id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_GAO-03-807T | gao_GAO-03-807T_0 | A small share of elderly households, about 19 percent or 5 million, rented their homes (compared to about 36 percent of nonelderly households), and about 3.3 million of these elderly households were renters with very low incomes—that is, 50 percent or less of area median income. Because their rental payments are not sufficient to cover the property’s operating costs, the project sponsor receives rental assistance payments from HUD to cover the difference between the property’s operating expenses (as approved by HUD) and total tenant rental receipts. Other federal programs can provide housing assistance to needy elderly households, albeit not exclusively. Section 202 Is an Important Source of Housing for Elderly Households with Very Low Incomes
Section 202 is the only federal housing program that targets all of its rental units to very low income elderly households. Because these households often have difficulty affording market rents, program funding is directed to localities based in part on their proportions of elderly renter households that have a housing affordability problem. Even with the program’s exclusive focus on the very low income elderly, Section 202 has reached only a small share of eligible households. The criteria for allocating funds to the field offices include, among other things, the total number of very low income elderly renters in the area and the number in this group that pay more than 30 percent of their incomes for rent. Between 1985 and 2001, Section 202 reached no more than about 8 percent of elderly households eligible for assistance under the program. Section 202 Projects Generally Did Not Meet Guidelines for Timeliness
Most of the Section 202 projects funded between fiscal years 1998 and 2000 did not meet HUD’s guideline for approving the start of construction within 18 months. However, a slight majority of the projects were processed and approved to start construction within 24 months. Various Factors Can Delay the Approval of Projects for Construction
Our review of projects funded from fiscal years 1998 through 2000 shows that several factors impeded Section 202 projects from meeting the 18- month processing time guideline, including insufficient capital advances, limited training and guidance for HUD field office staff on processing policies and procedures, and limitations in HUD’s project monitoring system. Insufficient Capital Advances Caused Some Sponsors to Seek Other Funding
Although HUD policy intends for capital advances to fund the cost of constructing a modestly designed project, capital advances have not always been sufficient to cover these expenses. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, an estimated 2 million elderly households with very low incomes (50 percent or less of area median income) did not receive housing assistance. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) considered most of these households to be "rent burdened" because they spent more than 30 percent of their incomes on rent. The Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program provides capital advances (grants) to nonprofit organizations to develop affordable rental housing exclusively for these households. Based on a report issued in May 2003, this testimony discusses the role of the Section 202 program in addressing the need for affordable elderly housing and factors affecting the timeliness of approving and constructing new projects.
What GAO Found
As the only federal housing program that targets all of its rental units to very low-income elderly households, HUD's Section 202 program provides a valuable housing resource for these households. Although they represent a small share of all elderly households, very low income elderly renters have acute housing affordability problems because of their limited incomes and need for supportive services. The Section 202 program offers about 260,000 rental units nationwide and ensures that residents receive rental assistance and access to services that promote independent living. However, even with the program's exclusive focus, Section 202 has only reached an estimated 8 percent of very low-income elderly households. More than 70 percent of Section 202 projects in GAO's analysis did not meet HUD's time guideline for gaining approval to start construction. These delays held up the delivery of housing assistance to needy elderly households by nearly a year compared with projects that met HUD's guideline. Several factors contributed to these delays, particularly capital advances that were not sufficient to cover development costs. Project sponsors reported that because of insufficient capital advances, they often had to spend time seeking additional funds from HUD and other sources. Although HUD's policy is to provide sufficient funding to cover the cost of constructing a modestly designed project, HUD has acknowledged that its capital advances for the Section 202 program sometimes fall short. Other factors affecting the timeliness of the approval process include inadequate training and guidance for field staff responsible for the approval process, inexperienced project sponsors, and local zoning and permit requirements. |
gao_GAO-05-139 | gao_GAO-05-139_0 | Selected Key Mergers and Transformation Practices Can Help Guide DHS in Taking a Comprehensive and Sustained Approach to its Management Integration Efforts
DHS would have the comprehensive and sustained approach to its management integration efforts that it needs over the long term to successfully transform the agency, if it more closely adhered to three selected key practices that we have found consistently at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. To assess DHS’s progress to date in integrating its management functions, we determined that three of the nine practices were especially important to ensure the agency has the management infrastructure it needs this early in the process to manage and sustain its integration: (1) an overarching integration strategy, with implementation goals and a time line that links its various individual management integration initiatives; (2) a dedicated implementation team with the responsibility and authority to drive the department’s management integration; and (3) committed and sustained leadership. Such goals and time lines could be contained in an overall integration plan for a merger or transformation effort. Early on, the department made some progress in consolidating the processes and systems of each individual function in areas such as information technology, financial management, procurement, and human capital. DHS has recently strengthened the role of its functional councils through its management directives to help coordinate integration departmentwide. The role of the Under Secretary for Management does contain some of the characteristics of a COO/CMO as we have described, such as integrating key management and transformation efforts by providing a single point of contact as the chief integrator of management functions across DHS. The Congress should continue to closely monitor whether additional leadership authorities are needed for the Under Secretary, or whether a revised organizational arrangement is needed to fully capture the roles and responsibilities of a COO/CMO position, such as elevating the position, and including a performance agreement and setting a term limit for it. Some of the guidance and plans DHS has already created could be used as a foundation for building such an integrated strategy. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure accountability and sustainability for DHS’s management integration over the long term, Congress may wish to continue to monitor the following: the progress of DHS’s management integration, for example, by requiring the department to periodically report on the status of its efforts, especially to determine whether it has: implemented a departmentwide integration management strategy; provided the BTO with sufficient authority to serve as a dedicated implementation team to help set priorities and make strategic decisions to drive integration across all functions, and whether the Under Secretary for Management has the authority to elevate attention on management issues and transformational change, integrate various key management and transformation efforts, and institutionalize accountability for addressing these management issues and leading this change. Scope and Methodology
To identify opportunities for DHS to improve its management integration efforts, we assessed these efforts by using three of the nine key practices consistently found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. The three selected practices are: ensuring top leadership drives the transformation, setting implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress from day one, and dedicating an implementation team to manage the transformation process. Department of Homeland Security: Financial Management Challenges. Human Capital: DHS Faces Challenges in Implementing Its New Personnel System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) represents one of the largest reorganizations of government agencies and operations in recent history. Significant management challenges exist for DHS as it merges the multiple management systems and processes from its 22 originating agencies in functional areas such as human capital and information technology. GAO was asked to identify opportunities for DHS to improve its management integration.
What GAO Found
GAO found that while DHS has made some progress in its management integration efforts, it has the opportunity to better leverage this progress by implementing a comprehensive and sustained approach to its overall integration efforts. GAO assessed DHS's integration efforts to date against three of nine key practices consistently found to be at the center of successful mergers and transformations: setting implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show progress, dedicating an implementation team to manage the transformation, and ensuring top leadership drives it. While there are other practices critical to successful mergers and transformations--including using the performance management system to define responsibility and assure accountability for change--GAO selected these three key practices because they are significant to building the infrastructure needed for DHS at this early juncture in its management integration efforts. Establishing implementation goals and a time line is critical to ensuring success and could be contained in an overall integration plan for a merger or transformation. DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist its integration efforts, on a function-by-function basis (information technology and human capital, for example); but it does not have a comprehensive strategy, with overall goals and a time line, to guide the management integration departmentwide. GAO's research shows that it is important to dedicate a strong and stable implementation team for the day-to-day management of the transformation. DHS has established a Business Transformation Office (BTO), reporting to the Under Secretary for Management, to help monitor and look for interdependencies among the individual functional integration efforts. However, the role of the BTO could be strengthened so that it has the requisite responsibility and authority to help the Under Secretary set priorities and make strategic decisions for the integration, as well as implement the integration strategy. The current responsibilities of the Under Secretary contain some of the characteristics of a COO/CMO. GAO has reported that such a position could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS's management initiatives. Recent DHS actions, such as management directives clarifying roles for the integration, can provide the Under Secretary additional support. However, it is still too early to tell whether the Under Secretary will have sufficient authority to direct, and make trade-off decisions for the integration, and institutionalize it departmentwide. The Congress should continue to monitor whether it needs to provide additional leadership authorities to the Under Secretary, or create a new position that more fully captures the roles and responsibilities of a COO/CMO. |
gao_GAO-12-708 | gao_GAO-12-708_0 | Most Secure Communities Removals Were Criminal Aliens, but Arrest Charge Data Are Incomplete
ICE data show that from October 2008 through March 2012, Secure Communities led to the removal of about 183,000 aliens, of which approximately 74 percent had a criminal conviction and 26 percent did not have a criminal conviction known to ICE. Of the data that ICE collected, traffic offenses were the most frequent arrest charges, of which over half were arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. From October 2008 through March 2012, ICE removed 182,896 aliens identified by Secure Communities, as indicated by ICE’s data. ICE Had Incomplete Data on Arrest Charges for Over Half of the Aliens It Removed under Secure Communities
ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest charges for about 56 percent of the approximately 119,000 aliens that Secure Communities identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest charges of aliens removed under the program. As these efforts have only recently been initiated, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of ICE’s efforts to improve the collection of arrest charge data. Weaknesses in ICE’s acquisition planning contributed to delays, cost increases, and products provided under the contracts that did not meet mission needs. The schedule delays and cost increases can be attributed in part to weaknesses in ICE’s planning, including ICE (1) not fully defining requirements before awarding contracts and (2) not developing an integrated master schedule. Consequently, ICE spent $14.3 million for the SDS contract to develop services that ICE found to be unusable. While planning efforts can be subject to uncertainty about future funding, developing a workforce plan prior to full program and system deployment could help position ICE so it is ready to effectively align staff among components responding to law enforcement agency queries when the modernized ACRIMe system is deployed. ICE and CRCL Identified Safeguards to Help Address Potential Civil Rights Abuses under Secure Communities; Some Efforts Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented
ICE and CRCL jointly identified four safeguards used to help protect aliens’ civil rights under Secure Communities. These safeguards include providing detainees a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to call when they believe their civil rights have been violated or they are U.S. citizens or crime victims, developing training materials for state and local law enforcement and ICE officials on how to protect aliens’ civil rights, initiating a process to statistically monitor arrests under Secure Communities to identify and investigate potential patterns of civil rights abuses, and using DHS’s existing complaint process to investigate complaints about possible civil rights abuses related to Secure Communities. ICE has invested millions of dollars to modernize ACRIMe capabilities that are central to Secure Communities’ success, but has not followed best practices in its acquisition of the modernized technology. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that ICE acquires effective technology to support the Secure Communities program and effectively uses its workforce, we recommend that the Director of ICE take the following three actions to follow sound management practices: establish well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional develop an integrated master schedule that identifies all tasks to be performed by the government and current and future contractors, and links activities being performed by different contractors; and develop a workforce plan to support the analysis of immigration status determinations under Secure Communities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Initiated in 2008, Secure Communities is an ICE program designed to identify potentially removable aliens, particularly those with criminal convictions, in state and local law enforcement custody. Fingerprints checked against a Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal database are checked against DHSs immigration database to help determine whether an arrested individual is removable. GAO was asked to review Secure Communities operations. This report addresses (1) enforcement trends under Secure Communities, (2) ICEs adherence to best practices in acquiring Secure Communitiesrelated technology, and (3) ICE safeguards to help protect against potential civil rights abuses under Secure Communities. GAO analyzed ICE data on removals from October 2008 through March 2012, and arrest charges from October 2010 through March 2012; reviewed program guidance, policies, and reports; and interviewed ICEs Law Enforcement Support Center and agency officials, local law enforcement and community groups in four locations selected for geographic diversity, among other factors. These perspectives are not generalizable, but provided insights into Secure Communities operations.
What GAO Found
Data from the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) indicate that the percentage of its removals attributable to Secure Communities increased from about 4 percent in fiscal year 2009 to about 20 percent in fiscal year 2011. Of about 183,000 aliens removed under the program from October 2008 through March 2012, about 74 percent had a criminal conviction. ICE did not have state or local arrest charges for about 56 percent of alien Secure Communities removals from October 2010 (when ICE began collecting arrest charges) through March 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest charges under the program. For the 44 percent of aliens removed on whom ICE collected arrest charge data, traffic offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, were the most frequent arrest charges. ICE is taking steps to improve the collection of arrest charge data, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of its efforts.
ICE has not consistently followed best practices in acquiring technology to help determine the immigration status of aliens identified by Secure Communities. ICE awarded contracts to modernize its technology without fully defining requirements or developing an integrated master scheduletwo best practices for managing capital programs. As a result, ICE encountered delays, cost increases, and products that did not meet ICEs needs. For example, ICE spent $14.3 million for one contract to develop services that ICE found to be unusable. Establishing well-defined requirements and developing an integrated schedule for completing technology modernization could better position ICE to prevent delays and cost increases. Further, ICE plans to develop a workforce plan after the systems are deployed. Developing a workforce plan prior to full system deployment, consistent with internal controls, could better position ICE to effectively use staff when it deploys the modernized technology.
DHSs Office of Civil Rights and ICE identified four safeguards to help protect aliens civil rights under Secure Communities, including providing detainees with a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to call when they feel their civil rights have been violated. Officials are also developing briefing materials on how to protect aliens civil rights, statistically analyzing arrest and other information to identify potential civil rights abuses, and using an existing DHS complaint process for addressing Secure Communities concerns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ICE develop well-defined requirements and an integrated master schedule that accounts for all activities for its technology contracts, and a plan for workforce changes in preparation for full technology deployment. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-170 | gao_HEHS-98-170_0 | In its 1996 informal staff-level estimate, CBO said it would cost SSA about $512 million to issue an enhanced card. CBO estimated the cost of issuing an enhanced card to 172 million number holders. SSA Estimates Are Reasonable for a Mass Issuance to All Number Holders
SSA’s 1997 estimates of the cost for issuing a more enhanced card generally appear to be reasonable if a new card is to be given to all 277 million current number holders. This relationship is particularly significant because it shows that regardless of the material from which the card is made or the technology used on the card for security purposes, reissuance of a new card to all number holders will cost a minimum of approximately $4 billion, using SSA’s current procedures. This estimate is based on cost and workload data associated with SSA’s current process for issuing or reissuing cards. SSA’s estimate applied the unit cost to all 277 million current number holders, which it believes was required by the mandate. However, we identified four alternative approaches that would cost less than the approach SSA evaluated: extending the mandated issuance time frame, issuing cards only to individuals who change jobs, issuing enhanced cards to new applicants and those requesting replacement cards, and using drivers’ licenses as an alternative to the Social Security card. However, this option would delay improving controls over the work authorization process. This alternative maximizes control over illegal workers and reduces the impact on SSA resources. But the overall cost savings from prospective issuance of the new card would be substantial. This approach could save significant SSA resources, and could make the reissuance of an enhanced Social Security card unnecessary. Doing so would likely help eliminate some of the burden on state MVAs because SSA may be able to provide citizenship information to the states for up to 87 million number holders whose work eligibility status SSA has already established. Ultimately, the costs associated with meeting the congressional goals of work eligibility verification and public confidence in the Social Security system will be dependent on a congressional decision as to the specific role of a new Social Security card. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our work were to explain differences in CBO’s and SSA’s estimates for replacing the Social Security card; evaluate SSA’s 1997 estimates of the cost of issuing a more secure Social Security card, including the feasibility and cost implications of charging user fees for a new card; and presenting additional card issuance options. Current List of Acceptable Documents for Employment Eligibility Verification
Documents that establish both identity and employment eligibility
U.S. Social Security card issued by SSA (other than a card stating it is not valid for employment)
Certification of Birth Abroad issued by the Department of State (form FS-545 or form DS-1350)
Alien registration receipt card with photograph or permanent resident card (INS form I-551)
Unexpired temporary resident card (INS form I-688)
Unexpired employment authorization card (INS form I-688A)
U.S. citizen identification card (INS form I-197)
Unexpired employment authorization document issued by INS, which contains a photograph (INS form I-766)
Identification card for use of resident citizen in the United States (INS form I-179)
Unexpired employment authorization document issued by INS, which contains a photograph (INS form I688B)
Unexpired employment authorization document issued by the INS (other than those listed under A list)
Breakdown of SSA’s Estimates of Cost to Issue Enhanced Social Security Cards
SSA’s 1997 Estimate of Cost and Work Years for Processing Social Security Number Applications
Number of applications (millions)
Total cost of processing (millions)
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) estimates of the costs of issuing a counterfeit-resistant card social security, focusing on: (1) the differences in CBO's and SSA's estimates for replacing the social security card; (2) SSA's estimates of the cost of issuing a more secure card; and (3) additional issuance options.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the wide variation between SSA's and CBO's estimates is due primarily to the different issuance assumptions used by each agency in its estimates; (2) CBO's estimate was an informal staff-level estimate of the cost to issue an enhanced card to 172 million number holders who it believed would request the new card; (3) SSA's estimate is based on issuing enhanced cards to 277 million number holders; (4) SSA's 1997 estimates of the cost for issuing an enhanced card generally appear to be reasonable if a new card were to be given to all 277 million current number holders; (5) regardless of the material from which the card is made or technology used for security purposes, issuing an enhanced card to all number holders using current procedures would cost a minimum of about $4 billion or more; (6) ultimately, SSA's costs will depend on how Congress decides to implement the issuance of a new card; (7) alternatives to the high cost associated with a mass issuance of new cards exist; (8) one alternative would be to issue a new enhanced social security card only to those who need it to verify work eligibility; (9) Bureau of Labor Statistics data suggest this approach could involve up to an estimated 118 million individuals--about 43 percent of the 277 million current number holders; (10) this option would help maximize control over illegal workers while significantly reducing SSA's costs; (11) in a second approach, SSA could issue the new card only to those applying for a new social security number and those who normally request replacement cards; (12) this option would also substantially reduce the cost of card issuance but provides no new employment authorization internal controls for many current number holders; (13) a third alternative could use state drivers' licenses and identity cards instead of social security cards for work eligibility verification purposes; (14) states renew these documents every few years and already include security features and a photograph; (15) the states could obtain current citizenship information from SSA for up to 87 million individuals for work authorization purposes; and (16) this option would avoid the enormous costs associated with reissuing the current social security card but would likely impose a significant burden on the states to make work eligibility determinations for the remaining 190 million individuals, and moreover, it would not necessarily enhance public confidence in the social security system. |
gao_GAO-09-4 | gao_GAO-09-4_0 | Background
The Medicare Part D Program
In the Medicare Part D program, drug plan sponsors compete to deliver prescription drug benefits and attract enrollees. The remaining two study sponsors chose to develop nonmodel ANOCs for the 2008 AEP. Stakeholders Raised Concerns about the ANOC’s Readability; CMS Did Not Assess the Effectiveness of Its Model ANOCs
Stakeholders have expressed various concerns regarding the readability of the ANOC and we found that prior to the 2008 and 2009 AEPs CMS did not systematically evaluate its effectiveness in conveying plan changes to beneficiaries. To help ensure that their enrollees understood the significance of plan changes, two sponsors in our study mailed supplemental information that showed changes in coverage and costs for the specific drugs the enrollee took in the past year. CMS officials recently reported that on October 1, 2008, they initiated an evaluation of their annual Medicare beneficiary materials—particularly the combined ANOC- EOC for the 2010 AEP—to assess their reading level, effectiveness, and length, among other factors. Such an evaluation is particularly important in light of changes that CMS made for the 2009 AEP, which raised further concerns among stakeholders. However, it is unclear whether the evaluation will consider potential benefits of alternative formats for communicating plan changes to beneficiaries. Stakeholders Expressed Concern about the Readability of CMS Model ANOC
Five sponsors and other stakeholders in our study noted that CMS’s model materials for the 2008 AEP were not sufficiently concise or beneficiary friendly and felt that the language in the model ANOC was at a reading level too high for some beneficiaries. CMS and sponsors made modifications to the enrollment process that resulted in a median processing time of 5 days for applications submitted throughout the 2008 AEP. However, the statutorily mandated AEP schedule—November 15 to December 31 with coverage effective January 1—lacks sufficient time in which to fully process enrollment applications. As a result, stakeholders reported inaccurate charges, additional administrative burden, and inconveniences for the beneficiary following the 2008 AEP. Not All Beneficiaries Switching Plans Were Fully Enrolled Before Their New Coverage Began
Despite these improvements, we found that 15 percent of the approximately 1 million beneficiaries choosing to switch plans during the 2008 AEP were at risk of not having access to their new coverage on January 1, 2008. CMS data also show that the time needed to fully process an enrollment application varied over the course of the AEP. Some stakeholders we interviewed in our study said that creating an interval for enrollment processing between the end of the AEP and the effective date of coverage would help ensure that coverage for a beneficiary switching plans would be in place on January 1. Although CMS told us that they recently initiated an evaluation of its annual notification materials, it is unclear whether alternative formats for the ANOC-EOC will be considered. Under the current mandated schedule, it is not possible to guarantee that beneficiaries choosing to switch plans late in December are fully enrolled in their new plans with pharmacists having sufficient evidence of the new coverage by January 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
In Medicare Part D, enrollees in stand-alone prescription drug plans (PDPs) are allowed to switch plans during an annual coordinated election period (AEP) set under law from November 15 to December 31, with new coverage effective January 1. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) required that plan sponsors send an Annual Notice of Change (ANOC)--using either its model or a nonmodel format--before the 2008 AEP. Among other things, GAO examined: (1) stakeholders' views of the model ANOC and CMS's efforts to assure its effectiveness, and (2) how the scheduling of the AEP affects the enrollment process for beneficiaries switching PDPs. Among the largest PDP sponsors, we selected eight to interview along with other stakeholders involved in the AEP. We also obtained and analyzed data from CMS.
What GAO Found
Sponsors, pharmacists, beneficiary advocates, and counselors GAO interviewed expressed concern that CMS's model ANOC for the 2008 AEP did not effectively communicate drug plan changes to enrollees. They noted that it contained language at a reading level too high for some beneficiaries as well as too much, often irrelevant, information. To help ensure their enrollees understood how plan changes would affect them personally, two study sponsors mailed additional information detailing specific changes in coverage and costs for drugs the beneficiary took in the past year. Despite GAO's previous recommendation that CMS ensure that its Part D materials meet communications guidelines, CMS's process for developing its model ANOC did not include a systematic evaluation of its effectiveness. However, CMS officials reported that they recently initiated an evaluation of their annual Medicare beneficiary materials for the 2010 AEP that will examine reading levels, effectiveness, and length, among other factors. Such an evaluation is important in light of changes CMS has made for the 2009 AEP, which have raised further concerns among stakeholders. It is unclear whether alternative formats for communicating plan changes to beneficiaries will be considered. Although CMS and plan sponsors made improvements to the enrollment process, CMS data showed that about 15 percent of beneficiaries who chose to switch plans in the 2008 AEP were not fully enrolled in their new plan by January 1. Modifications to the enrollment process for the 2008 AEP reduced the time needed to enroll beneficiaries in a new plan to a median of 5 days. However, the volume of applications submitted late in the AEP contributed to beneficiaries being at risk of not having access to their new coverage by January 1. In fact, among the beneficiaries who submitted applications after December 15, 40 percent were not completely processed until after the effective date of their new coverage. As a result, stakeholders reported that beneficiaries, pharmacies, and sponsors faced various operational challenges, including the risk of inaccurate charges and additional administrative burden. Some stakeholders we interviewed for our study said that creating an interval for enrollment processing between the end of the AEP and the effective date of coverage would help ensure that beneficiaries switching plans would have their coverage in place on January 1. |
gao_NSIAD-98-107 | gao_NSIAD-98-107_0 | Navy officials told us that when the Navy announces its intention to begin an A-76 study that includes military billets, the funding for those billets is eliminated from the military personnel budget beginning with the year the study is expected to be completed. According to OMB’s Circular A-76, certain functions should not be outsourced to the private sector. Historically, the Navy has attempted to minimize the number of sailors in general duty billets. New Outsourcing Coordination Efforts Will Be Instrumental in Making Decisions on Future Studies
Until May 1997, the Navy did not have procedures in place to ensure that rotational requirements were adequately considered when it determined potential functions for outsourcing study. Specifically, a memorandum of agreement was established specifying the coordination process between the Navy’s headquarters infrastructure officials and the military personnel officials regarding the procedures for studying military functions for potential outsourcing. This memorandum of agreement was further strengthened in September 1997 by a more detailed Navy-wide memorandum of agreement that applied to all major commands for all infrastructure reductions, including outsourcing. If a rotational shortage is identified, the specific rating is not recommended for outsourcing to avoid further degradation of the sea-shore rotation base. Future Outsourcing Goals Reinforce Need for Strategic Planning
Between fiscal years 1997 and 2002, the Navy plans to study 80,500 civilian and military positions for potential outsourcing at an estimated savings of $2.5 billion. Navy officials stated that they began a series of planning conferences in September 1997 involving appropriate officials from Navy headquarters and major commands. In addition, improved planning and coordination could minimize the elimination of required military shore billets, as well as avoid prematurely programming savings into future years’ budgets. While the Navy has recently begun to focus on strategies for attaining its outsourcing goals for future years, improved planning and coordination between headquarters and major commands are needed to reach agreement on realistic goals and time frames. DOD provided a number of comments addressing how the Navy has taken significant steps to implement policies and coordination procedures to protect rotational billets from outsourcing considerations and to involve the major commands in the strategic planning process for attaining its future years’ outsourcing goals. However, the Navy has not completed its plan as of April 1998. At the same time, our report points out that it appears likely the Navy will fall short of its goal for new outsourcing studies in fiscal year 1998, and some Navy officials expressed concern to us over whether they will be able to attain the optimistic goal of studying 10,000 military billets by the year 2003 and save $2.5 billion from outsourcing in its future years defense plan. We obtained documentation regarding current and planned A-76 studies, and A-76 study plans that were eliminated because of the impact on rotational requirements. We reviewed the outsourcing initiatives and the impact of these initiatives on rotational billets in the Army, Air Force, and Navy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) outsourcing of commercial activities reduces the availability of rotational billets for active duty military personnel, focusing on: (1) how the Navy's current outsourcing efforts have affected rotational billets; and (2) whether the Navy has policies and procedures in place to minimize the impact of outsourcing on rotational billets in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) several Navy Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 competitions announced for study in fiscal years (FY) 1997 and 1998 have the potential to eliminate military billets in areas where rotational shortages exist for personnel returning from sea duty; (2) as a result, the Navy has decided not to begin some of these A-76 studies and plans to reinstate funding authorization for the military positions eliminated when the studies were announced; (3) until recently, the Navy had not developed specific policies and coordination procedures to protect rotational billets from outsourcing considerations; (4) according to Navy officials such policies and procedures were not needed prior to FY 1997 because the Navy's outsourcing initiatives were limited and not centrally managed; (5) in May 1997, Navy officials signed a memorandum of agreement specifying a coordination process between the Navy's headquarters infrastructure officials and military personnel representatives to ensure that consideration is given to rotation requirements when determining potential functions for outsourcing; (6) this memorandum of agreement was further strengthened in September 1997 by a more detailed Navy-wide memorandum of agreement that applied to all major commands, which the Navy refers to as major claimants, for all infrastructure reductions, including outsourcing; (7) this coordination policy should prove important since the Navy's goal is to have completed A-76 competitions for 80,500 positions by the year 2002, including about 10,000 military billets; (8) the Navy expects that its outsourcing efforts will produce savings and accordingly has programmed expected savings of $2.5 billion into its future years defense plan for FY 2000 through 2003; (9) the Navy has not identified the specific activities and locations that will be studied to achieve projected savings, but has tasked its major commands with recommending specific activities and locations for A-76 competitions to meet this savings goal; (10) the Navy recently began a series of planning conferences involving appropriate officials from headquarters and major commands focusing on strategies for attaining its future years' outsourcing goals; (11) however, given the Navy's plans for outsourcing competitions, ongoing coordination and improved planning between headquarters and major commands is needed to reach agreement on realistic goals and timeframes; and (12) in addition, improved planning and coordination could minimize the elimination of required military shore billets, as well as avoid prematurely programming savings into future years' budgets. |
gao_GAO-09-790T | gao_GAO-09-790T_0 | USPS’s Financial Condition Continues to Deteriorate, and Its Financial Condition Has Been Added to Our High-Risk List
USPS’s financial condition and outlook continue to deteriorate with a worsening outlook for mail volume and revenue. As a result, USPS is projecting the following for fiscal year 2009: a net loss of about $7 billion, even if it achieves record cost savings of about $6 billion; an increase in outstanding debt by the annual statutory limit of $3 billion; and, despite this borrowing, an unprecedented $1 billion cash shortfall. USPS has reported that it does not expect to generate sufficient cash from operations to fully make its mandated payment of $5.4 billion for future retiree health benefits that is due by September 30, 2009. Further, USPS recently reported to Congress that—due to the need to maintain sufficient cash to cover costs—it will not fully make this payment, even if it receives $2 billion in relief from fiscal year 2009 retiree health benefits payments that would be provided by H.R. Two days ago, we added USPS’s financial condition to the list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch to achieve broad-based transformation. We reported that USPS urgently needs to restructure to address its current and long-term financial viability. 1). Accordingly, we have called for USPS to develop and implement a broad restructuring plan—with input from the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) and other stakeholders, and approval by Congress and the administration—that includes key milestones and time frames for actions, addresses key issues, and identifies what steps Congress and other stakeholders may need to take. Network Restructuring Needed to Help USPS Achieve Financial Viability
USPS needs to optimize its retail, mail processing, and delivery networks to eliminate growing excess capacity and maintenance backlogs, reduce costs, and improve efficiency. We recently reported that USPS needs to rightsize its retail and mail processing networks and reduce the size of its workforce. USPS has a window of opportunity to further reduce the cost and size of its workforce through attrition and the large number of upcoming retirements to minimize the need for layoffs. USPS has begun efforts to realign and consolidate some of its mail processing, retail, and delivery operations, but much more restructuring is urgently needed. We recognize that USPS would face formidable resistance to restructuring with many facility closures and consolidations because of concerns that these actions would impact service, employees, and local communities. USPS senior management will need to provide leadership and work with stakeholders to overcome resistance for its actions to be successfully implemented. USPS must use an open and transparent process that is fairly and consistently applied; engage with its unions, management associations, the mailing industry, and political leaders; and demonstrate results of actions. In turn, these stakeholders and Congress need to recognize that major changes are urgently needed for USPS to be financially viable. USPS Has Recently Begun Efforts to Consolidate Retail Facilities
To its credit, USPS recently began a national initiative to consolidate some of its 3,200 postal retail stations and branches in urban and suburban areas. 2). USPS Has Made Limited Progress in Consolidating Its Mail Processing Network
USPS has begun efforts to consolidate some mail processing operations, but much more needs to be done to restructure this network, particularly since USPS has closed only 1 of its approximately 400 major mail processing facilities. USPS Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Delivery Efficiency
USPS has ongoing efforts to increase the efficiency of mail delivery, which is USPS’s largest cost segment and includes more than 350,000 carriers that account for approximately 45 percent of salary and benefit expenses. First, USPS is realigning city carrier routes to remove excess capacity and improve efficiency, which is expected to generate nearly $1 billion in annual savings. USPS is studying how 5-day delivery could be implemented, potential savings, and impacts on its employees. Cutting delivery frequency would affect universal postal service and could further accelerate the decline in mail volume and revenues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition has worsened this year, with the recession and changing mail use causing declines in mail volume and revenues despite postal rate increases. GAO testified in May to this subcommittee that USPS expects these declines to lead to a record net loss and an unprecedented cash shortfall even if ambitious cost cutting is achieved. GAO reported that maintaining USPS's financial viability as the provider of affordable, high-quality universal postal service will require actions in a number of areas, such as (1) rightsizing its retail and mail processing networks by consolidating operations and closing unnecessary facilities and (2) reducing the cost and size of its workforce, which generates about 80 percent of its costs. Today GAO is releasing its report on USPS efforts to improve the efficiency of delivery. Delivery accounts for nearly half of USPS salary and benefit costs. This testimony (1) updates USPS's financial condition and outlook and explains GAO's decision to place USPS's financial condition on the High-Risk List and (2) discusses the need for USPS to restructure its mail processing, retail, and delivery networks and its efforts to improve their efficiency. It is based on GAO's past and ongoing work and updated USPS information.
What GAO Found
USPS's financial condition and outlook continue to deteriorate with a worsening outlook for mail volume and revenue. USPS now projects mail volume to decline by about 28 billion pieces to about 175 billion pieces in fiscal year 2009, a decline of 13.7 percent. As a result, USPS projects (1) a net loss of about $7 billion even with record savings of about $6 billion; (2) an increase in outstanding debt by the annual $3 billion limit; and, (3) despite this borrowing, an unprecedented $1 billion cash shortfall. Thus, USPS recently reported to Congress that, due to the need to maintain sufficient cash to cover costs, it will not fully make its mandated payment of $5.4 billion for future retiree health benefits due by September 30, 2009, even if it receives $2 billion in relief under pending House legislation. GAO added USPS's financial condition to the High-Risk List this week. GAO reported USPS urgently needs to restructure to address its current and long-term financial viability. Accordingly, GAO calls for USPS to develop and implement a broad restructuring plan--with input from the Postal Regulatory Commission and other stakeholders, and approval by Congress and the administration--that includes key milestones and time frames for actions, addresses key issues, and identifies what steps Congress and other stakeholders may need to take. USPS needs to optimize its retail, mail processing, and delivery networks to eliminate growing excess capacity and maintenance backlogs, reduce costs, and improve efficiency. USPS has a window of opportunity to reduce the cost and size of its workforce through attrition and the large number of upcoming retirements to minimize the need for layoffs. Although USPS has begun efforts to realign and consolidate some mail processing, retail, and delivery operations, much more is urgently needed. GAO recognizes that USPS would face formidable resistance to restructuring with many facility closures and consolidations because of concerns that these actions would affect service, employees, and communities. USPS management will need to provide leadership and work with stakeholders to overcome resistance for its actions to be successfully implemented. USPS must use an open, transparent, fair, and consistent process; engage with its unions, management associations, the mailing industry, and political leaders; and demonstrate results. In turn, these stakeholders and Congress need to recognize that major restructuring is urgently needed for USPS to be financially viable. To its credit, USPS recently began a national initiative to consolidate some of its 3,200 postal retail stations and branches in urban and suburban areas. USPS has begun efforts to consolidate some mail processing operations but has closed only 1 of 400 major mail processing facilities. USPS is realigning city carrier routes to remove excess capacity and improve efficiency, which is expected to save nearly $1 billion annually; has begun to install automated equipment to reduce costly manual sorting of flat-sized mail; and is studying how it could shift to 5-day delivery and the potential savings. |
gao_HEHS-98-201 | gao_HEHS-98-201_0 | Comprehensive Coverage Available to Children Nationwide, but Choice May Be Limited
Individual policies are available to children nationwide, and products that are priced specifically for children are available in almost all states. The benefit structure for child-only products was similar to comprehensive products typically available to adults in the individual market. Furthermore, some carriers do not tend to operate in states with certain regulatory requirements. Products Available Nationwide
As long as an adult is the policyholder and is responsible for the premium payment, almost all of the carriers we contacted in the individual market will sell a product that provides comprehensive coverage for a child only. We found that at least one individual comprehensive health insurance product is available to children in all 50 states. Most insurance agents and brokers we contacted in Georgia and Illinois were generally aware that these products are available from a number of carriers. Among the seven carriers we reviewed, child-only products represent a relatively small share of the carriers’ total individual health insurance sales—from under 1 percent to 20 percent. Thirteen states require carriers to guarantee-issue certain products to all applicants. Carriers also take into account the expected health care utilization of different age groups and the impact of various state regulations in calculating their premium rates. For the products we reviewed that are available to children, we found standard monthly premium rates for a healthy 15-year-old among our selected carriers ranged from a national low of about $42 for a $1,000 deductible PPO plan in Portland, Oregon, to one as high as $321 for a $250 deductible FFS plan in Los Angeles, California. Even within particular markets, there were substantial differences in the premium prices of products that carriers offered. We identified several factors that affect monthly premium rates for child-only products: age and number of covered children in a family and their expected health care utilization; geographic location and state regulations; and plan type and design, including deductible and cost-sharing options. Medical Underwriting May Preclude Coverage for Children With Certain Health Conditions
While most children qualify for coverage at the standard rate, children with certain health conditions can be denied coverage, or their coverage may exclude an existing condition or treatment of certain parts of the body, or they may be charged a rate higher than the standard premium rate in states that allow medical underwriting. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, two of the carriers we reviewed that market specifically to children told us that they do not cover children during their first 6 or 12 months of life due, in part, to the lack of information about a child’s potential long-term health status. 1.) Conclusions
Although comprehensive health insurance coverage is generally available for healthy children in the private individual market across the United States, consumers would do well to shop carefully for the child-only product that best meets their needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the availability of private sector health coverage for children in the individual insurance market, focusing on: (1) the availability and characteristics of private health insurance products that can be purchased only for a child and how these products differ from other individual private insurance products; (2) the costs of these child-only products; and (3) any barriers in access to individual private health coverage for children.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) comprehensive health coverage is available to children in the individual health insurance market across the United States; (2) at least one comprehensive product is available to most children in all 50 states; (3) in almost all states, a product that is priced specifically for children is available; (4) the insurance agents and brokers GAO contacted in two selected states were generally aware that products for children existed and could either sell the products themselves or refer GAO to someone who could; (5) the benefits covered under these products typically mirror those of products available to adults in the individual market; (6) while these products were available nationwide, among the carriers GAO contacted they represented a relatively small share of total individual sales--from under 1 percent to 20 percent; (7) furthermore, since many carriers do not tend to operate in states with certain regulatory requirements, consumers may have a more limited choice of benefit plans and carriers in these states; (8) as is the case with products for adults in the individual market, costs for child-only products varied considerably, both within and across selected markets; (9) standard monthly premium rates for the products GAO reviewed that are available to children are based largely on age, geographic location, plan type, and product design, including deductible and cost-sharing options; (10) in calculating rates, carriers also take into account the expected health care utilization of different age groups and the impact of various state regulations; (11) GAO found standard monthly premium rates for a healthy 15-year-old among its selected carriers ranged from a low of about $42 for a $1,000-deductible preferred provider organization plan in Portland, Oregon, to one as high as $321 for a $250-deductible fee-for-service plan in Los Angeles, California; (12) while these child-only products are available in all states--as is typical in the individual insurance market--many states do not require carriers to accept all applicants; (13) in these states, children with certain health conditions may be denied coverage, or their coverage may exclude an existing condition or treatments for particular parts of the body, or they may be charged a rate higher than the standard premium rate; and (14) of the carriers that GAO reviewed, two that market specifically to children do not cover children under these policies during their first 6 or 12 months of life, due to the high cost of early preventive care and lack of information about a child's possible future health problems. |
gao_AIMD-96-39 | gao_AIMD-96-39_0 | To assess Defense’s continuing efforts to address past problems, we examined (1) Defense’s August 1994 Performance Management Plan Version 5.0, (2) Defense’s August 1993 deployment plan, Implementation and Use of the CHCS, (3) Defense deployment schedules through October 4, 1995, (4) monthly progress reports provided to Defense by the CHCS contractor through December 1995, (5) Defense’s May 1995 report on VAX/PC system sizing algorithms, (6) Defense’s June 1995 report on high-end system sizing algorithms, and (7) Defense’s July 1995 report on the high-end computing platform for CHCS. They were provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and are incorporated as appendix I.
CHCS Deployment Is Complete
At the end of 1995, Defense completed deployment of CHCS to 526 of its 815 medical treatment facilities worldwide. Given the complexity of the design and development of CHCS and the number of facilities involved, this was not an easy task. Key to the successful development and deployment of CHCS has been the leadership provided by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Services Operations and Readiness and the CHCS program manager and their application of a set of fundamental information management practices that we refer to as best practices. This amount exceeds Defense’s $2.8 billion estimated system life-cycle cost by $1.3 billion. Productivity increases would come from improved scheduling and improved access to patient information. Defense’s analysis of those requirements led it to conclude that in order to provide physicians with this capability, it needed to develop a clinically-oriented graphical user interface (GUI). Specifically, Defense has (1) updated its performance management plan to include procedures for investigating and correcting extremely long response times and (2) improved its measures of system reserve capacity by developing performance simulation models for each CHCS computer platform that forecast computer resource capacity requirements. In recent meetings, they said they are reviewing Defense’s CHCS backup and recovery plan to address rapid repair or replacement of damaged CHCS equipment. Medical ADP Systems: Defense’s Tools and Methodology for Managing CHCS Performance Need Strengthening (GAO/AIMD-94-61, July 15, 1994). Medical ADP Systems: Composite Health Care System: Defense Faces a Difficult Task (GAO/IMTEC-90-42, March 15, 1990). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Composite Health Care System (CHCS), focusing on: (1) DOD efforts to complete deployment of CHCS to military medical treatment facilities worldwide; (2) DOD efforts to address previously identified problems; and (3) a new CHCS operational issue.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD completed deployment of CHCS to 526 medical treatment facilities worldwide, which was difficult because of the system's complexity and the number of sites involved; (2) two DOD officials ensured the deployment's success by providing leadership and using fundamental information management practices; (3) DOD expects CHCS benefits to exceed its costs by $1.3 billion over the system's expected life; (4) CHCS should improve scheduling, give greater and quicker access to patient information, and increase the timeliness of medical care; (5) DOD has made progress in addressing its two previously identified problems by developing a prototype clinically oriented graphical user interface to make patient order-entry less cumbersome and strengthening the tools and methodology needed to manage CHCS performance; (6) DOD has updated its CHCS performance management plan and developed performance simulation models for each CHCS computer platform; (7) the lack of an effective plan for rapidly repairing or replacing CHCS equipment damaged by disaster remains a problem; and (8) DOD did not address this problem because of cost concerns and a lack of accurate information, but it is reconsidering its options for providing equipment adequate backup. |
gao_RCED-98-95 | gao_RCED-98-95_0 | Omb Comments on Transparency Recommendations Suggest Need for Congressional Specificity
cases, the files contained no evidence of OIRA changes, and we could not tell if that meant that there had been no such changes to the rules or whether the changes were just not documented. This position seems to change the focus of responsibility in Executive Order 12866. We concluded that UMRA’s title II requirements had little effect on agencies’ rulemaking actions because those requirements (1) did not apply to many large rulemaking actions, (2) permitted agencies not to take certain actions if the agencies determined they were duplicative or unfeasible, and (3) required agencies to take actions that they were already required to take. Agencies’ Section 610 Review Notices in Unified Agenda Often Did Not Satisfy Statutory Requirements
The new version of S. 981 contains one set of requirements that was not in the bill introduced last year—that agencies develop a plan for the periodic review of rules issued by the agency that have or will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Each agency is also required to publish in the Federal Register a list of rules that will be reviewed under the plan in the succeeding fiscal year. However, of the 34 such entries in that edition of the Agenda, only 3 met the requirements of the statute. Although the Unified Agenda is a convenient and efficient mechanism by which agencies can satisfy the notice requirements in section 610 of the RFA, agencies can print those notices in any part of the Federal Register. Therefore, we believe that the reaffirmation and refinement of the section 610 rule review process in S. 981 can serve to underscore Congress’ commitment to periodic review of agencies’ rules and the public’s involvement in that process. Regulatory Impact Analyses Do Not Always Adhere to “Best Practices”
Another critical element of S. 981 is its emphasis on cost-benefit analysis for major rules in the rulemaking process. Mr. Chairman, at your and Senator Glenn’s request, we have been examining 20 economic analyses at 5 agencies to determine the extent to which those analyses contain the “best practices” elements recommended in OMB’s January 1996 guidance for conducting cost-benefit analyses. The 20 economic analyses varied significantly in the extent to which they contained the elements that OMB recommended. This Committee has been diligent in its oversight of the federal regulatory process. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998, focusing on federal agencies' implementation of: (1) the transparency requirements in Executive Order 12866; (2) title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995; (3) the public notification in section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980; and (4) Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) best practices guide for economic analyses used in rulemaking.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO reviewed four major rulemaking agencies' public dockets and concluded that it was usually very difficult to locate the documentation that the executive order required; (2) in many cases, the dockets contained some evidence of changes made during or because of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review, but GAO could not be sure that all such changes had been documented; (3) in other cases, the files contained no evidence of OIRA changes, and GAO could not tell if there had been no such changes to the rule or whether the changes were just not documented; (4) UMRA's title II requirements had little effect on agencies' rulemaking actions because those requirements: (a) did not apply to many large rulemaking actions; (b) permitted agencies not to take certain actions if the agencies determined they were duplicative or unfeasible; and (c) required agencies to take actions that they were already required to take; (5) the new version of S. 981 contains one set of requirements that was not in the bill introduced last year--that agencies develop a plan for the periodic review of rules issued by the agency that have or will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (6) each agency is also required to publish in the Federal Register a list of rules that will be reviewed under the plan in the succeeding fiscal year; (7) although the Unified Agenda is a convenient and efficient mechanism by which agencies can satisfy the notice requirements in section 610 of the RFA, agencies can print those notices in any part of the Federal Register; (8) GAO believes that the reaffirmation and refinement of the section 610 rule review process in S. 981 can serve to underscore Congress' commitment to periodic review of agencies' rules and the public's involvement in that process; (9) another critical element of S. 981 is its emphasis on cost-benefit analysis for major rules in the rulemaking process; (10) GAO has been examining 20 economic analyses at 5 agencies to determine the extent to which those analyses contain the best practices elements recommended in OMB's January 1996 guidance for conducting cost-benefit analyses; (11) the 20 economic analyses varied significantly in the extent to which they contained the elements that OMB recommended; and (12) agency officials stated that the variations in the degree to which the economic analyses followed OMB guidance and the limited use of the economic analyses were primarily caused by the limited degree of discretion that the underlying statutes permitted. |
gao_GAO-12-864 | gao_GAO-12-864_0 | According to CMS, the contracts are an opportunity to improve the integration of Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and the agency has implemented this requirement with the goal of “increased integration and coordination” for dual-eligible beneficiaries. A larger proportion of dual-eligible beneficiaries in D-SNPs, as well as dual-eligible beneficiaries in FFS, were under age 65 and disabled in 2011 compared with those in other MA plans (see fig. Among the characteristics in our analysis, the largest difference between D-SNPs and other MA plans was the proportion of full-benefit beneficiaries in each plan type: 80 percent of dual-eligible beneficiaries in D-SNPs and 75 percent of dual-eligible beneficiaries in FFS were eligible for full Medicaid benefits, compared with just 34 percent of dual-eligible beneficiaries in other MA plans. Health Status of Dual- Eligible Beneficiaries in D-SNPs Was Similar to That of Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries in FFS and Other MA Plans
Dual-eligible beneficiaries in D-SNPs had very similar health status as measured by their 2010 risk scores, the year for which the most recent data were available, when compared with dual-eligible beneficiaries in FFS and other MA plans. While the models of care we reviewed described in varying detail how the D-SNPs plan to provide other services, such as health risk assessments, to beneficiaries, most D-SNPs did not provide—and are not required to provide—estimates of the number of dual-eligible beneficiaries that would receive the services. D-SNPs Offered Fewer of Their 10 Most-Common Supplemental Benefits Than Other MA Plans
D-SNPs provide fewer supplemental benefits, on average, than other MA plans. Of the 10 supplemental benefits offered by more than half of D-SNPs, 7 were offered more frequently by other MA plans and 3 were offered more frequently by D-SNPs.benefits were offered much more frequently by D-SNPs compared to other MA plans: they offered dental benefits one-and-a-half times more (See fig. D-SNPs Reported More- Comprehensive Care Coordination Services and Greater Beneficiary Interaction Than Other MA Plans
Of the 15 D-SNPs we interviewed, 9 were in organizations that offered both D-SNPs and other MA plans, and representatives from 7 of those D-SNPs told us that their care coordination services are different from those in their organization’s other MA plan offerings. Although Some D-SNP Contracts with State Medicaid Agencies Expressly Provide for Benefit Integration or Care Coordination, Most Do Not
CMS stated that contracts between D-SNPs and state Medicaid agencies are an opportunity to increase benefit integration and care coordination.However, only about one-third of the 2012 contracts we reviewed contained any provisions expressly providing for D-SNPs to deliver Medicaid benefits, thereby achieving benefit integration. Only about one- fifth of the contracts expressly provided for active care coordination between D-SNPs and Medicaid agencies, which indicates that most care coordination was done exclusively by D-SNPs, without any involvement of state Medicaid agencies. Further, D-SNP representatives and state Medicaid officials expressed concerns about resources needed to contract with D-SNPs, and uncertainty about the future of D-SNPs. For D-SNPs contracting with state Medicaid agencies to provide all or some Medicaid benefits, the capitated payment reflected variation in coverage and conditions. Because D-SNPs are required by Medicare to provide care coordination services to dual-eligible beneficiaries, these services are often provided without reimbursement or payment from the state Medicaid agency. Additional standardized information would allow CMS to meet its goals for accountability for effective and efficient use of resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase D-SNPs’ accountability and ensure that CMS has the information it needs to determine whether D-SNPs are providing the services needed by dual-eligible beneficiaries, especially those who are most vulnerable, the Administrator of CMS should take the following four actions: require D-SNPs to state explicitly in their models of care the extent of services they expect to provide, to increase accountability and to facilitate evaluation; require D-SNPs to collect and report to CMS standard performance and outcome measures to be outlined in their models of care that are relevant to the population they serve, including measures of beneficiary health risk, beneficiary vulnerability, and plan performance; systematically analyze these data and make the results routinely available to the public; and conduct an evaluation of the extent to which D-SNPs have provided sufficient and appropriate care to the population they serve, and report the results in a timely manner. However, as we noted in the draft report, we believe such information could be useful in later evaluating whether D-SNPs met their intended goals. SNP Alliance representatives generally agreed with our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 9 million of Medicare's over 48 million beneficiaries are also eligible for Medicaid because they meet income and other criteria. These dual-eligible beneficiaries have greater health care challenges than other Medicare beneficiaries, increasing their need for care coordination across the two programs. In addition to meeting all the requirements of other MA plans, D-SNPs are required by CMS to provide specialized services targeted to the needs of dual-eligible beneficiaries as well as integrate benefits or coordinate care with Medicaid services. GAO was asked to examine D-SNPs' specialized services to dual-eligible beneficiaries. GAO (1) analyzed the characteristics of dual-eligible beneficiaries in D-SNPs and other MA plans, (2) reviewed differences in specialized services between D-SNPs and other MA plans, and (3) reviewed how D-SNPs work with state Medicaid agencies to enhance benefit integration and care coordination. GAO analyzed CMS enrollment, plan benefit package, projected revenue, and beneficiary health status data; reviewed 15 D-SNP models of care and 2012 contracts with states; and interviewed representatives from 15 D-SNPs and Medicaid agency officials in 5 states.
What GAO Found
About 9 percent of the dual-eligible population is enrolled in 322 Medicare dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNP), a type of Medicare Advantage (MA) plan. All dual-eligible beneficiaries are low income, but those in D-SNPs tended to have somewhat different demographic characteristics relative to those dual-eligible beneficiaries in other MA plans. On the basis of the most current data available (2010-2011), compared to those in other MA plans, dual-eligible beneficiaries in D-SNPs were more frequently under age 65 and disabled, more likely to be eligible for full Medicaid benefits, and more frequently diagnosed with a chronic or disabling mental health condition. In spite of these differences, the health status of D-SNP enrollees as measured by their expected cost to Medicare was similar to the health status of dual-eligible enrollees in other MA plans in 2010. D-SNPs provide fewer supplemental benefits--benefits not covered by Medicare fee-for-service (FFS)--on average, than other MA plans. Of the 10 supplemental benefits offered by more than half of D-SNPs, 7 were offered more frequently by other MA plans and 3 were offered more frequently by D-SNPs. Yet D-SNPs spent proportionately more of their rebate--additional Medicare payments received by many plans--to fund supplemental benefits compared to other MA plans, and less to reduce Medicare cost-sharing, which is generally covered by Medicaid. The models of care GAO reviewed, of 107 submitted for 2012, described in varying detail how the D-SNP planned to provide specialized services, such as health risk assessments, and meet other requirements, such as measuring performance. However, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers Medicare and oversees Medicaid, did not require D-SNPs to use standardized measures in the models of care, which would make it possible to compare the performance of D-SNPs. While D-SNPs are not required to report that information to CMS, such information would be useful for future evaluations of whether D-SNPs met their intended results, as well as for comparing D-SNPs. CMS stated that contracts between D-SNPs and state Medicaid agencies are an opportunity to increase benefit integration and care coordination. Our review of the contracts indicated only about one-third of the 2012 contracts contained any provisions for benefit integration, and only about one-fifth provided for active care coordination between D-SNPs and Medicaid agencies, which indicates that most care coordination was done exclusively by D-SNPs, without any involvement of state Medicaid agencies. However, some D-SNP contracts with state Medicaid agencies specified that the agencies would pay the D-SNPs to provide all or some Medicaid benefits. Representatives from the D-SNPs and Medicaid officials from the states GAO interviewed expressed concerns about the contracting process, such as limited state resources for developing and overseeing contracts, as well as uncertainty about whether Congress will extend D-SNPs as a type of MA plan after 2013, and the implementation of other initiatives to coordinate Medicare and Medicaid benefits for dual-eligible beneficiaries that could replace D-SNPs. To increase D-SNPs' accountability, GAO recommends improving D-SNP reporting of services provided to dual-eligible beneficiaries and making this information available to the public. In its comments on a draft of GAO's report, CMS generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-96-111 | gao_T-RCED-96-111_0 | In addition, Forest Service policy and planning officials believe that differences among the requirements and limitations in laws and regulations can sometimes be difficult to reconcile, and that reconciliation is further complicated by the fragmentation of authority for implementing these laws and regulations among several federal agencies and the states. Reducing the Influence of Subsequent Events
In addition, according to some Forest Service officials, events that occur after forest plans have been approved can significantly affect the agency’s ability to provide a high degree of confidence concerning the future availability of uses on national forest lands. Additionally, the Forest Service and other federal agencies recently have signed various memoranda of agreement to improve coordination. By establishing participation as a condition for appealing a decision, this change might increase public participation in the Forest Service’s project-level decisionmaking process. As a result, some Forest Service officials have suggested that the Congress needs to provide greater guidance on how the agency is to balance competing uses. In particular, the Chief has stated that (1) the maintenance and restoration of noncommodity uses, especially biological diversity, needs to be explicitly accepted or rejected and (2) if accepted, its effects on the availability of commodity uses should be acknowledged. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Forest Service's management of national forests, focusing on the issues related to multiple use of forest land.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Forest Service's decisions are affected by changing natural land conditions, funding, and new information and events; (2) laws concerning forest land use are complicated by fragmented authority between federal agencies and states; (3) the Forest Service should consider shortening the periods covered under forest plans, reducing the influence of subsequent events, improving the data on which decisions are based, increasing coordination among the Forest Service and other federal agencies, and limiting administrative appeals; (4) some Forest Service officials believe that Congress should provide guidance on how to balance competing uses of forest land; and (5) the Chief of the Forest Service believes that the maintenance and restoration of noncommodity uses should be explicitly accepted or rejected, and if accepted, the effects should be acknowledged. |
gao_RCED-98-160 | gao_RCED-98-160_0 | Of all the 73 PHAs with allocation plans, 64 designated a total of 24,902 housing units—approximately 36 percent of their housing stock for the elderly or persons with disabilities—as elderly-only. 3.) The Chicago Housing Authority accounted for much of this decline, reporting 419 fewer people with disabilities residing in units now designated elderly-only. Designating Housing Has Had Little Impact on Persons With Disabilities for Various Reasons
One reason the provisions in the 1992 act allowing PHAs to designate units for the elderly have had little impact on the availability of public housing for persons with disabilities is that so few PHAs have sought to use the provisions thus far. Of the approximately 3,000 certificates and vouchers that were available to housing authorities as of November 1, 1997, 1,558 had been issued to persons with disabilities who, in turn, had used 1,162 to obtain private rental housing and had turned back 174 unused, according to the authorities. About two-thirds of these PHAs with elderly-only units reported that they received more certificates and vouchers than the number of persons with disabilities residing in their elderly-only units.These PHAs issued 1,236 of these certificates and vouchers to persons with disabilities. Section 8 Assistance Has Had a Minimal Effect on the Overall Occupancy Levels
Our survey found that the number of persons with disabilities living in public housing units managed by those PHAs that have designated housing and received certificates and vouchers actually increased by 198 between the time the PHAs submitted their allocation plans and November 1, 1997.Similarly, occupancy by persons with disabilities increased by 197 households at the PHAs that designated elderly-only units and received certificates and vouchers and that provided complete occupancy data. However, the housing authorities reported in our survey that persons with disabilities required greater assistance to locate private housing. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations asked us to assess (1) the impact of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 on the availability of public housing for persons with disabilities and (2) how incremental Section 8 certificates and vouchers that were made available since the passage of the 1992 act were assisting persons with disabilities seeking affordable rental housing. As requested, we also developed estimates of the number of households that may meet HUD’s definition of persons with disabilities. Occupancy in the buildings designated for the elderly had not changed substantially since the housing authorities submitted their allocation plans, and where certificates and vouchers had been made available, persons with disabilities on waiting lists were able to use them to find housing. The authority developed its allocation plan because concerns arose about mixing elderly residents and younger people with disabilities. The Anaheim Housing Authority administers no public housing and therefore has no allocation plan, but it provides other housing assistance, including Section 8 rental certificates and vouchers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed: (1) the impact of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 on the availability of public housing for persons with disabilities; (2) how incremental Section 8 certificates and vouchers that were made available since the passage of the 1992 act were assisting persons with disabilities seeking affordable rental housing; and (3) the number of households that may meet the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) definition for persons with disabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) provisions of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 allowing public housing authorities to designate units as elderly-only have had little impact on the availability of public housing for people with disabilities; (2) 73 of the 3,200 public housing authorities had allocation plans approved by HUD as of November 1, 1997, allowing them to designate 24,902 of their units as elderly-only, approximately 36 percent of their housing stock for the elderly and persons with disabilities; (3) nearly all of these designated units had been available previously to tenants who were elderly or who had disabilities but were younger than 62; (4) the number of elderly residents and residents with disabilities in these and other housing units for which they were eligible had not changed substantially since the housing authorities began submitting allocation plans; (5) the number of younger tenants with disabilities living in housing designated for the elderly had declined by about 1,100 at the 53 housing authorities that provided complete occupancy data; (6) designating public housing units as elderly-only may have more impact in the future, depending on how many more housing authorities opt to do so and on what the housing alternatives are for younger people with disabilities; (7) it is too soon to determine the extent to which the Section 8 rental certificates and vouchers set aside for persons with disabilities have helped meet housing needs; (8) of approximately 3,000 certificates and vouchers that were available to housing authorities November 1, 1997, the authorities reported that they issued about 1,600 to persons with disabilities who used 1,162 to obtain private rental housing; (9) about 18 percent of the users had been living in public housing that had been designated for the elderly--indicating little movement by persons with disabilities residing in housing now designated as elderly-only; (10) how successful rental certificates and vouchers will be in providing housing alternatives for people with disabilities will be influenced by several factors, including statutory restrictions, local housing markets, and willingness of tenants with disabilities to use certificates and vouchers; and (11) according to housing authorities, those persons with disabilities who used certificates and vouchers required greater assistance than other recipients. |
gao_GAO-02-105 | gao_GAO-02-105_0 | Conclusions
Serious weaknesses exist in the Department’s policy and practices for developing core depot maintenance capabilities that are creating gaps between actual capabilities and those that will be needed to support future national defense emergencies and contingencies. If the existing policy is not clarified and current practices continue, the military depots will not have the equipment, facilities, and trained personnel to work on and provide related logistics support on many of the weapon systems and related equipment that will be used by the military in the next 5 to 15 years. While the Department states that it intends for its depots to have these capabilities, actual practices are much different. Core policy does not adequately take into consideration future systems repair needs and the impact of retiring systems on developing future capabilities. Also, other individual service practices negatively impact the establishment of future core capabilities and hinder management oversight. Additionally, investments in new facilities, equipment, and workforce training and revitalization have been limited for an extended period of time. Lastly, there is no strategic plan and associated service implementation plans to create and sustain a viable depot maintenance capability. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) policy and practices for developing core depot maintenance capabilities are creating gaps between actual capabilities and those needed for future national defense emergencies and contingencies. If the existing policy is not clarified and current practices continue, the military depots will not have the equipment, facilities, and trained personnel to provide logistics support on many of the weapon systems and related equipment for military use in the next five to 15 years. Although DOD intends for its depots to have these capabilities, actual practices are much different. Core policy does not adequately take into consideration future systems repair needs and the impact of retiring systems on developing capabilities. Furthermore, the practices of individual services hinder the establishment of future core capabilities and management oversight. Additional investments in new facilities, equipment, and workforce training and revitalization have been limited for some time. Finally, there is no strategic plan and associated service implementation plans to create and sustain a viable depot maintenance capability. |
gao_GAO-10-125 | gao_GAO-10-125_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine what experts and the available research indicate about the types of reentry programs and substance abuse programs that are effective or cost beneficial for juvenile offenders, we reviewed relevant literature, studies, and federal resources for juvenile justice programs, and interviewed federal officials and 26 juvenile justice experts. We selected two of OJJDP’s efforts through which it disseminates information about effective programs—the Model Programs Guide and the National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC), which provides training and support to the juvenile justice field in identifying and implementing effective programs—because they provide information about effective programs across the range of issue areas in which OJJDP is involved, including reentry and substance abuse programs. Several types of programs address juvenile reentry issues, as described in table 1. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) established OJJDP in 1974. For a more detailed description of reentry experts’ opinions about these program types, see appendix V.
