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gao_GGD-98-149 | gao_GGD-98-149_0 | Treasury’s Performance Plan Provides a Partial Picture of Intended Performance Across the Department
As the Results Act requires, the annual performance plan is to provide a basis for an agency to compare actual results with performance goals. While output measures are expected to be in the plan, Treasury could better convey its expected results and show how goals are to be achieved by developing additional outcome measures and better explaining how the outputs that are measured relate to the goals. Connecting Mission, Goals, and Program Activities
For the most part, the performance goals of the Department’s bureaus and offices are connected to their missions, strategic goals, and program activities in the budget request. However, the linkages between the program-level measures and performance goals are not consistently clear. However, the plan does not clearly indicate that ATF coordinated with the other agencies in setting its fiscal year 1999 annual goals or targets. Treasury’s Performance Plan Does Not Completely Discuss How the Department’s Strategies and Sources Will Help it Achieve its Goals
The Results Act requires that annual performance plans briefly describe the strategies and resources the agency intends to use to achieve its performance goals. We found that Treasury’s performance plan adequately discusses, with some exceptions, the resources to support the achievement of its performance goals. The usefulness of the plan, which includes the budget justification, would be enhanced with a fuller description of how its strategies relate to achieving the goals. We found that the information in Treasury’s plan on how strategies were connected to results did not always list strategies and, in other cases, did not adequately describe the strategies. Treasury’s Performance Plan Does Not Provide Sufficient Confidence That the Department’s Performance Information Will Be Credible
Treasury’s performance plan does not provide sufficient confidence that its performance information will be credible because it does not adequately describe procedures for verifying and validating performance data or sufficiently discuss the ramifications of known data limitations. These are challenges that Treasury faces as it strives to better meet the criteria set forth in the Results Act and related guidance. We believe that Treasury’s plan could be improved by including performance goals to address the significant management challenges and high-risk areas the Department faces. We found that the Treasury plan does not have performance goals that adequately address the eight high-risk areas we previously identified that affect Treasury operations. Some of the other major management challenges that Treasury faces are briefly acknowledged in the bureaus’ and offices’ plans. Developing a plan that fully meets all the criteria of the Act and related guidance will be a challenge because developing measures and collecting reliable data for some important areas of Treasury’s performance, such as taxpayer burden, are very difficult to do. Treasury’s plan could be enhanced by explicitly discussing the Department’s strategy to improve its performance measurement systems and data and by describing Treasury’s interim plans to measure performance in critical areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of the Treasury's fiscal year (FY) 1999 annual performance plan, focusing on: (1) the extent to which Treasury's performance plan provides a clear picture of intended performance across the agency; (2) how well Treasury's performance plan discusses the strategies and resources it will use to achieve its performance goals; and (3) the extent to which the Treasury's performance plan provides confidence that its performance information will be credible.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Treasury's FY 1999 annual performance plan partially meets the criteria set forth in the Government Performance and Results Act and related guidance; (2) one of the strengths of the plan is that the annual performance goals and measures are linked to the strategic goals in the bureaus' and offices' strategic plans; (3) moreover, the plan generally provides a clear connection between its performance goals and the program activities in Treasury's budget request; (4) with a few exceptions, the plan covers each of Treasury's program activities as required by the Results Act; (5) the plan could be improved to better meet the criteria set forth in the Results Act and related guidance by presenting information on performance goals and measures in a manner that would better reflect intended or expected performance and achievements; (6) while GAO recognizes that some output measures are necessary, it also believes the plan could define Treasury's expected performance better if it had more outcome goals and measures; (7) also, the plan does not consistently include information across Treasury's bureaus and offices on how the Department plans to coordinate its activities that share a common purpose with activities in other agencies; (8) the plan, which includes the budget justification, describes the resources for carrying out the strategies to meet the criteria set forth in the Results Act and related guidance; (9) however, the information in the plan on how the strategies relate to achieving the goals did not always list strategies or adequately describe them; (10) additional details on how Treasury plans to verify and validate performance data, along with some discussion of how the effects of data limitations are to be handled, would better assure Congress and other stakeholders that the intended performance or results, if achieved, are credible; (11) GAO realizes that developing measures and collecting reliable data for some important areas of Treasury's performance are very difficult to do; (12) however, Treasury's plan could be enhanced by explicitly discussing the Department's strategy to improve its performance measurement systems and data and by describing Treasury's interim plans to measure performance in critical areas; (13) Treasury's plan would be more useful to Congress and other stakeholders if it included performance goals to address the significant management challenges and high-risk areas it faces; and (14) the plan briefly acknowledges some of the major management challenges and high-risk areas, but it does not have performance goals that adequately address all of them. |
gao_GAO-05-955 | gao_GAO-05-955_0 | History of JSAS
JSAS was created in 1956 to help provide financial security for the families of deceased federal judges. It provides benefits to surviving eligible spouses and dependent children of judges who participate in the plan. Judges may elect coverage within 6 months of taking office, 6 months after getting married, or 6 months after being elevated to a higher court, or during an open season authorized by statute. Active and senior judges currently contribute 2.2 percent of their salaries to JSAS, and retired judges contribute 3.5 percent of their retirement salaries to JSAS. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether participating judges’ contributions for the 3 plan years ending on September 30, 2004, funded at least 50 percent of the JSAS costs and, if not, what adjustments in the contribution rates would be needed to achieve the 50 percent ratio. Judges Paid More Than Half of JSAS’s Costs
For each of the JSAS plan years 2002 through 2004, participating judges funded more than 50 percent of the JSAS normal costs. The judges’ contribution of JSAS normal costs shown in table 1 fluctuated from approximately 75 percent in plan year 2002, to approximately 64 percent in plan year 2003, and to 78 percent in plan year 2004. The variance in the federal government’s contribution rates was a result of the fluctuation in normal costs resulting from several combined factors, such as changes in assumptions; lower-than-expected return on plan assets; demographic changes—retirement, death, disability, new members, and pay increases; as well as an increase in plan benefit obligations. As shown in table 1, the judges’ average contribution for JSAS costs for this review period was approximately 72 percent, which exceeded the 50 percent contribution goal for judges. In AOUSC’s view, this omission is not consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992. Thus, for the 3 years covered by this review, we determined and reported that judges’ contributions funded approximately 72 percent of normal costs of JSAS, and therefore, an adjustment to the judges’ contribution rates was not needed under the existing legislation because the judges’ contributions achieved 50 percent of JSAS costs. However, if one were to interpret the act as calling for an equal sharing of the program’s costs between participants and the government, then, on the basis of the information contained in the JSAS actuarial report as of September 30, 2004, participating judges’ future contributions would have had to decrease a total of 0.86 percentage points below the current 2.2 percent of salaries for active judges and senior judges and 3.5 percent of retirement salaries for retired judges in order to fund 50 percent of JSAS costs over the past 3 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Judicial Survivors' Annuities System (JSAS) was created in 1956 to provide financial security for the families of deceased federal judges. It provides benefits to eligible spouses and dependent children of judges who elect coverage within 6 months of taking office, 6 months after getting married, or 6 months after being elevated to a higher court, or during an open season authorized by statute. Active and senior judges currently contribute 2.2 percent of their salaries to JSAS, and retired judges contribute 3.5 percent of their retirement salaries to JSAS. Pursuant to the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-572), GAO is required to review JSAS costs every 3 years and determine whether the judges' contributions fund 50 percent of the plan's costs. If the contributions fund less than 50 percent of these costs, GAO is to determine what adjustments to the contribution rates would be needed to achieve the 50 percent ratio. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) believes that GAO should be recommending a reduction in the judges' contribution rate. GAO disagrees with AOUSC's interpretation of the act's requirements.
What GAO Found
During plan years 2002 through 2004, the participating judges' contributions funded more than 50 percent of the JSAS normal costs. The participating judges funded approximately 75 percent of JSAS normal costs during plan year 2002, 64 percent during plan year 2003, and 78 percent during plan year 2004. On average over the 3-year period, the participating judges funded approximately 72 percent of JSAS normal costs, while the federal government funded approximately 28 percent. The variance in the government's contribution rates was a result of the fluctuation in normal costs resulting from several combined factors, such as changes in assumptions; lower-than-expected rates of return on plan assets; demographic changes--retirement, death, disability, new members, and pay increases; as well as an increase in plan benefit obligations. For the 3 years covered by the review, GAO determined that an adjustment to the judges' contribution rate was not needed because their average contribution share for the review period was approximately 72 percent, which exceeded the minimum 50 percent contribution goal specified by law. In addition, GAO examined the annual share of normal costs covered by judges' contributions over a 9-year period and found that on average the participating judges funded approximately 55 percent of JSAS's normal costs. |
gao_T-RCED-96-87 | gao_T-RCED-96-87_0 | On May 17, 1995, EPA announced plans to create a National Environmental Performance Partnership System. This system is to fundamentally change the EPA-state relationship by setting new goals for environmental protection and giving the states broad flexibility to meet them. In response to this problem, a major component of EPA’s National Environmental Performance Partnership System is a joint planning and priority-setting dialogue with the states that is intended to replace the current annual work plan process. In theory, the use of these agreements to increase state input and flexibility could improve EPA’s relations with its state partners and reduce the costs of implementing federal environmental programs. EPA believes that its consolidated grants would provide the states with easier access to multimedia funding and promote the reporting of their activities to integrate the management of facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) initiatives in response to the National Academy of Public Administration's recommendations to change the nation's approach to environmental protection, focusing on EPA attempts to improve its relationship with states.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA plans to create a National Environmental Performance Partnership System, which would fundamentally change the EPA-state relationship by setting new goals for environmental protection and giving states broad flexibility to meet them; (2) although this system should allow states more input in decisionmaking, provide for joint planning, and reduce EPA oversight of states that perform well, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of these partnership agreements; (3) states' attempts to integrate their regulatory activities across programs show potential for reducing pollution and increasing regulatory efficiency; and (4) EPA believes that its proposed consolidated grants should alleviate problems caused by inflexible federal fund allocations and duplicative reporting requirements. |
gao_GAO-05-441 | gao_GAO-05-441_0 | As a result, the Army has not been able to take proactive steps to control rising material costs. Factors Causing Army Depot Maintenance Prices to Increase
The composite sales price that the Army depot maintenance activity group charged its customers increased from $111.87 per direct labor hour in fiscal year 2000 to $147.07 per direct labor hour in fiscal year 2005 – a $35.20 difference or 31 percent increase. The Army Has Identified Some Causes of Material Cost Increases
Army depot maintenance officials stated that the activity group’s higher material costs can be attributed, to a large extent, to (1) increased material usage to rebuild certain weapon systems to like-new condition, as required by the Army’s recapitalization program; and (2) price growth—what the activity group pays various suppliers for material and component parts it uses to repair weapon systems and other items. This resulted in an increase in material costs. Method of Allocating Gains and Losses Does Not Provide Incentive For Depots to Set Prices Correctly
In setting future prices to break even, the Army spread depot maintenance reported gains and losses across all depots, rather than allocating reported losses or gains incurred by a specific depot to that depot. While DOD policy does not specify how to allocate gains and losses at the depot level, this practice does not provide the right incentives to the depots to set prices correctly in the budget. If one depot consistently incurred losses, the Army would increase the prices at other depots to help recoup the losses. As a result, the depot incurring the losses is not held accountable for operating on a break even basis. Factors contributing to carryover exceeding the ceilings included depots receiving new orders at fiscal year-end and depots not being able to obtain material needed to perform repair work in a timely manner. Some carryover is necessary at fiscal year-end if working capital funds are to operate efficiently and effectively. As we reported in May 2004, the Army’s inadequate management of its requirements and system testing activities before LMP was fielded were the primary contributing factors to the problems experienced at Tobyhanna since fiscal year 2003. These problems are continuing to prevent the Tobyhanna Army Depot from accurately reporting on its financial operations, which, in turn, adversely impacts the depot’s ability to accurately set customer sales prices. While the Army developed a reasonable approach that was to be followed in addressing system problems that must be resolved for LMP to provide the intended capabilities, the Army has not been able to effectively implement those processes. Specific examples of management weaknesses in this area include the lack of proactive steps to control rising material costs, overcharging certain depot maintenance customers, and excessive amounts of year-end carryover, which could result in an activity group receiving funds from customers in one fiscal year but not performing the work until well into subsequent fiscal years, thus tying up funds for lengthy periods that could otherwise be put to more beneficial near-term use. To determine if the Army depot maintenance activity group exceeded its carryover ceilings in the past and the reasons for exceeding the ceiling, we obtained and analyzed (1) the allowable amount of carryover for fiscal years 1996 through 2004 and (2) reported actual year-end carryover data for fiscal years 1996 through 2004. We also reviewed customer orders to determine why the work was not completed on these orders by the end of the fiscal year. To determine if the Army encountered problems with the implementation of LMP at the Tobyhanna Army Depot, we (1) identified problems reported by system users at the Tobyhanna Army Depot to the system developers and implementers (Army Materiel Command and CSC), (2) analyzed actions taken by the Army and its contractor to resolve reported system problems, (3) analyzed system stabilization plan to determine whether system problems were sufficiently identified and understood to allow proper problem resolution, (4) analyzed Army’s project management processes to determine whether underlying root causes of system problems were identified and appropriate system solutions were developed to resolve reported system problems, and (5) analyzed Tobyhanna’s financial reports produced by the legacy system and LMP at the time of conversion to LMP to determine whether differences in account balances were identified and reconciled. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army depot maintenance activity group received about $2.6 billion of orders in fiscal year 2004 to repair helicopters, combat vehicles, and air defense systems. To perform this work, the group operates under the working capital fund concept, where customers are to be charged the anticipated costs of providing goods and services to them. GAO was asked to determine (1) if prices charged by the group have increased and, if so, why; (2) how the group allocates gains or losses incurred at the individual depot level; and (3) if the group exceeded its allowable carryover ceilings and the reasons for exceeding the ceilings. GAO was also asked to determine if the Army encountered problems implementing a new system, the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), at the Tobyhanna Army Depot.
What GAO Found
GAO identified four management weaknesses that are impairing the efficiency and effectiveness of Army depot maintenance operations. The activity group's average sales price increased from $111.87 per hour for fiscal year 2000 to $147.07 per hour for fiscal year 2005--a 31 percent increase (21 percent if adjusted for inflation). An increase in material costs was the major driver of the sales price increase. The Army has identified some causes of the higher material costs such as increased material usage to rebuild certain weapon systems under the Army's recapitalization program and higher prices that it pays suppliers for parts, but it has not completed a comprehensive analysis of material cost increases. As a result, the Army has not been able to take proactive steps to control rising material costs. GAO analysis showed that in setting future prices, the Army spread depot maintenance reported gains and losses across all depots rather than allocating them to the individual depot that incurred the gains or losses. While DOD policy does not specify how to allocate gains and losses at the depot level, this practice does not provide the right incentives to the depots to set prices correctly in the budget. If one depot consistently incurred losses, the Army would increase the prices at other depots to help recoup its losses. As a result, the depot incurring the losses is not held accountable for operating on a break-even basis. The end result of this practice is that customers of depots with consistent losses are, in effect, subsidized by customers of depots with consistent gains. GAO analysis also showed that the reported carryover (work not completed at fiscal year end) exceeded DOD's carryover ceilings from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2003. Too much carryover could result in an activity group receiving funds from customers in one fiscal year but not performing the work until subsequent fiscal years. Factors contributing to carryover exceeding the ceilings include depots receiving new orders at fiscal year-end and not being able to obtain parts needed in a timely manner. Finally, the Army continued to encounter problems implementing a new system intended to improve depot operations. GAO previously reported on these problems in May 2004, and noted that the Army's inadequate requirements management and system testing were primary contributing factors to the problems. These problems are preventing the Tobyhanna Army Depot from accurately reporting on its financial operations, which, in turn, adversely impacts the depot's ability to accurately set prices. GAO's current review found that the Army has not put into place an effective management process to help ensure that the problems with the system are resolved. While the Army developed a process that identified the specific steps that should be followed in addressing the problems identified, the process was not followed. Until the underlying causes of the problems are corrected, other depots implementing LMP will encounter similar problems. |
gao_GAO-13-430 | gao_GAO-13-430_0 | To implement these local policies, some MACs have developed local edits for certain services. Similar to the national MUEs, these local edits set limits on the maximum number of units that may be billed by a provider for the same beneficiary on the same day. Over 99 Percent of 2011 Payments Were for Services under Unpublished MUE Limits
In 2011, Medicare paid approximately $23.9 billion for 1,845 types of services with unpublished MUEs. However, because MUEs were not implemented as per-day limits, approximately $14 million was paid for services where total units billed by a provider for a beneficiary on the same day exceeded the MUE limits. CMS officials stated that because the MUEs are unpublished, providers may not know a given service has an MUE and therefore may not include a modifier when billing for services. some MUEs that are likely to become DOS edits include those where it is anatomically impossible to exceed the MUE limit. Use of More Restrictive Local Contractor Edits for Certain Services Could Have Reduced Payments by an Additional $7.8 Million
Our examination of 13 services where MACs developed more restrictive local edits than the unpublished MUEs showed Medicare payments could have been reduced had CMS examined these edits and adopted them as part of its program integrity responsibilities. As a result, it may be missing an opportunity to identify situations in which savings could be achieved by implementing some of the local edits nationally. Payments for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits also tended to be concentrated in certain states. CMS Has Not Systematically Examined Claims That Exceeded Unpublished MUE Limits to Determine Whether They Were Proper
CMS and its contractors do not have a system in place for examining claims to determine the extent to which providers may be exceeding unpublished MUE limits and whether payments for such services were proper. CMS’s Contractors Did Not Systematically Examine Claims for Services above Unpublished MUE Limits to Determine If They Were Appropriate
CMS officials and contractors that we interviewed said they do not have a system in place for regularly examining claims related to services with unpublished MUEs from providers that most often exceeded MUE limits.While CMS has several strategies to reduce improper payments, and it reviews aberrant billing patterns at a provider level, that is, across all services billed by the provider, officials told us that they have no plans to review services specifically related to MUEs. Payments That Exceeded MUE Limits Were Concentrated among Certain Providers
We found that a small number of providers accounted for a large share of payments for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits. Of these, the 100 providers with the highest payments that exceeded the MUE limits accounted for nearly 44 percent of total excess payments, although they accounted for only about 1 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs. In addition, the provider with the highest payments that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits alone accounted for about 4 percent of these payments, although this provider accounted for less than 0.1 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs. About 26 percent of the top 100 providers exceeding unpublished MUE limits included clinical laboratories and DME providers. CMS has also estimated improper DME billing of 66 percent in fiscal year 2012—higher than for any other service measured. In November 2012, we recommended that CMS implement MUEs that assess all quantities of services provided to the same beneficiary by the same provider on the same day—in other words, as per-day limits—but allow the limits to be exceeded if the provider included modifiers to explain the medical necessity of exceeding the limits. Unpublished MUEs were developed for services and items that have been fraudulently or abusively billed in the past. Therefore, systematically examining billing information and claims from providers that exceed these limits and do not use modifiers to indicate the excess units are medically appropriate, could help identify improper payments and could inform CMS’s program integrity efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of the unpublished MUEs and better ensure Medicare program integrity, we recommend that the CMS Administrator take the following two actions: examine contractor local edits related to unpublished MUEs to determine whether any of the national unpublished MUE limits should be revised; and consider periodically reviewing claims to identify the providers exceeding the unpublished MUE limits and determine whether their billing was proper. In its written comments, HHS concurred with both our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
CMS has estimated improper Medicare fee-for-service payments of $29.6 billion in fiscal year 2012. To help prevent improper payments, CMS has implemented national MUEs, which limit the amount of a service that is paid when billed by a provider for a beneficiary on the same day. The limits for certain services that have been fraudulently or abusively billed are unpublished to deter providers from billing up to the maximum allowable limit.
