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gao_GAO-08-141 | gao_GAO-08-141_0 | Key Domestic Ports Handle Vast Majority of Energy Imports
The United States imports about 65 percent of its crude oil and petroleum products as well as about 3 percent of its natural gas needs. Overseas, terrorists have demonstrated the ability to carry out at least three types of threats. Second is a standoff missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon launched from a distance. For instance, LNG and LPG are highly combustible and pose a risk to public safety of fire or—in a more unlikely scenario in which they are in a confined space—explosion. In addition to maritime suicide attacks, terrorists have also targeted energy facilities on land. In some locations, however, the Coast Guard has had difficulty meeting its own self-imposed requirements for security activity. In U.S. Waterways and Ports, the Primary Challenge Involves Coping with Limited Resources and a Growing Security Workload
Domestically, many agencies and other stakeholders have taken steps to develop and implement plans for helping ensure the security of maritime energy commodity shipments. While port security grants and resource sharing agreements are expected to address at least part of the resource needs of the Coast Guard’s law enforcement partners, the Coast Guard is likely to require additional resources to fulfill its own new security responsibilities. Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face Several Challenges in Integrating Them
To mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker carrying energy commodities, the United States has multiple plans that address actions to be taken at the national, port, facility, and vessel levels. To translate these plans into effective response actions, stakeholders could face at least three main challenges. Second, port-level plans to mitigate the potentially substantial economic consequences of an attack, such as plans that set priorities for the movement of vessels after a port reopens, could be useful. To date, federal grants for port security have been directed mostly to prevention rather than response, but now DHS is moving toward a more comprehensive risk-based decision-making process for allocating grant funds. Conclusions
The ship-based supply chain for energy commodities remains threatened and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential to ensure safe and efficient delivery. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) determine the types of terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy commodities and the potential consequences of a successful attack; (2) describe what measures are being taken both internationally and domestically to protect these tankers, and what challenges, if any, federal agencies face in making these actions effective; and (3) if a terrorist attack succeeds despite these protective measures, describe what plans are in place to respond and discuss the potential challenges federal agencies may face in responding to a future attack. To describe what plans are in place for responding to a terrorist attack, should one occur despite protective measures, and discuss the challenges federal agencies may face in responding, we conducted interviews with officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice; the Environmental Protection Agency; as well as officials representing port authorities, state and local offices of public safety and emergency management, oil and gas facilities, and first responders, including police and fire departments. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Ter a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. | Why GAO Did This Study
U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55 percent of the nation's crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO's review addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO's review spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The supply chain faces three main types of threats--suicide attacks such as explosive-laden boats, "standoff" attacks with weapons launched from a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply chain could have a severe economic impact. Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite international agreements calling for certain protective steps, substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes. Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied natural gas. Some units' workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not developed plans for shifting resources among units. Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The President's maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in response. |
gao_GGD-96-152 | gao_GGD-96-152_0 | We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, IRS has not made adequate progress in correcting its management and technical weaknesses, and none of our recommendations have been fully implemented. As we reported, until IRS’ weaknesses are corrected and our recommendations are fully implemented, we believe the Congress should consider limiting TSM spending to only cost-effective modernization efforts that support ongoing operations and maintenance; correct IRS’ pervasive management and technical weaknesses; are small, represent low technical risk, and can be delivered in a relatively short time frame; and involve deploying already developed systems that have been fully tested, are not premature given the lack of a completed architecture, and produce a proven, verifiable business value. Developing the Capacity to Make Sound Technology Investments
Successfully achieving IRS’ business goals—reducing the volume of paper returns, better serving customers, and improving compliance—will depend heavily on investing in information technology. No Single IRS Entity Controls All Information Systems Efforts
IRS has not yet established an effective organizational structure to consistently manage and control systems modernization organizationwide. Plans Must Be Defined and Capabilities Strengthened Before Obtaining Additional Contractor Support
By increasing its reliance on contractors, IRS expects to improve the accountability for and probability of TSM success. We are encouraged that Treasury is taking a more active role in overseeing IRS’ efforts to improve its business operations. It is charged with reviewing: present IRS practices, especially its organizational structure, paper and return processing activities, infrastructure, and collection process; what is required for improvements in (1) making returns processing “paperless,” (2) modernizing IRS operations, (3) improving the collections process without major increases in personnel or funding, (4) improving taxpayer accounts management, (5) improving accuracy of information requested by taxpayers in order to file returns, and (6) changing the culture of IRS to make it more efficient, productive, and customer oriented; whether IRS could be replaced with a quasi-governmental organization with tangible incentives for managing its programs and activities, and for modernizing its activities; and whether IRS could perform other collection, information, and financial service functions of the federal government. The Commission’s work could help provide the added impetus necessary to (1) develop an effective implementation strategy for IRS’ business vision, (2) manage information systems as investments, (3) build a strong technical foundation for TSM, and (4) ensure the reliability of financial information and systems. In addition, IRS described the status of actions underway to resolve deficiencies in its financial management systems. IRS reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring the integrity of its financial data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed opportunities to improve the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) business operations, focusing on actions IRS needs to take to: (1) implement its business vision; (2) overcome management and technical weaknesses in its tax systems modernization (TSM) efforts; and (3) improve the reliability of its financial management systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS has not made significant progress in correcting its TSM management and technical weaknesses, and Congress should consider limiting IRS funding for TSM to critical and cost-effective projects; (2) IRS needs to develop an effective implementation strategy for its business vision, particularly regarding electronic filing, paper return processing, customer service, data capture and retrieval, and its TSM and reengineering efforts; (3) IRS needs to develop the capacity to make sound information technology investments; (4) IRS needs to build a technical foundation for TSM information systems projects, improve its software development activities, and complete systems architecture and test planning; (5) IRS has not given control of all systems development activities to one responsible official; (6) IRS must strengthen its capability to manage contracts effectively before obtaining additional contractor support; (7) IRS has not improved its financial management systems, financial records, and accounting procedures; (8) IRS, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Budget and Management need to ensure that IRS information management initiatives are promptly and fully implemented; (9) legislation has provided a good framework for measuring IRS performance in meeting its business vision; and (10) the National Commission on Restructuring IRS will have a leading role in evaluating IRS operations and recommending IRS organizational, management, and operating changes. |
gao_GAO-13-591 | gao_GAO-13-591_0 | Background
There are no specific government-wide training standards or training requirements for the federal grant workforce; however, the administration has taken some steps toward developing such standards. Establish certification standards by September 2015. Identifying the Federal Grant Workforce Presents Challenges
Despite the existence of a “grants management specialist” job series, identifying the federal grant workforce presents challenges due to differences in how agencies manage grants and the range of employees involved in grants management. OPM recognized the need for a classification that would more accurately capture the work of federal employees who manage grants, and in November 2010 the agency established a “grants management specialist” (series 1109). More than half of these employees worked at HHS. Agencies Assign Employees in a Wide Variety of Job Series to Manage Grants Other than the Grants Management Specialist Job Series
In addition to the 1109 grants management specialist series, the federal grant workforce includes a wide range of employees in other job series, many of whom function as program specialists. They identified over 5,100 employees, spanning more than 50 different occupational job series. To date, COFAR has not made public specific plans on how it will define the grant workforce, nor which members of the grant workforce—such as grants management specialists and program specialists—it intends to include when developing government-wide training standards. Agency Practices in Support of the Grant Workforce Included Identifying Competencies, Providing Agency- Specific Training, and Using Certification Programs
Government-wide Grants Management Competencies Do Not Include Competencies for Program Specialists That Some Agencies Incorporated in Their Own Models
We previously reported on the value of identifying competencies that are critical to successfully achieving agency missions and goals, such as those related to grant making, and assessing gaps in those competencies among the workforce. At HHS, several grant-making operating divisions told us that while they found OPM’s competency model useful for grants management specialists, they also needed a separate competency model for staff who function as program specialists working with their grants management specialists to manage grants. A recent effort to develop government-wide grants management competencies provides further confirmation of the importance of developing competencies based on how agencies manage grants. Agencies Have Adapted Grants Training Courses and Developed Other Training Mechanisms to Address Agency-Specific Policies and Procedures
We have previously reported that agencies need to provide their workforce with training and development that is aligned with their missions, goals, and cultures. Agencies also reported difficulties finding grants training that met all of the needs of their grant workforce. For example, Education worked with a commercial vendor to tailor the vendor’s grants training courses to reflect Education’s policies and procedures and include examples and exercises specific to the agency. Agency Experiences with Establishing Grants Management Certification Programs Illustrate the Usefulness of Tailoring Certification to Fit Roles and Responsibilities and the Value of Leadership Commitment
Certification programs are designed to ensure that individuals attain the knowledge and skills required to perform in a particular occupation or role by establishing consistent standards. For example, State identified two key roles in its grants management process—grants officers and grants officer representatives—and tailored separate certifications for these roles. A robust understanding of the diverse types of employees that make up the grant workforce and the key roles they carry out provides a foundation for the development of an effective government-wide grants training strategy. Include the program specialist role as COFAR develops a government-wide grants management competency model. 2. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, State, and Transportation; and to the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In order to better understand how the federal workforce responsible for managing grants is trained, and what challenges and good practices exist, we (1) described the federal grant workforce at selected agencies and analyzed the challenge of identifying the workforce government-wide; and (2) examined selected good practices agencies used and challenges, if any, they faced in training the grant workforce, as well as potential implications of these practices and challenges for government-wide efforts to develop grants training standards. To understand the efforts of the Council on Financial Assistance Reform we reviewed documents produced by the Council and interviewed staff at OMB. Selected Grants Management Training Practices
Grants Management Competencies and Assessing Training Needs
According to an Education official and agency documentation, the agency incorporates grants management competencies in the competency models for at least five of six job series which comprise the grant workforce. Agency-provided grants training is developed by subject- matter experts within the operating administrations or by agency-affiliated training institutes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Grants are a key tool used by the federal government to achieve a wide variety of national objectives. However, there are no government-wide training standards or requirements for the federal grant workforce. COFAR has reported it plans to develop such standards. GAO was asked to describe how the grant workforce is trained and what challenges and good practices exist. This report (1) describes the federal grant workforce at selected agencies and analyzes the challenge of identifying the workforce government-wide and (2) examines selected good practices agencies use and challenges, if any, in grants training and the potential implications for developing government-wide grants training standards. GAO obtained government-wide information on grants training through a questionnaire to chief learning officers at 22 federal agencies. For in-depth illustrative examples of grants training practices and challenges, GAO selected four agencies--Education, HHS, State, and DOT--based on factors such as total grant obligations and the number and type of grant programs administered. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials at OMB and OPM.
What GAO Found
Identifying the federal grant workforce presents challenges due to differences in how agencies manage grants and the wide range of job series that make up the grant workforce. Some agencies manage grants by using a combination of program specialists (subject-matter experts) and grants management specialists, while other agencies use program specialists to manage the entire grant process. In the four agencies that GAO focused on for this review--the Departments of Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), State (State), and Transportation (DOT)--agency officials identified over 5,100 employees who were significantly involved in managing grants, spanning more than 50 different occupational job series. Recognizing the need for a classification that would more accurately capture the work of federal employees who manage grants, in 2010 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) created the "Grants Management Specialist" job series. However, due to the different ways that agencies manage grants, the extent to which agencies have adopted this series varies widely. More than half of the 22 federal grant-making agencies GAO surveyed make limited or no use of the job series. The Council on Financial Assistance Reform (COFAR), established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in October 2011 to provide recommendations on grants policy and management reforms, has announced plans to develop government-wide grants training standards, but it has not released information on how it plans to define the grant workforce. Defining the grant workforce is an important step in developing an effective government-wide grants training strategy.
Agency officials identified three key practices to develop the grant workforce: (1) competencies, (2) agency-specific training, and (3) certification programs. First, some agencies developed their own competency models in order to better reflect the way they assigned grants management responsibilities. Officials at these agencies told GAO that OPM's grants management competency model was not directly applicable to employees carrying out the program specialist role in their organizations. For example, rather than apply OPM's competency model, a component of HHS developed a separate competency model tailored to program specialist employees responsible for managing grants. Second, agencies addressed their grants training needs through courses and other training mechanisms designed to provide knowledge of agency-specific policies and procedures. Officials reported challenges finding grants training that met all the needs of the grant workforce, and responded to this by customizing grants training courses. For example, Education customized commercial courses to include agency-specific policies and procedures and a component of HHS developed its own grants management courses to achieve the same goal. Third, to ensure a minimum level of proficiency in grants management, some agencies established grants management certification programs and tailored the certifications to fit the different roles within the grant workforce. For example, State tailored separate certification programs after recognizing two distinct roles played by its employees who manage grants. These agencies' experiences have implications for COFAR's plans to develop government-wide training standards, including creating grants management competencies, delivering training for those competencies, and establishing certification standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to the Director of OMB regarding the importance of including both types of grants management roles--grants management specialists and program specialists--when developing government-wide grants management competencies and certification standards.
OMB staff concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-228 | gao_HEHS-98-228_0 | The benefit amounts are based primarily on a worker’s earnings. Proponents of adding rates of return to the PEBES believe these rates would provide individuals with information on the current program and enable them to compare their rate of return for Social Security with rates for other investments. Using Rate of Return Estimates for Social Security Poses Challenges
Analysts disagree about whether it is appropriate to use rates of return to evaluate the Social Security program and the options for reform. Analysts Disagree on Using a Rate of Return for Social Security
As part of the Social Security reform debate, some analysts contend that comparing rates of return for Social Security with rates for the private market will help individuals understand that they could have potentially higher retirement incomes with a new system of individual retirement savings accounts. Other analysts, however, contend that the rate of return concept should not be applied to Social Security for various reasons. For example, the Social Security program is designed to help ensure that low-wage earners have adequate income in their retirement. To be clearly understood, rate of return estimates for Social Security need an explanation of how they are calculated and how uncertain the estimates are. Factors Contributing to Uncertainty of Estimates
Many factors that would be included in rate of return estimates for Social Security are subject to considerable uncertainty, and these uncertainties mean that the actual rates of return that individuals receive could vary substantially from their estimates. Explanations would be needed to understand a number of important factors, including whether the rates of return incorporated the transaction and administrative costs for investments or annuities, the differences in risk associated with Social Security and private investments, and the questions of how to treat the costs of the benefits promised under the current system when switching to any other retirement system. Presenting Rate of Return Information Would Complicate PEBES
The PEBES aims to provide information about the complex programs and benefits available through the Social Security program; however, the current statement is already lengthy and difficult to understand. Rate of Return Information Would Further Complicate PEBES
For rate of return information on the PEBES to be understood, SSA would need to (1) decide how much information to provide and (2) explain it in simple straightforward language—language that could be easily understood by the diverse population of workers slated to receive the statement. Personal Earnings and Benefit Estimate Statement
Comments From the Social Security Administration
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the recent proposal that would require the Social Security Administration (SSA) to place on the Personal Earnings and Benefit Estimate Statements (PEBES) an individualized estimate of the rates of return workers receive on their contributions to the Social Security program, focusing on the: (1) general implications of using a rate of return for social security; and (2) challenges of including this information on the PEBES.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there is substantial disagreement about whether the rate of return concept should be applied to the Social Security program; (2) supporters of such an application point out that a rate of return would provide individuals information about the return they receive on their contributions to the program; (3) however, others contend that it is inappropriate to use rate of return estimates for social security because the program is designed to pursue social insurance goals, such as ensuring that low-wage earners have adequate income in their old age or that dependent survivors are adequately provided for; (4) in addition, calculations for rates of return rely on a number of assumptions that affect the resulting estimates; (5) for individuals, the actual rates of return can vary substantially from the estimates due to various uncertainties, such as a worker's actual retirement age and future earnings; (6) to be clearly understood, the underlying assumptions and their effect on the estimates should be explained in any presentation of rate of return information; (7) furthermore, comparing rate of return estimates for social security with estimates for private investments could be difficult for various reasons; (8) for example, the comparisons would need to indicate whether the estimates for other investments include the transaction and administrative costs and the differences in risk associated with the social security trust funds and private investments; (9) providing rate of return information on the PEBES could further complicate and lengthen an already complex and difficult-to-understand statement; (10) in GAO's previous work, it concluded that the current PEBES is too long and its explanations of social security's complex programs are not easy for the public to understand; and (11) adding rate of return estimates to the PEBES would require detailed explanations about how the calculations were made and what assumptions were used about comparing a rate of return for social security with rates for private investments. |
gao_GAO-05-865 | gao_GAO-05-865_0 | 1.) The most common reasons that the remaining two-thirds of the individuals left the program without a job were that the individual refused services, failed to cooperate, or could not be located or contacted. State VR agencies collectively purchased more than $1.3 billion in services for all individuals who exited the program in fiscal year 2003, two-thirds of which was used to provide services to individuals exiting with employment. Employment, earnings, and the amount of purchased services received while in the VR program varied significantly by individuals’ type of disability and other characteristics. In addition, the state VR agencies varied substantially in the employment rates they achieved, the characteristics of individuals they served, their frequency of providing certain services, and their service expenditures. One-Third of Individuals Exited the VR Program Nationwide with Employment in Fiscal Year 2003
Of the more than 650,000 individuals exiting the VR program in fiscal year 2003, one-third (217,557) obtained a new job or maintained their existing job for at least 90 days after receiving customized services. 2.) Of those who exited without employment in fiscal year 2003, most did so because they refused services or failed to cooperate with their VR counselor (46 percent of the time) or could not be located or contacted (24 percent). 5.) Education’s VR Performance Measures Are Not Comprehensive, and Its Monitoring of State VR Agencies’ Performance Has Not Resulted in Timely Feedback
Education’s VR performance measures are not comprehensive in that they count only individuals exiting VR programs and fail to measure key populations. Moreover, the targets Education sets for performance do not take into consideration regional differences in VR populations or allow for comparisons across workforce programs. Education’s monitoring reports—state VR agencies’ primary source of feedback—are frequently late and based on data that are more than 2 years old. As a result, state VR agencies are not getting the kind of timely feedback they need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their programs. Education’s recent decision as part of its restructuring efforts to eliminate its regional VR offices, which had conducted most of the monitoring of state VR agencies, has made the details of the future monitoring process unclear. Education Does Not Effectively Monitor and Manage the Performance of State VR Agencies
In monitoring and managing the performance of state VR agencies, Education does not provide timely feedback, censure poorly performing agencies, or take full advantage of opportunities to promote the sharing of best practices among state VR agencies. Education also uses its Web site to disseminate information on best practices. Further, its performance measures do not take into account demographic and economic variations among states. Copies of this report are being sent to the Department of Education, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. To further determine the extent to which state VR agencies assist individuals in achieving employment as well as the extent to which Education monitors and measures performance to manage this decentralized VR program, we interviewed key program officials at Education’s headquarters and each regional office responsible for monitoring the state VR agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Education (Education) provides more than $2.5 billion annually to the states for a federal-state vocational rehabilitation (VR) program to help individuals with disabilities become employed. This program is among a large number of federal programs intended to assist people with disabilities. In 2003 GAO placed federal disability programs on its list of high-risk programs because many of these programs have not kept up with scientific advances and economic and social changes. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority as part of an effort to assist policy makers in determining how federal disability programs could more effectively meet the needs of individuals with disabilities and addressed it to each committee of jurisdiction. In this report, GAO assesses the (1) extent to which state VR agencies assist individuals in achieving employment, and (2) performance measures and monitoring practices Education uses to manage this decentralized program and achieve legislative goals.
What GAO Found
Of the more than 650,000 individuals exiting the state VR programs in fiscal year 2003, one-third (217,557) obtained a new job or maintained their existing job for at least 90 days after receiving services. Education's data showed that the remaining two-thirds exited the VR program without employment most often because the individual refused services or failed to cooperate with the VR counselor (46 percent of the time) or could not be located or contacted (24 percent). The VR program purchased more than $1.3 billion in services for all individuals who exited the program in fiscal year 2003, two-thirds of which were used to provide services to individuals exiting with employment. Employment, earnings, and the amount of purchased services received while in the VR program varied significantly by individuals' disability type and other characteristics. In addition, state VR agencies varied substantially in the employment rates they achieved, the characteristics of individuals they served, their frequency of providing certain services, and their service expenditures. Education's performance measures are not comprehensive, and its monitoring of state VR agencies has not resulted in timely feedback. Education does not comprehensively measure the performance of certain key populations, such as students transitioning from school to work, and tracks only the individuals who exit the program, not those still receiving services. In addition, Education's performance measures do not take into consideration all the variation among the state VR agencies or allow for comparisons with other workforce programs. Education's monitoring reports, which are its primary means of providing feedback to state VR agencies, are frequently late and based on data that are more than 2 years old. Consequently, state VR agencies do not receive the timely feedback needed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their programs. In managing the performance of the VR program, Education also does not censure poorly performing state VR agencies, reward strong performance, or take full advantage of opportunities to disseminate best practices. Education recently decided to eliminate its regional offices, which conducted most of the monitoring of state VR agencies, making the details of the future monitoring process unclear. |
gao_AIMD-95-180 | gao_AIMD-95-180_0 | Overview of the ALMRS/Modernization Project
BLM has designated the ALMRS/Modernization project as a mission-critical system to (1) automate land and mineral records and case processing activities and (2) provide information to support land and resource management activities. Also, BLM estimates that it will exceed the fiscal year 1996 limit of $69.5 million by $25.2 million. Progress on the Development and Implementation of ALMRS/ Modernization
BLM has completed most of the initial installation of computer and telecommunications equipment and has met most of its ALMRS IOC, GCDB, and rehost milestones thus far. BLM has taken action to maintain its tight development schedule, but slippages could still occur because there is little schedule time available to correct unanticipated problems. BLM recently revised the installation schedule because of an anticipated reduction in funding for fiscal year 1996. However, the project schedule could slip because there is little time available to deal with unexpected problems. BLM’s recent action to obtain independent verification and validation of ALMRS IOC software should help ensure that BLM’s requirements are met. The Bureau said it now plans to stress test the entire ALMRS/ Modernization to ensure that all systems and technology can process the workloads expected during peak operating conditions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) modernization of its Automated Land and Mineral Record System (ALMRS), focusing on: (1) BLM progress in developing and implementing ALMRS modernization; and (2) potential modernization risks.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although BLM initiated ALMRS planning in the early 1980s, it did not award the modernization contract until 1993 because of numerous changes in the project's concept and scope; (2) BLM has installed most of its initial computer and telecommunications equipment and has met most of its schedule milestones, but it is deferring some equipment deployment until fiscal year (FY) 1996 and FY 1997 because of a lack of funds; (3) project costs are expected to exceed the FY 1996 spending limit by $25.5 million due to added system requirements; (4) schedule slippages may occur because ALMRS modernization is becoming more complicated and BLM has allocated little time to deal with unanticipated problems; and (5) although BLM has recently obtained independent verification and validation of new ALMRS software to ensure that it meets BLM needs, BLM does not plan to stress test the entire ALMRS modernization project to access its ability to meet anticipated peak workloads. |
gao_GAO-13-368 | gao_GAO-13-368_0 | The Higher Education Opportunity Act
In part to ensure that students have access to information about selected course materials, Congress included several provisions related to textbook information in the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA), as described below. Publishers Have Disclosed Required Information and Made Materials Available Individually, but Stakeholders Said These Practices Had a Limited Effect on Faculty Decisions
Publishers Have Disclosed Required Information Online and in Other Marketing Materials
The eight publishers included in this study have disclosed textbook information including retail prices, available alternative formats, and descriptions of substantial content revisions between editions. In most cases, publishers’ textbook information was available to students and the public, in addition to faculty. Publishers Have Made Bundled Materials Available for Sale Individually
All publishers included in this study have made bundled materials available for sale individually, which is a requirement of HEOA. Faculty told us they typically prioritize selecting the most appropriate materials for their courses over pricing and format considerations. Changes in technology and available options in the college textbook market—factors unrelated to HEOA—have also shaped faculty decisions about course materials. Although faculty decisions about textbook selections have not changed much in response to publisher practices, representatives of faculty groups told us they are more aware of affordability than they used to be. Most Schools Provided Textbook Information Online, and Stakeholders Said Students Benefited from Increased Transparency
Most Schools Provided Textbook Information Online
Based on our review of a nationally representative sample of school websites, most schools provided students and college bookstores with the textbook information specified in the HEOA provisions. Schools are structured and operate in various ways, and HEOA allows some flexibility in whether and how they disclose textbook information. An estimated 19 percent of schools did not provide textbook information online. Of the estimated 81 percent of schools that provided textbook information online for the fall 2012 term: an estimated 67 percent had an institutional textbook rental an estimated 73 percent provided some used textbook pricing information for at least one course; and an estimated 40 percent provided other pricing information—almost always for digital products—for at least one course. Stakeholders Said School and Bookstore HEOA Implementation Costs Were Manageable, and Students and Others Cited Benefits of Greater Transparency
Representatives of schools, bookstores, and higher education associations we spoke with said the costs to schools and bookstores of implementing the HEOA provisions were manageable. Students, faculty, school administrators, and most other stakeholders we spoke with said students have benefited from having timely and reliable textbook information. Representatives of student organizations at three schools said they now have sufficient information and time to shop for their course materials before each academic term. Education provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To obtain a range of perspectives, we selected five publishers that represented over 85 percent of new U.S. higher education textbook sales, according to information they provided us, as well as three smaller publishers. While we reviewed documentation of publisher efforts to provide information to faculty and make bundled materials available for sale individually, we did not evaluate whether these practices, as supported by documentation or described to us in interviews, were in compliance with the law. To determine the extent to which postsecondary schools have provided students and college bookstores access to textbook information, we reviewed websites of a nationally representative, stratified random sample of 150 schools to determine the extent to which they disclosed textbook information in their fall 2012 course schedules. We also reviewed relevant studies and federal laws. | Why GAO Did This Study
The rising costs of postsecondary education present challenges to maintaining college affordability. Textbooks are an important factor students need to consider when calculating the overall cost of attending college. In an effort to ensure that faculty and students have sufficient information about textbooks, Congress included requirements in HEOA concerning publisher and school disclosures, as well as publisher provision of individual course materials. HEOA directed GAO to examine the implementation of the new textbook provisions.
This report addresses (1) the efforts publishers have made to provide textbook information to faculty and make bundled materials available for sale individually, and how these practices have informed faculty selection of course materials; and (2) the extent to which postsecondary schools have provided students and college bookstores access to textbook information, and what the resulting costs and benefits have been. To conduct this study, GAO interviewed eight publishers representing over 85 percent of new U.S. higher education textbook sales, administrators at seven schools, four campus bookstores, two national campus retailers, faculty and student groups at three schools, and others with relevant expertise. GAO also reviewed websites of a nationally representative sample of schools, complaint data from Education, and relevant federal laws.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. The Department of Education provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Publishers included in GAO's study have disclosed textbook information required by the Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA), such as pricing and format options, and made components of bundled materials available individually, but stakeholders GAO interviewed said these practices have had little effect on faculty decisions. While most publishers in GAO's study provided all relevant textbook information, two smaller publishers did not provide copyright dates of prior editions, and one did not provide certain pricing information. Publishers communicated information to faculty online and in other marketing materials, and in most cases the information was available to students and the public. In addition, publishers said they began making bundled materials available for sale individually before HEOA was passed. Faculty GAO interviewed said they typically prioritize selecting the most appropriate materials for their courses over pricing and format considerations, although they said they are more aware of affordability issues than they used to be. Changes in the availability of options in the college textbook market that are not related to HEOA, such as the increase in digital products, have also shaped faculty decisions about course materials.
Based on GAO's review of a nationally representative sample of schools, an estimated 81 percent provided fall 2012 textbook information online, and stakeholders GAO interviewed said implementation costs were manageable and students have benefited from increased transparency. HEOA allows schools some flexibility in whether and how they disclose information and an estimated 19 percent of schools did not provide textbook information online for various reasons, such as including textbook costs in tuition and fees or not posting a course schedule online. Representatives of most schools and bookstores, as well as others GAO interviewed, said implementation costs were not substantial. In addition, there was general consensus among students and others GAO interviewed that students have benefited from timely and dependable textbook information. Specifically, representatives of student organizations said they had sufficient information and time to comparison shop for their course materials before each academic term. |
gao_GAO-07-304 | gao_GAO-07-304_0 | The Navy is responsible for establishing the six fleet readiness centers. Onetime Savings Have Been Reduced, but Uncertainty Exists about When They Will be Achieved
While the Navy has reduced the projected onetime savings from lower levels of inventory, our analysis of a sample of aviation inventory items targeted for reduction concludes that the majority of these savings would not occur during the 6-year implementation period, and the amount of such savings over time is uncertain. However, we believe the Navy’s revised annual recurring savings estimates are still overstated by approximately $53 million because they include $28 million in savings from eliminating military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, and $25 million that should have been reported as onetime, and not recurring, savings. Increases in the Navy’s annual recurring savings estimates were offset to some degree by decreases in projected savings expected from reduced facility costs. Challenges to Realizing Savings from Establishing Fleet Readiness Centers
The Navy faces challenges in ensuring that projected savings are realized from implementing the fleet readiness center recommendation in addition to some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the Navy will need to monitor the extent to which these savings are achieved. In addition, the Navy acknowledges that other challenges remain, such as identifying and moving necessary depot artisans with the right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military intermediate department workforce. While this mixing of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in implementation, it could also help in developing a better-trained and more- productive workforce if properly managed. Accordingly, the Navy has developed a detailed communication plan to describe the challenges associated with implementing this BRAC recommendation. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reporting of savings projected from BRAC 2005 recommendations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to update the business plan for the fleet readiness centers (1) to reflect only savings that are directly related to implementing the recommendation, and (2) update projected onetime savings when data are available; and monitor implementation of the recommendation to determine the extent that savings already taken from the Navy budget are actually achieved. To assess the reliability of the data used to generate estimates of costs and savings and the validity of underlying assumptions used to generate cost and savings estimates, we reviewed Navy regulations and instructions for reporting aviation maintenance data and interviewed officials at Navy Air Systems Command, Navy Aviation depots, Navy Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Departments, and Naval Supply Systems Command knowledgeable about the data and the assumptions underlying estimated costs and savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers was expected to yield more savings than any other of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. To achieve these savings the Navy plans to integrate civilian depot personnel to complete some repairs at intermediate maintenance departments to reduce aviation maintenance costs. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, is one in a series of reports related to the 2005 BRAC recommendations. GAO's objectives were to (1) analyze the reasons for changes in costs and savings estimates since the recommendation was approved, and (2) identify challenges in implementing this BRAC recommendation. GAO analyzed Navy and BRAC Commission costs and savings estimates and interviewed officials at the Naval Air Systems Command and at three fleet readiness centers.
What GAO Found
The Navy has increased onetime costs, decreased onetime savings and increased annual recurring savings expected from the fleet readiness centers recommendation, but GAO believes the savings are likely overstated. In preparing a detailed business plan for implementing the recommendation, the Navy increased onetime costs by $31 million or 96 percent because of costs associated with relocating employees and inflation. The Navy also decreased expected onetime savings from reduced inventory levels by $594 million or 92 percent because Navy officials believed earlier estimates were too optimistic. GAO's analysis of inventory levels for a sample of aviation items indicates that the majority of the revised savings estimate will not occur during the 6-year BRAC implementation period and the amount of such savings are uncertain at this time. GAO believes the annual recurring savings are overstated by about $53 million or 15 percent because the Navy's estimate includes $28 million in savings from eliminating military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, and $25 million in onetime savings that was erroneously reported as recurring savings. While projected savings would remain substantial, they are still subject to some uncertainties and further efforts will be required to assess actual savings as this recommendation is implemented. The Navy faces challenges in ensuring projected savings are realized and faces some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, it will be important for the Navy to monitor the extent to which these savings are actually achieved to prevent adverse affects on naval aviation readiness or the need for additional funding. The Navy also faces workforce challenges, such as identifying and moving about 150 depot artisans with the right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military intermediate department workforce. This mixing of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in implementation but should help develop a better trained and more productive workforce. The Navy will need sustained leadership to successfully establish the fleet readiness centers. |
gao_GAO-05-253 | gao_GAO-05-253_0 | As such, financial information reported by the agencies on the federal government’s financial support of freshwater programs in the United States and abroad is an estimate of the minimum amount of funds provided for these efforts. Federal Agencies Provided an Estimated $49 Billion for Domestic Freshwater Programs during Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004
Of the 27 agencies that provided about $49 billion in federal financial support specifically for freshwater programs in the United States during fiscal years 2000 through 2004, 3 agencies accounted for over 70 percent of the total. EPA provided about 31 percent of the total support, the Corps accounted for about 26 percent of the total, and Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service accounted for about 16 percent of the total. Domestic drinking water supply and wastewater treatment programs were supported by 18 and 16 agencies, respectively. Grant programs and direct federal spending provided over $22 billion and about $22 billion, respectively, for domestic freshwater programs. We also identified domestic programs that may provide financial support for freshwater activities, but are not included in the $49 billion because supporting freshwater activities is not the programs’ primary purpose and activity-level data is not readily available. For the purposes of our review, we include information on U.S. contributions to these commissions in the same section as the information for domestic freshwater programs because these projects are joint efforts among the United States, Canada, and Mexico along the shared borders; however, information on funding spent solely in the United States by the commissions is not readily available. Federal Agencies Provided an Estimated $3 Billion for Freshwater Programs Abroad during Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004
Of the about $3 billion of U.S. financial support provided internationally for freshwater programs during fiscal years 2000 through 2004, an estimated $2 billion was spent throughout most of the world, and more recently another $1 billion supported freshwater projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Seven of the 8 agencies reported that they provided financial support for wastewater treatment and watershed management programs abroad. The United States Also Provided Financial Contributions to Various International Organizations That Support Freshwater Programs
In addition to providing financial support directly through federal agencies for freshwater programs abroad, the United States also indirectly supports these programs through its contributions to numerous international organizations (e.g., the United Nations and the World Bank). For the purpose of our review, we examined freshwater programs that support desalination; drinking water supply; flood control; irrigation; navigation (primarily for river-based transportation); wastewater treatment; water conservation; water dispute management; and watershed protection, restoration, and management activities. The agency also receives financial support from other federal agencies—such as Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Corps—to support domestic freshwater programs, including watershed management, irrigation, and water conservation. Consequently, the department supports multiple types of freshwater programs. Each of the 388 national parks is responsible for management activities in the park. U.S. Agency for International Development: $1.8 Billion
The U.S. Agency for International Development is an independent federal agency created under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Some portion of the general budgets of these organizations was used to support freshwater projects around the world. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the world's population tripled during the past century, demand for the finite amount of freshwater resources increased six-fold, straining these resources for many countries, including the United States. The United Nations estimates that, worldwide, more than 1 billion people live without access to clean drinking water and over 2.4 billion people lack the basic sanitation needed for human health. Freshwater supply shortages--already evident in the drought-ridden western United States--pose serious challenges and can have economic, social, and environmental consequences. Multiple federal agencies share responsibility for managing freshwater resources, but consolidated information on the federal government's financial support of these activities is not readily accessible. GAO was asked to determine for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 how much financial support federal agencies provided for freshwater programs in the United States and abroad. For the purposes of this report, freshwater programs include desalination, drinking water supply, flood control, irrigation, navigation, wastewater treatment, water conservation, water dispute management, and watershed management.
What GAO Found
Of the over $52 billion in total financial support provided by federal agencies for freshwater programs during fiscal years 2000 through 2004, about $49 billion was directed to domestic programs and about $3 billion supported programs abroad. Domestic program activities involved 27 federal agencies, but 3 agencies--the Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Agriculture's (Agriculture) Rural Utilities Service--accounted for over 70 percent of the financial support. Eighteen agencies supported domestic drinking water supply programs and 16 supported domestic wastewater treatment and watershed management programs. Grant programs of over $22 billion and direct federal spending of about $22 billion accounted for most of the domestic financial support. In addition to the about $49 billion that directly support freshwater activities in the United States, some agencies also have programs that may indirectly support such activities, but it is difficult to determine the dollar value of this indirect support. For example, Agriculture's Conservation Reserve Program supports multiple activities, including irrigation, but information on each activity supported by the program is not readily available. Also included in the domestic program is about $175 million that the United States provided to three commissions that conduct freshwater activities along U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada. Of the estimated $3 billion in total financial support directed toward freshwater programs abroad between fiscal years 2000 through 2004, about $1 billion was recently provided for freshwater projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most of the financial support for international freshwater programs was provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Foreign wastewater treatment and watershed management programs were the ones that most of the agencies supported. The vast majority of the U.S. support for international programs was provided through grants. Not included in the $3 billion for international support are the contributions that the United States made to the general budgets of numerous international organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank. The international organizations used some portion of the U.S. contributions to support freshwater activities around the globe. |
gao_AIMD-98-14 | gao_AIMD-98-14_0 | The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), GAO, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and others reported on the need to change the way credit programs were budgeted. Portraying a loan program as less costly than it really is when competing for funds under the discretionary caps means more or larger loans or loan guarantees could be made with a given appropriation since the program then could rely on automatic funding for subsequent reestimates to cover any shortfalls. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to determine (1) whether agencies completed estimates and reestimates of subsidy costs, (2) whether we could readily identify any trends including improvements in subsidy estimates as reported by the agencies, and (3) whether we could readily identify the causes for changes in subsidy estimates. You also asked us whether agencies with discretionary credit programs initially underestimated credit subsidy costs in response to the incentive created by the availability of permanent, indefinite budget authority for credit reestimates. We requested that agencies provide budget data and information for the selected programs for fiscal years 1992 through 1998. Problems Persist With Agencies’ Estimates of Subsidy Cost
In each of the agencies in our study, we found problems with the availability of estimated subsidy rates and supporting documentation and with the reliability of the subsidy rate estimates. Reliability of Some Subsidy Estimate Data Is Questionable
The reliability of credit data is questionable for a number of reasons including (1) the poor results of financial statement audits, (2) discrepancies we found between subsidy rates reported in the President’s Budget and the data confirmed to us by the agencies, (3) subsidy rate estimates not always supported by documentation, (4) acknowledgements from some staff that component data were questionable, and (5) staff reports of difficulties with systems support. USDA’s OIG gave a qualified audit opinion on the fiscal year 1996 financial statements of the rural development mission area because it was unable to obtain sufficient support for credit program receivables and estimated losses on loan guarantees and the related credit reform program subsidy and appropriated capital used. Over time we would expect to find that, for a given cohort, the annual changes in reestimates due to technical factors would be smaller. Because reliable component data were not available, we could not readily determine whether this had occurred. However, total subsidy estimates within a given cohort often varied widely over time. The available data we were able to obtain were not sufficient to assess whether a credit program’s budgetary treatment affected its initial subsidy estimates. The availability of automatic funding for reestimates of subsidy costs creates an incentive for agencies with discretionary programs to initially underestimate subsidy costs. While no single agency yet is successful in all aspects of credit reform implementation, some progress is being made at each of the agencies we studied. Two key principles of credit reform are (1) the definition of cost in terms of the present value of cash flows over the life of a credit instrument and (2) the inclusion in the budget of the costs of credit programs in the year in which the budget authority is enacted and the direct or guaranteed loans first may be disbursed. At the same time, OMB has drafted revised guidance to credit agencies. Further, changes in assumptions cause the subsidy rate for a cohort of loans to fluctuate from year to year, not reestimates. 9. 10. 6. 4. 6. 7. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on the government's measurement of subsidy costs for federal direct loans and loan guarantees, focusing on whether: (1) agencies completed estimates and reestimates of subsidy costs; (2) GAO could readily discern any trends including improvements in subsidy estimates; (3) GAO could readily identify the causes for changes in subsidy estimates; and (4) agencies with discretionary credit programs initially underestimated credit subsidy costs in response to the incentive created by the availability of permanent, indefinite budget authority for credit reestimates.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) after over 6 years of experience with credit reform, agencies continue to have problems in estimating the subsidy cost of credit programs; (2) the lack of timely reestimates as well as the frequent absence of documentation and reliable information limit the ability of agency management, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress to exercise intended oversight; (3) GAO found problems with the availability and reliability of subsidy estimates, reestimates, and supporting documentation in its cross-cutting review of 10 programs for fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1998; (4) in the audits of the FY 1996 financial statements, three of the five largest credit agencies received disclaimers or qualified opinions related to their credit programs; (5) auditors were unable to find support for agency data on such items as delinquencies and prepayments for loans receivable and liabilities for loan guarantees; (6) problems with the reliability and validity of the underlying credit data raise questions about the basis for the subsidy estimates included in the budget; (7) GAO would expect to find that, for a given cohort, the annual changes in reestimates due to technical factors would be smaller; (8) because component data were not available, GAO could not determine whether this occurred; (9) however, GAO did note that overall subsidy rates for a given cohort varied widely; (10) GAO observed a similar pattern of fluctuations in subsidy estimates at the program level; (11) subsidy rate estimates for any given program continued to fluctuate widely from year to year with no pattern or particular trend; (12) the intersection of credit reform and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990--that is, the fact that original subsidy appropriations must compete under the discretionary caps while reestimates are outside them--may offer an incentive for agencies with discretionary programs to underestimate subsidy costs initially to permit more loans or loan guarantees within a given appropriation level; (13) however, available data were not sufficient to assess whether a credit program's budgetary treatment affected its initial subsidy estimates; (14) better information on factors underlying changes in subsidy rates is needed to identify and understand why these estimates change; (15) while OMB provides a user's guide and some training on the subsidy model, it has not provided agencies with clear definitions of each component or sufficient guidance on how to use the model; and (16) while no single agency is successful in all aspects of credit reform implementation, some progress is being made at each of the agencies studied. |
gao_GAO-09-1020 | gao_GAO-09-1020_0 | The Lack of Timely, Accurate Information Has Delayed HRSA’s Redistribution of Funds and Places at Risk HRSA’s Ability to Obligate Funds in the Required Time Frame
The lack of timely and accurate information in grantees’ FSRs regarding grant year 2007 unobligated balances has delayed HRSA’s distribution of Part B supplemental grants, and places at risk HRSA’s ability to redistribute these funds by September 30, 2009, after which it will no longer have the authority to redistribute the funds. HRSA officials stated that due to grantees’ difficulty tracking funds separately, some grantees’ FSRs reported inaccurate unobligated balances, which required HRSA staff to correspond with grantees and request revised information, creating additional delays. HRSA Has Taken Actions to Collect Client-Level Data, but Some Grantees Did Not Submit Initial Reports by the Deadline
HRSA has taken actions to collect client-level data by implementing a new data collection and reporting system. HRSA stated that RSR will improve information on the clients served, the services provided to clients, and the outcomes of the services provided. RSR is designed to provide HRSA with a more accurate measure of the number of unique clients receiving CARE Act-funded services by assigning each individual an encrypted Unique Client Identifier thereby allowing the tracking of individuals who receive services from multiple providers. RSR is part of a process through which HRSA plans to collect information, including client-level data, from grantees and service providers funded under CARE Act Parts A, B, C, D, and F. First, the grantees and service providers collect data using their own data collection systems. HRSA Has Provided Financial and Technical Assistance to Grantees to Develop Their Own Client- Level Data Collection and Reporting Systems
HRSA provided financial assistance to CARE Act grantees to develop or adapt their client-level data collection and reporting systems so that they could submit the required information to RSR. Under the fiscal year 2009 SPNS initiative, HRSA awarded a total of approximately $4 million to all 57 Parts C and D grantees that applied for funding. Two of these health departments received $200,000 each. For example, officials from three health departments stated they were concerned about how to train service providers and other partners to collect client-level data. Table 2 provides a description of the reports to be submitted to RSR by grantees and service providers and the deadline for the initial reporting period for each report. The Number and Size of ADAP Waiting Lists Is Increasing
The number of individuals on ADAP waiting lists increased during grant year 2008 and has continued to increase in 2009. In the first quarter of grant year 2008 (April 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008), 2 ADAPs had waiting lists with a total of 55 people on those lists. In the fourth quarter of grant year 2008 (January 1, 2009, through March 31, 2009), there were 3 ADAPs with waiting lists, but the number of individuals on the lists had increased to 112. Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, and Wyoming all had waiting lists in August 2009. Nebraska had the largest ADAP waiting list with 71 individuals while Wyoming had the smallest list with 5 individuals. Table 3 lists the grantees with ADAP waiting lists and the number of individuals on those lists. For example, Hawaii officials expressed concern that they will have to establish a waiting list. As a result of the requirement to cancel unobligated balances and, in some cases, penalize grantees, HRSA implemented complex processes that have been difficult for grantees to comply with, thus delaying HRSA’s first implementation of the requirement. Because funds for these grants are only available until September 30, 2009, HRSA is at risk of losing the authority to make these grants. HRSA officials told us that, for grant years 2008 and 2009, they have changed their process for implementing the unobligated balance provisions in order to alleviate the burden on staff and to ensure that HRSA has the information it needs to implement the unobligated balance provisions in a timely manner. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the CARE Act, funds are made available to assist over 530,000 individuals affected by HIV/AIDS. Grantees directly provide services to individuals (clients) or arrange with service providers to do so. The Department of Health and Human Services's (HHS), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), which administers CARE Act programs, is required to cancel balances of grants that are unobligated after one year and redistribute amounts to grantees in need. HRSA began to collect client-level data in 2009. Under the CARE Act, states and territories receive grants for AIDS Drug Assistance Programs (ADAP), which provide HIV/AIDS drugs. GAO was asked to examine elements of the CARE Act. In this report, we review: (1) HRSA's implementation of the unobligated balance provisions, (2) HRSA's actions to collect client-level data, and (3) the status of ADAP waiting lists. GAO reviewed reports and agency documents and interviewed federal officials, officials from 13 state and 5 local health departments chosen based on location and number of cases, and other individuals knowledgeable about HIV/AIDS.
What GAO Found
The lack of timely and accurate information reporting by grantees has delayed HRSA's distribution of certain grants and has placed at risk HRSA's ability to obligate these funds. The late submission of actual unobligated balances for the 2007 grant year delayed HRSA's ability to determine grantees' unobligated balances and redistribute these funds to other grantees. A number of grantees were late in their submissions. For example, 21 of the 56 metropolitan areas submitted their information beyond the date initially set by HRSA. Additionally, some grantees reported inaccurate unobligated balances, which required HRSA staff to correspond with grantees and request revised information, creating additional delays. HRSA is authorized to obligate fiscal year 2007 funds for a 3-year period and is at risk of losing the authority to make grants from these funds. HRSA officials said they have made changes to how they implement the unobligated provisions in an effort to avoid these issues in the future. HRSA has taken actions to collect client-level data by implementing a new data collection and reporting system. However, some grantees and service providers did not submit the initial reports by HRSA's deadline. HRSA set a July 31, 2009, submission deadline for grantees' initial reports, but 100 of 638 grantees did not meet this deadline. Client-level data includes information such as the dates clients were served, the types of services provided, and the clients' health status. HRSA has implemented a system to collect data on the number of unique clients from grantees and service providers that will allow HRSA to determine the services each client received and the outcomes of these services. In order for HRSA to collect this information, grantees and service providers must first collect the data using their own systems, and HRSA has provided technical and financial assistance so that they can develop these systems. For example, under a project initiated in 2009, HRSA awarded approximately $4 million to CARE Act grantees for the development of their own client-level data collection systems. The number of ADAPs with waiting lists and the number of individuals on those lists is increasing. In the first quarter of grant year 2008 (April 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008), 2 ADAPs had waiting lists with a total of 55 people on those lists; this grew to 3 ADAPs and a total of 112 people in the fourth quarter of the year, and increased to 4 ADAPs and 136 individuals in August 2009. Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, and Wyoming were each maintaining a waiting list for ADAP services in August 2009; Nebraska had the largest number of individuals (71), and Wyoming had the smallest number (5). ADAP officials expressed concern that they will have to establish or expand waiting lists or implement other cost-control measures, such as limiting the number of drugs they make available. |
gao_GAO-06-517 | gao_GAO-06-517_0 | 1.) The Big Bend Dam is 95 feet high and was completed in September 1966. Consultant’s Compensation Analysis Differs from the Approach GAO Previously Used for Other Tribes
The Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ consultant differed from the approach we used in our prior reports. Consultant Used Various Settlement Proposals, Rather Than Consistently Using the Tribes’ Final Asking Prices
To arrive at an additional compensation estimate, the consultant did not consistently use the tribes’ final asking prices when calculating the difference between what the tribes asked for and what they finally received. With respect to the Fort Randall Dam, the consultant used amounts from a variety of settlement proposals for damages and administrative expenses. Lastly, the consultant did not use the tribes’ final asking prices for the rehabilitation component of the settlement payment. In our view, the consultant should have used the final rehabilitation figures proposed by the tribes in 1961—that is, $4 million for the Crow Creek Sioux tribe and $2.7 million for the Lower Brule Sioux tribe. Consultant Developed a Single Compensation Estimate for Each Tribe, Rather Than a Range of Estimates
In our two prior reports, we suggested that, for the tribes of Fort Berthold, Standing Rock, and Cheyenne River, the Congress consider a range of possible compensation based on the current value of the difference between the final asking price of each tribe and the amount that it received. Amounts Calculated by GAO Are Similar to the Amounts Received by the Tribes in the 1990s
Using the approach we followed in our prior reports, which was based on the tribes’ final asking prices, we found that the additional compensation the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes received in the 1990s was either at the high end or above the range of possible additional compensation. We then took the difference and adjusted it to account for the inflation rate and the Aaa corporate bond rate through either 1996 or 1997 to produce a possible range of additional compensation to compare it with the additional compensation the Congress authorized for the tribes in 1996 and 1997. There are two primary reasons for the difference between our additional compensation amounts and the consultant’s amounts. Second, our dollar values were adjusted to account for inflation and interest earned only through 1996 and 1997 to compare them with what the two tribes received in additional compensation at that time. The consultant, however, adjusted for interest earned up through 2003. In addition, he then incorrectly adjusted for the additional compensation the tribes were authorized in the 1990s. 109 and S. 374—would have the opposite effect. Our analysis does not support the additional compensation amounts contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374. Consultant’s Comments and Our Evaluation
Because the consultant’s analysis was the basis for the tribes’ additional compensation claims and the consultant had asserted that the additional compensation amounts were based on a methodology deemed appropriate by GAO, we chose to provide the tribes’ consultant with a draft of this report for review and comment. GAO Comments
1. Nonetheless, if the Congress relies on our analysis in this report and does not provide a third round of compensation to the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, the additional compensation provided to five of the seven tribes—the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe, the Crow Creek Sioux tribe, the Lower Brule Sioux tribe, the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, and the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation—would generally fall within the ranges we calculated using our approach, thereby leaving only two tribes—the Santee Sioux tribe and the Yankton Sioux tribe— that would have had their additional compensation calculated on a per- acre basis and not reviewed by GAO. 6. First, other tribes not affected by dam projects were also provided with rehabilitation funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1946 to 1966, the government constructed the Fort Randall and Big Bend Dams as flood control projects on the Missouri River in South Dakota. The reservoirs created behind the dams flooded about 38,000 acres of the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Indian reservations. The tribes received compensation when the dams were built and additional compensation in the 1990s. The tribes are seeking a third round of compensation based on a consultant's analysis. The Congress provided additional compensation to other tribes after two prior GAO reports. For those reports, GAO found that one recommended approach to providing additional compensation would be to calculate the difference between the tribe's final asking price and the amount that was appropriated by the Congress, and then to adjust it using the inflation rate and an interest rate to reflect a range of current values. GAO was asked to assess whether the tribes' consultant followed the approach used in GAO's prior reports. The additional compensation amounts calculated by the tribes' consultant are contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374.
What GAO Found
The tribes' consultant differed from the approach used in prior GAO reports by (1) not using the tribes' final asking prices as the starting point of the analysis and (2) not providing a range of additional compensation. First, in calculating additional compensation amounts, GAO used the tribes' final asking prices, recognizing that their final settlement position should be the most complete and realistic. In contrast, the consultant used selected figures from a variety of tribal settlement proposals. For example, for the rehabilitation component of the tribes' settlement proposals, the consultant used $13.1 million from proposals in 1957, rather than $6.7 million from the tribes' final rehabilitation proposals in 1961. Second, the tribes' consultant calculated only the highest additional compensation dollar value rather than providing the Congress with a range of possible additional compensation based on different adjustment factors, as in the earlier GAO reports. Based on calculations using the tribes' final asking prices, GAO's estimated range of additional compensation is generally comparable with what the tribes were authorized in the 1990s. By contrast, the consultant estimated about $106 million and $186 million for Crow Creek and Lower Brule, respectively (in 2003 dollars). There are two primary reasons for this difference. First, GAO used the tribes' final rehabilitation proposals from 1961, rather than the 1957 proposals used by the consultant. Second, GAO's dollar amounts were adjusted only through 1996 and 1997 to compare them directly with what the tribes received at that time. The consultant, however, adjusted for interest earned through 2003, before comparing it with the payments authorized in the 1990s. The additional compensation already authorized for the tribes in the 1990s is consistent with the additional compensation authorized for other tribes on the Missouri River. GAO's analysis does not support the additional compensation amounts contained in H.R. 109 and S. 374. |
gao_GAO-07-1211T | gao_GAO-07-1211T_0 | OMB plays a key role in overseeing the implementation and management of federal IT investments. OMB’s responsibilities under the act include establishing processes to analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital investments in information systems made by executive agencies. OMB must also report to Congress on the net program performance benefits achieved as a result of major capital investments in information systems that are made by executive agencies. Accordingly, we made several recommendations to agencies to improve their practices. Poorly Planned and Performing Projects Total at Least $10 Billion in Estimated Expenditures for Fiscal Year 2008
OMB and federal agencies have identified approximately 227 IT projects— totaling at least $10.4 billion in expenditures for fiscal year 2008—as being poorly planned, poorly performing, or both. Table 1 provides a historical perspective of the number of these projects and their associated budget since OMB started reporting on the Management Watch List in the President’s budget request for 2004. OMB Has Taken Steps to Improve the Identification and Oversight of Management Watch List and High Risk Projects, but Additional Efforts Are Needed
OMB has taken steps to improve the identification and oversight of the Management Watch List and high risk projects by addressing some of the recommendations we previously made, but additional efforts are needed to more effectively perform these activities and ultimately ensure that potentially billions of taxpayer dollars are not wasted. Specifically, we previously recommended that OMB take action to improve the accuracy and reliability of exhibit 300s and application of the high risk projects criteria, and perform governmentwide tracking and analysis of Management Watch List and high risk project information. However, questions remain as to whether all high risk projects with shortfalls are being reported by agencies. To its credit, OMB started publicly releasing aggregate lists of the Management Watch List and high risk projects in September 2006, and has been releasing updated versions on a quarterly basis by posting them on their website. While this is a positive step, OMB does not publish the specific reasons that each project is placed on the Management Watch List, nor does it specifically identify why high risk projects are poorly performing, as we have done in appendix II. Providing this information would allow OMB and others to better analyze the reasons projects are poorly planned and performing and take corrective actions and track these projects on a governmentwide basis. Such information would also help to highlight progress made by agencies or projects, identify management issues that transcend individual agencies, and highlight the root causes of governmentwide issues and trends. In summary, the Management Watch List and high risk projects processes play important roles in improving the management of federal IT investments by helping to identify poorly planned and poorly performing projects that require management attention. Until further improvements in the identification and oversight of poorly planned and poorly performing IT projects, potentially billions in taxpayer dollars are at risk of being wasted. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plays a key role in overseeing federal information technology (IT) investments. The Clinger-Cohen Act, among other things, requires OMB to establish processes to analyze, track, and evaluate the risks and results of major capital investments in information systems made by agencies and to report to Congress on the net program performance benefits achieved as a result of these investments. OMB has developed several processes to help carry out its role. For example, OMB began using a Management Watch List several years ago as a means of identifying poorly planned projects based on its evaluation of agencies' funding justifications for major projects, known as exhibit 300s. In addition, in August 2005, OMB established a process for agencies to identify high risk projects and to report on those that are performing poorly. GAO testified last year on the Management Watch List and high risk projects, and on GAO's recommendations to improve these processes. GAO was asked to (1) provide an update on the Management Watch List and high risk projects and (2) identify OMB's efforts to improve the identification and oversight of these projects. In preparing this testimony, GAO summarized its previous reports on initiatives for improving the management of federal IT investments. GAO also analyzed current Management Watch List and high risk project information.
What GAO Found
OMB and federal agencies have identified approximately 227 IT projects--totaling at least $10.4 billion in expenditures for fiscal year 2008--as being poorly planned (on the Management Watch List), poorly performing (on the High Risk List with performance shortfalls), or both. OMB has taken steps to improve the identification and oversight of the Management Watch List and High Risk projects by addressing recommendations previously made by GAO, however, additional efforts are needed to more effectively perform these activities. Specifically, GAO previously recommended that OMB take action to improve the accuracy and reliability of exhibit 300s and consistent application of the high risk projects criteria, and perform governmentwide tracking and analysis of Management Watch List and high risk project information. In response to these recommendations, OMB, for example, started publicly releasing aggregate lists of Management Watch List and high risk projects by agency in September 2006 and has been updating them since then on a quarterly basis. However, OMB does not publish the reasons for placing projects on the Management Watch List, nor does it specifically identify why high risk projects are poorly performing. Providing this information would allow OMB and others to better analyze the reasons projects are poorly planned and performing, take corrective actions, and track these projects on a governmentwide basis. Such information would also help to highlight progress made by agencies or projects, identify management issues that transcend individual agencies, and highlight the root causes of governmentwide issues and trends. Until OMB makes further improvements in the identification and oversight of poorly planned and poorly performing IT projects, potentially billions in taxpayer dollars are at risk of being wasted. |
gao_GAO-07-944T | gao_GAO-07-944T_0 | RMA Has Strengthened Procedures for Preventing Questionable Claims, but the Program Remains Vulnerable to Potential Abuse
RMA has taken a number of steps to improve its procedures to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, such as data mining, expanded field inspections and quality assurance reviews. However, as we testified in 2006, RMA was not effectively using all of the tools it had available and that some farmers and others continued to abuse the program, as the following discussion indicates. Inspections during the growing season were not being used to maximum effect. FSA was not providing RMA with inspection assistance in accordance with USDA guidance. For example, between 2001 and 2004, farmers filed claims on about 380,000 policies annually, and RMA’s data mining identified about 1 percent of these claims as questionable and needing FSA’s inspection. Under USDA guidance, FSA should have conducted all of the 11,966 requested inspections, but instead conducted only 64 percent of them; FSA inspectors said that they did not conduct all requested inspections primarily because they did not have sufficient resources. RMA’s data analysis of the largest farming operations was incomplete. Because it did not know the ownership interests in the largest farming operations, RMA could not readily identify potential fraud. According to our analysis, RMA should be able to recover up to $74 million in claims payments for 2003. RMA agreed with our recommendation to improve oversight of companies’ quality assurance programs, but we have not yet followed up with the agency to examine its implementation. RMA has infrequently used its new sanction authority to address program abuses. RMA’s Regulations and Some Statutory Requirements Hinder Efforts to Reduce Abuse in the Crop Insurance Program
While RMA can improve its day-to-day oversight of the federal crop insurance program in a number of ways, the program’s design, as laid out in RMA’s regulations or as required by statute, hinders the agency’s efforts to administer certain program provisions in order to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, as the following discussion indicates. RMA’s regulations allow farmers the option of insuring their fields individually rather than combined as one unit. Insuring fields separately enables farmers to “switch” production among fields—reporting production of a crop from one field that is actually produced on another field—either to make false insurance claims based on low production or to build up a higher yield history on a particular field in order to increase that field’s eligibility for higher future insurance guarantees. Statutorily high premium subsidies may inhibit RMA’s ability to control program abuse. High premium subsidies shield farmers from the full effect of paying higher premiums. Since the crop insurance program was revised under ARPA—that is, from 2002 through 2006—USDA has paid the insurance companies a total of $2.8 billion in underwriting gains. In terms of profitability, these underwriting gains represent an average annual rate of return of 17.8 percent over this 5-year period. According to industry statistics, the benchmark rate of return for U.S. insurance companies selling private property and casualty insurance was 6.4 percent during this period. However, they stated that this program should have a somewhat higher rate of return because of the (1) high volatility of underwriting gains for this program compared with the relatively steady gains associated with the property and casualty insurance industry, and (2) lack of investment opportunities when participating in the program because premiums are paid to the companies at harvest, not when farmers purchase a policy. From 2002 through 2006, USDA paid the insurance companies over $4 billion in cost allowances. Specifically, USDA recommends renegotiating the SRA financial terms and conditions once every 3 years. Congress has an opportunity in its reauthorization of the Farm Bill to provide USDA with the authority to periodically renegotiate the financial terms of the SRA with the insurance companies so that the companies’ rate of return is more in line with private insurance markets. Related GAO Products
Crop Insurance: Continuing Efforts Are Needed to Improve Program Integrity and Ensure Program Costs Are Reasonable. Crop Insurance: More Needs to Be Done to Reduce Program’s Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program’s Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with private insurers. In 2006, the program cost $3.5 billion, including millions in losses from fraud, waste, and abuse, according to USDA. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 granted RMA authority to renegotiate the terms of RMA's standard reinsurance agreement with companies once over 5 years. This testimony is based on GAO's 2005 report, Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program's Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, and May 2007 testimony, Crop Insurance: Continuing Efforts Are Needed to Improve Program Integrity and Ensure Program Costs Are Reasonable. GAO discusses (1) USDA's processes to address fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) extent the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse; and (3) reasonableness of underwriting gains and other expenses. USDA agreed with most of GAO's 2005 recommendations to improve program integrity.