Substance Abuse Experts Cited Evidence That Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Family Therapy Are Effective at Reducing Recidivism and Can Help to Reduce Substance Abuse, but Said That Evidence of Effectiveness Was Lacking for the Other Programs
Experts Cited Evidence from Available Research Showing Cognitive Behavioral and Family Therapies Effectively Reduce Recidivism and Demonstrate Success at Reducing Substance Abuse
All of the 13 substance abuse experts we interviewed stated that based on available research, cognitive behavioral therapy effectively reduces recidivism and has demonstrated success at reducing substance abuse. For example, one study found that juvenile drug courts are cost beneficial because they are expected to have a net benefit of $4,622 per program participant. In addition, seven experts also commented on reentry and substance abuse programs that were not included in the cited studies. In accordance with this authority and its mission to support states and communities in their efforts to develop and implement effective juvenile justice programs, OJJDP disseminates information related to these programs through a range of efforts, from those designed to meet the needs of the juvenile justice field as a whole to those that focus on effective programs in a specific issue area, such as gang prevention or girls’ delinquency. Evaluations and Needs Assessment Help OJJDP Ensure Usefulness of Information Provided by Training and Technical Assistance Efforts, but OJJDP Could Better Ensure the Utility of the Model Programs Guide’s Information through Regular Feedback
In accordance with federal guidelines from OJP and prior GAO work, OJJDP has mechanisms in place to regularly conduct evaluations and is currently conducting a needs assessment to ensure the usefulness of the information provided by its training and technical assistance efforts. OJJDP has mechanisms in place to regularly assess the usefulness of the information disseminated by NTTAC to ensure that it meets the needs of the juvenile justice field. Finalizing a Program Plan and Developing a Comprehensive Evaluation Plan Would Help OJJDP Achieve Its Research and Evaluation Goals and Use Its Limited Resources Effectively
OJJDP has articulated research and evaluation goals to support its mission of promoting effective programs and improving the juvenile justice system. Under the JJDPA, OJJDP is required to publish an annual program plan that describes planned activities that are under accounts authorized for research and evaluation activities and that demonstrate promising initiatives, among other things. Specifically, according to the JJDPA, the Administrator must take into account the public comments received during the 45-day period and develop and publish a final plan before December 31 of each fiscal year, describing the particular activities that the Administrator intends to carry out under parts D and E. While OJJDP has not published an annual program plan since 2002, it issued a proposed plan in the Federal Register to solicit public comment in December 2009. As a result, OMB recommended that OJP develop a comprehensive evaluation plan for juvenile justice programs to obtain better information about the programs’ impacts. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that OJJDP’s Model Programs Guide is regularly meeting user needs and providing the most helpful information on effective programs, consistent with federal guidelines, we recommend the Administrator of OJJDP develop a cost-effective mechanism for regularly soliciting and incorporating feedback from the juvenile justice field on the usefulness of the information provided in its Model Programs Guide. Juvenile drug courts are specialized courts established within and supervised by juvenile courts to provide intervention programs, such as cognitive behavioral therapy or family therapy, for substance-abusing juveniles and their families. | Why GAO Did This Study
State juvenile justice systems face critical problems when it comes to juvenile delinquency issues such as reentry--when offenders return home from incarceration--and substance abuse. GAO was asked to review juvenile reentry and substance abuse program research and efforts by the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to provide information on effective programs (i.e., whether a program achieves its intended goal) and cost-beneficial programs (i.e., whether the benefits of programs exceeded their costs). This report addresses (1) expert opinion and available research on these types of reentry and substance abuse programs, (2) the extent to which OJJDP assesses its efforts to disseminate information on effective programs, and (3) OJJDP's plans to accomplish its research and evaluation goals. GAO, among other things, reviewed academic literature, and OJJDP's dissemination efforts and research goals. GAO also interviewed OJJDP officials and a nonprobability sample of 26 juvenile justice experts selected based on their experience with juvenile reentry and substance abuse issues.
What GAO Found
The majority of the juvenile justice reentry and substance abuse experts GAO interviewed cited evidence that shows cognitive behavioral therapy--programs that help individuals change their beliefs in order to change their behavior--and family therapy--programs that treat juveniles by focusing on improving communication with family members--are effective and cost beneficial when addressing reentry and substance abuse issues. For example, two juvenile reentry experts cited studies showing that 1 year after participating in a cognitive behavioral therapy program, participants were less likely to commit another offense than nonparticipants. Additionally, experts cited a study that reported that a family therapy program provides about $80,000 in savings per participant when accounting for savings from a decline in crime, such as the cost the police would have incurred. Most experts indicated that there was limited evidence on the effectiveness and cost benefits of reentry programs, such as aftercare--programs that assist juvenile offenders in returning to their communities during the reentry process--and substance abuse programs, such as drug courts--specialized courts that provide programs for substance-abusing juveniles and their families. GAO reviewed two OJJDP efforts that provide information on effective programs across the range of juvenile justice issues, the National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC) and the Model Programs Guide. OJJDP has mechanisms in place to regularly assess the utility of the information provided by NTTAC, but does not have such a mechanism for the guide. OJJDP ensures the utility of NTTAC's information through evaluations in accordance with federal guidelines that highlight the importance of regularly soliciting feedback from users. However, OJJDP could better ensure the utility of the information disseminated by the Model Programs Guide by having a mechanism in place to solicit regular feedback from members of the juvenile justice field--for example, program practitioners--that is specifically related to the guide. OJJDP has articulated research and evaluation goals to support its mission of improving the juvenile justice system and is developing plans to assist in meeting these goals. OJJDP is required under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, as amended, to publish an annual program plan that describes planned activities under accounts authorized for research and evaluation activities, among other things. Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommended that OJJDP develop a comprehensive evaluation plan for juvenile justice programs. While OJJDP has not published an annual program plan since 2002, in December of 2009, it issued a proposed plan for public comment and aims to publish the final program plan once public comments are incorporated. Additionally, although the office has considered developing a comprehensive evaluation plan to address OMB recommendations, it had not previously done so because of a lack of resources. However, OJJDP is committed to developing a comprehensive evaluation plan once the program plan is finalized. |
gao_GAO-15-96 | gao_GAO-15-96_0 | This would allow data from multiple systems to be combined more efficiently for analysis and to produce products, such as weather forecasts. Management of the remaining 16 systems is split between four other NOAA offices. The majority of NOAA’s ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems use one of three types of platforms—buoys, ships, or satellites—to collect data on environmental parameters. Navigation tools. NOAA Spent about $430 Million Annually from Fiscal Year 2012 through 2014 on the Operations and Maintenance of Its Ocean, Coastal, and Great Lakes Observing Systems
NOAA estimates it spent approximately $430 million annually on average to operate and maintain its ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems in fiscal years 2012 through 2014. That amount is about 9 percent of NOAA’s total annual appropriations for these years. According to NOAA’s estimated cost information, the agency’s annual operations and maintenance costs ranged from about $22 million at the National Marine Fisheries Service to $198 million at the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations in fiscal year 2014 (see table 2). NOAA Has Not Taken All of the Steps It and Others Have Identified to Integrate and Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Its Observing Systems Portfolio
NOAA has not developed a plan for achieving an integrated observing system nor has it assessed whether there is unnecessary duplication in its observing systems. The report said that “given the need to protect and sustain resilient coastal communities, the absence of an integrated coastal observation system is a matter of particular concern.”
Our previous work has found that, in developing new initiatives, federal agencies can benefit from following leading practices for strategic planning. Instead, the NOAA official said the agency has focused on taking tangible actions. For example, the agency established an observing systems council to provide a more centralized perspective on observing systems management. However, without a plan describing what NOAA’s integrated observing systems portfolio should look like and how it will be managed, a strategy for moving toward this target architecture and management approach, and performance measures related to systems integration, NOAA cannot be assured that it has established a framework to effectively guide and assess the success of its observing systems integration efforts and for its stakeholders to track the agency’s efforts and hold it accountable. NOAA Has Not Assessed Whether There Is Unnecessary Duplication in Its Observing Systems Portfolio
Since 2010, some NOAA planning documents have identified the need to reduce systems costs by eliminating unnecessary duplication. NOAA officials told us they do not believe unnecessary duplication in data collection in the agency’s observing systems portfolio is a significant problem requiring further analysis. NOAA Is Working to Develop Analytical Capabilities to Improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Its Observing Systems but Has Not Developed a Methodology to Consistently Capture Cost Information
To enhance NOAA’s ability to understand and make cost-effective management decisions for its entire observing system portfolio, of which the ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems are a part, the agency has developed some analytical tools:
NOAA Observing System Architecture database. According to NOAA officials, the NOAA Chief Financial Officer has since asked a committee to explore developing a better method for tracking observing system costs though no time frame for doing so has been established. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen the management and cost-effectiveness of NOAA’s observing systems portfolio, including ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to take the following three actions:
Develop a plan for observing systems integration that includes a description of what an integrated portfolio of observing systems will include and achieve and how it will be managed, the steps necessary to move toward an integrated portfolio of observing systems, and how to measure progress toward the goal of an integrated observing systems portfolio. Develop a standardized methodology for the routine preparation and reporting of observing systems cost data. This is not the case. In response to the recommendation that NOAA analyze the extent to which unnecessary duplication exists in NOAA’s portfolio of observing systems, NOAA acknowledged a continued need to do so and said it has taken steps in this regard with the development of the NOAA Observing Systems Integrated Analysis model. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies and describes the ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) operates, (2) identifies the annual operations and maintenance costs of these systems for fiscal years 2012 through 2014, and (3) examines the extent to which NOAA has taken steps to integrate and improve the cost- effectiveness of its portfolio of observing systems, including ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes systems. 25. Data are collected primarily by research ships; however, satellites, buoys, and other methods are also used. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA operates and maintains a portfolio of observing systems to capture the environmental data needed to achieve its diverse missions. Some of these systems focus on the oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes. An observing system is a collection of one or more sensing elements that measures specific environmental conditions and resides on fixed or mobile platforms, such as buoys or satellites.
The House Appropriations Committee fiscal year report for the Department of Commerce's 2013 appropriations bill mandated GAO to review NOAA's ocean and coastal data collection systems. This report (1) identifies and describes the ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems NOAA operates; (2) identifies the annual operations and maintenance costs of these systems for fiscal years 2012 through 2014; and (3) examines the extent to which NOAA has taken steps to integrate and improve the cost-effectiveness of its observing systems portfolio. GAO analyzed agency documentation on, among other things, the characteristics and management of NOAA's observing systems, reviewed cost data from fiscal year 2012 through 2014, and interviewed NOAA officials.
What GAO Found
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce operates 41 ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems. NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research and National Ocean Service manage 25 of these observing systems, with management of the remaining 16 systems split among four other NOAA offices. The majority of NOAA's ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems use one of three platforms—buoys, satellites, or ships—to collect a range of environmental data, which are used to produce a variety of products, such as weather forecasts and navigational tools.
NOAA estimates it spent an average of approximately $430 million annually to operate and maintain its ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems in fiscal years 2012 through 2014. This is approximately 9 percent of NOAA's total annual appropriations for these years. In reviewing these estimates, GAO found NOAA's annual costs for these observing systems ranged from about $22 million for systems managed by the National Marine Fisheries Service to $198 million for systems managed by the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations in fiscal year 2014.
NOAA has not taken all of the steps it has identified as important to integrate and improve the cost-effectiveness of its observing systems portfolio. Since 2002, NOAA has identified the need to move toward an integrated observing systems portfolio. GAO's previous work has found that, in undertaking initiatives such as this, federal agencies can benefit from following leading practices for strategic planning, which include defining goals and performance measures to track progress. NOAA has not, however, developed a plan that clearly sets forth its vision for an integrated observing systems portfolio, the steps it needs to take to achieve this vision, or how it will evaluate its progress. NOAA officials said they have focused on taking specific steps toward integration rather than developing an integration plan. Without a plan, however, NOAA cannot be assured it has established a framework to effectively guide and assess the success of its observing system integration efforts. NOAA has also not assessed whether its observing systems are collecting unnecessarily duplicative data even though NOAA documents have identified the need to reduce duplication. NOAA officials told GAO that duplication is not a significant problem requiring further analysis. However, in the absence of an analysis, NOAA cannot know whether it is missing opportunities to achieve cost savings. NOAA has taken steps to integrate the management of its observing systems, including creating an observing systems council to provide a more centralized perspective on systems management. The agency has also developed analytical tools to assess its observing system capabilities and requirements, including a model to analyze investment options. Reliable cost data are needed to ensure the most accurate results from this model, but NOAA does not have a standard methodology for tracking its observing systems costs. NOAA officials said the agency is considering developing a better method for tracking observing system costs but has not established a time frame for doing so. Without accurate and consistent cost information, it will be difficult for NOAA to reliably compare the cost-effectiveness of its observing systems and make informed investment decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NOAA develop a plan to guide the integration of its observing systems, analyze whether unnecessary duplication exists in its observing systems portfolio, and develop a standardized methodology for the routine preparation and reporting of observing systems costs. NOAA generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-195 | gao_GAO-17-195_0 | As of March 2016, GSA had about 1,400 leases of high-security space in about 850 buildings. GSA and DHS’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) have joint responsibility for protecting federal facilities held or leased by GSA. Based on our independent analysis using the real property database, foreign entities owned high-security space that GSA is leasing in 20 buildings through 25 leases as of March 2016. We found that 26 different agencies and departmental components occupy high-security leased space in buildings that we identified as foreign owned, 22 of which occupy space that we identified as owned by companies based in non-NATO countries (China, Israel, South Korea, and Japan). Because the tenants include intelligence and law enforcement agencies, this high-security space is used, among other things, for classified operations and storage of weapons, law enforcement evidence, and sensitive data. The total amount of space leased was about 3.3 million square feet at an annual cost of about $97 million. The other five agencies that knew about occupying foreign-owned space had taken actions to mitigate the risk or were not concerned. Potential Risks of Leasing Foreign- Owned Space Include Espionage, Cyber Intrusions, and Money Laundering Concerns Selected Federal Officials and Real Estate Company Representatives Cited Physical and Cyber Security Risks Posed by Foreign Ownership
Several federal officials who assess foreign investments in the United States and selected real estate company representatives we spoke to told us that leasing space in foreign-owned buildings could present security risks such as espionage, unauthorized cyber and physical access to the facilities, and sabotage. GSA Does Not Check the Beneficial Owners of the Buildings It Leases
Another potential risk to the government regarding foreign-owned leased space is the possibility of entering into leases with hidden beneficial owners of buildings that are using the investment to launder money. GSA’s lease of space for the FBI field office in Seattle may be an example of GSA leasing high-security space from a beneficial owner who is a politically exposed person. When leasing space, GSA is required, among other things, to determine whether the prospective lessor is a responsible party. However, under GSA’s Acquisition Manual, foreign ownership is not one of the factors that GSA must consider when deciding whether to contract for a lease. Offerors are required to disclose certain ownership information that may indicate whether they are foreign owned. As discussed earlier, GSA’s information on foreign ownership of high- security space was not reliable, and, as a result, tenant agencies lack information on such foreign ownership even though it can pose risks involving physical and cyber security and foreign financing. Because GSA is not required to identify beneficial ownership information for the space it leases and because GSA is not informing tenant agencies when the space they are occupying is leased from foreign owners, tenants may not be aware that they are occupying space that is foreign owned and may not be addressing any security risks associated with foreign ownership. Conclusions
GSA’s incomplete information and lack of policies and procedures regarding foreign ownership of high-security leased space may undermine the security of the tenants’ facilities. Our review found that GSA is leasing a small portion of its high-security leased space from foreign owners. However, because ownership information was not available regarding about one-third of the buildings with high-security leased space, GSA is likely leasing from more foreign companies than is readily identifiable. Recommendation for Executive Agency Action
We recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration determine whether the beneficial owner of high-security space that GSA leases is a foreign entity and, if so, share that information with the tenant agencies so they can adequately assess and mitigate any security risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously reported that federal facilities are vulnerable to threats from foreign sources that may target their information systems and affect the physical security of the occupants. GAO was asked to examine GSA's lease of high-security space from foreign owners.
This report addresses (1) what is known about foreign ownership of high-security space leased by GSA, (2) potential risks posed by such foreign ownership, and (3) policies and procedures regarding GSA's leasing of space from foreign-owned entities. GAO reviewed GSA's leasing documents; identified and checked ownership information regarding high-security leased space to the extent possible using data, as of March 2016, from a firm that specializes in analyzing the commercial real estate market; interviewed GSA and federal foreign investment officials, tenant agencies that were occupying space owned by foreign entities, and five real estate companies that lease space to GSA or provide related services; and visited three foreign-owned high-security leased facilities selected to represent a variety of owners and tenants.
What GAO Found
GAO reviewed available information on the ownership of General Services Administration (GSA) leased space that requires higher levels of security protection based on factors such as mission criticality and facility size (high-security space) as of March 2016 and found that GSA is leasing high-security space from foreign owners in 20 buildings. The 26 tenant agencies occupy about 3.3 million square feet at an annual cost of about $97 million and use the space, in some cases, for classified operations and to store law enforcement evidence and sensitive data. The foreign-owned leased space included six Federal Bureau of Investigation field offices and three Drug Enforcement Administration field offices. GAO determined that the high-security space is owned by companies based in countries such as Canada, China, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. GAO was unable to identify ownership information for about one-third of GSA's 1,406 high-security leases as of March 2016 because ownership information was not readily available for all buildings.
Federal officials who assess foreign investments in the United States and some tenant agencies occupying high-security leased space told GAO that leasing space in foreign-owned buildings could present security risks such as espionage and unauthorized cyber and physical access. However, 9 of the 14 tenant agencies GAO contacted were unaware that the space they occupy is in a building that we identified as foreign owned. The other five agencies that knew about occupying foreign-owned space had taken actions to mitigate the risk or were not concerned. Another risk is possibly entering into leases with hidden beneficial owners—the persons who ultimately own and control a building. According to the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the risks of contracting with hidden beneficial owners include money laundering. GSA is not required to collect beneficial ownership information and therefore does not know the beneficial owners of the buildings it leases.
Federal agencies are required to assess and address the risks to their high-security facilities but GSA does not inform tenants when leasing space from foreign owners. When leasing space, GSA is required, among other things, to determine whether the prospective lessor is a responsible party, but foreign ownership is not one of the factors that it must consider. As a result, tenants may be unaware that they are occupying foreign-owned space and not know whether they need to address any security risks associated with such foreign ownership.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA determine whether the beneficial owner of high-security leased space is a foreign entity and, if so, share that information with the tenant agencies for any needed security mitigation. GSA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-229 | gao_T-AIMD-00-229_0 | H.R. Removing barriers to information sharing between government and industry can similarly enhance critical infrastructure protection. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), located in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is charged with this mission, but it is not clear whether NIPC has the right tools and resources needed to successfully coordinate information collection efforts with the private sector and to effectively correlate and analyze information received. The second challenge to realizing the goals of H.R. 4246 is that, to truly engage the private sector, the federal government needs to be a model for computer security. Currently, the federal government is not a model. However, audits conducted by GAO and agency inspectors general show that 22 of the largest federal agencies have significant computer security weaknesses, ranging from poor controls over access to sensitive systems and data, to poor control over software development and changes, to nonexistent or weak continuity of service plans. In summary, by removing private sector concerns about sharing information on critical infrastructure threats, H.R. 4246 can facilitate private-public partnerships and help spark the dialogue needed to identify threats and vulnerabilities and to develop response strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the proposed Cyber Security Information Act of 2000 (H.R. 4246), focusing on how it can enhance critical infrastructure protection and the formidable challenges involved with achieving the goals of the bill.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) by removing key barriers that are precluding private industry from sharing information about infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities, H.R. 4246 can help build the meaningful private-public partnerships that are integral to protecting critical infrastructure assets; (2) however, to successfully engage the private sector, the federal government itself must be a model of good information security; (3) currently, it is not; (4) significant computer security weaknesses--ranging from poor controls over access to sensitive systems and data, to poor control over software development and changes, to nonexistent or weak continuity of service plans--pervade virtually every major agency; (5) and, as illustrated by the recent ILOVEYOU computer virus, mechanisms already in place to facilitate information sharing among federal agencies about impeding threats and vulnerabilities have not been working effectively; and (6) moreover, the federal government may not yet have the right tools for identifying, analyzing, coordinating, and disseminating the type of information that H.R. 4246 envisions collecting from the private sector. |
gao_GAO-03-561 | gao_GAO-03-561_0 | These reviews replaced state self-reporting of their compliance with federal requirements. State surveys conducted since about mid-2000 showed less variance from federal comparative surveys, suggesting that (1) state surveyors’ performance in documenting serious deficiencies has improved and (2) the decline in serious nursing home quality problems is potentially real. Quality-of-Care Problems Were Understated in Homes with a History of Problems
Even with the reported decline in serious deficiencies, an unacceptably high number of nursing homes—one in five nationwide—still had actual harm or immediate jeopardy deficiencies. Weaknesses Persist in State Survey, Complaint, and Enforcement Activities
Widespread weaknesses persist in state survey, complaint investigation, and enforcement activities despite increased attention to these issues in recent years. Several factors at the state level contribute to the understatement of serious quality-of-care problems, including poor investigation and documentation of deficiencies, the absence of adequate quality assurance processes, and a large number of inexperienced surveyors in some states due to high attrition or hiring limitations. In addition, our analysis of OSCAR data indicated that the timing of a significant proportion of state surveys remained predictable, allowing homes to conceal problems if they choose to do so. States failed to refer a substantial number of homes for sanction, significantly undermining the policy’s intended deterrent effect. CMS Oversight of State Survey Activities Requires Further Strengthening
While CMS has increased its oversight of state survey and complaint activities and instituted a more systematic oversight process by initiating annual state performance reviews, CMS officials acknowledged that the effectiveness of the reviews could be improved. In particular, CMS officials told us that for the initial state performance review in fiscal year 2001, they lacked the capability to systematically distinguish between minor lapses identified during the reviews and more serious problems that require intervention. CMS oversight is also hampered by continuing limitations in OSCAR data, the inability or reluctance of some CMS regions to use such data to monitor state activities, and inadequate oversight of certain areas, such as survey predictability and state referral of homes for immediate enforcement actions. However, three federal initiatives critical to reducing the subjectivity evident in the current survey process and the investigation of complaints have been delayed. Our work, as well as that of CMS, demonstrates the persistence of several long-standing problems and also provides insights on factors that may be contributing to these shortcomings: state surveyors continue to understate serious deficiencies that caused actual harm or placed residents in immediate jeopardy; deficiencies are often poorly investigated and documented, making it difficult to determine the appropriate severity category; states focus considerable effort on reviewing proposed actual harm deficiencies, but many have no quality assurance processes in place to determine if less serious deficiencies are understated or have investigation and documentation problems; the timing of too many surveys remains predictable, allowing problems to go undetected if a home chooses to conceal deficiencies; numerous weaknesses persist in many states’ complaint processes, including the lack of consumer toll-free hotlines in many states, confusion over prioritization of complaints, inconsistent complaint investigation procedures, and the failure of most states to investigate all complaints alleging actual harm within 10 days, as required; and states did not refer a substantial number of homes that had a pattern of harming residents to CMS for immediate sanctions. Several areas that require CMS’s ongoing attention include (1) the newly established standard performance reviews to ensure that critical elements of the review, such as assessing states’ ability to properly document deficiencies, are successfully implemented, (2) the successful modernization of CMS’s data system by 2005 to support the survey process and provide key information for monitoring state survey activities, (3) the planned expansion of comparative surveys to improve federal oversight of the state survey process, (4) the survey methodology redesign intended to make the survey process more systematic, (5) the development of more structured guidance for surveyors to address inconsistencies in how the scope and severity of deficiencies are cited across states, and (6) the provision of detailed guidance to states to ensure thorough and consistent complaint investigations. Nursing home deficiency trends. Enforcement. Four states accounted for about 55 percent of cases that should have been referred. Nursing Homes: Success of Quality Initiatives Requires Sustained Federal and State Commitment. California Nursing Homes: Care Problems Persist Despite Federal and State Oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since July 1998, GAO has reported numerous times on nursing home quality-of-care issues and identified significant weaknesses in federal and state oversight. GAO was asked to assess the extent of the progress made in improving the quality of care provided by nursing homes to vulnerable elderly and disabled individuals, including (1) trends in measured nursing home quality, (2) state responses to previously identified weaknesses in their survey, complaint, and enforcement activities, and (3) the status of oversight and quality improvement efforts by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
What GAO Found
The proportion of nursing homes with serious quality problems remains unacceptably high, despite a decline in the incidence of such reported problems. Actual harm or more serious deficiencies were cited for 20 percent or about 3,500 nursing homes during an 18-month period ending January 2002, compared to 29 percent for an earlier period. Fewer discrepancies between federal and state surveys of the same homes suggests that state surveyors are doing a better job of documenting serious deficiencies and that the decline in serious quality problems is potentially real. Despite these improvements, the continuing prevalence of and state surveyor understatement of actual harm deficiencies is disturbing. For example, 39 percent of 76 state surveys from homes with a history of quality-of-care problems--but whose current survey found no actual harm deficiencies--had documented problems that should have been classified as actual harm or higher, such as serious, avoidable pressure sores. Weaknesses persist in state survey, complaint, and enforcement activities. According to CMS and states, several factors contribute to the understatement of serious quality problems, including poor investigation and documentation of deficiencies, limited quality assurance systems, and a large number of inexperienced surveyors in some states. In addition, GAO found that about one-third of the most recent state surveys nationwide remained predictable in their timing, allowing homes to conceal problems if they chose to do so. Considerable state variation remains regarding the ease of filing a complaint, the appropriateness of the investigation priorities, and the timeliness of investigations. Some states attributed timeliness problems to inadequate staff and an increase in the number of complaints. Although the agency strengthened enforcement policy by requiring states to refer for immediate sanction homes that had repeatedly harmed residents, GAO found that states failed to refer a substantial number of such homes, significantly undermining the policy's intended deterrent effect. CMS oversight of state survey activities has improved but requires continued attention to help ensure compliance with federal requirements. While CMS strengthened oversight by initiating annual state performance reviews, officials acknowledged that the reviews' effectiveness could be improved. For the initial fiscal year 2001 review, officials said they lacked the capability to systematically distinguish between minor lapses and more serious problems that required intervention. CMS oversight is also hampered by continuing database limitations, the inability of some CMS regions to use available data to monitor state activities, and inadequate oversight in areas such as survey predictability and state referral of homes for enforcement. Three key CMS initiatives have been significantly delayed--strengthening the survey methodology, improving surveyor guidance for determining the scope and severity of deficiencies, and producing greater standardization in state complaint processes. These initiatives are critical to reducing the subjectivity evident in current state survey and complaint activities. |
gao_GAO-16-217T | gao_GAO-16-217T_0 | Agencies Assess the Effectiveness of Their Programs in Several Ways but Have Not Consistently Conducted Reviews That Could Improve Responses to Fires
In our September 2015 report, we found that the agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs in several ways, including through performance measures, efforts to assess specific activities, and reviews of specific wildland fire incidents. We also found that the agencies had conducted reviews of their responses to wildland fires, but that they did not consistently follow agency policy in doing so or use specific criteria for selecting the fires they reviewed, limiting their ability to help ensure that their fire reviews provided useful information and meaningful results. For example, in fiscal year 2014, the Forest Service began developing a performance measure intended to reflect that, in some cases, allowing naturally-ignited fires to burn can provide natural resource benefits at a lower cost and lower risk to personnel than fully suppressing the fire as quickly as possible. The officials told us they plan to finalize the measure and use it in 2017. Agencies Have Undertaken Multiple Efforts to Assess Effectiveness of Specific Activities
The agencies have also undertaken multiple efforts to assess the effectiveness of particular wildland fire management activities, such as fuel reduction and aerial firefighting. Since the 1960s, multiple reviews of federal fire aviation programs have called for the Forest Service and Interior to collect information on the performance of firefighting aircraft. The agencies generally agreed with our recommendation. The Forest Service and Interior Agencies Have Not Consistently Conducted Reviews of Wildland Fire Incidents to Assess their Effectiveness
As detailed in our September 2015 report, the Forest Service and the Interior agencies have conducted reviews to assess their effectiveness in responding to wildland fires, but have not consistently followed agency policy in doing so and did not always use specific criteria for selecting the fires they reviewed. Instead, Forest Service officials told us the agency judgmentally selects incidents to review based on a range of broad criteria, such as complexity and national significance, taking into account political, social, natural resource, or policy concerns. Within Interior, Bureau of Land Management officials told us that the agency completed its last fire review based on significant cost (i.e., federal expenditures of $10 million or more) in 2013. These officials told us that the Bureau of Land Management, similar to the Forest Service, plans to shift the emphasis of its fire reviews to evaluate management actions rather than focusing on cost, and that officials are working to determine criteria for selecting fires for review. As a result, we recommended in our September 2015 report that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the Director of Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire to (1) develop specific criteria for selecting wildland fires for review and for conducting the reviews as part of their efforts to improve their approach to reviewing fires and (2) once such criteria are established, revise agency policies to align with the specific criteria developed by the agencies. The Forest Service Has Faced Challenges in Its Efforts to Modernize the Large Airtanker Fleet, but Has Increased the Availability of Large Airtankers Since Our 2013 Report
In our August 2013 report, we found that the Forest Service faced challenges in modernizing the government’s fleet of large airtankers— which had declined from 44 in 2002 to 8 in 2013—but since that report the agency has increased the availability of such aircraft, with some challenges remaining. Specifically, we found that the Forest Service planned to modernize the large airtanker fleet by obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium, and long terms, but that each component of this approach faced challenges that made the continued availability of such aircraft to meet national fire suppression needs uncertain. For the medium term, the Forest Service had awarded contracts for seven “next-generation” large airtankers that were expected to be faster and more up-to-date than the legacy aircraft. The Forest Service has issued additional contracts for next-generation aircraft and, as of November 2015, the agency had a total of 20 privately-owned large airtankers under contract, according to Forest Service officials. One aircraft, however, was used by the Forest Service during the 2015 wildland fire season under an agreement with the Coast Guard, according to Forest Service officials. However, as we found in our 2013 report, Forest Service and Interior officials expressed concern that MAFFS performance can be inadequate in some circumstances. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wildland fires play an important ecological role on the landscape, but they cost billions each year, result in loss of life, and cause damage to homes and other structures. The Forest Service and Interior are responsible for wildland fire management on federal lands, including acquiring firefighting assets such as large airtankers to assist in fire suppression activities. Increased fire intensity has prompted efforts aimed at implementing more effective fire management strategies. Understanding the effectiveness of these efforts takes on heightened importance given that the Forest Service and Interior have obligated $8.3 billion to suppress wildland fires in fiscal years 2009 through 2014.
This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in September 2015 and August 2013. It focuses on (1) how the federal wildland fire agencies assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs and (2) Forest Service efforts to modernize the large airtanker fleet and challenges it faces in doing so. For the 2015 report, GAO reviewed agency performance measures and other ways the agencies assess effectiveness. For the 2013 report, GAO reviewed large airtanker planning and acquisition documents. GAO also conducted selected updates by reviewing documentation and interviewing officials.
What GAO Found
As GAO found in its September 2015 report, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the Department of the Interior assess the effectiveness of their wildland fire management programs in several ways, including through performance measures, evaluations of particular activities, and reviews of specific wildland fires. Forest Service and Interior officials told GAO their performance measures need to be improved and that they are working to do so. For example, in fiscal year 2014, the Forest Service began developing a performance measure intended to reflect that, in some cases, allowing naturallyignited fires to burn can provide natural resource benefits at a lower cost and lower risk to personnel than fully suppressing the fire as quickly as possible. Officials told GAO they plan to finalize the measure and use it in 2017. In addition, Forest Service and Interior have undertaken efforts to evaluate particular wildland fire management activities, such as efforts to reduce potentially hazardous vegetation that can fuel fires, known as fuel reduction, and assess the performance of firefighting aircraft. However, GAO's 2015 report found that the Forest Service and Interior conducted reviews to assess their effectiveness in responding to wildland fire, but did not consistently follow agency policy which generally directs them to review each fire involving federal expenditures of $10 million or more. Forest Service and Interior officials told GAO that this policy overly emphasized the cost of wildland fire suppression rather than the effectiveness of their response to fires. However, the Forest Service and Interior have not established specific criteria for selecting fires for review and conducting the reviews. For example Forest Service officials told GAO the agency judgmentally selects incidents to review based on broad criteria such as complexity and national significance. By developing specific criteria, GAO concluded that the agencies may enhance their ability to help ensure that their fire reviews provide useful information about the effectiveness of their wildland fire activities.
In its August 2013 report, GAO found that the Forest Service faced challenges in modernizing the government's fleet of large airtankers—which had declined from 44 in 2002 to 8 in 2013—but since that report the agency has increased the availability of such aircraft. GAO found in 2013 that the Forest Service, which is responsible for contracting for large airtankers, planned to modernize the fleet by obtaining large airtankers from various sources over the near, medium, and long term, but that each component of that approach faced challenges, making the continued availability of such aircraft to meet fire suppression needs uncertain. For example, for the medium term, the Forest Service had awarded contracts for seven “next-generation” large airtankers, but as of August 2013 only one had completed necessary federal approval and certification processes. Since that report, Forest Service officials told GAO that the agency has increased the availability of large airtankers. Specifically, as of November 2015, the agency had contracted for 20 privately-owned large airtankers, and another 7 large airtankers are to be transferred to Forest Service ownership from the Coast Guard.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended in September 2015 that the agencies develop specific criteria for reviewing wildland fires. The agencies generally agreed. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_NSIAD-99-10 | gao_NSIAD-99-10_0 | In March 1998, the President announced (1) the restoration of direct charter flights between the United States and Cuba for authorized U.S. travelers, (2) a plan to streamline and expedite licensing procedures for medical exports, and (3) the reinstitution of family remittances up to $300 per quarter from persons in the United States to their families in Cuba. Indirect and Direct Flights to Cuba Are Consistent With U.S. Law
We believe that OFAC’s decision to permit U.S.-licensed air carrier service providers to charter foreign aircraft that landed in a third country, changed flight numbers, and then flew on to Cuba independent of the U.S. carrier service provider was consistent with its legal authority. We also believe that the executive branch’s decisions to restore direct U.S. flights to Cuba of both persons and cargo and to further monitor fully hosted travel to Cuba were consistent with the existing law. Agreement on Use of Confiscated Property Is Consistent With U.S. Law
A number of provisions in the 1996 Helms-Burton Act relate to U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government. The agreement would appear to preclude STET from being considered a trafficker in ITT’s confiscated property, at least for the 10-year period covered by the agreement. Exports may also reach Cuba illegally if businesses deliberately circumvent the embargo restrictions. New Guidelines Intended to Streamline Medical Exports Are Consistent With U.S. Law
On May 14, 1998, BXA issued guidelines describing expedited procedures for licensing medical exports to Cuba. This furthers the specific provision in the CDA authorizing medical exports to Cuba. Roles in Implementation and Monitoring
Although the State Department plays a pivotal role in policy matters, OFAC is primarily responsible for implementing the embargo and BXA licenses exports. Customs refers criminal violations to the Justice Department or civil violations to OFAC if warranted. The U.S. Attorneys’ offices have brought few prosecutions for violations of restrictions on travel and exports to Cuba over the 36 years of the embargo’s history. They also told us that the lack of significant monetary impact of Cuban embargo cases and jury appeal where humanitarian issues may be present are factors to be considered in these cases. However, the President’s broad authority over the conduct of foreign affairs as well as that under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act allows the executive branch a great deal of discretion in making changes to embargo restrictions. We believe that OFAC has the authority to make the family remittance changes under its general licensing authority, which was included in the codification of the embargo under section 102(h). It is difficult for U.S. enforcement agencies to monitor people and goods once they leave U.S. borders, and most foreign countries do not cooperate with U.S. embargo restrictions. Scope and Methodology
In order to assess the consistency of executive branch policy with U.S. laws and regulations, we met with U.S. officials at the Departments of State, Commerce’s Bureau of Export Administration, Justice, and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. In order to describe how U.S. goods can be available in Cuba, we consulted specialists, including the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Comments From the Departments of State and the Treasury
Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Department of the Treasury’s July 1996 travel procedures used for indirect flights by lawful U.S. travelers were consistent with the law, we researched and reviewed the laws that deal with the embargo against Cuba, including their legislative histories, applicable federal court decisions, the CACRs and official OFAC circulars. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation and monitoring of certain Cuban embargo provisions affecting travel, telecommunications, and trade, focusing on: (1) whether the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control's (OFAC) decision to allow authorized U.S. travelers to fly indirectly to Cuba was consistent with the law; (2) whether a telecommunications agreement between International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and STET International was consistent with U.S. law; (3) how U.S. products can be available in Cuba; (4) how U.S. agencies license and monitor U.S. travelers and companies, including licensed air carrier providers, and exports that are affected by the embargo's restrictions; and (5) whether the executive branch's changes to the embargo in 1998 were consistent with U.S. law.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the President's broad authority under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act allows the executive branch a great deal of discretion in making changes to embargo restrictions; (2) both flight procedures used by Treasury and the Department of Commerce were consistent with existing U.S. law; (3) the executive branch's 1998 change that further monitors fully hosted travel is also consistent with U.S. law; (4) GAO also believes that the agreement between ITT and STET International regarding ITT's confiscated property in Cuba is consistent with the applicable statutory language of Helms-Burton Act; (5) ITT has agreed to let STET use ITT's confiscated property in Cuba over the 10-year period of the agreement, and STET provided substantial compensation to ITT; (6) some U.S. goods can legally be exported to Cuba; (7) in most instances, U.S. goods can also be legally exported to Cuba by non-U.S. firms in third countries if the U.S. supplier has no knowledge that the buyer intends to sell them to Cuba; (8) exports may also reach Cuba illegally if businesses deliberately circumvent the embargo restrictions; (9) according to U.S. officials, few countries cooperate with U.S. enforcement of the embargo; (10) the executive branch's 1998 changes that expedite procedures for medical exports to Cuba and permit licensed medical and pharmaceutical sales representatives to travel to Cuba are consistent with the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which specifically authorizes medical exports, and OFAC's licensing authority under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations; (11) OFAC is primarily responsible for implementing the Cuba embargo, the Bureau of Export Administration licenses exports, and the Customs Service enforces the embargo at U.S. borders; (12) Customs seizes contraband and refers potential civil violations to OFAC and potential criminal violations to the Department of Justice (DOJ); (13) DOJ officials told GAO they have not prosecuted many Cuba embargo cases partly due to the difficulty of proving specific intent to violate the law; (14) they also indicated that the lack of significant monetary impact of Cuban embargo cases and jury appeal where humanitarian issues may be present are factors to be considered in these cases; (15) in 1998, the executive branch changed family remittance procedures to allow U.S. persons to send general family remittances of up to $300 per quarter to relatives in Cuba; and (16) based on GAO's review of all the applicable statutory language, GAO believes OFAC had the authority to make the family remittance changes under its general legislative authority. |
gao_GAO-10-94 | gao_GAO-10-94_0 | Second, BOP projects inmate population changes for the budget year and for several years into the future. BOP’s Methods for Estimating Costs Largely Reflect Best Practices
BOP’s methods for estimating costs in its annual budget requests to DOJ largely reflect the best practices outlined in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Specifically, BOP followed a well-defined process for developing a mostly comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible cost estimate for fiscal year 2008. For example, we found BOP’s projections were accurate, on average, to within 1 percent of the actual inmate population growth from fiscal year 1999 through August 20, 2009. While not required by OMB or DOJ in annual budget development guidance, conducting an uncertainty analysis of this kind is a best practice. BOP has not conducted an uncertainty analysis, and therefore has not quantified the level of confidence associated with its cost estimate. By providing the results of such analysis to DOJ, BOP officials could share advance information on the probability and associated risks of operating expenses exceeding enacted funding levels— a situation BOP faced in fiscal year 2008. By documenting all steps for developing its budget cost estimate, BOP would be better positioned to recreate its estimates in the event of attrition within its budget office among those who developed initial budget cost estimates. Costs for Key Operations Have Exceeded the Funding Levels Requested in the President’s Budget in Recent Years
BOP’s costs for key operations to maintain basic services, such as those for inmate medical care and utilities, exceeded the funding levels requested in the President’s budget from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, limiting BOP’s ability to manage its growing inmate population. During this period, BOP’s annual non-salary inmate medical care and utilities costs exceeded funding levels in the President’s budget request by a total of about $131 million and $55 million, respectively, largely due to inflation and inmate population growth. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve transparency in BOP’s cost estimation process, as well as DOJ’s annual budget formulation and justification process, and to provide DOJ with more detailed information to consider when deliberating its budget proposal for BOP, we recommend that the Attorney General take the following two actions: instruct the BOP Director to require the BOP budget staff to conduct an uncertainty analysis quantifying the extent to which operations costs could vary due to changes in key cost assumptions and submit the results along with budget documentation to DOJ so that DOJ could be aware of the range of likely costs and BOP’s associated confidence levels; and instruct the BOP Director to require the BOP budget staff to improve documentation of calculations used to estimate its costs. BOP identifies and estimates costs for new initiatives/program increases, such as activation of a new BOP prison facility, by reviewing the proposals submitted by its divisions and regional offices, and historical data. Consistent with best practices, BOP used relevant historical cost data and considered adjustments for general inflation when estimating costs for its fiscal year 2008 budget request to DOJ, and its methods for projecting inmate population have been largely accurate. In some cases, however, we required the guidance of BOP budget analysts to identify backup support because the documentation was insufficient to allow someone unfamiliar with the budget to locate detailed corroborating data. As a result, BOP has faced funding gaps in its operations account that has left it with limited flexibility to manage its continually growing inmate population. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for the custody and care of about 209,000 federal inmates--a population which has grown by 44 percent over the last decade. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the President requested additional funding for BOP because costs for key operations were at risk of exceeding appropriated funding levels. Government Accountability Office (GAO) was congressionally directed to examine (1) how BOP estimates costs when developing its annual budget request to DOJ; (2) the extent to which BOP's methods for estimating costs follow established best practices; and (3) the extent to which BOP's costs for key operations exceeded requested funding levels identified in the President's budget in recent years, and how this has affected BOP's ability to manage its growing inmate population. In conducting our work, GAO analyzed BOP budget documents, interviewed BOP and DOJ officials, and compared BOP's cost estimation documentation to criteria in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.
What GAO Found
BOP uses three general steps to estimate costs for its annual budget submission: (1) estimating cost increases to maintain service levels, such as inmate medical care and utilities; (2) projecting inmate population changes for the budget year and for several years into the future using a modeling program that incorporates data on the current inmate population and estimated incoming population and associated sentences; and (3) estimating costs to both provide additional capacity to house projected inmate population growth and implement new programs, such as activating new prisons. BOP's methods for cost estimation largely reflect best practices outlined in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. BOP followed a well-defined process for developing a mostly comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible cost estimate for fiscal year 2008. For example, BOP used relevant historical cost data and considered adjustments for general inflation when estimating costs for its budget request to DOJ. Moreover, BOP's methods for projecting inmate population changes were accurate, on average, to within 1 percent of the actual inmate population growth from fiscal year 1999 to August 2009. Still, BOP could strengthen its methods in two ways. First, BOP has not quantified the level of confidence associated with its cost estimate. While not required by the Office of Management and Budget or DOJ, conducting an uncertainty analysis of this kind is a best practice. By providing the results of such analysis to DOJ, BOP officials could share advance information on the probability and associated risks of operating expenses exceeding enacted funding levels. Second, during our review of documentation for BOP's fiscal year 2008 cost estimate, in some cases we required the guidance of BOP budget analysts to identify backup support because the documentation was insufficient to allow someone unfamiliar with the budget to locate detailed corroborating data. By documenting all steps, BOP would be better positioned to recreate its budget cost estimates in the event of attrition among those who initially developed them. According to BOP, from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, costs for non-salary inmate medical care and utilities exceeded funding levels in the President's budget request by about $131 million and $55 million, respectively. As a result, BOP has faced funding gaps in its operations account that has left it with limited flexibility to manage its continually growing inmate population. |
gao_AIMD-99-44 | gao_AIMD-99-44_0 | First Biennial Plan Important Step Toward Improving Financial Management
In developing its concept of operations as part of its Biennial Plan, DOD has taken an important step in improving its financial management operations. DOD has reported, for the first time, the importance of the programmatic functions of personnel, acquisition, property management, and inventory management to the department’s ability to support consistent, accurate information flows to all information users. However, the concept of operations does not address two critical elements that are necessary for producing sustainable financial management improvement over the long term. Specifically, the concept of operations does not address (1) how its financial management operations effectively support not only financial reporting but also asset accountability and control, and (2) budget formulation. Transition Plan Does Not Provide a Road Map From the Current Environment to DOD’s Future Financial Management System
The transition plan, while an ambitious statement of DOD’s planned improvement efforts, has two important limitations: (1) clear links are not provided between the envisioned future operations and the numerous planned improvement initiatives to determine whether the proposed transition will result in the target financial management environment and (2) actions to ensure feeder systems’ data integrity are not addressed. In addition, Volume II of the department’s Biennial Plan includes overview information on over 200 specific initiatives. Without identifying specific actions that will ensure feeder system data integrity, it is unclear whether the department will be able to effectively carry out not only its financial reporting, but also its other financial management responsibilities. Further Details Will Be Needed to Evaluate the Workability of DOD’s Planned Financial Management Environment
Certain additional detailed information would be necessary to determine whether implementation of the department’s future financial management environment is “workable”—that is, whether the planned environment is practical, cost-effective, and feasible. Such details are not within the scope of the high-level, strategic financial management improvement plan that DOD was asked to provide and we were asked to analyze. DOD officials have stated that they recognize that additional information will be necessary and that they are developing further details on these issues. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To address the requirements of section 912 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261), our objectives were to determine (1) whether DOD’s concept of operations included the critical elements necessary for producing sustainable financial management improvement over the long term and (2) whether the transition plan provided a “road map” from the current environment to DOD’s planned future financial management environment. This report also includes a discussion of additional technical details that would be needed to determine whether implementation of the department’s future financial management environment is practical, cost-effective, and feasible. 3. 4. 5. 6. 8. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Biennial Financial Management Improvement Plan to determine whether the: (1) concept of operations included the critical elements necessary for producing sustainable financial management improvement over the long term; (2) transition plan provided a strategic-level road map from the current environment to DOD's planned future financial management environment; and (3) implementation of the department's future financial management environment is practical, cost-effective, and feasible.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in developing this overall concept of its envisioned financial management environment, DOD has taken an important first step in improving its financial management operations; (2) the department's Biennial Plan also represents a significant landmark because it includes, for the first time, a discussion of the importance of the programmatic functions of personnel, acquisition, property management, and inventory management to the department's ability to support consistent, accurate information flows to all information users; (3) in addition, DOD's Biennial Plan includes an impressive array of initiatives intended to move the department from its current state to its envisioned financial management environment; (4) while the initiatives discussed should result in some improvements in DOD's financial management operations, the department's Biennial Plan lacks critical elements necessary for producing sustainable financial management improvement over the long term; (5) specifically, the Plan's discussion of how DOD's financial management operations will work in the future--its concept of operations--does not address: (a) how its financial management operations will effectively support not only financial reporting but also asset accountability and control; and (b) budget formulation; (6) in addition, the transition plan, while an ambitious statement of DOD's planned improvement efforts, has two critical flaws: (a) links are not provided between the envisioned future operations and the over 200 planned improvement initiatives to determine whether the proposed transition will result in the target financial management environment; and (b) actions to ensure feeder systems' data integrity are not addressed--an acknowledged major deficiency in the current environment; (7) without identifying specific actions that will ensure feeder system data integrity, it is unclear whether the department will be able to effectively carry out not only its financial reporting, but also its other financial management responsibilities; (8) additional detailed information would be necessary to determine whether implementation of the department's future financial management environment is practical, cost-effective, and feasible; (9) such details are appropriately not included in the strategic financial management improvement plan that DOD was asked to provide; and (10) DOD officials have stated that they recognize that additional information will be necessary and that they are developing further details on these issues. |
gao_GAO-05-409 | gao_GAO-05-409_0 | Our January 2003 report on SBA’s first five loan sales highlighted accounting anomalies related to its disaster loans and loan sales program. These were (1) major flaws in the cash flow model used to estimate the cost of the disaster loan program, (2) errors and inconsistencies in the model used to determine whether sales were beneficial, (3) incorrect loan values used to calculate the results of loan sales, and (4) inconsistencies between the interest rates used to estimate subsidy costs and the interest rates used to determine interest payments to Treasury. This failure to adjust prior interest payments to reflect the final interest rate resulted in excess payments to Treasury and an insufficient balance in SBA’s financing account and subsidy allowance, since the interest payments impact both. This improved the reliability of the disaster program cost estimates and corrected the abnormal balance in the subsidy allowance for the disaster loan program. New Policies and Procedures Will Help Ensure Future Estimates Are Reasonable, but Additional Procedures and Documentation Are Needed
In addition to implementing the corrective actions to resolve the accounting anomalies, SBA also implemented new policies and procedures to help ensure that future loan program cost estimates will be reasonable, including (1) the development and implementation of new standard operating procedures for calculating reestimates; (2) the preparation of documentation to support the rationale and basis for key aspects of the cash flow model; (3) a process to coordinate the preparation of cost estimates between budget, accounting, and program staff; and (4) a revised reestimate approach. In addition, there may be opportunities to improve the model, as well as simplify the estimation process, that warrant further consideration by SBA. Even though SBA completed substantial documentation for the new cash flow model, we found that this documentation was not sufficient to readily provide for knowledge transfer between staff and contractors to help ensure proper maintenance and updating of the model. There may also be opportunities to improve the model with additional variables. Conclusions
SBA took prompt action to identify the deficiencies related to its disaster and loan sale programs with a comprehensive review of its financial records. The corrective actions it then took established a basis for reliable and reasonable cost estimates. At the same time, the complexities associated with estimating costs for these programs will require continued attention. To identify the corrective actions taken and assess whether these actions resolved the identified deficiencies, we: obtained and assessed the new cash flow model used to estimate the cost of the disaster loan program and its various supporting documentation; obtained an understanding of how the model works by reviewing SBA’s summary of the behavior equations, the production system documentation, and assumptions made in the model; analyzed the model’s methodology, including choice of statistical technique and variables included in the analysis, and determined that they were appropriate and reasonably related to the prediction of cash flows of disaster loans; replicated certain components of the model, such as the process used to segment the portfolio into groups of loans and predict future loan performance; assessed SBA’s logistic regression used to determine and support the variables used in the model to verify that the variables selected were statistically significant; reviewed (1) SBA’s testing of the cash flow model for biases; (2) SBA’s comparison of the loans sold and the loans kept; (3) E&Y’s reports summarizing its independent reviews of the model, including procedures performed, findings, and observations; and (4) SBA’s financial statement auditor’s assessment of SBA’s model, its reestimates, and its revised loan sale loss calculation; obtained SBA’s analysis of its interest payments to Treasury and verified reviewed SBA’s fiscal year 2004 financial statements summarizing the implementation of the balances approach to reestimate costs; interviewed SBA officials, an SBA contractor, and SBA’s financial interviewed OMB officials to obtain an understanding of their efforts to update the tools agencies use to calculate interest on financing account balances. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to a January 2003 GAO report that identified significant anomalies in the Small Business Administration's (SBA) disaster loan accounts and raised serious concerns about its ability to account for loan sales and estimate program costs, SBA conducted an extensive analysis to identify causes of the anomalies and implemented a number of corrective actions. In light of SBA's actions, GAO undertook a follow-up review to (1) describe the nature of the deficiencies SBA identified, (2) determine whether its corrective actions resolved the deficiencies, and (3) assess whether its procedures provide a reasonable basis for future credit estimates.
What GAO Found
SBA took prompt action with a comprehensive review of its financial records and systems to identify the deficiencies related to accounting for its disaster loans and loan sale program. SBA's review found (1) the cash flow model used to estimate the cost of the disaster loan program was unreliable and underestimated the cost, (2) the model used to determine whether sales were beneficial had errors and incorrectly indicated that loans were sold at gains, (3) incorrect loan values used to calculate the results of loan sales led to inaccurate reporting in SBA's financial statements, and (4) incomplete tools provided by OMB to calculate interest payments on borrowings from Treasury resulted in excess payments to Treasury and an insufficient balance in SBA's financing account and subsidy allowance. To resolve these deficiencies, SBA implemented a number of corrective actions during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. To address the first three, SBA developed a new cash flow model to estimate the costs and loan values for the disaster loan program. This improved the agency's ability to prepare more reliable cost estimates and determine the gain or loss on prior loan sales. To address the fourth deficiency, SBA analyzed its interest payments to Treasury and found that it had overpaid by about $134 million. SBA included this amount in its reestimates for the disaster loan program to correct prior interest payments and also implemented a different approach to update or "reestimate" its cost estimates, which will adjust its transactions with Treasury going forward. However, until OMB updates its tools for computing these interest payments, other credit agencies may also be over- or underpaying interest to Treasury. Further, SBA improved its policies and procedures to help ensure that future loan program cost estimates will be reasonable. For example, SBA implemented new standard operating procedures for calculating reestimates and prepared documentation to support the rationale and basis for key aspects of the cash flow model. However, because of the complexities associated with estimating loan program costs, additional actions by SBA would help improve the long-term reliability of cost estimates. These include (1) further documentation of the model and disaster data to readily provide for knowledge transfer between staff and contractors to help ensure proper maintenance, updating, and running of the model; (2) periodic assessments of the model's ability to predict loan performance; and (3) additional procedures to ensure the disaster data used in the model are tested to verify and document that they are reliable. In addition, there may be opportunities to improve the model with additional variables, such as financial strength of borrowers, as well as revisions to simplify the estimation process that warrant further consideration by SBA. |
gao_GAO-11-441T | gao_GAO-11-441T_0 | Overlap and Fragmentation Can Indicate Unnecessary Duplication
We identified 34 areas where agencies, offices, or initiatives may have similar or overlapping objectives or may provide similar services to the same populations; or where government missions are fragmented across multiple agencies or programs (see table 1). Overlap and fragmentation among government programs or activities can be harbingers of unnecessary duplication. The areas identified below are not intended to represent the full universe of duplication, overlap, or fragmentation within the federal government. Our future work will examine other areas of government for potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation. As table 1 shows, many of the issues we identified are focused on activities that are contained within single departments or agencies. In those cases, agency officials can generally achieve cost savings or other benefits by implementing existing GAO recommendations or by undertaking new actions suggested in our March 1 report. However, a number of issues we have identified span multiple organizations and therefore may require higher-level attention by the executive branch or enhanced congressional oversight or legislative action. With the proliferation of these contracts, however, there is a risk of unintended duplication and inefficiency. In addition, options such as consolidating or eliminating overlapping programs have the potential to reduce administrative costs but may not reduce spending on benefits unless fewer individuals are served as a result Employment and training programs: In fiscal year 2009, 47 federal employment and training programs spent about $18 billion to provide services, such as job search and job counseling, to program participants. Opportunities Exist for Other Cost Savings or Revenue Enhancements
Given today’s fiscal environment, our work summarizes 47 additional areas—beyond those directly related to duplication, overlap, or fragmentation—describing other opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. These cost- saving and revenue-enhancing opportunities also span a wide range of federal government agencies and mission areas (see table 2). The President’s 2011 budget proposal contains a provision that would address the need for more complete and accurate information on noncovered state and local pensions, and it estimates savings of $2.9 billion over 10 years. Although Congress has increased the amount of some fixed penalties since our report, only two penalties are to be adjusted for inflation on a periodic basis. In conclusion Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Committee, given the challenges noted above, careful, thoughtful actions will be needed to address many of the issues discussed in our March 1 report, particularly those involving potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal programs and activities. These are difficult issues to address because they may require agencies and Congress to re-examine within and across various mission areas the fundamental structure, operation, funding, and performance of a number of long- standing federal programs or activities with entrenched constituencies. As the nation rises to meet the current fiscal challenges, GAO will continue to assist Congress and federal agencies in identifying actions needed to reduce duplication, overlap, and fragmentation; achieve cost savings; and enhance revenues. In our future annual reports, we will look at additional federal programs and activities to identify further instances of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation as well as other opportunities to reduce the cost of government operations and increase revenues to the government. Specific questions about individual issues may be directed to the area contact listed at the end of each area summary in the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our first annual report to Congress responding to a new statutory requirement that GAO identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives--either within departments or governmentwide--that have duplicative goals or activities. This work will inform government policymakers as they address the rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our national government. Our annual simulations of the federal government's fiscal outlook show continually increasing levels of debt that are unsustainable over time, absent changes in the federal government's current fiscal policies. Since the end of the recent recession, the gross domestic product has grown slowly and unemployment has remained at a high leveWhile the economy is still recovering and in need of careful attenwidespread agreement exists on the need to look not only at the near term but also at steps that begin to change the long-term fiscal path as soon as possible without slowing the recovery. With the passage of time, the window to address the fiscal challenge narrows and the magnitude of the required changes grows. This testimony is based on our March 1, 2011, report and addresses two key issues: (1) federal programs or functional areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists, the actions needed to address such conditions, and the potential financial and other benefits of doing so; and (2) other opportunities for potential cost savings or enhanced revenues. The issues raised in the report were drawn from our prior and ongoing work.
What GAO Found
We identified 81 areas for consideration--34 areas of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation as well as 47 additional cost-saving and revenue-enhancing areas. The 81 areas span a range of federal government missions such as agriculture, defense, economic development, energy, general government, health, homeland security, international affairs, and social services. Within and across these missions, our report touches on hundreds of federal programs, affecting virtually all major federal departments and agencies. By reducing or eliminating unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation and by addressing the other cost-saving and revenue-enhancing opportunities contained in the report, the federal government could yield tens of billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. However, these actions will require some difficult decisions, and sustained attention by the administration and the Congress. In some cases, there is sufficient information to estimate potential savings or other benefits if actions are taken to address individual issues. In other cases, estimates of cost savings or other benefits would depend upon what congressional and executive branch decisions were made, including how certain of our recommendations are implemented. Nevertheless, considering the amount of program dollars involved in the issues we have identified, even limited adjustments could result in significant savings. Additionally, information on program performance, the level of funding in agency budgets devoted to overlapping or fragmented programs, and the implementation costs that might be associated with program consolidations or terminations, are factors that could impact actions to be taken as well as potential savings. We identified 34 areas where agencies, offices, or initiatives may have similar or overlapping objectives or may provide similar services to the same populations; or where government missions are fragmented across multiple agencies or programs. Overlap and fragmentation among government programs or activities can be harbingers of unnecessary duplication. The areas identified below are not intended to represent the full universe of duplication, overlap, or fragmentation within the federal government. Our future work will examine other areas of government for potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation. Given today's fiscal environment, our work summarizes 47 additional areas--beyond those directly related to duplication, overlap, or fragmentation--describing other opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. These cost-saving and revenue-enhancing opportunities also span a wide range of federal government agencies and mission areas. |
gao_GAO-17-655T | gao_GAO-17-655T_0 | OPM, OMB, and SSA Have Had Limited Success in Assisting With Governmentwide Reduction in the Collection, Use, and Display of SSNs
In response to the recommendations of the Identity Theft Task Force, OPM, OMB, and SSA undertook several actions aimed at reducing or eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and display of SSNs. In addition to issuing this guidance, in January 2008, OPM proposed a new regulation regarding the collection, use, and display of SSNs that would have codified the practices outlined in its 2007 guidance and that also required the use of an alternate identifier. However, according to officials in SSA’s Office of the Deputy Commissioner, the clearinghouse is no longer active. Agencies Reported Reducing Their Use and Display of SSNs and Cited Ongoing Challenges; Moreover, Poor Planning and Ineffective Monitoring Have Limited Their Efforts
Based on their responses to our questionnaire on SSN reduction efforts in our draft report, all of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported taking a variety of steps to reduce such collection, display, and use. Interactions with other federal and external entities require use of the SSN. Lacking direction from OMB, many agencies’ reduction plans did not include key elements, such as time frames and performance indicators, calling into question the plans’ utility. In addition, OMB has not required agencies to maintain up-to-date inventories of SSN collections and has not established criteria for determining when SSN use or display is “unnecessary,” leading to inconsistent definitions across the agencies. Subsequently, OMB required agencies to report on the progress of their SSN reduction efforts through their annual FISMA reports. Further, the annual updates did not include performance metrics. In conclusion, based on preliminary information from our study of federal SSN reduction efforts, the initiatives that the 24 CFO Act agencies have undertaken show that it is possible to identify and eliminate the unnecessary use and display of SSNs. Until OMB and agencies adopt better and more consistent practices for managing their SSN reduction processes, overall governmentwide reduction efforts will likely remain limited and difficult to measure; moreover, the risk of SSNs being exposed and used to commit identity theft will remain greater than it need be. Accordingly, our draft report contains five recommendations to OMB to improve the consistency and effectiveness of governmentwide efforts to reduce the unnecessary use of SSNs and thereby mitigate the risk of identity theft. Specifically, the report recommends that OMB: specify elements that agency plans for reducing the unnecessary collection, use, and display of SSNs should contain and require all agencies to develop and maintain complete plans; require agencies to modify their inventories of systems containing PII to indicate which systems contain SSNs and use the inventories to monitor their reduction of unnecessary collection and use of SSNs; provide criteria to agencies on how to determine unnecessary use of SSNs to facilitate consistent application across the federal government; take steps to ensure that agencies provide up-to-date status reports on their progress in eliminating unnecessary SSN collection, use, and display in their annual FISMA reports; and establish performance measures to monitor agency progress in consistently and effectively implementing planned reduction efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSNs are key pieces of identifying information that potentially may be used to perpetrate identity theft. Thieves find SSNs valuable because they are the identifying link that can connect an individual's information across many agencies, systems, and databases.