GAO was asked to review issues related to MUEs. This report examines the extent to which CMS has (1) paid for services that exceeded the unpublished MUE limits and (2) examined billing from providers that exceeded unpublished MUE limits. GAO analyzed Medicare claims related to these limits in 2011, and interviewed CMS officials and selected contractors in states with high improper payments.
What GAO Found
Less than 0.1 percent of payments Medicare made in 2011 were for amounts of services that exceeded certain unpublished limits for excess billing and where the claims did not include information from the providers to indicate why the additional services were medically necessary. These limits are set by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--as a means to avoid potentially improper payments. To implement these limits, CMS established automated controls in its payment systems called Medically Unlikely Edits (MUE). These MUEs compare the number of certain services billed against limits for the amount of services likely to be provided under normal medical practice to a beneficiary by the same provider on the same day--for example, no more than one of the same operation on each eye. GAO analysis of 2011 claims data found approximately $14 million out of a total of $23.9 billion in Medicare payments for services that exceeded unpublished MUE limits and where the claims did not include information from the providers to indicate why the additional services were medically necessary. As GAO has previously reported, claims could exceed the limits because the MUEs are not set up as per-day limits that assess all services billed by a provider for a single beneficiary on the same day. CMS plans to begin implementing MUEs for some services as per-day limits for services where it would be impossible to exceed the limits for anatomical or other reasons. Medicare contractors that pay claims may develop local edits, which can set more restrictive limits for some services than the national unpublished MUE limits. GAO's analysis of claims data applying a few of these more restrictive local limits showed that by applying them instead of the relevant national MUE limits, CMS could have lowered payments by an additional $7.8 million. However, CMS is not evaluating these local edits to determine if these lower limits might be more appropriate. To the extent that these and other local edits are not evaluated more systematically, CMS may be missing an opportunity to achieve savings by revising some national MUEs to correspond with more restrictive local limits.
CMS and its contractors did not have a system in place for examining claims to determine the extent to which providers may be exceeding unpublished MUE limits and whether payments for such services were proper. CMS officials and contractors told us that they examine aberrant billing patterns at a provider level, that is, across all services billed by the provider, but not specifically for services with unpublished MUE limits. GAO found that payments that exceeded MUE limits were concentrated among certain providers and types of specialties, in certain states, and for certain services. For example, the top 100 providers with payments that exceeded the MUE limits accounted for nearly 44 percent of total payments that exceeded the MUE limits, although they accounted for only about 1 percent of total payments for all services with unpublished MUEs. Moreover, about 26 percent of the top 100 providers included clinical laboratories and durable medical equipment providers, both of which have been identified in the past as having high potential for fraudulent billings. Because unpublished MUEs were developed for services and items that have been fraudulently or abusively billed in the past, without systematically examining billing information and claims from the top providers exceeding those limits CMS may be missing another opportunity to improve its program integrity efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS examine contractor edits to determine if any national unpublished MUE limits should be revised; and consider reviewing claims to identify providers that exceed the unpublished MUE limits, and determine whether their billing was proper. In its written comments, HHS concurred with both our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-297 | gao_GAO-04-297_0 | The regulations leave room for judgment and interpretation by the Corps districts when considering jurisdiction over, for example, (1) adjacent wetlands, (2) tributaries, and (3) ditches and other man-made conveyances. Since the SWANCC decision, the Corps and EPA have provided limited additional guidance to the districts concerning jurisdictional determinations. Additionally, in January 2003, the Corps and EPA published an ANPRM, soliciting public comments on, among other things, whether isolated, intrastate, nonnavigable waters are jurisdictional under the Clean Water Act, whether the regulations should define the term isolated waters and whether any other revisions are needed to the regulations defining “waters of the United States.” According to EPA officials, respondents submitted approximately 133,000 comments with widely differing views on the need for a new regulation and the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction. In December 2003, the Corps and EPA decided that they would not issue a new rule on federal regulatory jurisdiction over isolated wetlands. Regulations and Guidance Define Waters of the United States but Do Not Specify Detailed Aspects of Making a Jurisdictional Determination
EPA’s and the Corps’ regulations defining waters of the United States establish the framework for determining which waters are within federal jurisdiction. Some districts often use the 100-year floodplain to determine if wetlands are adjacent to waters of the United States. Nevertheless, these officials stated that we documented enough differences in the district office practices to warrant a more comprehensive survey, which would include the Corps districts not surveyed in this report. Many of the 16 districts that we contacted generally relied on oral communication to convey their practices to interested parties and only 3 had developed documentation of their practices that they made available to the public. Conclusions
After the Supreme Court’s 2001 SWANCC decision that struck down the migratory bird rule, Corps districts have needed to rely on criteria other than use of the water as habitat for migratory birds to assert jurisdiction over certain waters and wetlands. However, it is unclear whether or to what degree these differences in Corps district office practices would result in different jurisdictional determinations in similar situations, in part, because Corps staff consider many factors when making these determinations. Recommendations for Executive Action
In light of the uncertainty of the impact of differences in district offices’ interpretation and application of the regulations, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army in consultation with the Administrator of EPA: survey the district offices to determine how they are interpreting and applying the regulations and whether significant differences exist among the Corps’ 38 districts; evaluate whether and how the differences in the interpretation and application of the regulations among the Corps district offices need to be resolved, recognizing that some level of flexibility may be needed because of differing climatic, hydrologic, and other relevant circumstances among the districts; and require districts to prepare and make publicly available documentation specifying the interpretation and application of the regulations they use to determine whether a water or wetland is jurisdictional. The Department of Defense said that, on the basis of our recommendations, it will (1) conduct a more comprehensive survey to further assess the Corps district office practices in determining jurisdiction; (2) develop a strategic approach to ensure the Corps is achieving the highest level of consistency and predictability possible for making jurisdictional determinations; and (3) ask the Corps districts and divisions to prepare documentation describing specific local practices used in making jurisdictional determinations and make this information available to the public. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To identify the national criteria for making jurisdictional determinations, and administrative and judicial developments affecting this process since Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), we reviewed federal regulations and related guidance that define “waters of the United States.” We also interviewed officials of both the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) headquarters in Washington D.C. Further, we reviewed the Supreme Court’s SWANCC decision, as well as various subsequent and related lower court decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) receives thousands of Clean Water Act permit applications from project proponents wishing to fill waters and wetlands. The first step in the permitting process is to determine if the waters and wetlands are jurisdictional. Prior to 2001, if migratory birds used the waters or wetlands as habitat, they were usually jurisdictional. In 2001, the Supreme Court--in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)--struck down the migratory bird rule, leaving the Corps to rely on other jurisdictional criteria. GAO was asked to describe the (1) regulations and guidance used to determine jurisdictional waters and wetlands and related developments since SWANCC, (2) extent to which Corps district offices vary in their interpretation of these regulations and guidance, and (3) extent to which Corps district offices document their practices and make this information publicly available.
What GAO Found
EPA's and the Corps' regulations defining waters of the United States establish the framework for determining which waters fall within federal jurisdiction. However, the regulations leave room for interpretation by Corps districts when considering (1) adjacent wetlands, (2) tributaries, and (3) ditches and other man-made conveyances. Since the SWANCC decision, the Corps and EPA have provided limited additional guidance to the districts concerning jurisdictional determinations, and the Corps has prohibited the districts from developing new local practices for determining the extent of Clean Water Act regulatory jurisdiction. In January 2003, the Corps and EPA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) soliciting comments on whether there was a need to revise the regulations that define which waters should be subject to federal jurisdiction. The ANPRM generated approximately 133,000 comments representing widely differing views. The agencies decided in December 2003 that they would not proceed with a rulemaking. Additionally, since SWANCC, 11 federal appellate court decisions relating to the extent of jurisdictional waters have been rendered; and 3 of these decisions are on appeal with the Supreme Court, with review denied for 2 others. Corps districts differ in how they interpret and apply the federal regulations when determining which waters and wetlands are subject to federal jurisdiction. For example, one district generally regulates wetlands located within 200 feet of other jurisdictional waters, while other districts consider the proximity of wetlands to other jurisdictional waters without any reference to a specific linear distance. Additionally, some districts assert jurisdiction over all wetlands located in the 100-year floodplain, while others do not consider floodplains as a factor. Although districts used generally similar criteria to identify the jurisdictional limits of tributaries, they used differing approaches in how they apply these criteria. Whether or to what degree individual differences in Corps district office practices would result in different jurisdictional determinations in similar situations is unclear, in part, because Corps staff consider many factors when making these determinations. Nevertheless, Corps headquarters officials stated that GAO had documented enough differences in district office practices to warrant a more comprehensive survey, which would include the other districts not surveyed in this report. This would help to ensure that the Corps is achieving the highest level of consistency possible under the current circumstances. Only 3 of the 16 districts that GAO reviewed made documentation of their practices available to the public. Other districts generally relied on oral communication to convey their practices to interested parties. |
gao_HEHS-95-192 | gao_HEHS-95-192_0 | Second, VA expects to improve the geographic accessibility of VA hospital beds for as many veterans as possible. The planners concluded that these beds were needed to make VA health care more geographically accessible to veterans in East Central Florida. Using Existing Capacity to Provide Medical and Psychiatric Beds Appears Prudent
VA has a large supply of unused beds in its three hospitals now serving Central Florida veterans and the number of unused beds is expected to increase substantially. To achieve the most prudent and economical use of resources, VA’s hospital planning should be guided by two objectives. Veterans’ Past Use of VA Hospitals Inadequately Considered
VA’s decision to build 470 medical, surgical, and psychiatric beds in the Brevard hospital is based on the assumption that East Central Florida veterans’ demand for care will equal veterans’ use of VA hospitals nationwide. VA’s use of lower-cost alternatives could meet its service delivery goals and would also avoid the unneeded expenditure of government resources. For example, using available beds at the former Orlando Naval Hospital and converting unused beds at existing VA hospitals for psychiatric or nursing home care will reduce the risk of large unused bed capacity at the proposed Brevard hospital, which appears likely because of expected decreases in the veteran population and VA’s increased reliance on outpatient care to serve veterans. The officials disagreed with our overall conclusion that there is a more prudent and economical way to achieve VA’s service delivery goals in Central Florida than building a new 470-bed hospital and 120-bed nursing home in Brevard County and converting the former Naval Hospital in Orlando to a nursing home. More specifically, he questioned whether the conversion of the former Naval Hospital to a nursing home is the most economical and prudent use of resources. Also, he asked us to explore available options and, if possible, suggest a more prudent and economical way for VA to meet its service delivery goals for Florida veterans. VA makes its construction decisions based on a comparison of veterans’ projected use and the potential availability of beds in community and state homes. Furthermore, most of the inpatient psychiatric services planned for the hospital in Brevard are comparable to existing VA services or are planned at VA’s three facilities in Central Florida. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) plans to provide accessible medical and other services to veterans in East Central Florida, focusing on: (1) VA acquisition of the former Orlando Naval Hospital; (2) whether the conversion of the hospital to a nursing home is the most economical use of VA resources; and (3) whether more prudent and economical options exist to meet VA service delivery goals for Florida veterans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) VA conversion of the former Naval hospital to a nursing home and the construction of a hospital and nursing home in Brevard County are not a prudent and economical use of VA resources; (2) VA planning assumptions are questionable, particularly those regarding the availability of community nursing home beds and unused VA hospital beds, and the potential decrease in future demand for VA hospital beds; (3) VA could meet its service delivery goals by using existing capacity, which would result in lower costs and greater convenience for the veterans; (4) preserving the Orlando hospital as a hospital would improve the geographic accessibility of VA medical and psychiatric services at a lower cost; (5) the number of unused VA hospital beds is expected to increase because of the projected decline in the veteran population; (6) VA could convert some of the unused medical and surgical beds in the three central Florida hospitals to psychiatric beds to make those beds more geographically accessible to all Florida veterans rather than concentrating them at the new hospital in Brevard County; (7) construction of the Brevard hospital is not justified, since VA greatly overestimated veterans' potential use of Florida VA facilities; and (8) VA needs to focus its strategy on the most prudent and economical use of its limited resources and avoid unnecessary expenditures while meeting its service delivery goals in a more timely manner. |
gao_GAO-17-323 | gao_GAO-17-323_0 | The Navy planned to experiment with these ships to determine its preferred design variant. Accelerated Frigate Acquisition Plans Require Significant Procurement Commitments Without Key Cost, Design, and Capability Knowledge
Current acquisition plans for the frigate require Congress and the Navy to make significant decisions and potential future commitments of about $9 billion—based on early budget estimates—without key program knowledge. The Navy plans to request authority from Congress in 2017 to use what the Navy refers to as a block buy approach for all 12 planned frigates and request funding for the lead frigate as part of the fiscal year 2018 budget request. The Navy’s award decision planned for 2018 will be informed by formal cost estimate information, but like Congress, the Navy will lack detail design knowledge and have more limited information on LCS’s operational capability than would have been available for the previously planned fiscal year 2019 frigate award. And finally, the current and planned LCS construction demands at both LCS shipyards that extend into 2021 suggest no schedule imperative exists that would require the Navy to request or to receive authority in 2017 for the frigate or to award the lead ship in 2018 as currently planned. This improved understanding of the frigate design was then going to be available to support the Navy’s construction contracts to both shipyards for frigates in fiscal year 2019. Specifically, the two shipbuilders for the Navy’s newest configuration of the Arleigh Burke class destroyers—DDG 51 Flight III—agreed that allowing more time for the design to mature, via detail design, would provide greater confidence in their understanding of the Flight III-specific design changes and how the changes will affect ship construction costs. With 13 LCS in various phases of construction (LCS 9, 11-22) and 3 more (LCS 23, 24, and 26) set to begin construction later in fiscal year 2017, delaying a decision on the frigate until fiscal year 2019 would enable the Navy and the shipbuilders to improve knowledge on cost, design, and operational capability of LCS that relates directly to the frigate. Conclusions
The Navy’s impending fiscal year 2018 budget request presents a key opportunity for Congress to affect the way forward for the frigate program by ensuring the Navy possesses sufficient knowledge on cost, design, and capability before authorizing an investment of a potential $9 billion for a program that has no current formal cost estimate—independent or otherwise, will not have begun key detail design activities, has significant unknowns in regards to operational performance of the ship upon which it will be based, and based on the existing and planned shipyard workloads, has no industrial base imperative to begin construction in the Navy’s planned time frame. A decision by Congress to authorize the block buy of 12 frigates is effectively the final decision for the entire planned buy of 40 LCS and frigates. According to the Navy’s approved acquisition strategy, the frigates would still require annual appropriations and Congress could thus conduct oversight of the program through that process; however, it will likely be more difficult to make decisions to reduce or delay the program should that become warranted, as the Navy may point to losses in favorable block buy prices, as has been done previously with LCS. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To ensure sound frigate procurement decisions, Congress should consider not enacting authority pursuant to the Navy’s request for a block buy of 12 frigates in the fiscal year 2018 budget and consider delaying funding of the lead frigate until at least fiscal year 2019 when sufficient cost, design, and capability knowledge is expected to be available to inform decisions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure the department and the shipbuilders have sufficient knowledge of the frigate’s anticipated cost and design during the procurement process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to delay frigate procurement plans and the award of the lead frigate contract until at least fiscal year 2019 when cost estimates will be completed, detail design could be underway, and significant progress will have been made in demonstrating through testing the operational capabilities of LCS that are relevant to the frigate. National Defense: Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy envisioned a revolutionary approach for the LCS program: dual ship designs with interchangeable mission packages intended to provide mission flexibility. This approach has fallen short, with significant cost increases, schedule delays, and reduced capabilities—some of which have yet to be demonstrated. The LCS acquisition approach has changed several times. The latest change led to the frigate—a ship that involves minor modifications to an LCS design.
The House report 114-537 for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to examine the Navy's plans for the frigate. This report examines the Navy's plans for the frigate acquisition as well as remaining opportunities for oversight. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and leveraged prior GAO reports on shipbuilding and acquisition best practices.
What GAO Found
The Navy's current acquisition approach for its new frigate—a ship based on a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design with minor modifications—requires Congress to make significant program decisions and commitments in 2017 without key cost, design, and capability knowledge. In particular, the Navy plans to request authority from Congress in 2017 to pursue what the Navy calls a block buy of 12 planned frigates and funding for the lead ship, which the Navy intends to award in 2018. Approval of these plans would effectively represent the final decision for the entire planned buy of 40 LCS and frigates. According to the Navy's approved acquisition strategy, the frigates would still require annual appropriations, so Congress would maintain its oversight through its annual appropriation decisions; however, any decision to reduce or delay the program, should that become warranted, could nevertheless be more difficult as the Navy may point to losses in favorable block buy prices, as has been done previously with LCS.
The Navy's impending request presents a key opportunity for Congress to affect the way forward for the frigate program by ensuring the Navy possesses sufficient knowledge on cost, design, and capability before authorizing an investment of a potential $9 billion for a program that
• has no current formal cost estimate—independent or otherwise,
• will not begin key detail design activities until late fiscal year 2018,
• has significant unknowns in regards to operational performance of the ship upon which its design will be based, and
• based on the existing and planned shipyard workloads, has no industrial base imperative to begin construction in the Navy's planned time frame.