What GAO Found
GAO reported that RMA did not use all available tools to reduce the crop insurance program's vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. RMA has since taken some steps to improve its procedures. In particular: (1) USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) inspections during the growing season were not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA requested. Without inspections, farmers may falsely claim crop losses. However, FSA said it could not conduct all requested inspections, as GAO recommended, because of insufficient resources. RMA now provides information more frequently so FSA can conduct timelier inspections. (2) RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations was incomplete. In 2003, about 21,000 of the largest farming operations did not report all of the individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations, as required. Therefore, RMA was unaware of ownership interests that could help it prevent potential program abuse. FSA and RMA started sharing information to identify such individuals or entities, but have stopped temporarily to resolve producer privacy issues. USDA should recover up to $74 million in improper payments made during 2003. (3) RMA was not effectively overseeing insurance companies' efforts to control program abuse. According to GAO's review of 120 cases, companies did not complete all the required quality assurance reviews of claims, and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. RMA agreed to improve oversight of their reviews, but GAO has not followed up to examine its implementation. RMA's regulations to implement the crop insurance program, as well as some statutory requirements, create design problems that hinder its efforts to reduce abuse. For example, the regulations allow farmers to insure fields individually rather than together. As such, farmers can "switch" reporting of yield among fields to make false claims or build up a higher yield history on a field to increase its eligibility for higher insurance guarantees. RMA did not agree with GAO's recommendation to address the problems associated with insuring individual fields. Statutorily high premium subsidies may also limit RMA's ability to control program abuse: the subsidies shield farmers from the full effect of paying higher premiums associated with frequent claims. From 2002 through 2006, USDA paid the insurance companies underwriting gains of $2.8 billion, which represents an average annual rate of return of 17.8 percent. In contrast, according to insurance industry statistics, the benchmark rate of return for companies selling property and casualty insurance was 6.4 percent. USDA renegotiated the financial terms of its standard reinsurance agreement with the companies in 2005, but their rate of return was 30.1 percent in 2005, and 24.3 percent in 2006. It also paid the companies a cost allowance of $4 billion to cover administrative and operating costs for 2002 through 2006. USDA recommended that Congress provide RMA with authority to renegotiate the financial terms and conditions of its standard reinsurance agreement once every 3 years. |
gao_GAO-14-267T | gao_GAO-14-267T_0 | Background
DHS Acquisitions and the Cancellation of Gen-3
We have highlighted DHS acquisition management issues in our high-risk list since 2005. We released a report that evaluated the acquisition decision-making process for Gen-3 in September 2012. On April 24, 2014, DHS issued an Acquisition Decision Memo (ADM) announcing the cancellation of the acquisition of Gen-3. The ADM also announced that S&T will explore development and maturation of an effective and affordable automated aerosol biodetection capability, or other operational enhancements, that meet the operational requirements of the BioWatch system. During this process, the sample is evaluated for the presence of genetic material from five different biological agents. Our Prior Work on the Gen-3 Acquisition Identified Challenges and DHS Has Since Cancelled the Program
Our prior findings and recommendations related to the Gen-3 acquisition provide DHS with lessons learned for future decision making. For example, in addition to—or perhaps reflecting—its origin in a predetermined solution from the Mission Needs Statement, the AoA did not fully explore costs or consider benefits and risk information as part of the analysis. To help ensure DHS based its acquisition decisions on reliable performance, cost, and schedule information developed in accordance with guidance and good practices, in our September 2012 report, we recommended that before continuing the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and possible alternatives based on cost- benefit and risk information. DHS concurred with the recommendation and in 2012, DHS directed the BioWatch program to complete an updated AoA. On the basis of our review, we concluded that the IDA-conducted AoA followed the DHS guidance and resulted in a more robust exploration of alternatives than the previous effort. On April 24, 2014, the DHS Acquisition Review Board reviewed the BioWatch Gen-3 acquisition with OHA and issued an ADM announcing the cancellation of the acquisition of Gen-3. According to the DHS ADM, the AoA “did not confirm an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost of a full technology switch” to Gen-3. BioWatch program officials said the decision to cancel the Gen-3 acquisition was a cost-effectiveness measure, because the system was going to be too costly to develop and maintain in its current form. However, our prior work reviewing DHS research and development efforts highlights challenges DHS may face in transitioning the future biodetection development efforts S&T is now charged with exploring back to the program office, OHA. For example, S&T works with DHS components to ensure that it meets their R&D needs by signing technology transition agreements (TTA) to ensure that components use the technologies S&T develops. However, we previously reported in September 2012 that while S&T had 42 TTAs with DHS components, none of these TTAs has yet resulted in a technology being transitioned from S&T to a component. In that review we also found that other DHS component officials we interviewed did not view S&T’s coordination practices positively. As a result, we recommended that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D at the department-level that includes a well-understood definition of R&D that provides reasonable assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D resources and activities for internal and external use are achieved. Future Considerations for the Currently Deployed Gen-2 system
With the cancellation of the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS will continue to rely on its currently deployed Gen-2 system as an early indicator of an aerosolized biological attack. Cancellation of the Gen-3 system also raises questions that need to be answered about the future maintenance of the Gen-2 system, since it will no longer be replaced, as planned. In April 2014, program officials described some of the options they are considering to upgrade the currently deployed system, including:
The addition of a trigger to the current system to enhance performance indoors. For example, BioWatch program officials indicated they will need to replace the laboratory equipment for the currently deployed system, as early as 2015, and readjust life cycle costs. Further, while Gen-2 has been used in the field for over a decade, information about the technical capabilities for the Gen-2 system, including the limits of detection, is limited. In 2011, the National Academy of Sciences stated that the rapid initial deployment of BioWatch did not allow for sufficient testing, validation, and evaluation of the system and its components. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's BioWatch program aims to detect the presence of biological agents considered to be at a high risk for weaponized attack in major U.S. cities. Initially, development of a next generation technology (Gen-3) was led by DHS S&T, with the goal of improving upon currently deployed technology (Gen-2). Gen-3 would have potentially enabled collection and analysis of air samples in less than 6 hours, unlike Gen-2 which can take up to 36 hours to detect and confirm the presence of biological pathogens. Since fiscal year 2007, OHA has been responsible for overseeing the acquisition of this technology. GAO has published a series of reports on biosurveillance efforts, including a report on DHS's Gen-3 acquisition.
In April 2014, DHS cancelled the acquisition of Gen-3 and plans to move development efforts of an affordable automated aerosol biodetection capability, or other enhancements to the BioWatch system to DHS S&T. This statement addresses (1) observations from GAO's prior work on the acquisition processes for Gen 3, and the current status of the program; (2) observations from GAO's prior work related to DHS S&T and the impact it could have on the BioWatch program; and (3) future considerations for the currently deployed Gen-2 system.
This testimony is based on previous GAO reports issued from 2010 through 2014 related to biosurveillance and research and development, and selected updates obtained from January to June 2014. For these updates, GAO reviewed studies and documents and interviewed officials from DHS and the national labs, which have performed studies for DHS.
What GAO Found
In September 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) acquisition of a next generation biosurveillance technology (Gen-3) in October 2009 without fully following its acquisition processes. For example, the analysis of alternatives (AoA) prepared for the Gen-3 acquisition did not fully explore costs or consider benefits and risk information in accordance with DHS's Acquisition Life-cycle Framework. To help ensure DHS based its acquisition decisions on reliable performance, cost, and schedule information, GAO recommended that before continuing the Gen-3 acquisition, DHS reevaluate the mission need and alternatives. DHS concurred with the recommendation and in 2012 decided to reassess mission needs and conduct a more robust AoA. Following the issuance of the AoA in December 2013, DHS decided in April 2014 to cancel Gen-3 acquisition and move the technology development back to the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). According to DHS's acquisition decisions memorandum, the AoA did not confirm an overwhelming benefit to justify the cost of a full technology switch to Gen-3. Moreover, DHS officials said the decision to cancel the Gen-3 acquisition was a cost-effectiveness measure, because the system was going to be too costly to develop and maintain in its current form.
GAO's prior work on DHS research and development (R&D) highlights challenges DHS may face in shifting efforts back to S&T and acquiring another biodetection technology. In September 2012, GAO reported that while S&T had dozens of technology transition agreements with DHS components, none of these had yet resulted in a technology developed by S&T being used by a component. At the same time, other DHS component officials GAO interviewed did not view S&T's coordination practices positively. GAO recommended that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D at the department that includes a well-understood definition of R&D that provides reasonable assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D resources and activities for internal and external use are achieved. S&T agreed with GAO's recommendations and efforts to address them are ongoing. Addressing these coordination challenges could help to ensure that S&T's technology development efforts meet the operational needs of OHA.
Cancellation of the Gen-3 acquisition also raises potential challenges that the currently deployed Gen-2 system could face going forward. According to DHS officials, DHS will continue to rely on its Gen-2 system as an early indicator of an aerosolized biological attack. However, in 2011, National Academy of Sciences raised questions about the effectiveness of the currently deployed Gen-2 system. While Gen-2 has been used in the field for over a decade, the National Academy of Sciences reported that information about the technical capabilities of the system, including the limits of detection, is limited. In April 2014, DHS officials also indicated that they will soon need to replace laboratory equipment of the currently deployed Gen-2 system and readjust life cycle costs since there will be no Gen-3 technology to replace it. |
gao_NSIAD-95-153 | gao_NSIAD-95-153_0 | The Army is just beginning the mid- and long-term phases of its BCI efforts with the development of a COEA to identify affordable and promising alternatives. Cohesive Management Plan and Structure Needed
The services’ current management plan and structure for cooperative IFF Q&A systems, which reflect the division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy, lack needed cohesiveness. The current management structure also risks unnecessary delays in the development and fielding of a set of systems planned to help prevent future fratricide by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts differently. For example, while DOD has made development of combat identification systems a high priority, the Navy, through its funding process, did not make CAI a high priority. A joint COEA would ensure that DOD and the services have a joint analysis that will help to select systems representing the most cost and operationally effective integrated solution. In our prior report on combat identification, we noted that the Army planned to begin procuring the near-term millimeter wave cooperative identification system without an analysis of whether the near-term system could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) create a single OSD funding line for the Army’s BCI and Navy’s CAI efforts, (2) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop and institute a cohesive management structure and plan in line with the Process Action Team’s recommendation, and (3) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop a joint COEA for their BCI and CAI efforts giving due consideration to the problem and costs of obtaining systems’ interoperability. This, however, should not be the basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to accomplish the goals of the demonstration. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's and Navy's development of combat identification systems to reduce the occurrences of friendly fire incidents, focusing on the services' management plans and structures for the systems' development and integration.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army and Navy do not have a cohesive management plan and structure for the development of their cooperative combat identification systems; (2) the lack of cohesiveness reflects the division in the services' responsibilities for developing systems for different combat modes; (3) the two services have based their system development plans on different technologies and have not fully addressed how and at what cost these systems will be integrated; (4) the lack of a cohesive management structure could lead to development and deployment delays by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts differently; (5) the Navy has developed a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for its system, but the Army is just beginning to develop its COEA; (6) the development of separate COEA risks wasting resources because of duplication and delays in system development and deployment and does not address the need for interoperability; (7) the DOD proposal for a single funding line for system development would help ensure better cooperative systems development; and (8) the Army plans to procure more near-term identification systems than it needs for its planned field demonstration and without knowing if the systems are affordable and can be integrated into long-term solutions. |
gao_GAO-14-33 | gao_GAO-14-33_0 | Federal law also confers a number of benefits and protections for married spouses or former spouses.income, spouses or former spouses may receive retirement and survivor income based exclusively on marriage, independent of their own work history. This report focuses on four main sources of retirement income: (1) Social Security retirement benefits, (2) defined benefit (DB) plans, (3) defined contribution (DC) plans, and (4) individual retirement accounts In the case of certain types of retirement (IRA).provides varying types and levels of protections to spouses of workers who are eligible for Social Security, participate in an employer sponsored DB or DC plan, or own an IRA. The Decline in Marriage Is More Pronounced for Certain Demographic Groups
The decline in marriage has been more pronounced for certain racial and ethnic groups as well as income and education levels. Further, from 1987 through 2010, the percentage of households in which the wives’ earnings exceeded their husband’s rose from 24 to 38 percent. Trends in Marriage and Work Patterns Have Resulted in Fewer Women Receiving Social Security Spousal Benefits and Married Women Contributing More to Household Savings
Fewer Women Are Receiving Social Security Spousal Benefits
Fewer women are receiving Social Security spousal benefits today than in the past. At the same time, as women’s workforce participation and earnings have risen, the percentage of women receiving benefits based solely on their own work record increased from about 39 to 48 percent. Married Women’s Contributions to Household Account-Based Retirement Savings Approach Men’s in Dual- Earner Households
With women’s rising workforce participation and earnings, married women are contributing more to household account-based retirement savings, but their share of contributions varies with the work patterns of the household. Over One-Third of Married Households Receiving Income from Pensions Opted Not to Receive a Survivor Benefit
Over the last decade, over one-third of married households receiving income from pensions opted not to receive a spousal survivor benefit. Over the same period, the proportion of women who are expected to receive benefits based exclusively on marriage— known as spouse-only benefits—is projected to decline from 8 to 2 At the same time, the proportion of women who are expected percent.to receive benefits based on both work history and marriage—known as dually-entitled/spouse benefits—is projected to decrease from 15 to 8 percent. Current Trends Suggest a Growing Proportion of the Elderly Will Be at Risk of Living in Poverty During Retirement
As the population that is ineligible for spousal and survivor benefits based on marital history—i.e., those who are not married or divorced without a marriage of at least 10 years—is projected to increase, the proportion of people who will depend entirely on their own earnings and savings in retirement is expected to increase as well. For many elderly, women in particular, this shift is likely to be positive, reflecting their higher earnings and greater capacity to save for retirement. The Shift Away from Defined Benefit Plans Also Increases the Economic Vulnerability of Elderly Spouses
The transition in private employer plan sponsorship from DB to DC plans has increased the vulnerability of spouses due to differences in the level of spousal protections between these retirement plans. In contrast, under DC plans, there is generally no federal requirement to provide an annuity option and participants do not need spousal consent to withdraw funds from the account—either before or at retirement. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the Social Security Administration for review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methods
To analyze trends in marriage and labor force participation and their implications for retirement security, we examined: (1) the trends in and status of marriage and labor force participation in the American household; (2) how those trends have affected spousal benefits and retirement savings behavior within households; and (3) what the implications of these trends are for retirement security. The data in these reports draw upon Census and BLS surveys including: the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports; the Survey of Income and Program Participation; and the Annual Social and Economic Supplements, Current Population Survey. Nonetheless, our analysis of nationally representative survey data had several limitations. To identify the policy options that may address retirement security issues under Social Security and private employer-sponsored plans, we reviewed past GAO reports and interviewed experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Marriage has historically helped protect the financial health of couples and surviving spouses in old age. Based on their marriage, and independent of their own work history, spouses may receive retirement and survivor income through Social Security and some employer-sponsored pension plans. Many of the federal requirements governing these benefits were developed at a time when family structures, work patterns, and pensions were very different from what they are today. In recent decades, marriage has become less common, more households have two earners rather than one, and many employers have shifted from DB plans to DC plans. In light of these trends, GAO was asked to examine the issue of marriage and retirement security. Specifically, GAO examined: (1) the trends in and status of marriage and labor force participation in American households, (2) how those trends have affected spousal benefits and retirement savings behavior within households today, and (3) the implications of these trends for future retirement security. GAO analyzed nationally representative survey data including the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and the Current Population Survey (CPS); conducted a broad literature review; and interviewed agency officials and a range of experts in the area of retirement security.
GAO is making no recommendations. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury, and incorporated them, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Over the last 50 years, the composition and work patterns of the American household have changed dramatically. During this period, the proportion of unmarried and never-married individuals in the population increased steadily as couples chose to marry at later ages and live together prior to marriage. At the same time, the proportion of single-parent households more than doubled. These trends were more pronounced for individuals with lower levels of income and education and for certain racial and ethnic groups. Over the same period, labor force participation among married women nearly doubled.
Taken together, these trends have resulted in a decline in the receipt of spousal and survivor benefits and married women contributing more to household retirement savings. From 1960 through 2011, the percentage of women aged 62 and older receiving Social Security benefits based purely on their spouse's (or deceased spouse's) work record declined from 56 to 25. At the same time, the percentage of women receiving benefits based purely on their own work records rose from 39 to 48. Further, as of 2010, among married households receiving pensions, 40 percent had elected not to receive a survivor benefit. Rising labor force participation among married women enabled them to contribute more to household retirement savings. From 1992 to 2010, married women's average contributions to household retirement savings increased from 20 to 38 percent.
In the future, fewer retirees will receive spousal or survivor benefits from Social Security and private employer-sponsored pension plans, increasing vulnerabilities for some. Eligibility for Social Security spousal benefits among women is projected to decline, in part, because fewer women are expected to qualify based on marital history and more are expected to qualify for their own benefit based on their own work record. For many women, this shift will be positive, reflecting their greater earnings and capacity to save for retirement. However, women with low levels of lifetime earnings and no spouse or spousal benefit may face greater risk of poverty in old age. For private plans, the shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans increases the vulnerability of spouses because of different federal protections for spouses under these plans. DB plans are required to offer survivor benefits, which can only be waived with spousal consent. In contrast, DC plan participants generally do not need spousal consent to withdraw funds from the account. |
gao_GAO-03-23 | gao_GAO-03-23_0 | Before a species, such as the desert tortoise, can receive protection under the Endangered Species Act, the Secretary of the Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Service, is required to use the best available scientific and commercial data (e.g., biological or trade data obtained from scientific or commercial publications, administrative reports, maps or other graphic materials, or experts on the subject) to decide whether the species is at risk of extinction. Listing, Critical Habitat Designation, and Recommendations for Recovery Were Reasonable
Scientists we consulted agreed that the listing of the desert tortoise in 1990, the critical habitat designation, and the recommendations in the recovery plan were reasonable, based on the limited data available on the desert tortoise when the relevant decisions were made. In addition, researches noted declines in numbers. The criteria are: as determined by a scientifically credible monitoring plan, the population within a recovery unit must exhibit a statistically significant upward trend or remain stationary for at least 25 years (one desert tortoise generation); enough habitat must be protected within a recovery unit, or the habitat and desert tortoise populations must be managed intensively enough to ensure long-term population viability; provisions must be made for population management within each recovery unit so that population growth rates are stable or increasing; regulatory mechanisms or land management commitments must be implemented that provide for long-term protection of desert tortoises and their habitat; and the population in a recovery unit is unlikely to need protection under the Endangered Species Act in the foreseeable future. Research is underway in several of the recommended areas, including diseases and how they are transmitted, desert tortoise habitat and health, nutrition, predation, the effects of climate variability on tortoises, and survival of juvenile desert tortoises. Expenditures for Desert Tortoise Recovery Exceed $100 Million, but the Total Economic Impact Has Not Been Quantified
Since the desert tortoise was first listed in 1980, more than $100 million has been spent on its conservation and recovery, but the total economic impact of the recovery effort is unknown. Aside from such expenditures, the overall economic impact—benefits as well as indirect costs incurred by local governments, landowners, and developers as a result of restrictions—associated with the tortoise recovery effort is unknown, although some limited analyses have been done. The five agencies’ total staff-time estimate for these pre- and post-reporting periods is valued at about $10.6 million (in addition to the $92 million in expenditures reported by federal and state agencies). Other kinds of restrictions can similarly have an economic cost. The county has funded 5 years’ population monitoring (conducted by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources) at $115,000 per year. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the scientific basis for the 1990 listing, critical habitat designation, and recovery plan recommendations for the desert tortoise; (2) the effectiveness of actions taken by federal agencies and others to conserve desert tortoises; (3) what is known about trends in tortoise populations; and (4) costs and benefits associated with tortoise recovery actions since 1980, when one population of the tortoise was listed, to the extent that data were available. To evaluate the scientific basis for the listing decision, critical habitat designation, and recovery plan (known collectively as “key decisions”), we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to identify and assist in the selection of scientists to provide technical assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1980s, biologists have been concerned about declines in the Mojave Desert Tortoise, which ranges through millions of acres in the western United States. The tortoise was first listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act in Utah in 1980; it was later listed as threatened rangewide in 1990. The listing and designation of critical habitat for the tortoise, as well as recommendations in the tortoise recovery plan, have been controversial. In our report, we evaluate--assisted by scientists identified by the National Academy of Sciences--the scientific basis for key decisions related to the tortoise, assess the effectiveness of actions taken to conserve desert tortoises, determine the status of the population, and identify costs and benefits associated with desert tortoise recovery actions.
What GAO Found
The 1990 listing of the desert tortoise, the critical habitat designation, and recommendations in the recovery plan for the tortoise were reasonable, given the information available at the time. Under the Endangered Species Act, listing and critical habitat decisions must be based on the best available scientific and commercial data. These decisions and the recovery plan recommendations were based on sources that reflected existing knowledge about desert tortoises. To protect the tortoise, government agencies have restricted grazing and off-road vehicle use and taken other protective actions in desert tortoise habitat, but the effectiveness of these actions is unknown. Research is underway in several areas, including tortoise disease, predation, and nutrition, but the research has not assessed the effectiveness of the protective actions. Furthermore, the status of desert tortoise populations is unclear because data are unavailable to demonstrate population trends. Before the tortoise may be delisted, populations must increase or remain stable for at least 25 years--one generation of desert tortoises. Determining the trends will cost an estimated $7.5 million in the first 5 years, plus additional monitoring every 3 to 5 years at a cost of about $1.5 million per year of monitoring. The Fish and Wildlife Service depends on other agencies and organizations to assist with funding and monitoring, but these agencies and organizations cannot guarantee assistance from year to year because of other priorities. Expenditures on desert tortoise recovery since the species' first listing in 1980 exceed $100 million, but the exact investment is unknown. The investment includes $92 million in "reasonably identifiable" expenditures for the tortoise, plus staff time valued at about $10.6 million. The overall economic impact of the tortoise recovery program--including benefits as well as the costs incurred by local governments, landowners, and developers as a result of restrictions--is unknown. |
gao_GAO-06-945 | gao_GAO-06-945_0 | Under PHMSA’s regulations, which incorporate voluntary industry consensus standards for managing the system integrity of gas pipelines, operators must reassess their gas transmission pipeline segments for safety threats overall at least every 10, 15, or 20 years (consistent with industry consensus standards), depending on the condition of the pipelines and the stress under which the pipeline segments are operated. 2.) About 2010, operators will be expected to begin reassessing some segments of their pipelines for corrosion under the 7-year reassessment requirement while they are completing baseline assessments of other segments—called “the overlap.”
It is important to note that the reassessment intervals under the industry consensus standards, the 7-year reassessment requirement for corrosion, and PHMSA’s regulations for time-dependent threats represent the maximum number of years between reassessments. Baseline assessment findings conducted to date and the generally safe condition of gas transmission pipelines suggest that the 7-year requirement appears to be conservative. Most Operators Have Reported That Their Gas Transmission Pipelines Are Mostly Free of Serious Problems
Through December 2005 (latest data available), 76 percent of the operators (182 of 241) reporting baseline assessment activity to PHMSA told the agency that their gas transmission pipelines were in good condition and free of major defects, requiring only minor repairs. 1.) Forty-four of these operators have begun baseline assessments, and 37 of these 44 (84 percent) told us that they found few safety problems that required reducing pipeline pressure and performing immediate repairs in response to baseline assessments in highly populated or frequently used areas. However, nationwide, these incidents are relatively rare. Further, since operators, are required to identify and repair significant problems, the overall safety and condition of the gas transmission pipeline system should be enhanced before reassessments begin toward the end of the decade. The maximum intervals of 10, 15, and 20 years are based on worst-case corrosion growth rates. However, operators expressed their uncertainty about whether qualified direct assessment and confirmatory direct assessment contractors will be available. Operators Report that Services and Tools Are Likely to Be Available for Reassessments
Thirty-seven out of 52 operators (71 percent), one in-line inspection association, and all four inspection contractors that provide direct assessment or in-line inspection tool services that we contacted told us that the services and tools needed to conduct periodic reassessments will likely be available to most operators. 3.) As a result, operators might not be able to meet the reassessment requirement. The information provided by the operators that we contacted shows a marked overall increase in assessment and reassessment activity in 2010 (a 16 percent increase over 2009 activity) and then a gradual decrease of activity through 2012. Another reason for the difference may be due to methodology. Rather, if conditions warrant, an operator would be required to reassess a pipeline segment as frequently as needed—perhaps even more frequently than every 7 years. Scope and Methodology
To understand how the findings from operators’ baseline assessments inform us about the need to reassess gas transmission pipelines at least every 7 years, we reviewed the requirements of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 and PHMSA’s implementing regulations. To determine the extent to which gas transmission pipeline operators and local distribution companies will likely have the resources to reassess their pipelines, at least every 7 years, we synthesized testimonial and documentary evidence obtained from our discussions with (1) 52 operators (as described above) and (2) pipeline assessment tool contractors, direct assessment vendors, and industry associations on the prospective availability of equipment, equipment operators, and data analysts to interpret results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 requires that operators (1) assess gas transmission pipeline segments in about 20,000 miles of highly populated or frequently used areas by 2012 for safety threats, such as incorrect operation and corrosion (called baseline assessments), (2) remedy defects, and (3) reassess these segments at least every 7 years. Under the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) regulations, operators must reassess their pipeline segments for corrosion at least every 7 years and for all safety threats at least every 10, 15, or 20 years, based on industry consensus standards--and more frequently if conditions warrant. Operators must also carry out other prevention and mitigation measures. To meet a requirement in the 2002 act, this study addresses how the results of baseline assessments and other information inform us on the need to reassess gas transmission pipelines every 7 years and whether inspection services and tools are likely to be available to do so, among other things. In conducting its work, GAO contacted 52 operators that have carried out about two-thirds of the baseline assessments conducted to date.
What GAO Found
Periodic reassessments of gas transmission pipelines are useful because safety threats can change. However, the 7-year requirement appears to be conservative because (1) most operators found few major problems during baseline assessments, and (2) serious pipeline incidents involving corrosion are rare, among other reasons. Through December 2005 (latest data available), 76 percent of the operators (182 of 241) that had begun baseline assessments reported to PHMSA that their pipelines required only minor repairs. These results are encouraging because operators are required to assess their riskiest segments first. Since operators are also required to repair these problems, the overall safety and condition of their pipelines should be enhanced before reassessments begin. In addition, PHMSA data suggest that serious gas transmission pipeline problems due to corrosion are rare. For example, there have been no deaths or injuries as a result of incidents due to corrosion since 2001. Of the 52 operators contacted that have calculated reassessment intervals, the large majority (20 of 23) told GAO that based on conditions identified during baseline assessments, they could safely reassess their pipelines for corrosion, every 10, 15, or 20 years--as industry consensus standards prescribe unless pipeline conditions warrant an earlier assessment. Sufficient resources may be available for operators' reassessment activities, but some uncertainty exists. For the most part, the 52 operators that GAO contacted expect to be able to obtain the services and tools needed through 2012. However, they expressed some concern about whether enough qualified vendors for the confirmatory and direct assessment methods (above-ground inspections followed by excavations) would be available. Industry associations and GAO attempted to determine the degree to which activity would increase from 2010 to 2012, when operators begin reassessing pipelines while completing baseline assessments. An industry effort showed an increase in assessment and reassessment activity, but GAO's showed a decrease. The reasons for the differences are not clear but may be due, in part, to differences in the operators contacted and the methodologies used in collecting this information. |
gao_GAO-07-615T | gao_GAO-07-615T_0 | Background
Congress established FHA in 1934 under the National Housing Act (P.L. FHA determines the expected cost of its insurance program, known as the credit subsidy cost, by estimating the program’s future performance. However, FHA has estimated that, assuming no program changes, the loans it expects to insure in fiscal year 2008 would require a positive subsidy, meaning that the present value of estimated cash inflows would be less than the present value of estimated cash outflows. Two major trends in the conventional mortgage market have significantly affected FHA. FHA Has Not Implemented Sufficient Standards and Controls to Manage Financial Risks of Loans with Down-Payment Assistance
In our November 2005 report examining FHA’s actions to manage the new risks associated with the growing proportion of loans with down-payment assistance, we found that the agency did not implement sufficient standards and controls to manage the risks posed by these loans. According to FHA, high claim and loss rates for loans with this type of down-payment assistance were major reasons for changing the estimated credit subsidy rate from negative to positive for fiscal year 2008 (in the absence of any program changes). FHA has not treated such assistance as a seller inducement and, therefore, does not subject this assistance to the limits it otherwise places on contributions from sellers. Our report made several recommendations designed to better manage the risks of loans with down-payment assistance generally, and more specifically from seller-funded nonprofits. Practices That Other Mortgage Institutions Use Could Help FHA Manage Risks from Low- or No-Down- Payment Products
If Congress authorized FHA to insure mortgages with smaller or no down payments, practices that other mortgage institutions use could help FHA to design and manage the financial risks of these new products. In a February 2005 report, we identified steps that mortgage institutions take when introducing new products. Although FHA is required to provide up to 100 percent coverage of the loans it insures, FHA may engage in co-insurance of its single-family loans. Mortgage institutions also can mitigate the risk of low- and no-down- payment products through stricter underwriting. FHA has utilized pilots or demonstrations when making changes to its single-family mortgage insurance but generally has done so in response to legislative requirement rather than on its own initiative. The Way FHA Developed TOTAL Limits the Scorecard’s Effectiveness in Assessing the Default Risk of Borrowers
A primary tool that FHA uses to assess the default risk of borrowers who apply for FHA-insured mortgages is its TOTAL scorecard. Accordingly, the greater the effectiveness of TOTAL, the greater the likelihood that FHA will be able to effectively manage the risks posed by borrowers and operate in a financially sound manner. In the past 12 years, significant changes—growth in the use of down-payment assistance, for example—have occurred in the mortgage market that have affected the characteristics of those applying for FHA- insured loans. In response, FHA has developed and begun putting in place policies and procedures that call for annual (1) monitoring of the scorecard’s ability to predict loan default, (2) testing of additional predictive variables to include in the scorecard, and (3) updating the scorecard with recent loan performance data. Our ongoing work indicates that FHA plans to use borrowers’ TOTAL scores to help set insurance premiums. For example, the current reestimated cost for the fiscal year 2006 cohort is about $800 million less favorable than originally estimated. Competition from conventional mortgage providers could have resulted in FHA insuring more risky borrowers. To more reliably estimate program costs, we recommended that FHA study and report on how variables found to influence credit risk, such as payment-to-income ratios, credit scores, and down-payment assistance would affect the forecasting ability of its loan performance models. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has seen increased competition from conventional mortgage and insurance providers. Additionally, because of the worsening performance of the mortgages it insures, FHA has estimated that its single-family insurance program would require a subsidy--that is, appropriations--in fiscal year 2008 in the absence of program changes. To help FHA adapt to the evolving market, proposed changes to the National Housing Act would allow greater flexibility in setting insurance premiums and reduce down-payment requirements. To assist Congress in considering the financial challenges facing FHA, this testimony provides information from recent reports GAO has issued and ongoing work concerning the proposed legislation that address different aspects of FHA's risk management. Specifically, this testimony looks at (1) FHA's management of risk related to loans with down-payment assistance, (2) instructive practices for managing risks of new products, (3) FHA's development and use of its mortgage scorecard, and (4) FHA's estimation of program costs.
What GAO Found
Recent trends in mortgage lending have significantly affected FHA, including growth in the proportion of FHA-insured loans with down-payment assistance, wider availability of low- and no-down-payment products, and increased use of automated tools (e.g., mortgage scoring) to underwrite loans. Although FHA has taken steps to improve its risk management, in a series of recent reports, GAO identified a number of weaknesses in FHA's ability to estimate and manage risk that may affect its financial performance. For example, FHA has not developed sufficient standards and controls to manage risks associated with the substantial proportion of loans with down-payment assistance, including assistance from nonprofit organizations funded by home sellers. According to FHA, high claim and loss rates for loans with such assistance were major reasons for the estimated positive subsidy cost (meaning that the present value of estimated cash inflows would be less than the present value of estimated cash outflows) for fiscal year 2008, absent any program changes. FHA has not consistently implemented practices--such as stricter underwriting or piloting--used by other mortgage institutions to help manage the risks associated with new product offerings. Although FHA has indicated that it would impose stricter underwriting standards for a no-down-payment mortgage if the legislative changes were enacted, it does not plan to pilot the product. The way that FHA developed its mortgage scorecard, while generally reasonable, limits how effectively it assesses the default risk of borrowers. With increased competition from conventional mortgage providers, limitations in its scorecard could cause FHA to insure mortgages that are relatively more risky. FHA's reestimates of the costs of its single-family mortgage program have generally been less favorable than originally estimated. Increases in the expected level of claims were a major cause of a particularly large reestimate that FHA submitted as of the end of fiscal year 2003. GAO made several recommendations in its recent reports, including that FHA (1) incorporate the risks posed by down-payment assistance into its scorecard, (2) study and report on the impact of variables not in its loan performance models that have been found to influence credit risk, and (3) consider piloting new products. FHA has taken actions in response to GAO's recommendations, but continued focus on risk management will be necessary for FHA to operate in a financially sound manner in the face of market and program changes. |
gao_AIMD-97-4 | gao_AIMD-97-4_0 | As part of the downsizing, FHA’s Office of Single Family Housing is planning to reduce its staff from a 1994 level of 2,700 to 1,150 by the year 2000. Single Family Housing Initiatives to Reduce Staff by 57 Percent
FHA plans to use its existing information technology capabilities to facilitate some streamlining and staff reduction initiatives, while other initiatives will require new information technology applications. New information system support will be needed for FHA’s planned changes to loss mitigation and disposition operations. Loan Processing
To reduce its loan processing staff, FHA is (1) expanding the use of its electronic data transfer capabilities so that fewer staff are needed to enter data into systems from paper documents and (2) using its information systems to support the consolidation of operations from 81 offices to 5 offices. Additional efficiency and effectiveness improvements may be possible if FHA incorporates other information systems capabilities used by the organizations. For example, FHA officials stated they must deal with budget and procurement limits and the lack of skilled managers and technical staff that are necessary to quickly develop and implement the needed information systems. In this regard, as part of its efforts to improve operations, FHA officials told us that they are considering using the expertise of other organizations. FHA has also established a process for approving lenders’ use of other automated loan origination systems. In making future decisions on technology acquisitions, the agency can incorporate the technology investment framework established by the new Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (ITMRA), which is based on industry best practices. Information technology figures prominently in the plans to support and enable the operational changes that are being contemplated. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested by the Chairs of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology and Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, our objectives were to determine (1) how FHA plans to use information technology to support the streamlining of single family housing operations and reduce staff, (2) whether FHA’s planned initiatives are similar to those undertaken by leading mortgage organizations to increase productivity, and (3) what FHA is doing to ensure that information technology initiatives will maintain or improve management controls over single family housing operations. As part of our work to determine what information is available that the planned information technology initiatives can help achieve the projected staff reductions and efficiencies, we analyzed information from FHA’s pilot test of consolidated loan processing operations, identified information technology applications and systems used by other mortgage industry organizations, and compared FHA’s reinvented processes and systems to those of the other mortgage organizations. While planned single family housing initiatives may help resolve management control weaknesses, insufficient information is available to assess them because detailed operating procedures and system designs have not yet been developed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) streamlining plans, focusing on: (1) FHA plans to use information technology to support the streamlining of single-family housing operations and reduce staff; (2) similarities between FHA initiatives and those undertaken by leading mortgage organizations to increase productivity; and (3) FHA efforts to ensure that technology initiatives will maintain or improve management controls over single-family housing operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FHA plans to use existing information technology capabilities to facilitate some streamlining and staff reduction initiatives, while other initiatives will require new information technology applications; (2) FHA plans to reduce single family housing staff from its 1994 level of about 2,700 to 1,150 in the year 2000 by: (a) expanding the use of existing electronic data transfer capabilities and using information systems to support the consolidation of loan processing operations from 81 offices to 5 offices; (b) implementing new loss mitigation processes that will be supported with a new information system; and (c) using information technology to support new processes associated with conducting real property maintenance and disposition operations or selling defaulted mortgage notes rather than foreclosing on properties; (3) FHA plans to incorporate information technology initiatives that are similar to, but not as extensive as, those used by other mortgage industry organizations to improve productivity; (4) further improvements may be achieved if FHA adopts other automated capabilities used by these organizations; (5) some of FHA's planned changes may help resolve management control weaknesses or maintain adequate controls for loan origination, loss mitigation, and property disposition; (6) however, GAO was unable to assess the impact of the planned changes because FHA has not yet made all of the decisions, developed the detailed operating procedures, or identified the information systems requirements that will be needed to implement the planned initiatives and management controls; (7) FHA officials recognize that additional information technology investments are needed to achieve the efficiency and effectiveness of other mortgage organizations; (8) however, they added that they must deal with budget and procurement limits and technical skills shortfalls to make needed improvements; (9) in this regard, FHA is considering using the expertise of other organizations; (10) in making future technology acquisitions, FHA can take advantage of the recently enacted Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, which establishes a framework for information technology decisionmaking and implementation based on best industry practices. |
gao_GAO-17-686T | gao_GAO-17-686T_0 | Background
According to the President’s budget, the federal government plans to invest more than $96 billion on IT in fiscal year 2018—the largest amount ever. However, as we have previously reported, investments in federal IT too often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, while contributing little to the desired mission-related outcomes. Federal data center consolidation initiative (FDCCI). Enhanced transparency and improved risk management. Specifically, from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, we made 803 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. In February 2017, we issued an update to our high-risk series and reported that, while progress had been made in improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations, significant work still remained to be completed. For example, as of May 2017, OMB and the agencies had fully implemented 380 (or about 47 percent) of the 803 recommendations. Most agencies and OMB agreed with our recommendations or had no comments. Specifically, as of August 2016, these agencies had identified a total of 9,995 data centers, of which they reported having closed 4,388, and having plans to close a total of 5,597 data centers through fiscal year 2019. To better ensure that federal data center consolidation and optimization efforts improve governmental efficiency and achieve cost savings, in our May 2017 report, we recommended that 11 of the 24 agencies take action to ensure that the amounts of achieved data center cost savings and avoidances are consistent across all reporting mechanisms. Risks Need to Be Fully Considered When Agencies Rate Their Major Investments on OMB’s IT Dashboard
To facilitate transparency across the government in acquiring and managing IT investments, OMB established a public website—the IT Dashboard—to provide detailed information on major investments at 26 agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. In total, we have made 47 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to help improve the accuracy and reliability of the information on the Dashboard and to increase its availability. Most agencies agreed with our recommendations or had no comments. Specifically, our assessments of risk for 95 investments at the 15 selected agencies matched the CIO ratings posted on the Dashboard 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. Twelve agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations and three agencies disagreed, stating that their CIO ratings were adequate. Agencies Need to Increase Their Use of Incremental Development Practices
OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies. In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months. Subsequently, in August 2016, we reported that agencies had not fully implemented incremental development practices for their software development projects. Specifically, we noted that, as of August 31, 2015, 22 federal agencies had reported on the Dashboard that 300 of 469 active software development projects (approximately 64 percent) were planning to deliver usable functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2016, as required by OMB guidance. Further, in conducting an in-depth review of seven selected agencies’ software development projects, we determined that 45 percent of the projects delivered functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2015 and 55 percent planned to do so in fiscal year 2016. The Department of the Treasury did not comment on its recommendation. Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees. In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide. In particular, 22 of the 24 major agencies did not have comprehensive license policies and only 2 had comprehensive license inventories. Among other things, we recommended that the agencies regularly track and maintain a comprehensive inventory of software licenses and analyze the inventory to identify opportunities to reduce costs and better inform investment decision making. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. As of May 2017, 123 of the recommendations had not been implemented, but 4 agencies had made progress. Most agencies have taken steps to improve the management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing key FITARA initiatives, including data center consolidation, efforts to increase transparency via OMB’s IT Dashboard, incremental development, and management of software licenses; and they have continued to address recommendations we have made over the past several years. In addition, we will continue to monitor agencies’ implementation of our previous recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion on IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, these investments have too often failed, incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Accordingly, in December 2014, Congress enacted FITARA, aimed at improving agencies' acquisitions of IT. Further, in February 2015, GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list.
This statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations. This statement is based on GAO prior and recently published reports on (1) data center consolidation, (2) risk levels of major investments as reported on OMB's IT Dashboard, (3) implementation of incremental development practices, and (4) management of software licenses.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve information technology (IT) through a series of initiatives, and as of May 2017, had fully implemented about 47 percent of the approximately 800 related GAO recommendations. However, additional actions are needed.
Consolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was reinforced by the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) in 2014. GAO reported in May 2017 that agencies had closed 4,388 of the 9,995 total data centers, and had plans to close a total of 5,597 through fiscal year 2019. As a result, agencies reportedly saved or avoided about $2.3 billion through August 2016. However, out of the 23 agencies that submitted required strategic plans, only 7 had addressed all required elements. GAO recommended that agencies complete their plans to optimize their data centers and achieve cost savings and ensure reported cost savings are consistent across reporting mechanisms. Most agencies agreed with the recommendations.
Enhancing transparency . OMB's IT Dashboard provides information on major investments at federal agencies, including ratings from Chief Information Officers that should reflect the level of risk facing an investment. GAO reported in June 2016 that agencies had not fully considered risks when rating their investments on the Dashboard. In particular, of the 95 investments reviewed, GAO's assessments of risks matched the ratings 22 times, showed more risk 60 times, and showed less risk 13 times. GAO recommended that agencies improve the quality and frequency of their ratings. Most agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations.
Implementing incremental development . OMB has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. Since 2012, OMB has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. In August 2016, GAO reported that while 22 agencies had reported that about 64 percent of 469 active software development projects planned to deliver usable functionality every 6 months for fiscal year 2016, the other 36 percent of the projects did not. Further, for 7 selected agencies, GAO identified differences in the percentages of software projects reported to GAO as delivering functionality every 6 months, compared to what was reported on the Dashboard. GAO made recommendations to agencies and OMB to improve the reporting of incremental data on the Dashboard. Most agencies agreed or did not comment on the recommendations.
Managing software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that better management of licenses was needed to achieve savings. Specifically, only two agencies had comprehensive license inventories. GAO recommended that agencies regularly track and maintain a comprehensive inventory and analyze that data to identify opportunities to reduce costs and better inform decision making. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments; as of May 2017, 4 agencies had made progress in implementing them.
What GAO Recommends
From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations, and included recommendations to improve the oversight and execution of the data center consolidation initiative, the accuracy and reliability of the Dashboard, incremental development policies, and software license management. Most agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations or had no comments. In addition, in fiscal year 2016, GAO made about 200 new recommendations in this area. GAO will continue to monitor agencies' implementation of these recommendations. |
gao_GGD-96-23 | gao_GGD-96-23_0 | Table 1.3 lists the CRA regulation’s technical requirements. Assessing compliance with the technical requirements of CRA is relatively straightforward. To identify the major problems in implementing CRA, determine to what extent the regulatory reforms would address these problems, and identify challenges the regulators would face in ensuring the success of the reforms, we reviewed in detail compliance examinations at 40 banks and thrifts located in 4 regions, including the Northeast, Midwest, West, and South Central parts of the United States. To identify the initiatives that had been taken to overcome lending barriers and enhance community lending opportunities, (1) we judgmentally selected, on the basis of availability, and interviewed over 20 community group representatives; (2) held a roundtable discussion involving representatives from the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, the Center for Community Change, and the Consumer Federation of America; and (3) attended several workshops and conferences sponsored by a variety of industry and community groups, in addition to the regulators covering CRA compliance. These problems included too little reliance on lending results and too much reliance on documentation of efforts and processes, leading to an excessive paperwork burden; inconsistent CRA examinations by regulators resulting in uncertainty about how CRA performance is to be rated; examinations based on inadequate information that may not reflect a complete and accurate measure of institutions’ performance; and dissatisfaction with regulatory enforcement of the act, which largely relies on protests of expansion plans to ensure institutions are responsive to community credit needs. They advocated that the CRA reform should eliminate this burden by focusing examinations on performance or results. In response to the third problem of data usefulness, the final regulations have clarified the information to be used to evaluate performance, but the affected parties disagree about whether the data to be collected under the revised regulations will appropriately reflect lending results or be too burdensome. From our case studies, we identified several areas that are key to implementing the revised CRA regulations. Innovative and Cooperative Initiatives Have Overcome Some Lending Barriers
Various individual and cooperative efforts among institutions, community groups, and others have provided the means to lower credit risk and reduce transaction costs in community lending. In a proposed amendment to CRA, the Community Reinvestment Improvement Act of 1995 (H.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the major problems in implementing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), focusing on the: (1) extent to which regulatory reforms address these problems; (2) challenges regulators face in ensuring the success of CRA reforms; and (3) initiatives taken to enhance lending opportunities in low-income areas.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) bankers, community groups, and regulatory officials generally agree that there is too much reliance on bank documentation efforts and processes, and that CRA examinations are inconsistent and do not accurately reflect the lending institutions' compliance or performance; (2) revised CRA regulations clarify the data used to assess results against performance-based standards, but the affected parties disagree about whether the data collection requirements provide for meaningful performance assessment or are unduly burdensome; (3) differences in examiner training and experience, vague interpretations of CRA standards, and inadequate information and time for implementing CRA performance ratings challenge regulators as they implement CRA regulations; (4) bankers, regulators, and community groups are taking part in a variety of individual and cooperative initiatives to improve community lending and reduce related burdens; (5) barriers to community lending and investment include the higher costs and risks associated with community lending and the underwriting requirements of major participants in secondary mortgage markets; and (6) Congress has considered proposals to amend CRA that would reduce the compliance burden and exempt small institutions from CRA requirements. |
gao_GAO-08-892 | gao_GAO-08-892_0 | 42 A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders Have Alleged Abuse Since 2000; Total Number of Alleged Incidents Is Likely Higher
We identified 42 individual A-3 and G-5 visa holders who have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity in the United States from 2000 through June 2008. However, the total number of alleged incidents is likely to be higher for four reasons: household workers’ fear of contacting law enforcement authorities, NGOs’ protection of victim confidentiality, limited information on some allegations handled by the U.S. government, and federal departments’ difficulties in tracking household worker abuse allegations and investigations involving foreign diplomats. State has several offices that receive allegations of abuse by foreign diplomats, but no single office maintains information on all allegations. Three Factors Complicate Investigations of Abuse by Foreign Diplomats
The U.S. government’s process of investigating foreign diplomats for alleged abuse is complicated by three factors—(1) constraints posed by immunity, (2) household workers’ heightened vulnerabilities due to their employers’ status, and (3) the length of time it takes for Justice to obtain State’s opinion on the use of specific investigative techniques in trafficking investigations. This fear can inhibit household workers from cooperating with investigations, further limiting the investigators’ options for collecting evidence. Although certain techniques, such as searching the residence of a diplomat who has full immunity and inviolability without the diplomat’s consent, are clearly prohibited, other techniques may touch the diplomat’s “sphere of privacy.” According to State officials, the permissibility of these techniques under international law is less clear. According to a Justice official, obtaining some of this information can be difficult and time- consuming. State may need to consider reciprocity, such as how use of a specific technique might affect treatment of U.S. diplomats abroad. Officials from both agencies told us they are considering developing an interagency process that would outline time frames for discussing the use of investigative techniques, but they have, thus far, not taken any formal actions toward creating one. Weaknesses Exist in Implementation and Oversight of A-3 and G-5 Visa Policies and Procedures
At the four consular posts we visited, we found weaknesses in State’s process for ensuring that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are implemented correctly and consistently, and some consular officers were unfamiliar with or unclear about aspects of guidance relating to these visas. Although State headquarters issues A-3 and G-5 policies and procedures, it relies on individual posts to ensure they are implemented correctly and consistently and has not instituted a process to spot-check compliance. Informing A-3 and G-5 Visa Applicants of Their Rights
State’s guidance also includes provisions encouraging consular officers to help educate A-3 and G-5 visa applicants about their rights under U.S. laws, but some officers we spoke with were unaware of these provisions. The provisions also might result in refusal of an A-3 or G-5 visa if a particular diplomat is linked to a pattern of employee disappearance, abuse allegations, or other irregularities. A State official told us the department is drafting possible language for these additional provisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual, but officials have not reached internal agreement on final language and have no timetable for doing so. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) seek to determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity since 2000, (2) review the U.S. government’s process for investigating abuse allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, and (3) describe and assess how State ensures correct and consistent implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa polices and procedures. To review the U.S. government’s process for investigating abuse allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, we reviewed State documents including the Foreign Affairs Manual, cables sent to consular officers on A-3 and G-5 visas, “Diplomatic and Consular Immunity Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities,” diplomatic notes to Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in the United States regarding conduct of diplomatic agents in the United States, USUN’s diplomatic notes to Permanent Missions and Permanent Observer Offices, and State’s 2007 document to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled “State’s Initiatives to Promote Fair Treatment of Domestic Workers by Diplomatic Personnel.” We also interviewed officials from State’s Office of the Chief of Protocol, Office of the Legal Adviser, Diplomatic Security Service, USUN, and Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the Department of State (State) reported that some foreign diplomats may be abusing the household workers they brought to the United States on A-3 or G-5 visas. GAO was asked to (1) determine the number of A-3 or G-5 visa holders who have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity since 2000, (2) review the U.S. government's process for investigating these allegations, and (3) assess how State ensures that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are implemented correctly and consistently. GAO analyzed documents, interviewed officials, and conducted fieldwork at four consular posts that issue large numbers of A-3 or G-5 visas.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 42 household workers with A-3 or G-5 visas who alleged that they were abused by foreign diplomats with immunity from 2000 through 2008, but the total number is likely higher. The total number of alleged incidents since 2000 is likely higher for four reasons: household workers' fear of contacting law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations' protection of victim confidentiality, limited information on some cases handled by the U.S. government, and federal agencies' challenges identifying cases. For example, State has several offices that receive allegations of abuse by foreign diplomats, but no single office maintains information on all allegations. The U.S. government's process for investigating alleged abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats is complicated by three factors. First, immunity can pose constraints for law enforcement in collecting evidence. Second, the status of foreign diplomats can heighten their workers' sense of vulnerability, causing the workers to fear cooperating with investigators. Third, the length of time it takes to obtain a legal opinion from State on the permissibility of using certain investigative techniques can hamper investigations. According to State, although some techniques are clearly prohibited by international law (such as searching certain diplomats' residences), the permissibility of others under international law is less clear. In advising on the use of investigative techniques, State considers legal and policy issues, such as reciprocity--assessing how U.S. diplomats abroad might be affected by actions taken toward a foreign diplomat on U.S. soil. State may ask Justice to provide information to help determine the permissibility of certain techniques, but the process of obtaining this information can be difficult and time consuming for Justice. Although both State and Justice have discussed creating a process to avoid delays, no formal actions have, thus far, been taken to establish one. Weaknesses exist in State's process for ensuring correct and consistent implementation of policies and procedures for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas. GAO's review of employment contracts submitted at four consular posts by A-3 and G-5 visa applicants showed that they often did not include State's required components, such as a guarantee of the minimum or prevailing wage. GAO also found that officers at the four posts were unclear about or unfamiliar with certain aspects of State's guidance. Few of the officers were aware that they should inform A-3 and G-5 visa applicants of their rights under U.S. law during their interview. Some officers at the four posts also were uncertain about the reasons for refusing A-3 or G-5 visas. State is considering adding provisions to its guidance that would more clearly stipulate reasons for refusing these visas, such as if an A-3 or G-5 applicant seeks to work for a foreign diplomat who is linked to a pattern of employee disappearance, abuse allegations, or other irregularities. However, State has not reached internal agreement on these provisions and has set no timetable for doing so. State headquarters officials said they rely on individual posts to monitor implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures and do not routinely assess posts' compliance |
gao_GAO-05-134 | gao_GAO-05-134_0 | Funds for the HCFAC program are appropriated from the trust fund to an expenditure account, referred to as the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account (control account) maintained within the trust fund. As shown in figure 1, these deposits primarily consisted of penalties and multiple damages and criminal fines collected as a result of health care fraud cases. Also, DOJ did not record some expenditure data in its accounting system as HCFAC expenses and therefore could not provide an electronic file of all nonpayroll expenses from which we could select a statistical sample of these fiscal year 2003 expenses. Reported Amounts Appropriated from the Trust Fund for HCFAC and General Uses of the Funds Were Consistent with HIPAA
HIPAA specifies the maximum amounts that may be appropriated from the trust fund each year for HCFAC, as well as a minimum and maximum amount of the appropriations that must go to the HHS/OIG for Medicare and Medicaid antifraud activities. In June 2003, OI upgraded its workload tracking system to record hours for all staff. Some Reported Cost Savings Are Related to Trust Fund Expenditures for HCFAC, but Most Are Not
For the first time, some of the reported cost savings can be considered savings to the trust fund, resulting from trust fund expenditures for the HCFAC program. Of these amounts, about $1.5 billion in cost savings for fiscal year 2002 and $3.9 billion for fiscal year 2003 resulted from actions taken since the HCFAC program was created. However, the remaining cost savings ($18.4 billion for fiscal year 2002 and $16.9 billion for fiscal year 2003) continued to be related to actions that predate the HCFAC program and cannot be associated with expenditures from the trust fund for HCFAC activities. Repeated Delays in Issuing the HHS and DOJ Joint HCFAC Reports Impact Relevance of Data
HIPAA requires that HHS and DOJ issue a joint report on the HCFAC program for each fiscal year by January 1 of the following calendar year. However, beginning with the report for fiscal year 2001 the report has been issued late and the length of the delay has increased each year. DOJ also commented on the status of two remaining open recommendations from our prior report. To assess the reliability of information reported by HHS and DOJ in the joint HCFAC reports for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 as appropriations from the trust fund for HCFAC, we obtained and reviewed the HIPAA legislation, which includes the maximum and minimum amounts that can be appropriated from the trust fund for HCFAC; obtained and reviewed the HCFAC funding requests for the HHS and DOJ components to determine whether activities included in the requests were consistent with the stated purposes of the HIPAA legislation; obtained the funding decision memorandum detailing how the funds would be distributed between HHS and DOJ, and obtained related documentation for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to verify the HCFAC funds certified by HHS and DOJ officials; and compared amounts reported in the joint HCFAC reports to the approved funding decision memorandum and compared amounts from the decision memorandum to the OMB documentation (Apportionment Schedule SF-132) to verify that the amounts were made available. To assess the reliability of information reported by HHS and DOJ in the joint HCFAC reports for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 as cost savings, we obtained the schedule of HHS/OIG Cost Savings 1998-2011 and compared the data for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to the HCFAC joint reports; obtained the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 HHS/OIG semiannual reports and traced and compared the amounts identified as cost savings to the amounts reported in the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 HCFAC joint reports; selected cost saving transactions on a nonstatistical basis, traced and compared the data to supporting documentation; and reviewed the dates of reports that the OIG cited as having findings and recommendations that resulted in the reported cost savings. Medicare: Reporting on the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because of the susceptibility of health care programs to fraud and abuse, Congress enacted the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) program as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Pub. L. No. 104-191. HIPAA requires that the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Justice (DOJ) issue a joint annual report to Congress on amounts deposited to the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and amounts appropriated from the trust fund for the HCFAC program. It also requires GAO to submit reports biennially. This, our final report required by law, provides the results of our review of amounts reported as (1) deposits to the trust fund, (2) appropriations from the trust fund and justification for expenditure of such amounts by HHS and DOJ, and (3) savings resulting from expenditures from the trust fund. We also report on the repeated late issuance of the annual HCFAC report as well as the status of our prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
Our review of the HCFAC program for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 determined that amounts reported as trust fund deposits--$766 million (fiscal year 2002) and $243 million (fiscal year 2003)--were appropriate. The sources of these deposits were primarily penalties and multiple damages and criminal fines collected from health care fraud cases. Amounts reported as appropriations from the trust fund for HCFAC activities--$209 million (fiscal year 2002) and $240 million (fiscal year 2003)--were consistent with HIPAA. The HHS/OIG received funds within the minimum and maximum amounts allowed by HIPAA to carry out Medicare and Medicaid antifraud activities. The expenditures charged against HCFAC funds by HHS and DOJ for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were reasonable but the HHS/OIG did not record time charges in its workload systems for all staff that worked on HCFAC activities. Also, DOJ did not record all fiscal year 2003 expenditures in its accounting system so they could be readily identified as HCFAC related. Failure to properly record staff hours and expenditure data could hinder DOJ and HHS in monitoring the uses of HCFAC funds. Some reported cost savings--$19.9 billion (fiscal year 2002) and $20.8 billion (fiscal year 2003) can be considered savings to the trust fund, resulting from trust fund expenditures for the HCFAC program, but most can not. For example, $1.5 billion of the cost savings for fiscal year 2002 and $3.9 billion for fiscal year 2003 are the result of HHS/OIG recommendations and other initiatives since the HCFAC program was created. However, the remaining cost savings continued to be largely the result of actions that predate the HCFAC program and cannot be associated with expenditures from the trust fund for HCFAC. HIPAA requires that HHS and DOJ issue to Congress a joint HCFAC report on January 1 of each year. However, DOJ and HHS have issued the last three reports late and the length of the delay has increased each year. HHS and DOJ cited onerous internal review processes as the reason for late issuance. |
gao_GAO-05-183 | gao_GAO-05-183_0 | Background
The U.S. Navy currently operates 288 surface ships and submarines. 1.) The Navy’s budgeting for cost growth has changed over the past 2 decades. However, the total projected cost growth on contracts for the eight ships is likely to be higher. Cost growth was more pronounced for the lead ships in the two new classes we looked at—the Virginia class and especially the San Antonio class—than the more mature Arleigh Burke and Nimitz classes. From fiscal years 2001 to 2005, 5 to 14 percent of the Navy’s ship construction budget, which totaled about $52 billion over the 5-year period, went to pay for cost growth for ships funded in prior years. 2.) The most common causes were related to design modifications, the need for additional and more costly materials, and changes in employee pay and benefits. For example, the design of LPD 17 continued to evolve even as construction proceeded. As a result, workers were required to rebuild completed areas of the ship to accommodate design changes. Price increases also contributed to the growth in materials costs. Navy Funding and Management Practices Result in Insufficient Provision for Risk
Navy practices for estimating costs and for contracting and budgeting for ships have resulted in unrealistic funding of programs and when unexpected events occur, tracking mechanisms are slow to pick them up. Navy Estimates Do Not Capture Uncertainty and Are Often Not Independently Evaluated
In developing cost estimates for the eight case study ships, Navy cost analysts did not conduct uncertainty analyses to measure the probability of cost growth, nor were independent estimates conducted for some ships—even in cases where major design changes had occurred. Independent cost estimates can provide decision makers with additional insight into a program’s potential costs—in part because these estimates frequently use different methodologies and may be less burdened with organizational bias. For example, for the San Antonio class ships, the Navy negotiated prices for the detail design and construction of the lead ship (LPD 17) and the first two follow-on ships (LPD 18 and LPD 19) at the same time. Both the Virginia class submarine and the Nimitz class aircraft carrier programs’ variance analysis reports discussed the root causes for any cost growth and schedule slippage and described how these variances were affecting the shipbuilders’ projected final costs. To improve the quality of cost estimates for shipbuilding programs and reduce the magnitude of unbudgeted cost growth, we recommend the Secretary of Defense conduct independent cost reviews for all follow-on ships when significant changes occur in a program and establish criteria as to what constitutes significant changes to a shipbuilding program, conduct independent reviews of every acquisition of an aircraft carrier, direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a confidence level for all ship cost estimates, based on risk and uncertainty analyses. This report identified eight ship classes with ships under construction. Therefore, the Navy will need additional appropriations to cover this cost growth. 7.) CVN 77 has also experienced a significant increase in material costs due to under budgeting. Since that time, the Congress has appropriated $1 billion to cover the increases in the ships’ costs. For the two case study ships we examined, we found that increases in the number of labor hours and material costs to build the submarines accounted for 83 percent of the cost growth on shipbuilding construction contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Navy invests significantly to maintain technological superiority of its warships. In 2005 alone, $7.6 billion was devoted to new ship construction in six ship classes--96 percent of which was allocated to four classes: Arleigh Burke class destroyer, Nimitz class aircraft carrier, San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship, and the Virginia class submarine. Cost growth in the Navy's shipbuilding programs has been a long-standing problem. Over the past few years, the Navy has used "prior year completion" funding--additional appropriations for ships already under contract--to pay for cost overruns. This report (1) estimates the current and projected cost growth on construction contracts for eight case study ships, (2) breaks down and examines the components of the cost growth, and (3) identifies any funding and management practices that contributed to cost growth.
