
In addition to establishing a robust information security program, agencies can take other actions to help guard against the possibility that personal information they maintain is inadvertently compromised. The office recommends that such notifications include, among other things, ● a general description of what happened; ● the type of personal information that was involved; ● what steps have been taken to prevent further unauthorized acquisition of personal information; ● the types of assistance to be provided to individuals, such as a toll- free contact telephone number for additional information and assistance; information on what individuals can do to protect themselves from identity theft, including contact information for the three credit reporting agencies; and information on where individuals can obtain additional information on protection against identity theft, such as the Federal Trade Commission’s Identity Theft Web site (www.consumer.gov/idtheft). Thus it is recommended that organizations consult with law enforcement regarding the timing and content of notifications. Given that people may be adversely affected by a compromise of their personal information, it is critical that they fully understand the nature of the threat and the options they have to address it. In summary, the recent security breach at VA has highlighted the importance of implementing effective information security practices. Although VA has taken steps to mitigate previously reported weaknesses, it has not implemented a comprehensive, integrated information security program, which it needs in order to effectively manage risks on an ongoing basis. Only through strong leadership, sustained management commitment and effort, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight can VA address its persistent, long-standing control weaknesses. To reduce the likelihood of experiencing such breaches, agencies can take a number of actions that can help guard against the possibility that databases of personally identifiable information are inadvertently compromised: strategically, they should ensure that a robust information security program is in place and that PIAs are developed. More specific practical measures aimed at preventing inadvertent data breaches include limiting the collection of personal information, limiting data retention, limiting access to personal information and training personnel accordingly, and considering using technological controls such as encryption when data need to be stored on mobile devices. Nevertheless, data breaches can still occur at any time, and when they do, notification to the individuals affected and/or the public has clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the dangers of identity theft. Care is needed in defining appropriate criteria if agencies are to be required to report security breaches to the public. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. Veterans Affairs: Subcommittee Post-Hearing Questions Concerning the Department’s Management of Information Technology. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent information security breach at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in which personal data on millions of veterans were compromised, has highlighted the importance of the department's security weaknesses, as well as the ability of federal agencies to protect personal information. Robust federal security programs are critically important to properly protect this information and the privacy of individuals. GAO was asked to testify on VA's information security program, ways that agencies can prevent improper disclosures of personal information, and issues concerning notifications of privacy breaches. In preparing this testimony, GAO drew on its previous reports and testimonies, as well as on expert opinion provided in congressional testimony and other sources.
What GAO Found
For many years, significant concerns have been raised about VA's information security--particularly its lack of a robust information security program, which is vital to avoiding the compromise of government information, including sensitive personal information. GAO and the department's inspector general have reported recurring weaknesses throughout VA, including the Veterans Benefits Administration, in such areas as access controls, physical security, and segregation of incompatible duties. The department has taken steps to address these weaknesses, but these have not been sufficient to establish a comprehensive information security program. For example, it is still developing plans to complete a security incident response program to monitor suspicious activity and cyber alerts, events, and incidents. Without an established and implemented security program, the department will continue to have major challenges in protecting its information and information systems from security breaches such as the one it recently experienced. In addition to establishing robust security programs, agencies can take a number of actions to help guard against the possibility that databases of personally identifiable information are inadvertently compromised. A key step is to develop a privacy impact assessment--an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed--whenever information technology is used to process personal information. In addition, agencies can take more specific practical measures aimed at preventing data breaches, including limiting the collection of personal information, limiting the time that such data are retained, limiting access to personal information and training personnel accordingly, and considering the use of technological controls such as encryption when data need to be stored on portable devices. When data breaches do occur, notification of those affected and/or the public has clear benefits, allowing people the opportunity to protect themselves from identity theft. Although existing laws do not require agencies to notify the public of data breaches, such notification is consistent with agencies' responsibility to inform individuals about how their information is being accessed and used, and it promotes accountability for privacy protection. That said, care is needed in defining appropriate criteria for triggering notification. Notices should be coordinated with law enforcement to avoid impeding ongoing investigations, and in order to be effective, notices should be easy to understand. Because of the possible adverse impact of a compromise of personal information, it is critical that people fully understand the threat and their options for addressing it. Strong leadership, sustained management commitment and effort, disciplined processes, and consistent oversight will be needed for VA to address its persistent, long-standing control weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-12-719T | gao_GAO-12-719T_0 | Missed Opportunities for Savings in Medicare
In the past several years, we have made a number of recommendations for CMS to address missed opportunities for savings in the Medicare program, which the agency has not fully implemented. These include recommendations related to the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) and Medicare Advantage (MA) programs. Medicare Fee-for-Service
Minimizing improper payments and fraud. We recommended that CMS require its contractors to develop automated prepayment controls to identify potentially improper claims when billing reaches atypical levels. In 2009, we reported that fraudulent and abusive practices in home health agencies, such as overstating the severity of a beneficiary’s condition, contributed to Medicare home health spending To strengthen controls on improper payments in home and utilization.health agencies, we recommended that CMS amend current regulations to expand the types of improper billing practices that are grounds for revocation of billing privileges. In 2010, we recommended that CMS designate responsible personnel with authority to evaluate and promptly address vulnerabilities identified to reduce improper payments. Enhancing payment safeguard mechanisms. In 2008, we reported on rapid spending growth for advanced imaging services. Aligning coverage for services with clinical recommendations. To better align preventive service use with clinical recommendations, we recommended that CMS provide coverage for Task Force recommended services, as appropriate, given cost- effectiveness and other criteria. Medicare Advantage
Better reflecting beneficiary health status in payments to MA plans. In 2010, the federal government spent about $115 billion on the MA program, a private plan alternative to the Medicare FFS program. In January 2012, we reported that CMS could achieve billions of dollars in additional savings by more accurately adjusting for differences between MA plans and Medicare FFS providers in the reporting of beneficiary diagnoses.construct a risk score for each beneficiary. To improve the accuracy of the adjustment made for differences in coding practices over time, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS direct the Administrator of CMS to incorporate the most recent data available in its estimates; identify and account for all years of diagnostic coding differences that could affect the payment year for which any adjustment is made; account for the upward trend of the annual impact of coding differences in its estimates; and to the extent possible, account for all relevant differences in beneficiary characteristics between the MA and Medicare FFS populations. We recently reported that CMS could achieve billions of dollars in savings by canceling the MA Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration—which CMS’s Office of the Actuary has estimated will cost more than $8 billion over 10 years.in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), as amended, CMS is conducting a nationwide demonstration to test whether a scaled bonus structure would lead to larger and faster annual quality improvement for MA plans at various performance levels. Need for Additional Oversight of Medicaid
We have conducted a substantial body of work on Medicaid program management. Improving oversight of supplemental payments. We have recommended that CMS adopt transparency requirements for non-DSH supplemental payments and develop a strategy to ensure that all state supplemental payment arrangements have been reviewed by CMS. CMS has taken action to address some of these recommendations, but we continue to believe additional action is warranted. Consequently, we referred this to Congress for consideration. However, no changes are planned in the methods used to determine budget neutrality of demonstrations to ensure that demonstrations do not increase the federal financial liability. Improving rate-setting methodologies. HHS has implemented many of our recommendations that have proven to be financially beneficial while also enhancing program management. HHS has made clear that it is committed to improving the nation’s health and well-being while simultaneously contributing to deficit reduction. We therefore urge HHS to expedite action on our open recommendations to further advance its performance and accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
HHS manages hundreds of complex programs benefiting the health and well-being of Americans, accounting for a quarter of all federal outlays. For fiscal year 2012, HHS is responsible for approximately $76 billion in discretionary spending and for an estimated $788 billion in mandatory spending. The size and critical mission of the two largest HHS programs, Medicare and Medicaid, make it imperative that HHS is fiscally prudent yet vigilant in protecting the populations that depend on these programs. In recent years, GAO has identified shortcomings and recommended actions to enhance operations and correct inefficiencies in Medicare and Medicaid, and HHS has implemented many recommendations, resulting in billions of dollars in savings. Because agencies now must do more with less, recommendations not yet implemented are opportunities for further conserving HHS funds and strengthening oversight of programs serving the nations most vulnerable populations.
GAO was asked to testify on issues related to HHSs budget. This statement draws from GAOs prior work, including work on these two high-risk programs, in which GAO made recommendations related to (1) the management of Medicare and (2) the need for additional oversight of Medicaid. To the extent information was available, GAO updated the status of these recommendations.
What GAO Found
Over the past several years, GAO has made a number of recommendations to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)to increase savings in Medicare fee-for-service and Medicare Advantage (MA), which is a private plan alternative to the traditional Medicare fee-for-service program. Open recommendations that could yield billions of dollars in savings remain in many areas, such as the following:
Minimizing improper payments and fraud in Medicare. GAO recommended that CMS require contractors to automate prepayment controls to identify potentially improper claims for medical equipment and supplies, expand current regulations to revoke billing privileges for home health agencies with improper billing practices, designate authorized personnel to evaluate and address vulnerabilities in payment systems, and enhance payment safeguards for physicians who use advanced imaging services.
Aligning coverage with clinical recommendations. GAO recommended that CMS provide coverage for services recommended by clinical experts, as appropriate, given cost-effectiveness and other criteria.
Better aligning payments to MA plans. To ensure that payments to MA plans reflect the health status of beneficiaries, GAO recommended that CMS more accurately adjust for differences between MA plans and traditional Medicare providers in reporting beneficiary diagnoses. GAO also recommended that CMS cancel the MA Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration because its design precludes it from yielding meaningful results.
GAO has made recommendations to CMS regarding Medicaid program oversight. Open recommendations remain in many areas, such as the following:
Improving oversight of Medicaid payments . GAO recommended that CMS adopt transparency requirements and a strategy to ensure that supplemental payments to providers have been reviewed by CMS. These supplemental payments are separate from and in addition to those made at states regular Medicaid rates.
Ensuring Medicaid demonstrations do not increase federal liability. GAO recommended that CMS revise its approval process for demonstrations to ensure they are budget neutral, which GAO subsequently referred to Congress as a matter for consideration.
The size of Medicare and Medicaid requires CMS to focus continually on the appropriateness of the methodology for payments that these programs make and the pre- and postpayment checks that can help ensure that program spending is appropriate, overpayment recovery is expedient, and agency practices with regard to operations for these programs are efficient. Therefore, GAO urges HHS to ensure action is taken on open recommendations to advance its performance and accountability. |
gao_GAO-09-184 | gao_GAO-09-184_0 | Background
Protecting U.S. airspace has changed over the years. The Air Force is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Air Force units. While NORAD is not required to conduct risk assessments on a routine basis, doing so could allow it to enhance its ability to determine the appropriate level and types of resources—including units, personnel, and aircraft—for ASA operations. NORAD officials stated that it has not adopted a risk-based management approach primarily because DOD does not require NORAD to use a risk- based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements. The Air Force Has Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and Guidance
The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance because it (1) has focused on other priorities and (2) believes that ASA operational requirements, such as the number of sites, might be decreased to pre-September 11, 2001, levels in the future. The Air Force Does Not Operate ASA as a Steady- State Mission
Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force has not implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. In addition, the Air Force did not fully fund ASA operations in the two previous 2-year programming cycles. Readiness of Units Performing ASA Operations is Partially Assessed by NORAD and PACOM but Not by the Air Force
DOD is to evaluate personnel, training, and quantity and quality of equipment to determine the readiness of units to perform their missions. This preassessment evaluates the quality of alert aircraft, to include the overall condition of the aircraft, and the units’ ability to respond to different air sovereignty scenarios, such as intercepting various types of aircraft. Our structured interviews with the commanders of units that conduct ASA operations showed that they did not evaluate and report the personnel, training, or quantity and quality of equipment to perform ASA operations because the Air Force has not formally assigned ASA as a mission to the units and it has not declared the operations as a steady-state mission. Specifically, by fiscal year 2020, 11 of the 18 current ASA sites could be without viable aircraft to conduct ASA operations. While Air Force officials have acknowledged the challenges we identified to the long-term sustainability of ASA operations, they have not developed plans to address them because the service has been focused on other priorities, such as overseas operations. Plans would provide the Air Force with information that could assist it in its efforts to ensure long-term sustainability of ASA operations and the capability of ASA units to protect U.S. airspace. Further, if the Air Force, or other service if assigned, does not formally assign the ASA mission to units performing ASA operations and ensure that the readiness of units performing ASA operations is fully assessed—to include training, personnel, equipment, and the ability to respond to an alert— opportunities may be lost to identify and resolve readiness issues. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has adopted a risk-based management approach to determine air sovereignty alert (ASA) operational requirements, we reviewed prior GAO reports that recommended organizations use risk assessments to manage risk and determine operational requirements. In identifying the challenges to the long-term sustainability of the Air Force’s ASA operations and the extent to which the service had plans to address these challenges, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from a range of DOD organizations involved in conducting, managing, or overseeing ASA activities and funding. Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to U.S. intelligence, the threat to U.S airspace remains. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is to defend U.S. air space and the U.S. Air Force has 18 sites in the United States that conduct air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. ASA operations support fighter aircraft in conducting homeland air defense operations. GAO examined the extent to which (1) NORAD has adopted a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD), NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance; (3) the Air Force assesses the readiness of units conducting ASA operations; and (4) the Air Force faces challenges in sustaining ASA operations for the future and what plans, if any, it has to address such challenges. GAO reviewed relevant ASA guidance, directives, and planning documents; and interviewed DOD officials, including the commanders of all 18 ASA sites.
What GAO Found
Responding to individual requests from DOD, NORAD has done some assessments to determine ASA operational requirements. NORAD has not adopted a risk-based approach to determining ASA requirements, including routine risk assessments. Although GAO previously reported on the benefits to organizations that routinely do risk assessments to determine program requirements, NORAD does not conduct such assessments because DOD does not require NORAD to do so. However, such assessments could enhance NORAD's ability to determine and apply the appropriate levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft for the ASA mission. The Air Force has not implemented ASA operations in accordance with DOD, NORAD, and Air Force directives and guidance, which instruct the Air Force to establish ASA as a steady-state (ongoing and indefinite) mission. The Air Force has not implemented the 140 actions it identified to establish ASA as a steady-state mission, which included integrating ASA operations into the Air Force's planning, programming, and funding cycle. The Air Force has instead been focused on other priorities, such as overseas military operations. While implementing ASA as a steady-state mission would not solve all of the challenges the units must address, it would help them mitigate some of the challenges associated with conducting both their ASA and warfighting missions. NORAD has partially assessed the readiness of ASA units; however the Air Force has not evaluated personnel, training, and quantity and quality of equipment. Readiness measures are designed to ensure that DOD forces are properly trained, equipped, and prepared to conduct their assigned missions. For example, while NORAD evaluated the extent to which aircraft were maintained for ASA operations and the units' ability to respond to an alert and to locate and intercept aircraft, it did not evaluate training. Because the Air Force has not implemented ASA as a steady-state mission or formally assigned the mission to the units, it does not assess ASA readiness. By assessing the readiness of units that consistently conduct ASA operations, DOD would be better assured that these units are organized, trained, and equipped to perform ASA operations. The Air Force faces two challenges to sustaining its ASA capabilities over the long term--(1) replacing or extending the service life of aging fighter aircraft and (2) replacing ASA units with equipment and trained personnel when they deploy. For example, if aircraft are not replaced by 2020, 11 of the 18 current air sovereignty alert sites could be without aircraft. The Air Force has not developed plans to mitigate these challenges because it has been focused on other priorities. Plans would provide the Air Force information that could assist it in ensuring the long-term sustainability of ASA operations and the capability of ASA units to protect U.S. airspace. |
gao_AIMD-97-16 | gao_AIMD-97-16_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget asked us to review the budget treatment of federal insurance programs to assess whether the current cash-based budget provides complete information and whether accrual concepts could be used to improve budgeting for these programs. Specifically, we were asked to (1) identify approaches for using accrual concepts in budgeting for insurance programs, (2) highlight trade-offs among different approaches, including the current budget treatment, and (3) discuss potential implementation issues, such as cost estimation. Key Information for Budget Decision-making— the Risk Assumed by the Government—Is Not Readily Available
As a general principle, decision-making is best informed if the government recognizes the costs of its commitments at the time it makes them. In most cases, the cash-based budget does not adequately reflect on a timely basis either the government’s cost or the economic impact of these programs because costs are recognized when claims are paid rather than when the commitment is made and when economic behavior is generally changed. Benefits of Accrual-Based Budgeting for Individual Federal Insurance Programs Will Depend on Several Factors
Although the use of accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance programs has the potential to overcome a number of the shortcomings of cash-based budgeting for these programs, a number of factors influence the extent to which the information and incentives for a particular insurance program would be changed. By recognizing the government’s cost in the budget deficit at the time decisions are made, the incentives for managing insurance costs may be improved. If premium rates were set to cover the long-term expected cost of the insurance extended, sufficient reserves could be established over time. The cash-based budget may misstate the cost of the government’s insurance commitments in any particular year because the time between receipt of program collections, the occurrence of an insured event, and the final payment of a claim can extend over several budget periods. The characteristics of the risks insured by the federal government, frequent program modifications, and the absence of sufficient data on possible losses have hampered the development of risk-assumed estimates. We believe that the potential benefits of an accrual-based budgeting approach for federal insurance programs warrant continued effort in the development of risk-assumed cost estimates. Supplemental reporting of these estimates in the budget over a number of years could help policymakers understand the extent and nature of the estimation uncertainty and permit an evaluation of the desirability and feasibility of adopting a more comprehensive accrual-based approach. The value of reporting risk-assumed estimates was also endorsed by FASAB in accounting standards it developed, which require disclosure of risk-assumed cost estimates as supplemental information for insurance programs beginning with financial statements for fiscal year 1997. Furthermore, OMB agreed that the challenges involved in bringing risk-assumed estimates into the budget are significant and that additional effort to improve estimation methods is required. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the budget treatment of federal insurance programs to assess whether the current cash-based budget provides complete information on the government's cost and whether accrual concepts could be used to improve budgeting for these programs, focusing on: (1) potential approaches for using accrual concepts in the budget for insurance programs; (2) trade-offs among different approaches, including the current cash-based budget treatment; and (3) potential implementation issues such as cost estimation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the cash-based budget does not adequately reflect the government's cost or the economic impact of federal insurance programs because generally costs are recognized when claims are paid rather than when the commitment is made; (2) in any particular year, the cost of the government's insurance commitments may be understated or overstated because the time between the receipt of program collections, the occurrence of an insured event, and the final payment of a claim can extend over many budget periods; (3) decisionmaking is best informed if the government recognizes the costs of its commitments at the time it makes them; (4) for insurance programs, accrual-based budgeting which would recognize the expected long-term cost of the insurance commitment at the time the insurance is extended offers the potential to overcome a number of the deficiencies of cash-based budgeting by improving cost recognition; (5) in most cases, the risk-assumed approach to accrual would be analogous to a premium rate-setting process in that it looks at the long-term expected cost of an insurance commitment at the time the insurance commitment is extended; (6) in practical terms, however, attempts to improve cost recognition occur on a continuum since insurance programs and insurable events vary significantly; (7) the challenges involved in bringing accrual-based estimates into the budget are significant and dictate beginning with an informational and analytic step; (8) development of models to generate reasonably reliable risk-assumed estimates is made difficult by the nature of the risks insured by the government, frequent program modifications, and the sufficiency of data on potential losses; (9) the potential benefits of accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance programs warrant continued effort in the development of risk-assumed cost estimates; (10) supplemental reporting of risk-assumed estimates in the budget as they are developed over a number of years would help policymakers understand the extent and nature of the estimation uncertainty and evaluate whether a more comprehensive accrual-based budgeting approach should be adopted; (11) supplemental reporting of risk-assumed estimates in the budget would parallel the new accounting treatment required under accounting standards developed by the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB); and (12) in requiring the disclosure of risk-assumed estimates as supplemental information to agency financial statements, FASAB recognized the usefulness of these estimates to better inform budget decisions. |
gao_GAO-09-312T | gao_GAO-09-312T_0 | We have reported that some hospitals are expanding their IT systems to support improvements in quality of care. 1). In the health IT field, standards may govern areas ranging from technical issues, such as file types and interchange systems, to content issues, such as medical terminology. Federal Health IT Efforts Highlight Importance of Establishing Standards, Developing Comprehensive Plans, and Ensuring Privacy
Widespread adoption of health IT has the potential to improve the efficiency and quality of health care. Among these are mechanisms to establish clearly defined health IT standards that are agreed upon by all important stakeholders, comprehensive planning grounded in results-oriented milestones and measures, and an approach to privacy protection that encourages acceptance and adoption of electronic health records. Mechanisms and Structures for Harmonizing and Implementing Health IT Standards Are Essential to Enable Interoperability
The need for health care standards has been broadly recognized for a number of years. Among other lessons, they reported the need to define and adopt common standards and terminology to achieve data quality and consistency, system interoperability, and information protection. The interconnected work of these organizations to identify and promote the implementation of standards is important to the overall effort to advance the use of interoperable health IT. Comprehensive Planning with Milestones and Performance Measures Is Essential to Achieving Health IT Goals
Using interoperable health IT to help improve the efficiency and quality of health care is a complex goal that involves a range of stakeholders and numerous activities taking place over an expanse of time; in view of this complexity, it is important to develop comprehensive plans that are grounded in results-oriented milestones and performance measures. Without comprehensive plans, it is difficult to coordinate the many activities under way and integrate their outcomes. Addressing and mitigating this risk is essential to encourage public acceptance of the increased use of health IT and electronic medical records. ● Examples of principles that health IT programs and applications need to address include the uses and disclosures principle, which provides limits to the circumstances in which an individual’s protected heath information may be used or disclosed, and the access principle, which establishes individuals’ rights to review and obtain a copy of their protected health information in certain circumstances. ● Key challenges include understanding and resolving legal and policy issues (for example, those related to variations in states’ privacy laws), ensuring that only the minimum amount of information necessary is disclosed to only those entities authorized to receive the information, ensuring individuals’ rights to request access and amendments to their own health information, and implementing adequate security measures for protecting health information. Specifically, within its approach, the department had not defined a process to ensure that the key privacy principles and challenges we had identified were fully and adequately addressed. Moreover, the department may miss an opportunity to establish the high degree of public confidence and trust needed to help ensure the success of a nationwide health information network. Lacking an overall approach for protecting the privacy of personal electronic health information, there is reduced assurance that privacy protection measures will be consistently built into health IT programs and applications. Without such assurance, public acceptance of health IT may be at risk. In closing, Mr. Chairman, many important steps have been taken, but more is needed before we can make a successful transition to a nationwide health IT capability and take full advantage of potential improvements in care and efficiency that this could enable. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
As GAO and others have reported, the use of information technology (IT) has enormous potential to help improve the quality of health care and is important for improving the performance of the U.S. health care system. Given its role in providing health care, the federal government has been urged to take a leadership role to improve the quality and effectiveness of health care, and it has been working to promote the nationwide use of health IT for a number of years. However, achieving widespread adoption and implementation of health IT has proven challenging, and the best way to accomplish this transition remains subject to much debate. At the committee's request, this testimony discusses important issues identified by GAO's work that have broad relevance to the successful implementation of health IT to improve the quality of health care. To develop this testimony, GAO relied largely on its previous work on federal health IT activities.
What GAO Found
Health IT has the potential to help improve the efficiency and quality of health care, but achieving the transition to a nationwide health IT capability is an inherently complex endeavor. A successful transition will require, among other things, addressing the following issues: (1) Establishing a foundation of clearly defined health IT standards that are agreed upon by all important stakeholders. Developing, coordinating, and agreeing on standards are crucial for allowing health IT systems to work together and to provide the right people access to the information they need: for example, technology standards must be agreed on (such as file types and interchange systems), and a host of content issues must also be addressed (one example is the need for consistent medical terminology). Although important steps have been taken, additional effort is needed to define, adopt, and implement such standards to promote data quality and consistency, system interoperability (that is, the ability of automated systems to share and use information), and information protection. (2) Defining comprehensive plans that are grounded in results-oriented milestones and measures. Using interoperable health IT to improve the quality and efficiency of health care is a complex goal that involves a range of stakeholders, various technologies, and numerous activities taking place over an expanse of time, and it is important that these activities be guided by comprehensive plans that include milestones and performance measures. Without such plans, it will be difficult to ensure that the many activities are coordinated, their results monitored, and their outcomes most effectively integrated. (3) Implementing an approach to protection of personal privacy that encourages public acceptance of health IT. A robust approach to privacy protection is essential to establish the high degree of public confidence and trust needed to encourage widespread adoption of health IT and particularly electronic medical records. Health IT programs and applications need to address key privacy principles (for example, the access principle, which establishes the right of individuals to review certain personal health information). At the same time, they need to overcome key challenges (for example, those related to variations in states' privacy laws). Unless these principles and challenges are fully and adequately addressed, there is reduced assurance that privacy protection measures will be consistently built into health IT programs and applications, and public acceptance of health IT may be put at risk. |
gao_GAO-13-570 | gao_GAO-13-570_0 | Moreover, a similar number of federal managers (40 percent) reported that they did not know if an evaluation had been completed. Most Managers Who Had Evaluations Reported That Evaluations Helped Them Assess and Improve Programs
For the 37 percent of federal managers who had evaluations, the survey asked to what extent those evaluations had contributed to a variety of program management and policy making activities. Eighty to 81 percent of these managers reported that evaluations contributed to a moderate or greater extent to implementing changes to improve program management or performance and in assessing program effectiveness or value. The evaluators we interviewed provided several examples of how evaluations had contributed to their modifying existing or developing new programs. The only factor that more than one-fourth of the managers reported as having hindered the agency’s use of evaluation to a great or very great extent was lack of resources to implement the evaluation findings (33 percent). Potential Barriers Associated with Study Features or Agency Evaluation Capacity
Of seven potential barriers to use concerning the studies or an agency’s capacity or support for using evaluations, none were generally considered significant by the 37 percent of federal managers who reported having evaluations: concern about the credibility (validity or reliability) of study results (49 percent rated small or no extent); difficulty generalizing the results to other persons or localities (53 difficulty obtaining study results in time to be useful (58 percent); difficulty determining how to use evaluation findings to improve the program (54 percent); lack of staff knowledgeable about interpreting or analyzing program evaluation results (50 percent); difficulty accepting evaluation findings that do not conform to expectations (54 percent); lack of ongoing top executive commitment or support for using evaluation to make program or funding decisions (55 percent). Managers’ Limited Knowledge of Congressional Support for Evaluation
Only 18 percent of managers reported that lack of ongoing congressional commitment to use evaluation to make program or funding decisions was a barrier to use to a great or very great extent; however, more (39 percent) reported not being able to judge whether this was a barrier. Lessons for Facilitating Agencies’ Use of Evaluation Results
The evaluators we interviewed emphasized three basic strategies to facilitate evaluation’s influencing program management and policy: demonstrate leadership support of evaluation for accountability and build a strong body of evidence, and engage stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. It is also a strategy for ensuring that information is available for input to fast-breaking policy discussions. The evaluators described providing assistance, training, and incentives to program staff and service providers to conduct and use evaluations. Concluding Observations
Agencies’ lack of evaluations may be the greatest barrier to their ability to inform program management and policy making. Yet, just over a third of federal managers reported that an evaluation had been completed in the past 5 years on any of the programs, operations, or projects that they were involved in. Seeking out in advance the interests and concerns of key program stakeholders, including the Congress, can help ensure that agency evaluations provide the information necessary for effective management and congressional oversight. Two of the barriers to evaluation use managers most frequently cited in our survey concerned addressing issues important to decision makers and resolving differences of opinion among stakeholders. Comprehensive program evaluations that examine the coverage and effectiveness of a cluster of federal programs and policies aimed at achieving similar outcomes could be key in coordinating and streamlining programs so as to reduce duplication and overlap. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Labor and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The agencies and OMB staff provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Labor; to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and to appropriate congressional committees. Human Services Research Dissemination: What Works? Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships. Government Performance: Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using Performance Information to Improve Results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) aims to ensure that agencies use performance information in decision making and holds them accountable for achieving results and improving government performance. GPRAMA requires GAO to evaluate the act's implementation; this report is one of a series to assess its initial implementation. GAO examined the extent of agencies' use of program evaluations--a particular form of performance information, factors that may hinder their use in program management and policy making, and strategies that may facilitate their use.
GAO surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,391 federal civilian managers and supervisors to obtain their perspectives on several results-oriented management topics, including the extent of and barriers to their evaluation use. GAO also interviewed the Office of Management and Budget and evaluators on barriers to evaluation use and strategies to facilitate it at five agencies selected for their evaluation experience in the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Labor. These officials' views cannot be generalized but provide useful insights.
What GAO Found
In a governmentwide survey, GAO found that most federal managers lack recentevaluations of their programs. Thirty-seven percent reported that an evaluation had been completed within the past 5 years of any program, operation, or project they were involved in. Another 40 percent of managers reported that they did not know if an evaluation had been completed. However, 80 percent of managers who did have evaluations reported that those evaluations contributed to a moderate or greater extent to improving program management or performance and to assessing program effectiveness or value. Fewer reported that evaluations contributed moderately or more to allocating resources within a program (67 percent) or streamlining programs (61 percent).
Of the 37 percent of federal managers who had evaluations, the factor most often rated as having hindered use to a great or very great extent was lack of resources to implement the evaluation findings (33 percent). The next most frequently reported barriers related to program context, such as resolving differences of opinion among program stakeholders (23 percent). Other issues were not considered significant barriers by these managers, such as the lack of credibility or timeliness of study results, lack of leadership commitment or support for using evaluations, or difficulty accepting unexpected findings. Managers reported limited knowledge of congressional support for using results; 39 percent reported not being able to judge whether this was a barrier.