The Navy's previous frigate acquisition plans included achieving a higher degree of ship design knowledge before awarding the lead ship in fiscal year 2019, as the plans included significant detail design activities prior to contract award. As GAO has previously found, such an approach—which has been supported by shipbuilders—offers greater confidence in the understanding of design changes and how they will affect ship construction costs. Further, as GAO's work on best practices for program cost estimates suggests, the Navy's prior plans for frigate design efforts and an award in fiscal year 2019 would have provided more information on which to base a decision, including a better understanding of risks and costs. The previous plans also better aligned with LCS test plans to improve the department's understanding of the operational capability and limitations for each ship variant. This knowledge could then be used to inform the Navy's decision on which LCS-based design for the frigate it will pursue. In addition to the valuable knowledge to be gained by not pursuing the frigate in the planned 2018 time frame, the existing and planned LCS construction workload for both shipyards is another important factor to consider. Specifically, each shipyard has LCS construction demands that extend into 2021, suggesting no imperative for the Navy to award the frigate in 2018. Delaying the frigate award until at least fiscal year 2019—when more is known about cost, design, and capabilities—would enable better-informed decisions and oversight for this potential $9 billion taxpayer investment.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider not enacting authority pursuant to the Navy's request for a block buy of 12 frigates in fiscal year 2018 and delaying funding of the lead frigate until at least fiscal year 2019, when more information is available on the ship's cost, design, and capabilities. GAO also recommends that DOD delay its procurement plans until sufficient knowledge is attained. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation but is not planning to delay frigate procurement. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid. |
gao_GAO-13-650 | gao_GAO-13-650_0 | OGIS Was Established to Help Oversee the Administration of FOIA
To help address the concerns surrounding FOIA implementation, the OPEN Government Act,NARA to: among other things, established OGIS within review policies and procedures that agencies have developed to administer FOIA; review agency compliance with FOIA requirements; recommend policy changes to Congress and the President to improve the administration of FOIA; and offer mediation services to resolve disputes between individuals or entities making FOIA requests and agencies as an non-exclusive alternative to litigation. According to Justice, as of fiscal year 2012, a total of 99 federal agencies had responsibility for implementing FOIA. Similarly, while the office reported that it has reviewed agencies’ annual FOIA reports and Chief FOIA Officer reports from Justice’s Office of Information Policy website to identify best practices on improving FOIA processing, and has made general observations about agencies’ policies, procedures, and compliance with FOIA through the office’s mediation case work, these actions were not undertaken as part of a specific review of agencies’ compliance with FOIA, as required by the OPEN Government Act. A key factor contributing to the absence of proactive and comprehensive reviews of federal agencies’ FOIA policies, procedures, and compliance by OGIS is that the office has not established a structured methodology for conducting such reviews. OGIS officials added that the office is in the early stages of drafting a methodology for conducting the reviews, but that a time frame for when the methodology will be completed has not been established. (Most of the
One or both parties took action or modified their position after OGIS’s intervention. However, consistent with its fiscal year 2013 annual report, in which the office states that it has no formal metrics for measuring success, OGIS has not developed measures and goals for its mediation services. Until OGIS establishes quantifiable goals and measures of success for its mediation services, the office will not be positioned to determine how effectively it is performing mediation and contributing to the resolution of cases that might otherwise have resulted in potentially costly litigation or gone unresolved. These recommendations have largely focused on improving the internal coordination of government FOIA operations and areas where OGIS’s role could be made more effective. OGIS officials stated that the recommendations were based on the office’s ongoing work with federal agencies and members of the public. Toward this end, OGIS collects best practices for improving FOIA processing from several sources, including its reviews of agencies’ annual FOIA reports and mediation case files, as well as anecdotally from persons involved in mediation cases facilitated by the office. OGIS publishes best practices related to key FOIA requirements and guidance in its annual reports, and on its website (https://ogis.archives.gov/) and blog (http://blogs.archives.gov/foiablog/). Conclusions
Since it was established 4 years ago, OGIS has taken actions to implement selected legislative responsibilities, although it has fallen short in certain areas. Specifically, while the office has suggested improvements to a number of agencies’ FOIA regulations and system of records notices, it has not completed a methodology for proactively reviewing agencies’ policies, procedures, and compliance with FOIA requirements and a time frame for doing so. On the basis of its reviews of agency policy and procedures, and mediation experience, OGIS has made a number of recommendations to Congress and the President and shared best practices to help agencies improve the administration of FOIA. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the actions that the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) has taken to (1) review agencies’ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) policies, procedures, and compliance, (2) mediate disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies, and (3) recommend policy changes to Congress and the President, and develop and issue guidance and best practices to agencies aimed at improving the administration of FOIA. | Why GAO Did This Study
The OPEN Government Act of 2007 amended FOIA and established OGIS within the National Archives and Records Administration to provide oversight and assistance to federal agencies in implementing FOIA. To evaluate how effectively the office is meeting its responsibilities, GAO assessed the actions that the office has taken to (1) implement its responsibilities for reviewing agencies' policies, procedures, and compliance with FOIA; (2) mediate disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies; and (3) recommend policy changes to Congress and the President and develop and issue guidance and best practices to improve the administration of FOIA. To do so, GAO analyzed documents describing the office's plans and activities for conducting reviews, mediation case files, and documents describing its policy recommendations made to Congress and the President and its guidance and best practices. GAO also interviewed officials at relevant agencies.
What GAO Found
Since its establishment in 2009, the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) has provided comments on proposed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regulations for 18 of 99 federal agencies that administer FOIA, as well as a number of Privacy Act system of records notices. While OGIS has suggested improvements to a number of those regulations and notices, it has not performed the reviews of regulations and notices in a proactive, comprehensive manner, and has not conducted any reviews of agencies' compliance with the law. In addition, since it was established 4 years ago, the office has not developed a methodology for conducting reviews of agencies' FOIA policies and procedures, or for compliance with FOIA requirements. OGIS is in the early stages of developing a methodology for conducting such reviews, but has not established a time frame for completion. Until OGIS establishes a methodology and time frame for proactively reviewing agencies' FOIA policies, procedures, and compliance, the office will not be positioned to effectively execute its responsibilities as required by the act.
OGIS is providing mediation services and is resolving disputes that might otherwise go unresolved or lead to litigation, although not all of its efforts have been successful. OGIS has achieved positive results for about two-thirds of the cases reviewed by GAO where mediation services were provided. For example, in several cases, one or both parties took action or modified their position after OGIS's intervention. Nevertheless, the office lacks quantifiable goals and measures for its mediation activities, as required by law. For example, it does not have goals to measure timeliness or success. Without these important management tools, OGIS cannot determine how effectively its mediation services are in improving the implementation of FOIA.
Since April 2012, OGIS has issued nine recommendations to Congress and the President aimed at improving the administration of FOIA. These recommendations focus on areas where OGIS could help agencies improve their FOIA processes as well as areas where its role could be made more effective. These recommendations were based on its ongoing work with federal agencies and with members of the public. In addition, while not required to issue guidance or best practices, the office collects best practices for improving FOIA processing from several sources, including its reviews of agencies' annual FOIA reports and mediation case files, as well as anecdotally from persons involved in mediation cases facilitated by the office. OGIS shares these best practices in its annual reports and on its website and blog.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OGIS fulfill its statutory responsibilities by establishing (1) a time frame for completing and implementing a methodology for proactively reviewing agencies' policies, procedures, and compliance with FOIA requirements and (2) measures and goals for its mediation services. In written comments on a draft of the report, the National Archives and Records Administration concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-353T | gao_GAO-05-353T_0 | Such large intense fires increasingly threaten catastrophic ecosystem damage and also increasingly threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure in the wildland-urban interface. These plans are intended to identify needed local fuel reduction, preparedness, suppression, and rehabilitation actions. Important Progress Has Been Made in Addressing Federal Wildland Fire Management Problems over the Last 5 Years
The federal government has made important progress over the last 5 years in improving its management of wildland fire. Progress in Local Implementation: Data and Research, Fire Management Planning, and Coordination and Collaboration Have Been Strengthened
The agencies have strengthened local wildland fire management implementation by making significant improvements in federal data and research on wildland fire over the past 5 years, including an initial mapping of fuel hazards nationwide. Coordination among federal agencies and their collaboration with nonfederal partners, critical to effective implementation at the local level, also has been improved. Progress in Accountability: Better Performance Measures and a Results Monitoring Framework Have Been Developed
Accountability for the results the federal government achieves from its investments in wildland fire management activities also has been strengthened. Agencies Face Several Challenges to Completing a Long- Needed Cohesive Strategy for Reducing Fuels and Responding to Wildland Fire Problems
While the federal government has made important progress over the past 5 years in addressing wildland fire, a number of challenges still must be met to complete development of a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies available long-term options and funding needed to reduce fuels on the nation’s forests and rangelands. Completing and Implementing the LANDFIRE System Is Essential to Identifying and Addressing Wildland Fire Threats
The agencies face several challenges to completing and implementing LANDFIRE, so that they can more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire threats and better target fuel reduction efforts. In implementing LANDFIRE, however, the agencies will have to overcome the challenges presented by the current lack of a consistent approach to assessing the risks of wildland fires to ecosystem resources as well as the lack of an integrated, strategic, and unified approach to managing and using information systems and data, including those such as LANDFIRE, in wildland fire decision making. This research also suggests that these new climate patterns may continue for decades, resulting in further increases in the amount of wildland fire. Fire Management Plans Will Need to Be Updated with Latest Data and Research on Wildland Fire
The agencies will need to update their local fire management plans when more detailed, nationally consistent LANDFIRE data become available. The plans also will have to be updated to incorporate recent agency fire research on approaches to more effectively address wildland fire threats. The cost of the 2002 interagency team’s option that reduced risks to communities and ecosystems over the long term is consistent with a June 2002 National Association of State Foresters’ projection of the funding needed to implement the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy developed by the agencies and the Western Governors’ Association the previous year. The New Strategic Analysis Effort: In May 2004, Agriculture and Interior began the initial phase of a wildland fire strategic planning effort that also might contribute to identifying long-term options and needed funding for reducing fuels and responding to the nation’s wildland fire problems. The improvements in data, modeling, and fire behavior research that the agencies have under way, together with the new cost-effectiveness focus of the Fire Program Analysis system to support local fire management plans, represent important tools that the agencies can begin to use now to provide the Congress with initial and successively more accurate assessments of long-term fuel reduction options and related funding needs. Recommendation for Executive Action
Because there is an increasingly urgent need for a cohesive federal strategy that identifies long-term options and related funding needs for reducing fuels, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its consideration of the agencies’ fiscal year 2006 wildland fire management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps the agencies will take, together with related time frames, to complete such a cohesive strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires has surged, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems. Past management practices, including a concerted federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect communities and ecosystem resources, unintentionally resulted in steady accumulation of dense vegetation that fuels large, intense, wildland fires. While such fires are normal in some ecosystems, in others they can cause catastrophic damage to resources as well as to communities near wildlands known as the wildland-urban interface. GAO was asked to identify the (1) progress the federal government has made in responding to wildland fire threats and (2) challenges it will need to address within the next 5 years. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's report Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy (GAO-05-147), released on February 14, 2005.
What GAO Found
Over the last 5 years, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and land management agencies in the Department of the Interior, working with the Congress, have made important progress in responding to wildland fires. The agencies have adopted various national strategy documents addressing the need to reduce wildland fire risks; established a priority for protecting communities in the wildland-urban interface; and increased efforts and amounts of funding committed to addressing wildland fire problems, including preparedness, suppression, and fuel reduction on federal lands. In addition, the agencies have begun improving their data and research on wildland fire problems, made progress in developing long-needed fire management plans that identify actions for effectively addressing wildland fire threats at the local level, and improved federal interagency coordination and collaboration with nonfederal partners. The agencies also have strengthened overall accountability for their investments in wildland fire activities by establishing improved performance measures and a framework for monitoring results. While the agencies have adopted various strategy documents to address the nation's wildland fire problems, none of these documents constitutes a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies the long-term options and related funding needed to reduce fuels in national forests and rangelands and to respond to wildland fire threats. Both the agencies and the Congress need a comprehensive assessment of the fuel reduction options and related funding needs to determine the most effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire problems. Completing a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and needed funding will require finishing several efforts now under way, each with its own challenges. The agencies will need to finish planned improvements in a key data and modeling system--LANDFIRE--to more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire threats and to better target fuel reduction efforts. In implementing LANDFIRE, the agencies will need more consistent approaches to assessing wildland fire risks, more integrated information systems, and better understanding of the role of climate in wildland fire. In addition, local fire management plans will need to be updated with data from LANDFIRE and from emerging agency research on more cost-effective approaches to reducing fuels. Completing a new system designed to identify the most cost-effective means for allocating fire management budget resources--Fire Program Analysis--may help to better identify long-term options and related funding needs. Without completing these tasks, the agencies will have difficulty determining the extent and location of wildland fire threats, targeting and coordinating their efforts and resources, and resolving wildland fire problems in the most timely and cost-effective manner over the long term. A November 2004 report of the Western Governors' Association also called for completing a cohesive federal strategy to address wildland fire problems. |
gao_GGD-96-69 | gao_GGD-96-69_0 | The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the focus and developmental status of the labs, (2) the factors that hindered or assisted the development of the labs, (3) whether the labs were collecting performance data, and (4) whether the labs had achieved any results. Almost two-thirds of the respondents said their labs’ customers were both internal and external to the government. Other regulations are issued by line agencies and apply only to the issuing agency. Lab officials also reported other types of problems when they requested regulatory waivers. Downsizing Had Both Positive and Negative Effects on the Labs
As noted in chapter 1, many of the reinvention labs were initiated or were being implemented at a time when federal agencies were being reduced in size. For example, they said that GPRA • complemented and reinforced their labs’ ongoing reinvention efforts; • promoted the development of performance measures and results-based management systems that were a part of their labs’ goals; forced their organization to focus on performance, redefining mission, corporate goals, and objectives; • compelled management to think about how to integrate various management reform legislation, such as the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 and the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, with the reinvention labs; and • provided a driving force for interest in, and design of, a new operations evaluation process for the lab. The respondents most commonly said their labs were collecting data on the units’ outputs (77 percent) and/or were collecting informal comments from staff or customers (69 percent). As figure 4.3 shows, although more than three-fourths of the labs implemented at only the lab site were collecting performance data, over 90 percent of the labs implemented at the lab site and beyond were collecting such data. However, not all of the data the labs collected appear to have been used. Respondents Said Labs Often Did Not Have Pre-Lab Performance Data
Respondents frequently said that performance data allowed them to conclude that their labs had improved units’ productivity, customer satisfaction, and staff morale. Conclusions and Recommendation
At the time of our survey, 26 agencies and other federal entities had designated a total of 185 reinvention labs in various parts of the country. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the National Performance Review's (NPR) initiative to establish reinvention labs in federal departments and agencies, focusing on: (1) the labs' developmental status; (2) factors that hindered or assisted their development; (3) whether the labs were collecting performance data; and (4) whether the labs have achieved any results.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) more than 2 dozen federal agencies and other entities have developed a total of 185 reinvention labs; (2) the labs deal with a variety of issues, from personnel management to improving operations using technology; (3) almost all of the labs consider customer service as their primary goal, and consider other government organizations to be customers; (4) while labs considered management support to be important to lab development, the use of regulatory waivers and communication about the labs' progress were rarely needed or used; (5) other federal reform efforts, such as downsizing and the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act, had both positive and negative effects on the labs' development; (6) labs experienced difficulties in sustaining efforts that crossed agency boundaries or challenged agencies' existing cultures; (7) over two-thirds of the labs had collected some type of performance data, ranging from information on unit outputs to informal comments from staff and customers, but some lab administrators refused to collect performance data because they believed it was unnecessary or not worthwhile; (8) the performance data are inconclusive, since there are no previous data for comparison and the nature of the data is subjective; (9) the labs have yielded results by improving customer service, increasing unit productivity and employee morale, and reducing costs at some federal sites; and (10) the value of the labs will be realized only when lab efforts proven to be effective spread beyond the lab sites. |
gao_GAO-15-843T | gao_GAO-15-843T_0 | 1.) Gas gathering pipelines collect natural gas from production areas, while hazardous liquid gathering pipelines collect oil and other petroleum products. PHMSA regulates gathering pipelines in nonrural areas, resulting in regulation of approximately 10 percent of gathering pipelines. Gathering Pipelines Pose Safety Risks That PHMSA Is Working to Address
In our 2012 and 2014 reports, we identified safety risks associated with gas and hazardous liquid gathering pipelines that PHMSA was planning to but had not yet addressed through regulatory proposals. In 2012, we found that PHMSA does not collect comprehensive data on safety risks associated with gathering pipelines. In our 2012 report, we found that the data PHMSA collects for regulated pipelines help federal and state safety officials and pipeline operators increase the safety of these pipelines by better identifying and quantifying safety risks, as well as by implementing mitigation strategies, and addressing potential regulatory needs. Such pipelines, if located in rural areas, are generally not subject to DOT safety regulations that apply to other pipelines. Historically, gathering pipelines were smaller and operated at lower pressure and thus posed less risk than long- distance pipelines. The recent increase in their size and pressure raises safety concerns because they could affect a greater area in the event of an incident. PHMSA issued Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemaking for onshore hazardous liquid and gas pipelines in October 2010 and August 2011, respectively, seeking comment on whether to require operators to report on federally unregulated gathering pipelines, as well as on whether to establish a new, risk-based regime of safety requirements for large- diameter, high-pressure gas gathering pipelines, including those pipelines in rural locations. In our 2014 report, we recommended that PHMSA move forward with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address gathering pipeline safety that addresses the risks of larger-diameter, higher-pressure federally unregulated gathering pipelines, including subjecting such pipelines to emergency response planning requirements that currently do not apply. DOT generally concurred with the recommendation. Better Guidance on Use of Automated Valves and a Performance-Based Approach to Incident Response Could Improve Operators’ Response Times
In our January 2013 report on pipeline operator incident response, we found that numerous variables influence the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents. In our January 2013 report, we concluded that PHMSA has an opportunity to improve incident response times by developing a performance-based approach for pipeline operators to improve incident response times. For example, PHMSA could evaluate nationwide data to determine response times for different types of pipeline (based on location, operating pressure, and pipeline diameter, among other factors). Reliable data would improve PHMSA’s ability to measure incident response and assist the agency in exploring the feasibility of developing a performance-based approach for improving operator response to pipeline incidents. PHMSA officials also said they plan to develop a more specific performance-based standard for incident response as part of the upcoming February 2016 rulemaking. Guidance and More Information Needed for Use of Risk-Based Reassessment Intervals
The current statutory requirement for natural gas transmission pipeline operators to reassess pipeline integrity at least every 7 years provides a safeguard by allowing operators and regulators to identify and address problems on a continual basis, but in our June 2013 report, we found that this requirement is not fully consistent with risk-management practices, which are the basis for PHMSA’s integrity management program. To better identify the resource requirements needed to implement risk-based reassessment intervals that are longer than 7 years for gas transmission pipelines, we recommended that PHMSA collect information on the feasibility of addressing the potential challenges of implementing risk- based reassessment intervals that are longer than 7 years, for example by preparing a report or developing a legislative proposal for a pilot program, in consultation with Congress, that studies the impact to regulators and operators of a potential rule change. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation relies on a pipeline network of more than 2.6 million miles to transport hazardous liquids and natural gas. This network includes gathering pipelines that transport products to processing facilities and transmission pipelines that transport products from processing facilities to users (see figure). Pipeline safety oversight from PHMSA, along with state partners, covers issues such as incident response planning and integrity management. PHMSA uses a risk-based approach to regulate pipelines, resulting in regulation of all transmission pipelines and about 10 percent of gathering pipelines. Specifically, PHMSA does not regulate gathering pipelines that are smaller, operate at lower pressure, and are located in rural areas.