What GAO Found
For the eight ships GAO assessed, the Congress has appropriated $2.1 billion to cover the increases in the ships' budgets. The GAO's analysis indicates that total cost growth on these ships could reach $3.1 billion or even more if shipyards do not maintain current efficiency and meet schedules. Cost growth for the CVN 77 aircraft carrier and the San Antonio lead ship (LPD 17) has been particularly pronounced. Increases in labor hour and material costs together account for 77 percent of the cost growth on the eight ships. Shipbuilders frequently cited design modifications, the need for additional and more costly materials, and changes in employee pay and benefits as the key causes of this growth. For example, the San Antonio's lead ship's systems design continued to evolve even as construction began, which required rebuilding of completed areas to accommodate the design changes. Materials costs were often underbudgeted, as was the case with the Virginia class submarines and Nimitz class aircraft carriers. For the CVN 77 carrier, the shipbuilder is estimating a substantial increase in material costs. Navy practices for estimating costs, contracting, and budgeting for ships have resulted in unrealistic funding of programs, increasing the likelihood of cost growth. Despite inherent uncertainties in the ship acquisition process, the Navy does not account for the probability of cost growth when estimating costs. Moreover, the Navy did not conduct an independent cost estimate for carriers or when substantial changes occurred in a ship class, which could have provided decision makers with additional knowledge about a program's potential costs. In addition, contract prices were negotiated and budgets established without sufficient design knowledge and construction knowledge. When unexpected events did occur, the incomplete and untimely reporting on program progress delayed the identification of problems and the Navy's ability to correct them. |
gao_GAO-09-622 | gao_GAO-09-622_0 | USAID is the agency primarily responsible for implementing the bilateral aid program, while State oversees annual contributions to international organizations, primarily to UNRWA, for the multilateral program. “No contributions by the United States shall be made to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East except on the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency takes all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called Palestinian Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.”
This clause is commonly referred to as “section 301(c).”
State is responsible for implementing section 301(c) and, in that capacity, oversees U.S. contributions to UNRWA. USAID Strengthened Its Antiterrorism Policies and Procedures and Complied with Them in Making New Prime Awards, but Has Weaknesses in Compliance at the Subaward Level
Since 2006, USAID has strengthened its antiterrorism policies and procedures to help ensure that assistance is not inadvertently provided to terrorists. This specialist is responsible for conducting recurring compliance reviews of prime awardees’ subaward activities. USAID Complied with Its Strengthened Antiterrorism Policies and Procedures at the Prime Award Level
USAID Included All Applicable Clauses in All New Prime Awards Made in Fiscal Year 2008 and Obtained Required Certifications
All prime awardee and subawardee non- U.S. organizations or individuals (16 years old or older) proposed to receive cash or in-kind assistance under a cooperative agreement, grant, or subgrant. We found that all 32 new prime awards made by USAID in fiscal year 2008 contained the appropriate mandatory clauses—the antiterrorism and naming clauses—and, where applicable, USAID had obtained the advanced antiterrorism certifications, as required under Mission Order 21. Insufficient Evidence to Assess Subaward Compliance with Requirements Related to Mandatory Clauses
Based on our random stratified sample, we estimate that 17 percent, plus or minus 7 percentage points, of all fiscal year 2008 subawards identified by USAID did not contain sufficient evidence to determine whether the mandatory clauses were included in the subaward at the time the subaward was made. State and UNRWA Have Strengthened Policies and Procedures to Determine Whether UNRWA’s Actions Are Consistent with Its Agreement to Conform with Conditions for Receiving U.S. Funds, but Weaknesses Remain
UNRWA has agreed with State to take steps to conform with the condition on U.S. contributions set forth in section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and report to State on its efforts semiannually. For example, State has not defined what would constitute nonconformance or developed written definitions of key terms, including “all possible measures”—a concern we also raised in 2003—that would help serve as criteria for analyzing UNRWA’s semiannual reports. State Has Strengthened Some Policies and Procedures to Oversee UNRWA’s Conformance with U.S. Conditions on Contributions, but Limitations Exist
UNRWA Reported Denying Refugees Benefits, Including Cash Assistance, Due to Inappropriate Conduct
UNRWA reported denying approximately 110 applications for discretionary cash assistance to refugees since July 2006 because agency investigations found the refugees’ behavior was inconsistent with UN neutrality or restrictions related to section 301(c). However, the list is limited to those individuals or entities affiliated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban and thus does not specifically include major regional groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which the United States has designated as foreign terrorist organizations. Regarding prime awardees’ fiscal year 2008 subawards identified by USAID, required vetting occurred and applicable antiterrorism certifications were obtained. UNRWA has strengthened its policies and procedures to conform with conditions on U.S. funds, such as expanding screening of all recipients of UNRWA funds against the UN 1267 list, but UNRWA’s internal audits do not determine whether UNRWA contractors have signed contracts that include the required antiterrorism clause or assess controls for UNRWA’s overall cash assistance program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has complied with its policies and procedures to help ensure that its programs do not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza and (2) assess the Department of State’s (State) and UNRWA’s policies and procedures to support conformance with U.S. statutory conditions placed on contributions provided to UNRWA to prohibit funding of terrorist-related activities. ents are contained in U.S. appropriations the U.S. code. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government is one of the largest donors to Palestinians. It provided nearly $575 million in assistance in fiscal year 2008. This assistance is provided through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and through contributions to international organizations, primarily the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The Department of State (State) oversees U.S. contributions to UNRWA. To help ensure that U.S. funds for these programs are not provided to individuals or entities engaged in terrorist activities, USAID and State must comply with restrictions under U.S. law. GAO was asked to (1) assess the extent to which USAID has complied with its antiterrorism policies and procedures and (2) assess State's and UNRWA's policies and procedures to support conformance with U.S. statutory conditions. GAO reviewed U.S. and UNRWA documents; interviewed USAID, State, and UNRWA officials; and conducted fieldwork in Israel, Jerusalem, and Jordan.
What GAO Found
USAID strengthened its antiterrorism policies and procedures and complied with them in making new prime awards, but had weaknesses related to compliance at the subaward level. ("Prime awardee" refers to an organization that directly receives USAID funding to implement projects. "Subawardee" refers to an organization that receives funding from prime awardees.) USAID strengthened its policies and procedures in response to our 2006 recommendations by, for example, strengthening its vetting process, which involves investigating a person or entity for links to terrorism. Since 2006, USAID has instituted new procedures to monitor prime awardee compliance with antiterrorism requirements, which have allowed it to take some actions to address areas of concern. The agency has hired a specialist who reviews prime awardees' subaward files for compliance with its antiterrorism policies. All 32 new prime awards made by USAID in fiscal year 2008 included all applicable clauses. USAID obtained the applicable antiterrorism certifications and conducted required vetting for all applicable new prime awards. For a random sample of fiscal year 2008 subawards, applicable antiterrorism certifications were obtained and vetting was conducted. However, an estimated 17 percent of subawards had insufficient evidence to assess compliance related to mandatory clauses. For the remaining subawards, an estimated 5 percent did not contain the mandatory clauses at the time of the award. GAO also found limitations in the agency's monitoring of subawards for inclusion of mandatory clauses. Since 2003, State and UNRWA have strengthened policies and procedures to conform with conditions on U.S. contributions to UNRWA, but weaknesses remain. Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, prohibits U.S. contributions to UNRWA except on the condition that UNRWA take all possible measures to assure that no part of the U.S. contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to, among others, any refugee who has engaged in any act of terrorism. UNRWA has agreed to conform to conditions on U.S. contributions, but State has not established criteria to determine whether UNRWA's actions are consistent with this agreement. While State has not defined the key term "all possible measures" or defined nonconformance, it has strengthened some policies and procedures to oversee UNRWA's conformance. UNRWA has strengthened policies and procedures to promote neutrality of its beneficiaries, staff, contractors, and facilities that cover a broader range of conduct than covered in section 301(c). UNRWA reported denying approximately 110 applications for cash assistance to refugees since July 2006, because the agency found the refugees' behavior was inconsistent with UN neutrality or restrictions related to section 301(c). However, limitations exist. UNRWA said it has screened all staff, contractor, and beneficiary names against a UN Security Council list of potential terrorists and found no matches. However, the list does not include Hamas and Hezbollah, which the United States has designated as foreign terrorist organizations. Finally, internal UNRWA audits do not assess controls for all cash assistance programs or whether contracts contain antiterrorism clauses. |
gao_GAO-07-1128 | gao_GAO-07-1128_0 | According to the commission’s charter, USCESRC must monitor and assess the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. We compared the mandated issue areas and annual report contents and found the commission’s annual reports covered the statutory economic and security issue areas. To comply with the June 1 deadline, the commission submitted interim reports in 2006 and 2007. The commission has not issued its annual reports on time because appointment dates for commissioners and the commission work cycle activities are not aligned with the annual report issuance deadline. Specifically, in terms of its organizational structure, the commission has not formally defined and assigned key duties and responsibilities that are typically divided or segregated among different people in order to reduce the risk of error or fraud. 3). Management Policies and Procedures Have Weaknesses or Are Not Present
The commission’s policies and procedures for managing administrative operations and staff are insufficient, incomplete, or not adequately documented, thereby impairing their effectiveness and putting the commission at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Also, procurement procedures need to ensure as much transparency, competition, and accountability as possible. Ineffective Internal Control over Financial Management and Reporting
The commission’s internal control over financial management and reporting was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that financial activities were properly processed and recorded and complied with federal laws and regulations. Our tests of the commission’s non-payroll-related transactions for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 found deficiencies, such as missing or inadequate supporting documentation, lack of proper authorization and approval, and improper classification. The commission’s application of the government travel and purchase card programs lacks written guidance, proper segregation of duties, and adequate training. As a result, the commission’s financial resources are at an increased risk of fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement. Time and Attendance Reporting Lacks Proper Approvals
Our review of the commission’s payroll process for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 showed that the commission’s T&A records were not always completed and approved in accordance with the policies and procedures described by the commission. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we assess the extent to which (1) the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission (USCESRC) has complied with its charter, (2) the commission has had an organizational structure and policies and procedures for managing its operations effectively, and (3) internal control over the commission’s financial management and reporting has provided reasonable assurance that resources are not at risk. In the Highlights and on page 2, it is clear that GAO’s assessment of organizational structure and management policies and procedures is based on internal control standards for the federal government. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
In October 2000, Congress established the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to assess the national security implications of the trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China and issue an annual report by June 1. The 12-member commission has a budget of about $3 million. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which the commission has (1) complied with its charter, (2) had an organizational structure and policies and procedures for managing its operations effectively, and (3) had internal control over the financial management and reporting that provides reasonable assurance that resources are not at risk. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed the commission's charter, annual reports, records, and management policies and procedures and interviewed commissioners, executive directors, and staff. GAO focused on fiscal years 2005 and 2006 financial transactions.
What GAO Found
Although the contents of the commission's annual reports have complied with statutory reporting requirements, the commission has not met the annual reporting deadline. It issued its 2005 and 2006 reports over 5 months late because the commissioners' appointment dates and the commission work cycle activities are not aligned with the annual reporting deadline. For example, over half the commissioners' terms will expire in December, 5 months before they are to approve and issue the 2008 report. However, the commission has taken steps to comply with applicable provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The commission's organizational structure and management policies and procedures have weaknesses and are not in accordance with GAO's internal control standards for the federal government. The commission has not formally defined and assigned key management duties and responsibilities that are typically divided or segregated among different people. Also, policies and procedures were insufficient, incomplete, or not adequately documented. For example, GAO found that the commission had no written policies or procedures to ensure that the procurement of certain goods and services was transparent, competitive, and at the best value. Internal control over financial management and reporting was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that activities were properly processed and recorded and complied with federal laws and regulations. GAO noted weak or missing internal controls in three broad areas. In examining non-payroll-related financial transactions, GAO found inadequate documentation, lack of proper authorization and approval, and improper classification, including $13,000 in questionable purchases. The purchase and travel card programs lacked written guidance, proper segregation of duties, and adequate training. Also, time and attendance records were not always approved according to the commission's policies and procedures. As a result of inadequate control in these areas, the commission's financial resources are at an increased risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. |
gao_NSIAD-97-78 | gao_NSIAD-97-78_0 | The Air Force does not have total control over the allocation of its personnel. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because of congressional concerns about active duty personnel levels, we assessed (1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force has changed since 1986, (2) whether the Air Force has any shortages in meeting its wartime requirements, and (3) whether there is potential to reduce the active force further. To determine if the shortages identified by FORSIZE affected the Air Force ability to carry out the national military strategy, we interviewed Air Force headquarters functional managers to determine whether the shortages were in the forces that deploy to theaters of operation or in forces that sustain operations at bases in the United States. During this time, mission forces will be reduced at a much greater rate than infrastructure forces—47 percent compared to 30 percent. Infrastructure Forces Are Decreasing at a Slower Rate Than Mission Forces
Between fiscal year 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce the number of active personnel in infrastructure functions from approximately 346,000 to 241,000, or by 30 percent. FORSIZE 95 identified an active wartime shortage of 19,585 personnel. Our report reflects that the Air Force has identified several ways to compensate for these wartime shortages. In addition, a preliminary air staff review of its infrastructure force has identified a potential to reduce the active force by as much as 75,000 beyond fiscal year 1998 by contracting out some functions now performed by military personnel and converting some military positions to civilian. Air Force Plans to Reduce Active Duty Personnel Below Congressional Floor in Fiscal Year 1998
On the basis of the Air Force’s fiscal year 1998 budget proposal provided to OSD, the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce its active military end strength to about 371,600 or 9,400 below the current congressional floor. Air Force officials stated the planned personnel reductions will not lessen the Air Force’s war-fighting capability, since they are primarily in infrastructure-related functions. Ongoing Air Force Studies Have Identified Potential to Further Reduce Active Personnel
The Air Force has not yet fully assessed the potential for substituting less costly civilian employees or contractors for some of the active duty personnel currently assigned to infrastructure activities. In a November 1996 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that DOD’s existing civilian workyear policy needs to be modified so the Air Force can achieve savings by replacing military personnel assigned to positions that are not military essential with civilians. We developed several options for consolidating the fighter force that would permit the Air Force to maintain the same number of aircraft but carry out its missions with fewer active duty personnel. Conclusions
Potential exists to replace active military personnel with contractors or civilian employees. The actual number of active military positions that could be eliminated depends on the results of several ongoing initiatives as well as senior Air Force leadership commitment to reduce infrastructure to fund force modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Air Force's personnel reduction efforts, focusing on: (1) how the size and composition of the active Air Force has changed since 1986; (2) whether the Air Force has sufficient numbers of personnel to meet wartime requirements; and (3) whether there is potential to further reduce the active force that could result in a more efficient force.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between fiscal year (FY) 1986 and 1997, the Air Force will reduce its active military personnel from over 600,000 to 381,100, or by 37 percent; (2) mission forces have been reduced at a much greater rate than infrastructure forces during the last decade; (3) as a result, approximately two-thirds of the Air Force's 381,100 active duty personnel are now allocated to infrastructure functions such as installation support and acquisition; (4) further, today's smaller force has a higher ratio of officers than in 1986; (5) potential exists to reduce the active Air Force below the 381,100 minimum level set by Congress, without adversely affecting the Air Force's war-fighting capability; (6) in May 1996, GAO suggested options to consolidate fighter squadrons which, if implemented, would permit the Air Force to maintain the same number of aircraft but carry out its missions with fewer active duty personnel; (7) GAO has also reported that the Air Force could achieve savings by replacing military personnel in some administrative and support positions with civilian employees; (8) for FY 1998, the Air Force plans to seek statutory authority to reduce the active force by about 9,400 below the current minimum; (9) GAO's analysis shows the majority of these planned decreases are in infrastructure functions; (10) prompted by the Secretary of Defense's goal to reduce infrastructure to free funds for force modernization, the Air Force has recently identified a potential to reduce the active force by as many as 75,000 additional military personnel beyond FY 1998; (11) the Air Force is reviewing options for replacing military personnel assigned to infrastructure functions with civilian employees or contractors that may be able to perform some functions at less cost than military personnel; (12) the actual number of active personnel that will ultimately be replaced will depend on the results of continuing Air Force analysis to determine whether such substitutions will be organizationally feasible and cost-effective; (13) the Air Force projects it would have an active wartime shortage of about 19,600 personnel if two major regional conflicts occurred; (14) however, the Air Force does not need additional active personnel to cover this wartime shortage because it has identified ways to compensate for the shortage; and (15) moreover, this shortage would present little risk in carrying out the military strategy since it primarily affects forces that would provide operating support for bases in the United States rather than in the forces that would deploy to war. |
gao_RCED-96-18 | gao_RCED-96-18_0 | Orange juice and apple juice are the most widely purchased juices for the school meal programs, as well as for consumption nationwide. Although comprehensive data are not available, industry officials believe that the adulteration of apple juice is insignificant. However, these officials emphasized that such tests are not designed to identify potential adulteration. Sixteen of the 18 school districts we contacted required 100-percent-pure juice to meet the Food and Consumer Service’s nutritional standards, but none of these districts took additional steps to ensure that the juice they purchased met this specification. Instead, the schools relied primarily on the integrity of the vendor and the product label. Collectively, it has debarred or is debarring 21 individuals associated with these cases and all three companies that remain in operation. Enhancing Detection Would Increase Costs
Government and industry officials identified two primary options for enhancing the detection of adulterated fruit juice: conducting in-plant inspections and instituting a juice-testing program. (2) What recent federal enforcement actions have been taken against juice adulterators, and what was the magnitude of the fraud? (3) What are the options for enhancing the detection of juice adulteration, including mandatory inspection of juice plants that sell their products to the federal school meal programs? To determine the nature and extent of the adulteration problem and the ability of current inspection and testing methods to detect adulteration, we contacted officials from the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition and Office of Regulatory Affairs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Food and Consumer Service and Agricultural Marketing Service, and the Florida Department of Citrus, as well as academic experts and officials from private laboratories involved in testing juice for adulteration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the sale of adulterated fruit juice to school meal programs, focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of the problem; (2) whether federal inspection and testing methods can detect juice adulteration; (3) recent federal enforcement actions taken against juice adulterators; and (4) options for enhancing the detection of adulterated juice.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) juice adulterators have cut costs by adding less expensive ingredients to juice and labeling the product as pure; (2) although most school districts require that the juice it serves be 100 percent pure, they generally rely on the product label and the vendor's integrity to ensure that the juice meets nutritional standards; (3) the extent of juice adulteration is unclear, since juice plant inspections and laboratory tests are not designed to detect adulteration; (4) government and industry officials believe that apple juice adulteration is not a major problem, but as much as 20 percent of the orange juice sold to school meal programs may be adulterated; (5) the Department of Justice has convicted six juice adulterators and the Department of Agriculture has debarred three companies that remain in operation; and (6) in-plant inspections and juice testing programs are potentially effective but costly options for enhancing the detection of adulterated juice. |
gao_GAO-15-226 | gao_GAO-15-226_0 | However, DOD’s three distribution performance metrics do not provide decision makers with a comprehensive view of performance across the entire global distribution pipeline as they do not incorporate costs, cover all the military services, or extend to the “last tactical mile.”
DOD Has Established Three Metrics to Measure Its Distribution Performance
To measure the performance of its global distribution pipeline, DOD has established three metrics—logistics response time, customer wait time, and time-definite delivery. Similarly, DOD has set as a time-definite delivery standard that 85 percent of all items ordered from the United States for delivery to Japan by ocean transport should be delivered within 57 days. DOD’s Metrics Do Not Provide a Comprehensive View of Distribution Performance
DOD’s three distribution performance metrics do not provide decision makers with a comprehensive view of performance across the entire global distribution pipeline. However, DOD’s definitions of its three metrics and its guidance for using them to measure distribution performance do not address cost. The DOD guidance establishing the customer wait time performance measure requires that the military departments (e.g., the Departments of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy) use the customer wait time measurement to assess the performance of the supply chain, but does not require that each of the military services establish a customer wait time standard to assess its distribution performance. Moreover, unless DOD’s guidance is revised to help ensure the three distribution performance metrics address multiple priorities and provide useful information for decision making on matters such as cost and unless a service-wide customer wait time standard is established and used for the U.S. Marine Corps, it will be difficult for DOD to form a comprehensive view of the performance of its entire global distribution pipeline. However, DOD officials stated that U.S. Forces–Afghanistan did not report this performance assessment to TRANSCOM. DOD May Not Have Sufficiently Reliable Data to Accurately Determine Whether It Has Met Its Established Distribution Standards
DOD may not have sufficiently reliable data to accurately determine the extent to which it has met the standards it has established for distribution performance, because it has not conducted regular comprehensive assessments of its data collection and reporting processes. responding to our data-reliability questionnaire, indicated that it had not conducted a risk assessment of its data. In addition, officials we spoke with from TRANSCOM, the services, and several other DOD components told us of a number of potential inaccuracies in the data TRANSCOM uses to evaluate distribution performance. Without a policy requiring regular comprehensive data- reliability assessments, DOD lacks reasonable assurance that organizations will conduct such assessments and data will be sufficiently reliable to effectively measure DOD’s performance in distribution. Specifically, we stated that the corrective action plan should (1) identify the scope and root causes of capability gaps and other problems, effective solutions, and actions to be taken to implement the solutions; (2) include the characteristics of effective strategic planning, including a mission statement; goals and related strategies (for example, objectives and activities); performance measures and associated milestones, benchmarks, and targets for improvement; resources and investments required for implementation; key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals; and the involvement of all key stakeholders in a collaborative process to develop and implement the plan; and (3) document how the department will integrate these plans with its other decision-making processes; delineate organizational roles and responsibilities; and support department-wide priorities identified in higher-level strategic guidance. Although DOD has taken several actions to address its distribution challenges and improve distribution processes, these efforts to improve distribution are focused on a specific portion or segment of the process and are not based on an assessment of the entire distribution pipeline. Implementing our previous recommendation that DOD develop a comprehensive corrective action plan for distribution would help to identify and address root causes of distribution challenges and better position DOD to address distribution performance. To ensure the reliability of DOD’s distribution performance data, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to develop and enforce policies to require data-reliability assessments to be conducted by DOD organizations involved in the collection and reporting of distribution performance data, such as TRANSCOM and the military services, to evaluate and address any gaps in its distribution performance data. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to revise guidance to ensure that the three distribution metrics incorporate cost. However, DOD did not agree that there would be value in any parallel effort to incorporate cost into the third distribution performance metric—time-definite delivery—because it maintains that this metric provides the standards to measure whether logistics response time performance is meeting expectations. DOD concurred with the recommendation to revise guidance to ensure that a customer wait time standard is established and used for the Marine Corps. We compared the responses to standards for internal control within the federal government. To determine the extent to which DOD has taken actions to identify causes and develop solutions for any gaps in distribution, we reviewed documents provided by TRANSCOM, including from TRANSCOM’s Distribution Performance Management Branch within its Strategy, Policy, Programs, and Logistics Directorate. DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Observations on DOD’s Progress and Challenges in Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD operates a complex, multibillion-dollar distribution system for delivering supplies and equipment to U.S. forces globally. DOD's goal in operating this global distribution pipeline is to deliver the right item to the right place at the right time, at the right cost. GAO has reported on weaknesses in DOD's distribution performance and has identified management of DOD's entire supply chain as a high-risk area.
This review assesses the extent to which DOD (1) has established metrics for its distribution performance, (2) is able to accurately measure its performance against distribution standards, and (3) has taken actions to identify causes and develop solutions for any gaps in distribution. GAO analyzed DOD's distribution metrics, DOD's responses to data-reliability questionnaires, and corrective actions, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
To measure the performance of its global distribution pipeline, the Department of Defense (DOD) has established three metrics:(1) logistics response time—number of days between the time a customer submits an order and receives it, (2) customer wait time—number of days between the time a maintenance unit, a subset of customers, submits an order and receives it, and (3) time-definite delivery—a measure of the probability (e.g., 85 percent) that a customer will receive an order within an established logistics response time. However, these metrics do not provide decision makers with a complete representation of performance across the entire global distribution pipeline. DOD's definitions of its metrics and guidance for using them do not address cost, although DOD officials stated that cost is included in metrics used to assess other aspects of the supply chain, and the Marine Corps has not established a customer wait time metric. Further, although joint doctrine has set efficient and effective distribution “from the factory to the foxhole” as a priority, these metrics do not always include performance for the final destination. Unless DOD's guidance is revised to ensure the three distribution performance metrics include cost information for decision making and the Marine Corps establishes a customer wait time metric, and DOD incorporates metric performance to the final destination, it will be difficult for DOD to achieve a comprehensive view of the performance of its entire global distribution pipeline.
DOD may not have sufficiently reliable data to accurately determine the extent to which it has met the standards it has established for distribution performance, because it has not developed policy for requiring regular comprehensive assessments to be conducted of its distribution data-collection and reporting processes. Several DOD organizations indicated that they had not conducted this type of review that would be consistent with standards for internal control in the federal government. Specifically, the Air Force indicated that it had not conducted a risk assessment of its data, a part of assessing data reliability. Officials GAO spoke with from U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the services, and other DOD components described a number of potential inaccuracies, such as delivery dates recorded after deliveries were actually made, in the data TRANSCOM uses to evaluate distribution performance. Without a policy requiring regular comprehensive data-reliability assessments, DOD lacks reasonable assurance that organizations will conduct such assessments and that data will be sufficiently reliable to effectively measure DOD's performance in distribution.
Although DOD has taken several actions to address gaps in its distribution performance, including conducting performance reviews, and holding workshops to assess problems and develop solutions, these efforts focus on specific areas of distribution, and DOD has not developed a comprehensive corrective action plan for the entire distribution pipeline that identifies the scope and root causes of capability gaps and other problems, solutions, and actions to be taken. In July 2011, GAO recommended DOD develop such a corrective action plan. DOD did not concur, citing several ongoing efforts. However, these efforts do not address gaps across all distribution operations. Thus, implementing GAO's prior recommendation would help identify root causes of and solutions to distribution challenges and better position DOD to address distribution performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) revise guidance to ensure its metrics incorporate cost, (2) revise guidance to ensure the Marine Corps establishes a customer wait time metric, (3) incorporate performance information from the final destination, and (4) develop policy requiring data-reliability assessments. DOD concurred with the second and fourth recommendations and partially concurred with the first, stating that there would be no value to affix cost to time-definite delivery. DOD did not concur with the third recommendation, stating that data to the final destination should not be incorporated into DOD's performance metrics. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-79 | gao_GAO-06-79_0 | In order to be perfected, a complaint must contain the required four elements of a Title VIII complaint: the names and addresses of the person alleging the discriminatory practice and the respondent, a description and the address of the dwelling involved, and a statement of the facts leading to the allegation; and satisfy the Act’s jurisdictional requirements that the complainant has standing to file the complaint; that the respondent, dwelling, subject matter of discrimination (e.g., refusal to rent or sell) and the basis (e.g., race, color, or familial status) for the alleged discrimination are covered by the Act; and that the complaint has been filed within a year of the last occurrence of the alleged discriminatory practice. In 2004, FHEO hubs and FHAP agencies closed about one-third of their cases via conciliation. An estimated 30 percent noted that it was either somewhat or very difficult to reach a live person the first time they contacted a fair housing agency, and 34 percent said they had difficulty contacting staff after the initial contact. 5.) 10). However, the relative infrequency with which some practices were used, according to documentation in the case files, raises questions about investigation thoroughness. Evidence Indicates a Lack of Consistent Efforts to Conciliate Complaints
Although HUD requires fair housing agencies to attempt conciliation throughout the complaint process, our review of case files, survey of complainants, and test calls revealed that FHEO and FHAP agencies did not always attempt to conciliate complaints, made limited efforts to do so, or did not meet HUD’s requirement that they document these efforts. Complainants Were Dissatisfied with the Fair Housing Complaint Process, Its Outcome, and Certain Aspects of Intake and Investigation
While an estimated 44 percent of complainants were somewhat or very satisfied with the fair housing complaint process, based on our survey, we estimate that about half of all complainants were either somewhat or very dissatisfied. Similarly, nearly 60 percent were dissatisfied with the outcome of the fair housing complaint process, and almost 40 percent would be unlikely to file a complaint in the future. In general, complainants had similar responses for FHEO and FHAP investigations. The lack of documentation that conciliation is offered raises questions about HUD’s ability to assure that such attempts are made as appropriate throughout the fair housing process. Intake
To determine the thoroughness of efforts by the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) and Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) agencies during the intake process, we conducted two activities. Investigation and Conciliation
To address the thoroughness of investigation procedures, including conciliation attempts, we reviewed the documentation in 197 randomly selected case files of housing discrimination cases completed during the last 6 months of 2004 around the country (see table 1). Complainant Satisfaction
We surveyed a sample of complainants whose cases had been investigated and closed by FHEO and FHAP agencies from July 1 to December 31, 2004, to determine levels of satisfaction with the thoroughness, fairness, timeliness, and outcomes of the intake and investigation process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) and related state and local Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) agencies receive and investigate several thousand complaints of housing discrimination. These activities, including required conciliation attempts, are directed by HUD's standards, which are based on law, regulation, and best practices. GAO's 2004 report examining trends in case outcomes raised questions about the quality and consistency of the intake (the receipt of initial inquiries) and investigation processes. This follow-up report assesses the thoroughness of fair housing intake and investigation (including conciliation) processes, and complainant satisfaction with the process.
What GAO Found
Evidence from several sources raises questions about the timeliness and thoroughness of the intake process. Thirty percent of complainants GAO surveyed noted that it was either somewhat or very difficult to reach a live person the first time they contacted a fair housing agency. GAO experienced similar difficulty in test calls it made to each of the 10 FHEO and 36 state FHAP agency intake centers. For example, 5 locations did not respond to the test calls. Further, FHEO and FHAP agencies do not consistently record in their automated information system contacts they receive that they consider potential fair housing inquiries and timeliness data are unreliable, limiting the system's effectiveness as a management control. GAO's review of a national random sample of 197 investigative case files for investigations completed within the last 6 months of 2004 found varying levels of documentation that FHEO and FHAP investigators met investigative standards and followed recommended procedures. Further, though the Fair Housing Act requires that agencies always attempt conciliation to the extent feasible, only about a third of the files showed evidence of such attempts. FHEO officials stated that the required investigation and conciliation actions may have been taken but not documented as required in case files. According to GAO's survey of a national random sample of 575 complainants whose complaint investigations were recently completed, about half were either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the outcome of the fair housing complaint process, and almost 40 percent would be unlikely to file a complaint in the future. Although GAO and survey respondents found that FHEO and FHAP agency staff were generally courteous and helpful, important lapses remain in the complaint process that may affect not only how complainants feel about the process but also how thoroughly and promptly their cases are handled. |
gao_GAO-03-190 | gao_GAO-03-190_0 | TSA Actions and Plans to Implement Selected Results-Oriented Practices
Within its first year of existence, TSA has made an impressive start in implementing practices that can create a results-oriented organizational culture and help TSA as it begins to take responsibility for the security of the maritime and surface modes of transportation. ATSA required TSA to issue specific reports to the Congress on its activities and progress in establishing and meeting its goals. Concluding Observations
Never has a results-oriented focus been more critical than today, when the security of America’s citizens depends so directly and immediately on the results of many federal programs. TSA has faced immense challenges in its first year of existence to build the infrastructure of a large organization and meet mandated deadlines to federalize aviation security. As TSA begins to take responsibility for security in the maritime and surface modes of transportation, its current and future challenge is to build, sustain, and institutionalize the organizational capacity to help it achieve its current and future goals. As TSA moves into the newly created DHS, TSA has an opportunity to continue to foster a results-oriented culture. | Why GAO Did This Study
Never has a results-oriented focus been more critical than today, when the security of America's citizens depends on the outcomes of many federal programs. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) that created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and made it responsible for transportation security. ATSA requires TSA to implement specific practices that are intended to make it a results-oriented organization.
What GAO Found
In its first year, TSA has simultaneously started to build the infrastructure of a large organization as it focused primarily on meeting its aviation security deadlines. As TSA begins to take responsibility for security in the maritime and surface modes of transportation, its current and future challenge is to continue to build, sustain, and institutionalize the organizational capacity to help it achieve its current and future goals. In this regard, TSA has made an impressive start in implementing practices that can create a results-oriented culture. These practices--leadership commitment, strategic planning, performance management, collaboration and communication, and public reporting and customer service--are shown below. Such practices are especially important when TSA moves into the newly created Department of Homeland Security. |
gao_HEHS-95-66 | gao_HEHS-95-66_0 | The second set of regulations was issued in response to the Sullivan v. Zebley Supreme Court decision, which required SSA to make its process for determining disability in children analogous to the adult process. Both sets of regulations placed more emphasis on assessing how children’s impairments limit their ability to act and behave like unimpaired children of similar age. Both also emphasize the importance of obtaining evidence from nonmedical sources as part of this assessment. . . .”
To determine adults’ eligibility for disability benefits, SSA uses a five-step sequential evaluation process. 1.) “an inquiry into the impact of an impairment on the normal daily activities of a child of the claimant’s age—speaking, walking, dressing and feeding oneself, going to school, playing, etc.”
Although the Court required the functional assessment, it did not define the degree of limitation necessary to qualify for benefits, except by analogy to the adult definition of disability. Before the IFA process was introduced in 1991, the national award rate for all types of childhood cases was 38 percent, but the award rate jumped to 56 percent in the first 2 years after the IFA and DBRA regulations were issued. The majority were found eligible based on IFAs. SSA’s efforts and experts’ suggestions are geared toward improving the process rather than addressing the underlying conceptual problems with the IFA. The media have reported allegations that parents coach their children to fake mental impairments by misbehaving or performing poorly in school so that they can qualify for SSI benefits. Unless parents admit to it, coaching is almost impossible to substantiate. We believe that more consistent decisions could be made if adjudicators based functional assessments of children on the functional criteria in SSA’s medical listings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effects of the judicially mandated individualized functional assessment (IFA) process on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, focusing on: (1) allegations that parents may be coaching their children to fake mental impairments to qualify under the lower eligibility standards created by IFA; and (2) how IFA affects the children's eligibility for benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the judicial decision that required changes in IFA essentially made the process for determining disability in children analogous to the adult process; (2) the new process assesses how children's impairments limit their ability to act and behave like unimpaired children of similar age; (3) it has become important to obtain evidence of disability from nonmedical sources as part of the children's assessment; (4) although the court required a new type of assessment for disabled children, it did not define the degree of limitation necessary to qualify for SSI benefits; (5) before the IFA process was introduced in 1991, the national award rate for all types of childhood cases was 38 percent, but the award rate jumped to 56 percent in the first 2 years after IFA regulations were issued; (6) the non-medical aspects of the IFA evaluation rely heavily on adjudicator judgment; (7) while the Social Security Administration (SSA) has attempted to improve the process, and thereby reduce fraud and improve accuracy in awards, IFA has an underlying conceptual problem; (8) although the IFA process attempts to improve accuracy, the presence of coaching by parents is almost impossible to detect; and (9) more consistent eligibility decisions could be made if adjudicators based functional assessments of children on the functional criteria in SSA medical listings. |
gao_GAO-05-528 | gao_GAO-05-528_0 | However, we found that RMA is not effectively using all of the tools it has available and that producers and others can continue to take advantage of the program. RMA’s Analysis to Detect Potential Program Fraud and Abuse for Many Large Farming Operations Is Incomplete
RMA’s data mining excludes many large farming operations because producers fail to report other individuals’ and entities’ interests in these operations. As a result, RMA should be able to recover up to $70 million in claims payments. First, in terms of RMA’s regulations, producers can insure their fields individually instead of insuring all fields combined, which makes it easier for them to switch production among fields, either to make false insurance claims or to build up a higher yield history on a particular field in order to increase its eligibility for higher future insurance guarantees. Annually, RMA pays about $300 million in claims for prevented planting. Recently Prosecuted Crop Insurance Fraud Cases Highlight Program Vulnerabilities
Eight recent crop insurance fraud cases that were investigated by USDA’s OIG and resulted in criminal prosecution between June 2003 and April 2005 reflect some of the issues we identified. The cases show how producers, sometimes in collusion with others, falsely report planting, claims of damage and production to try to circumvent RMA’s procedures. In some cases, producers hid production or switched it from one field to another. Several of these cases also demonstrate the importance of having FSA and RMA work together to identify and share information on questionable farming practices/activities. In addition, insurance companies’ quality control reviews of claims are weak because RMA does not effectively oversee the companies’ quality assurance efforts leaving the crop insurance program susceptible to fraud and abuse. The program’s high premium subsidies, specified in the Federal Crop Insurance Act, as amended by ARPA, may also limit RMA’s ability to control program abuse because the subsidies shield producers from the full effect of paying higher premiums associated with frequent or larger claims. We further recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture promulgate regulations to implement its expanded authority under ARPA to impose sanctions; direct FSA to share producer-derived information with RMA for data mining to administer and enforce the requirements of the crop insurance program; direct RMA to determine if payments have been made to ineligible producers or to entities that failed to disclose ownership interests and, if so, to recover the appropriate amounts; direct RMA to strengthen its oversight of the insurance companies’ implementation of the quality control review system; and direct RMA to reduce the insurance guarantee or eliminate optional unit coverage for producers who consistently have claims that are irregular in comparison with other producers growing the same crop in the same location. We continue to believe RMA has not fully exercised its new authority. Specifically, we agreed to (1) assess the effectiveness of USDA’s procedures and processes to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in selling and servicing crop insurance policies; (2) determine the extent to which program design issues may make the program more vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse; and (3) determine the effectiveness of USDA’s procedures to assure program integrity in developing new crop insurance products. U.S. Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C.
Agriculture Risk Protection Act (ARPA). -3- 4. Based on results from data mining, OIG, and USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) and Risk Management Agency (RMA) conducted field inspections on a producer in Tennessee. While not all of these policy irregularities are necessarily sanctionable, the 3,000 questionable claims provide a general reference in comparison with the 114 sanctions RMA imposed from 2001 through 2004. However, as we report, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the monitoring inspections RMA requested between 2001 and 2004, and FSA offices in nine states did not conduct any of the inspections RMA requested in one or more of these years. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal crop insurance protects producers against losses from natural disasters. In 2004, the crop insurance program provided $47 billion in coverage, at a cost of $3.6 billion, including an estimated $160 million in losses from fraud and abuse. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers this program with private insurers. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (ARPA) provided new tools to monitor and control abuses, such as having USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) conduct field inspections. GAO assessed, among other things, the (1) effectiveness of USDA's processes to address program fraud and abuse and (2) extent to which the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse.
What GAO Found
While RMA employs a range of processes to help prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse and has reported more than $300 million in savings over the past 4 years in the crop insurance program, GAO found that RMA does not effectively use all the tools it has available. Inspections during the growing season are not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA had requested. Without inspections, producers may falsely claim crop losses. RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations is incomplete. According to GAO's analysis, in 2003, about 21,000 of the largest farming operations in the program did not report individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations. As a result, USDA should be able to recover up to $74 million in claims payments. FSA did not give RMA access to the data needed to identify such individuals or entities. RMA is not effectively overseeing insurance companies' quality assurance programs. GAO's review of 120 cases showed that companies completed only 75 percent of the required reviews and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. RMA has infrequently used its new sanction authority to address program abuses. RMA has not issued regulations to implement its new sanction authority under ARPA. RMA imposed only 114 sanctions from 2001 through 2004. Annually, RMA identifies about 3,000 questionable claims, not all of which are necessarily sanctionable. Eight recent crop insurance fraud cases, investigated by USDA's Office of Inspector General and resulting in criminal prosecutions between June 2003 and April 2005, reflect these issues. Totaling $3 million in insurance claims, these cases show how producers, sometimes in collusion with insurance agents and others, falsely claim prevented planting, weather damage, and low production. In some cases, producers hid or moved production from one field to another. Several of these cases also demonstrate the importance of having FSA and RMA work together to identify and share information on questionable farming practices/activities. RMA's regulations, as well as statutory requirements, create program design problems that hinder RMA officials' efforts to reduce program abuse. For example, RMA's regulations allow producers to insure fields individually rather than all fields combined. This option enables producers to "switch" reporting of yield among fields to either make false claims or build up a higher yield history on a field to increase its eligibility for higher insurance guarantees. High premium subsidies, established by statute, may also limit RMA's ability to control program abuse because the subsidies shield producers from the full effect of paying higher premiums associated with frequent or larger claims. |
gao_GAO-03-553T | gao_GAO-03-553T_0 | DOD Is Investing Billions of Dollars Annually to Operate, Maintain, and Modernize Its Amalgamation of Business Systems
As part of its ongoing business systems modernization program, and consistent with our past recommendation, DOD has created an inventory of its existing and new business system investments. As of October 2002, DOD reported that this inventory consisted of 1,731 systems and system acquisition projects across DOD’s functional areas. As we have previously reported, this systems environment is not the result of a systematic and coordinated departmentwide strategy, but rather is the product of unrelated, stovepiped initiatives to support a set of business operations that are nonstandard and duplicative across DOD components. To the department’s credit, it recognizes the need to eliminate as many systems as possible and integrate and standardize those that remain. In fact, three of the four Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) projects that are the subject of the report being released today were collectively intended to reduce or eliminate all or part of 17 different systems that perform similar functions. Figure 2 provides the allocation of DOD’s business systems modernization budget for fiscal year 2003 budget by component. These disciplines include having and implementing (1) an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain systems investments; (2) an investment management process to ensure that systems are invested in incrementally, are aligned with the enterprise architecture, and are justified on the basis of cost, benefits, and risks; and (3) a project oversight process to ensure that project commitments are being met and that needed corrective action is taken. Key Modernization Management Weaknesses Continue, But DOD Plans to Correct Them
The future of DOD’s business systems modernization is fraught with risk, in part because of longstanding and pervasive modernization management weaknesses. As we have reported, these weaknesses include (1) lack of an enterprise architecture; (2) inadequate institutional and project-level investment management processes; and (3) limited oversight of projects’ delivery of promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. To DOD’s credit, it recognizes the need to address each of these weaknesses and has committed to doing so. Further, we stated that DOD’s plans to continue spending billions of dollars on new and modified systems independently from one another, and outside the context of a departmental modernization blueprint, would result in more systems that are duplicative, noninteroperable, and unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface; moreover, they would not address longstanding financial management problems. Corporate investment management approach: DOD has yet to establish and implement an effective departmentwide approach to managing its business systems investment portfolio. DOD also had not yet conducted a comprehensive review of its ongoing IT investments to ensure that they were consistent with its architecture development efforts. In particular, none of the four DFAS projects addressed in the report being issued today had current and reliable economic justifications to demonstrate that they would produce value commensurate with the costs and risks being incurred. Table 2 highlights the four projects’ estimated cost increases and schedule delays. For these four projects, oversight responsibility was shared by the DOD comptroller, DFAS, and the DOD chief information officer (CIO). However, these oversight authorities have not ensured, in each case, that the requisite analytical basis for making informed investment decisions was prepared. DOD CIO—Oversight of the department’s “major” IT projects, of which two of the four DFAS projects (DCD/DCW and DPPS) qualify, is the responsibility of DOD’s CIO. DOD has taken steps to address some of our recommendations. For example, it has clarified organizational accountability and responsibility for the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its business systems modernization program has been an area of longstanding concern to Congress and one that GAO has designated as high risk since 1995. Because of this concern, GAO was requested to testify on (1) DOD's current inventory of existing and new business systems and the amount of funding devoted to this inventory; (2) DOD's modernization management capabilities, including weaknesses and DOD's efforts to address them; and (3) GAO's collective recommendations for correcting these weaknesses and minimizing DOD's exposure to risk until they are corrected. In developing this testimony, GAO drew from its previously issued reports on DOD's business systems modernization efforts, including one released today on four key Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) projects.
What GAO Found
As of October 2002, DOD reported that its business systems environment consisted of 1,731 systems and system acquisition projects spanning about 18 functional areas. This environment is the product of unrelated, stovepiped initiatives supporting nonstandard, duplicative business operations across DOD components. For fiscal year 2003, about $18 billion of DOD's IT funding relates to operating, maintaining, and modernizing these nonintegrated systems. To DOD's credit, it recognizes the need to modernize, eliminating as many of these systems as possible. The future of DOD's business systems modernization is fraught with risk because of longstanding and pervasive modernization weaknesses, three of which are discussed below. GAO's report on four DFAS systems highlights some of these weaknesses, and GAO's prior reports have identified the others. DOD has stated its commitment to addressing each and has efforts under way that are intended to do so. Lack of departmentwide enterprise architecture: DOD does not yet have an architecture, or blueprint, to guide and constrain its business system investments across the department. Nevertheless, DOD continues to spend billions of dollars on new and modified systems based the parochial needs and strategic direction of its component organizations. This will continue to result in systems that are duplicative, are not integrated, are unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface, and will not adequately address longstanding financial management problems. Lack of effective investment management: DOD does not yet have an effective approach to consistently selecting and controlling its investments as a portfolio of competing department options and within the context of an enterprise architecture. DOD is also not ensuring that it invests in each system incrementally and on the basis of reliable economic justification. For example, for the four DFAS projects, DOD spent millions of dollars without knowing whether the projects would produce value commensurate with costs and risks. Thus far, this has resulted in the termination of one of the projects after about $126 million and 7 years of effort was spent. Lack of effective oversight: DOD has not consistently overseen its system projects to ensure that they are delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. For example, for the four DFAS projects, oversight responsibility is shared by the DOD Comptroller, DFAS, and the DOD chief information officer. However, these oversight authorities have largely allowed the four to proceed unabated, even though each was experiencing significant cost increases, schedule delays, and/or capability and scope reductions and none were supported by adequate economic justification. As a result, DOD invested approximately $316 million in four projects that may not resolve the very financial management weaknesses that they were initiated to address. |
gao_GAO-06-75 | gao_GAO-06-75_0 | Background
Five insular areas—American Samoa, Guam, CNMI in the Pacific Ocean, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea—represent the largest insular areas of the United States. However, significant variation exists among the insular areas in terms of the distribution of funds by source, largely due to the number of Medicare beneficiaries residing in each area. Medicare Represents the Majority of Federal Health Care Spending in Insular Areas
Federal health care financing programs—primarily Medicare—comprised the vast majority of the $2.2 billion in total federal health care spending in the five insular areas in fiscal year 2003. Notable Differences Exist in Methods Used to Allocate Federal Health Care Funds in the Insular Areas Compared to the States
The methods used to allocate federal health care funds in the insular areas differ, in some cases, from those used in the states. Similarly, differences exist in how the Medicaid and SCHIP programs are funded in the insular areas. In addition, allocation methods used for certain HHS grants establish separate rules for the insular areas. Hospitals in American Samoa and CNMI are also paid based on their costs; however, they are not subject to target amounts or a national cap. Multiple Factors Explain Differences in Individual Spending Levels in Insular Areas Compared to the States
Although most of the key sources of health care funding available in the insular areas are also available in the states, individual spending levels are often lower in the insular areas. In addition, statutory limits on Medicaid funding in the insular areas contribute to lower per capita spending. In light of these statutory limits, CMS does not hold insular areas accountable for providing all the mandatory Medicaid services, including nursing home care, which makes up nearly a third of Medicaid expenditures in the states. In contrast, HHS grant funding per capita is higher in the insular areas than in the states, due, in part, to allocation formulas that result in higher payments to them as well as to states with smaller populations. Lower Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary Explained by Payment Policy Differences and Lower Utilization
As in the insular areas, Medicare comprised the majority—over 60 percent—of federal health care funding in the states in fiscal year 2003 and, with limited exceptions, the program operates largely the same in the insular areas as in the states. The insular areas expressed concern that the report did not sufficiently address certain issues, such as implications of statutory limits on federal Medicaid spending and a more comprehensive analysis of local circumstances that affect the availability and costs of health care services. Specifically, CNMI and Puerto Rico commented that the statutory limits on federal Medicaid spending—the Medicaid cap and minimum FMAP—result in insufficient federal Medicaid payments to the insular areas and explain the significant differences in federal Medicaid payments between them and the states. For example, Puerto Rico commented that as a result of the limits on federal Medicaid payments, it and other insular areas shoulder a larger share of financial responsibility for the Medicaid program than the states, and that the federal contribution to the program is far less than the minimum FMAP suggests. | Why GAO Did This Study
Five insular areas of the United States--American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands--benefit from federal health care financing and grant programs that help fund health care services to their over 4 million residents. However, notable differences exist in how the programs are funded or operate in the insular areas, such as statutory limits on federal Medicaid funding to the insular areas that do not apply in the states. To help understand these differences, GAO was asked to identify (1) the key sources of federal health care funding in the insular areas, (2) differences between insular areas and the states in the methods used to allocate these funds, and (3) differences in spending levels per individual between insular areas and the states. In commenting on a draft of this report, American Samoa, CNMI, and Puerto Rico suggested the need for additional information on certain issues, such as implications of statutory limits on federal Medicaid spending and a more comprehensive analysis of local circumstances that affect the availability and costs of health care services.
What GAO Found
Multiple federal programs fund health care services in the insular areas. Federal health care financing programs--Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)--represented nearly 90 percent of the $2.2 billion in health care funding to these areas in fiscal year 2003, with Medicare alone representing over three-quarters of total funding. The Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Interior (DOI) also provide grants to the insular areas. Significant variation exists among the insular areas in terms of the distribution of funds by these sources, largely due to the number of Medicare beneficiaries in each area. The methods used to allocate these federal funds to insular areas often differ from methods used in the states. For example, Medicare pays hospitals in most insular areas based on their costs rather than the prospective payment system used for most hospitals in the states. Similarly, federal funding for Medicaid and SCHIP is subject to statutory limits that do not apply to states, including minimum federal contributions and a cap on federal Medicaid payments. In addition, certain HHS grants use different rules to determine insular areas' funding. Differences in allocation methods as well as other factors contribute to lower spending levels per individual in the insular areas compared to the states. For example, Medicare spending per beneficiary in the insular areas was less than half the amount it was in the states, due in part to differences in payment policies and to beneficiaries' lower utilization of services. In addition, the statutory limits on federal Medicaid funding in these areas contributed to lower federal Medicaid per capita payments in the five insular areas compared to the national average. However, in light of limits on federal funding, the insular areas are not held accountable for covering all Medicaid benefit requirements, such as nursing facility services that represent nearly one-third of Medicaid expenditures in the states. Insular areas benefit from certain HHS grant allocation formulas that result in higher per capita payments to them than the states, on average. |
gao_RCED-95-95 | gao_RCED-95-95_0 | NRC Does Not Yet Know the Number of Sites Requiring Additional Cleanup
In our 1989 review of NRC’s decommissioning procedures and criteria, we found that NRC had improperly terminated licenses at two of the eight sites we reviewed. NRC has determined that 22 of the 29,000 licenses involved sites that exceed radioactive guidelines for unrestricted use and, consequently, require additional cleanup. NRC does not expect that a large number of former sites will require additional cleanup, although the total number of these sites will not be known for several years. According to NRC, the contractor will complete its review of the remaining 9,500 terminated licenses in 1996. However, NRC officials told us that it will take several more years to review the contractor’s work and conduct any site inspections that may be needed to assess contamination resulting from these licenses. Little Progress Has Been Made in Cleaning Up Sites Under the Site Decommissioning Management Plan
In March 1990, NRC established a program—termed the Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP)—to help ensure the timely cleanup of sites facing difficult and/or prolonged decommissioning. In July 1993, NRC issued new regulations that required licensees and others who use or possess radioactive materials to prepare and maintain adequate documentation on activities that could affect decommissioning at their sites. Delays in cleaning up contaminated sites can also result in more difficult cleanups. However, neither disposal option is viable for many SDMP sites contaminated with large quantities of radioactive waste. NRC expects the studies will take at least 2 years to complete. Litigation, Coordination, and Negotiations Have Delayed Many SDMP Site Cleanups
Litigation, coordination, and negotiations between affected parties also have delayed cleanups at many SDMP sites. According to NRC, it has acted to improve the timeliness of its document reviews. Another 895 licenses require additional review to determine if the sites require further cleanup. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) decommissioning program, focusing on: (1) NRC progress in identifying all former licensees' sites that require additional cleanup; (2) NRC progress in ensuring that sites on its Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SDMP) are cleaned up in a timely manner; and (3) factors that impede the timely cleanup of sites.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NRC has reviewed about 75 percent of its terminated licenses to identify sites that need additional cleanup and has found 22 sites that exceed its radioactive contamination guidelines; (2) NRC is seeking additional information on another 895 terminated licenses to determine if those sites need additional remediation; (3) NRC will not know the total number of sites that will require additional cleanup until it completes its review; (4) NRC expects to complete its initial review in 1996, but it will take several more years to conduct site inspections to determine contamination levels; (5) although NRC established SDMP in 1990 to ensure the timely remediation of sites facing difficult or prolonged cleanups, it has made little progress in cleaning up those sites; (6) NRC has issued additional regulations that require licensees to document their activities that could affect decommissioning operations; (7) the delays in cleaning up contaminated sites increase the risk of human exposure to radioactive wastes; and (8) factors that have delayed or halted cleanup at SDMP sites include difficulties in disposing of large quantities of a certain radioactive waste, litigation, coordination and negotiations between affected parties, and time consuming administrative reviews of decommissioning documents. |
gao_GAO-13-679T | gao_GAO-13-679T_0 | FRA provides regulatory oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads, both passenger and freight. The Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 was the first authorization of FRA’s safety activities since 1994 and is due to be reauthorized in 2013. RSIA overhauled federal rail safety requirements by directing the FRA to, among other things, promulgate additional new rail safety regulations and guidance in areas such as railroad risk reduction plans, track inspections standards, and highway-rail grade crossing safety. PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent some accidents caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. FRA’s Rail Safety Framework Includes Data to Inform Its Rail Safety Oversight Efforts but Faces Potential Oversight Challenges
FRA’s Oversight Framework Primarily Uses Federal and State Inspectors to Oversee Railroad Safety Efforts
Our work to date indicates that FRA primarily monitors railroads’ compliance with federal safety regulations through routine inspections by individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads’ systems. Our preliminary work has found that thirty states also employ railroad safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct safety oversight activities, supplemental to FRA’s activities, based on FRA rail safety regulations and to enforce state railroad safety laws. FRA is also responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for commuter railroads and Amtrak. In 2006, FRA implemented a risk-based approach, using its National Inspection Plan (NIP), to allocate its limited inspection resources to ensure rail safety. FRA has also developed the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), which is a planning and evaluation tool used to assess its inspection resources from a nationwide perspective. FRA officials also told us that while the SAM model has been refined based on what they have learned from making improvements to the NIP, the SAM is not designed to take into account certain changes—such as increasing freight train volume or accidents in a particular region—as the SAM uses past accident data to provide a baseline for the nationwide distribution of its inspectors. However, FRA regional officials we talked to stated that the staffing decisions based on SAM results do not necessarily align their inspectors with their perspective of the needs in their region nor does it take a region’s geography into account. FRA Faces Several Potential Challenges to Its Rail Safety Oversight Mission
Based on our work to date, we have identified several potential challenges affecting FRA’s rail safety oversight, including lack of a final rule requiring the submission of Risk Reduction Plans by specified railroads, lack of succession planning to ensure sufficient staff numbers and expertise, and other ongoing and emerging challenges. RSIA required FRA to develop a rulemaking requiring certain railroads to submit risk reduction plans, within 4 years of enactment, which was October 2012. Our work to date has found that FRA does not yet have a specific plan to replace its aging inspector workforce. According to FRA officials, in the next 5 years, 150 of FRA’s 470 inspectors (about 32 percent) will be eligible to retire. For example, FRA regional officials stated that it takes about 1 to 2 years to find, hire, train, and certify a new experienced inspector and 3 to 4 years to get an inexperienced trainee certified by FRA as a qualified inspector. Developing PTC components and PTC installation: Some PTC components are still in development—most notably the PTC back- office server. One or more of these servers will be installed in over a dozen railroads’ back offices and are needed to communicate vital information between the back office, locomotives, and waysides. In addition, PTC installation is a time- and resource-consuming process. Most of the freight railroads we spoke with expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized the importance of field testing to ensure the system performs the way it is intended. FRA resources: Although most railroads we spoke with said they have worked closely with FRA throughout the PTC implementation process, some railroads cited concerns with FRA’s limited resources and the agency’s ability to help facilitate railroads’ PTC implementation. First, FRA officials must verify the field testing of PTC. Our work to date also indicates that by attempting to implement PTC by the 2015 deadline, railroads may be making choices that could introduce financial and operational risks to PTC implementation. Representatives from freight railroads and FRA told us railroads will not compromise the safety functions of the PTC system and will ensure that PTC is implemented meeting RSIA requirements. These representatives noted that without adequate testing, PTC systems could potentially malfunction or fail more frequently, causing system disruptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The rail network is one of Americas safest modes of transportation, although several recent rail accidents have reinforced the need for constant effort from the private and public sectors to ensure safety for rail passengers, the public, and railroad employees. FRA, the federal agency responsible for railroad safety, works with freight, commuter, and intercity passenger railroads and certain states to ensure the safety of the U.S. railroad network.
In 2007, FRA developed and implemented a risk-based approach to its safety inspections of the railroad network. In 2008, RSIA was enacted and, among other things, reauthorized FRAs rail safety program and included several new rail safety provisions, such as the implementation of PTC and creation of rail safety risk reduction plans.
This statement discusses GAOs preliminary observations about 1) how FRA oversees rail safety, 2) challenges to rail safety, and 3) PTC implementation by the U.S. rail industry. GAO examined FRAs overall rail safety framework and interviewed state rail safety officials and officials from FRA; selected Class I, II, and III railroads; and Amtrak on rail safety and PTC implementation.
GAO plans to issue reports on reviews of rail safety and PTC in the fall of 2013.
What GAO Found
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) primarily monitors railroads' compliance with federal safety regulations through routine inspections by individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads' systems. Thirty states also employ railroad safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct supplemental safety oversight activities based on FRA rail safety regulations and enforce state railroad safety laws. FRA applies a quantitative, risk-based approach, the National Inspection Plan, to inform its rail safety oversight efforts using analyses of past accident and inspection data and other information to target inspections in each region. FRA also uses a planning and evaluation tool, the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), to distribute its inspection resources across each FRA region. However, according to several FRA regional administrators that GAO spoke with, the staffing decisions based on SAM results do not necessarily align with their perspectives on the inspector needs for their regions.
Based on GAO's work to date, there are several potential challenges affecting FRA's rail safety oversight. First, the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) required FRA to issue regulations requiring certain railroads to submit risk reduction plans within 4 years. FRA has not yet issued a final rule on the plans. Second, FRA does not have a specific plan to replace its aging inspector workforce. According to FRA officials, in the next 5 years, about 32 percent of FRA inspectors will be eligible to retire. Although FRA officials said that they anticipate being able to replace inspectors, it can take 1 to 2 years to find, hire, train, and certify a new inspector. Finally, FRA faces other ongoing and emerging safety challenges like addressing adverse weather conditions and their impact on railroad operations and equipment, educating the public on the potential hazards of rail-highway crossings, accommodating changes in rail safety risks including new freight flows that affect the need for inspections, and hiring and training a specialized inspector workforce to provide adequate safety oversight for emerging technologies including positive train control (PTC), a communications-based system designed to prevent train accidents caused by human factors.