The agency evaluators GAO interviewed noted that it usually takes a number of studies, rather than just one, to influence change in programs or policies. They described using evaluations to modify existing or develop new programs and share what works with their program partners. They emphasized three basic strategies to facilitate evaluation influence:
1. Demonstrate leadership support of evaluation for accountability and improvement by promoting capacity building and the use of evidence and funding evaluation offices to promote and support the use of evidence.
2. Build a strong body of evidence by attending to rigor in whatever methods are used and accumulating a knowledge base from which to respond to varied questions over time or fast-breaking policy discussions.
3. Engage stakeholders throughout the evaluation process--developing relationships to gain their input to planning and buy-in; providing assistance, training, and incentives; and disseminating usable messages.
GAO observes that
Agencies' lack of evaluations may be the greatest barrier to their informing program managers and policy makers.
Seeking out in advance the interests and concerns of program stakeholders, including Congress, can help ensure that evaluations will provide the information necessary for effective management and oversight.
Comprehensive evaluations that examine the coverage and effectiveness of federal programs and policies aimed at achieving similar outcomes could be key to coordinating and streamlining programs to reduce duplication and overlap.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations.
The Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Labor, and Office of Management and Budget staff provided technical comments on a draft of this report that we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-532T | gao_GAO-06-532T_0 | Within USDA, GIPSA is responsible for implementing the Packers and Stockyards Act. GIPSA initiates investigations and actions to halt unfair and anticompetitive practices by meatpacking companies and by other parties involved in livestock marketing. The subsequent OIG report noted that while GIPSA had a credible record in certain areas, it (1) did not have the capability to perform effective anticompetitive practice investigations and (2) faced formidable obstacles to become effective in performing such investigations. In response, GIPSA completed a major restructuring of its headquarters and field offices in 1999 and hired staff to strengthen its investigations of alleged anticompetitive practices. Because of continued concerns about whether GIPSA was taking sufficient action to protect competition in livestock markets, GAO was requested to review USDA’s efforts to implement the Packers and Stockyards Act. Subsequently, the OIG completed a follow-up review on GIPSA’s administration and oversight of the Packers and Stockyards Programs in January 2006. 2000 GAO Review Identified Critical Factors Detracting From GIPSA’s Investigative Capabilities
We identified two critical factors that detracted from GIPSA’s investigative capability, as well as areas where GIPSA could improve its efforts to develop and share key information. First, the agency’s investigations were planned and conducted primarily by economists without the formal involvement of attorneys from OGC. Second, GIPSA’s investigative practices were designed for traditional trade practices and financial issues the agency had emphasized for years and were not suited for the more complex competition-related concerns it was addressing. Attorneys were assigned to lead and conduct investigations from the outset so that officials with a legal perspective focused on assessing potential violations of law. We concluded that GIPSA’s program needed additional steps to become more effective and efficient in performing investigations and recommended that GIPSA develop a teamwork approach for investigations with GIPSA’s economists and OGC’s attorneys working together to identify violations of the law. Processes and Practices For Anticompetitive Practice Investigations
We also found that GIPSA’s basic investigative processes and practices were not designed for addressing the complex anticompetitive practices it had begun to encounter in recent years—instead they were designed for the more traditional trade practice and financial issues that the agency had emphasized for years. They also agreed that GIPSA could report on market activities and identify those that may raise concerns about fairness and competition, as FTC had done. In our report, we recommended that GIPSA provide industry participants and the Congress with clarifications of GIPSA’s views on competitive activities by reporting publicly on changing business practices in the cattle and hog industries and identifying market operations or activities that raised concerns under the Packers and Stockyards Act. GIPSA’s Actions To Address GAO’s Recommendations Fell Short in Several Areas
USDA’s General Counsel and the Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs concurred with our recommendations and provided encouraging details about their planned implementation. They noted that OGC attorneys would work closely with GIPSA’s economists, legal specialists, and other technical specialists to ensure that investigative plans had a sound basis and to address critical legal issues throughout the conduct of an investigation. Overall, it appears that as GIPSA officials responded to the prior OIG and GAO reports, they did so in a manner that prevented, rather than facilitated the desired actions and results. Challenges and Other Issues Associated With Addressing Longstanding Weaknesses
Given GIPSA’s lack of progress in addressing prior report findings and recommendations dating back almost a decade, continued vigilance and monitoring of its key activities and management initiatives by the OIG and other oversight bodies is essential. developing an internal review function to monitor and report on the progress of corrective actions resulting from external reviewers, such as the OIG and GAO; moving forward in identifying techniques used by DOJ and FTC that are most appropriate under the Packers and Stockyards Act. GIPSA also stated that it will enable its legal specialists to consult with OGC and will integrate attorneys into complex competition investigations earlier in the process. Finally, as GIPSA moves forward in developing its processes, it should consider the feasibility of assigning lead roles to OGC attorneys for investigations that involve more complex anticompetitive practices—an approach we have recommended that is also consistent with DOJ and FTC practices. Going forward, it is also possible that GIPSA’s efforts to periodically inform the industry and the Congress about its monitoring efforts, as well as changing competitive conditions could be of further usefulness. GIPSA has issued reports on the cattle, hog, and poultry industries from 2000 through 2004, and has initiated a broad study on livestock and red meat marketing practices. While informative to the industry and policy makers, such analyses could also be internally valuable to GIPSA as a tool for identifying current and emerging areas of vulnerability and better targeting its oversight resources and activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed before Congress the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) management and oversight of the Packers and Stockyards Act. Within USDA, the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) is responsible for administering the Packers and Stockyards Act and investigating concerns about unfair and anticompetitive practices in the $90 billion livestock market. Prior reports issued by the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) and our office have identified weaknesses in GIPSA's investigation and enforcement activities, and recommended actions to address them. A more recent OIG report shows that, in several key areas, GIPSA still has not taken sufficient steps to address those recommendations. This testimony focuses on our prior work and discusses (1) factors that have affected GIPSA's ability to investigate concerns about anticompetitive practices, (2) GIPSA's actions to address our recommendations and areas where their efforts have fallen short, and (3) challenges and other issues we believe GIPSA should consider as it moves to further strengthen its capacity to address competitiveness issues.
What GAO Found
In summary, in 2000, we identified two critical factors that detracted from GIPSA's ability to investigate anticompetitive practices in livestock markets, and another area where improvement was needed. First, the agency's investigations were planned and conducted primarily by economists without the formal involvement of attorneys from USDA's Office of General Counsel (OGC). As a result, a legal perspective that focused on assessing potential violations was generally absent when investigations were initiated and conducted. Second, GIPSA's investigative practices were designed for traditional trade practices and financial issues the agency had emphasized for years and were not suited for the more complex competition-related concerns it was addressing. Finally, while not a critical concern, we noted that GIPSA had an important role in keeping the industry and the Congress informed about its monitoring of livestock markets and could have done more to identify market operations or activities that appeared to raise concerns under the Packers and Stockyards Act. USDA concurred with our findings and noted specific actions it planned to take in response to our recommendations, including (1) formalizing consultations between GIPSA and OGC on complex investigations, and integrating OGC attorneys into its investigative teams; (2) developing a tiered process whereby routine investigations would be reviewed and approved by headquarters staff, while complex investigations received an additional OGC review; (3) adopting relevant procedures used by DOJ and FTC for planning, developing, implementing, and reviewing investigations; and (4) reporting publicly on changing business practices and activities that raise fairness and competition concerns. Despite these plans, the January 2006 OIG report identified substantial ongoing weaknesses in GIPSA's investigative processes and noted that GIPSA's actions to respond to the prior OIG and GAO reports had fallen short in key areas. In particular, GIPSA had not yet developed a teamwork approach for investigations whereby GIPSA's economists and USDA's OGC attorneys could work together to identify violations of law, nor had it taken sufficient steps to ensure legal specialists within GIPSA were used most effectively. In addition, GIPSA had not followed through in adopting appropriate investigative guidance similar to those of DOJ and FTC to strengthen its ability to investigate anticompetitive and unfair practices. Given GIPSA's lack of progress in addressing prior report findings and recommendations dating back for almost a decade, continued vigilance and monitoring of its key activities and management initiatives by the OIG and other oversight bodies is essential. In its response to the OIG's 2006 report, GIPSA noted that it intends to reassess and develop a defined process for managing investigations, enhancing communication among staff and managers, appropriately dividing responsibility for its varied types of investigations, and developing an internal review function to monitor and report on corrective actions resulting from the OIG and GAO reviews. Consistent with our prior recommendations, GIPSA also plans to define the role of OGC attorneys and GIPSA legal specialists in investigations and to move forward in identifying and adopting certain techniques used by the DOJ and the FTC. As GIPSA moves ahead in reexamining its processes it should consider assigning lead roles to OGC attorneys for certain investigations involving complex anticompetitive practices. Finally, going forward, GIPSA's efforts to periodically inform the industry and the Congress about competitive conditions could be of further usefulness. GIPSA plans to complete a study on livestock and red meat marketing practices later this year. While potentially informative to the industry and policymakers, it could also help GIPSA identify current and emerging areas of vulnerability and better target its oversight resources. |
gao_GAO-07-1077 | gao_GAO-07-1077_0 | DOD Has Begun Developing and Implementing a Risk Management Approach to Ensure the Availability of the DIB
DOD has begun developing and implementing a risk management approach to ensure the availability of DIB assets needed to support mission-essential tasks, though implementation is still at an early stage. It focuses on steps to (1) identify a critical asset list; (2) prioritize the critical assets on that list; (3) perform vulnerability assessments on high-priority critical assets; and (4) encourage contractors’ actions to remediate or mitigate adverse effects found during these assessments, as appropriate, to ensure continuity of business operations. DCMA has also developed an asset prioritization model for determining a criticality score and ranking critical assets, from highest to lowest risk. DCMA has developed a process to identify the most important DIB assets and to narrow this list to those it considers critical. DCMA Has Established a Standardized Vulnerability Assessment Process
DCMA has established a standardized mission assurance vulnerability assessment process for critical DIB assets. DOD Will Need to Address Several Key Challenges in Implementing Its DIB Risk Management Approach
DOD faces several key challenges in implementing its DIB risk management approach and will need to address them to ensure that its approach is sound and its progress can be measured. Fourth, DOD lacks a plan for identifying and addressing challenges in assessing vulnerabilities of critical foreign contractors. The DOD risk management approach calls for identifying DIB assets critical to supporting combatant commanders’ mission- essential tasks that would result in DOD-wide mission failure if the asset were to be damaged, degraded, or destroyed. Model Has Not Yet Had External Technical Review
Our review of the asset prioritization model revealed that weighting factors were selected and much of the input data were determined according to subjective decisions made with only limited review. The absence of comprehensive threat data undermines the utility of the index score for prioritizing contractors. Furthermore, DOD has not established targets or time frames for resolving this issue. Without a comprehensive list of critical assets and a reliable asset prioritization model, DOD cannot ensure that it has identified the most important DIB critical assets, as is necessary for carrying out the National Military Strategy. Third, DOD is currently scheduling and conducting assessments based on contractor amenability and security clearance status, rather than on the rankings assigned to critical DIB assets according to its asset prioritization model. Until all of these issues are addressed, DOD will lack the visibility it needs over critical DIB asset vulnerabilities, will be unable to encourage critical DIB contractors to take needed remediation actions, and will be unable to make informed decisions regarding limited resources. Schedule and conduct vulnerability assessments on the critical DIB assets based on their respective rankings as validated in the asset prioritization model, to ensure that the most critical DIB assets are assessed in a timely manner and DOD maximizes its use of limited resources. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to prepare a plan to collaborate with the Department of State and other agencies, as appropriate, to develop options to identify and address potential challenges in assessing vulnerabilities in foreign critical DIB assets. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To conduct our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) defense industrial base (DIB) program, we obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the following DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Information Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy; Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Counterintelligence & Security, Physical Security Programs; DOD Counterintelligence Field Activity, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program Management Directorate; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD), Critical Infrastructure Protection Office; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Information Management & Technology Directorate; Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Combat Support Assessments Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office, Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Branch; Office of the Chief Information Officer; Mission Assurance Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, Virginia; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Security Division, Critical Department of the Air Force, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Homeland Defense Division; Headquarters, Defense Intelligence Agency, Office for Critical Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security/Defense; Headquarters, Defense Information Systems Agency, Critical Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command, Mission Assurance Division, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska To examine the status of DOD’s efforts to develop and implement a risk management approach, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan as they relate to the DIB sector-specific and sector assurance plans, as well as other studies conducted by GAO, the Congressional Research Service, and the DOD Inspector General concerning risk management and defense critical infrastructure. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. military relies on the defense industrial base (DIB) to meet requirements to fulfill the National Military Strategy. The potential destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation of critical DIB assets by attack, crime, technological failure, natural disaster, or man-made catastrophe could jeopardize the success of U.S. military operations. GAO was asked to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Critical Infrastructure Program and has already reported that DOD has not developed a comprehensive management plan for its implementation. This, the second GAO report, has (1) determined the status of DOD's efforts to develop and implement a risk management approach to ensure the availability of DIB assets, and (2) identified challenges DOD faces in its approach to risk management. GAO analyzed plans, guidance, and other documents on identifying, prioritizing, and assessing critical domestic and foreign DIB assets and held discussions with DOD and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
DOD has begun developing and implementing a risk management approach to ensure the availability of DIB assets needed to support mission-essential tasks, though implementation is still at an early stage. Its sector assurance and sector-specific plans focus on steps to identify a list of critical assets that, if damaged, would result in unacceptable consequences; prioritize those critical assets based on a risk assessment process; perform vulnerability assessments on high-priority critical assets, and encourage contractors' actions to remediate or mitigate adverse effects found during these assessments, as appropriate, to ensure continuity of business. The Defense Contract Management Agency, the executing agency for the DIB, has developed a process to identify the most important DIB assets and to narrow this list to those it considers critical. It has also developed an asset prioritization model for determining a criticality score and ranking critical assets, and it has established a standardized mission assurance vulnerability assessment process for critical DIB assets. DOD faces several key challenges in implementing its DIB risk management approach. Overall, DOD's methodology for identifying critical DIB assets is evolving, and DOD lacks targets and time frames for completing development of key program elements that are needed for its risk management approach. Without them, DOD cannot measure its progress toward ensuring that DIB assets supporting critical DOD missions are properly identified and prioritized. The specific challenges are as follows: First, DOD is not fully incorporating the military services' mission-essential task information (i.e., listings of assets whose damage, degradation, or destruction would result in DOD-wide mission failure) in compiling its critical asset list. Second, GAO's analysis of DOD's prioritization model shows that weighting factors were selected and data determined according to subjective decisions and limited review, and that needed contractor-specific data were lacking, as was comprehensive threat information, thus undermining the utility of the index score for prioritizing contractors. Without these comprehensive data and a reliable asset prioritization model, DOD will not be in a sound position to know that it has identified the most important and critical assets, as called for in the National Military Strategy. Third, with regard to scheduling and conducting assessments of critical DIB assets, DOD is currently doing so based on contractor amenability and security clearance status without regard for assets' priority rankings, and thus cannot ensure that the most critical DIB contractors are assessed. Fourth, DOD lacks a plan for developing options to work with the Department of State and other appropriate agencies to identify and address potential challenges in assessing vulnerabilities in foreign critical DIB assets. Until all these challenges are addressed, DOD will lack the visibility it needs over critical DIB asset vulnerabilities, will be unable to encourage critical DIB contractors to take needed remediation actions, and will be unable to make informed decisions regarding limited resources. |
gao_GAO-03-252 | gao_GAO-03-252_0 | Airports and Airlines are Taking a Variety of Actions to Reduce Emissions, Although Specific Impact of These Actions Unknown
Many of the nation’s busiest airports and airlines that serve them have initiated voluntary emission reduction measures, such as converting shuttle buses and other vehicles from diesel or gasoline fuels to cleaner alternative fuels. While the actual impact of these measures is unknown, some measures (such as shifting to new cleaner gas or diesel engines or alternative fuels) have the potential to significantly reduce emissions, such as nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, and carbon monoxide. Representatives from the aviation industry as well as federal and state officials told us that the new air quality standards, combined with the boost in emissions expected from increases in air travel, could cause airports to be subject to more emission control requirements in the future. For example, a number of carriers at Dallas/Fort Worth International and Houston airports have agreed to voluntarily reduce emissions associated with ground service equipment by up to 75 percent. Proposed Airport Projects Have Been Able to Conform to Current Air Quality Standards
In addition to facing control measures as part of state strategies to attain the Clean Air Act’s ambient air quality standards, airports must also submit most major construction project proposals for federal environmental review, which includes an evaluation of the proposed project’s impacts on air quality. The airport operators also indicated that having such a program encourages airport sponsors to undertake efforts to reduce emissions. However, the group has not defined specific objectives or established time frames for achieving its goal of reducing aviation-related emissions. Two Countries Have Introduced Emission- Based Fees
Other countries use many of the same measures to reduce emissions at airports as the United States and, in addition, two countries have imposed landing fees based on the amount of nitrogen oxides emissions produced by aircraft. Improvements in Aircraft and Engine Design Have Reduced Many Aircraft Emissions, but Nitrogen Oxides Emissions are Increasing
Although research and development efforts by NASA and aircraft and engine manufacturers have led to engine and airframe improvements that have increased fuel efficiency and lowered carbon dioxide and hydrocarbon emissions, trade-offs among several factors, including engine performance, have also resulted in increased nitrogen oxides emissions. Our analysis of data on aircraft emissions during landings and takeoffs indicates that the newest generation of aircraft engines, while meeting international standards, can produce considerably more nitrogen oxides emissions than the older versions they are replacing. Our analysis of aircraft landing/takeoff emissions shows that newer aircraft produce considerably more nitrogen oxides than older models. This TALON technology is being used on some aircraft in the U.S. In addition, more attention will be focused on finding additional ways to reduce emissions from airports to enable localities to meet more stringent ozone standards, which go into effect in late 2003. Among the issues that the framework should address are the need for baseline information on the extent and impact of aviation- related emissions, particularly nitrogen oxides emissions; the interrelationship among emissions and between emissions and noise; options for reducing aviation-related emissions, including the feasibility, cost, and emission reducing potential of these options; goals and time frames for achieving any needed emission reductions; the roles of NASA, other government agencies, and the aviation industry in developing and implementing programs for achieving needed emission reductions; and coordination of emission reduction proposals with members of ICAO. A study of emissions at Los Angeles International Airport is expected to shed some light on the subject. State environmental officials attribute this projected increase in the airports’ ozone contribution to an expected doubling of aircraft emissions coupled with a 50 percent decrease in emissions from other sources. These air travel delays add to regional air quality problems because idling aircraft contribute to pollution. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although noise has long been a problem around airports, the anticipated growth in demand for air travel has also raised questions about the effect of airport operations on air quality. Aviation-related emissions of nitrogen oxides, which contribute to the formation of ozone, have been of particular concern to many airport operators. A federal study at 19 airports estimated that, by 2010, aircraft emissions have the potential to significantly contribute to air pollution in the areas around these airports. GAO agreed to review efforts in the United States and other countries to reduce emissions at airports and the effect of improvements in aircraft and engine design on emissions.
What GAO Found
Many airports have taken measures to reduce emissions, such as converting airport ground vehicles from diesel or gasoline to cleaner alternative fuels. While the actual impact of these measures is unknown, some measures (such as shifting to cleaner alternative fuels) have the potential to significantly reduce emissions, such as nitrogen oxides. In some cases--such as at Los Angeles and Dallas/Fort Worth airports--the emission reduction measures have been imposed by federal or state agencies to bring severely polluted areas into attainment with the Clean Air Act's air quality standards or to offset expected increases in emissions from airport expansion projects. Many industry and government officials that GAO contacted said that new, stricter federal air quality standards that will go into effect in 2003, combined with a boost in emissions due to an expected increase in air travel, could cause airports to be subject to more federal emission control requirements. In 1998, a group of government and industry stakeholders was established to develop a voluntary nationwide program to reduce aviation-related emissions; however, thus far, the group has not agreed to specific objectives or elements of a program. Other countries use many of the same measures as the United States to reduce emissions at airports. Two countries have imposed landing fees based on the amount of emissions produced by aircraft. However, U.S. officials question the effectiveness of these fees. Research and development efforts by the federal government and the aircraft industry have improved fuel efficiency and reduced many emissions from aircraft, including hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide, but have increased emissions of nitrogen oxides, which are a precursor to ozone formation. As a result, many new aircraft are emitting more nitrogen oxides than the older aircraft they are replacing. For example, GAO's analysis of aircraft emission data shows that the engines employed on the newest models of a widely used jet aircraft, while meeting current standards for nitrogen oxide emissions, average over 40 percent more nitrogen oxides during landings and takeoffs than the engines used on the older models. Technologies are available to limit nitrogen oxide emissions from some other newer aircraft models. Many state and federal officials GAO contacted said that, in the long term, nitrogen oxide emissions from aircraft will need to be reduced as part of broader emission reduction efforts in order for some areas to meet federal ozone standards. |
gao_NSIAD-96-135 | gao_NSIAD-96-135_0 | Introduction
In late 1997, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is scheduled to begin assembling the International Space Station (ISS). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Commerce Committee, asked us to review the program’s cost and schedule status and NASA’s actions to improve cost reporting. The ISS Program Still Faces Substantial Cost and Schedule Threats
The ISS program has been producing flight hardware since 1993. However, it continues to face cost and schedule issues that threaten the already limited financial reserves available to complete the station within its $17.4-billion total and $2.1-billion annual budget, including (1) the large number of authorized unpriced changes to the prime development contract, (2) unfavorable cost and schedule trends, and (3) potentially understated cost estimates at completion. If a problem’s solution could not be funded by available reserves, program managers could be faced with either exceeding the annual funding cap or deferring or rephasing other activities, thus possibly delaying the development schedule and likely increasing overall funding requirements. It also predicted that several U.S. Performance Measurement Systems Being Implemented, but Problems Remain
NASA has made significant progress in implementing detailed and comprehensive performance measurement systems at its major contractors and product group subcontractors working on the prime development program. NASA has made slower progress in obtaining performance measurement data from nonprime contractors. This task is made more difficult because the performance measurement systems specified by the centers’ contracts do not prescribe the same level of disciplined planning and contractor conformity to validated performance measurement systems as required of the ISS prime development contractor, and nonprime contract managers are not as familiar with the newer performance measurement concepts as the prime contract managers are. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) International Space Station (ISS) program, focusing on: (1) the program's cost and schedule status; and (2) NASA efforts to improve its cost reporting.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) over the past several years, ISS flight hardware has been produced; (2) as of April 1996, the ISS prime contract was about $89 million over cost and about $88 million behind schedule; (3) overall, the prime contract is 45-percent complete and these variances are within planned funding levels; (4) however, many cost threats to the development program remain, and financial reserves needed for unexpected contingencies remain limited over the next few years; (5) if available reserves ultimately prove inadequate, program managers would have to either exceed the annual funding limitation or defer or rephase other activities, thus possibly delaying ISS's schedule and likely increasing its overall cost; (6) NASA has made progress toward ensuring that the ISS prime development contractor and its major subcontractors implement effective performance measurement systems for managing their contracts, but a complete performance measurement system is still not in place; and (7) also, NASA has made slower progress implementing effective performance measurement systems on its contracts for developing ground-based and on-orbit capabilities for using and operating ISS. |
gao_GAO-07-37 | gao_GAO-07-37_0 | Municipalities Use a Variety of Practices to Increase Recycling
Recycling coordinators with whom we spoke identified several key practices being used to increase recycling in their cities. The three practices they cited most frequently were making recycling convenient and easy for their residents, offering financial incentives for recycling, and conducting public education and outreach. In addition to these three key practices, recycling coordinators and the recycling literature identified other ways to increase recycling, such as targeting a wide range of materials for recycling, extending recycling programs to the commercial sector, mandating that residents recycle, and targeting multiunit dwellings for recycling. Through recycling, residents can produce less waste, use smaller garbage cans, and thus lower their garbage collection bills. EPA Has Several Recycling Programs, but They Lack Performance Measures; Commerce Is Not Fully Meeting Its RCRA Recycling Requirement
Several EPA programs are designed to increase recycling and help the agency achieve its 2008 national municipal solid waste recycling goal; however, the programs lack performance measures and comprehensive performance data to help determine their impact. However, the agency supports increased international trade in recycled and recyclable materials as part of its general trade promotion responsibilities. In 1994, EPA launched WasteWise, one of the agency’s primary recycling programs. Commerce Is Taking No Actions to Stimulate the Development of Markets for Recycled Materials in the United States
While Commerce is taking some actions to stimulate international markets for recycled materials, the agency is not taking any actions to stimulate domestic markets and, therefore, is not fully meeting its responsibilities under RCRA subtitle E. For example, Commerce is not identifying the geographical location of existing or potential markets for recycled materials or the economic and technical barriers to the use of recycled materials in the United States. Stakeholders Identified a Number of Federal Policy Options That Could Help Municipalities Increase Recycling
Recycling stakeholders we interviewed identified various federal policy options that they believe could help municipalities increase their recycling rates. The three policy options cited most frequently as top priorities were to establish a nationwide campaign to educate the public about recycling, enact a federal bottle bill in which beverage containers may be returned for money, and require producers to establish a system that consumers can use to recycle their products. Other policy options for helping municipalities to increase recycling include facilitating the sharing of recycling best practices, expanding EPA research on the economic and environmental benefits of recycling, providing additional grant money for recycling projects, reducing or removing subsidies to industries that extract virgin materials, and providing subsidies to the recycling industry. Although EPA has implemented several programs at the national and regional levels to encourage recycling, their effectiveness is unknown. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) identify the key practices that selected U.S. cities are using to increase recycling, (2) describe what the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) are doing to encourage recycling nationwide, and (3) identify federal policy options that stakeholders with recycling expertise believe could help increase recycling. In addition, we interviewed officials from federal, state, and local government; industry; and nonprofits, as well as academics and consultants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although recycling can generate environmental and economic benefits, the national recycling rate has increased only slightly since 2000, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). While local governments have the primary role in operating recycling programs, EPA and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) have some legal responsibilities for encouraging recycling. GAO was asked to (1) identify key practices cities are using to increase recycling, (2) describe what EPA and Commerce are doing to encourage recycling, and (3) identify federal policy options that could help increase recycling. GAO interviewed recycling coordinators in 11 large cities about key practices and 13 additional recycling stakeholders about policy options. GAO selected both groups based on geographic representation and recycling expertise, among other factors.