This statement addresses PHMSA's efforts in the areas of (1) gathering pipeline safety, (2) pipeline operator incident response, and (3) assessment of natural gas pipeline integrity. It is based on GAO's March 2012, January 2013, June 2013, and August 2014 reports on pipeline safety and July 2015 updates from PHMSA on its actions to respond to the reports' recommendations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has begun but not completed efforts to improve pipeline safety in response to GAO's prior recommendations:
Gathering pipelines : In 2012, GAO found that while gathering pipelines that are not regulated by PHMSA were generally considered to present less safety risk than other pipelines, PHMSA did not collect comprehensive data to identify such risks. GAO concluded that such data could help pipeline safety officials and pipeline operators increase the safety of these pipelines by better identifying and quantifying safety risks. In 2014, GAO found that construction of larger, higher-pressure gathering pipelines had increased due to the increased production of oil and gas, raising safety concerns because an incident could affect a greater area than an incident from a smaller, lower-pressure pipeline. PHMSA plans to issue proposed rules in fall 2015 that include collecting data on unregulated gathering pipelines.
Pipeline operator incident response : In January 2013, GAO found that PHMSA's data on operators' incident response times were not reliable, limiting the agency's ability to move to a performance-based approach for incident response. Improved data would allow PHMSA to determine appropriate response times for different types of pipelines, based on location and other factors. PHMSA plans to require changes in operator reporting to improve its incident response data and develop a performance-based standard as part of an upcoming rulemaking.
Gas pipeline assessment : In June 2013, GAO found that a requirement for gas transmission pipeline operators to reassess the integrity of their pipelines every 7 years provided a safeguard that issues were regularly addressed, but was not fully consistent with risk-based practices. A risk-based approach based on individual pipeline characteristics could call for assessments to occur more or less frequently than 7 years. However, implementing intervals longer than 7 years could require additional inspection resources to verify that operators appropriately assessed risk. GAO also found that guidance for calculating assessment intervals was lacking. PHMSA plans to issue guidance in 2016 and is researching the feasibility of risk-based assessments occurring less frequently than every 7 years.
What GAO Recommends
In its reports, GAO made seven recommendations to DOT to improve pipeline safety data and guidance and to move forward with proposed rulemaking to address safety risks. GAO recommended, for example, that DOT move forward with proposed rulemaking to address risks from newer gathering pipelines. DOT is taking actions to respond to the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-764 | gao_GAO-14-764_0 | Irrigation districts then enter into separate agreements with landholders to provide project water.geographic area, Reclamation may have only one or two contracts with irrigation districts for that water project, which provides water to a small number of landholders. Reclamation’s Data Indicate an Outstanding Repayment Obligation of $1.6 Billion Allocated to Irrigation
Reclamation’s data on water project construction cost repayments indicate that, of the $6.4 billion in costs allocated to irrigation as of the end of fiscal year 2012, $1.6 billion remains outstanding. Reclamation Could Better Promote That Information on Water Project Construction Costs and Repayments Is Publicly Available
Reclamation has not publicly reported the information it collects on water project construction costs and repayment since the 1980s, and we found that Reclamation does not make it readily known to the public that it prepares repayment statements annually or that they are available.Reclamation officials said that the purpose of the repayment statements is generally for internal management use, such as when the agency is preparing for contract negotiations, or to provide information to certain power users on the amounts of irrigation assistance power may be responsible for paying. Some individuals we interviewed were not aware that Reclamation prepares repayment statements annually, or that the agency would make them available upon request. Based on our analysis, early repayment affects the financial return to the federal government, and it accelerates the elimination of certain restrictions and requirements for landholders that are in place until their repayment obligations are fulfilled, among other things. Early Repayment Authority Is Limited to a Small Number of Irrigation Districts
The authority for irrigation districts, or for landholders within those districts, to repay their allocated water project construction costs early— that is, repay outstanding repayment obligations, either through lump-sum or accelerated payments, in advance of the date specified in the districts’ contracts—is limited. Of those 87 irrigation districts, 69 districts exercised their authority and repaid early, or had some landholders who repaid early, as of December 2013, with early repayments totaling more than $238.9 million, according to Reclamation data. Specifically, we identified 32 irrigation districts that sought and received statutory authority for early repayment by the district or landholders.analysis of Reclamation data shows that, of those 32 irrigation districts with statutory authority, 30 districts repaid early or had some landholders within the district who repaid early, with their early repayments totaling $220.2 million, as of December 2013 (see app. Early Repayment Affects the Financial Return to the Federal Government
Early repayment affects the financial return to the federal government, largely depending on whether a discount may be authorized, such as calculating the present value of the outstanding repayment obligation to determine the amount to be repaid early, and the size of that discount. If no discounts are authorized, any repayments that occur earlier than the due date specified in the contract would be worth more to the government because irrigation districts’ repayments do not bear interest. As a result, landholders may be able to receive project water, to the extent it is available, on additional land or at a subsidized rate once they have fulfilled their repayment obligations. By further disseminating information to the public that construction cost and repayment data are available, Reclamation may increase interested parties’ opportunities to obtain cost and repayment information, and Reclamation would promote transparency and potentially increase informed participation by the public. This, in turn, could further enable Congress, water users, and the public to assess past funding arrangements and enhance their ability to make informed decisions for funding potential new work, such as to expand water storage capacity. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of our work and the methodology used for the following objectives: examine (1) the extent to which Reclamation collects and reports information on water project construction costs and the status of repayment by irrigation districts and (2) the extent to which irrigation districts can repay their allocated water project construction costs early and the implications of early repayment. The repayment statements contain information on total costs for the water project, including construction costs incurred as of the end of the fiscal year; estimated future construction costs, and other costs that Reclamation includes in its repayment analysis for construction costs, such as capitalized operation and maintenance costs; the allocation of construction costs among project purposes, including irrigation; and the status of repayment for costs allocated to each project purpose, including repayment realized, anticipated future repayment, and any financial assistance granted to irrigation districts, such as credits, which relieve water users from a portion of their allocated repayment obligations. We also interviewed a nonprobability sample of nine individuals knowledgeable about Reclamation water projects on the status of repayments, early repayment authority, or both. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1902, Reclamation has financed and built water projects to provide water for irrigation and various other uses in 17 western states. The costs to construct the water projects including irrigation as a project purpose—a combined total of more than $20 billion—were primarily financed by the federal government, but irrigation districts and other water users that receive project water are obligated to repay the government for their allocated share of construction costs. Reclamation typically enters into multiyear contracts with irrigation districts that establish water delivery and repayment of their share of construction costs over time.
GAO was asked to provide information on the status of irrigation repayments. This report examines (1) the extent to which Reclamation collects and reports information on construction costs and the status of repayment and (2) the extent to which irrigation districts can repay early and the implications of early repayment. GAO reviewed laws and policies; fiscal year 2012 construction cost repayment and early repayment data; and interviewed Reclamation officials and nonprobability samples of eight irrigation districts and nine individuals knowledgeable about water projects.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation collects information on water project construction costs and the status of repayment by irrigation districts—entities that have entered into contracts with the agency to receive project water for irrigation purposes—but has not publicly reported repayment information since the 1980s. Reclamation's data on water project construction cost repayments indicate that, of the $6.4 billion in costs allocated to irrigation as of the end of fiscal year 2012, $1.6 billion remains outstanding. The remaining $4.8 billion has been repaid by irrigation districts or through other revenue sources or will be provided in financial assistance to the districts. Reclamation's policy is to make the statements it prepares annually on repayment available to the public upon request, but the agency does not make it readily known to the public that it prepares these statements or that they are available. GAO interviewed individuals knowledgeable of Reclamation water projects who indicated that this information would be useful for their work, such as in considering funding arrangements for the expansion of water projects; some individuals were not aware that Reclamation prepares repayment statements annually, or that the agency would make them available upon request. By more widely disseminating information to the public that construction cost and repayment data are available, Reclamation may increase interested parties' opportunities to obtain cost and repayment information. This, in turn, could further enable Congress, water users, and the public to assess past funding arrangements and enhance their ability to make informed decisions for funding potential new work, such as to expand water storage capacity.
The authority for irrigation districts—or for landholders who own or lease land for agricultural purposes within those districts—to repay their allocated share of construction costs early is limited to a small number of districts, and its use has various financial and other implications. Early repayment authority allows irrigation districts or landholders to repay their total outstanding repayment obligations in advance of the date specified in the districts' contracts. As of December 2013, 87 irrigation districts—representing about 15 percent of all districts with contracts—had authority for the district or its landholders to repay early. Of those authorized, 69 irrigation districts either repaid early, or had some landholders who repaid early, with those payments totaling more than $238.9 million. GAO found that early repayment's effect on the financial return to the federal government largely depends on whether a discount may be authorized, such as calculating the present value of the outstanding repayment obligation to determine the amount to be repaid early, and the size of that discount. If no discounts are authorized, any early repayments that occur would be worth more to the government because the repayments do not bear interest. In addition, early repayment accelerates the elimination of certain restrictions and requirements for landholders that are in place until their repayment obligation is fulfilled. For example, once landholders have fully repaid their construction cost obligations, they are no longer subject to acreage limits on the amount of land they can own or lease for agricultural purposes and irrigate with project water and may be able to receive project water on additional land.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Reclamation better promote to the public that information on water projects' construction costs and repayment status is available. The Department of the Interior concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-1039 | gao_GAO-08-1039_0 | Background
DOD initiated the EELV program in 1995 to develop a new generation of launch vehicles. The EELV program— designed to provide assured, affordable access to space for government satellites—consists of two families of commercially owned and operated launch vehicles, the Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles. In May 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin announced plans to create a joint venture that would combine the production, engineering, test, and launch operations associated with U.S. government launches of Boeing’s Delta and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas rockets. DOD Faces Numerous Uncertainties in the EELV Program and ULA Transition
DOD faces numerous uncertainties in the EELV program and ULA transition related to the reliability of the launch vehicles, the amount of work remaining in the ULA transition, and program budget decisions based on premature data. Third, DOD does not know whether its EELV program budget is sufficient to manage the program over the next 5 years because the Air Force accounted for anticipated savings from the ULA transition in the program budget, even though savings estimates were based on preliminary data. This is significant because the number of times a configuration has been successfully launched can be an indicator of a configuration’s design and production process reliability, according to an Aerospace Corporation study of EELV launch risk. ULA estimates that consolidation of launch infrastructure and operations under the ULA joint venture from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 will cost about $205 million, and it plans to recover much of this expense from the government. DOD Has Made Strides to Effectively Oversee and Manage the EELV Program but Challenges Exist in These Areas
In recent years, DOD has taken steps to effectively oversee and manage the EELV program by closely monitoring the ULA transition and changing its strategy for acquiring launch services. In addition, a new independent life-cycle cost estimate was not required for the program when it transitioned into the sustainment phase. As a result, OSD will not be able to rely on an updated life-cycle cost estimate for making long-term investment planning decisions. According to DOD officials, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for the program is not realistic, due in part to an optimistic launch vehicle production rate. DOD Expanded Its Program Management Responsibilities
As part of its effort to increase its oversight and gain program knowledge, in 2005 the Under Secretary of the Air Force expanded the program office’s management responsibilities when he approved a new acquisition strategy for the EELV program. Currently, the program office has approximately 211 military and civilian personnel, as well as over 290 contractor staff. Program officials cautioned that although Aerospace Corporation personnel have assisted with technical tasks the program office can not complete due to the staff shortage, the program can not rely on contractors to perform inherently governmental functions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to effectively oversee and manage the EELV program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to require the program to continue to provide OSD, and Congress as appropriate, with updates of program cost and status information using criteria that apply to major research and development and procurement programs; and direct the Director of the Cost Analysis Improvement Group to conduct an independent life-cycle cost estimate of the EELV program once the ULA joint venture transition is completed, and periodically update the estimate to account for significant program changes. Scope and Methodology
To determine what uncertainties the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program and United Launch Alliance (ULA) transition and to assess how DOD is positioned to manage and oversee the EELV program, we reviewed and analyzed documents from and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group; Congressional Budget Office; and Federal Trade Commission. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend over $27 billion acquiring launch services through the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program over the next 12 years. The EELV program uses two families of commercially owned and operated vehicles to launch satellites. Partly because the commercial space market did not develop as expected, the EELV program has undergone significant changes. These include: adoption of a new acquisition strategy in 2005 that sought to ensure the viability of the two EELV launch vehicle providers, Boeing and Lockheed Martin; the subsequent decision by those two companies to form a joint venture called the United Launch Alliance (ULA); and a 10-year increase in the life of the program. In light of these changes, GAO was asked to (1) determine what uncertainties DOD faces in the EELV program and in the transition to ULA, and (2) assess how DOD is positioned to manage and oversee the effort. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed a wide variety of DOD documents and interviewed DOD and program officials.
What GAO Found
The EELV program currently faces uncertainties in the reliability of the vehicles used to launch military and other government spacecraft as well as its budget for future years and in the merger of its two principal suppliers. Taken together, these unknowns require careful monitoring and oversight to ensure a fairly long track record of launch successes can continue. Though the program has had 21 successful operational launches, no single configuration from either family of launch vehicles has been launched enough times to demonstrate production process reliability. The ULA transition may also influence the demonstration of vehicle reliability because ULA plans to relocate production activities and may alter manufacturing processes. The consolidation of Boeing and Lockheed into ULA--a massive undertaking that seeks to combine two distinct corporate cultures, and consolidate launch infrastructure and business operations from five locations across the country to two--poses a variety of other cost, schedule, and performance uncertainties and risks. DOD does not know whether its EELV program budget is sufficient to manage the program in the short term because the Air Force reduced the EELV program budget to incorporate anticipated savings from the ULA transition, even though savings estimates were based on preliminary data. DOD has taken steps to position itself to effectively oversee and manage the ULA transition and EELV program but still faces significant challenges in these areas. More specifically, DOD has established a well-defined process for how the ULA transition will be overseen and established mechanisms that allow the diverse agencies involved to coordinate the analysis and raise critical issues to senior leaders. However, when DOD moved the EELV program from the research and development phases in 2007 to the sustainment phase, DOD eliminated requirements on the program to produce data that would illuminate what impacts the transition is having on the program, what cost increases are occurring and why, and what other programmatic and technical vulnerabilities exist and how they are being addressed. Furthermore, a new independent life-cycle cost estimate was not required for the program when it moved to the sustainment phase; as a result, DOD will not be able to rely on this estimate for making long-term investment planning decisions. According to DOD officials, the latest life-cycle cost estimate for the program is not realistic. In addition, as part of its effort to increase its oversight and gain program knowledge, in 2005 the Under Secretary of the Air Force expanded the program office's management responsibilities when he approved a new acquisition strategy for the EELV program. At the same time, program officials stated that they do not have the government staff necessary to perform what they consider to be inherently governmental functions related to the expansion of oversight. |
gao_HEHS-97-59 | gao_HEHS-97-59_0 | 1). Body of Research on Current Head Start Program Insufficient to Draw Conclusions About Impact
The body of research on current Head Start is insufficient to draw conclusions about the impact of the national program. Drawing such conclusions from a body of research would require either (1) a sufficient number of reasonably well-designed individual studies whose findings could appropriately be combined to provide information about the impact of the national program or (2) at least one large-scale evaluation using a nationally representative sample. In addition, no single study used a nationally representative sample, permitting findings to be generalized to the national program. Most of these studies targeted cognitive outcomes, leaving other outcome areas, such as health and nutrition, scarcely examined. In addition, all the studies suffered to some extent from methodological problems that weakened our confidence in the findings of the individual studies. Research Planned by HHS Focuses on Program Improvement, Not Impact
Head Start’s planned research will provide little information about the impact of regular Head Start programs because it focuses on descriptive studies; studies of program variations, involving new and innovative service delivery strategies and demonstration projects; and studies of program quality. HHS also funds studies designed to answer questions about the effectiveness of new or innovative service delivery strategies and demonstrations and how effectiveness may relate to characteristics of the population served. HHS Believes Effectiveness of Head Start Is Already Proven, So Further Impact Research Is Not Warranted
HHS maintains that early research has proven the effectiveness of early childhood education, including Head Start, so impact research is not the most effective use of limited research funds. HHS officials mentioned difficulties with both types of designs in studying Head Start’s impact. Our report states that HHS’ planned research focuses on program improvement, and we agree that such studies are needed. Methodology
To report on what existing research says about Head Start’s impact, we identified studies meeting our basic selection criteria as outlined in the “Literature Review” section of this appendix. The Effectiveness of Family Health Care in Head Start: The Role of Parental Involvement
Author: Barbara A. Facchini Outcome area studied: Health Overview of study: Relationship of the amount of parental involvement in the Head Start program to the amount of health care received by both Head Start-age children and their siblings Design: Post-test only, comparison group selected from waiting list Population: West Haven, Connecticut, Head Start program Sample: 40 Head Start children and 20 waiting-list children for comparison group Head Start program year(s): 1980-81 Measures/instrumentation: Immunizations, physical examinations, health screenings, and dental examinations Findings: Immunizations were up to date for about one-half of both the Head Start children and the waiting-list children before the beginning of the Head Start programs. Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services
Acknowledgments
Many researchers and early childhood experts provided valuable assistance and information used in producing this report. 7, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the impact of the current Head Start Program, focusing on what: (1) the studies conducted on current Head Start programs suggest about Head Start's impact; and (2) types of Head Start studies are planned by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although an extensive body of literature exists on Head Start, only a small part of this literature is program impact research; (2) this body of research is inadequate for use in drawing conclusions about the impact of the national program in any area in which Head Start provides services such as school readiness or health-related services; (3) not only is the total number of studies small, but most of the studies focus on cognitive outcomes, leaving such areas as nutrition and health-related outcomes almost completely unevaluated; (4) individually, the studies suffer to some extent from methodological and design weaknesses, such as noncomparability of comparison groups, which call into question the usefulness of their individual findings; (5) in addition, no single study used a nationally representative sample so that findings could be generalized to the national program; (6) failing to find impact information in existing research, GAO examined HHS' research plans for Head Start; (7) planned research will focus on new or innovative service delivery strategies and demonstrations but will provide little information on the impact of regular Head Start programs; (8) HHS' planned research includes descriptive studies, studies of program variations, involving new and innovative service delivery strategies and demonstration projects, and studies of program quality; (9) HHS officials, in explaining the agency's research emphasis, stated that early research has proven Head Start's impact; (10) such research, however, conducted over 20 years ago, may no longer apply to today's program because of program changes and changes in the population served; (11) HHS also noted some ethical and methodological difficulties of conducting impact research, especially studies that would produce national estimates of program effect; (12) neither ethical nor methodological issues present an insurmountable deterrent to conducting research on Head Start's impact; and (13) moreover, the size and cost of the program appear to warrant an investment in such research. |
gao_GAO-15-183 | gao_GAO-15-183_0 | For example, the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition is responsible for ensuring that the nation’s food supply is safe, sanitary, wholesome, and honestly labeled, and that cosmetic products are safe and properly labeled. FDA Foreign Offices Have Engaged in a Variety of Activities Since 2010 to Help Ensure the Safety of Imported Food
FDA’s foreign offices have engaged in a variety of activities intended to help ensure the safety of imported food; building relationships with foreign counterparts has been a top-priority activity. For each of the 5 following years, FSMA mandated that FDA inspect at least twice the number of facilities inspected during the previous year. FDA is not currently keeping pace with the FSMA mandate for increased foreign food inspections under either scenario’s targets. However, FDA has not conducted an analysis to determine whether either the required number of inspections in the FSMA mandate or the lower number of inspections it is conducting is sufficient to ensure comparable safety of imported and domestic food. However, the extent of the contributions is unknown because FDA’s performance measures have not fully captured these contributions. Without performance measures that can be used to demonstrate the offices’ contributions to long-term outcomes related to imported FDA- regulated products, FDA has less information available to effectively measure the foreign offices’ progress toward meeting the agency’s goals. As shown in figure 5, 44 percent of FDA’s approved foreign office positions were vacant as of October 2014, and most of these vacancies were in the China Office. In our 2010 report on FDA’s foreign offices, we recommended that FDA develop a strategic workforce plan for the foreign offices to help ensure that the agency is able to recruit and retain staff with the necessary experience and skills. Conclusions
FDA established foreign offices to help prevent unsafe products from entering the United States. Without such an analysis, FDA is not in a position to know what is a sufficient number of foreign inspections and, if appropriate, request a change in the mandate regarding the number of foreign inspections to be conducted. According to FDA officials, the agency has initiated a review to determine how to better reflect the value of the foreign offices in the agency-wide performance system. FDA has taken some steps to address recruitment challenges, but the agency has not yet completed a strategic workforce plan. We continue to believe that a strategic workforce plan for the foreign offices is critical to FDA’s ability to address staffing challenges, especially given the number of vacancies abroad. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure the safety of food imported into the United States, we recommend that the Commissioner of Food and Drugs complete an analysis to determine the annual number of foreign food inspections that is sufficient to ensure comparable safety of imported and domestic food. Our objectives of this report were to examine (1) the activities the FDA foreign offices have engaged in since 2010 to help ensure the safety of imported food, (2) the extent of the foreign offices’ contributions to the safety of imported food, and (3) the extent to which FDA has engaged in workforce planning for its foreign offices. To examine the activities of FDA’s foreign offices, we reviewed and analyzed documents including FDA reports to Congress that were mandated by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) that describe the activities of all foreign offices, evaluated written answers to questions about their activities since the 2010 report, and conducted structured interviews with FDA officials in the foreign offices, and analyzed counts of foreign food facility inspections for each year of the FSMA mandate. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDA has responsibility for ensuring the safety and proper labeling of more than 80 percent of the U.S. food supply, including an increased volume of imported food. Beginning in 2008, FDA established foreign offices to help prevent unsafe products from reaching U.S. borders. In 2010, GAO examined FDA's foreign offices and found that they engaged in a variety of activities relating to food safety but faced challenges due to an increasing workload and other factors. GAO was asked to follow up that report.