This statement summarize GAO's draft report that: (1) describes what governmentwide initiatives have been undertaken to assist agencies in eliminating their unnecessary use of SSNs and (2) assesses the extent to which agencies have developed and executed plans to eliminate the unnecessary use and display of SSNs and have identified challenges associated with those efforts. For the draft report on which this testimony is based, GAO analyzed documentation, administered a questionnaire, and interviewed officials from the 24 CFO Act agencies that led or participated in SSN elimination efforts.
What GAO Found
In its draft report, GAO noted that several governmentwide initiatives aimed at eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and display of Social Security numbers (SSN) have been underway in response to recommendations that the presidentially appointed Identity Theft Task Force made in 2007 to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Social Security Administration (SSA). However, these initiatives have had limited success. In 2008, OPM proposed a new regulation requiring the use of an alternate federal employee identifier but withdrew its proposed regulation because no such identifier was available. OMB required agencies to develop SSN reduction plans and continues to require annual reporting on SSN reduction efforts. SSA developed an online clearinghouse of best practices associated with the reduction of SSN use; however, the clearinghouse is no longer available online.
All 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act developed SSN reduction plans and reported taking actions to curtail the use and display of the numbers. Nevertheless, in their responses to GAO's questionnaire and follow-up discussions, the agencies cited impediments to further reductions, including (1) statutes and regulations mandating the collection of SSNs, (2) the use of SSNs in necessary interactions with other federal entities, and (3) technological constraints of agency systems and processes.
Further, poor planning by agencies and ineffective monitoring by OMB have limited efforts to reduce SSN use. Lacking direction from OMB, many agencies' reduction plans did not include key elements, such as time frames and performance indicators, calling into question their utility. In addition, OMB has not required agencies to maintain up-to-date inventories of their SSN holdings or provided criteria for determining “unnecessary use and display,” limiting agencies' ability to gauge progress. In addition, OMB has not ensured that agencies update their annual progress nor has it established performance metrics to monitor agency efforts to reduce SSN use. Until OMB adopts more effective practices for guiding agency SSN reduction efforts, overall governmentwide reduction will likely remain limited and difficult to measure, and the risk of SSNs being exposed and used to commit identity theft will remain greater than it need be.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's draft report contains five recommendations to OMB to require agencies to submit complete plans for ongoing reductions in the collection, use, and display of SSNs; require inventories of systems containing SSNs; provide criteria for determining “unnecessary” use and display of SSNs; ensure agencies update their progress in reducing the collection, use, and display of the numbers in annual reports; and monitor agency progress based on clearly defined performance measures. |
gao_T-RCED-96-231 | gao_T-RCED-96-231_0 | These subsidies are linked either to multifamily apartment units (project-based) or to individuals (tenant-based). Problems Affecting the Portfolio
The insured Section 8 portfolio suffers from three basic problems—high subsidy costs, high exposure to insurance loss, and in the case of some properties, poor physical condition. These include (1) program design flaws that have contributed to high subsidies and put virtually all the insurance risk on HUD; (2) HUD’s dual role as mortgage insurer and rental subsidy provider, which has resulted in the federal government averting claims against the FHA insurance fund by supporting a subsidy and regulatory structure that has masked the true market value of the properties; and (3) weaknesses in HUD’s oversight and management of the insured portfolio, which have allowed physical and financial problems at a number of HUD-insured multifamily properties to go undetected or uncorrected. If existing rents exceeded market rents, the process would lower the mortgage debt, thereby allowing a property to operate and compete effectively at lower market rents. After reviewing HUD’s proposal, various stakeholders raised questions and concerns about the proposal, including the effect that it would have on different types of properties and residents, and the long-term financial impact of the proposal on the government. Study Confirms Excess Subsidy Costs and Significant Physical Needs at Properties
Ernst & Young estimates that the majority of the properties have assisted rents exceeding market rents and that the properties have significant amounts of immediate deferred maintenance and short-term and long-term capital needs. On the other hand, HUD has indicated that also including those properties with rents currently below market levels could help improve these properties’ physical and financial condition and reduce the likelihood of default. To What Extent Should the Government Provide Tax Relief to Owners Affected by Portfolio Reengineering
HUD’s portfolio reengineering proposal is likely to have adverse tax consequences for some project owners. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) efforts to reengineer its multifamily rental housing portfolio.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the portfolio's excessive subsidy costs, high exposure to insurance loss, and poor physical condition stem from program design flaws, HUD dual role as loan insurer and rental subsidy provider, and weaknesses in HUD oversight and management; (3) in 1995, HUD proposed allowing property owners to set rents at market levels, terminating Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance, and replacing project-based rent subsidies with portable tenant-based subsidies; (4) although the proposal could lower mortgage debt, it would result in substantial FHA insurance claims; (5) HUD has made several proposal changes in 1996 due to concerns about the lack of data, effects on properties and existing residents, and the long-term financial impact on the government; (6) a 1996 contractor's report confirmed that most properties have assisted rents that are higher than estimated market rents and significant maintenance and capital improvement needs; (7) the study also indicates that most portfolio properties need to have their debt reduced to continue operating; and (8) reengineering issues requiring congressional consideration include HUD portfolio management problems, FHA insurance for restructured loans, project- versus tenant-based rent subsidies, protection for displaced households, inclusion of properties with below-market rents, mortgage restructuring, government financing of rehabilitation costs, and property owners' tax relief. |
gao_GAO-01-424 | gao_GAO-01-424_0 | Of the 65 federal Web sites reviewed, 57 did not use persistent cookies. However, of the eight Web sites using persistent cookies, four did so without disclosing this in their privacy policies, as required by OMB. The four remaining sites using persistent cookies disclosed this use but did not meet OMB’s other conditions. In addition, four sites that did not use persistent cookies did not post privacy policies on their home pages. OMB’s Cookie Guidance Helpful but Fragmented and Unclear
Although OMB’s guidance has proved useful in ensuring that federal Web sites address privacy issues, the guidance is fragmented, with multiple documents addressing various aspects of Web site privacy and cookie issues. Conclusions
Most federal Web sites we reviewed were following OMB’s guidance on the use of cookies. The sites that were not following the guidance either have taken or plan to take corrective action. Recommendations for Executive Action
To clarify agency requirements on the use of automatic collections of information, including the use of cookies on their Web sites, we recommend that the Director, OMB, in consultation with other parties, such as agency officials and the CIO Council, unify OMB’s guidance on Web site privacy policies and the use of cookies, clarify the resulting guidance to provide comprehensive direction on the use of cookies by federal agencies on their Web sites, and consider directing federal agencies to disclose the use of session cookies in their Web site privacy notices. OMB did not provide comments. These Web sites consisted of (1) the sites operated by the 33 high- impact agencies, which handle the majority of the government’s contact with the public, and (2) 32 sites randomly selected from the General Services Administration’s government domain registry database. We reviewed each Web site between November and December, 2000, to determine which were using cookies and the type of cookies given. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies are using Internet "cookies" to enable electronic transactions and track visitors on their websites. Cookies are text files that have unique identifiers and are used to store and retrieve information that allow websites to recognize returning users, track on-line purchases, or maintain and serve customized web pages. This report discusses whether (1) federal websites complied with the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance on the use of cookies and (2) the guidance provided federal agencies with clear instructions on the use of cookies. GAO reviewed 65 websites randomly selected from the General Services Administration's government domain registry database between November 2000 and January 2001 to determine whether they used persistent cookies and whether such use was disclosed in the website's privacy policy. As of January 2001, most of the websites reviewed were following OMB's guidance on the use of cookies. Of the 65 sites GAO reviewed, 57 did not use persistent cookies on their websites, eight used persistent cookies, four did not disclose such use in their privacy policy, and the remaining four sites using persistent cookies did provide disclosure but did not meet OMB's other conditions for using cookies. In addition, four other sites that did not use cookies did not post privacy policies on their home pages. Those sites were taking, or planning to take, corrective action to address their noncompliance with OMB guidance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although OMB's guidance proved useful in ensuring that federal websites address privacy issues, the guidance remained fragmented, with multiple documents addressing various aspects of Web site privacy and cookie issues. In addition, the guidance did not provide clear direction on the disclosure of session cookies. |
gao_GAO-13-636 | gao_GAO-13-636_0 | Current Printing Practices Show Changes since 1990
Since the JCP Regulations were updated in 1990, agencies’ printing operations have changed in scale and type. Fewer In-house Printing Plants Are in Operation Than in 1990
Based on definitions we developed in conjunction with GPO and the Interagency Council on Printing and Publication Services, among the agencies in our survey universe, we measured 64 percent fewer in-house printing plants than the number included in the 1990 JCP Regulations. DOD accounted for the greatest decline in in-house printing plants. For example, the 1990 JCP Regulations listed 142 in-house printing plants for the armed services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which currently manages the majority of DOD’s printing infrastructure. This executive order included a provision encouraging agencies “to limit the publication and printing of hard copy documents and to presume that information should be provided in an electronic form, whenever practicable, permitted by law, and consistent with applicable records retention requirements.”
Agencies Reported Operating Primarily Duplication Equipment at In-house Printing Plants
The vast majority of agencies that currently operate in-house printing plants reported operating duplication equipment. That is, most agencies reported operating high-speed duplication machines, and fewer reported operating conventional printing presses. Of the 32 agencies operating in- house printing plants, 17 reported that all of their in-house printing was duplication, and another 14 agencies reported operating some duplication equipment in addition to ink-based conventional printing presses. The remaining agency did not report its type of equipment (see fig. No agency reported having only ink-based conventional printing presses at its in-house plants. In addition to agencies operating fewer printing plants and conducting more duplication, interviews with selected agencies showed declines in printing volumes in recent years. All six agencies also reported greater spending on printing sent to GPO and private printers than on in-house printing or duplication. Current Printing Practices Are Not Fully Reflected in Existing Printing Authorities
1990 JCP Regulations
Even with these changes in agencies’ printing, the definition of “printing” has not been updated in the 1990 JCP Regulations, which outline printing-related definitions and list authorized agency in-house printing plants. In 1994, Title 44 was updated to include “duplicating” in the definition of “printing,” so that it read “… ‘printing’ includes the processes of composition, platemaking, presswork, duplicating, silk screen processes, binding, microform, and the end items of such processes.” However, the 1990 JCP Regulations have not been updated to include duplicating in the definition of printing, and duplicating is not separately defined in either authority. In addition, the 1990 JCP Regulations provide that federal agencies report on their print operations to the JCP, but the requirements do not address duplication. The majority of government documents are published digitally (electronically produced and then disseminated over the Internet); however, the provisions in the law that require agencies to submit documents to the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) do not reference digital publishing. Officials from selected agencies told us they do not submit digital documents to FDLP, and two reported that they do not have any policies or procedures for submitting documents to the FDLP regardless of whether the documents were printed at their in- house printing plants or published electronically. FDLP staff have taken a number of steps to address this challenge, and to obtain digital documents from agencies. In a January 2013 report, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recommended that GPO work with depository libraries and other library groups to develop a comprehensive plan for preserving the print collection of government documents, including a process for ingesting digitized copies into FDsys, GPO’s online system that provides free access to government publications. Agency Comments
We provided copies of our draft report to GPO and DOD for their review and comment. GPO generally agreed with our findings and provided a letter and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not provide comments. This includes using this data to select agencies to survey. To describe how federal printing regulations and statutes reflect current printing practices, we reviewed legal documents such as Title 44 of the U.S. Code and the 1990 JCP Regulations, administered a survey to the universe of agencies described above, and interviewed officials from the printing industry, GPO, and other federal agencies. Duplicating includes high-speed duplicating. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law requires that, with limited exceptions, all federal printing be performed by or through GPO. The JCP authorizes exemptions to specific agencies to operate in-house printing plants. In its 1990 JCP Regulations, the JCP included a list of authorized federal in-house printing plants. Some agency documents, once published, are required to be submitted to the FDLP, a GPO program designed to preserve government documents and make them available to the public.
GAO was asked to examine how federal printing practices had changed since the JCP Regulations were updated in 1990. This report describes (1) agencies' current printing practices--including the number of in-house printing plant and selected agencies' volumes and spending--and (2) how agencies' current printing practices are reflected in federal printing regulations and statutes.
GAO surveyed agencies that might be operating in-house printing plants, interviewed GPO and agency officials, analyzed agency data on printing volumes and spending, and reviewed printing regulations and statutes. GAO also selected six agencies from those surveyed to interview, based on their printing and reproduction obligations. Findings from these interviews cannot be generalized to other federal agencies.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO provided copies of the draft report to GPO and DOD for review and comment. GPO generally agreed with the findings and provided a letter and technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not provide comments.
What GAO Found
Agencies GAO surveyed reported operating fewer in-house printing plants than in 1990. Specifically, surveyed agencies reported operating 64 percent fewer plants than the number listed in the Congress's Joint Committee on Printing's (JCP) Government Printing and Binding Regulations, updated in 1990 (1990 JCP Regulations). The Department of Defense (DOD) accounted for the greatest decline in in-house printing plants. The 1990 JCP Regulations listed 142 DOD printing plants; however, the Defense Logistics Agency, which currently manages the majority of DOD's printing infrastructure, reported 17 in-house printing plants in GAO's survey. In addition, most agencies reported operating toner-based high-speed duplication machines, and fewer reported operating ink-based conventional printing presses. Of the 32 agencies operating in-house printing plants, 17 reported that all of their in-house printing was conducted on high-speed duplication machines; another 14 agencies reported operating some duplication equipment in addition to conventional printing presses (the remaining agency did not report its type of equipment). No agency reported having only ink-based conventional printing presses at its in-house plants. In addition, interviews with selected agencies showed declines in printing volumes and total spending, and suggested that agencies spent more on printing sent to the Government Printing Office (GPO) and its contracted private printers than on printing done at in-house printing plants.
Agencies' printing practices have changed, but existing authorities have not been updated. For example, in 1994, Title 44 of the U.S Code was updated to include "duplicating" in the definition of "printing," but the 1990 JCP Regulations do not include this definition. According to JCP staff, the Committee is aware that the 1990 JCP Regulations do not include duplicating in the definition of printing, and the Committee is working to revise the guidance. Also, the majority of government documents are now published digitally, but provisions in Title 44 that require agencies to submit documents to the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) do not reference digital publishing. Selected agencies GAO interviewed reported that they do not submit digital documents to FDLP. FDLP staff have taken a number of steps to address this, including educating agencies about FDLP requirements. In addition, the National Academy of Public Administration recently recommended that GPO develop a plan to preserve and collect government documents, and include a process for ingesting digitized copies into GPO's online government publications system, and GPO reported that it would incorporate this recommendation into its national plan for the future of the FDLP. |
gao_NSIAD-97-25 | gao_NSIAD-97-25_0 | The NSSN program is intended to address the Navy’s requirement for 10 to 12 new attack submarines by the year 2012 that are as quiet as the Seawolf, but at lower cost and without compromising military utility. NSSN Costs Have Risen
Based on Navy estimates for a 30-ship, single shipyard program, the Seawolf’s average acquisition cost was estimated to be about $1.85 billion compared to the NSSN’s estimate of about $1.5 billion. Based on a 30-ship, two shipbuilder program, the Navy’s estimated acquisition cost for the fifth ship of the NSSN class has already risen from about $1.5 billion to about $1.8 billion as of March 1996. According to the Navy, most of the $250 million increase in the estimated cost of the fifth NSSN is the result of the direction in Public Law 104-106 to add a second shipbuilder to the program and to accelerate the procurement of two of the first four submarines. Although we believe the cost categories seem reasonable, we have no basis to agree or disagree with the total program estimate because the Navy has not provided support for the costs associated with the individual categories. Potential for Cost Increases for Variety of Program Reasons
Even without adding a second shipbuilder to the program, there is a potential for cost increases, because of a variety of program risks. The estimated start-up costs for the second shipbuilder range from $1 million to $1 billion. If a new design is proposed and accepted, the estimated cost would depend on the submarine’s attributes and requirements. As we point out in our report, the C3I system is a highly complex development and integration effort and there is prototype equipment development concurrent with ship construction. DOD believes that the current estimate is adequate and that it is not appropriate to use the cost of transferring the design of the DDG-51 to estimate the cost of transferring the design of the NSSN. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the status of the Navy's New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Program to identify areas of potential risk for rising costs and to provide information on the submarines' potential performance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the NSSN program is not likely to meet the objective of producing a submarine that is significantly less costly than the Seawolf; (2) based on Navy estimates for a 30-ship, single shipbuilder program, the Seawolf's average acquisition cost was estimated to be about $1.85 billion compared to the NSSN's estimate of about $1.5 billion; (3) based on a 30-ship, two shipbuilder program, the Navy's current estimated acquisition cost for the fifth ship of the NSSN class has already risen from about $1.5 billion to about $1.8 billion; (4) Public Law 104-106 directed the Navy to accelerate construction of the first two submarines and to use two shipyards instead of one to build the first four submarines; (5) according to the Navy, this change has increased the estimated cost of developing and building 30 NSSNs by $3 billion; (6) although GAO believes the cost categories seem reasonable, GAO has no basis to agree or disagree with the total program estimate because the Navy has not provided support for the costs associated with the individual categories; (7) according to the Department of Defense, a $3.8-billion increase in budget authority for the Fiscal Year 1997-2001 Future Years Defense Plan period will be needed to acquire two submarines earlier than originally planned as directed by the law; (8) GAO believes there is a potential for other cost increases because of a variety of program risks: (a) anticipated changes in the ship's design or the addition of new technologies are likely; (b) the NSSN command, control, communication, and intelligence combat system development and integration program is highly complex and optimistic; (c) development of some prototype equipment is concurrent with ship construction; and (d) the cost of transferring the submarine's design from the first to the second shipbuilder is based on an optimistic estimate that is less than the actual cost of the last major design transfer; and (9) there is a divergence of views on the start-up costs for the second shipbuilder. |
gao_GAO-15-298 | gao_GAO-15-298_0 | Since 1981, over 1.2 million persons diagnosed with AIDS have been reported to the CDC and over 600,000 of them have died. 1). Also, in some cases local community-based organizations receive both HOPWA and Ryan White Part A funding. Estimates of Housing Need for Persons with HIV Are Not Reliable, and the HOPWA Formula Does Not Effectively Target Funds
As the number of persons with HIV in the United States continues to increase, research finds that stable housing is critical for effective medical care and is associated with improved health outcomes for persons with HIV. HUD Does Not Reliably Estimate the Extent of Housing Needs among Persons with HIV
HUD’s estimate of the number of persons with HIV who have a housing need is not reliable. GAO’s work on assessing data reliability indicates that data should be consistent—that is, data should be clear and well defined enough to yield similar results in similar analyses. Because HUD does not require grantees to use selected data sources in a consistent manner, the resulting information is not comparable. Use of cumulative AIDS cases rather than living HIV cases has led to MSAs with similar numbers of persons living with HIV receiving markedly different amounts of HOPWA funding. However, it is not clear that HRSA’s housing status data are current because HRSA does not require or encourage grantees to maintain current data on clients’ housing status. Internal control standards for the federal government state that events should be promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. Both HUD and HRSA collect data from HOPWA and Ryan White HIV/AIDS program grantees, respectively, including data on the activities funded and clients’ housing status (i.e., whether they have stable and permanent housing). Additionally, HRSA staff provided technical assistance to Ryan White Part A grantees. Federal internal control standards state that monitoring should assess the quality of performance over time and that activities need to be established to monitor performance measures and indicators. By not analyzing trends in the unmet housing need data grantees are required to report, HUD may be missing opportunities to identify and address problems in grantee reporting. HRSA Collects Program Data but Does Not Monitor Housing Information
Although HRSA headquarters staff conduct routine monitoring of Ryan White HIV/AIDS program grantees, they do not focus on housing information. By not focusing attention on the housing data that grantees are required to report, such as housing status, HRSA staff with responsibility for program monitoring may be missing an opportunity to improve their management of grantees’ performance. While HUD advises grantees to use one or more of seven specific data sources, HUD does not require grantees to use these sources in a consistent and therefore comparable manner, as suggested by federal internal control standards and our work on data reliability. HUD has taken steps toward developing a standard methodology but has not established time frames for finalizing these efforts. Because HOPWA funds are awarded based on cumulative AIDS cases, these funds are not being targeted as effectively or equitably as they could be. Without taking steps to ensure that grantee-reported housing status data are current, HRSA may not have reliable information to use in reporting on the extent to which Ryan White HIV/AIDS program clients are reaching the National HIV/AIDS Strategy goals for attainment of permanent housing. Matter for Congressional Consideration
If Congress wishes HOPWA funding to more closely account for the current impact of the HIV, it should consider revising the funding formula used to determine grantee eligibility and grant amounts to reflect a measure of persons living with HIV, including those with AIDS. Recommendations for Executive Action
We make the following four recommendations:
To improve information on the unmet housing needs of persons with HIV and follow through on its efforts to develop a standard methodology, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD direct the Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development to require grantees to use comparable methodologies to analyze HUD’s recommended data sources on unmet housing need. Regarding the second part of the statement with which HUD disagreed—that HUD uses unmet housing need to assess the performance of the program—we revised the report to state that HUD uses unmet housing need data for reporting on the performance of the program, rather than assessing the performance of the program. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to discuss (1) the need for housing assistance for persons with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the extent to which federal assistance reaches communities in need; (2) the results that have been achieved through federal programs that provide housing assistance for persons with HIV and what is known about the strengths and weaknesses of these programs; (3) the extent to which federal programs that provide housing assistance and supportive services for persons with HIV coordinate with one another; and (4) the extent of federal oversight of programs that provide housing assistance to persons with HIV. Also, we obtained and analyzed expenditure data for both programs. Additionally, we interviewed both HUD and HRSA officials on how they use performance data to monitor HOPWA and Ryan White Part A grantees. Formula grant funding criteria are based on each MSA’s share of cumulative Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 1.2 million people in the United States are estimated to have HIV, and about 50,000 new infections occur each year. Research has shown that persons with HIV who lack stable housing are less likely to adhere to HIV care. HUD's HOPWA program and HRSA's Ryan White program provide grants to localities that can be used to fund housing and supportive services specifically for persons with HIV.
GAO was mandated to review housing assistance for persons with HIV. This report addresses (1) the need for housing assistance for persons with HIV and the extent to which assistance reaches communities in need, (2) results achieved through HOPWA and Ryan White, and (3) federal oversight of these programs. For both programs, GAO analyzed program data on persons served and outcomes achieved as of 2012, reviewed policies, interviewed agency officials, and visited a non-generalizable sample of four geographically diverse cities that received varying amounts of both HOPWA and Ryan White funding.
What GAO Found
The extent to which persons with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) need housing assistance is not known, in part because the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) estimate of the housing needs of persons with HIV, including those with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), is not reliable. HUD does not require Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) grantees to use a consistent methodology to calculate unmet need. The agency has taken steps towards developing a standard methodology, but it has not established time frames for finalizing these efforts. GAO's work on assessing data reliability indicates that data should be consistent. Because HUD does not require grantees to use selected data sources in a consistent manner, the reported information on unmet housing needs of persons with HIV are not comparable across jurisdictions and are not useful and reliable. In addition, the statutory HOPWA funding formula is based on cumulative AIDS cases since 1981, including persons who have died, rather than on current numbers of persons living with HIV (including those with AIDS). This approach has led to areas with similar numbers of living HIV cases receiving different amounts of funding. Because HOPWA funds are awarded based on cumulative AIDS cases, these funds are not being targeted as effectively or equitably as they could be.
Agency data for HOPWA and the Health Resources and Services Administration's (HRSA) Ryan White program indicate most recipients of assistance obtained stable, permanent housing, but Ryan White housing data may have limitations. HRSA, within the Department of Health and Human Services, does not require Ryan White grantees to maintain current data on clients' housing status. However, it uses the data that grantees report to calculate the proportion of clients that have stable housing. HRSA is charged with tracking Ryan White clients' housing status as a part of the White House's National HIV/AIDS Strategy. Federal internal control standards state that events should be promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. Because HRSA does not require grantees to maintain current data on clients' housing status, HRSA's data may be of limited usefulness in tracking the National HIV/AIDS Strategy goal of improving clients' housing status.
HUD and HRSA perform oversight activities but may be missing opportunities to use data to improve performance. HUD staff conduct risk-based monitoring of HOPWA grantees, and HRSA staff have improved monitoring of Ryan White grantees. HUD and HRSA both collect performance data from their grantees and take steps to ensure that the data are complete and submitted in a timely manner. HUD uses performance data to create summaries of program performance but does not have a specific process for comparing individual grantees' year-to-year data for unmet housing need. Federal internal control standards note the importance of such comparisons. By not analyzing these trends, HUD may not be identifying and addressing reporting problems. In addition, HRSA staff responsible for monitoring Ryan White grantees do not review grantee data on housing assistance provided. Federal internal control standards state that activities need to be established to monitor performance measures. By not focusing attention on housing data, HRSA staff with monitoring responsibility are not proactively using available resources to monitor individual grantees' contributions to the National HIV/AIDS Strategy goal of improving clients' housing status.
What GAO Recommends
If Congress wishes HOPWA funding to be more effectively targeted, it should consider revising the funding formula to reflect the number of living persons with HIV. GAO also recommends that (1) HUD require a consistent methodology for estimating unmet housing needs and (2) both HUD and HRSA improve the reliability and use of performance data to manage their programs. HRSA agreed with GAO's recommendations. HUD agreed with the first recommendation but disagreed with the second, stating that it already assesses trends in some program data. GAO clarified that HUD should identify reporting issues by analyzing trends in its unmet housing need data. |
gao_GAO-16-384 | gao_GAO-16-384_0 | As FPS’s parent organization, NPPD has responsibility for managing and overseeing FPS’s human capital efforts. FPS’s Human Capital Plan and Related Efforts Generally Align with Most Key Principles, but FPS Has Not Fully Developed Performance Measures to Evaluate Progress
FPS’s Plan and related human capital planning efforts generally align with four of the five key principles for strategic workforce planning that we identified. We found that FPS solicited input from its management and employees, NPPD, and external stakeholders. FPS’s Plan describes five categories, each of which contains several human capital strategies (i.e., programs, policies, and processes) (see sidebar). Furthermore, FPS did not identify targets for the performance measures identified in the Plan. For example, FPS did not identify a desired target for the “attrition rate” measure (e.g., reduce new hires’ attrition rate by 3 percentage points over fiscal years 2017 through 2020). However, the officials’ plans are not clear because they have not yet established time frames for addressing the issues we identified on performance measures. Furthermore, it will be difficult for stakeholders—such as Congress and the public—to hold FPS accountable for achieving its goals. FPS Designed Its Staffing Model to Align with Most Key Practices and Uses It to Make Management Decisions but Has Not Documented a Process to Ensure Data Quality
FPS Designed Its Staffing Model Consistent with Most Key Practices
FPS issued its latest staffing model in August 2013, which identified the number and composition of FTEs the agency needs to meet its mission, based on various data inputs, assumptions, and analyses. A federal facility’s security risk level determines the frequency with which FPS must complete a facility’s security assessment. The model includes annual targets for completing facility security assessments by facility security level. Data quality: FPS officials took steps to ensure the quality of the data used in the model. FPS headquarters officials also told us that the training hours estimates in the model represent training requirements at the time of developing the model and that when they update the model, they plan to change the training hours used in the model to reflect changes in training requirements. FPS Uses Its Staffing Model to Help Make Management Decisions but Has Not Yet Updated It to Reflect Current Operating Conditions
We found that FPS uses the staffing model in conjunction with other management tools, professional judgement, and institutional knowledge to help inform human capital planning and budget requirements, as described below. Nonetheless, FPS and NPPD have no specific time frames for updating the model. Because FPS officials did not document a process for assuring data quality during the development of the model and without relevant guidance, FPS may not be able to ensure that future updates to its staffing model will provide accurate estimates of staffing needs, putting FPS at risk of not fully understanding whether it has the staff it needs to perform its mission. Moreover, FPS’s development of both the Plan and model largely align with recognized key workforce-planning principles and staffing model practices. FPS has not fully developed human capital performance measures, and while both NPPD and FPS plan on taking additional action in this area, future progress is uncertain because the NPPD and FPS have not established a time frame for developing additional measures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help FPS enhance its strategic human capital planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD to work with the Director of FPS to take the following three actions: identify time frames for developing human capital performance measures with targets that are explicitly aligned to FPS’s stated human capital goals, establish a plan and time frames for updating FPS’s staffing model regularly and for unexpected changes in operating conditions, and develop and document guidance on the process FPS will use to ensure the quality of its staffing model data, such as guidance on how to collect data, validate assumptions, and perform sensitivity analyses to assess the assumptions. DHS concurred with our recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them. To address both objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, documents from FPS and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and our prior work related to workforce planning and human capital management. The five key principles include: 1. involving top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing a strategic workforce plan; 2. determining critical skills and competencies needed for employees; 3. developing strategies tailored to address gaps and needs; 4. building the organizational capability needed to support human capital 5. developing performance measures to evaluate progress toward reaching human capital or agency goals. Some activities have a number of associated tasks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal security workforce plays a crucial role in meeting the growing challenges of protecting federal facilities. FPS, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), worked with NPPD to develop a staffing model and a Plan in 2013 and 2015 to help FPS manage its workforce. A 2015 Senate Appropriations Committee report included a provision for GAO to review the Plan . The committee also asked GAO to evaluate the staffing model. GAO examined (1) FPS's Plan and related human capital planning efforts and (2) how FPS designed and uses its staffing model. GAO assessed FPS's Plan and model to determine if they aligned with key workforce-planning principles and practices for designing staffing models. GAO identified these principles and practices from prior work and other sources. GAO also interviewed NPPD and FPS officials in headquarters and three regions selected to obtain regional variation such as in the number of FPS staff.
What GAO Found
The Federal Protective Service (FPS)—which protects about 9,500 federal facilities—developed a Strategic Human Capital Plan ( Plan ) and engaged in related efforts that generally align with most key principles GAO identified for strategic workforce planning. Specifically, FPS
solicited input from key stakeholders, such as its employees and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)—FPS's parent organization responsible for managing and overseeing FPS's human capital efforts;
determined critical skills and competencies;
developed human capital strategies (i.e., programs, policies, and processes) tailored to address identified gaps and needs in its workforce; and
identified actions that build the organizational capability to support the strategies.
However, FPS has not fully developed performance measures to evaluate progress toward goals, which is also a key principle for strategic workforce planning. For example, FPS has not identified performance measures for all of the Plan's strategies, has not included targets for the identified performance measures (e.g., a desired target for the “attrition rate” measure), and has not linked the measures to FPS's human capital goals. GAO's work on measuring program performance has found that targets and linkages are among the attributes of successful performance measures. FPS and NPPD officials said they plan on developing measures with targets and linkages but have not yet established time frames for completing these tasks. Without performance measures that have targets and linkages, it will be difficult for NPPD and FPS to assess whether the Plan and related efforts are helping achieve FPS's human capital goals and its facility protection mission.
FPS designed its staffing model—which identifies the federal workforce the agency needs to meet its mission—consistent with most key practices GAO identified for the design of staffing models, and FPS uses the model to help make management decisions. Specifically, FPS's model includes:
work activities and the time required to perform them;
facility risk levels, which determine the frequency with which FPS must complete facility security assessments; and
input from key stakeholders, including NPPD and some regional officials.
FPS officials said they took steps, such as reviewing work hour estimates, to ensure the quality of data used in the model—another key practice. FPS currently uses the model to help make human capital planning and other management decisions, but NPPD and FPS have not identified time frames for updating the model since its last update in August 2013. Furthermore, FPS cannot assure data quality in future updates to the model because it has no documented process for ensuring data quality. Without time frames for updating the model and guidance on ensuring data quality, NPPD and FPS may not have accurate estimates of staffing needs to make management decisions.
What GAO Recommends
To improve FPS's human capital planning, GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct NPPD and FPS to identify time frames for developing performance measures with targets that are explicitly aligned to FPS's goals, establish a plan and time frames for updating its staffing model, and develop and document guidance for ensuring the quality of staffing model data. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them. |
gao_GAO-05-438 | gao_GAO-05-438_0 | The act established the LOCAL Television Loan Guarantee Board. Specifically, the act requires the board to: (1) direct the Administrator to prescribe regulations and develop underwriting criteria in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and an independent public accounting firm within 120 days after the Congress appropriated funds; (2) establish and collect loan application and loan guarantee origination fees to offset the cost of administering the program under the act, including the costs of the board and the Administrator; and (3) consider other numerous specialized technical and business requirements prior to approving a loan guarantee. The act provides for terminating the board’s authority to guarantee loans (1) by December 31, 2006 with all appropriated funds or (2) by an earlier cut-off date with regard to most of the funding if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that at least 75 percent of the DMAs not in the top 40 DMAs have access to local television broadcast signals for virtually all households (as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture). Program Prepared for Implementation but Funding Rescinded
During fiscal year 2004, the LOCAL TV Board completed the steps necessary to prepare the LOCAL TV Program for implementation by issuing the mandated underwriting criteria and operating rules. On December 23, 2003, through a notice published in the Federal Register, the board provided applicants the first opportunity to apply for a loan guarantee. On December 8, 2004, the Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, one provision of which rescinded the program’s unobligated balances which were available for guaranteeing loans. Further, the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2006 pointed out that the unobligated budget authority for this account had been rescinded and stated that the Administration was not proposing additional funds for the Local TV Program. During fiscal year 2004, there were 210 DMAs throughout the United States. To make this statutory determination for early termination of loan guarantee authority, the Secretary would have had to determine that at least 75 percent of the remaining 170 DMAs (i.e., at least 128 DMAs) have access to local television signals for virtually all households. Using these sources, the board’s analysis showed as of September 30, 2004, that 114 of the 170 DMAs were receiving local television signals from at least one of the two major DBS providers. During fiscal year 2004, the board analyzed the extent to which direct broadcast satellites were currently providing access to local television signals in DMAs. Conversely, these data indicate that the number of U.S. television households without access to local television signals from DBS has decreased from approximately 23.4 million in August 2003 to about 4.8 million in September 2004. The board also told us that the number of television households without access to local television via DBS or cable television dropped from 2.9 million in August 2003 to .6 million in September 2004. Program Development Costs Total More Than $1.2 Million
The LOCAL TV Board’s estimated cost to implement the program from its initial funding on November 28, 2001, to September 30, 2004, is over $1.2 million. First, it includes $662,000 in obligations and disbursements made from the $2 million administrative appropriation for Ernst & Young LLP to develop the underwriting criteria and program regulations and related GovWorks administrative fees. The second component includes the board’s estimate of salaries and expenses incurred by the Working Group members to support the board that totals approximately $597,000. | Why GAO Did This Study
This is GAO's third report addressing the LOCAL TV Act's requirement that GAO perform an annual audit of the (1) administration of the provisions of the act and (2) financial position of each applicant who receives a loan guarantee under the act, including the nature, amount, and purpose of investments made by the applicant. Although the LOCAL Television Loan Guarantee Program (LOCAL TV Program) was implemented in fiscal year 2004, there were no loan guarantee applicants for GAO to audit. Therefore, this report primarily addresses whether program administration during fiscal year 2004 satisfied the provisions of the act.
What GAO Found
During fiscal year 2004, the LOCAL Television Loan Guarantee Board completed the steps necessary to prepare the LOCAL TV Program for implementation by issuing the mandated underwriting criteria and operating rules. On December 23, 2003, the board provided applicants the first opportunity to apply for a loan guarantee. The board received one application, which it returned with the related fee because the board determined that it was incomplete. On December 8, 2004, the Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, one provision of which rescinded appropriations that would have been used to guarantee loans under the LOCAL TV Program. The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2006 pointed out that the unobligated budget authority for this program had been rescinded and the administration was not proposing additional funds for this program. The LOCAL TV Act authorizes the LOCAL TV Board to approve loan guarantees until December 31, 2006. An amendment to this act provides for an earlier cut-off date with regard to most of the funding if the Secretary of Agriculture were to determine that at least 75 percent of the designated market areas (DMA) not in the top 40 had access to local television broadcast signals for virtually all households. During fiscal year 2004, there were 210 DMAs throughout the United States. To satisfy the requirement that at least 75 percent of the remaining 170 DMAs have access to local television signals, 128 DMAs would require local television access. Using available industry data, the board's analysis showed that as of September 30, 2004, 114 DMAs were receiving local television signals from at least one of the two major direct broadcast satellite (DBS) providers. These data further indicate that nationally, the number of U.S. television households without access to local television signals from DBS decreased from approximately 23.4 million in August 2003 to about 4.8 million as of September 2004. The board also pointed out that, during the same time period, the number of television households without access to local television through DBS or cable television dropped from 2.9 million to .6 million. The board's estimated cost to implement the LOCAL TV Program from its initial funding on November 28, 2001, to September 30, 2004, is just over $1.2 million, composed of contractual and in-house services. The contractual services include $662,000 in obligations and disbursements made from the $2 million administrative appropriation, primarily for an independent public accounting firm to develop the underwriting criteria and program regulations. Salaries and expenses incurred by the Working Group members to support the LOCAL TV Board were approximately $597,000 from initial program funding through September 30, 2004. These costs were borne by the staff's respective departments and agencies. |
gao_GAO-01-203 | gao_GAO-01-203_0 | Conclusions
The Carlsbad office is developing a computerized project-tracking system for its consultation and HCP projects. This system, if properly implemented, should improve the office’s record keeping and its ability to track the status of projects and help determine why they are in that status. The new system could also improve project management by allowing office managers to determine how long an applicant has been involved in the consultation or HCP process and whether the recommended time frames for completing consultations and the targeted time frames for processing HCPs have been exceeded. The Carlsbad office does not maintain its project files in accordance with federal internal control standards and the Service’s guidelines. Without this information, there has often been confusion between the office and its customers on what was agreed to and why. In addition, without adequate documentation, managers and others have a difficult time determining whether the status of a project is justified. The Carlsbad office will still have difficulty accomplishing this if it is not able to do something about its staffing problems. An inability to hire new staff and retain existing, experienced staff has made it difficult for the Carlsbad office to meet the demands of its workload. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Carlsbad field office. | What GAO Found
The Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) Carlesbad office is developing a computerized project-tracking system for its consultation and habitat conservation planning (HCP) projects. This system, if properly implemented, should improve the office's record keeping and its ability to track the status of projects and help determine why they are in that status. The new system could also improve project management by allowing office managers to determine how long an applicant has been involved in the consultation or HCP process and whether the recommended time frames for completing consultations and the targeted frames for processing HCPs have been exceeded. The Carlsbad office will still have difficulty completing its consultations and HCP projects within recommended or targeted time frames if it is unable to address its staffing problems. An inability to hire new staff and retain existing, experienced staff has made it difficult for the Carlsbad office to meet the demands of its workload. Because the Carlsbad office does not maintain its project files in accordance with federal internal control standards and FWS' guidelines, there has often been confusion between the office and its customers on what was agreed to and why. In addition, without adequate documentation, managers and others have a difficult time determining whether the status of a project is justified. Although the Carlsbad office has developed an informal process for handling customer complaints, the process has many weaknesses regarding the handling of complaint data. |
gao_GAO-05-889T | gao_GAO-05-889T_0 | The Homeland Security Act established ONCRC within DHS to oversee and coordinate federal programs for, and relationships with federal, state, local, and regional authorities in the NCR. With regard to coordination, the ONCRC was mandated to: coordinate the activities of DHS relating to the NCR, including cooperation with the DHS’ Office for State and Local Government Coordination; coordinate with federal agencies in the NCR on terrorism preparedness to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of the federal role in domestic preparedness activities; coordinate with federal, state, local, and regional agencies and the private sector in NCR on terrorism preparedness to ensure adequate planning, information sharing, training, and execution of domestic preparedness activities among these agencies and entities; serve as a liaison between the federal government and state, local, and regional authorities, and private sector entities in the NCR to facilitate access to federal grants and other programs. ONCRC also has responsibilities related to resource and needs assessments and advocating for needed resources in the NCR, including: assessing and advocating for resources needed by state, local, and regional authorities in the NCR to implement efforts to secure the homeland; and submitting an annual report to Congress that (1) identifies resources required to fully implement homeland security efforts in the NCR, (2) assesses progress in implementing homeland security efforts in the NCR, and (3) includes recommendations to Congress regarding additional resources needed to fully implement homeland security efforts in the NCR. The NCR is a complex multijurisdictional area comprising the District of Columbia and surrounding county and city jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia. Develop and implement strategies for the use of the funds that identify key goals and priorities; 2. Our May 2004 Report Showed the Need to Improve Management of First-Responder Grants in the NCR
As we reported in May 2004, in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Health and Human Services awarded about $340 million through 16 first-responder grants to NCR jurisdictions to enhance regional emergency preparedness. Without the standards, a regionwide plan, and data on available funds and spending, it will be extremely difficult to determine whether NCR first responders have the ability to respond to threats and emergencies with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts that involve a variety of first responder disciplines from NCR jurisdictions. Recommendations in Our May 2004 Report Not Yet Fully Implemented
To help ensure that emergency preparedness grants and associated funds are managed in a way that maximizes their effectiveness, our May 2004 report included three recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Recommendation 1: Work with the NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan to establish goals and priorities for enhancing first responder capacities that can be used to guide the use of federal emergency preparedness funds. Actions taken: According to an ONCRC official, a final draft for review has been circulated to key stakeholders. The NCR, through the D.C. Office of Homeland Security, has a system for tracking the use of UASI funds in the NCR and other homeland security grant funds available to D.C., such as the State Homeland Security Grants. However, at this time, it does not have an automated, uniform, system to track non-UASI grant funds available and used by other NCR jurisdictions. Recommendation 3: Identify and address gaps in emergency preparedness and evaluate the effectiveness of expenditures in meeting those needs by adopting standards and preparedness guidelines based on likely scenarios for NCR and conducting assessments based on them. Actions taken: To date, no systematic gap analysis has been completed for the region as a whole. The NCR plans to use the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) as a means of conducting a gap analysis and assessing NCR jurisdictions against EMAP’s standards for emergency preparedness—an effort expected to be completed by March 2006. How this effort would be integrated with DHS’ capabilities-based planning and assessments for first responders has not yet been determined, pending the issuance of DHS’ final version of the National Preparedness Goal in October 2005. As we noted in the recent past, the ongoing security risk to the NCR requires a comprehensive, coordinated, and carefully planned approach to the expenditure of federal first responder grants. This requires a regionwide strategic plan, performance goals, an assessment of preparedness gaps to guide priority setting, and continuing assessments of the progress made in closing identified gaps. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the National Capital Region (NCR)--the District of Columbia and nearby jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia--was recognized as a significant potential target for terrorism. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, about $340 million in emergency preparedness funds were allocated to NCR jurisdictions. In May 2004, GAO issued a report (GAO-04-433) that examined (1) the use of federal funds emergency preparedness funds allocated to NCR jurisdictions, (2) the challenges within the NCR to organizing and implementing efficient and effective preparedness programs, (3) any emergency preparedness gaps that remain in the NCR, and (4) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) role in the NCR. The report made recommendations to the Secretary of DHS to enhance the management of first responder grants in the NCR. We also reported in September 2004 (GAO-04-1009) that the NCR's Governance Structure for the Urban Area Security Initiative could facilitate collaborative, coordinated, and planned management and use of federal funds for enhancing emergency preparedness, if implemented as planned DHS agreed to implement these recommendations.
What GAO Found
A coordinated, targeted, and complementary use of federal homeland security grants is important in the NCR and elsewhere. These grants are one means of achieving an important goal: enhancing the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist and other incidents with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts that involve a variety of first responders from multiple jurisdictions. To oversee and coordinate federal emergency preparedness programs among federal, state, local, and regional authorities in the NCR, the Homeland Security Act established the Office for National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) within DHS. The ongoing security risk requires a comprehensive, coordinated, and carefully planned approach to the expenditure of federal first responder grants. This requires a NCR-wide strategic plan, performance goals, an assessment of preparedness gaps to guide priority setting, and continuing assessments of the progress made in closing identified gaps This testimony summarizes our prior work and provides information on the implementation of the three recommendations in our May 2004 report. First, we recommended that DHS work with the NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan. DHS and NCR jurisdictions have completed a final draft for review that has been circulated to key stakeholders. Second, we recommended that DHS monitor's the plans implementation, which must await a final plan. To implement and monitor the future plan, data will be needed regarding the funding available and used for implementing the plan and enhancing first responder capabilities in the NCR--data that is not currently routinely available. The NCR, through the District of Columbia's Office of Homeland Security, has a system for tracking the use of Urban Area Security Initiative funds in the NCR as well as other homeland security grant funds available to Washington, D.C. However, the NCR does not currently track non-Urban Area Security Initiative funds available to and used by other NCR jurisdictions in an automated, uniform way. Rather, it obtains information about those funds through a variety of means, including teleconferences involving senior emergency preparedness officials. Third, we recommended that DHS identify and address preparedness gaps and evaluate the effectiveness of expenditures by conducting assessments based on established guidelines and standards. No systematic gap analysis has been completed for the region; however, by March 2006, the NCR plans to complete an effort to use the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) as a means of conducting a gap analysis and assess NCR jurisdictions against EMAP's national preparedness standards. The result would be a report on the NCR's compliance with EMAP standards for emergency preparedness and an analysis of areas needing improvement to address in the short- and long-term. The ONCRC has not determined how this effort would be integrated with DHS' capabilities-based planning and assessments for first responders, pending the issuance of DHS' final version of the National Preparedness Goal in October 2005. |
gao_GAO-04-41 | gao_GAO-04-41_0 | SAMHSA oversees implementation of the Synar Amendment that requires states to enact and enforce tobacco control laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to minors. Other programs and activities administered by HHS, DOD, DOJ, Education, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) address tobacco use as part of a broader focus on unhealthy behaviors, such as substance abuse and violence. Some Federal Programs Only Address Tobacco Use
We identified two federal programs that focus only on tobacco use. The first, CDC’s NTCP, focuses on preventing and reducing tobacco use among the general population, but it also explicitly targets tobacco use among youth. For instance, CDC recommends that states establish comprehensive tobacco control programs that include certain components, such as community-based programs to reduce tobacco use that include a wide range of prevention activities, such as engaging youth in developing and implementing tobacco control interventions, conducting educational programs for young people, parents, school personnel, and others, and restricting access to tobacco products; school programs to implement school health policies that consist of tobacco-free policies, evidence-based curricula, teacher training, parental involvement, cessation services, and links between school and other community efforts and state media and educational campaigns; marketing campaigns to counter protobacco influences and increase prohealth messages and influences, including paid television, radio, billboard, and print media campaigns; cessation services to help people quit smoking; enforcement of tobacco control policies by restricting minors’ access to tobacco and restricting smoking in public places; and statewide efforts to provide localities with technical assistance on how to evaluate tobacco programs, promote media advocacy, implement smoke- free policies, and reduce minors’ access to tobacco. The second federal program that focuses only on tobacco and aims to prevent tobacco use among youth is SAMHSA’s program to oversee state implementation of legislation commonly referred to as the Synar Amendment. Other Federal Programs Address Tobacco Use Along with Other Unhealthy Behaviors
Other federal programs aim to address tobacco use among youth as part of a broader focus on unhealthy behaviors. HHS Agencies Support Research to Address Tobacco Use among Youth
In addition to supporting programs that aim to address tobacco use among youth, HHS agencies conduct research on tobacco use and its health effects. Federal Departments and Agencies Collect a Variety of Information on Their Programs That Aim to Prevent Tobacco Use among Youth
To monitor federal programs that aim to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth, federal departments and agencies collect information on how their programs are being implemented by grantees and the effectiveness of grantees’ efforts in meeting national program goals. According to CDC officials, other important sources of information are the biannual reports that the agency requires states to submit on the progress of their tobacco control programs. They obtain this information by various means, such as periodic reports and visits to grantee sites. HHS agencies also coordinate on efforts to jointly support research on tobacco use prevention and cessation. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS, DOD, DOJ, and Education for comment. HHS and Education provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. In written comments, HHS stated that the report was very informative and provided a thorough overview of nicotine and tobacco activities related to youth, but did not include programs within CMS that are a substantial element of HHS tobacco prevention. Including joint federal-state programs that finance health insurance such Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, was beyond the scope of our review. HHS also noted that the report did not include information about the challenges other federal agencies experienced in coordinating tobacco-related issues. However, these officials did not cite any challenges they had experienced with coordinating their tobacco-related efforts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To do our work, we obtained and reviewed program documents, strategic and performance plans, pertinent program reports and special studies, surveillance and other data, and federal Web sites from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) including the Office of the Secretary, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Office of Public Health and Science, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Indian Health Service, National Institutes of Health (NIH), and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); the Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and Education; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Federal Trade Commission; and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The programs, research, and activities that we discuss in this report do not represent an exhaustive list of all federal efforts to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth, but highlight a range of such efforts. To determine how federal departments and agencies monitor programs that aim to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth and the types of monitoring information that departments and agencies collect, we obtained and reviewed descriptive information on federal departments and agencies’ monitoring efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable death in the United States. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that, on average, over 440,000 deaths and $76 billion in medical expenditures were attributable to cigarette smoking each year from 1995 through 1999. Reducing tobacco-related deaths and the incidence of disease, along with the associated costs, represents a significant public health challenge for the federal government. Most adults who use tobacco started using it between the ages of 10 and 18. According to a Surgeon General's report, if children and adolescents can be prevented from using tobacco products before they become adults, they are likely to remain tobacco-free for the rest of their lives. GAO was asked to provide information on federal efforts to prevent and reduce youth smoking. Specifically, this report describes (1) federal programs, research, and activities that aim to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth, (2) the efforts of federal departments and agencies to monitor their programs, and (3) the coordination among federal departments and agencies in efforts to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth.
What GAO Found
Some federal programs, research, and activities that aim to address tobacco use among youth focus only on tobacco while others aim to address tobacco use as part of broader efforts to address unhealthy behaviors such as substance abuse and violence. Two federal programs within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) focus only on tobacco use. CDC's National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP) focuses on preventing and reducing tobacco use among the general population and explicitly targets youth. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's program to oversee implementation of a provision of federal law, commonly referred as the Synar Amendment, focuses only on tobacco use among youth. The Synar Amendment requires states to enact and enforce laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to minors. In addition to these tobacco-focused programs, HHS, and the Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and Education sponsor programs that include tobacco use as part of broader efforts to address unhealthy behaviors among youth, such as substance abuse and violence. For example, Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program is designed to prevent substance abuse and violence. HHS agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health, conduct research on tobacco use and nicotine addiction among youth and its health effects on youth. HHS agencies and other federal departments also support activities to prevent and reduce tobacco use among youth, such as education and outreach efforts. HHS and its component agencies coordinate tobacco-related efforts with other federal, state, and local government agencies and nongovernmental entities. Federal departments and agencies collect a variety of information to monitor how programs that aim to address tobacco use among youth are being implemented by grantees and the effectiveness of grantee efforts in meeting program goals. The information is collected through various means, including grant applications, progress reports, periodic site visits, and program evaluations. For example, to monitor NTCP, CDC requires states to submit biannual reports on the implementation of state NTCP-supported tobacco control programs. The information that federal departments and agencies collect on these programs is also used to provide training and technical assistance to grantees on topics such as conducting program evaluation. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS stated that the report was very informative but it did not include programs like Medicaid that are a substantial element of HHS tobacco prevention efforts. Including programs that finance health insurance such as Medicaid, however, was beyond the scope of our review. Also, HHS noted that we did not include information about the challenges other federal agencies face in coordinating tobaccorelated issues but DOD, DOJ, and Education did not describe such challenges. DOD and DOJ had no comments on the report and HHS and Education provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-422 | gao_GAO-17-422_0 | On October 14, 2008, Treasury allocated $250 billion of the original $700 billion, later reduced to $475 billion, in overall TARP funds for CPP. On December 31, 2009, the program was closed to new investments. CPP Proceeds Surpass Original Investments and Almost All Institutions Have Exited Program
Treasury continues to make progress winding down CPP. For the life of the program, repayments and sales totaled almost $200 billion (see fig.1). In 2016, institutions’ repayments totaled about $25 million. Moreover, as of December 31, 2016, Treasury had received about $227 billion in returns, including repayments and income, from its CPP investments, which exceeds the amount originally disbursed by almost $22 billion. Investments outstanding represent about 0.1 percent of the amount Treasury disbursed for CPP. As of December 31, 2016, 696 of the 707 institutions that originally participated in CPP had exited the program (see fig. 2). A total of 6 institutions exited CPP in 2016. Restructurings allow troubled financial institutions to negotiate new terms or discounted redemptions for their CPP investment. Treasury requires institutions to raise new capital from outside investors (or merge with another institution) as a prerequisite for a restructuring. With this option, Treasury receives cash or other securities that generally can be sold more easily than preferred stock, but the restructured investments sometimes result in recoveries at less than par value. Treasury officials said that they expect the majority of the remaining institutions will require a restructuring to exit the program in the future because the overall weaker financial condition of the remaining institutions makes full repayment unlikely. Overall Financial Condition of Remaining CPP Institutions Has Improved but Some Show Signs of Financial Weakness
Overall, the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP as of December 31, 2016, appears to have improved since the end of 2011. For example, 5 of the 11 institutions had negative return on average assets for the third quarter of 2016. Treasury officials told us that Treasury regularly monitors all institutions remaining in the program. For example, Treasury’s financial agent has provided quarterly valuations and credit reports for all of the institutions remaining in the CPP portfolio. Agency Comments
We provided Treasury with a draft of this report for review and comment. Treasury provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
CPP was established as the primary means of restoring stability to the financial system under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Under CPP, Treasury invested almost $205 billion in 707 eligible financial institutions between October 2008 and December 2009. CPP recipients have made dividend and interest payments to Treasury on the investments. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, as amended, includes a provision that GAO report at least annually on TARP activities and performance. This report examines (1) the status of CPP, including repayments, investments outstanding, and number of remaining institutions; and (2) the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP.
To assess the program's status, GAO reviewed Treasury reports on the status of CPP. In addition, GAO reviewed information from Treasury officials to identify the agency's current efforts to wind down the program. Finally, GAO used financial and regulatory data to assess the financial condition of institutions remaining in CPP.
GAO provided a draft of this report to Treasury for its review and comment. Treasury provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) continues to make progress winding down the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). As of December 31, 2016, investments outstanding stood at almost $0.2 billion (see figure), which represents about 0.1 percent of the original amount disbursed. Treasury had received almost $200 billion in repayments, including about $25 million in 2016. Further, Treasury's returns for the program, including repayments and income, totaled about $227 billion, exceeding the amount originally disbursed by almost $22 billion. Of the 707 institutions that originally participated in CPP, 696 had exited the program, including 6 institutions in 2016.
Treasury officials expect that the majority of the remaining institutions will require a restructuring to exit the program. Restructurings allow institutions to negotiate terms for their CPP investments. With this option, Treasury requires institutions to raise new capital or merge with another institution and Treasury agrees to receive cash or other securities, typically at less than par value. Treasury officials expect to rely primarily on restructurings because the overall weaker financial condition of the remaining institutions makes full repayment unlikely.
The financial condition of the institutions remaining in CPP as of December 31, 2016, appears to have improved since the end of 2011, but some institutions show signs of financial weakness. For example, 5 institutions had negative returns on average assets (a common measure of profitability) for the third quarter of 2016. |
gao_GAO-15-24 | gao_GAO-15-24_0 | Federal Assistance to Servicemembers, Veterans, and Their Families
DOD and VA play key roles in offering assistance to servicemembers, veterans, and their families. Additionally, DOD, VA and other agency partners administer the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which provides counseling to departing servicemembers, and offers employment assistance and information on federal veteran benefits, among other things.to the revised TAP as Transition, Goals, Plans, Success (Transition GPS). Our past reports, as well as reports by others, have highlighted issues surrounding DOD and VA programs, including issues concerning fragmentation, overlap, and duplication; lack of coordination; and challenges in providing some benefits and services.have recommended in two GAO reports that DOD and VA need to better integrate care coordination and case management programs to reduce duplication and better assist recovering servicemembers, veterans, and their families by helping to ensure the continuity of their care. We Identified 99 DOD Programs That Address the Effects of Combat
Using our definition of “program,” we identified 99 healthcare and benefit programs administered by DOD and the military services that address the effects of combat on servicemembers, their families, or both. Over a third of the 99 programs that we identified offer multiple types of services. The three services most common in the 99 programs are support for mental health and substance abuse (50), information and referral (37), and case management or care coordination (15). The frequency and types of service offered across these 87 programs are portrayed in Figure 2. We also present the number of programs by type of service provided by each agency in table 3. Many of the 87 programs we identified not only support servicemembers and veterans but also their families. We Identified 12 DOD and VA Programs That Raise Awareness and Understanding of Servicemembers’ and Veterans’ Experiences
Using our definition of “program,” we identified 12 programs administered by DOD, the military services, and VA that raise awareness and understanding of servicemembers’ and veterans’ experiences in combat and coming home. Variation in Definitions Limits the Ability to Compare Our Lists with DOD and VA Inventories
The lists of programs that we developed are generally not comparable with DOD’s and VA’s 2013 GPRAMA program inventories. DOD’s inventory is organized by its budget and the strategic goals contained in its 2010 strategic plan. For instance, one goal is “preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer force,” and as part of this goal, the strategic plan states that “wounded warrior care” is one of DOD’s highest priorities. Under this goal, DOD cites “hospitals and other medical activities”— including “medical care for active-duty personnel in regional defense and non-defense facilities”—as programs. However, DOD’s list does not contain any of the programs that we included on our lists, such as the Army Wounded Warrior Program, the Federal Recovery Coordination Program, or Warrior Transition Units. Some of the programs on both lists include the Readjustment Counseling at Vet Centers, the Post-9/11 GI Bill, and Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment programs. As noted above, such differences may be due to differing contexts in which the respective lists were compiled. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix summarizes our work to identify Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) programs as well as to compare the lists of programs that we generated under objectives 1-3 with DOD and VA’s 2013 program inventories that were included in the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) program inventory compiled in response to a requirement in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). We established a definition for program by reviewing our prior work and other relevant studies on related programs for servicemembers and veterans who have served in recent conflicts. In general, we defined “programs or activities” as a federally funded, organized set of activities directed toward a specific purpose or goal that an agency undertakes and is being administered in fiscal year 2014. Exclude programs that exclusively provide services to post-9/11 active-duty servicemembers who are transitioning to VA or civilian employment or civilian life (these programs are included in objective 2). Definition: DOD, military services, or VA programs whose primary focus is to raise civilian public awareness of the combat experiences of post-9/11 active-duty servicemembers and the readjustment experiences of veterans. Raise public awareness and understanding 1. We identified publicly available sources that contain lists of relevant federal programs. We sent our preliminary list of programs to officials at DOD and VA for comment and verification. To help convey our findings, we developed categories to group the types of service provided by the programs. Because some programs offer more than one type of service, programs can fall into more than one category or service type. Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1) Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Service- member, Veteran, and Family Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORR ES) Psycholog- ical Health Outreach Program (P- HOP)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of Combat (Objective 1)
Appendix II: Programs Addressing the Effects of combat (Objective 1)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
X Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2) Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
X Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Appendix III: Programs for Transitioning and Readjusting to Civilian Life (Objective 2)
Program Name
Mental health and substance abuse description of “Other”
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the contact named above, individuals making key contributions to this report were Brett Fallavollita, Assistant Director; James Whitcomb, Analyst-in-Charge, Deitra Lee, and Joel Marus. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD and VA play key roles in offering post-combat support to servicemembers and veterans through various programs and activities. Congress mandated that GAO identify DOD and VA programs designed to address the effects of combat on servicemembers who have served during recent conflicts, assist servicemembers and veterans with the transition to civilian life, and raise public awareness of these issues.