What GAO Found
Recycling coordinators with whom we spoke in selected cities across the country identified several key practices they are using to increase recycling in their cities. The three practices they cited most frequently were (1) making recycling convenient and easy for their residents, (2) offering financial incentives for recycling, such as allowing residents who produce less waste through recycling to use smaller garbage cans and pay lower fees, and (3) conducting public education and outreach. In addition, both recycling coordinators and the recycling literature identified other ways to increase recycling, such as targeting a wide range of materials for recycling and extending recycling programs to the commercial sector. As a part of its Resource Conservation Challenge strategy, EPA operates several national and regional programs that are designed to increase recycling and help EPA achieve its national municipal solid waste recycling goal of 35 percent by 2008. One of EPA's principal national recycling programs, WasteWise, creates voluntary partnerships with groups, such as universities, states, and businesses, to help them increase their recycling. EPA also provides competitive grants to support projects designed to increase recycling. The impact of EPA's programs is unknown, however, because the programs lack performance measures and comprehensive data on program performance. Although Commerce is required under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to stimulate the development of markets for recycled materials, the agency is not currently taking any actions to do so in the United States. For example, Commerce is not identifying the location of markets for recycled materials, identifying economic and technical barriers to recycling, or encouraging the development of new uses for recycled materials in the United States. However, agency officials told GAO that Commerce supports increased international trade in recycled and recyclable materials as part of its general trade promotion responsibilities. The recycling stakeholders we interviewed identified various federal policy options that they believe could help municipalities increase their recycling rates. The three federal policy options cited most frequently were to (1) establish a nationwide campaign to educate the public about recycling, (2) enact a national "bottle bill" in which beverage containers may be returned for money, and (3) require manufacturers to establish systems that consumers can use to recycle their products. Other identified policy options included facilitating the sharing of recycling best practices among municipalities, expanding EPA research on the economic and environmental benefits of recycling, and providing additional grant money for recycling projects. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-58 | gao_T-HEHS-99-58_0 | But the number and complexity of the BBA’s requirements and the urgency of systems changes, coupled with a backlog of decades-old problems associated with HCFA’s routine operations, make it clear that much more needs to be accomplished. HCFA Made a Concerted Effort on Y2K, but Critical Tasks Are Incomplete
Over the past year, HCFA has made a concerted effort to deal with its most pressing priority—the Year 2000 computer systems problem—commonly referred to as Y2K. For example, HCFA has taken steps to allocate HIPAA funding and to implement authorities to combat waste and abuse in the Medicare program. studying HCFA’s and the states’ efforts to implement the Children’s Health Insurance Program and will report on the results later this year. HCFA’s Handling of Ongoing Responsibilities for Financial Management and Routine Oversight Raises Serious Concerns
Over the last several years, HCFA has been lax in managing critical ongoing program responsibilities, such as financial management—particularly by Medicare claims administration contractors—and oversight of nursing home compliance. HCFA Has Made Changes to Enhance Its Management Capacity, but Problems Persist
Because its mission has been rapidly growing and changing, HCFA officials have worked hard to strengthen the agency’s management capabilities. It hired more staff with needed skills in 1998, but it has not completed a long-term strategic approach to meet its future human resource needs. These types of problems are found in other agencies, but HCFA still must be diligent in addressing them. The President’s budget for fiscal year 2000 proposes a reform initiative for HCFA that is designed to increase its flexibility in the human resources area and to increase the agency’s accountability. In our January 1998 testimony, we noted that the agency’s staff had not yet moved to the actual location of their new organizational units, which tended to exacerbate problems with internal communication and coordination. Performance System, Awards Program, and Flexible Work Hours Affect Agency Productivity
HCFA managers and staff discussed a variety of factors that hamper agency operations and limit effective management. Although we believe that HCFA is not unique in experiencing these problems, mitigating them could improve agency performance. HCFA’s senior management has identified management and other training as an area where HCFA must improve. HCFA Has New Proposals to Strengthen Management
its accountability to the Congress by providing biannual reports on its progress. More effective planning, new staff with needed skills, and better accountability could help HCFA address these challenges and better ensure quality health care for the elderly, poor, and disabled. Medicare Home Health: Success of Balanced Budget Act Cost Controls Depends on Effective and Timely Implementation (GAO/T-HEHS-98-41, Oct. 29, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) progress in: (1) addressing its most immediate priorities; and (2) strengthening its internal management to effectively discharge its major implementation and oversight responsibilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HCFA is facing an unprecedented set of challenges; (2) the immediacy and resource demands associated with meeting the year 2000 computer system challenges--coupled with HCFA's late start in addressing them--have put a tremendous burden on the agency this past year and have affected the timing and quality of its work on many other projects; (3) it has also slowed efforts to improve the oversight of ongoing operations, such as financial management and Medicare fee-for-service claims administration, which desperately need attention; (4) even where HCFA has made progress--such as in implementing a number of the mandated Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requirements--GAO believes that more work, and many refinements, are still needed; (5) HCFA must meet these challenges with an aging workforce; (6) HCFA has taken a number of steps internally to capitalize on its staff's strengths to deal with a rapidly changing health care marketplace and growing responsibilities; (7) for example, HCFA has developed a strategic plan that better articulates its future direction, has progressed in its customer-focused reorganization by moving staff to their new organizational units, and has hired more staff with needed skills; (8) on the other hand, in focus groups GAO conducted, HCFA managers and staff discussed issues that continue to hamper effective agency operations; (9) to further strengthen HCFA's ability to effectively manage its employees and programs, the administration has proposed new authorities for contracting and new flexibility in hiring in the President's budget for fiscal year 2000; (10) it also proposes new mechanisms to enhance agency accountability, with biannual reports to Congress and an advisory board to help the agency streamline internal and program management; (11) HCFA senior officials have taken concrete steps to improve agency management this year but will need to maintain the momentum over the next several years to overcome the agency's current and future challenges; and (12) this will be especially difficult in an agency that for years has been plagued by external pressures and management problems. |
gao_GAO-14-347 | gao_GAO-14-347_0 | In 2008, the Fostering Connections Act was enacted, which amended title IV-E. In 2000, HHS issued regulations that established a systematic review process to monitor states’ child welfare programs to determine whether the programs are in compliance with federal law, regulations, and the relevant approved state plan. States Reported Implementing Suggested Practices but Continue to Face Challenges with Certain Requirements
States Reported Requiring Caseworkers to Employ Multiple Practices to Implement the Fostering Connections Act
According to our survey, to implement the various provisions of the Fostering Connections Act, many states required child welfare workers to employ multiple practices suggested by HHS and other child welfare- focused organizations. (See app. Further, 19 states reported in our survey that the lack of a requirement for educational agencies to coordinate with child welfare agencies is a major challenge they face in ensuring school stability for foster youth. These challenges to maintaining family connections, ensuring school stability, and assisting older youth are not new; states have faced many of them since before the Fostering Connections Act was enacted. Only Twenty-One States We Surveyed Reported Calculating Savings From Adoption Assistance Income Eligibility Changes for Fiscal Year 2012
Regarding implementation of the Fostering Connections Act provision directing states to reinvest any savings due to the elimination of income eligibility criteria for adoption assistance payments, only 21 states we surveyed reported performing calculations of these savings from this change for fiscal year 2012, and 20 states reported performing the calculations for fiscal year 2011. HHS Has Not Yet Systematically Monitored State Implementation of the Fostering Connections Act
To date, HHS’s main oversight of state implementation of the Fostering Connections Act has consisted of reviewing states’ title IV-E plans to ensure they comply with federal requirements; however, the agency has not yet systematically reviewed actual state implementation of the act. HHS regulations provide that states must undergo a complete review of child welfare programs—including title IV- E—every 5 years, and HHS implements this requirement using the CFSR process. In March 2014, HHS announced plans to conduct the next round of CFSRs beginning in fiscal year 2015. HHS also lacks adequate data to assess if states are complying with the policies they outlined in their title IV-E plans or the effectiveness of states’ actions. Internal control standards state that management should obtain data on a timely basis for effective monitoring. Additionally, while some states may voluntarily collect information about the outcomes of their programs, many do not. HHS has an important role in helping assess what states have done and what else is needed to improve outcomes for children in foster care. At the same time, HHS has not yet updated data reporting requirements to reflect the new provisions of the Fostering Connections Act. To help identify areas where states may need additional support or guidance in their efforts to provide children in foster care with services and assistance under title IV-E, as amended by the Fostering Connections Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should proceed with and expeditiously finalize plans to: systematically monitor state practices for compliance with policies outlined in their title IV-E plans that cover the new provisions established by the Fostering Connections Act, and update AFCARS to collect relevant data from states about provisions established by the Fostering Connections Act. HHS provided formal comments that are reproduced in appendix V. HHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. Education did not have comments. HHS concurred with our recommendations and outlined steps it is taking to implement them. In response to our recommendation to provide guidance on how states could calculate savings from the changes to the federal adoption assistance income eligibility criteria, HHS said the department will gather examples of how savings are being calculated and documented by some states and develop a document to provide as technical assistance to other states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 400,000 children were living in foster care in fiscal year 2012, according to the most recent data available. HHS oversees states' implementation of federal child welfare requirements under title IV-E of the Social Security Act. In 2008, the Fostering Connections Act amended title IV-E to improve the outcomes for children in foster care, such as maintaining family and school connections. GAO was asked to review implementation of the act.
GAO examined (1) steps states have taken to implement selected provisions of the act and challenges they have faced, and (2) the extent to which HHS has monitored states' efforts. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance and surveyed 52 state child welfare agencies, achieving a 100 percent response rate. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and state and local child welfare and educational agency officials; caseworkers; court officials, and foster youth and parents in four states, selected to ensure variety of program characteristics and geographic dispersion.
What GAO Found
To implement the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Fostering Connections Act), many states GAO surveyed (which included the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) reported requiring caseworkers to employ multiple practices to improve outcomes for children in foster care; however, states continue to face challenges that can undermine progress. Among the practices that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and others suggested states use, survey respondents reported requiring caseworkers to use group decision-making to maintain family connections, consult with schools, and facilitate adult connections for older youth. At the same time, a majority of surveyed states reported facing challenges, especially related to foster placements (see fig. below).
Note: Responses do not sum to 52 if states selected “do not know/not applicable” or did not respond.
Further, the Fostering Connections Act made additional children eligible for federal adoption assistance payments thereby potentially freeing up state funds previously used for this purpose. Although states are required to spend any resulting savings on child welfare services, only 21 states reported calculating these savings for fiscal year 2012, and 20 states reported difficulties performing the calculations. HHS has not provided states guidance in this area, and without it states may continue to struggle with the calculations, leading to potential lost program funding.
HHS approved states' plans to implement the Fostering Connections Act; however, the agency has not yet monitored states' actions. HHS regulations specify that states must undergo a complete review of child welfare programs every 5 years, yet HHS's last review cycle began in 2007—using a tool developed before the act was passed. Internal control standards emphasize using timely data for effective monitoring, but data collected by HHS do not reflect the act's provisions. In March 2014, HHS announced plans to begin a review cycle in fiscal year 2015, but details about how it would address changes from the act were unavailable. Without adequate monitoring or updated data, HHS lacks information about the implementation of the act and the effectiveness of states' actions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS (1) provide guidance on how states could calculate savings resulting from changes to federal adoption assistance eligibility criteria, (2) systematically monitor states' implementation of the act, and (3) update data reporting requirements related to the act. HHS concurred with our recommendations. HHS also provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. The Department of Education had no comments. |
gao_GAO-03-439 | gao_GAO-03-439_0 | An Attack Against Chemical Facilities Could Cause Economic Harm and Loss of Life
Experts agree that chemical facilities present an attractive target for terrorists intent on causing massive damage because many facilities house toxic chemicals that could become airborne and drift to surrounding areas if released. These estimates include the residential population located within the range of a toxic gas cloud produced by a “worst-case” chemical release, called the “vulnerable zone.” According to EPA, 123 chemical facilities located throughout the nation have toxic “worst-case” scenarios where more than one million people would be in the “vulnerable zone” and could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas. No Federal Requirements Specifically Require Chemical Facilities to Address the Threat of Terrorism
No federal laws explicitly require that chemical facilities take security actions to safeguard their facilities against a terrorist attack. A number of federal laws impose safety requirements applicable to chemical facilities, but these requirements do not specifically address security preparedness against terrorism. However, these safety requirements may help mitigate the effects of such an attack. EPA’s Views of Its Authority to Require Chemical Facilities to Prepare for Terrorist Acts
EPA believes that the Clean Air Act could be interpreted to provide authority to address site security from terrorist attack at chemical facilities. However, EPA has not attempted to use these Clean Air Act provisions. EPA is concerned that such an interpretation would pose significant litigation risk and has concluded that chemical facility security would be more effectively addressed by passage of specific legislation. Federal Agencies Have Not Comprehensively Assessed the Vulnerability of the Chemical Industry to Terrorism, but Have Taken Some Preliminary Steps
The federal government lacks comprehensive information on the chemical industry’s vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks because it has not comprehensively assessed the industry. However, federal agencies have taken preliminary steps to assist the industry in its preparedness efforts. EPA plans to work with the industry on voluntary initiatives but has no plans to monitor or document the extent to which the industry has implemented voluntary security measures. Chemical Industry Has Taken Actions to Address Security Concerns, but Faces Significant Challenges in Preparing Against Terrorist Attacks
The chemical manufacturing industry has undertaken a number of initiatives to address security concerns at chemical facilities, including developing security guidelines and tools to assess vulnerabilities, but challenges remain. The ACC requires its members to conduct security vulnerability assessments and implement security improvements. Moreover, the industry faces a number of challenges in preparing facilities against terrorist attacks, including ensuring that facilities obtain adequate information on threats and determining the appropriate security measures given the level of risk. While the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of EPA commended the industry’s voluntary efforts to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. chemical facilities to terrorist attacks, they stated that voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to assure the public of the industry’s preparedness. Conclusions
Across the nation, thousands of industrial facilities manufacture, use, or store hazardous chemicals in quantities that could potentially put large numbers of Americans at risk of injury or death in the event of a chemical release. Yet, despite all efforts since the events of September 11, 2001, to protect the nation from terrorism, the extent of security preparedness at U.S. chemical facilities is unknown. Agency Comments
We provided the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and EPA with a draft of this report for review and comment. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, triggered a national re-examination of the security of thousands of industrial facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals in quantities that could potentially put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious injury or death in the event of a terrorist-caused chemical release. GAO was asked to examine (1) available information on the threats and risks from terrorism faced by U.S. chemical facilities; (2) federal requirements for security preparedness and safety at facilities; (3) actions taken by federal agencies to assess the vulnerability of the industry; and (4) voluntary actions the chemical industry has taken to address security preparedness, and the challenges it faces in protecting its assets and operations.
What GAO Found
Chemical facilities may be attractive targets for terrorists intent on causing economic harm and loss of life. Many facilities exist in populated areas where a chemical release could threaten thousands. EPA reports that 123 chemical facilities located throughout the nation have toxic "worst-case" scenarios where more than a million people in the surrounding area could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas if a release occurred. To date, no one has comprehensively assessed the security of chemical facilities. No federal laws explicitly require that chemical facilities assess vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their facilities from attack. However, a number of federal laws impose safety requirements on facilities that may help mitigate the effects of a terrorist-caused chemical release. EPA believes that the Clean Air Act could be interpreted to provide authority to require chemical facilities to assess their vulnerabilities and to make security enhancements that protect against attacks. However, EPA has not attempted to use these Clean Air Act provisions because of concerns that this interpretation would pose significant litigation risk and has concluded that chemical facility security would be more effectively addressed by passage of specific legislation. The federal government has not comprehensively assessed the chemical industry's vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. EPA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice have taken preliminary steps to assist the industry in its preparedness efforts, but no agency monitors or documents the extent to which chemical facilities have implemented security measures. Consequently, federal, state, and local entities lack comprehensive information on the vulnerabilities facing the industry. To its credit, the chemical industry, led by its industry associations, has undertaken a number of voluntary initiatives to address security at facilities. For example, the American Chemistry Council, whose members own or operate 1,000, or about 7 percent, of the facilities subject to Clean Air Act risk management plan provisions, requires its members to conduct vulnerability assessments and implement security improvements. The industry faces a number of challenges in preparing facilities against attacks, including ensuring that all chemical facilities address security concerns. Despite the industry's voluntary efforts, the extent of security preparedness at U.S. chemical facilities is unknown. Finally, both the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of EPA have stated that voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to assure the public of industry's preparedness. |
gao_GAO-12-788 | gao_GAO-12-788_0 | Background
PPACA established the PPHF to provide for expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs to improve health and help restrain the rate of growth in private and public sector health care costs. For this purpose, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to transfer amounts from the PPHF to HHS accounts to increase funding, over the fiscal year 2008 level, for programs authorized by the Public Health Service Act, “for prevention, wellness, and public health activities including prevention research, health screenings, and initiatives, such as the Community Transformation grant program, the Education and Outreach Campaign Regarding Preventive Benefits, and immunization programs.” Within HHS, agencies including the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and the OS administer programs authorized by the Public Health Service Act. HHS Agencies and Activities for Which PPHF Funds Were Allocated and Entities That Received PPHF Funding, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
HHS allocated PPHF funds for 43 activities in five HHS agencies— AHRQ, CDC, HRSA, OS, and SAMHSA—in the first 2 years of the fund.The majority of the $500 million in PPHF funding available for fiscal year 2010 was allocated for activities administered by HRSA, while the majority of the $750 million in PPHF funding available for fiscal year 2011 was allocated for activities administered by CDC (see fig. Process and Criteria for Allocating and Awarding PPHF Funds for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011
HHS implemented an abbreviated process to allocate PPHF funds for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 because of the timing when PPACA was enacted, according to HHS. In its abbreviated process, HHS requested proposals for PPHF funding from agencies. HHS did not develop HHS-wide criteria for fiscal years 2010 and 2011; instead HHS instructed agencies to use activities cited in the PPACA provisions establishing the PPHF as guidance for developing proposals for activities for which HHS could allocate PPHF funding. According to HHS, the proposed activities were also aligned with existing departmental priorities. HHS Reporting of Performance Measures, Targets, and Outcomes of Activities and Projects Receiving PPHF Funding
HHS has relied on its agencies to establish performance measures and targets and to track outcomes of PPHF activities. HHS agency officials told us that it is too early to report outcomes for many activities for which PPHF funding was allocated because many projects receiving PPHF funding in fiscal year 2010, 2011, or both are multiyear projects or have not yet completed project evaluations, and outcomes have not been measured or reported. Collectively, HHS allocated a total of $198.1 million for fiscal year 2010 and $246.3 million for fiscal year 2011 for these three activities. Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. For each HRSA activity that received PPHF funding, tables 63 through 70 summarize information on awards made with those funds through grants and contracts for each fiscal year. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2010, PPACA established the PPHF to provide for expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs, including prevention research, health screenings, and immunization programs. PPACA appropriated $500 million for fiscal year 2010, $750 million for fiscal year 2011, and additional amounts for future fiscal years to operationalize the PPHF.
HHS allocates funding from the PPHF for specific prevention and public health activities administered by HHS agencies. The agencies, once funds are transferred to them, use the PPHF funds to support individual projects through, for example, grants and contracts. GAO was asked to provide information on how PPHF funds were allocated for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. This report describes, for those fiscal years, (1) the HHS agencies and activities for which PPHF allocations were made, (2) the process and criteria HHS used to allocate PPHF funds, and (3) HHS reporting of the outcomes of activities receiving PPHF funding. GAO reviewed agency documents, including budget justifications, funding announcements, data on PPHF allocations and awards of PPHF-funded grants, contracts, and interagency agreements; examined agency websites; and interviewed HHS officials.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) allocated funds from the Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) for 43 activities in five agencies. These activitieswhich include HHS programs and initiativeswere administered by HHSs Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and the Office of the Secretary (OS). Most of the $500 million available for fiscal year 2010 was allocated for activities administered by HRSA, and most of the $750 million available for fiscal year 2011 was allocated for activities administered by CDC (see fig.). HHS agencies funded individual projects with PPHF funds through grants, contracts, and interagency agreements.
Because the PPHF was established midway through fiscal year 2010 and after the President had submitted the fiscal year 2011 budget request, for the funds first 2 years HHS used an abbreviated process to allocate PPHF funds. Instead of developing HHS-wide written criteria, HHS requested that its agencies propose activities for PPHF funding based on language in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provision establishing the PPHF. According to HHS, the proposed activities were also aligned with existing departmental priorities.
HHS has relied on its agencies to establish performance measures and targets and to track outcomes (the results) of the PPHF-funded activities. Agency officials reported that for many activities, it is too early to report outcomes because many projects receiving PPHF funding in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are multiyear projects or have not yet completed evaluations. |
gao_GAO-12-735 | gao_GAO-12-735_0 | A debtor (or other interested party) may file a reorganization plan, which ultimately may be confirmed by the court. In addition to the evaluation of whether the financial company fits within one of the categories described above, federal regulators recommending whether the Secretary of the Treasury should appoint FDIC as receiver must include: an evaluation of whether the financial company is in default or in danger of default; a description of the effect that the default of the financial company would have on the financial stability in the United States; a description of the effect that the default of the financial company would have on economic conditions or financial stability for low- income, minority, or underserved communities; a recommendation on the nature and extent of actions to be taken under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding the financial company; an evaluation of the likelihood of a private-sector alternative to prevent the default of the financial company; an evaluation of why a case under the Code is not appropriate for the an evaluation of the effects on creditors, counterparties, and shareholders of the financial company and other market participants. Regulators have reported progress on developing a universal identifier for financial companies that would help them identify and manage companies’ counterparty exposures. Federal Regulators Have Issued Final Rules for OLA and Resolution Plans
Final Rules for OLA. Proposed Rules Related to OLA. Although this rule requires these types of financial institutions to submit plans describing how they would be resolved through the bankruptcy process, regulators reported that having companies file resolution plans would help FDIC in planning for the exercise of the possible use of its resolution authorities, including OLA. Plans for the largest bank holding companies are due in July 2012. FDIC officials told us that they have started to develop a “minimum recovery” rule to respond to these concerns and clarify how creditors would receive no less than they would under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. § 343. under OLA. Concerns Have Been Raised about FDIC’s Limited Experience with Resolving Large, Complex Institutions
Although FDIC and other regulatory officials noted that resolution plans could help prepare for the possible failure of a large financial company, not enough time has passed to determine the effectiveness of the living will requirement in assisting financial companies to prepare for bankruptcy (as discussed earlier) as well as aiding FDIC in the use of its Title II authority. In the bankruptcy process, the resolution or liquidation of large, complex, internationally active financial firms involves multiple challenges. Financial Company Bankruptcies Remain Difficult to Track and Several Major Cases Move Forward
In the 2011 report, we found that comprehensive data on the number of financial companies in bankruptcy are not readily available. Two large cases we began tracking in our 2011 report, Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, are moving forward, but these cases along with the more recent bankruptcy of MF Global illustrate the challenges in resolving large, complex financial institutions. Specifically, data on the number of financial company bankruptcies and their outcomes have been difficult to obtain. Although AOUSC officials told us that they currently were not routinely collecting any data that would allow the identification and tracking of financial company bankruptcies, AOUSC and the Federal Judicial Center have undertaken a collaborative effort to create a specialized database of financial companies that have filed for bankruptcy protection from 2000 to 2010, but they have concerns about the reliability of these data as they are untested for this purpose. We continued to monitor two financial megacases, Washington Mutual, Inc. (Washington Mutual) and Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman) and began monitoring a third, MF Global Holdings Ltd. (MF Global). Both financial institutions filed for Chapter 11 protection in September 2008. A new case involves MF Global, a holding company with a broker-dealer and commodity broker, which filed for Chapter 11 protection in October 2011. Lehman Brothers. As discussed earlier, FDIC and other regulators have been taking steps to improve international coordination of the resolution of large, systemically important financial institutions but challenges remain. We received technical comments from the remaining agencies, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As required under section 202 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), this report examines: (1) actions the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. District Court) has taken in response to the judicial review provision of Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), including any revisions to Local Civil Rule 85; (2) federal rules or regulations relating to OLA and efforts to improve international coordination, including living wills, in resolving financial companies; and (3) data collection efforts and the outcomes of financial institutions that were in the bankruptcy process. We also conducted interviews with officials at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC); Commodity Futures Trading Commission; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve); Federal Judicial Center; Securities and Exchange Commission; Securities Investor Protection Corporation; Department of the Treasury (Treasury); and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. District Court). To address the second objective on federal regulations relating to OLA and the resolution of financial institutions, we searched the Federal Register and monitored the websites of FDIC and the Federal Reserve to determine if relevant rules related to FDIC’s authority under Title II and resolution planning had been issued. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Act created OLA for resolving failed, systemically important financial companies. Since the act was passed in 2010, regulators have been developing regulations to implement this authority and avoid disorderly resolutions that create substantial losses for the financial system. In July 2011, GAO issued the first of its statutorily mandated reports on the effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code for resolving or liquidating complex, internationally active financial companies. Among the topics examined in this second report, GAO reviewed: (1) federal rules or regulations relating to OLA and the resolution of financial institutions, including living wills; and (2) status of efforts to improve coordination on international resolutions, data collection efforts, and the outcomes of financial institutions that were in the bankruptcy process.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agencies draft and final rules related to OLA and comment letters submitted. GAO continued to monitor developments related to the Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual bankruptcies, and began monitoring a recent bankruptcy filing by MF Global. GAO also studied available data on the number of financial company bankruptcies and met with relevant agency and court officials.
GAO makes no new recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft for comment to AOUSC, the Department of the Treasury, and federal financial regulators. None provided written comments and technical comments have been incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The federal financial regulators have issued certain final rules for resolving large, complex financial companies under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acts (Dodd-Frank Act) established Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA). Under OLA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) could serve as receiver of a failing financial company instead of the company entering the bankruptcy process. Regulators continue to address a number of issues related to FDICs new authority, including how creditors will ensure that they receive no less than they would under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation; how certain assets and liabilities would be treated in a new company created by FDIC under OLA; and what role the Securities Investor Protection Corporation would play in the resolution of a broker-dealer under OLA. Regulatory officials reported that they were continuing to draft rules to clarify how OLA would be used. FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve) also have issued final rules requiring certain financial companies to file resolution plans or living wills that must detail how companies would resolve their operations through an orderly bankruptcy. Regulators told GAO that the plans also would help FDIC plan for the exercise of its resolution authority, including OLA. The filing dates for these plans are phased in over the next year and a half, with the first group of financial companies filing their first plans on July 1, 2012. However, nonbank financial companies that also will need to provide plans have yet to be designated.
International coordination remains a critical component in resolving the failure of a large, complex financial company and regulators have been taking steps to address this and are testing new data collection efforts. Specifically, efforts are under way to develop a universal legal entity identifier that allows companies to identify and manage risks from companies with which they are engaged in financial transactions. This additional information could help regulators in resolving internationally active financial companies. Data to identify financial institutions filing for bankruptcy protection as well as their outcomes are limited. Since neither FDIC nor federal judicial agencies have a database that tracks financial companies in bankruptcy, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) and the Federal Judicial Center have begun a new effort to track financial company bankruptcies, but reported court data are untested for this purpose. Several large financial institution bankruptcies are still in progress. Two of the largest financial company bankruptcies, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman Brothers) and Washington Mutual, Inc.both of which filed in September 2008recently had their reorganization plans confirmed by creditors and approved by the courts. However, these cases are not yet fully resolved. In the Lehman Brothers case, international litigation could take several years to resolve. The October 2011 bankruptcy of MF Global Holdings Ltd., a holding company with a securities and commodities broker, has raised concerns about how commodity customers are treated under a liquidation regime and also involves international litigation over customer property. These financial company bankruptcies highlight the challenges FDIC and other regulators would face in resolving large, complex financial companies under the OLA process. |
gao_GAO-02-297 | gao_GAO-02-297_0 | records in various areas of the country, including Puerto Rico) to estimate the number of people and housing units missed or counted more than once in the census and to evaluate the final census counts. Although the bureau’s A.C.E. The four phases of the person matching process were (1) computer matching, (2) clerical matching, (3) nationwide field follow- up on records requiring more information, and (4) a second phase of clerical matching after field follow-up. The woman was coded as “unresolved.”
Quality Assurance Results Suggest Person Matching Procedures Were Implemented as Planned
The bureau employed a series of quality assurance procedures for each phase of person matching. The bureau reported that person matching quality assurance was successful at minimizing errors because the quality assurance procedures found error rates of less than 1 percent. The Bureau Took Action to Address Some Deviations, but Effect on Matching Results Is Unknown
The bureau carried out person matching as planned, with only a few procedural deviations. estimates of census undercounts. sample and concluded that matching quality in 2000 was improved over that in 1990, but that error introduced during matching operations remained and contributed to an overstatement of A.C.E. The bureau has reported that additional review and analysis on these remaining uncertainties would be necessary before any potential uses of these data can be considered. computer systems. to measure the quality of the 2010 Census, it will be important for the bureau to determine the impact of the deviations and explore operational improvements, in addition to the research it might carry out on other uncertainties in the A.C.E. | What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau conducted the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (ACE) survey to estimate the number of people missed, counted more than once, or otherwise improperly counted in the 2000 Census. On the basis of uncertainty in the ACE results, the Bureau's acting director decided that the 2000 Census tabulations should not be adjusted in order to redraw the boundaries of congressional districts or to distribute billions of dollars in federal funding. Although ACE was generally implemented as planned, the Bureau found that it overstated census undercounts because of an error introduced during matching operations and other uncertainties. The Bureau concluded that additional review and analysis of these uncertainties would be needed before the data could be used. Matching more than 1.4 million census and ACE records involved the following four phases, each with its own matching procedures and multiple layers of review: computer matching, clerical matching, field follow-up, and clerical matching. The Bureau applied quality assurance procedures to each phase of person matching. Because the quality assurance procedures had failure rates of less than one percent, the Bureau reported that person matching quality assurance was successful at minimizing errors. Overall, the Bureau carried out person matching as planned, with few procedural deviations. GAO identified areas for improving future ACE efforts, including more complete documentation of computer matching decisions and better assurance that problems do not arise with the bureau's automated systems. |
gao_GAO-07-283 | gao_GAO-07-283_0 | The United States is a case in point. Recent world production of oil has been running at near capacity to meet rising demand, which has put upward pressure on oil prices. Supply and demand, in turn, affect the type of oil that is produced. Timing of Peak Oil Production Depends on Uncertain Factors
Most studies estimate that oil production will peak sometime between now and 2040, although many of these projections cover a wide range of time, including two studies for which the range extends into the next century. Key uncertainties in trying to determine the timing of peak oil are the (1) amount of oil throughout the world; (2) technological, cost, and environmental challenges to produce that oil; (3) political and investment risk factors that may affect oil exploration and production; and (4) future world demand for oil. However, some experts criticize this methodology; they believe such an estimate may be too high because the U.S. experience overestimates increases in future worldwide reserves. It is unclear how much oil can be recovered from nonconventional sources. Future World Demand for Oil Is Uncertain
Uncertainty about future demand for oil—which will influence how quickly the remaining oil is used—contributes to the uncertainty about the timing of peak oil production. Future world oil demand will depend on such uncertain factors as world economic growth, future government policy, and consumer choices. Alternative Transportation Technologies Face Challenges in Mitigating the Consequences of the Peak and Decline
In the United States, alternative transportation technologies have limited potential to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, at least in the near term, because they face many challenges that will take time and effort to overcome. If the peak occurs in the more distant future, however, alternative technologies have a greater potential to mitigate the consequences. As a primary fuel, corn ethanol is not currently available on a large national scale and federal agencies do not consider it to be cost-competitive with gasoline or diesel. The technologies we examined currently supply the equivalent of only about 1 percent of U.S. annual consumption of petroleum products, and DOE projects that even under optimistic scenarios, these technologies could displace only the equivalent of about 4 percent of annual projected U.S. consumption by around 2015. DOE projects that the alternative technologies we examined have the potential to displace up to the equivalent of 34 percent of annual U.S. consumption of petroleum products in the 2025 through 2030 time frame. The level of effort dedicated to overcoming challenges to alternative technologies will depend in part on the price of oil, with higher oil prices creating incentives to develop alternatives. Federal Agencies Do Not Have a Coordinated Strategy to Address Peak Oil Issues
Federal agency efforts that could contribute to reducing uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production or mitigating its consequences are spread across multiple agencies and are generally not focused explicitly on peak oil issues. Federal agency-sponsored studies have expressed a growing concern over the potential for a peak, and officials from key agencies have identified options for reducing the uncertainty about the timing of a peak in oil production and mitigating its consequences. However, there is no strategy for coordinating or prioritizing such efforts. For example, DOE officials reported that they could expand their efforts to encourage the development of alternative fuels and advanced vehicle technologies. To assess the potential for transportation technologies to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, we examined options to develop alternative fuels and technologies to reduce energy consumption in the transportation sector. Oil Supply Analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. economy depends heavily on oil, particularly in the transportation sector. World oil production has been running at near capacity to meet demand, pushing prices upward. Concerns about meeting increasing demand with finite resources have renewed interest in an old question: How long can the oil supply expand before reaching a maximum level of production--a peak--from which it can only decline? GAO (1) examined when oil production could peak, (2) assessed the potential for transportation technologies to mitigate the consequences of a peak in oil production, and (3) examined federal agency efforts that could reduce uncertainty about the timing of a peak or mitigate the consequences. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed studies, convened an expert panel, and consulted agency officials.