This study examines (1) the activities FDA foreign offices have engaged in since 2010 to help ensure the safety of imported food, (2) the extent of the foreign offices' contributions to the safety of imported food, and (3) the extent to which FDA has engaged in workforce planning for its foreign offices. GAO reviewed documentation of foreign office activities and plans, visited offices in China and Mexico, and interviewed agency officials, foreign regulators, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) foreign offices have engaged in a variety of activities since 2010 to help ensure that imported food is safe. Foreign offices reported that building relationships with foreign counterparts and gathering and assessing information were among their top priorities. As directed by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), foreign offices also inspected foreign food facilities. Under FSMA, FDA is to inspect at least 600 foreign food facilities in 2011 and, for each of the next 5 years, inspect at least twice the number of facilities inspected during the previous year. As shown in the figure below, FDA is not currently keeping pace with the FSMA mandate. FDA officials told GAO that they do not plan to meet the FSMA mandate because of funding, and they question the usefulness of conducting that many inspections. However, FDA has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the number of inspections in the FSMA mandate or the lower number of inspections it is conducting is sufficient to ensure comparable safety of imported and domestic food. Without such an analysis, FDA is not in a position to know what is a sufficient number of foreign inspections and, if appropriate, request a change in the mandate.
FDA foreign offices cite their contributions to the safety of imported food, but the agency's performance measures do not fully capture these contributions. GAO recommended in 2010 that FDA develop performance measures that can be used to demonstrate the offices' contributions to imported food safety. This recommendation remains valid. FDA has initiated a review to determine how to better reflect the value of the foreign offices in the agency-wide performance systems. Until the offices' contributions are captured, FDA will have less information to effectively measure their progress toward meeting agency goals.
FDA has taken some steps to address recruitment challenges since GAO last reported, but it still does not have a strategic workforce plan. In 2010, GAO recommended that FDA develop such a plan for the foreign offices to help ensure that it recruits and retains staff with the necessary experience and skills. GAO continues to believe that such a plan for the foreign offices is critical to FDA's ability to address staffing challenges, especially since 44 percent of foreign office positions were vacant as of October 2014.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA complete an analysis to determine the annual number of foreign food inspections that is sufficient to ensure comparable safety of imported and domestic food. FDA agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_RCED-98-130 | gao_RCED-98-130_0 | This report found that FAA’s efforts on aviation weather were unfocused and that the agency had not clearly defined its role in providing aviation weather information. FAA has attempted to address these criticisms by creating an aviation weather directorate and issuing a policy on weather. Instead, this official stated, FAA set its research priorities by reviewing the requests submitted by the national laboratories and contractors to the several offices with responsibility for aviation weather. Panelists Concluded That FAA Had Made Limited Progress in Defining Policy and Exercising Leadership
Three of the recommendations our January 1998 expert panel reviewed addressed FAA’s lack of leadership on aviation weather issues. . . is a long-term program.” However, panelists also questioned whether the changes cited by FAA demonstrate that it has taken the lead for federal aviation activities. Specifically, several panelists expressed concern that FAA had not developed a plan to implement the new policy. Experts Questioned FAA’s Efforts to Coordinate With Other Federal Agencies
NRC and FAA’s RE&D Advisory Committee raised concerns about FAA’s coordination with other federal agencies involved in aviation weather, especially in the area of research. Experts Saw FAA’s Efforts to Meet All Users’ Needs for Weather Information as Poor
In the reports by NRC and FAA’s RE&D Advisory Committee, experts also raised concerns that FAA was not providing enough consistent weather information and training to aviation users, such as pilots, dispatchers, and air traffic controllers. According to NRC, one of FAA’s goals is to provide consistent weather information to all types of users. Similarly, the advisory committee reported in 1995, “The Administrator should set policies for training and certification that will lead to enhanced understanding and decision-making regarding weather, taking into account the many significant forthcoming changes in the National Airspace System.”
FAA Is Developing Aviation Weather Systems and Training for Various Users
FAA weather officials cited the various aviation weather systems it is developing and deploying as evidence that it is meeting the needs of all aviation users. Reports and Panelists Questioned FAA’s Commitment to Funding Weather Activities
Each of the three reports also raised concerns about the amount of funding FAA has provided for weather activities. The RE&D Advisory Committee also stated in 1995 that, because of the low priority given to weather activities, “weather-related programs are inconsistently funded, causing less than acceptable performance.” Finally, in 1997, the advisory committee found that “as a result of the present budget environment, the FAA management has decided to give weather programs a lower priority than other system areas, thereby causing cancellations or significant delays to critical weather efforts.”
The reports discussed several instances that raised questions about FAA’s commitment to funding aviation weather projects that meet users’ needs. For example, from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1998, aviation weather research accounted for 4 percent of the funds allocated to all types of FAA research. We asked for their comments on (1) the original intent of the recommendation, (2) any other actions FAA had taken to address the recommendation, and (3) the adequacy of FAA’s response. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement the weather-related recommendations made by the National Research Council (NRC) and FAA's advisory committee, focusing on: (1) policy and leadership; (2) interagency coordination; (3) meeting different types of users' needs for weather information; and (4) the level of funding provided for weather activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the panel of experts GAO convened concluded that FAA had made limited progress in implementing the weather-related recommendations made by NRC and FAA's advisory committee; (2) regarding the first area of concern, policy and leadership, the reports concluded that FAA is the agency best suited for leading federal aviation weather efforts but that it had not accepted that role; (3) the NRC report linked this criticism to the dispersal of responsibilities among several FAA organizations; (4) the reports also concluded that FAA did not have clear policy guidance to define its role in aviation weather activities; (5) since 1995, FAA has attempted to address these twin concerns by creating a new organization to direct aviation weather activities and by issuing a policy that states that FAA takes the responsibility for leading aviation weather activities; (6) GAO's expert panel concluded that because FAA has not yet produced a plan to implement the new policy, its actions did not go far enough to address the concerns that the report originally raised; (7) with regard to the second concern, interagency coordination, the reports questioned the adequacy of FAA's efforts to coordinate aviation weather activities with other federal agencies; (8) concerning the third area--FAA's efforts to meet the needs all types of users--the reports concluded that FAA was not providing consistent information or adequate training; (9) as evidence that it is meeting the needs of all types of users, FAA cited a list of systems it is developing to provide weather information to various users and a list of the training courses it offers; (10) GAO's expert panel expressed continuing concerns about whether the equipment FAA listed would form an integrated system to serve all users; (11) panelists also raised concerns about the training offered by FAA, stating that better training could help reduce disparities in the abilities of air traffic controllers to interpret weather information; (12) with respect to the amount of funding FAA has allocated for aviation weather activities, the reports raised questions about the low level of funding provided to weather-related projects compared with other activities; and (13) GAO's review of FAA's budget information for fiscal year (FY) 1990 through FY 1998 confirms that the agency has allocated less funding for aviation weather during this period than for most other acquisition and research priorities. |
gao_GAO-07-1104T | gao_GAO-07-1104T_0 | It provides all of the funding for three of FAA’s four accounts, including (1) the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) account, which funds technological improvements to the air traffic control system; (2) the Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D) account, which funds research on issues related to aviation safety, mobility, and the environment as well as most of FAA’s contribution to JPDO; and (3) the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), which provides grants for construction and safety projects at airports. Estimates Indicate That Current Funding Structure Can Support FAA Activities, Including NextGen, but Structure Raises Concerns about Equity and Efficiency
The current funding structure—excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution—has funded FAA for many years, and estimates indicate that this structure can potentially provide sufficient funds for the next several years to support the transition to NextGen. Policy choices, structural changes in the aviation industry, and external events have affected revenues flowing into and out of the fund. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the existing funding structure, if maintained, will generate substantially increasing revenues over the next decade. Assuming that the General Fund provides about 19 percent of FAA’s budget, CBO estimates that through 2017 the Trust Fund can support about $22 billion in additional spending over the baseline FAA spending levels CBO has calculated for FAA (the 2006 funding level, growing with inflation) provided that most of that spending occurs after 2010. For example, Congress could raise more revenue from airspace system users for modernization or for other purposes by raising the rates on one or more of the current excise taxes. Congress could also provide more General Fund revenues for FAA, although the nation’s fiscal imbalance may make a larger contribution from this source difficult. Some stakeholders have also raised concerns that the current funding system does not provide aircraft operators with incentives to use FAA services in the most efficient manner. Selected Provisions of Proposals for Funding Aviation Activities Have Implications for Revenue Generation and Could Have Unintended Consequences
Provisions of the Senate and House reauthorization bills propose different types of revenue sources to fund FAA and NextGen. S. 1300 includes a provision requiring the FAA Administrator to impose a surcharge of $25 per flight to be available to pay the costs of NextGen capital projects. Advocates of this approach say that funding FAA in part through such a charge would do more than the current structure to ensure that revenues are adequate to cover costs over time and to create incentives for efficient use of the national airspace system by directly connecting charges with the costs imposed by users. Another S. 1300 provision would grant FAA the authority to seek debt financing by issuing bonds directly to the private capital market. This calculation assumes that the increased PFC would not affect passenger demand for air travel. H.R. H.R. 2881 includes increased user fees to pay for the costs of certain certification and registration activities of FAA. The proposal would raise the fee to $130 and allow FAA to periodically adjust this and other fees based on the cost of providing the service. However, in general, when fees are imposed for aviation activities, care must be taken that they do not contribute to a situation in which safety might be compromised. Other issues include the cost savings that could result from more efficient FAA operations and acquisition processes, which could reduce the need for new NextGen funding, and the extent to which FAA uses public-private partnerships or leasing arrangements to acquire NextGen infrastructure as flexibly and as cost-effectively as possible. While JPDO has released estimates for NextGen, questions remain over how much it will cost and which entities will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, demonstration projects, and training that will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. The overall cost of NextGen could be reduced to the extent that FAA realizes cost savings from improved operations and acquisition processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates one of the safest air transportation systems in the world, but this system is under growing strain as the demand for air travel increases. Recognizing the need to transform this system, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan and develop the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The current authorization for FAA, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund), and the excise taxes that support the Trust Fund will expire September 30, 2007. Reauthorization bills in the Senate (S. 1300) and the House (H.R. 2881) identify various revenue sources, including flight surcharges and certain fees, to fund FAA, including NextGen. Concerned about the need for stable, sustainable financing for the nation's multibillion-dollar transportation infrastructure investments, including NextGen, GAO has designated transportation financing as high risk. GAO's statement addresses (1) the extent to which the current funding structure can support FAA's activities, including NextGen, (2) the implications of selected provisions of proposals to fund aviation activities, and (3) issues that could affect the overall cost of NextGen. The statement is based on recent GAO reports and testimonies, updated through interviews with FAA officials and stakeholder representatives.
What GAO Found
Recent estimates indicate that FAA's current funding structure--consisting primarily of Trust Fund revenues plus a contribution from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury--can potentially support FAA's activities, including NextGen. The current structure has provided sufficient funding for FAA's activities to date, and both FAA and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have estimated that revenues will continue to increase. According to CBO projections through 2017, the current structure, if maintained, could support about $22 billion in additional spending over current spending levels (adjusted for inflation). Congress could also raise more revenue for FAA by raising excise tax rates or by increasing the General Fund contribution. However, contributions from the General Fund may be limited by the federal government's long-term fiscal imbalance, and policy choices, structural changes in the aviation industry, and external events could affect Trust Fund revenues. Furthermore, the current funding structure raises concerns about equity and efficiency because users may pay more or less than the costs of the air traffic control services they receive, and therefore they may lack incentives to use the national airspace system as efficiently as possible. Selected proposals for funding aviation activities have implications for revenue generation, but could pose unintended consequences. For example, S. 1300 would authorize a surcharge of $25 per flight on many flights to help pay for NextGen capital projects. While a surcharge would create an incentive for efficient use of air traffic services, some stakeholders raise the possibility that such a fee could lead to reduced air service for small communities. S. 1300 would also allow FAA to seek debt financing for capital projects in the private capital market--a proposal designed to create a stable revenue source but costlier than using appropriations or borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. H.R. 2881 would raise airport passenger facility charges, thereby benefiting larger airports more than smaller ones, and it would increase fees for certain FAA certification and registration activities. However, in general, when fees are imposed for aviation activities, care must be taken that they do not contribute to a situation in which safety might be compromised. Issues that could affect the overall cost of NextGen are primarily related to the content and cost of its infrastructure and research. JPDO is developing and has issued some key planning documents that will provide more insights into some of these issues, but questions remain over which entities will perform activities such as research and development. Other issues include the cost savings that could result from more efficient FAA operations and acquisition processes, which could reduce the need for new NextGen funding, and the extent to which public-private partnerships and leasing can be used to acquire NextGen infrastructure as flexibly and cost-effectively as possible. |
gao_GAO-02-1132T | gao_GAO-02-1132T_0 | Congestion
Ensuring continued mobility involves preventing congestion from overwhelming the transportation system. Other Mobility Challenges
Besides dealing with the challenge of congestion, ensuring mobility also involves ensuring access to transportation for certain underserved populations. As a result of the negative consequences of transportation, tradeoffs must be made between facilitating increased mobility and giving due regard to environmental and other social goals. The strategies include (1) focusing on systemwide outcomes, (2) using a full range of techniques, and (3) providing options for financing surface and maritime transportation. Focus on the Entire Surface and Maritime Transportation System Rather Than on Specific Modes or Types of Travel to Achieve Desired Mobility Outcomes. Provide Options for Financing Mobility Improvements and Consider Additional Sources of Revenue
More options for financing surface and maritime transportation projects and more sources of revenue may be needed to achieve desired mobility outcomes and address those segments of transportation systems that are most congested. In summary, the nation faces significant challenges in maintaining and enhancing mobility on its surface and maritime transportation systems, particularly with the growing congestion that accompanies increased passenger and freight travel. | What GAO Found
The scope of the U.S. surface and maritime transportation systems--which primarily includes roads, mass transit systems, railroads, and ports and waterways--is vast. One of the major goals of these systems is to provide and enhance mobility. With increasing passenger and freight travel, the surface and maritime transportation systems face a number of challenges in ensuring continued mobility. These challenges include: (1) preventing congestion from overwhelming the transportation system, and (2) ensuring access to transportation for certain underserved populations and achieving a balance between enhancing mobility and giving due regard to environmental and other social goals. There is no one solution for the mobility challenges facing the nation, and numerous approaches are needed to address these challenges. These strategies include: (1) focusing on the entire surface and maritime transportation system rather than on specific modes or types of travel to achieve desired mobility outcomes, (2) using a full range of techniques to achieve desired mobility outcomes, and (3) providing more options for financing mobility improvements and considering additional sources of revenue. |
gao_GGD-99-85 | gao_GGD-99-85_0 | Farmer Mac strives to fulfill its statutory mission mainly by purchasing agricultural mortgages from lenders. We did not examine the impact of Farmer Mac on agricultural mortgage interest rates or the availability of agricultural mortgage credit. In an attempt to facilitate an efficient secondary market, Farmer Mac has streamlined the process for buying loans and standardized some aspects of a secondary market transaction, including underwriting guidelines, but it believes that standardized loan documents, such as those used in the secondary market for residential mortgages, would be cost prohibitive. To mitigate its exposure to risks, Farmer Mac uses risk management techniques to help it conduct secondary market activities in a safe and sound manner. Close and fund the loan. Management of interest-rate risk. Underwriting standards. However, events such as a less favorable interest-rate environment or declines in the credit quality of agricultural mortgage could reduce Farmer Mac’s future profitability. The net benefits and costs also depend on how Farmer Mac’s activities interact with those of the two other GSEs FCS and the FHLBank System. Government sponsorship of Farmer Mac has the potential, if it remains viable and continues to grow, to generate benefits through loan programs and products that help agricultural lenders manage risks. Conclusions
The share of loans in a primary market that are sold by lenders in a secondary market depends on the benefits generated by the secondary market. Farmer Mac has used its post-1996 charter authorities to streamline the process for buying loans and to develop new programs and products that have provided an alternative funding source for some agricultural lenders. Farmer Mac has also standardized some aspects of the secondary market transaction by requiring participating agricultural mortgage lenders to make representations and warranties that their loans meet Farmer Mac underwriting standards, but Farmer Mac has not standardized loan documents because state laws governing agricultural mortgage loans and agricultural lending practices vary. We noted that elements of Farmer Mac’s risk management techniques appeared to be generally consistent with industry risk management principles. Since its 1996 restructuring, Farmer Mac has made some progress in developing a secondary market in agricultural mortgages, but it currently has a relatively small market presence. It appears that Farmer Mac can be viable if it continues to expand, it experiences returns that are comparable to current levels, and economic conditions in the overall and agricultural economies of the nation remain stable. For these reasons, Farmer Mac stated that our report “contains no valid foundation for the finding that Farmer Mac’s market penetration at its early stage of development is low compared to the housing enterprises and all references to that effect should be deleted from the report.” In contrast to our conclusion, Farmer Mac stated, “…we believe the correct finding is that Farmer Mac’s 2% market penetration during its first three years of operations compares very favorably to the housing GSEs’ progress in the multifamily market, which is the more appropriate market for comparison with agricultural mortgages.”