In this report GAO identified the number of programs, including the types of services offered that: 1) address the effects of combat on post-9/11 active-duty servicemembers and their families, 2) help post-9/11 servicemembers and veterans transition to civilian life, and 3) help raise public awareness and understanding of servicemembers' and veterans' combat and transition experiences. Also, GAO examined how the lists of programs identified compare with program inventories prepared by DOD and VA pursuant to law. To address these objectives, GAO established and applied its definition of “program.” In general, GAO defined programs as federally funded, organized sets of activities agencies undertake that are directed toward specific purposes or goals and are being administered in fiscal year 2014. GAO also searched publicly available sources that contain lists of programs; sent preliminary lists of programs to DOD and VA for verification; and reviewed relevant reports and 2013 program inventories for DOD and VA.
This report contains no recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 99 programs provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) to help address the effects of combat on post-9/11 servicemembers, their families, or both. These programs often offer multiple types of services. The services most common are mental health and substance abuse (50), information and referral (37), and case management or care coordination (15).
GAO identified 87 programs administered either by DOD or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to help post-9/11 servicemembers and veterans transition to civilian life. Some of the 87 programs offer more than one type of service, such as the Transition Assistance Program, which offers employment, education, and information on veterans' benefits, among other services (see figure).
Note: The numbers of programs by type of service do not equal 87 because some programs provide more than one service. The frequency of a type of service does not necessarily indicate its utilization.
GAO identified 12 programs administered by either DOD or VA to raise public awareness and understanding of servicemembers' and veterans' experiences in combat, coming home, and transitioning to civilian life. For example, among the nine DOD programs identified, the Briefings with the Boss program convenes employers and National Guard and Reserve members to discuss issues linked to military service and civilian employment.
The lists of programs that GAO developed using its definition are not comparable with those in DOD's 2013 program inventory and have only limited comparability with VA's 2013 program inventory. This limited comparability is primarily due to differing contexts in which the lists were compiled. While GAO's lists address specific mandated questions, DOD's and VA's lists were developed following Office of Management and Budget guidance, which generally provides flexibility in how agencies define their programs. Both DOD and VA chose to identify programs at a broad level. For example, DOD's inventory is partially organized by its strategic goals. One goal is “preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer force,” for which wounded warrior care is cited as a high priority. Under this goal, DOD lists “hospitals” and “regional defense facilities” as programs. In contrast, GAO identified individual programs, such as the Army Wounded Warrior Program and Warrior Transition Units, which were not listed in DOD's inventory. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-92 | gao_T-AIMD-96-92_0 | This generally means that controls be established in a number of areas, including, but not limited to: a comprehensive security program with top management commitment, sufficient resources, and clearly assigned roles and responsibilities for those responsible for the program’s implementation; clear, consistent, and up-to-date information security policies and vulnerability assessments to identify security weaknesses; awareness training to ensure that computer users understand the security risks associated with networked computers; assurance that systems administrators and information security officials have sufficient time and training to do their jobs properly; cost-effective use of technical and automated security solutions; and a robust incident response capability to detect and react to attacks and to aggressively track and prosecute attackers. Equally worrisome are DISA’s internal test results; in assessing vulnerabilities, DISA attacks and successfully penetrates Defense systems 65 percent of the time. But in the Rome case, Air Force Information Warfare Center staff estimated that the attacks on the Rome Lab cost the government over half a million dollars. This included costs for time spent to take the lab’s systems off the networks, verify the integrity of the systems, install security “patches,” and restore computer service. National Security Concerns
systems experts believe that computer attacks are capable of disrupting communications, stealing sensitive information, and threatening our ability to execute military operations. Instead, all they really need to steal sensitive data or shut down military computers is a $2,000 computer and modem and a connection to the Internet. . . goes well beyond the Department. Defense Faces Challenges in Securing Its Systems
methods of attack. DISA established its Global Defensive Information Warfare Control Center and its Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team (ASSIST) in Arlington, Virginia. Each of the military services has established computer emergency response capabilities, as well. However, many of Defense’s policies relating to computer systems attacks are outdated and inconsistent. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed information security procedures at the Department of Defense (DOD).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as many as 250,000 DOD computer systems were attacked in 1995; (2) hackers successfully penetrate DOD computer systems 65 percent of the time; (3) hackers attack DOD computer systems to steal and destroy sensitive data and install reentry devices; (4) these attacks cost the government over half a million dollars, including the cost of disconnecting the system, verifying the system's integrity, installing security patches, and restoring computer services; (5) hackers are capable of disrupting communications and threatening U.S. military operations; (6) DOD faces a huge challenge in protecting its computer systems due to the size of its information infrastructure, increasing amounts of sensitive data, Internet use, and skilled hackers; (7) DOD has established a Global Information Warfare Control Center and a Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team to provide around-the-clock service and respond to computer attacks; (8) many DOD policies pertaining to computer security are outdated and inconsistent and DOD system and network administrator's are inadequately trained to perform their jobs; and (9) DOD needs to be more aggressive in developing an automated program that responds to computer attacks. |
gao_GAO-14-429T | gao_GAO-14-429T_0 | Assisting Congress and the Nation
GAO remains one of the best investments in the federal government, and our dedicated staff continues to deliver high quality results. In FY 2013 alone, GAO provided services that spanned the broad range of federal programs and activities. We received requests for our work from 95 percent of the standing committees of Congress and almost two-thirds of their subcommittees. Last year, our work yielded significant results across the government, including $51.5 billion in financial benefits—a return of about $100 for every dollar invested in GAO. Senior GAO officials also provided testimony 114 times before 60 Committees or Subcommittees on a wide range of issues that touched virtually all major federal agencies. Since FY 2003, GAO’s work has resulted in substantial financial and other benefits for the American people, including: over ½ trillion dollars in financial benefits; about 14,500 program and operational benefits that helped to change laws, improve public services, and promote sound management throughout government; and about 12,000 reports, testimony, and other GAO products that included over 22,000 recommendations. Strategic Plan for Serving Congress
In December 2013, Members and their staff were invited to comment on our draft Strategic Plan for Serving Congress in FYs 2014-2019. The draft plan was issued in February 2014 and outlines our proposed goals and strategies for supporting Congress’s top priorities. I have met with the chairs and ranking members of many of the standing committees and their subcommittees to hear firsthand feedback on our performance, as well as highlight the need to prioritize requests for our services to maximize the return on investment. GAO Recognized as One of the “Best Places to Work”
We take great pride in reporting that we continue to be recognized as an employer of choice, and have been consistently ranked near the top on “best places to work” lists. Fiscal Year 2015 Requirements
GAO’s FY 2015 budget request will preserve staff capacity and continue critical infrastructure investments. Offsetting receipts and reimbursements primarily from program and financial audits and rental income totaling $30.9 million are expected in FY 2015. In order to address the priorities of Congress, GAO needs a talented, diverse, high-performing, knowledgeable workforce. However, a significant proportion of our employees are currently retirement eligible, including 34 percent of our executive leadership and 21 percent of our supervisory analysts. Therefore, workforce and succession planning remain a priority for GAO. In FY 2014, through a targeted recruiting GAO plans to hire entry-level staff and student interns, boosting our staff capacity for the first time in 3 years to 2,945 FTE. This will allow GAO to reverse the downward trend in our FTEs and achieve some progress in reaching our optimal staffing level of 3,250 FTE, and develop a talent pool for the future. Improvements to our aging IT infrastructure will allow GAO to further streamline business operations, reduce redundant efforts, increase staff efficiency and productivity, improve access to information, and enhance our technology infrastructure to support an array of engagement management, human capital, and financial management systems. GAO also plans to continue upgrading aging building systems to ensure more efficient operations and security. To support these requirements our FY 2015 budget request includes resources to: begin upgrading the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system to increase energy efficiency and reliability; repair items identified in our long-range asset management plan, such as the water heater, chiller plant, and cooling fans; enhance continuity planning and emergency preparedness address bomb blast impact mitigation efforts. Our request seeks an increase to maintain our staffing level and provide employees with the appropriate resources and support needed to effectively serve Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO provides nonpartisan, objective, and reliable information to Congress, federal agencies, and to the public and recommends improvements, when appropriate, across the full breadth and scope of the federal government's responsibilities.
GAO's work supports a broad range of interests throughout Congress. In FY 2013, GAO received requests for our work from 95 percent of the standing committees of Congress and almost two-thirds of their subcommittees. Additionally, senior GAO officials testified at 114 hearings on national and international issues, before 60 committees and subcommittees that touch on virtually all major Federal Agencies.
GAO remains one of the best investments in the federal government, and GAO's dedicated staff continues to deliver high quality results. In FY 2013 alone, GAO's work yielded $51.5 billion in financial benefits--a return of about $100 for every dollar invested in GAO. Since FY 2003, GAO's work has resulted in:
over 1/2 trillion dollars in financial benefits; and
about 14,500 program and operational benefits that helped to change laws, improve public services, and promote sound management throughout government.
GAO is requesting a budget of $525.1 million to preserve its staff capacity and continue critical information technology and building infrastructure investments.
What GAO Found
GAO's fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget request of $525.1 million seeks an increase of 3.9 percent to maintain staff capacity as well as continue necessary maintenance and improvements to our information technology (IT) and building infrastructure. Additionally, receipts and reimbursements, primarily from program and financial audits, and rental income, totaling $30.9 million are expected in FY 2015.
GAO recently issued our draft Strategic Plan for Serving Congress in FYs 2014-2019. The plan outlines our proposed goals and strategies for supporting Congress's top priority. I also have met with the Chairs and Ranking Members of many of the standing committees and their subcommittees to hear firsthand feedback on our performance, as well as prioritize requests for our services to maximize the return on investment.
In order to address Congressional priorities, and fulfill GAO's mission, a talented, diverse, high-performing, knowledgeable workforce is essential. Workforce and succession planning remain a priority for GAO. A significant proportion of our employees are currently retirement eligible, including 34 percent of our executive leadership and 21 percent of our supervisory analysts.
In 2014, through a targeted recruiting strategy to address critical skills gaps, GAO plans to boost our employment level for the first time in 3 years to 2,945 Full Time Equivalents (FTE). The requested FY 2015 funding level will preserve strides planned for FY 2014 to increase our staff capacity. In conjunction with the ongoing recruiting efforts and planning, we will revive our intern program and hire and train an increased number of entry level employees. This will reverse the downward staffing trajectory, develop a talented cadre of analyst and leaders for the future, achieve progress in reaching an optimal FTE level of 3,250 FTE, and assist GAO in meeting the high priority needs of Congress.
We also take great pride in reporting that we continue to be recognized as an employer of choice, and have been consistently ranked near the top on "best places to work" lists.
Improvements to our aging IT infrastructure will allow GAO to further streamline business operations, increase staff efficiency and productivity, as well as improve access to information. Planned investments in IT will address deferred upgrades and enhance our technology infrastructure to support an array of engagement management, human capital, and financial management systems.
We also plan to continue upgrading aging building systems to ensure more efficient operations and security. Areas of focus include, increasing the energy efficiency and reliability of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system; enhancing continuity planning and emergency preparedness capabilities; and addressing bomb blast impact mitigation efforts |
gao_GAO-12-340 | gao_GAO-12-340_0 | § 2432, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress at the end of each fiscal-year quarter a report on current major defense acquisition programs. DOD’s Reports to Congress on Estimated Weapon System O&S Costs Were Inconsistent and Sometimes Unreliable
Program offices reporting life-cycle O&S cost estimates in the SAR were often inconsistent in their cost reporting and also did not follow best practices for presenting cost estimates. Such deficiencies may limit visibility needed for effective oversight of long-term weapon system O&S costs during the acquisition process. Program Offices Were Inconsistent in Reporting Estimated Life-Cycle O&S Costs and Did Not Incorporate Best Practices for Presenting These Cost Estimates
The SAR statute requires that life-cycle cost reporting for major weapon systems be uniform, to the extent practicable, across the department, but we found a number of inconsistent practices in how program offices were reporting life-cycle O&S cost estimates in the SAR. Based on the SAR submissions we reviewed, program offices were inconsistent in (1) the explanatory information they included with the cost estimates, (2) the source of the cost estimate they cited as the basis for the reported costs, (3) the unit of measure they used to portray average costs, (4) the frequency with which they updated reported costs, and (5) the reporting of antecedent system costs. In addition to these inconsistencies, we found that SAR submissions also did not incorporate best practices for presenting cost estimates, such as tracking cost changes over time and identifying cost drivers. In addition, 11 systems did not provide O&S cost estimates in the 2010 SAR. Another 35 programs (42 percent) did not cite a source, as previously noted. Specifically, 57 (68 percent) of the 84 programs reporting O&S costs in the 2010 SAR did not report O&S costs for an antecedent system. Program Offices Sometimes Provided Unreliable Life-Cycle O&S Cost Estimates in Their SARs
SARs are intended to provide Congress with authoritative program information on the cost, schedule, and performance of major weapon systems, but we found that some programs submitted unreliable O&S cost data. While some of the program offices told us specific reasons for the errors, others did not provide an explanation. DOD Could Improve O&S Cost Reporting with Detailed Implementation Guidance and a More Effective SAR Review Process
DOD’s reports to Congress on estimated weapon system O&S costs were often inconsistent and sometimes unreliable due to a lack of detailed implementation guidance for reporting these costs. In addition, DOD’s process for reviewing the O&S cost sections of the SAR prior to final submission did not provide assurance that the program offices reported costs uniformly, to the extent practicable, and that these reported costs were reliable. In the absence of improvements to the SAR guidance and to DOD’s review process, deficiencies in reporting estimated life-cycle O&S costs are likely to continue. DOD’s existing implementation guidance collectively provides minimal, and in some areas conflicting, instructions for O&S cost reporting. The SAR data submitted by program offices are subject to multiple reviews within the military services and by OSD, but this review process has not provided assurance that O&S costs are reported consistently and reliably. The revisions, at a minimum, should provide additional detail on the following areas: the explanatory information that should be included in the O&S narrative, including the specific assumptions underlying the cost estimate; the source to be used as the basis for reported O&S cost estimate information, especially when more than one source is available (such as a program office cost estimate, service cost estimate, and CAPE independent cost estimate); a consistent unit of measure for reporting average costs over time by commodity type—or other designated weapon system group—as agreed to by OSD and the services; criteria for identifying an antecedent system and reporting on the results of the cost comparison in the SAR; and reporting O&S costs for major modifications to existing weapon systems. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the selected acquisition reports (SAR) provide consistent and reliable operating and support (O&S) cost estimate information that enables effective oversight of major weapon system costs, we reviewed statutory requirements in 10 U.S.C. § 2432 for reporting weapon system life-cycle costs in the SARs, as well as Department of Defense (DOD) implementation guidance for the SAR. After determining that a total of 84 of the 95 weapon systems included O&S costs in their December 2010 SARs, we analyzed the annual SARs that were submitted for these systems between 2005 through 2010.Specifically, we analyzed the SARs to determine the types and scope of explanatory information included in the O&S narrative accompanying the cost estimate data; the source of the O&S cost estimate cited as the basis for the reported costs; the units of measure used to present O&S costs; the frequency that O&S costs were updated from year to year; and the extent to which O&S costs for antecedent systems were reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
With the nation facing fiscal challenges and the potential for tighter defense budgets, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have placed more attention on controlling the billions of dollars spent annually on weapon system operating and support (O&S) costs. These costs include, costs for repair parts, maintenance, and personnel, and account for about 70 percent of the total costs of a weapon system over its life cycle. The selected acquisition report (SAR) is DODs key recurring status report on the cost, schedule, and performance of major defense acquisition programs and is intended to provide authoritative information for congressional oversight of these programs. Oversight of O&S costs is important because many of the key decisions affecting these life-cycle costs are made during the acquisition process. GAO reviewed weapon system O&S cost estimates that DOD submits in the SAR. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which the SARs provide consistent and reliable O&S cost estimate information that enables effective oversight of these weapon system costs. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed SAR data for 84 major systems that submitted O&S cost estimates in the 2010 SAR and selected a nonprobability sample of 15 systems for more in-depth review.
What GAO Found
DODs reports to Congress on estimated weapon system O&S costs are often inconsistent and sometimes unreliable, limiting visibility needed for effective oversight of these costs. The SAR statute requires that life-cycle cost reporting for major weapon systems be uniform, to the extent practicable, across the department, but GAO found a number of inconsistent practices in how program offices were reporting life-cycle O&S cost estimates in the SAR. Program offices were inconsistent in (1) the explanatory information they included with the cost estimates; (2) the source of the cost estimate they cited as the basis for the reported costs; (3) the unit of measure they used to portray average costs; (4) the frequency with which they updated reported costs; and (5) the reporting of costs for an antecedent system being replaced by the new weapon system. For example, 35 (42 percent) of the 84 programs that reported O&S costs in the 2010 SAR did not cite a source of these data, contrary to DODs guidance, and 57 (68 percent) of the programs did not report O&S costs for an antecedent system. Also, O&S cost submissions in the SAR did not always incorporate best practices for presenting cost estimates, such as tracking cost changes over time and identifying cost drivers. In addition, 11 systems did not provide O&S cost estimates in the 2010 SAR.
Although SARs are intended to provide Congress with authoritative program information on major weapon systems, 7 of the 15 sample programs GAO reviewed submitted unreliable O&S cost estimate data in the 2007, 2009, or 2010 SARs. For example, an Air Force program underreported O&S costs by $2.1 billion (fiscal year 2002 dollars), or 18 percent. While some of the program offices did not provide an explanation for the errors in the submitted data, others cited specific reasons. For example, one Navy program office underreported O&S costs in the SAR and explained that it excluded certain costs that were not under its control, such as externally funded spare parts and military personnel. However, excluding such costs is contrary to the SAR statute. An Air Force program reported current and projected funding for the program rather than estimated life-cycle O&S costs. This practice also had the effect of underreporting these costs.
DODs reports to Congress on estimated weapon system O&S costs were often inconsistent and sometimes unreliable due to a lack of (1) detailed implementation guidance for reporting these costs and (2) an effective process for reviewing the O&S cost sections of the SAR before final submission to Congress. DODs guidance collectively provides minimal instructions for O&S cost reporting. The guidance also does not incorporate some of the best practices GAO has identified for presenting cost estimates. Further, although the SAR data submitted by program offices are subject to multiple reviews within the military services and by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, this review process has not provided assurance that O&S costs are reported consistently and reliably. In the absence of improvements to the SAR guidance and to the review process, deficiencies in reporting O&S costs are likely to continue. Improved reporting of O&S costs in the SAR could help to place more emphasis on assessing, managing, and controlling long-term weapon system O&S costs.
What GAO Recommends
To enhance visibility of weapon system O&S costs during acquisition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its guidance to program offices on cost reporting and also improve its process for reviewing these costs prior to final submission of the SAR to Congress. DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-891 | gao_GAO-11-891_0 | DOD’s Visibility into the Number of Contracts Eligible for Closeout Is Hindered by Inadequate Data
DOD does not have visibility into the total number of its Iraq contracts eligible for closeout, but our analysis of available data indicates that relatively few of these contracts will be closed within the time frames prescribed by the FAR. C3, which awarded the majority of the Iraq contracts, did not have sufficient internal controls to ensure its contracting data were accurate and complete, and was further affected by limitations of its contracting systems, turnover in contracting personnel, and other competing demands. Based on available data provided by C3 and the other DOD contracting organizations we reviewed, there are at least an additional 4,298 Iraq contracts—90 percent of which are already over age—that need to be closed. C3’s data on these firm-fixed price contracts indicates that C3 closed over 9,600 of its Iraq contracts awarded between fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Planning, Workforce, and Contractor Accounting Issues Hinder Efforts to Close Contracts
DOD’s ability to close the contracts it awarded to support efforts in Iraq is hindered by several factors, including the failure to plan for or emphasize the need to close these contracts until reconstruction efforts were well underway, staffing shortfalls, and contractor accounting issues. Limited DCAA Staffing and Unresolved Contractor Accounting Challenges Hinder Closeout of Cost- Type Contracts
DOD’s efforts to close its large, cost-type contracts are hindered by staffing shortages at DCAA and unresolved issues with contractors’ cost accounting practices. For example, DOD has deobligated some funds to make them available to meet other DOD needs, but there remains at least $135 million that will potentially not be available for use by DOD at the end of fiscal year 2011. Additionally, instances of improper payments and potential fraud were sometimes found years after final deliveries were made, but contracting personnel may not be able to recover funds owed to the government. While C3 officials noted that some contracting officers may have tracked unspent funds for contracts for which they were responsible, we found that C3’s contracting data systems did not maintain such financial data. Growing Backlog of Afghanistan Contracts Suggests Problems Related to Closing Contracts Will Continue
DOD reported that actions are underway to address the lessons learned in Iraq, including developing deployable contract management systems and explicitly requiring that contract closeout requirements be incorporated into contingency contracting planning documents. As part of this effort, C3 identified the need to improve and consolidate data management, improve contract oversight, and increase emphasis on contract administration and closeout. To address its backlog of contracts awarded before fiscal year 2009, C3 delegated responsibility for closing at least 22,597 Afghanistan inactive contracts to the Task Force. Conclusions
Contract closeout is a key step to ensure the government receives the goods and services it purchases at the agreed upon price and, if done in a timely manner, provides opportunities to utilize unspent funds for other DOD needs. DOD’s recognition in 2008 that it needed to address the backlog of contracts that are over age for closeout and its establishment of the Task Force came too late in the operation to make a significant difference in closing contracts within the required time frames. Further, the limited visibility provided by the contracting and financial management systems hindered DOD’s ability to identify and address improper payments. DOD has recognized the need to increase DCAA’s staffing and address contractor business systems, but fully implementing these initiatives will take several years. To help improve DOD’s ability to manage the closeout of contracts awarded in support of future contingencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, take the following two actions: revise DOD’s contingency contracting doctrine and guidance to reflect the need for advanced planning for contract closeout; and require senior contracting officials to monitor and assess the progress of contract closeout activities throughout the contingency operation so steps may be taken if a backlog emerges. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to close its Iraq contracts, under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, we examined the (1) total number of its contracts with performance in Iraq that are eligible for closeout and the extent to which DOD closed these contracts within required time frames, (2) factors that contributed to contracts not being closed within required time frames, (3) steps DOD took to manage the financial risks associated with not closing contracts within required time frames, and (4) how DOD captured and implemented lessons learned from closing its Iraq contracts. We reviewed DOD’s current contingency contracting doctrine and guidance, and interviewed officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are responsible for revising the doctrine and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, DOD obligated at least $166.6 billion on contracts supporting reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these contingency contracts, in particular those awarded in Iraq, need to be closed. Contract closeout is a key step to ensure the government receives the goods and services it purchased at the agreed upon price and, if done timely, provides opportunities to use unspent funds for other needs and reduces exposure to other financial risks. To assess DOD's efforts to close its Iraq contracts, GAO examined the (1) number of contracts that are eligible for closeout and the extent to which they will be closed within required time frames, (2) factors contributing to contracts not being closed within required time frames, (3) steps DOD took to manage the financial risks associated with not closing contracts within required time frames, and (4) extent to which DOD captured and implemented lessons learned from closing its Iraq contracts. GAO reviewed contingency contracting guidance, analyzed contract and closeout data for contracts awarded between fiscal years 2003 and 2010, and interviewed DOD officials from six organizations responsible for awarding or closing out these contracts.
What GAO Found
DOD does not have visibility into the number of its Iraq contracts eligible for closeout, but available data indicate that DOD must still review and potentially close at least 58,000 contracts awarded between fiscal years 2003 and 2010. GAO's analysis indicates that relatively few of its contracts will be closed within required time frames. For example, about 90 percent of the limited number of contracts for which DOD could provide closeout data are already over age for closeout. The U.S. Central Command's Contracting Command (C3) and its predecessors, which awarded many of DOD's Iraq contracts, did not have sufficient internal controls to ensure that contracting data were accurate and complete. C3's management visibility was further affected by limitations of its information systems, staff turnover, and poor contract administration. DOD's ability to close its contracts has been hindered by the lack of advance planning, workforce shortfalls, and contractor accounting challenges. For example, DOD's contingency contracting doctrine and guidance do not specifically require advanced planning for contract closeouts. DOD took steps in 2008 to address its backlog of contracts needing to be closed but such actions came too late to make significant difference in closing contracts within required time frames. DOD is now transitioning responsibility for closing out C3's contracts to the Army Contracting Command. Staffing challenges, however, during this transition have hindered efforts to close these contracts. Efforts to close large, cost-type contracts have been further hindered by Defense Contract Audit Agency staffing shortages and unresolved issues with contractors' accounting practices, which have delayed audits of the contractors' incurred costs. DOD's efforts to identify unspent contract funds and improper payments--two examples of financial risks that timely closeout of contracts may help identify--are hindered by limited visibility into its Iraq contracts. DOD identified at least $135 million in unspent funds that could potentially not be available to meet other DOD needs. If not used, these funds will be returned to the U.S. Treasury at the end of fiscal year 2011. Should DOD identify a need to pay for an unanticipated cost on these contracts, it will need to use other funds that are currently available. Additionally, instances of improper payments and potential fraud were sometimes found years after final contract deliveries were made, making it harder for DOD to recover funds owed to it and increasing the risk that it may need to pay contractors interest fees on late payments. DOD has identified and addressed some of the problems related to the closeout of Iraq contracts, but the growing backlog of over 42,000 Afghanistan contracts that need to be closed suggests the underlying causes have not been resolved. DOD officials noted that the lessons learned in Iraq highlight the need to improve contract data, increase the emphasis on contract administration and closeout, and improve contingency contracting doctrine and guidance. DOD officials reported that actions are underway to correct these deficiencies in future contingencies, but fully implementing these initiatives may take several years.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to ensure DOD has sufficient resources to close its Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and to better plan for and improve visibility of closeout efforts in future contingencies. DOD concurred with each of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-476T | gao_GAO-11-476T_0 | Some TARP Programs, Including Those That Have Ended and Those That Remain Active, Continue to Present Challenges
According to OFS, from the inception of TARP through March 9, 2011, it has disbursed $410 billion, and received more than $286 billion primarily from interest, dividends, and principal repayments on direct loans, repurchases of investments, and sales of investments. The reported net cost of TARP transactions from inception through September 30, 2010, was $18.5 billion; however, the ultimate cost of TARP will change as a result of (1) differences between the estimated values of the direct loans and investments as of September 30, 2010, and the amounts OFS will ultimately realize (as the assumptions and estimates underlying the valuation of these assets are inherently subject to substantial uncertainty), and (2) further disbursements, such as those relating to the housing programs which are not subject to repayment. For example, a growing number of CPP participants have missed scheduled dividend or interest payments. Through February 2011, Treasury had received about $171 billion in full and partial repayments from 146 institutions, including 28 institutions that exchanged $363 million of their CPP investments for investments under Treasury’s CDCI program. However, questions about the health of smaller banks continue, and small institutions participating in CPP may face challenges in fulfilling the terms needed to exit the program. About Half of the TALF Loans Have Been Repaid, but Continued Monitoring is Important
TALF provided loans to private investors to purchase asset-backed securities (ABS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) to encourage the issuance of new securitizations and provide liquidity for new consumer and business loans. AIFP Illustrates both Progress and Ongoing Uncertainty in Recouping Assistance
From December 2008 through December 2009, Treasury announced $86.3 billion in funding available to help stabilize the auto industry and disbursed $79.7 billion of this funding, including (1) about $62 billion to fund Chrysler and GM while they restructured, (2) about $16.3 billion to provide capital assistance to Ally Financial, and (3) $1.5 billion to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) created by Chrysler Financial. As of March 9, 2011, approximately $29.5 billion had been repaid and Treasury owned 33.3 percent equity in GM, 9.2 percent in Chrysler, and 73.8 percent in Ally. Since emerging from bankruptcy in the summer of 2009, Chrysler and GM have shown signs of progress in returning to profitability; however, their ability to fully repay the AIFP debt and equity investments depends on a variety of factors, which will require Treasury’s ongoing oversight. Treasury’s Exposure to AIG Under TARP is Tied to the Current and Future Health of the Company and the Insurance Industry
In November 2008, Treasury began providing assistance to AIG, and with the closing of AIG’s recapitalization plan in January 2011, this assistance has risen still further, but AIG has recently started repaying its debt to Treasury. The government’s prospects for recouping the assistance it has provided largely rests with the return that Treasury earns when it sells its common stock in AIG. As of December 31, 2010, $1 billion in TARP funds had been disbursed for TARP-funded housing programs, of which $840 million has been disbursed for HAMP-related activity. In July 2009 and June 2010, we reported on the challenges Treasury faced in implementing HAMP and made recommendations to improve the transparency and equitable implementation of the program. In addition, we noted that Treasury had yet to establish a comprehensive system of internal control for HAMP, including metrics and benchmarks for servicers’ performance. Our most recent work shows there is more Treasury can do to ensure the effective implementation of these programs, including ensuring that servicers have sufficient capacity to implement them and that borrowers are notified about potential eligibility for second-lien modifications. Treasury still holds oversight responsibility for the fund managers until the funds no longer hold assets. As of March 9, 2011, Treasury’s investments accounted for about $15.9 billion of about $22.4 billion available to fund PPIP. Of this investment, about $15.2 billion remained outstanding. Treasury had seen unrealized capital gains of approximately $750 million. The existing TARP programs that are intended to assist small businesses focused on capitalizing certain depository institutions and stabilizing secondary markets for SBA-guaranteed loans. As of March 9, 2011, Treasury had provided about $570 million to 84 CDFIs, 28 of which had already participated in CPP. SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, which was announced in March 2009 and closed in September 2010. As of March 9, 2011, Treasury had made 31 purchases of SBA 7(a) securities totaling about $370 million. The Federal Reserve estimates that about 850,000 small business loans were financed in part by securities supported by TALF. As we have seen, some programs are still being implemented and others, while having been closed or terminated, have assets that must be managed, repaid, and divested. OFS has continued to make management and oversight enhancements. Our opinion on internal control over financial reporting is based on criteria established under 31 U.S.C. Since the passage of EESA, indicators generally suggest that credit markets have improved and while the effectiveness of the TARP programs have varied, some have reportedly had the desired effects, especially if stabilizing the financial system and restoring confidence was considered to be the principal goal of the intervention. January 12, 2011. Financial Audit: Office of Financial Stability (Troubled Asset Relief Program) Fiscal Years 2010 and 2009 Financial Statements. August 3, 2010. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Home Affordable Modification Program Continues to Face Implementation Challenges. March 25, 2010. October 8, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which Congress established on October 3, 2008, in response to the financial crisis that threatened the stability of the U.S. financial system and the solvency of many financial institutions. Under the original TARP legislation, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had the authority to purchase or insure $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions. The Secretary of the Treasury extended the authority originally provided under EESA through October 3, 2010. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)--signed into law on July 21, 2010--set a new spending ceiling for TARP, in effect prohibiting Treasury from incurring any additional obligations for programs that had not been initiated prior to June 25, 2010. A broad range of activities have been initiated under TARP. Specific initiatives have injected capital into key financial institutions; implemented programs to address problems in the securitization markets; provided assistance to the automobile industry and American International Group, Inc. (AIG); and offered incentives for modifying residential mortgages, among other things. As TARP passes the 30-month mark, U.S. financial markets appear to be less volatile than they were in 2008. But questions about a sustained economic recovery continue, and certain areas of the economy still face significant challenges. For example, foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies continue to linger and small businesses still face tight credit conditions. As a result, TARP has been transformed into a program that focuses primarily on preserving homeownership and improving financial conditions for small financial institutions and businesses. While many other programs have ended and begun winding down operations and some participating institutions have repaid part or all of their TARP funds, the prospect of repayment from some other institutions, both large and small, remains uncertain. This statement is primarily based on our January 12, 2011, report and focuses on (1) the status of TARP programs; (2) Treasury's progress in implementing an effective management structure for TARP, including staffing the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), overseeing contractors, and establishing a comprehensive system of internal controls; and (3) trends in key relevant economic indicators.
What GAO Found
Some TARP programs--Capital Assistance Program, Asset Guarantee Program, and Targeted Investment Program--have been terminated. Others, like the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), have closed and are winding down operations, and several programs that focus on preserving homeownership and that have provided assistance to auto companies and AIG remain active. (1) CPP, which closed in December 2009, had $30.8 billion outstanding as of March 9, 2011, and had received about $171 billion in full and partial repayments from CPP participants. However, Treasury faces various oversight and management challenges in addressing missed dividend and interest payments and monitoring repayment requests. (2) Funding of TALF loans by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) closed in June 2010, and no TARP funds had been expended as of March 9, 2011, to purchase collateral from FRBNY because no collateral had been surrendered to TALF LLC. TALF will continue to pose potential risks to Treasury until all loans are repaid to FRBNY and the program is terminated. (3) While the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) remains Treasury's primary program to assist homeowners facing foreclosure, the program had a slow start and has not performed as anticipated. Treasury announced several new programs in 2010. As of March 9, 2011, $1.2 billion, none of it recoverable, had been disbursed for TARP housing programs. Our most recent work shows there is more Treasury can do to better ensure the effective implementation of this program. (4) The Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) had an outstanding balance of just more than $44.2 billion as of March 9, 2011. At that time, approximately $29.5 billion had been repaid, but Treasury still owned 33.3 percent equity in General Motors (GM), 9.2 percent in Chrysler, and 73.8 percent in Ally. While the auto companies' financial conditions have shown signs of improvement, their ability to fully repay the AIFP debt and equity investments depends on a variety of factors, which will require Treasury's ongoing oversight. (5) AIG has continued to receive assistance over the last year provided largely rests with the return that Treasury earns when it sells its common stock in AIG. (6) The Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) continues to be an active program with $15.9 billion disbursed as of March 9, 2011, and $15.2 billion outstanding. Of this investment, Treasury had seen unrealized capital gains of approximately $750 million. Treasury still holds oversight responsibility for the fund managers until the fund no longer holds assets. (7) The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) and the SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program are small business programs that account for a small portion of TARP funding. CDCI closed in September 2010, and as of March 9, 2011, Treasury had provided about $570 million to 84 CDFIs, 28 of which had already participated in CPP. SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program closed in September 2010, and as of March 9, 2011, Treasury had made 31 purchases of SBA 7(a) securities totaling about $370 million. |
gao_GAO-06-1000T | gao_GAO-06-1000T_0 | Background
The tax gap is an estimate of the difference between the taxes—including individual income, corporate income, employment, estate, and excise taxes—that should have been paid voluntarily and on time and what was actually paid for a specific year. Reducing the Tax Gap through Tax Simplification or Tax System Reform Depends on Their Design and May Have Effects Beyond Tax Compliance
Tax law simplification and reform both have the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. The extent to which the tax gap would be reduced depends on which parts of the tax system would be simplified and in what manner as well as how any reform of the tax system is designed and implemented. For example, IRS’s recent tax gap estimate includes a $32 billion loss in individual income taxes for tax year 2001 because of noncompliance with these provisions. However, these credits and deductions serve purposes that Congress has judged to be important to advance federal goals. Fundamental tax reform would most likely result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few tax preferences or complex tax code provisions and if taxable transactions are transparent. However, these characteristics are difficult to achieve in any system and experience suggests that simply adopting a fundamentally different tax system may not by itself eliminate any tax gap. Providing IRS with Additional Enforcement Tools Potentially Could Improve Compliance Significantly, but Identifying and Designing Such Tools Can Be Challenging
Changing the tax laws to provide IRS with additional enforcement tools, such as expanded tax withholding and information reporting, could also reduce the tax gap by many billions of dollars, particularly with regard to underreporting—the largest segment of the tax gap. However, designing new withholding or information reporting requirements to address underreporting can be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to at least some form of withholding or information reporting, there are varied forms of underreporting, and the requirements could impose costs and burdens on third parties. Taxpayers tend to report income subject to tax withholding or information reporting with high levels of compliance, as shown in figure 1, because the income is transparent to the taxpayers as well as to IRS. In addition to improving taxpayer compliance, information reporting can help IRS to better allocate its resources to the extent that it helps IRS better identify noncompliant taxpayers and the potential for additional revenue that could be obtained by contacting these taxpayers. Devoting Additional Resources to Enforcement Likely Could Reduce the Tax Gap, but to What Extent Is Difficult to Predict
Devoting more resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars in that IRS would be able to expand its enforcement efforts to reach a greater number of potentially noncompliant taxpayers. However, determining the appropriate level of enforcement resources to provide IRS requires taking into account many factors, such as how effectively and efficiently IRS is currently using its resources, how to strike the proper balance between IRS’s taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. If Congress were to provide IRS more enforcement resources, the amount of the tax gap that could be reduced depends in part on the size of any increase in IRS’s budget, how IRS would manage any additional resources, and the indirect increase in taxpayers’ voluntary compliance that would likely result from expanded IRS enforcement. Generally, larger budget increases should result in larger reductions in the tax gap. Each of the three approaches I have discussed could make a contribution to reducing the tax gap, although using multiple approaches may be the most effective strategy since no one approach is likely to address noncompliance fully and cost effectively. Leveraging technology. Optimizing resource allocation. As previously discussed, developing reliable measures of the return on investment for strategies to reduce the tax gap would help inform IRS resource allocation decisions. Evaluating the results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax gap--the difference between the tax amounts taxpayers pay voluntarily and on time and what they should pay under the law--has been a long-standing problem in spite of many efforts to reduce it. Most recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated a gross tax gap for tax year 2001 of $345 billion and estimated it would recover $55 billion of this gap, resulting in a net tax gap of $290 billion. When some taxpayers fail to comply, the burden of funding the nation's commitments falls more heavily on compliant taxpayers. Reducing the tax gap would help improve the nation's fiscal stability. For example, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield $3 billion annually. GAO was asked to discuss the tax gap and various approaches to reduce it. This testimony discusses to what extent the tax gap could be reduced through three approaches--simplifying or reforming the tax system, providing IRS with additional enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement--as well as various factors that could guide decision-making when devising a strategy to reduce the tax gap. This statement is based on prior GAO work.
What GAO Found
Simplifying the tax code or fundamental tax reform has the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. IRS has estimated that errors in claiming tax credits and deductions for tax year 2001 contributed $32 billion to the tax gap. Thus, considerable potential exists. However, these provisions serve purposes Congress has judged to be important and eliminating or consolidating them could be complicated. Fundamental tax reform would be most likely to result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few, if any, exceptions (e.g., few tax preferences) and taxable transactions are transparent to tax administrators. These characteristics are difficult to achieve, and any tax system could be subject to noncompliance. Withholding and information reporting are particularly powerful tools to reduce the tax gap. They could help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars, especially if they can make currently underreported income transparent to IRS. These tools have been shown to lead to high, sustained levels of taxpayer compliance. Using these tools can also help IRS better allocate its resources to the extent they help IRS identify and prioritize its contacts with noncompliant taxpayers. As GAO previously suggested, reporting the cost, or basis, of securities sales is one option to improve taxpayers' compliance. However, designing additional withholding and information reporting requirements may be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to reporting, there are many forms of underreporting, and withholding and reporting requirements impose costs on third parties. Devoting additional resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. However, determining the appropriate level of enforcement resources for IRS requires taking into account many factors such as how well IRS is currently using its resources, how to strike the proper balance between IRS's taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. If Congress decides to provide IRS more enforcement resources, the amount the tax gap could be reduced would depend on factors such as the size of budget increases, how IRS manages any additional resources, and the indirect increase in taxpayers' voluntary compliance resulting from expanded enforcement. Increasing IRS's funding would enable it to contact millions of potentially noncompliant taxpayers it identifies but does not have resources to contact. Finally, using multiple approaches may be the most effective strategy to reduce the tax gap, as no one approach is likely to fully and cost effectively address noncompliance. Key factors to consider in devising a tax gap reduction strategy include periodically measuring noncompliance and its causes, setting reduction goals, leveraging technology, optimizing IRS's allocation of resources, and evaluating the results of any initiatives. |
gao_GAO-05-201 | gao_GAO-05-201_0 | Background
In recent years, agencies have increasingly placed orders against existing contracts that have been awarded by another agency to save time and administrative effort. At the same time as use of interagency contracting has increased, DOD has also increased its use of contractors in military operations. In general, breakdowns in the procurement process, such as not following competition requirements and not properly justifying the decision to use interagency contracting, occurred when the orders were issued. Because the officials at Interior and the Army responsible for the orders did not fully carry out their roles and responsibilities, the contractor was allowed to play a role in the procurement process normally performed by the government. Interior’s contracting office did not comply with required BPA procedures meant to ensure the government receives the best value for its dollars and that competition is encouraged. In this void, the contractor played a significant role in developing, issuing, and administering the orders, including identifying the contractor’s BPA with Interior as the contract vehicle to provide the services; drafting statements of work; suggesting that Army officials use the company’s rough order of magnitude price as the government cost estimate; acting as a conduit for information from the Army in Iraq to the Interior providing the Interior contracting office with a draft justification and approval to award additional work to the company on a sole source basis; sending invoices directly for payment; and requesting that construction work be performed under the BPA, which would have also been out of scope from the GSA Schedule contract, although subsequent discussions between CACI and Interior contracting officials resulted in the work being awarded separately on a sole source basis due to urgency. When these controls are not in place, particularly in a fee-for-service environment, more emphasis can be placed on customer satisfaction and revenue generation than on compliance with sound contracting policy and required procedures. We found an absence of these management controls for the 11 orders that were issued and administered for interrogation and other services. Lack of Management Oversight
Significant problems in the way Interior’s contracting office carried out its responsibilities in issuing these orders were not detected or addressed by management. Lack of Adequate Training
Interior’s contracting office personnel and Army personnel in Iraq that were responsible for the orders for interrogation and other services lacked adequate training on their contracting responsibilities. We found that the personnel acting as CORs did not, for the most part, have the requisite training and were unaware of the scope of their duties and responsibilities. However, due to the recent nature of these efforts, it is too soon to tell how effective they will be. DOD, for its part, issued a policy in October 2004, signed by high-level officials from the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, requiring that military departments and defense agencies establish procedures for reviewing and approving the use of other agencies’ contracts. To determine what breakdowns occurred in the process of procuring interrogation and other services and the contributing factors to the breakdowns, we reviewed contract files on the 11 orders issued to CACI to understand the facts about how the orders were issued. To evaluate the extent to which actions taken by Interior and DOD address contributing factors to breakdowns in the procurement process, we identified and reviewed steps taken by these agencies, such as newly released policies and guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, federal agencies have increasingly turned to interagency contracts--where one agency, for example, places an order under an existing contract for another agency--as a way to streamline the procurement process. Interagency contracting can offer benefits of improved efficiency, but this approach needs to be effectively managed. To learn more about some of the challenges of interagency contracting, we reviewed the process that the Department of Defense (DOD) used to acquire interrogation and certain other services through the Department of the Interior to support military operations in Iraq. On behalf of DOD, Interior issued 11 task orders, valued at over $66 million, on an existing contract. This report identifies breakdowns in the procurement process, contributing factors that led to the breakdowns, and the extent to which recent actions by Interior and DOD address these contributing factors.
What GAO Found
DOD, faced with an urgent need for interrogation and other services in support of military operations in Iraq, turned to the Department of the Interior for contracting assistance. Numerous breakdowns occurred in the issuance and administration of the orders for these services. The breakdowns included issuing orders that were beyond the scope of the underlying contract, in violation of competition rules; not complying with additional DOD competition requirements when issuing task orders for services on existing contracts; not properly justifying the decision to use interagency contracting; not complying with ordering procedures meant to ensure best value for the government; and inadequate monitoring of contractor performance. Because the officials at Interior and the Army responsible for the orders did not fully carry out their roles and responsibilities, the contractor was allowed to play a role in the procurement process normally performed by the government. A lack of effective management controls--in particular insufficient management oversight and a lack of adequate training--led to the breakdowns. When these management controls are not in place, particularly in an interagency fee-for-service contracting environment, more emphasis can be placed on customer satisfaction and revenue generation than on compliance with sound contracting policy and required procedures. Significant problems in the way Interior's contracting office carried out its responsibilities in issuing the orders for interrogation and other services on behalf of DOD were not detected or addressed by management. Further, the Army officials responsible for overseeing the contractor, for the most part, lacked knowledge of contracting issues and were not aware of their basic duties and responsibilities. In response to the above concerns, Interior and DOD have taken actions to strengthen management controls. For example, Interior has re-issued or clarified several policies for its contracting personnel and has required them to take training on the proper use of General Service Administration contracts. DOD has issued a new policy requiring that military departments and defense agencies establish procedures for reviewing and approving the use of other agencies' contracts. These actions are a positive step toward addressing some of the contributing causes to the breakdowns GAO found, but it is too soon to tell how effective they will be. |
gao_GAO-10-903 | gao_GAO-10-903_0 | Until recently, these proposals generally remained outside the mainstream discussions of climate policy, which focused either on strategies to reduce emissions or adapt to climate change impacts. We found that more is known about certain CDR approaches, since related laboratory and field experiments have been conducted, whereas there is limited understanding of other CDR approaches and SRM. More Relevant Modeling Studies and Experiments Have Focused on CDR than on SRM
: Update and Recommendations (Paris: 2007). Based on our literature review and interviews with experts, to date only one study has been published for a field experiment related to SRM technologies—a 2009 Russian experiment that injected aerosols into the middle troposphere to measure their reflectivity. Experts and Relevant Studies Identified Major Uncertainties that Merit Further Investigation
Experts we interviewed and relevant studies identified several major uncertainties in the field of geoengineering that are in need of further investigation. Most Federal Research Activities Focused on Mitigation or Basic Science, but a Few Specifically Addressed Geoengineering
The 13 agencies participating in USGCRP identified 52 research activities relevant to geoengineering—accounting for approximately $100.9 million in federal funding for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Officials from federal offices coordinating federal responses to climate change—CEQ, OSTP, and USGCRP—stated that they do not currently have a coordinated geoengineering strategy or position. The Extent to Which Existing Federal Laws and International Agreements Apply to Geoengineering Is Unclear, and Experts and Officials Identified Governance Challenges
Legal experts we interviewed and EPA and Department of State (State) officials said that the extent to which existing laws and international agreements apply to geoengineering is unclear, largely because detailed information on geoengineering approaches and effects is not available. EPA has taken steps to regulate one CDR approach and has determined that an existing law provides sufficient authority to regulate two other approaches. Legal experts and federal officials identified challenges for establishing governance of geoengineering, such as the potential for unintended and uneven impacts, although their views differed on the most effective governance approach. This official was not aware of CERCLA’s applicability to any other geoengineering activity. Geological sequestration. In contrast, State officials said that parties to other agreements have not addressed other geoengineering approaches because they have not reached a similar stage of development. Legal experts and EPA officials we interviewed generally agreed that the federal government should take a coordinated, interagency approach to domestic geoengineering regulation. While agencies identified about $100.9 million in research funding relevant to geoengineering in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, federal officials also said that a substantial portion of the existing federal climate change and earth science research could be relevant to understanding geoengineering—roughly $2 billion in requested budget authority for 2010 alone. However, because there is no coordinated federal geoengineering strategy, it is difficult to determine the extent of relevant research. Recommendation
GAO recommends that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in consultation with relevant federal agencies, develop a clear, defined, and coordinated approach to geoengineering research in the context of a federal strategy to address climate change that (1) defines geoengineering for federal agencies; (2) leverages existing resources by having federal agencies collect information and coordinate federal research related to geoengineering in a transparent manner; and if the administration decides to establish a formal geoengineering research program, (3) sets clear research priorities to inform decision-making and future governance efforts. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) the general state of the science regarding geoengineering approaches and their potential effects; (2) the extent to which the federal government is sponsoring or participating in geoengineering research or deployment; and (3) the views of legal experts and federal officials about the extent to which federal laws and international agreements apply to geoengineering activities, and associated challenges, if any, to geoengineering governance. We also met with federal officials from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of State (State) to collect their views on the applicability of domestic laws and international agreements to geoengineering, and governance challenges, if any. | Why GAO Did This Study
Policymakers have raised questions about geoengineering--large-scale deliberate interventions in the earth's climate system to diminish climate change or its impacts--and its role in a broader strategy of mitigating and adapting to climate change. Most geoengineering proposals fall into two categories: carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which would remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere, and solar radiation management (SRM), which would offset temperature increases by reflecting sunlight back into space. GAO was asked to examine (1) the state of geoengineering science, (2) federal involvement in geoengineering, and (3) the views of experts and federal officials about the extent to which federal laws and international agreements apply to geoengineering, and any governance challenges. GAO examined relevant scientific and policy studies, relevant domestic laws and international agreements, analyzed agency data describing relevant research for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and interviewed federal officials and selected recognized experts in the field.
What GAO Found
Few geoengineering experiments or modeling studies have been conducted, and major uncertainties remain on the efficacy and potential consequences of geoengineering approaches. GAO's review of relevant studies and discussions with selected experts indicated that relatively more laboratory and field research relevant to certain CDR approaches exists, although most of this research was not designed to apply to geoengineering. In contrast, few modeling studies or field experiments have focused on SRM approaches, according to experts and recent studies. Experts identified only one SRM field experiment with published results--a 2009 Russian experiment that injected aerosols into the middle troposphere to measure their reflectivity. Experts, as well as relevant studies, identified several major uncertainties in need of further investigation for CDR and SRM. Federal agencies identified 52 research activities, totaling about $100.9 million, relevant to geoengineering during fiscal years 2009 and 2010. GAO's analysis found that 43 activities, totaling about $99 million, focused either on mitigation strategies or basic science. Most of the research focused on mitigation efforts, such as geological sequestration of CO2, which were identified as relevant to CDR approaches but not designed to address them directly. GAO found that nine activities, totaling about $1.9 million, directly investigated SRM or less conventional CDR approaches. Officials from interagency bodies coordinating federal responses to climate change indicated that their offices have not developed a coordinated strategy, and believe that, due to limited federal investment, it is premature to coordinate geoengineering activities. However, federal officials also noted that a large share of existing federal climate science research could be relevant to geoengineering. Agencies requested roughly $2 billion for such activities in fiscal year 2010. Without a coordinated federal strategy for geoengineering, it is difficult for agencies to determine the extent of relevant research, and policymakers may lack key information to inform subsequent decisions on geoengineering and existing climate science efforts. According to legal experts and federal officials, the extent to which federal laws and international agreements apply to geoengineering is unclear. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken steps to regulate one CDR approach and has determined that it has sufficient authority to regulate two other approaches. EPA officials said EPA has not assessed the applicability of other laws because geoengineering research is in its initial stages. Similarly, legal experts and Department of State officials said that, except for three instances, parties to international agreements have not addressed their agreements' applicability to geoengineering, largely due to limited geoengineering activity and awareness of the issue. Legal experts' and officials' views differed on the best approach for international governance, but generally agreed that the federal government should take a coordinated, interagency approach on domestic regulation. Experts and officials also identified governance challenges, such as the need to address liability.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that within the Executive Office of the President, the appropriate entities, such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), establish a clear strategy for geoengineering research in the context of the federal response to climate change to ensure a coordinated federal approach. OSTP neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation, but provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-12-246 | gao_GAO-12-246_0 | investigate, and take punitive action against potential violators of U.S. export control laws. Inspections of items scheduled for export are routinely conducted at U.S. air, sea, and land ports, as part of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer’s responsibilities for enforcing U.S. import and export control laws and regulations at our nation’s ports of entry. Agencies Use a Risk- Based Approach to Allocate Resources but Do Not Fully Track Those Used For Export Control Enforcement
Agencies use some form of a risk-based approach when allocating resources to export control enforcement as their missions are broader than export controls. As agencies can use these resources for other activities based on need, tracking resources used solely on export control enforcement activities is difficult. Only OEE allocates all of its resources exclusively to export control enforcement as that is its primary mission, and State and the Treasury have relatively few export control enforcement staff to track. Given the overlapping jurisdiction of several enforcement agencies, in some cities agencies have voluntarily created local task forces that bring together enforcement resources to work collectively on cases—informally leveraging resources. This task force also includes participation by the military service intelligence units and other law enforcement agencies. Reform Initiatives May Help Address Challenges In Investigating Illicit Transshipments But Detailed Plans Are Unknown
Enforcement agencies face several challenges in investigating illicit transshipments, both domestically and overseas—including license determination delays; limited access in some overseas locations; and a lack of effectiveness measures that reflect the complexity and qualitative benefits of export control cases. Recognizing broader challenges in export control enforcement, the President announced the creation of a national export enforcement coordination center, which may help agencies address some of the challenges described below, but detailed plans to do so have yet to be developed. Investigators Face Several Challenges in Investigating Illicit Transshipments— Both Domestically and Overseas
The current export control enforcement system poses several challenges that potentially reduce the effectiveness of activities and limit the identification and investigation of illicit transshipments. Export control enforcement agencies seek to keep defense and dual-use items from being illegally exported through intermediary countries or locations to an unauthorized final destination, such as Iran, but agencies face challenges that can impact their ability to investigate export control violations, both domestically and overseas. First, license determinations—which confirm whether an item is controlled and requires a license, and thereby help confirm whether an export control violation has occurred—can sometimes be delayed, potentially hindering investigations and prosecutions. Second, investigators have limited access to secure communications and cleared staff in several domestic field offices, which can limit their ability to share timely and important information. Fourth, agencies lack consistent data to quantify and identify trends and patterns in illicit transshipments of U.S. export-controlled items. Lastly, investigative agencies lack measures of effectiveness that fully reflect the complexity and qualitative benefits of export control cases. As the center’s operation progresses, it has the opportunity to address ongoing challenges in export control enforcement, including reducing potential overlap in investigations, and help agencies to work as efficiently as possible, maximize available intelligence and agency investigative data, and measure the effectiveness of U.S. export control enforcement activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better inform management and resource allocation decisions, effectively manage limited export control enforcement resources, and improve the license determination process, we are making the following four recommendations: We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, as they implement efforts to track resources expended on export control enforcement activities, use such data to make resource allocation decisions. We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the departmental representatives of the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, including Commerce, Justice, State, and the Treasury leverage export control enforcement resources across agencies by building on existing agency efforts to track resources expended, as well as existing agency coordination at the local level; establish procedures to facilitate data sharing between the enforcement agencies and intelligence community to measure illicit transshipment activity; and develop qualitative and quantitative measures of effectiveness for the entire enforcement community to baseline and trend this data. In its comments, DHS stated its intent to work with the other agencies to improve the license determination process as well as take steps to deploy its resources in the most effective and efficient manner and provided target dates for completing these actions. We interviewed officials about their enforcement priorities at the headquarters of Commerce, DHS, Justice, and State. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government controls the export of sensitive defense and dual-use items (having both military and commercial use). The five agencies primarily responsible for export control enforcementthe Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, State and the Treasuryconduct inspections and investigations, and can levy punitive actions against violators. A challenging aspect of export control enforcement is the detection of illicit transshipmentsthe transfer of items from place of origin through an intermediary country to an unauthorized destination, such as Iran. In 2010, the President announced reforms to the U.S. export control system to address weaknesses found by GAO and others. GAO was asked to address how the export control enforcement agencies allocate resources, as well as the challenges they face and the potential impact of export control reform on enforcement activities. GAO reviewed documents and met with enforcement agency officials as well as with U.S. and foreign government and company officials in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates, which have a high volume of trade and have been identified as potential hubs for illicit transshipments.
What GAO Found
Agencies use a risk-based approach, including workload and threat assessment data, to allocate resources, but most do not fully track those used for export control enforcement activities. As their missions are broader than export controls, agencies can use staff resources for other activities based on need, making tracking resources used solely for export control enforcement difficult. Only Commerces Office of Export Enforcement allocates its resources exclusively to export control enforcement as that is its primary mission. Other agencies, such as State and the Treasury, have relatively few export control enforcement staff to track. While several agencies acknowledge the need to better track export enforcement resources and have taken steps to do so, they do not know the full extent of their use of these resources and do not use this information in resource allocation decisions. In some cities, agencies are informally leveraging export enforcement resources through voluntarily created local task forces that bring together enforcement resources to work collectively on export control cases.
Enforcement agencies face several challenges in investigating illicit transshipments, both domestically and overseas, which potentially reduce the effectiveness of enforcement activities and limit the identification and investigation of illicit transshipments. These include:
License Determination Delay s. License determinationswhich confirm whether an item is controlled and requires a license, and thereby help confirm whether an export control violation has occurredare often not timely, potentially hindering investigations and prosecutions.
Limited Secure Communications and Cleared Staff . Investigators have limited access to secure communications and staff with high-level security clearances in several domestic field offices, limiting investigators ability to share timely and important information.
Lack of Trend Data on Illicit Transshipments . While there is a good exchange of intelligence between enforcement agencies and the intelligence communityto seize shipments and take other actions against export control violatorsofficials noted that no formal process or means existed for these groups to collectively quantify and identify statistical trends and patterns relating to information on illicit transshipments.
Lack of Effectiveness Measures Unique to the Complexity of Export Controls . Investigative agencies lack measures of effectiveness that fully reflect the complexity and qualitative benefits of export control cases.