What GAO Found
Most studies estimate that oil production will peak sometime between now and 2040. This range of estimates is wide because the timing of the peak depends on multiple, uncertain factors that will help determine how quickly the oil remaining in the ground is used, including the amount of oil still in the ground; how much of that oil can ultimately be produced given technological, cost, and environmental challenges as well as potentially unfavorable political and investment conditions in some countries where oil is located; and future global demand for oil. Demand for oil will, in turn, be influenced by global economic growth and may be affected by government policies on the environment and climate change and consumer choices about conservation. In the United States, alternative fuels and transportation technologies face challenges that could impede their ability to mitigate the consequences of a peak and decline in oil production, unless sufficient time and effort are brought to bear. For example, although corn ethanol production is technically feasible, it is more expensive to produce than gasoline and will require costly investments in infrastructure, such as pipelines and storage tanks, before it can become widely available as a primary fuel. Key alternative technologies currently supply the equivalent of only about 1 percent of U.S. consumption of petroleum products, and the Department of Energy (DOE) projects that even by 2015, they could displace only the equivalent of 4 percent of projected U.S. annual consumption. In such circumstances, an imminent peak and sharp decline in oil production could cause a worldwide recession. If the peak is delayed, however, these technologies have a greater potential to mitigate the consequences. DOE projects that the technologies could displace up to 34 percent of U.S. consumption in the 2025 through 2030 time frame, if the challenges are met. The level of effort dedicated to overcoming challenges will depend in part on sustained high oil prices to encourage sufficient investment in and demand for alternatives. Federal agency efforts that could reduce uncertainty about the timing of peak oil production or mitigate its consequences are spread across multiple agencies and are generally not focused explicitly on peak oil. Federally sponsored studies have expressed concern over the potential for a peak, and agency officials have identified actions that could be taken to address this issue. For example, DOE and United States Geological Survey officials said uncertainty about the peak's timing could be reduced through better information about worldwide demand and supply, and agency officials said they could step up efforts to promote alternative fuels and transportation technologies. However, there is no coordinated federal strategy for reducing uncertainty about the peak's timing or mitigating its consequences. |
gao_GAO-13-451T | gao_GAO-13-451T_0 | Drinking water infrastructure involves treatment plants, distribution pipelines, and other equipment needed to take water from natural sources, such as rivers, lakes, and groundwater aquifers, treat it, and then provide it to households, businesses, and others for drinking and other uses. The issue of how the federal government should help to finance the nation’s water and wastewater infrastructure involves several considerations. EPA’s Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds Capitalize State- Managed Revolving Funds
EPA’s Clean Water and Drinking Water SRF programs are the largest sources of federal assistance to states and local communities for funding drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. EPA receives federal appropriations that are then, in turn, granted to states to use in conjunction with state funds to provide loans for improvements at communities’ water and wastewater treatment systems. From these federal and state funds, states then typically provide assistance in the form of low- or no-interest loans to communities or utilities, repayment of which replenishes the funds and provides the ability to fund future loans for additional projects. Stakeholders Identified Issues to Consider in Designing a Clean Water Trust Fund, a National Bank for Wastewater Infrastructure, and Public-Private Partnerships
A variety of approaches have been discussed to pay for the nation’s water and wastewater infrastructure needs. In May 2009 and June 2010, we reported on the views of stakeholders, including individuals and groups from the wastewater industry and federal, state, and local governments with knowledge of water and wastewater infrastructure issues, of what is needed to create three of these financing approaches. Clean Water Trust Fund
A clean water trust fund would provide a dedicated source of federal funding for wastewater infrastructure, similar to federal trust funds such as the Highway and Airport and Airways Trust Funds, which are used to account for funds that are dedicated for spending on a specific purpose. Stakeholders concluded that a number of issues need to be addressed in creating a clean water trust fund.administration and use of the trust fund, (2) the type of financial assistance that should be provided for projects, and (3) the activities eligible for funding. A majority of stakeholders (15 of 20) expressed the view that a trust fund should be administered through an EPA-state partnership like the current Clean Water SRF program. Stakeholders had mixed views on how a trust fund should be used. A majority of stakeholders supported the creation of a bank, but their views varied on its mission and administrative structure. Stakeholders differed in their views of what projects to fund through a national infrastructure bank but they agreed on how the projects should be prioritized, such as whether a bank should be used exclusively for large projects. Public-Private Partnerships for Wastewater Infrastructure
A third approach for financing wastewater infrastructure is to encourage private investment in projects, including through public-private partnerships at the municipal level. The challenge most often cited by municipal and company officials was public and political opposition. Issues with Efficiently Financing Water Infrastructure
As the nation faces limited budgets and funding for federal programs, the importance of targeting federal funds to communities with the greatest need and spending funds efficiently increases. In October 2012, we reported on the three largest sources of federal funding for rural water infrastructure and identified opportunities for these programs to coordinate and lower the costs to communities applying for funding from more than one program and agency. As we reported in March 2004, comprehensive asset management is an approach that could give utilities the information and analytical tools they need to manage existing assets more effectively Using asset management concepts, utilities and to plan for the future.and other organizations responsible for managing capital infrastructure can minimize the total costs of designing, acquiring, operating, maintaining, replacing and disposing of capital assets over their useful lives. Our 2004 report recommended various actions that EPA could take to promote asset management, and EPA has taken those actions, including holding workshops for utilities and coordinating its ongoing initiatives. In addition, in its SRF sustainability policy, EPA supports asset management as an approach to increase the longevity of infrastructure. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation faces costly upgrades to aging and deteriorating drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. Frequent and highly publicized incidents of combined sewer overflows into rivers and streams, as well as water main breaks in the nation's largest cities, are the most visible manifestations of this problem.
A variety of approaches have been proposed to help bridge the potential gap between projected infrastructure needs--estimated by EPA as almost $335 billion for drinking water infrastructure and $298 billion for wastewater infrastructure--and current funding. GAO has conducted recent work on three of these approaches. In addition, GAO's recent work has addressed rural water infrastructure funding and economic recovery, as well as utilities' use of asset management, an approach to planning for and managing infrastructure costs.
This testimony is based on a body of work from August 2002 through October 2012 and focuses on (1) EPA's Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund programs; (2) stakeholders' views on creating a clean water trust fund, a national wastewater infrastructure bank, and public-private partnerships for wastewater infrastructure; and (3) issues in financing drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. GAO's testimony summarizes the results of issued reports.
GAO made recommendations in past reports to strengthen utilities' use of asset management and coordination of rural water infrastructure funding. EPA generally concurred with the recommendations, taking action on some and beginning action on others.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs are the largest sources of federal assistance to states and local communities for funding drinking water and wastewater infrastructure. In fiscal year 2012, EPA funded the Clean Water SRF program $1.5 billion and the Drinking Water SRF program $918 million from congressional appropriations. EPA grants capitalization funds to states, which in turn provide low- or no-interest loans to local communities or utilities to pay for water distribution pipelines, treatment plants, sewer lines, and other similar infrastructure.
GAO reviewed three of the approaches proposed to pay for the nation's drinking water and wastewater needs, each of which offers a different means to fund and finance projects. To understand these approaches as they apply to wastewater infrastructure, GAO surveyed stakeholders, including industry representatives and associations and federal, state, and local government officials. GAO's reports identified the following issues with each approach:
A clean water trust fund would provide a dedicated source of funding, such as an excise or other tax, for wastewater infrastructure. Stakeholders identified three main issues that would need to be addressed in setting one up: how a trust fund should be administered and used, what type of financial assistance should be provided, and what activities should be eligible to receive funding. A majority of stakeholders said that a trust fund should be administered through EPA in partnership with the states, but they differed in their views on how a trust fund should be used.
A national infrastructure bank would use public and/or private funds to finance infrastructure projects through a variety of loans, loan guarantees, and other mechanisms. A majority of stakeholders supported the creation of such a bank but also identified three issues that should be considered in designing a bank: mission and administrative structure, financing authorities, and project eligibility and prioritization.
Public-private partnerships encourage private investment in infrastructure projects. GAO identified seven municipalities that have entered into privately financed partnerships for wastewater infrastructure. Municipal and company officials identified advantages to these partnerships, such as having access to sources of financing other than traditional sources, but also identified challenges to using partnerships. Local opposition is one challenge, as is the complexity and difficulty of contracting involved.
GAO's work on asset management, among other things, highlights the importance of targeting federal funding to communities with the greatest need and spending funds efficiently. For example, in 2004, GAO identified opportunities for EPA to improve its promotion of asset management to utilities-- an approach that could give utilities the information and analytical tools they need to manage existing assets more effectively and to plan for the future. Since then, EPA has implemented GAO's recommendations on asset management by, among other things, holding workshops and coordinating initiatives to provide asset management information. |
gao_NSIAD-96-206 | gao_NSIAD-96-206_0 | For these reasons, all NASA programs have carryover balances. Program Carryover Balances Vary Significantly
Carryover balances at the end of fiscal year 1995 for Human Space Flight and Science, Aeronautics, and Technology programs totaled $3.6 billion. NASA often discusses and analyzes carryover balances in terms of equivalent months of a fiscal year’s budget authority that will be carried into the next fiscal year. The carryover balances at the end of fiscal year 1995 ranged from the equivalent of 1 month for the Space Shuttle to 16 months for Academic Programs. Science programs such as MTPE, Space Science, and Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications, fund grants to a much greater extent than the Space Station and the Space Shuttle. NASA Is Taking Actions to Analyze and Reduce Carryover Balances
Although carryover naturally occurs in the federal budget process, NASA officials became concerned that the balances were too high. NASA is taking actions to analyze and reduce these balances. NASA’s Comptroller will review justifications for carryover balances as part of the fiscal year 1998 budget development process. The study recommended that NASA implement thresholds for the amount of funds to be carried over from one fiscal year to the next. We compared the balances of individual Human Space Flight and Science, Aeronautics, and Technology programs to this 3-month threshold and found that at the end of fiscal year 1995, nine programs exceeded the threshold by a total of $1.3 billion. Table 4 compares individual program carryover amounts with the 3-month threshold at the end of fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997. Estimates of budget authority, obligations, and accrued costs of program activities will be specifically scrutinized to ensure that the timing of the budget authority to accrued costs is consistent with minimal, carefully justified balances of uncosted budget authorities at fiscal year end. The carryover referred to by the Comptroller is the equivalent of 8 weeks, or 15 percent, of the next fiscal year’s cost. The Comptroller stressed that he was not attempting to set a threshold for the appropriate level of carryover, but instead was setting a criteria beyond which there should be a strong justification for carryover. In fiscal years 1996 and 1997, the amounts requiring justification are estimated at $1.5 billion and $1 billion, respectively. We reviewed budget and cost plans and discussed carryover balances with NASA’s Chief Financial Officer; NASA’s Comptroller and his staff; and with financial management staff for the MTPE, Space Science, Space Station, Space Shuttle, and Aeronautics programs. We will also provide copies to others on request. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent of carryover budget balances for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) program and other NASA programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) carryover balances in NASA's Human Space Flight and Science, Aeronautics, and Technology programs totalled $3.6 billion by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1995; (2) individual programs carried over varying amounts, ranging from the equivalent of 1 month to 16 months of FY 1995 new budget authority; (3) MTPE carried $695 million, or more than 6 months, of budget authority into FY 1996; (4) Under NASA's current budget and cost plans, these balances will be reduced in FY 1996 and 1997, but the actual reductions depend on the extent NASA's projected costs match the actual costs incurred and the amount of new budget authority received for FY 1997; (5) NASA officials are concerned that the current amounts are too high and are taking actions to reduce these balances; (6) a recent NASA study of carryover balances determined that the equivalent of 3 months of budget authority should be carried into the next fiscal year and recommended actions to bring NASA programs within that threshold, and also noted that the threshold needs to be studied over time to determine if it is appropriate; (7) applying the initial 3-month threshold to estimated carryover balances at the end of FY 1996 shows that 7 of the 11 Human Space Flight and Science, Aeronautics, and Technology programs have a total carryover of $1.1 billion beyond the threshold; (8) NASA's Comptroller intends to carefully scrutinize carryover amounts as part of the FY 1998 budget development process, and formally requested program managers to justify carryover balances that exceed amounts necessary to fund program costs for 8 weeks of the next fiscal year; (9) the 8 weeks was not a threshold for the appropriate level of carryover, but rather a criterion for identifying balances for review; (10) at the end of FY 1996, nine programs would need to justify $1.5 billion beyond the Comptroller's 8-week criterion; and (11) the three programs with the largest estimated balances requiring justification are Space Science with $558 million, MTPE with $435 million, and Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications with $257 million. |
gao_HEHS-97-50 | gao_HEHS-97-50_0 | Beneficiaries’ ability to make informed health care choices would be enhanced by the availability of objective, comparative information and access to a hot line. A limited enrollment period would facilitate an annual HMO marketing campaign and create a natural opportunity for HCFA to distribute comparative plan information to beneficiaries. HMOs would focus more of their marketing dollars on mass media campaigns—including print, radio, and television advertising—concentrated around Medicare’s enrollment season. Representatives of most HMOs we contacted stated that limiting Medicare’s enrollment period would slow the growth of managed care because plans would not (1) have time to educate beneficiaries about Medicare’s managed care option and (2) be able to hire enough trained sales staff on a seasonal basis to answer beneficiary questions during the limited enrollment period. The effectiveness of an FEHBP-like mass marketing campaign for Medicare may depend on whether HCFA develops ancillary mechanisms to inform beneficiaries. If the Medicare program relies solely on enrollment brokers and prohibits HMOs from marketing to individual beneficiaries, however, growth of Medicare managed care might slow. Under the limited enrollment period policy discussed here, beneficiaries dissatisfied with their HMOs would have three choices: (1) remain in the HMO, (2) switch to traditional Medicare fee for service and pay the deductible and coinsurance for submitted claims, or (3) switch to traditional Medicare fee for service and purchase a Medigap policy if one was available to them. The annual enrollment change resulting from a limited enrollment period could be difficult for HMOs to predict accurately; any unanticipated HMO enrollment growth could contribute to provider access problems. A Limited Enrollment Period Policy Could Discourage Some Employers From Offering Managed Care to Retirees
Limiting Medicare’s enrollment period would create varying degrees of administrative problems for employers and could, as a result, discourage some employers from offering managed care to their retirees. 3.) 4.) Limiting Disenrollment Might Save Medicare Money but Cause Problems for Beneficiaries and HMOs
If a new enrollment policy also limited HMO members’ opportunities to disenroll and change to fee for service, the Medicare program might save some money; however, the policy could also result in reduced beneficiary protections, increased beneficiary dissatisfaction, and slower HMO growth. Depending on the timing of the enrollment period, the announcement of the payment rates might need to occur earlier in the year so that HMOs could set premiums and benefits before Medicare’s open season. 5.) Although such a policy would reinforce the concept of managed care and reduce the opportunities for less healthy HMO enrollees to change to Medicare fee for service, our analysis suggests that the savings might be relatively small. Moreover, an enrollment policy change would likely have several unintended consequences, including the loss of important beneficiary protections and complications for many employers who offer managed care to their retirees. HCFA agreed that the monthly disenrollment option is an important consumer protection. Our report indicates that changing Medicare’s current policy of allowing beneficiaries to switch among HMOs or between an HMO and fee for service could have far-reaching consequences. The Health Benefit Services Division handles enrollments or changes in plans and conducts educational activities for members. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how a limited enrollment period would affect the Medicare program, private health plans, beneficiaries, and employers who provide Medicare supplemental benefits to retirees, focusing on: (1) the growth of Medicare's managed care program; (2) employers' attempts to administer their respective benefits seasons; (3) taxpayer savings measured against beneficiary protections; and (4) the resources needed by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which runs Medicare's day-to-day operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) changing Medicare's current policy that allows beneficiaries to switch among health maintenance organizations (HMO) or between an HMO and fee for service monthly would have far-reaching consequences for the Medicare program, beneficiaries, HMOs, employers, and HCFA; (2) the specific effects would depend on the limits placed on switching plans; (3) any change that restricts beneficiary opportunities to enroll or disenroll would likely slow the growth of Medicare managed care; (4) a limited enrollment period for Medicare could have two principal advantages: (a) to improve the quality and distribution of managed care information to beneficiaries: a focused enrollment period would create a natural opportunity for HCFA to provide objective, comparative information about health plans; and (b) to make impractical the current practice of in-home sales of HMOs, a source of marketing abuses, which are difficult for HCFA to deter; (5) a limited enrollment period could also have several of the following disadvantages, the combined effect of which could slow Medicare managed care enrollment growth: (a) lessen the effectiveness of marketing Medicare HMOs: HMOs would likely focus more of their marketing dollars on mass media campaigns concentrated around Medicare's enrollment season, but beneficiaries unfamiliar with managed care might not receive enough specifics through mass marketing to appreciate any advantages offered by an HMO over traditional fee-for-service Medicare; (b) lessen the attractiveness of HMOs to beneficiaries: the only choice available to dissatisfied HMO enrollees might be to change to fee for service and pay either Medicare's deductibles and coinsurance or, if available, premiums for a supplemental Medigap policy; and (c) pose considerable administrative obstacles for employers: accommodating Medicare's schedule could be so administratively difficult that some employers might simply stop offering a managed care option to their retirees; (6) limiting beneficiaries' option to change to fee-for-service Medicare except during the officially appointed open season could also produce the following mixed effects: (a) Medicare might achieve modest savings on money now spent on services for HMO members who change to fee for service; and (b) beneficiaries would lose an important consumer protection and might be less willing to enroll in managed care; (7) ultimately, changing Medicare's HMO enrollment and disenrollment policies could have unintended effects; and (8) savings could be offset if policy changes also led to slowing or reducing the enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in HMOs. |
gao_GAO-02-894 | gao_GAO-02-894_0 | HHS named this program the Child Care and Development Fund. In addition to consolidating federal funds, PRWORA significantly changed federal child care policy by giving states maximum flexibility to design child care programs for low-income families. States set maximum reimbursement rates that consist of two parts—the state subsidy paid directly to a provider and the co-payment the family pays to a provider. Most States Reported Considering Market Rate Survey Results, but Also Considered Budgets and Other Factors in Setting Child Care Reimbursement Rates
States used the results of market rate surveys to help set child care reimbursement rates, but also reported considering other factors such as budgets in rate setting. States reported that their market rate survey results primarily included data on providers’ fees from regulated child care center, family home, and group home providers. Conversely, 14 states reported that they did not pay different reimbursement rates to providers based on their location. Budgets are important because they establish a financial framework for developing programs and policy goals. In Selected Communities, Different Subsidies and Co-Payments Resulted in Varied Access to Child Care for Low-Income Families
In the nine communities we visited, we calculated that the maximum reimbursement rates afforded hypothetical 2-person families widely different levels of access to child care providers who accepted the subsidy. Child Care: States Increased Spending on Low-Income Families. | What GAO Found
Federal welfare legislation passed in 1996 placed a greater emphasis on helping low-income families end dependence on government benefits by promoting job preparation and work. To reach this goal, the legislation gave states greater flexibility to design programs that use federal funds to subsidize child care for low-income families. Under the Child Care and Development Fund, this flexibility includes the freedom to largely determine which low-income families are eligible to receive child care subsidies. These maximum rates consist of two parts--a state subsidy and family co-payment. States also establish maximum reimbursement rates for child care. States reported considering market rate survey and budget and policy goals in setting maximum reimbursement rates. All states reported conducting market rate surveys in the past 2 years that obtained data on providers' fees, but 10 states reported that they did not base the reimbursement rates for child care providers on their most recent market rate surveys. In the nine communities visited, GAO calculated that hypothetical families' access to child care centers and family home providers varied widely as a result of the different subsidies and family co-payments established by each state. |
gao_GAO-10-30 | gao_GAO-10-30_0 | The Department of Education, HHS, and Department of Justice support six initiatives similar to the Coalition’s to identify effective social interventions. Reviewers Defined the Top Tier Criteria through Case Discussion
The Top Tier initiative’s public materials are less transparent about the process and criteria used to determine whether an intervention met the Top Tier standard than about candidate selection. The Coalition reports that it plans to supplement guidance over time by accumulating case decisions rather than developing more detailed guidance on what constitutes sizable and sustained effects. Top Tier Follows Rigorous Standards but Is Limited for Identifying Effective Interventions
The Top Tier initiative’s criteria for assessing evaluation quality conform to general social science research standards, but other features of the overall process differ from common practice for drawing conclusions about intervention effectiveness from a body of research. The major difference in rating study quality between the Top Tier initiative and the six other initiatives is a product of the top tier standard as set out in certain legislative provisions: the other initiatives accept well-designed, well-conducted quasi-experimental studies as credible evidence. Broad Scope Fails to Focus on Effectiveness in Achieving Specific Outcomes
The Top Tier initiative’s topic selection, emphasis on long-term effects, and narrow evidence criteria combine to provide limited information on the effectiveness of approaches for achieving specific outcomes. In addition, the exclusivity of its top tier standard also diverges from the more common approach of rating the credibility of study findings along a continuum and resulted in the panel’s recommending only 6 of 63 interventions for ages 0– 18 reviewed as providing “sizable, sustained effects on important life outcomes.” Thus, although they are not their primary audience, the Top Tier initiative provides practitioners with limited guidance on what works. Randomized Experiments Can Provide the Most Credible Evidence of Effectiveness under Certain Conditions
In our review of the literature on program evaluation methods, we found general agreement that well-conducted randomized experiments are best suited for assessing intervention effectiveness where multiple causal influences lead to uncertainty about what has caused observed results but, also, that they are often difficult to carry out. Randomized experiments are considered best suited for interventions in which exposure to the intervention can be controlled and the treatment and control groups’ experiences remain separate, intact, and distinct throughout the study. Rigorous Alternatives to Random Assignment Are Available
In our review of the literature on evaluation research methods, we identified several alternative methods for assessing intervention effectiveness when random assignment is not considered appropriate— quasi-experimental comparison group studies, statistical analyses of observational data, and in-depth case studies. In general, they involve collecting additional data and targeting comparisons to help rule out plausible alternative explanations of the observed results. Reliable assessments of the credibility of evaluation results require expertise in research design and measurement, but their reliability can be improved by providing detailed guidance and training. Requiring evidence from randomized experiments as sole proof of an intervention’s effectiveness is likely to exclude many potentially effective and worthwhile practices for which random assignment is not practical. Deciding to adopt an intervention involves additional considerations— cost, ease of use, suitability to the local community, and available resources. Agency and Third- Party Comments
The Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy provided written comments on a draft of this report, reprinted in appendix II. The Coalition and the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate throughout the text. Improving Evaluation of Anticrime Programs. Abstinence Education: Efforts to Assess the Accuracy and Effectiveness of Federally Funded Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent congressional initiatives seek to focus funds for certain federal social programs on interventions for which randomized experiments show sizable, sustained benefits to participants or society. The private, nonprofit Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy undertook the Top Tier Evidence initiative to help federal programs identify interventions that meet this standard. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to examine (1) the validity and transparency of the Coalition's process, (2) how its process compared to that of six federally supported efforts to identify effective interventions, (3) the types of interventions best suited for assessment with randomized experiments, and (4) alternative rigorous methods used to assess effectiveness. GAO reviewed documents, observed the Coalition's advisory panel deliberate on interventions meeting its top tier standard, and reviewed other documents describing the processes the federally supported efforts had used. GAO reviewed the literature on evaluation methods and consulted experts on the use of randomized experiments. The Coalition generally agreed with the findings. The Departments of Education and Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report. The Department of Justice provided no comments.
What GAO Found
The Coalition's Top Tier Evidence initiative criteria for assessing evaluation quality conform to general social science research standards, but other features of its overall process differ from common practice for drawing conclusions about intervention effectiveness. The Top Tier initiative clearly describes how it identifies candidate interventions but is not as transparent about how it determines whether an intervention meets the top tier criteria. In the absence of detailed guidance, the panel defined sizable and sustained effects through case discussion. Over time, it increasingly obtained agreement on whether an intervention met the top tier criteria. The major difference in rating study quality between the Top Tier and the six other initiatives examined is a product of the Top Tier standard as set out in certain legislative provisions: the other efforts accept well-designed, well-conducted, nonrandomized studies as credible evidence. The Top Tier initiative's choice of broad topics (such as early childhood interventions), emphasis on long-term effects, and use of narrow evidence criteria combine to provide limited information on what is effective in achieving specific outcomes. The panel recommended only 6 of 63 interventions reviewed as providing "sizeable, sustained effects on important outcomes." The other initiatives acknowledge a continuum of evidence credibility by reporting an intervention's effectiveness on a scale of high to low confidence. The program evaluation literature generally agrees that well-conducted randomized experiments are best suited for assessing effectiveness when multiple causal influences create uncertainty about what caused results. However, they are often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to carry out. An evaluation must be able to control exposure to the intervention and ensure that treatment and control groups' experiences remain separate and distinct throughout the study. Several rigorous alternatives to randomized experiments are considered appropriate for other situations: quasi-experimental comparison group studies, statistical analyses of observational data, and--in some circumstances--in-depth case studies. The credibility of their estimates of program effects relies on how well the studies' designs rule out competing causal explanations. Collecting additional data and targeting comparisons can help rule out other explanations. GAO concludes that (1) requiring evidence from randomized studies as sole proof of effectiveness will likely exclude many potentially effective and worthwhile practices; (2) reliable assessments of evaluation results require research expertise but can be improved with detailed protocols and training; (3) deciding to adopt an intervention involves other considerations in addition to effectiveness, such as cost and suitability to the local community; and (4) improved evaluation quality would also help identify effective interventions. |
gao_NSIAD-98-151 | gao_NSIAD-98-151_0 | In June 1998, the Air Force plans to proceed into the final development phase with the primary purpose of fabricating launch vehicles and activating the launch sites. More importantly, the methodology itself is inadequate for measuring potential program savings because it does not include the investment costs that DOD plans to incur in EELV system development to achieve cost savings. A net present value (NPV) analysis, which would use total program costs, is preferred. Methodology Used for Measuring Recurring Cost Reduction
The Air Force’s methodology for measuring recurring cost reduction is described in the following way: EELV recurring costs, meaning production and launch costs, should be a minimum of 25 percent less, with an objective of 50 percent less, than the recurring costs of using existing expendable launch vehicles—the Delta, Atlas, and Titan class systems. These costs are based on projected government launch requirements for fiscal years 2002 through 2020. Fluctuations in Mission Model Contents Make Cost Savings Uncertain
Since program inception in 1995, the total number, type, and timing of launches contained in the Air Force’s EELV mission model have fluctuated considerably, making a cost reduction estimate, based on the model, uncertain. The major reasons for the fluctuations were (1) assignment of satellites to the wrong type of launch vehicle, (2) inclusion of unverified launch requirements, and (3) reductions in the number of heavy-lift launches because of satellite downsizing. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Air Force is in the process of developing a new launch cost baseline, built around the most current EELV mission model, in preparation for the milestone II review. The standard criterion for deciding whether a government program can be justified on economic principles is NPV, which would include both recurring and nonrecurring costs, as well as the time value of money. Revised Acquisition Approach Contains Challenges, Risks, and Benefits
The use of a relatively new acquisition method, called other transactions, will challenge DOD in determining how best to protect the government’s interests. Also, risks are inherent in the program because of (1) DOD’s plan to limit its investment and the contractors’ resulting unwillingness to guarantee a system to meet the government’s launch requirements and (2) a chance that certain launch facilities may not be available as currently scheduled. Other Transaction Instruments Will Challenge DOD to Protect Government’s Interests
Initially, under DOD’s revised acquisition approach, the Air Force planned to award firm-fixed-price contracts to both EELV contractors for the development effort. This unwillingness is because DOD’s financial risk is to be capped at $500 million per contractor, while the contractors’ financial risk would be an open-ended commitment. We did not reassess these factors for this report; however, current Air Force planning documentation identifies meeting launch site facility preparation schedules as the primary program risk. Other Air Force planning documents show the continued use of certain launch facilities for several months after they are scheduled to undergo site preparations for EELV. In addition, we obtained DOD’s planned investment costs based on a combination of congressional appropriations and funds programmed by the Air Force for EELV development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, with emphasis on the Department of Defense's (DOD) revised acquisition approach, focusing on whether: (1) DOD's goal of reducing recurring space launch costs could be achieved; (2) DOD's planned investment would result in commensurate benefits; and (3) there are risks that could affect the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's goal in acquiring the EELV system is to reduce recurring production and launch costs by at least 25 percent for fiscal years 2002 through 2020 from the costs that would be incurred if the existing Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch vehicles were used; (2) using DOD's methodology, GAO estimated that the program would exceed the 25-percent goal; (3) however, the number, type, and timing of launches specified in the vehicle's mission model have continued to fluctuate, making a cost reduction estimate, based on the model, uncertain; (4) the major reasons for the fluctuations were that: (a) satellites were assigned to the wrong type of launch vehicle; (b) launch requirements were unverified; and (c) satellite downsizing has changed launch requirements; (5) the Air Force is in the process of developing a new launch cost baseline and cost reduction estimate, based on the most current EELV mission model, in preparation for the DOD milestone II review in June 1998; (6) more importantly, the Air Force's recurring cost methodology does not adequately measure the economic benefits of the program; (7) the reason is that nonrecurring investment costs, which DOD plans to incur to develop the system in order to achieve a cost savings, are not included; (8) the standard criterion for deciding whether a government program can be justified on economic principles--the primary purpose of this program--is net present value (NPV), which would include both recurring and nonrecurring costs and the time value of money; (9) DOD has not yet officially performed a NPV analysis and has not identified all government costs to do so; (10) the use of other transaction instruments for EELV development will challenge DOD in determining how best to protect the government's interests; (11) under DOD's revised acquisition approach, the contractors are not willing to guarantee system performance because their financial risk would be open ended and DOD's investment would be limited; (12) despite this position, the Air Force is counting on the contractors to provide launch services to satisfy the government's requirements, based on their financial interest in a growing commercial market for launch services; (13) in addition, the Air Force planning documentation states that the primary program risk is in meeting launch site facility preparation schedules; and (14) other Air Force planning documentation shows the continued use of certain launch facilities for several months after the facilities are scheduled to undergo site preparation for the vehicle. |
gao_GAO-07-1044T | gao_GAO-07-1044T_0 | To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is to collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; detect fraudulent travel documents, verify traveler identity, and determine traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; facilitate information sharing and coordination within the immigration and border management community; and identify foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their admission; (2) may be eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials. The scope of the program includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. The department has requested $462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the program. US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs
A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at most POEs. For example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric hits in primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT Exit Is Not Operational
Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and resources towards establishing an operational exit capability at air, sea, and land POEs. Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and resources, DHS still does not have an operational exit capability. Our prior reports have raised a number of concerns about DHS’s management of US-VISIT’s exit efforts. As we and others have reported, the absence of a biometric exit capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data are available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit capability, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their original period of admission—a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, ICE’s efforts to ensure the integrity of the immigration system could be degraded if it continues to spend its limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have already left the country. Nonetheless, DHS continued to operate the exit pilots. Based on the department’s latest available documentation, it intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either the plans or the analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-term deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will be done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire, deliver, deploy, and operate this capability, including plans describing expected system capabilities, defining measurable outcomes (benefits and results), identifying key stakeholder (e.g., airlines) roles/responsibilities and buy-in, and coordinating and aligning with related programs. If this does not change, there is no reason to expect that DHS’s newly launched efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution will produce results different from its past efforts—namely, no operational exit solution despite many years and hundreds of millions of dollars of investment. More importantly, the continued absence of an exit capability will hinder DHS’s ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement mission. Hence, it is important that DHS approach its latest attempt to deploy its exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and disciplined fashion that we have previously recommended. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues to invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry (POEs). The program uses biometric identifiers (digital finger scans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. GAO's testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities and DHS's management of past and future exit efforts. In developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior reports on US-VISIT as well as ongoing work for the committee.