A major point of the section in the report containing these comparisons is that Farmer Mac’s penetration of the agricultural mortgage market is relatively small. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the progress that the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) has made in achieving its statutory mission and examined its future viability, focusing on: (1) actions taken by Farmer Mac to promote the development of a secondary market, including the introduction of new programs and products; the standardization of loan processes, including loan documents and underwriting standards; and the use of risk management techniques to facilitate safe and sound secondary market activities; and (2) Farmer Mac's future viability and the potential benefits and costs of a government-sponsored secondary market for agricultural mortgages.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in an attempt to make the secondary market in agricultural mortgages an attractive alternative for lenders, Farmer Mac has: (a) used its enhanced charter authorities to develop new programs and products and streamlined the process for buying loans; (b) standardized certain aspects of the loan processes, such as underwriting; and (c) developed risk management techniques to facilitate safe and sound secondary market activities; (2) while these efforts have increased secondary market activity, Farmer Mac's share of the overall agricultural mortgage market remains small, about 1.2 percent; (3) since its 1996 restructuring, Farmer Mac has introduced programs to directly purchase agricultural mortgages from lenders and to exchange agricultural mortgage-backed securities for mortgage loans held by lenders; (4) Farmer Mac also recently introduced a program (called AgVantage) through which it provides to agricultural lenders loans that are based on agricultural mortgage collateral; (5) Farmer Mac has standardized some aspects of secondary market transactions by requiring participating lenders to attest that their loans meet Farmer Mac underwriting standards; (6) Farmer Mac has not developed standardized loan documents because it believes the cost would be prohibitive given the state-by-state variability of laws governing agricultural mortgages; (7) Farmer Mac purchased futures and options to help manage the interest-rate risk of those loans it held in its portfolio, and its risk management techniques appeared to be generally consistent with industry risk management principles; (8) it appears that Farmer Mac could continue to be viable if: (a) its recent rate of expansion is maintained; (b) it continues to experience rates of return that are comparable to current levels; and (c) economic conditions in the national and agricultural economies remain stable; (9) events such as a less favorable interest-rate environment or declines in the credit quality of agricultural mortgages could reduce Farmer Mac's future profitability; (10) one important determinant of the net benefits generated by Farmer Mac is the extent to which its activities compete with or complement those of other government sponsored enterprises (GSE); and (11) because there is potential for mission overlap among Farmer Mac, Farm Credit System (FCS), and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System, new or expanded activities by one of these entities can affect the benefits generated by the other two. |
gao_GAO-11-848 | gao_GAO-11-848_0 | Benefits of NNSA’s Move to a Single M&O Contract for Y-12 and Pantex Will Remain Uncertain until NNSA Further Develops Its Proposal
NNSA’s anticipated benefits as a result of its proposal to award a single contract for the management of Y-12 and Pantex will remain uncertain until NNSA makes decisions about the details of the contract and addresses several issues raised by NNSA officials, contractors, and members of Congress. Among these benefits, NNSA anticipates that increased efficiencies at those sites could save an estimated $895 million in nominal dollars over the next 10 years. Some cost savings seem likely under a single contract, but NNSA’s analysis suggests that efficiencies also could be achieved under existing contracts. NNSA Expects Increased Efficiency and Savings of $895 Million Over 10 Years
According to its analysis on the proposed acquisition strategy, NNSA expects that the proposed consolidation of the M&O work at its Y-12 and Pantex sites will increase efficiencies at those sites. First, NNSA’s analysis indicates that consolidating the contracts will streamline and make more uniform training; human resources practices; and information systems, such as payroll, budget, and finance systems; and improve the comparability of management data at both sites. NNSA’s analysis estimated that these efficiency gains and other improvements could eliminate about 1,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) support service jobs over the next 10 years at the Y-12 and Pantex sites. Proposed Consolidated M&O Strategy Raises Additional Issues
In addition to concerns over cost savings, a number of NNSA and contractor officials have raised issues about a consolidated M&O contract potentially disrupting the work at sites. Furthermore, because of increased complexity under a consolidated contract, some NNSA officials said that federal oversight of a consolidated contract may need to be enhanced. Benefits of a Single Enterprise-wide Construction Contract Will Remain Uncertain Until NNSA Further Develops Its Proposal
NNSA has identified several potential benefits associated with awarding a single, enterprise-wide construction contract, but a number of issues have also been raised by NNSA and others. However, NNSA’s projected savings from a consolidated construction contract—approximately $24 million per year or $120 million in nominal dollars over a 5-year period—is uncertain, especially since it appears unlikely that some of NNSA’s major construction projects will be part of the contract. NNSA and others have also identified two potential concerns associated with the new contracting strategy, including (1) the need to closely integrate the work of the existing M&O and new construction contractor could necessitate increased federal oversight and (2) reduced industry interest in the contract if major projects are not included. However, actual cost savings resulting from implementing a consolidated construction contract strategy that NNSA developed are uncertain for three primary reasons. Without an accurate total cost baseline of its ongoing and planned construction projects, it will be difficult for NNSA to accurately estimate savings. More specifically, senior NNSA officials told us that it is unlikely that the construction contract will include UPF and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility (CMRR) at LANL or some other major facilities because including them would disrupt ongoing design and construction carried out by M&O contractors. Collectively, these two facilities represent about 85 percent of NNSA’s total planned construction projects through fiscal year 2016. However, NNSA has not identified in a systematic manner how it plans to implement these 18 improved management practices at all of its sites. Consistent with cost-estimating best practices, such information should specify the costs, risks, and benefits expected enterprise-wide and at each site for both proposed consolidated contracts. In addition, NNSA will not complete a study of federal site office structure and roles and responsibilities until December 2012. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following four actions: In order to manage NNSA’s contracts as effectively and efficiently as possible the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to take the following action: Develop a plan for implementing the 18 improved management practices identified by its analysis, as appropriate, to improve its current contract management practices. As we also recommended, information gathered through the draft RFP, when combined with recent budget projections and cost estimates, should be used by NNSA to assess, in ways consistent with federal standards for internal control and cost-estimating best practices the costs, risks, and benefits of NNSA’s proposal expected enterprise-wide and at each NNSA site. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)-- proposed in March 2010 a new acquisition strategy that includes consolidating the management and operating (M&O) contracts for two of its eight sites--the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Tennessee and the Pantex Plant in Texas--and consolidating all construction projects for all of its sites under a single, enterprise-wide contract. NNSA anticipates that this strategy will reduce costs, enhance mission performance, and improve construction management. NNSA's sites are overseen by colocated federal site offices. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's preliminary proposals for (1) a consolidated M&O contract for Y-12 and Pantex and (2) an enterprise-wide construction contract. GAO reviewed analyses supporting NNSA's acquisition strategy; examined agency directives and guidance; and interviewed DOE, NNSA, and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
Based on the analysis supporting its proposed acquisition strategy, NNSA expects that the proposed consolidation of the M&O work at its Y-12 and Pantex Plants will increase efficiencies and save $895 million in nominal dollars, primarily through efficiency gains and other improvements in support services (i.e., integrated budget and finance systems, more uniform training and human resources practices), that could result in the potential elimination of about 1,000 support service jobs over the next 10 years. NNSA selected these sites because both have M&O contracts with terms that expire in 2012, as well as similar nuclear production operations. Anticipated savings from this proposed consolidation, however, are uncertain because of the assumptions NNSA used when calculating these savings, the limited details available about the actual work that will be consolidated, and the adequacy of historical data used in the analysis. NNSA officials said that savings will be more accurately determined as industry provides feedback on the recently released draft request for proposal. In addition to cost savings, a number of NNSA and contractor officials have raised other issues with a consolidated M&O contract proposal, including uncertainty about the number of actual staff reductions that can be achieved and the need for a federal oversight plan for the new consolidated contract. In addition, NNSA's analysis suggests that efficiencies may also be achieved under its existing contracts through improved management practices. However, NNSA has not developed a plan for implementing these improved management practices at all of its sites. NNSA also anticipates several potential benefits, including cost savings, associated with awarding a single, enterprise-wide construction contract. It is uncertain, however, whether these benefits will be realized because of a number of issues. For example, NNSA's projected savings from a consolidated construction contract--approximately $120 million in nominal dollars over a 5- year period--are uncertain because NNSA lacks an accurate total cost baseline of its ongoing and planned construction projects and because it is likely that the construction contract will exclude major projects, such as the Uranium Processing Facility and Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility, out of concern that this consolidated contract would disrupt ongoing design and construction efforts. Collectively, these two facilities represent about 85 percent of NNSA's total planned construction projects through fiscal year 2016. In addition, NNSA has not conducted, consistent with federal standards of internal control and cost-estimating best practices, an assessment of risks associated with awarding an enterprise-wide construction contract, such as costs and benefits expected enterprise-wide and at each site for both proposed consolidated contracts. NNSA officials and contractors said that NNSA may need increased federal oversight to integrate the work of existing M&O and consolidated construction contractors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that NNSA develop a plan for implementing the improved management practices identified by its analysis and assess the costs, risks, and benefits of the consolidated construction contract to better define and inform its acquisition strategy and to take appropriate future actions. NNSA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-521 | gao_GAO-04-521_0 | For example, appropriations committee report language states that the program should focus on “urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the United States.” Furthermore, the program funds a longer-term export control activity that is designated in committee reports as being outside the scope of the program’s expected activities. That export control activity has not been integrated with State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, which supports development of export control capabilities in other countries. We reviewed the types of activities funded by the major programs in the context of program authorizations and found that these programs engage in activities that are in accord with their legislative authorizations. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund Appears to Engage in Activities Beyond Expectations for the Scope of its Mission
The NDF preplans some activities and engages in longer-term activities, including export control activities that, while authorized by law, appear to be inconsistent with expectations for the scope of the program’s mission. Yet the NDF earmarked at least half of its fiscal year 2004 request of $35 million for preplanned and longer-term, multiyear activities to include (1) $8.75 million for a Biological Weapons Terrorism Initiative to help countries develop laws and regulations, inventory existing materials, track the movement of existing materials, and secure existing stock and (2) $8.75 million for the expansion and deployment of an automated export control system called Tracker, which has been under development and deployment by the NDF since 1994. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes another $7 million for the same effort. However, project implementation is generally performed by experts from other U.S. government agencies who are also federal employees, or by outside contractors. Recommendation
In this report, we are recommending that the Secretaries of State and Commerce evaluate the extent to which the export control activities of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program are integrated and thus ensure that recipient countries are receiving comprehensive assistance to improve their export control systems. To determine the extent to which program management utilized outside experts, we met with program officials responsible for implementing the NADR programs to discuss, and obtain information and documentation on, the composition of program management staff and the extent to which programs utilized outside experts in project implementation. Nonproliferation Programs Funded through the Department of State’s NADR Account
The Department of State’s nonproliferation programs funded through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account are designed to help achieve U.S. national security interests by preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State requested $415 million to fund programs in the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) appropriations account for fiscal year 2005. Interest has been expressed in learning about whether programs are being implemented in accord with the law, and in the extent to which programs use experts hired on a contractual basis. GAO was asked to determine (1) the legal authorizations for the programs and the extent to which programs are implemented in accord with these authorizations and (2) the extent to which program management and implementation use outside experts.
What GAO Found
The seven major programs funded through the Department of State's Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs appropriations account are authorized by law and engage in activities that are in accord with their authority. However, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) engages in activities that, while authorized by law, appear to be inconsistent with expectations about the scope of the program's mission. Past appropriations committee reports and testimony by the Secretary of State indicated that the NDF is designed to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation events of immediate concern to the United States. However, at least half of the NDF's $35 million budget request for fiscal year 2004 and 57 percent of the $34.5 million request for fiscal year 2005 were designated for longer-term activities preplanned through the annual budget process, including expansion of an export control system called Tracker. Furthermore, the Tracker system has been developed and deployed independently of another Department of State program, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, which supports the development of export control capabilities in foreign countries. Currently, the Tracker system is not integrated into the export control assessments and activities of this program or the export control activities of other Departments, such as the Department of Commerce. Program management offices, which range in size from 1 to 26 staff, average about 80 percent federal employees and 20 percent experts hired on a contractual basis. In contrast, projects funded by these programs are implemented by experts on contract from other U.S. government agencies (who may also be federal employees), outside contractors, or international and nongovernmental organizations. The Department of State concurred with the need to integrate export control activities, but took exception to other issues regarding the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. |
gao_GAO-16-786 | gao_GAO-16-786_0 | Over time, changes have been made to eligibility ages, the retirement earnings test, the FRA, and other important factors affecting claiming. Lack of Understanding of Key Social Security Information, Along with Financial Need and Other Factors, May Contribute to Individuals Claiming Benefits Early
Individuals Have Some Knowledge of Social Security Benefits, but Most Do Not Understand Key Program Rules and Details
Our review of survey reports and academic studies, and interviews with people with Social Security expertise, suggest that most individuals do not understand important rules and details that could affect their retirement benefits or the benefits of their spouses and survivors. For example, the publication When to Start Receiving Retirement Benefits provides an overview of information needed to make the claiming decision, including a discussion of the tradeoffs of claiming benefits earlier versus later, information on life expectancy and longevity risk, how claiming could affect spousal and survivors benefits, and the retirement earnings test. Claims Process Sometimes Does Not Provide Key Information That Could Help People Decide When to Claim Benefits
While SSA provides important information through its website and publications to help people make informed decisions about when to claim benefits, our observation of the online and in-person claims process found that some key information may not be consistently provided to potential claimants when they file, particularly during in-person interviews. SSA’s Program Operations Manual System (POMS) states that claims specialists are to provide information, and avoid giving advice, to claimants. The POMS also specifies that when taking an application for Social Security benefits, the claims specialist is responsible for explaining the advantages and disadvantages of filing an application so that the individual can make an informed filing decision. Compared to the in-person process, online applicants have more consistent access to key information on the screen or through tabs and pop-up boxes as they complete the application. For example, claimants were not consistently informed that monthly benefit amounts would be higher if the claimant waited, as specified in POMS. Similar to in-person interviews, however, the online application process does not inform claimants that benefits are based on the highest 35 years of earnings; that life expectancy and longevity risk are important considerations in deciding when to claim; and that benefits may be taxed. In addition, to ensure potential claimants are consistently provided with key information during the claiming process to help them make informed decisions about when to claim benefits, SSA should take steps to ensure that: when applicable, claims specialists inform claimants that monthly benefit amounts are determined by the highest (indexed) 35 years of earnings, and that in some cases, additional work could increase benefits; when appropriate, claims specialists clearly explain the retirement earnings test and inform claimants that any benefits withheld because of earnings above the earnings limit will result in higher monthly benefits starting at FRA; claims specialists explain that lump sum retroactive benefits will result in a permanent reduction of monthly benefits. SSA generally agreed with our recommendations. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examined: (1) the extent to which people understand Social Security rules affecting their benefits, and other factors that may influence when they claim retirement benefits; and (2) the information that the Social Security Administration (SSA) provides to individuals inquiring about claiming that enables them to make informed claiming decisions. Based on our review of studies and on expert interviews, we identified key information categories that are central to making an informed decision about when to claim retirement benefits. Observations of Claims Process at Field Offices and Online
We observed a demonstration of SSA’s online retirement claims process and a nongeneralizable sample of 30 face-to-face claims applications and inquiries at 7 SSA field offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many eligible individuals claim Social Security retirement benefits at the earliest eligibility age, even though they would receive higher benefits if they waited until older ages. In order to make an informed decision about when to claim, people need to understand how various Social Security rules and other factors affect benefit amounts. GAO was asked to examine these issues.