Some of these challenges may be addressed by ongoing export control reform initiatives, but reform presents both opportunities and challenges. Revising the control list could simplify the license determination process, but could also result in the need for increased enforcement activity overseas to validate the recipient of the items as fewer items may require U.S. government approval in advance of shipment. As most staff located overseas have other agency and mission-related priorities, their availability may be limited. The newly created national Export Enforcement Coordination Center is intended to help agencies coordinate their export control enforcement efforts as well as share intelligence and law enforcement information related to these efforts. However, it is unclear whether the center will address all of the challenges GAO found, as detailed plans for its operations are under development.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Commerce, DHS, Justice, and State take steps individually and with other agencies through the national Export Enforcement Coordination Center to better manage export control enforcement resources and improve the license determination process. Agencies agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-174T | gao_GAO-08-174T_0 | Exempt commercial markets and OTC derivatives are also used to hedge this risk. However, because these changes occurred simultaneously, identifying the specific effect of any one of these changes on energy prices is difficult. Various Changes in the Physical Market Contributed to Rising Prices
The physical energy markets have undergone substantial change and turmoil during this period, which can affect spot and futures markets. 1). The Effect on Prices of Relatively High but Falling Volatility and a Growing Volume of Trading in Derivatives Is Unclear
As you can see, conditions in the physical markets have undergone changes that can help explain at least some of the increases in both physical and derivatives commodity prices. For example, political instability and terrorist acts in countries that supply oil create uncertainties about future supplies, which are reflected in futures prices. Not surprisingly, our work also revealed that as the number of traders increased, so did the trading volume on NYMEX for all energy futures contracts, particularly crude oil and natural gas. Unleaded gasoline and heating oil experienced less dramatic growth in their trading volumes over this period. While much harder to quantify, another notable trend was the significant increase in the amount of energy derivatives traded outside exchanges. Some market participants and observers have concluded that large purchases of oil futures contracts by speculators could have created an additional demand for oil that could lead to higher prices. CFTC Oversees Exchanges and Has Limited Authority over Other Derivatives Markets
Under CEA, CFTC’s authority for protecting market users from fraudulent, manipulative, and abusive practices in energy derivatives trading is primarily focused on the operations of traditional futures exchanges, such as NYMEX, where energy futures are traded. Most importantly, it is currently examining the relationship between trading in the regulated and exempt energy markets and the role this trading plays in the price discovery process. It is also examining the sufficiency of the scope of its authority over these markets—an issue that will warrant further examination as part of the CFTC reauthorization process. However, these traders also may have positions in the physical markets, which means the reports that CTFC receives on market activities, which do not include such off-exchange transactions, may not present an accurate picture of all positions in the market place for the commodity. The agency may receive limited information, such as trading records, from OTC participants to help CFTC enforce the CEA’s antifraud or antimanipulation provisions. The scope of CFTC’s oversight authority has raised concerns among some members of Congress and others that activities on these markets are largely unregulated, and that additional CFTC oversight is needed. Given ongoing questions about the similarity of products traded on the markets and how and whether exempt markets play a role in the price discovery process and whether existing reporting requirements are sufficient, we recommend that Congress take up this issue during the CFTC reauthorization process to begin to answer some of these questions and the implications for the current regulatory structure in light of the changes that have occurred in this market. CFTC Engages in Large Trader Reporting, Surveillance, and Enforcement Activities, but the Effectiveness of the Activities Is Largely Uncertain
CFTC provides oversight for commodity futures markets by analyzing large trader reporting data, conducting routine surveillance, and investigating and taking enforcement actions against market participants and others. However, as with programs operating in regulatory environments where performance is not easily measurable, evaluating the effectiveness of CFTC’s enforcement activities is challenging because it lacks effective outcome-based performance measures. CFTC Oversight Includes Surveillance of Energy Futures Trading, but the Full Extent of Follow-up Activities Is Uncertain
CFTC conducts regular market surveillance and oversight of energy trading on NYMEX and other futures exchanges, focusing on detecting and preventing disruptive practices before they occur and keeping the CFTC commissioners informed of possible manipulation or abuse. Such information includes how different or similar are the characteristics and uses of exchange and off-exchange products being traded and do these continue to justify different regulatory treatment; to what extent does trading in off-exchange financial derivatives affect price discovery and what are the regulatory and policy implications; how large of an effect are nontraditional market participants, such as commodity index funds, having in these markets; and are the changes in the energy markets unique or are such concerns also worth reviewing for other commodity markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Energy prices for crude oil, heating oil, unleaded gasoline, and natural gas have risen substantially since 2002, generating questions about the role derivatives markets have played and the scope of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) authority. This testimony focuses on (1) trends and patterns in the futures and physical energy markets and their effects on energy prices, (2) the scope of CFTC's regulatory authority, and (3) the effectiveness of CFTC's monitoring and detection of abuses in energy markets. The testimony is based on the GAO report, Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Trends in Energy Derivatives Markets Raise Questions about CFTC's Oversight ( GAO-08-25 , October 19, 2007). For this work, GAO analyzed futures and large trader data and interviewed market participants, experts, and officials at six federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Various trends in both the physical and futures markets have affected energy prices. Specifically, tight supply and rising demand in the physical markets contributed to higher prices as global demand for oil has risen rapidly while spare production capacity has fallen since 2002. Moreover, increased political instability in some of the major oil-producing countries has threatened the supply of oil. During this period, increasing numbers of noncommercial participants became active in the futures markets (including hedge funds) and the volume of energy futures contracts traded also increased. Simultaneously, the volume of energy derivatives traded outside of traditional futures exchanges increased significantly. Because these developments took place concurrently, the effect of any individual trend or factor on energy prices is unclear. Under the authority granted by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), CFTC focuses its oversight primarily on the operations of traditional futures exchanges, such as the New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. (NYMEX), where energy futures are traded. Increasing amounts of energy derivatives trading also occur on markets that are largely exempt from CFTC oversight. For example, exempt commercial markets conduct trading on electronic facilities between large, sophisticated participants. In addition, considerable trading occurs in over-the-counter (OTC) markets in which eligible parties enter into contracts directly, without using an exchange. While CFTC can act to enforce the CEA's antimanipulation and antifraud provisions for activities that occur in exempt commercial and OTC markets, some market observers question whether CFTC needs broader authority to more routinely oversee these markets. CFTC is currently examining the effects of trading in the regulated and exempt energy markets on price discovery and the scope of its authority over these markets--an issue that will warrant further examination as part of the CFTC reauthorization process. CFTC conducts daily surveillance of trading on NYMEX that is designed to detect and deter fraudulent or abusive trading practices involving energy futures contracts. To detect abusive practices, such as potential manipulation, CFTC uses various information sources and relies heavily on trading activity data for large market participants. Using this information, CFTC staff may pursue alleged abuse or manipulation. However, because the agency does not maintain complete records of all such allegations, determining the usefulness and extent of these activities is difficult. In addition, CFTC's performance measures for its enforcement program do not fully reflect the program's goals and purposes, which could be addressed by developing additional outcome-based performance measures that more fully reflect progress in meeting the program's overall goals. Because of changes and innovations in the market, the reports that CFTC receives on market activities may no longer be accurate because they use categories that do not adequately separate trading being done for different reasons by various market participants. |
gao_GAO-16-150T | gao_GAO-16-150T_0 | Initially, Congress provided no appropriation to cover the credit subsidy costs of loan guarantees under section 1703, requiring all borrowers receiving a loan guarantee to pay to offset the credit subsidy costs of their own projects. DOE Has Made Efforts to Improve Loan Program Implementation and Oversight by Implementing Some but Not All Related GAO Recommendations
DOE has made efforts to improve its loan program implementation and oversight and, to date, has taken actions in response to 15 of our 24 prior recommendations. In 2007, 2008, and 2010—which covered the early stages of the LGP—we made 15 recommendations to address numerous issues where DOE had moved forward with the program before key elements were in place. DOE implemented 11 of our 15 recommendations from this period. For example: In our February 2007 report, we found that DOE’s actions had focused on expediting program implementation—such as soliciting preapplications for loan guarantees—rather than ensuring the department had in place the critical policies, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to better ensure the program’s success. We made five recommendations addressing these concerns. As Congress expanded the DOE loan programs to include 1705 projects and ATVM, we issued additional reports in 2011, 2012, and 2014 highlighting our concerns about DOE making loans and disbursing funds without having sufficient expertise and performance measures, among other things. For example: In February 2011, we found that DOE was using ATVM staff with largely financial, and not technical, expertise to evaluate the progress of projects to produce more fuel-efficient passenger vehicles and their components. We recommended that DOE develop sufficient and quantifiable performance measures for its program goals. Estimated Net Costs of DOE’s Loan Programs Include about $2.2 Billion in Credit Subsidy Costs, Plus Administrative Expenses
In our April 2015 report, we found that DOE estimated the credit subsidy costs of the loans and loan guarantees in its portfolio to be about $2.2 billion as of November 2014, including about $807 million for five loans on which the borrowers had defaulted. The estimated $2.2 billion in credit subsidy costs was a decrease from initial DOE estimates totaling about $4.5 billion, and we found that changes in credit subsidy cost estimates varied by loan program and the type of technology supported by the loans and loan guarantees, and by other factors, such as the availability of a steady stream of revenue for a project. Specifically, defaults on loan guarantees for two solar manufacturing projects and one energy storage project were largely responsible for an increase in the credit subsidy cost estimate for DOE’s LGP portfolio from $1.33 billion (when the loan guarantees were issued) to $1.81 billion as of November 2014. Borrowers also defaulted on two ATVM loans, but the credit subsidy cost estimate for DOE’s ATVM loan program’s portfolio decreased from initial DOE estimates totaling about $3.16 billion to $404 million as of November 2014, mainly because of a significant improvement in the credit rating of one loan. None of the projects with loans in default had revenue streams that were provided for under long-term contracts for the sale of energy produced by the project pursuant to a power purchase agreement, offtake agreement, or similar contractual language. In DOE’s portfolio, 21 of the 30 projects supported by the program included power purchase or offtake agreements. Regarding administrative costs, our April 2015 report found that such costs for the programs have totaled about $312 million from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2014, including approximately $251.6 million for LGP and $60.6 million for the ATVM loan program. In addition, according to DOE, in November 2008 the Office of Management and Budget approved the LGP’s model for calculating the credit subsidy costs of loan guarantees. DOE Loan Programs: DOE Has Made More Than $30 Billion in Loans and Guarantees and Needs to Fully Develop Its Loan Monitoring Function. Department of Energy: Status of Loan Programs. Department of Energy: Observations on Actions to Implement the New Loan Guarantee Program for Innovative Technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE's Loan Programs Office administers the LGP for certain renewable or innovative energy projects and the ATVM loan program for projects to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles and components. Both programs can expose the government to substantial financial risks if borrowers default. DOE considers these risks in calculating credit subsidy costs. The law requires that the credit subsidy costs of DOE loans and loan guarantees be paid for by appropriations, borrowers, or some combination of both.
This testimony summarizes (1) DOE's progress in addressing GAO's prior recommendations related to the implementation and oversight of its loan programs and (2) GAO's 2015 report on the credit subsidy costs of the DOE loan programs.
This statement is based on a body of work that GAO completed between February 2007 and April 2015. GAO made numerous recommendations in these reports and obtained updates from agency officials. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has made efforts to improve the implementation and oversight of its loan programs and, to date, has taken actions to address 15 of 24 of GAO's prior related recommendations. DOE's Loan Guarantee Program (LGP), authorized by Congress in 2005, was designed to encourage certain types of energy projects (e.g., nuclear, solar, and wind generation; solar manufacturing; and energy transmission) by agreeing to reimburse lenders for the guaranteed amount of loans if the borrowers default. DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program, authorized by Congress in 2007, was designed to encourage the automotive industry to invest in technologies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles and their components. In 2007, 2008, and 2010—which covered the early stages of the LGP—GAO made 15 recommendations to address numerous concerns where DOE had moved forward with that program before key elements were in place. For example, in its February 2007 report, GAO found that DOE's actions had focused on expediting program implementation—such as soliciting preapplications for loan guarantees—rather than ensuring the department had in place the critical policies, procedures, and mechanisms needed to better ensure the program's success. DOE has implemented 11 of the 15 recommendations. In 2011, 2012, and 2014, as Congress expanded the loan programs, GAO made 9 additional recommendations to address concerns about DOE making loans and disbursing funds without having sufficient engineering expertise, sufficient and quantifiable performance measures for assessing program progress, or a fully developed loan monitoring function, among other things. Although DOE generally agreed with most of the 9 recommendations, to date it has implemented only 4 of them.
In an April 2015 report, GAO found that DOE estimated the credit subsidy costs of the loans and loan guarantees in its portfolio—that is, the total expected net cost to the government over the life of the loans—to be about $2.2 billion as of November 2014, including about $807 million for five loans on which borrowers had defaulted. The estimated $2.2 billion in credit subsidy costs was a decrease from DOE's initial estimates totaling about $4.5 billion. GAO found that changes in credit subsidy cost estimates varied by loan program and the type of technology supported by the loans and loan guarantees, among other factors. Specifically, defaults on loan guarantees for two solar manufacturing projects and one energy storage project were largely responsible for an increase in the credit subsidy cost estimate for the LGP's portfolio from $1.33 billion when the loan guarantees were issued to $1.81 billion as of November 2014. Borrowers also defaulted on two ATVM loans, but the credit subsidy cost estimate for the ATVM loan program's portfolio decreased from $3.16 billion to $404 million as of November 2014, mainly because of a significant improvement in the credit rating of one loan. In DOE's portfolio, 21 of the 30 projects had guaranteed revenue streams provided for under a long-term contract, such as a power purchase agreement, but none of the five defaulted loans supported projects with such a contract. GAO also found that administrative costs of the loan programs totaled about $312 million from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2014; these costs are not included in credit subsidy costs. |
gao_GAO-07-538 | gao_GAO-07-538_0 | DOD Has Established the Structures Needed to Effectively Manage Business System Investments, but Has Not Fully Defined Many of the Related Policies and Procedures
According to our ITIM framework, organizations should establish the management structures needed to manage their investments and build an investment foundation by having defined policies and procedures for selecting and controlling individual projects (Stage 2 capabilities), and organizations also should manage projects as a portfolio of investments according to defined policies and procedures, treating them as an integrated package of competing investment options and pursuing those that best meet the strategic goals, objectives, and mission of the agency (Stage 3 capabilities). The department has defined four of nine practices that call for project- level policies and procedures (see table 4) and one of the five practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures (see table 6). With respect to project-level investment management practices, DOD officials stated that these are performed at the component level, and that departmental policies and procedures established for overseeing components’ execution of these practices are sufficient. With respect to portfolio-level practices, however, these officials stated that they intend to improve departmental policies and procedures for business system investments by, for example, establishing a single governance structure, but plans or time frames for doing so have not been established. Until DOD fully defines departmentwide policies and procedures for both individual projects and the portfolios of projects, it risks selecting and controlling these business system investments in an inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc manner, which in turn reduces the chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most cost-effective manner. In addition, DOD’s business transformation and IRB guidance define a process for ensuring that programs support the department’s ongoing and future business needs. Specifically, DOD has issued departmentwide guidance that assigns responsibilities to the USD(AT&L) for managing and establishing business system investment portfolios, including leveraging or establishing a governance forum to oversee these business system investment portfolio activities. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to define and implement policies and procedures for creating and modifying portfolio selection criteria for business system investments. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the Department of Defense’s (DOD) corporate investment management approach comports with relevant federal guidance. Our analysis was based on the best practices contained in GAO’s Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) framework, and the framework’s associated evaluation methodology, and focused on DOD’s establishment of departmental-level policies and procedures for business system investments needed to assist organizations in complying with the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Stages 2 and 3). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high-risk," and continues to do so today. In 2004, Congress passed legislation reflecting prior GAO recommendations for DOD to adopt a corporate approach to information technology (IT) business system investment management. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's efforts, GAO assessed whether the department's corporate investment management approach comports with relevant federal guidance. In doing so, GAO applied its IT Investment Management framework and associated methodology, focusing on the framework's stages related to the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.
What GAO Found
DOD has established the management structures needed to effectively manage its business system investments, but it has not fully defined many of the related policies and procedures that GAO's IT Investment Management framework defines. Specifically, the department has defined four of nine practices that call for project-level policies and procedures, and one of the five practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures. For example, DOD has established an enterprisewide IT investment board responsible for defining and implementing its business system investment governance process, documented policies and procedures for ensuring that systems support ongoing and future business needs, developed procedures for identifying and collecting information about these systems to support investment selection and control, and assigned responsibility to an individual or a group for managing the development and modification of the business system portfolio selection criteria. However, DOD has not fully documented business system investment policies and procedures for directing investment board operations, selecting new investments, reselecting ongoing investments, integrating the investment funding and the investment selection processes, and developing and maintaining a complete business system investment portfolio(s). Regarding project-level investment management practices, DOD officials said that these are performed at the component level, and that departmental policies and procedures established for overseeing components' execution of these practices are sufficient. For portfolio-level practices, however, these officials stated that they intend to improve departmental policies and procedures for business system investments by, for example, establishing a single governance structure, but plans or time frames for doing so have not been established. Until DOD fully defines departmentwide policies and procedures for both individual projects and portfolios of projects, it risks selecting and controlling these business system investments in an inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc manner, which in turn reduces the chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most cost-effective manner. |
gao_RCED-96-124 | gao_RCED-96-124_0 | Remediation activities at DOE’s facilities are governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act (CERCLA) of 1980, as amended, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, as amended. 3.) 4.) 5.) Because removal actions progress to actual cleanup more quickly than other CERCLA processes, removal actions can provide information about waste sites that is useful in focusing other types of remediation. Removal actions may also reduce the cumulative risk to human health and the environment. Various Factors Are Limiting the Use of Removal Actions
Our analysis and discussions with DOE and regulatory officials at the facilities we visited suggest that six factors limit the wider use of removal actions. Removal actions are not part of the agreements with regulators or DOE contractors. Some DOE and regulatory officials told us that they believe removal actions are intended for emergency situations or for planning relatively small, uncomplicated remediation projects, not for “mainstream” cleanups. Preference is given to streamlining full CERCLA and interim remedial planning approaches. However, planning and evaluation will still take significantly longer under streamlined CERCLA processes than under removal actions. Limited planning may increase the risk that an incorrect remedy will be chosen. Where appropriate, this action may include systematically evaluating each waste site where actual cleanup has not yet begun, including those sites where a lengthier assessment process is under way, to identify the sites where using a removal action would be feasible and cost-effective; seeking agreement to eliminate requirements in existing interagency agreements that favor lengthier review and assessment processes in exchange for a commitment to achieving significant cleanup progress through removal actions; and identifying and implementing incentives for DOE’s contractors that would increase the emphasis on, and the reward for, pursuing removal actions where appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) use of removal actions to reduce the cost and accelerate the pace of environmental restoration projects.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) removal actions save money and time compared with other remediation planning approaches; (2) the use of removal actions may provide information that is useful for other types of remediation, reduce the cumulative risk to human health and the environment, and reduce the size of sites under DOE control; (3) the use of removal actions at DOE facilities varies; (4) the use of removal actions is limited because removal actions are not part of interagency agreements with regulators or DOE contractors; (5) some officials believe that removal actions are intended for emergency situations or for planning small remediation projects; (6) officials at some sites are concentrating on streamlining Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabilities Act (CERCLA) and interim remedial planning approaches, but planning and evaluation will still take significantly longer under simpler CERCLA processes; and (7) limited planning may increase the risk that an incorrect remedy will be chosen. |
gao_GAO-07-446T | gao_GAO-07-446T_0 | In 1996, in order to continue carrying out its responsibilities and operations, the Coast Guard initiated the Deepwater program to replace or upgrade its aging vessels, aircraft, and other essential equipment. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard was also assigned homeland security missions related to protection of ports, waterways, and coastal areas. Based on its revised mission responsibilities, the Coast Guard updated its Deepwater Acquisition Program Baseline in November 2005. Coast Guard Removed 123-foot Patrol Boats from Service for Operational and Safety Reasons, and is Acting to Mitigate Operational Impacts
Between January 2001 and November 2006, numerous events led up to the failure of the Coast Guard’s bridging strategy to convert the legacy 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats. To address these issues, the Coast Guard’s original (2002) Deepwater plan included a strategy to convert all 49 of the 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats to strengthen the hulls. These 8 converted boats were removed from service on November 30, 2006 because of operational and safety concerns. Specifically, in recent testimony, the Commandant of the Coast Guard stated that Coast Guard has taken the following actions: multi-crewing certain 110-foot patrol boats with crews from the 123-foot patrol boats that have been removed from service so that patrol hours for these vessels can be increased; deploying other Coast Guard vessels to assist in missions formerly performed by the 123-foot patrol boats; and securing permission from the U.S. Navy to continue using 179-foot cutters on loan from the Navy for an additional 5 years (these were originally to be returned to the Navy in 2008) to supplement the Coast Guard’s patrol craft. Deepwater Asset Delivery Schedule is Mixed, with 7 of 10 on or Ahead of Schedule and 3 Behind Due to Various Factors
Our review of available data show that as of January 2007, of the 10 classes of Deepwater assets to be acquired or upgraded, 4 are ahead of schedule; 3 remain on schedule (and for 1 of these, design problems have arisen); and 3 are behind scheduled delivery and face design, funding, or technology challenges. The remaining 2 new maritime assets are small vessels that are on or ahead of schedule at this time. Fast Response Cutter
Concerns about the viability of the design of the FRC have delayed the delivery of the first FRC by at least 2 years. Preliminary Observations on the Status of Deepwater Program Management, Contractor Accountability, and Cost Control
Since the inception of the Deepwater program, we have expressed concerns about the risks involved with the Coast Guard’s system-of- systems acquisition approach and the Coast Guard’s ability to manage and oversee the program. Our concerns have centered on three main areas: program management, contractor accountability, and cost control through competition. We will continue our work focusing on the Coast Guard’s efforts to address our recommendations and report on our findings later this year. The Coast Guard’s ability to assess IPT performance continues to be problematic. Preliminary observations from our ongoing work on the Coast Guard’s efforts to improve system integrator accountability follow. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater program was designed to upgrade or replace its aging legacy aircraft and vessels with assets focusing on the Coast Guard's traditional at-sea roles. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard took on additional security missions, resulting in revisions to the Deepwater plan. GAO's prior work raised concerns about Coast Guard's efforts to upgrade or acquire assets on schedule, and manage and effectively monitor the system integrator. This testimony provides GAO's preliminary observations on (1) events and issues surrounding the Coast Guard's bridging strategy to convert the legacy 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot patrol boats; (2) the status of the Coast Guard's efforts to acquire new or upgraded Deepwater assets; and (3) the Coast Guard's ability to effectively manage the Deepwater program, hold contractors accountable, and control costs through competition. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from August 2006 to February 2007.
What GAO Found
Numerous events since January 2001 led up to the failure of the Coast Guard's bridging strategy to convert its legacy 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats. These converted boats were removed from service on November 30, 2006 because of operational and safety concerns. According to the Coast Guard Commandant, actions are being taken to mitigate the impact of the removal of these patrol boats on mission activities. For example, patrol hours of some 110-foot patrol boats have been increased through the addition of crews from the 123-foot patrol boats, and other Coast Guard vessels have been deployed to assist in carrying out missions. The delivery record for the 10 classes of upgraded or new Deepwater aircraft and vessels is mixed. Specifically, 7 of the 10 asset classes are on or ahead of schedule. Among these, 5 first-in-class assets have been delivered on or ahead of schedule; 2 others remain on time but their planned delivery dates are in 2009 or beyond; therefore, delays could still potentially occur. Three Deepwater asset classes are currently behind schedule due to various problems related to designs, technology, or funding. For example, the Fast Response Cutter (a new vessel), which had been scheduled for first-in-class delivery in 2007, has been delayed by at least 2 years in part because work on its design was suspended until technical problems can be addressed. From the program's outset, GAO has raised concerns about the risks involved with the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy. In 2004, GAO reported that program management, contractor accountability, and cost control were all challenges, and made recommendations in these areas. Insufficient staffing, ineffective performance measures, and the Coast Guard's lack of knowledge about the extent to which the contractor was using competition have contributed to program risk. The Coast Guard has taken some actions to address these issues. GAO plans to continue to assess the Coast Guard's Deepwater program, including its efforts to address GAO recommendations, and will report the findings later this year. |
gao_GAO-02-735 | gao_GAO-02-735_0 | Activities that are to take place during this period include establishing a technical baseline and a life-cycle cost estimate for the remainder of the program, prioritizing the core complete science program, and reaching an agreement with the international partners on the station’s final configuration and capabilities. Reasons for Cost Increases and Mechanisms That Should Have Alerted NASA Management
According to NASA officials, as a consequence of the inadequate definition of requirements, changes in program content, schedule delays, and inadequate program oversight, the estimated development cost of the space station has grown by about $13 billion since 1995 of which about $5 billion is attributable to growth since the fiscal year 2001 estimate. Some research disciplines were severely affected by the fiscal year 2002 reduction. Specifically, the preparation of a reliable life-cycle cost estimate may be difficult because NASA currently lacks a modern integrated financial management system to track and maintain data needed for estimating and controlling costs. In addition, many tasks and studies being undertaken will not be completed until September 2002, leaving NASA with a very short time frame to incorporate its results into the 2004 budget. Lastly, NASA has not yet reached agreements with its international partners on an acceptable on-orbit configuration as well as how research facilities and costs should be shared. Because of the cost growth, the program is essentially unable to carry out the full intent of its original objectives. Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Prior GAO Reports and Testimonies Related to the International Space Station Program
NASA: Compliance With Cost Limits Cannot Be Verified. Space Station: Cost to Operate After Assembly Is Uncertain. | What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revealed that the cost to complete assembly of the international space station has risen from $25 billion to $30 billion. Much of that cost growth is due to inadequate definition of requirements, changes in program content, schedule delays, and poor program oversight. Weaknesses in the program's cost-estimating process call into question the credibility of NASA's plans to carry out its budget through fiscal year 2006. The cost growth has also severely affected the space station's ability to conduct scientific research. NASA has instituted several management and cost-estimating reforms, including a life-cycle cost estimate, a program management plan, and a reprioritized science program. However, significant challenges remain. Preparation of the life-cycle cost estimate may be difficult because NASA's financial management system is unable to adequately track space station costs. Many tasks and studies being undertaken will not be completed until September 2002, leaving NASA with little time to incorporate its results into its budget for fiscal year 2004. Finally, NASA has yet to reach an agreement with its international partners on an acceptable on-orbit configuration, the sharing of research facilities, and cost sharing. |
gao_GAO-13-277 | gao_GAO-13-277_0 | In April 2011, regulators entered into consent orders with 14 mortgage servicers. Complexities of the Foreclosure Review Process and Limitations in Regulators’ Guidance and Monitoring May Have Hindered Achievement of Goals
According to regulators, the goals of the foreclosure review were for consultants to identify as many harmed borrowers as possible, to treat similarly situated borrowers across all 14 servicers similarly, and to help restore public confidence in the mortgage market. Regulators reported that more than 160,000 borrowers had submitted requests-for-review as of April 30, 2012. In addition to consistent consent orders and guidance, OCC and Federal Reserve staff implemented regular communication mechanisms to help foster consistency in the reviews. For example, some third-party consultants planned to review all rescinded foreclosures, whereas others proposed reviewing a sample of those loans. Broad Guidance and Limited Monitoring of Inconsistencies Increased Risks of Different Treatment for Similar Borrowers
According to third-party consultants, regulators’ guidance did not address certain aspects of the foreclosure review and consultants had to use additional judgment and interpretation when applying certain guidance, increasing the risks of inconsistency among review results. The Foreclosure Review Highlighted the Importance of Planning and Monitoring Progress toward Goals
Our analysis of the foreclosure review process identified challenges in regulators’ planning for the foreclosure review. Limited Communication Hindered Transparency for Individual Borrowers and the General Public
Regulators publicly released information on the foreclosure review process beyond what is typically disclosed in connection with a consent order, including engagement letters between servicers and consultants and some guidance provided to the consultants. Despite these disclosures, some stakeholders perceived gaps in key information about how the file reviews were conducted. OCC and the Federal Reserve staff said that they considered releasing additional guidance to the public, but both regulators refrained from doing so because of concerns that releasing detailed information risked disclosure of confidential or proprietary information. In letters to OCC and the Federal Reserve, consumer groups indicated that these borrowers were frustrated by the lack of information on their particular file review. Our prior work establishing a lessons-learned process also has found that assessing and using lessons learned from previous experience can provide a powerful method of ensuring that beneficial information is factored into the planning and work processes of future activities. GAO’s internal control standards state the importance of relevant, reliable, and timely communications within an organization as well as with external stakeholders. In the absence of a clear communication strategy to direct external communications, including public reporting and direct communication with individual borrowers, regulators face risks to transparency and public confidence similar to those experienced in the foreclosure review process. Further, regulators announced agreements that led to the amended consent orders and ended the foreclosure review with 11 servicers without a clear communication strategy, and the information that will be provided to borrowers and the general public remains unclear. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making three recommendations to the regulators: (1) To better ensure that the goals of the foreclosure review are realized for servicers that are not subject to amended consent orders, we recommend that the Comptroller of the Currency and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as appropriate, improve oversight of sampling methodologies and mechanisms to centrally monitor consistency, such as assessment of the implications of inconsistencies on remediation results for borrowers in the remaining foreclosure reviews. (3) To better ensure transparency and public confidence in the activities under the amended consent orders and results of the continuing foreclosure reviews, we recommend that the Comptroller of the Currency and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System develop and implement a communication strategy to regularly inform borrowers and the public about the processes, status, and results of the activities under the amended consent orders and continuing foreclosure reviews. As we discussed in the report, developing and using objective measures to monitor and assess consistency among the continuing reviews is important. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to assess: (1) challenges to the achievement of the goals of the foreclosure review, (2) the extent of transparency in the foreclosure review process, and (3) lessons that could be useful for activities under the amended consent orders and continuing reviews. We were in the process of reviewing various aspects of the foreclosure review when the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) announced agreements with 11 of the 14 servicers to discontinue the foreclosure review and replace it with a broad payment process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since April 2011, OCC and the Federal Reserve had been overseeing the foreclosure review, a requirement of consent orders entered into by 14 mortgage servicers. This undertaking involved a review of loan files by thirdparty consultants to identify errors in servicing and foreclosure practices. More than 4 million borrowers were eligible for reviews. In January 2013, the regulators announced agreements with 11 of the servicers that replaced the reviews with a broad payment process to compensate borrowers in a more timely manner. Reviews continue for three remaining servicers. GAO has been reviewing various aspects of the foreclosure review process. This report addresses: (1) challenges to the achievement of the goals of the foreclosure review, (2) transparency of the process, and (3) lessons that could be useful for carrying out activities under the amended consent orders and continuing reviews. GAO analyzed third-party consultants' sampling plans, reviewed regulatory guidance and other documents, and interviewed representatives of third-party consultants and law firms, consumer groups, and regulators.
What GAO Found
Complexity of the reviews, overly broad guidance, and limited monitoring for consistency impeded the ability of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to achieve the goals of the foreclosure review--to identify as many harmed borrowers as possible and ensure similar results for similarly situated borrowers. Regulators said that coordinating among foreclosure review participants was challenging, and consultants said that the reviews were complex. In spite of regulators' steps to foster consistency, broad guidance and limited monitoring reduced the potential usefulness of data from consultants and increased risks of inconsistency. For example, GAO found that guidance was revised throughout the process, resulting in delays. Other guidance did not specify key sampling parameters for the file reviews and regulators lacked objective monitoring measures, resulting in difficulty assessing the extent of borrower harm. Good planning and collecting objective data during monitoring provide a basis for making sound conclusions. Without using objective measures to assess sampling or comparing review methods across consultants, regulators' ability to monitor progress toward achievement of foreclosure review goals was hindered.
Although regulators released more information than is typically associated with consent orders, limited communication with borrowers and the public adversely impacted transparency and public confidence. To promote transparency, regulators released redacted engagement letters and guidance on remediation. In addition, OCC released two interim progress reports. However, some stakeholders perceived gaps in key information and wanted more detailed information about how the reviews were carried out. Regulators stated they considered publicly releasing additional information, but expressed concerns that releasing detailed information risked disclosure of confidential or proprietary information. Further, borrowers who requested reviews experienced gaps in communication. For example, borrowers who submitted requests when the submission period opened waited nearly a year before receiving an update.
The foreclosure review activities to date highlight key lessons related to planning, monitoring, and communication. GAO's prior work shows that assessing and using lessons learned from previous experience can benefit the planning of future activities. The foreclosure review produced lessons in advanced planning and establishing mechanisms to monitor progress toward goals. Without assessing and applying relevant lessons learned, regulators might not address challenges in the continuing reviews or similar challenges in activities under the amended consent orders. In particular, regulators announced the agreements that led to the amended consent orders without a clear communication strategy. Although the regulators plan to release reports on the results of the amended consent orders and the continuing foreclosure reviews, neither regulator had made decisions about what information to provide to borrowers. GAO's internal control standards and best practices indicate that an effective communication strategy and timely reporting can enhance transparency and public confidence. Absent a clear strategy to guide regular communications with individual borrowers and the general public, regulators face risks to transparency and public confidence similar to those experienced in the foreclosure review.
What GAO Recommends
OCC and the Federal Reserve should improve oversight of sampling and consistency in the continuing reviews, apply lessons in planning and monitoring from the foreclosure review, as appropriate, to the activities of the continuing reviews and amended consent orders, and implement a communication strategy to keep stakeholders informed. In their comment letters, the regulators agreed to take steps to implement the recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-98-145 | gao_AIMD-98-145_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine how susceptible the State Department’s automated information systems are to unauthorized access, (2) identify what the State Department is doing to address information security issues, and (3) determine what additional actions may be needed. To determine how susceptible State’s systems are to unauthorized access, we tested the department’s technical and physical controls for ensuring that data, systems, and facilities were protected from unauthorized access. State Lacks a Comprehensive Information Security Program
Our tests were successful primarily because State’s computer security program is not comprehensive enough to effectively manage the risks to which its systems and networks are exposed. For example, the department does not have the information it needs to effectively manage its risks—it does not fully appreciate the sensitivity of its information, the vulnerabilities of its systems, or the costs of countermeasures. Moreover, top managers at State have not demonstrated that they are committed to strengthening security over the systems that they rely on for nearly every aspect of State’s operations. Ability to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of policy and other controls. State has no information security plan. Greater Internet Connectivity Poses Additional Risks
Internet security was the only area in which we found that State’s controls were currently adequate. Recognizing this, State conducted an analysis of the risks involved with increasing Internet use. However, the department has not yet decided to what extent it will accept and/or address these new risks. These steps include ensuring that top managers are fully aware of the need to protect State’s computer resources, establishing a strong central management focal point to remedy the diluted and fragmented security management structure, and addressing the risks of additional external connectivity before expanding its Internet usage. Establish a central information security unit and assign it responsibility for facilitating, coordinating, and overseeing the department’s information security activities. Establish and implement key controls to help the department protect its information systems and information, including periodic penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities in State’s assessments of the department’s ability to (1) react to intrusion and attacks on its information systems, (2) respond quickly and effectively to security incidents, (3) help contain and repair any damage caused, and (4) prevent future damage, and central reporting and tracking of information security incidents to ensure that knowledge of these problems can be shared across the department and with other federal agencies. If State expands Internet connectivity without effectively mitigating the significant additional risks that entails, it will increase its already serious vulnerabilities to individuals or organizations seeking to damage State’s operations, commit terrorism, or obtain financial gain. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) how susceptible the Department of State's unclassified automated information systems are to unauthorized access; (2) what State is doing to address information security issues; and (3) what additional actions may be needed to address the computer security problem.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) State's information systems and the information contained within them are vulnerable to access, change, disclosure, disruption or even denial of service by unauthorized individuals; (2) GAO conducted penetration tests to determine how susceptible State's systems are to unauthorized access and found that it was able to access sensitive information; (3) moreover, GAO's penetration of State's computer resources went largely undetected, further underscoring the department's serious vulnerability; (4) the results of GAO's tests show that individuals or organizations seeking to damage State operations, commit terrorism, or obtain financial gain could possibly exploit the department's information security weaknesses; (5) although State has some projects under way to improve security of its information systems and help protect sensitive information, it does not have a security program that allows State officials to comprehensively manage the risks associated with the department's operations; (6) State lacks a central focal point for overseeing and coordinating security activities; (7) State does not routinely perform risk assessments to protect its sensitive information based on its sensitivity, criticality, and value; (8) the department's primary information security policy document is incomplete; (9) the department lacks key controls for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of its security programs and it has not established a robust incident response capability; (10) State needs to greatly accelerate its efforts and address these serious information security weaknesses; (11) however, to date, its top managers have not demonstrated that they are committed to doing so; (12) Internet security was the only area in which GAO found that State's controls were currently adequate; (13) however, plans to expand its Internet usage will create new security risks; (14) State conducted an analysis of the risks involved with using the Internet more extensively, but has not yet decided how to address the security risks of additional external connectivity to the concerns this review has raised; and (15) if State increases its Internet use before instituting a comprehensive security program and addresses the additional vulnerabilities unique to the Internet, it will unnecessarily increase the risks of unauthorized access to its systems and information. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-102 | gao_T-HEHS-96-102_0 | Both tiers are responsible for ensuring that individual researchers and their research institutions comply with federal laws and regulations for protecting human subjects. At the federal level are the NIH’s OPRR and the FDA. At the local level, institutional review boards (IRB)—that is, review panels that are usually associated with a particular university or other research institution—are responsible for implementing federal human subject protection requirements for research conducted at or supported by their institutions. The Common Rule requires research institutions receiving federal support and federal agencies conducting research to establish IRBs to review research proposals for risk of harm to human subjects and to perform other duties to protect human research subjects. Therefore, FDA’s and OPRR’s monitoring and enforcement efforts include review of results of IRB operations, clinical trials, and allegations of researcher misconduct. To this end, FDA conducts on-site inspections of individual drug studies. Fda Can Impose Penalties for Serious Violations
FDA has used four types of actions to enforce its regulations: (1) obtaining a promise from a researcher to abide by FDA requirements for conducting drug research, (2) invoking a range of restrictions on a researcher’s use of investigational drugs, (3) disqualifying a researcher from the use of investigational drugs, and (4) criminally prosecuting a researcher. First, pressure from heavy workloads and competing priorities can weaken IRB oversight. Given the many pressures that can weaken the effectiveness of the protection system, continued vigilance is critical to ensuring that subjects are protected from harm. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) efforts to protect human research subjects, focusing on the prevention, monitoring, and enforcement activities of the National Institutes of Health's Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to ensure the protection of human research subjects, the agencies require researchers to make assurance agreements that they will comply with federal human subject protection requirements and uphold ethical standards; (2) the agencies also use institutional review boards (IRB), local review panels that review research plans to ensure that human subjects are protected; (3) both FDA and OPRR conduct on-site visits and inspections, clinical trials, investigations of allegations of researcher misconduct, and IRB reviews to identify violations of protection requirements; (4) to enforce the regulations, FDA and OPRR have requested modifications to research plans, restricted researchers' use of drugs, disqualified, suspended, or criminally prosecuted researchers; and (5) oversight effectiveness is hampered by heavy IRB workloads and competing priorities, organizational conflicts-of-interest, limited site visits and inspections, and pressures resulting from differing perceptions on the need for research versus treatment. |
gao_GAO-14-333 | gao_GAO-14-333_0 | AOC’s Policies and Guidance Conform to Leading Practices for Two Characteristics of Reliable Cost Estimates, but Fall Short in Two Others
As previously discussed, the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide defines 12 leading practices related to four characteristics— comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible—that are important to developing high-quality, reliable estimates. We discuss characteristics using five rating categories— does not meet, minimally meets, partially meets, substantially meets, or fully meets. AOC guidance is specific about sources of data. However, AOC’s guidance does not require that cost estimates be updated with actual costs during a project’s construction phase—a leading practice. Because of the weaknesses in AOC’s policies and guidance pertaining to two of the four characteristics that are important to developing high- quality, reliable estimates, the project cost estimates that AOC produces may not always be reliable. Without reliable cost estimates, AOC’s projects risk experiencing cost overruns or budget surpluses, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. Furthermore, potential limitations in the reliability of its estimates may impair Congress’s ability to make well-informed funding decisions and affect how AOC allocates resources across competing projects in its capital program. Our final assessment found that the Cannon Building renewal estimate to be substantially comprehensive, well documented, and accurate while lacking in elements affecting its credibility, and the Capitol Dome restoration estimate to be substantially comprehensive and well documented while lacking in areas pertaining to accuracy and credibility. For the credibility characteristic, we found the estimate partially met leading practices. Conclusions
AOC project’s cost-estimating guidance policy and two resulting project estimates that we reviewed may not be fully reliable because they incorporated some, but not all, leading practices in cost estimating. We recognize that incorporating GAO’s cost- estimating best practices into AOC’s cost-estimating policy and guidance may involve additional costs—such as for conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis for projects and conveying the confidence level of the estimate to Congress and AOC managers. Recommendations
To improve the Architect of the Capitol’s project-cost-estimating process, enhance the transparency of its related process, and allow for more informed decision making related to projects’ costs, we recommend that the Architect of the Capitol take the following two actions, to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs: incorporate leading practices we identified as lacking for cost estimating in the AOC’s cost-estimating guidance and policies, and for ongoing and future projects, submit the confidence level derived from risk and uncertainty analyses along with budget documentation to appropriate congressional decision makers, so that Congress is aware of the range of likely costs and AOC’s associated confidence levels. This report addresses the extent to which AOC’s policies and guidance for developing cost estimates conform to leading practices identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and provide a reliable basis to support funding and capital program decisions. When the tasks associated with the leading practices that define a characteristic are mostly or completely satisfied, we consider the characteristic to be “substantially” or “fully” met. In addition, our review of the Cannon Building estimate is responsive to a mandate in the House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill (H.R. Appendix III: GAO’s Summary Assessments of AOC’s Project Cost Estimates for the Cannon Building’s Renewal and Capitol Dome’s Restoration
Appendix III: GAO’s Summary Assessments of AOC’s Project Cost Estimates for the Cannon Building’s Renewal and Capitol Dome’s Restoration Estimating leading practice characteristic and rationale for assessment Comprehensive The cost estimate should include both government and contractor costs of the program over its full life cycle, from inception of the program through design, development, deployment, operation and maintenance, to retirement of the program. AOC did not document variances between planned and actual costs. Modeling the aggregated risks precludes AOC from identifying relationships among risk elements and determining which risks have the greatest influence on project costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
AOC is responsible for the maintenance, renovation, and new construction of the U.S. Capitol complex, which comprises more than four dozen facilities. Reliable cost estimates for projects are crucial to AOC's capital-planning and construction processes. The House Appropriations Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2014 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill mandated that GAO review AOC's cost-estimating methodology.
This report addresses the extent to which AOC's policies and guidance for developing cost estimates adheres to leading practices. GAO analyzed AOC's cost-estimating guidance, interviewed AOC officials, and compared AOC's cost-estimating guidance and documentation and two projects' cost estimates to leading practices in GAO's Cost Guide . When most or all of the practices associated with each characteristic of a high-quality, reliable estimate are followed, GAO considers the characteristic to be “fully” or “substantially” met. When, in turn, all four characteristics are at least “fully” or “substantially” met, GAO considers a cost estimate to be reliable.
What GAO Found
GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide ( Cost Guide ) defines 12 leading practices that are associated with four characteristics— c omprehensive, well documented, accurate , and credible —that are important to developing high-quality, reliable project-cost estimates. Using the Cost Guide , GAO determined that the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) cost-estimating guidance conforms to leading practices for developing estimates that are, in general, comprehensive and well-documented . However, AOC's guidance does not substantially conform to leading practices related to developing cost estimates that are accurate and credible . For example, pertaining to the credible characteristic, AOC's guidance does not require determining the confidence level of estimates or quantifying the extent to which a project's costs could vary due to changes in key assumptions. GAO found the strengths and weaknesses of AOC's guidance generally reflected in the cost estimates for AOC's Cannon House Office Building's (Cannon Building) renewal project ($753 million) and Capitol Dome's restoration project ($125 million).
Cannon Building renewal—GAO found the estimate is substantially comprehensive, well documented, and accurate, but several factors that affect its credibility are lacking. For example, AOC's risk analysis does not allow for determination of which risks have the greatest influence on project costs and may overstate the effect of the risks.
Capitol Dome restoration—GAO found the estimate is substantially comprehensive and well documented, but lacking key analysis that support accurate and credible estimates. For example, AOC did not use actual costs from completed phases to update its estimates and did not complete a risk and uncertainty analysis.
Overall, AOC's cost-estimating guidance may not enable fully reliable estimates because it incorporates some, but not all, leading practices. Without reliable cost estimates that convey their confidence levels, AOC's projects risk experiencing cost overruns or budget surpluses, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. Potential limitations in the reliability of AOC's estimates may make it difficult for Congress to make well-informed funding decisions and affect how AOC allocates resources across competing projects in its capital portfolio.
Source: GAO analysis of AOC documents and data.
= Fully Meets =Substantially Meets =Partially Meets =Minimally Meets = Does Not Meet
Note: A characteristic is fully met when the associated tasks of underlying leading practices are completely satisfied; substantially met when a large portion of the associated tasks are satisfied; partially met when about half of the associated tasks are satisfied; minimally met when a small portion of the associated tasks are satisfied; and not met when none of the associated tasks are satisfied.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that AOC incorporate additional leading practices into its cost-estimating guidance and submit the confidence levels of project estimates to Congress. AOC concurred with the recommendations and provided context and clarification on its cost-estimating guidance and policies. |
gao_GAO-03-41 | gao_GAO-03-41_0 | program to assess the quality of the population data collected in the 2000 Census, using a smaller sample of 300,000 housing units. The bureau conducted A.C.E., which corresponded to the PES in past censuses and the ICM in the original 2000 Census Plan, to measure and correct the overall and differential coverage of the U.S. resident population in the 2000 Census. The bureau accounts for the costs of conducting the ICM/A.C.E. programs. programs? This original estimate included fiscal years 1997 through 2003. programs? The first evidence for the $400 million cost estimate for conducting the ICM/A.C.E. costs are based on assumptions about the needs for headquarters and support staff and related benefits, contractual services, travel, office space, and equipment costs necessary to conduct and support operations of the program. As shown in figure 1, we identified from bureau records budgeted amounts of $276.5 million for conducting the ICM/A.C.E. As shown in figure 2, we identified from bureau records obligated amounts of $206.9 million, of which $58.4 million was for the ICM program from fiscal year 1996 through 1999, and $148.5 million was for the A.C.E. About $57.7 million of budgeted funds that we identified from bureau records for the ICM/A.C.E. programs were not obligated through fiscal year 2001. What were the ICM/A.C.E. program-related costs for the bureau dress rehearsal in fiscal year 1998? programs that we could identify. We did not suggest that the difference between $277 million of budgeted life cycle costs and $207 million of obligated life cycle costs demonstrated the bureau’s inability to properly manage and record expenditures relating to the ICM/A.C.E. | Why GAO Did This Study
To assess the quality of the population data collected in the 2000 Census, the U.S. Census Bureau conducted the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E.) program, which focused on a survey of housing units designed to estimate the number of people missed, counted more than once, or otherwise improperly counted in the census. GAO reviewed the life cycle costs of the A.C.E. program and its predecessor, the Integrated Coverage Measurement (ICM) program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the original estimated cycle costs of conducting the ICM/A.C.E. programs were $400 million. The first evidence for the original $400 million estimate is in the original budget justifications for fiscal year 2000. The bureau based its estimates of ICM/A.C.E. costs on assumptions about the needs for personnel and benefits, contractual services, travel, office space, equipment, and other costs necessary to conduct and support operations of the programs. The budgeted amounts that GAO identified from bureau records for conducting the ICM/A.C.E. programs are $277 million through fiscal year 2003. The obligated costs that GAO identified from bureau records for conducting the ICM/A.C.E. programs are $207 million through fiscal year 2001. $58 million of budgeted funds for the ICM/A.C.E. programs that GAO identified from bureau records were not obligated through fiscal year 2001. The ICM/A.C.E. program-related costs that GAO identified from bureau records for the 1998 dress rehearsal were $11 million budgeted and $9 million obligated. |
gao_GAO-02-183 | gao_GAO-02-183_0 | Background
BSE and vCJD are among a group of diseases known as transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE). However, since inspections began in 1997, FDA has reported hundreds of firms out of compliance—most often for failure to meet requirements to label feed that contained prohibited proteins or for including prohibited proteins in cattle feed. The Economic Impacts of a U.S. Outbreak Could Be Severe, and the Health Risks Are Uncertain
If BSE were discovered in U.S. cattle, beef exports and domestic beef consumption would drop, damaging many sectors of the economy, according to federal economists. If the infected cattle were to enter the food supply, some people might develop vCJD. For example, hamburger chains and soup and frozen dinner manufacturers could see dramatic declines in business. The United States Set Controls on Importing Animals and Met BSE Testing Goals Earlier Than Many Countries, but Its Feed Ban Is More Permissive
The United States prohibited the import of cattle and other ruminants 3 to 5 years earlier than many other countries. Its surveillance program to test cattle brains for BSE also met international targets for the number of animals tested earlier than many other countries. However, the United States has a more permissive feed ban than other countries—one that allows cattle feed to contain proteins from horses and pigs. FDA is reviewing whether these ingredients should continue to be allowed in cattle feed. Finally, as in most countries that are BSE-free, including the United States, cattle brains and other central nervous system tissue can be sold as human food. Therefore, forceful federal prevention efforts are warranted to keep BSE away from U.S. shores. FDA’s transmittal to the Chairman did not disclose this. | Why GAO Did This Study
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease, has been found in cattle in 23 countries. Countries with BSE have suffered large economic losses because of declines in both beef exports and domestic beef sales. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have primary responsibility for preventing the introduction of BSE-contaminated cattle, beef, and cattle-derived products into the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FDA has not acted promptly to force firms to keep prohibited proteins out of cattle feed and to label animal feed that cannot be fed to cattle. FDA's data on inspections are severely flawed, and FDA is unaware of the full extent of industry compliance. If BSE was discovered in U.S. cattle, many consumers might refuse to buy domestic beef; beef exports could decline dramatically as could sales in related industries, such as hamburger chains and frozen dinner manufacturers. Furthermore, some people might develop mad cow disease if infected cattle were to enter the food supply. The United States acted as many as five years earlier than did other countries to impose controls over imports of animals and animal feed ingredients from countries that had experienced mad cow disease. Similarly, U.S. surveillance efforts to test cattle brains for mad cow disease met internationally recommended testing targets earlier than did other countries. However, the United States' feed ban is more permissive than that of other countries, allowing cattle feed to contain proteins from horses and pigs. FDA is reviewing whether these ingredients should continue to be allowed in cattle feed. Finally, as in most countries that are BSE-free, cattle brains and other central nervous system tissue can be sold as human food. |
gao_GAO-17-399 | gao_GAO-17-399_0 | Background
International Trade Agreements with the United States
The United States is a party to a variety of international trade agreements, including WTO agreements, FTAs, bilateral investment treaties, and trade and investment framework agreements. Most of these agreements also include chapters that address workers’ rights and the environment and provide cooperation mechanisms through which the United States provides trade capacity-building assistance to help partner countries meet their obligations under these agreements. U.S. Agencies Involved in Enforcement and Monitoring of Trade Agreements
USTR, which is part of the Executive Office of the President, and several other U.S. government agencies have responsibility for monitoring and enforcing trade agreements. Trade Enforcement Trust Fund Established by Congress
The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 established a “Trade Enforcement Trust Fund” from which USTR or other federal agencies can receive funding to monitor and enforce WTO agreements and FTAs and also to support trade capacity-building assistance to help partner countries meet their FTA obligations and commitments. Information Is Not Available to Definitively Determine Resources Expended for Monitoring and Enforcing Trade Agreements
Eleven offices or bureaus within six U.S. federal agencies told us that they had staff that worked on monitoring and enforcement of trade agreements in fiscal year 2016. However, none of the agencies routinely tracks staff time at a level of detail that distinguishes time specifically dedicated to trade agreement monitoring and enforcement from time spent on these other responsibilities. Table 4 shows the agencies’ estimates of FTEs and the associated salary and benefit costs for efforts to monitor and enforce trade agreements in fiscal year 2016. The estimates suggest that in fiscal year 2016, 11 agency offices and bureaus dedicated over 700 FTEs and over $100 million to monitoring and enforcing trade agreements. However, these totals and the underlying estimates do not fully include all costs related to trade monitoring and enforcement and, for some agencies, may not represent all staff who were involved in such activities. The total funding for these projects was about $256 million. Trade capacity-building projects active in fiscal year 2016 supported activities in 14 countries that were parties to the following 9 of the 14 U.S. FTAs: Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)
United States – Chile Free Trade Agreement
United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area
United States – Morocco Free Trade Agreement
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Mexico only)
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of Free Trade Area
Panama Free Trade Agreement
United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement The most active trade capacity-building projects during fiscal year 2016— 34 active projects— occurred in CAFTA-DR countries, while the fewest— 3 active projects—occurred in Mexico. Labor and environmental projects covered a wide range of issues within FTA partner countries. According to agency officials, some of the trade capacity-building projects included goals to assist FTA partner countries in meeting their FTA obligations in addition to other goals. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Because none of the relevant agencies routinely tracks staff resources and funding specifically for monitoring and enforcement of trade agreements, these agencies had to develop estimates of their fiscal year 2016 full-time equivalents (FTE) and funding used for these activities in response to our request for information. To identify U.S. trade capacity-building assistance projects to help partner countries meet their obligations under FTAs, we collected available information on relevant trade capacity-building projects that were active in 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
Monitoring and enforcing trade agreements is a key element of the U.S. government's efforts to boost exports of U.S. goods and services. The vast majority of U.S. exports, which totaled $2.26 trillion in 2015, are covered by at least one trade agreement to which the United States is a party. These agreements include multilateral World Trade Organization agreements and bilateral or regional FTAs with 20 countries. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and several other federal agencies share responsibility for monitoring and enforcing partner countries' compliance with trade agreements. The U.S. government also provides trade capacity-building assistance, which includes goals to help partner countries meet their obligations under trade agreements.
The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Public Law 114-25, includes a provision for GAO to examine federal agencies' resources to monitor and enforce international trade agreements. This report (1) examines agencies' resources and activities for monitoring and enforcing international trade agreements in fiscal year 2016 and (2) identifies agencies' trade capacity-building projects, active in fiscal year 2016, to assist FTA partner countries in meeting their obligations under these agreements. GAO reviewed agency documents, interviewed agency officials, and analyzed agencies' estimates of resources used to monitor and enforce trade agreements.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Eleven U.S. agency offices and bureaus have responsibilities for monitoring and enforcing international trade agreements; however, they do not have information that allows for a definitive count of the staff resources and related funding used to carry out these responsibilities. This is because many of the staff who conduct trade monitoring and enforcement activities at these agencies do so as part of a broader portfolio of activities, and none of the agencies routinely tracks staff time at this level of detail. In response to GAO's request for information, the 11 offices and bureaus used a variety of methods to develop estimates of the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff they believe worked on trade monitoring and enforcement activities in 2016 and the approximate costs associated with salaries and benefits for these FTEs. The estimates suggest that in fiscal year 2016, these 11 offices and bureaus dedicated over 700 FTEs at a cost of more than $100 million to monitor and enforce trade agreements. However, the estimates do not fully include all related costs (such as overhead costs) and, in some cases, may not represent all staff who conducted trade monitoring and enforcement activities.
U.S. agencies provide trade capacity-building assistance to help partner countries meet their obligations under free trade agreements (FTA) with the United States, such as their labor and environmental commitments. In fiscal year 2016, U.S. agencies oversaw 80 trade capacity-building projects intended to help partner countries meet their obligations as parties to FTAs. These projects, many of which spanned multiple years, amounted to about $256 million in obligated and planned funding. About 80 percent of project funding was related to helping partner countries comply with labor or environmental commitments. |
gao_GAO-12-816 | gao_GAO-12-816_0 | These threats can be either unintentional, such as interference from energy generated by other devices or from the surrounding environment, or intentional, as recently demonstrated by information security researchers. NIST is a nonregulatory, federal agency within the Department of Commerce. However, federal officials and information security researchers said efforts to mitigate these risks could adversely affect devices’ performance. Several of the experts we consulted noted that certain intentional information security threats were of greater concern than other threats. Information Security Risks Could Adversely Affect the Safety and Effectiveness of Medical Devices
Information security risks resulting from the exploitation of vulnerabilities by threats could adversely affect the safety and effectiveness of active implantable medical devices. FDA Considered Information Security Risks Resulting from Certain Threats during Its Review of Two Devices, and Has Plans to Enhance Its Information Security Efforts
For the two medical devices that have known vulnerabilities, FDA considered information security risks from unintentional threats, but not risks from intentional threats during its premarket review of the related supplements. FDA Officials Considered Information Security Risks from Unintentional Threats, but Not from Intentional Threats in Their Review of Two PMA Supplements
In the reviews of two PMA supplements for medical devices with known vulnerabilities conducted in 2001 and 2006, FDA officials considered information security risks resulting from unintentional threats, but not from intentional threats. Specifically, FDA considered information security risks in four of the eight information security control areas we selected— software testing, verification, and validation; risk assessments; access control; and contingency planning (see table 6 below and app. However, FDA did not consider risks from unintentional threats for the four remaining information security control areas—risk management, patch and vulnerability management, technical audit and accountability, and security-incident response. For example, FDA officials would review a scalpel for potential clinical risks resulting from its intended use in a clinical setting. Additionally, in commenting on a draft of this report, HHS noted that FDA anticipates completing the review on the agency’s approach to evaluating software in medical devices in calendar year 2012. HHS also noted that FDA will include an assessment of information security risks for medical devices. Despite having postmarket efforts in place, FDA faces challenges in using them to identify information security problems. FDA Has Adverse Event Reporting and Other Postmarket Efforts in Place to Identify Problems with Medical Devices, including Those Related to Information Security
FDA has various postmarket efforts in place to identify problems with medical devices once they have been approved for marketing, including any problems related to information security. They noted that information security is a relatively new issue area with respect to its applicability to medical devices, which could make it a difficult type of problem to understand and report to FDA. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure the safety and effectiveness of active implantable medical devices, we are recommending that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of FDA to develop and implement a more comprehensive plan to assist the agency in enhancing its review and surveillance of medical devices as technology evolves, and that will incorporate the multiple aspects of information security. This plan should include, at a minimum, four actions, such as determining how FDA can increase its focus on manufacturers’ identification of potential unintentional and intentional threats, vulnerabilities, the resulting information security risks, and strategies to mitigate these risks during its PMA review process; utilize available resources, including those from other entities, such as leverage its postmarket efforts to identify and investigate information security problems; and establish specific milestones for completing this review and implementing these changes. DHS and the Department of Defense did not provide comments on a draft of this report. In its comments, HHS concurred with our recommendation and described relevant efforts FDA has initiated. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting information security risks associated with active implantable medical devices; (2) determine the extent to which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considered information security risks in its premarket approval (PMA) review process for certain active medical devices with known vulnerabilities; and (3) determine what postmarket efforts FDA has in place to identify information security problems involving active implantable medical devices. These publications also included information related to the two devices that researchers have demonstrated are susceptible to intentional threats—an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (defibrillator) and an insulin pump. Adverse event reports are to be submitted to FDA through mandatory and voluntary sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Certain medical devices have become increasingly complex, and the growing use of wireless technology in these devices has raised concerns about how protected they are against information security risks that could affect their safety and effectiveness.
FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices in the United States. FDA reviews manufacturers applications to market medical devices during its premarket review process and monitors devices, once it has approved them, through its postmarket efforts.
In this report, GAO (1) identifies the threats, vulnerabilities, and resulting information security risks associated with active implantable medical devices, (2) determines the extent to which FDA considered information security during its premarket review of certain devices with known vulnerabilities, and (3) determines what postmarket efforts FDA has in place to identify information security problems. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from agencies, such as FDA, HHS, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Department of Homeland Security. GAO also interviewed subject-matter experts in information security.
What GAO Found
Several information security threats exist that can exploit vulnerabilities in active implantable medical devices, but experts caution that efforts to mitigate information security risks may adversely affect device performance. Threats to active devicesthat is, devices that rely on a power source to operatethat also have wireless capability can be unintentional, such as interference from electromagnetic energy in the environment, or intentional, such as the unauthorized accessing of a device. Several experts consider certain threats to be of greater concern than others; for example, experts noted less concern about interference from electromagnetic energy than other threats. Incidents resulting from unintentional threats have occurred, such as a malfunction resulting from electromagnetic interference, but have since been addressed. Although researchers have recently demonstrated the potential for incidents resulting from intentional threats in two devicesan implantable cardioverter defibrillator and an insulin pumpno such actual incidents are known to have occurred, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Medical devices may have several such vulnerabilities that make them susceptible to unintentional and intentional threats, including untested software and firmware and limited battery life. Information security risks resulting from certain threats and vulnerabilities could affect the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. These risks include unauthorized changes of device settings resulting from a lack of appropriate access controls. Federal officials and experts noted that efforts to mitigate information security risks need to be balanced with the potential adverse effects such efforts could have on devices performance, including limiting battery life.
FDA considered information security risks from unintentional threats, but not risks from intentional threats, during its 2001 and 2006 premarket review of two medical devices that have known vulnerabilities. Specifically, FDA considered risks from unintentional threats for four of the eight information security control areas GAO selected for its evaluationsoftware testing, verification, and validation; risk assessments; access control; and contingency planning. However, the agency did not consider risks from intentional threats for these areas, nor did the agency provide evidence of its review for risks from either unintentional or intentional threats for the remaining four information security control areasrisk management, patch and vulnerability management, technical audit and accountability, and security-incident-response activities. According to FDA, it did not consider information security risks from intentional threats as a realistic possibility until recently. In commenting on a draft of this report, FDA said it intends to reassess its approach for evaluating software used in medical devices, including an assessment of information security risks.