What GAO Found
After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs but comparable exit capabilities are not. To the department's credit, operational entry capabilities have reportedly produced results, including more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. However, DHS still does not have the other half of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts. During this time, GAO has continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS is managing US-VISIT in general, and the exit side of US-VISIT in particular, and has made numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program delivers clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The department's latest available documentation indicates that little has changed in how DHS is approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit efforts. Specifically, DHS has indicated that it intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either plans or analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these funds. Rather, it has only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Beyond this high-level schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what will be done by what entities and at what cost. In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit intentions, it is unlikely that the department's latest efforts to deliver near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different from the past. Therefore, the prospects for having operational exit capabilities continue to be unclear. Moreover, the longer the department goes without exit capabilities, the more its ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement missions will suffer. Among other things, this means that DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their original period of admission, which is a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, DHS immigration and customs enforcement entities will continue to spend limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have already left the country. |
gao_GGD-99-108 | gao_GGD-99-108_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairmen of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control requested that we determine (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission, including its efforts to (a) target and investigate national and international drug traffickers and (b) help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and allocated the additional staff. Consequently, during the 1990s, DEA gave a higher priority than in the past and increased resources to working with and assisting state and local law enforcement agencies, including starting a new program to help combat drug-related violent crime in local communities. DEA started participating in two interagency programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia. DEA helped establish, train, and fund special foreign police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign countries, primarily in Latin America. DEA Developed an Investigative Approach Focusing on the Communications of Major Drug Trafficking Organizations
Since it was established, DEA’s highest priority has been to investigate major drug trafficking organizations, both domestic and foreign, responsible for supplying illegal drugs consumed in the United States. Conclusions
DEA expanded its enforcement strategy in the 1990s to focus its operations on what it refers to as the seamless continuum of drug trafficking. DEA Has Not Yet Developed Performance Targets Consistent With the National Drug Control Strategy
DEA’s strategic goals and objectives, along with its enhanced programs and initiatives in the 1990s discussed in chapter 2, are consistent with the strategic goals of ONDCP’s National Drug Control Strategy. DEA has significant responsibilities for helping to achieve the following three National Strategy goals. During the1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of its operations, that is, its strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches. However, DEA has not developed performance targets for its programs and initiatives aimed at disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations and arresting their leaders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the strategies and operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the 1990s, focusing on: (1) what major enforcement strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches DEA has implemented in the 1990s to carry out its mission, including its efforts to: (a) target and investigate national and international drug traffickers; and (b) help state and local law enforcement agencies combat drug offenders and drug-related violence in their communities; (2) whether DEA's goals and objectives, programs and initiatives, and performance measures are consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; and (3) how DEA determined its fiscal year 1998 staffing needs and allocated the additional staff.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the 1990s, DEA has enhanced or changed important aspects of its operations; (2) DEA expanded its domestic enforcement operations to work more with state and local law enforcement agencies and help combat drug-related violent crime in local communities; (3) DEA implemented an investigative approach domestically and internationally, focusing on intercepting the communications of major drug trafficking organizations to target the leaders and dismantle their operations; (4) DEA started participating in two interagency programs to target and investigate major drug trafficking organizations in Latin America and Asia; (5) DEA changed its foreign operations by screening and training special foreign police units to combat drug trafficking in certain key foreign countries; (6) DEA has significant responsibilities for the drug supply reduction portion of the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) National Drug Control Strategy; (7) DEA's strategic goals and objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives, in the 1990s have been consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy; (8) however, DEA has not developed measurable performance targets for its programs and initiatives that are consistent with those adopted for the National Strategy; and (9) as a result, it is difficult for DEA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Congress, and the public to assess how effective DEA has been in achieving its strategic goals and the effect its programs and initiatives in the 1990s have had on reducing the illegal drug supply. |
gao_GAO-15-389T | gao_GAO-15-389T_0 | 1). This office is responsible for developing policies and providing technical assistance and funding to Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regions and BIE schools to address their facility needs. Once funding for school construction and repair is approved, Indian Affairs offers three main project management options. Indian Affairs Does Not Effectively Track School Conditions, and Persistent Challenges Affect Facilities at Selected Schools Indian Affairs’ Information on School Conditions Continues to Be Incomplete or Inaccurate, Which Reduces Its Effectiveness in Identifying Problems and Targeting Limited Funds
Our past work and other research pointed to a variety of persistent challenges Indian Affairs has encountered in maintaining complete and accurate data on the condition of BIE school facilities. The Committee attributed the problems to a lack Our ongoing work suggests that issues with the quality of data on school conditions—such as inconsistent data entry by schools and insufficient quality controls—continues to make it difficult to determine the actual number of schools in poor condition, which impedes Indian Affairs’ ability to effectively track and address school facility problems. Interior’s Inspector General has recently found similar challenges with data entry at several other schools, and it continues to monitor this issue. A Variety of Challenges Adversely Affect the Condition of Schools
During our ongoing work, we visited schools in three states that reported facing a variety of facility-related challenges, including remoteness of their locations, aging buildings and infrastructure, limited funding, and problems with the quality of new construction, which we believe could affect their ability to provide safe, quality educational environments for students. (See fig.2.) 4.) Systemic Management Challenges Impede Oversight of and Support for School Facilities
Preliminary results from our work indicate that key challenges at Indian Affairs are impeding effective management of BIE school facilities. Limited Staff Capacity to Address School Facility Needs
Our ongoing work suggests that the capacity of BIA regional facilities and BIE school staff to address school facility needs is limited due to steady declines in staffing levels, gaps in technical expertise, and limited institutional knowledge. recommended that Indian Affairs revise its strategic workforce plan. Indian Affairs agreed to implement the recommendation but has not yet done so. Inconsistent Accountability for School Construction
Our preliminary results suggest that Indian Affairs has not provided consistent oversight of some school construction projects, including projects it managed itself and projects managed by tribes. For example, at one BIE-operated school we visited, Indian Affairs managed a project in which a contractor completed a $3.5 million project to replace roofs in 2010, but the roofs have leaked since their installation, according to agency documents. These leaks have led to mold in some classrooms and numerous ceiling tiles having to be removed throughout the school. Poor Communication with Schools Regarding Roles and Responsibilities of Different Indian Affairs Offices
Our preliminary results also suggest that unclear lines of communication and confusion among BIE schools about the roles and responsibilities of the various Indian Affairs’ offices responsible for facility issues hamper efforts to address school facility needs. BIE and tribal officials at some schools we visited said they were unclear about what office they should contact about facility problems or to elevate problems that are not addressed. As a result, students and staff at the elementary school went without hot water for about a year. This situation is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that call for effective internal communication throughout an agency. - - - - - In conclusion, the federal government, through the Department of the Interior, has a trust responsibility for the education of Indian students, including building and maintaining school facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
BIE oversees 185 elementary and secondary schools that serve approximately 41,000 students on or near Indian reservations in 23 states. In 2014, Interior's Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs funded the operations, maintenance, construction, and repair of about 1,785 educational and dormitory buildings, which are worth an estimated $4.2 billion. Recent reports have raised concerns about the physical condition of these facilities and their effect on Indian students' educational outcomes. Several studies indicate that better school facilities are associated with better student outcomes.
This testimony reports on ongoing GAO work related to the conditions of BIE schools. A full report will be issued later this year. Based on GAO's preliminary findings, this testimony focuses on: (1) what is known about the conditions of selected BIE schools and (2) the extent to which Indian Affairs effectively oversees and supports BIE school facilities.
For this work, GAO is reviewing agency data and documentation, and relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewing agency officials; and has conducted site visits to schools in three states, which were selected based on their geographic diversity and other factors.
What GAO Found
Information on the physical condition of Bureau of Education (BIE) schools is not complete or accurate as a result of longstanding issues with the quality of data collected by the Department of the Interior's (Interior) Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs). GAO's preliminary results indicate that issues with the quality of data on school conditions—such as inconsistent data entry by schools and inadequate quality controls—make determining the number of schools in poor condition difficult. These issues impede Indian Affairs' ability to effectively track and address school facility problems. While national information is limited, GAO's ongoing work has found that BIE schools in three states faced a variety of facility-related challenges, including problems with the quality of new construction, limited funding, remote locations, and aging buildings and infrastructure (see figure below).
GAO's ongoing work also indicates that several key challenges at Indian Affairs are impeding effective management of school facilities. Specifically, GAO found declines in staffing levels and gaps in technical expertise among facility personnel in Indian Affairs. Further, GAO found that Indian Affairs did not provide consistent oversight of some school construction projects. At a school GAO visited, Indian Affairs managed a $3.5 million project to replace school roofs. Yet the replacement roofs have leaked since they were installed in 2010, causing mold and ceiling damage in classrooms. Indian Affairs has monitored this situation but has not addressed problems with the roofs. Indian Affairs' facility management is also hindered by poor communication with schools and tribes and confusion about whom to contact to address facility problems. Poor communication has led to some school facility needs not being met. For example, school officials submitted a request for funding to address their school's lack of hot water almost a year before GAO visited the school, but Indian Affairs facility officials were unaware of this until notified by GAO. GAO's preliminary results indicate that these persistent challenges diminish Indian Affairs' capability to oversee and support facilities and provide technical assistance to schools. They also run counter to federal internal control standards and leading practices on workforce planning and construction project accountability. |
gao_HEHS-95-87 | gao_HEHS-95-87_0 | DHS contract management staff’s monitoring of managed care plan performance in terms of access and quality of care includes (1) investigation of complaints from beneficiaries, county welfare departments, beneficiary advocate groups, and providers; (2) review of disenrollments from plans; (3) review of emergency room visits by plan members; (4) follow-up of contractor corrective action plans for deficiencies identified in medical and financial audits; and (5) reviews of plan capacity and access. The state, however, admits that implementation will be slow and incremental. By December 1996, California intends to have approximately 3.4 million Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care—a majority of the estimated 6 million Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Problems identified to date in a primarily voluntary enrollment program could be significantly magnified in a much larger program with mandatory enrollment. We believe that California’s two-plan model will restrict competition and beneficiary choice. We reviewed documents related to the Medi-Cal managed care program and plans for expansion, including the following: federal and state program laws, regulations, policies, and procedures;
HCFA Region IX’s Review of California’s Administration of Its Managed Care Program for fiscal year 1993; and
California’s strategic plan for expanding the Medi-Cal managed care program. A number of factors counteract the tendency of financial incentives to impair the quality of care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed California's Medicaid managed care program, focusing on: (1) state oversight of managed care contractors; (2) state plans for expansion; and (3) key issues in implementing the expanded program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) California plans a major expansion of its Medi-Cal managed care program in selected counties; (2) by the end of 1996, the number of enrollees in California managed care plans will total over 3.4 million, almost four times the number currently enrolled; (3) enrollment will be mandatory for women and children, who will choose from one of two plans, unlike the current voluntary system with several choices; (4) mandatory enrollment could magnify the problems already associated with California's Medi-Cal program, such as availability and quality of services, capabilities of management staff, and providers' financial incentives to limit care; and (5) any benefits of competitive managed care could be lessened by California's decision to limit beneficiaries to two health plans. |
gao_GAO-15-819 | gao_GAO-15-819_0 | These include:
Government-wide: cross-agency priority (CAP) goals. The Executive Branch Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address Crosscutting Issues, but OMB Has Increased Emphasis on Governance of Cross-Agency Priority Goals
OMB and Agencies Continue to Miss Opportunities to Address Crosscutting Issues
Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to achieve, such as those related to protecting the environment, promoting public health, and providing homeland security, require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency, level of government, or sector. One of the GPRAMA provisions that has the potential to help in addressing crosscutting issues is the requirement that agencies develop inventories of their programs, though in October 2014 we reported that several issues limit the usefulness of the inventories. OMB Is Taking Steps to Enhance the Governance and Implementation of Current CAP Goals
OMB has made several improvements to its CAP goal guidance, in part in response to our prior work, which found that OMB should strengthen CAP goal reviews. Ensuring Performance Information Is Useful and Used by Managers Remains a Challenge, but OMB and Agencies Are Implementing Processes That May Lead to Improvements
Agencies Continue to Face Challenges in Using Performance Information for Decision Making
We have long reported that agencies are better equipped to address management and performance challenges when managers effectively use performance information for decision making. However, our recent work shows that agencies continue to have problems effectively using performance information. GPRAMA requires that reviews of progress of agency priority goals (APG) be held at least quarterly; as this requirement is more fully implemented, the use of performance information for decision making should improve. Nearly all of the 22 agencies that reported holding in-person reviews responded that they always or often use their review meetings to assess progress on APGs and to identify goals at risk and strategies for performance improvement. In addition, evidence-based tools—such as program evaluations and “pay for success” funding mechanisms—can also facilitate the use of performance information. GPRAMA and related guidance provide several mechanisms that can help individuals and agencies see this connection and help them contribute to agency and government-wide goals. Data-driven and strategic reviews. Goal leaders’ Senior Executive Service performance plans. OMB and Agencies Have Not Clearly Communicated Key Performance Information, but More Effective Implementation of GPRAMA Requirements Would Improve Transparency
To operate as effectively and efficiently as possible and to make difficult decisions to address the federal government’s fiscal and performance challenges, Congress, the administration, and federal managers must have ready access to reliable and complete financial and performance information—both for individual federal entities and for the federal government as a whole. OMB staff stated that this information will likely not be available until agencies start reporting on the next set of APGs (for fiscal years 2016 and 2017). OMB and Agencies Generally Agreed with GAO’s Prior Recommendations to Improve GPRAMA Implementation, but Most Have Not Yet Been Implemented
Our work examining aspects of GPRAMA implementation and its effects on agency performance management has identified a number of areas in which improvements are needed. However, of the 69 recommendations we have made, 55 (about 80 percent) have not yet been implemented, while 14 recommendations (about 20 percent) have been implemented. We made 21 recommendations to OMB and agencies between May 2012, when we issued our first report on GPRAMA implementation, and June 2013, when we issued our previous summary report. Specifically, these 23 recommendations were included in our recent work on data-driven reviews and the quality of performance information, and they focus on ensuring that agency data-driven review processes and reporting on the quality of performance information are consistent with GPRAMA requirements, OMB guidance, and leading practices. OMB staff generally agreed with the information presented in the report, and provided us with technical clarifications, which we have incorporated as appropriate. Our objectives for this report were to evaluate how GPRAMA implementation has affected progress in addressing four areas: (1) crosscutting issues; (2) the extent to which performance information is useful and used; (3) aligning daily operations with results; and (4) communication of performance information. We also interviewed OMB and Performance Improvement Council staff. Appendix II: Recommendations to OMB from GAO’s Work under the GPRA Modernization Act That Have Been Implemented
Table 4 shows recommendations we have made as part of our work under the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has implemented. Managing for Results: Selected Agencies Need to Take Additional Efforts to Improve Customer Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective implementation of GPRAMA can help address significant and long-standing budget, management, and performance challenges the federal government faces. This report is the latest in a series of GAO work in response to a statutory provision to review GPRAMA implementation. It examines how implementation has affected progress in addressing (1) crosscutting issues; (2) the extent to which performance information is useful and used; (3) alignment of daily operations with results; and (4) communication of performance information.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed GPRAMA and related guidance, recent and ongoing work related to these four areas, and the status of the 69 recommendations made to OMB and agencies as part of GAO's prior work on GPRAMA implementation. GAO also interviewed OMB and Performance Improvement Council (PIC) staff. GAO included work issued since June 2013, when GAO issued the previous summary report on GPRAMA's initial implementation.
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. OMB and agencies generally agreed with the 69 related recommendations GAO made between 2012, when GAO issued its first report in response to the statutory provision in GPRAMA, and now, but most recommendations (about 80 percent) have not yet been implemented. GAO shared a draft of this report with OMB. OMB staff generally agreed with the information presented in the report and provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's work over the past 2 years shows that implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) continues to be uneven, with varying effects on agencies' performance management. Some progress has been made in areas where GAO has made prior recommendations; however, GAO has continued to identify a range of long-standing challenges in the four areas discussed below.
The executive branch still needs to take additional actions to address crosscutting issues, but the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has increased emphasis on governance of cross-agency priority (CAP) goals. For example, OMB has issued new guidance and governance for CAP goals, which cover areas where cross-agency collaboration is needed. However, more effective implementation of GPRAMA requirements, such as the requirement that agencies develop inventories of their programs, would help address crosscutting issues by providing decision makers with comprehensive program and funding information.
Ensuring performance information is useful and used by managers remains a challenge, but OMB and agencies are implementing processes that may lead to improvements. Agencies continue to have problems effectively using performance information. GAO's analysis indicates that agencies' reported use of performance information generally did not improve between 2007 and 2013. However, as OMB and agencies continue to implement data-driven and strategic review processes, the use of performance information should improve. For example, GAO found that nearly all of the 22 agencies that reported holding in-person data-driven reviews of agency priority goals (APG)—which represent agencies' highest priorities—said they use the reviews to assess progress on APGs and that they have had a positive effect on goal progress. Similarly, some agencies have increased their use of or enhanced their efforts to improve their capacity to use other evidence-based tools, such as program evaluations.
Agencies continue to face challenges linking individual and agency performance to results . GPRAMA provisions, such as the requirement that agencies identify a goal leader responsible for APG achievement, promote linkages between individual performance and agency results. GAO has recommended that agencies strengthen some mechanisms that can promote this connection, such as through Senior Executive Service performance plans. Agencies also need to take additional actions to address GAO recommendations on measuring performance in a number of areas, such as customer service.
OMB and agencies have not clearly communicated reliable and complete financial and performance information, but more effective implementation of GPRAMA requirements would improve transparency. GPRAMA requirements for reporting on the quality of performance information have the potential to improve the transparency of that information. While OMB has updated some of its guidance, improved reporting on the quality of information is not expected from the agencies until the fiscal year 2016 and 2017 reporting cycle. |
gao_GAO-14-444 | gao_GAO-14-444_0 | Mail delivery is USPS’s largest cost area, comprising 41 percent of total costs in fiscal year 2013. 2). USPS is required to provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas. USPS Data Have Limitations, but USPS Estimates Large Potential Savings from Large- Scale Delivery Mode Conversions
USPS estimates of delivery mode costs and potential savings from converting to less costly modes have limitations because they rely on cost estimates and data from a 1994 USPS study. USPS Delivery Mode Cost and Savings Estimates Have Limitations
USPS estimates of delivery mode costs and potential savings from converting to less costly modes have limitations because they rely on cost estimates and data from a 1994 USPS study.on the time postal employees used to prepare and deliver mail for each mode of delivery. In lieu of current data, USPS increased these 1994 cost estimates for each mode of delivery by The study collected data 55 percent, based on the total percent change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) from fiscal year 1994 to 2012. Because CPI-U is a measure of inflation for the U.S. economy, changes in CPI-U over this period of time may not have been the same as changes in USPS delivery costs, which are affected by factors such as postal wage rates, postal benefit costs, and gasoline prices. Without such information on costs of modes and on potential savings through delivery conversions, USPS and lawmakers may not have an accurate understanding of the impact of delivery mode changes on which to base their decisions. Specifically, USPS estimated that its delivery costs in fiscal year 2012 ranged from about $380 annually for the average door delivery point to about $240 for curbline delivery and about $170 for centralized delivery such as cluster boxes and apartment house mailboxes (see fig. USPS Estimates Large Potential Savings from Mandatory Conversion of Residential and Business Delivery Points to Less Costly Modes
Based on the differences in delivery mode costs, USPS provided us with estimates showing that it could realize large savings from large-scale mandatory conversions of both residential and business delivery points from costly door delivery even as it continues to add new delivery points every year. USPS Has Taken Some Actions to Shift to Less Costly Delivery Modes but Faces Impediments
USPS Actions Include Changes in Delivery Policy and a Voluntary Conversion Program for Existing Business Delivery
In April 2012, USPS updated its policy regarding assigning delivery modes to new addresses. USPS revised its Postal Operations Manual—a —to regulation of the USPS pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulationsspecify that USPS determines the mode of delivery for new addresses. USPS achieved 43,333 such conversions, about 15 percent of its goal—or about 0.8 percent—of the about 5.6 million business door delivery points. USPS officials explained that based on the fiscal year 2013 results, they set a lower goal of 34,652 voluntary business conversions for fiscal year 2014. USPS did achieve some voluntary residential conversions in fiscal year 2013. USPS reported 36,302 out of about 32.2 million residential door delivery points—or about 0.1 percent—were converted to centralized delivery. However, according to USPS officials, USPS has been reluctant to mandate conversions. Under the voluntary conversion process, customers on a route may choose to maintain door delivery, or a high number of customers may request and receive hardship exemptions for elderly persons or those with special needs, which would allow them to keep door delivery service, thus reducing the number of conversions and lowering potential savings. USPS Faces Stakeholder Resistance and Other Impediments to Conversions
Large-scale mandatory conversions have the potential to achieve large savings, but USPS faces impediments, such as customer inconvenience and safety and security concerns. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve information needed for USPS and congressional decision making as well as transparency for all stakeholders, we recommend that the Postmaster General and USPS’s executive leaders collect and analyze updated data on delivery mode costs and the potential savings from converting delivery points to less costly modes of delivery and establish a time frame for publicly reporting the results. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To discuss the costs and potential savings associated with converting to less costly delivery modes, we obtained available U.S. To discuss USPS’s actions to convert delivery modes to less costly modes and any impediments to conversion, we reviewed pertinent USPS documentation, such as information on the Delivering Results, Innovation, Value and Efficiency (DRIVE) initiative, and interviewed USPS delivery operations officials and field officials, on USPS’s efforts to promote voluntary conversion of some business addresses to less costly modes of delivery. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS is expected to provide prompt, reliable and efficient nationwide service while remaining self-supporting, but it is facing serious fiscal challenges with insufficient revenues to cover its expenses. Mail delivery is USPS's largest cost area, totaling about $30 billion annually. Although USPS lacks authority to make certain changes that could reduce costs, it does have the authority to convert from more expensive to less expensive delivery modes.
GAO was asked to examine potential cost savings and issues related to delivery conversion. This report discusses: (1) the estimated costs of each delivery mode and potential savings associated with converting to less costly modes and (2) USPS actions to convert to less costly delivery modes and any impediments to conversions. GAO obtained and analyzed USPS estimates from fiscal years 1994 through 2012 on delivery mode costs as well as potential savings from conversions to less costly modes and determined that the estimates have limitations, which we discuss in the report. GAO also interviewed officials from USPS and mailing industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) estimates of delivery mode costs and potential savings from converting to less costly modes show that door-to-door delivery is much more costly than delivery to a curbside or centralized mailbox and that USPS could achieve large savings by mandating large-scale conversions from door delivery to other modes. For fiscal year 2012, USPS estimated average annual costs of about $380 per delivery point for door delivery, compared with about $240 for delivery to the curb, and about $170 for delivery to a central location. USPS also estimated potential ongoing savings of over $2 billion annually from mandating conversion of about one-third of door deliveries to other modes. However, USPS's estimates of these specific costs and savings have limitations, in part because they rely on data from a 1994 USPS study. In lieu of current data, USPS adjusted the 1994 data according to increases in the Consumer Price Index—an adjustment that may not have been the same as changes in USPS delivery costs, which are affected by factors such as increases in postal wage rates, postal benefit costs, and gasoline prices. USPS officials estimate a new study could be conducted to replace the 1994 study for a total of about $100,000 to $750,000, depending on the extent of the study. Without current information on costs of delivery modes and on potential savings through delivery conversions, USPS and lawmakers may not have an accurate understanding of the impact of delivery mode changes on which to base their decisions.
USPS has taken some actions to shift door deliveries to less costly delivery modes on a voluntary basis, but it faces stakeholder resistance and other impediments to mandatory conversions. USPS revised its regulations in April 2012 specifying that USPS determines the mode of delivery for new addresses and that new addresses must receive less costly modes, such as centralized delivery, unless USPS approves an exception. Additionally, USPS implemented voluntary business conversions in fiscal year 2013. USPS reported that 43,333 out of about 5.6 million business door delivery points—or about 0.8 percent—were voluntarily converted in fiscal year 2013. USPS has set a modest goal of about 35,000 additional voluntary business conversion goals for fiscal year 2014. USPS also converted about 36,302 out of about 32.2 million residential door delivery points—or about 0.1 percent—to centralized delivery on a voluntary basis in fiscal year 2013. Through the voluntary conversion process, customers on a route may choose to maintain door delivery, reducing the number of conversions and lowering potential savings. Large-scale mandatory conversions have the potential to achieve large savings. However, USPS is reluctant to mandate conversions. There is some evidence that USPS would face resistance from customers, USPS employees, and mailing industry stakeholders if it were to implement mandatory conversion of delivery to less costly modes. Stakeholder concerns include personal safety, mail security, and difficulty finding suitable urban locations for boxes to deliver mail to a curbside or centralized location.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USPS collect updated data on delivery mode costs and the potential savings of converting to less costly modes of delivery and establish a time frame for publicly reporting the results. USPS agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-4 | gao_GAO-04-4_0 | Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
Congress added section 106 to the Bank Holding Company Act in 1970 to address concerns that an expansion in the range of activities permissible for bank holding companies might give them an unfair competitive advantage because of the unique role their bank subsidiaries served as credit providers.Section 106 makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, for a bank to extend credit or furnish any product or service, or vary the price of any product or service (the “tying product”) on the “condition or requirement” that the customer obtains some additional product or service from the bank or its affiliate (the “tied product”). Also, section 106 generally does not prohibit a bank from conditioning its relationship with a customer on the total profitability of its relationship with the customer. According to the Board’s proposed interpretation, a bank can legally condition the availability of a bank product, such as credit, on the customer’s selection from a mix of traditional and nontraditional products or services—a mixed-product arrangement—only if the bank offered the customer a “meaningful choice” of products that includes one or more traditional bank products and did not require the customer to purchase any specific product or service. Some Corporate Borrowers Alleged That Unlawful Tying Occurs, but Available Evidence Did Not Substantiate These Allegations
Some corporate borrowers alleged that commercial banks unlawfully tie the availability of credit to the borrower’s purchase of other financial services, including debt underwriting services from their banks’ investment affiliates. Although customer information could have an important role in helping regulators enforce section 106, regulators do not have a specific mechanism to solicit information from corporate bank customers on an ongoing basis. Moreover, with few exceptions, complaints have not been brought to the attention of the banking regulators. Because documentary evidence demonstrating unlawful tying might not be available in bank records, regulators might have to look for other forms of indirect evidence, such as testimonial evidence, to assess whether banks unlawfully tie products and services. In response to recent allegations of unlawful tying at large commercial banks, the Federal Reserve and OCC conducted a special targeted review of antitying policies and procedures at several large commercial banks and their holding companies. The banking regulators found that banks covered in the review generally had adequate controls in place. Investment Affiliates of Commercial Banks Have Gained Market Share in Underwriting
In recent years, the market share of the fees earned from debt and equity underwriting has declined at investment banks and grown at investment affiliates of commercial banks. Further, as discussed in an earlier section, it is not clear that commercial banks underprice loan commitments. Regulatory guidance has noted that some tying arrangements involving corporate credit are clearly lawful, particularly those involving ties between credit and traditional bank products. Customers have a key role in providing information that is needed to enforce section 106. However, the Federal Reserve and OCC have little information on customers’ understanding of lawful and unlawful tying under section 106 or on customers’ knowledge of the circumstances of specific transactions. The Comptroller of the Currency and the General Counsel of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System replied that they generally agreed with the findings of the report and concurred in our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Investment affiliates of large commercial banks have made competitive inroads in the annual $1.3 trillion debt-underwriting market. Some corporate borrowers and officials from unaffiliated investment banks have alleged that commercial banks helped their investment affiliates gain market share by illegally tying and underpricing corporate credit. This report discusses these allegations, the available evidence related to the allegations, and federal bank regulatory agencies' efforts to enforce the antitying provisions.