GAO's work to date indicates that railroads may not be able to fully implement PTC by the 2015 deadline established in RSIA. This is because of the many interrelated challenges caused by the complexity and breadth of PTC implementation. For example, PTC components, such as the back office servers, which are needed to communicate vital information between locomotives and wayside signals, are still under development. In addition, the need to integrate PTC components and field test the system is a time- and resource-consuming process. Finally, some railroads had concerns with FRA's limited resources and ability to verify field testing and certify the system once it is fully implemented. Officials from freight railroads and FRA stated they will not compromise PTC safety functions and will ensure PTC is implemented to meet the requirements of the RSIA mandate. However, in attempting to implement PTC by the 2015 deadline, railroads may be making choices that could introduce financial and operational risks. For example, freight railroad representatives told us that without adequate time for field testing, PTC systems could potentially malfunction or fail more frequently, causing system disruptions. |
gao_GAO-15-684 | gao_GAO-15-684_0 | CT Bureau’s Authorized Staffing Has Increased since Fiscal Year 2011, and Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Reduce Long- standing Staffing Gaps
The CT Bureau’s number of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) staff positions has grown annually since fiscal year 2011, and the bureau has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The percentage of vacancies in the bureau has ranged from 17 percent to 23 percent in fiscal years 2011 to 2015. The Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified before Congress on June 2, 2015 that the CT Bureau had reduced its FTE vacancies to 11 positions. However, we have been unable to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State has not provided sufficient documentation. Filling many of the remaining positions was postponed until the current Coordinator for Counterterrorism had time to assess the bureau’s needs and priorities, according to the CT Bureau. Specifically, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the CT Bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals identified in the bureau’s first multiyear strategic plan. The bureau also reported results achieved toward each established indicator. CT Bureau Has Not Established Time Frames for Addressing Recommendations from Program Evaluations
Standard practices in program management include, among other things, establishing specific time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. On the basis of our review of these action plans, the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015. CT Bureau’s Collaboration on Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance Programs Was Generally in Line with Key Collaboration Practices
We found that activities between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within State as well as with other U.S. government agencies on counterterrorism programs, specifically the CVE and CTF programs, were generally in line with six of the seven key practices that GAO has identified for interagency collaboration in the areas of (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) bridging organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and responsibilities, (5) resources, and (6) written guidance and We did not review one additional key collaboration agreements.practice, which covers participants, because doing so would have required taking a comprehensive look across all the State bureaus and other U.S. government agencies to ensure that all the relevant participants in counterterrorism efforts were included and would have required an evaluation of their relevant resources, skills, and abilities to contribute, which was outside the scope of this review. Conclusions
Given the critical importance of preventing terrorist attacks on the United States and its interests around the world, State elevated the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the Bureau of Counterterrorism in fiscal year 2012 to lead the department’s effort to counter terrorism abroad and to secure the United States against terrorist threats and violent extremism. Also, while the CT Bureau has completed four program evaluations, resulting in 60 recommendations to improve its programs, it has implemented only about half of those recommendations and has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames for completing actions in response to evaluation recommendations, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure the timely implementation of programmatic improvements that would benefit both the country-specific efforts evaluated as well as the broader global program. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given that countering violent extremism is a priority for the U.S. government in general and State’s CT Bureau, we recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated. Specifically, State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would most benefit from third-party evaluation during the upcoming fiscal year and expected CVE to be included in its final determination. State indicated that it will commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator and implementing those actions that are deemed both implementable and worthwhile. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In addition to presenting information on the evolution of the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) and changes in funding, the objectives of this review were to examine (1) how the CT Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau’s coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts.
This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau's authorized FTEs increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period, FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. The vacancies included both staff and management positions. Bureau officials said they postponed filling some positions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities. A senior Bureau of Counterterrorism official testified before Congress in June 2015 that the bureau was making progress and that it had 11 vacancies. However, we have not been able to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State did not provide sufficient documentation.
While the bureau has undertaken efforts to assess its progress, it has not yet evaluated its priority Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program and has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals and reported results achieved toward each indicator. The bureau has also completed four evaluations covering three of its six programs that resulted in 60 recommendations. The bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015 but has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure timely implementation of programmatic improvements. In addition, despite identifying its CVE program as a priority and acknowledging the benefit of evaluating it, the bureau has postponed evaluating it each fiscal year since 2012.
The bureau's coordination on two programs GAO reviewed, CVE and Counterterrorism Finance, generally reflects key practices for effective collaboration. For example, GAO identified efforts to define outcomes and accountability, bridge organizational cultures, and establish written guidance and agreements—all key practices of effective collaboration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator. |
gao_GAO-15-568 | gao_GAO-15-568_0 | Their mission is to enhance the long-term bilateral defense relationship between the United States and the host nation. To better support the combatant commands and be globally responsive and regionally engaged, the Army is in the process of aligning its total force to geographic combatant commands—including the Active Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves. AFRICOM Identifies and Synchronizes Security Cooperation Activities, but the Allocated Brigades Sometimes Lack Key Information about the Activities
The brigades have conducted a range of security cooperation activities identified and synchronized through AFRICOM’s campaign planning process. Further, while USARAF’s fiscal year 2015 Operation Order identifies the need to coordinate activity concepts with the Offices of Security Cooperation, it does not specify a clear mechanism for doing so and USARAF, the Offices of Security Cooperation, and the brigades lack a collective venue for coordination, which they would need in order to respond to dynamic activity requirements and to ensure a shared For instance, officials said that understanding of critical information.USARAF planners and the Offices of Security Cooperation informally contact one another on an individual basis to discuss proposed activities, but they do not consistently and formally meet to discuss upcoming activities. Without a formal and consistent mechanism for stakeholders to coordinate upcoming activities and ensure that information about the activities is timely and complete, the brigades’ ability to effectively conduct security cooperation activities may be challenged and the resources invested may not have the anticipated effect. The Brigades Have Generally Been Prepared to Meet Requirements in Africa, but Limitations Exist With Regard to Mission-Specific Training, Equipping, and Access to Passports
The brigades have been trained and equipped for their core decisive- action missions, which has generally prepared them to meet requirements in Africa. The brigades develop training programs to address these requirements, but Army stakeholders have identified some concerns about how brigade training is being conducted, supported, and funded. Brigades Develop Decisive- Action and Mission-Specific Training
To date, three brigade combat teams have conducted both decisive- action and mission-specific training for deployments to Africa in support of AFRICOM and based on Army Forces Command guidance. Army and brigade officials estimated that decisive-action training also addresses about 90 to 95 percent of the training required to support security cooperation and other activities in Africa. The brigades have experienced capability gaps, because the Army has not fully identified the mission-essential equipment required for the brigades to operate in Africa as allocated forces throughout their period of employment and has not provided this equipment to the brigades in a timely manner. Challenges and Delays in Obtaining Official Passports Have Affected Brigades’ Ability to Meet Requirements
The brigades have experienced challenges and delays in obtaining official passports that have affected their ability to deploy to meet requirements in Africa because, in part, AFRICOM activity timeframes do not always facilitate timely compliance with Department of State passport procedures. As a result of these issues, the Department of State determined that it needed to be more stringent in reviewing passport applications, to ensure that the applicants had a validated requirement for official passports. To help ensure that the allocated brigades have timely and complete information to enable them to prepare for and execute security cooperation activities, direct the Commander of AFRICOM in conjunction with the Commander of USARAF, to develop a formal mechanism—such as regularly scheduled, country-specific meetings that include USARAF desk officers, the Offices of Security Cooperation, and the brigades—to review and discuss upcoming security cooperation activities to ensure that key stakeholders are aware of critical information, have an opportunity to shape the activity, and can gather additional information if necessary. To identify opportunities to enhance brigade mission-specific training, direct the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Commander of Army Forces Command and the Commander of Army Training and Doctrine Command, to conduct an assessment of the Army’s approach to providing mission-specific training to regionally aligned forces, including the brigades allocated to AFRICOM, and determine whether any adjustments are needed. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has clearly identified and synchronized security cooperation activities for the brigades in Africa, we reviewed key security cooperation activity planning documentation such as theater- and country-level plans, briefings and information on AFRICOM’s and U.S. Army Africa’s (USARAF) planning processes, and operations orders. Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa. | Why GAO Did This Study
In support of the Department of Defense's (DOD) increasing emphasis on strengthening partner nations' security forces, the Army is aligning its forces with geographic combatant commands to provide tailored, trained, and responsive forces to meet the commands' requirements. In 2013, AFRICOM became the first combatant command to be allocated an Army regionally aligned brigade combat team—the first of three to date—which was tasked to the command primarily to support security cooperation.
The House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO assess DOD's efforts to plan for and employ these brigades in Africa. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which (1) AFRICOM has clearly identified and synchronized security cooperation activities for the brigades in Africa and (2) the brigades have been prepared to meet mission requirements in Africa. The term ‘synchronize' refers to coordination efforts by AFRICOM and its components to achieve unity of effort across the command. GAO reviewed documents and data and interviewed DOD and Department of State officials.
What GAO Found
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) identifies and synchronizes security cooperation activities through various planning processes, but the brigades allocated to AFRICOM sometimes lack key information about these activities. The brigades have conducted hundreds of security cooperation activities, such as exercises with partner nations, throughout Africa. As part of AFRICOM's planning processes, the Offices of Security Cooperation—located in U.S. embassies in Africa—work with U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) to identify and develop security cooperation activities based on the needs of the host nation and AFRICOM's objectives. The brigades are tasked to conduct many of these activities, but they sometimes lack timely and complete information about the activities, such as activity objectives, which can compromise their effectiveness. While personnel from USARAF and the Offices of Security Cooperation coordinate informally, they do not always have a shared understanding of the activity objectives or involve the brigades in planning. Furthermore, USARAF does not have a formal mechanism that includes both the Offices of Security Cooperation and the brigades to shape activities and address information gaps. As a result, the brigades' ability to conduct activities may be challenged, and the resources invested may not have the anticipated effect.
The brigades have been trained and equipped for their core missions, which has generally prepared them to meet requirements in Africa, but opportunities exist to enhance their mission-specific preparation. The brigades' core training is estimated to cover 90 to 95 percent of the skills needed to support activities in Africa. The brigades have developed regionally-focused, mission-specific training programs to cover the remaining skills. Some Army officials identified concerns about how this training is being supported, but the Army may not have the information it needs to address these concerns, because it has not completed an Army-directed assessment of training for regionally aligned forces. In addition, the brigades have experienced some equipment gaps, particularly in communications systems, because the Army has not fully identified mission-specific equipment requirements or established, or applied, a mechanism to ensure that brigades have the necessary equipment. Furthermore, the Army and the Department of State have not agreed on a process for providing official passports to brigade personnel before their employment period. As a result, the brigades have faced challenges in obtaining passports that have limited their ability to deploy the appropriate personnel to Africa. Without action on these issues, the brigades' ability to fully support the mission in Africa may be affected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a coordination mechanism to improve planning for activities, assess mission-specific training for aligned forces, identify and provide mission-specific equipment for the brigades, and that DOD and the Department of State coordinate on providing passports to the brigades. Both concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-32 | gao_GAO-11-32_0 | For both the Merit Review Program and CSP, proposals are typically evaluated in two review cycles per year. To be considered for intramural research funding: The proposal must be veteran-centric. VA Intramural PTSD Research Funding Increased from $9.9 Million in Fiscal Year 2005 to $24.5 Million in Fiscal Year 2009
Based on the VA data we obtained and summarized, we found that overall intramural PTSD research funding from VA’s medical and prosthetic research appropriation increased from about $9.9 million in fiscal year 2005 to about $24.5 million in fiscal year 2009, or by about 150 percent (see fig. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, intramural PTSD research funding ranged from 2.5 percent to 4.8 percent of VA’s medical and prosthetic research appropriation. The Number of PTSD Studies Funded through VA’s Intramural Research Program Increased from 47 in Fiscal Year 2005 to 96 in Fiscal Year 2009
Similarly, we found that the number of PTSD studies funded from VA’s medical and prosthetic research appropriations through VA’s intramural research program increased from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009. VA Intramural PTSD Research Studies Are Funded Primarily According to Scientific Merit
According to VA officials, intramural research proposals, including those on PTSD, are reviewed and funded in VA’s Merit Review Program and VA’s CSP primarily according to scientific merit. According to VA, research and development service directors may also choose to fund a small number of additional proposals at the margin that respond to research priority areas. After the reviewers vote, they each provide scores for a proposal recommended for funding based on scientific merit. According to VA officials, the number of proposals funded may vary depending on the budget. Third, after receiving summaries of the studies with the highest level of evidence, the VA and DOD group of clinical leaders and experts rates the research using an established grading scheme that considers the level of evidence of each research study—the scope and methodological rigor of an individual study; the overall quality of evidence—the overall quality of all of the research that addresses a particular clinical question, considering the level of evidence of all the studies considered; and the net effect of an intervention—according to the collective results of the studies considered, the intervention’s benefits minus the intervention’s harms. VA Reviewed Research Outcomes and Used Existing Resources in Determining Which PTSD Services to Require Its Facilities to Provide or Make Available to Veterans
According to VA officials, the decision to require that cognitive processing therapy and prolonged exposure therapy be made available to veterans diagnosed with PTSD at VA facilities—as indicated in the Handbook, which established certain requirements for mental health services within VA—was based on a review of research outcomes and the availability of existing resources. According to VA, agency officials and qualified subject matter experts reviewed relevant research outcomes and the quality of the research to determine the most efficacious PTSD treatments available when determining which PTSD services to include in the Handbook and make available to veterans. Furthermore, VA officials said that these two therapies had greater evidence supporting their effectiveness than other PTSD services also graded as level “A” in the 2004 PTSD CPG. VA officials told us that prior to issuing the Handbook in 2008, VA had already begun investing considerable resources to implement national training programs for cognitive processing therapy and prolonged exposure therapy in 2006 and 2007, respectively. VA officials explained that they followed a process when choosing cognitive processing therapy and prolonged exposure therapy, but added that clinical decision-making processes are not typically expected to be documented in a formal manner. VA officials stated that they are currently clarifying the language regarding some of the requirements, but do not plan to revise any of the requirements relating to PTSD services at this time. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: VA Research Centers and Programs That Conduct or Support PTSD Research
In addition to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) research studies that are conducted by individual Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) investigators, or researchers, VA also funds a number of research centers or programs that conduct or support PTSD research. Appendix IV: The Process for Developing VA/DOD Evidence-Based Clinical Practice Guidelines
In 1999, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) formed the VA/DOD Evidence-Based Practice Work Group to issue joint VA/DOD clinical practice guidelines (CPG)—tools that provide guidance and evidence-based recommendations to clinicians regarding the most effective interventions and services for a variety of health care topics. To develop or update a CPG, the VA/DOD Evidence- Based Practice Work Group has a standardized process to ensure that systematic reviews of relevant research outcomes are conducted in order to formulate evidence-based recommendations for prevention, assessment, and treatment services. | Why GAO Did This Study
In addition to providing health care to veterans, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) funds research that focuses on health conditions veterans may experience. According to VA, experts estimate that up to 20 percent of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom veterans have experienced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and demand for PTSD treatment is increasing. Because of the importance of research in improving the services that veterans receive, GAO was asked to report on VA's funding of PTSD research, and its processes for funding PTSD research proposals, reviewing and incorporating research outcomes into clinical practice guidelines (CPG)--tools that offer clinicians recommendations for clinical services but do not require clinicians to provide one service over another--and determining which PTSD services are required to be made available at VA facilities. To do this work, GAO obtained and summarized VA data on the funding of PTSD research from its medical and prosthetic research appropriation through its intramural research program. GAO also reviewed relevant VA documents, such as those for developing CPGs and those related to VA's 2008 Uniform Mental Health Services in VA Medical Centers and Clinics handbook (Handbook), which defines certain mental health services that must be made available at VA facilities. GAO also interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
Based on VA data GAO obtained and summarized, GAO found that the amount of funding VA provided for intramural PTSD research increased from $9.9 million in fiscal year 2005 to $24.5 million in fiscal year 2009. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, intramural PTSD research funding ranged from 2.5 percent to 4.8 percent of VA's medical and prosthetic research appropriation. In addition, the number of PTSD research studies VA funded through the Merit Review Program and the Cooperative Studies Program (CSP)--VA's two primary funding mechanisms in its intramural research program--increased from 47 in fiscal year 2005 to 96 in fiscal year 2009. According to VA officials, intramural research proposals, including those on PTSD, are funded primarily according to scientific merit in both the Merit Review Program and CSP. Proposals are evaluated by a panel of reviewers and scored based on their scientific merit. Directors of VA's research and development services--offices that focus on different research areas and administer VA's intramural research program--fund proposals based on their scores, typically up to a specified percentile. The number of proposals funded may vary based on budgetary considerations and, for a small number of proposals, responsiveness to VA research priority areas. VA has a process to review and incorporate relevant research outcomes to develop CPGs for a number of topics, including PTSD. VA relies on the policies of a joint VA and Department of Defense (DOD) work group--comprised of VA and DOD officials--to ensure that systematic reviews of relevant research outcomes are conducted when issuing CPGs. In brief, a systematic review is conducted to identify the most methodologically rigorous research studies that are applicable to each clinical question contained in the CPG. A group of subject matter experts then assesses the individual research studies in order to determine the overall quality of evidence available for each particular clinical question, considers the potential benefits and harms of a clinical intervention to determine its net effect, and, based on an assessment of the overall quality of the evidence and the net effect of an intervention, develops recommendations for the CPG. According to VA officials, the decision to require that two PTSD services--cognitive processing therapy and prolonged exposure therapy--be made available at VA facilities by including them in the Handbook was based on a review of research outcomes and the availability of existing resources. Specifically, VA officials told GAO that these two services were strongly recommended in the 2004 PTSD CPG and had greater evidence supporting their effectiveness than other PTSD services. VA also told GAO that prior to the Handbook's 2008 issuance, VA had already begun investing resources in training programs for cognitive processing therapy in 2006 and prolonged exposure therapy in 2007. While VA provided some documentation regarding the decision-making process for PTSD services, VA officials explained that clinical decision-making processes are not typically expected to be documented in a formal manner. VA officials told GAO that they are currently clarifying language in the Handbook but do not plan to revise any requirements relating to PTSD services at this time. VA provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-298 | gao_GAO-08-298_0 | Some recent programs of questionable stability and savings submitted to the Congress for multiyear authorization raise concerns about DOD’s management and controls for justifying multiyear candidates. Multiyear costs and savings estimates were not completed in time for submission with the fiscal year 2007 defense budget. Each was also impacted by contract provisions and changes in business conditions. Cost Increases Lead to Questions about Realism of Budget Estimates Used to Justify Multiyear
We found that unit cost growth on these programs ranged from 10 to 30 percent more than projected by the budget justification data. While this tendency would apply to annual as well as multiyear contracts, it is arguably more problematic for multiyear contracts because of the government’s increased exposure to risk over multiple years. Impacts on Cost and Performance from Contract Provisions and Other Factors
We also collected information on multiyear contract provisions for the three programs with completed multiyear contracts and for the recently awarded F-22A contract. Although a direct causal link is not demonstrated, our analysis of multiyear programs approved by Congress shows that estimated savings were on average higher before the substantial savings requirement than after. Other factors—lower quantities of modern systems being procured, stricter termination liability allowances, and contraction in the defense industrial base—may also contribute to decreased estimated savings for current and future systems by lessening the benefits from large quantity buys and efficient production rates, key attributes of multiyear contracts. Cancellation liability changes. According to DOD and defense research center officials as well as the studies they conducted, calculating the actual cost savings from the use of a multiyear contract and comparing results to original expectations is very problematic for several reasons: (1) multiyear cost and other program data is unavailable; (2) lack of comparable data on costs of annual contracts; and (3) original assumptions change from the justification package, such as design modifications and variations in buy quantities, labor, and material rates. Furthermore, DOD does not track and evaluate actual performance on multiyear contracts for major DOD weapon systems. Assessing results could provide valuable insights and lessons learned on prior experience and identify opportunities to improve future multiyear procurements. Some concerns noted in this report, such as the practice of understating costs and overselling benefits, apply also to annual contracts, but the standards should be higher for multiyear contracts because of the larger up-front investments required and the government’s exposure to risk should the program fail or be substantially changed. Recommendations
To improve the outcomes of the multiyear justification reviews of major DOD weapon systems, the Secretary of Defense should direct appropriate offices within the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) (Comptroller) and USD (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) to: (1) improve and expand guidance provided to military services to better define multiyear decision criteria for major DOD weapon systems and to facilitate more consistent, objective, and knowledge-based evaluations of these multiyear candidates within DOD; (2) establish a process for third party validation of the costs and savings data submitted for such candidate programs; and (3) implement a central database for maintaining historical records and for effectively monitoring and tracking major DOD weapon system multiyear procurements, to include documenting the specific decisions made by stakeholders and their rationales for decisions. We conducted limited case studies for selected multiyear aircraft contracts to assess outcomes and the internal and external events affecting performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD spends $10 billion annually on multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts for weapons systems. MYPs may save money through more efficient relationships with suppliers and producers, but may also suffer losses if cancelled and can limit future budget flexibility. Recently, Congress has been concerned about DOD's management of the process and savings realized by MYPs. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's review process for MYP candidates; examine MYP program outcomes; identify the impact of changes to MYP savings threshold guidance, and determine how much DOD validates MYP performance. To do this, GAO reviewed statutes and other guidance, held discussions with relevant officials, examined DOD budget justifications and contracts, and conducted limited case studies.
What GAO Found
DOD's process for justifying multiyear programs leaves questions about the appropriateness of some approved MYPs and the cost effectiveness of investments made for the risks assumed, as indicated by recent submissions for the F-22A and V-22. Although the law has clear requirements for stable, low risk programs with realistic cost and savings estimates, lack of guidance and a rigorous process is not achieving this. It is difficult to precisely determine the impact of multiyear contracting on procurement costs. GAO studies of three recent MYPs identified unit cost growth ranging from 10 to 30 percent compared to original estimates, due to changes in labor and material costs, requirements and funding, and other factors. In some cases, actual MYP costs were higher than estimates for annual contracts. Although annual contracts also have unit cost growth, it is arguably more problematic for MYP's because of the up-front investments and the government's exposure to risk over multiple years. MYP savings were on average higher before changes in law called for "substantial savings" rather than a specific quantitative standard. Other factors--lower quantities of modern systems procured, stricter cancellation liability allowances, and contraction in the defense industrial base--may have also impacted savings by lessening opportunities for more efficient purchases, a key attribute of MYPs. DOD does not track multiyear results against original expectations and makes little effort to validate if actual savings were achieved. GAO's case studies indicate that evaluating actual MYP results provides valuable information on the veracity of original estimates in the justification packages, the impacts on costs and risks from internal and external events, and lessons learned that can be used to improve future multiyear candidates and savings opportunities. |
gao_GAO-12-546 | gao_GAO-12-546_0 | HRSA Uses Three Main Methods to Oversee Grantee Compliance and Has a Process to Address Noncompliance
HRSA primarily relies on three main methods to oversee grantees’ compliance with Health Center Program requirements: annual compliance reviews, site visits, and routine communications. Additionally, when HRSA identifies noncompliance with these requirements, the agency has a recently revised process to address this with its grantees. HRSA provides guidance to project officers for determining whether grantees are meeting each of the 19 program requirements. HRSA’s Process for Identifying Noncompliance Is Insufficient, and It Is Too Soon to Assess the Revised Process for Addressing Noncompliance
HRSA’s process for identifying noncompliance is insufficient as annual compliance reviews do not identify all instances of noncompliance and the extent to which HRSA uses site visits to assess compliance is unclear, but appears to be limited. Moreover, HRSA’s project officers do not consistently identify and document grantee noncompliance. Our analysis of 48 compliance decisions that project officers made during their fiscal year 2011 annual compliance reviews for our eight selected grantees found that in 43 cases (90 percent) project officers determined grantees were in compliance with requirements.However, in 23 of these 43 cases (53 percent), we were unable to find sufficient information to support the project officer’s compliance decision and the project officers did not indicate that they were unable to clearly determine compliance, which is what HRSA guidance instructs them to do if they are uncertain about whether or not the grantee demonstrated compliance, for example:
Project officers determined that all eight selected health center grantees were in compliance with the after hours coverage requirement. While HRSA requires project officers to document their basis for finding a grantee out of compliance with a requirement, it does not require project officers to document their basis for finding a grantee in compliance. As noted earlier, HRSA’s guidance indicates that project officers are to document these instances when compliance is unclear by writing a comment in a text field of the evaluation tool, but HRSA has no centralized or automated mechanism to ensure this occurs. The lack of such a mechanism, coupled with the lack of documentation of project officers’ basis for finding a grantee in compliance, limits HRSA’s ability to determine whether a project officer decided a grantee was in compliance with a requirement because the file contained evidence demonstrating compliance, or because the project officer was unsure about compliance and simply defaulted to an affirmative compliance decision without including documentation of his or her concerns. However, there may be other instances that we were unable to identify based on the available data. HRSA’s data indicate that 58 grantees, or 5 percent of all health center grantees, had site visits to review compliance with all 19 program requirements during this time period. (6 percent) had a site visit that may have assessed compliance with some of the 19 program requirements. HRSA’s Ability to Address Noncompliance Is Unclear As the Agency’s Process Has Recently Changed
The extent to which HRSA’s revised process—the progressive action process—is adequately resolving conditions or terminating grantee funding is unclear because HRSA’s experience with this revised process is too recent to make any overall assessment. Despite these efforts, however, HRSA’s oversight is insufficient to ensure that it consistently identifies all instances of grantee noncompliance with Health Center Program requirements. This is especially problematic because project officers we interviewed had different interpretations of what constitutes compliance with certain requirements and therefore, when they should place a condition on a health center’s grant. Finally, HRSA’s recently revised process for addressing grantee noncompliance with the 19 program requirements seems to provide both the agency and grantees with a uniform structure for addressing compliance deficiencies. Periodically assess whether its new progressive action process for addressing grantee noncompliance, including the time frames allotted for grantees to respond, is working as intended and make any needed improvements to the process. While HHS concurred with our recommendations and indicated that the report’s findings were helpful in informing ongoing efforts to improve oversight of the Health Center Program, it did not concur with what it characterized as some of the central conclusions drawn from the report’s findings. Appendix I: Characteristics of Selected Health Center Grantees
As part of our assessment of the extent to which the Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA) process identifies and addresses noncompliance with Health Center Program requirements, we reviewed HRSA’s oversight of eight selected health center grantees. 2.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Health Center Program, HRSA provides grants to eligible health centers. HRSA is responsible for overseeing over 1,100 health center grantees to ensure their compliance with Health Center Program requirements. GAO was asked to examine HRSAs oversight. This report (1) describes HRSAs oversight process and (2) assesses the extent to which the process identifies and addresses noncompliance with what HRSA refers to as the 19 key program requirements. GAO reviewed and analyzed HRSAs policies and procedures and available programwide data related to HRSA's oversight of health centers, interviewed HRSA officials, and reviewed documentation of HRSAs oversight from 8 selected grantees that varied in their compliance experience, as well as other factors.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) relies on three main methods to oversee grantees compliance with the 19 key program requirements.
Annual compliance reviews. HRSA project officers review available information, including that submitted by grantees, to determine whether the grantee is in compliance with each of the 19 program requirements.
Site visits. HRSA and its consultants visit grantees to review documentation, meet with officials, and tour the health center. Some of these visits are intended to assess compliance with some or all program requirements.
Routine communications. Project officers communicate with grantees via phone and e-mail to learn about issues that may affect their compliance.
When HRSA identifies noncompliance with program requirements, it uses a process, implemented in April 2010, to address this with a grantee. This process provides a grantee with defined time frames for addressing any identified noncompliance. If a grantee is unable to correct the compliance issue by the end of the process, HRSAs policy is to terminate the health centers grant.
HRSAs ability to identify grantees noncompliance with Health Center Program requirements is insufficient.
HRSA does not require project officers to document their basis for determining that a grantee is in compliance with a requirement. When project officers are uncertain about compliance, HRSA instructs them to consider a grantee in compliance and to note the lack of certainty in a text field of their evaluation tool. However, HRSA has no centralized mechanism to ensure this occurs. Thus, it is unclear whether project officers' decisions that a grantee is in compliance with a requirement are because there was sufficient evidence demonstrating compliance or the project officer failed to document that compliance was uncertain.
The number of compliance-related visits conducted may be limited. HRSAs available data indicates that only 11 percent of grantees had a compliance-related site visit from January through October 2011; less than half of which had a visit that assessed compliance with all 19 program requirements.
HRSAs project officers do not consistently identify and document grantee noncompliance. Project officers GAO interviewed had different interpretations of what constitutes compliance with some program requirements and therefore when they should cite a grantee for noncompliance.
HRSAs process for addressing grantee noncompliance with program requirements seems to provide both the agency and grantees with a uniform structure for addressing noncompliance. However, the extent to which this process is adequately resolving grantee noncompliance or terminating grantee funding is unclear because HRSAs experience with this process is too recent for GAO to make an overall assessment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, HRSA improve its documentation of compliance decisions, strengthen its ability to consistently identify and cite grantee noncompliance, and periodically assess whether its new process for addressing grantee noncompliance is working as intended. HHS concurred with all of GAOs recommendations, and stated that HRSA has already begun implementing many of them. HHS, however, did not concur with what it characterized as certain conclusions drawn from the findings. HHS based its comments on only some of the evidence. GAOs analysis of all the evidence and HRSAs planned implementation of the recommendations confirm the validity of the findings and conclusions. |
gao_GAO-04-405 | gao_GAO-04-405_0 | Key Multilateral Development Banks Face Significant Challenges to Financing the Existing Initiative
The World Bank, AfDB, and IaDB face a combined financing shortfall of $7.8 billion in present value terms under the existing HIPC Initiative. The IaDB expects to finance its $600 million shortfall by reducing future lending to poor countries. Bilateral donors may be asked to contribute additional funds under the existing initiative; the United States may be called on to contribute an additional $1.8 billion. However, the total projected funding gap of $7.8 billion is understated because the World Bank estimate does not include the costs for four countries that are eligible for debt relief but for which data are unreliable. In addition, the estimates of all three banks do not account for any additional relief that may be provided to countries because their economies deteriorated since they qualified for debt relief. 1.) Achieving Economic Growth and Debt Relief Targets Requires Substantial Financial Assistance
Even if the $7.8 billion shortfall is fully financed, we estimate that, if exports grow slower than the World Bank and IMF project, the 27 countries that have qualified for debt relief may need more than $375 billion in additional assistance to help them achieve their economic growth and debt relief targets through 2020. This $375 billion consists of $153 billion in expected development assistance, $215 billion in assistance to fund shortfalls from lower export earnings, and at least $8 billion for debt relief (see fig. Countries Face a Substantial Financial Shortfall in Export Earnings
We estimate that 23 of the 27 HIPC countries will earn about $215 billion less from their exports than the World Bank and IMF project. Under this strategy, multilateral creditors would first switch the minimum percentage of loans to grants to achieve debt sustainability, and then donors would pay debt service in excess of 5 percent of government revenue. Potential U.S. Costs Are Significant
If the United States decides to help fund the $375 billion, we estimate that it could cost approximately $52 billion over 18 years, both in bilateral grants and in contributions to multilateral development banks. All three institutions said that our use of historical export growth rates are not good predictors of the future because significant structural changes are underway in many countries that could lead to greater growth. We consider these historical rates to be a more realistic gauge of future growth because of these countries reliance on highly volatile primary commodities and other vulnerabilities such as HIV/AIDS. In response, we assessed (1) the multilateral development banks’ projected funding shortfall for the existing HIPC Initiative and (2) the amount of funding, including development assistance, needed to help countries achieve economic growth and debt relief targets. Methodology for Assessing the Amount of Funding Needed to Achieve Targets
General Approach
We analyzed World Bank and IMF staff projections contained within the debt sustainability analyses (DSA) to assess the impact of historical export growth rates on countries’ debt burdens and the funding needed to achieve economic growth and debt relief targets for the 27 countries that have reached their decision or completion points. 2. 6. 2. Comments from the African Development Bank
The following are GAO’s comments on the African Development Bank letter, dated April 2, 2004. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, established in 1996, is a bilateral and multilateral effort to provide debt relief to poor countries to help them achieve economic growth and debt sustainability. Multilateral creditors are having difficulty financing their share of the initiative, even with assistance from donors. Under the existing initiative, many countries are unlikely to achieve their debt relief targets, primarily because their export earnings are likely to be significantly less than projected by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). GAO assessed (1) the projected multilateral development banks' funding shortfall for the existing initiative and (2) the amount of funding, including development assistance, needed to help countries achieve economic growth and debt relief targets. The Treasury, World Bank, and African Development Bank commented that historical export growth rates are not good predictors of the future because significant structural changes are under way in many countries that could lead to greater growth. We consider these historical rates to be a more realistic gauge of future growth because of these countries' reliance on highly volatile primary commodities and other vulnerabilities such as HIV/AIDS.
What GAO Found
The three key multilateral development banks we analyzed face a funding shortfall of $7.8 billion in 2003 present value terms, or 54 percent of their total commitment, under the existing HIPC Initiative. The World Bank has the most significant shortfall--$6 billion. The African Development Bank has a gap of about $1.2 billion. Neither has determined how it would close this gap. The Inter-American Development Bank is fully funding its HIPC obligation by reducing its future lending resources to poor countries by $600 million beginning in 2009. We estimate that the cost to the United States, based on its rate of contribution to these banks, could be an additional $1.8 billion. However, the total estimated funding gap is understated because (1) the World Bank does not include costs for four countries for which data are unreliable and (2) all three banks do not include estimates for additional relief that may be required because countries' economies deteriorated after they qualified for debt relief. Even if the $7.8 billion gap is fully financed, we estimate that the 27 countries that have qualified for debt relief may need more than $375 billion to help them achieve their economic growth and debt relief targets by 2020. This $375 billion consists of $153 billion in expected development assistance, $215 billion to cover lower export earnings, and at least $8 billion in debt relief. Most countries are likely to experience higher debt burdens and lower export earnings than the World Bank and IMF project, leading to an estimated $215 billion shortfall over 18 years. To reach debt targets, we estimate that countries will need between $8 billion and $20 billion, depending on the strategy chosen. Under these strategies, multilateral creditors switch a portion of their loans to grants and/or donors pay countries' debt service that exceeds 5 percent of government revenue. Based on its historical share of donor assistance, the United States may be called upon to contribute about 12 percent of this $375 billion, or approximately $52 billion over 18 years. |
gao_GAO-13-613 | gao_GAO-13-613_0 | In addition to this automated process, the MACs may conduct MMRs when they are unable to determine whether the services provided were medically necessary on the basis of the information on the claim. Providers and beneficiaries may appeal denials of services that are based on these reviews. Medicare Outpatient Therapy Spending
Medicare spending for outpatient therapy has increased from $1.3 billion in 1999 to $5.7 billion in 2011. The Therapy Caps Exceptions Process
The therapy caps that were first imposed in 1999 to control spending growth raised concern that patients with extensive need of outpatient therapy services would be affected adversely, and the caps were only in effect in 1999 and for part of 2003 due to a series of temporary congressional moratoria. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended the Medicare therapy caps exceptions process, including the requirement for the manual review of claims over $3,700, through December 31, 2013. CMS did not issue complete guidance at the start of the MMR process, causing implementation challenges for the MACs, and the MACs were unable to fully automate systems for tracking the reviews of preapproval requests in the time allotted. CMS Implemented MMRs of Preapproval Requests and of Claims Submitted without Preapproval
CMS implemented two types of MMRs during the last 3 months of 2012— reviews of preapproval requests and reviews of claims submitted without preapproval. CMS officials told us that they included the preapproval request process in 2012 in order to help protect beneficiaries from being held liable for payment of claims not affirmed by the MMR, as the process would give the provider and beneficiary guidance as to whether the MACs would affirm or not affirm payment for the requested outpatient therapy services. The MACs were also required to manually review submitted claims before providing payment for therapy services provided above $3,700 without a preapproval request. Effective for dates of service on or after October 1, 2012, CMS required the MACs to implement an edit in part of the claims processing system to stop claims that reached the $3,700 threshold and to trigger MMRs by the MACs. 2.) If a MAC requested additional documentation, the review time frames would begin again. MACs Did Not Receive Timely Guidance from CMS and Could Not Fully Automate Systems for Processing Preapproval Requests
The MACs did not receive complete CMS guidance before the start of the 3-month MMR process regarding how the MACs should manage incomplete preapproval requests, how they should count the 10-day review time frame, and how they should handle preapproval requests received in the wrong phase. In addition, the MACs did not have enough time to fully automate systems for tracking and processing preapproval requests before the start of the MMR process. Further, CMS did not provide guidance on how the MACs should process incomplete preapproval requests, which accounted for approximately 23 percent of the total requests submitted, until November 7, 2012. CMS initially instructed the MACs to make decisions on preapproval requests and inform providers and beneficiaries of their decisions within 10 business days of receipt of all requested documentation, and to automatically approve requests they were unable to review within 10 days. The MACs we interviewed adapted their systems to manage the preapproval process in different ways with varying degrees of automation. CMS Estimates That Preapproval Requests and Claims for over 115,000 Beneficiaries Were Subject to MMRs, but the Final Outcomes of These Reviews Remain Uncertain
CMS officials estimate that preapproval requests and claims for over 115,000 Medicare beneficiaries were subject to approximately 167,000 MMRs conducted by the MACs as of March 1, 2013. MACs Reviewed an Estimated 167,000 Preapproval Requests and Claims and Affirmed 60 Percent
CMS staff estimated that the MACs manually reviewed more than 167,000 preapproval requests and claims without preapprovals for outpatient therapy from October 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012, affecting more than 115,000 Medicare beneficiaries. Of these MMRs, an and 57,000 were for estimated 110,000 were for preapproval requestsclaims for services that were not preapproved. CMS officials told us that MACs did the “best they could” and that the final numbers provided in the MMR weekly workload report were obtained outside the MACs’ computerized systems and should be considered approximate or an estimate of the results of the reviews at the time of this report. Agency Comments
HHS provided written comments on a draft of this report. HHS highlighted CMS’s 2012 efforts to review the medical records associated with requests for exceptions for outpatient therapy services in excess of the annual $3,700 threshold. The department noted that CMS managed the new workload without additional funding and within a short time frame, and that the MACs shifted staff from other responsibilities to the MMR process. Outpatient therapy manual reviews were extended for 2013 and, according to HHS, CMS streamlined the MMRs of therapy services by transitioning the responsibility for these reviews from the MACs to the agency’s RACs as of April 1, 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011, Medicare paid about $5.7 billion to provide outpatient therapy services for 48 million beneficiaries. Rising Medicare spending for outpatient therapy services--physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech-language pathology--has long been of concern. Congress established per person spending limits, or "therapy caps," for nonhospital outpatient therapy, which took effect in 1999. In response to concerns that some beneficiaries needing extensive services might be affected adversely, Congress imposed temporary moratoria on the caps several times until 2006, when it required CMS to implement an exceptions process. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, in addition to extending the exceptions process, required CMS to conduct MMRs of requests for exceptions for outpatient services provided on or after October 1, 2012, over an annual threshold of $3,700. The act also mandated that GAO report on the implementation of the MMR process.
This report describes (1) CMS's implementation of the 2012 MMR process, and (2) the number of individuals and claims subject to MMRs and the outcomes of these reviews. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, CMS policies and guidance, and CMS data on these reviews. GAO also interviewed CMS staff and officials from three MACs that accounted for almost 50 percent of the MMR workload and that processed claims for states previously determined to be at a higher risk for outpatient therapy improper payments.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented two types of manual medical reviews (MMR)--reviews of preapproval requests and reviews of claims submitted without preapproval--for all outpatient therapy services that were above a $3,700 per-beneficiary threshold provided during the last 3 months of 2012. However, CMS did not issue complete guidance on how to process preapproval requests before the implementation of the MMR process in October 2012, and the Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC) that conducted the MMRs were unable to fully automate systems for tracking preapproval requests in the time allotted. CMS required the MACs to manually review preapproval requests within 10 business days of receipt of all supporting documentation to determine whether the services were medically necessary, and to automatically approve any requests they were unable to review within that time frame. CMS officials told GAO that the purpose of the preapproval process was to protect beneficiaries from being liable for payment for nonaffirmed services by giving the provider and beneficiary guidance as to whether Medicare would pay for the requested services. If a provider delivered services without submitting a preapproval request, the MACs were required to manually review submitted claims above the $3,700 threshold prior to payment within 60 days of receiving the needed documentation. The MACs faced particular challenges with implementing reviews of preapproval requests because CMS continued to issue new guidance on how to manage preapproval requests after the MMR process started. For example, CMS did not inform the MACs how to process incomplete requests or count the 10-day preapproval request review time frame until November 7, 2012, and the MACs initially handled requests differently. In addition, all three MACs GAO interviewed told GAO that MMRs of preapproval requests were especially challenging because they did not have time to fully automate systems for tracking and processing the requests before the start of the MMR process, although they adapted their systems to manage the requests in different ways.
CMS officials estimated that the MACs reviewed an estimated total of 167,000 preapproval requests and claims for outpatient therapy service above the $3,700 threshold provided from October 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012. Of these reviews, CMS estimated that 110,000 were for preapproval requests and 57,000 were for claims submitted without prior approval. However, due in part to the lack of automation, CMS officials reported that the total number of reviews should be considered estimates of the results of the MMR process at the time of this report. CMS estimated that the MACs affirmed about two-thirds of the preapproval requests and about one-third of the claims submitted without preapproval. Because providers can appeal denials of payment, the final outcome of the MMRs remains uncertain. CMS also estimated that by December 31, 2012, over 115,000 beneficiaries were affected by the reviews in 2012, a number that will rise as more claims subject to review are submitted throughout 2013.
In its comments on a draft of this report, HHS emphasized that CMS managed the 2012 MMR process without additional funding and within a short time frame. HHS noted that the MMR process was extended for 2013 and CMS transitioned the responsibility for these reviews to other contractors as of April 1, 2013. |
gao_GAO-10-33 | gao_GAO-10-33_0 | 1 for example.) 1 for example.) There were some small differences among both populations with regard to race. Also in 2008, the average age of students with disabilities was about 26 years old, or about 1 year older than their peers. 2). 3). 4). Attention deficit disorder (ADD) was the next most common type, accounting for 19 percent of such students. In contrast, in the 2008 NPSAS, fewer than 10 percent of students with disabilities reported having a specific learning disability, such as dyslexia. Schools Use Different Approaches and Accommodations to Support Students with Disabilities
Postsecondary schools provide a wide range of accommodations to students with disabilities. Schools are required to provide reasonable accommodations tailored to an individual student’s needs to allow equal access to higher education. Some schools offer enhanced or more comprehensive services than are required by law. For example, some school officials we interviewed told us their schools offered a variety of workshops or courses that addressed study skills, time management, and social interaction skills. Some schools also offer specialized programs to supplement academic instruction. Technological advances have expanded the educational opportunities for students with disabilities. For example, voice recognition software can help students prepare papers by “talking” to the computer instead of using the keyboard. Schools Face a Broad Range of Challenges in Supporting Students with Disabilities, and New Challenges Are Likely to Emerge as the Population Changes
Schools Face Challenges during Students’ Transition to Postsecondary School
The transition students with disabilities face regarding their rights and responsibilities when beginning higher education can have implications for schools if students are not fully prepared for it. Another challenge schools face is a lack of awareness among some faculty members regarding legal requirements for supporting students with disabilities, according to schools officials we interviewed and research. Growing Numbers of Veterans with Disabilities and Students with Intellectual Disabilities May Pose New Challenges for Schools
The needs of emerging populations of students with different types of disabilities can present challenges to schools that lack experience supporting these populations. Various Education Offices Provide Assistance to Schools but Lack a Coordinated Approach
Education Provides Assistance to Schools in Supporting Students with Disabilities
Education has provided assistance to postsecondary schools to support students with disabilities through three different offices. The three different offices—OCR, OSERS, and OPE—have different missions and priorities, focus on different clients, and provide different types of assistance to schools; however, all three offices have a role in promoting access for students with disabilities in postsecondary education. Although OCR’s primary role is enforcement, it has taken the lead among the three offices in providing information and assistance directly to postsecondary schools to help them comply with legal requirements and informing students, parents, community groups, and others of their rights and responsibilities. Within OSERS, the Office of Special Education Programs is dedicated to improving results for infants, toddlers, children and youth with disabilities by providing leadership and financial suppor t to assist states and local districts; however, the office has supported three technical assistance centers with narrow focuses related to transi tion and postsecondary education that support states and schools: the National Secondary Transition Technical Assistance Center and the National Post-School Outcomes Center assist states in collecting data related to post-secondary school transition planning and post-school outcomes for youth with disabilities, respectively, and the Postsecondary Education Programs Network is a national network of regional centers that provide resources, information, and training to schools focused on improving services and access for certain students only—those who are deaf or hard of hearing. According to OPE officials, the office does not provide broader technical assistance on disability issues to postsecondary schools because the office lacks expertise in this area. Appendix I: Technical Appendix
This appendix discusses in more detail our review of federal data on postsecondary students with disabilities for question one: what is known about the population of postsecondary students with disabilities. Appendix II: Data on Students with Disabilities
Appendix III: Postsecondary Schools, Associations, and Experts Interviewed
Appendix III: Postsecondary Schools, Associations, and Experts Interviewed American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE)
American Association of Community Colleges (AACC)
American Council on Education (ACE)
Association on Higher Education and Disability (AHEAD)
Center for the Study and Advancement of Disability Policy Delta Alpha Pi International Honor Society Disability Access Information and Support (DAIS)
HEATH Resource Center at George Washington University Institute for Community Inclusion (ICI)
National Council on Disability (NCD)
National Secondary Transition Technical Assistance Center (NSTTAC)
National Youth Leadership Network (NYLN) (Student Group)
Appendix IV: Postsecondary Schools That Received Education Grants to Support Students with Disabilities in FY 2008
FY 2008 demonstration project grantees San Diego State University Research Foundation Board of Regents, University of Nebraska, University of Nebraska/ Lincoln Northampton County Area Community College Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education Texas A&M University University of Texas/ Pan American University of Vermont and State Agricultural College Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System (University of Wisconsin/ Milwaukee)
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Education
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact above, Harriet Ganson (Assistant Director), Linda Siegel (Analyst-in-Charge), Jennifer Cook, Jeffrey DeMarco, and Alison Grantham made significant contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research suggests that more students with disabilities are pursuing higher education than in years past, and recent legislative changes, such as those in the Higher Education Opportunity Act and Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, have the potential to increase the number and diversity of this population. GAO was asked to examine (1) what is known about the population of postsecondary students with disabilities; (2) how postsecondary schools are supporting students with disabilities; (3) what challenges, if any, schools face in supporting these students; and (4) how the Department of Education is assisting schools in supporting these students. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed federal survey and some state data; conducted site visits; interviewed agency officials, disability experts, school officials, and students; and reviewed laws, regulations, and literature.
What GAO Found
Students with disabilities represented nearly 11 percent of all postsecondary students in 2008, according to a federal survey. Moreover, this population appears to have grown, based on selected federal and state data. Also, in 2008, students with disabilities were similar to their peers without disabilities with regard to age, race, and the schools they attended. Students reported having a range of disabilities in 2008, and the distribution of disability types had changed since 2000. For example, the proportion of students that reported having attention deficit disorder had increased from 7 to 19 percent. Postsecondary schools use different approaches and accommodations to support students with disabilities. Schools are required to provide reasonable accommodations, such as note takers and extended time on tests, tailored to individual students' needs. Further, some schools offer enhanced or more comprehensive services than are required by law. For example, some schools GAO visited provided support on time management and study skills. Other schools offer specialized programs, such as one designed to help students with learning disabilities transition to meet college-level reading and writing requirements. Assistive technology has expanded the educational opportunities for students with disabilities. For example, voice recognition software can help students prepare papers by "talking" to the computer. Schools face a broad range of challenges in supporting students with disabilities as they transition to higher education. For example, schools face challenges in supporting students who are unaware of their rights and responsibilities regarding accommodations and in providing services that involve specialized knowledge. Another challenge schools reported was a lack of awareness among some faculty members regarding legal requirements for supporting students with disabilities. Schools also anticipate facing challenges in supporting two growing populations of postsecondary students: veterans with newly acquired disabilities and students with intellectual disabilities. Education has provided some assistance to postsecondary schools to support students with disabilities through three offices. However, the agency has no mechanism to systematically share information across offices and coordinate their technical assistance efforts. These offices--Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, and Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE)--have different missions and priorities, focus on different clients, and provide different types of assistance to schools. Although OCR's primary role is enforcement, it has taken the lead in providing assistance to postsecondary schools regarding disability topics. OPE has focused its technical assistance primarily on those 47 schools that received grants in 2008 related to students with disabilities. According to OPE officials, the office does not provide broader technical assistance on disability issues because it lacks expertise in this area. School officials told GAO they need more guidance and information about serving students with disabilities. |
gao_GAO-13-239 | gao_GAO-13-239_0 | TSA Collects and Uses Data to Track Canine Program Performance, but Could Better Analyze These Data to Identify Program Trends
TSA collects and uses key canine program data in its Canine Website System, a central management database, but it could better analyze these data to identify program trends. Through CWS, TSA captures the amount of time canine handlers spend on proficiency training as well as screening for explosives, among other functions. However, TSA has not fully analyzed the performance data it collects in CWS to identify program trends and areas that are working well or in need of corrective action. Such analyses could better position TSA to determine canine teams’ proficiency, guide future deployment efforts, and help ensure that taxpayer funds are being used effectively. Our analysis of CWS utilization data for the period from May 2011 through April 2012 showed that LEO teams consistently reported greater levels of monthly utilization minutes than TSI teams, and that on average, from September 2011 through July 2012, TSI air cargo teams exceeded their monthly screening requirement. Our analysis of TSA’s cargo screening data from September 2011 through July 2012 showed that TSI air cargo teams nationwide generally exceeded their monthly requirement to screen air cargo placed on passenger aircraft. This suggests that TSA could increase the percentage of air cargo it requires canine teams to screen, or redeploy additional TSI air cargo teams. TSA Has Not Deployed Passenger Screening Canine Teams to the Highest- Risk Airports and Did Not Determine Their Effectiveness Prior to Deployment
TSA’s 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of TSA’s response resolution protocols for these teams have resulted in PSC teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airport terminals and concourses. TSA officials agreed that the decision to defer to airport stakeholders’ willingness to have PSC teams deployed to their airports has resulted in PSCs not being optimally utilized. TSA Plans to Complete PSC Effectiveness Assessments in 2013; Initial Results Indicate Performance Challenges
TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness and before identifying where within the airport environment these teams would be most effectively utilized. To assess the effectiveness of PSC teams in detecting explosives odor, TSA and DHS S&T are assessing their capabilities based on several factors. Assessing the effectiveness of PSCs in the operational environment could help provide TSA with reasonable assurance that PSCs are effective in identifying explosives odor on passengers and provide an enhanced security benefit. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure TSA analyzes canine team data to identify program trends, and determines if PSC teams provide an added security benefit to the civil aviation system, and if so, deploys PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, we recommend that the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration direct the Manager of the NCP to take the three following actions:
Regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. Expand and complete testing, in conjunction with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate (i.e., in the sterile area, at the passenger checkpoint, and on the public side of the airport) prior to making additional PSC deployments to help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within airports. We believe it is important for TSA to also review its analysis of canine teams’ performance screening air cargo in order to inform future decisions on the percentage of air cargo that it requires canine teams to screen, as well as the number of TSI air cargo canine teams needed to meet TSA’s air cargo screening requirement. DHS concurred with the third recommendation, to deploy PSC teams to the highest-risk airports. (2) To what extent has TSA deployed passenger screening canine teams using a risk-based approach and determined their effectiveness prior to deployment? To determine what data TSA has on its canine program, what these data show, and the extent to which TSA has analyzed these data to identify program trends, we interviewed TSA’s Office of Security Operations headquarters and field officials about the type of data they collect and how they analyze the data to monitor canine team effectiveness consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA has implemented a multilayered system composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the transportation system. One of TSA's security layers is NCP, composed of over 760 deployed explosives detection canine teams, including PSC teams trained to detect explosives on passengers. As requested, GAO examined (1) data TSA has on its canine program, what these data show, and to what extent TSA analyzed these data to identify program trends, and (2) the extent to which TSA deployed PSC teams using a risk-based approach and determined their effectiveness prior to deployment. To address these questions, GAO conducted visits to four geographic locations selected based on the number and type of canine teams deployed. The results of these site visits are not generalizable, but provided insights into NCP. GAO also analyzed TSA data from 2011 through 2012, such as utilization data; reviewed documents, including response protocols; and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency that administers the National Canine Program (NCP), is collecting and using key data on its canine program, but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. TSA collects canine team data using the Canine Website System (CWS), a central management database. TSA uses CWS to capture the amount of time canine teams conduct training as well as searching for explosives odor, among other functions. However, TSA has not fully analyzed the data it collects in CWS to identify program trends and areas that are working well or in need of corrective action. Such analyses could help TSA to determine canine teams' proficiency, inform future deployment efforts, and help ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively. For example:
GAO analysis of canine team training data from May 2011 through April 2012 showed that some canine teams were repeatedly not in compliance with TSA's monthly training requirement, which is in place to ensure canine teams remain proficient in explosives detection.
GAO analysis of TSA's cargo-screening data from September 2011 through July 2012 showed that canine teams primarily responsible for screening air cargo placed on passenger aircraft exceeded their monthly screening requirement. This suggests that TSA could increase the percentage of air cargo it requires air cargo canine teams to screen or redeploy teams.
TSA has not deployed passenger screening canines (PSC)--trained to identify and track explosives odor on a person--consistent with its risk-based approach, and did not determine PSC teams' effectiveness prior to deployment. TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, GAO found that PSC teams have not been deployed to the highest-risk airport locations. TSA officials stated that the agency generally defers to airport officials on whether PSC teams will be deployed, and some airport operators have decided against the use of PSC teams at their airports because of concerns related to the composition and capabilities of PSC teams. As a result of these concerns, the PSC teams deployed to higher-risk airport locations are not being used for passenger screening as intended, but for other purposes, such as screening air cargo or training. TSA is coordinating with aviation stakeholders to resolve concerns related to PSC team deployment, but has been unable to resolve these concerns, as of September 2012. Furthermore, TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams' operational effectiveness and before identifying where within the airport these teams would be most effectively utilized. TSA is in the process of assessing the effectiveness of PSC teams in the operational environment, but testing is not comprehensive since it does not include all areas at the airport or compare PSCs with already deployed conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in stationary objects). As a result, more comprehensive testing could provide TSA with greater assurance that PSC teams are effective in identifying explosives odor on passengers and provide an enhanced security benefit.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in December 2012. Information TSA deemed Sensitive Security Information has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that TSA (1) regularly analyze data to identify program trends and areas working well or in need of corrective action, and (2) take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of PSCs. If PSCs are determined to be effective, GAO is recommending that TSA coordinate with stakeholders to deploy PSC teams to the highest-risk airport locations and utilize them as intended. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-650 | gao_GAO-17-650_0 | Vessel carriers: Transport cargo from a foreign port to a U.S. port. For cargo transiting the United States, but for which the United States is not the final destination, the rule requires importers to submit an ISF-5 to CBP prior to loading. Targeting High-Risk Shipments Using ISF Rule Data
According to the rule, ISF data are intended to improve CBP’s ability to identify (target) high-risk shipments. Targeters at the ATUs are to review the information associated with shipments destined for ports within their respective regions to identify those shipments that may be at risk for containing terrorist weapons or other contraband. Submission Rates for ISFs Vary, While Carrier Requirement Rates Could Not Be Determined; CBP Generally Monitors Compliance
Submission Rates for ISF- 10s Have Generally Been High, and CBP is Taking Steps to Increase ISF-5 Submission Rates
Submission rates for ISF-10s have generally been high and CBP is taking steps to increase the ISF-5 submission rate. In particular, submission rates for shipments requiring an ISF-10 increased from approximately 95 percent in 2012 to 99 percent in 2015 (see figure 2). In July 2016, CBP published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which seeks to address the ISF-5 issue by expanding the definition of ISF Importer to ensure that the party that has the best access to the required information will be responsible for filing the ISF. Submission Rates for Vessel Stow Plans and Container Status Messages Could Not Be Determined
We were not able to determine submission rates for the two additional carrier requirements—vessel stow plans and CSMs—for 2012 through 2015. According to CBP officials, carriers’ overall compliance overall with stow plan submissions is likely nearly 100 percent given that targeters at ATUs follow up with carriers prior to vessel arrival if they have not yet submitted the vessel stow plan. CBP Has Taken Actions to Enforce ISF and Stow Plan Submissions, but Could Do More to Enforce CSMs and Assess the Effectiveness of its ISF Enforcement Actions
CBP Has Taken Actions to Enforce Submission of ISF-10s and Stow Plans, but not CSMs
CBP primarily uses two types of enforcement actions—ISF holds and liquidated damages claims—to enforce compliance with the ISF rule among importers and carriers. An evaluation of the effectiveness of its enforcement actions could help inform CBP’s enforcement strategy and increase compliance at ports with relatively low ISF-10 submission rates. CBP Reports the ISF Program Has Improved Its Ability to Identify High-Risk Shipments, but CBP Could Collect Additional Information to Better Evaluate Program Effectiveness
CBP Reports ISF Rule Data Have Helped Assess Shipment Risk, but Collecting Additional Performance Information Could Enhance Evaluation of Program Effectiveness
CBP officials told us that ISF rule data have improved CBP’s ability to assess the risk of cargo shipments, but evaluating the direct effects of ISF rule data on identifying high-risk shipments is difficult. However, we identified examples of additional information CBP could collect to better evaluate the program’s effectiveness. According to CBP, vessel stow plans also help CBP assess shipment risk by allowing CBP to identify unmanifested containers—containers and their associated contents not listed on a vessel’s manifest—that pose a security risk in that no information is known about their origin or contents. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance CBP’s identification of high-risk cargo shipments and its enforcement of the ISF rule, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following two actions: enforce the ISF rule requirement that carriers provide CSMs to CBP when targeters identify CSM noncompliance; and evaluate the ISF enforcement strategies used by ATUs to assess whether particular enforcement methods could be applied to ports with relatively low submission rates. Further, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP identify and collect additional performance information on the impact of the ISF rule data, such as the identification of shipments containing contraband, to better evaluate the effectiveness of the ISF program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) implementation of the Importer Security Filing (ISF) and Additional Carrier Requirements (ISF rule). More specifically, our objectives were to address: (1) importers’ and carriers’ compliance rates for ISF rule requirements, and the extent to which CBP monitors their compliance; (2) CBP’s actions to enforce the ISF rule and whether its enforcement actions have contributed to increased compliance among importers and carriers; and (3) whether the ISF program has improved CBP’s ability to identify high-risk cargo shipments prior to their arrival in the United States, and the extent to which data submitted under the program are accurate. Further, we could not determine submission rates for CSMs because CBP could provide us data on the number of CSMs it received from carriers, but not those it did not receive because CBP does not have access to carriers’ private systems to know when CSMs have been created and should be provided to CBP. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cargo shipments can present security concerns as terrorists could use cargo containers to transport a weapon of mass destruction or other contraband into the United States. In January 2009, CBP, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), implemented the ISF rule. The rule requires importers and vessel carriers to submit information, such as country of origin, to CBP before cargo is loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels. The information is intended to improve CBP's ability to identify high-risk shipments.
GAO was asked to review the ISF program. This report addresses: (1) importers' and carriers' submission rates for ISF rule requirements, (2) CBP's actions to enforce the ISF rule and assess whether enforcement actions have increased compliance, and (3) the extent to which the ISF rule has improved CBP's ability to identify high-risk shipments. GAO, among other things, analyzed CBP's compliance and enforcement data for 2012 through 2015—the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review—and interviewed CBP officials and trade industry members.
What GAO Found
Through the Importer Security Filing (ISF) and Additional Carrier Requirements (the ISF rule), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) requires importers to submit ISFs and vessel carriers to submit vessel stow plans and container status messages (CSM). Submission rates for ISF-10s—required for cargo destined for the United States—increased from about 95 percent in 2012 to 99 percent in 2015. Submission rates for ISF-5s—required for cargo transiting but not destined for the United States—ranged from about 68 to 80 percent. To increase ISF-5 submission rates, CBP published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in July 2016 to clarify the party responsible for submitting the ISF-5. GAO could not determine submission rates for vessel stow plans, which depict the position of each cargo container on a vessel, because CBP calculates stow plan submission rates on a daily basis, but not comprehensively over time. CBP officials noted, though, that compliance overall is likely nearly 100 percent because Advance Targeting Units (ATU), responsible for identifying high-risk shipments, contact carriers if they have not received stow plans. GAO also could not determine submission rates for CSMs, which report container movements and status changes, because CBP does not have access to carriers' private data systems to know the number of CSMs it should receive. CBP targeters noted that they may become aware that CSMs have not been sent based on other information sources they review.
CBP has taken actions to enforce ISF and stow plan submissions, but has not enforced CSM submissions or assessed the effects of its enforcement actions on compliance at the port level. ATUs enforce ISF and vessel stow plan compliance by using ISF holds, which prevent cargo from leaving ports, and issuing liquidated damages claims. CBP has not enforced CSM submissions because of the high volume it receives and lack of visibility into carriers' private data systems. However, when CBP targeters become aware that CSMs have not been received based on reviewing other information sources, taking enforcement actions could provide an incentive for carriers to submit all CSMs and help targeters better identify high-risk cargo. GAO's enforcement data analysis shows that ATUs used varying methods to enforce the ISF rule and that ports' ISF-10 submission rates varied. By assessing the effects of its enforcement strategies at the port level, CBP could better ensure it maximizes compliance with the rule.