FDA has postmarket efforts, such as its adverse event reporting system, in place to identify problems with medical devices, including those related to information security. However, FDA faces challenges in using them to identify information security problems. For example, the agencys adverse event reporting system relies upon reports submitted by entities, such as manufacturers, that are more closely related to clinical risks than to information security risks. Because information security in active implantable medical devices is a relatively new issue, those reporting might not understand the relevance of information security risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA develop and implement a plan expanding its focus on information security risks. In comments on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with GAOs recommendation and described relevant efforts FDA has initiated. |
gao_GAO-07-587T | gao_GAO-07-587T_0 | Magnitude of Unpaid Taxes of Medicare Part B Physicians, Health Professionals, and Suppliers
Our analysis of 2005 data found that over 21,000 physicians, health professionals, and suppliers who received Medicare Part B payments during the first 9 months of 2005 had over $1 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2005. Because the IRS database does not include amounts owed by taxpayers who have not filed tax returns and for which IRS has not assessed tax amounts due, the estimated amount of unpaid federal taxes is understated. Examples of Medicare Part B Physicians, Health Professionals, and Suppliers Involved in Abusive and Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
For all 40 cases involving Medicare Part B physicians, health professionals, and suppliers with outstanding tax debt that we audited and investigated, we found abusive and/or potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system. Rather than fulfill their role as “trustees” of this money and forward it to IRS as required by law, these physicians, health professionals, and suppliers diverted the money for other purposes. In addition, as discussed previously, willful failure to remit payroll taxes can be a criminal felony offense punishable by imprisonment up to 5 years, while the failure to properly segregate payroll taxes can be a criminal misdemeanor offense punishable by imprisonment of up to a year. In addition to failure to pay taxes, our investigations also revealed that several physicians associated with our case studies received Medicare Part B payments even though they had significant problems related to the practice of medicine. A hospital revoked the physician’s hospital privileges for substandard care and the state medical board also investigated the physician. As a result, the federal government lost opportunities to collect between $50 million and $140 million in unpaid taxes in the first 9 months of calendar year 2005. The basis of exclusion of certain individuals and entities from participation in Medicare programs is made by statute. HHS has not established a policy to obtain Medicare applicants’ consent to obtain tax information from IRS to consider in its Medicare eligibility decision making process. Further, HHS has not established policy to participate in the IRS continuous levy program, thus preventing IRS from capturing at least a portion of the Medicare payments made to physicians, health professionals, and suppliers that owe tax debts. In July 2001, we reported that HHS did not have plans to participate in the continuous levy program and we recommended that the Commissioners of IRS and FMS work with HHS to develop plans to include Medicare payments in the continuous levy program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the magnitude of unpaid taxes owed by Medicare Part B physicians, health professionals and suppliers, we requested from Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the related Medicare Part B claims data for calendar year 2005. To identify examples of abuse or potentially criminal activity, we selected 40 Medicare Part B physicians, health professionals, and suppliers with federal tax debts for detailed audit and investigation. To determine the extent to which HHS officials and their contractors are required to consider tax debts or other criminal activities in the enrollment of physicians, health professionals, and suppliers into Medicare, we examined Medicare regulations and HHS policies and procedures for enrollment. To determine the potential levy collections on the first 9 months of calendar year 2005, we used 15 percent and 100 percent of the total paid claim or total tax debt amount reported to TOP per IRS records, whichever is less. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Medicare program, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its contractors paid a reported $330 billion in Medicare benefits in calendar year 2005. Because GAO previously identified government contractors with billions of dollars in unpaid federal taxes, Congress requested that we expand our work in this area to all Medicare providers. This testimony addresses Medicare physicians, health professionals, and suppliers for services related to senior health care, who received about 20 percent of all Medicare payments. Because of limitations in HHS data, GAO was asked to determine if Medicare Part B physicians, health professionals, and suppliers have unpaid federal taxes, and if so, to (1) determine the magnitude of such debts; (2) identify examples of Medicare physicians and suppliers that have engaged in abusive, or potentially criminal activities; and (3) assess HHS efforts to prevent delinquent taxpayers from enrolling in Medicare and levy payments to pay delinquent federal taxes. To perform this work, GAO reviewed data from HHS and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In addition, GAO reviewed policies, procedures, and regulations related to Medicare. GAO also performed additional investigative activities. We plan to report on the results of our work related to other Medicare providers including any needed recommendations later this year.
What GAO Found
Over 21,000 of the physicians, health professionals, and suppliers (i.e., about 5 percent of all such providers) paid under Medicare Part B during the first 9 months of calendar year 2005 had tax debts totaling over $1 billion. This $1 billion figure is understated because some of these Medicare health care providers have understated their income and/or not filed their tax returns. We selected 40 Medicare physicians, health professionals, and suppliers with high tax debt for more in-depth investigation of the extent and nature of any related abusive or potentially criminal activity. Our investigation found abusive and potentially criminal activity, including failure to remit to IRS individual income taxes and/or payroll taxes withheld from their employees. Rather than fulfill their role as "trustees" of this money and forward it to IRS, they diverted the money for other purposes. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. Further, individuals associated with some of these providers used payroll taxes withheld from employees for personal gain (e.g., to purchase a new home) or to help fund their businesses. Many of these individuals accumulated substantial wealth and assets, including million-dollar houses and luxury vehicles, while failing to pay their federal taxes. In addition, some physicians received Medicare payments even though they had serious quality-of-care issues, including license reprimands and prior suspensions from state medical boards, revocations of hospital privileges, and previous exclusions from the Medicare program. HHS has not issued Medicare regulations or policies requiring Medicare contractors to consider tax debts in making a decision about whether to enroll a physician, health professional, or supplier into Medicare. Further, HHS has not established a policy to obtain taxpayer consent to obtain tax information from IRS as part of its Medicare eligibility decision-making process. IRS can continuously levy up to 100 percent of each payment made to a federal payee--for example, a Medicare physician--until that tax debt is paid. However, HHS is not participating in the continuous levy program and thus the government has not collected unpaid taxes from Medicare payments. In the first 9 months of calendar year 2005, we estimate that the government lost opportunities to collect between $50 million and $140 million by not participating in the continuous levy program. |
gao_GAO-06-456T | gao_GAO-06-456T_0 | Federal Health Care Spending Drives the Long-Term Fiscal Challenge
Among mandatory spending programs—and indeed tax expenditures—the health area is especially important because the long-term fiscal challenge is largely a health care challenge. Our most recent simulation results illustrate the importance of health care in the long-term fiscal outlook as well as the imperative to take action. Simply put, our nation’s fiscal policy is on an imprudent and unsustainable course. These long-term budget simulations show, as do those published last December by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), that over the long term we face a large and growing structural deficit due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care costs and lower federal revenues as a percentage of the economy. As these simulations illustrate, absent significant policy changes on the spending and/or revenue side of the budget, the growth in mandatory spending on federal retirement and especially health entitlements will encumber an escalating share of the government’s resources. Indeed, when we assume that all the temporary tax reductions are made permanent and discretionary spending keeps pace with the economy, our long-term simulations suggest that by 2040 federal revenues may be adequate to pay only some Social Security benefits and interest on the federal debt. Although revenues will be part of the debate about our fiscal future, assuming no changes to Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other drivers of the long-term fiscal gap would require at least a doubling of taxes—and that seems highly implausible. Ultimately, the nation will have to decide what level of federal benefits and spending it wants and how it will pay for these benefits. As figure 5 shows, unlike Social Security which grows larger as a share of the economy and then levels off, within this projection period we do not see Medicare growth abating. Whether or not the President’s Budget proposals on Medicare are adopted, they should serve to raise public awareness of the importance of health care costs to both today’s budget and tomorrow’s. This could serve to jump start a discussion about appropriate ways to control the major driver of our long-term fiscal outlook—health care spending. For example, Department of Defense health care spending rose from about $12 billion in 1990 to about $30.4 billion in 2004—in part, to meet additional demand resulting from program eligibility expansions for military retirees, reservists, and the dependents of those two groups and for the increased needs of active duty personnel involved in conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. This means that addressing the unsustainability of health care costs is also a major competitiveness and societal challenge that calls for us as a nation to fundamentally rethink how we define, deliver, and finance health care in both the public and the private sectors. As a nation, we are going to need to weigh unlimited individual wants against broader societal needs and decide how responsibility for financing health care should be divided among employers, individuals, and government. Individuals wanting additional services, and insurance coverage to pay for them, might be required to allocate their own resources. Limit spending growth for government-sponsored health care programs (e.g., percentage of the budget and/or the economy). These policies permit the value of employees’ health insurance premiums to be excluded from the calculation of their taxable earnings and exclude the value of the premium from the employers’ calculation of payroll taxes for both themselves and employees. The problem of escalating health care costs is complex because addressing federal programs such as Medicare and the federal-state Medicaid program will need to involve change in the health care system of which they are a part—not just within federal programs. We, however, have an obligation to look beyond today. We should act sooner rather than later. We all must make choices that may be difficult and unpleasant today to avoid passing an even greater burden on to future generations. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses entitlement and other mandatory spending programs in light of our nation's long-term fiscal outlook and the challenges it poses for the budget and oversight processes. In our report entitled 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, we presented illustrative questions for policy makers to consider as they carry out their responsibilities. These questions look across major areas of the budget and federal operations including discretionary and mandatory spending, and tax policies and programs. We hope that this report, among other things, will be used by various congressional committees as they consider which areas of government need particular attention and reconsideration. Congress will also receive more specific proposals, some of them will be presented within comprehensive agendas. Our report provides examples of the kinds of difficult choices the nation faces with regard to discretionary spending; mandatory spending, including entitlements; as well as tax policies and compliance activities.
What GAO Found
Mandatory spending programs--like tax expenditures--are governed by eligibility rules and benefit formulas, which means that funds are spend as required to provide benefits to those who are eligible and wish to participate. Since Congress and the President must change substantive law to change the cost of these programs, they are relatively uncontrollable on an annual basis. Moreover, as we reported in a 1994 analysis, their cost cannot be controlled by the same "spending cap" mechanism used for discretionary spending. By their very nature mandatories limit budget flexibility. Mandatory spending has grown as a share of the total federal budget. Under both the Congressional Budget Office baseline estimates and the President's Budget, this spending would grow further. While the long-term fiscal outlook is driven by Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, it does not mean that all other mandatory programs should be "given a pass." As we have noted elsewhere, reexamination of the "fit" between government programs and the needs and priorities of the nation should be an accepted practice. So in terms of budget flexibility--the freedom of each Congress and President to allocate public resources--we cannot ignore mandatory spending programs even if they do not drive the aggregate. While some might suggest that mandatory programs could be controlled by being converted to discretionary or annually appropriated programs, that seems unlikely to happen. If we look across the range of mandatories we see many programs have objectives and missions that contribute to the achievement of a range of broad-based and important public policy goals such as providing a floor of income security in retirement, fighting hunger, fostering higher education, and providing access to affordable health care. To these ends, these programs--and tax expenditures--were designed to provide benefits automatically to those who take the desired action or meet the specified eligibility criteria without subjecting them to an annual decision regarding spending or delay in the provision of benefits such a process might entail. Although mandatory spending is not amenable to "caps," that does not mean that mandatory programs should be permitted to be on autopilot and grow to an unlimited extent. Since the spending for any given entitlement or other mandatory program is a function of the interaction between the eligibility rules and the benefit formula--either or both of which may incorporate exogenous factors such as economic downturns--the way to change the path of spending for any of these programs is to change those rules or formulas. We recently issued a report on "triggers"--some measure which, when reached or exceeded, would prompt a response connected to that program. By identifying significant increases in the spending path of a mandatory program relatively early and acting to constrain it, Congress may avert much larger and potentially disruptive financial challenges and program changes in the future. |
gao_GAO-16-382 | gao_GAO-16-382_0 | See figure 1 for a map of the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument showing the location of Midway, which lies about 1,300 miles from Honolulu. II for a fuller chronology of Midway events.) FWS Officials Reported That Midway’s Operations Funding Has Decreased in Recent Years and Project- Specific Funding Has Varied
The Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge’s funding consists of both operational and project-specific funding. After Increasing for Fiscal Years 2009 to 2011, FWS Allocations for Midway Operations Reportedly Decreased Substantially
According to an FWS budget official we interviewed, after increasing from fiscal year 2009 to 2011 to a peak of more than $4 million, Region 1’s funding of operations for Midway decreased in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. For example, the Department of the Interior’s Central Hazardous Materials Fund—an appropriation available to pay for the department’s removal actions under CERCLA––provided over $20 million from fiscal year 2010 to 2015 to perform lead-based paint abatement projects on Midway, according to FWS officials. For Henderson Airfield, FAA, under an interagency agreement for capital improvements with FWS, also provides up to $2.5 million annually to pay for capital improvement projects, such as resurfacing runways and taxiways. FWS Has Maintained Most Historic Properties but Not Others and Has Not Adequately Provided Public Notification and Sought Public Comment under the Section 106 Process
FWS has maintained most historic properties on Midway but has demolished others without providing adequate public notification and seeking public comment and input, which is not consistent with the regulations implementing section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. However, officials with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation pointed out that another factor in the regulations that should be considered in determining the extent of seeking and considering the views of the public is the likely level of public interest in the action. Without ensuring that key parties that have previously expressed interest in historic preservation issues on Midway are notified about future actions that may have an adverse effect on historic properties, FWS will not have reasonable assurance that it is adequately providing public notification and an opportunity for public comment under the section 106 process. Challenges FWS Faces Relate to Personnel, Infrastructure, Supplies, and Transportation Access
FWS has not had a public visitation program on Midway since November 2012 and faces multiple challenges to reestablishing such a program in the future. The building that is available to house visitors, known as Bachelor Officer Quarters Charlie Barracks, is almost beyond the point of repairs and renovation, according to a condition assessment conducted by contractors in 2009. In 2015, FWS officials estimated that $1.2 million in additional annual funding would be needed to operate and oversee a reestablished public visitation program and that additional funding would also be needed for start-up costs. Midway’s Henderson Airfield serves as an emergency landing airport for aircraft for the mid-Pacific Ocean region and facilitates access to the marine national monument that includes Midway. To gain FAA approval, air carriers must, among other things, designate adequate airports, which are certified by FAA, for use in the event of a diversion during ETOPS. Henderson Airfield also serves as an emergency airport for military aircraft. Recommendation for Executive Action
To fulfill the secretarial order’s directive that FWS manage Midway in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the U.S. The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation also agreed with our recommendation and suggested that, to better reflect the regulations implementing section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, we clarify in our recommendation that FWS ensure the public––and not just key parties previously expressing interest in historic preservation issues on Midway––are notified about future undertakings that have adverse effects on historic properties. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has maintained historic properties on Midway and the extent to which it has consulted key stakeholders and sought public comment; (3) identify challenges, if any, FWS faces in reestablishing a public visitation program; and (4) describe the use of Henderson Airfield as an emergency landing airport and access point for the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument. To examine how FWS has maintained its historic properties, the extent to which it has consulted key stakeholders, and any challenges FWS faces in reestablishing a public visitation program, we collected documents and data to determine the universe of historic properties on Midway and actions that have been taken on these properties. To describe the use of Henderson Airfield, we reviewed FWS and FAA reports, policies, and regulations on the operation of Henderson Airfield and extended operations airports and interviewed FWS and FAA officials regarding the agencies’ roles and responsibilities in providing an emergency landing site on Midway. The law excludes Midway from the state of Hawaii’s territory. April 3, 1997. May 7, 2003. 2009. As a result, FWS limited access to Midway in January 2002. See table 5 for a summary of public visitation on Midway since 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Midway, a trio of islands about 1,300 miles from Honolulu, has been managed by FWS as a wildlife refuge since the closure of a naval base in 1996. Midway also serves as a national memorial to a historic World War II battle. GAO was asked to review FWS's management of Midway.
This report examines (1) funding for operations and projects on Midway for fiscal years 2009 to 2015, (2) how FWS maintained historic properties on Midway and the extent to which it consulted with key parties and sought public comment, (3) challenges FWS faces in reestablishing a public visitation program, and (4) the use of Midway's Henderson Airfield.
GAO visited Midway in April 2015 to observe the condition of historic and other properties. GAO reviewed budget data for Midway from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; reviewed laws, policies, and regulations on historic preservation; examined public visitation plans, emergency landing data, and the use of the airfield; and interviewed FWS, FAA, and Advisory Council on Historic Preservation officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
According to officials in the Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), operations funding for Midway Atoll (Midway) has decreased in recent years and project-specific funding has varied. Specifically, budget officials said that FWS, after increasing the funding allocated to Midway's operations to more than $4 million by fiscal year 2011, decreased Midway's allocation by more than $1 million by fiscal years 2012 and 2013. These officials said that the lower allocation led to suspension of public visitation on Midway in November 2012, which, in turn, decreased operations funding available from fees collected for services such as lodging. Midway has also received funding for specific projects, such as lead-based paint abatement. In addition, under an interagency agreement, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has reimbursed FWS up to $3 million per year for the direct costs of operating Midway's Henderson Airfield and provided additional funds for capital improvement projects, such as resurfacing runways.
FWS has maintained most historic properties on Midway but has demolished others without providing for public notice and involvement, which is not consistent with the regulations implementing section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. A 2000 order by the Secretary of the Interior directs FWS to administer Midway in accordance with the law. Federal agencies must provide the public with notice of and opportunity to comment on agency actions that may affect historic properties. Since 2012, FWS has demolished seven historic properties on Midway as part of the agency's removal of lead-based paint and taken another action adversely affecting historic properties without providing adequate public notification, including directly notifying parties that have previously expressed interest in historic preservation issues on Midway, and an opportunity for public comment. An FWS official said that the extent of such notification may vary based on the size of the actions. However, officials with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation said that groups known to have a high level of interest should be notified directly. Without providing public notification, including ensuring that such parties are notified about future actions that may adversely affect historic properties, FWS will not have reasonable assurance that it is adequately seeking public comment and input under the section 106 process.
Since the suspension of public visitation to Midway in 2012, FWS faces multiple challenges relating to personnel, infrastructure, supplies, and transportation access to reestablish the program. For example, the building used to house visitors is almost beyond the point of repair and renovation, according to a 2009 assessment of its condition. FWS officials estimated that $1.2 million in annual funding would be needed to reestablish a public visitation program and that additional funding would also be needed for start-up costs.
Midway's Henderson Airfield serves as an emergency landing airport for aircraft in the mid-Pacific Ocean region and facilitates access to Midway and its surroundings. Under FAA regulations, air carriers must designate in their flight plans a certified airport for use in the event of an emergency during extended operations. Since 2003, there have been seven military and civilian emergency landings on Midway.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FWS ensure that the public, including previously interested key parties, are notified about FWS actions on Midway that may have an adverse effect on historic properties. The Department of the Interior agreed with GAO's recommendation.
View a video of GAO's review of FWS's management of Midway. To view high-resolution photographs from this report, please see GAO's Flickr page . |
gao_GAO-04-291 | gao_GAO-04-291_0 | This report can provide a starting point for agencies to use to build on the experiences and lessons learned by the five agencies we reviewed as part of their efforts to design and develop training and development programs. II for a description of the five agencies included in this study.) 3). Officials said that their agencies have transitioned, or are in the process of transitioning, to more comprehensive, consistent planning approaches. IRS involved key stakeholders and benchmarked with other organizations in developing its leadership competency model In working to build its leadership development program in the wake of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, IRS officials believed they needed a leadership competency model that was based directly on the work of IRS's business units. Projecting costs and benefits of proposed training and development programs was a challenge for the five agencies. They usually developed broad information on anticipated benefits and expected costs, often without tying anticipated benefits to specific performance improvements or considering all costs related to the training program. Agencies’ Lessons Learned in Developing Strategies and Solutions for Their Training Needs
Agency officials have encountered a variety of challenges in their efforts to design training programs to meet the developmental needs of their employees. Within each of the 21 regional networks, an Education Service Representative acts as a liaison in coordinating numerous developmental programs with VHA headquarters—sharing information with their counterparts about effective practices and identifying areas of possible duplication or inconsistency across VHA. USACE’s training center conducts pre- and post-tests on over 90 percent of the courses it offers and is working toward the goal of using such tests for all courses. Determining methods for evaluating training programs as part of their design can help identify and remove obstacles to successful implementation. Lesson learned: Plan for the use of multiple data types and sources to provide a balanced approach in assessing the effectiveness of training and development programs. According to training center officials, the results of this course evaluation are assembled with the end-of-course participant survey feedback and pre- and post-testing results to present a comprehensive and balanced view of the effectiveness of the training program. Interior, IRS, and OPM provided written comments on the draft report. IV), Interior’s Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks generally agreed with the report’s findings regarding the Department and the FWS. VI), the Director of OPM said that she appreciated the opportunity for OPM to be included in the report and to share information on OPM’s training and development activities and programs. USACE informed us that it had no comments on the draft report. Specifically, we focused on the agencies’ experiences and lessons learned related to assessing current and future agency skill and competency requirements and identifying related training and development needs, developing strategies and solutions for training and development needs, determining methods to evaluate the effectiveness of training and development programs. To address this objective we focused on five agencies: the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Department of Defense; the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS), Department of the Interior; the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of the Treasury; the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM); and the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Department of Veterans Affairs. To obtain information about the five agencies’ experiences and lessons learned related to designing training and development programs, we Interviewed agency human capital and training officials and subject matter experts responsible for agency training, performance, and other initiatives; and Reviewed and analyzed agency documents such as workforce plans, analyses, and reports; strategic, performance, and succession plans and reports; organizational, occupational, and unit-based competency standards; knowledge and skills inventories; skills gaps assessments; competency and skill assessments; surveys of agency employees; training plans and proposals; workforce demographic data; budget data; evaluation plans and reports; and performance measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective training and development programs are an integral part of a learning environment, helping improve federal workforce performance in achieving agency results. Therefore, in this report GAO was asked to identify examples of selected federal agencies' experiences and some of the key lessons they have learned in designing their training and development programs. This work focused on ways that these agencies (1) assessed agency skills gaps and identified training needs, (2) developed strategies and solutions for these training and development needs, and (3) determined methods to evaluate the effectiveness of training and development programs. GAO worked with five agencies to identify their experiences and lessons learned: the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Department of Defense; Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Department of the Interior (Interior); Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of the Treasury; the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); and Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Agency officials provided information during interviews and furnished supporting documentation for analysis and review.
What GAO Found
GAO identified important lessons learned from five federal agencies' experiences in designing training and development programs for their employees that could be useful to other agencies facing similar challenges. These lessons learned are related to the following three areas. Assessing Agency Skill Requirements and Identifying Training Needs: The agencies used a variety of approaches to assess current and future skill requirements, such as implementing workforce planning models and conducting knowledge and skills inventories. Generally, the agencies are transitioning to more comprehensive approaches. One of the lessons learned was to involve stakeholders and benchmark with others to identify critical skills and competencies and related training needs. For example, IRS officials believed they needed a leadership competency model directly based on the work of their agency's business units. To develop a comprehensive model, they interviewed top IRS leaders and benchmarked with leading practices in the public and private sector. Developing Strategies and Solutions for Training Needs: The agencies considered a mixture of delivery mechanisms, as well as potential sources for training and development opportunities. However, projecting costs and benefits of proposed training and development programs presented challenges for them. The agencies usually developed broad information on anticipated benefits and expected costs of potential investments, although often without tying benefits to specific performance improvements or considering all costs. One of the lessons learned was to establish mechanisms to avoid duplication or inconsistencies. Education Service Representatives in each regional VHA network, for example, coordinate training and development programs with headquarters--sharing information about successful practices and identifying areas where coordination is needed. Determining Methods for Evaluating Training Programs: Overall, the agencies relied primarily on participants' end-of-course evaluations, but they are beginning to use more comprehensive evaluation approaches, including limited use of return-on-investment analysis techniques. One of the lessons learned is to plan for the use of multiple data types and sources in order to attain a balanced assessment once the course is implemented. For example, USACE's training center incorporated pre- and post-tests on over 90 percent of its courses, as well as approaches to collect participants' and course managers' feedback, as part of the design. Four of the five agencies provided comments on a draft of this report. Interior and VA said that they generally agreed with the report's findings regarding their respective agencies. IRS and OPM said that they appreciated the opportunity to be included in the report and to share information on training activities. USACE provided no comments on the draft report. |
gao_GAO-11-244T | gao_GAO-11-244T_0 | USPS’s Financial Condition Continues to Decline and Its Financial Outlook Is Poor
USPS’s financial condition continued to decline over the past fiscal year and its financial outlook is poor for fiscal year 2011 and the foreseeable future. Key USPS results for fiscal year 2010 included a $1.0 billion decline in total revenue to $67.1 billion, and a $3.7 billion increase in total expenses to $75.6 billion, resulting in a record loss of about $8.5 billion, a $1.8 billion increase in outstanding debt (which left $1.2 billion of available borrowing authority), a total of $12 billion in outstanding debt due to the Treasury, and a $1.2 billion cash balance at the end of the fiscal year. USPS has recently released its budget for fiscal year 2011, projecting a $6.4 billion loss (see fig. 1)—one of the largest in USPS history— including the impact of a $5.5 billion payment due in 2011 to prefund retiree health benefits; a $3 billion increase in outstanding debt due to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), thereby reaching its $15 billion statutory limit; and a $2.7 billion cash shortfall at the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2010, mail volume decreased about 6 billion pieces from the previous fiscal year to 171 billion pieces. Third, results of USPS cost savings efforts in fiscal year 2010 were insufficient to offset rising costs in other areas. Further Actions Are Needed to Modernize and Restructure USPS
As its core product—First-Class Mail—continues to decline, USPS must modernize and restructure to become more efficient, control costs, keep rates affordable, and meet changing customer needs. To do so, USPS will need to become much leaner and more flexible. Key challenges include the following: Mail volume and changing use of the mail: USPS projects mail volume to continue declining to about 150 billion pieces by fiscal year 2020—about 30 percent below its 2006 peak. Use of the mail is changing as communications and payments continue to shift to electronic alternatives—a shift that is being facilitated by rapid adoption of broadband. These trends expose weaknesses in USPS’s business model, which has relied on volume growth to help cover costs. Postal revenues: USPS expects revenue to stagnate in the next decade as continued declines in mail volume are offset by rate increases. Compensation and benefit costs: Compensation and benefits, including retiree health benefits and workers’ compensation, totaled about $60 billion in fiscal year 2010, or close to 80 percent of USPS costs. Further, USPS has delayed buying new delivery vehicles for lack of capital resources. Large unfunded financial obligations and liabilities: USPS’s unfunded obligations and liabilities were roughly $100 billion at the end of fiscal year 2010. Key Issues Need to Be Addressed by Postal Legislation
Proposed postal legislation, including S. 3831, provides a starting point for considering key issues where congressional decisions are needed to help USPS undertake needed reforms. This bill is based on legislative proposals USPS made this past spring. Resolving large USPS funding requirements for pension and retiree health benefits is important. It is equally important to USPS’s future to address constraints and legal restrictions, such as those related to closing facilities, so that USPS can take more aggressive action to reduce costs. Urgent action is needed as some changes, such as rightsizing networks, will take time to implement and produce results. Congressional decisions may involve difficult trade-offs related to USPS’s role as a federal entity expected to provide universal mail delivery and ready access to postal retail service while being self-financing through businesslike operations. In this testimony, we will highlight some options related to three areas that are also addressed by S. 3831—compensation and benefits, rightsizing networks and workforce, and expanding nonpostal activities. USPS has costly excess capacity and inadequate flexibility to quickly reduce costs in its processing and retail networks. Allowing USPS to expand into new nonpostal activities would raise issues about the areas in which it should be allowed to compete with the private sector, how to assure fair competition, how to mitigate risks associated with entering new lines of business, and how to finance such efforts. Congress and USPS urgently need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS’s financial viability and enable it to begin making necessary changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition and outlook deteriorated sharply during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. USPS actions to cut costs and increase revenues were insufficient to offset declines in mail volume and revenues. Mail volume declined from 213 billion pieces in fiscal year 2006, to 171 billion pieces in fiscal year 2010--or about 20 percent. Volume declines resulted from the recession and changes in the use of mail as transactions and messages continued to shift to electronic alternatives. In this environment, USPS initiatives to increase revenues had limited results. USPS expects mail volume to decline further to about 150 billion pieces by 2020. This trend exposes weaknesses in USPS's business model, which has relied on growth in mail volume to help cover costs. GAO and others have reported on options for improving USPS's financial condition, including GAO's April 2010 report on USPS's business model (GAO-10-455). Recently, legislation has been introduced that addresses USPS's finances and the need for flexibility to help modernize operations. This testimony discusses (1) updated information on USPS's financial condition and outlook, (2) the need to modernize and restructure USPS, and (3) key issues that need to be addressed by postal legislation. It is based primarily on GAO's past and ongoing work. In comments on our statement, USPS generally agreed with its accuracy and provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
USPS's financial condition continued to decline in fiscal year 2010 and its financial outlook is poor for fiscal year 2011 and the foreseeable future. Key results for fiscal year 2010 included total revenue of $67.1 billion and total expenses of $75.6 billion, resulting in (1) a record loss of $8.5 billion--up $4.7 billion from fiscal year 2009, (2) a $1.8 billion increase in outstanding debt to the Treasury, thus making the total outstanding debt $12 billion, and (3) a $1.2 billion cash balance at the end of the fiscal year. USPS's budget for fiscal year 2011 projects (1) a $6.4 billion loss, (2) a $3 billion increase in debt to the $15 billion statutory limit, and (3) an end-of-year cash shortfall of $2.7 billion. USPS has reported achieving close to $13 billion in cost savings in the past 5 fiscal years. However, as its most profitable core product, First-Class Mail, continues to decline, USPS must modernize and restructure to become more efficient, control costs, keep rates affordable, and meet changing customer needs. To do so, USPS needs to become much leaner and more flexible. Key challenges include: changing use of the mail; compensation and benefit costs that are close to 80 percent of total costs; difficulties realigning networks to remove costly excess capacity and improve efficiency; constrained capital investment, which has declined to one of the lowest levels in two decades and led to delays in buying new vehicles; lack of borrowing capacity when USPS reaches its statutory debt limit; and large unfunded financial obligations and liabilities of roughly $100 billion at the end of fiscal year 2010. Proposed postal legislation, including S. 3831, provides a starting point for addressing key issues facing USPS and facilitating changes, such as rightsizing networks, that will take time to implement and produce results. Also, decisions on postal issues may involve trade-offs related to USPS's role as a federal entity expected to provide universal postal service while being self-financing through businesslike operations. Three key areas addressed by the bill include compensation and benefits; rightsizing USPS networks and workforce; and whether to allow USPS to expand its nonpostal activities. For example, resolving large USPS funding requirements for retiree health benefits is important, while continuing to prefund retiree health benefits to the extent USPS's finances permit. It is equally important to address constraints and legal restrictions, such as those related to closing facilities, so that USPS can take more aggressive action to reduce costs. Allowing USPS to expand into nonpostal activities raises issues of how to mitigate risks associated with new lines of business, assure fair competition with the private sector, and how to finance such efforts. Congress and USPS urgently need to take action to restore USPS's financial viability as business and consumer use of the mail continues to evolve. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-162 | gao_T-HEHS-96-162_0 | VA Pharmacies Provide an Assortment of OTC Products
VA physicians prescribed OTC products for veterans more than 7 million times in fiscal year 1995, accounting for almost one-fifth of all prescriptions. They and the pharmacies have taken a number of different actions to limit the number of OTC products available through the pharmacies and the quantity of products veterans can receive. It had similar quantity restrictions for 15 other OTC medications. This system provides a more restricted number of OTC products than most VA facilities. OTC medications for its beneficiaries. VA recovered an estimated $7 million of these costs through veterans’ copayments. For individual OTC products, veterans’ medication copayments ranged between 4 percent to more than 100 percent of VA’s costs, depending on the type of OTC product and the quantities dispensed. Given that VA pharmacies filled prescriptions for such products over 2 million times last year, VA facilities may have the opportunity to achieve significant cost reductions if eligibility rules are more strictly enforced. VA facilities could also reduce costs by collecting medication copayments at the time of dispensing. Reduce OTC Product Handling Costs
VA pharmacies could significantly reduce their OTC product dispensing costs of $48 million by providing more economical quantities of medications and supplies. Some network directors plan to review their formularies to identify products that could be removed. Unlike VA, other health plans’ copayment requirements generally apply equally to all beneficiaries and for all covered products. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) policies concerning over-the-counter (OTC) medications, medical supplies, and dietary supplements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA pharmacies provide many OTC medications; (2) VA pharmacies dispensed analgesics nearly 3 million times in 1995; (3) some VA pharmacies restrict certain veterans from receiving OTC products, as well as the quantity that they can receive; (4) one-third of VA facilities reduced the number of OTC medications available; (5) network directors are working to achieve a level of consistency and cost-containment for VA facilities within their network; (6) non-VA health plans make OTC products available to all beneficiaries on a uniform basis; (7) these plans' coverage of OTC products are more restrictive than most VA facilities coverage; (8) VA pharmacies dispensed more than 15 million OTC products last year, at an estimated cost of $165 million; (9) VA recovered 4 percent of its total dispensing costs through veterans' copayments; (10) veterans medication costs depended on the type of product and their eligibility status; and (11) VA can reduce the resources it devotes to OTC medications by adhering to statutory eligibility rules, dispensing OTC products more efficiently, collecting copayments, reducing the number of OTC products available to outpatients, and expanding copayment requirements. |
gao_GAO-01-949 | gao_GAO-01-949_0 | 2). Table 1 shows these regulators, along with the types of institutions that they regulate. FCA Administrative Expenses Fell Modestly From 1996 Through 2000, Remaining Within Congressionally Imposed Limits
Over the last 5 years, FCA has reduced expenditures for administrative expenses, reflecting the agency’s success in controlling operating costs. FCA Administrative Expenses Were Lower in 2000 Than in 1996
Significant dollar decreases in personnel costs were largely responsible for the decrease in administrative spending and the 5.8 percent decline compared with the 8.59 percent growth rate in federal government expenditures. Our analysis of FCA data shows that personnel costs accounted for over 80 percent of the FCA administrative expenses during the 5-year study period. Equipment purchases and other contractual services accounted for the largest increases in administrative expenditures in 1996 through 2000. Travel and transportation expenses declined (by about 10 percent) between 1996 and 2000. However, Congress did not set a spending limit for 1996. FCA Calculates Its Assessments in Much the Same Way as Other Federal Financial Regulators
FCA and the other federal financial regulators do not receive any federal money to fund their annual operating budgets, relying primarily on assessment revenue collected from the institutions they oversee. The FCA Formula for Assessing Primary Market Entities Considers Assets, Marginal Costs, and Financial Performance as Well as FCA’s Funding Needs
The law requires that the assessments be apportioned “on a basis that is determined to be equitable by the Farm Credit Administration.” FCA’s current assessment regulations for banks, associations, and “designated other System entities” were developed in 1993 through the negotiated rulemaking process. The few secondary market entities, which include Farmer Mac, are all assessed using less complex methodologies. He agreed with the information presented in the draft report regarding FCA’s administrative spending between 1996 and 2000. Appendix I: Comments From the Farm Credit Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) regulates the farm credit system. Administrative expenses, which accounted for about 97 percent of FCA's total operating expenses of $34.5 million in fiscal year 2000, are funded primarily by assessments on the institutions that make up the system, including the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac). This report (1) analyses trends in administrative expenses for fiscal years 1996 through 2000 and (2) compares ways that FCA and other federal financial regulators calculate the assessments they need to fund their operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although FCA's administrative expenditures varied each year between 1996 and 2000, they remained below 1996 levels and stayed within congressionally imposed annual spending limits for each year during 1997 through 2000. Between 1996 and 2000, the agency experienced a decline in administrative spending of around $2 million, or 5.8 percent. Personnel costs were the largest single expense, consistently accounting for more than 80 percent of administrative spending; thus, a 15 percent staff reduction also provided the greatest overall savings. Unlike many government agencies whose operations are funded by taxpayers' money, the federal financial regulators are self-funded agencies that rely primarily on assessments from the entities they regulate. In calculating these assessments, FCA and the other federal financial regulators use separate methodologies for primary and secondary market entities. |
gao_HEHS-99-26 | gao_HEHS-99-26_0 | Federal participation in the infectious diseases surveillance network focuses on CDC activities—particularly those of the National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), which operates CDC’s infectious diseases laboratories. Not All States Conduct Surveillance and Testing for Important Emerging Infections
While state surveillance and laboratory testing programs are extensive, not all include every significant emerging infectious disease, leaving gaps in the nation’s surveillance network. Slightly more than half the state laboratories use PFGE, which state and CDC officials believe could be valuable to most or all states’ diseases surveillance efforts. 1). Testing to support state surveillance of hepatitis C and penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae occurs in fewer than half of the states. Epidemiologists and laboratory officials both said that public health officials often lack either basic computer equipment or integrated data systems that would allow them to rapidly share surveillance-related information with public and private partners. Most state officials believe they need to expand their infectious diseases surveillance programs. No Public Health Consensus Defines Core Capacities Needed for Surveillance System
Although many state officials are concerned about their staffing and technology resources, public health officials have not developed a consensus definition of the minimum capabilities that state and local health departments need to conduct infectious diseases surveillance. Many state laboratory directors and epidemiologists said this assistance has been essential to their ability to conduct infectious diseases surveillance and to take advantage of new laboratory technology. Laboratory testing and consultation. Training. 2). State officials also cited a need for training and technical assistance in information-sharing systems. 3). 4). Our survey results tend to support this view: surveillance of five of the six emerging infectious diseases we asked about is widespread among states, and surveillance of four of the six is supported by testing in state public health laboratories. Just over half of the state public health laboratories have access to molecular technology that many experts believe all states could use, and few states require the routine submission of specimens to their state laboratories for testing—a step urged by CDC. In addition, many state epidemiologists believe their surveillance programs do not sufficiently study all infectious diseases they consider important, including antibiotic-resistant conditions and hepatitis C.
Both laboratory directors and epidemiologists expressed concerns about the staffing and technology resources they have for surveillance and information sharing. This report discusses (1) the extent to which states conduct public health surveillance and laboratory testing of selected emerging infectious diseases, (2) the problems state public health officials face in gathering and using laboratory-related data in the surveillance of emerging infectious diseases, and (3) the assistance CDC provides to states for laboratory-related surveillance and the extent to which state officials consider it valuable. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the nation's infectious diseases surveillance network, focusing on the: (1) extent to which states conduct public health surveillance and laboratory testing of selected emerging infectious diseases; (2) problems state public health officials face in gathering and using laboratory-related data in the surveillance of emerging infectious diseases; and (3) assistance that the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides to states for laboratory-related surveillance and the value of this assistance to state officials.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) surveillance and testing for important emerging infectious diseases are not comprehensive in all states, leaving gaps in the nation's infectious diseases surveillance network; (2) GAO's survey found that most states conduct surveillance of five of the six emerging infectious diseases GAO asked about, and state public health laboratories conduct tests to support state surveillance of four of the six; (3) over half of the state laboratories do not conduct tests for surveillance of hepatitis C and penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae; (4) many state epidemiologists believe that their infectious diseases surveillance programs should expand, and they cited a need to gather more information on antibiotic-resistant diseases; (5) just over half of the state public health laboratories have access to advanced molecular technology, which could be valuable to all states' diseases surveillance efforts; (6) few states require the routine submission of specimens or isolated quantities of a pathogen from patients with certain diseases for testing in state laboratories--a step CDC has urged them to adopt to improve the quality of surveillance information; (7) many state laboratory directors and epidemiologists reported that inadequate staffing and information-sharing problems hinder their ability to generate and use laboratory data to conduct infectious diseases surveillance; (8) participants in the surveillance network often lack basic computer hardware or integrated systems to allow them to rapidly share information; (9) many state officials told GAO that they did not have sufficient staffing and technology resources, and public health officials have not agreed on a consensus definition of the minimum capabilities that state and local health departments need to conduct infectious diseases surveillance; (10) this lack of consensus makes it difficult to assess resource needs; (11) most state laboratory directors and epidemiologists placed high value on CDC's testing and consulting services, training, and grant funding and said these services were critical to their ability to use laboratory data to detect and monitor emerging infections; (12) state officials said CDC needs to better integrate its data systems and help states build systems that link them to local and private surveillance partners; and (13) state officials would like CDC to provide more hands-on training experience. |
gao_GAO-07-316 | gao_GAO-07-316_0 | In 2005, 13 countries shipped natural gas to 14 LNG-importing countries. LNG imports, as a percentage of a country’s total gas supply, for each of the importing countries ranged from 3 percent in the United States to nearly 95 percent in Japan. Studies Identified Various Distances That the Heat Effects of an LNG Fire Could Be Hazardous to People because of Assumptions Made
The studies’ conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to the heat could burn people ranged from about 500 meters (less than 1/3 mile) to more than 2,000 meters (about 1-1/4 miles). The results—size of the LNG pool, the duration of the fire, and the heat hazard distance for skin burn—varied in part because the studies made different assumptions about key parameters of LNG spills and also because they were designed and conducted for different purposes. Volume of LNG spilled. The longer the fire, the greater potential for damage to the tanker and for cascading failure. The 2004 Sandia study was intended to develop guidance on a risk-based analysis approach to assess potential threats to an LNG tanker, determine the potential consequences of a large spill, and review techniques that could be used to mitigate the consequences of an LNG spill. In these cases, the LNG spill from one tank, as well as the subsequent fire, causes the neighboring two tanks to fail on the LNG tanker, resulting in LNG spills from three of the five tanks on the tanker. Some Studies Examined Other Potential Hazards and Identified Their Impact on Public Safety
Three of the studies also examined other potential hazards of an LNG spill, including LNG vapor explosions, other types of explosions, and asphyxiation. Experts Generally Agreed That the Most Likely Public Safety Impact of an LNG Spill Is Fire’s Heat Effect, but That Further Study Is Needed to Clarify the Extent of This Effect
Our panel of 19 experts generally agreed on the public safety impact of an LNG spill and disagreed with a few of the conclusions of the Sandia study. These priorities include large-scale fire experiments, large-scale LNG spill experiments on water, the potential for cascading failure of multiple LNG tanks, and improved modeling techniques. Experts Disagreed with a Few Key Conclusions of the Sandia National Laboratories Study
Experts disagreed with heat hazard and cascading failure conclusions of the Sandia study. As table 2 shows, DOE’s recently funded study involving large-scale LNG fire experiments addresses some, but not all, of the research priorities identified by the expert panel. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address the first objective, we identified eight unclassified, completed studies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) hazards and reviewed the six studies that included new, original research (either experimental or modeling) and clearly described the methodology used. Detonation in a confined setting (BLEVE)
If experts answered that “under controlled experimental conditions, it is possible to induce this type of explosion in this type of setting,” they were asked to answer the following question: What is the likelihood of a each type of explosion of LNG vapors in each setting described occurring following an LNG spill caused by a terrorist attack on a tanker? | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States imports natural gas by pipeline from Canada and by tanker as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from overseas. LNG--a supercooled form of natural gas--currently accounts for about 3 percent of total U.S. natural gas supply, with an expected increase to about 17 percent by 2030, according to the Department of Energy (DOE). With this projected increase, many more LNG import terminals have been proposed. However, concerns have been raised about whether LNG tankers could become terrorist targets, causing the LNG cargo to spill and catch on fire, and potentially explode. DOE has recently funded a study to consider these effects; completion is expected in 2008. GAO was asked to (1) describe the results of recent studies on the consequences of an LNG spill and (2) identify the areas of agreement and disagreement among experts concerning the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. To address these objectives, GAO, among other things, convened an expert panel to discuss the consequences of an attack on an LNG tanker.
What GAO Found
The six unclassified completed studies GAO reviewed examined the effect of a fire resulting from an LNG spill but produced varying results; some studies also examined other potential hazards of a large LNG spill. The studies' conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to the heat (heat hazard) could burn people ranged from less than 1/3 of a mile to about 1-1/4 miles. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) conducted one of the studies and concluded, based on its analysis of multiple attack scenarios, that a good estimate of the heat hazard distance would be about 1 mile. Federal agencies use this conclusion to assess proposals for new LNG import terminals. The variations among the studies occurred because researchers had to make modeling assumptions since there are no data for large LNG spills, either from accidental spills or spill experiments. These assumptions involved the size of the hole in the tanker; the volume of the LNG spilled; and environmental conditions, such as wind and waves. The three studies that considered LNG explosions concluded explosions were unlikely unless the LNG vapors were in a confined space. Only the Sandia study examined the potential for sequential failure of LNG cargo tanks (cascading failure) and concluded that up to three of the ship's five tanks could be involved in such an event and that this number of tanks would increase the duration of the LNG fire. GAO's expert panel generally agreed on the public safety impact of an LNG spill, but believed further study was needed to clarify the extent of these effects, and suggested priorities for this additional research. Experts agreed that the most likely public safety impact of an LNG spill is the heat hazard of a fire and that explosions are not likely to occur in the wake of an LNG spill. However, experts disagreed on the specific heat hazard and cascading failure conclusions reached by the Sandia study. DOE's recently funded study involving large-scale LNG fire experiments addresses some, but not all, of the research priorities identified by the expert panel. The leading unaddressed priority the panel cited was the potential for cascading failure of LNG tanks. |
gao_GAO-07-541 | gao_GAO-07-541_0 | Background
The Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) created the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a retirement savings plan similar to private- sector 401(k) plans, as a key component of the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) for federal workers. First, an independent entity audits administrative expenses as part of a larger financial audit of FRTIB. Trends and Composition of Administrative Expenses
FRTIB’s administrative expenses ranged from a peak of $101 million in fiscal year 2000 to $83 million estimated for fiscal year 2006. However, in real terms, FRTIB’s administrative expenses in 2006 were at a 7-year low. Overview of Individual Categories of Expenses and Comparison of Expenses Against Other Agencies and Federal Regulations
For its administrative activities, FRTIB has established practices that are consistent with federal regulations. Although the cost per square foot for its headquarters is comparable to average rates that GSA cites for nearby available properties, the amount of space FRTIB rents is greater per employee than GSA recommends. Services Purchased from Private Contractors and Other Federal Agencies
The amount that FRTIB spends purchasing services from other entities is at a 7-year low. Currently, FRTIB rents more than 47,000 square feet. FRTIB travel is governed by federal travel regulations. This measure is very important for participants—and the TSP compares favorably on this measure. Looking only at an aggregate measure—whether the investment fee or the total administrative costs—provides insufficient information to judge whether individual activities are being conducted either to achieve the best performance or in the most efficient manner. Benchmarking by individual activity permits an organization to compare the performance of its individual processes/activities—and the way those processes/activities are conducted—with either standards or “best in class” in a specific activity. Consistent with this commitment FRTIB is looking into consolidating its office space. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify the administrative expenses of the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB) we reviewed the President’s budget, FRTIB’s audited financial statements, FRTIB’s budget documents from meeting notes of the board members, and FRTIB’s written responses to our questions. To judge whether the administrative expenses of FRTIB are the result of practices consistent with federal regulations, we identified the regulations that guide FRTIB’s expenses for activities such as compensating employees. We also reviewed FRTIB’s responses to questions we submitted. 2. However, consistent with FRTIB’s commitment to managing the TSP in the interest of participants and beneficiaries of TSP, we note that use of telecommunications offers opportunities to further reduce expenses. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB) is charged with managing the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)--a key component of retirement savings for many federal employees--in the interest of its participants and beneficiaries. As part of a broader request on oversight of FRTIB, GAO reviewed (1) the administrative expenses of FRTIB and key components of these expenses, (2) whether the administrative expenses of FRTIB are the result of practices consistent with federal regulations and similar functions at other agencies, and (3) FRTIB's current method of benchmarking administrative expenses. GAO reviewed FRTIB's budgets, audited financial statements, a benchmarking study, and written responses to questions that GAO submitted. GAO also reviewed the regulations that guide FRTIB's spending.
What GAO Found
FRTIB's administrative expenses ranged from a peak of $101 million in fiscal year 2000 to $83 million estimated for fiscal year 2006. Only the 2001 administrative expenses were lower, reflecting the termination of a key contract. In real terms, FRTIB's administrative expenses in 2006 were at a 7-year low. Throughout this period more than half of FRTIB's administrative expenses went towards purchasing services from outside entities--private contractors and other government agencies. The next largest share of FRTIB's budget was for miscellaneous expenses, such as printing and information technology. Additional administrative expenses were spent on compensation of FRTIB's 65 employees, rent, and travel. FRTIB has established practices that are consistent with federal regulations--for acquisition, compensation, and travel. There are some areas, however, that suggest opportunities for future savings. The amount FRTIB pays per square foot is consistent with average rental rates that the General Services Administration (GSA) cites for nearby available properties. However, FRTIB rents more space per employee than GSA would recommend. Given recent downsizing, FRTIB has begun looking into consolidating its office space. Additionally, opportunities exist to reduce the travel expenses of TSP board members traveling to Washington, D.C. FRTIB's current method of benchmarking TSP participants' investment fees against those charged by 401(k) plans is a very important measure for participants--and the TSP compares favorably on this measure. However, looking only at an aggregate measure provides insufficient information to judge whether individual activities are being conducted either to achieve the best performance or in the most efficient manner. Benchmarking by individual activity permits an organization to compare its performance with standards or "best in class" in a specific activity. |
gao_GAO-16-33 | gao_GAO-16-33_0 | Under agreement with CMS, a state survey agency in each state assesses whether nursing homes meet CMS’s standards, allowing them to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Clinical quality measures. Nursing Home Quality Data Show Mixed Results, Although Data Issues Complicate Ability to Assess Quality Trends
In recent years, trends in four key sets of data that give insight into nursing home quality show mixed results. Specifically, one of the four data sets suggests that consumers’ concerns over nursing home quality have increased, which may indicate a potential decrease in quality, while the other three sets of data may indicate potential improvement in nursing home quality. Data on Nursing Home Quality Show Mixed Results
Nationally, in recent years, one of four data sets—number of consumer complaints—demonstrated a potential decrease in nursing home quality, while the other three data sets—serious deficiencies cited on standard surveys, staffing data, and selected clinical quality measures— demonstrated potential quality improvement. Consumer complaints: From 2005 through 2014, the average number of consumer complaints reported per nursing home increased nationally from 3.2 to 3.9, a 21 percent increase over the 10-year period. 1.) Data Issues Complicate Ability to Assess Quality Trends
CMS’s ability to use available data to assess nursing home quality trends is complicated by various issues with these data. Specifically, each of the four key sets of nursing home data we analyzed have issues that make it difficult to determine whether observed trends reflect actual changes in quality, data issues, or a combination of both. CMS officials said these challenges led to reduced state survey agency capacity to conduct surveys, which could contribute to the decrease in the number of deficiencies cited on standard surveys. CMS Has Modified Oversight Activities, But Has Not Monitored Potential Effect on Nursing Home Quality Oversight
In recent years CMS has made numerous modifications to its nursing home oversight activities. Some of these modifications expanded or added new oversight activities. Other modifications have reduced existing oversight activities. For example, CMS has made modifications to the federal monitoring survey program and the Special Focus Facility program. Nursing homes placed in the SFF program receive additional oversight because of the homes’ history of poor performance. Specifically, CMS officials said that increasing oversight responsibilities, such as those required by PPACA, and a limited number of staff and financial resources at the central, regional, and state levels required the agency to evaluate its activities and reduce the scope of some activities. Under federal internal control standards, ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of normal program operations. Federal internal control standards require agencies to monitor performance data to assess the quality of performance over time, and CMS’s ability to do so is hindered by data issues. Consistent with federal internal control standards, establishing an effective process for monitoring modifications of essential oversight activities made at the CMS central office, CMS regional office, and state survey agency levels—whether positive or negative—could allow CMS to better understand the effects these modifications may have on nursing home quality and make improvements to its own oversight. To help ensure modifications of CMS’s oversight activities do not adversely affect the agency’s ability to assess nursing home quality and that effective modifications are adopted more widely, the Administrator of CMS should establish a process for monitoring modifications of essential oversight activities made at the CMS central office, CMS regional office, and state survey agency levels to better understand the effects on nursing home quality oversight. As we describe in this report, ongoing auditing of self-reported data is important for ensuring data accuracy; as a result, whenever self-reported data are used for understanding nursing home quality—including the new electronic payroll system for collecting staffing data and data used to calculate clinical quality measures—our recommendation indicates that HHS should plan for and conduct audits in a continuing manner. Appendix I: Additional Detail on Analysis
This appendix describes our scope and methodology for examining the extent to which reported nursing home quality has changed in recent years and the factors that may have affected any observed changes. For this examination, we analyzed four sets of quality data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). | Why GAO Did This Study
To help ensure nursing home residents receive quality care, CMS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), defines quality standards homes must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. To monitor compliance with these standards, CMS enters into agreements with state survey agencies to conduct on-site surveys of the state's homes and also collects other data on nursing home quality. CMS and others have reported some potential improvements in nursing home quality.
GAO was asked to study these trends. This report examines (1) the extent to which reported nursing home quality has changed in recent years and the factors that may have affected any observed changes, and (2) how CMS oversight activities have changed in recent years. GAO analyzed four sets of CMS quality data—deficiencies cited on standard surveys (2005-2014), consumer complaints (2005-2014), staffing levels (2009-2014), and a sub-set of clinical quality measures (2011-2014)—at both national and state levels. We also reviewed relevant documents, including CMS guidance and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and interviewed CMS and state agency officials at 5 states selected on factors such as size.
What GAO Found
In recent years, trends in four key sets of data that give insight into nursing home quality show mixed results, and data issues complicate the ability to assess quality trends. Nationally, one of the four data sets—consumer complaints—suggests that consumers' concerns over quality have increased, while the other three data sets—deficiencies, staffing levels, and clinical quality measures—indicate potential improvement in nursing home quality. For example, the average number of consumer complaints reported per home increased by 21 percent from 2005-2014, indicating a potential decrease in quality. Conversely, the number of serious deficiencies identified per home with an on-site survey, referred to as a standard survey, decreased by 41 percent over the same period, indicating potential improvement. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) ability to use available data to assess nursing home quality is complicated by various issues with these data, which make it difficult to determine whether observed trends reflect actual changes in quality, data issues, or both. For example, clinical quality measures use data that are self-reported by nursing homes, and while CMS has begun auditing the self-reported data, it does not have clear plans to continue. Federal internal control standards require agencies to monitor performance data to assess the quality of performance over time.
In recent years, CMS has made numerous modifications to its nursing home oversight activities, but has not monitored the potential effect of these modifications on nursing home quality oversight. Some of the modifications have expanded or added new oversight activities, while others have reduced existing oversight activities. According to CMS, some of the reductions to oversight activities are in response to an increase in oversight responsibilities and limited number of staff and financial resources. However, CMS has not monitored how the modifications might affect CMS's ability to assess nursing home quality. For example, CMS reduced the number of nursing homes participating in the Special Focus Facility program—which provides additional oversight of homes with a history of poor performance—from 152 in 2013 to 62 in 2014. State survey agency officials who conduct surveys for CMS also made modifications which could have either a positive or negative effect on oversight, but CMS does not have an effective mechanism for monitoring. Federal internal control standards require ongoing monitoring as a part of normal program operations; without this monitoring, CMS cannot ensure that any modifications in oversight do not adversely affect its ability to assess nursing home quality.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that CMS implement a clear plan for ongoing auditing of self-reported data and establish a process for monitoring oversight modifications to better assess their effects. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-66 | gao_RCED-97-66_0 | State and Federal Actions to Encourage Voluntary Cleanups
To encourage redevelopment and help clean up sites that have not yet been addressed, most states, in the last few years, have created voluntary cleanup programs. In contrast to the state cleanup programs that rely on enforcement to compel cleanups by responsible parties, these programs allow volunteers, such as site owners or developers, to approach the state and initiate cleanups on their own. The agency is currently drafting guidance for establishing agreements with states that would specify, for programs meeting EPA’s criteria, that generally EPA will plan to take further action at sites in a state’s voluntary program only in limited circumstances. We agreed to (1) identify voluntary cleanup programs’ accomplishments; (2) describe these programs’ organization, funding, and major characteristics; and (3) determine the effects of federal hazardous waste policies on voluntary cleanups and the types of federal assistance that could further support voluntary programs. For the same reasons, voluntary cleanups are also less costly for both the states and volunteers. State officials attributed the success of their voluntary programs to the incentives these programs typically provide to attract participants, including (1) relief under state law from future liability—and therefore relief from the risk of incurring additional costs—for past contamination; (2) clearly defined cleanup standards that identify the extent of the necessary cleanup—and therefore the time and costs involved—at the start of a cleanup; and (3) reduced paperwork and cleanup requirements. Voluntary Cleanups Cost Less and Take Less Time
Because voluntary programs have fewer paperwork and oversight requirements than enforcement programs, they cost less both for the state and for volunteers, according to officials in every program we reviewed. The states receive funding for their programs by charging volunteers to participate, so their programs are, to some extent, privately financed. Whereas nearly all of the voluntary programs admitted sites contaminated enough to qualify for federal cleanup, two programs managed such sites only through the federal or their state’s enforcement program. All of the 17 programs reduced the requirements they imposed on cleanups to attract participants, but the changes varied extensively. First, EPA has been adding fewer sites to the federal Superfund program. Participants in these programs generally must meet the requirements by selecting one of three approaches for achieving an appropriate level of cleanup: the amount of a chemical that naturally existed in the local soil and groundwater before the contamination occurred; the cleanup standard established by the state for a contaminant, based on a determination of the maximum amount of the contaminant that can remain in soil or water without posing a risk to public health or the environment: The state analyzes the toxicity of the contaminant and the likelihood that people will be exposed to it to establish this cleanup standard; or the amount of cleanup necessary to control the unique risks posed by a particular contaminant at a particular site, as determined by a formal assessment of that site’s risks. EPA and the Congress Have Provided Funds
Since 1995, EPA has allowed the states to use a portion of the funds from their Superfund cooperative agreements to develop their voluntary cleanup programs. Not all of the 10 initial agreements would satisfy all of the criteria set forth in EPA’s interim memorandum. Consequently, to better define its criteria for voluntary programs in its final guidance, EPA could look to the models implemented by several states that vary their requirements with the risks and conditions at individual sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the voluntary cleanup programs that states have created to facilitate privately initiated cleanups, focusing on: (1) the voluntary cleanup programs' accomplishments; (2) these programs' organization, funding, and major characteristics; and (3) the effects of federal hazardous waste policies on voluntary cleanups and the types of federal assistance that could further support voluntary programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) voluntary programs' accomplishments include identifying, evaluating, and cleaning up many contaminated sites that would not have been addressed under other federal or state cleanup programs for some time, if at all, according to the state managers GAO surveyed; (2) because of these programs' cooperative nature and reduced cleanup procedures, voluntary cleanups are also less costly for the states and participants and take less time; (3) most of the 17 programs are organized to supplement their state's enforcement program, but a few are responsible for nearly all of the cleanups in their state; (4) all of the programs allowed volunteers to come forward on their own, saving their state from having to take time-consuming and costly enforcement actions; (5) all of the programs received funding through the fees paid by volunteers to participate, but most also relied on some federal and state funds; (6) nearly all of the programs admitted any type of site, including highly contaminated sites that could qualify for the federal program; (7) as an incentive to encourage cleanups, all of the programs gave volunteers some assurance of relief from future state liability at a completed site, but the legal strength of this assurance varied considerably; (8) in addition, to cut cleanup time and costs, all of the programs reduced the requirements they imposed on voluntary cleanups; (9) several programs balanced the requirements they implemented with incentives to attract volunteers by tailoring the stringency of the requirements to the risks and conditions at individual sites; (10) the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) authority under Superfund to ensure that any cleanup protects public health and the environment and the federal law's stringent liability provisions deter participation in voluntary programs because potential volunteers fear they could face expensive and indefinite cleanup liability; (11) Congress and EPA have supported voluntary programs by allowing the states to use a portion of the funds they receive through the federal Superfund program to develop and implement the voluntary programs; (12) to address liability issues, EPA has been working with the states over the past year to develop final guidance for negotiating agreements between EPA and the states, under which EPA generally will not plan to take further action at sites in a voluntary program that meets the agency's criteria for ensuring effective and protective cleanups; and (13) in the meantime, EPA has issued an interim memorandum outlining six criteria for voluntary programs that EPA's regions can use to enter into agreements with the states. |
gao_GAO-16-740 | gao_GAO-16-740_0 | The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff led the effort in consultation with the Departments of State and Energy. In support of this objective, the United States signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia—known as New START—on April 8, 2010, which entered into force on February 5, 2011. According to DOD’s April 2014 report on its plan to implement New START, DOD plans to maintain 400 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles; 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and 60 deployed heavy bombers. DOD and military service officials told us these numbers reflect DOD’s current planned strategic force structure for implementing New START. Figure 1 shows DOD’s planned deployed strategic force structure for implementing New START, including the number of delivery vehicles for each leg of the triad. DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad in the 2010 NPR and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Forces in Subsequent Reviews
DOD assessed the need for each leg of the strategic triad in support of the 2010 NPR and considered other reductions to nuclear forces in subsequent reviews. The department identified advantages of each leg of the triad and concluded that retaining all three would help maintain strategic deterrence and stability. The 2010 NPR report states that the administration considered various options for U.S. nuclear force structure, including options in which the United States would eliminate one leg of the triad. DOD officials also told us that the department had assessed nuclear force reductions as part of subsequent reviews, including during the development of the President’s nuclear employment guidance, the 2013 Strategic Choices Management Review, and the development of DOD’s plan to implement New START. These advantages—including the survivability of the sea-based leg; the intercontinental ballistic missiles’ contribution to stability; and the ability of the nuclear-capable bombers to visibly forward deploy—are further described in Navy and Air Force acquisition documents completed both before and after the 2010 NPR, from 2008 through 2014. DOD officials were unable to provide us documentation of the NPR’s analysis of the strategic force structure options that were considered; officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Strategic Command told us that much of the NPR analysis on the consideration of different strategic force structure options was discussed in senior-level meetings and was not documented. In addition to the discussions and analysis of options for alternative strategic force structures that occurred during the development of the 2010 NPR, Strategic Command, Air Force, and Navy officials told us that they had also analyzed alternative strategic force structures in advance of the NPR discussions. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of the classified version of this report to DOD for review and comment. In response to that draft report, DOD provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1960s, the United States has deployed nuclear weapons on three types of strategic delivery vehicles collectively known as the strategic triad. The triad comprises the sea-based leg (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), ground-based leg (intercontinental ballistic missiles), and airborne leg (nuclear-capable heavy bombers). As a result of arms control agreements and strategic policies, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons and strategic delivery vehicles has been reduced substantially; however, the strategic triad has remained intact. DOD and the Department of Energy are planning to invest significant resources to recapitalize and modernize the strategic triad in the coming decades. The departments projected in 2015 that the costs of maintaining U.S. nuclear forces for fiscal years 2016 through 2025 would total $319.8 billion, and DOD expects recapitalization and modernization efforts to extend into the 2030s.