What GAO Found
Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 prohibits commercial banks from "tying," a practice which includes conditioning the availability or terms of loans or other credit products on the purchase of certain other products and services. The law does permit banks to tie credit and traditional banking products, such as cash management, and does not prohibit banks from considering the profitability of their full relationship with customers in managing those relationships. Some corporate customers and officials from an investment bank not affiliated with a commercial bank have alleged that commercial banks illegally tie the availability or terms, including price, of credit to customers' purchase of other services. However, with few exceptions, formal complaints have not been brought to the attention of the regulatory agencies and little documentary evidence surrounding these allegations exists, in part, because credit negotiations are conducted orally. Further, our review found that some corporate customers' claims involved lawful ties between traditional banking products rather than unlawful ties. These findings illustrate a key challenge for banking regulators in enforcing this law: while regulators need to carefully consider the circumstances of specific transactions to determine whether the customers' acceptance of an unlawfully tied product (that is, one that is not a traditional banking product) was made a condition of obtaining credit, documentary evidence on those circumstances might not be available. Therefore, regulators may have to look for indirect evidence to assess whether banks unlawfully tie products and services. Although customer information could have an important role in helping regulators enforce section 106, regulators generally have not solicited information from corporate bank customers. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recently reviewed antitying policies and procedures of several large commercial banks. The Federal Reserve and OCC, however, did not analyze a broadly-based selection of transactions or generally solicit additional information from corporate borrowers about their knowledge of transactions. The agencies generally found no unlawful tying arrangements and concluded that these banks generally had adequate policies and procedures intended to prevent and detect tying practices. The agencies found variation among the banks in interpretation of the tying law and its exceptions. As a result, in August 2003, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, working with OCC, released for public comment new draft guidance, with a goal of better informing banks and their customers about the requirements of the antitying provision. |
gao_GAO-04-826T | gao_GAO-04-826T_0 | Background
OPS, within the Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), administers the national regulatory program to ensure the safe transportation of natural gas and hazardous liquids by pipeline. OPS is a small federal agency. In December 2002, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act increased these amounts to $100,000 and $1 million, respectively. Key Management Elements Are Needed to Determine the Effectiveness of OPS’s Enforcement Strategy
The effectiveness of OPS’s enforcement strategy cannot be determined because OPS has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management—clear performance goals for the enforcement program, a fully defined strategy for achieving these goals, and performance measures linked to goals that would allow an assessment of the enforcement strategy’s impact on pipeline safety. However, although OPS began to implement these changes in 2000, it has not yet developed a policy that defines this new, more aggressive enforcement strategy or describes how it will contribute to the achievement of its performance goals. Agency officials recognize the need to develop an enforcement policy and up-to-date detailed enforcement guidelines and have been working to do so. The three measures that OPS is considering could provide more information on the intermediate outcomes of the agency’s enforcement strategy, such as the frequency of repeat violations and the number of repairs made in response to corrective action orders, as well as other aspects of program performance, such as the timeliness of enforcement actions. While OPS’s new measures may produce better information on the performance of its enforcement program than is currently available, OPS has not adopted key practices for achieving these characteristics of successful performance measurement systems: Measures should demonstrate results (outcomes) that are directly linked to program goals. OPS Has Increased Its Use of Civil Penalties; the Effect on Deterrence Is Unclear
In 2000, in response to criticism that its enforcement activities were weak and ineffective, OPS increased both the number and the size of the civil monetary penalties it assessed. OPS Now Assesses More and Larger Civil Penalties
OPS assessed more civil penalties during the past 4 years under its current “tough but fair” enforcement approach than it did in the previous 5 years, when it took a more lenient enforcement approach. 2.) From 2000 through 2003, OPS assessed 88 civil penalties (22 per year on average) compared with 70 civil penalties from 1995 through 1999 (about 14 per year on average). Civil penalties represent about 14 percent (216 out of 1,530) of all enforcement actions taken over the past 10 years. The Effect of OPS’s Larger Civil Penalties on Deterring Noncompliance Is Unclear
Although OPS has increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it has imposed, the effect of this change on deterring noncompliance with safety regulations, if any, is not clear. The stakeholders we spoke with expressed differing views on whether the civil penalties deter noncompliance. Pipeline safety advocacy groups that we talked to also said that the civil penalty amounts OPS imposes are too small to have any deterrent effect on pipeline operators. As discussed earlier, for 2000 through 2003, the average assessed penalty was about $29,000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interstate pipelines carrying natural gas and hazardous liquids (such as petroleum products) are safer to the public than other modes of freight transportation. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), the federal agency that administers the national regulatory program to ensure safe pipeline transportation, has been undertaking a broad range of activities to make pipeline transportation safer. However, the number of serious accidents--those involving deaths, injuries, and property damage of $50,000 or more--has not fallen. Among other things, OPS takes enforcement action against pipeline operators when safety problems are found. OPS has several enforcement tools to require the correction of safety violations. It can also assess monetary sanctions (civil penalties). This testimony is based on ongoing work for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and for other committees, as required by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. The testimony provides preliminary results on (1) the effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy and (2) OPS's assessment of civil penalties.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of OPS's enforcement strategy cannot be determined because the agency has not incorporated three key elements of effective program management--clear program goals, a well-defined strategy for achieving goals, and performance measures that are linked to program goals. Without these key elements, the agency cannot determine whether recent and planned changes in its strategy will have the desired effects on pipeline safety. Over the past several years, OPS has focused on other efforts--such as developing a new risk-based regulatory approach--that it believes will change the safety culture of the industry. While OPS has become more aggressive in enforcing its regulations, it now intends to further strengthen the management of its enforcement program. In particular, OPS is developing an enforcement policy that will help define its enforcement strategy and has taken initial steps toward identifying new performance measures. However, OPS does not plan to finalize the policy until 2005 and has not adopted key practices for achieving successful performance measurement systems, such as linking measures to goals. OPS increased both the number and the size of the civil penalties it assessed against pipeline operators over the last 4 years (2000-2003) following its decision to be "tough but fair" in assessing penalties. OPS assessed an average of 22 penalties per year during this period, compared with an average of 14 per year for the previous 5 years (1995-1999), a period of more lenient "partnering" with industry. In addition, the average penalty increased from $18,000 to $29,000 over the two periods. About 94 percent of the 216 penalties levied from 1994 through 2003 have been paid. The civil penalty is one of several actions OPS can take when it finds a violation, and these penalties represent about 14 percent of all enforcement actions over the past 10 years. While OPS has increased the number and size of civil penalties, stakeholders--including industry, state, and insurance company officials and public advocacy groups--expressed differing views on whether these penalties deter noncompliance with safety regulations. Some, such as pipeline operators, thought that any penalty was a deterrent if it kept the pipeline operator in the public eye, while others, such as safety advocates, told us that the penalties were too small to be effective sanctions. |
gao_GAO-05-804 | gao_GAO-05-804_0 | To implement these provisions in the Act, the Secretary chartered the Management Council and the Task Force as federal advisory committees. According to its charter, the Task Force also functions only in an advisory capacity and reports to the Secretary of the Interior. For the 5 years from the beginning of fiscal year 2000 through the end of fiscal year 2004, according to FWS officials, the Klamath River Basin Conservation Area Restoration Program received about $9.8 million in cash and noncash contributions: almost $6.3 million from federal sources and almost $3.6 million from nonfederal sources. The federal funds included about $5.1 million in appropriations derived from FWS’s Resource Management appropriation account,which includes a lump-sum appropriation that FWS allocates to various program activities, including the Fisheries Program. In addition, according to FWS officials, the Restoration Program benefited during that same time period from about $1.7 million in cash and noncash contributions from federal entities that participated in restoration projects and from $5.8 million in cash and noncash contributions from nonfederal entities that participated in restoration projects. Combining that amount with the $4.7 million in cash and noncash contributions provided to restoration projects by project participants brings the total invested by the Restoration Program directly to restoration projects during the 5-year period to a little over $7.6 million. The Secretary of the Interior and the Director of FWS have taken a number of actions to formulate, establish, and implement the Restoration Program, including designating a conservation area, establishing the Management Council and the Task Force, formulating a long-term plan, and funding over 350 restoration projects in the Klamath River Basin. Regarding the financial requirements of the Act, FWS officials have correctly identified the need to fund some Restoration Program expenditures, such as certain travel and salary expenses for FWS officials who are members of the Management Council or the Task Force, from monies that are not subject to the Act’s restrictions. However, they have not yet incorporated into their accounting procedures and record-keeping practices sufficient controls to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with those provisions of the Act. In addition, concerning the Act’s requirement that 50 percent of the Restoration Program’s costs be provided by nonfederal sources, FWS officials do collect some information regarding nonfederal contributions to restoration projects, but they do not distinguish between cash and noncash contributions in project documents, document their valuation decisions regarding the noncash contributions, or take steps to verify that nonfederal contributions meet the Act’s criteria. Incorporating these additional controls into the Restoration Program’s operations would not be difficult or costly, and would provide reasonable assurance of compliance with those provisions of the Act. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this engagement were to provide information about (1) sources and amounts of funding received by and for the Restoration Program for fiscal years 2000 through 2004; (2) amounts of funds received by and for the Restoration Program for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 spent for restoration projects, travel reimbursements, administrative expenses, overhead, and technical support; (3) amounts of funding received by the Task Force and Management Council for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 spent for the purposes of restoration projects, travel reimbursements, administrative expenses, overhead, and technical support; and (4) whether the Secretary of the Interior has complied with specific requirements contained in certain provisions of the Klamath River Basin Fishery Resources Restoration Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Klamath River Basin Fishery Resources Restoration Act (Act), passed in October 1986, required the Secretary of the Interior to establish and restore a conservation area in that river basin, created a management council and a task force to assist and advise the Secretary, and authorized $21 million until September 30, 2006. The restoration program reports that it had been appropriated over $17 million by September 2005. In anticipation of the authorization's expiration, GAO was asked to provide information for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the most recent 5-year period for which complete information is available, about (1) funding for the program; (2) expenditures by the program for restoration projects, travel expenses, administrative expenses, overhead, and technical support; (3) expenditures by the management council and the task force; and (4) whether the Secretary complied with certain requirements of the Act. GAO obtained funding and expenditure information from FWS but did not audit that financial information.
What GAO Found
The Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) have taken a number of actions to formulate, establish, and implement the Klamath River Basin Conservation Area Restoration Program, including designating a conservation area, establishing the management council and the task force, formulating a long-term plan, and funding restoration projects in the Klamath River Basin. The restoration program reports receiving a little over $9.8 million in cash and noncash contributions during fiscal years 2000 through 2004 from federal and nonfederal sources. The federal portion totaled almost $6.3 million and consisted of about $5.1 million from FWS's lump-sum resource management appropriation account, and almost $1.2 million in cash and noncash contributions from federal entities that participated in restoration projects with FWS, according to FWS records. FWS records also show that the nonfederal portion consisted of almost $3.6 million in cash and noncash contributions from nonfederal entities that participated in restoration projects. During the same 5-year period, the restoration program spent about $7.6 million in cash and noncash contributions for restoration projects, about $200,000 for travel reimbursements, about $1.1 million for administrative expenses, and about $491,000 for overhead, according to information provided by FWS officials. Information was not available on technical support expenses incurred by the restoration program. The management council and the task force serve solely in an advisory capacity and do not directly select or manage projects. FWS officials told GAO that they paid about $800,000 to cover operating costs of the management council and the task force for the 5-year period. Regarding the financial requirements of the Act, FWS officials have correctly identified the need to fund some Restoration Program expenditures from monies that are not subject to the Act's restrictions, and FWS officials told GAO they believe they are in compliance with these provisions. However, FWS has not yet incorporated into their accounting procedures and record-keeping sufficient controls to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with those provisions of the Act. In addition, the Act requires that half of the restoration program's costs be funded by nonfederal sources. FWS officials collect some information on restoration projects regarding any nonfederal contributions, but they do not distinguish between cash and noncash contributions in project documents, document their valuation decisions regarding the noncash contributions, or take steps to verify that nonfederal contributions meet the Act's criteria. Incorporating these additional controls into the Restoration Program's operations would not be difficult or costly, and would provide reasonable assurance of compliance with those provisions of the Act. |
gao_GAO-13-651 | gao_GAO-13-651_0 | Three of the Navy’s four current and planned UAS programs incorporated, or are planning to incorporate, an open systems approach from the start of development in key components of their UAS—the air vehicle, ground control station, and payloads (i.e., cameras and radar sensors). None of the Air Force’s three UAS programs were initially developed as an open system, and only one is being upgraded to include an open systems approach. Program officials also anticipate that they will be able to independently integrate at least 32 different payloads developed by 24 different manufacturers. Over the past several years, the Army has taken steps to make the ground control stations open systems for all three of its fielded UAS and the payload interfaces open in two of those systems, while the Air Force plans to make the ground control station an open system for one of its three UAS. Policies and Leadership Can Help Drive an Open Systems Approach for Weapon Acquisition Programs, but Challenges Exist
Policies and leadership support are two fundamental ways of getting DOD’s weapon acquisition community to shift from a culture of relying on contractors to provide proprietary systems to one where systems are designed to be open. The Navy developed an open systems policy in 2005 and its UAS programs largely followed that policy from the start of development. Further, while DOD leadership is placing a renewed emphasis on an open systems approach through its Better Buying Power initiatives, it is not currently tracking the extent to which weapon acquisition programs are adopting open systems across the department or whether program offices have enough technical expertise to effectively implement an open systems approach. Air Force and Army Are Lagging in Open Systems Implementation
Although DOD acquisition policy directs program managers to employ a modular, open systems approach for acquisition programs to minimize life-cycle costs, the Navy is the only service that did so while developing its UAS programs. DOD Leadership Lacks Visibility into Open Systems Implementation and Military Service Expertise
DOD recognizes that it needs to increase its leadership efforts to implement open systems for its weapon acquisition programs, but does not know the extent to which programs are implementing this approach or if the services have the requisite technical expertise. However, officials from 11 offices/companies we spoke with, including a DOD contractor; the UAS Task Force; 6 of 10 Air Force, Army, and Navy UAS programs; the Naval Air Systems Command technical experts; the DOD Open Systems Architecture Data Rights Team; and an open systems expert who consulted with DOD on an open systems approach, stressed that DOD does not have adequate expertise across the department to effectively implement an open systems approach. Traditionally, DOD has acquired proprietary weapon systems that limit these opportunities and make these systems more costly to develop, procure, upgrade, and support. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy to take the following actions: require their acquisition programs to include open systems metrics developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in their systems engineering plans, track progress in meeting these metrics, and report their progress to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics at key acquisition milestones; and assess their respective service-level and program office capabilities relating to an open systems approach and work with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering to develop short-term and long-term strategies to address any capability gaps identified. DOD partially concurred with all four recommendations. Therefore, this report examines (1) the characteristics and benefits of an open systems approach, (2) DOD’s efforts in applying an open systems approach to its UAS portfolio, and (3) challenges, if any, DOD is encountering in implementing this approach. In addition, we developed a questionnaire to collect information on which elements of an open systems approach UAS programs incorporated, their use of guidance and tools, and their contracting strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
For fiscal year 2014, DOD requested over $11 billion to modify existing weapon systems--more than 10 percent of its total procurement budget. Traditionally, DOD has acquired proprietary systems, which are costly to upgrade and limit opportunities for competition. Through its Better Buying Power initiatives, DOD has re-emphasized the use of an open systems approach as a way to reduce costs through effective competition.
GAO was asked to examine DOD's progress in implementing an open systems approach for UAS acquisitions. This report addresses (1) the characteristics and benefits of an open systems approach, (2) DOD's efforts in implementing an open systems approach for its UAS portfolio, and (3) challenges, if any, DOD is encountering in implementing this approach. GAO analyzed relevant literature and DOD policies on open systems and interviewed agency and private industry officials to understand how open systems have been implemented and their benefits. In addition, GAO assessed acquisition documents and questionnaire responses from 10 current and planned UAS programs to determine their open system strategies.
What GAO Found
An open systems approach, which includes a modular design and standard interfaces, allows components of a product (like a computer) to be replaced easily. This allows the product to be refreshed with new, improved components made by a variety of suppliers. Designing weapons as open systems offers significant repair, upgrade, and competition benefits that could translate to millions of dollars in savings as the weapons age.
The services vary in their use of open systems on the Department of Defense's (DOD) 10 largest unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The Navy used an open systems approach at the start of development for the air vehicle, ground control station, and payloads (i.e., cameras and radar sensors) for three of its four current and planned UAS and anticipates significant efficiencies. For example, Navy and contractor officials expect the Small Tactical UAS to be able to integrate at least 32 payloads developed by 24 manufacturers, some in a matter of days or months rather than years as previous programs experienced. Conversely, none of the Army or Air Force UAS programs initially implemented an open systems approach, relying instead on prime contractors to upgrade and modernize the UAS. The Army is now developing an open ground control station for each of its three legacy UAS programs. Only one of the Air Force's three UAS programs plans to implement an open systems approach on fielded aircraft.
Policies and leadership can help drive DOD's acquisition community to use an open systems approach, but challenges exist. Although DOD and the services have policies that direct programs to use an open systems approach, the Navy is the only service that largely followed the policy when developing its UAS. In addition, while new open systems guidance, tools, and training are being developed, DOD is not tracking the extent to which programs are implementing this approach or if programs have the requisite expertise to implement the approach. Navy UAS program officials told us they relied on technical experts within Naval Air Systems Command to help develop an open systems approach for their programs. Until DOD ensures that the services are incorporating an open systems approach from the start of development and programs have the requisite open systems expertise, it will continue to miss opportunities to increase the affordability of its acquisition programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Air Force and Army implement their open systems policies, DOD develop metrics to track open systems implementation, and the services report on these metrics and address any gaps in expertise. DOD partially concurred and stated that its current policies and processes are sufficient. GAO maintains additional action is needed. |
gao_GAO-16-584 | gao_GAO-16-584_0 | VA’s EHCPM makes these projections 3 or 4 years into the future for budget purposes based on data from the most recent fiscal year. With the exception of the Veterans Choice Program, which is funded through the Veterans Choice Fund, medical services furnished by community providers have been, and will continue to be, funded through this appropriation account through fiscal year 2016. Higher-than-Expected Obligations for the CIC Program and Hepatitis C Drugs Accounted for VA’s Fiscal Year 2015 Projected Funding Gap
Higher-than-Expected Obligations for VA’s CIC Programs Accounted for 85 Percent of VA’s Projected Fiscal Year 2015 Funding Gap
Higher-than-expected obligations identified by VA in April 2015 for VA’s CIC programs accounted for $2.34 billion (or 85 percent) of VA’s projected funding gap of $2.75 billion in fiscal year 2015. These higher- than-expected obligations for VA’s CIC programs were driven by an increase in utilization of VA medical services across VA, reflecting, in part, VA’s efforts to improve access to care after public disclosure of long wait times at VAMCs. VA officials expected that the Veterans Choice Program would absorb much of the increased demand from veterans for health care services delivered by non-VA providers. To address the fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap, on July 31, 2015, VA obtained temporary authority to use up to $3.3 billion in Veterans Choice Program appropriations for amounts obligated for medical services from non-VA providers—regardless of whether the obligations were authorized under the Veterans Choice Program or CIC—for the period from May 1, 2015 until October 1, 2015. Unanticipated Obligations for Hepatitis C Drugs Contributed to the Remaining Portion of VA’s Projected Fiscal Year 2015 Funding Gap
Unexpected obligations for new hepatitis C drugs accounted for $0.41 billion of VA’s projected funding gap of $2.75 billion in fiscal year 2015. VA officials told us that VA did not anticipate in its budget the obligations for new hepatitis C drugs—which help cure the disease—because the drugs were not approved by the Food and Drug Administration until fiscal year 2014, after VA had already developed its budget estimate for fiscal year 2015. VA Has Made Efforts to Prevent Future Funding Gaps, but Uncertainties about Future Utilization of Health Care Services Remain
To help prevent future funding gaps, VA has made efforts to improve its cost estimates for CIC services and the department’s tracking of associated obligations. VA Has Made Efforts to Improve Cost Estimates and Tracking of Obligations for CIC Services
Faced with a projected funding gap in fiscal year 2015, VA made efforts to improve its cost estimates for CIC services as well as the department’s tracking of associated obligations. This policy also requires VISNs to certify monthly to VA’s Chief Business Office that the appropriate review and corrective actions have been taken and appropriately documented. While we found that all six selected VISNs and the VAMCs they manage certified that they had implemented this new policy, the methods used to identify and correct discrepancies between estimated costs for CIC authorizations in FBCS and the amount of estimated obligations in FMS varied. Finally, to better track that VAMCs’ obligations for CIC do not exceed available budgetary resources for fiscal year 2016, VA allocated funds specifically for CIC to each VAMC. Moreover, as we have previously reported, VA has made previous attempts to update IFCAP and FMS that were unsuccessful. VA Is Using More Recent Data to More Accurately Project Future Health Care Utilization, but Uncertainties Remain
To more accurately project future health care utilization of VA services given the implementation of the Veterans Choice Program, in November 2015 VA took steps to update its EHCPM projection to better inform future budget estimates. Moreover, even with improvements to its projection, VA, like other federal agencies, must make tradeoffs in formulating its budget estimate that requires it to balance the expected demand for health care services against other competing priorities. While we are not making any recommendations in this report, in its comments, VA agreed with our findings and reiterated the uncertainty the department faces in estimating the cost of emerging health care treatments. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA projected a funding gap of about $3 billion in its fiscal year 2015 medical services appropriation account, which funds VA health care services except for those authorized under the Veterans Choice Program. To close this gap, VA obtained temporary authority to use up to $3.3 billion from the $10 billion appropriated to the Veterans Choice Fund in August 2014.
GAO was asked to examine VA's fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap and any changes VA has made to prevent potential funding gaps in future years. This report examines (1) the activities or programs that accounted for VA's fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap in its medical services appropriation account and (2) changes VA has made to prevent potential funding gaps in future years.
GAO reviewed VA obligations data and related documents to determine what activities accounted for the projected funding gap in its fiscal year 2015 medical services appropriation account, as well as the factors that contributed to the projected funding gap. GAO interviewed VA officials to identify the steps taken to address the projected funding gap. GAO also examined changes VA made to prevent future funding gaps and reviewed the implementation of these changes at the VAMCs within six VISNs, selected based on geographic diversity.
What GAO Found
GAO found that two areas accounted for the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap of $2.75 billion.
Higher-than-expected obligations for VA's longstanding care in the community (CIC) programs—which allow veterans to obtain care from non-VA providers—accounted for $2.34 billion or 85 percent of VA's projected funding gap. VA officials expected that the Veterans Choice Program—which is a relatively new CIC program implemented in fiscal year 2015 that allows veterans to access care from non-VA providers under certain conditions—would absorb veterans' increased demand for more timely care after public disclosure of long wait times. However, administrative weaknesses slowed enrollment into this program, and use of the Veterans' Choice Fund was far less than expected. Moreover, as utilization of CIC programs overall increased, VA's weaknesses in estimating costs and tracking obligations for CIC services resulted in VA facing a projected funding gap.
Unanticipated obligations for hepatitis C drugs accounted for the remaining $408 million of VA's projected funding gap. VA did not anticipate in its budget the obligations for these costly, new drugs because the drugs did not gain approval from the Food and Drug Administration until fiscal year 2014—after VA had already developed its budget estimate for fiscal year 2015.
To help prevent future funding gaps, VA has made efforts to better estimate costs and track obligations for CIC services and better project future utilization of VA's health care services. Specifically,
VA implemented new policies directing VA medical centers (VAMC) and Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) to better estimate costs for CIC authorizations—by using historical data and correcting for obvious errors—and to better track CIC obligations by comparing estimated costs with estimated obligations, correcting discrepancies, and certifying each month that these steps were completed. These policies are necessary, in part, because deficiencies in VA's financial systems make tracking obligations challenging. The VISNs and associated VAMCs GAO reviewed have implemented these policies.
VA also allocated funds to each VAMC for CIC and hepatitis C drugs and began comparing VAMCs' obligations in these areas to the amount of funds allocated to help ensure that obligations do not exceed budgetary resources.
VA updated the projection it uses to inform budget estimates 3 to 4 years in the future, adding fiscal year 2015 data reflecting increased CIC utilization.
While VA has made these efforts to better manage its budget, uncertainties remain regarding utilization of VA's health care services. For example, utilization of the Veterans Choice Program in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 is uncertain because of continued enrollment delays affecting the program. Moreover, even with improvements to its projection, VA, like other federal agencies, must make tradeoffs in formulating its budget estimate that requires it to balance the expected demand for health care services against other competing priorities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. After reviewing a draft of this report, VA agreed with what GAO found. |
gao_GAO-10-139 | gao_GAO-10-139_0 | With regard to the manner in which TSES separated (through resignation, retirement, expiration of a limited term appointment, termination, or transfer to another cabinet-level department), our analysis of CPDF data shows that resignations were the most frequent type of TSES separation, accounting for almost half of total separations over the 5-year period and about two thirds of all separations during fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (see table 4). Attrition among TSES Has Been Lower than that of All Other DHS SES, but Until Fiscal Year 2008, Higher than SES Attrition among Other Cabinet-level Departments
As shown in figure 2, the rate of attrition among TSES staff for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 was consistently lower than the rate of attrition among all DHS SES. Former TSES Staff We Interviewed Primarily Cited Adverse Reasons for Leaving TSA; Current TSA Employees and Other Stakeholders Expressed Varying Views on the Impact of These Separations
In interviews with 46 of 95 TSES who separated from TSA from fiscal years 2005 through 2008, most reported adverse reasons for leaving the agency—that is, a reason related to dissatisfaction with some aspect of their TSA experience, as opposed to a nonadverse reason, such as to spend more time with family or pursue another professional opportunity. These interviewees defined top leadership as the TSA Administrator or those reporting directly to him, such as Assistant Administrators. However, inconsistent with internal control standards, TSA did not always clearly document its implementation of merit staffing requirements. However, TSA does not list “TSES” among the answer choices, which precludes TSES staff who fill out the survey from identifying their position rank. Without the ability to isolate the responses of TSES staff from those of other staff, it will be difficult for TSA to use the results of the exit survey to identify reasons for attrition specific to TSES staff, thus hindering TSA’s ability to use exit survey data to develop a strategy for retaining talented TSES staff with specialized skills and knowledge, and ensuring continuity among the agency’s leadership. To better manage its TSES program, TSA also established in 2006 a hiring process for TSES staff that incorporates merit staffing requirements; however, TSA lacked documentation that would demonstrate whether TSA is consistently following these requirements. Based upon our review, we found that for 20 of the 25 career TSES who were hired competitively in calendar year 2006 and for 8 of the 16 TSES who were hired competitively in calendar year 2008, documentation identifying how TSA implemented at least one of the merit staffing procedures was either missing or unclear. What has been the attrition rate among TSES staff for fiscal years 2004 through 2008, and how does it compare to attrition among SES staff in other DHS components and cabinet-level departments? To what extent are current TSA efforts to manage TSES attrition consistent with effective human capital practices and standards for internal control in the federal government? Objective 3-The Extent to which TSA Efforts to Manage TSES Attrition and Improve Overall Management of Its TSES Workforce Are Consistent with Effective Human Capital Practices and Standards for Internal Control
To gather information on TSA efforts to address attrition, we interviewed the Assistant Administrator and the Deputy Assistant Administrator of TSA’s Human Capital Office to learn about the various initiatives they have underway to address attrition and to improve management of their executive resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES) consists of executive-level staff serving in key agency positions just below political appointees. Committees of Congress have raise questions about the frequency of turnover within the TSES and have directed GAO to examine turnover among TSES staff. Accordingly, this report examines: (1) TSES attrition and how it compares with that of Senior Executive Service (SES) staff in other DHS components and cabinet-level departments, (2) the reasons TSES staff separated from TSA, and (3) TSA efforts to mange TSES attrition consistent with effective management practices. To answer these objectives, GAO analyzed data within the Office of Personnel Management's Central Personnel Data File, reviewed TSA human capital policies and procedures, and interviewed former TSES staff. The results of these interviews are not generalizable, but represent the views of about half the TSES staff who separated from fiscal years 2005 through 2008.