CBP officials stated that ISF rule data have improved their ability to identify high-risk cargo shipments, but CBP could collect additional performance information to better evaluate program effectiveness. Evaluating the direct impact of ISF rule data in assessing shipment risk is difficult; however, GAO identified examples of how CBP could better assess the ISF program's effectiveness. For example, CBP could track the number of containers not listed on a manifest—which could pose a security risk—it identifies through reviewing vessel stow plans. Collecting this type of additional performance information could help CBP better assess whether the ISF program is improving its ability to identify high-risk shipments.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2017. Information CBP deemed Law Enforcement Sensitive has been deleted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP (1) enforce the CSM requirement when targeters identify carriers' noncompliance; (2) evaluate the effect of enforcement strategies on compliance at the port level; and (3) collect additional performance information to better evaluate the effectiveness of the ISF program. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-64 | gao_GAO-13-64_0 | Background
History of 529 Plans
529 plans are a college savings vehicle that originated in the states. In 1996, Congress enacted Section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code, setting out requirements that state 529 plans must meet to be exempt from federal tax. Earnings on contributions grow tax-deferred. Almost all states offer a college savings plan. Few Families Have 529 Plans and Those Who Do Tend to Be Wealthier
A Small Percentage of Families Have 529 Plans
According to the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), less than 3 percent of U.S. families had 529 plans or Coverdells, a similar but less often used education savings account. Based on our analysis of the 2010 SCF, we estimate that the median financial asset value for families with 529 plans or Coverdells was about $413,500, which is about twenty-five times the median financial asset value for families without 529 plans or Coverdells (about $15,400).retirement assets than other families. States’ 529 Plan Features and Other Factors Can Affect Participation
Tax Benefits, Fees, and Investment Options Vary Across State 529 Plans
Officials in every state and most experts and representatives we interviewed identified tax benefits, fees, and investment options as some of the most important features consumers consider when choosing whether or not to participate in a 529 plan and, if so, which plan to choose. Fees among 529 plans vary widely; total annual asset-based fees among plans nationwide ranged from 0 percent to 1.97 percent for direct-sold plans and 0 percent to 2.78 percent for advisor-sold plans, as of July 2012. Participation is Affected by Ability to Save and Other Factors, but Some States Have Adopted Strategies to Address Barriers
Families encounter a number of barriers as they consider saving for college: they may struggle with making saving a priority, and for those who do plan to save, many do not know 529 plans exist as a savings option. Families may encounter a variety of barriers saving for college, such as insufficient income, underestimating the cost of college, and misconceptions about financial aid availability, but selected states are taking steps to help address these barriers. An ongoing experiment conducted by the Center for Social Development also found a positive impact on the number of 529 plan accounts for families who were automatically enrolled in a state-owned 529 account with a matching program in one state. The site encourages families to save even in small amounts to offset the amount of debt the family will incur. According to a 2009 Treasury report, families saving in 529 plans may need to carefully consider whether their child will go to college because the penalty incurred if the funds are not used for qualified education expenses may outweigh the tax benefits for low-income families. Savings in 529 Plans Affect Financial Aid the Same as Other Assets
Savings in 529 Plans Are Treated Similarly to Other Assets That Are Included When Calculating the Expected Family Contribution
The extent to which savings in 529 plans, or other investments, affect how much a family is expected to contribute to the cost of college—the federal expected family contribution (EFC)—generally depends on the family’s amount of assets. As a result, the amount of net parental assets, including savings in 529 plans, that can be included in the EFC ranges from 2.64 percent to 5.64 percent. It is not clear whether the $1.6 billion in federal tax expenditures that these plans represent strategically targets limited federal resources. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review examined: (1) the percentage and characteristics of families enrolling in 529 plans, (2) the plan features and other factors that affect participation in 529 plans, and (3) the extent to which savings in 529 plans affect financial aid awards. To answer these research objectives, we analyzed government data; interviewed state 529 plan officials from select states as well as industry representatives and academic experts; reviewed plan documents and analyzed industry data; conducted a literature review; interviewed federal, state, and institutional financial aid officials; and reviewed Department of Education (Education) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) documents as well as relevant federal laws, regulations and guidance. We also developed separate estimates for students who are considered either dependent on their parents or independent for financial aid purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Paying for college is becoming more challenging, partly because of rising tuition rates. A college savings plan can be an option to help meet these costs. To encourage families to save for college, earnings from 529 plans--named after section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code--grow tax-deferred and are exempt from federal income tax when they are used for qualified higher education expenses. In fiscal year 2011, the Department of the Treasury estimated these plans represented $1.6 billion in forgone federal revenue. Managed by states, over one hundred 529 plan options were available to families nationwide as of July 2012. The number of 529 plan accounts and the amount invested in them has grown during the past decade. GAO was asked to describe (1) the percentage and characteristics of families enrolling in 529 plans, (2) plan features and other factors that affect participation in 529 plans, and (3) the extent to which savings in 529 plans affect financial aid awards. GAO analyzed government data, including the SCF. This survey's 529 plan data are combined with Coverdells, so the SCF estimates used in the report include both 529 and Coverdell data. GAO also analyzed National Postsecondary Student Aid Study data; conducted interviews with federal and state officials, industry and academic experts, and state and institutional higher education officials; reviewed 529 plan and Department of Education documents; conducted a literature review; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance.
What GAO Found
A small percentage of U.S. families saved in 529 plans in 2010, and those who did tended to be wealthier than others. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), less than 3 percent of families saved in a 529 plan or Coverdell Education Savings Account (Coverdell)--a similar but less often used college savings vehicle also included in the SCF. While the economic downturn may have reduced income available for education savings, even among those families who considered saving for education a priority, fewer than 1 in 10 had a 529 plan (or Coverdell). Families with these accounts had about 25 times the median financial assets of those without. They also had about 3 times the median income and the percentage who had college degrees was about twice as high as for families without 529 plans (or Coverdells).
States offer consumers a variety of 529 plan features that, along with several other factors, can affect participation. Some of the most important features families consider when choosing a 529 plan are tax benefits, fees, and investment options, according to experts and state officials GAO interviewed. These features can vary across the state plans. For example, in July 2012, total annual asset-based fees ranged from 0 to 2.78 percent depending on the type of plan. 529 plan officials and experts GAO interviewed said participation is also affected by families' ability to save, their awareness of 529 plans as a savings option, and the difficulty in choosing a plan given the amount of variation between plans. Selected states, however, have taken steps to address these barriers. For example, to address families' ability to save, particularly for low-income families, some states have adopted plans that include less risky investments, have low minimum contributions, and match families' contributions.
Savings in 529 plans affect financial aid similarly to a family's other assets. For federal aid, a family's assets affect how much it is expected to contribute to the cost of college. If the amount of those assets exceeds a certain threshold, then a percentage is expected to be used for college costs. For example, for students who are dependent on their parents, the percentage of parental assets, including savings in 529 plans, that the family may be expected to contribute ranges from 2.64 to 5.64 percent. Many states and selected institutions also treat 529 plan savings the same as other family assets. However, a few states provide them with special treatment, such as exempting those funds from their financial aid calculation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-08-1086 | gao_GAO-08-1086_0 | Within SBI, SBInet is the program for acquiring, developing, integrating, and deploying an appropriate mix of (1) surveillance technologies, such as cameras, radars, and sensors, and (2) command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies. Limited Definition of SBInet Deployments, Capabilities, Schedule, and Life Cycle Management Process Increases Program’s Exposure to Risk
Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered, when and where they will be delivered, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to change since the program began and, even now, remain unclear. Further, the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet is similarly unclear and has continued to change. The absence of clarity and stability in these key aspects of SBInet introduces considerable program risks, hampers DHS’s ability to measure program progress, and impairs the ability of the Congress to oversee the program and hold DHS accountable for program results. However, the program office does not yet have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of SBInet, and according to program officials, such a schedule has not been in place since late 2007. For example, the deployment of the SBInet system to the Tucson Sector will not be completed in 2009 as planned. However, this guidance was not finalized until February 2008 and thus was not used in performing a number of key requirements-related activities. Further, it has not ensured that the operational requirements were, for example, verifiable, and it has not made certain that all of the different levels of requirements are aligned to one another. As a result, the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended is increased, as are the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework. Our analysis of this plan shows that it is consistent with leading practices. Baselined Operational Requirements Used to Inform Lower-Level Requirements Are Limited
As stated above, one of the leading practices for developing and managing requirements—which is reflected in the program office’s own plan—is that requirements should be sufficiently analyzed to ensure that the requirements are, among other things, complete, unambiguous, and verifiable. Specifically, we attempted to trace requirements in the version of this database that the program office received in March 2008 and were unable to trace large percentages of component requirements to either higher-level or lower-level requirements. Specifically, it has not tested individual system components prior to integrating these components with other components and the COP software. However, it still does not have an approved system integration test plan. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all entities involved in SBInet testing, the risk of test activities not being effectively and efficiently performed increases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) has defined the scope and timing of planned SBInet capabilities and how these capabilities will be developed and deployed, (2) is effectively defining and managing SBInet requirements, and (3) is effectively managing SBInet testing. To determine if DHS is effectively defining and managing SBInet requirements, we reviewed relevant documentation, such as the Requirements Development and Management Plan, the Requirements Management Plan, the Configuration and Data Management Plan, the Operational Requirements Document, System of Systems A-Level Specification, B-2 Specifications, and Vendor Item Control Drawings, and compared them to industry best practices to determine the extent to which the program has effectively managed the systems requirements and maintained traceability backwards to high-level operational requirements and system requirements, and forward to system design and verification methods. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders through, among other things, new technology, increased staffing, and new fencing and barriers. The technology component of SBI, which is known as SBInet, involves the acquisition, development, integration, and deployment of surveillance systems and command, control, communications, and intelligence technologies. GAO was asked to determine whether DHS (1) has defined the scope and timing of SBInet capabilities and how these capabilities will be developed and deployed, (2) is effectively defining and managing SBInet requirements, and (3) is effectively managing SBInet testing. To do so, GAO reviewed key program documentation and interviewed program officials, analyzed a random sample of requirements, and observed operations of a pilot project.
What GAO Found
Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered, when and where they will be delivered, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to change since the program began and, even now, are unclear. Further, the program office does not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of the program, and GAO's assimilation of available information indicates that the schedule has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet. The absence of clarity and stability in these key aspects of SBInet impairs the ability of the Congress to oversee the program and hold DHS accountable for program results, and it hampers DHS's ability to measure program progress. SBInet requirements have not been effectively defined and managed. While the program office recently issued guidance that defines key practices associated with effectively developing and managing requirements, such as eliciting user needs and ensuring that different levels of requirements and associated verification methods are properly aligned with one another, the guidance was developed after several key activities had been completed. In the absence of this guidance, the program has not effectively performed key requirements definition and management practices. For example, it has not ensured that different levels of requirements are properly aligned, as evidenced by GAO's analysis of a random probability sample of component requirements showing that a large percentage of them could not be traced to higher-level system and operational requirements. Also, some of SBInet's operational requirements, which are the basis for all lower-level requirements, were found by an independent DHS review to be unaffordable and unverifiable, thus casting doubt on the quality of lower-level requirements that are derived from them. As a result, the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended is increased, as are the chances of expensive and time-consuming system rework. SBInet testing has not been effectively managed. For example, the program office has not tested the individual system components to be deployed to the initial deployment locations, even though the contractor initiated integration testing of these components with other system components and subsystems in June 2008. Further, while a test management strategy was drafted in May 2008, it has not been finalized and approved, and it does not contain, among other things, a clear definition of testing roles and responsibilities; a high-level master schedule of SBInet test activities; or sufficient detail to effectively guide project-specific test planning, such as milestones and metrics for specific project testing. Without a structured and disciplined approach to testing, the risk that SBInet will not satisfy user needs and operational requirements, thus requiring system rework, is increased. |
gao_GAO-03-528T | gao_GAO-03-528T_0 | For example, the NRC Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980 established a requirement for off-site emergency planning around nuclear power plants and allowed NRC to issue a nuclear plant operating license only if it determines that there is either a related state or local emergency preparedness plan that provides for responding to accidents at the specific plant and complies with NRC’s emergency planning guidelines or state, local, or facility plan that provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety are not endangered by the plants’ operation in the absence of a related state or local emergency preparedness plan. Indian Point 2 is one of the 104 commercial nuclear power plants nationwide licensed to operate. In 2001, We Noted That Indian Point 2 Had Struggled to Resolve Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses
Over the years, Consolidated Edison’s efforts to improve emergency preparedness at Indian Point 2 were not completely successful, and the company experienced recurring weaknesses in its program, as we reported in July 2001. Despite these initiatives, in April 2001, NRC reported that it had found problems similar to those previously identified at Indian Point 2. In commenting on a draft of our July 2001 report, NRC noted that its April 2001 inspection report concluded that Consolidated Edison’s emergency preparedness program would provide reasonable assurance of protecting the public. The Four Counties Strengthened Their Emergency Preparedness Programs but Suggested Better Communication Among NRC, FEMA, and Nonstate Entities
The need to improve communication between Consolidated Edison and the counties about the extent of the emergency and the potential impact on the public was highlighted during the February 2000 event. The counties had also taken some other actions to improve their radiological emergency programs. In particular, county officials said that since they are responsible for radiological emergency preparedness for Indian Point 2, NRC and FEMA should communicate directly with them during nonemergency situations. FEMA generally implements its programs through the states and relies on the states to communicate relevant information to local jurisdictions. In commenting on a draft of our report, FEMA said that the emergency plans for the four New York counties require them to conduct off-site monitoring and dose calculations at the alert level. Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses at Indian Point 2 Have Continued
In reviewing NRC’s reports on its on-site inspections and evaluations of the plant’s emergency preparedness exercises or drills completed since we issued our 2001 report, we found that the facility’s emergency preparedness program has continued to experience problems or weaknesses. For example, NRC reported that, in an emergency exercise conducted last fall, the facility gave out unclear information about the release of radioactive materials, which also happened during the February 2000 event. In addition, NRC reported that several actions to correct previously identified weaknesses had not been completed. With respect to our 2001 recommendation that NRC and FEMA reassess their practices of primarily communicating with state officials during nonemergency situations, federal and local officials indicated that little has changed since our report. In addition to improving the plant’s program, a better track record in addressing these problems could go a long way in helping alleviate the heightened concerns in the surrounding communities about the plant’s safety and preparedness for an emergency. The Witt Report Raises Emergency Preparedness Issues at Indian Point and Other Nuclear Power Plants
On August 1, 2002, the Governor of New York announced that James Lee Witt Associates would conduct a comprehensive and independent review of emergency preparedness around the Indian Point facility and for that portion of New York State in proximity to the Millstone nuclear power plant in Waterford, Connecticut. According to Witt Associates, the review encompassed many related activities that were designed, when taken together, to shed light on whether the jurisdictions’ existing plans and capabilities are sufficient to ensure the safety of the people of the state in the event of an accident at one of the plants, and how the existing plans and capabilities might be improved. We have not evaluated the Witt report or verified the accuracy of its findings and conclusions. The draft Witt report concludes that NRC and FEMA regulations need to be revised and updated. According to the agency, the draft report raises a number of issues that should be considered for enhancing the level of preparedness in the communities surrounding the Indian Point facility, such as better public education, more training of off-site responders, and improved emergency communications. According to NRC, the draft report gives “undue weight” to the impact of a terrorist attack. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants has become of heightened concern. Currently, 104 commercial nuclear power plants operate at 64 sites in 32 states and provide about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. In July 2001, GAO reported on emergency preparedness at the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant in New York State. This testimony discusses GAO's findings and recommendations in that report and the progress the plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have made in addressing these problems. GAO also provides its thoughts on the findings of a soon-to-be-issued report (the Witt report) on emergency preparedness at Indian Point and the Millstone nuclear power plant in Connecticut, and the implications of that report for plants nationwide. Since 2001, the Entergy Corporation has assumed ownership of the Indian Point 2 plant from the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (ConEd).
What GAO Found
In 2001, GAO reported that, over the years, NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected. ConEd had some corrective actions underway before a 2000 event raised the possibility of a leak of radioactively contaminated water into the environment. ConEd took other actions to address problems during this event. According to NRC, more than a year later, the plant still had problems similar to those previously identified--particularly in the pager system for activating emergency personnel. However, NRC, in commenting on a draft of GAO's report, stated that ConEd's emergency preparedness program could protect the public. Four counties responsible for responding to a radiological emergency at Indian Point 2 had, with the state and ConEd, developed a new form to better document the nature and seriousness of any radioactive release and thus avoid the confusion that occurred during the February 2000 event. Because they are the first responders in any radiological emergency, county officials wanted NRC and FEMA to communicate more with them in nonemergency situations, in addition to communicating through the states. However, NRC and FEMA primarily rely on the states to communicate with local jurisdictions. Since GAO's 2001 report, NRC has found that emergency preparedness weaknesses have continued. For example, NRC reported that, during an emergency exercise in the fall of 2002, the facility gave out unclear information about the release of radioactive materials, which had also happened during the February 2000 event. Similarly, in terms of communicating with the surrounding jurisdictions, little has changed, according to county officials. County officials told GAO that a videoconference system--promised to ensure prompt meetings and better communication between the plant's technical representatives and the counties--had not been installed. In addition, NRC and FEMA continue to work primarily with the states in nonemergency situations. Although they note that there are avenues for public participation, none of these is exclusively for the county governments. GAO did not evaluate the draft Witt report or verify the accuracy of its findings. The draft Witt report is a much larger, more technical assessment than the 2001 GAO report. While both reports point out difficulties in communications and planning inadequacies, the draft Witt report concludes that the current radiological response system and capabilities are not adequate to protect the public from an unacceptable dose of radiation in the event of a release from Indian Point, especially if the release is faster or larger than the release for which the programs are typically designed. GAO is aware that, in commenting on a draft of the Witt report, FEMA disagreed with some of the issues raised but said the report highlights several issues worth considering to improve emergency preparedness in the communities around Indian Point and nationwide. NRC concluded that the draft report gives "undue weight" to the impact of a terrorist attack. |
gao_GAO-15-377 | gao_GAO-15-377_0 | Local Solutions and G2G Assistance
USAID’s Local Solutions initiative aims to increase funding for partner- country systems, including partner governments, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, that have sufficient capacity—and to help strengthen their capacity when needed—in order to achieve sustainable development outcomes. Implementation: This phase entails selecting appropriate funding mechanisms and implementing G2G assistance activities according to the terms and conditions established in bilateral assistance agreements and other legal documents. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E): This phase entails conducting audits of partner-government entities and assessing the progress and results of G2G assistance activities. Planning: USAID Missions Completed Detailed Fiduciary Risk Assessments but Did Not Always Address Risks and Mitigation Steps in Project Design and Missed Opportunities to Coordinate with Other Donors
USAID policy addresses accountability standards calling for identification, analysis, and mitigation of risks, and we found that USAID missions completed detailed risk assessments. However, missions did not always integrate risk mitigation measures into project and M&E planning when required by USAID policy. In addition, M&E plans we reviewed often did not incorporate steps USAID and partner governments agreed upon to address risks and build capacity. In addition, consistent with USAID policy addressing accountability standards related to the establishment of control activities, missions employed G2G assistance agreements and corresponding implementation letters with partner governments to commit funds and set objectives and conditions for funding, among other things. However, the audits were often submitted late, limiting their usefulness as a monitoring tool. In addition, we found that project-level plans for M&E rarely included indicators or evaluation questions for assessing the degree to which G2G assistance activities would build local systems capacity, increase country ownership, or enhance sustainability—the three interrelated goals of the Local Solutions initiative. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following five actions to improve accountability for G2G assistance: 1. develop an action plan to improve the timeliness of risk assessments so that these assessments can better inform project planning; 2. develop an action plan to ensure that M&E plans for G2G assistance activities incorporate risk mitigation measures; 3. disseminate information to missions regarding best practices for coordinating risk assessments with other donors; 4. identify the factors contributing to late submission of required audits and develop a strategy to improve on-time audit submission and follow-up; and 5. develop and disseminate guidance on assessing the effects of G2G assistance on partner-country capacity, ownership, and sustainability, including through the identification of indicators and evaluation approaches. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to assess the extent to which U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) policies and practices related to (1) planning, (2) implementing, and (3) monitoring and evaluating government-to-government (G2G) assistance provide reasonable assurance that this assistance is used as intended. Second, mission officials in Indonesia and Georgia determined that all of each mission’s respective fiscal year 2012 obligations had not, in fact, been implemented through partner government entities and, as such, were incorrectly characterized as G2G assistance. We also selected 3 USAID missions—Nepal, Peru, and Tanzania—for in- depth case studies. USAID agreed with these recommendation and noted steps it was taking to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
USAID's Local Solutions initiative, launched in 2010 as part of USAID Forward, seeks to reform how the agency administers development assistance and to increase funding implemented through partner-country systems, including partner governments. In fiscal years 2012 through 2014, average annual obligations to G2G activities were about $620 million. The Local Solutions initiative aims to strengthen local capacity and enhance country ownership and sustainability of development efforts. GAO was asked to review accountability under this initiative.
GAO assessed the extent to which USAID policies and practices related to (1) planning, (2) implementing, and (3) monitoring and evaluating G2G assistance provide reasonable assurance that this assistance is used as intended. GAO analyzed key USAID policy documents; interviewed USAID officials; reviewed planning documents from 14 USAID missions; and conducted fieldwork in Nepal, Peru, and Tanzania.
What GAO Found
For each key phase for government-to-government (G2G) assistance activities under its Local Solutions initiative, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has policies that generally reflect federal accountability standards to help ensure funds are used as intended. However, GAO identified several steps in implementing these policies that could further strengthen accountability.
Planning: This phase entails designing projects that link to USAID missions' country development strategies, assessing and mitigating risks, and preparing planning documents. GAO found that USAID missions completed detailed fiduciary risk assessments for G2G assistance activities when required but did not always include mitigation steps in planning documents, in part, because risk assessments were often done after planning had been completed. Also, project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans often did not incorporate steps USAID and partner governments agreed to take to mitigate risks and build capacity.
Implementation: In this phase, USAID implements G2G activities according to the terms and conditions established in assistance agreements with partner governments. USAID missions usually selected funding mechanisms in which USAID reimburses partner governments for costs related to completion of agreed-upon activities. In addition, consistent with USAID policy, missions employed assistance agreements and corresponding implementation letters to commit funds and set objectives, among other things.
M&E. This phase includes conducting audits of partner-government entities and assessing the results of G2G assistance activities. Annual audits GAO reviewed were often submitted late, which delays audit follow-up actions required by USAID policy and limits the audits' usefulness as a monitoring tool. In addition, project M&E plans GAO reviewed rarely included indicators or evaluation questions for assessing the degree to which G2G assistance activities are building capacity, increasing ownership, or ensuring sustainability—the three interrelated goals of the Local Solutions initiative.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID take steps to strengthen accountability for G2G assistance by, among other things, improving the timeliness of risk assessments; incorporating risk mitigation measures into M&E planning; improving on-time audit submission; and assessing the effects of G2G assistance on capacity, ownership, and sustainability. USAID agreed with all of GAO's recommendations and noted various actions it is taking to address them. |
gao_GAO-10-168 | gao_GAO-10-168_0 | In 2007, UNOPS established an internal oversight office, including an internal audit program modeled after Institute for Internal Auditors standards. In 2007 UNOPS management requested further investigation of misconduct in Afghanistan. Reforms Have Strengthened Internal Controls, but the Extent of Their Effectiveness Has Not Been Assessed
Project Tracking System Has Improved Documentation of Projects, but Weaknesses Remain
While changes to UNOPS’s project tracking system, Atlas, have improved documentation of projects at UNOPS, the effectiveness of these improvements is limited by the lack of systematic data reliability assessments and other system implementation inadequacies. In 2007, when UNOPS management proposed the first phase of the investigation, UNOPS had no investigative capacity of its own and, thus, had to request and pay other investigators for their services. The UNOPS Director of internal oversight and the Ethics Officer told us that there have been no audits or assessments of UNOPS’s Ethics Office. UNOPS’s Executive Board Lacks Full Access to Internal Audit Reports that Could Provide Greater Insights into UNOPS’s Operations
While UNOPS’s Executive Board receives information from various sources about the effectiveness of UNOPS’s financial and programmatic operations, the board members—including the United States—do not have full access to internal audit reports, which could increase transparency and provide further insight into UNOPS’s operations. USAID Has Not Consistently Implemented Its Oversight Policies When Making Grant Awards with UNOPS and Has Been Vulnerable to Program Fraud and Abuse
While USAID’s general policies for making grants with PIOs require USAID to evaluate grantees and to include provisions in some cases under which the grantee agrees to give USAID access to oversight information, USAID has not consistently implemented these policies when making grant awards with UNOPS. We found that some of these omissions can be attributed to USAID’s lack of clear guidance, training, and monitoring of its required audit provisions. USAID’s failure to adhere to its policies limited its oversight of grants that were subsequently associated with alleged findings of criminal actions and mismanaged funds. USAID could not provide official documentation of assessments for 7 of the 11 grants it made to UNOPS from 2004 through 2008 (see app. USAID Did Not Acknowledge Information from UN Audits and Investigations of UNOPS while Continuing to Award Grants to UNOPS
None of USAID’s four official pre-award assessments of UNOPS from 2004 through 2008 acknowledged adverse findings from publicly available UN audits and investigations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which United Nations (UN) Office of Project Services (UNOPS) has addressed key concerns about its internal controls, we reviewed key UN and UNOPS reports and documents outlining changes UNOPS management made to the organization and its operations from 2006 to 2009. From these locations UNOPS oversees activities in more than 50 countries. 2. 3. 4. United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United Nations (UN) Office for Project Services (UNOPS) provides numerous services for its clients, including procurement and project management. Recent audits and investigations of UNOPS have revealed alleged violations of law, weak internal controls, and financial mismanagement. UNOPS officials misused some of the more than $400 million awarded to UNOPS by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from 2004 through 2008. GAO was asked to (1) assess the extent to which UNOPS has addressed key concerns about its internal controls, and (2) evaluate USAID's oversight of UNOPS-implemented projects. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed UNOPS and USAID policies and grant documentation.
What GAO Found
While UNOPS management continues to implement reforms that address key concerns raised by audits and investigations, the effectiveness of some implemented reforms has not been assessed. Management efforts to improve UNOPS include (1) development of UNOPS's project tracking system, Atlas; (2) establishment of an internal oversight office; and (3) establishment of an ethics office. While changes to Atlas have improved UNOPS's financial documentation, UNOPS does not systematically assess data reliability in Atlas. Although UNOPS's internal oversight has been strengthened by the creation of an oversight office, two phases of an investigation of activities in Afghanistan have not begun. UNOPS had no investigative capacity of its own and had to seek out external investigators for which it is still negotiating the scope and cost. In addition, while UNOPS's ethics office complies with most UN requirements, no one has assessed the effectiveness of the office's activities. Finally, UNOPS's Executive Board lacks full access to internal audit reports that could provide greater insights into UNOPS's operations. USAID has not consistently implemented its oversight policies when making grant awards with UNOPS and has been vulnerable to program fraud and abuse. While USAID has policies that require it to perform pre-award assessments of Public International Organizations (PIO), such as UNOPS, USAID could not provide official documentation of these assessments for 7 of its 11 awards made to UNOPS from 2004 through 2008. In the 4 assessments USAID provided, there were no statements acknowledging findings of weak internal controls from UN audits and investigations. In addition, USAID did not negotiate to include audit authority for 9 of these awards that would have allowed USAID access to UNOPS project financial records. We found that an absence of clear guidance, training, and monitoring contributed to these failures. USAID's noncompliance with its policies resulted in limited access to data on UNOPS grants that were associated with findings of possible criminal |
gao_GAO-07-221 | gao_GAO-07-221_0 | Most of these countries also have established orphan source recovery programs to collect sealed radiological sources that have been abandoned or lost. About Half the Countries Make Disposal Options Available for Most Lower- Activity LLRW
About half of the countries in our survey indicated that they currently have a disposal option for lower-activity LLRW, but few have a disposal option for higher-activity LLRW. Some countries in our survey indicated that they have alternative disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste. Eight countries indicated that they have disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste. Financial Assurance Requirements and Other Approaches Are Used by Most Countries to Reduce Government LLRW Recovery Costs
Nine of the 18 countries we surveyed indicated that their nuclear regulatory authorities require all non-utility LLRW generators to have sufficient financial assurances to cover the removal of radioactive waste from their sites. Domestic Experts Support Need to Evaluate the U.S. LLRW Management System
There was general agreement among the representatives from the LLRW stakeholder groups that the management of LLRW in the United States needs improvement. Comments from representatives of U.S. LLRW stakeholders groups as well as statements and recommendations in recent reports related to LLRW management indicate that the application of approaches similar to those used in other countries may improve the management of U.S. radioactive waste. Comprehensiveness and usefulness of national radioactive waste inventory all types of radioactive waste by volume, location and generator type; inventory the possession and status of use of sealed radiological sources in more than category 1 and 2; designate a national authority to manage the radioactive waste take steps to verify the completeness and accuracy of these databases; require waste generators to submit waste inventory information to the national authority at least once a year; and use the radioactive waste inventory databases to forecast future waste volumes, and to inform the public on volumes of waste at central storage and disposal facilities. Prompt removal of higher-activity LLRW, primarily disused sealed radiological sources from waste generator sites establish on-site storage time limits for non-utility waste generators, at least when disposal options are available; and implement other methods to facilitate the removal disused sealed radiological sources, such as requiring time limits on the use of sources, return of disused sources to a supplier, and users to notify the nuclear regulatory authority when the source becomes disused. The response of the United States to the GAO survey indicated that NRC does not require a disposal fee at the time of purchase or require that source users and suppliers contribute to a recovery fund. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
In our review, we examined the extent to which foreign countries have (1) comprehensive national LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity LLRW in storage at waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements to assure that LLRW generators have adequate financial reserves to cover all waste disposition costs. Nevertheless, in the course of conducting our study, we found that most countries in our survey use national radioactive waste management plans to guide the management of these wastes. Our report identified approaches used in some other countries to reduce the government cost to recover and disposition these disused sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S. low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW ranges from very low-activity to higher-activity waste. To identify potential approaches to overcome these limitations, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which other countries have (1) LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements that LLRW generators have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs, as well as any other approaches that might improve U.S. LLRW management. GAO primarily relied on a survey of 18 countries representing leading LLRW generators to identify their management approaches and to compare them with U.S. survey results and with approaches suggested by LLRW generators, disposal operators, and regulators in the United States.
What GAO Found
Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), disposed of at least 15 million cubic feet of LLRW in 2005. This waste includes debris, rubble, soils, paper, liquid, metals, and clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material, and sealed radiological sources that are no longer useful for industrial or other applications (disused). Other countries that have nuclear reactor units and use radioactive materials in other ways manage the residual LLRW in some ways that are different than in the United States. Of the countries surveyed, GAO found that most countries indicated they have national radioactive waste inventory databases that include information on all waste generators, waste types, storage locations, and disused sealed radiological sources, and that they use them to forecast future disposal capacity needs. Most countries indicated they facilitate the timely removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological sources, from generator sites to enhance safety and security, including requiring the return of a disused source to a source supplier. Most countries indicated they have disposal options for lower-activity LLRW, central storage options for higher-activity LLRW, and alternative disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste that in most cases does not require an exemption review by a nuclear regulatory authority. Half the countries indicated they impose financial assurance requirements on all waste generators to cover disposition costs, and most of these countries also use other approaches to reduce government costs to recover higher-activity LLRW, such as requiring a disposal fee at the time that a sealed radiological source is purchased. GAO also found that most countries surveyed use national radioactive waste plans to guide the management of their radioactive wastes. Many representatives from LLRW generators, disposal operators, regulators, and others told GAO that the application of similar approaches to those used by other countries might improve the management of U.S. radioactive waste. |
gao_GAO-03-1001 | gao_GAO-03-1001_0 | Students Express Overall Satisfaction with Academies, but Perceptions Vary on Some Quality-of-Life Issues
Although a majority of the 9,238 students who responded to our survey at the three military service academies expressed overall satisfaction with their academy, the students gave wide-ranging responses to a variety of questions about quality-of-life issues. Their perceptions of discrimination and harassment prevention and preferential treatment issues often varied according to gender and race/ethnicity. Students’ Rating of Academic and Military Training Is High
As figure 3 shows, between 90 and 93 percent of the students at each academy rated the overall academic program as good or excellent. 4). However, about one-quarter to one-third of the students rated their academy’s performance standards for developing military officers as generally or much too low (see question 8, app. Additionally, between 83 and 87 percent of students who were not recruited athletes believed that recruited athletes received preferential treatment during the admissions process. However, differences in student perceptions were generally between male and female students and minorities and nonminority students. Faculty Generally Agree with Student Perceptions on Some Quality-of-Life Issues
The 1,586 faculty members who responded to our survey generally agreed with student perceptions of aspects of student life at the academies, but they were less likely than students to report that quality-of-life problems at the academies are seldom openly confronted and/or solved. Faculty perceptions varied on the practice of the honor code/concept and gender and race-/ethnicity-based discrimination and harassment and preferential treatment issues. Faculty Perceptions Varied on the Extent to Which Quality-of-Life Problems Are Addressed
Thirty-eight percent of the faculty at the Military Academy, 45 percent at the Naval Academy, and 46 percent at the Air Force Academy reported that quality-of-life problems are openly confronted and/or solved to some, little, or no extent at the academies. By comparison, 59 percent of students at the Military and Naval Academies and 71 percent of students at the Air Force Academy held the same views. Faculty Perceptions of Prevention of Discrimination and Harassment Varied
Faculty were asked for their perceptions on the same gender-based and race-/ethnicity-based discrimination and harassment issues as were students. More than 90 percent of the faculty who had participated in the admissions process in the last 4 years at the Military and Naval Academies and 72 percent at the Air Force Academy responded that they perceived recruited athletes as receiving preferential treatment during the admissions process. For example, the percentage of students and faculty that rated their academy’s performance standards for developing military officers as being generally or much too low suggests that this may be an area of concern. Agency Comments
DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments. Scope and Methodology
To obtain student and faculty perceptions of aspects of student life at the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. To administer the surveys, we built six Web-based survey sites, two for each academy (one for students and one for faculty). In the past 4 years, have you participated in the admissions process? Academy Preparatory Schools. Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army, Navy, and Air Force each operate an academy to educate and train young men and women to become leaders and effective junior officers in the military services. The approximately 4,000 students who attend each academy undergo a challenging 4-year program of academic, physical, and military education that culminates in a bachelor's degree and a commission as a military officer. In addition to completing academic course work, students must participate in rigorous military training and in mandatory athletic activities. In return for their free education, these students must serve on active duty for 5 years after graduation. In two reports, GAO reviewed all three service academies and their preparatory schools. In this report, GAO surveyed students and faculty to obtain their perceptions of various aspects of student life at the academies. GAO conducted a Web-based survey of 12,264 students and 2,065 faculty members at the three service academies on questions related to such student life issues as academic and military programs; gender- and race-/ethnicity-based discrimination and harassment; and preferential treatment. GAO's survey did not query students and faculty on specific incidents of alleged sexual assault at the academies. We are making no recommendations in this report. DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments.
What GAO Found
The majority of students who responded to GAO's survey expressed overall satisfaction with their academy, although students gave wide-ranging responses to a variety of quality-of-life questions. About 59 percent of students at the Military and Naval Academies and 71 percent at the Air Force Academy reported that quality-of-life problems are openly confronted and/or solved to some, little, or no extent. Over 90 percent of students rated their academic programs as good or excellent. About a quarter to a third of students rated their academy's performance standards for developing military officers as too low. Most differences in student responses on academy emphasis on prevention of gender- and race-/ethnicity-based discrimination and harassment were generally between male and female students and minorities and nonminority students. Over 80 percent of students who were not recruited as athletes responded that recruited athletes receive preferential treatment during the admissions process. The faculty members who responded to the survey generally agreed with the students' perceptions of student life at the academies, but they were less likely than students to say that quality-of-life problems are seldom openly confronted and/or solved. About a quarter to a third of faculty agreed with student perceptions that performance standards for developing military officers were too low. Faculty perceptions varied on issues associated with gender- and race-/ethnicity-based discrimination and harassment and preferential treatment. More than 90 percent of faculty who participated in the admissions process in the past 4 years at the Military and Naval Academies and 72 percent at the Air Force Academy responded that recruited athletes receive preferential treatment during the admissions process. |
gao_GAO-10-763 | gao_GAO-10-763_0 | DHS Is Taking Action to Validate the Scientific Basis of TSA’s SPOT Program but Opportunities Exist to Help Inform Future Program Decisions
Although DHS is in the process of validating the way in which the SPOT program utilizes the science of behavior detection in an airport environment, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying passengers as potential threats in airports. TSA stated that no other large-scale U.S. or international screening program incorporating behavior- and appearance-based indicators has ever been rigorously scientifically validated. However, S&T’s current research plan is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection and appearances can be effectively used to reliably identify individuals in an airport terminal environment who pose a risk to the aviation system. Our prior work has recommended the use of such independent panels for comprehensive, objective reviews of complex issues. Specifically, these data could have been compared to data collected during the SPOT pilots to determine if SPOT was more effective than random screening in detecting passengers who pose a potential risk to aviation security. However, TSA does not link goals in the SPOT strategic plan with other related strategic documents, such as the Aviation Implementation Plan of DHS’s Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan and the Passenger Checkpoint Screening Program Strategic Plan. More Fully and Consistently Utilizing Available Information Technology Could Enhance TSA’s Ability to Identify Threats to the Aviation System
Inconsistencies in the use of available information technology to aid in the collection and recording of data on passengers by BDOs during referrals to LEOs, lack of guidance on, or a mechanism for, BDOs to request the TSA’s Transportation Security Operations Center to run the names of passengers exhibiting suspicious behaviors against law enforcement and intelligence databases, and the Center’s not checking all of the databases available to it—have limited TSA’s ability to identify potential terrorist threats to the aviation system. Developing additional guidance in the SPOT operating procedures could help improve consistency in the extent to which BDOs utilize Transportation Security Operations Center resources. We did not analyze the extent to which the law enforcement and intelligence databases available to TSA may contain overlapping information. TSA Lacks Program Effectiveness Measures for SPOT but Is Taking Steps to Improve Evaluation Capabilities
TSA has established some performance measures by tracking SPOT referral and arrest data, but lacks the measures needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the SPOT program and, as a result, has not been able to fully assess SPOT’s contribution to improving aviation security. Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, we recommend that the TSA Administrator take the following six actions to ensure the program’s effective implementation: To provide additional assurance that TSA utilizes available resources to support the goals of deterring, detecting, and preventing security threats to the aviation system, TSA should: Provide guidance in the SPOT Standard Operating Procedures or other TSA directive to BDOs, or other TSA personnel, on inputting data into the Transportation Information Sharing System and set milestones and a time frame for deploying Transportation Information Sharing System access to SPOT airports so that TSA and intelligence community entities have information from all SPOT LEO referrals readily available to assist in “connecting the dots” and identifying potential terror plots. To better measure the effectiveness of the program and evaluate the performance of BDOs, TSA should: Establish a plan that includes objectives, milestones, and time frames to develop outcome-oriented performance measures to help refine the current methods used by Behavior Detection Officers for identifying individuals who may pose a risk to the aviation system. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) determined whether the Screening of Passengers By Observation Techniques (SPOT) program had a scientifically-validated basis for identifying passengers before deploying it, we reviewed literature on behavior analysis by subject matter experts, interviewed seven experts in behavior analysis, interviewed other federal agencies and entities about how they use behavior detection techniques, and analyzed relevant reports and books on the topic. These included a 2008 study by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences that has a discussion regarding deception and behavioral surveillance, as well as other issues related to behavioral analysis. However, these visits provided helpful insight into the operation of SPOT at airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
To enhance aviation security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began initial testing in October 2003 of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) carry out SPOT's mission to identify persons who pose a risk to aviation security by focusing on behavioral and appearance indicators. GAO was asked to review the SPOT program. GAO analyzed (1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, (2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT's effect on aviation security. GAO analyzed TSA documents, such as strategic plans and operating procedures; interviewed agency personnel and subject matter experts; and visited 15 SPOT airports, among other things. Although the results from these visits are not generalizable, they provided insights into SPOT operations.
What GAO Found
Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the process of validating some aspects of the SPOT program, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide without first validating the scientific basis for identifying suspicious passengers in an airport environment. A scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes, according to the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. According to TSA, no other large-scale security screening program based on behavioral indicators has ever been rigorously scientifically validated. DHS plans to review aspects of SPOT, such as whether the program is more effective at identifying threats than random screening. Nonetheless, DHS's current plan to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. For example, factors such as the length of time BDOs can observe passengers without becoming fatigued are not part of the plan and could provide additional information on the extent to which SPOT can be effectively implemented. Prior GAO work has found that independent expert review panels can provide comprehensive, objective reviews of complex issues. Use of such a panel to review DHS's methodology could help ensure a rigorous, scientific validation of SPOT, helping provide more assurance that SPOT is fulfilling its mission to strengthen aviation security. TSA is experiencing implementation challenges, including not fully utilizing the resources it has available to systematically collect and analyze the information obtained by BDOs on passengers who may pose a threat to the aviation system. TSA's Transportation System Operations Center has the resources to investigate aviation threats but generally does not check all law enforcement and intelligence databases available to it to identify persons referred by BDOs. Utilizing existing resources would enhance TSA's ability to quickly verify passenger identity and could help TSA to more reliably "connect the dots." Further, most BDOs lack a mechanism to input data on suspicious passengers into a database used by TSA analysts and also lack a means to obtain information from the Transportation System Operations Center on a timely basis. TSA states that it is in the process of providing input capabilities, but does not have a time frame for when this will occur at all SPOT airports. Providing BDOs, or other TSA personnel, with these capabilities could help TSA "connect the dots" to identify potential threats. Although TSA has some performance measures related to SPOT, it lacks outcome-oriented measures to evaluate the program's progress toward reaching its goals. Establishing a plan to develop these measures could better position TSA to determine if SPOT is contributing to TSA's strategic goals for aviation security. TSA is planning to enhance its evaluation capabilities in 2010 to more readily assess the program's effectiveness by conducting statistical analysis of data related to SPOT referrals to law enforcement and associated arrests. |
gao_GAO-10-800 | gao_GAO-10-800_0 | For example the federal government used well-established grants such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Community Development Block Grant, and the Social Services Block Grant to provide financial and human recovery assistance to Louisiana and Mississippi residents. Some of these grants include the Department of Health and Human Services’s (HHS) Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant and HUD’s Disaster Housing Assistance Program. Using federal funding programs such as those shown in table 2, nonprofit organizations have provided a wide range of recovery services to residents affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita including housing, long-term case management, and a variety of counseling services (including crisis management and substance abuse). The Federal Government Supported Nonprofits through Coordination and Capacity Building to Facilitate Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery
Nonprofits Reported Usefulness of Coordination with FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons
The National Response Framework (NRF) designates the FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaison (VAL) as the primary liaison to the nonprofit community. VALs are responsible for initiating and maintaining a working relationship between FEMA, federal, state, and local agencies and nonprofit organizations. Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding Provided a Variety of Assistance to Nonprofits Including Problem Identification, Information Sharing, and Networking
In November 2005, the President issued an executive order establishing the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC) with the broad mission of supporting recovery efforts following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. OFC was created as a response to the unprecedented rebuilding challenges presented by these storms as well as concerns regarding the lack of coordination in the government’s initial response to these events. Other Agencies Also Bolstered the Capacity of Nonprofits by Providing Temporary Staff, Training, and Technical Assistance
Other federal agencies also provided important nonmonetary assistance to nonprofit organizations involved in Gulf Coast recovery. For example, nonprofit officials attended a 2008 White House sponsored conference designed to highlight and strengthen the role of faith-based and community-based organizations in disaster relief and preparedness. The Federal Government Is Taking Steps to Address Challenges and Strengthen Relationships with Nonprofits
Challenges Experienced by Nonprofits in Obtaining Federal Disaster Assistance Led to Efforts to Address Some Concerns
The rules and requirements that typically accompany federal grants along with the limitations of many nonprofits’ financial and administrative capacity made it difficult for some organizations to access federal funding to deliver recovery services. These program waivers made it easier for nonprofits with limited financial resources to sponsor AmeriCorps workers. In addition, ensuring continuity presented a challenge as FEMA experienced a large turnover among VALs in the first year after the disaster. We have previously reported that VALs could benefit from additional training on federal programs and resources. FEMA has taken steps to respond to our recommendation as well as address other training issues in its VAL program. It expects to complete three VAL-specific courses by the end of 2010. As we have recently reported, the federal government has taken steps to strengthen the nation’s disaster recovery process. The group has developed a draft framework, which includes details about expected roles and responsibilities of nonprofits in disaster recovery. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address our first objective on how the federal government has worked with nonprofit organizations to facilitate Gulf Coast Recovery following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, we first conducted a systematic review and synthesis of GAO and other reports to identify (a) the range of federal programs used to support Gulf Coast recovery; (b) the types of nonprofit organizations that provide federally-supported recovery assistance; and (c) the types of service delivery mechanisms federal agencies used when working with nonprofit organizations. For this objective we also interviewed officials involved in recovery efforts from federal, state, and local governments, as well as officials from nonprofit organizations, to help us refine our understanding of the range of federal government relationships with nonprofit organizations active in Gulf Coast recovery. In addition, given their role in disaster recovery, we placed a focus on the activities of two components of the Department of Homeland Security—the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding—in describing how the federal government has worked with nonprofits on Gulf Coast recovery. | Why GAO Did This Study
Residents of the Gulf Coast continue to struggle to recover almost 5 years after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the area in August and September of 2005. In many cases the federal government coordinates with, and provides support to, nonprofit organizations in order to deliver recovery assistance to impacted residents. A better understanding of how the federal government works with nonprofit organizations to provide such assistance may be helpful for recovery efforts on the Gulf Coast as well as for communities affected by major disasters in the future. GAO was asked to describe (1) how the federal government has worked with nonprofit organizations to facilitate Gulf Coast recovery following the 2005 hurricanes and (2) steps the federal government has taken to address challenges to strengthen relationships with nonprofits in the future. Toward this end, GAO reviewed the applicable disaster recovery literature and relevant supporting documents. GAO also interviewed officials from federal, state, and local governments as well as a wide range of nonprofit officials involved in Gulf Coast recovery.
What GAO Found
The federal government used a variety of direct and indirect funding programs to support the delivery of human recovery services by nonprofit organizations following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in areas such as housing, long-term case management, and health care. These programs included well-established grants such as the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and its Social Services Block Grant, as well as the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant. Programs established in the wake of the 2005 hurricanes also provided funding to nonprofits offering recovery services. These included HHS's Primary Care Access and Stabilization Grant and HUD's Disaster Housing Assistance Program. The federal government also supported nonprofit organizations through coordination and capacity building. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) used Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VAL) to help establish and maintain working relationships between nonprofits and FEMA as well as other federal, state, and local agencies. The Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding in the Department of Homeland Security provided a variety of assistance to nonprofits including problem identification, information sharing, and networking. Other federal agencies also worked to bolster the capacity of nonprofits by providing temporary staff, training, and technical assistance to nonprofit organizations. The federal government is taking steps to address several challenges and strengthen its relationship with nonprofit organizations providing recovery assistance. For example, nonprofit officials GAO spoke with cited challenges with the federal disaster grant process including what they viewed to be complicated record keeping and documentation procedures as well as other requirements to obtain aid. A report issued earlier this year by the President's Advisory Council for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships recognized the need to ease the administrative burden on nonprofits and contains specific recommendations for action. In an effort to make it easier for nonprofits with limited financial resources to obtain the services of AmeriCorps workers, the Corporation for National and Community Service waived the usual matching requirements in the wake of the 2005 hurricanes. In addition, FEMA is taking steps to address challenges regarding the training of its VAL staff. Following an earlier GAO recommendation that VALs could benefit from additional training regarding federal recovery resources, FEMA issued a VAL handbook and is developing several VAL training courses that it expects to implement by the end of 2010. Finally, although there has been a lack of specific guidance regarding the role of nonprofits in disaster recovery, the federal government has taken steps to address this gap. FEMA and HUD have led a multi-agency effort that resulted in the development of a draft National Disaster Recovery Framework. Among other things, this framework contains specific information about the roles and responsibilities of nonprofits in disaster recovery.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report but discusses the implementation status of a relevant prior recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-378T | gao_GAO-07-378T_0 | CBP officials at 12 of 21 land POE sites we visited told us about US-VISIT- related computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected visitor processing and inspection times, and at 9 of the 12 sites, computer processing problems were not always reported to CBP’s computer help desk, as required by CBP guidelines. While the US-VISIT Program Office established performance measures for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 intended to gauge performance of various aspects of US-VISIT at air, sea, and land POEs in the aggregate, performance measures specifically for land POEs had not been developed. Additional performance measures that consider operational and facility differences at land POEs would put US- VISIT program officials in a better position to identify problems, trends, and areas needing improvements. Various Factors Have Prevented US-VISIT from Implementing a Biometric Exit Capability
Various factors have prevented US-VISIT from implementing a biometric exit capability. According to these officials, it is unclear how new traffic lanes and new facilities could be built at land POEs where space constraints already exist, such as those in congested urban areas. For example, the RFID solution did not meet the congressional requirement for a biometric exit capability because the technology that had been tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave. Until such a plan is finalized and issued, DHS is not able to articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together— including any interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor Congress is positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT exit capability or plan for the program’s future. DHS Had Not Articulated How US- VISIT Strategically Fits with Other Land Border Security Initiatives
My statement will now focus on DHS efforts to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. Among other things, we found that key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of Canada enter or return to the United States—a decision critical to making decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the country, including what common facilities or infrastructure might be needed to perform these inspections at land POEs, and a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not made decisions involving a broad set of considerations that included (1) utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2) ensuring that proper equipment and facilities are in place to facilitate crossings at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility with other border crossing technology already in use. Because US-VISIT will likely continue to have an impact on land POE facilities as it evolves—especially as new technology and equipment are introduced—it is important for US-VISIT and CBP officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying and reporting potential computer and other operational problems that could affect the ability of US-VISIT entry capability to operate as intended. Our recommendation also stated that DHS’s report should include a description of how DHS plans to align US-VISIT with other emerging land border security initiatives and what facilities or facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that different technologies and processes work in harmony. This concludes my prepared testimony. The act provided that US-VISIT “shall include a requirement for the collection of biometric exit data for all categories of individuals who are required to provide biometric entry data, regardless of the port of entry where such categories of individuals entered the United States.”
The new provisions in the 2004 act also addressed integration and interoperability of databases and data systems that process or contain information on aliens and federal law enforcement and intelligence information relevant to visa issuance and admissibility of aliens; maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the US-VISIT data system; using the system to track and facilitate the processing of immigration benefits using biometric identifiers; the goals of the program (e.g., serving as a vital counterterrorism tool, screening visitors efficiently and in a welcoming manner, integrating relevant databases and plans for database modifications to address volume increase and database usage, and providing inspectors and related personnel with adequate real time information); training, education, and outreach on US-VISIT, low-risk visitor programs, and immigration law; annual compliance reports by DHS, State, the Department of Justice, and any other department or agency subject to the requirements of the new provisions; and development and implementation of a registered traveler program. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes a December 2006 GAO report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.
What GAO Found
US-VISIT entry capability had been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology tested (see photo, below right) did not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and thus cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS had not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus could not ensure that the program would meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at land POEs in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-208 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-208_0 | Key Elements of Export Control System
State and Commerce’s export control systems are based on fundamentally different premises. This difference in who makes licensing decisions underscores the weight the two systems assign to economic and commercial interests relative to national security concerns. Under States’ system, Commerce is not involved, underscoring the primacy of national security and foreign policy concern. Commerce’s system is more transparent to the license applicant than State’s system. Evolution of Export Controls for Commercial Satellites
Export control of commercial communications satellites has been a matter of contention over the years among U.S. satellite manufacturers and the agencies involved in their export licensing jurisdiction—the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and the intelligence community. In April 1995, the Chairman of the President’s Export Council met with the Secretary of State to discuss issues related to the jurisdiction of commercial communications satellites and the impact of sanctions that affected the export and launch of satellites to China. The process of planning a satellite launch takes several months, and there is concern that technical discussions between U.S. and foreign representatives may lead to the transfer of information on militarily sensitive components. Observations on the Current Export Control System
The addition of new controls over satellites transferred to Commerce’s jurisdiction in 1996 addressed some of the key areas where the Commerce procedures are less stringent than those at State. There remain, however, differences in how the export of satellites are controlled under these new procedures. Congressional notification requirements no longer apply, although the Congress is currently notified because of the Tiananmen waiver process. Sanctions do not always apply to items under Commerce’s jurisdiction. Defense’s power to influence the decision-making process has diminished since the transfer. Technical information may not be as clearly controlled under the Commerce system. The additional controls applied to the militarily sensitive commercial communications satellites transferred to Commerce’s control in 1996 were not applied to the satellites transferred in 1993. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the military sensitivity of commercial communications satellites and the implications of the 1996 change in export licensing jurisdiction, focusing on: (1) key elements in the export control systems of the Departments of Commerce and State; (2) how export controls for commercial satellites have evolved over the years; (3) concerns and issues debated over the transfer of commercial communications satellites to the export licensing jurisdiction of Commerce; (4) safeguards that may be applied to commercial satellite exports; and (5) observations on the current export control system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. export control system--comprised of both the Commerce and State systems--is about managing risk; (2) exports to some countries involve less risk than to other countries and exports of some items involve less risk than others; (3) the planning of a satellite launch with technical discussions and exchanges of information taking place over several months, involves risk no matter which agency is the licensing authority; (4) recently, events have focused concern on the appropriateness of Commerce jurisdiction over communication satellites; (5) this is a difficult judgment; (6) by design, Commerce's system gives greater weight to economic and commercial concerns, implicitly accepting greater security risks; (7) by design, State's system gives primacy to national security and foreign policy concerns, lessening--but not eliminating--the risk of damage to U.S. national security interests; (8) the addition of new controls over satellites transferred to Commerce's jurisdiction in 1996 addressed some of the key areas where the Commerce procedures are less stringent than those of State; (9) there remain, however, differences in how the export of satellites is controlled under these new procedures; (10) Congress notification requirements no longer apply; (11) sanctions do not always apply to items under Commerce's jurisdiction; (12) the Department of Defense's power to influence the decisionmaking process has diminished since the transfer; (13) technical information may not be as clearly controlled under the Commerce system; and (14) the additional controls applied to the militarily sensitive commercial communications satellites transferred to Commerce's control in 1996 were not applied to the satellites transferred in 1993. |
gao_GAO-08-946 | gao_GAO-08-946_0 | Extent of Official Data from SWF Countries and Others on SWF Sizes and Investments Varies
Information about SWFs publicly reported by SWFs, the governments that control them, international organizations, and private researchers provides a limited picture of their size, investments, and other descriptive factors. Some SWFs have existed for many years, but recently a number of new funds have been created. Based on these reviews, we found that 29 of 48 funds publicly disclosed the value of assets since the beginning of 2007. Thirty funds reported at least some information on their investment activities. We found that about 77 percent of the 48 SWFs publicly reported the purpose of their funds, with 13 of the largest 20 funds doing so. While some SWFs disclose holdings information, officials of other SWFs expressed concerns that disclosures could be used by other investors in ways that could reduce the funds’ investment earnings. The extent of the information on SWFs publicly reported from the Article IV consultations varied, with some documents only noting that the country had such a fund and others providing the current level of assets in the SWF and country officials’ expectations for growth of the SWF through revenues or fiscal transfer. IMF expects to implement new reporting guidance in 2009 that would call for countries to separately report their SWF holdings on a voluntary basis. While this is a positive development that could further expand the official information available, its success depends on the degree to which countries participate. These data, however, do not specifically identify SWFs. Private Researchers Have Collected Some Information on SWFs
Because not all SWFs disclose their activities publicly, information about the size of some SWFs comes from estimates published by private researchers, including investment bank researchers and nonprofit research and policy institutions. By analyzing the information reported by individual SWFs, IMF data, and private researchers’ estimates, we found the total assets held by the 48 SWFs we identified are estimated to be from $2.7 trillion to $3.2 trillion (see app. SWF assets are expected to grow significantly in the future. Public Information from the U.S. Government and Others on SWF Investments in U.S. Assets Is Limited
BEA and Treasury are charged with collecting and reporting information on foreign investment in the United States, but the extent to which SWFs have invested in U.S. assets is not readily identifiable from such data. Only a few SWFs reported specific information on their U.S. investments. Some individual SWF investments in U.S. assets can be identified from reports filed by investors and issuers as required by U.S. securities laws, but these filings would not necessarily reflect all such investments during any given time period. Treasury collects the data through surveys of U.S. financial institutions and others. Data Collected by U.S. To the extent that SWFs are invested in U.S. government securities, those holdings are included in the “U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks” under “Foreign official assets in the United States.”
BEA and Treasury Data Show That Investment from Countries with SWFs and from Official Institutions Is Increasing
While BEA and Treasury data cannot be used to identify the total extent of SWF investment, these data show that the United States has been receiving more investment over time from countries with SWFs and from foreign official institutions. 8.) Some of the U.S. companies that recently received SWF investments also included information about these transactions in their annual reports. Roughly $43 billion of this value reflects investment since 2007, largely consisting of deals involving financial sector entities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to examine (1) the availability of data on the size of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) and their holdings internationally that have been publicly reported by SWFs, their governments, international organizations, or private organizations, and (2) the availability of reported data by the U.S. government and other sources on SWF investments in the United States. As a result, we chose to include in our analysis those funds that (1) were government chartered or sponsored investment vehicles; (2) invested, in other than sovereign debt, some or all of their assets outside the country that established them; (3) were funded through transfers from their governments of funds arising primarily from sovereign budget surpluses, trade surpluses, central bank currency reserves, or revenues from the commodity wealth of the countries, and (4) were not currently functioning as pension funds receiving contributions from and making payments to individuals. To determine the availability of data on SWF investments in the United States reported by the U.S. government and others, we reviewed the extent to which federal data collection efforts of the Departments of the Treasury (Treasury) and Commerce (Commerce) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were able to report on SWF activities. Because acquisitions resulting in total beneficial ownership of 5 percent or less of a voting class of a Section 12 registered equity security will not be reported to SEC, these data sources capture only a proportion of the total U.S. SWF investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are government-controlled funds that seek to invest in other countries. With new funds being created and many growing rapidly, some see these funds providing valuable capital to world markets, but others are concerned that the funds are not transparent and could be used to further national goals and potentially harm the countries where they invest. GAO plans to issue a series of reports on various aspects of SWFs. This first report analyzed (1) the availability of publicly reported data from SWFs and others on their sizes and holdings internationally, and (2) the availability of publicly reported data from the U.S. government and other sources on SWFs' U.S. investments. GAO reviewed foreign government disclosures, Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and Department of Commerce (Commerce) reporting, and private researcher data to identify SWFs and their activities. GAO also analyzed information from international organizations and securities filings. Treasury and Commerce commented that GAO's report provides timely and useful contributions to the SWF debate; SEC noted that U.S. securities requirements apply to all large investors, including SWFs. Future GAO reports will address laws affecting SWF investments, SWF governance practices, and the potential impact of SWFs and U.S. options for addressing them.