This report examines (1) the extent to which people understand Social Security rules affecting their retirement benefits; and (2) what information SSA provides to individuals to enable them to make informed claiming decisions. GAO observed a demonstration of the online claims process and a nongeneralizable sample of 30 in-person claims applications and inquiries in 7 field offices; reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, and agency documentation; reviewed surveys and academic studies, selected in part based on expert referrals and a comprehensive review of the research literature; and interviewed Social Security experts and agency officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of nine surveys and academic studies, and interviews with retirement experts, suggest that many individuals do not fully understand key details of Social Security rules that can potentially affect their retirement benefits. For example, while some people understand that delaying claiming leads to higher monthly benefits, many are unclear about the actual amount that benefits increase with claiming age. The studies and surveys also found widespread misunderstanding about whether spousal benefits are available, how monthly benefits are determined, and how the retirement earnings test works. Understanding these rules and other information, such as life expectancy and longevity risk, could be central to people making well-informed decisions about when to claim benefits. By having this understanding of retirement benefits, people would also be in a better position to balance other factors that influence when they should claim benefits, including financial need, poor health, and psychological factors.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) makes comprehensive information on key rules and other considerations related to claiming retirement benefits available through its publications, website, personalized benefits statements, and online calculators. However, GAO observed 30 in-person claims at SSA field offices and found that claimants were not consistently provided key information that people may need to make well-informed decisions. For example, in 8 of 26 claims interviews in which the claimant could have received higher monthly benefits by waiting until a later age, the claims specialist did not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of delaying claiming. Further, only 7 of the 18 claimants for whom the retirement earnings test could potentially apply were given complete information about how the test worked. SSA's Program Operations Manual System (POMS) states that claims specialists should explain the advantages and disadvantages of filing an application so that the individual can make an informed filing decision. The problems we observed during the claims interviews occurred in part because the questions included in the claims process did not specifically cover some key information.
Online applicants have more access to key information on the screen or through tabs and pop-up boxes as they complete an application. However, similar to in-person interviews, the online application process does not inform claimants that benefits are based on the highest 35 years of earnings or that life expectancy is an important consideration in deciding when to claim.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to SSA, including that SSA take steps to ensure that claims specialists provide information on delayed benefits that is consistent with POMS, and that the claims process provides claimants better information on the retirement earnings test. SSA generally agreed with our recommendations. recommendations.ns.ommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-95-82 | gao_NSIAD-95-82_0 | The Commerce and State Departments approved a total of 67 export licenses worth about $530 million for missile-related items for China for fiscal years 1990 through 1993. Thus, Commerce-identified dual-use missile technology exports totaled less than 1 percent of all exports requiring individual validated licenses to China. DOD Officials Are Concerned That They Do Not See All Commerce Department Missile Technology Applications
DOD officials have expressed concern that Commerce is not referring potential missile technology applications for interagency review. Licensing Process and Monitoring Controls Cannot Ensure That U.S. Exports to China Are Kept From Sensitive End Users
Licensing process controls for dual-use and missile technology export applications cannot ensure that U.S. proliferation-related dual-use and munitions exports to China, aside from separately monitored satellite exports, are kept from sensitive end users. U.S. Government Monitoring of China’s Compliance With MTCR Commitments and License Conditions
U.S. government officials believe that the U.S. government generally performs adequate monitoring of China’s compliance with the terms of its MTCR commitments not to export MTCR technology out of China. Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions on China Is Uncertain
The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on China is difficult to determine because, to date, no consensus on a definition of, or criteria for, measuring the effectiveness of proliferation sanctions imposed on China has been established. The 1993 proliferation sanctions have not yet resulted in China’s agreement to commit to the current MTCR Guidelines and Annex. The analysts provided some information on sensitive end users, but the Commerce Department, after a technical review of the data, said that the license applications did not involve restricted missile technology. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and U.S. missile technology-related exports to the Peoples' Republic of China, focusing on the: (1) extent to which dual-use and missile technologies are exported to sensitive end-users; (2) U.S. government's ability to monitor China's compliance with the U.S.-China bilateral agreement; and (3) effectiveness of U.S. sanctions imposed on China.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) for fiscal years 1990 through 1993, the U.S. government approved 67 export licenses worth about $530 million for missile-related technology items exported to China; (2) such export licenses accounted for less than one percent of all special licenses for exports to China; (3) the Department of Defense (DOD) is concerned that the Department of Commerce might not be identifying or seeking interagency concurrence on all potential missile-technology export license applications; (4) DOD does not have an interagency agreement with Commerce regarding which export applications should be referred for comments; (5) existing licensing procedures and monitoring controls cannot ensure that most missile-technology and dual-use exports are kept from sensitive end users, but controls on satellite-related exports appear to be adequate; (6) U.S. government agencies do not share all the information they have on sensitive end users in China; (7) the lack of Chinese cooperation has made end-use monitoring of export licenses only marginally effective; (8) Commerce does not require monitoring cooperation before it grants an export license; (9) although China has recently accepted more stringent MTCR requirements, it does not accept the revised MTCR guidelines and annex; and (10) there are no criteria for measuring the effectiveness of proliferation sanctions imposed on China. |
gao_GAO-14-574 | gao_GAO-14-574_0 | Its mission is to support the export of U.S. goods and services, thereby supporting U.S. jobs. The underwriting of loans guaranteed by Ex-Im is performed by either Ex-Im loan officers or qualified lenders with delegated authority, which allows a lender to authorize a loan guaranteed by Ex-Im in accordance with agreed-upon underwriting requirements without first obtaining Ex-Im approval. Underwriting Guidance Was Established, but It Did Not Reasonably Assure Consistent Implementation and Compliance with Certain Requirements
The Manual, which describes Ex-Im’s loan guarantee underwriting procedures, provided a framework for Ex-Im officials to implement Ex- Im’s underwriting process requirements for loan guarantee transactions, and Ex-Im implemented many key aspects of its underwriting process as required by the Manual. Specifically, the Manual did not include certain procedures that should be performed, or sufficiently detailed instructions on how certain procedures should be performed and documented, to reasonably assure compliance with Ex- Im’s requirements and consistency with federal guidance prior to loan guarantee approval. Further, Ex-Im did not have mechanisms to verify compliance with certain established procedures related to loan guarantee transactions prior to approval. verify that transaction applicants are not delinquent on federal debt helps assure applicant eligibility is consistent with federal guidance. However, the Manual did not include detailed instructions for preparation and inclusion of all required documents or analyses in a loan file prior to loan guarantee approval. However, this risk-based approach for scheduling these examinations was not documented. While Ex-Im Has Taken Steps to Prevent, Detect, and Investigate Fraud, It Has Not Documented Its Overall Fraud Processes
While Ex-Im has taken steps to prevent, detect, and investigate fraud and officials could describe the steps they use, Ex-Im has not documented its overall fraud process, which is recommended by several authoritative auditing and antifraud organizations as a key step in evaluating and updating these processes. Detecting fraud is a potential outcome of the processes Ex-Im uses to monitor guaranteed loans as well as the steps it uses in its claims and recoveries process once a loan defaults. 7 for an overview of fraud prevention processes.) Ex-Im’s CRC directly monitors loan guarantee transactions by selecting and reviewing a random sample of loan guarantee transactions for compliance with internal Ex-Im policies and procedures and ensures that the transactions occurred as outlined in the terms of the loans. Improvements in these areas could help enhance the assessment of transaction participant eligibility and the reasonable assurance of repayment and the oversight of lenders, as well as help prevent fraud. Establish mechanisms to oversee compliance with Ex-Im’s existing procedures, prior to loan guarantee approval, for (1) obtaining credit reports for transaction borrowers or documenting why they were not applicable; (2) documenting certain eligibility procedures, including the Character, Reputational, and Transaction Integrity reviews for medium- and long-term loan guarantee transactions, export item eligibility, and country eligibility; and (3) documenting the analysis of country exposure. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine the extent to which the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im) (1) adequately designed and implemented procedures to reasonably assure compliance with its underwriting process requirements for loan guarantee transactions and consistency with federal guidance and (2) adequately designed procedures to prevent, detect, and investigate fraudulent applications for loan guarantees. In addition, we reviewed Ex-Im’s Office of Inspector General (IG) reports since 2009 related to underwriting issues, various laws applicable to Ex-Im, and GAO reports related to Ex-Im. The results from our samples apply to the universe of loan guarantees authorized from October 1, 2011, to March 31, 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ex-Im serves as the official export credit agency of the United States, providing a range of financial products to support the export of U.S. goods and services. Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, increased demand for Ex-Im support resulted in significant increases in Ex-Im's outstanding financial commitments and risk exposure, which heightened interest in ensuring that Ex-Im has procedures in place to minimize financial risks.
GAO was mandated by the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 to review the extent to which Ex-Im (1) adequately designed and implemented procedures to reasonably assure compliance with its underwriting process requirements for loan guarantee transactions and consistency with federal guidance and (2) adequately designed procedures to prevent, detect, and investigate fraudulent applications for loan guarantees. To address these objectives, GAO (1) reviewed Ex-Im's relevant procedures and federal guidance; (2) conducted tests on statistically random samples of loan guarantees authorized between October 1, 2011, and March 31, 2013; and (3) interviewed Ex-Im officials.
What GAO Found
The Export-Import Bank's (Ex-Im) Loan, Guarantee, and Insurance Manual (Manual) describes Ex-Im's underwriting procedures and generally provides loan officers with a framework to implement its underwriting process requirements for loan guarantee transactions. GAO's review of a statistical sample of loan guarantees indicated that Ex-Im implemented many key aspects of the underwriting process as required by the Manual. However, the Manual did not (1) include certain procedures or sufficiently detailed instructions to verify compliance with Ex-Im's requirements and consistency with federal guidance, such as a procedure to verify that loan guarantee transaction applicants did not have delinquent federal debt; (2) include instructions for loan officers to use credit reports and for the inclusion of all required documents and analyses in the loan file prior to approval; and (3) call for assessments of collateral, as required by federal guidance, for certain loan guarantee transactions prior to approval. Further, Ex-Im did not have mechanisms to verify compliance with certain established procedures, including documenting certain loan guarantee eligibility procedures. In addition, Ex-Im's current risk-based approach for scheduling examinations to monitor lenders with delegated authority to approve guaranteed loans was not documented. Improvements in these areas help enhance the assessment of transaction participant eligibility and the reasonable assurance of repayment, as well as help prevent fraud.
While Ex-Im has processes to prevent, detect, and investigate fraud, Ex-Im has not documented its overall processes for doing so. Such documentation is recommended by several authoritative auditing and antifraud organizations as a key step in evaluating and updating these processes. The processes Ex-Im used to prevent and detect fraud were part of its underwriting and monitoring of loan guarantees. A number of divisions within Ex-Im, as well as lenders, played a role in preventing fraudulent applications from being approved and monitoring activity that could help detect potential fraud. If a guaranteed loan defaults and an indicator of fraud existed, staff would work with Ex-Im's Office of Inspector General to leverage its investigative resources to pursue involved parties.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making a number of recommendations to Ex-Im to enhance its loan guarantee underwriting process with additional procedures for ensuring compliance with Ex-Im and federal requirements, as well as for documenting fraud processes. In commenting on GAO's draft report, Ex-Im concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-133 | gao_GAO-11-133_0 | PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent some accidents caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. The four largest Class I freight railroads have identified suppliers of PTC technology and are working with these suppliers to develop PTC components; however, they have not yet installed PTC, except for some limited pilot installations. Key Steps Remain to Implement PTC by 2015, with a Potential for Delay
By law, the rail industry must complete development, testing, and full implementation of PTC on most major routes within 5 years. Potential delays in developing PTC components, software, and interoperability standards, as well as delays that could occur during the subsequent testing and implementation of PTC systems, raise the risk that railroads will not meet the implementation deadline and that the safety benefits of PTC will be delayed. Furthermore, the extent to which commuter railroads and small freight railroads have difficulty in covering the costs of PTC implementation raises the risk that these railroads could miss the deadline if funding is not available or that other critical needs may go unmet if money is diverted to pay for PTC. Cost, Uncertainty about Effectiveness, Regulations, and Lack of Interoperability Create Challenges to Implementing New Rail Safety Technologies
Experts and other stakeholders identified costs, uncertainty about effectiveness, regulations, and lack of interoperability with existing systems and equipment as key challenges to implementing new rail safety technologies: Cost: Most experts indicated that cost was a major challenge for implementing rail safety technologies in all four technology categories, including for some of the most promising technologies—specifically electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, crash energy management, and switch position monitors/indicators. FRA Has Taken Actions to Fulfill the PTC Mandate and Promote Other Technologies, but Opportunities Exist to Inform Congress of Risks and Improve Monitoring
To Date, FRA Is Taking the Necessary Steps to Fulfill the PTC Mandate
To fulfill the PTC mandate, FRA (1) has developed regulations regarding the implementation of PTC systems, (2) is monitoring PTC implementation efforts, and (3) is managing funding programs to support PTC implementation. FRA plans to monitor railroads’ progress in implementing PTC by requiring railroads to provide periodic information on implementation progress and by directly observing railroads’ testing and implementation of PTC. Additionally, FRA is required to report to Congress in 2012 on the progress railroads have made in implementing PTC. FRA Has an Opportunity to Identify and Report to Congress on PTC Implementation Risks and Potential Mitigation Actions
As we have previously discussed, there are uncertainties regarding when the remaining tasks to implement PTC can be completed, which raise certain risks to the successful completion of PTC by the 2015 deadline. FRA officials told us they are aware of some of these risks, but they said that it is too early to know whether they are significant enough to jeopardize successful implementation by the 2015 deadline. Reporting this information can help demonstrate program results and build support for the agency’s efforts. Much focus has been placed on implementing PTC to address accidents caused by human factors, but technologies besides PTC hold promise for improving safety by addressing other accident causes, such as problems with track or equipment. While FRA has employed several key best practices for encouraging the use of new technologies, employing a method to monitor and report on the industry’s adoption of new technologies that FRA was involved in developing could provide useful information for demonstrating the results of its R&D program and refining future efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following two actions: To support the effective identification and mitigation of risks to the successful fulfillment of PTC requirements by 2015, direct the Administrator of FRA to include in FRA’s 2012 report to Congress an analysis of the likelihood that railroads will meet the PTC implementation deadline; the risks to successful implementation of PTC; and actions Congress, railroads, or other stakeholders can take to mitigate risks to successful PTC implementation. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for review and comment. DOT also said that it would consider our recommendations. Amtrak provided a technical comment, which we incorporated. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses (1) the progress railroads have made in developing and implementing positive train control (PTC) and the remaining steps to implement PTC systems; (2) the potential benefits of other rail safety technologies under development as well as the challenges to implementing them; and (3) the extent of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of other rail safety technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Positive train control (PTC) is a communications-based train control system designed to prevent some serious train accidents. Federal law requires passenger and major freight railroads to install PTC on most major routes by the end of 2015. Railroads must address other risks by implementing other technologies. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) oversees implementation of these technologies and must report to Congress in 2012 on progress in implementing PTC. As requested, this report discusses railroads' progress in developing PTC and the remaining steps to implement it, the benefits of and challenges in implementing other safety technologies, and the extent of FRA's efforts to fulfill the PTC mandate and encourage the implementation of other technologies. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed FRA and rail industry officials. GAO also interviewed and surveyed rail experts.
What GAO Found
The four largest freight railroads and Amtrak have made progress in developing PTC and are preparing for implementation, but there is a potential for delays in completing the remaining sequence of steps to implement PTC in time for the 2015 deadline. For example, although railroads have worked with suppliers to develop some PTC components, the software needed to test and operate these components remains under development. As a result, it is uncertain whether components will be available when needed, which could create subsequent delays in testing and installing PTC equipment. Additionally, publicly funded commuter railroads may have difficulty in covering the $2 billion that PTC is estimated to cost them, which could create delays if funding for PTC is not available or require that railroads divert funding from other critical areas, such as maintenance. The uncertainties regarding when the remaining steps to implement PTC can be completed, as well as the related costs, raise the risk that railroads will not meet the implementation deadline, delaying the safety benefits of PTC. Additionally, other critical needs may go unmet if funding is diverted to pay for PTC. Other technologies hold promise for preventing or mitigating accidents that PTC would not address, but face implementation challenges. Experts identified technologies to improve track inspection, locomotives and other rail vehicles, and switches as having promise to provide additional safety. But challenges to implementing these technologies include their costs, uncertainty about their effectiveness, regulations that could create disincentives to using certain technologies, and lack of interoperability with existing systems and equipment. For example, electronically controlled pneumatic brakes are a promising technology to improve safety by slowing or stopping trains faster, but are expensive and not compatible with some common train operations. FRA has taken actions to fulfill the PTC mandate and has the opportunity to provide useful information on risks and mitigation strategies to Congress in its 2012 report. FRA has developed PTC regulations, hired new staff to monitor implementation of PTC, and created a grant program to provide funding to railroads. Going forward, as it monitors railroads' progress, FRA will have additional information for determining whether the risks previously discussed are significant enough to jeopardize successful implementation of PTC by the 2015 deadline. Prior GAO reports have noted that the identification of risks and strategies to mitigate them can help ensure the success of major projects. Including such information in FRA's 2012 report would help Congress determine whether additional actions are needed to ensure PTC is implemented successfully. Additionally, FRA's actions to encourage the implementation of other rail safety technologies align with some, but not all, best practices for such efforts. For example, FRA has followed the best practice of involving the industry early in developing new technologies, but it does not monitor the industry's use of technologies that it helped develop. Monitoring and reporting on the industry's adoption of new technologies could help the agency better demonstrate the results of its efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct DOT's Administrator of FRA to (1) include in its 2012 report to Congress information about PTC implementation risks and strategies to mitigate them and (2) monitor and report on the adoption of other technologies supported by the agency's efforts. DOT reviewed a draft of this report, provided technical comments, and said it would consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-327 | gao_GAO-06-327_0 | MDA Made Progress during Fiscal Year 2005, but Some Activities Were Not Completed as Planned
MDA made progress during fiscal year 2005 in carrying out the fiscal year plans of work established by the seven BMDS elements, but it was not able to field all planned components or conduct all scheduled tests. Collectively, prime contractors for the various elements overran their budgets by about $458 million, or about 14 percent, with GMD accounting for approximately 80 percent of the collective overrun. However, over the course of the block, MDA progressively reduced the number of components that it expected to field and increased its cost goal, primarily to recognize the cost of sustaining fielded assets. Officials primarily attribute the increased cost to MDA’s sustainment of fielded assets. Two of these tests were initiated. Time pressures caused MDA to stray from a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, allowing the GMD program to condense its acquisition cycle at the expense of cost, quantity, and performance goals. For example, MDA has the flexibility to make trade-offs between BMDS elements. That is not to say that DOD and Congress are not kept informed of MDA’s progress or changes, but that the MDA Director, by statute, has the discretion to determine which variations are significant enough to be reported. Corrective Actions May Not Alleviate Pressures Associated with Schedule- Driven Block Approach
Although MDA is taking many actions to address quality assurance problems, it has not taken any steps to ensure that all elements follow a knowledge-based acquisition strategy or to ensure that the time is available to follow such a strategy. To date, around $90 billion has been spent, and over the next 6 years, DOD expects that it will need about $58 billion more to enhance the BMDS. Beyond that, more funding will be required if DOD is to reach its ultimate goal of developing a system capable of countering ballistic missile launches from any range during all phases of flight. Instead, MDA fielded assets before their capability was known. While recognizing this approach did successfully accelerate fielding, to the extent it continues to feature concurrency as a means for acceleration, it may not be affordable for the considerable amount of capability that is yet to be developed and fielded. It is possible for MDA to return to a knowledge-based approach to development while still fielding capability in blocks. MDA’s experience during Block 2004 shows that it may not always be possible to deliver a capability in a 2-year time frame. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) developed and fielded in Block 2004 three Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements for operational use in the event of an emergency. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
The GMD element is a missile defense system being developed to protect the United States against ICBM attacks launched from Northeast Asia and the Middle East. The first flight test (FT-1) was successfully conducted in December 2005, 1 month later than planned. Quality control weaknesses also raise concerns about the performance of GMD interceptors. Appendix V: Integrated Management Plan
Event 0 – Block Capability Alternative Block planning process completed Long lead targets, tests and exercises identified Affordability analysis completed Acquisition strategy approved Preliminary block plan approved Event 1 – Preliminary block definition Block performance assessments updated Detailed cost estimates/estimates at completions (EAC) available Costs/benefit analysis updated Risks assessed and mitigation programs established Preliminary operational concept and operations architecture drafted Preliminary designs for all elements/components/targets completed Required funding identified for development Integrated master schedule created Preliminary block definition approved Event 2 – Final block definition Performance assessments updated Detailed cost estimates/EACs available Risks assessed and mitigation programs updated Military utility characterized and operational concept refined Preliminary integration test plan available Final design for all elements/components/targets completed Funding available for development Block activation plan available Block definition updated Event 3 – First complete development article Detailed cost estimates/EACs available Operational concept defined and operations architecture available Test range and support planning completed Military utility assessment completed First development article/targets built and initial tests completed Event 4 – Element/Component development complete Detailed cost estimates/EACs available Block integration test planning completed Element/component/targets development and testing complete Support systems defined Training systems defined Fielding readiness assessed (initial defensive operations)
Appendix VI: Scope and Methodology
To examine the progress MDA made in fiscal year 2005 toward its Block 2004 goals, we examined the efforts of individual programs that are developing BMDS elements under the management of MDA, such as the GMD program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent nearly $90 billion since 1985 to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). In the next 6 years, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the developer, plans to invest about $58 billion more. MDA's overall goal is to produce a system that is capable of defeating enemy missiles launched from any range during any phase of their flight. MDA's approach is to field new capabilities in 2-year blocks. The first--Block 2004--was to provide some protection by December 2005 against attacks out of North Korea and the Middle East. Congress requires GAO to assess MDA's progress annually. This year's report assesses (1) MDA's progress during fiscal year 2005 and (2) whether capabilities fielded under Block 2004 met goals. To the extent goals were not met, GAO identifies reasons for shortfalls and discusses corrective actions that should be taken.