What GAO Found
Separation data from fiscal years 2004 through 2008 show that attrition among TSA's TSES staff was consistently lower than the rate of attrition among all DHS SES staff and, through 2007, higher than SES attrition for all other cabinet-level departments. Separations among TSES staff peaked at 20 percent in fiscal years 2005, but declined each year thereafter, and resignations (as opposed to retirements, terminations, transfers to other cabinet level departments, or expirations of a term appointment) were the most frequent type of TSES separations over this period. In interviews with 46 former TSES staff, the majority (36 of 46) identified at least one adverse reason (that is, a reason related to dissatisfaction with some aspect of their experience at TSA) for leaving, as opposed to a nonadverse reason (such as leaving the agency for another professional opportunity). The two most frequently cited reasons for separation were dissatisfaction with the leadership style of the TSA administrator or those reporting directly to him (14 of 46) and to pursue another professional opportunity (14 of 46). To better address TSES attrition and manage executive resources, TSA has implemented measures consistent with effective human capital management practices and standards for internal control in the federal government. These measures include, among other things, reinstating an exit survey and establishing a process for hiring TSES staff that encompasses merit staffing requirements. However, TSA could improve upon these measures. For example, due to TSA officials' concerns about respondents' anonymity, TSA's new exit survey precludes TSES staff from identifying their position. Without such information, it will be difficult for TSA to identify reasons for attrition specific for TSES staff. Moreover, inconsistent with internal control standards, TSA did not document its adherence with at least one merit staffing procedure for 20 of 25 TSES hired in calendar year 2006 and 8 of 16 TSES hired in calendar year 2008. Although there are internal mechanisms that provide TSA officials reasonable assurance that merit staffing principles are followed, better documentation could also help TSA demonstrate to an independent third party, the Congress, and the public that its process for hiring TSES staff is fair and open. |
gao_GAO-09-552 | gao_GAO-09-552_0 | 1). According to these reports, the Corps awarded 21 new continuing contracts during this time: 9 for construction and 12 for operations and maintenance, ranging in value from $2.1 million to $341.5 million, for a total of about $811 million. However, we found that some continuing contracts were double-counted, while others were omitted from the reports. We also identified other types of errors that did not affect the overall totals of new contracts or their value but, nevertheless, raise questions about the accuracy of the information that the Corps is providing to Congress. Similarly, we found that two fully funded contracts were incorrectly included in the 2007 quarterly reports as existing continuing contracts. Although the Corps concurred at the time, Corps officials told us that the agency had not developed a tracking system as we had recommended because it believed its system of asking divisions to provide information on a quarterly basis was sufficient for tracking the use of continuing contracts. While these changes, taken together, have resulted in a decrease in the number of continuing contracts that the Corps has awarded, they have not significantly affected the agency’s ability to execute its Civil Works program. These officials did not provide any examples, however, of where work on a project was stopped because funds were not available. The Corps Did Not Comply with a Legal Requirement in Implementing the New Continuing Contracts Clause
In implementing the new continuing contracts clause, the Corps did not comply with a legal requirement and, as a result, some districts are reluctant to use it when awarding contracts. Specifically, the Corps has been using the new continuing contracts clause prior to its publication in the Federal Register for public comment, in violation of section 22 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (OFPP Act), 41 U.S.C.§ 418b. This section of the act generally provides that no procurement regulation relating to the expenditure of appropriated funds that has a significant effect beyond the internal operating procedures of the agency or a significant cost or administrative impact on contractors or offerors may take effect until 60 days after the procurement regulation is published for public comment in the Federal Register. This requirement for advance comment may be waived if urgent and compelling circumstances make compliance impracticable; in such cases, a procurement regulation shall be effective on a temporary basis if a notice of the regulation is published in the Federal Register stating that it is temporary and providing for a public comment period of 30 days. According to these officials, because this legal requirement has not been met, they are concerned that using the new clause could subject the Corps to legal challenges such as bid protests. Such potential legal challenges could prolong projects and increase their costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Corps provides accurate and reliable reports to Congress on its use of continuing contracts and complies with federal procurement law, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following three actions: Establish adequate internal controls to ensure accurate and complete information is collected and reported to Congress on the use of continuing contracts. More specifically, from 1922 to 2005, the Corps had the authority to award multiyear contracts (called continuing contracts) without having received appropriations to cover the full contract amount. For the purpose of this review, we have referred to the special clause as the “new clause.”
To determine the accuracy of the information the Corps reported to Congress in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, we compared information from the Corps’ quarterly reports on the number, type, and dollar value of continuing contracts that used the new clause with information obtained from a Corps database and results of interviews with Corps officials in selected divisions and districts. To obtain information about the extent to which the Corps’ use of continuing contracts with the new clause may have affected its execution of the Civil Works program and the extent of the Corps’ use of continuing contracts with the new clause, we interviewed Corps division and district officials at the locations identified above, as well as at Corps headquarters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has had the authority to award multiyear contracts--continuing contracts--without having received appropriations to cover the full contract amount. In 2006, Congress limited the Corps' use of such contracts by prohibiting obligations made in advance of appropriations. In response, the Corps developed a new clause that stopped work once funding for a fiscal year was expended. GAO was mandated to examine (1) the accuracy of the Corps' fiscal years 2007 and 2008 quarterly reports to Congress about continuing contracts that included the new clause, (2) the extent to which the Corps' use of continuing contacts with the new clause may have affected its execution of the Civil Works program during this time, and (3) the extent to which the Corps followed legal procedures in implementing the new clause. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed Corps documents, such as its quarterly reports and bid protests, federal procurement laws, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Corps' quarterly reports to Congress for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 about continuing contracts with the new clause were inaccurate. According to the reports, the Corps awarded 21 new continuing contracts during fiscal years 2007 to 2008: 9 for construction and 12 for operations and maintenance, ranging in value from $2.1 million to $341.5 million, for a total value of about $811 million. However, GAO found that some continuing contracts were double-counted, while others were missing from the reports. GAO also found other types of errors, such as a fully funded contract that was incorrectly included in the quarterly report as a continuing contract. These errors raise questions about the accuracy of the reports. GAO identified similar inaccuracies in the Corps' quarterly reports during its 2006 review and at that time recommended that the Corps develop a tracking system to monitor its use of these contracts. While the Corps believes its system of asking divisions to provide information on a quarterly basis is sufficient for tracking continuing contracts, GAO disagrees. Without a tracking system supported by sufficient internal controls to ensure accuracy, errors can persist in the information provided to Congress. The Corps' use of the new clause has generally not affected the agency's ability to execute its Civil Works program. The Corps decreased its use of continuing contracts beginning around the time that the new clause was initiated. However, while acknowledging that the transition to the new clause created some initial difficulties that have since been overcome, Corp officials did not provide any examples of work being stopped on a project because funds were not available. The Corps did not comply with a legal requirement in implementing the new clause, resulting in some districts' reluctance to use it. Section 22 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (OFPP Act) generally provides that no procurement regulation that has a significant effect beyond the internal operating procedures of the agency or a significant cost on contractors or offerors may take effect until 60 days after the procurement regulation is published for comment in the Federal Register. This requirement may be waived in urgent and compelling circumstances; however, the regulation must still be published in the Federal Register stating that it is temporary and providing for a public comment period of 30 days. Although the Corps has requested approval since 2006 from the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense, as it is required to, the clause has never been published and the Corps has continued to use it. GAO believes that the Corps' argument that its pursuit of publication satisfies the statute is unpersuasive. Moreover, GAO spoke with Corps officials from districts and divisions who expressed concern about using the clause prior to its publication. Specifically, they are concerned that using the clause could subject the Corps to legal challenges, such as bid protests, and that such potential challenges could delay projects and increase their costs. |
gao_RCED-96-141 | gao_RCED-96-141_0 | Four DOE Programs Have a Repayment Policy, and the Repayment Mechanisms Are Similar
Although DOE participates with the private sector in many cost-shared technology development programs, only four require repayment of the federal investment if the technology is ultimately commercialized. The mechanisms used for repayment are similar in that they generally require a portion of royalties and fees from licensing technologies and revenues from commercial sales. Also, three programs provide for up to a 20-year repayment period and two allow flexibility on when repayment begins. A major difference in the programs is that one program provides for up to 150-percent repayment, while the other programs limit repayment to 100 percent. Advantages
The primary advantage of a repayment policy is that the government could recover some of its investment in the development of technologies. DOE officials generally believe that repayment would create an administrative burden in negotiating, administering, auditing, and enforcing cost-sharing and repayment agreements. Many DOE officials believe that obtaining increased cost-sharing by industry is preferable to requiring repayment of the federal investment. Nuclear Energy Programs
DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy administers the Advanced Light Water Reactor Program under cost-shared partnerships with industry. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) requires repayment of its investment under cost-shared technology development and demonstration programs, including the similarities and differences in the mechanisms used for repayment, we interviewed DOE officials responsible for administering such programs; reviewed DOE reports and program documents, congressional budget requests, relevant legislation and congressional reports, and various private sector reports and publications that discuss the programs; and drew from our past reviews and reports on such programs. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) cost-sharing arrangements it has with the private sector to fund technology development programs, focusing on the: (1) extent to which DOE requires repayment of its investment in cost-shared technology development; and (2) advantages and disadvantages of repayment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) of the many cost-shared technology development programs DOE participates in, only the Clean Coal Technology Program, Metal Initiative Program, Electric Vehicles Advanced Battery Development Program, and Advanced Light Water Reactor Program require repayment of the federal investment if the technology is ultimately commercialized; (2) repayments are collected through royalties and fees from licensing technologies and revenues from commercial sales; (3) each of the programs except the Metals Initiative Program provide for up to a 20-year repayment period; (4) the Metals Initiative Program provides for up to 150-percent repayment, while the other programs limit repayment to 100 percent; (5) while a repayment policy could recover some or all of the federal government's investment, the additional costs and administrative burdens it imposes could discourage industry from commercializing new technologies; (6) the administrative burdens involved in a repayment policy include negotiating, administering, auditing, and enforcing cost-sharing and repayment agreements; and (7) shifting a greater portion of the burden of cost-sharing from government to industry may be preferable to requiring repayment. |
gao_GAO-04-705 | gao_GAO-04-705_0 | Wildland Fires Have Wide-Ranging Effects on Environmental Resources and Ecosystems, Depending on a Range of Factors
While they burn and afterward, wildland fires have dramatic effects on environmental resources and ecosystems, including the production of large amounts of smoke, the burning of trees and other vegetation, and the erosion of soil into streams and lakes. However, fires can also benefit resources by recycling soil nutrients, renewing vegetation growth, and adding material to streams that improves spawning habitat for fish. The 20 fires included in our survey highlighted the complex, wide-ranging—and sometimes contradictory—effects of fire on both individual resources, such as trees and streams, and ecosystems. The wildland fires in our survey burned over 158,000 acres of federal land in 10 states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming, with as few as 243 acres and as many as almost 50,000 acres burning in one fire. For example, officials indicated that the short-term loss of vegetation cover after the Horse Creek fire would cause soil erosion and loss. Forest Service and BLM Do Not Gather Comprehensive Information on the Varied Effects of Wildland Fires on Ecosystems and Landscapes
Although the National Fire Plan established a goal of restoring forest and rangeland ecosystems to conditions that are more fire-adapted, and therefore more resilient to fire, land managers do not have comprehensive data on the broad landscape effects of wildland fire to help them monitor these effects over time. Finally, while the forest and BLM field offices gather some data on severity of fires that burn on their lands, the agencies do not consistently collect data on burn severity that reflect the long-term effects of fires. The Forest Service and BLM Do Not Systematically Assess the Risks to Environmental Resources and Ecosystems to Target and Conduct Fuel Reduction Activities
Although the National Fire Plan identifies the need to reduce the risk of environmental and ecosystem effects from wildland fires by targeting fuel reduction activities to the areas that face the greatest potential losses, the Forest Service and BLM do not systematically assess the risks to resources and ecosystems for the purpose of targeting fuel reduction projects. At the project level, although the agencies have recognized the need to better analyze the relative risks of undertaking fuel reduction activities versus not doing so, they do not have a systematic approach to assess these risks. Guidance Is Unclear About How to Assess and Document the Risks of Environmental Effects of Fuel Reduction Projects
The varied use of risk assessment at the project level is a result of the fact that the agencies do not have clear guidance about the systematic assessment of the risks of environmental effects from wildland fire from fuel reduction projects. The agencies have opportunities to clarify the analysis and documentation of the risks of environmental effects from not taking action to reduce fuels. In February 2004, the agencies issued interim guidance on the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA). Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the agencies’ ability to identify and manage the actual and potential effects of wildland fires on the environment, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, after consulting with the Wildland Fire Leadership Council, direct the Forest Service and BLM to develop a monitoring plan to implement the agencies’ framework approved in May 2004 and include a pilot program for testing on Forest Service and BLM lands the applicability of, and resource needs associated with, the burn severity mapping and data tool developed by the National Park Service; develop and issue guidance, in consultation with experts inside and outside the agencies, that formalizes a framework for systematically assessing landscape-level risks to ecosystems from wildland fires; and clarify existing guidance, working with CEQ and taking into account any lessons learned from the CEQ demonstration program, on the assessment and documentation of the risks of environmental effects associated with not conducting fuel reduction projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decades of fire suppression, as well as changing land management practices, have caused vegetation to accumulate and become altered on federal lands. Concerns about the effects of wildland fires have increased efforts to reduce fuels on federal lands. These efforts also have environmental effects. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) describe effects from fires on the environment, (2) assess the information gathered by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on such effects, and (3) assess the agencies' approaches to environmental risks associated with reducing fuels.
What GAO Found
Wildland fires can have dramatic effects on environmental resources and ecosystems, including production of large amounts of smoke, loss of trees, and erosion of soil into streams and lakes. However, fires can also benefit resources by recycling soil nutrients, renewing vegetation growth, and adding gravel to streams, which improves spawning habitat for fish. The 20 wildland fires that we surveyed burned over 158,000 acres of federal land and had complex, wide-ranging, and sometimes contradictory, effects on both individual resources, such as trees and streams, and ecosystems. For example, the short-term effects of the Missionary Ridge fire in Colorado that burned almost 50,000 acres of trees and other vegetation included increased debris and sediment that affected water quality in some areas. However, in other areas, officials said even dramatic changes to streams would not be detrimental in the long term. The Forest Service and BLM gather specific information on the environmental effects of individual wildland fires, such as soil erosion. The agencies do not, however, gather comprehensive data on the severity of wildland fire effects on broad landscapes and ecosystems--that is, large areas that may involve one or more fires. The agencies recently developed a monitoring framework to gather severity data for fires, but they have not yet implemented it. These data are needed to monitor the progress of the agencies' actions to restore and maintain resilient fire-adapted ecosystems, a goal of the National Fire Plan. The National Fire Plan directs the Forest Service and BLM to target their fuel reduction activities with the purpose of lowering the risk of environmental effects from wildland fires in areas that face the greatest losses. However, the agencies do not systematically assess the risks across landscapes that fires pose to different environmental resources or ecosystems or the risks of taking no action on fuel reduction projects. At the landscape level, the Forest Service and BLM do not have a formal framework for systematically assessing the risk of fire to resources and ecosystems, although some of the forests and BLM field offices have developed risk assessments on their own or in collaboration with regional, state, or local efforts. At the project level, while the agencies recognize the need to better analyze the risk of acting to reduce fuels versus not doing so, neither fire planning guidance nor National Environmental Policy Act guidance specify how to do this. Opportunities exist to clarify how the agencies should analyze the effects of not taking action to reduce fuels. The agencies can clarify interim guidance to implement the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, and the agencies can, in conjunction with Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), further develop the lessons learned from a CEQ demonstration program carried out in 2003. Without a risk-based approach, these agencies cannot target their fuel reduction projects across landscapes or make fully informed decisions about which effects and project alternatives are more desirable. |
gao_GAO-08-795T | gao_GAO-08-795T_0 | The committee’s final report proposed a set of principles for pro the privacy and security of personal information, known as the Fair Information Practices. The major requirements for the protection of personal information by federal agencies come from two laws: the Privacy Act of 1974 and the privacy provisions of the E-Government Act of 2002. For example, officials had questions about the act’s applicability to electronic records. Key Terms in the Privacy Act May Be Defined Too Narrowly
Because the Privacy Act’s controls on the collection, use, and disclosure of personally identifiable information only apply wh en such information is covered by the act’s key terms, especially the “system-of-records” construct, they do not consistently protect suc h information in all circumstances of its collection and use throughout the federal government. Changing the system-of-records definition is an option that could help ensure that the act’s protections are consistently applied to all personally identifiable information. While purpose statements for certain law enforcement and anti-terrorism systems might need to be phrased broadly enough so as not to reveal investigative techniques or the details of ongoing cases, very broadly defined purposes could allow for unnecessarily broad ranges of uses, thus calling into question whether meaningful limitations had been imposed. In addition to concerns about limiting use to a specified purpose within an agency, more extensive issues have been raised when data are shared outside an agency. Despite not being required to do so, agencies we reviewed reported taking measures to ensure the data are used appropriately by recipients However, in the absence of such measures, data shared outside federal agencies would not always have sufficient protections. .
To better confine agencies’ use of personal information to its specified purposes, laws or guidance could be revised to (1) requ agencies to justify the use of key elements of personal informat (2) set specific limits on routine uses and internal agency uses of personal information, and (3) require agencies to establish formal agreements with external entities before sharing personal information with them. Based on discussions with privacy experts, agency officials, and analysis of laws and related guidance, a number of options ex improving public notice regarding federal collection and use of personal information: Require layered public notices in conjunction with system-of- records notices. Set requirements to ensure that purpose, collection limitations, and use limitations are better addressed in the content of pr ivacy notices. Make all notices available on a governmentwide privacy Web site Relevant privacy notices could be published at a central governmentwide location, with an address such as www.privacy.gov, and at corresponding standard agency Web sites with addresses of the form www.agency.gov/privacy. Amending Privacy Law Privacy Protections
In summary, current laws and guidance governing the federal government’s collection, use, and disclosure of personal informatio have gaps and other potential shortcomings in three broad categories: (1) the Privacy Act and E-Government Act do not always provide protections for federal uses of personal information, (2) laws and guidance may not effectively limit agency collection ) the and use of personal information to specific purposes, and (3 Privacy Act may not include effective mechanisms for informing the public. In assessing the appropriate balance between the needs of the federal government to collect personally identifiable information for programmatic purposes and the assurances that individuals should have that their information is being sufficiently protected and properly used, Congress should consider amending applicable laws, such as the Privacy Act and the E-Government Act, according to the alternatives outlined in our report, including revising the scope of the laws to cover all personally identifiable information collected, used, and maintained by the federal government; ● setting requirements to ensure that the collection and use of personally identifiable information is limited to a stated pur and ● establishing additional mechanisms for informing the public a privacy protections by revising requirements for the structure and publication of public notices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have been raised about the privacy and security of personal information in light of advances in information technology and the increasingly sophisticated ways in which the government obtains and uses information. Federal agencies' use of personal information is governed by the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002, while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides implementation guidance and oversight. These laws and guidance are based on the Fair Information Practices, a set of widely accepted principles for protecting privacy. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, concerning the sufficiency of privacy protections afforded by existing laws and guidance. To do this, GAO analyzed privacy laws and guidance, compared them with the Fair Information Practices, and obtained perspectives from federal agencies as well as an expert forum.
What GAO Found
Although privacy laws and guidance set minimum requirements for agencies, they may not consistently protect personally identifiable information in all circumstances of its collection and use throughout the federal government and may not fully adhere to key privacy principles. Based on discussions with privacy experts and agency officials, as well as analysis of laws and related guidance, GAO identified issues in three major areas: Applying privacy protections consistently to all federal collection and use of personal information. The Privacy Act's definition of a "system of records," which sets the scope of the act's protections, does not always apply whenever personal information is obtained and processed by federal agencies. For example, if agencies do not retrieve personal information by identifier, the act's protections do not apply. This has led experts to agree that the Privacy Act's system-of-records construct is too narrowly defined. An alternative for addressing these issues could include revising the system-of-records definition to cover all personally identifiable information collected, used, and maintained systematically by the federal government. Ensuring that use of personally identifiable information is limited to a stated purpose. According to the Fair Information Practices, the use of personal information should be limited to a specified purpose. Yet current laws and guidance impose only modest requirements for describing the purposes for personal information and limiting how it is used. For example, agencies are not required to be specific in formulating purpose descriptions in their public notices. Overly broad specifications of purpose could allow for unnecessarily broad ranges of uses, thus calling into question whether meaningful limitations had been imposed. Alternatives for addressing these issues include setting specific limits on use of information within agencies and requiring agencies to establish formal agreements with external governmental entities before sharing personally identifiable information with them. Establishing effective mechanisms for informing the public about privacy protections. Public notices are a primary means of establishing accountability for privacy protections and giving individuals a measure of control over the use of their personal information. Although the Federal Register is the government's official vehicle for issuing public notices, critics have questioned whether system-of-records notices published in the Federal Register effectively inform the public about government uses of personal information. Options for addressing concerns about public notices include requiring that purpose, collection limitations, and use limitations are better addressed in the content of privacy notices, and revising the Privacy Act to require that all notices be published on a standard Web site, with an address such as www.privacy.gov . |
gao_T-HEHS-98-207 | gao_T-HEHS-98-207_0 | The Social Security Act established 65 as the minimum age at which retirement benefits can be obtained. Raising the Retirement Ages Improves Social Security Solvency and Could Increase Economic Output
Raising the retirement ages effectively reduces benefits and thereby would improve Social Security’s solvency. However, the increase in economic activity assumes that, by remaining in the labor force for more years, older workers would not be displacing younger workers . Raising Retirement Ages Provides Incentives for Workers to Extend Their Careers, but Their Participation and the Demand for Their Labor Are Uncertain
Raising the Social Security retirement ages would provide many individuals an incentive to work longer, but whether they do depends on how the labor market responds. Still, it is unclear whether workers will want to work longer and whether employers will want to retain or hire them. One recent study, by Burkhauser and others, examined the effects of raising the ERA and concluded that such an increase would have only a limited impact on individuals in poor health because the majority of people who retire at the ERA do so because they are financially able to do it. situation, rather than a desire to retire, could discourage an older worker from remaining in the labor force. Because of the nature of their jobs, many older blue-collar workers—who compose 40 percent of the labor force between the ages of 53 and 63—experience health problems that may inhibit their ability to work and reduce the demand for their labor. An additional medical coverage issue is that individuals who are dually eligible for DI and SSI benefits are also generally eligible to receive Medicaid, which will increase costs to this program. As noted earlier, some of these new DI participants would be dually eligible for SSI and Medicaid benefits, which would impose additional costs. While raising the retirement ages will extend the life of the Social Security trust fund and could lead to higher levels of economic output, the potential negative consequences should be recognized. The magnitude of the increase depends on the extent to which individuals react to the newly created incentives to apply to these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed raising the retirement age for social security benefits, focusing on: (1) how raising the retirement ages could affect social security's long-term solvency and the U.S. economy; (2) how the labor market for older workers might respond to these changes; and (3) the possible impacts from raising the retirement ages on the Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) raising the retirement ages does appear to improve the social security program's long-term solvency and could increase the nation's economic output; (2) raising the ages at which individuals can draw benefits creates incentives for workers to remain in the labor force, thereby increasing revenues to the trust fund and decreasing the amount of benefits paid; (3) the majority of older workers, aged 62 to 67, do not appear to have health limitations that would prevent them from extending their careers, and thus their labor force participation should increase as the retirement ages are raised; (4) this greater labor force participation should raise the level of economic output as more people work longer; (5) however, the extent to which labor force participation increases depends on whether sufficient jobs are available for older workers; (6) employees may be willing and able to extend their careers, but it is unclear whether employers will be willing to retain or hire them because of negative perceptions about costs and productivity; (7) blue-collar workers may be disproportionately affected by these labor demand and supply factors because they are at greater risk for incurring certain health problems that could limit their ability to remain in the labor force; (8) for example, workers in poor health who otherwise might have kept working until they qualified for social security retirement benefits may opt to apply for DI, which could increase costs to this program; and (9) in addition, SSI could also experience increased participation and higher costs because some individuals will be dually eligible for DI and SSI. |
gao_GAO-14-639 | gao_GAO-14-639_0 | The first round of APGs was publicly reported in February 2012, and they were to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2013. GPRAMA also established in law the Performance Improvement Council (PIC), chaired by OMB’s Deputy Director for Management and composed of performance improvement officers from various federal agencies. Goal Leaders Are Carrying out Their Roles and Responsibilities on Goal Progress, but Their Performance Plans Do Not Always Hold Them Directly Accountable
Goal Leaders are Generally Highly-Placed within Their Organizations and Reported a Range of Roles and Responsibilities
The goal leaders for the goals in our sample were, in general, placed at high levels within their agencies and so were in senior leadership positions that enabled them to drive progress on their APGs. Goal Leaders Report Varied Effects from Goal Leader Designation, but Identified Benefits in Conjunction with Other Related GPRAMA Requirements
A majority of the goal leaders we interviewed said the goal leader designation had positive effects on goal progress and achievement. OMB also directed agencies to appoint deputy goal leaders because the position may help provide continuity in the event that the goal leader leaves the agency, and also provides a point of contact for OMB, particularly in situations in which the designated goal leader is very highly placed in the agency. Of the 47 APGs in our sample, 20 (slightly more than 40 percent) had a change in goal leader during this time period. Although most of the goal leaders we interviewed had formal deputy goal leaders in place, 11 of the 46 (24 percent) did not. Although other agency staff may fulfill many of the roles that a deputy goal leader would, officially designating a deputy goal leader would be consistent with OMB’s view that deputies serve a key role in implementing APGs. OMB staff agreed with our recommendation. As of June 2014, OMB and Performance Improvement Council (PIC) staff reported that agencies continue to work to implement this recommendation through a PIC working group that is intended to help agencies share best practices for conducting QPRs, but did not have a specific timeframe in place for full implementation: To better leverage agency quarterly performance reviews as a mechanism to manage performance toward agency priority and other agency-level performance goals, the Director of OMB—working with the PIC and other relevant groups—should identify and share promising practices to help agencies extend their QPRs to include, as relevant, representatives from outside organizations that contribute to achieving their agency performance goals. HUD refers to their QPRs as “HUDStat.”
Goal Leaders Recognized the Contributions Different Types of Programs Made to Their APGs, but There Are Limited Mechanisms for Sharing Information Across Agencies
GPRAMA requires the agency head and chief operating officer, with the support of the performance improvement officer, to assess whether relevant organizations, program activities, regulations, policies, and other activities are contributing as planned to the agency’s APGs, and to identify these contributing programs for publication on Performance.gov. Goal Leaders Identified Some Common Challenges and Practices in Goal Management, but Share This Information to a Limited Extent
Goal Leaders Identified Some Common Challenges and Practices in Managing Goals, but Have Limited Exchange of Information with Other Goal Leaders
Goal leaders we interviewed identified several common challenges in managing APGs. In these cases, most examples involved sharing information with officials with whom they work on issues related to their APGs. Performance plans are a tool for ensuring that officials are evaluated on and held accountable for defined outcomes, but the majority of the performance plans we reviewed did not fully reflect responsibility for APGs. Although other mechanisms, such as QPRs, also promote accountability, agencies that do not clearly link goal leader and deputy performance plans with APGs may be missing opportunities to ensure that goal leaders and deputies are held accountable for goal progress. To better promote the sharing of information among goal leaders and their deputies, we recommend that the Director of OMB work with the PIC to further involve agency priority goal leaders and their deputies in sharing information on common challenges and practices related to agency priority goal management. While this is true, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 established the goal leader position in law and assigned specific responsibilities to goal leaders. The objectives of this report are to: (1) evaluate the roles and responsibilities of agency priority goal leaders in managing goal progress and the extent to which they are held accountable for achievement of priority goals; (2) review the extent to which priority goal leaders collaborate with other programs and agencies that contribute to the achievement of the priority goals; and (3) describe any challenges and practices identified by priority goal leaders in managing goals, and evaluate the extent to which they exchange this information with other priority goal leaders. The sample we selected included nearly half (47) of these APGs. To address our second objective, we obtained and analyzed documentation from goal leaders related to collaboration, such as minutes and agenda of meetings during 2012 and 2013 at which APGs were discussed, and records of agency analysis of different program types that contribute to APGs, such as grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Leadership involvement and accountability are important factors driving successful performance improvement in government. GPRAMA established the role of the agency priority goal leader and assigned accountability for achieving APGs to these officials.
This report is one of a series in which GAO, as required by GPRAMA, reviewed the act's implementation. It assesses (1) the roles and responsibilities of agency priority goal leaders in managing goal progress and the extent to which they are held accountable for goal achievement; (2) the extent to which goal leaders collaborate with other programs and agencies that contribute to APG achievement; and (3) any challenges and practices identified by goal leaders, and the extent to which they exchange this information with their peers.
To address all three objectives, GAO examined nearly half (47 of 103) of the APGs for 2012 and 2013, and analyzed relevant documentation. GAO also interviewed the goal leaders and other relevant officials for each of the 47 selected goals.
What GAO Found
Agency priority goal leaders GAO interviewed were generally highly-placed within their agencies—for example, several were heads of agencies—and reported a range of responsibilities related to managing agency priority goals (APG), such as laying out goal strategies. A majority of the goal leaders said the goal leader designation had benefits for their APGs, such as greater visibility for the goal. Several also believed that there were benefits to designating the goal leader position in conjunction with other requirements from the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), such as reviewing priority goal progress at least quarterly. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directs agencies to appoint deputy goal leaders. Deputy goal leaders manage day-to-day implementation of APGs and provide continuity in the event of goal leader turnover. From the time the APGs were published in February 2012 to the end of fiscal year 2013 (when they were to have been achieved), about 40 percent of the APGs GAO examined had a change in goal leader, while about 30 percent had a change in the deputy position. In addition, although most of the 46 goal leaders GAO interviewed had formal deputy goal leaders in place, 11 (24 percent) did not. Without a designated deputy goal leader, agencies lack a formally designated official to fill a key role in goal implementation. Individual performance plans are one of several mechanisms to provide goal leader and deputy goal leader accountability for APGs. Most goal leaders and all deputy goal leaders had performance plans. These plans covered a range of responsibilities, but generally did not fully reflect their APGs. In fact, many did not refer to the APG. Performance plans that link more directly to APGs could help ensure that officials are evaluated on and held responsible for APG progress and outcomes.
Goal leaders collaborated with officials from outside their agencies to drive progress on APGs. However, some goal leaders reported that these outside contributors were not included in the quarterly performance reviews. Goal leaders also reported that a variety of different types of programs, such as grant and regulatory programs, contributes to their APGs. However, they reported few mechanisms for sharing information with other agencies related to assessing these programs. Further, for a variety of reasons agencies have focused less attention on identifying the tax expenditures that contribute to their APGs. These findings are consistent with prior recommendations GAO made to OMB regarding GPRAMA implementation. OMB has taken some steps to address the recommendations.