What GAO Found
Limited information is publicly available from official government sources for some SWFs. While some have existed for decades, 28 of the 48 SWFs that GAO identified have been created since 2000, primarily in countries whose foreign exchange reserves are growing through oil revenues or trade export surpluses. GAO analysis showed that about 60 percent of these 48 SWFs publicly disclosed information about the size of their assets since the beginning of 2007, but only about 4 funds published detailed information about all their investments--and some countries specifically prohibit any disclosure of their SWF activities. Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) currently collects data on countries' international financial flows, GAO found that only 13 countries separately reported their SWF holdings in public IMF documents. IMF plans to issue new reporting guidance in 2009 that asks countries to voluntarily report the size of their SWF holdings in their international statistics. While this could increase the transparency of SWFs, its success depends on the extent to which countries participate. In the absence of official national or international public reporting, much of the available information about the value of holdings for many SWFs is from estimates by private researchers who project funds sizes by adjusting any reported amounts to reflect likely reserve growth and asset market returns. For the funds GAO identified, officially reported data and researcher estimates indicated that the size of these 48 funds' total assets was from $2.7 trillion to $3.2 trillion. Some researchers expect these assets to continue to grow significantly. U.S. government agencies and others collect and publicly report information on foreign investments in the United States, but these sources have limitations and the overall level of U.S. investments by SWFs cannot be specially identified. From surveys of U.S. financial institutions and others, Treasury and Commerce reported that foreign investors, including governments, private entities, and individuals, owned over $20 trillion of U.S. assets in 2007, but the amounts held by SWFs cannot be specifically identified from the reported data because either the agencies do not obtain specific investor identities or the agencies are precluded from disclosing individual investor information. GAO found that as many as 16 of the 48 SWFs reported some information on their U. S. investments. One reported all U.S. holdings, but others only identified a few specific investments or indicated that some of their total assets were invested in the United States. Some SWF investments can be identified in U.S. securities filings, under a requirement for disclosure of investments that result in aggregate beneficial ownership of greater than 5 percent of a voting class of certain equity securities. At least 8 SWFs have disclosed such investments since 1990. GAO analysis of a private financial research database identified SWF investments in U.S. companies totaling over $43 billion from January 2007 through June 2008, including SWF investments in U.S. financial institutions needing capital as a result of the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis. Additional U.S. reporting requirements would yield additional information for monitoring the U.S. activities of SWFs, although some U.S. officials have expressed concerns that they could also increase compliance costs for U.S. financial institutions and agencies and could potentially discourage SWFs from making investments in U.S. assets. |
gao_GAO-04-496 | gao_GAO-04-496_0 | These provide employment and training assistance to workers who lost their jobs because of layoffs and plant closings. States and local areas submit an application via mail or fax. Delays in Grant Awards Hampered Services to Dislocated Workers
Labor’s grant process is not as effective as it could be because most grants are not awarded in a timely manner, and as a result, services to workers in some states have been delayed, interrupted, or denied. During program years 2000-2002, Labor’s goal was to approve national emergency grants within 30 calendar days of receiving a complete application. Nearly 90 percent of the regular grants awarded from July 1, 2000, to June 30, 2003 took more than 30 days to award. On average, Labor took 83 days to award incremental payments, which is 9 days quicker than the average number of days Labor took to make initial regular grant awards. Twenty-five states said that because of the delays in receiving grant funds, local areas had to delay or deny services to dislocated workers. Finally, Labor is planning to issue guidelines that document its timeliness goal. Additional Actions Needed to Better Manage Grant Award Process
Some weaknesses still remain in Labor’s planned changes that could prevent Labor from accurately assessing how long it takes to make grant awards and incremental payments. First, the way Labor has defined its 30- day goal allows the agency to stop counting the number of days elapsed if it finds problems with the grant application. Little Is Known about How Grant Funds Are Used because of Weaknesses in Data Collection
Little is known on a national level about how national emergency grant funds are used because of weaknesses in two data sources, and although Labor is taking steps to improve the data collected, these steps may not go far enough to ensure the data’s reliability. In addition, although Labor has checked states’ most recent submissions to the national participant database to identify whether data are missing, Labor does not have specific plans to check states’ future submissions to ensure that data are complete. Labor does not have a timeliness goal for the full award process or for incremental payments. In addition, to ensure that information relating to national emergency grants is accurate and complete, we recommend that Labor develop specific reporting guidance on progress reports to ensure that grantees define data elements consistently, and ensure that all states submit WIASRD data on participants exiting from services provided with national emergency grants (for grantees that are not states, ensure that they submit WIASRD data on national emergency grants to states for submission to Labor). Delays in grant awards have had effects on the ability of local areas to provide services to workers who have lost their jobs, as reported by 25 states that responded to our survey on national emergency grants. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to determine (1) the effectiveness of the overall process for awarding national emergency grant funds, (2) whether Labor’s proposed changes will improve the grant award process, and (3) what is known about how grant funds are being used. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Labor (Labor) awards national emergency grants to states and local areas to provide assistance to workers who lose their jobs because of major economic dislocations or disasters. Most grants awarded are regular grants to assist workers affected by plant closings or mass layoffs. Questions have been raised about whether grant funds are getting to states and local areas quickly enough. GAO was asked to assess the effectiveness of the process for awarding national emergency grants, whether Labor is planning changes that will improve the grant award process, and what is known about how grant funds are used.
What GAO Found
Labor does not award most national emergency grants in a timely manner, and as a result, services to workers have been delayed, interrupted, or denied. Labor's goal is to make award decisions within 30 calendar days of receiving a complete application. However, nearly 90 percent of regular grants took longer than 30 days to award. On average, Labor took 92 days to award regular grants. For grants disbursed in more than one payment, Labor took on average 83 days to award the additional increments. Twenty-five of 38 states responding to our survey reported that because of grant award delays, local areas had to delay or deny services to workers. Labor is taking some steps, such as implementing an electronic system to better manage its award process and incorporating its 30-day goal in new guidelines, that may improve the timeliness of grant awards. However, some weaknesses still remain in Labor's planned changes that could prevent Labor from accurately assessing how long it takes to make grant awards and incremental payments. For example, Labor plans to stop counting the days elapsed if it finds problems with an application, and Labor's proposed guidelines do not establish a timeliness goal for incremental payments. Little is known on a national level about how national emergency grant funds are used because of weaknesses in two primary data sources. Because of the lack of clear guidance, states report inconsistent data in progress reports, and some states have not reported data on national emergency grants to a national database covering Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs. To address these problems, Labor is implementing a standardized electronic form for grantees to submit progress reports, issued guidance requiring states to submit data on national emergency grant participants to the national WIA database, and checked states' latest submissions to identify if data were missing. However, Labor's guidance still is not sufficiently clear to ensure that states will report data in progress reports consistently, and Labor does not have specific plans to continue checking states' data submissions to ensure that data are complete. |
gao_GAO-04-139 | gao_GAO-04-139_0 | State Uses Critical Elements of Workforce Planning and Is Hiring and Assigning Officers Overseas with the Necessary General Skills
State used critical elements of workforce planning to identify Foreign Service officer staffing and skill gaps within the next 5 to 10 years. direction and program goals. In 2001, the Secretary of State launched the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), a $197.5 million plan to address the staffing and skills deficits to ensure diplomatic readiness. State Has Met Its Hiring Targets but Gaps in Mid- Level Officers Will Take up to 10 Years to Fill
State has met its hiring targets for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. State Has Hired and Assigned Foreign Service Officers with the General Skills and Competencies to Do the Job
Almost all officials we interviewed said State identified and hired very talented and capable junior officers with the general skills and competencies, such as written and oral communication, required to do their jobs well, noting that the examination process was identifying junior officers with the needed skills. In addition to the language issue, State officials and some junior officers expressed other concerns, including the junior officers’ public diplomacy skills, supervision, and on-the-job training requirements, as well as issues related to rotational positions. State’s Effort to Address Critical Languages Lacks Numerical Targets, Data on Effectiveness
State has acknowledged that it has gaps in the number of officers proficient in certain hard languages, but its workforce planning does not identify the number of officers to hire with those skills. However, State officials said the department is revising this system. The ability to speak a difficult language is one of many factors influencing a junior officer’s assignment to an overseas post. Conclusions
Critical gaps in the number and skills of Foreign Service staff endangered State’s ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy. State has been able to hire junior officers with the general skills it requires and to fill overseas positions. State should also explore additional opportunities to maximize assignment of junior officers who have skills in these languages to overseas posts where they can use these languages. Scope and Methodology
To report on State’s processes for determining the number and skills of junior officers it needs during the next 5 to 10 years, we examined workforce planning documents and data, including the overseas staffing model. To examine the challenges State still needs to address, especially regarding officers with hard-to-learn language skills, we solicited data from three different State Department databases. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the 1990s, the State Department lost more people than it hired. The resultant shortfalls in the number and skills of Foreign Service officers have endangered U.S. diplomatic readiness. Furthermore, recent studies, including several by GAO, have questioned whether State's recruitment system identifies people with the appropriate skills and whether State is assigning officers with specialized skills, such as the ability to speak a difficult language, to positions where they can be utilized. GAO was asked to review State's processes for determining the number and skills of junior officers the department needs and to determine whether it is hiring and assigning officers with the general skills to carry out foreign policy overseas. GAO was also asked to examine the challenges State still needs to address, especially regarding officers' foreign language skills.
What GAO Found
State used critical elements of workforce planning to identify the number of junior officers it needs to hire within the next 5 to 10 years. State implemented key elements of workforce planning, including setting strategic direction and goals, identifying gaps in its workforce, and developing strategies to address these gaps. State's analysis showed that it had a deficit of 386 positions, mainly at the mid level, and in 2001, State launched a $197 million plan to address the gaps. State has met its 2002 to 2003 hiring targets for junior officers and is filling overseas positions with junior officers with the general skills and competencies required to do their job well. However, State officials said it will take up to 10 years to hire and promote junior officers in sufficient numbers to significantly decrease the shortage of midlevel officers. While State is able to fill overseas positions with junior officers who have the necessary general skills, the department continues to face challenges filling the gaps in staff with proficiency in certain hard-to-learn languages, such as Arabic and Chinese. State has implemented a plan to target applicants who speak these difficult languages. However, this plan does not include numeric goals, and State has collected limited data to assess the effectiveness of its efforts. Other challenges include new officers' public diplomacy skills and training in this area, increased supervisory and on-the job requirements when State assigns junior officers to positions above their experience level, and the impact of rotational assignments on junior officers' performance and managers' time. |
gao_GAO-07-499T | gao_GAO-07-499T_0 | When a visitor arrives at a U.S. POE, the biometric information is used to verify that the visitor is the person who was issued the visa or other travel documents. However, after almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at most POEs but has not implemented exit capabilities. For example, on January 5, 2004, it deployed and began operating most aspects of its planned biometric entry capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports for selected foreign nationals, including those from visa waiver countries; as of December 2006, the program office had deployed and began operating this entry capability in the secondary inspection areas of 154 of 170 land POEs. In 2003, the program office estimated that it would cost approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry and exit capability at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be installed, and that such an effort would have a major impact on f implementing a biometric exit facility infrastructure at land POEs. In light of nonbiometric technology to record travelers’ departure, but testing showed numerous performance and reliability problems. Moreover, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and deadlines set, the RFID solution does not meet the legislative requirement for a biometric exit capability. According to program officials, technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby mitigating traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. DHS Continues to Face Longstanding US-VISIT Management Challenges and Future Uncertainties
Our work and other best practice research have shown that applying disciplined and rigorous management practices improves the likelihood of delivering expected capabilities on time and within budget. For almost 4 years, we have reported on fundamental limitations in DHS’s efforts to define and justify the program’s future direction and to cost-effectively manage the delivery of promised capabilities on time and within budget. DHS needs to address these challenges going forward, and the recommendations that we made over the last 3 years are aimed at encouraging this. For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT (both in terms of deploying interfaces between and enhancements to existing systems and in defining a longer-term, strategic US-VISIT solution) without producing the program’s operational context. According to the program’s Chief Strategist, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and to define an overall vision for immigration and border management. As of February 2007, about 2 years later, we were told that this strategic plan has not yet been approved, although the program’s Acting Director stated that the plan is currently with OMB and should be provided to the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security by March 2007. It is also to interoperate US-VISIT’s IDENT system and the Department of Justice’s IAFIS system. At this same time, DHS has launched other major border security programs without adequately defining the relationships to US-VISIT and each other. Despite these dependencies, DHS has yet to define these relationships or how they will be managed. US-VISIT had not assessed the cost and benefits of its early increments. Further, the cost estimate upon which the analysis was based did not meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. DHS Did Not Adequately Assess the Impact of Entry Capabilities on Land Ports of Entry Operations and Planned Capability Enhancements Carry Potential Cost Implications Knowing how planned US-VISIT capabilities will impact POE operations is critical to US-VISIT investment decision makers. DHS Has Not Fully Implemented Key US-VISIT Acquisition and Financial Management Controls
Managing major programs like US-VISIT requires applying discipline and rigor when acquiring and accounting for systems and services. Specifically, we reported that the program had not effectively overseen US-VISIT-related contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and implement the full range of controls associated with effective management of contractor activities. Moreover, the program is overdue in establishing the means to ensure that it is pursuing the right US-VISIT solution, and that it is managing it the right way. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investing billions of dollars in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. The program uses biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. The program is also to biometrically confirm the individual's departure. For over 3 years, GAO has reported on US-VISIT capability deployments and shortfalls, as well as fundamental limitations in DHS's efforts to define and justify US-VISIT's future direction and to cost-effectively manage the delivery of program capabilities on time and within budget. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of the program's implementation and (2) the program's progress in addressing longstanding management weaknesses. Given where US-VISIT is today and the challenges and uncertainties associated with where it is going, GAO believes that DHS is long overdue in demonstrating that it is pursuing the right US-VISIT solution and that it is managing US-VISIT the right way.
What GAO Found
After spending almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at most ports of entry; however, it has not implemented a biometric exit capability or a suitable alternative. As of December 2006, US-VISIT had deployed and was operating entry capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports of entry. However, the implementation of a biometric land exit capability is currently not feasible, according to program officials, because the only proven technology available would require additional staffing and infrastructure demands, and cause delays with potential impacts on trade and commerce. Also, testing and analysis of a non-biometric solution identified numerous performance and reliability problems, and such an alternative technology does not meet legislative requirements. DHS believes that advances over the next 5 to 10 years will allow solutions that do not require major infrastructure changes, but the prospects for such technology are uncertain. DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties. For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT without producing the program's operational and technological context. According to program officials, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS's organizational mission and to define an overall immigration and border management vision. After almost 2 years, this plan has not yet been approved, but the Acting Director said that it is currently with OMB for approval. At the same time, DHS has launched other major security programs without defining the relationship between US-VISIT and these programs. DHS has yet to economically justify its investment in US-VISIT increments or assess their operational impacts. For over 3 years, we reported that the program did not adequately assess the increment's costs and benefits because the assessments were unclear and insufficient, and the cost estimates upon which they were based did not meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. GAO further reported that the program had not assessed the impact of the entry and exit capabilities on operations and facilities, in part, because the scope of the evaluations performed were too limited. DHS has not implemented key acquisition and financial management controls. For example, GAO reported that the program had not effectively overseen contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and implement effective contract oversight activities. Without these management controls, there is greater risk that US-VISIT will not produce the right solution, and be managed the right way. Accordingly, GAO has made numerous recommendations to address these management challenges. |
gao_GAO-08-613T | gao_GAO-08-613T_0 | These tails are also known as depleted uranium because the material is depleted in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium. However, DOE still maintains over 700,000 metric tons of depleted uranium tails in about 63,000 metal cylinders in storage yards at its Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, enrichment plants. Tails have historically been considered a waste product because considerable enrichment processing is required to further extract the remaining useful quantities of uranium-235. DOE Has Options for the Tails but Has Not Finished a Comprehensive Assessment of Them
DOE’s potential options for its tails include selling the tails “as is,” re- enriching them, or storing them indefinitely. Although we found that DOE generally has authority to carry out the re-enrichment and storage options, the department has not finished a comprehensive assessment of these options, and it is still evaluating the details of how such options might be implemented. DOE’s Legal Authority to Sell the Tails in Their Current Form Is Doubtful
While selling the tails in their current unprocessed form is a potential option, we believe that DOE’s authority to conduct such sales is doubtful because of specific statutory language in 1996 legislation governing DOE’s disposition of its uranium. Should Congress grant DOE the needed legal authority by amending the USEC Privatization Act or through other legislation, firms such as nuclear power utilities and enrichment companies would be interested in purchasing at least that portion of the tails with higher concentrations of extractable uranium-235 as a valuable source for nuclear fuel. Although DOE would have to pay for re-enrichment, it might obtain more value from selling the re-enriched uranium instead of the tails if its re- enrichment costs were less than the discount it would have to offer to sell the tails as is. Storing the tails indefinitely could prevent DOE from taking advantage of the large increase in uranium prices to obtain potentially large amounts of revenue from material that was once viewed as waste. Moreover, once the tails were converted into a more stable form of uranium oxide, DOE’s costs to re-enrich the tails would be higher if it later decided to pursue this approach. Instead, the policy statement states that this effort will occur “in the near future.”
DOE’s Depleted Uranium Inventory Is Potentially Worth Billions of Dollars, but Many Factors Could Greatly Change Its Value
At current uranium prices, we estimate DOE’s tails to have a net value of $7.6 billion; however, we would like to emphasize that this estimate is very sensitive to changing uranium prices, which recently have been extremely volatile, as well as to the availability of enrichment capacity. Appendix I: GAO’s Legal Analysis of DOE’s Current Authority to Manage Depleted Uranium
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
As part of the Government Accountability Office’s review of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) potential options for managing its inventory of excess depleted uranium (also known as “tails”), we examined DOE’s legal authority to implement three basic options: (1) re- enriching the tails and then selling or transferring them, (2) storing the un- enriched tails indefinitely, and (3) selling or transferring the inventory of tails “as is.”
We conclude that DOE has general authority under the Atomic Energy Act to carry out the first and second options—to re-enrich and then sell or transfer the tails, as well as to store them indefinitely. However, we believe that because of constraints on DOE’s AEA authority in the USEC Privatization Act, the department’s authority to sell or transfer tails in their current form is doubtful and that under rules of statutory construction, DOE likely lacks such authority under current law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1940s, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been processing natural uranium into enriched uranium, which has a higher concentration of the isotope uranium-235 that can be used in nuclear weapons or reactors. This has resulted in over 700,000 metric tons of leftover depleted uranium, also known as "tails," that have varying residual concentrations uranium-235. The tails are stored at DOE's uranium enrichment plants in Portsmouth, Ohio and Paducah, Kentucky. Although the tails have historically been considered a waste product and an environmental liability, recently an about tenfold increase in uranium prices may give DOE options to use some of the tails in ways that could provide revenue to the government. GAO's testimony is based on its March 31, 2008, report entitled Nuclear Material: DOE Has Several Potential Options for Dealing with Depleted Uranium Tails, Each of Which Could Benefit the Government (GAO-08-606R). The testimony focuses on (1) DOE's potential options for its tails and (2) the potential value of DOE's tails and factors that affect the value. It also contains an analysis of DOE's legal authority to carry out the potential options. In its report, GAO recommended that Congress consider clarifying DOE's statutory authority to manage depleted uranium. GAO also recommended that DOE complete a comprehensive uranium management assessment as soon as possible.
What GAO Found
DOE's potential options for its tails include selling the tails "as is," re-enriching the tails, or storing them indefinitely. DOE's current legal authority to sell its depleted uranium inventory "as is" is doubtful, but DOE generally has authority to carry out the other options. The department has not finished a comprehensive assessment of these options and is still evaluating the details of how such options might be implemented. DOE's authority to sell the tails in their current unprocessed form is doubtful. Because of specific statutory language in 1996 legislation governing DOE's disposition of its uranium, we believe that DOE's authority to sell the tails in unprocessed form is doubtful and that, under rules of statutory construction, DOE likely lacks such authority. However, if Congress were to provide the department with the needed authority, firms such as nuclear power utilities and enrichment companies may be interested in purchasing these tails and re-enriching them as a source of nuclear fuel. DOE could contract to re-enrich the tails. Although DOE would have to pay for re-enrichment, it might obtain more value from selling the re-enriched uranium instead of the tails if its re-enrichment costs were less than the discount it would have to offer to sell the tails as is. DOE could store the tails indefinitely. While this option conforms to an existing DOE plan to convert tails into a more stable form for long term storage, storing the tails indefinitely could prevent DOE from obtaining the potentially large revenue resulting from sales at currently high uranium prices. The potential value of DOE's depleted uranium tails is currently substantial, but changing market conditions could greatly affect the tails' value over time. Based on February 2008 uranium prices and enrichment costs and assuming sufficient re-enrichment capacity is available, GAO estimates the value of DOE's tails at$7.6 billion. However, this estimate is very sensitive to changing uranium prices, which recently have been extremely volatile, as well as to the availability of enrichment capacity. |
gao_GAO-06-477T | gao_GAO-06-477T_0 | Under the law, the CIO is to review each collection of information before submission to OMB, including reviewing the program office’s evaluation of the need for the collection and its plan for the efficient and effective management and use of the information to be collected, including necessary resources. During this review, the agency is to publish a notice of the collection in the Federal Register. The 1995 PRA amendments also require OMB to set specific goals for reducing burden from the level it had reached in 1995: at least a 10 percent reduction in the governmentwide burden-hour estimate for each of fiscal years 1996 and 1997, a 5 percent governmentwide burden reduction goal in each of the next 4 fiscal years, and annual agency goals that reduce burden to the “maximum practicable opportunity.” At the end of fiscal year 1995, federal agencies estimated that their information collections imposed about 7 billion burden hours on the public. Agency Processes for Reviewing Information Collections Were Not Effective
Governmentwide, agency CIOs generally reviewed information collections before they were submitted to OMB and certified that the 10 standards in the act were met. However, in our 12 case studies, CIOs provided these certifications despite often missing or partial support from the program offices sponsoring the collections. Further, although the law requires CIOs to provide support for certifications, agency files contained little evidence that CIO reviewers had made efforts to get program offices to improve the support that they offered. Numerous factors have contributed to these conditions, including a lack of management support and weaknesses in OMB guidance. Support for Certifications Was Often Missing or Partial, Despite CIO Reviews
Among the PRA provisions intended to help achieve the goals of minimizing burden while maximizing utility are the requirements for CIO review and certification of information collections. OMB’s instructions to agencies on this part of the certification require agencies to describe any methods used to reduce burden only if the collection of information has a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” This does not appropriately reflect the act’s requirements concerning small business: the act requires that the CIO certify that the information collection reduces burden on small entities in general, to the extent practical and appropriate, and provides no thresholds for the level of economic impact or the number of small entities affected. When support for the PRA certifications is missing or inadequate, OMB, the agency, and the public have reduced assurance that the standards in the act, such as those on avoiding duplication and minimizing burden, have been consistently met. Two Agencies Have Developed Processes to Reduce Burden Associated with Information Collections
IRS and EPA have supplemented the standard PRA review process with additional processes aimed at reducing burden while maximizing utility. Once the forms are chosen, the office performs highly detailed, in- depth analyses, including extensive outreach to the public affected, the users of the information within and outside the agency, and other stakeholders. IRS reports that this targeted, resource-intensive process has achieved significant reductions in burden: over 200 million burden hours since 2002. In contrast, for the 12 information collections we examined, the CIO review process resulted in no reduction in burden. Similarly, both IRS and EPA addressed information collections that had undergone CIO review and received OMB approval and nonetheless found significant opportunities to reduce burden. According to PRA Experts, the Current Approach to Paperwork Reduction Could Be Improved
In considering PRA reauthorization, the Congress has the opportunity to take into account ideas that were developed by the various experts at the PRA forum that we organized in 2005. It was suggested that the volume of collections to be individually reviewed could impede such integration. This suggestion was paired with the idea that the review process itself should be more rigorous; as the panel put it, “now it’s a rather pro forma process.” They also observed that two Federal Register notices seemed excessive in most cases. Our previous work has not addressed every topic raised by the forum, so we cannot argue for or against all these suggestions. Pilot projects would be expected to build on the lessons learned at IRS and EPA. As our review showed, the CIO review process, as currently implemented, tended to lack rigor, allowing agencies to focus on clearing an administrative hurdle rather than on performing substantive analysis. To that end, we suggested that the Congress mandate pilot projects that are specifically targeted at reducing burden. Forum: The Legislative Framework for Information Resources Management
Forum Participants
Associate Executive Director Association of Research Libraries Princeton University; formerly National Opinion Research Center Founder and Executive Director, OMB Watch Administrative Law & Information Policy; formerly OMB and IRS Privacy Officer Vice President, SRA International; formerly OMB Director, Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, State University of New York Partner, Guerra, Kiviat, Flyzik and Associates; formerly Department of Treasury and Secret Service Privacy & Information Policy Consultant; formerly counsel to the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture Editor of Access Reports, FOIA Journal Independent Consultant; formerly OMB Professor and Independent Consultant; formerly OMB Manager, Regulatory Policy National Federation of Independent Business Director, Public Policy, Software & Information Industry Association Senior Scientist, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, The National Academies Fellow in Law and Government, American University, Washington College of Law; formerly Administrative Conference of the U.S.
Others in Attendance
At the forum, others attending included GAO staff and a number of other observers: Deputy Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Minority Senior Legislative Counsel, House Committee on Government Reform Minority Counsel, House Committee on Government Reform Policy Analyst, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Director of Energy and Environment, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Senior Policy Analyst, Office of Management and Budget Policy Analyst, Office of Management and Budget Minority Professional Staff Member, House Committee on Government Reform Counsel, House Committee on Government Reform Policy Analyst, Office of Management and Budget Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Senior Professional Staff Member, House Committee on Government Reform House Committee on Government Reform Branch Chief, Statistics Branch, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs In addition, staff of the National Academies’ National Research Council, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, helped to develop and facilitate the forum: Charles Brownstein, Director; Kristen Batch, Research Associate; and Margaret Huynh, Senior Program Assistant. GAO-05-424. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans spend billions of hours each year providing information to federal agencies by filling out forms, surveys, or questionnaires. A major aim of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is to minimize the burden that these information collections impose on the public, while maximizing their public benefit. Under the act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to approve all such collections. In addition, agency Chief Information Officers (CIO) are to review information collections before they are submitted to OMB for approval and certify that these meet certain standards set forth in the act. GAO was asked to testify on the implementation of the act's provisions regarding the review and approval of information collections. For its testimony, GAO reviewed previous work in this area, including the results of an expert forum on information resources management and the PRA, which was held in February 2005 under the auspices of the National Research Council. GAO also drew on its earlier study of CIO review processes (GAO-05-424) and alternative processes that two agencies have used to minimize burden. For this study, GAO reviewed a governmentwide sample of collections, reviewed processes and collections at four agencies that account for a large proportion of burden, and performed case studies of 12 approved collections.
What GAO Found
Among the PRA provisions aimed at helping to achieve the goals of minimizing burden while maximizing utility is the requirement for CIO review and certification of information collections. GAO's review of 12 case studies showed that CIOs provided these certifications despite often missing or inadequate support from the program offices sponsoring the collections. Further, although the law requires that support be provided for certifications, agency files contained little evidence that CIO reviewers had made efforts to get program offices to improve the support they offered. Numerous factors have contributed to these problems, including a lack of management support and weaknesses in OMB guidance. Because these reviews were not rigorous, OMB, the agency, and the public had reduced assurance that the standards in the act--such as minimizing burden--were consistently met. To address the issues raised by its review, GAO made recommendations to the agencies and OMB aimed at strengthening the CIO review process and clarifying guidance. OMB and the agencies report making plans and taking steps to address GAO's recommendations. Beyond the collection review process, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have set up processes that are specifically focused on reducing burden. These agencies, whose missions involve numerous information collections, have devoted significant resources to targeted burden reduction efforts that involve extensive public outreach. According to the two agencies, these efforts led to significant reductions in burden. For example, each year, IRS subjects a few forms to highly detailed, in-depth analyses, reviewing all data requested, redesigning forms, and involving stakeholders (both the information users and the public affected). IRS reports that this process--performed on forms that have undergone CIO review and received OMB approval--has reduced burden by over 200 million hours since 2002. In contrast, for the 12 case studies, the CIO review process did not reduce burden. When it considers PRA reauthorization, the Congress has the opportunity to promote new approaches, including alternatives suggested by the expert forum and by GAO. Forum participants made a range of suggestions on information collections and their review. For example, they suggested that OMB's focus should be on broad oversight rather than on reviewing each individual collection and observed that the current clearance process appeared to be "pro forma." They also observed that it seemed excessive to require notices of collections to be published twice in the Federal Register, as they are now. GAO similarly observed that publishing two notices in the Federal Register did not seem to be effective, and suggested eliminating one of these notices. GAO also suggested that the Congress mandate pilot projects to target some collections for rigorous analysis along the lines of the IRS and EPA approaches. Such projects would permit agencies to build on the lessons learned by the IRS and EPA and potentially contribute to true burden reduction. |
gao_GAO-15-523T | gao_GAO-15-523T_0 | Twenty-four Areas Identified to Improve Efficiency and Effectiveness across the Federal Government
In our 2015 annual report, we identify 12 new areas in which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, and we present 20 actions to executive branch agencies and Congress to address these issues. An example of duplicative federal efforts is the US Family Health Plan (USFHP)—a statutorily required component of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Military Health System—and TRICARE Prime, which offers the same benefits to military beneficiaries. To eliminate this duplication within DOD’s health system and potentially save millions of dollars, we suggested that Congress terminate the statutorily required USFHP. In addition to areas of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, our 2015 report identified 46 actions that the executive branch and Congress can take to reduce the cost of government operations and enhance revenue collections for the U.S. Treasury in 12 areas. These opportunities for executive branch or congressional action exist in a wide range of federal government missions (see table 2). Examples of opportunities to reduce costs or enhance revenue collections from our 2015 annual report include updating the way Medicare pays certain cancer hospitals, rescinding unobligated funds, and re-examining the appropriate size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Congress and Executive Branch Agencies Continue to Make Progress toward Addressing Our Identified Actions
In addition to the 66 new actions identified for this year’s annual report, we have continued to monitor the progress that executive branch agencies or Congress have made in addressing the issues we identified in our 2011-2014 annual reports. In total, as of March 6, 2015, the date we completed our audit work, we found that overall 169 (37 percent) were addressed, 179 (39 percent) were partially addressed, and 90 (20 percent) were not addressed. Executive branch and congressional efforts from fiscal years 2011 through 2014 have resulted in over $20 billion in realized cost savings to date, with another approximately $80 billion in additional benefits projected to be accrued through 2023.the progress that has been made over the last 4 years. This level of spending suggests that by using smarter buying practices the government could realize billions of dollars in savings. These recommendations, if effectively implemented, could improve program management, help reduce improper payments in these programs, and achieve cost savings. Existing and New Tools Can Assist in Identifying, Evaluating, and Addressing Fragmentation, Overlap, or Duplication
For GAO’s most recent work on GPRAMA, see GAO, Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Inconsistent Definitions and Information Limit the Usefulness of Federal Program Inventories, GAO-15-83 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 31, 2014); Managing for Results: Selected Agencies Need to Take Additional Efforts to Improve Customer Service, GAO-15-84 (Washington D.C.: Oct. 24, 2014); and Managing for Results: Agencies’ Trends in the Use of Performance Information to Make Decisions, GAO-14-747 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 26, 2014). To help analysts and decision makers better assess the extent of fragmentation, overlap and duplication, GAO has developed an evaluation and management guide (GAO-15-49SP), which is being released concurrently with our 2015 annual report. Part one provides four steps for analysts—including federal, state, and local auditors; congressional staff; and researchers—to identify and evaluate instances of fragmentation, overlap or duplication. In recognition that the pervasiveness of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication may require attention beyond the program level, the guide also includes information on a number of options Congress and the executive branch may consider to address these issues government- wide. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the fiscal pressures facing the government continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. Such opportunities exist throughout government.
To bring these opportunities to light, Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to annually identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives (both within departments and government-wide) that are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative. As part of this work, GAO also identifies additional opportunities to achieve cost savings or enhanced revenue collection. GAO's 2015 annual report is its fifth in this series ( GAO-15-404SP ).
This statement discusses (1) new opportunities GAO identifies in its 2015 report; (2) the status of actions taken to address the opportunities GAO identified in its 2011-2014 reports; and (3) existing and new tools available to help executive branch agencies and Congress reduce or better manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. To identify what actions exist to address these issues and take advantage of opportunities for cost savings and enhanced revenues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work, including recommendations for executive action and matters for congressional consideration.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2015 annual report identifies 66 new actions that executive branch agencies and Congress could take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government in 24 areas. GAO identifies 12 new areas in which there is evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, GAO suggests that Congress repeal the statutorily required US Family Health Plan—a decades-old component of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Health System—because it duplicates the efforts of DOD's managed care support contractors by providing the same benefit to military beneficiaries. GAO also identifies 12 areas where opportunities exist either to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections. For example, GAO suggests that Congress update the way Medicare has paid certain cancer hospitals since 1983, which could save about $500 million per year.
The executive branch and Congress have made progress in addressing the approximately 440 actions government-wide that GAO identified in its past annual reports. Overall, as of March 6, 2015, 37 percent of these actions were addressed, 39 percent were partially addressed, and 20 percent were not addressed. Executive branch and congressional efforts to address these actions over the past 4 years have resulted in over $20 billion in financial benefits, with about $80 billion more in financial benefits anticipated in future years from these actions. Although progress has been made, fully addressing all the remaining actions identified in GAO's annual reports could lead to tens of billions of dollars of additional savings.
Addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication within the federal government is challenging due to, among other things, the lack of reliable budget and performance information. If fully and effectively implemented, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 and the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 could help to improve performance and financial information. In addition, GAO has developed an evaluation and management guide ( GAO-15-49SP ), which is being released concurrently with the 2015 annual report. This guide provides a framework for analysts and decision makers to identify and evaluate instances of fragmentation, overlap and duplication and consider options for addressing or managing such instances. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-164 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-164_0 | The U.S. intelligence community, which includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others, has issued classified National Intelligence Estimates and an update on the foreign-origin terrorist threat to the United States. According to intelligence agencies, conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the likelihood that terrorists may use chemical and biological materials may increase over the next decade. Origins and Principles of U.S. Policy and Strategy to Combat Terrorism
U.S. policy and strategy have evolved since the 1970s, along with the nature and perception of the terrorist threat. This policy resulted from the findings of the 1985 Vice President’s Task Force on Terrorism, which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the significant federal assets to respond to terrorist incidents. First, in certain critical areas, just as the Vice President’s Task Force on Terrorism noted in 1985, improvements are needed in interagency coordination and program focus. In a second, related observation, more money is being spent to combat terrorism without any assurance of whether it is focused on the right programs or in the right amounts. Our December 1997 report showed that seven key federal agencies spent more than an estimated $6.5 billion in fiscal year 1997 on federal efforts to combat terrorism, excluding classified programs and activities. Because governmentwide priorities have not been established and funding requirements have not necessarily been validated based on an analytically sound assessment of the threat and risk of terrorist attack, there is no basis to have a reasonable assurance that funds are being spent on the right programs in the right amounts and that unnecessary program and funding duplication, overlap, misallocation, fragmentation, and gaps have not occurred. Our third observation is that there are different sets of views and an apparent lack of consensus on the threat of terrorism—particularly WMD terrorism. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work and observations on federal efforts to combat terrorism, focusing on the: (1) foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat in the United States; and (2) origins and principles of the U.S. policy and strategy to combat terrorism.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists; (2) terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the likelihood that they may use chemical and biological materials may increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies; (3) more than a decade ago, the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination; (4) GAO's work suggests that the government should continue to strive for improved interagency coordination today; (5) the need for effective interagency coordination--both at the federal level and among the federal, state, and local levels--is paramount; (6) the challenges of efficient and effective management and focus for program investments are growing as the terrorism issue draws more attention from Congress and as there are more players and more programs and activities to integrate and coordinate; (7) the United States is spending billions of dollars annually to combat terrorism without assurance that federal funds are focused on the right programs or in the right amounts; (8) as GAO has emphasized in two reports, a critical piece of the equation in decisions about establishing and expanding programs to combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat and risk assessment using valid inputs from the intelligence community and other agencies; (9) threat and risk assessments could help the government make decisions about: (a) how to target investments in combating terrorism and set priorities on the basis of risk; (b) unnecessary program duplication, overlap, and gaps; and (c) correctly sizing individual agencies' levels of effort; and (10) finally, there are different sets of views and an apparent lack of consensus on the threat of terrorism--particularly weapons of mass destruction terrorism. |
gao_GAO-01-341 | gao_GAO-01-341_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify DOD’s incident response capabilities and how these capabilities are being implemented and (2) identify challenges to improving these capabilities. In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is funding research to develop more sophisticated intrusion detection systems. Conclusions
DOD has established significant incident response capabilities at the military services and mechanisms for centrally coordinating information assurance activities and incident response capabilities through DIAP and JTF-CND, respectively. However, DOD faces challenges in improving the effectiveness of its incident response capabilities, including (1) coordinating resource planning and priorities for incident response across the department; (2) integrating critical data from heterogeneous systems, sensors, and other devices to better monitor cyber events and attacks; (3) establishing a departmentwide process to periodically and systematically review systems and networks on a priority basis for security weaknesses; (4) ensuring that components across the department consistently report compliance with vulnerability alerts; (5) improving the coordination of component-level incident response actions; and (6) developing departmentwide performance measures to assess incident response capabilities and thus better ensure mission readiness. Comments From the Department of Defense
Ordering Information
The first copy of each GAO report is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of computer incident response capabilities and identifies challenges to improving these.
What GAO Found
GAO found that during the last several years, DOD has taken several steps to build incident response capabilities and enhance computer defensive capabilities across the Department, including the creation of computer emergency response teams and incident response capabilities within each of the military services as well as the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Defense Logistics Agency. DOD also created the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) to coordinate and direct the full range of activities within the Department associated with incident response. GAO identified the following six areas in which DOD faces challenges in improving its incident response capabilities: (1) coordinating resource planning and prioritization activities; (2) integrating critical data from intrusion detection systems, sensors, and other devices to better monitor cyber events and attacks; (3) establishing departmentwide process to periodically review systems and networks for security weaknesses; (4) increasing individual unit compliance with departmentwide vulnerability alerts; (5) improving DOD's system for coordinating component-level incident response actions; and (6) developing departmentwide performance measures to assess incident response capabilities. |
gao_HEHS-96-44 | gao_HEHS-96-44_0 | Since then, 10 additional waivers have been approved. The 1115 waiver is health care reform in Tennessee. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed the financing arrangements for approved 1115 Medicaid demonstration waivers in several states, with a focus on (1) the relationship between the waiver and other state health reform initiatives, (2) the planned sources of funding available to finance expanded coverage, (3) the potential net impact of these waivers on federal Medicaid expenditures, and (4) the actual waiver expenditures of states with the most implementation experience. Three of Four Demonstration Waivers Are Potentially Not Budget Neutral
Contrary to the administration’s assertion that approved Medicaid 1115 waivers are budget neutral, net federal spending in the four states we examined could potentially exceed projected without-waiver program costs over the 5-year duration of the demonstrations. The net additional federal funding available in these four states is small in relation to allowable demonstration spending. However, overall federal Medicaid expenditures could grow significantly if the administration shows a similar flexibility in reviewing the large backlog of pending waivers. Oregon was able to meet greater than expected demand without exceeding its waiver agreement expenditure cap. We continue to believe that the administration’s waiver funding caps for these states may result in increased federal spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the financing arrangements for four approved section 1115 Medicaid demonstration waivers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the approved spending limits for demonstration waivers in Oregon, Hawaii, and Florida are not budget neutral and could increase federal Medicaid expenditures; (2) Tennessee's 1115 waiver agreement should cost less than the continuation of its prewaiver program and result in savings; (3) although additional federal funding is relatively lower than demonstration spending under federal expenditure caps, federal Medicaid expenditures could increase rapidly if similar flexibility in reviewing state 1115 financing strategies is allowed; (4) five waivers have been approved since late 1994, and the backlog of pending waivers includes three states with large Medicaid programs; (5) additional federal funding is available to protect against the uncertainties states face in implementing demonstrations; and (6) it remains unclear whether the states implementing demonstrations will exceed their 1115 waiver funding caps. |
gao_GAO-08-207T | gao_GAO-08-207T_0 | VA and DOD Have Been Working to Exchange Health Information Since 1998
For nearly a decade, VA and DOD have been undertaking initiatives to exchange data between their health information systems and create comprehensive electronic records. However, the departments have faced considerable challenges in project planning and management, leading to repeated changes in the focus and target completion dates of the initiatives. A longer-term initiative was to develop a common health information architecture that would allow a two-way exchange of health information. The two repositories are to exchange information through an interface named CHDR. In October 2004, responding to a congressional mandate, the departments established two more short-term initiatives: the Laboratory Data Sharing Interface, aimed at allowing VA and DOD facilities to share laboratory resources, and the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange (BHIE), aimed at giving both departments’ clinicians access to records on shared patients (that is, those who receive care from both departments). In the long-term project to modernize their health information systems, the departments have begun, among other things, to implement the first release of the interface between their modernized data repositories. VA and DOD Have Begun Deployment of a Modernized Data Interface
In their long-term effort to share health information, VA and DOD have completed the development of their modernized data repositories, agreed on standards for various types of data, and begun to populate the repositories with these data. At 7 sites, VA and DOD are now exchanging limited medical information for shared patients: specifically, computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy information. Once in the repositories, these computable data can be used by DOD and VA at all sites through their existing systems. Although implementing this interface is an important accomplishment, the departments are still a long way from completing the modernized health information systems and comprehensive longitudinal health records. This involves different tasks for each department. Short-Term Projects Are Allowing VA and DOD to Exchange Limited Health Information
In addition to the long-term effort previously described, the two departments have made some progress in meeting immediate needs to share information in their respective legacy systems through short-term projects which, as mentioned earlier, are in various stages of completion. One-Way Transfer Capability Is Operational
DOD has been using FHIE to transfer information to VA since 2002. Table 4 summarizes the types of health data currently shared via the long- and short-term initiatives we have described, as well as additional types of data that are currently planned for sharing. Special Procedures Provide Information to VA Polytrauma Centers
In addition to the information technology initiatives described, DOD and VA have set up special procedures to transfer medical information to VA’s four polytrauma centers, which treat active duty service members and veterans severely wounded in combat. DOD staff pointed out that this laborious process is feasible only because the number of polytrauma patients is small. These special efforts to transfer medical information on seriously wounded patients represent important additional steps to facilitate the sharing of information that is vital to providing polytrauma patients with quality health care. Work still to be done includes agreeing to standards for the remaining categories of medical information; populating the data repositories with all this information; completing the development of HealtheVet VistA, and AHLTA; and transitioning from the legacy systems. Further, it is not clear how all the initiatives we have described today are to be incorporated into an overall strategy toward achieving the departments’ goal of a comprehensive, seamless exchange of health information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in ongoing efforts to share medical information, which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active-duty military personnel and veterans. These efforts include a long-term program to develop modernized health information systems based on computable data: that is, data in a format that a computer application can act on--for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies. In addition, the departments are engaged in short-term initiatives involving existing systems. GAO was asked to testify on the history and current status of the departments' efforts to share health information. To develop this testimony, GAO reviewed its previous work, analyzed documents about current status and future plans and interviewed VA and DOD officials.
What GAO Found
For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share health information and to create comprehensive electronic medical records. However, they have faced considerable challenges in these efforts, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target completion dates. Currently, the two departments are pursuing both long- and short-term initiatives to share health information. Under their long-term initiative, the modern health information systems being developed by each department are to share standardized computable data through an interface between data repositories associated with each system. The repositories have now been developed, and the departments have begun to populate them with limited types of health information. In addition, the interface between the repositories has been implemented at seven VA and DOD sites, allowing computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data to be exchanged. Implementing this interface is a milestone toward the departments' long-term goal, but more remains to be done. Besides extending the current capability throughout VA and DOD, the departments must still agree to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populate the data repositories with this information, complete the development of the two modernized health information systems, and transition from their existing systems. While pursuing their long-term effort to develop modernized systems, the two departments have also been working to share information in their existing systems. Among various short-term initiatives are a completed effort to allow the one-way transfer of health information from DOD to VA when service members leave the military, as well as ongoing demonstration projects to exchange limited data at selected sites. One of these projects, which builds on the one-way transfer capability, developed an interface between certain existing systems that allows a two-way view of current data on patients receiving care from both departments. VA and DOD are now expanding the sharing of additional medical information by using this interface to link other systems and databases. The departments have also established ad hoc processes to meet the immediate need to provide data on severely wounded service members to VA's polytrauma centers, which specialize in treating such patients. These processes include manual workarounds (such as scanning paper records) that are generally feasible only because the number of polytrauma patients is small. While these multiple initiatives and ad hoc processes have facilitated degrees of data sharing, they nonetheless highlight the need for continued efforts to integrate information systems and automate information exchange. At present, it is not clear how all the initiatives are to be incorporated into an overall strategy focused on achieving the departments' goal of comprehensive, seamless exchange of health information. |
gao_GAO-12-65 | gao_GAO-12-65_0 | Background
Regulatory Roles
Funeral homes, cemeteries, crematories, pre-need plans, and third party sales of funeral goods are all various segments of the death care industry, and the federal and state governments both have a role in regulating the industry. In 1999 and 2003, we reported on various aspects of federal and state regulation of the death care industry.things, we stated that with respect to the federal government’s role in regulating the death care industry, aside from the FTC’s Funeral Rule, there is no other regulation that specifically addresses the marketing practices of the death care industry at the federal level; most regulatory Among other responsibilities regarding the industry are handled at the state level. The FTC’s Funeral Rule, which became fully effective in April 1984, provides, among other things, that consumers are entitled to price information about funeral goods and services before they purchase them, which would enable the consumer to use the information for comparative shopping if he or she wishes. Federal and State Regulation of the Death Care Industry and the Extent to Which It Has Changed Vary
Federal Regulatory Structure Largely Unchanged
The Funeral Rule has not changed since it went into effect in1994, and according to FTC staff, implementation of the Funeral Rule has generally remained the same since we last reported on the Rule in 2003. The FTC conducts undercover shopping through enforcement sweeps of funeral homes to ensure compliance with the Funeral Rule and to maintain consumer confidence. The FTC reported an overall compliance rate of about 85 Arizona was the only state that reported that some In addition, the majority of state regulators also reported that funeral homes, funeral directors, and embalmers are required to be licensed in their respective states. In Both 2003 and 2011 States Reported Varied Regulatory Requirements, with Specific Rules or Regulations Most Consistently Reported for Funeral Homes
The extent to which state regulators reported that their state (1) had specific rules or regulations, (2) required licensing, and (3) required inspections in both 2003 and 2011 varied by industry segment. By comparison, with respect to the inspection of funeral homes and crematories,
37 of 43 state regulators (86 percent) who responded to our 2003 survey reported that their state required the inspection of funeral homes, while 35 of the 38 state regulators (92 percent) reported this in 2011, and
33 of 36 state regulators (92 percent) who responded to our 2003 survey reported that their state required the inspection of crematories, while 28 of the 34 state regulators (82 percent) reported this in 2011. Many state regulators who responded to our 2011 survey also reported that their states made changes to their laws or regulations since 2003 that primarily provided clarification or enhanced consumer protections. State regulators views on the extent to which these changes strengthened their regulatory program varied, as shown in figure 4. State regulators views on whether they believe that there was a need for their state government to take a more active role in regulating the death care industry varied, as shown in figure 6. Appendix I: Survey Methodology
To obtain information on the various ways states regulate the death care industry, how it has changed, and to what extent more regulation is needed we developed and administered five web-based surveys to all 50 states to provide current information on state regulation for each of the five death care industry segments—funeral homes, cemeteries, crematories, sales of pre-need funeral plans, and third party sellers of funeral goods. We also conducted interviews with officials at the Federal Trade Commission and six national associations to identify any additional issues to follow up on in the surveys. Licensing requirements for cemetery operators have changed since we surveyed state regulators in 2003. For nonguaranteed contracts, 100 percent of the costs of funeral and cemetery goods and services must be trusted. Cemeteries and Cemetery Operators
Licensing requirements. The state regulator who responded to our survey reported that these changes were a result of proposals from state agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Media reports have identified instances of desecration of graves and human remains at cemeteries, and in one instance, reported that bodies were removed from graves and the sites resold. Allegations have also surfaced about the mismanagement of pre-need plans that are designed to provide consumers the opportunity to fund funeral and cemetery arrangements before they are needed. The FTC's Funeral Rule requires that, among other things, funeral providers give consumers lists that disclose the cost of funeral goods and services before they enter into funeral transactions. Proposed legislation introduced in March 2011 would increase the federal governments role in regulating the industry by, among other things, requiring that the FTC regulate aspects of cemetery operations. GAO was asked to review the regulation of the death care industry. This report discusses (1) how federal and state governments regulate the industry and how regulation has changed since 2003 and (2) state regulators' views on the need for additional regulation.
GAO reviewed FTC's Funeral Rule and interviewed officials representing the FTC and national industry and consumer associations; surveyed state officials to gather data on state regulation of the death care industry; and, where possible, compared the results of the 2011 surveys with those of similar surveys GAO conducted in 2003. The response rate for our 2011 surveys ranged from 78 to 84 percent. GAO also reviewed laws and regulations. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The extent to which the federal and state governments regulate the death care industryfuneral homes, cemeteries, crematories, pre-need funeral plans, and third party sales of funeral goodsvaries, as does the extent to which regulation has changed since GAO last reported on the regulation of the death care industry in 2003. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) continues to annually conduct undercover shopping at various funeral homes to test compliance with the Funeral Rule. Of the over 2,400 funeral homes that the FTC shopped since 1996, the FTC reported an overall compliance rate of about 85 percent. With respect to state regulation, consistent with GAOs findings in 2003, the way in which states regulate the industry varies across industry segments and states. Also, the extent to which state regulators reported that they had specific rules or regulations for each industry segment in both 2003 and 2011 varied. Most consistent across states in both years was reporting that there were specific rules or regulations for funeral homes (94 and 95 percent in 2003 and 2011, respectively). In contrast, 77 percent of state regulators of cemeteries reported that their states had specific rules or regulations for cemeteries in 2003, and 88 percent reported this in 2011. Certain state regulators also reported that their states made various statutory or regulatory changes since 2003, primarily to clarify legislation or regulation or to enhance consumer protections, and that they believe these changes strengthened their regulatory program to varying degrees. State regulators reported that these changes came about for a variety of reasons, including accounts of desecration of human remains or proposals from state agencies and industry groups.
State regulators views on the need for additional federal and state regulation of the industry varied, as shown in the figure below.
The FTC provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-10-196T | gao_GAO-10-196T_0 | As we showed in our August 2008 report, equipment exported to developing countries may be handled in a way that threatens human health and the environment. Two Promising Initiatives Assist Federal Agencies in Procuring, Operating, and Disposing of Electronic Products in an Environmentally Preferable Manner
As we reported in November 2005, existing federal government approaches to ensuring environmentally responsible management of electronic equipment from procurement through disposal rely heavily on two interrelated EPA electronic product stewardship initiatives. The first, the electronic product environmental assessment tool (EPEAT®), assists federal procurement officials in comparing and selecting laptop computers, desktop computers, and monitors with environmentally preferable attributes. The second, the federal electronics challenge (FEC), helps federal agencies fully utilize the benefits of EPEAT-rated electronics by providing resources to help agencies extend these products’ life spans, operate them in an energy efficient way, and expand markets for recycling and recovered materials by recycling them at end of life. EPEAT was developed along the lines of EPA’s and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy Star program in which the federal government rewards manufacturers of energy-efficient products that ultimately save money and protect the environment by providing them with a label for their products that certifies these benefits. Federal Agencies and Facilities Have Increased Participation in EPEAT and FEC in Recent Years
As of December 31, 2008, EPA reported that 16 federal agencies and 215 federal facilities—representing slightly more than one-third of all federal employees—participated in the FEC to some extent. In addition, according to the 128 facilities that reported data to EPA, a majority of electronic products purchased during 2008 were EPEAT-registered. For instance, in 2008 FEC participants reported to EPA and the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive that 88 percent of all desktop computers, laptop computers, and monitors they purchased or leased were EPEAT registered. Procurement officials reported purchasing 95 percent of their monitors with energy-efficient power management features enabled and 38 percent of computers with this feature. Finally, participants reported that 50 percent of electronics taken out of service were donated for reuse; 40 percent were recycled; 8 percent were sold; and 2 percent were disposed of. Through participation in the FEC, numerous federal facilities have purchased greener electronic products, reduced the environmental impacts of electronic products during use, and managed obsolete electronics in an environmentally safe way. Opportunities Exist for More Federal Agencies and Facilities to Join EPA’s Initiatives, and Current Participants Can Significantly Strengthen Their Participation
The EPEAT and FEC accomplishments achieved to date are steps in the right direction, but opportunities exist to significantly increase the breadth and depth of federal agency and facility participation. First, agencies and facilities representing almost two-thirds of the federal workforce are not yet participating in these promising initiatives, despite Executive Order 13423. Instead, participation simply means these agencies have identified their current practices for managing electronic products and set goals to improve them. Moreover, as the FEC is an initiative aimed to encourage and support participating agencies and facilities, it does not impose consequences on those agencies who do not meet their goals. As a practical matter, only 34 FEC facility participants (16 percent of participants) reported to EPA that they managed electronic products in accordance with FEC goals for at least one of the three lifecycle phases— procurement, operation, or disposal—with only 2 facilities showing they did this for all three phases in 2008. As part of this calculation, we added the environmental benefits attained if federal agencies operated all EPEAT units in an energy efficient manner (i.e., enabled Energy Star features) and reused and recycled the end-of-life electronics they replaced in accordance with FEC goals. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Advancing technology has led to increasing sales of new electronic devices. With this increase comes the dilemma of managing them at the end of their useful lives. If discarded with common trash, a number of environmental impacts may result, ranging from the loss of valuable resources to the potential release of toxic substances, such as lead. If recycled, they may be exported to countries with waste management systems that are less protective of human health and the environment that those of the United States. The federal government is the world's largest purchaser of electronics, spending nearly $75 billion on electronic products and services in 2009. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has helped implement several product stewardship initiatives to encourage responsible management of electronic products in all three phases of a product's lifecycle--procurement, operation, and end-of-life disposal. In response to a request to provide information on federal procurement and management of electronic products, GAO's testimony describes (1) EPA's electronic product stewardship initiatives, (2) federal agency participation in them, and (3) opportunities for strengthening participation. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work and updated with data from EPA. In our prior report, EPA agreed that increasing federal participation in its initiatives could be encouraged. Agency officials still agree with this finding.
What GAO Found
Federal government approaches to ensuring environmentally responsible management of electronic equipment from procurement through disposal rely heavily on two interrelated initiatives. The first initiative, the electronic product environmental assessment tool (EPEAT), was developed along the lines of EPA's and the Department of Energy's Energy Star program and assists federal procurement officials in comparing and selecting computers and monitors with environmental attributes that also routinely save money through reduced energy usage over the products' lives. The second initiative--the federal electronics challenge (FEC)--helps federal agencies realize the benefits of EPEAT-rated electronics by providing resources to help agencies extend these products' life spans, operate them in an energy efficient way, and expand markets for recovered materials by recycling them at end of life. The first 5 years of EPA's initiatives have resulted in notable energy savings and environmental benefits reported by participating agencies. According to facilities that reported information to EPA and the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive in 2008, 88 percent of all desktop computers, laptop computers, and monitors the facilities purchased or leased were EPEAT-registered. EPEAT participation reportedly resulted in procurement officials purchasing 95 percent of their monitors with Energy Star power management features enabled and 38 percent of computers with this feature. In addition, 16 federal agencies and 215 federal facilities--representing about one-third of all federal employees--participated in the FEC to some extent in 2008. As a result, participants reported that 50 percent of electronics taken out of service were donated for reuse, 40 percent were recycled, 8 percent were sold, and 2 percent were disposed of. The environmentally responsible choices associated with EPEAT and FEC resulted in a reported $40.3 million in cost savings for participants. The EPEAT and FEC accomplishments are steps in the right direction, but opportunities exist to increase the breadth and depth of federal participation. First, agencies and facilities representing about two-thirds of the federal workforce are not participating in these promising initiatives, despite instructions to do so in implementing Executive Order 13423. Second, few participating agencies and facilities maximize these programs' resources and their potential benefits. For some, participation simply means the agency identified its current practices for managing electronic products and set goals to improve them. Moreover, as the FEC aims to support participating agencies and facilities, it does not impose consequences for those that do not meet their goals. In fact, only 34 FEC facility partners showed they managed electronic products in 2008 in accordance with FEC goals for at least one of the three lifecycle phases, and only 2 facilities showed they did so for all phases. For perspective, GAO calculated that if federal agencies replaced 500,000 desktop and laptop computers and monitors with EPEAT-registered products and operated and disposed of them in accordance with FEC goals, they could achieve substantially greater energy reductions and cost savings. |
gao_GAO-12-70 | gao_GAO-12-70_0 | DOE’s R&D Plan Lays Out a Systematic Approach to Selecting and Demonstrating Nuclear Fuel Cycles but Lacks Important Details
DOE’s R&D plan details a systematic approach—that is, the use of scientific methods and engineering principles—to select and eventually demonstrate nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. However, the plan does not explain the current readiness of the critical technologies and the estimated time and costs of further developing these technologies; it also does not explain how DOE will collaborate with the nuclear industry and other countries with experience in conducting nuclear R&D in achieving its goals. Development of systems, including nuclear reactors, that would transmute radioactive materials recovered from spent fuel to improve the use of the nuclear fuel and significantly reduce the radioactivity associated with these materials. Security. DOE Plans to Assess Technology Readiness, but It Has Not Explained the Current Readiness of Fuel Cycle Technologies or the Estimated Time and Cost Associated with Their Development
DOE’s R&D plan states that it is necessary to assess the readiness of technologies associated with the nuclear fuel cycles in selecting fuel cycle options for further review. As we have reported, assessing the readiness of technology is a best practice to help control schedule and costs. DOE’s R&D Plan Identifies the Need to Collaborate with the Nuclear Industry but Does Not Include a Long-term Collaboration Strategy
DOE’s R&D plan identifies the importance of collaborating with the nuclear industry—the ultimate user of any nuclear fuel cycle and associated technologies that are developed—and the department has made some efforts to obtain industry advice, but the plan does not include a long-term strategy for how to conduct such collaboration. We note, however, that DOE has an independent role in deciding on a nuclear fuel cycle and associated technologies that best serve U.S. interests in minimizing waste and reducing proliferation and terrorism risks. As we have reported, defining organizational roles and responsibilities in formal mechanisms can help agencies strengthen their commitment to work collaboratively by clarifying who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions will be made. French and British Experiences in Reprocessing and Recycling Can Provide Insights for U.S. Decision Making
France and the United Kingdom’s experiences in developing and operating reprocessing and recycling infrastructures can provide some insights into the decisions DOE may need to make in selecting and demonstrating nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. However, the effect of reprocessing and recycling spent nuclear fuel on the amount of space needed for a geologic repository is under review, including whether to dispose of radioactive materials that are being stored but that are potentially reusable, primarily plutonium. Without such a strategy, DOE cannot be assured that the nuclear industry will accept and use the technologies that it develops. Recommendations for Executive Action
For the Office of Nuclear Energy to reach its goal of selecting sustainable nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies by 2020 and demonstrating them by 2050, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary of the Office Nuclear Energy to take the following actions: (1) Revise the R&D plan to include the current readiness levels of the technologies associated with the fuel cycle options being considered and the estimated time and cost for developing these technologies in relationship to the R&D plan’s schedules and goals, include a strategy for sustaining long-term collaboration with the nuclear industry, including a formal mechanism that clarifies the role industry will have at critical points in selecting fuel cycle options and associated technologies, and specify how DOE will use collaborative agreements with other countries to advance its R&D efforts and use available facilities and expertise in these other countries to more efficiently and effectively meet its R&D goals. DOE did not rule out the future use of a formal memorandum of understanding between its Office of Nuclear Energy and NNSA to help ensure that they coordinate to avoid overlap and duplication in their efforts to minimize proliferation and terrorism risks. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed the (1) approach the Department of Energy (DOE) is taking to select and demonstrate sustainable nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies; (2) efforts DOE is making to understand and minimize nuclear proliferation and terrorism risks associated with nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies; and (3) experiences of France and the United Kingdom in reprocessing and recycling spent nuclear fuel that may be useful to the United States in selecting sustainable nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. AREVA did not provide information on the amount of this trace material. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
More demand for electricity and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions have increased interest in nuclear power, which does not rely on fossil fuels. However, concerns remain about the radioactive spent fuel that nuclear reactors generate. The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a research and development (R&D) plan to select nuclear fuel cycles and technologies, some of which reprocess spent fuel and recycle some nuclear material, such as plutonium. These fuel cycles may help reduce the generation of spent fuel and risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. GAO was asked to review (1) DOE's approach to selecting nuclear fuel cycles and technologies, (2) DOE's efforts to reduce proliferation and terrorism risks, and (3) selected countries' experiences in reprocessing and recycling spent fuel. GAO reviewed DOE's plan and met with officials from DOE, the nuclear industry, and France and the United Kingdom.