GAO was asked to review DOD's analysis of the decision to retain all three legs of the strategic triad. This report describes the processes DOD used in supporting that decision. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from DOD and the military services on the key reviews DOD carried out from 2009 to 2014— including the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review—in analyzing its strategic force structure.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) assessed the need for each leg of the strategic triad in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and considered other reductions to nuclear forces in subsequent reviews. The department identified advantages of each leg of the triad and concluded that retaining all three would help maintain strategic deterrence and stability. The advantages DOD identified include the survivability of the sea-based leg, the intercontinental ballistic missiles' contribution to stability, and the ability of the nuclear-capable bombers to visibly forward deploy. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report states—and DOD officials also told GAO—that the administration has considered various options for the U.S. nuclear force structure, including options in which DOD would eliminate one leg of the triad. For example, Strategic Command, Air Force, and Navy officials told GAO that they had analyzed alternative strategic force structures in preparation for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. DOD officials also told GAO that the department had assessed nuclear force reductions as part of reviews conducted after the Nuclear Posture Review, including during the development of the President's 2013 nuclear employment guidance, the 2013 Strategic Choices Management Review, and DOD's 2014 plan to implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia. The figure shows DOD's current planned strategic force structure for implementing New START, including the number of delivery vehicles that would be retained for each leg of the triad.
This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in May 2016. It excludes classified information on warhead levels, the specific advantages of each leg of the triad, and some of the analyses of alternatives that were considered.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-195 | gao_GAO-08-195_0 | This comparison may result in outsourcing federal jobs to the private sector. The Forest Service Does Not Have a Realistic Strategic Plan or Adequate Guidance to Effectively Implement Its Competitive Sourcing Program
The Forest Service lacks a realistic strategic plan and adequate guidance to help ensure that it can effectively and efficiently implement its competitive sourcing program. In addition, the Forest Service does not have a strategy on how to assess the cumulative effect that competing activities could have on its ability to fight wildland fires and respond to other emergencies, even though outsourcing a large number of federal jobs to the private sector could reduce the availability of certified responders in the long term. The Forest Service’s Strategic Plan for Managing Its Competitive Sourcing Program Is Not Realistic
The Forest Service’s December 2005 Green Plan for managing its competitive sourcing program is not realistic because it does not take into account the personnel and funding resources that are likely to be available to implement the plan, even though it proposes to subject all commercial activities—performed by approximately 24,500 FTEs—to feasibility studies during fiscal years 2005 through 2009. Furthermore, agency employees may be tempted to classify an activity as either inherently governmental or core-commercial to exempt it from competition. For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, we found that the Forest Service (1) narrowly interpreted the spending limitations to exclude certain costs and (2) lacked sufficiently complete and reliable cost data to demonstrate its compliance with the appropriations acts’ spending limitations on its competitive sourcing activities. The Forest Service’s Interpretation of Costs That Are Subject to Statutory Spending Limitations Was Too Narrow
For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the Forest Service did not attempt to collect cost data on all competitive sourcing activities because it believed that some costs associated with these activities were not subject to the spending limitations of $5 million, $2 million, and $3 million, respectively, as established in its appropriations acts. In consultation with Forest Service officials, we agreed that it was not feasible to reconstruct cost data for competitive sourcing activities between fiscal years 2004 and 2006 to determine if the Forest Service exceeded the appropriations acts’ spending limitations. Figure 1 shows how savings from competitions are calculated. The Forest Service Did Not Include All Costs Associated with Its Competitive Sourcing Program When Calculating Savings Reported to Congress
While the Forest Service could not substantiate the savings it reported to Congress using OMB’s guidance, the guidance itself allows agencies to exclude some costs associated with A-76 competitions, which, if excluded, may not provide Congress with an accurate measure of the savings produced by the competitions. We are also concerned about the usefulness of the cost savings that the Forest Service reported to Congress. The Forest Service responded. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Forest Service has (1) plans and guidance to help implement its competitive sourcing program effectively and (2) sufficient cost data to ensure that it complied with its competitive sourcing statutory spending limitations and accurately reported its competitive sourcing savings to Congress for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. Finally, we examined the guidance currently available to Forest Service employees responsible for scoping competitive sourcing competitions and interviewed Forest Service officials familiar with the agency’s competitive sourcing activities. Without clear guidance, we do not believe that the Forest Service’s current process can offer sufficient safeguards to ensure that key work activities are excluded from A-76 competitions, especially in light of the agency’s plan to examine the activities of two thirds of its workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competitive sourcing is aimed at promoting competition between federal employees and the private sector as a way to improve government operations. Key work activities--those that are either inherently governmental or core to the agency's mission--are generally exempt from competitions. In fiscal year 2004, Congress began placing spending limitations on the Forest Service's competitive sourcing program because of concerns about how the program was managed. Also, like other agencies, the Forest Service must report annually to Congress on the savings achieved from any competitions it conducted. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the Forest Service has (1) plans and guidance to help implement its competitive sourcing program effectively and (2) sufficient cost data to ensure that it complied with its spending limitations and accurately reported its savings to Congress for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. To answer these objectives, GAO examined the agency's strategic plan, guidance, and available cost data for competitive sourcing and interviewed key agency officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service lacks a realistic strategic plan and adequate guidance to help ensure that it can effectively implement its competitive sourcing program. For example, the Forest Service's current strategic plan is unrealistic because it does not take into account the likely availability of personnel and funding resources needed to implement the plan. Furthermore, the Forest Service lacks sufficient guidance on identifying key work activities that should be excluded from competitions. Although Forest Service officials do not believe that inappropriate work activities have been included in competitions that it has held, without clear guidance the Forest Service remains at risk of doing so. The agency also lacks a strategy on how to assess the cumulative effect that competitions could have on its ability to fight wildland fires and respond to other emergencies. Outsourcing a large number of federal jobs to the private sector could, over time, reduce the number of available responders. For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the Forest Service lacked sufficiently complete and reliable cost data to (1) demonstrate its compliance with statutory spending limitations on its competitive sourcing activities and (2) accurately report competitive sourcing savings to Congress. Regarding compliance with spending limitations, the Forest Service did not collect cost data on all activities related to competitive sourcing because it believed that some costs were not subject to the limitations. For example, the Forest Service did not collect data on employees' salaries related to studying the feasibility of conducting a competition--a key component of its competitive sourcing process. GAO has interpreted the statutory spending limitations to generally apply to all costs attributable to the Forest Service's competitive sourcing program. Moreover, because the Forest Service's cost data used to determine compliance with statutory spending limitations were not reliable, the Forest Service cannot know if it exceeded the limitations. Regarding the savings achieved from its competitions, the Forest Service reported to Congress a savings totaling over $38 million between fiscal years 2004 and 2006. However, the Forest Service could not provide GAO with sufficient data or the methodology it used to calculate savings derived from competitions. In addition, GAO found that the Forest Service did not consider certain costs, which were substantial, in its savings calculations. As a result, Congress may not have an accurate measure of the savings from the Forest Service's competitive sourcing competitions during this period. |
gao_GAO-03-387 | gao_GAO-03-387_0 | Further, analysis by other organizations also has examined the experiences of minority groups under Social Security. Certain Key Factors Influence Racial Groups’ Receipt of Social Security Benefits and Payment of Social Security Taxes
A variety of socioeconomic and demographic factors influence the receipt of Social Security—most significantly, lifetime earnings, the incidence of disability, and mortality. Lifetime earnings factor directly into the progressive benefit formula, which replaces a larger proportion of pre- retirement covered earnings for low-income earners than it does for higher-income earners. Additionally, the probability of being on the Disability Insurance rolls affects the expected value of benefits. Higher Benefits Relative to Taxes Paid are Associated with Lower Lifetime Earnings and Higher Disability Incidence
Differences by race in the relationship between taxes paid and benefits received under Social Security are due to differences in lifetime earnings, the incidence of disability, and mortality between the groups. However, whites with low lifetime earnings and high disability rates also receive greater benefits relative to taxes than their higher- income and nondisabled counterparts. As a Group, on Average Minorities Accrue Higher Benefits in Relation to the Taxes They Pay
In the aggregate, blacks and Hispanics generally have higher disability rates and lower lifetime earnings, and thus receive greater benefits relative to taxes than whites. Additionally, we used three measures of equity–lifetime benefit-to-tax ratio, net lifetime benefits, and internal rates of return—to analyze the relationship between Social Security contributions and benefits under Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), Old- Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI). We also used three benchmark-policy scenarios that restore the 75-year actuarial balance of the Social Security system–-a payroll tax increase, a progressive benefit reduction, and a proportional benefit reduction. Three equity measures are used to determine how groups compare in terms of the taxes they pay and the benefits they receive under Social Security. These tables are located on the Bureau’s website at: http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/detail/lt99_10.a Mortality affects the benefits received relative to taxes paid because it determines the number of years a person will pay taxes and receive benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although Social Security's benefit and contribution provisions are neutral with respect to race, ethnicity, and gender, concerns about the experiences of minority groups under Social Security focus on whether they benefit less than whites, particularly because of the shorter life expectancy of blacks. These concerns are related to the concept of equity, or how benefits compare with taxes. To gain a thorough understanding of the experiences of minority populations under Social Security, GAO was asked to examine (1) what socioeconomic and demographic factors influence Social Security taxes paid and benefits received and (2) how different equity measures compare across racial groups. Because of the current system's projected actuarial deficit, to conduct this study, GAO made its calculations using three policy scenarios, each of which achieves 75-year solvency: a payroll tax increase and a progressive and proportional benefit cut. Further, GAO used three measures of equity: lifetime benefit-to-tax ratios, net lifetime benefits, and real internal rates of return. GAO also examined four birth cohorts: 1931-40, 1941-45, 1946-55, and 1956-64.
What GAO Found
Lifetime earnings, the incidence of disability, and mortality are three key factors that influence the taxes individuals pay into the Social Security system and the benefits they receive. Lifetime earnings factor directly into the Social Security benefit formula, which is designed to replace a larger proportion of pre-retirement-covered earnings for low-income earners than for higher-income earners. Additionally, the probability of being on the Disability Insurance rolls affects the expected value of benefits. People who are disabled start receiving benefits earlier. The third factor, mortality, affects the benefits received relative to taxes paid because it determines the number of years a person will pay taxes and receive benefits. Differences by race in the relationship between taxes paid and benefits received under Social Security are due mainly to differences in lifetime earnings, the incidence of disability, and mortality among the groups. In the aggregate, blacks and Hispanics have higher disability rates and lower lifetime earnings, and thus as a group tend to receive greater benefits relative to taxes than whites. However, whites with low lifetime earnings or high disability rates also receive greater benefits relative to taxes than their higher-income or nondisabled counterparts. Higher benefits relative to taxes paid are associated with lower lifetime earnings and higher disability incidence. |
gao_GAO-06-210 | gao_GAO-06-210_0 | BEA Uses a Model to Estimate Remittances Sent from the United States, but the Accuracy of BEA’s Estimate Is Uncertain for Several Reasons
BEA uses a model to estimate remittances (which it calls “personal transfers”) from the United States. BEA estimated that remittances from the United States in 2003 were $28.2 billion. In 2005, BEA revised its model for estimating remittances and incorporated more current Census Bureau data on the size and demographic characteristics of the foreign-born population of the United States; however, the model is limited particularly by lack of current data on the proportion of income immigrants were likely to remit and the assumptions BEA makes about its data. BEA revised its estimates back to 1991 using this new approach, which resulted in an increase in estimated remittances for all years. The Accuracy of BEA’s Remittances Estimates Is Affected by the Quality of the Data and the Assumptions Used in the Methodology
BEA’s approach has several strengths: in theory, it captures both formal and informal channels of sending remittances. Other Entities Use Different Estimation Methodologies Resulting in a Range of Remittance Estimates
Some central banks and IDB use a variety of methodologies and data sources to estimate remittances. The IDB Uses a Variety of Sources to Estimate Remittances Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
Since the year 2000, the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the IDB has been studying the issue of remittances and their impact on the development of the Latin American and Caribbean region. BEA is an active member of an international group supporting this effort, which recommended an agreed upon definition of remittances. In June 2006, a new group will also start an effort to improve guidance on collecting and reporting remittance data. International Working Group Was Established in 2005 to Improve Remittance Data
In 2004, at the annual G8 meeting in Sea Island, Georgia, leaders of the G8 countries recognized the important role remittances play and called upon international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF to lead a global effort to improve remittance statistics. The working group’s first objective was to clarify the definition of remittances. Observations
In recent years, remittances have received growing attention from policy makers because major industrial countries began to understand the magnitude and importance of these flows to developing countries. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to examine (1) the methodology the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses to develop the official U.S. estimates on the volume of remittances from the United States, (2) methodologies used by other countries and multilateral institutions to estimate remittances from the United States, and (3) international efforts to improve the collection and reporting of remittance data. BEA’s Methodology for Estimating Remittances
BEA’s model to estimate remittances combines data on the number of the adult foreign-born population living in the United States, the percentage of the adult foreign-born population that remits, the income of the adult foreign-born population, and the percentage of income that is remitted by the adult foreign-born population. 2. 6. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Remittances are the personal funds that the foreign born send to their home countries. In recent years, estimated remittances have grown dramatically, and policy makers have increased their attention to these flows. Organizations use various methodologies to estimate remittance flows, which result in a range of estimates. In 2004, the Group of Eight (G8) leaders emphasized the need for improved statistical data on remittances. In light of the growing volume of remittances and the differences in estimates, GAO examined (1) the methodology that the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses to develop the official U.S. estimate, (2) methodologies that other countries and multilateral organizations use to estimate remittances, and (3) international efforts to improve the collection and reporting of remittance data.
What GAO Found
BEA uses a model to estimate remittances from the United States and, although the methodology has some strengths, the accuracy of BEA's estimate is uncertain for several reasons. BEA estimated remittances for 2003 at $28.2 billion; its model used data on the number of foreign-born residents, their income, the proportion of income that is remitted, and other demographic data. The strengths of BEA's methodology are that, in theory, it estimates remittances sent through formal and informal channels. It also is low-cost because it uses existing data on the foreign born. However, BEA's methodology was limited by the quality and timeliness of the data, particularly on the portion of income likely to be remitted. BEA revised its model in 2005 to use new data sources, but the accuracy of its estimates depends on the accuracy of its assumptions regarding the remitting behavior of the foreign born and other factors. Some central banks and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) use different methodologies to provide estimates of remittances from the United States that vary significantly. For example, Mexico's central bank estimates remittances primarily by collecting data from money transmitters. The IDB used a variety of sources, such as surveys of remittance senders and receivers, and information from remittance transfer companies and central banks, to estimate remittances from the United States to Latin America to be $30.6 billion in 2003. We aggregated BEA's data to estimate remittances to this region to be $17.9 billion. BEA is an active participant in recent international efforts to improve remittance statistics. The World Bank and others established a remittances working group in 2005, which delegated tasks to other international groups to (1) clarify the definition of remittances and (2) provide guidance on how to collect and estimate remittances. BEA participated in the first group, which recommended a new definition of remittances. The second group will have its first meeting in June 2006. |
gao_GAO-04-511 | gao_GAO-04-511_0 | Establish a simple, transparent, and equitable cost-distribution system. ICASS Has Not Eliminated Duplicative Administrative Support Structures or Streamlined Operations
ICASS has not resulted in efficient delivery of administrative support services or achieved economies of scale because it has neither eliminated costly duplication of administrative support services nor led to systematic cost-containment measures and the streamlining of operations. While agencies cited affordability concerns, programmatic needs, and control issues as reasons for not subscribing to ICASS services, we found that they seldom provided detailed business cases that justified decisions to self-provide support services. In addition, neither service providers nor customer agencies have made systematic efforts to contain costs by consolidating or streamlining services. However, we found that few systematic efforts to consolidate duplicative administrative structures or streamline administrative processes have occurred at either the postwide or worldwide level. ICASS Is Generally Effective in Providing Quality Services Based on Its Stated Goals, but Impediments Still Hinder Its Success
Based on the system’s primary goals, ICASS is generally effective in providing quality administrative support services, although not to the extent that it could be if certain impediments were addressed. We found that ICASS is simple and transparent enough for customers to understand the basic structures that govern service provision at post. Other obstacles to maximizing the system’s effectiveness include limits to overseas staffs’ decision-making authority, which can weaken ICASS’s goal of “local empowerment.” Finally, we found that available training and informational resources that could enhance participants’ knowledge and implementation of ICASS are underutilized. Customers agreed that the system was more equitable than its predecessor, the FAAS system. Moreover, annual reviews of progress toward achieving ICASS strategic goals have not been conducted. ICASS was designed, in part, to the contain costs of overseas administrative services. The U.S. Scope and Methodology
To respond to both objectives of our review—whether the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system has led to efficient delivery of administrative services and whether ICASS is an effective mechanism for providing quality services—we conducted fieldwork and reviewed documentation in Washington, D.C., and at eight posts worldwide. For our case study posts, we collected data and documentation from and conducted interviews with embassy personnel involved in ICASS, including Ambassadors and Charges d’Affaires, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, State management officers, ICASS staff, and customer agency managers and staff who work with ICASS, on the role of the ICASS Council and its decision-making process; mechanisms for ensuring quality services, including evaluating service provider performance and customer satisfaction; the degree to which customers understand ICASS goals and structures, and whether they agree that service quality matches ICASS costs; the level of ICASS training among council members and service providers, including foreign nationals; the management burden associated with ICASS, and the pros and cons the effect of the changing nature of agencies’ staffing (including State’s) on ICASS costs and quality of service; the effect of temporary duty personnel and regional staffing on ICASS whether agencies pay the full costs associated with their presence at the cost centers to which each customer agency subscribes; the cost centers to which each agency does not subscribe, the basis for not subscribing to those services, and how agencies provide for administrative support services to which they do not subscribe under ICASS; the effect that opting out of services has on other agencies; and the degree to which the ICASS Council has considered new approaches to providing ICASS services, including streamlining processes and adopting best practices developed by agencies at posts or by other posts in the region. Overall, ICASS is implemented in one of two manners. GAO Comments
1. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Costs for overseas posts' administrative support services have risen nearly 30 percent since fiscal year 2001, reaching about $1 billion in 2003. These costs are distributed among 50 agencies through the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system, which was designed to reduce costs and provide quality services in a simple, transparent, and equitable manner. Since ICASS was implemented in 1998, its performance has not been systematically reviewed. GAO was asked to examine (1) whether ICASS has led to efficient delivery of administrative services and (2) whether ICASS is an effective mechanism for providing quality services.
What GAO Found
ICASS has not resulted in more efficient delivery of administrative support services because it has neither eliminated duplication nor led to efforts to contain costs by systematically streamlining operations. GAO found that agencies often decide not to use ICASS services and self-provide support services--citing reasons of cost, programmatic needs, and greater control--which can lead to duplicative structures and a higher overall cost to the U.S. government. Although some agencies' reasons for self-providing services may be supportable, GAO found that agencies rarely made business cases for why they chose not to take ICASS services initially or withdrew from services later. In addition, service providers and customer agencies have undertaken few systematic efforts to consolidate services or contain costs by streamlining administrative support structures. Furthermore, GAO found that deterrents to consolidating and streamlining administrative structures largely outweigh the incentives. However, there are efforts, both internal and external to ICASS, that may address some of the obstacles that prevent ICASS from operating more efficiently. Based on the system's primary goals, ICASS is generally effective in providing quality administrative support services in an equitable manner, although not to the extent that it could be if certain impediments were addressed. GAO found that ICASS is simple and transparent enough for customers to understand its basic principles. Furthermore, most personnel agree that ICASS is more equitable than its predecessor. However, ICASS strategic goals lack indicators to gauge progress toward achieving them, and progress toward achieving posts' performance standards is not annually reviewed or updated. Other obstacles to maximizing ICASS include limits to overseas staffs' decision-making authority, which can diminish ICASS's goal of "local empowerment." Finally, GAO found that training and information resources, which could enhance participants' knowledge and implementation of ICASS, are underutilized. |
gao_RCED-95-180 | gao_RCED-95-180_0 | EPA’s Actions to Strengthen Regulations Governing Tank Construction and Contingency Plans
EPA has taken steps to strengthen the regulations for tank construction and contingency plans, although these steps do not fully implement our three recommendations. Minimizing damage from spilled oil. Therefore, we recommended that owners and operators be required to develop such response plans. Difficulty in securing OMB’s approval to collect data for a national inventory of regulated facilities also delayed implementation. It needed this type of information to target for inspection those facilities that posed the greatest environmental risk. Although EPA has not established overall inspection priorities, it has identified one national priority. In 1994, EPA partially implemented our recommendation on contingency planning, and by 1996 it expects to implement three more recommendations (on inspection procedures and documentation, training for inspectors, and penalties for noncompliance). EPA is uncertain when the other three recommendations (on tank construction and design and on targeting inspections) will be implemented. Summary of Recommendations in GAO’s 1989 Report
In 1989, we made seven recommendations to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to improve the regulation and inspection of aboveground oil storage tanks. Recommendations to Improve the Inspection Program
To better ensure the safety of the nation’s aboveground oil storage facilities and decrease the chances of oil being discharged into the environment, we recommended that the Administrator strengthen EPA’s aboveground oil storage facility inspection program by developing, in coordination with state and local authorities, a system of inspection priorities on the basis of a national inventory of tanks; developing instructions for performing and documenting inspections; defining and implementing minimum training needs for inspectors; and establishing a national policy for fining violators. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) actions to address weaknesses in the regulation and inspection of aboveground oil storage tanks (AST), and provided information on the age, size, and other characteristics of AST.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) EPA has not fully implemented any of its seven recommendations to improve the safety of aboveground oil storage tanks; (2) EPA has only partially implemented the recommendations because it gave higher priority to implementing new legislative requirements and had difficulty obtaining Office of Management and Budget approval to collect data for a national inventory of regulated facilities; (3) EPA has partially implemented one of three recommendations to strengthen its regulations governing storage tank construction; (4) proposed regulations emphasize, but do not require, that tank construction comply with certain standards and recommend that tanks be periodically tested; (5) EPA has required the facilities that pose the greatest environmental risk to develop response plans to minimize damages from spilled oil, but it has no plans to extend the requirement to other facilities; and (6) EPA expects to implement three recommendations on improving inspection procedures and documentation, training inspectors, and establishing penalties for noncompliance by 1996, but it does not know when the fourth recommendation on targeting inspections will be implemented. |
gao_GAO-09-574 | gao_GAO-09-574_0 | CDC also funds some laboratory activities carried out in state public health laboratories, commonly referred to as the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The Bioterrorism Act expanded the select agent program by granting comparable regulatory authorities to USDA for biological agents and toxins that present a severe threat to plant or animal health or plant or animal products; requiring coordination/concurrence between USDA and HHS on select agents and toxins regulated by both agencies (“overlap” agents and toxins); requiring the Secretaries of USDA and HHS to establish and maintain a list of each biological agent and toxin (select agent and toxin) that has the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, animal or plant health, or animal or plant products and directing the Secretaries of HHS and Agriculture to biennially review and republish the select agent list, making revisions as appropriate to protect the public; requiring the Secretaries by regulation to provide for registration of facilities for the possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins, not just for those facilities sending or receiving select agents; requiring the Attorney General (delegated to the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division) to check criminal, immigration, national security, and other electronic databases with information submitted in the registration process for all individuals and nongovernmental entities to determine if the registrant is a restricted person as defined in the USA PATRIOT Act or has been reasonably suspected by federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies of committing a federal crime of terrorism or having known involvement in an organization that engages in terrorism or is an agent of a foreign power (this is called a security risk assessment); requiring the Secretaries to establish a national database that includes the names and locations of registered entities; the lists of agents and toxins such entities possess, use, or transfer; and information regarding the characterizations of such agents and toxins; requiring the Secretaries to promulgate regulations that include safeguard and security requirements for persons possessing, using, or transferring a select agent or toxin commensurate with the risk such an agent or toxin poses to public, animal, and plant health and safety, including required notification to the Secretaries and law enforcement agencies of theft, loss, or release of a listed agent or toxin; and establishing civil money penalties for persons violating the regulations and additional criminal penalties for knowingly possessing a select agent or toxin without registering it or knowingly transferring a select agent or toxin to an unregistered person. 3. The expansion of high-containment laboratories in the United States began in response to the emergency situation resulting from the anthrax attacks in 2001. Understandably, the expansion initially lacked a clear, governmentwide coordinated strategy. In that emergency situation, the expansion was based on the perceptions of individual agencies about the capacity required for their high-containment laboratory activities as well as the availability of congressionally approved funding. Decisions to fund the construction of high-containment laboratories were made by multiple federal agencies in multiple budget cycles. Federal and state agencies, academia, and the private sector considered their individual requirements, but a robust assessment of national needs was lacking. Even now, after more than 7 years, we have not been able to find any detailed projections based on a governmentwide strategic evaluation of future capacity requirements in light of existing capacity; the numbers, location, and mission of the laboratories needed to effectively counter biothreats; and national public health goals. Without this information, there is little assurance of having facilities in the right places with the right specifications to meet a governmentwide strategy. High-containment laboratories can pose health risks for individual laboratory workers as well as the surrounding community. However, the lessons we have identified highlight ways to improve biosafety and biosecurity. Lessons Learned: Insider Risk and Inventory Control of Biological Agents
This incident highlights two lessons: (1) an ill-intentioned insider can pose a risk not only by passing on confidential information but also by removing dangerous material from a high-containment laboratory, and (2) it is impossible to have completely effective inventory control of biological material with currently available technologies. The Pirbright incident shows that beyond initial design and construction, ongoing maintenance plays a critical role in ensuring that high- containment laboratories operate safely and securely over time. Furthermore, since no single agency is in charge of the current expansion, no one is determining the associated aggregate risks posed by the expansion. As a consequence, no federal agency can determine whether high-containment laboratory capacity may now be less than, meet, or exceed the national need or is at a level that can be operated safely. If an agency were tasked or a mechanism were established with the purpose of overseeing the expansion of high-containment laboratories, it could develop a strategic plan to (1) ensure that the number and capabilities of potentially dangerous high-containment laboratories are no greater or less than necessary, (2) balance the risks and benefits of expanding such laboratories, and (3) determine the type of oversight needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the National Security Advisor, in consultation with the Secretaries of Health and Human Services (HHS), Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), and Homeland Security (DHS); the National Intelligence Council; and other executive departments as deemed appropriate identify a single entity charged with periodic governmentwide strategic evaluation of high-containment laboratories that will the number, location, and mission of the laboratories needed to effectively meet national goals to counter biothreats; the existing capacity within the United States; the aggregate risks associated with the laboratories’ expansion; and the type of oversight needed and (2) develop, in consultation with the scientific community, national standards for the design, construction, commissioning, and operation of high-containment laboratories, specifically including provisions for long- term maintenance. To develop lessons learned from recent incidents at four high-containment laboratories, we interviewed academic experts in microbiological research involving human, animal, and plant pathogens and conducted site visits at selected federal, civilian, military, academic, and commercial BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories, including the sites involved in the recent incidents. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. laboratories working with dangerous biological pathogens (commonly referred to as high-containment laboratories) have proliferated in recent years. As a result, the public is concerned about the oversight of these laboratories. The deliberate or accidental release of biological pathogens can have disastrous consequences. GAO was asked to determine (1) to what extent, and in what areas, the number of high-containment laboratories has increased in the United States, (2) which federal agency is responsible for tracking this expansion and determining the associated aggregate risks, and (3) lessons learned from highly publicized incidents at these laboratories and actions taken by the regulatory agencies. To carry out its work, GAO surveyed and interviewed federal agency officials, (including relevant intelligence community officials), consulted with experts in microbiology, reviewed literature, conducted site visits, and analyzed incidents at high-containment laboratories.
What GAO Found
The recent expansion of high-containment laboratories in the United Statesbegan in response to the need to develop medical countermeasures after the anthrax attacks in 2001. Understandably, the expansion initially lacked a clear, governmentwide coordinated strategy. In that emergency situation, the expansion was based on individual agency perceptions of the capacity their high-containment labs required as well as the availability of congressionally approved funding. Decisions to fund the construction of high-containment labs were made by multiple federal agencies in multiple budget cycles. Federal and state agencies, academia, and the private sector considered their individual requirements, but an assessment of national needs was lacking. Even now, after more than 7 years, GAO was unable to find any projections based on a governmentwide strategic evaluation of future capacity requirements set in light of existing capacity; the numbers, location, and mission of the laboratories needed to effectively counter biothreats; and national public health goals. Such information is needed to ensure that the United States will have facilities in the right place with the right specifications. Furthermore, since no single agency is in charge of the expansion, no one is determining the aggregate risks associated with this expansion. As a consequence, no federal agency can determine whether high-containment laboratory capacity may now meet or exceed the national need or is at a level that can be operated safely. If an agency were tasked, or a mechanism were established, with the purpose of overseeing the expansion of high-containment laboratories, it could develop a strategic plan to (1) ensure that the numbers and capabilities of potentially dangerous high-containment laboratories are no greater than necessary, (2) balance the risks and benefits of expanding such laboratories, and (3) determine the type of oversight needed. Four highly publicized incidents in high-containment laboratories, as well as evidence in scientific literature, demonstrate that (1) while laboratory accidents are rare, they do occur, primarily due to human error or systems (management and technical operations) failure, including the failure of safety equipment and procedures, (2) insiders can pose a risk, and (3) it is difficult to control inventories of biological agents with currently available technologies. Taken as a whole, these incidents demonstrate failures of systems and procedures meant to maintain biosafety and biosecurity in high-containment laboratories. For example, they revealed the failure to comply with regulatory requirements, safety measures that were not commensurate with the level of risk to public health posed by laboratory workers and pathogens in the laboratories, and the failure to fund ongoing facility maintenance and monitor the operational effectiveness of laboratory physical infrastructure. Oversight plays a critical role in improving biosafety and ensuring that high-containment laboratories comply with regulations. However, some aspects of the current oversight programs provided by the Departments of Health and Human Services and Agriculture are dependent upon entities monitoring themselves and reporting incidents to federal regulators. Since 2001, personnel reliability programs have been established to counter insider risks, but their cost, effectiveness, and impact has not been evaluated. |
gao_GAO-03-607 | gao_GAO-03-607_0 | 1). The protracted conflict led to the flight of a large number of refugees into Pakistan and Iran. Despite the fact that only 11.5 percent (7.5 million hectares) of Afghanistan’s total area is cultivable, 85 percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, and 80 percent of export earnings and more than 50 percent of the gross domestic product have historically come from agriculture. 2). Since 1965, the WFP has been the major provider of food assistance to Afghanistan. U.S. and International Food Assistance Had Significant Impact and Was Well Managed, but Donor Support Was Problematic
The emergency food assistance provided to Afghanistan by the United States and the international community from January 1999 through December 2002 benefited millions and was well managed, but donor support was inadequate. Further, WFP could have provided assistance to an additional 685,000 people and reduced its delivery times if the United States had donated cash or regionally purchased commodities instead of shipping U.S.-produced commodities. Over the 4-year period, WFP delivered approximately 1.6 million metric tons of food that helped avert famine and stabilize the Afghan people, both in Afghanistan and in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The United States provided most of this funding. U.S. Food Assistance Contributions Were Costly and Inefficient
The U.S.-produced commodities and humanitarian daily rations provided by the United States to Afghanistan resulted in lower volumes of food than if the United States had provided regionally purchased commodities or cash donations. Finally, the inadequacy of proposed agricultural assistance, and the increase in domestic terrorism, warlords’ control of much of the country, and opium production all present obstacles to the international community’s goal of achieving food security and political stability in Afghanistan. The assistance was provided in an effort to increase short-term food security and decrease Afghanistan’s dependence on emergency food assistance. Because of the lack of coordination, the Afghan government and the international community have not developed a single operational strategy to direct the agricultural rehabilitation effort; instead, all of the major assistance organizations have independent strategies. Lack of Coordination Prevented Development of Operational Strategy
Because of the inadequate coordination of agricultural assistance, the Afghan government and the international community have not developed an operational agricultural sector strategy. Environmental and political problems have limited the impact of the international community’s agricultural assistance efforts. A new coordination mechanism established in December 2002 is largely similar to earlier mechanisms, and it is too recent for us to determine its effectiveness. These obstacles threaten the recovery of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of achieving food security and political stability in Afghanistan. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the events of September 11, 2001 led to the defeat of the Taliban, the United States and the international community developed an assistance program to support Afghanistan's new government and its people. Key components of this effort include food and agricultural assistance. GAO was asked to assess (1) the impact, management, and support of food assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the impact and management of agricultural assistance to Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and political stability.
What GAO Found
The emergency food assistance that the United States and the international community provided from January 1999 through December 2002 helped avert famine by supplying millions of beneficiaries with about 1.6 million tons of food. However, the inadequacy of the international community's financial and in-kind support of the World Food Program's (WFP) appeal for assistance disrupted the provision of food assistance throughout 2002. Because of a lack of resources, WFP reduced the amount of food rations provided to returning refugees from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Meanwhile, as a result of the statutory requirement that U.S. agencies providing food assistance purchase U.S.-origin commodities and ship them on U.S.-flag vessels, assistance costs and delivery times were higher by $35 million and 120 days, respectively, than if the United States had provided WFP with cash or regionally produced commodities. Had the U.S. assistance been purchased regionally, an additional 685,000 people could have been fed for 1 year. The livelihood of 85 percent of Afghanistan's approximately 26 million people depends on agriculture. Over 50 percent of the gross domestic product and 80 percent of export earnings have historically come from agriculture. Over the 4-year period, because of continued conflict and drought, the international community provided primarily short-term agricultural assistance such as tools and seed. As a result, the assistance did not significantly contribute to the reconstruction of the agricultural sector. In 2002, agricultural assistance was not adequately coordinated with the Afghan government; a new coordination mechanism was established in December 2002, but it is too early to determine its effectiveness. As a result of the weak coordination, the Afghan government and the international community have not developed a joint strategy to direct the overall agricultural rehabilitation effort. Meanwhile, inadequate assistance funding, continuing terrorist attacks, warlords' control of much of the country, and the growth of opium production threaten the recovery of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of food security and political stability in Afghanistan. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-107 | gao_T-HEHS-96-107_0 | 3.) “The possible adverse effects of the proposed legislation should also, I believe, be considered. VA has gradually shifted from a system primarily providing treatment for veterans with service-connected disabilities incurred in wartime to a system increasingly focused on the treatment of low-income veterans with medical conditions unrelated to military service. 4.) VA Eligibility Provisions Frustrate Veterans and Limit VA’s Ability to Meet Veterans’ Health Care Needs
Unlike public and private health insurance, the VA health benefits program does not (1) have a well-defined benefit package or (2) entitle veterans to, or guarantee the availability of, covered services. Our review, however, found little basis for linking most inappropriate hospitalizations to VA eligibility provisions. Proposed Bills Would Eliminate Restrictions on Outpatient Eligibility, but Other Problems Would Continue
Eligibility reform proposals introduced during the past year would eliminate the restrictions on veterans’ access to outpatient care. Limit the Number of Veterans Eligible for VA Health Care
Another way to develop budget-neutral eligibility reform would be to pay for expanded eligibility for some veterans by restricting or eliminating eligibility for others. These include increased cost sharing, authorizing recoveries from Medicare, and allowing VA to retain funds from third-party recoveries. VA has historically used savings from efficiency improvements to fund new programs. Key Provisions of Selected Proposals to Reform Eligibility for VA Health Care
This appendix contains a synopsis of the key provisions in the four major eligibility reform bills introduced during the past year. 1385) would, on a temporary basis for the period ending September 30, 1999, expand the mandatory care category for comprehensive outpatient medical treatment to include all veterans in the mandatory care category for hospital care (core group) other than those with noncompensable service-connected disabilities (nursing home and dental services would remain discretionary); require VA to expand its capacity to provide outpatient care and allocate resources to its facilities in a way that would give veterans access to care that is reasonably similar regardless of where they live; include preventive health services and prosthetic appliances in the definition of services that are provided to core group veterans; include home health services in the definition of services that may be provided to core group veterans; authorize the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to use systems of patient prioritization and to set up a system of enrollment of eligible veterans; allow VA to retain a portion of third-party recoveries to expand outpatient require VA to ensure that any veteran with a service-connected disability is provided all benefits to which he or she is entitled. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed various proposals to reform eligibility for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA health care has evolved from a system primarily providing hospital care to veterans injured during wartime to a system focused on the treatment of low-income veterans with medical conditions unrelated to military service; (2) the eligibility provisions of the VA health care system are vague, provide uneven services, do not guarantee services, and cannot provide the total care that low-income veterans need; (3) while VA health care eligibility provisions should be reformed to better suit veterans' health care needs, none of the proposed legislation would be budget neutral; (4) present eligibility provisions do not cause inappropriate hospitalizations; (5) several legislative proposals to reform VA eligibility provisions would eliminate the restrictions on outpatient care and create a uniform benefit package, but inappropriate use of resources, uneven access, and some restrictions would continue to exist; (6) the proposed legislation to reform VA eligibility provisions would increase service availability, demand, and program costs; and (7) approaches for developing budget-neutral eligibility reforms include limits on covered benefits, limits on the number of veterans eligible, an increase in veteran cost-sharing, the authorization of recoveries from Medicare, VA retention of a portion of third-party recoveries, and reinvestment of savings from efficiency improvements. |
gao_GAO-14-18 | gao_GAO-14-18_0 | Bank holding companies and their subsidiaries also accrued benefits specific to their own institutions, including liquidity benefits from programs that allowed them to borrow at lower interest rates and at longer maturities than might have been available in the markets. At the end of 2008, use of these programs—measured for each institution as the percentage of total assets supported by the programs—was larger on average for larger banking organizations—those with $50 billion or more in total assets— than for smaller banking organizations. The six largest bank holding companies were significant participants in several emergency programs but exited most of the programs by the end of 2009. Crisis Programs with Broad-Based Eligibility Provided Funding Support to Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiaries
During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve System, Treasury, and FDIC introduced new programs with broad-based eligibility to provide general funding support to the financial sector and to stabilize the financial system. Stabilizing deposit funding. Federal Reserve System programs. Differences in the level of program use by institutions of various sizes were driven in part by differences in how institutions funded themselves. For example, compared to smaller bank holding companies, larger bank holding companies relied to a greater extent on short-term credit markets that were the most severely disrupted during the crisis and participated more in programs intended to address disruptions in these markets. Smaller banking organizations relied more on deposits to fund their activities. The Federal Reserve Board Granted Exemptions to Allow Banks to Provide Liquidity Support to the Nonbanking Sector and for Other Purposes
During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board granted a number of exemptions to requirements under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act for a range of purposes, such as allowing banks to provide greater liquidity support to the nonbank sector. Dodd-Frank Aims to Restrict Future Government Support, but Implementation Is Incomplete and Effectiveness Remains Uncertain
Enacted in July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act contains provisions intended to modify the scope of federal safety nets for financial firms, place limits on agency authorities to provide emergency assistance, and strengthen regulatory oversight of the largest firms, among other things. FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board have finalized certain changes to traditional safety nets for insured banks, but impacts of the act’s provisions to limit the scope of financial transactions that benefit from these safety nets will depend on how they are implemented. FDIC has made progress toward implementing its new resolution authority and continues to work to address potential obstacles to the viability of its resolution process as an alternative to bankruptcy, such as challenges that could arise when resolving more than one large institution concurrently. While these actions collectively helped to avert a more severe crisis, they raised concerns about moral hazard and the appropriate scope of federal safety nets for the financial sector. The act also requires the Federal Reserve Board to establish policies and procedures governing future actions under this authority. As of the date of this report, the Federal Reserve Board has not yet completed its process for drafting these policies and procedures and has not set time frames for doing so. While the act did not set a specific deadline, setting time frames could help ensure more timely completion of these policies and procedures. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure that the design and implementation of any future emergency lending programs comply with Dodd-Frank Act requirements in a timely manner, we recommend that the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System set timeframes for completing the process for drafting policies and procedures governing the use of emergency lending authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine: (1) support banks and bank holding companies received as a result of government efforts to stabilize financial markets during the financial crisis of 2007-2009; and (2) recent statutory and regulatory changes related to government support for banks and bank holding companies and factors that could impact the effectiveness of these changes. It does not address benefits that some financial institutions may have received and may continue to receive from perceived government support. To address our second objective, we identified and reviewed relevant statutory provisions, regulations, and agency documents. To identify recent statutory and regulatory changes related to government support for banks and bank holding companies, we reviewed sections of the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) that change rules or create new requirements for safety net programs for insured depository institutions; further restrict the types of financial activities that can be conducted by insured depository institutions or their holding companies; make changes to agencies’ emergency authorities to assist or resolve financial institutions; and subject the largest bank holding companies to enhanced regulatory oversight and standards. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. Treasury capital investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government extended unprecedented support to financial institutions to stabilize financial markets during the financial crisis. While these actions helped to avert a more severe crisis, they raised questions about the appropriate scope of government safety nets for financial institutions. GAO was asked to review the benefits that large bank holding companies (those with more than $500 billion in assets) have received from actual and implied government support.
This is the first of two reports GAO will issue on this topic. This report examines (1) actual government support for banks and bank holding companies during the financial crisis, and (2) recent statutory and regulatory changes related to government support for banks and bank holding companies. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and agency documents; analyzed program transaction data; and interviewed regulators, representatives of financial institutions, and academics. In a second report to be issued in 2014, GAO will examine any funding or other economic advantages the largest bank holding companies have received as a result of implied government support.
What GAO Found
During the 2007-09 financial crisis, the federal government's actions to stabilize the financial system provided funding support and other benefits to bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. Agencies introduced new programs with broad-based eligibility that provided funding support to eligible institutions, which included entities that were part of a bank holding company and others. Programs that provided the most significant support directly to bank holding companies or their subsidiaries included Department of the Treasury capital investment programs, Federal Reserve System lending programs, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guarantee programs. Together these actions helped to stabilize financial conditions, while participating firms also accrued benefits specific to their own institutions, such as liquidity benefits from programs that allowed them to borrow at longer maturities and at interest rates that were below possible market alternatives. At the end of 2008, program use--measured for each institution as the percentage of total assets supported by the programs--was higher on average for banks and bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in total assets than for smaller firms. The six largest bank holding companies were significant participants in several emergency programs but exited most by the end of 2009. Differences in program use were driven in part by how institutions funded themselves. For example, while smaller banks relied more on deposit funding, larger bank holding companies relied more on short-term funding markets and participated more in programs that assisted these markets. In addition to these programs, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) granted several regulatory exemptions to allow banks to provide liquidity support to their nonbank affiliates and for other purposes. Finally, government assistance to individual troubled firms benefited these firms, their counterparties, and the financial system.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) contains provisions that aim to modify the scope of federal safety nets, restrict future government support and strengthen regulatory oversight for the banking sector, but implementation is incomplete and the effectiveness of some provisions remains uncertain. Agencies have finalized certain changes to traditional safety nets for insured banks, but impacts of provisions to limit the scope of transactions that benefit from these safety nets will depend on how they are implemented. The act also places restrictions on emergency authorities used by regulators during the crisis to assist financial firms. For example, it prohibits the use of these authorities to rescue a specific failing firm. The Federal Reserve Board is required by the act to establish policies and procedures implementing changes to its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, but it has not completed its process for drafting the required procedures or set time frames for doing so. Setting time frames could help ensure more timely completion of these procedures. FDIC has made progress toward implementing its new authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to resolve a large failing firm. FDIC continues to work to address potential obstacles to the viability of its resolution process as an alternative to bankruptcy, such as challenges that could arise when resolving more than one failing firm. Finally, the Federal Reserve Board has finalized certain enhanced prudential standards for the largest financial firms intended to reduce the risks these firms could pose to the financial system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Federal Reserve Board establish timeframes for completing its process for drafting procedures related to its emergency lending authority to ensure timely compliance with Dodd-Frank Act requirements. The Federal Reserve Board accepted this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-312 | gao_GAO-14-312_0 | Background
The Trust was established by statute as a tax-exempt entity to manage and invest the assets used to pay a portion of Railroad Retirement Program benefits. The Trust may invest Trust assets in stocks, bonds and other investment vehicles in a manner similar to other defined benefit (DB) plans. For example, the report includes a discussion of the evolution, current status and performance of the Trust’s investment portfolio. The Annual Management Report also includes relevant Trust policies such as Trust by-laws, investment guidelines, and a conflicts of interest policy statement. The Trust Has Commissioned Periodic Performance Audits Since 2002, but Has Not Established a Formal Policy for Such Audits
While not required by law to do so, the Trust has commissioned four performance audits since the Trust was organized in 2002. Performance Audit Practices of Comparable Entities Can Differ from the Trust in Scope and Frequency
Most Comparable Entities Are Subject to Multiple Levels of Performance Audits, but the Nature and Frequency of Reviews May Vary
Subject to Independent External Auditors
Unlike the Trust, most state plans and both federal programs we contacted are subject to performance audits that can be initiated and conducted by an independent entity. External audits of these plans can be initiated and conducted independent of the plans’ governing board and management. State and Federal Audits Cover Certain Areas Not Included in Trust Reviews
Trust performance audits are comparable to state and federal audits in terms of the breadth of topics reviewed. In some cases, such reviews have resulted in findings and recommendations in areas that could be relevant to the Trust. According to Experts, the Trust’s Performance Audit Practices Are Similar to Those of Large Private Sector Plans
According to experts on private sector pensions, the Trust’s practice of commissioning external firms to conduct performance audits every 2 to 3 years is comparable to the practices of large private sector plans. Both Trust and Board representatives stated that, in their view, the current oversight is adequate, citing annual mandatory financial audits, regular reporting and communications between the Board and Trust, and voluntary periodic Trust-commissioned performance audits. Board officials stated that such a development would be counter to the Trust’s originating legislation, and one official stated that externally-initiated audits could open the door to political influence, stating that audit objectives could be framed in a way that would pressure the Trust’s investment policies in a particular direction. Trust representatives also expressed concerns about what they perceived as an unconstructive, confrontational relationship with the OIG. Require Periodic Audits with External Input on Scope
Key stakeholders—including Board and Trust officials—generally supported this option. To protect these assets—and the entity that manages them—from political influence, the Trust was established independent of the federal government and explicitly exempted from the title 31 of the U.S. Code, which governs the financial operations of the federal government and establishes the powers and duties of GAO. First, while 42 of the 50 state plans we surveyed and both federal agencies we reviewed are subject to performance audits that are initiated and conducted by external entities, the Trust is not. Because performance audit policies or the work of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the PBGC Office of Inspector General, the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, and the Department of Labor’s Employee Benefit Security Administration are reflected in our report, we also provided those agencies with a copy of the report for technical review and comment. What performance audit policies and practices exist for the oversight of the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (Trust)? What performance audit policies apply to comparable organizations, such as large state public pension plans? What options, if any, could be pursued to improve Trust performance audit policies and what tradeoffs do stakeholders believe such options entail? To answer our first question, we reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, and Railroad Retirement Board (Board) policies and procedures regarding oversight of the Trust and the memorandum of understanding established between the Board, the Trust, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of the Treasury. We generally obtained these reports from the website of the states’ Auditors General or equivalent. These options were based substantially on the oversight models that apply to state pension plans or comparable federal agencies, as developed under objective 2. We then interviewed experts and stakeholders familiar with the Trust—including representatives of the Board, the Trust, the OIG, and other federal officials, as well as railroad labor and management—to discuss the potential benefits of establishing independent performance audits of the Trust. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Trust was established by federal statute effective in 2002 to manage a portion of the assets the Board uses to pay benefits to retired railroad workers, and managed about $25 billion in assets as of 2013. The Trust invests assets in stocks, bonds, and other investment vehicles in a manner similar to that of defined benefit plans. To insulate the Trust from political influence over its investment decisions, the Trust was established independent of the federal government. It is exempted from the federal law that governs the financial operations of the U.S. government and which establishes the duties and powers of the GAO. GAO assessed (1) the performance audit policies and practices that exist for oversight of the Trust; (2) the performance audit policies that apply to comparable organizations, such as large state public pension plans; and (3) what options, if any, could be pursued to improve Trust performance audit policies and what tradeoffs stakeholders believe such options entail.
GAO reviewed applicable federal laws, Trust policies and procedures, and relevant reports such as state, federal, and Trust-commissioned performance audit reports. GAO also interviewed officials of the Board, state and federal pension plans, the state Auditors General, and private plan fiduciary experts.
What GAO Found
Oversight of the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (Trust) includes both regular reporting and communications with the Railroad Retirement Board (Board), and periodic performance audits that the Trust has opted to commission; however, no written requirement for such audits exists. The Trust's mandatory annual management report includes financial and descriptive information, including a discussion of the evolution, current status and performance of the Trust's investment portfolio and administrative costs, including investment manager fees. The Trust has also commissioned four external performance audits since its creation—the first in 2004 and the most recent in 2012. These reviews have encompassed a wide range of issues, including the accuracy of monthly reports, compliance with Trust investment manager hiring policies, processes to ensure accuracy of financial recordkeeping and internal controls, adequacy of due diligence procedures, and the role of non-traditional investments.
Performance audit practices of comparable entities can differ from the Trust in scope and frequency. The large majority of state pension plans and two federal programs GAO reviewed that manage investment assets are subject to performance audits that can be initiated and conducted by an external entity, and some of these audits have addressed issues Trust-commissioned audits have not included. Forty-two of the 50 state plans GAO contacted are subject to performance audits that can be initiated and conducted by an external auditor, such as state Auditors General or equivalent, or by offices of internal audit. In some cases, the external auditor reviews the plan annually, while in others, plans are audited less frequently. Both federal programs—the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's single-employer insurance program and the Thrift Savings Plan—are also subject to externally initiated and conducted performance audits. State and federal audits varied in subject and scope, and in some cases, examined issues that Trust-commissioned reviews have not yet included, such as ethics and conflict of interest policies. Experts told GAO that Trust performance audit practices are comparable to those of large private sector plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
Based on our review of oversight models that apply to state plans and other information, GAO developed several options to enhance the Trust's performance audit practices, and stakeholders identified potential advantages and limitations pertaining to them. For example, the Board's Office of Inspector General (OIG) could be granted authority to conduct performance audits, which would help ensure these reviews are initiated and performed independent of the Trust. However, both Board and Trust officials had reservations about this option, stating that the OIG lacks sufficient expertise in aspects of the Trust investment program, and expressing concerns about what they perceive as an unconstructive working relationship. The Trust's practice of commissioning periodic performance audits could be established as a formal requirement, either through a memorandum of agreement between the key parties, or through a statutory amendment, with external input on subject and scope of the audits. Trust and Board officials stated that this would be a reasonable option, and in early 2014 developed an initial proposal to implement such an agreement.
What GAO Recommends
This report makes no recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-732 | gao_GAO-02-732_0 | Without agencywide operating procedures, the Army has relied on its major command and local installation program coordinators to establish purchase card policies and procedures to guide approving officials, cardholders, and others involved in the purchase card program as they implement the program. The guidance also does not establish program coordinators’ oversight responsibilities. Inadequate human capital resources. Also, many approving officials are responsible for a large number of cardholders. We identified three types of improper purchases. Another type was split purchases in which the cardholder circumvents cardholder single purchase limits. Transactions that are both improper and abusive were discussed previously. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the overall control environment and improve internal control for the Army’s purchase card program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) and other Army officials as appropriate to improve the overall Army purchase card infrastructure by taking the following actions. Although most cardholders have limits of $2,500, some have limits of $25,000 or higher. | What GAO Found
The Army's purchase card program--the largest within the Defense Department--offers significant benefits, but weak internal controls have left the Army vulnerable to fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases. The Army has yet to issue servicewide regulations or operating procedures, instead relying on ad hoc memoranda and other informal guidance. The Army also does a poor job of overseeing the purchase card program. The Army lacks the infrastructure--guidance and human capital--needed for effective program oversight. GAO identified several improper transactions involving clothing, food, and other items. GAO also identified improper purchases in which cardholders made a large number of purchases of similar items to circumvent the mandated limit of $2,500 for a single purchase. |
gao_RCED-98-187 | gao_RCED-98-187_0 | Progress of Capital Improvements and Support Services Varies
Progress in completing capital improvements and implementing community and support services varies at HOPE VI sites. Although the rate of spending for capital improvements has increased, the vast majority of the grant funds have yet to be disbursed. HUD has established measures of performance for capital improvements and has begun to collect baseline data for use in measuring the results of community and support services. 3.) Starting with the grants awarded in fiscal year 1997, HUD changed the allocation for community and support services from up to 20 percent of the grant funds to up to $5,000 per unit. These sites have to overcome complex structural, social, and management challenges that require time to resolve. Legal issues and legislative and administrative changes to the program’s requirements have also added time to developments. The use of leveraged financing has also introduced time-consuming requirements for coordinating the different funding sources’ procedures and schedules. Financial Leveraging Is Expected to Increase
Even though leveraging is more complex than relying on grant funds alone, according to HUD’s data, the majority of the 81 HOPE VI sites funded to date are planning to mix public and private financing, primarily by combining low-income housing tax credits or loans from private lenders with the HOPE VI grants. 9). Although HUD has hired contractors to provide some additional oversight and recently decided to add 11 positions, the new staff will need time to become familiar with the program. In 1997, efforts to streamline HUD’s field structure left few employees in the field with knowledge of HOPE VI issues. In 1997, HUD hired outside contractors to help develop management systems and oversee the HOPE VI program. As requested, we reviewed (1) the progress in completing capital improvements and implementing community and support services at HOPE VI sites, (2) the primary reasons why progress at some HOPE VI sites has been slow, (3) the extent to which leveraging is planned to be used at HOPE VI sites, and (4) HUD’s capacity to oversee the program. Furthermore, during our site visits, we gathered additional information on capital improvements and community and support services. According to a HUD official, the total development costs were higher at Ellen Wilson than at most other HOPE VI sites. The housing authority plans to apply for future HOPE VI grants and leverage funds from private developers. Some progress is now being made at the new site. GAO Comments
1. 2. 4. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the: (1) progress in completing capital improvements and implementing community and support services at HOPE VI sites; (2) primary reasons why progress at some HOPE VI sites has been slow; (3) extent to which financial leveraging is used at HOPE VI sites; and (4) Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) capacity to oversee the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) progress in completing capital improvements and implementing community and support services varies at HOPE VI sites; (2) overall, the rate of spending on capital improvements is increasing, but the vast majority of the grant funds remain to be disbursed; (3) although housing authorities could spend up to 20 percent of the grant funds awarded in fiscal years 1993 through 1996 for community and support services to help residents find jobs and become self-sufficient, the average expenditure was about 12 percent; (4) to track the progress of capital improvements and community and support services, HUD has established measures of performance for capital improvements and has hired a contractor to collect baseline data on community and support services; (5) at the HOPE VI sites visited, progress in implementing capital improvements and community and support services has varied with structural, social, and management issues specific to each site; (6) legal issues covering the preparation of grant agreements, legislative and administrative changes in unit replacement and demolition policies, and limited HUD staffing have also delayed progress at HOPE VI sites; (7) more complex redevelopment plans have created major opposition among groups of residents at several sites and produced delays; (8) using HOPE VI grants to leverage funding from public and private sources has introduced time-consuming requirements for coordinating the different sources' procedures and schedules; (9) financial leveraging has increased over time, and this trend is expected to continue; (10) a 1998 HUD policy limiting a property's total development costs to industry averages is also expected to encourage leveraging; (11) because HOPE VI developments are more complex and costlier than most multi-family housing developments, the new policy will require the use of leveraging in the future; (12) reorganizing and downsizing have left HUD with fewer resources for overseeing HOPE VI grants; (13) streamlining has also left few employees in the field with knowledge of HOPE VI issues; (14) HUD has hired contractors to provide some additional oversight and has restored 11 positions to the HOPE VI program; and (15) although these additions will offset some of the staffing cuts, the new staff will need time to acquire expertise in the program. |
gao_GAO-06-385 | gao_GAO-06-385_0 | Laws and Executive Orders Have Established Requirements to Improve Information Sharing since 2001
Since the information-sharing weaknesses of September 11, the President and the Administration have called for a number of terrorism-related information-sharing initiatives driven predominately by two statutory mandates—The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). Most recently in December 2005, the President once again tried to better clarify the roles and responsibilities of the ODNI program manager, Information Sharing Council, DHS, and other agencies in support of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The program manager is in the early stages of addressing the mandate and issued an interim implementation plan to Congress in January 2006 that lays out a number of steps and deadlines for deliverables. On January 26, 2006, the program manager announced his resignation from his position. At the time of our review, a new program manager had not yet been appointed. Once a new program manager is named, it will be important for the DNI to monitor milestones set in the interim implementation plan; identify any barriers to achieving the milestones, such as insufficient resources; and recommend to the oversight committees with jurisdiction any necessary changes to the organizational structure or approach to the ISE. The Large Number of Sensitive but Unclassified Designations and the Lack of Consistent Policies and Procedures for Their Use Make Sharing Information More Difficult
Federal agencies report that they are using a total of 56 different designations for information they determined is sensitive but unclassified, and agencies that account for a large percentage of the homeland security budget reported using most of these designations. There are no governmentwide policies or procedures that describe the basis on which agencies should designate, mark, and handle this information. In this absence, the agency determines what designations to apply to its sensitive but unclassified information. Furthermore, most agencies do not determine who and how many employees can make such designations, provide them training on how to do so, or perform periodic reviews of how well their practices are working, nor are there governmentwide policies that require such internal control practices. By not providing guidance and monitoring, there is a probability that the designation will be misapplied, potentially restricting material unnecessarily or resulting in dissemination of information that should be restricted. Some Agencies and End Users Reported Challenges in Sharing Sensitive but Unclassified Information
More than half of the agencies reported challenges in sharing sensitive but unclassified information. Conclusions
In part because of the complexity of the task, shifting responsibilities, and missed deadlines, more than 4 years after September 11 the federal government still lacks comprehensive policies and processes to improve the sharing of information that is critical to protecting our homeland. We will then send copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Director of National Intelligence; the Secretaries and heads of the 26 departments and agencies in our review; and interested congressional committees. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the status of efforts to establish governmentwide policies and processes for sharing terrorism- related information between the federal government and its state, local, and private sector partners and (2) identify the universe of different sensitive but unclassified designations agencies apply to homeland security and to other sensitive information and determine the extent to which these agencies have policies and procedures in place to ensure their consistent use. L. No. § 73- 21; Directive 12.6 (December 1999) (policy revision in draft) Definition: Safeguards Information means information, not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted Data that specifically identifies a licensee’s or applicant’s detailed control and accounting procedures or security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of special nuclear material, by whomever possessed, whether in transit or at fixed sites, in quantities determined by the Commission to be significant to the public health and safety or the common defense and security; security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of source material or byproduct material, by whomever possessed, whether in transit or at fixed sites, in quantities determined by the Commission to be significant to the public health and safety or the common defense and security; or security measures (including security plans, procedures, and equipment) for the physical protection of and the location of certain plant equipment vital to the safety of production or utilization facilities involving nuclear materials covered by paragraphs (1) and (2) if the unauthorized disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of such material or such facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
A number of initiatives to improve information sharing have been called for, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The 2002 act required the development of policies for sharing classified and sensitive but unclassified homeland security information. The 2004 act called for the development of an Information Sharing Environment for terrorism information. This report examines (1) the status of efforts to establish government-wide information sharing policies and processes and (2) the universe of sensitive but unclassified designations used by the 26 agencies that GAO surveyed and their related policies and procedures.