Goal leaders identified some common challenges and practices in managing APGs, but shared this information to a limited extent. For example, goal leaders commonly cited resource constraints as a challenge, and practices related to measuring goal progress as helpful. One of the roles of the Performance Improvement Council (PIC), a council made up of agency performance improvement officers and chaired by OMB, is to facilitate information exchange. The PIC has shared tools and information with goal leaders; however PIC staff's primary points of contact are agencies' performance improvement officers and their deputies. Overall, goal leaders and their deputies have had little direct interaction with the PIC. More direct outreach from PIC staff could facilitate information sharing among goal leaders and their deputies, and help ensure that they do not miss opportunities to better manage their APGs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB work with agencies to (1) ensure that they appoint deputy goal leaders; and (2) more clearly link goal leaders' and deputies' performance plans to APGs, and work with the PIC to further involve goal leaders and deputies in information-sharing related to APGs. OMB staff generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-616 | gao_GAO-11-616_0 | Credit default swaps. Federal Assistance to AIG
Because of concerns about the effect of an AIG failure, in 2008 and 2009, the Federal Reserve System and Treasury agreed to make $182.3 billion available to assist AIG. The Possibility of AIG’s Failure Drove Federal Reserve Aid after Private Financing Failed
A year before the first federal assistance to AIG, warning signs of the company’s financial difficulties began to appear. Over the following months, the Federal Reserve System received information about AIG’s deteriorating condition from a variety of sources and contacts, and it stepped in to provide emergency assistance as possible bankruptcy became imminent in mid-September 2008. Attempts to secure private financing, which would have precluded or limited the need for government intervention, failed as the extent of AIG’s liquidity needs became clearer. Both the Federal Reserve System and AIG considered bankruptcy issues, with AIG deciding independently to accept federal assistance in lieu of bankruptcy. Because of urgency in financial markets by the time the Federal Reserve System intervened, officials said there was little opportunity to consider alternatives before extending the initial assistance in the form of the Revolving Credit Facility. When AIG’s financial troubles persisted after the Revolving Credit Facility was established, the company and the Federal Reserve System considered a range of options for further assistance. Throughout the course of AIG assistance, the company’s credit ratings were a critical consideration, according to Federal Reserve System officials, as downgrades would have triggered large new liquidity demands on the company and could have jeopardized government repayment. 1. 4. 2). But FRBNY’s policy objective was to prevent a disorderly failure of AIG, and FRBNY officials said they did not believe that would have been possible if AIG was downgraded to the levels rating agencies were considering. FRBNY’s Maiden Lane III Design Likely Required Greater Borrowing, and Accounts of Attempts to Gain Concessions From AIG Counterparties are Inconsistent
After the first extension of federal assistance to AIG—the Revolving Credit Facility—ML III was a key part of the Federal Reserve System’s continuing efforts to stabilize the company. We found that in designing ML III, FRBNY decided against plans that could have reduced the size of its lending or increased the loan’s security, as it opted against seeking financial contributions from AIG’s financial counterparties. We also found that the Federal Reserve Board approved ML III with an expectation that concessions would be negotiated with the counterparties, but that FRBNY made varying attempts to obtain these discounts, which could have been another way to provide greater loan security or to lower the size of the government’s lending commitment. This willingness was conditioned on all other counterparties agreeing to the same concession, the counterparty told us. FRBNY had little or no bargaining power given the circumstances. The official declined to discuss conversations with Federal Reserve System officials, citing French secrecy law. CDOs that ML III did not purchase were excluded due to decisions by both FRBNY and counterparties. As the value of the underlying assets changed, the value of AIG’s CDS protection became different, the officials said. The Federal Reserve’s Actions Were Generally Consistent With Existing Laws and Policies, but They Raised a Number of Questions
The actions of the Federal Reserve System in providing several rounds of assistance to AIG involved a range of laws, regulations, and procedures. In addition, we identified a series of complex relationships involving FRBNY, its advisors, AIG counterparties, and service providers to CDOs in which ML III invested that grew out of the government’s intervention. The Federal Reserve Exercised Its Broad Emergency Lending Authority to Aid AIG but Did Not Fully Document Its Decisions
When the Federal Reserve Board approved emergency assistance for AIG beginning in September 2008, it acted pursuant to its authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Federal Reserve Influenced AIG’s Securities Filings About Federal Aid but Did Not Direct the Company on What Information to File
During the financial crisis, questions arose about FRBNY’s involvement in AIG’s exclusion of some ML III-related information from its federal securities filings—counterparty transaction details and the description of a key ML III design feature. Its emergency lending also made it a significant creditor to AIG. The lack of a comprehensive policy for managing vendor conflicts, including relationships that cause competing interests, could expose FRBNY to greater risk that it would not fully identify and appropriately manage vendor conflicts of interest in the event of future crises. We obtained these documents primarily from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), including records they have provided to Congress. We conducted interviews with many of those involved in federal assistance to AIG, to obtain information on their participation in the events leading up to federal assistance for AIG, as well as their perspectives on the condition of AIG and the financial markets at the time. From the private sector, we interviewed current and former AIG executives, representatives from FRBNY advisors, an AIG advisor, AIG business counterparties, credit rating agencies, potential private-sector financiers, and academic and finance experts. To examine the extent to which key actions taken were consistent with relevant law or policy, we reviewed AIG-related documents indicated earlier to identify key actions taken. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2008, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) approved emergency lending to American International Group, Inc. (AIG)--the first in a series of actions that, together with the Department of the Treasury, authorized $182.3 billion in federal aid to assist the company. Federal Reserve System officials said that their goal was to avert a disorderly failure of AIG, which they believed would have posed systemic risk to the financial system. But these actions were controversial, raising questions about government intervention in the private marketplace. This report discusses (1) key decisions to provide aid to AIG; (2) decisions involving the Maiden Lane III (ML III) special purpose vehicle (SPV), which was a central part of providing assistance to the company; (3) the extent to which actions were consistent with relevant law or policy; and (4) lessons learned from the AIG assistance. To address these issues, GAO focused on the initial assistance to AIG and subsequent creation of ML III. GAO examined a large volume of AIG-related documents, primarily from the Federal Reserve System--the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)--and conducted a wide range of interviews, including with Federal Reserve System staff, FRBNY advisors, former and current AIG executives, AIG business counterparties, credit rating agencies, potential private financiers, academics, finance experts, state insurance officials, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) officials. Although GAO makes no new recommendations in this report, it reiterates previous recommendations aimed at improving the Federal Reserve System's documentation standards and conflict-of-interest policies.
What GAO Found
While warning signs of the company's difficulties had begun to appear a year before the Federal Reserve System provided assistance, Federal Reserve System officials said they became acutely aware of AIG's deteriorating condition in September 2008. The Federal Reserve System received information through its financial markets monitoring and ultimately intervened as the possibility of bankruptcy became imminent. Efforts by AIG and the Federal Reserve System to secure private financing failed after the extent of AIG's liquidity needs became clearer. Both the Federal Reserve System and AIG considered bankruptcy issues, although no bankruptcy filing was made. Due to AIG's deteriorating condition in September 2008, the Federal Reserve System said it had little opportunity to consider alternatives before its initial assistance. As AIG's troubles persisted, the company and the Federal Reserve System considered a range of options, including guarantees, accelerated asset sales, and nationalization. According to Federal Reserve System officials, AIG's credit ratings were a critical consideration in the assistance, as downgrades would have further strained AIG's liquidity position. After the initial federal assistance, ML III became a key part of the Federal Reserve System's continuing efforts to stabilize AIG. With ML III, FRBNY loaned funds to an SPV established to buy collateralized debt obligations (CDO) from AIG counterparties that had purchased credit default swaps from AIG to protect the value of those assets. In exchange, the counterparties agreed to terminate the credit default swaps, which were a significant source of AIG's liquidity problems. As the value of the CDO assets, or the condition of AIG itself, declined, AIG was required to provide additional collateral to its counterparties. In designing ML III, FRBNY said that it chose the only option available given constraints at the time, deciding against plans that could have reduced the size of its lending or increased the loan's security. Although the Federal Reserve Board approved ML III with an expectation that concessions would be negotiated with AIG's counterparties, FRBNY made varying attempts to obtain these discounts. FRBNY officials said that they had little bargaining power in seeking concessions and would have faced difficulty in getting all counterparties to agree to a discount. While FRBNY took actions to treat the counterparties alike, the perceived value of ML III participation likely varied by the size of a counterparty's exposure to AIG or its method of managing risk. While the Federal Reserve Board exercised broad emergency lending authority to assist AIG, it was not required to, nor did it, fully document its interpretation of its authority or the basis of its decisions. For federal securities filings AIG was required to make, FRBNY influenced the company's filings about federal aid but did not direct AIG on what information to disclose. In providing aid to AIG, FRBNY implemented conflict-of-interest procedures, and granted a number of waivers, many of which were conditioned on the separation of employees and information. A series of complex relationships grew out of the government's intervention, involving FRBNY advisors, AIG counterparties, and others, which could expose FRBNY to greater risk that it would not fully identify and appropriately manage conflict issues and relationships. |
gao_GAO-06-318T | gao_GAO-06-318T_0 | To achieve its goals, US-VISIT uses biometric information (digital fingerscans and photographs) to verify identity and screen persons against watch lists. When a visitor arrives at a port of entry, the biometric information is used to verify that the visitor is the person who was issued the visa or other travel documents. Ultimately, visitors are to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning. Other key US-VISIT functions include ● collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their admission; (2) may be eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; ● detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and ● facilitating information sharing and coordination within the immigration and border management community. For example, on January 5, 2004, it deployed and began operating most aspects of its planned entry capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports, and added the remaining aspects in February 2005. DHS Has Yet to Demonstrate that US-VISIT as Defined Is the Right Solution
A prerequisite for prudent investment in programs is having reasonable assurance that a proposed course of action is the right thing to do, meaning that it properly fits within the larger context of an agency’s strategic plans and related operational and technology environments, and that the program will produce benefits in excess of costs over its useful life. We have made recommendations to DHS aimed at ensuring that this is in fact the case for US-VISIT, and the department has taken steps intended to address our recommendations. According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 that shows how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and that defines an overall vision for immigration and border management. Return on Investment Has Yet to be Determined
Prudent investment also requires that an agency have reasonable assurance that a proposed program will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and risks. Since our February 2005 report, the program has developed a cost- benefit analysis for Increment 1B (which is to provide exit capabilities at air and sea ports of entry). For example, it did not include a detailed work breakdown structure. Strengthening the program’s cost-estimating capability is extremely important. DHS Is Still Establishing Needed Program Management Capabilities
Establishing effective program management capabilities is important to ensure that an organization is going about delivering a program in the right way. One area in which DHS has made good progress is in implementing our recommendations to establish the human capital capabilities necessary to manage US-VISIT. Since then, the program office has finalized the human capital plan, completed more activities, and formulated plans to complete others (for example, according to the program office, it has completed an analysis of its workforce to determine diversity trends, retirement and attrition rates, and mission-critical and leadership competency gaps, and it has plans to complete an analysis of workforce data to maintain strategic focus on preserving the skills, knowledge, and leadership abilities required for the US-VISIT program’s success). DHS’s progress in implementing our human capital recommendations should help ensure that it has sufficient staff with the right skills and abilities to successfully execute the program. Having such staff has been and will be particularly important in light of the program’s more limited progress to date in establishing program management process capabilities. Until these controls are effectively implemented, US-VISIT will be at risk of not delivering promised capabilities on time and within budget. Because DHS test plans were not sufficiently well-defined to be effective, we recommended that before testing begins, DHS develop and approve test plans that meet the criteria that relevant systems development guidance prescribes for effective test plans: namely, that they (1) specify the test environment; (2) describe each test to be performed, including test controls, inputs, and expected outputs; (3) define the test procedures to be followed in conducting the tests; and (4) provide traceability between the test cases and the requirements to be verified by the testing. However, the test plan did not adequately trace between test cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. DHS Has Yet to Fully Establish Program Accountability Mechanisms
To better ensure that US-VISIT and DHS meet expectations, we made recommendations related to measuring and disclosing progress against program commitments. Without such measurements, program performance and accountability can suffer. The expenditure plan for fiscal year 2005 (the fourth US-VISIT expenditure plan) does not describe progress against commitments made in the previous plans. The longer the program proceeds without these, the greater the risk that the program will not meet its commitments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. US-VISIT uses these biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen persons against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. Visitors are also to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning at selected air and sea ports of entry. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of US-VISIT and (2) DHS progress in implementing recommendations that GAO made as part of its prior reviews of US-VISIT annual expenditure plans. The testimony is based on GAO's prior reports as well as ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO's recommendations are directed at helping the department improve its capabilities to deliver US-VISIT capability and benefit expectations on time and within budget. According to DHS, the recommendations have made US-VISIT a stronger program.
What GAO Found
The US-VISIT program has met a number of demanding requirements that were mandated in legislation. A pre-entry screening capability is in place in overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. This has been accomplished during a period of DHS-wide change, and has resulted in preventing criminal aliens from entering the country and potentially deterring others from even attempting to do so. Nevertheless, DHS has more to do to implement GAO recommendations aimed at better ensuring that US-VISIT is maximizing its potential for success and holding itself accountable for results. DHS has taken steps to address those GAO recommendations intended to ensure that US-VISIT as defined is the "right thing." For example, it is clarifying the strategic context within which US-VISIT is to operate, having drafted a strategic plan to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS's mission goals and operations and to provide an overall vision for immigration and border management. However, the plan has yet to be approved, causing its integration with other departmentwide border security initiatives to remain unclear. In addition, the department has analyzed the program's costs, benefits, and risks, but its analyses do not yet demonstrate that the program is producing or will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and risks. In particular, the department's return-on-investment analyses for exit options do not demonstrate that these solutions will be cost-effective. DHS has also taken steps to address those GAO recommendations aimed at ensuring that the program is executed in the "right way." The department has made good progress in establishing the program's human capital capabilities, which should help ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities. This is particularly important in light of the program's more limited progress in establishing capabilities in certain program management process areas, such as test management. For example, a test plan used in a recent system acceptance test did not adequately trace between test cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. Incomplete test plans reduce assurance that systems will perform as intended once they are deployed. DHS also has begun addressing GAO's recommendations to establish accountability for program performance and results, but more needs to be done. For example, DHS's expenditure plans have not described progress against commitments made in previous plans. Unless performance against commitments is measured and disclosed, the ability to manage and oversee the program will suffer. The longer the program proceeds without fully addressing GAO's recommendations, the greater the risk that it will not deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. |
gao_GAO-12-859 | gao_GAO-12-859_0 | U.S. TWV Industrial Base Includes a Number of Manufacturers Whose Reliance on Sales to DOD Vary
Numerous Vehicle Manufacturers and Suppliers Comprise the U.S. TWV Industrial Base
The U.S. TWV industrial base includes seven vehicle manufacturers, over 90 major subsystem suppliers, and potentially thousands of parts and component suppliers. Four of the seven manufacturers provided approximately 92 percent of all TWVs purchased by DOD in fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DOD purchased over 158,000 TWVs in fiscal years 2007 through 2011 but plans to buy significantly less from now through fiscal year 2017. DOD demands for TWVs increased dramatically in response to the operational demands and threats experienced by U.S. forces during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Manufacturer Reliance on Sales to DOD Varied
Despite the significant decrease in DOD TWV purchases, the four manufacturers we met with generally reported that these sales remain an important part of their revenue stream. For example, according to manufacturers, suppliers generally produced parts, such as engines, transmissions, axles, and tires for their commercial vehicles in addition to supplying parts for the TWVs they produce. TWV Sales to Foreign Governments Were Relatively Few and Generally Purchased with U.S. Funds
U.S. manufacturers sold relatively few TWVs for use by foreign governments in fiscal years 2007 through 2011, when compared to the 158,000 vehicles sold to DOD over that same period. However, most of the manufacturers we met with stated that while sales of TWVs to foreign governments have not equaled those sold to DOD, such sales are becoming an increasingly important source of revenue as DOD purchases fewer vehicles. While Afghanistan and Iraq were the largest recipients of U.S. manufactured TWVs through such assistance programs, DOD officials informed us that as the war efforts conclude there, U.S. funding for TWVs for these two countries’ security forces has declined and is not planned to continue. U.S. Manufacturers and Foreign Governments Identified Multiple Interrelated Factors That May Affect TWV Foreign Sales
U.S. manufacturers of TWVs and foreign government officials we met with identified a number of interrelated factors that they perceive as affecting whether a foreign government decides to purchase U.S. manufactured TWVs. In addition, these U.S. manufacturers and foreign government officials expressed mixed views on the effect the U.S. arms transfer control regimes may have on foreign governments’ decisions to buy U.S. vehicles. The four U.S. manufacturers consider these used vehicles to be a risk to their future sales of U.S. TWVs to foreign governments because foreign governments could be less likely to purchase new vehicles from U.S. manufacturers if the U.S. Army transfers these used vehicles through foreign assistance programs. Foreign Competition, Different Vehicle Requirements, and Concerns Associated with U.S. Arms Transfer Control Regimes Affect Foreign Governments’ Decisions to Purchase U.S. TWVs
Foreign government and manufacturer officials that we interviewed identified a number of TWV manufacturers that compete with U.S. manufacturers for international sales. Foreign government officials also explained that U.S. manufacturers can generally produce TWVs to meet their governments’ requirements, but the vehicles U.S. TWV manufacturers are producing for DOD do not necessarily align with these requirements. While sales of TWVs to foreign governments are generally approved by the U.S. government once initiated, U.S. manufacturers and foreign officials said that foreign governments may prefer to purchase vehicle manufactured outside the United States, in part, due to the amount of time to process sales and licenses requests and end-use restrictions associated with the U.S. arms transfer control regimes. Further, there are many foreign manufacturers that can supply vehicles that meet foreign governments’ requirements. DOD and State provide technical comments and two of the manufacturers provided clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
DODs need for TWVs dramatically increased in response to operational demands and threats experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq. TWVs primarily transport cargo and personnel in the field and include the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. The U.S. TWV industrial base, which includes manufacturers and suppliers of major subsystems, increased production to meet DODs wartime requirements. That base now faces uncertainties as DODs budget declines and operational requirements for these vehicles decrease. In addition to sales to DOD, U.S. manufacturers sell vehicles to foreign governments.
The Senate Armed Services Committee Report on a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to (1) describe the composition of the U.S. TWV industrial base, (2) determine how many U.S. manufactured TWVs were purchased by foreign governments from fiscal years 2007 through 2011, and (3) identify factors perceived as affecting foreign governments decisions to purchase these vehicles. GAO analyzed data from DOD on U.S. and foreign government TWV purchases, as well as sales data from the four primary U.S. TWV manufacturers. GAO also collected data from five foreign governments, including those that did and did not purchase U.S. TWVs.
What GAO Found
The U.S. tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) industrial base includes seven manufacturers that utilize common suppliers of major subsystems, such as engines and armor. Four of these manufacturers reported that their reliance on sales to the Department of Defense (DOD) varies, in part, as they also produce commercial vehicles or parts. Collectively, the seven manufacturers supplied DOD with over 158,000 TWVs to meet wartime needs from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. DOD, however, plans to return to pre-war purchasing levels, buying about 8,000 TWVs over the next several years, in part, due to fewer requirements.
Almost 28,000 U.S.-manufactured TWVs were purchased for use by foreign governments from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. Approximately 92 percent of these vehicles were paid for using U.S. security assistance funds provided to foreign governments. Iraq and Afghanistan were the largest recipients of such assistance, but officials stated that DOD does not plan to continue funding TWV purchases for these countries. While sales to foreign governments are unlikely to offset reductions in DOD purchases, manufacturers reported that foreign sales are becoming an increasingly important part of their revenue stream.
Sales of U.S.-manufactured TWVs to foreign governments may be affected by multiple interrelated factors, including the availability of used DOD vehicles for sale, foreign competition, differing vehicle requirements, and concerns associated with U.S. arms transfer control regimes. U.S. manufacturers said sales of used Army TWVs to foreign governments could affect their ability to sell new vehicles. U.S. manufacturers and foreign governments also identified a number of non-U.S. manufacturers that produce TWVs that meet foreign governments requirements, such as right-side drive vehicles. While U.S. manufacturers can produce vehicles that meet these requirements, vehicles they produced for DOD generally have not. Finally, manufacturers and foreign officials had mixed views on how the U.S. arms transfer control regimes may affect foreign governments decisions to purchase U.S. vehicles. U.S. manufacturers and foreign officials expressed concerns with processing times and U.S. end-use restrictions, but foreign officials also said that such concerns have not been a determining factor when purchasing TWVs that meet their requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD, the Department of State, and two manufacturers provided technical or clarifying comments on a report draft that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-78 | gao_GAO-02-78_0 | Section 13(c) requires that DOL certify that fair and equitable labor protection arrangements are in place before DOT makes grants to transit applicants. Such labor protection arrangements are to provide for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits under existing collective bargaining agreements; (2) continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) protection of employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment; (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass transportation systems and priority of reemployment for employees terminated or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. In addition, some critics have stated that Section 13(c) has caused inflated wages and benefits in the transit industry. However, 85 percent of the transit agencies surveyed reported that, in general, Section 13(c) did not affect their decisions on whether to adopt new technologies. Section 13(c) Identified As a Burden Less Often Than Other Federal Grant Requirements
Some of the transit agencies we surveyed indicated that Section 13(c) requirements for receiving financial assistance were a burden regarding time, effort, and resources. Observations
The transit agencies we surveyed generally reported that Section 13(c) has had a minimal impact on labor costs, adoption of technologies, and operations. However, a notable number of transit agencies reported that Section 13(c) has discouraged them from contracting for fixed-route transit services and has delayed their receipt of federal grants. | What GAO Found
Concerns have arisen about the 37-year-old statutory provision commonly known as Section 13(c). Before the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) may make grants to transit applicants, the Department of Labor (DOL) must certify that fair and equitable arrangements are in place to protect mass transit employees affected. Section 13(c) requires that the arrangements provide for continued of collective bargaining rights and protect of employees against a worsening of their positions. Once certified, the arrangements are incorporated into the grant agreement between FTA and the grantee. Critics claim that Section 13(e) greatly increases the cost of transit operations, hinders transit agencies' efforts to adopt new technology, and constrains the efficient operation of transit systems. Supporters counter that Section 13(c) has enhanced labor-management stability and has improved communication and working relationships between management and labor. The transit agencies GAO surveyed reported that Section 13(c) had a minimal impact on their (1) labor costs, (2) ability to adopt new technologies, and (3) ability to modify transit operations. Transit agencies reported that Section 13(c) has delayed the award of federal grants and has presented a burden regarding time, efforts, and resources. Transit officials said that growth in the transit industry may mitigate the effects of Section 13(c). |
gao_GAO-06-875T | gao_GAO-06-875T_0 | Explosive detection systems used to screen checked baggage include EDS and ETD machines. The Deployment of Stand-alone Explosive Detection Systems Led to Operational Inefficiencies and Security Risks that In- Line Systems Could Address at Some Airports
Stand-alone Checked Baggage Screening Systems Created Operational Inefficiencies and Security Risks
Since its inception in November 2001 through June 22, 2006, TSA has procured and installed about 1,600 EDS machines and about 7,200 ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400 commercial airports. Table 3 identifies TSA’s estimates for bags screened per hour by EDS machines in stand- alone and in-line configurations and ETD machines. In February 2006, TSA reported that recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS checked baggage screening systems and the EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for higher- performance and lower-cost screening systems. TSA’s use of alternative screening procedures has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. As part of our ongoing work on TSA’s use of alternative screening procedures to screen checked baggage, we found that the superior efficiency of screening with in-line EDS compared to screening with stand- alone EDS may have been a factor in reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports where in-line systems were installed. TSA Has Begun Systematically Planning for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but It Continues to Face Funding Uncertainties
TSA Has Made Progress in Planning for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems
TSA has made progress in its efforts to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to fund these systems on a large-scale basis. In March 2005, we reported that while TSA has made progress in deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. This framework introduces a strategy intended to increase security through deploying in-line and stand-alone EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-cycle costs for the program, minimize impacts to TSA and airport/airline operations, and provide a flexible security infrastructure for accommodating growing airline traffic and potential new threats. The framework is an initial step in addressing the following areas: Optimized checked baggage screening solutions—finding the ideal mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative screening solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes; Funding prioritization schedule by airport—identifying the top 25 airports that should first receive federal funding for projects related to the installation of explosive detection systems based on quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other factors; Deployment strategy—developing a plan for the acquisition of next- generation EDS systems, the redeployment of existing EDS assets, and investment in life-cycle extension programs; EDS Life-Cycle Management Plan—structuring guidelines for EDS research and development investment, procurement specifications for next-generation EDS systems, and the redeployment of existing EDS assets and investment in life-cycle extension programs that minimize the cost of ownership of the EDS systems; and Stakeholder collaboration plan—working with airport operators and other key stakeholders to develop airport-specific screening solutions, refine the nationwide EDS deployment strategy, and investigate alternative funding programs that may allow for innovative as well as non-federal sources of funding or financing, including formulas for sharing costs among different government entities and the private sector. In February 2006, TSA estimated that the total cost of installing and operating the optimal checked baggage screening systems, including in- line EDS machines, at the 250 airports is approximately $22.4 billion over 20 years, of which about $6 billion is for installation, life-cycle replacement, existing committed funding, and equipment maintenance costs. In a May 2006 meeting of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, TSA reported that under current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. The maximum number of bags an EDS machine can screen per hour is 500, which can be achieved only when the machines are integrated in-line with the baggage conveyor system. Specifically, the analysis identified that using in-line systems instead of stand-alone systems at these nine airports could save the federal government about $1.3 billion over 7 years and that TSA’s initial investment would be recovered in a little over 1 year. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed two types of baggage screening equipment: explosive detection systems (EDS), which use X-rays to scan bags for explosives, and explosive trace detection systems (ETD), in which bags are swabbed to test for chemical traces of explosives. TSA considers screening with EDS to be superior to screening with ETD because EDS machines process more bags per hour and automatically detect explosives without direct human involvement. In March 2005, GAO reported that while TSA had made progress in deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic, prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. GAO's testimony today updates our previous report and discusses TSA's (1) deployment of EDS and ETD systems and the identified benefits of in-line systems, and (2) planning for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and efforts to identify funding and financing options.
What GAO Found
Since its inception in November 2001 through June 2006, TSA has procured and installed about 1,600 EDS machines and 7,200 ETD machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at over 400 airports. However, initial deployment of EDS machines in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--and ETD machines resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as compared with using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. For example, TSA's use of stand-alone EDS and ETD machines required a greater number of screeners and resulted in screening fewer bags for explosives each hour. In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA has agreed to help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that many of the initial in-line EDS systems did not achieve the anticipated savings. However, recent improvements in the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS screening technology now offer the opportunity for higher-performance and lower-cost screening systems. Finally, screening with in-line EDS systems may result in security benefits by reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening procedures, such as screening with explosives detection canines and physical bag searches, which involve trade-offs in security effectiveness. TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to fund the installation of in-line EDS systems on a large-scale basis. In February 2006, TSA released its strategic planning framework for checked baggage screening aimed at increasing security through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-cycle costs, minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and airline operations, and providing a flexible security infrastructure. As part of this effort, TSA identified the 25 airports that should first receive federal funding for the installation of in-line EDS systems, and the optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes. In February 2006, TSA estimated that installing and operating the optimal checked baggage screening systems will cost about $22.4 billion over 20 years and reported that under current investment levels, installation of optimal baggage screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. TSA is collaborating with airport operators, airlines, and other key stakeholders to identify funding and cost sharing strategies and is focusing its research and development efforts on the next generation of EDS technology. |
gao_HEHS-95-235 | gao_HEHS-95-235_0 | Total Expenditures Have Increased Since 1979-80
From 1979-80 to 1992-93, total real expenditures for public elementary and secondary education increased by 40 percent to $254.4 billion. In addition, the number of at-risk children in all categories has increased since 1980. The growth in these at-risk populations has increased the demand for specialized classroom services. Per Pupil Expenditures Have Recently Leveled Off
After decades of increase (with one plateau in the late 1970s), per pupil expenditures for elementary and secondary education leveled off beginning in 1989-90, increasing less than 1 percent, on average, each year until 1992-93 (see app. For the nation, the average total per pupil expenditure for 1992-93, using fall enrollment as a measure, was $5,296, although per pupil expenditures vary throughout the United States. 2). State, local, and federal shares for education spending vary by state. Elementary and Secondary Education’s Share of State Budgets Decreased
Between fiscal years 1987 and 1994, the relative share of elementary and secondary education spending in state budgets decreased by 11 percent. 3). VI.1 and VI.2.) VI.3 and VI.4.) Conclusions
Recent trends in U.S. education finance reveal the leveling off of per pupil spending for education combined with increasing enrollment in public elementary and secondary schools. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) defines ability to raise revenue similarly, “as the hypothetical ability of a state and its local governments to raise revenue to provide public services in the state relative to the need for those services.” We have also developed a measure of ability to raise revenue that estimates a state’s ability to finance educational services, which we call ability to raise revenue for education. We also determined changes over time in our two measures of willingness to raise revenue, for education and overall. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the current status and trends in public education spending, focusing on: (1) the current expenditure levels for education and how they have changed over time; (2) the roles local, state, and federal governments play in financing education in the United States, and how these roles have changed over time; and (3) how the states differ in their capacity to provide resources for education and their relative tax effort.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1980, total real expenditures in public elementary and secondary schools have increased, while the average national per pupil expenditure increased then stabilized after 1989; (2) total public expenditures for elementary and secondary education increased by 40 percent to $254.4 billion from the 1979-1980 school year to the 1992-1993 school year; (3) the number of poor children attending elementary and secondary schools has increased, and the cost of educating these and other at-risk children is higher than educating those not at risk; (4) the average per pupil expenditure for elementary and secondary students has leveled off after years of increase; (5) the average per pupil expenditure in school year 1992-1993 was $5,296; (6) the portion of state budgets designated for elementary and secondary education decreased between fiscal years 1987 and 1994; (7) states' ability to raise revenues for education grew more slowly than their willingness to raise revenues for overall spending; and (8) state and local governments feel more pressure to increase education spending in less wealthy school districts. |
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