What GAO Found
DOE's R&D plan relies on a systematic approach--that is, the use of scientific methods and engineering principles--to select and demonstrate nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. However, it does not explain the current readiness levels of the technologies associated with the fuel cycles and the estimated time and cost of further development; it also does not explain how DOE will collaborate with the nuclear industry and other countries experienced in nuclear R&D in achieving its goals. In particular: (1) In 2010, DOE screened 863 previously identified nuclear fuel cycles and technologies and grouped them into 266 fuel cycles for further exploration. Independent reviewers found this screening process useful and recommended changes that DOE officials stated they would act on. (2) DOE's R&D plan states that it is necessary to assess the readiness levels of technologies associated with nuclear fuel cycles. However, neither the plan nor the screening process describe the current readiness levels of all critical technologies or the time or estimated costs for further development. As GAO has reported, assessing the readiness of technology is a best practice to help control schedule and costs. (3) DOE's R&D plan states the importance of collaborating with the nuclear industry--the ultimate user of any fuel cycle and technologies that are developed--and DOE continues to get industry advice. However, the plan does not include a strategy for long-term collaboration with industry, without which DOE cannot be assured that the nuclear industry will accept and use the fuel cycles and technologies that the department may develop. (4) DOE has agreements with other countries that provide collaborative opportunities to share research results and leverage DOE's R&D efforts, such as using the countries' research facilities. However, the plan does not explain how DOE will use these agreements to advance its R&D goals. As stated in DOE's R&D plan, the Office of Nuclear Energy has efforts under way to minimize proliferation and terrorism risks associated with nuclear power, but faces challenges. These challenges include developing reliable and cost-effective fuel cycles while minimizing the attractiveness to potential adversaries of radioactive materials resulting from these cycles. NNSA is also working on these issues, and the two agencies have worked together informally to avoid duplication and overlap but do not have a formal mechanism to collaborate on future efforts, which can help agencies strengthen their commitment to work collaboratively by clarifying who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions will be made. GAO reviewed France's and the United Kingdom's decades of experiences in developing and operating reprocessing and recycling infrastructures. These experiences can provide some insights into the decisions DOE may need to make in selecting nuclear fuel cycles and technologies. For example, reprocessing and recycling is likely to reduce the amount of space needed for a nuclear waste repository because some of the radioactive materials are reused, but the amount of this reduction would depend on how much of the radioactive materials that are reused might ultimately require disposal in such a repository.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE revise its plan to include the current readiness levels of fuel cycle technologies and the estimated time and cost to develop them, include a strategy for long-term collaboration with the nuclear industry, and specify how DOE will use international agreements to advance its efforts. GAO also recommends that DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complete a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to avoid duplication and overlap of efforts. DOE agreed with the first three recommendations and did not rule out the future use of a MOU. GAO continues to believe that this formal collaboration mechanism is needed. |
gao_NSIAD-98-48 | gao_NSIAD-98-48_0 | DSB Studies Project Infrastructure Cost Savings From Outsourcing and Other Initiatives
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requested that DSB identify DOD activities that the private sector could do more efficiently and to determine the expected savings from outsourcing. The report cited evidence from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) public-private competition studies of commercial and depot maintenance activities. The Board also noted that an Outsourcing Institute study found that the private sector saved about 10 to 15 percent by outsourcing but that the public sector savings from outsourcing would be higher because of the inefficiency of government service organizations. Opportunities Exist for Logistics Infrastructure Savings
Our reviews of best practices within the private sector and ongoing work at DOD indicate that DOD has significant opportunities for reducing logistics costs and improving performance by changing its business processes. DOD’s prime vendor program for medical supplies, along with other inventory reduction efforts, has resulted in savings that we estimate exceed $700 million. PA&E Analysis Raises Questions on DSB Savings Estimates
PA&E’s analysis of the DSB’s estimated $6 billion in annual logistics savings found that the estimate was overstated by about $1 billion and that another $3 billion in projected savings would be difficult to achieve or unlikely to be achieved. According to PA&E officials, DSB’s $6-billion savings estimate was overstated by about $1 billion because contract administration and oversight costs were understated and one-time inventory savings (spread over 6 years) was claimed as steady state savings. The remainder of the achievable savings have already been identified in DOD’s future year defense program. Specifically, we found that (1) the Board’s projected annual savings from reliability improvements are overstated by over $1 billion; (2) the DSB’s 25-percent savings rate from outsourcing appears to be overly optimistic; and (3) DSB, while recognizing it would be difficult to do so, assumed that DOD would overcome impediments that prevent the outsourcing of all logistics functions. We do not know by how much or whether these questions would change the $2 billion in savings that PA&E concluded were achievable. To the extent that competitive markets do not exist, the amount of savings that can be generated through outsourcing may be reduced. However, certain barriers, including legal and cultural impediments, must be overcome to fully implement DSB’s recommendations. Conclusions and Recommendations
We agree with DSB that there are many opportunities for significant reductions in logistics infrastructure costs. However, the Board’s projected savings are overly optimistic. We recommend that the plan establish time frames for identifying and evaluating alternative support options and implementing the most cost-effective solutions and identify required resources, including personnel and funding, for accomplishing the cost-reduction initiatives. This report is a step in the right direction and sets forth certain strategic goals and direction. Scope and Methodology
The scope of our review was limited to reviewing the Defense Science Board’s (DSB) projected $6 billion annual savings for the continental United States (CONUS) logistics. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the basis for the Defense Science Board's (DSB) estimate that the Department of Defense (DOD) could potentially save $6 billion annually by reducing its logistics infrastructure costs within the continental United States, focusing on: (1) the opportunities for logistics infrastructure savings; and (2) DOD's and GAO's analyses of the DSB's projected logistics infrastructure savings.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO agrees with the DSB that DOD can reduce the costs of its logistics activities through outsourcing and other initiatives; (2) DOD has already achieved over $700 million in savings from the use of a prime vendor program and other inventory-related reduction efforts for defense medical supplies; (3) according to studies by the Center for Naval Analyses, competition for work, including competition between the public sector and the private sector--regardless of which one wins--can result in cost savings; (4) many private-sector firms have successfully used outsourcing to reduce their costs of operations; (5) the DOD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) directorate's analysis shows, however, that the DSB's estimated annual savings of $6 billion is overstated by about $4 billion because of errors in estimates, overly optimistic savings assumptions, and legal and cultural impediments; (6) according to PA&E's analysis, this $4 billion includes: (a) $1 billion in overstated contract administration and oversight savings and one-time inventory savings; and (b) $3 billion in savings that would be unlikely or would be difficult to achieve within the Board's 6-year time frame, given certain legislative requirements and DOD's resistance to outsourcing all logistics functions; (7) GAO's analysis confirmed PA&E's conclusion that the Board's estimated savings were overstated; (8) GAO's analysis also raised questions about the Board's projected savings, but GAO does not know by how much or whether these questions would change the $2 billion in savings that PA&E concluded were achievable; (9) GAO questioned whether DOD would achieve a 25-percent savings from outsourcing, as the Board assumed, because the savings were based primarily on studies of public-private competitions in highly competitive private-sector markets; (10) however, competitive markets may not exist in some areas; (11) notwithstanding GAO's concerns about the magnitude of savings, DOD can make significant reductions in logistics costs; (12) the Secretary of Defense recently issued a strategic plan for achieving such reductions; (13) this report is a step in the right direction; and (14) DOD now needs an implementation plan based on a realistic assessment of the savings potential of various cost-reduction alternatives and the time frames for accomplishing various activities required to identify and implement the most cost-effective solutions. |
gao_GAO-10-555T | gao_GAO-10-555T_0 | Leverage within the Financial Sector Increased before the Financial Crisis, and Financial Institutions Sought to Deleverage When the Crisis Began
Leverage steadily increased in the financial sector before the crisis began around mid-2007 and created vulnerabilities that increased the severity of the crisis, according to studies we reviewed. 1). 2). Some Studies Suggested That Deleveraging by Financial Institutions by Selling Financial Assets and Restricting New Lending Could Have Contributed to the Crisis
Some studies we reviewed highlighted the possibility that deleveraging through asset sales by financial institutions could trigger downward spirals in asset prices and contribute to a financial crisis. Importantly, other theories that do not involve asset spirals caused by deleveraging through asset sales provide possible explanations for the sharp price declines in mortgage-related securities and other financial instruments. Moreover, as the crisis is complex, no single theory likely is to explain in full what occurred or necessarily rule out other explanations. In addition, some studies we reviewed suggested that deleveraging by restricting new lending could contribute to the crisis by slowing economic growth. Regulators and Market Participants Had Mixed Views about the Effects of Deleveraging in the Recent Crisis
Officials from federal financial regulators, two securities firms, a bank, and a credit rating agency whom we interviewed had mixed views about the effects of deleveraging by financial institutions in the recent crisis. Regulatory officials said that hedge funds and other asset managers also deleveraged by selling assets to meet redemptions or margin calls. The regulators and market participants we interviewed had mixed views on whether sales of financial assets contributed to a downward price spiral. Regulators Limit Financial Institutions’ Use of Leverage Primarily Through Regulatory Capital Requirements
Federal financial regulators (Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and OTS) generally have imposed capital and other requirements on their regulated institutions as a way to limit excessive use of leverage and ensure the stability of the financial system and markets. Federal banking and thrift regulators have imposed minimum risk-based capital and non-risk-based leverage ratios on their regulated institutions. In addition, the regulators supervise the capital adequacy of their regulated institutions through ongoing monitoring, including on-site examinations and off-site tools. Bank holding companies are subject to capital and leverage ratio requirements similar to those for banks. Thrift holding companies are not subject to such requirements; rather, capital levels of thrift holding companies are individually evaluated based on each company’s risk profile. SEC primarily uses its net capital rule to limit the use of leverage by broker-dealers. Other financial institutions, such as hedge funds, use leverage but, unlike banks and broker-dealers, typically are not subject to regulatory capital requirements; instead, market discipline plays a primary role in limiting leverage. Regulators Are Considering Reforms to Address Limitations the Crisis Revealed in Regulatory Framework for Restricting Leverage
The financial crisis has revealed limitations in existing regulatory approaches that serve to restrict leverage. Although regulators have proposed changes to improve the risk coverage of the regulatory capital framework, limit cyclical leverage trends and better address sources of systemic risk, they have not yet fully evaluated the extent to which these proposals would address these limitations. First, regulatory capital measures did not always fully capture certain risks, particularly those associated with some mortgage-related securities held on and off balance sheets. As a result, a number of financial institutions did not hold capital commensurate with their risks and some lacked adequate capital or liquidity to withstand the market stresses of the crisis. Such an assessment is critical to ensure that Basel II changes that would increase reliance on complex risk models and banks’ own risk estimates do not exacerbate regulatory limitations revealed by the crisis. With multiple regulators primarily responsible for individual markets or institutions, none of the financial regulators has clear responsibility to assess the potential effects of the buildup of systemwide leverage or the collective activities of the industry for the financial system. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009 GAO conducted a study on the role of leverage in the recent financial crisis and federal oversight of leverage, as mandated by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. This testimony presents the results of that study, and discusses (1) how leveraging and deleveraging by financial institutions may have contributed to the crisis, (2) how federal financial regulators limit the buildup of leverage; and (3) the limitations the crisis has revealed in regulatory approaches used to restrict leverage and regulatory proposals to address them. To meet these objectives, GAO built on its existing body of work, reviewed relevant laws and regulations and academic and other studies, and interviewed regulators and market participants.
What GAO Found
Some studies suggested that leverage steadily increased in the financial sector before the crisis began in mid-2007 and created vulnerabilities that have increased the severity of the crisis. In addition, subsequent disorderly deleveraging by financial institutions may have compounded the crisis. First, the studies suggested that the efforts taken by financial institutions to deleverage by selling financial assets could cause prices to spiral downward during times of market stress and exacerbate a financial crisis. Second, the studies suggested that deleveraging by restricting new lending could slow economic growth. However, other theories also provide possible explanations for the sharp price declines observed in certain assets. As the crisis is complex, no single theory is likely to fully explain what occurred or rule out other explanations. Regulators and market participants we interviewed had mixed views about the effects of deleveraging. Some officials told us that they generally have not seen asset sales leading to downward price spirals, but others said that asset sales have led to such spirals. Federal regulators impose capital and other requirements on their regulated institutions to limit leverage and ensure financial stability. Federal bank regulators impose minimum risk-based capital and leverage ratios on banks and thrifts and supervise the capital adequacy of such firms through on-site examinations and off-site monitoring. Bank holding companies are subject to similar capital requirements as banks, but capital levels of thrift holding companies are individually evaluated based on each company's risk profile. The Securities and Exchange Commission uses its net capital rule to limit broker-dealer leverage and used to require certain broker-dealer holding companies to report risk-based capital ratios and meet certain liquidity requirements. Other important market participants, such as hedge funds, also use leverage. Hedge funds typically are not subject to regulatory capital requirements, but market discipline, supplemented by regulatory oversight of institutions that transact with them, can serve to constrain their leverage. The crisis has revealed limitations in regulatory approaches used to restrict leverage. First, regulatory capital measures did not always fully capture certain risks, which resulted in some institutions not holding capital commensurate with their risks and facing capital shortfalls when the crisis began. Federal regulators have called for reforms, including through international efforts to revise the Basel II capital framework. The planned U.S. implementation of Basel II would increase reliance on risk models for determining capital needs for certain large institutions. The crisis underscored concerns about the use of such models for determining capital adequacy, but regulators have not assessed whether proposed Basel II reforms will address these concerns. Such an assessment is critical to ensure that changes to the regulatory framework address the limitations the crisis had revealed. Second, regulators face challenges in counteracting cyclical leverage trends and are working on reform proposals. Finally, the crisis has revealed that with multiple regulators responsible for individual markets or institutions, none has clear responsibility to assess the potential effects of the buildup of systemwide leverage or the collective effect of institutions' deleveraging activities. |
gao_GAO-11-617T | gao_GAO-11-617T_0 | Instituting a More Coordinated and Crosscutting Approach to Achieving Meaningful Results
The federal government faces a series of challenges that in many instances are not possible for any single agency to address alone. The crosscutting approach required by the act will provide a much needed basis for more fully integrating a wide array of federal activities as well as a cohesive perspective on the long-term goals of the federal government that is focused on priority policy areas. Effective GPRAMA implementation could help inform reexamination or restructuring efforts related to these and other areas by identifying the various agencies and federal activities—including spending programs, regulations, and tax expenditures—that contribute to each crosscutting goal. Examples from our work on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation include: Teacher quality programs: In fiscal year 2009, the federal government spent over $4 billion specifically to improve the quality of our nation’s 3 million teachers through numerous programs across the government. Focusing on Addressing Weaknesses in Major Management Functions
Although agencies have made progress improving their operations in recent years, they need more effective management capabilities to better implement new programs and policies. The act specifies that these goals should include five areas: financial management, human capital management, information technology management, procurement and acquisition management, and real property management. Ensuring Performance Information Is Both Useful and Used in Decision Making
Agencies need to consider the differing information needs of various users—such as agency top leadership and line managers, OMB, and Congress—to ensure that performance information will be both useful and used in decision making. By also requiring information to be posted on a governmentwide Web site, the act will make performance information more accessible and easy to use by stakeholders and the public, thus fostering transparency and civic engagement. In addition, to help ensure that performance information is used—not simply collected and reported as a compliance exercise—GPRAMA requires top leadership and program officials to be involved in quarterly reviews of priority goals. Sustaining Leadership Commitment and Accountability for Achieving Results
Perhaps the single most important element of successful management improvement initiatives is the demonstrated commitment of top leaders. Engaging Congress in Identifying Management and Performance Issues to Address
In order for performance improvement initiatives to be useful to Congress for its decision making, garnering congressional buy-in on what to measure and how to present this information is critical. In past reviews, we have noted the importance of considering Congress a partner in shaping agency goals at the outset. GPRAMA significantly enhances requirements for agencies to consult with Congress when establishing or adjusting governmentwide and agency goals. GAO’s Role in Evaluating GPRAMA, High Risks, and Other Major Government Challenges
Realizing the promise of GPRAMA for improving government performance and accountability and reducing waste will require sustained oversight of implementation. Finally, GAO reports to each new Congress on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for broad-based transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. While the long-term outlook is driven on the spending side of the budget by rising health care costs and demographics, other areas of the budget should not be exempt from scrutiny. Programs and management functions at significant risk of waste, fraud, and abuse must be corrected. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is the world's largest and most complex entity, with about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2010 that fund a broad array of programs and operations. GAO's long-term simulations of the federal budget show--absent policy change--growing deficits accumulating to an unsustainable increase in debt. While the spending side is driven by rising health care costs and demographics, other areas should also be scrutinized. In addition, there are significant performance and management challenges that the federal government needs to confront. GAO was asked to testify on the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), as the administration begins implementing the act. This statement is based on GAO's past and ongoing work on GPRA implementation, as well as recently issued reports (1) identifying opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue; and (2) updating GAO's list of government operations at high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation. As required by GPRAMA, GAO will periodically evaluate implementation of the act and report to Congress on its findings and recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO's past and ongoing work illustrates how GPRAMA could, if effectively implemented, help address government challenges in five areas: Instituting a more coordinated and crosscutting approach to achieving meaningful results. GPRAMA could help inform reexamination or restructuring efforts and lead to more effective, efficient, and economical service delivery in overlapping program areas by identifying the various agencies and federal activities--including spending programs, regulations, and tax expenditures--that contribute to crosscutting outcomes. These program areas could include numerous teacher quality initiatives or multiple employment and training programs, among others. Focusing on addressing weaknesses in major management functions. Agencies need more effective management capabilities to better implement their programs and policies. GPRAMA requires long-term goals to improve management functions in five key areas: financial, human capital, information technology, procurement and acquisition, and real property management. GAO's work has highlighted opportunities for improvements in each of these areas and aspects of all of them are on the GAO high risk list. Ensuring performance information is both useful and used in decision making. Agencies need to consider the differing needs of various stakeholders, including Congress, to ensure that performance information will be both useful and used. For performance information to be useful, it must be complete, accurate, valid, timely, and easy to use. Yet decision makers often do not have the quality performance information they need to improve results. To help address this need, GPRAMA requires (1) disclosure of information about accuracy and validity, (2) data on crosscutting areas, and (3) quarterly reporting on priority goals on a publicly available Web site. Sustaining leadership commitment and accountability for achieving results. Perhaps the single most important element of successful management improvement initiatives is the demonstrated commitment of top leaders, as shown by their personal involvement in reform efforts. GPRAMA assigns responsibilities to a Chief Operating Officer and Performance Improvement Officer in each agency to improve agency management and performance. Engaging Congress in identifying management and performance issues to address. In order for performance improvement initiatives to be useful to Congress for its decision making, garnering congressional buy-in on what to measure and how to present this information is critical. GAO has previously noted the importance of considering Congress a partner in shaping agency goals at the outset. GPRAMA significantly enhances requirements for agencies to consult with Congress. |
gao_GAO-06-567 | gao_GAO-06-567_0 | The Bureau measured the accuracy of the 1990 Census as well, and recommended statistically adjusting the results. The Bureau does not plan to use statistical estimates of the population for adjusting census data based on its belief that the 2000 Census demonstrated “that the science is insufficiently advanced to allow making statistical adjustment to population counts of a successful decennial census in which the percentage of error is presumed to be so small that adjustment would introduce as much or more error than it was designed to correct.”
The Top 20 Formula Grant Programs Represented Two Thirds of All Federal Grant Programs
In fiscal year 2004, the federal government administered 1,172 grant programs, with $460.2 billion in combined obligations. For example, Medicaid was the largest formula grant program, with federal obligations of $183.2 billion, or nearly 40 percent of all grant obligations, in fiscal year 2004. Using statistical population estimates to recalculate federal Medicaid allocations to states, states would have shifted 0.23 percent of $159.7 billion in federal Medicaid funds in fiscal year 2004 and 0.25 percent of $1.7 billion in SSBG funds would have shifted as a result of the simulations in fiscal year 2005. If statistical population estimates had been used, of the overall allocation of $159.7 billion of federal funds, 22 states would have received more Medicaid funding, 17 states would have received less, while 11 states and the District of Columbia would have received the same. Based on our simulation of the formula funding for Medicaid---Nevada would have gained 1.47 percent in grant funding and Wisconsin would have lost 1.46 percent. Statistical Population Estimates from the 2000 Census Would Have Reallocated 0.25 Percent of SSBG Funds Among the States
Using statistical population estimates to recalculate federal SSBG allocations, 0.25 percent of $1.7 billion in SSBG funds would have shifted in fiscal year 2005 as a result of the simulation. In short, 27 states and the District of Columbia would have gained $4.2 million and 23 states would have lost a total of $4.2 million. Based on our simulation of the formula funding for SSBG, Washington, D.C. would have gained 2.05 percent in grant funding and Minnesota would have lost 1.17 percent. Statistical Population Estimates from the 2000 Census Would Have Shifted a Smaller Percentage of Funding Compared to Those from the 1990 Census
For the Medicaid program, recalculating state allocations using statistical population estimates based on the 2000 Census would have changed the funding for 39 states in fiscal year 2004. This is because the difference between the actual and estimated population counts was smaller for the 2000 Census compared to the 1990 Census. Scope and Methodology
As agreed with your offices, we identified (1) the top 20 formula grant programs based on the amount of funds targeted by any means, and (2) how much money would have been allocated using census data for certain formula grant programs, and the prospective impact of using estimated population counts from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses to recalculate state allocations for these grant programs. We use the term “allocation” to include Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reimbursement to states of Medicaid expenditures subject to the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) formula and Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) state allotments. Both the Census Bureau and GAO deem the 1990 and 2000 statistical population estimates as unreliable and they should not be used for any purposes that legally require data from the decennial census. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decennial census data need to be as accurate as possible because the population counts are used for, among other purposes, allocating federal grants to states and local governments. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) used statistical methods to estimate the accuracy of 1990 and 2000 Census data. Because the Bureau considered the estimates unreliable due to methodological uncertainties, they were not used to adjust the census results. Still, a key question is how sensitive are federal formula grants to alternative population estimates, such as those derived from statistical methods? GAO was asked to identify (1) the top 20 formula grant programs based on the amount of funds targeted by any means, and (2) the amount of money allocated for Medicaid and Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), and the prospective impact of estimated population counts from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses on state allocations for these two programs. Importantly, as agreed, GAO's analysis only simulates the formula grant reallocations. We used fiscal year 2004 Medicaid state expenditure and 2005 SSBG state allocation data, the most recent data available.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2004, the top 20 formula grant programs together had $308 billion in obligations, or 67 percent of the total $460.2 billion obligated by the 1,172 federal grant programs. Medicaid was the largest formula grant program, with obligations of $183.2 billion, or nearly 40 percent of all grant obligations. The federal government allocated $159.7 billion to states in Medicaid funds (not including administrative costs such as processing and making payments to service providers) and $1.7 billion in SSBG funds. Recalculating these allocations using statistical population estimates from the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation and the Post Enumeration Survey--independent sample surveys designed to estimate the number of people that were over- and undercounted in the 2000 and 1990 Censuses--would have produced the following results. First, a total of 0.23 percent ($368 million) of federal Medicaid funds would have been shifted overall among the states in fiscal year 2004 and 0.25 percent ($4.2 million) of SSBG funds would have shifted among the states in fiscal year 2005 as a result of the simulations using statistical population estimates from the 2000 Census. Second, with respect to Medicaid, 22 states would have received additional funding, 17 states would have received less funding, and 11 states and the District of Columbia would have received the same amount of funding using statistical population estimates from the 2000 Census. Based on a fiscal year 2004 federal Medicaid allocation to the states of $159.7 billion, Nevada would have been the largest percentage gainer, with an additional 1.47 percent in funding, and Wisconsin would have lost the greatest percentage--1.46 percent. Third, with respect to SSBG, 27 states and the District of Columbia would have gained funding, and 23 states would have lost funding using statistical population estimates from the 2000 Census. Based on a fiscal year 2005 SSBG allocation of $1.7 billion, Washington, D.C. would have been the biggest percentage gainer, receiving an additional 2.05 percent in funding, while Minnesota would have lost the greatest percentage funding--1.17 percent. Fourth, statistical population estimates from the 2000 Census would have shifted a smaller percentage of funding compared to those using the 1990 Census because the difference between the actual and estimated population counts was smaller in 2000 compared to 1990. |
gao_GAO-02-887 | gao_GAO-02-887_0 | Most federal funding for these programs is administered by state or local government entities, which have the ability to contract with social service providers, including religious organizations. FBOs Received a Small Proportion of Contracted Funds and Most Had Previously Contracted with the Government
Overall, FBOs contracted for a small proportion of the government funding available to nongovernmental contractors under the four programs we examined. Contracts with FBOs accounted for 8 percent (or about $80 million) of the $1 billion in federal and state TANF funds spent by state governments on contracts with nongovernmental entities in 2001, and 2 percent (or about $16 million) of the $712 million Welfare-to-Work competitive grant funds in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. FBOs contracting for SAPT funds provided prevention and treatment of substance abuse. These factors include FBOs’ limited awareness of funding opportunities, limited administrative and financial capacity, inexperience with government contracting, and beliefs about the separation of church and state. Because of confusion over whether the state constitution also applied to federal funds, Georgia adopted a law that specified that charitable choice allowed religious organizations to receive federal funding. For example, some faith-based providers do not want to separate their religion from their delivery of services. Understanding and Implementation of Charitable Choice Safeguards Vary and Incidence of Violations Is Unknown
In the five states we visited, understanding and implementation of charitable choice safeguards differed, and the incidence of problems involving safeguards is unknown. Officials Implementing Charitable Choice Provisions Differed in Their Understanding of Certain Safeguards
Most state and local officials we interviewed knew that charitable choice provisions were meant to allow FBOs to participate in the contracting process on the same basis as other organizations and understood that the law prohibits the use of public funds for religious worship, instruction, or proselytizing; however, they often differed in their understanding of allowable religious activities. Indiana’s Family and Social Services Administration implemented a similar practice. FBOs Are Held Accountable for Performance in the Same Way As Non- FBOs, but Comparative Performance Information Is Unavailable
FBOs are held accountable for performance in the same way as other organizations that contract with the government, according to state and local officials in the five states we visited. Research efforts are currently under way to provide information on the performance of FBOs in delivering social services. We selected these states to obtain a range in the levels of both state government activities with regard to faith-based initiatives and contracting with faith-based organizations, as well as geographic dispersion. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends billions of dollars annually to provide services to the needy directly, or through contracts with a large network of social service providers. Faith-based organizations (FBO), such as churches and religiously affiliated entities, are a part of this network and have a long history of providing social services to needy families and individuals. In the past, religious organizations were required to secularize their services and premises, so that their social service activities were distinctly separate from their religious activities, as a condition of receiving public funds. Beginning with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Congress enacted "charitable choice" provisions, which authorized religious organizations to compete on the same basis as other organizations for federal funding under certain programs without having to alter their religious character or governance. The statutory provisions cover several programs, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Welfare to Work. Similar provisions also apply to the Community Services Block Grant and the substance abuse prevention and treatment programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that faith-based organizations receive a small proportion of the government funding provided to nongovernmental contractors. Contracts with faith-based organizations accounted for 8 percent of the $1 billion in federal and state TANF funds spent by state governments on contracts with nongovernmental entities in 2001. Although charitable choice was intended to allow FBOs to contract with government in these programs, several factors continue to constrain the ability of small FBOs to contract with the government. These factors include FBO's lack of awareness of funding opportunities, limited administrative and financial capacity, inexperience with government contracting, and beliefs about the separation of church and state. State and local officials differed in their understanding and implementation of certain charitable choice safeguards, such as the prohibition on the use of federal funds for religious worship or instruction; however, the incidence of problems involving safeguards is unknown. Faith-based organizations are held accountable for performance in the same way as other organizations contracting with the government. However, little information is available to compare the performance of FBOs to that of other organizations. |
gao_GAO-03-811 | gao_GAO-03-811_0 | SEC Has Taken Steps to Address Our Recommendations
In our 2001 report, we made seven recommendations to SEC to address needed improvements to information it provided to investors about SIPC’s policies and practices, particularly regarding the evidentiary standard for unauthorized trading claims and to expand its review of SIPC operations among others. Imposing this requirement could help investors protect their interests and benefit unsophisticated investors who may not review the SIPC brochure or other disclosures made on account statements. SEC officials expressed concern about imposing another rule on securities firms. Instead, SIPC replaces missing stocks and other securities where it is possible to do so…even when investments have increased in value.”
In addition, SIPC amended its advertising bylaws in 2002 to require firms that choose to make an explanatory statement about SIPC to include a link to the SIPC Web site. NASD and SEC have also begun to make disclosures about SIPC and market risk to investors. Our review of the excess SIPC policies offered by the four major insurers found the policies varied by firm and insurer in terms of the amount of coverage offered per customer and in aggregate per firm. Attorneys familiar with the policies also agreed that the disclosure of the coverage and the terms of coverage could be improved. Consequently, as the policies expire, most insurers are not renewing their existing policies beyond 2003 and have stopped underwriting new policies in general. At this time, it is unclear what some of the securities firms that had excess SIPC coverage plan to do going forward. Three of the Four Major Insurers Identified Stopped Underwriting Excess SIPC Policies in 2003
During our review, three of the four major insurers that offered excess SIPC coverage in 2002 stopped underwriting these policies beyond 2003. Therefore, most firms are still exploring a number of options on how best to proceed, including Self-insuring or creating a “captive” insurance company that would offer the coverage. Purchasing policies from the remaining major insurer. We also found that SIPC has substantially revamped its brochure and Web site and continues to be committed to improving its investor education program to ensure that investors have access to information about investing and the role and function of SIPC. Rather than including this information in its brochure, SIPC revised its brochure to provide references or links to Web sites, such as SEC and NASD, but not to the specific investor education oriented Web pages discussing ratifying potentially unauthorized trades or fraud. More specific links to investor education Web pages within each Web site would mitigate this problem. Finally, SEC reiterates the recommendations it made to SIPC in its 2003 examination report, which as SEC describes are “important to enhance the SIPA liquidation process for the benefit of public investors.”
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) discuss the status of the recommendations that we made to SEC in our 2001 report, (2) discuss the status of the recommendations that we made to SIPC in our 2001 report, and (3) discuss the issues surrounding excess SIPC coverage. We also reviewed a variety of SEC and SIPC informational sources, such as SIPC’s brochure and SEC’s and SIPC’s Web sites, to determine what SEC and SIPC disclosed to investors regarding SIPC’s policies and practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
As result of ongoing concerns about the adequacy of disclosures provided to investors about the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and investors' responsibilities to protect their investments, GAO issued a report in 2001 entitled Securities Investor Protection: Steps Needed to Better Disclose SIPC Policies to Investors (GAO-01-653). GAO was asked to determine the status of recommendations made to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and SIPC in that report. GAO was also asked to review a number of issues involving excess SIPC insurance, private insurance securities firms purchase to cover accounts that are in excess of SIPC's statutory limits.
What GAO Found
SEC has taken steps to implement each of the seven recommendations directed to SEC in GAO's May 2001 report. SEC has updated its Web site to provide investors with more information about SIPC's policies and practices, particularly with regard to unauthorized trading and nonmember affiliate claims. SEC has taken other steps consistent with our recommendations to improve its oversight of SIPC and is working with self-regulatory organizations (SRO) to increase investor awareness of SIPC's policies through distribution of the SIPC brochure and disclosures on account statements. Likewise, SIPC has taken steps to implement the three recommendations directed to SIPC in our 2001 report, but additional work is needed on one. SIPC has updated its brochure and Web site to clarify that investors should complain in writing to their securities firms about suspected unauthorized trades. SIPC also expanded a statement in its brochure that discusses market risk and SIPC coverage and amended its advertising bylaws to require firms that display an expanded statement about SIPC to include a reference or link to SIPC's Web site. Moreover, SEC, the NASD, and many securities firms provide the recommended disclosures about the scope of SIPC coverage to investors on their Web sites. SIPC also added links to Web sites in its brochure that offer information about investment fraud. However, investors could benefit from more specific links to investor education information. Until this year, certain well-capitalized, large, and regional securities firms were able to purchase and provide excess SIPC coverage from four major insurers. The insurance policies varied by firm and insurer in terms of the amount of coverage offered per customer and in aggregate per firm. Attorneys familiar with the policies agreed that the disclosure of the coverage and the terms of coverage could be improved. During the review, GAO found that three of the four major insurers that offered excess SIPC coverage in 2002 stopped underwriting these policies in 2003. Consequently, as the policies expire in 2003, most insurers are not renewing their existing policies and have stopped underwriting new policies. At this time, holders of the insurance policies have not decided what to do going forward. However, several options are being explored including self-insuring and purchasing policies from the remaining major insurer. |
gao_GAO-11-603 | gao_GAO-11-603_0 | 2). NHTSA Conducts Oversight of Safety Defect Recalls, and Other Selected Agencies Generally Share Similar Authorities
As part of its oversight role, NHTSA is responsible for reviewing auto manufacturers’ planning and implementation of safety defect recalls to ensure compliance with legal requirements. To this end, the agency is responsible for reviewing, among other things, the manufacturer’s description of vehicles affected by a safety defect, actions the manufacturer plans take to remedy those vehicles through a recall, and notification letters the manufacturer plans to send to owners of affected vehicles. NHTSA also monitors the effectiveness of recall campaigns being conducted by manufacturers based, in large part, on a manufacturer’s quarterly reports showing the completion rate of a campaign. In addition, the agency provides information and guidance to the public on recalls, primarily through its Web site, www.safercar.gov. Foreign agencies we reviewed also generally had similar authorities to NHTSA, with a few exceptions. Second, NHTSA oversees a manufacturer’s implementation of a safety defect recall. Among other information, a recall notification letter must include the following items: an opening statement that states “This notice was sent to you in accordance with the requirements of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act”; a clear description of the safety defect and the malfunction that may result an evaluation of the risk to vehicle safety related to the defect; a description of what a vehicle owner can do to get the defect remedied; a statement of precautions, if any, a vehicle owner should take to reduce the risk that the malfunction will occur before the defect is remedied; a statement indicating that remedy work is free of any cost to the vehicle owners, unless the manufacturer is exempt from providing it free of cost; and on the envelope of the notification letter, inclusion of the words “SAFETY,” “RECALL,” and “NOTICE” in all capital letters and in a font size that is larger than that used in the address information. Auto Industry Stakeholders Are Generally Satisfied with the Recall Process for Safety Defects, but Several Challenges May Affect Recall Completion Rates
Although industry stakeholders were generally satisfied with the recall process for safety defects, certain challenges may affect the completion rate of recalls. In addition, we found five challenges that may affect the completion rate of safety recalls: identifying and notifying vehicle owners of auto safety defects, motivating vehicle owners to comply with notification letters, providing better information to vehicle owners and the public, using existing data to improve completion rates of recall campaigns, and lacking the authority to require manufacturers to notify used-car dealerships of recalls and to require used-car dealerships to notify potential buyers of the existing defect. Manufacturers Reported Clear Requirements and Open Communication as Benefits of NHTSA’s Role in the Recall Process for Safety Defects
Manufacturers we spoke with were generally satisfied with the recall process for safety defects and stated that NHTSA’s role in this process is a key benefit. Focus group participants responded that they preferred letters that included certain elements. the owner’s vehicle identification number (VIN) information. Providing Better Information to Vehicle Owners and the Public
Our focus groups revealed that many vehicle owners may not be familiar with the Web site www.safercar.gov—NHTSA’s primary means of communicating defect information to the public. However, the information NHTSA provides on its Web site could be more useful. 3). 4). Using Data More Effectively
Although NHTSA uses manufacturer data to track the average annual recall completion rate for all vehicle recall campaigns, NHTSA does not currently use its data to conduct aggregate analyses of completion rates across factors such as manufacturer, component, and vehicle type or by analyzing completion rates based on the characteristics of the defect notification letters, such as the format of the letter mailed to vehicle owners. Enhancing NHTSA’s Recall Authorities
Legislation proposed in the 111th Congress, if enacted, would have modified the authority NHTSA has to recall vehicles. Develop a plan to use the data it collects on recall campaigns to analyze particular patterns or trends that may characterize successful recalls and determine whether these represent best practices that could be used in other recall campaigns. Our report addresses the following questions: (1) What is the extent of NHTSA’s role in the auto safety defect recall process, and how do its authorities compare with those of other selected federal and foreign agencies with safety recall authority? (2) What are the benefits and challenges of the auto safety defect recall process for NHTSA and the manufacturers? To compare NHTSA’s authorities with those of other federal agencies, we reviewed legislation and interviewed officials at selected federal agencies that, similar to NHTSA, have product safety oversight responsibilities, including the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to determine what differences and similarities exist between the agencies’ recall authorities and those of NHTSA. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, auto manufacturers recalled more vehicles than any other year, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the federal oversight authority for vehicle recalls. However, many recalled vehicles are never fixed, posing a risk to vehicle operators, other drivers, and pedestrians. After the recent recalls of Toyota vehicles, Congress raised questions about the auto safety defect recall process, including the sufficiency of NHTSA's oversight authorities and whether vehicle owners are being effectively motivated to comply with recalls. In response, GAO reviewed laws and documents and interviewed NHTSA and stakeholders about the (1) extent of NHTSA's role in the recall process, and how its authorities compare to selected federal and foreign agencies that oversee recalls; (2) benefits and challenges of the recall process for NHTSA and manufacturers; and (3) options for improving the recall process. GAO also conducted focus groups with vehicle owners to better understand their perspectives.
What GAO Found
NHTSA monitors manufacturers' recall campaigns and completion rates (the number of defective vehicles that are fixed) and provides information and guidance to the public. NHTSA is responsible for reviewing the planning and implementation of recall campaigns to ensure compliance with legal requirements. To this end, the agency is responsible for reviewing, among other things, the manufacturer's description of vehicles affected by a safety defect, actions the manufacturer plans to take to remedy those vehicles through a recall, and notification letters the manufacturer plans to send to the vehicles' owners. NHTSA also monitors the effectiveness of manufacturers' recall campaigns, based in large part on the data manufacturers are required to submit on completion rates. In addition, the agency provides information and guidance to the public on recalls, primarily through its Web site. NHTSA generally has similar authorities to those of selected federal and foreign agencies GAO reviewed that oversee recalls--the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and agencies in Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom--although some differences exist in how they can implement their authorities. Auto industry stakeholders are generally satisfied with the recall process, but several challenges may affect recall completion rates, and thus, the number of defective vehicles that are removed from the road. Manufacturers cited NHTSA's role in the process as a key benefit, reporting clear requirements and open communication. Although franchised dealerships had some concerns related to manufacturers' communication and availability of repair parts, they were also generally satisfied with how manufacturers reimbursed them. Nevertheless, NHTSA faces challenges that may affect recall completion rates; for example, focus group participants reported that 1) they preferred notification letters with certain elements and may be more likely to comply if the letters included the vehicle identification number (VIN) and clarified the severity of the defect and 2) they were unfamiliar with NHTSA's primary means of communicating defect information to the public--its Web site. Furthermore, according to GAO's review, although recall completion rates vary considerably by certain factors, NHTSA has not consistently used the data it collects to identify which factors make some recalls more successful than others. Finally, NHTSA does not have authority to notify potential used car buyers of a defect. Based on these challenges, NHTSA has the following and other options for improving the recall process and, more importantly, recall completion rates. First, NHTSA could modify the way manufacturers must present information in safety defect notification letters and publicize information resources, like NHTSA's Web site, so that vehicle owners are better motivated and informed. Second, NHTSA may be able to use manufacturers' data to identify what factors make some recalls more or less successful than others to better target monitoring of recall campaigns and identify best practices. Finally, expanding NHTSA's recall authorities may help identify more defective vehicles and improve recall completion rates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NHTSA (1) modify requirements for notification letters; (2) enhance and publicize its Web site (3) better use manufacturers' data; and (4) seek legislative authority to notify potential used car buyers of recalls. NHTSA agreed to consider GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-968 | gao_GAO-06-968_0 | FERC’s Role in Influencing Prices That Consumers Pay for Natural Gas Has Been Limited
Since natural gas commodity prices were deregulated in 1993, FERC’s role ensuring that the price consumers pay for natural gas is fair has been twofold and limited. First, FERC has an indirect role overseeing the market that determines commodity prices, with activities generally limited to monitoring the market to identify and punish market manipulation while supporting the development of competition. Second, FERC directly approves rates that determine interstate transportation prices. Since Deregulation, FERC Has Had a Limited, Indirect Role Overseeing Natural Gas Commodity Prices
In carrying out its responsibilities to help ensure that natural gas commodity prices in deregulated markets are competitive and free from manipulation, FERC’s Office of Enforcement polices wholesale natural gas commodity markets for manipulation. As shown in figure 2, real natural gas commodity prices accounted for almost 60 percent of the total consumer price in 2005, compared with about 30 percent in 1993. The officials said that, even after increasing the number of staff working in the Office of Enforcement dedicated to market monitoring, they are still not able to examine all of the potentially millions of transactions that occur in numerous physical and financial markets. EPAct 2005 identified six actions for FERC related to natural gas or natural gas markets. 3 in table 1). Specifically, Office of Enforcement officials noted that following the issuance of FERC’s Policy Statement on Enforcement in October 2005, which explained the new market manipulation rules and higher penalties, some industry members have self reported instances of noncompliance with FERC-approved rules in an effort to gain FERC’s consideration for a lesser penalty. States Directly Oversee Utilities’ Prices for Local Distribution of Gas, but They Have a Limited Role in Natural Gas Commodity and Transportation Prices
States directly oversee the prices utilities charge for local distribution of natural gas but have only a limited role approving natural gas commodity and interstate transportation prices. FERC officials acknowledged that providing some additional information would increase stakeholders’ understanding of FERC’s oversight of natural gas and help deter market manipulation. States can deny utilities from recovering the costs of these purchases from consumers if the costs of the gas purchases do not reflect fair market prices; however, regulators in states we reviewed told us this rarely occurs. As a result, according to the state regulators and other experts we interviewed, the states must rely on FERC to monitor commodity markets and ensure prices are fair. Stakeholders, including state regulators, other government officials, and the public, are highly affected by the commodity markets that FERC is charged with overseeing, but some of these stakeholders remain largely unaware of FERC’s oversight processes and activities. In providing even more information to stakeholders on its oversight efforts, including information, as appropriate, about ongoing monitoring and investigation activities, FERC could both increase stakeholders’ understanding about FERC’s efforts to ensure the fairness of natural gas prices and better deter market manipulation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, natural gas prices spiked to more than $15 per thousand cubic feet, nearly seven times higher than in the late 1990s. As a result, policymakers have increasingly focused on better understanding how prices are overseen. The prices that consumers pay for natural gas are composed of (1) the commodity price, (2) the cost of interstate transportation, and (3) local distribution charges. Oversight of these components belongs to the federal government, through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the states. In 1993, federal price controls over commodity prices were removed, but FERC is still charged with ensuring that prices are fair. Recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) broadened FERC's authority. GAO agreed to (1) analyze FERC's role overseeing natural gas prices, (2) summarize FERC's progress in implementing EPAct 2005, and (3) examine states' role in overseeing natural gas prices. In preparing this report, GAO met with officials from 10 states that regulate gas in different ways and analyzed relevant laws and documentation.
What GAO Found
Since natural gas commodity prices were deregulated in 1993, FERC's role in ensuring that commodity prices are determined competitively and are free from manipulation has been limited to (1) indirectly monitoring commodity markets to identify and punish market manipulation and (2) supporting competition in those markets. FERC faces challenges ensuring prices are fair, however, because staff cannot monitor all of the potentially millions of transactions and because it is difficult to identify market manipulation. FERC's oversight of commodity markets has risen in importance recently because the commodity price amounted to nearly 60 percent of the total consumer price in 2005 compared with about 30 percent in 1993. FERC also directly approves interstate transportation prices. FERC has completed action on four of the six new tasks identified by EPAct 2005 related to natural gas. FERC officials said that EPAct 2005 has achieved tangible results. For example, following FERC's issuance of a policy statement on enforcement in October 2005, some industry members have self-reported instances of noncompliance with FERC-approved rules in an effort to gain consideration for a lesser penalty. States directly oversee prices for local distribution of natural gas and have a limited role approving commodity and interstate transportation prices. States directly approve utilities' charges for local delivery of natural gas, but this represented only about 30 percent of the consumer price in 2005. While states can deny gas utilities from passing on the cost of the gas commodity to consumers, state officials told us this rarely occurs. State officials rely on FERC to ensure that commodity prices are fair, but some said they are unaware of FERC's oversight efforts. FERC officials agree that expanding the information they provide to stakeholders would improve stakeholders' understanding of FERC's efforts and could help deter manipulation. |
gao_GAO-01-499 | gao_GAO-01-499_0 | In addition, environmental and land management laws—enacted primarily during the 1960s and 1970s—require other participating federal and state agencies to address specific resource needs, including protecting endangered species, achieving clean water, and preserving wild and scenic rivers. Participants Cannot Agree on the Need for, and Type of, Reforms to the Licensing Process
FERC, federal and state land and resource agencies, licensees, environmental groups, and other participants in the licensing process do not agree on whether further reforms are needed to reduce process- related time and costs. However, without complete and accurate time and cost data and the ability to link time and costs to projects, processes, and outcomes, FERC cannot assess the extent to which the observations and suggestions—or any recommended administrative reforms or legislative changes—might shorten the process or make it less costly. FERC also cannot identify other federal agencies’ actual costs to participate in the licensing process. As agreed, this report discusses (1) why the licensing process now takes longer and costs more than it did when FERC issued most original licenses several decades ago; (2) whether participants in the licensing process agree on the need for, and type of, further reforms to the process to reduce time and costs; and (3) whether available time and cost data are sufficient to reach informed decisions on the effectiveness of recent reforms and the need for further reforms to the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report assesses the licensing process of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Specifically, GAO examines (1) why the licensing process now takes longer and costs more than it did when FERC issued most original licenses several decades ago; (2) whether participants in the licensing process agree on the need for, and type of, further reforms to reduce time and costs; and (3) whether available time and cost data are sufficient to allow informed decisions on the effectiveness of recent reforms and the need for further reforms.
What GAO Found
GAO found that since 1986, FERC has been required to give "equal consideration" to, and make tradeoffs among, hydropower generation and other competing resource needs. Additional environmental and land management laws have also placed additional requirements on other federal and state agencies participating in the licensing process to address specific resource needs. GAO found no agreement between FERC, federal and state land resource agencies, licensees, environmental groups, and other participants in the licensing process on the need for further reforms to reduce process-related time and costs. Finally, available time and cost data are insufficient to allow informed decisions on the effectiveness of recent reforms. Without complete and accurate time and cost data and the ability to link time and costs to projects, processes, and outcomes, FERC cannot assess the extent to which the observations and suggestions--or any recommended administrative reforms or legislative changes--might reduce the process' length and costs. |
gao_GAO-07-634 | gao_GAO-07-634_0 | Transportation Security Officers
TSOs screen all passengers and their carry-on baggage prior to allowing passengers access to their departure gates. Between April 2005 and December 2005, based on available documentation, TSA deliberated 189 proposed changes to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs, 92 of which were intended to modify the way in which passengers and their carry-on items are screened. When deciding whether to implement the proposed modification, TSA officials considered not only the impact that the bulk- item pat-down procedure would have on security, but also the impact that the procedure would have on screening efficiency and customer service. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged the importance of evaluating whether proposed screening procedures, including USP and the bulk-item pat-down, would enhance detection capability. While we commend TSA’s efforts to supplement professional judgment with data and metrics in its decision to modify passenger checkpoint screening procedures, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of the data collected to determine the extent to which the removal of small scissors and tools from the prohibited items list could free up TSO resources. However, TSA’s methods for data collection and analysis could be improved. However, TSA only documented the reasoning behind its decisions for about half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were not implemented. There are three elements of the TSO technical proficiency component of PASS that are intended to measure TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures: (1) quarterly observations conducted by FSD management staff of TSOs’ ability to perform particular screening functions in the operational environment, such as pat-down searches and use of the hand-held metal detector, to ensure they are complying with checkpoint screening SOPs; (2) quarterly quizzes given to TSOs to assess their knowledge of the SOPs; and (3) an annual, multipart knowledge and skills assessment. TSA Uses Local and National Covert Testing, in Part, to Assess TSO Compliance with SOPs
TSA also conducts local and national covert tests, which are used to evaluate, in part, the extent to which noncompliance with the SOPs affects TSOs’ ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. Conclusions
The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple U.S.-bound aircraft highlighted the need for TSA to continuously reassess and revise, when deemed appropriate, existing passenger checkpoint screening procedures to address threats against the commercial aviation system. We believe that TSA has implemented a reasonable approach to modifying passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its consideration of risk factors (threat and vulnerability information), day-to-day experience of TSA airport staff, and complaints and concerns raised by passengers and by making efforts to balance security, efficiency, and customer service. While we are encouraged that TSA’s documentation of its decisions regarding the SOP modifications made in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot was improved compared to earlier documentation, it is important for TSA to continue to work to strengthen its documentation efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen TSA’s evaluation of proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs and TSA’s ability to justify its decisions to implement or not implement proposed SOP modifications, in the March 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA to take the following two actions: when operationally testing proposed SOP modifications, develop sound evaluation methods, when possible, that can be used to assist TSA in determining whether proposed procedures would achieve their intended result, such as enhancing TSA’s ability to detect prohibited items and suspicious persons and freeing up existing TSO resources that could be used to implement proposed procedures, and for future proposed SOP modifications that TSA senior leadership determines are significant, generate and maintain documentation to include, at minimum, the source, intended purpose, and reasoning behind decisions to implement or not implement proposed modifications. The documentation included a list of proposed changes considered, as well as the source, the intended purpose, and in some cases the basis for recommending the SOP modification—that is, the information, experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the modifications—and the reasoning behind decisions to implement or reject proposed SOP modifications. In addition, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials who were responsible for overseeing efforts to monitor TSO compliance with standard operating procedures. Thirty of the screening changes considered by TSA between April 2005 and December 2005 were proposed by TSA headquarters officials, including Security Operations officials, who are responsible for overseeing implementation of checkpoint screening. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) most visible layer of commercial aviation security is the screening of airline passengers at airport checkpoints, where travelers and their carry-on items are screened for explosives and other dangerous items by transportation security officers (TSO). Several revisions made to checkpoint screening procedures have been scrutinized and questioned by the traveling public and Congress in recent years. For this review, GAO evaluated (1) TSA's decisions to modify passenger screening procedures between April 2005 and December 2005 and in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, and (2) how TSA monitored TSO compliance with passenger screening procedures. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed TSA documents, interviewed TSA officials and aviation security experts, and visited 25 airports of varying sizes and locations.
What GAO Found
Between April 2005 and December 2005, proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening standard operating procedures (SOP) were made for a variety of reasons, and while a majority of the proposed modifications--48 of 92--were ultimately implemented at airports, TSA's methods for evaluating and documenting them could be improved. SOP modifications were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff. TSA considered the daily experiences of airport staff, complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public, and analysis of risks to the aviation system when proposing SOP modifications. TSA also made efforts to balance the impact on security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding which proposed modifications to implement, as in the case of the SOP changes made in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. In some cases, TSA tested proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose. However, TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. For example, TSA officials decided to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat information, which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system. However, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of data it collected to assess whether this screening change would free up TSOs to focus on screening for high-risk threats, as intended. TSA officials acknowledged the importance of evaluating whether proposed screening procedures would achieve their intended purpose, but cited difficulties in doing so, including time pressures to implement needed security measures quickly. Finally, TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures was not complete. TSA documented the basis--that is, the information, experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the modifications--for 72 of the 92 proposed modifications. In addition, TSA documented the reasoning behind its decisions for half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were not implemented. Without more complete documentation, TSA may not be able to justify key modifications to passenger screening procedures to Congress and the traveling public. TSA monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its performance accountability and standards system and through covert testing. Compliance assessments include quarterly observations of TSOs' ability to perform particular screening functions in the operating environment, quarterly quizzes to assess TSOs' knowledge of procedures, and an annual knowledge and skills assessment. TSA uses covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with procedures affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges. |
gao_GAO-04-328 | gao_GAO-04-328_0 | Specifically, as previously discussed, FACA requires that the membership of committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be performed. Advisory Committees Play an Important Role in the Development of Federal Policies
Generally composed of individuals from outside of the federal government, federal advisory committees play an important role in the development of public policy and government regulations by providing advice to policymakers on a wide array of issues. Their advice—on issues such as stem cell research, space exploration, trade policy, drinking water standards, and drug approvals— can enhance the quality and credibility of federal decision making. Advisory committees may be established to provide a peer review function. First, with respect to independence, OGE guidance on whether to appoint members to advisory committees as special government employees or representatives—a decision that determines whether an agency conducts a conflict-of-interest review—has limitations that we believe are a factor in three agencies’ continuing their long- standing practice of essentially appointing all members as representatives. Because such members are not providing stakeholder advice, they would be more appropriately appointed as special government employees, subject to reviews for conflicts of interest. Information That Can Help Agencies Ensure Committees Are Balanced Is Not Systematically Gathered and Evaluated
Many agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate information that can help them determine the points of view of their potential committee members regarding the subject matters the committees will consider and thus better ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. However, GSA guidance does not address what types of information could be helpful to agencies in assessing the points of view of potential committee members, nor do agency procedures identify what information should be collected about potential members to make decisions about committee balance. Although these practices for obtaining and reviewing pertinent information to assess for conflicts of interest and impartiality are broadly applicable, some of the practices, such as seeking public comment on proposed committees, are most particularly relevant to those committees addressing sensitive or controversial topics. In explaining the need for obtaining background information about prospective members, the National Academies emphasize that the work of their committees must be, and must be perceived as being, free of any significant conflict of interest and uncompromised by bias. To better ensure that the committee members, agency and congressional officials, and the public understand the nature of the advice provided by federal advisory committees, we recommend that GSA issue guidance that agencies should identify the committee formation process used for each committee, particularly how members are identified and screened and how committees are assessed for overall balance; state in the appointment letters to committee members whether they are appointed as special government employees or representatives; in cases where appointments are as representatives, the letters should further identify the entity or group that they are to represent; identify each member’s appointment category on the GSA FACA database; for representative members, the entity or group represented should also be identified; and state in the committee products the nature of the advice provided—that is, whether the product is based on independent advice or consensus among the various identified interests or stakeholders. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the role of federal advisory committees in the development of national policies; (2) examines the extent to which governmentwide and agency-specific policies and procedures for evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees; and (3) identifies practices that could better ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being, independent and balanced. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because advisory committees are established to advise federal decision makers on significant national issues, it is essential that their membership be, and be perceived as being, free from conflicts of interest and balanced as a whole. GAO was asked to (1) describe the role of federal advisory committees in the development of national policies, (2) examine the extent to which existing guidance and policies and procedures for evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view ensure independent members and balanced committees, and (3) identify practices and measures that could help ensure independence and balance.
What GAO Found
Federal advisory committees play an important role in shaping public policy by providing advice on a wide array of issues, such as stem cell research, drinking water standards, space exploration, drug approvals, and federal land management. About 950 advisory committees perform peer reviews of scientific research; offer advice on policy issues; identify long-range issues; and evaluate grant proposals, among other functions. Additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the independence of members--that is, that they are free from significant conflicts of interest--and balance of federal advisory committees. For example, current limitations in the Office of Government Ethics' (OGE) guidance are a factor in at least three agencies' continuing a long-standing practice of appointing most or all members as "representatives"--expected to reflect the views of the entity or group they are representing and not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews--even when the agencies call upon the members to provide advice on behalf of the government. Such members would be more appropriately appointed as "special government employees," who are reviewed for conflicts of interest. OGE officials agreed with GAO that these agencies' appointments of some members as representatives of their fields of expertise are not appropriate, and this practice avoids using the special government employee category that was created to help the government hire experts in various fields for such purposes. OGE guidance that representatives may speak for, among others, any recognizable group of persons should be clarified to state that they generally are not to represent an expertise. Also, to be effective, advisory committees must be, and be perceived as being, fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to be performed. However, the General Services Administration's (GSA) guidance on advisory committee management does not address what types of information could be helpful to agencies in assessing the points of view of potential committee members, nor do agency procedures identify what information should be collected about potential members to make decisions about committee balance. Consequently, many agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate information pertinent to determining the points of view of potential committee members, such as previous public positions or statements on matters being reviewed. GAO identified promising practices and measures that can better ensure independence and balance and promote transparency in the federal advisory committee system, such as obtaining nominations from the public and making public information about how members are identified and screened. Wider use of these practices--particularly for committees addressing sensitive or controversial topics--could reduce the likelihood that committees are, or are perceived as being, biased or imbalanced. |
gao_GAO-14-28 | gao_GAO-14-28_0 | Fiscal exposures vary widely as to source, extent of the government’s legal commitment, and magnitude. Figure 1 illustrates the range of the legal commitment. Fiscal exposures may be explicit in that the government is legally required to fund the commitment, or implicit in that an exposure arises not from a legal commitment, but from current policy, past practices, or other factors that may create the expectation for future spending. Some exposures present elements of both explicit and implicit exposures. If an event occurs, some payment is legally required; this represents an explicit exposure. There may be an expectation that the government will provide assistance beyond the program’s total available resources or budget authority (e.g., flood insurance payments made in response to a major disaster): this expectation represents an implicit exposure. Future spending for other implicit exposures can be more difficult to estimate. losses if an event occurs in the future, the generally cash-based measures used in the budget do not reflect the magnitude of the government’s legal commitment of future resources at the time decisions are being made. Therefore, some measures reported in the government’s financial statements can be useful indicators of future spending arising from certain fiscal exposures. Prior to 2008, securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were explicitly not guaranteed by the federal government and the government had no legal responsibility to provide support to these GSEs. However, in response to the financial crisis, the government placed them into conservatorship and agreed to provide temporary assistance, creating a new explicit exposure. In addition, we found that the budget provides incomplete information or potentially misleading signals about today’s legal commitments for some other exposures as well. Approaches to Better Recognize the Programs that Create Fiscal Exposures in the Budget
Given the variation in fiscal exposures, when making budget decisions, a uniform, across-the-board approach to make fiscal exposures more apparent may not be appropriate. Several factors need to be taken into account in selecting an approach to better recognize fiscal exposures in the budget: the extent of the government’s legal commitment; the length of time until the resulting payment is made; and the extent to which the magnitude of the exposure can be reasonably estimated. For the Federal Crop Insurance budget account, a supplemental table includes the cost of the premium subsidy provided by the government. facing the federal government—would be an important first step toward enhancing control and oversight over federal resources and can aid in monitoring the financial condition of programs over the longer term. Incorporating measures of the full cost into primary budget data would provide enhanced control over future spending. This can both improve the nation’s fiscal condition and enhance the budgetary flexibility for responding to unexpected or emerging challenges. The amount of federal spending resulting from this exposure depends on the extent of losses incurred by farmers. PBGC is an example of a program for which cash-based budgeting provides potentially misleading information. Extent and Estimated Magnitude of the Exposure
The purchase agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac illustrate how an exposure can change over time. See GAO, U.S. fund was started in reaction to rapidly rising health care costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government's long-term fiscal imbalances are driven on the spending side by the effects of an aging population and rising health care costs on Social Security and major federal health programs. However, GAO identified a variety of other fiscal exposures--responsibilities, programs, and activities that may legally commit or create the expectation for future federal spending--that vary as to source, extent of the government's legal commitment, and magnitude. A more complete understanding of these other fiscal exposures can help policymakers anticipate changes in future spending and enhance control and oversight over federal resources.
GAO was asked to provide information on risks facing the federal budget. This report (1) examines selected programs that create a fiscal exposure, including the extent and estimated magnitude of the government's legal commitment; and (2) assesses how fiscal exposures could be better recognized in the budget. Based on its review of budget and financial data, GAO selected nine programs, including federal employee benefit programs, insurance programs, and the stock purchase agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and drew upon previous work to discuss potential approaches for improving budgetary attention to fiscal exposures.
What GAO Found
Fiscal exposures may be explicit in that the federal government is legally required to pay for the commitment; alternatively, it may be implicit in that the exposure arises from expectations based on current policy or past practices. The nine programs GAO examined illustrate the range of federal fiscal exposures (see figure) and how they can change over time. Also, some programs may have elements of both explicit and implicit exposure. Federal insurance programs, for example, fall across the spectrum: if an event occurs, some payment is legally required--an explicit exposure. However, there may be an expectation that the government will provide assistance beyond the amount legally required--that is an implicit exposure. Prior to 2008, securities issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were explicitly not backed by the U.S. government. However, in response to the financial crisis, the government's agreement to provide temporary assistance to cover their losses up to a set amount created a new explicit exposure. The amount of future spending arising from federal fiscal exposures varies in the degree to which it is known and can be measured.