What GAO Found
More than 4 years after September 11, the nation still lacks governmentwide policies and processes to help agencies integrate the myriad of ongoing efforts, including the agency initiatives we identified, to improve the sharing of terrorism-related information that is critical to protecting our homeland. Responsibility for creating these policies and processes shifted initially from the White House to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and then to the Department of Homeland Security, but none has yet completed the task. Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform Act called for creation of an Information Sharing Environment, including governing policies and processes for sharing, and a program manager to oversee its development. In December 2005, the President clarified the roles and responsibilities of the program manager, now under the Director of National Intelligence, as well as the new Information Sharing Council and the other agencies in support of creating an Information Sharing Environment by December 2006. At the time of our review, the program manager was in the early stages of addressing this mandate. He issued an interim implementation report with specified tasks and milestones to Congress in January 2006, but soon after announced his resignation. This latest attempt to establish an overall information-sharing road map under the Director of National Intelligence, if it is to succeed once a new manager is appointed, will require the Director's continued vigilance in monitoring progress toward meeting key milestones, identifying any barriers to achieving them, and recommending any necessary changes to the oversight committees. The agencies that GAO reviewed are using 56 different sensitive but unclassified designations (16 of which belong to one agency) to protect information that they deem critical to their missions--for example, sensitive law or drug enforcement information or controlled nuclear information. For most designations there are no governmentwide policies or procedures that describe the basis on which an agency should assign a given designation and ensure that it will be used consistently from one agency to another. Without such policies, each agency determines what designations and associated policies to apply to the sensitive information it develops or shares. More than half the agencies reported challenges in sharing such information. Finally, most of the agencies GAO reviewed have no policies for determining who and how many employees should have authority to make sensitive but unclassified designations, providing them training on how to make these designations, or performing periodic reviews to determine how well their practices are working. The lack of such recommended internal controls increases the risk that the designations will be misapplied. This could result in either unnecessarily restricting materials that could be shared or inadvertently releasing materials that should be restricted. |
gao_GAO-10-492 | gao_GAO-10-492_0 | In exchange for this funding, the Treasury has become part-owner of the two new companies that re- emerged, receiving 60.8 percent of the equity in the new GM and 9.85 percent of the equity in the new Chrysler, and has a debt interest of about $14 billion in loans between the two. better communicate to external stakeholders, including Congress, about its TARP strategies and activities to improve the integrity, accountability, and transparency of the program. During the bankruptcy process, newly organized companies for both GM and Chrysler were established in the summer of 2009. Domestic automakers sponsor some of the largest private sector defined benefit plans. 2). 3). Both Automakers Project Large Contributions to Plans Will Be Required within the Next Five Years
Although projections of plan funding are inherently sensitive to underlying assumptions, GM and Chrysler currently estimate that they may need to make large contributions to their pension plans within the next 5 years in order to meet minimum funding requirements. 4). Economic Stress in Auto Industry Has Endangered Auto Supplier Pensions
Automaker restructuring, the credit market crisis, and the global recession have created significant economic stress across the auto supply industry. Auto suppliers experienced a rise in the number of bankruptcies, liquidations, and pension plan terminations in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless, to hypothetically examine the potential impact if their plans were to be terminated, we explored how PBGC and plan participants would have been affected had the plans been terminated when these companies filed for bankruptcy in 2009, and the factors at play that could change that picture if the plans were to be terminated 5 years later. In May 2009, PBGC reported that unfunded pension liabilities across the auto industry as a whole totaled about $77 billion as of January 31, 2009, and accounted for about $42 billion of PBGC’s total exposure of $168 billion. With respect to PBGC’s exposure for GM’s and Chrysler’s pension plans in particular, PBGC calculated its potential exposure prior to when the new companies assumed sponsorship of the plans. The estimate for the pension plans of the former Delphi Corporation alone is over $6.2 billion. When PBGC calculated its exposure across the auto sector as a whole in January 2009—prior to the shift in sponsorship of GM’s and Chrysler’s plans to the new companies—PBGC estimated that about $35 billion in unfunded liabilities would be nonguaranteed benefits; that is, plan participants would bear losses for about $35 billion in benefits not funded by the company and not guaranteed by PBGC if all the at-risk underfunded plans across the sector were terminated. According to PBGC officials, a significant number of GM and Chrysler participants could be vulnerable to having their benefits reduced due to this limit should the pension plans be terminated. In theory, this barrier prevents Treasury in its role as owner from interacting with Treasury in its role as pension regulator or overseer of PBGC. Treasury officials told us they expect both GM and Chrysler to return to profitability. This, too, is the case for the companies’ pensions. Treasury officials who oversee TARP expect both automakers to return to profitability. As a result, supplier bankruptcies and pension plan terminations may continue for the near future. Such disclosure could help mitigate the potential or perceived tensions that could arise with the federal government’s multiple roles with respect to the automakers and, when the time comes, could shed light on how Treasury’s decision to divest will impact the companies’ pension plans. Both Treasury and PBGC provided technical comments, which are incorporated into the report where appropriate. Should we be unable to obtain funding from some other source to resolve these pension funding obligations, either Delphi or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the “PBGC”) may initiate plan terminations.”
Delphi’s financial difficulties continued, and when the second transfer of pension assets and liabilities to GM was not implemented on July 31, 2009, PBGC terminated all six of Delphi’s U.S. qualified defined benefit plans. Related GAO Products
Troubled Asset Relief Program: The U.S. Government Role as Shareholder in AIG, Citigroup, Chrysler, and General Motors and Preliminary Views on its Investment Management Activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over $81 billion has been committed under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to improve the domestic auto industry's competitiveness and long-term viability. The bulk of this assistance has gone to General Motors (GM) and Chrysler, who sponsor some of the largest defined benefit pension plans insured by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). As part of GAO's statutorily mandated oversight of TARP, this report examines: (1) the impact of restructuring on GM's and Chrysler's pension plans; (2) the impact of restructuring on auto supply sector pension plans; (3) the impacts on PBGC and plan participants should auto industry pension plans be terminated; and (4) how the federal government is dealing with the potential tensions of its multiple roles as pension regulator, shareholder, and creditor. To conduct this study, GAO interviewed officials at GM, Chrysler, a labor union, a supplier association, the Departments of the Treasury and Labor, and PBGC; and reviewed relevant statutes, reports, and documents concerning the automakers' restructuring and pension plan funding. Treasury and PBGC generally agreed with the report's findings. Their technical comments and the technical comments provided by GM, Chrysler, and Delphi, were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The new GM and the new Chrysler that were established during each company's bankruptcy process in the summer of 2009 assumed sponsorship for all the old companies' U.S. defined benefit plans. Although the pension plans have been maintained, their future remains uncertain. According to current company projections, large contributions may be needed to comply with federal pension funding requirements within the next 5 years. Officials at the Department of the Treasury, which oversees TARP, expect both GM and Chrysler to return to profitability. If this is the case, then the companies will likely be able to make the required payments and prevent their pension plans from being terminated. However, if GM and Chrysler were not able to return to profitability and their pension plans were terminated, PBGC would be hit hard both financially and administratively. In early 2009, prior to the new companies assuming sponsorship, PBGC estimated that its exposure to potential losses for GM's and Chrysler's plans to be about $14.5 billion. Meanwhile, automaker downsizing and the credit market crisis have created significant stress for suppliers and their pensions. During 2009, there was a rise in the number of supplier bankruptcies, liquidations, and pension plan terminations. In July, the nation's largest auto parts supplier, Delphi Corporation, terminated its pension plans with expected losses to PBGC of over $6.2 billion. Across the auto sector as a whole, in January 2009, PBGC estimated that unfunded pension liabilities totaled about $77 billion, with PBGC's exposure for potential losses due to unfunded benefits of about $42 billion, leaving plan participants to bear the potential loss of the $35 billion difference through reduced benefits. Moreover, until Treasury either sells or liquidates the equity it acquired in each of the companies in exchange for the TARP assistance, its role as shareholder creates potential tensions with its role as pension regulator and overseer of PBGC in its role as pension insurer. In particular, tensions could arise if decisions must be made between allocating funds to company assets (thereby protecting shareholders, including taxpayers) or to pension fund assets (thereby protecting plan participants). As GAO reported previously, better communication with Congress and others about TARP interests could help mitigate such tensions. |
gao_GAO-03-909T | gao_GAO-03-909T_0 | Additional Disclosure of Mutual Fund Costs Might Benefit Investors
Although mutual funds already disclose considerable information about the fees they charge, our report recommended that SEC consider requiring that mutual funds make additional disclosures to investors about fees in the account statements that investors receive. Unlike many other financial products, mutual funds do not provide investors with information about the specific dollar amounts of the fees that have been deducted from the value of their shares. A number of alternatives have been proposed for improving the disclosure of mutual fund fees, that could provide additional information to fund investors. However, SEC’s proposal would not require mutual funds to disclose to each investor the specific amount of fees in dollars that are paid on the shares they own. Because SEC’s current proposal, while offering some advantages, does not make mutual funds comparable to other products and provide information in the document that is most relevant to investors—the quarterly account statement—our report recommended that SEC consider requiring additional disclosures relating to fees be made to investors in these documents. In addition to specific dollar disclosures, we also noted that investors could be provided with other disclosures about the fees they pay on mutual funds that would have a range of implementation costs, including some that would have even less overall cost to the industry. H.R. H.R. Mutual Fund Boards Follow Many Sound Corporate Governance Practices but Such Practices are Not Mandatory for All Funds
Mutual funds implemented many sound practices concerning their boards of directors, but these practices are not mandatory for all funds. However, not all of these sound corporate governance practices are currently mandatory for mutual funds. H.R. Changes in Mutual Fund Distribution Practices Raise Potential Conflicts of Interest Between Broker-Dealers and Investors
One mutual fund distribution practice—called revenue sharing—that has become increasingly common involves mutual fund investment advisers making additional payments beyond those made under 12b-1 plans to broker-dealers that sell fund shares. Revenue sharing payments may also create conflicts of interest between broker-dealers and their customers. Although revenue sharing payments can create conflicts of interest between broker-dealers and their clients, the extent to which broker- dealers disclose to their clients that their firms receive such payments from fund advisers is not clear. This recommendation is consistent with the requirement in H.R. Soft Dollar Arrangements Provide Benefits, but Could Adversely Impact Investors
Soft dollar arrangements allow fund investment advisers to obtain research and brokerage services that could potentially benefit fund investors but could also increase investors’ costs. When investment advisers buy or sell securities for a fund, they may have to pay the broker- dealers that execute these trades a commission using fund assets. However, this form is not provided to the shareholders of a mutual fund, although the information about the soft dollar practices that the adviser uses for particular funds are required to be included in the Statement of Additional Information that funds prepare, which is available to investors upon request. As a result, our report recommends that SEC evaluate ways to provide additional information to fund directors and investors on their fund advisers’ use of soft dollars. However, because SEC has not acted to more fully address soft dollar-related concerns, investors and mutual fund directors have less complete and transparent information with which to evaluate the benefits and potential disadvantages of their fund adviser’s use of soft dollars. If H.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have been raised over whether the disclosures of mutual fund fees and other fund practices are sufficiently transparent and fair to investors. GAO's testimony discusses (1) mutual fund fee disclosures, (2) the extent to which various corporate governance reforms are in place in the mutual fund industry, (3) the potential conflicts that arise when mutual fund advisers pay broker-dealers to sell fund shares, and (4) the benefits and concerns over fund advisers' use of soft dollars.
What GAO Found
The work that GAO has conducted at the request of this Committee addresses several of the areas that are included in the recently introduced Mutual Funds Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of 2003 (H.R. 2420). Mutual funds disclose considerable information about their costs to investors, but unlike many other financial products and services, they do not disclose to each investor the specific dollar amount of fees that are paid on their fund shares. Consistent with H.R. 2420, our report recommends that SEC consider requiring mutual funds to make additional disclosures to investors, including considering requiring funds to specifically disclose fees in dollars to each investor in quarterly account statements, which we estimate may result in minimal increases in fund expenses. Our report also discusses other alternatives that could also prove beneficial to investors and spur increased competition among mutual funds on the basis of fees but be even less costly to the industry overall. U.S. mutual funds have boards of directors who are charged with overseeing the interests of fund shareholders. Various corporate governance reforms have been proposed to improve the effectiveness of mutual fund boards. As a result of SEC requirements or industry best practice recommendations, many of these practices were already in place at many funds, but not all such practices were mandatory. H.R. 2420 would ensure that all mutual funds implement these practices. Mutual fund advisers have been increasingly making additional payments out of their own profits to the broker-dealers that sell their fund shares. Although allowed under current rules, these revenue sharing payments can create conflicts between the interests of broker-dealers and their customers that could limit the choices of funds that investors are offered. Under current disclosure requirements, however, investors may not always be explicitly informed that their broker-dealer, who is obligated to recommend only suitable investments based on the investor's financial condition, is also receiving payments to sell particular funds. Consistent with H.R. 2420, our report also recommended that more disclosure be made to investors about any revenue sharing payments their broker-dealers are receiving. Under a practice known as soft dollars, a mutual fund adviser uses fund assets to pay commissions to broker-dealers for executing trades in securities for the mutual fund's portfolio but also receives research or other brokerage services as part of the transaction. Although this research and other services can benefit fund investors, these arrangements could result in increased expenses for fund shareholders if fund advisers trade excessively to obtain additional soft dollar research. SEC has addressed soft dollar practices in the past and recommended actions could provide additional information to fund directors and investors, but has not yet acted on all of its own recommendations. Consistent with H.R. 2420, our report recommended that more disclosure be made to mutual fund directors and investors. |
gao_RCED-98-14 | gao_RCED-98-14_0 | By applying program-specific statutory and administrative criteria, program staff screen and prioritize project applications for each discretionary program. The second phase of the selection process begins after FHWA’s Office of Engineering provides the Office of the Administrator with a report for each discretionary program that lists the eligible projects and includes other information, such as what funding the states received in prior years through the discretionary programs and any congressional interest or support for specific projects. The two phases differ in the extent of documentation available to explain how decisions are made—that is, how program staff apply the criteria to group the projects and how the Office of the Administrator makes the final selections. Staff Priorities and Office of the Administrator’s Final Selections Differ
The current process to select projects under the discretionary programs has been in place since fiscal year 1995. In general, under the current process, the Office of the Administrator relies more on its discretion in making the selections than it did under an earlier process that relied almost entirely on program staffs’ analyses and recommendations. As displayed in figure 2, the Office of the Administrator selected over 98 percent of all the projects that the program staff recommended in fiscal years 1992-94 (180 projects selected from 183 staff recommendations). According to FHWA’s Acting Deputy Administrator, the Office of the Administrator found it difficult to make equitable decisions using the rank order lists and thus made the change to the groupings. The official also said that the process did not give the Office of the Administrator enough flexibility to take into account other equally important considerations, such as the geographic distribution of funding. In fiscal year 1995, 92 percent of the projects that the Office of the Administrator selected were projects that staff had categorized as “promising” or “most promising”; 69 percent in fiscal 1996; and 59 percent in fiscal 1997—about 73 percent overall for the 3-year period. The Office of the Administrator selected 100 percent of the projects recommended by the program staff during fiscal years 1992-94 and 100 percent of those that the staff placed in the most promising category during fiscal 1995-97. The information from FHWA described the number and dollar amount of projects submitted for funding, the statutory and administrative criteria for eligibility and selection, and the Office of the Administrator’s final project selections. To determine how changes in the process have affected which projects DOT selects for discretionary funding, we examined the staffs’ analysis of the projects submitted for funding in each program, as well as the Office of the Administrator’s subsequent project selections. The act also provided that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) establish a formal process to rank and select discretionary bridge projects for funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Transportation's (DOT) project selection process for five federal discretionary programs, focusing on: (1) the selection process and criteria DOT uses to fund projects under its discretionary highway programs; and (2) how DOT's process has changed and how the changes may have affected which projects DOT selects for discretionary funding.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOT uses a two-phase process for selecting and funding transportation projects for the five discretionary programs GAO reviewed; (2) in the first phase, Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) program staff in the field and headquarters compile and evaluate the applications that states submit for discretionary funding; (3) program staff screen the applications by applying eligibility criteria established by statute or administratively; (4) on the basis of written criteria, program staff group the projects into four categories that range in priority from most promising to not qualified and submit the groupings to the Office of the Administrator; (5) the submission to the Office of the Administrator provides information on each candidate project, data on discretionary funds that each state received during prior years, and the current level of congressional interest; (6) in the second phase, the Office of the Administrator uses the information submitted by the program staff, as well as other factors, to evaluate the projects and make the final selections; (7) according to FHwA's Acting Deputy Administrator, the Office of the Administrator has tried to ensure that the dollars are spread fairly among all the states and that the interests of members of Congress are addressed; (8) in contrast to the analyses that the program staff complete in the first phase, the Office of the Administrator does not document the factors it uses to select the final projects or its rationale for making the final selections; (9) DOT is authorized to establish procedures for reviewing and selecting transportation projects under its discretionary programs; (10) GAO's review of the selection process revealed that under the current process, in place during fiscal years 1995-1997, the Office of the Administrator relied more on its discretion and less on the program staff's input and analyses than it did under an earlier process used during fiscal years 1992-1994; (11) under this new process, which was designed to provide the Office of the Administrator with more flexibility in taking into account items such as the geographic distribution of funding, 73 percent of the projects that the Office of the Administrator selected were categorized as "most promising" or "promising"; (12) the Office of the Administrator selected a declining portion of projects from these categories over the 3-year period; and (13) during fiscal years 1992-94, when staff ranked projects in order of priority and recommended specific projects and funding amounts, the Office of the Administrator selected over 98 percent of all projects that the program staff recommended. |
gao_GAO-12-406 | gao_GAO-12-406_0 | The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is the central DOD source to identify, authenticate, authorize, and provide information on DOD- affiliated personnel. Army Regulation No. The Army and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in Indianapolis (DFAS-IN) did not have an effective, repeatable process for identifying the population of active duty payroll accounts. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) did not have an effective process for comparing military pay account files to military personnel files to identify a valid population of military payroll transactions. For example, it took 3 months and repeated attempts before DFAS-IN could provide a population of service members who received active duty Army military pay in fiscal year 2010. Similarly, it took DMDC over 2 months to compare the total number of fiscal year 2010 active duty payroll accounts to its database of personnel files. DOD’s Financial In addition, these ineffective processes are not in accord Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance sets out key tasks essential to achieving audit readiness, including defining and identifying the population of transactions for audit purposes. At the time we initiated our audit, Army officials told us that they had not yet focused on this area in their audit readiness efforts because the target date for The Army military pay was not until the first quarter of fiscal year 2015. inability to readily provide a population of military pay accounts impeded our efforts to accomplish our audit objectives and, if not effectively addressed, will impede the Army’s ability to meet DOD’s new Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal of September 30, 2014. The Army Was Unable to Provide Documentation to Support the Validity and Accuracy of a Sample of Payroll Transactions
The Army does not have an efficient or effective process or system for providing documentation that supports payments for Army military payroll. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and DOD’s FIAR Guidance require audited entities to document transactions and events and assure that supporting documentation can be identified, located, and provided for examination. The Army Was Unable to Locate Supporting Documentation for Military Pay Account Sample Items
Although the Army deployed the Interactive Personnel Management System (iPERMS) as the Army’s Official Military Personnel File in 2007 and the requirements for assuring that adequate supporting documentation is available for audit and examination are clearly defined, the Army did not have procedures in place to assure that its military pay transactions were adequately supported and that the supporting documentation could be readily retrieved and provided for financial audit purposes. our 250 sample items, partial support for 3 sample items, and no support for the remaining 245 sample items. Conclusions
Active Army military payroll, reported at $46.1 billion for fiscal year 2010, is material to all of the Army’s financial statements, and as such, will be significant to the Army’s audit readiness goals for the Statement of Budgetary Resources. Timely and effective implementation of these efforts could help reduce the risk related to DOD’s 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal. Moreover, these initiatives, while important, do not address (1) establishing effective processes and systems for identifying a valid population of military payroll records, (2) ensuring Leave and Earnings Statement files and supporting personnel documents are readily available for verifying the accuracy of payroll records, (3) ensuring key personnel and other pay-related documents that support military payroll transactions are centrally located, retained in service member Official Military Personnel Files, or otherwise readily accessible, and (4) requiring the Army’s Human Resources Command to periodically review and confirm that service member Official Military Personnel File records in iPERMS or other master personnel record systems are consistent and complete to support annual financial audit requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help the Army develop the processes and controls necessary to achieve financial statement audit readiness for military pay, we are making the following four recommendations. For instance, our report states that without effective processes for identifying a complete population of Army military pay records and comparing military pay accounts to personnel records, the Army will have difficulty meeting DOD’s 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal and its 2017 goal for a complete set of auditable financial statements. Our objectives were to perform basic audit procedures necessary to conclude about the validity and accuracy of Army’s active duty military payroll. Those basic audit procedures included (1) identifying a valid population of military payroll transactions, and (2) testing a sample of payroll transactions for validity and accuracy. In support of our objectives, we reviewed Army military personnel and payroll policies and procedures and identified sources of pay-related documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indianapolis (DFAS-IN) reported that fiscal year 2010 active Army military payroll totaled $46.1 billion. However, for several years, GAO and others have reported continuing deficiencies with Army military payroll processes and controls, raising questions about the validity and accuracy of reported Army military pay and whether it is auditable. The Department of Defense (DOD) has recently accelerated its Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal by 3 months to 2014 and is required to achieve audit readiness for a full set of DOD financial statements by 2017. GAO performed basic audit procedures for the Armys active duty military payroll to assess the Armys ability to (1) identify a valid population of payroll transactions and (2) test a sample of payroll transactions for validity and accuracy. GAO reviewed applicable laws and regulations, analyzed DOD and Army policies and procedures, drew a statistical sample of payroll transactions to test their accuracy and validity, and met with DOD, DFAS-IN, Army, and Defense Manpower Data Center officials.
What GAO Found
The Army could not readily identify the population of Army military payroll accounts given its existing procedures and systems. The Army and DFAS-IN did not have an effective, repeatable process for identifying the population of active duty payroll records. For example, it took 3 months and repeated attempts before DFAS-IN could provide a population of service members who received active duty Army military pay in fiscal year 2010. Further, because the Army does not have an integrated military personnel and payroll system, it was necessary to compare the payroll file to active Army personnel records. However, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DODs central repository for information on DOD-affiliated personnel, did not have an effective process for comparing military pay account files with military personnel files to identify a valid population of military payroll transactions. It took DMDC over 2 months and labor-intensive research to compare and reconcile the total number of fiscal year 2010 active duty payroll accounts to its database of personnel files. DODs Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance states that identifying the population of transactions is a key task essential to achieving audit readiness. Without effective processes for identifying the population of Army military pay records and comparing military pay accounts to personnel records, the Army will have difficulty meeting DODs 2014 audit readiness goal for the Statement of Budgetary Resources.
In addition, the Army does not have an efficient or effective process or system for providing supporting documents for Army military payroll. For example, DFAS-IN had difficulty retrieving and providing usable Leave and Earnings Statement files and the Army was unable to locate or provide supporting personnel documents for GAOs statistical sample of fiscal year 2010 Army military pay accounts. GAOs Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and DODs FIAR Guidance provide that audited entities document transactions and events and assure that supporting documentation can be identified, located, and provided for examination. Although the Army deployed the Interactive Personnel Management System (iPERMS) as the Armys Official Military Personnel File in 2007, it had not consistently or completely populated iPERMS with personnel records. At the end of September 2011, 6 months after receiving GAOs 250 statistical sample items, the Army and DFAS-IN were able to provide complete documentation for 2 of GAOs sample items and provided partial documentation for 3 items, but provided no documentation for 245 of GAOs 250 sample items.
The Army has begun several military pay audit readiness efforts that, if successfully implemented, could help increase the likelihood of meeting DODs 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal and the 2017 mandate for audit readiness on a complete set of DOD financial statements. These efforts include documenting and testing payroll system application controls, documenting Army military pay business processes, identifying the range of supporting documents for military pay, and developing an integrated military personnel and payroll system. Most of these efforts are not yet documented and, therefore, there is no assurance that they will be implemented timely and effectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to help the Army develop the processes and controls necessary to achieve financial statement audit readiness, including identifying and validating the population of military payroll transactions and obtaining and retaining necessary pay-affecting documents. The Army concurred with GAOs four recommendations and noted actions it is taking. |
gao_GAO-10-948T | gao_GAO-10-948T_0 | Defaults on Student Loans
In August 2009, GAO reported that in the repayment period, students who attended for-profit colleges were more likely to default on federal student loans than were students from other colleges. For-Profit Colleges Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and Otherwise Questionable Sales and Marketing Practices
Our covert testing at 15 for-profit colleges found that four colleges encouraged fraudulent practices, such as encouraging students to submit false information about their financial status. In addition all 15 colleges made some type of deceptive or otherwise questionable statement to undercover applicants, such as misrepresenting the applicant’s likely salary after graduation and not providing clear information about the college’s graduation rate. Selected video clips of our undercover tests can be seen at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-948T. Fraudulent Practices Encouraged by For-Profit Colleges
Four of the 15 colleges we visited encouraged our undercover applicants to falsify their FAFSA in order to qualify for financial aid. However, this undercover applicant indicated that he had $250,000 in savings—more than enough to pay for the program’s $39,000 costs. Admissions representative encouraged applicant to change the FAFSA to falsely add dependents in order to qualify for Pell Grants. Colleges described the duration of the program as if students would attend classes for 12 months per year, but reported the annual cost of attendance for only 9 months of classes per year. This disguises the program’s total cost. Accurate and Helpful Information Provided
In some instances our undercover applicants were provided accurate or helpful information by campus admissions and financial aid representatives. In line with federal regulations, undercover applicants at several colleges were provided accurate information about the transferability of credits to other postsecondary institutions, for example: A representative at a college owned by a publicly traded company in Pennsylvania told our applicant that with regard to the transfer of credits, “different schools treat it differently; you have to roll the dice and hope it transfers.”
A representative at a privately owned for-profit college in Washington, D.C. told our undercover applicant that the transfer of credits depends on the college the applicant wanted to transfer to. Four of our prospective students filled out forms on two Web sites, which ask questions about students’ interests, match them to for-profit colleges with relevant programs, and provide the students’ information to the appropriate college or the college’s outsourced calling center for follow-up about enrollment. Two other prospective students expressed interest in a bachelor’s in business administration degree, one on each Web site. Within minutes of filling out forms, three prospective students received numerous phone calls from colleges. One fictitious prospective student received a phone call about enrollment within 5 minutes of registering and another 5 phone calls within the hour. For example, a representative of a privately owned for-profit college in California told our undercover applicant that the $14,495 cost of tuition for a computer-aided drafting certificate was “really low.” A representative at a for-profit college in Florida owned by a publicly traded company told our undercover applicant that the cost of their associate’s degree in criminal justice was definitely “worth the investment”. However, based on information we obtained from for-profit colleges we tested, and public and private nonprofit colleges in the same geographic region, we found that most certificate or associate’s degree programs at the for-profit colleges we tested cost more than similar degrees at public or private nonprofit colleges. We compared the cost of tuition at the 15 for-profit colleges we visited, with public and private non-profit colleges located in the same geographic area as the for-profit college. We found that tuition for certificates at for-profit colleges were often significantly more expensive than at a nearby public college. After refusing to sign an enrollment agreement the applicant was allowed to speak to someone in financial aid. | Why GAO Did This Study
Enrollment in for-profit colleges has grown from about 365,000 students to almost 1.8 million in the last several years. These colleges offer degrees and certifications in programs ranging from business administration to cosmetology. In 2009, students at for-profit colleges received more than $4 billion in Pell Grants and more than $20 billion in federal loans provided by the Department of Education (Education). GAO was asked to 1) conduct undercover testing to determine if for-profit colleges' representatives engaged in fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise questionable marketing practices, and 2) compare the tuitions of the for-profit colleges tested with those of other colleges in the same geographic region. To conduct this investigation, GAO investigators posing as prospective students applied for admissions at 15 for-profit colleges in 6 states and Washington, D.C.. The colleges were selected based on several factors, including those that the Department of Education reported received 89 percent or more of their revenue from federal student aid. GAO also entered information on four fictitious prospective students into education search Web sites to determine what type of follow-up contact resulted from an inquiry. GAO compared tuition for the 15 for-profit colleges tested with tuition for the same programs at other colleges located in the same geographic areas. Results of the undercover tests and tuition comparisons cannot be projected to all for-profit colleges.
What GAO Found
Undercover tests at 15 for-profit colleges found that 4 colleges encouraged fraudulent practices and that all 15 made deceptive or otherwise questionable statements to GAO's undercover applicants. Four undercover applicants were encouraged by college personnel to falsify their financial aid forms to qualify for federal aid--for example, one admissions representative told an applicant to fraudulently remove $250,000 in savings. Other college representatives exaggerated undercover applicants' potential salary after graduation and failed to provide clear information about the college's program duration, costs, or graduation rate despite federal regulations requiring them to do so. For example, staff commonly told GAO's applicants they would attend classes for 12 months a year, but stated the annual cost of attendance for 9 months of classes, misleading applicants about the total cost of tuition. Admissions staff used other deceptive practices, such as pressuring applicants to sign a contract for enrollment before allowing them to speak to a financial advisor about program cost and financing options. However, in some instances, undercover applicants were provided accurate and helpful information by college personnel, such as not to borrow more money than necessary. In addition, GAO's four fictitious prospective students received numerous, repetitive calls from for-profit colleges attempting to recruit the students when they registered with Web sites designed to link for-profit colleges with prospective students. Once registered, GAO's prospective students began receiving calls within 5 minutes. One fictitious prospective student received more than 180 phone calls in a month. Calls were received at all hours of the day, as late as 11 p.m. To see video clips of undercover applications and to hear voicemail messages from for-profit college recruiters, see http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-948T . Programs at the for-profit colleges GAO tested cost substantially more for associate's degrees and certificates than comparable degrees and certificates at public colleges nearby. A student interested in a massage therapy certificate costing $14,000 at a for-profit college was told that the program was a good value. However the same certificate from a local community college cost $520. Costs at private nonprofit colleges were more comparable when similar degrees were offered. |
gao_GAO-17-110 | gao_GAO-17-110_0 | MSPB has jurisdiction over claims made by whistleblowers in two types of appeals—an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal and an Otherwise Appealable Action (OAA) appeal. In the first type of appeal—an IRA—the individual is subject to a personnel action, such as a reassignment with no reduction in pay or grade, and claims that the action was taken because of whistleblowing or other covered protected activity, but the action need not be one that is directly appealable to MSPB. MSPB’s Data Show a Higher Annual Number of Whistleblower Appeals Post WPEA; but Weaknesses Exist in MSPB’s Recording and Reporting Processes
MSPB Data Show a Higher Annual Number of Post-WPEA IRA Appeals, but a Lower Annual Number of OAA Appeals
MSPB data show the agency received a total of 1,213 IRA appeals for whistleblower reprisal claims for fiscal years 2013 through 2015. While WPEA clarified the scope of protected disclosures and expanded the individual right of action appeal for certain other protected activities, the act did not alter MSPB’s jurisdiction over OAAs. According to MSPB officials, in some cases appeals were reported under more than one outcome due to human error and limitations in the data coding that resulted in over reporting of appeals closed. Summary judgment authority is a procedural device used when there is no dispute as to the material facts of the case, and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the responsibility of the court. They said that this would give whistleblowers access to a jury trial similar to nonfederal employee whistleblowers. The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 was enacted to further ensure that employees come forward and report violations of law, or certain agency mismanagement or ethical violations, primarily by expanding protected disclosures. Some of these discrepancies may have been caused by the lack of updated data entry user guides and the lack of a quality check in its data analysis and reporting process. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure the accuracy of MSPB’s reporting on whistleblower appeals received and closed, the Chairman of MSPB should take the following two actions:
Update MSPB’s data entry user guide to include additional guidance and procedures to help improve the identification of appropriate whistleblower appeal closing codes to use. Specifically, this report: (1) describes changes in the number of whistleblower reprisal appeals filed with MSPB, as well as the outcome of appeals, since WPEA’s effective date, including whether or not MSPB, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or any other court determined the allegations to be frivolous or malicious; and provides (2) subject matter specialists’ views on granting MSPB summary judgment authority for whistleblower cases, and (3) subject matter specialists’ views on granting jurisdiction for some subset of whistleblower cases to be decided by a district court of the United States, and the potential impact on MSPB and the federal court system. We also requested and reviewed MSPB whistleblower reprisal appeals data for 2 fiscal years prior to WPEA’s effective date, specifically for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, in order to have 5 years of consecutive data to identify changes in the number of whistleblower reprisal appeals filed after WPEA’s effective date. To address the second and third objectives, we conducted six focus groups in July 2016 with subject matter specialists knowledgeable about WPEA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal employee whistleblowers—individuals who report violations of law or certain agency mismanagement— may risk reprisals from their agencies. WPEA seeks to strengthen the rights of and protections for federal whistleblowers.
WPEA includes a provision for GAO to report on the law's implementation. This report (1) describes changes in the number of whistleblower reprisal appeals filed with MSPB, as well as the outcome of appeals, since WPEA's effective date; (2) provides subject matter specialists' views about granting MSPB summary judgment authority for whistleblower cases; and (3) provides subject matter specialists' views about granting jurisdiction for a subset of whistleblower appeals to be decided by a district court of the United States.
GAO obtained data from MSPB on whistleblower appeals received and closed from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. This period begins approximately 2 years prior to WPEA's effective date of December 27, 2012, and continues through the end of fiscal year 2015. GAO also conducted six focus groups with subject matter specialists that include whistleblower advocates and agency labor relations officials.
What GAO Found
Of the two types of whistleblower appeals—individual right of action (IRA) and otherwise appealable action (OAA)—Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) data show higher numbers of IRA appeals received by MSPB after enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA). In an IRA appeal, an individual has been subject to a personnel action, such as a reassignment, and claims the action was reprisal for whistleblowing. In contrast, the number of OAA appeals decreased after WPEA. In an OAA appeal, an individual has been subject to an action directly appealable to MSPB, such as a demotion, and claims that the action was taken because of whistleblowing. WPEA, among other things, clarified the scope of protected disclosures which may have contributed to a higher number of IRA appeals. WPEA did not alter MSPB's jurisdiction over OAAs.
MSPB has taken steps to collect and report whistleblower appeals data. GAO identified a number of weaknesses in MSPB's data collection. Some were due to shortcomings in data coding that resulted in over reporting appeals closed. Further, MSPB has not updated its data entry user guides to reflect new reporting requirements nor has it instituted checks to ensure data accuracy, which are inconsistent with internal control standards.
Subject matter specialists varied in their opinions about the benefits of granting summary judgment authority—a procedural device used when there is no dispute as to the material facts of the case—to MSPB. Benefits cited included a more efficient process; but negatives included the loss of a whistleblower's right to a hearing. Similarly, the specialists provided a mix of opinions about granting jurisdiction for cases to U.S. District Courts. A benefit cited was access to a jury trial, while a negative cited was the increased workload of the courts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that MSPB help ensure the accuracy of its reporting on whistleblower appeals received and closed by (1) updating its data entry user guide to include additional guidance and procedures, and (2) adding a quality check in its data analysis and reporting process to better identify discrepancies. MSPB agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-995T | gao_GAO-01-995T_0 | This flawed policy has resulted in a proliferation of purchase cards at the two units. Potentially Abusive Transactions
We also identified a number of potentially abusive transactions. Conclusions
The serious breakdown in internal controls at SPAWAR San Diego and Navy Public Works San Diego are the result of a weak overall internal control environment, flawed or nonexistent policies and procedures, and employees that do not adhere to valid policies. The proliferation of cardholders at these two activities resulted in over 1,700 cardholders with essentially the authority to make their own purchase decisions in an environment that lacked basic controls over receipt of government property, certification of monthly statements, and accountability over sensitive property items. The combination of these factors also contributed to the five known fraud cases and leaves the government highly vulnerable to significant additional fraud, waste, and abuse from the purchase card program at these two Navy units. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Pursuant to Senator Grassley’s request, we obtained and reviewed information on five fraud cases related to Navy purchase card programs in the San Diego, California, area and to review purchase card controls and accounting for two Navy units based in San Diego—the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems Center and the Navy Public Works Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses internal controls weaknesses that left two Navy units in San Diego, California, vulnerable to purchase card fraud and abuse.
What GAO Found
GAO found a proliferation of purchase cards at the two units in San Diego--the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command and the Navy Public Works. In the end, more than 1,700 cardholders essentially had the authority to make their own purchase decisions. A serious breakdown in internal controls over the receipt of government property and the certification of monthly statements, coupled with flawed or nonexistent policies and procedures and the failure of Navy employees to adhere to valid policies and procedures, led to (1) the loss, theft, and misuse of government property; (2) the potential abuse of purchase cards; and (3) payments of potentially fraudulent charges. Five fraud cases have already been identified, and the government remains extremely vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse arising from the purchase card program at the two Navy units. This testimony summarized the November report, GAO-02-32 . |
gao_HEHS-95-141 | gao_HEHS-95-141_0 | The responsibility for monitoring the trials rests with the sponsor. NCI-Sponsored Trials Included Some Use of Tranquilizing Agents
Published reports of the three trials did not disclose the extent of tranquilizer use among study patients. Table 1 shows the number of patients receiving hydrazine sulfate and various antiemetic medications. Retrospective Analyses Found No Evidence of Adverse Effects From the Use of Allegedly Incompatible Drugs
Analyses of data from NCI-sponsored clinical trials found no evidence of adverse effects on survival associated with hydrazine sulfate and the use of tranquilizing agents as antiemetics and barbiturates. Before completion of NCI’s sponsored clinical trials, FDA approved more than 70 applications permitting the compassionate use of hydrazine sulfate. In its approvals, FDA staff requested that physicians caution their patients to avoid tranquilizers, barbiturates, and alcohol while taking hydrazine sulfate. NCI Did Not Ensure Collection of Data on the Use of Alleged Incompatible Agents
NCI contributed to the subsequent controversy surrounding these trials by not requiring better data collection and analysis of this issue. Although NCI officials were aware of the concerns surrounding the use of allegedly incompatible agents with hydrazine sulfate, they did not believe it was necessary to maintain research records during its trial regarding concurrent medications and possible alcohol use. CALGB’s Published Trial Results Did Not Accurately Describe Tranquilizer Use
A paper presenting the final results of the CALGB clinical trial did not clearly describe the use of tranquilizing agents by study patients. We believe the investigator erred in not reporting the widespread use of benzodiazepine tranquilizing agents. Although CALGB informed NCI that the use of concurrent medications would be captured on the patient research forms in accordance with the research plan, CALGB investigators did not uniformly record this information on the forms as originally intended. NCI criticized this lapse and ensured that a letter from the CALGB investigator was published that provided more complete and accurate information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the National Cancer Institute (NCI)-sponsored clinical trials of the anticancer drug hydrazine sulfate, focusing on: (1) NCI protocol design and data management procedures; (2) how NCI and the trials' investigators dealt with the drug's potential incompatibility with certain agents; (3) the extent to which patients received these incompatible agents; and (4) how the investigators reported the issue.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the three large NCI-sponsored clinical trials showed that the drug did not prolong cancer patients' survival; (2) controversy surrounding the trials focused on trial participants' use of tranquilizers, barbiturates, and alcohol, which were allegedly incompatible with the drug; (3) clinical trial records showed that participants used tranquilizers under varying circumstances, particularly for relief from vomiting; (4) the investigators believed that it was unethical to withhold antiemetic medications from patients undergoing chemotherapy; (5) subsequent analyses of patients' use of concurrent medications did not invalidate NCI conclusions that the drug was ineffective; (6) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may have contributed to the confusion surrounding the trials due to its more conservative position on how the drug should be administered to some patients; (7) although FDA approved more than 70 applications permitting the use of hydrazine sulfate, it cautioned physicians about their patients' use of tranquilizing agents while on the drug; (8) there were lapses in recordkeeping and reporting because NCI did not require complete and accurate research records on the patients' use of tranquilizing agents during the trials; and (9) NCI-sponsored investigators only recently analyzed this issue, since published results did not accurately describe the widespread use of tranquilizers during the trials. |
gao_AIMD-98-154 | gao_AIMD-98-154_0 | VA Lacks Overall Business Process Improvement Strategy
The Clinger-Cohen Act requires agency heads to analyze the missions of the agency and, on the basis of this analysis, revise and improve the agency’s mission-related and administrative processes before making significant investments in supporting information technology. However, to date, VA has not committed to when it will have an overall business process improvement strategy to accomplish reengineering. As a result of these weaknesses, the department does not know whether it is making the right investments, how to control these investments effectively, or whether these investments have provided mission-related benefits in excess of their costs. VA’s CIO responsibilities are not limited primarily to information management. The Clinger-Cohen Act calls for CIOs to have information resources management as their primary duty. Conclusions
VA has not fully implemented critical provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act and other information technology legislative reforms to achieve its “One VA” vision of becoming more customer-focused and delivering seamless service to veterans. Moreover, VA’s process for controlling information technology projects through periodic status and in-process reviews does not adequately monitor and manage its investments so as to detect or avoid problems early. To fulfill the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act and other information technology legislative reforms, we also recommend that the Secretary direct VA’s CIO to develop a detailed implementation plan with milestones for completing an integrated, departmentwide information technology architecture; fully implement a disciplined process for selecting information technology investments in which all decisions are based upon complete and current project information including estimated project costs, expected mission-related benefits, projected schedule, and risks; conduct formal in-process reviews at key milestones in a project’s life cycle, including comparing actual and estimated project costs, benefits, schedule, and risks, and provide these results, as well as the results of periodic project status reviews performed by VA components, to decisionmakers who will determine whether to continue, accelerate, or terminate information technology projects; and initiate post-implementation reviews for information technology projects within 12 months of implementation, to compare completed project cost, schedule, performance, and mission improvement outcomes with original estimates, and provide the results of these reviews to decisionmakers so that improvements can be made to VA’s information technology investment process. Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine how VA has implemented the following specific provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act and other legislative reforms: reengineering business processes before acquiring information technology, completing an integrated information technology architecture, institutionalizing a disciplined information technology investment decision-making process; and appointing an agency CIO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has implemented specific provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act and other legislative reforms, including: (1) reengineering business processes before acquiring information technology; (2) completing an integrated information technology architecture; (3) institutionalizing a disciplined information technology investment decisionmaking process; and (4) appointing an agency Chief Information Officer (CIO).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA has not fully implemented critical provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act and other legislative reforms; (2) although VA has taken some initial steps, it has not adequately implemented these legislative reforms; (3) specifically, the Clinger-Cohen Act requires agencies to analyze their mission-related and administrative processes, and on the basis of this analysis, revise and improve these processes before making significant investments in supporting information technology; (4) although GAO's business process reengineering guide states that agencies should have an overall business process improvement strategy to accomplish reengineering, VA has not developed such a strategy; (5) VA also has not yet defined the departmentwide integrated information technology architecture needed to efficiently utilize information systems across the department; (6) in addition, VA has not institutionalized a disciplined process for selecting, controlling, and evaluating information technology as investments as required by the Clinger-Cohen Act; (7) specifically, VA decisionmakers did not have current and complete information such as cost, benefit, schedule, risk, and performance data at the project level, which is essential to making sound investment decisions; (8) in addition, VA's process for controlling and evaluating its investment portfolio is incomplete and, as a result, decisionmakers do not have the information needed to: (a) detect or avoid problems early; and (b) improve VA's investment process; (9) as a consequence, the department does not know whether it is making the right investments, how to control these investments effectively, or whether these investments have provided mission-related benefits in excess of their costs; (10) although the Clinger-Cohen Act requires agencies' CIOs to have information management as their primary duty, the responsibilities of VA's CIO are not limited primarily to information management; (11) instead, the CIO also functions as the department's Assistant Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer; and (12) as a result, information technology issues are not addressed promptly. |
gao_GAO-15-487 | gao_GAO-15-487_0 | Naval Forces Central Command. Inconsistent and Ambiguous Policies Have Impeded Central Storage and Quality Assurance of OEHS Data Inconsistent DOD and Military Service-Specific Policies Have Resulted in Fragmentation and Duplication in the Storage of OEHS Data
Inconsistencies between DOD and military service-specific policies regarding OEHS data storage has led to fragmentation and duplication of OEHS data between the department’s two systems—MESL and DOEHRS. Our prior work has found that inefficiencies can occur when there is fragmentation and duplication, such as when more than one system offers the same services.store unclassified OEHS data, officials’ efforts to store these data are inefficient and have resulted in both fragmentation and duplication. This has occurred because, in some cases, similar types of unclassified OEHS Without consistent policies on which system should be used to data have been submitted to both MESL and DOEHRS, and in other cases, identical OEHS data has been submitted to both systems. However, neither system serves as a central repository for these data. As a result, it is difficult to identify complete and comprehensive data sets for specific types of OEHS data, which may lead to problems when officials attempt to use these data in the future. Officials may perform these quality assurance checks while at a deployment site. As a result, some of the military services developed their own guidance, which has resulted in inconsistent approaches and levels of effort. This runs counter to federal standards for internal control, which state that management should continually monitor information captured and maintained for several factors, including its reliability. Site Assessments Are Used to Identify Potential Health Risks, but the Extent to Which These Risks Are Mitigated for Deployed Servicemembers Is Unclear
Site Assessments Are Used to Identify Potential Health Risks for Servicemembers Deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan
The military services use site assessments to identify and address potential occupational and environmental health risks at deployment locations. In 2007, DOD established the Occupational and Environmental Health Site Assessment (OEHSA) as the standardized process for assessing and reporting occupational and environmental health site conditions at deployment sites. In contrast, DOD’s policy for its safety and occupational health program requires that the department’s components, including the combatant commands, establish procedures to ensure that decisions related to risk management are documented, archived, and reevaluated on a recurring basis. Furthermore, clear and appropriate documentation is a key component of internal controls, according to the federal standards for internal control. DOD’s and VA’s Use of OEHS Data to Address Post- Deployment Health Conditions Has Been Limited
Despite the ongoing collection of OEHS data, both DOD and VA have used OEHS data to a limited extent to address post-deployment health conditions. Force Health Protection & Readiness officials told us that the primary limitation with OEHS data collected during deployments continues to be the inability to capture individual servicemembers’ exposures—an issue that we reported on in 2012. However, problems with the storage and quality assurance for OEHS data compromise the departments’ ability to use them in determining service-connections for specific health conditions, or in conducting other important research. Of additional concern, DOD does not know the extent to which recommended countermeasures for mitigating exposures to occupational and environmental health hazards are being implemented at deployment sites because CENTCOM does not require the documentation of these decisions. While the health and well-being of our servicemembers and veterans is paramount, DOD’s and VA’s ability to prevent, diagnose, and study post-deployment health conditions is compromised without accessible and reliable information about risk mitigation activities and OEHS data. Recommendations for Executive Action
To eliminate the fragmentation and duplication in the storage of unclassified OEHS data we recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine which IT system—DOEHRS or MESL—should be used to store specific types of unclassified OEHS data, clarify the department’s policy accordingly, and require all other departmental and military-service- specific policies to be likewise amended and implemented to ensure consistency. To ensure that potential occupational and environmental health risks are mitigated for servicemembers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require CENTCOM to revise its policy to ensure that base commanders’ decisions on whether to implement risk mitigation recommendations identified in OEHSAs are adequately documented and consistently monitored by the appropriate command. In commenting on this draft, DOD concurred with all of our recommendations, and VA generally agreed with our conclusions. Further, CENTCOM officials told us that they are not monitoring the implementation of these recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
OEHS is the regular collection and reporting of occupational and environmental health hazard data that can be used to help prevent, treat, or control disease or injury. In 2005, GAO reported that DOD needed to make improvements with OEHS during deployments to address immediate and long-term health issues.
GAO was asked to assess DOD's current OEHS efforts. This report examines (1) the extent to which the military services centrally store OEHS data and verify its reliability; (2) how, if at all, DOD identifies potential occupational and environmental health risks for sites in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to what extent these risks are mitigated; and (3) the extent to which DOD and VA use OEHS data to address post-deployment health conditions. GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and military service policies on OEHS data storage and quality assurance, as well as policies related to conducting and monitoring assessments for deployment sites. GAO also interviewed DOD, military service, and VA officials, as well as groups representing servicemembers and veterans.
What GAO Found
Inconsistencies between Department of Defense (DOD) and military service-specific policies regarding occupational and environmental health surveillance (OEHS) data storage have contributed to fragmentation and duplication of OEHS data between two information technology systems—the Military Exposure Surveillance Library (MESL) and the Defense Occupational and Environmental Health Readiness System (DOEHRS). Not having consistent policies for which system should be used to store OEHS data is contrary to federal standards for internal control. As a result, officials' efforts to store these data have resulted in both fragmentation and duplication, which GAO's prior work has shown may result in inefficiencies. Correspondingly, in some cases, similar types of unclassified OEHS data are being submitted to both MESL and DOEHRS, and in other cases, identical OEHS data are being submitted to both systems. However, neither system serves as a central repository for these data, and as a result, it is difficult to identify complete and comprehensive OEHS data sets, which may lead to problems when officials attempt to use these data in the future. Additionally, DOD's policy for OEHS data does not specifically address quality assurance. Consequently, some of the military services have developed their own guidance, resulting in inconsistent approaches and levels of effort, which has reduced DOD's ability to be confident that the data are sufficiently reliable. Federal standards for internal control state that management should continually monitor information captured and maintained for several factors, including reliability.
The military services use site assessments to identify and address potential occupational and environmental health risks at a deployment site. These assessments may include recommended countermeasures, such as the use of personal protective equipment. However, the extent to which these recommendations are being implemented is unclear because U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—the combatant command responsible for military operations in the geographic area that includes Iraq and Afghanistan—does not require base commanders to document their decisions on implementing them. Officials also said they are not monitoring these recommendations, and instead rely on others to elevate concerns, as necessary. In contrast, DOD's policy for its safety and occupational health program requires the department's components, including the combatant commands, to ensure that risk management decisions are documented and reevaluated. Federal standards for internal control also note that appropriate documentation is a key internal control activity and that agencies should monitor their activities for managing identified risks.
Both DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have used OEHS data to a limited extent to address post-deployment health conditions. For example, DOD officials said that the primary limitation with OEHS data collected during deployments continues to be the inability to capture exposure data at the individual servicemember level, although a method to do so is currently being explored. Additionally, DOD and VA use OEHS data to conduct research that may help determine service connections for post-deployment health conditions, but it has been difficult for researchers to establish a causal link between exposures and specific health conditions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD clarify its policies for the storage and quality assurance of OEHS data, and require other related policies to be amended accordingly. GAO also recommends that CENTCOM revise its policy to require adequate documentation and consistent monitoring of deployment risk mitigation activities. In commenting on the report, DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations, and VA generally agreed with the conclusions. |
gao_GAO-03-1041 | gao_GAO-03-1041_0 | Centralized database. The Army and Air Force Did Not Comply with Deployment Health Surveillance Policies for Many Servicemembers
The Army and Air Force did not comply with DOD’s force health protection and surveillance requirements for many of the servicemembers in our samples at the selected installations we visited. Many Servicemembers Lacked Pre-deployment and Post-deployment Health Assessments
We found that servicemembers missing one or both of their pre- and post-deployment assessments ranged from 38 to 98 percent in our samples. Based on our review of servicemember medical records for the deployments at the four installations we visited, we found that between 14 and 46 percent of the servicemembers were missing at least one of their required immunizations prior to deployment (see fig. According to DOD health officials, the lack of complete and accurate medical records complicated the diagnosis and treatment of servicemembers who experienced post-deployment health problems that they attributed to their military service in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91. As set forth above, Public Law 105-85, enacted November 1997, requires the Secretary of Defense to retain and maintain health-related records in a centralized location. Health-related documentation missing from the centralized database ranged from 0 to 63 percent for pre-deployment health assessments, 11 to 75 percent for post-deployment health assessments, and 8 to 93 percent for immunizations. We believe that the lack of such a system was a major cause of the high rate of noncompliance we found at the units we visited. DMDC is currently reviewing the deployment information submitted by the services to determine its accuracy and completeness. Moreover, because DOD and the services do not have an effective quality assurance program in place to help ensure compliance, these problems went undetected and uncorrected. Continued noncompliance with these policies may result in servicemembers with existing health problems or concerns being deployed with unaddressed health problems or without the immunization protection they need to counter theater disease threats. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To meet our objectives, we interviewed responsible officials and reviewed pertinent documents, reports, and information related to force health protection and deployment health surveillance requirements obtained from officials at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Joint Staff; the Marine Corps Force Health Protection Office; and the Offices of the Surgeons General for the Army and Air Force Headquarters in the Washington, D.C., area. To determine whether the military services were meeting DOD’s force health protection and surveillance requirements for servicemembers deploying in support of OEF and OJG, we identified DOD and each service’s overall deployment health surveillance policies. To determine whether DOD has corrected problems related to the accuracy and completeness of databases reflecting which servicemembers deployed to certain locations, we interviewed officials within the Deployment Health Support Directorate and the Defense Manpower Data Center and reviewed documentation related to the completeness of deployment databases and planned improvements in capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, many servicemembers experienced health problems that they attributed to their military service in the Persian Gulf. However, a lack of servicemember health and deployment data hampered subsequent investigations into the nature and causes of these illnesses. Public Law 105-85, enacted in November 1997, required the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a system to assess the medical condition of service members before and after deployments. GAO was asked to determine whether (1) the military services met DOD's force health protection and surveillance requirements for servicemembers deploying in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Central Asia and Operation Joint Guardian (OJG) in Kosovo and (2) DOD has corrected problems related to the accuracy and completeness of databases reflecting which servicemembers were deployed to certain locations.
What GAO Found
The Army and Air Force--the focus of GAO's review--did not comply with DOD's force health protection and surveillance policies for many active duty servicemembers, including the policies that they be assessed before and after deploying overseas, that they receive certain immunizations, and that health-related documentation be maintained in a centralized location. GAO's review of 1,071 servicemembers' medical records from a universe of 8,742 at selected Army and Air Force installations participating in overseas operations disclosed that 38 to 98 percent of servicemembers were missing one or both of their health assessments and 14 to 46 percent were missing at least one of the required immunizations. DOD also did not maintain a complete, centralized database of servicemembers' medical assessments and immunizations. Health-related documentation missing from the centralized database ranged from 0 to 63 percent for pre-deployment assessments, 11 to 75 percent for post-deployment assessments, and 8 to 93 percent for immunizations. There is no effective quality assurance program at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs or at the Army or Air Force that helps ensure compliance with policies. GAO believes that the lack of such a program was a major cause of the high rate of noncompliance. Continued noncompliance with these policies may result in servicemembers deploying with health problems or delays in obtaining care when they return. Finally, DOD's centralized deployment database is still missing the information needed to track servicemembers' movements in the theater of operations. By July 2003, the department's data center had begun receiving location-specific deployment information from the services and is currently reviewing its accuracy and completeness. |
gao_GAO-12-48 | gao_GAO-12-48_0 | Collectively, these systems, in combination with others, will transform air traffic control to air traffic management. These different governing structures contribute to differing management structures for NextGen and SESAR. U.S. companies are participating in SESAR’s development phase, either as a member organization or as an associate partner. FAA and the European Commission Are Working Collaboratively on Components Common to NextGen and SESAR
FAA and the European Commission Agreed to Collaborate on NextGen and SESAR and to Continue Existing Collaborative Research
In 2006, FAA and the European Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to ensure coordination between the aviation modernization programs in the United States and the EU. FAA was allowed to participate as an observer at bimonthly meetings of the EU’s Industry Consultation Body. FAA and the European Commission Have Established a Structure and Governance Process for Collaboration
In March 2011, FAA and the European Commission signed a new MOC that replaced the 2006 MOU (updated in 2009) and provides more specific direction on collaboration and governance as NextGen and SESAR move forward. 2). RTCA and EUROCAE have formed jointly led and staffed special committees to develop standards for the new technology that NextGen and SESAR will employ and help ensure interoperability in technologies that may differ in some ways between the two systems. In 2011, FAA and the EU reaffirmed their agreement that interoperability is essential by establishing the MOC. Both parties recognize that it is in their mutual interest that aircraft be able to operate seamlessly as they fly from one system to the other. To FAA’s credit, its NextGen Implementation Plan, issued in March 2011, does state that the United States and EU have agreed to enter into a new MOC to advance the interoperability of NextGen and SESAR technologies and that FAA and SJU are collaborating on air traffic management research, development, and validation for global interoperability. Mitigating Stakeholder Skepticism Is a Challenge
Lack of Details on Collaborative Efforts Contributes to Stakeholder Skepticism about NextGen and SESAR Benefits
Some stakeholders we interviewed on both sides of the Atlantic expressed skepticism about whether or when the future benefits of NextGen and SESAR will be realized, echoing concerns that have been raised in the past. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify and understand the efforts that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken to ensure the interoperability of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) with the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) programme, we reviewed key documents and conducted semistructured interviews with FAA officials and aviation stakeholders. Specifically, we reviewed agreements between FAA and the European Union (EU) concerning collaborative research on air traffic management and other documents such as the NextGen Implementation Plan and the European Air Traffic Management Master Plan, which provide details on NextGen and SESAR programs, and reports comparing NextGen and SESAR concepts and avionics road maps. To determine how FAA’s collaborative efforts with the EU compare with effective interagency collaborative practices, we compared FAA’s collaborative efforts, as documented in status reports of action plan teams and in the 2011 Memorandum of Cooperation, with key practices that we have previously identified in effective interagency collaborations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is leading development of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), which will transform the current radar-based air traffic control system into a satellite-based system. At the same time, the European Union (EU) is developing a similar transformation effort, known as the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) programme. Interoperable NextGen and SESAR systems and procedures will be important for aircraft to seamlessly transition from one system to the other.
As requested, this report discusses (1) the efforts that FAA has taken to ensure the interoperability of NextGen with SESAR and (2) how those efforts compare with effective interagency collaboration practices. To address these issues, GAO reviewed agreements between the U.S. and the EU concerning collaborative research on air traffic management and documents related to NextGen and SESAR; reviewed the literature on effective collaboration; and interviewed FAA and EU officials.
What GAO Found
FAA and the EU are working collaboratively toward ensuring interoperability as they modernize their air traffic control systems (NextGen and SESAR) and are generally using effective collaborative practices, but mitigating stakeholder skepticism about realizing NextGen/SESAR benefits will be a challenge.
FAA-EU collaborative efforts predate NextGen and SESAR and helped establish some of these systems central concepts.
In March 2011, FAA and the EU signed a new agreement that established a formal collaborative structure for NextGen and SESAR.
FAA is generally following collaborative practices that we have observed in successful interagency collaborations, but some U.S. and EU stakeholders expressed skepticism about whether NextGens and SESARs benefits will ever be realized.
FAA could reduce stakeholder skepticism by providing, in its public documents, details on the new structure for collaboration and governance with the EU.
FAA and the EU are working collaboratively toward Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) and Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) interoperability. In 2006, FAA and the European Commission established a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that allowed reciprocal participation in meetings, which provided each with an awareness of the others plans. The MOU also continued a long-standing agreement that fostered collaborative research and helped develop some of the central concepts of NextGen and SESAR, such as data communications and satellite-based surveillance. Additionally, FAA and the EU conducted demonstrations of NextGen/SESAR procedures and technologies that produced useful results at the airports involved in the demonstrations. In March 2011, FAA and the EU signed a separate Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) that established a formal collaborative structure for NextGen and SESAR. Outside of formal agreements, U.S. and EU standards bodies have formed joint committees to develop common standards for NextGen and SESAR systems. Additionally, FAA and the EU are working with an international standards organization to facilitate global interoperability. |
gao_RCED-97-54 | gao_RCED-97-54_0 | Instead, most agencies rely on food stamp applicants to provide accurate household information and to report subsequent changes, such as the incarceration of a household member. After this matching program was implemented, some caseworkers charged that much of the information provided in the IEVS matches did not lead to savings in the Food Stamp Program. Prisoners’ participation in the Food Stamp Program resulted in overpayments of $3.5 million for the locations where we conducted matches. A computer match of data on states’ food stamp participants and verified inmates could be a cost-effective method for identifying a prisoner’s participation in a food stamp household and thus provide the evidence needed to remove the prisoner from the calculation of a household’s eligibility and benefits. Recommendations
To identify state and county prisoners who are included as members of households receiving food stamps, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture actively encourage states to implement periodic computer matches of data on state and local prison inmates with data on participants in the Food Stamp Program. Specifically, we determined (1) how many prisoners were included as members of households that received food stamp benefits and the estimated value of improper benefits that were issued to the households, (2) how prisoner participation could take place without detection, and (3) whether computer matching can be an effective method for identifying prisoner participation. Food stamp benefits are calculated for households, not for individuals. To determine why prisoner participation was not detected, we asked FCS to identify state or local agencies that collect prison data and compare that data with data on food stamp recipients to identify prisoner participation. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on Food Stamp Program overpayments, focusing on: (1) how many prisoners were included as members of households that received food stamp benefits, hereafter referred to as prisoner participation, and the estimated value of improper benefits that were issued to the households; (2) how prisoner participation could take place without detection; and (3) whether computer matching can be an effective method for identifying prisoner participation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite federal regulations prohibiting inmates of correctional institutions from participating in the Food Stamp Program, GAO identified 12,138 inmates in the areas it examined who were included in households receiving food stamps; (2) these households improperly collected an estimated $3.5 million in food stamp benefits; (3) prisoner participation goes undetected because agencies generally do not verify the information on household membership provided by food stamp applicants; (4) furthermore, according to officials of the Department of Agriculture's Food Stamp Program, most state or local agencies responsible for administering the program do not routinely collect and review lists of individuals incarcerated in state and local facilities to determine whether any of these individuals are being counted as members of food stamp households; (5) given the program's reliance on client-provided information, computer matching of lists of prisoners and food stamp household members provides a straightforward and potentially effective mechanism to accurately and independently identify prisoners' participation; and (6) while states have implemented various computer matching routines, such as the Income and Eligibility Verification System, which compares data on welfare clients with data on state and federal wages and benefits, many states have not yet implemented a computer matching program to identify prisoners participating in the Food Stamp Program. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.