For some exposures GAO found that the budget provided incomplete information or potentially misleading signals regarding the full cost of the commitments made today. A uniform across-the-board approach to make fiscal exposures more apparent when making budget decisions may not be appropriate given their varying characteristics. Several factors need to be taken into account in selecting an approach to better recognize fiscal exposures in the budget: the extent of the government's legal commitment; the length of time until the resulting payment is made; and the extent to which the magnitude of the exposure can be reasonably estimated. Expanding the availability and use of supplemental information, including measures that can signal significant changes in the magnitude of fiscal exposures, would be an important first step to enhancing oversight over federal resources and can aid in monitoring the financial condition of programs over the longer term. Incorporating measures of the full cost into primary budget data would provide enhanced control over future spending, which can help both improve the nation's fiscal condition and enhance budgetary flexibility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations but this analysis provides additional support for past recommendations to improve budget recognition of fiscal exposures by, for example, expanding the availability and use of information on expected future spending arising from commitments made today. |
gao_GAO-14-559 | gao_GAO-14-559_0 | Little research exists on which specific interlock program characteristics may improve installation rates or otherwise improve the effectiveness of ignition-interlock programs, but NHTSA’s ongoing and planned research—expected to be completed between 2014 and 2015—may fill this gap. Most studies use DWI arrest as a proxy for alcohol-impaired driving; however researchers have noted that arrest for DWI is a rare event, with some estimating that less than 1 A 2011 review of percent of alcohol-impaired drivers are detected.literature assessing the effectiveness of ignition interlocks identified 15 studies (12 in the U.S., 2 in Canada, and 1 on Sweden) that observed that ignition interlock installation reduced the risk of being re-arrested for DWI offenders, compared to DWI offenders not using ignition interlocks. Research we identified on the effectiveness of ignition interlocks also indicates that once the devices are removed, DWI arrest rates return to pre-interlock rates.DWI offenses in New Mexico observed a reduction in re-arrest while the ignition interlocks were installed, but in a period following removal of the ignition interlock, there was no significant difference in DWI re-arrest rates between offenders who had installed the ignition interlock and those who had not. NHTSA officials reported that between 15 and 20 percent of offenders arrested for DWI install ignition interlocks. For example, NHTSA officials told us that in an ongoing study of state ignition-interlock programs, they were able to identify only eight states with sufficient data (e.g., the number of ignition interlocks ordered and the number of DWI offenders who actually installed the ignition interlocks) to estimate the program’s installation rate. NHTSA is currently working with the Preusser Research Group (PRG) to conduct a study on factors that could help states improve installation rates. NHTSA Provided Assistance to States for Ignition-Interlock Programs, but Some State Officials Questioned NHTSA’s Implementation of MAP-21 Grant
NHTSA offered a variety of assistance—including guidance, technical assistance, research, and education—to help states establish and improve their ignition-interlock programs, including the new ignition- interlock grant established by MAP-21. According to some state officials, exemptions are seldom used in practice, but are important to maintain because they facilitate the ability of offenders to work. As described previously, states qualify for this grant by requiring that all individuals convicted of a DWI offense be limited to driving motor vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock. NHTSA officials stated that they based their implementation of the ignition-interlock grant on the plain meaning of the authorizing language in MAP-21, which did not include any reference to exemptions or exclusions. Specifically, NHTSA’s Digest indicated that as of May 2012 at least 5 states allowed exemptions for employer vehicles, and additional states had other factors that would prevent them from qualifying for the ignition-interlock grant. Based on experience in reviewing state impaired driving laws, NHTSA officials recognized that many states would have to change existing laws to apply to first time offenders and eliminate exemptions. Few states were expected to qualify in the grant’s first years because it would be difficult for state legislatures to change their ignition interlock laws in that time frame. Most of the states that did not receive the grant were disqualified due to employer exemptions. State legislatures in Arizona and Washington were able to eliminate employer exemptions and other disqualifying factors from their laws in order to qualify for the grant in fiscal year 2014, bringing the total grant recipients to four that year. Because the ignition-interlock grant is relatively new, the extent to which additional state legislatures would be willing or able to modify their laws to qualify for the grant is unclear. In the first 2 years of the grant program, few states applied for the grant and of those, most were disqualified because of exemptions that allowed DWI offenders to drive employer-owned vehicles without ignition interlocks. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT also provided technical corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) what is known about the effectiveness of ignition interlocks in reducing alcohol-impaired driving and (2) the extent to which the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has assisted states in implementing ignition- interlock programs, including the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) ignition-interlock grant program. To identify the types of assistance that NHTSA provides to states to help them establish and implement their ignition-interlock programs, we interviewed NHTSA officials about their activities and reviewed reports describing NHTSA’s ignition interlock-related research, technical assistance, and conferences. For both objectives, we interviewed representatives from safety advocacy organizations such as the Governors Highway Safety Association and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. | Why GAO Did This Study
Motor vehicle crashes involving alcohol-impaired drivers killed 10,322 people in 2012 and account for almost one third of all traffic fatalities annually. Ignition interlocks are one strategy states use to combat DWI. In 2012, MAP-21 established a grant program for states that adopt and implement mandatory alcohol ignition-interlock laws for all convicted DWI offenders. Funding authorization for this program expires at the end of fiscal year 2014.
GAO was asked to review the effectiveness of ignition interlocks and NHTSA's implementation of the new grant program. This report discusses (1) what is known about ignition interlock effectiveness and (2) the extent to which NHTSA has assisted states in implementing ignition-interlock programs, including the grant program. GAO reviewed 25 studies that analyzed relationships between ignition interlocks and DWI arrests and fatalities; interviewed NHTSA officials and reviewed reports about NHTSA's assistance to states; and interviewed representatives from safety-advocacy and research organizations, and officials involved with ignition-interlock programs from 10 states. The states were selected based on grant program qualification and the number of alcohol-impaired fatalities, among other factors. The information from these states is not generalizable. DOT officials reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the findings. DOT offered technical corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Research GAO reviewed consistently indicated that when installed ignition “interlocks”—devices that prevent drivers from starting their cars if they have been drinking alcohol—effectively reduce the rate of re-arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI) when installed. But once the devices are removed, DWI re-arrest rates return to pre-interlock rates. (Most studies use DWI arrest as a proxy for alcohol-impaired driving.) Further, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of offenders arrested for DWI actually install ignition interlocks. Many factors contribute to low installation rates. For example, some states lack the resources to monitor offenders to ensure they install ignition interlocks; other states require that offenders pay fees and penalties to be eligible to install ignition interlocks and return to driving with interlocks. State ignition interlock programs vary in terms of how they are designed, but little research exists on which specific interlock program characteristics—such as monitoring or length of installation—could improve the effectiveness of interlock programs. NHTSA is currently conducting studies on factors that could help states improve installation rates or otherwise improve the effectiveness of their interlock programs. NHTSA expects these studies to be completed by 2015.
NHTSA has offered a variety of technical assistance, research, and education to help states establish and improve their ignition-interlock programs, as well as implement the ignition interlock grant program established by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21). While state officials confirmed that NHTSA's overall ignition-interlock-related activities have been useful, some questioned NHTSA's implementation of the ignition interlock grant program. Specifically, NHTSA's implementation was based on the plain meaning of the authorizing language in MAP-21, which did not include any reference to exemptions. As a result, states with “employer exemptions”—programs that require offenders to drive only vehicles equipped with ignition interlocks for personal use but allow them to drive employer-owned vehicles for work purposes—were disqualified. Some state officials told us these exemptions are seldom used in practice, but are important to maintain because they facilitate the ability of offenders to work. According to NHTSA officials, they recognized that to qualify for the grant, many states would have to modify their ignition-interlock laws to make them applicable to first time offenders and eliminate exemptions; therefore, few states were expected to qualify in the grant's first years because it would be difficult for state legislatures to change their ignition-interlock laws in that time frame. In fiscal year 2013, 2 states qualified for the grant; most of the additional 12 states that applied for the grant were disqualified at least in part due to employer exemptions, but the legislatures in 2 of those states later removed such exemptions from their laws, resulting in 4 states qualifying for the grant in fiscal year 2014. Because the ignition interlock grant is relatively new, the extent to which additional state legislatures may be willing or able to modify their laws to qualify for the grant is unclear. A 2012 NHTSA review of states' impaired-driving laws found that at least 5 states' ignition-interlock laws included employer vehicle exemptions, but additional states had other factors that would prevent them from qualifying for the ignition-interlock grant. |
gao_GAO-10-569T | gao_GAO-10-569T_0 | Available Information about the Occurrence of Concussion in High School Sports Cannot Provide an Overall National Estimate
We identified three national databases that, as part of broader data collection efforts, collect information on the occurrence of concussion in high school sports, but they do not provide an overall national estimate of occurrence. These databases are the NCCSI database, the CPSC’s National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), and the Center for Injury Research and Policy’s High School RIO. High School RIO provides national estimates of the occurrence of concussion in 20 sports for high schools with certified athletic trainers, based on its sample of 100 high schools with certified athletic trainers. The third database, NCCSI, provides information on cases of concussion with serious complications, but it cannot provide national estimates of occurrence of all concussions. For example, High School RIO gathers information only on concussions that are reported to or observed by a certified athletic trainer, but, according to officials from an athletic trainers’ association, athletes may be reluctant to report symptoms of possible concussions to athletic trainers to avoid being removed from play. Similarly, NEISS gathers information only on concussions in patients who are treated in emergency departments, but not all athletes with a concussion go to an emergency department for treatment. The Primary Federal Program Directed Specifically at Preventing Concussion in High School Sports Is CDC’s Heads Up: Concussion
CDC’s Heads Up: Concussion in High School Sports is the primary federal program directed specifically at preventing concussion in high school sports. As part of the agency’s promotional activities for its national roll-out, CDC developed press kits and other promotional materials, and to promote the program, it partnered with 14 public and private organizations, including Education, physician associations, and other organizations that conduct work in high school athletics or sports medicine. These initiatives are not targeted exclusively at high school sports, but are directed more broadly at sports and recreation safety for youth and adults. For example, CPSC developed a brochure on which helmets to wear for a variety of activities, such as football, baseball, and bicycling, to prevent head injuries, including concussion. Concussion Education and Return-to-Play Requirements Are the Focus of Key State Laws, but Exact Requirements Differ
The three key state laws regarding the management of concussion that were identified by federal officials and experts all include requirements related to concussion education and athletes’ return to play. The education components of the key state laws—those of Oregon, Texas, and Washington—vary in terms of targeted group and frequency of training. The return-to-play requirements of the key state laws vary with respect to the conditions under which the requirements apply and the personnel who may authorize return to play. The educational requirements of the Oregon law are targeted at coaches. The Washington law is the only one that requires that parents, in addition to coaches and athletes, receive education. The Washington law requires that an athlete suspected of having a concussion be evaluated and cleared to return to play by a health professional specifically trained in the evaluation and management of concussion. Voluntary Nationwide Guidelines for Managing Concussion Incurred in High School Sports All Recommend Assessing Concussion on an Individual Basis, with Gradual Return to Play
Federal officials and experts we spoke with identified five sets of voluntary nationwide guidelines that address the management of concussion in sports. All sets of guidelines also recommend returning an athlete to play on a gradual basis, tailored to the individual athlete’s recovery and based on the athlete’s signs and symptoms and the results of various concussion assessment tools, such as tests of memory, cognition, balance, and physical exertion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Participation in school sports can benefit children but also carries a risk of injury, including concussion. Concussion is a brain injury that can affect memory, speech, and muscle coordination and can cause permanent disability or death. Concussion can be especially serious for children, who are more likely than adults both to sustain a concussion and to take longer to recover. These factors may affect return-to-play decisions, which determine when it is safe for an athlete to participate in sports again. GAO was asked to testify on concussion incurred in high school sports. This statement focuses on (1) what is known about the nationwide occurrence of concussion, (2) federal concussion prevention programs, (3) the components of key state laws related to the management of concussion, and (4) the recommendations of voluntary nationwide concussion management guidelines. To do this work, GAO conducted literature searches; reviewed injury databases, state laws, and documents from federal agencies and organizations that conduct work in high school athletics or sports medicine; and interviewed federal officials and experts who identified key state laws and nationwide guidelines and provided other information. GAO shared the information in this statement with the relevant federal agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO identified three national databases that, as part of broader data collection efforts, collect information on the occurrence of concussion in high school sports, but they do not provide an overall national estimate of occurrence. Although the High School Reporting Information Online database provides national estimates of occurrence of concussion, it covers only 20 sports for high schools with certified athletic trainers. It may underestimate occurrence because some athletes may be reluctant to report symptoms of a possible concussion to avoid being removed from a game. The Consumer Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) National Electronic Injury Surveillance System provides national estimates only on concussions treated in an emergency room. The National Center for Catastrophic Sports Injury Research database provides information only on cases of concussion with serious complications and cannot provide national estimates of the occurrence of all concussions. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's program, Heads Up: Concussion in High School Sports, which began in September 2005, is the primary federal prevention program directed toward concussion. In addition, CPSC carries out prevention initiatives that include distributing educational materials, but these initiatives are directed more broadly at sports and recreation safety, such as appropriate helmets for football, baseball, and bicycling. The three key laws regarding the management of concussion in high school sports that were identified by federal officials and experts--those of Oregon, Texas, and Washington--all address concussion education and return to play, but their specific requirements vary. The education requirements vary with respect to who is to receive the education. For example, the Washington law targets coaches, athletes, and parents, while the Oregon law targets coaches only. There is also variation with respect to the content and frequency of education. The return-to-play requirements vary in the conditions under which athletes may return to play and in who may authorize it. For example, the Texas requirements apply specifically to athletes who lose consciousness, which excludes many concussions, and the Washington law requires return-to-play authorizations to be made by health professionals specifically trained in the evaluation and management of concussion. GAO found five sets of voluntary nationwide guidelines, which were developed by organizations that conduct work in high school athletics or sports medicine, that address the management of concussion in high school sports. All recommend monitoring an athlete with a concussion on the sidelines and assessing cognitive function regularly for signs of deterioration. All guidelines also recommend returning an athlete to play on a gradual basis, tailored to an individual's recovery and based on symptoms and the results of memory, cognition, and balance tests |
gao_RCED-97-137 | gao_RCED-97-137_0 | A number of possible indicators of aviation safety exist. FAA’s Actions to Provide More Aviation Safety Information to the Public
FAA began to take a number of actions to provide aviation safety-related information to the public in July 1996. The Administrator asked FAA’s Office of System Safety to assemble a working group of senior-level officials to determine how the FAA could most efficiently and effectively accomplish this task. As a result, FAA announced on January 29, 1997, that it would use the Internet to pursue all three of its information strategies: establishing an aviation safety information web site linked to FAA’s Internet web site, publicizing significant enforcement actions, and undertaking a public education campaign on aviation safety. In addition to the press release and public education information, the aviation safety information web site includes a link to a web site maintained by the FAA’s Office of System Safety, where the public can access and search several of the principal sources of aviation safety data and information that are used by the federal government. When it was first made available to the public, the web site included three aviation safety databases:
The NTSB Aviation Accident/Incident Database, which is the official repository of aviation accident data and causal factors. Early Data Indicate That Public Demand for Aviation Safety Information on the Internet Has Grown
Since FAA first established its aviation safety web site on the Internet, it has seen an approximately fourfold increase in the number of users who have accessed the safety data web site each week. They added, however, that it is too early to tell if these trends will continue. FAA’s Plans to Expand Information About Aviation Safety on Its Web Site
FAA plans to add other safety-related information to the web site gradually over time. By May 31, 1997, FAA plans to add data from the FAA National Airspace Incident Monitoring System, which includes information on near mid-air collisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) what actions the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken to make aviation safety information more available to the public; (2) what the public demand has been for FAA's aviation safety information; (3) FAA's plans to expand the aviation safety information available to the public; and (4) FAA's progress in making safety information available to the public.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA took a number of actions to provide aviation safety-related information to the public beginning in July 1996; (2) FAA formed a working group of senior-level agency officials and adopted a strategy of providing aviation safety information to the public through a three-part effort: (a) establishing an aviation safety information web site linked to the FAA's Internet web site; (b) publicizing significant enforcement actions; and (c) undertaking a public education campaign on aviation safety; (3) as of April 10, 1997, FAA has included four databases on its aviation safety Internet web site; (4) those databases include information on aviation accidents, other safety-related incidents, traffic data (e.g., departures made) reported by large commercial air carriers, which can be used to calculate comparative accident or incident rates, and the safety recommendations made by the National Transportation Safety Board to FAA; (5) since FAA first made its aviation safety site on the Internet available to the public, it has seen an approximate fourfold increase in the number of users who have accessed the web site each week; (6) usage has increased during those weeks when a public announcement related to the site has been made; (7) in addition, FAA's data indicate that users are spending more time using the site; (8) it is too soon, however, to tell if these trends will continue; (9) FAA plans to expand the number of databases that it posts on its aviation safety web site throughout the rest of 1997; and (10) it expects to incorporate information on the airlines' composition (i.e., the make, models, and ages of aircraft in each airline's fleet) and other indicators of aviation safety (e.g., data on near mid-air collisions). |
gao_GAO-01-973 | gao_GAO-01-973_0 | Background
Surveillance of foodborne diseases allows public health officials to recognize trends, detect outbreaks, pinpoint the causes of these outbreaks, and develop effective prevention and control measures. Four of these—the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System, FoodNet, PulseNet, and the Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm— focus on foodborne diseases and cover multiple pathogens. Delayed Reporting and Incomplete Data Limit CDC’s Surveillance Systems, but CDC Is Working to Address These Problems
Public health officials that we contacted said that both untimely release of surveillance data by CDC and the gaps in some of CDC’s data limit the surveillance systems’ usefulness. These programs are designed to address staffing or technology shortages, or both, and will help the states provide CDC with more complete information. To encourage more standardized reporting among the states, CDC consults annually with the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists to determine which infectious diseases, including foodborne diseases, are important enough to merit routine reporting to CDC. Officials from CDC told us they have also entered into cooperative agreements with the council and with the Association of Public Health Laboratories to assess the states’ capability and capacity to address public health issues, including foodborne diseases. Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System
CDC created the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System in 1973 to collect data about cases of foodborne disease that are contracted by two or more patients as a result of ingesting a common food. | What GAO Found
Foodborne diseases in the United States cause an estimated 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths annually, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Surveillance is the most important tool for detecting and monitoring both existing and emerging foodborne diseases. In the United States, surveillance for foodborne disease is also used to identify outbreaks--two or more cases of a similar illness that result from ingestion of a common food--and their causes. CDC has 18 surveillance systems used to detect cases or outbreaks of foodborne disease, pinpoint their cause, recognize trends, and develop effective prevention and control measures. Four principal systems--the Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System, PulseNet, FoodNet, and the Surveillance Outbreak Detection Algorithm--focus on foodborne diseases and cover more than one pathogen. Although CDC's systems have contributed to food safety, the usefulness of several of these surveillance systems is impaired both by CDC's untimely release of surveillance data and by gaps in the data collection. CDC is providing funds to state and local health departments to address their staffing and technology needs to help the states provide CDC with more complete information. CDC officials have entered into a cooperative agreement with the Association of Public Health Laboratories to assess the states' capability and capacity to address public health issues, including foodborne disease. CDC consults annually with the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists to encourage more standardized reporting among states. |
gao_RCED-99-107 | gao_RCED-99-107_0 | This saving would be achieved by maintaining travel costs at a level $35 million below the fiscal year 1995 level. Contractor Travel Costs Are Increasing
Travel costs incurred by DOE contractors were reduced in fiscal year 1996, but since then these costs have been increasing. Annual contractor travel costs were reduced to about $223 million in fiscal year 1996 but increased to about $241 million in fiscal year 1997 and to about $249 million in fiscal year 1998. The remaining top destinations were Oakland/San Francisco, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Los Alamos, New Mexico. The second most frequent foreign destination was the United Kingdom, which accounted for 6 percent of all foreign trips. The remaining top foreign destinations were Germany, France, and Japan. More frequent trips to Russia have significantly contributed to this increase. Most Travel Is Related to Facilities’ Missions
DOE contractors reported that most travel to domestic and foreign locations was for business purposes, that is, travel for purposes related to the mission of the facilities. The next most frequent travel category was for attending conferences. Figure 2 provides information on the major travel categories reported by DOE contractor sites. The report cited a May 1997 particle accelerator conference in Vancouver, British Columbia, that was attended by 520 DOE contractor employees (as well as 5 DOE employees), resulting in travel costs of about $1 million. In another case, 176 DOE and DOE contractor participants attended a January 1996 human genome conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico. However, DOE has had limited success. However, DOE did not establish measures to enforce these targets, nor was it prescriptive as to how these cost reductions were to be achieved. During fiscal years 1996-98, even though the number of contractor staff has dropped and some contractors reported that they increased the use of video and teleconferencing, the number of trips taken by DOE contractors had not been reduced. We noted that contractors have had some success in this area. Millions Spent Annually for Contractor Employees on Assignment to Washington, D.C.
DOE spends millions of dollars on the costs associated with management and operating contractor employees assigned temporarily or permanently to Washington, D.C. DOE’s Office of Inspector General raised concerns about the Department’s awareness of, and control over, these assignments, and DOE has taken actions to reduce the number of employees on assignments and plans to reduce it further. However, a concern remains about the payments that contractors are making to employees on long-term temporary assignments for their increased tax-related costs. For its part, DOE contractors were aware of the targets, but many contractors did not translate this into an overall strategy or plan to achieve lower travel costs. We discussed with officials from the Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the Office of Management and Administration the Department’s efforts to reduce contractor travel costs and obtained their viewpoints on the contractors’ control of travel and efforts to meet the current cost-reduction targets. Living Allowances Currently Provided by Various DOE Contractors for Employees on Assignment in Washington, D.C., Area
Assignments greater than 1 year
55% of current federal travel regulations per diem rate
Additional 10% of base pay field premium
Additional 10% of base pay location allowance
100% of current federal travel regulations rate
Additional 10% of base pay field premium
Additional 10% of base pay location allowance
25% of base pay cost of living differential
55% of current federal travel regulations per diem rate
10% of base pay assignment allowance
100% of current federal travel regulations rate
10% of base pay assignment allowance $1,000 miscellaneous allowance
15%-18% of base pay living differential (declining to zero after 5 years) $1,000 miscellaneous allowance
55% of current federal travel regulations per diem rate
80% of current federal housing allowance
40% “plus-up” of housing allowance to cover additional tax liabilities
55% of current federal travel regulations rate for stays of 1 to 6 months
Actual and reasonable costs for stays of 6 to 12 months $1,000 miscellaneous allowance
Actual and reasonable costs, plus an additional allowance to cover additional tax liabilities $1,000 miscellaneous allowance $1,000 miscellaneous allowance
60%-85% of federal travel regulations lodging rate
60%-85% of federal travel regulations lodging rate
20% of base salary cost of living adjustment (declining to zero after 5 years)
Comments From the Department of Energy
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) contractor travel costs, and DOE's efforts to reduce these costs, focusing on the: (1) travel costs incurred by DOE contractors and their primary destinations during fiscal years (FY) 1996 through 1998; (2) purpose of this travel; and (3) success that DOE has had in reducing contractor travel costs and additional actions available to reduce these costs further.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) travel costs incurred by DOE contractors were reduced from $261 million in FY 1995 to $223 million in FY 1996; (2) since then, travel costs have increased--to $249 million by FY 1998--even though funding to the contractors during this period had been decreasing; (3) about 96 percent of the contractors' travel was to domestic locations, the most frequent of these being Washington, D.C. and the sites of DOE's major laboratories and test facilities: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Oakland/San Francisco, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Los Alamos, New Mexico; (4) the most frequent foreign destinations were Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan; (5) the purpose of most travel was reported as being for business reasons, that is, travel for purposes related to the mission of the facilities; (6) this category included trips to attend meetings or perform research; (7) GAO identified trips that were miscategorized or were of questionable value to DOE; (8) for example, business trips included travel to obtain advanced degrees; (9) the second most frequently cited travel purpose was for attending conferences; (10) according to DOE's Inspector General, the large number of conference attendees is a concern; (11) the Inspector General identified hundreds of DOE contractor staff attending a 1997 conference in Vancouver, British Columbia, resulting in travel costs of about $1 million; (12) DOE's success in reducing contractor travel costs has been limited; (13) although contractor travel costs have increased since FY 1996, they have remained below the FY 1995 level--the level that DOE established as a baseline for calculating contractor travel cost savings; (14) only in FY 1996 did DOE attain the expected $30 million savings in contractor travel by achieving a $38 million reduction in that year; (15) contractors did not continue to achieve such savings because DOE did not enforce its cost reduction targets and some contractors did not have an overall strategy or plan to achieve lower travel costs; (16) DOE spends millions of dollars on travel and other costs for contractor employees on temporary or permanent assignment to Washington, D.C.; (17) DOE has reduced the number of contractor employees in Washington and is planning on further reductions; and (18) however, concerns exist over the additional compensation that contractors are providing for employees on long-term temporary assignments to cover the tax liabilities on their living allowances. |
gao_GAO-07-850T | gao_GAO-07-850T_0 | Current and Future Issues That Challenge States’ Ability to Improve Child Outcomes
States reported that their ability to improve child outcomes was challenged most by inadequate levels of mental health and substance abuse services available to children and families, too few caseworkers for too many child welfare cases, and a lack of homes that can meet the needs of certain children, such as those with developmental disabilities. Challenges are expected to grow in future years related to serving children with special needs or who have been exposed to illegal drugs, and changing demographic trends that will require greater multicultural sensitivity in providing services to an increasingly diverse child welfare population. Inadequate Levels of Mental Health, Substance Abuse, and Other Services Challenge States’ Ability to Meet the Needs of Children and Families
State child welfare agencies identified specific services underlying their challenge to serve children and families, citing constraints on federal funding, service gaps, and limited awareness of services outside the child welfare system as contributing factors. 1.) 2.) 3.) 4.) 5.) For example, child welfare officials in Texas reported that the state does not have a sufficient number of adoptive homes for children with special needs. As a result, these children generally stay in foster care for longer periods of time. For example, with respect to services, states most frequently reported that they were challenged by the lack of mental health and substance abuse services for children and families, yet only four states reported having initiatives to improve the level of these services. Recent legislation supports states’ efforts to improve substance abuse services. Most states also reported that they had implemented initiatives to improve recruitment and retention of child welfare caseworkers, but few states reported initiatives to address two of the most frequently reported factors underlying this challenge—the administrative burden on caseworkers and effective supervision. Recent law supports states’ efforts in this area as well. In addition, the law reorganized the Child Welfare Services program funded under Title IV-B, adding a purpose section to the law that included: “providing training, professional development, and support to ensure a well-qualified child welfare workforce.”
Almost all states reported implementing initiatives to improve their ability to find appropriate homes for children, but few states reported initiatives that addressed two of the three most frequently reported factors underlying this challenge (see fig. Some states implemented initiatives under federal demonstration projects, and evaluations of outcomes states were required to conduct under these projects showed mixed results. Federal Action Taken To Ensure States Develop Plans to Serve Children and Families Displaced by Disaster
Several actions have been taken by HHS and the Congress to better ensure that states are prepared to continue child welfare services for children and families displaced by disaster across county or state lines. We reported in July 2006 that although 29 states, plus Puerto Rico, experienced a federally declared disaster in 2005, only 8 of these states reported having a written child welfare disaster plan. HHS took action that addressed states’ concerns and our report recommendations including updating its 1995 disaster plan guidance, providing technical assistance, and asking states to voluntarily submit copies of their disaster plans for review by December 2006. The deadline set by HHS for submission of these plans is June 30, 2007. As funding fluctuates or declines, full awareness of resources outside the child welfare system becomes especially important, and we recommended in our October 2006 report that the Secretary of HHS improve awareness of and access to various social services funded by the federal government. Recent federal action has been taken to establish requirements and dedicate funding to states to help address these specific problems now and in the future. GAO-07-75. GAO-06-944. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance, GAO-06-297T. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite substantial federal and state investment, states have had difficulty ensuring the safety, well-being, and permanency of children in foster care. Ensuring these outcomes becomes even more difficult in the event of disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, when children and families may become displaced across state lines. This testimony discusses (1) the issues that states reported as most important to resolve now and in the future to improve outcomes for children under their supervision (2) initiatives states reported taking to address these issues and how recent law provides support for additional state efforts and (3) federal action taken to assist states' efforts in developing child welfare disaster plans. This testimony is primarily based on our October 2006 report on state child welfare challenges (GAO-07-75) and our July 2006 report on state child welfare disaster planning (GAO-06-944). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Congress took action that addressed our July report recommendations. However, HHS disagreed with our October report recommendation to improve awareness of and access to federal social services by modifying the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance or other means. We continue to believe that taking such action would help improve services to children and families.
What GAO Found
States reported in our survey that inadequate levels of mental health and substance abuse services, the high average number of child welfare cases per worker, and the difficulty finding homes for children with special needs were the most important challenges to resolve in order to improve outcomes for children under states' care. Child welfare officials cited various reasons these challenges existed in their states, such as a lack of funding for family support services and a lack of caseload standards. Over the next 5 years, major challenges for state child welfare systems were cited as serving a growing population of children with special needs or who have been exposed to illegal drugs, and changing demographic trends that will require greater multicultural sensitivity in providing services to some groups of children and their families. States have some initiatives in place to address these challenges, but these initiatives do not always address areas of states' greatest concern. For example, only 4 of 31 states dissatisfied with substance abuse services reported initiatives to improve the level of these services. Similarly, states reported little or no action to address two of the most frequently reported factors underlying the challenge to recruit and retain caseworkers - the administrative burden on caseworkers and effective supervision. Recent law provides additional requirements and funding to help states address these challenges. Some states implemented initiatives under federal demonstration projects, including those to improve substance abuse services and permanent homes for children. However, outcome evaluations of these initiatives have shown mixed results. Several actions have been taken by HHS and the Congress to better ensure that states are prepared to continue child welfare services for children displaced by disaster. Our earlier work showed that although 29 states, plus Puerto Rico, experienced a federally declared disaster in 2005, only 8 of these states reported having a written child welfare disaster plan. Since that time, HHS has updated its guidance to states and provided technical assistance. In addition, the Congress passed the Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006, requiring that states have procedures in place concerning how state child welfare agencies would respond in the event of a disaster. The deadline set by HHS for submission of these plans is June 30, 2007. |
gao_GAO-03-595T | gao_GAO-03-595T_0 | Budget and performance integration is one of the administration's five priorities in the PMA, while PART is the central element in the performance budgeting piece of the PMA. According to OMB, the assessments were a factor in funding decisions for the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request. Building on agencies’ hard-won achievements in developing plans and measures, the government now faces the challenge of promoting the use of that information in budget decision making, program improvement, and agency management. Promoting a more explicit use of performance information in decision making promises significant rewards, but it will not be easy, and in fact, is fraught with risks. Decision makers need a road map that defines what successful performance budgeting would look like, and that identifies the key elements and potential pitfalls on the critical path to success. What Is Performance Budgeting, and What Might Be Expected from It? Performance budgeting cannot replace the budget process as it currently exists, but it can help shift the focus of budgetary debates and oversight activities by changing the agenda of questions asked in these processes. Credible Performance Information and Agencies’ Capacity to Produce It Is Critical
For performance data to more fully inform resource allocations, decision makers must feel comfortable with the appropriateness and accuracy of the outcome information and measures presented—that is, they are comprehensive and valid indicators of a program’s outcomes. Decision makers likely will not use performance information that they do not perceive to be credible, reliable, and reflective of a consensus about performance goals among a community of interested parties. Accordingly, the quality and credibility of outcome-based performance information and the ability of federal agencies to produce such evaluations of their programs’ effectiveness are key to the success of performance- based budgeting. Through GPRA reporting, agencies have increased the information available on program results. The closer the linkage between an agency’s performance goals, its budget presentation, and its net cost statement, the greater the reinforcement of performance management throughout the agency and the greater the reliability of budgetary and financial data associated with performance plans. Clearer and closer association between expected performance and budgetary requests can more explicitly inform budget discussions and focus them—both in Congress and in agencies—on expected results, rather than on inputs or transactions solely. Certainly making clear connections between resources, costs, and performance for programs is valuable. However, the real payoff will come in strengthening the budget process itself. First, the focus on outcomes can broaden the debate and elevate budget trade-offs from individual programs to a discussion of how programs work together to achieve national goals. Although the evaluation of programs in isolation may be revealing, it is often critical to understand how each program fits with a broader portfolio of tools and strategies— such as regulations, direct loans, and tax expenditures—to accomplish federal goals. Reclaiming our fiscal flexibility will require the reexamination of existing programs, policies, and activities. Making performance budgeting a reality throughout the federal government will be facilitated by efforts to improve the structural alignment of performance planning goals with budget and cost accounting structures and presentations. Performance budgeting is difficult work. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted in 1993, federal agencies increasingly have been expected to link strategic plans and budget structures with program results. The current administration has taken several steps to strengthen and further the performance-resource linkage by making budget and performance integration one of its five management initiatives included in the President's Management Agenda. GAO has reported and testified numerous times on agencies' progress in making clearer connections between resources and results and how this information can inform budget deliberations. The administration's use of the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for the fiscal year 2004 President's budget and further efforts in fiscal year 2005 to make these connections more explicit, have prompted our examination of what can and cannot be expected from performance budgeting.
What GAO Found
Performance management is critical to delivering program results and ensuring accountability, but it is not without risks. Building on agencies' hard-won achievements in developing plans and measures, the government faces the challenge of promoting the use of that information in budget decision making, program improvement, and agency management. More explicit use of performance information in decision making promises significant rewards, but it will not be easy. Decision makers need a road map that defines what successful performance budgeting would look like, and identifies key elements and potential pitfalls. Credible performance information and measures are critical for building support for performance budgeting. For performance data to more fully inform resource allocation decisions, decision makers must feel comfortable with the appropriateness and accuracy of the outcome information and measures presented--that is, that they are comprehensive and valid indicators of a program's outcomes. Decision makers likely will not use performance information that they do not perceive to be credible, reliable, and reflective of a consensus about performance goals among a community of interested parties. The quality and credibility of outcome-based performance information and the ability of federal agencies to evaluate and demonstrate their programs' effectiveness are key to the success of performance budgeting. Successful performance budgeting is predicated on aligning performance goals with key management activities. The closer the linkage between an agency's performance goals, its budget presentation, and its net cost statement, the greater the reinforcement of performance management throughout the agency and the greater the reliability of budgetary and financial data associated with performance plans. Clearer and closer association between expected performance and budgetary requests can more explicitly inform budget discussions and shift the focus from inputs to expected results. The test of performance budgeting will be its potential to reshape the kinds of questions and trade-offs that are considered throughout the budget process. The real payoff will come in strengthening the budget process itself. The focus on outcomes potentially can broaden the debate and elevate budget trade-offs from individual programs to a discussion of how programs work together to achieve national goals. It is critical to understand how programs fit within a broader portfolio of tools and strategies for program delivery. Shifting perspectives from incremental budgeting to consideration of all resources available to a program, that is, base funding as well as new funds, potentially can lead to a reexamination of existing programs, policies, and activities. Prudent stewardship of our nation's resources is essential not only to meeting today's priorities, but also for delivering on future commitments and needs. |
gao_GAO-08-189 | gao_GAO-08-189_0 | DOE Has Overstated the Progress Made on Key Performance Measures, Raising Doubts about the IPP Program’s Nonproliferation Benefits
DOE has not accurately portrayed the IPP program’s progress, according to our analysis of two key measures used to assess the program’s performance—the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. Officials at 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed said that IPP program funds have allowed their institutes to recruit, hire, and retain younger scientists. DOE reported that these 32 commercial successes had helped create or support 2,790 new private sector jobs for former weapon scientists in Russia and other countries. DOE Has Not Developed an Exit Strategy for the IPP Program, but Instead Has Expanded Efforts to Iraq and Libya and Is Using the Program to Support the Department’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
Russian government officials, representatives of Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and individuals at U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the IPP program, particularly in Russia, whose economy has improved in recent years. Specifically: A senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told us in July 2007 that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia’s economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should be “graduated” from the IPP program, and DOE officials believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In contrast, State has already assessed participating institutes and developed a strategy—using a range of factors, such as the institute’s ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract funding from other sources—to graduate certain institutes from its Science Centers program. DOE Expanded IPP Efforts to Iraq and Libya and Is Working with Its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to Maintain the IPP Program’s Relevance
DOE recently expanded its scientist assistance efforts on two fronts: DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya, and the IPP program is working with DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy to develop IPP projects that support GNEP—a DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power. Multiple DOE and Contractor Reviews and Delays in Project Implementation Contribute to the IPP Program’s Large Balances of Unspent Program Funds
In every fiscal year since 1998, DOE has carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the IPP program, primarily because of DOE and its contractors’ lengthy and multilayered review and approval processes for paying former Soviet weapons scientists for IPP-related work and long delays in implementing some IPP projects. For example, as of September 2007, DOE had carried over about $30 million in unspent funds—$2 million more than the $28 million that the Congress had appropriated for the IPP program in fiscal year 2007. According to officials from U.S. industry partners, national laboratories, and Russian and Ukrainian institutes, some IPP projects experience long implementation delays. To address a number of management issues that need to be resolved so that the IPP program operates more effectively, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, immediately take the following eight actions: establish a more rigorous, objective, and well-documented process for verifying the WMD backgrounds and experiences of participating foreign scientists; develop more reliable data on the commercialization results of IPP projects, such as the number of jobs created; amend IPP program guidance to include a clear definition of what constitutes a commercially successful IPP project; seek explicit congressional authorization to expand IPP efforts outside of the former Soviet Union; for IPP efforts in Libya, ensure compliance with the statutory restriction on the percentage of IPP program funds spent on oversight activities at the DOE national laboratories to no more than 35 percent; develop clear and specific guidance for IPP projects that are intended to streamline the process through which foreign scientists receive IPP funds by eliminating unnecessary layers of review; and seek to reduce the large balances of unspent funds associated with the IPP program and adjust future budget requests accordingly. We also assessed State’s planned exit strategy for its Science Centers program. 2. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. Although DOE claims to have received additional information from this institute to corroborate the number of jobs reported to have been created, DOE did not provide this information to us. 6. DOE asserted that we did not include endorsements of the program in our draft report. In our view, this is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address concerns about unemployed or underemployed Soviet-era weapons scientists in Russia and other countries, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994 to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary work in the short term and create private sector jobs for these scientists in the long term. GAO assessed (1) DOE's reported accomplishments for the IPP program, (2) DOE's exit strategy for the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has experienced annual carryovers of unspent funds and the reasons for any such carryovers. To address these issues, GAO analyzed DOE policies, plans, and budgets and interviewed key program officials and representatives from 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes.
What GAO Found
DOE has overstated accomplishments for the 2 critical measures it uses to assess the IPP program's progress and performance--the number of scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. First, although DOE claims to have engaged over 16,770 scientists in Russia and other countries, this total includes both scientists with and without weapons-related experience. GAO's analysis of 97 IPP projects involving about 6,450 scientists showed that more than half did not claim to possess any weapons-related experience. Furthermore, officials from 10 Russian and Ukrainian institutes told GAO that the IPP program helps them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists who might otherwise emigrate to the United States or other western countries and contributes to the continued operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. Second, although DOE asserts that the IPP program helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs for former weapons scientists, the credibility of this number is uncertain because DOE relies on "good-faith" reporting from U.S. industry partners and foreign institutes on the number of jobs created and does not independently verify the number of jobs reported to have been created. DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program, even though officials from the Russian government, Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the program. Importantly, a senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told GAO that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia's economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should "graduate" from the program. In contrast, the Department of State (State), which supports a similar program to assist Soviet-era weapons scientists, has assessed participating institutes and developed a strategy to graduate certain institutes from its program. Instead of finding ways to phase out the IPP program, DOE has recently expanded the program to include new countries and areas. Specifically, in 2004, DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya. In addition, the IPP program is working with DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy to develop projects that support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership--a DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power. In every fiscal year since 1998, DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the program. For example, as of September 2007, DOE carried over about $30 million in unspent funds--$2 million more than the $28 million that the Congress had appropriated for the IPP program in fiscal year 2007. Two main factors have contributed to this recurring problem--lengthy review and approval processes for paying former Soviet weapons scientists and delays in implementing some IPP projects. |
gao_GAO-09-262 | gao_GAO-09-262_0 | Several systems will be used in the 2010 census. In March 2008, we designated the 2010 census as a high-risk area, citing several long-standing and emerging challenges. Dress Rehearsal Includes Testing of Certain Systems and Operations
In preparation for the 2010 census, the Bureau planned what it refers to as the Dress Rehearsal. Bureau Is Making Progress in Conducting Key Decennial System Testing, but Lacks Plans and Schedules to Guide Remaining Efforts
The Bureau has made progress in conducting system, integration, and end- to-end testing for the 2010 census, but much remains to be done. The weaknesses in the Bureau’s IT testing can be attributed, in part, to a lack of sufficient executive-level oversight and guidance on testing. Without comprehensive oversight and guidance, the Bureau cannot ensure that it is thoroughly testing its systems before the 2010 Decennial Census. Bureau Has Performed Many System Testing Activities, but Much Remains to be Done
Through the Dress Rehearsal and other testing activities, the Bureau has completed key system tests, but significant testing has yet to be performed, and planning for this is not complete. In addition, the Bureau has not established a master list of interfaces between key systems, or plans and schedules for integration testing of these interfaces. Bureau Has Conducted Limited End-to-End Testing as Part of the Dress Rehearsal, but Has Not Developed Testing Plans for Critical Operations
The Dress Rehearsal was originally conceived to provide a comprehensive end-to-end test of key 2010 census operations; however, as mentioned earlier, because of the problems encountered with the handheld devices, among other things, testing was curtailed. Furthermore, as of December 2008, the Bureau has neither established testing plans nor schedules to perform end-to-end testing of the key operations that were removed from the Dress Rehearsal, nor has it determined when these plans will be completed. Although the 2010 Decennial Census is managed by the Decennial Management Division, the oversight and management of key census IT systems is performed on a decentralized basis. For example, the executive alert report does not include the progress of testing activities, and although the dashboard provides a high-level, qualitative assessment of testing for key operations and selected systems, it does not provide information on the testing progress of all key systems and interfaces. Further, the assessment of testing progress has not been based on quantitative and specific metrics. For example, the status of testing key operations removed from the Dress Rehearsal was marked as acceptable, or “green,” although the Bureau does not yet have plans for testing these activities. The Bureau also has weaknesses in its testing guidance; it has not established comprehensive guidance for system testing. Any significant change to an existing IT system introduces the risk that the system may not work as intended; therefore, testing all systems after changes have been made to ensure the systems work as intended is critical to the success of the 2010 census. We also interviewed program officials and contractors of key decennial systems to obtain information on the current status of and plans for testing activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Decennial Census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides vital data that are used, among other things, to reapportion and redistrict congressional seats. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census a high-risk area, citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges, including weaknesses in the Census Bureau's (Bureau) management of its information technology (IT) systems and operations. In conducting the 2010 census, the Bureau is relying on both the acquisition of new IT systems and the enhancement of existing systems. Thoroughly testing these systems before their actual use is critical to the success of the census. GAO was asked to determine the status of and plans for testing key decennial systems. To do this, GAO analyzed testing documentation, interviewed Bureau officials and contractors, and compared the Bureau's efforts with recognized best practices.
What GAO Found
Although the Bureau has made progress in testing key decennial systems, critical testing activities remain to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 census. Bureau program offices have completed some testing of individual systems, but significant work still remains to be done, and many plans have not yet been developed (see table below). In its testing of system integration, the Bureau has not completed critical activities; it also lacks a master list of interfaces between systems; has not set priorities for the testing of interfaces based on criticality; and has not developed testing plans and schedules. Although the Bureau had originally planned what it refers to as a Dress Rehearsal, starting in 2006, to serve as a comprehensive end-to-end test of key operations and systems, significant problems were identified during testing. As a result, several key operations were removed from the Dress Rehearsal and did not undergo end-to-end testing. The Bureau has neither developed testing plans for these key operations, nor has it determined when such plans will be completed. Weaknesses in the Bureau's testing progress and plans can be attributed, in part, to a lack of sufficient executive-level oversight and guidance. Bureau management does provide oversight of system testing activities, but the oversight activities are not sufficient. For example, Bureau reports do not provide comprehensive status information on progress in testing key systems and interfaces, and assessments of the overall status of testing for key operations are not based on quantitative metrics. Specifically, key operations that do not yet have plans developed are marked as making acceptable progress based solely on management judgment. Further, although the Bureau has issued general testing guidance, it is neither mandatory nor specific enough to ensure consistency in conducting system testing. Without adequate oversight and more comprehensive guidance, the Bureau cannot ensure that it is thoroughly testing its systems and properly prioritizing testing activities before the 2010 Decennial Census, posing the risk that these systems may not perform as planned. |
gao_GAO-03-1013T | gao_GAO-03-1013T_0 | Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool
The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerabilities in the visa process when it became known that all 19 of the terrorist hijackers had been issued visas to enter the United States. Also, the Departments of State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. In our October 2002 report, we concluded that the visa process could be an important tool to keep potential terrorists from entering the United States but that weaknesses limited its effectiveness as an antiterrorism tool. In our June 2003 report, we identified the policies and procedures of several agencies that govern the visa revocation process and determined the effectiveness of the process. To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies and their respective inspection and investigation units in a timely manner; develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the United States after revocation; and determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat. Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice agreed on the level of evidence needed to deny and revoke visas? These policies should balance the need for national security with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel to the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other agencies, are involved in the visa process. Each plays an important role in making security decisions so that potential terrorists do not enter the country. In two GAO reports, we assessed the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism tool.
What GAO Found
Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our October 2002 report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when issuing visas; and State and Justice disagreed on the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. In our June 2003 report, we found that State had revoked visas for terrorism concerns but that the revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the country before their visas were revoked might be security risks; and the process broke down when information on revocations was not being shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement officials. These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping potential terrorists out of the United States. |
gao_RCED-97-67 | gao_RCED-97-67_0 | For fiscal years 1989 through 1997, the Congress appropriated $113 million for FHIP. 1). The initiatives are (1) the private enforcement initiative—funding for private nonprofit organizations to undertake testing and other enforcement-related activities; (2) the fair housing organizations initiative—funding for private nonprofit organizations to create new fair housing enforcement organizations in those areas of the country that were unserved or underserved by such organizations or expand the capacity of existing private nonprofit fair housing organizations; (3) the education and outreach initiative—funding for private and public entities to educate the general public and housing industry groups about fair housing rights and responsibilities; and (4) the administrative enforcement initiative—funding for state and local government agencies that administer fair housing laws certified by HUD as substantially equivalent to federal law to help such agencies broaden their range of enforcement and compliance activities. 2). Reflecting the program’s principal focus, HUD’s budget requests to the Congress set forth how it plans to divide the total amount of dollars requested for FHIP among the four initiatives. HUD’s Allocation of FHIP Funds
According to the Acting FHIP Division Director, the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity determines how funds are allocated on the basis of legislation, administration and agency priorities, and input from the housing industry and fair housing groups. In accordance with its budget plans, HUD has made the largest portion of FHIP dollars available for the private enforcement initiative. For the 3 most recent years (fiscal years 1994 through 1996), the greatest demand, as measured by the amounts requested on applications, has been for the private enforcement initiative. FHIP Grant Recipients and Activities Are Diverse
From the program’s inception through September 1996, a total of 220 different organizations received FHIP grants in 44 states and the District of Columbia; 26 organizations received about half of all FHIP funds awarded. In addition, private enforcement initiative grants funded special projects that focus on high-priority issues such as mortgage lending discrimination and insurance redlining. Data on Funding for the Fair Housing Initiatives Program and the Demand for Funds
The following four tables provide details on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) allocation of funds among the Fair Housing Initiatives Program’s (FHIP) four funding initiatives or categories, the dollar amounts made available under each category, and the level of demand for funds under each category. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Fair Housing Initiatives Program, focusing on: (1) how funds are allocated among the program's four initiatives or funding categories, what dollar amounts are made available under each category, and what level of demand exists for funds under each category; and (2) who receives program funds and how the funds are being used.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from the program's inception through fiscal year (FY) 1997, the Congress has appropriated $113 million to carry out the Fair Housing Initiatives Program; (2) the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, judgmentally determines how funds are allocated among the four initiatives on the basis of the program legislation, the administration's and the agency's priorities, and input from the housing industry and fair housing groups; (3) the agency's budget requests to the Congress set forth how it plans to divide the total program dollars among the four initiatives; (4) the largest portion, more than $40 million, has been budgeted and made available for the private enforcement initiative; (5) as measured by the amounts requested on applications, for the 3 most recent years, fiscal years 1994 through 1996, there is also great demand for the private enforcement initiative; (6) through FY 1996, 220 different organizations in 44 states and the District of Columbia received program grants; (7) of all the funds awarded, 26 organizations received about half; (8) the largest portion of funds, about $41 million, was spent on the private enforcement initiative for activities aimed at determining the existence of discrimination in renting, sales, and lending, primarily testing to investigate individual complaints and testing to investigate industry practices; (9) grantees have used funds for a variety of other fair housing activities, such as litigation, new fair housing organizations and capacity building for existing organizations, pamphlets and brochures, print, television, and radio advertisements, and conferences and seminars for housing industry professionals; and (10) other funded activities also have included special projects on mortgage lending and insurance redlining. |
gao_NSIAD-98-145 | gao_NSIAD-98-145_0 | The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has responsibility for the MEADS program. Because of its unique capabilities, warfighting commands with theater ballistic missile defense missions support MEADS. MEADS Presents Funding Dilemma
BMDO will be unable to acquire MEADS without impacting higher priority missile defense programs unless DOD or the Army provide additional funds. Over the next 6 years, for which BMDO is currently budgeting, the organization needs $1.4 billion to execute the planned MEADS program. Because it has had difficulty funding MEADS, BMDO is considering various program options to find a less costly acquisition program. Estimate Forecasts $3.6 Billion Design and Development Cost
In March 1998, BMDO developed, in cooperation with the Army, a cost estimate for a MEADS system that would meet Army requirements. The United States expects to pay about one-half of this amount, or $1.8 billion. The funds are expected to pay for the U.S. share of MEADS estimated research and development cost and the procurement of eight battalions of equipment. BMDO needs about $1.4 billion between fiscal years 2000 and 2005 to develop a system that meets all of the Army’s requirements. MEADS partners are aware that the United States is considering other options. However, BMDO did not fully address funding or technology transfer issues before initiating the international program and may not be able to achieve these benefits. Some U.S. and European officials suggest that the United States may be viewed as an unreliable partner if it is unable to fund MEADS. Conclusions
If MEADS is designed to meet established requirements, it will give warfighters capabilities that are not present in any existing or planned air and missile defense systems. MEADS should be able to engage a wide range of targets, be easily transported by small transport aircraft, be capable of moving cross country and over unimproved roads, and be sufficiently lethal to destroy both conventional warheads and weapons of mass destruction. DOD believes that jointly developing and producing MEADS with U.S. allies will reduce the U.S. investment in the weapon system and strengthen political ties, creating a more effective coalition force and increasing the allies’ ability to defend themselves. However, DOD does not know whether it is willing to share information to create a truly interoperable system, whether an international program can utilize existing U.S. missile system technology to its maximum advantage, how it will fund the U.S. share of the international program, or how it can alter the MEADS system or acquisition strategy to make the program affordable and acceptable to its partners. In addition, areas that warrant attention include the (1) technology that is likely to be released into the program, (2) effect that the technology’s release could have on U.S. national security, and (3) impact of a determination to withhold information on both the execution of the program and U.S. allies. DOD said that it would take steps to ensure that (1) the approval process for future international programs includes a careful assessment of long-term funding needs and technology transfer issues and that (2) security personnel are included in negotiations of international agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program, focusing on the: (1) unique capabilities that MEADS will add to U.S. air and missile defense; (2) development cost of MEADS and its affordability within the expected ballistic missile defense budget; and (3) impact that international development will have on MEADS cost and capability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) if the Army is successful in meeting established requirements, MEADS will have capabilities that no other planned theater missile defense system will possess; (2) the system should defeat a wide range of threats arriving from any direction, be transportable within theater by small transport aircraft, be mobile enough to travel cross country or over unimproved roads with the maneuver force, and be sufficiently lethal to negate weapons of mass destruction; (3) acquiring MEADS will affect higher priority missile programs or the infrastructure that supports those programs unless DOD increases the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDO) budget allocation; (4) BMDO forecasted in March 1998 that it needed about $1.8 billion for fiscal year (FY) 1999 though FY 2007 to pay its portion of MEADS' estimated $3.6-billion design and development cost; (5) in addition, BMDO will need another $10.1 billion for FY 2005 through FY 2016 to acquire eight battalions of equipment; (6) the European partners are expected to contribute about one-half of the design and development funds; (7) thus, for FY 1999 through FY 2005--the years for which BMDO is now budgeting--the U.S. cost could be reduced to about $1.4 billion; (8) BMDO has no funds budgeted for MEADS after FY 1999 and has been reviewing various program options to find a less expensive acquisition strategy; (9) DOD officials believe that a joint cooperative effort with U.S. allies is the best means of acquiring MEADS because it reduces cost, improves political ties, and builds a more effective coalition force; (10) however, DOD did not fully assess funding and technology transfer issues before initiating the international program and may not be able to achieve these benefits; (11) U.S. and European program participants said that the United States may be viewed as an unreliable partner if it cannot fund its portion of the program, which could threaten the U.S.' ability to participate in future collaborative efforts; (12) even if the United States remains in the program, it may have difficulty developing a truly interoperable weapon without sharing valuable technology; (13) the international structure may also prevent contractors from pursuing the most cost-effective system solution; (14) contractors are finding it difficult to use existing technology developed for other systems because the process for transferring U.S. information to foreign countries is slow and the United States is reluctant to transfer some critical technology; and (15) difficulties might have been avoided if security experts had been included in negotiations of the international agreement. |
gao_GAO-05-382T | gao_GAO-05-382T_0 | RHS now facilitates homeownership, develops rental housing, and promotes community development through loan and grant programs in rural communities. 3). Changing Some Eligibility Requirements Could Better Delineate Boundaries for Urban-Rural Areas and Address Inconsistent Treatment of Similar Communities
Changes to the way eligibility is defined might allow RHS to better designate “rural” areas and treat communities with similar characteristics more consistently. RHS has a policy stating that a serious lack of mortgage credit at rates and terms comparable with those offered by the agency exists in all rural areas. Additionally, RHS lacked sufficient internal control to adequately monitor the disbursement of rental assistance funds. Specifically, in estimating needs for its rental assistance contracts, RHS used higher inflation factors than recommended, did not apply the inflation rates correctly to each year of the contract, and based estimates of future spending on recent high usage rather than average rates. For example, using these two methods, RHS overestimated its 2003 budget needs by $51 million or 6.5 percent. Internal Control Issues Contribute to Errors in Loan and Grants Databases
Today we are releasing a report addressed to the RHS Administrator on internal control issues in the Information Resource Management (IRM) databases. In reviewing 29,000 records for five states we found incorrect, incomplete, and inconsistent entries. Until RHS can demonstrate that its edit functions or other data entry design features can ensure the accuracy and completeness of the data in the IRM databases, second-party review would be necessary. Conclusions
RHS has made progress in improving program management over the past few years. For example, while determining what areas are eligible for rural housing programs will always require an element of judgment, several changes to the current eligibility requirements could help RHS make more consistent eligibility determinations. RHS has recently moved on a number of fronts to correct the many rental assistance program shortcomings identified in our reports. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To improve eligibility determinations in rural housing programs, we suggested that Congress may wish to consider eliminating the MSA criterion, recommending that RHS use density measures as a basis for its eligibility decisions, phasing out the practice of “grandfathering” communities, and eliminating the “lack of credit” requirement. To ensure that rental assistance funds are effectively distributed to properties that have tenants with the greatest need, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture require program officials to establish centralized guidance on transferring unused rental assistance, improve sampling methods to ensure a sufficient number of tenant households are selected for supervisory reviews, and improve tenant verification of information, including more effective use of alternate methods of income verification. | Why GAO Did This Study
The rural America of 2005 is far different from the rural America of the 1930s, when the federal government first began to provide housing assistance to rural residents. Advances in transportation, computer technology, and telecommunications, along with the spread of suburbia, have linked many rural areas to urban areas. These changes, along with new fiscal and budget realities, raise questions about how Rural Housing Service (RHS) programs could most effectively and efficiently serve rural America.
What GAO Found
This testimony is based on a report on how RHS determines which areas are eligible for rural housing programs, three reports on RHS's rental assistance budgeting and distribution processes, and a report we are releasing today on internal control issues with RHS's loans and grants databases. GAO found that while RHS has significantly improved the housing stock in rural America and has made progress in addressing problems, several issues prevent the agency from making the best use of resources. Specifically: (1) Statutory requirements for program eligibility, including those related to metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), "grandfathering" communities, and demonstrating a "serious lack of mortgage credit," are of marginal utility. For example, using density measures rather than MSAs might allow RHS to better differentiate urban and rural areas, and phasing out the "grandfathering" of communities could better ensure that RHS makes more consistent eligibility determinations; (2) RHS has consistently overestimated its rental assistance budget needs by using higher inflation rates than recommended by the Office of Management and Budget and incorrectly applying those rates. Also RHS lacked sufficient internal controls to adequately monitor the use of rental assistance funds, particularly for fund transfers and income verifications. RHS has been taking actions that should correct many of the rental assistance shortcomings GAO identified; and (3) GAO found incorrect, incomplete, and inconsistent entries in RHS's loans and grants databases. Until RHS can demonstrate that its system edit functions or other design features can ensure the accuracy of data in its databases, second-party review is necessary to meet internal control standards. |
gao_GAO-09-832T | gao_GAO-09-832T_0 | Changes in Census Population Counts Can Affect the Allocation of Federal Funds
Federal grants use various sources of population counts in their funding formulas. First, the Bureau conducts the decennial census, which provides population counts once every 10 years, and also estimates the population for the years between censuses—known as postcensal estimates. In addition, the Current Population Survey conducted by the Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides monthly data and is used to allocate funds for programs under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, which provides workforce development services to employers and workers. Among funding formulas that rely on population data, the degree of reliance varies. On the one hand, the SSBG formula allocates funding based on a state’s population relative to the total U.S. population. On the other hand, some formulas use population plus one or more other variables to determine funding levels. Medicaid, for example, uses population counts and income to determine the federal reimbursement rate. Accurate Population Counts Are Important for Allocating Federal Assistance
On the basis of simulations we conducted of formula grant allocations, we found that changes in population counts can affect, albeit modestly, the allocations of federal funds for the programs analyzed. Note that these simulations were for illustrative purposes only—to demonstrate the effect that alternative population estimates could have on selected federal grant programs. In our 2006 report, based on population estimates that differed from the 2000 Census count by about 0.5 percent across the U.S. and varying state by state, we found that of the $159.7 billion total federal Medicaid funding in 2004, 22 states would have shared an additional $208.5 million in Medicaid funding, 17 states would have lost a total of $368 million, and 11 states and the District of Columbia would have had their funding unchanged. In total, 0.2 percent of Medicaid funds would have shifted as a result of the simulation. However, due to concerns over the quality of the data and other factors, the Bureau has never used the results of its coverage measurement efforts to adjust the census population count. Factors Other Than Population Can Affect Distribution of Federal Funds
Although accurate population counts and estimates play an important role in allocating federal assistance, various other factors related to the design of federal grant programs may mitigate or increase the effect that population changes can have on the distribution of federal funds. Hold-Harmless Provisions: In order to prevent funding losses from a formula change, programs can include hold-harmless provisions guaranteeing a level of funding that is based on a prior year’s funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
In past years, the federal government has annually distributed over $300 billion in federal assistance through grant programs using formulas driven in part by census population data. Of the more than $580 billion in additional federal spending, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will obligate an estimated additional $161 billion to federal grant programs for fiscal year 2009. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) puts forth tremendous effort to conduct an accurate count of the nation's population, yet some error in the form of persons missed or counted more than once is inevitable. Because many federal grant programs rely to some degree on population measures, shifts in population, inaccuracies in census counts, and methodological problems with population estimates can all affect the allocation of funds. This testimony discusses (1) how census data are used in the allocation of federal formula grant funds and (2) how the structure of the formulas and other factors can affect those allocations. This is based primarily on GAO's issued work on various formula grant programs and the allocation of federal funds.
What GAO Found
Federal grants use various sources of population counts in their funding formulas. They include the decennial census, which provides population counts once every10 years, and also serves as the baseline for estimates of the population for the years between censuses--known as postcensal estimates. Other sources of population data include the Bureau's American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey conducted by the Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which provides monthly data. The degree of reliance on population in funding formulas varies. For example, the Social Services Block Grant formula allocates funding based solely on a state's population relative to the total U.S. population. Other programs use population plus one or more variables to determine funding levels. Medicaid, for example, uses population counts and income to determine its federal reimbursement rate. On the basis of simulations GAO conducted of federal grant allocations by selected federal grant programs--for illustrative purposes only--we found that changes in population counts can affect, albeit modestly, the allocations of federal funds across the states. For example, in 2006 we found that compared to the $159.7 billion total federal Medicaid funding in 2004, 22 states would have shared an additional $208.5 million in Medicaid funding, 17 states would have lost a total of $368 million, and 11 states and the District of Columbia would have had their funding unchanged. In total 0.2 percent of Medicaid funds would have shifted as a result of the simulation. In addition to population data, various other factors related to the design of federal grant programs may mitigate the effect that population changes can have on the distribution of federal funds. For example, in order to prevent funding losses from a formula change, several programs include hold-harmless provisions guaranteeing that each recipient entity will receive a specified proportion of the prior year's amount or share regardless of population changes. |
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