What GAO Found
MDA made good progress during fiscal year 2005 in the development and fielding of two of the seven elements reviewed. Most of the others encountered problems that slowed progress. Meanwhile, contractors for the seven elements exceeded their fiscal year budget by about $458 million, or about 14 percent, most of which was attributable to cost overruns in developing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element. Accelerating Block 2004 allowed MDA to successfully field missile defense assets faster than planned. But, MDA delivered fewer quantities than planned and exceeded the cost goal of $6.7 billion by about $1 billion. The increased cost is primarily the added cost of sustaining fielded assets. However, the increase would have been greater if some development and other activities had not been deferred into Block 2006. Also, MDA has been unable to verify actual system performance because of flight test delays. Time pressures caused MDA to stray from a knowledge-based acquisition strategy. Key aspects of product knowledge, such as technology maturity, are proven in a knowledge-based strategy before committing to more development. MDA followed a knowledge-based strategy with elements not being fielded, such as Airborne Laser and Kinetic Energy Interceptor. But it allowed the GMD program to concurrently mature technology, complete design activities, and produce and field assets before end-to-end testing of the system--all at the expense of cost, quantity, and performance goals. For example, the performance of some GMD interceptors is questionable because the program was inattentive to quality assurance. If the block approach continues to feature concurrency as a means of acceleration, MDA's approach may not be affordable for the considerable amount of capability that is yet to be developed and fielded. MDA has unusual flexibility to modify its strategies and goals, make trade-offs, and report on its progress. For example, MDA's Director may determine when cost variations are significant enough to report to Congress. MDA is taking actions to strengthen quality control. These actions are notable, but they do not address the schedule-induced pressures of fielding or enhancing a capability in a 2-year time frame or the need to fully implement a knowledge-based acquisition approach. |
gao_GAO-11-276 | gao_GAO-11-276_0 | IDENT stores, searches, matches, and shares fingerprints. DOD recognized the importance of such interoperability and directed adherence to internationally accepted biometric standards. As a result, DOD is unable to automatically transmit information collected by this device, which is about 13 percent of approximately 4.8 million biometric records maintained by DOD, to federal agencies, such as the FBI. Third, DOD has not fully defined roles and responsibilities that specify accountability needed to ensure its collection devices meet new or updated standards. DOD Has Not Taken Certain Actions Needed to Help Ensure New and Updated Standards Are Implemented
DOD has not taken certain actions necessary to help ensure that its collection devices adhere to new and updated standards, including not having an effective process, procedure, or timeline for implementing updated standards, not routinely testing collection devices at sufficient levels of detail for conformance to these standards, and not fully defining roles and responsibilities to ensure accountability. DOD Is Sharing Biometric Information but Sharing Is Limited by the Absence of an Agreement with DHS and DOD’s System Capacity
DOD is sharing its biometric information and has an agreement to share biometric information with DOJ, which allows for direct connectivity and the automated sharing of biometric information between their biometric systems. However, DOD’s ability to optimize sharing is limited by not having a finalized sharing agreement with DHS, and its capacity to process biometric information. Currently, DOD and DHS do not have a finalized agreement in place to allow direct connectivity between their biometric systems, due to the need for additional reviews of the proposed agreement by certain DHS officials, among others. DOD is working with DHS to develop a memorandum of understanding to share biometric information now scheduled for completion in May 2011; however, without the agreement, it is unclear whether direct connectivity will be established between DOD and DHS, which affects response times to search queries. Moreover, the advancements other agencies make in their biometric systems may continue to overwhelm DOD’s efforts as it works to identify its long-term biometric system capability needs and associated costs. DOD’s Biometric System Is Limited in Meeting Demands from Key Federal Agencies’ Biometric Systems
To enable agencies to meet the demand for searching stored biometric information on their systems, agencies’ biometric systems have varying system capacities based on their mission needs, which affects their ability to similarly process each other’s queries for biometric information. DOD officials do not believe that they need to match other agencies’ biometric system capacities because they do not anticipate receiving the same number of queries given differences in mission. However, DOD and other agency officials have expressed concern that DOD’s biometric system is limited in its ability to maximize sharing of biometric information. For example, DOD has adopted standards for the collection of biometrics to enhance interoperability with other key federal agencies’ biometric systems, but at least one DOD device responsible for the collection of over 600,000 biometric records, does not meet DOD adopted standards, such as a handheld biometric collection device used by the Army. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to collect and help ensure that federal agencies are sharing biometric information on individuals who pose a threat to national security to the fullest extent possible, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for the oversight of DOD biometrics, to take the following five actions in collaboration with other key federal agencies and internal DOD stakeholders, including BIMA, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines, and U.S. Air Force: Implement a process for updating collection devices to adopted standards to help ensure that all DOD systems related to biometrics, including collection devices, conform to adopted standards. We contacted and obtained information from officials and entities associated with the collection, storage, use, and sharing of biometric information across the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as other key federal agencies, including the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State (State), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
Biometrics technologies that collect and facilitate the sharing of fingerprint records, and other identity data, are important to national security and federal agencies recognize the need to share such information. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $3.5 billion for fiscal years 2007 to 2015 on biometrics. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has (1) adopted standards and taken actions to facilitate the collection of biometrics that are interoperable with other key federal agencies, and (2) shares biometric information across key federal agencies. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents including those related to standards for collection, storage, and sharing of biometrics; visited selected facilities that analyze and store such information; and interviewed key federal officials.
What GAO Found
DOD has adopted a standard for the collection of biometric information to facilitate sharing of that information with other federal agencies. DOD recognized the importance of interoperability and directed adherence to internationally accepted biometric standards. DOD applied adopted standards in some but not all of its collection devices. Specifically, a collection device used primarily by the Army does not meet DOD adopted standards. As a result, DOD is unable to automatically transmit biometric information collected to federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For example, this device is responsible for 13 percent of the records maintained by DOD--the largest number of submissions collected by a handheld device, according to DOD. Further, this constitutes approximately 630,000 DOD biometric records that cannot be searched automatically against FBI's approximately 94 million. DOD has not taken certain actions that would likely improve its adherence to standards, all of which are based on criteria from the Standard for Program Management, the National Science and Technology Council, and the Office of Management and Budget guidance, respectively. First, DOD does not have an effective process, procedure, or timeline for implementing updated standards. Second, DOD does not routinely test at sufficient levels of detail for conformance to these standards. Third, DOD has not fully defined roles and responsibilities specifying accountability needed to ensure its collection devices meet new and updated standards. DOD is sharing its biometric information and has an agreement to share biometric information with the Department of Justice, which allows for direct connectivity and the automated sharing of biometric information between their biometric systems. DOD's ability to optimize sharing is limited by not having a finalized sharing agreement with DHS, and its capacity to process biometric information. Currently, DOD and DHS do not have a finalized agreement in place to allow direct connectivity between their biometric systems. DOD is working with DHS to develop a memorandum of understanding to share biometric information now scheduled for completion in May 2011; however, without the agreement, it is unclear whether direct connectivity will be established between DOD and DHS, which affects response times to search queries. Further, agencies' biometric systems have varying system capacities based on their mission needs, which affects their ability to similarly process each other's queries for biometric information. As a result, DOD and other agency officials have expressed concern that DOD's biometric system may be unable to meet the search demands from their other biometric systems over the long-term. DOD officials do not believe that they need to match other agencies' biometric system capacities because they do not anticipate receiving the same number of queries given differences in mission. However, the advancements other agencies make in their biometric systems may continue to overwhelm DOD's efforts as it works to identify its long-term biometric system capability needs and associated costs.
What GAO Recommends
To improve DOD's ability to collect and share information, GAO recommends that DOD implement processes for updating and testing biometric collection devices to adopted standards; fully define and clarify the roles and responsibilities for all biometric stakeholders; finalize an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and identify its long-term biometric system capability needs. DOD agreed with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-1112T | gao_GAO-06-1112T_0 | State banking and financial regulators are responsible for overseeing independent lenders and mortgage brokers and generally do so through licensing that mandates certain experience, education, and operations requirements to engage in mortgage activities. AMP Lending Rapidly Grew and Borrower Characteristics Changed as Consumers Sought Mortgage Products That Increased Affordability
From 2003 through 2005, AMP lending grew rapidly, with originations increasing threefold from less than 10 percent of residential mortgages to about 30 percent. Most of the originations during this period consisted of interest-only ARMs and payment-option ARMs, and most of this lending occurred in higher-priced regional markets concentrated on the East and West Coasts. Historically, AMP borrowers consisted of wealthy and financially sophisticated borrowers who used these specialized products as financial management tools. However, today a wider range of borrowers use AMPs as affordability products to purchase homes that might otherwise be unaffordable using conventional fixed-rate mortgages. Borrowers Could Face Payment Shock; Lenders Face Credit Risk but Appear to Be Taking Steps to Manage the Risk
Although AMPs have increased affordability for some borrowers, they could lead to increased payments or “payment shock” for borrowers and corresponding credit risk for lenders. Regulators and consumer advocates have expressed concern that some borrowers might not be able to afford these higher monthly payments. In addition, with a wider range of AMP borrowers now than in the past, those with fewer financial resources or limited equity in their homes might find refinancing their mortgages or selling their homes difficult, particularly if their loans have negatively amortized or their homes have not appreciated in value. Federal and state banking regulatory officials and lenders with whom we spoke said most banks have diversified their assets to manage the credit risk of AMPs held in their portfolios, or have reduced their risk through loan sales or securitization. As such, in our report we agree with federal regulatory officials and industry participants that it was too soon to tell the extent to which AMP risks may result in delinquencies and foreclosures for borrowers and losses for banks that hold AMPs in their portfolios. Borrowers May Not Be Well-informed of AMP Risks and Mortgage Disclosures May Not Effectively Describe These Risks to Consumers
Regulatory officials and consumer advocates expressed concern that some AMP borrowers may not be well-informed about the terms and risks of their complex AMP loans. These disclosures were provided to borrowers between 2004 and 2006 by six federally regulated lenders that collectively made over 25 percent of the interest- only and payment option ARMs produced in 2005.We found that these disclosures addressed current Regulation Z requirements, but some did not provide full and clear explanations of AMP risks such as negative amortization or payment shock. Federal banking regulators issued draft interagency guidance in December 2005 that recommended prudent underwriting, portfolio and risk management, and information disclosure practices related to AMP lending. During the public comment period for the guidance, lenders and others suggested in their letters that the stricter underwriting recommendations were overly prescriptive and might put federally and state-regulated banks at a competitive disadvantage because the guidance would not apply to independent mortgage lenders or brokers. Most States in Our Sample Responded to AMP-Lending Risks within Existing Regulatory Frameworks, While Others Have Taken Additional Actions
State banking and financial regulatory officials from the eight states in our sample expressed concerns about AMP lending in their states; however, most relied on their existing regulatory system of licensing and examining mortgage lenders and brokers to stay abreast of and react to AMP issues. However, the popularity, complexity, and widespread marketing of AMPs highlight the importance of mortgage disclosures to help borrowers make informed mortgage decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Alternative mortgage products (AMPs) can make homes more affordable by allowing borrowers to defer repayment of principal or part of the interest for the first few years of the mortgage. Recent growth in AMP lending has heightened the importance of borrowers' understanding and lenders' management of AMP risks. GAO's report discusses the (1) recent trends in the AMP market, (2) potential AMP risks for borrowers and lenders, (3) extent to which mortgage disclosures discuss AMP risks, and (4) federal and selected state regulatory response to AMP risks. GAO used regulatory and industry data to analyze changes in AMP monthly payments under various scenarios; reviewed available studies; and interviewed relevant federal and state regulators and mortgage industry groups, and consumer groups.
What GAO Found
From 2003 through 2005, AMP originations, comprising mostly interest-only and payment-option adjustable-rate mortgages, grew from less than 10 percent of residential mortgage originations to about 30 percent. They were highly concentrated on the East and West Coasts, especially in California. Federally and state-regulated banks and independent mortgage lenders and brokers market AMPs, which have been used for years as a financial management tool by wealthy and financially sophisticated borrowers. In recent years, however, AMPs have been marketed as an "affordability" product to allow borrowers to purchase homes they otherwise might not be able to afford with a conventional fixed-rate mortgage. Because AMP borrowers can defer repayment of principal, and sometimes part of the interest, for several years, some may eventually face payment increases large enough to be described as "payment shock." Mortgage statistics show that lenders offered AMPs to less creditworthy and less wealthy borrowers than in the past. Some of these recent borrowers may have more difficulty refinancing or selling their homes to avoid higher monthly payments, particularly in an interest-rate environment where interest rates have risen or if the equity in their homes fell because they were making only minimum monthly payments or home values did not increase. As a result, delinquencies and defaults could rise. Federal banking regulators stated that most banks appeared to be managing their credit risk well by diversifying their portfolios or through loan sales or securitizations. However, because the monthly payments for most AMPs originated between 2003 and 2005 have not reset to cover both interest and principal, it is too soon to tell to what extent payment shocks would result in increased delinquencies or foreclosures for borrowers and in losses for banks. Regulators and others are concerned that borrowers may not be well-informed about the risks of AMPs, due to their complexity and because promotional materials by some lenders and brokers do not provide balanced information on AMPs benefits and risks. Although lenders and certain brokers are required to provide borrowers with written disclosures at loan application and closing, federal standards on these disclosures do not currently require specific information on AMPs that could better help borrowers understand key terms and risks. In December 2005, federal banking regulators issued draft interagency guidance on AMP lending that discussed prudent underwriting, portfolio and risk management, and consumer disclosure practices. Some lenders commented that the recommendations were too prescriptive and could limit consumer choices of mortgages. Consumer advocates expressed concerns about the enforceability of these recommendations because they are presented in guidance and not in regulation. State regulators GAO contacted generally relied on existing regulatory structure of licensing and examining independent mortgage lenders and brokers to oversee AMP lending. |
gao_GAO-02-953 | gao_GAO-02-953_0 | For those properties identified by HUD as having above-market rents, Congress created the mark-to-market program in 1997 to reduce rents to market levels and restructure existing mortgage debt to levels supportable by these rents. The goals of the mark-to-market program include preserving the affordability and the availability of low-income rental housing, while reducing the long-term costs of Section 8 project-based assistance. Under the mark-to-market program, properties whose rents are above market levels undergo one of two types of restructuring. Approximately 211 properties have not completed the mortgage restructuring process, even though, as a result of having their rents reduced to market level, OMHAR determined that such a restructuring is necessary for the properties to have acceptable, positive cash flows.OMHAR places properties that it believes should have had a mortgage restructuring on the watch list because it believes such properties are at risk of developing physical and financial problems stemming from insufficient cash flow. Properties Are on the Watch List for One of Three Reasons
OMHAR places properties on the watch list when a property’s rents are reduced to market level but its mortgage is not restructured. OMHAR assigned the majority of these properties to the watch list because the property owners elected not to enter into or complete the mortgage restructuring process, even though OMHAR had determined that the mortgage needed to be restructured. Secondly, OMHAR also places properties on the watch list if it determines that because of economic conditions in the market and/or a property’s financial and/or physical condition, restructuring the property is not financially viable. Financial Assessment Scores Suggest Many Watch-List Properties Are Experiencing Financial Problems
Based on information from FASS, which contains information from property owners’ audited annual financial statements, 131 of the 211 watch-list properties, or 62 percent, show signs of potential financial risk. According to OMHAR, the total cost of the needed improvements to the property is too high for OMHAR to finance under the mark-to-market program. HUD’s project manager stated that the owner will most likely opt out of the Section 8 program at the end of the 24 months and compete in the private rental market. Physical and Financial Condition
The property received a score of 99 on its most recent physical inspection, which took place in August 1999 (2 years before the property was placed on the watch list). HUD considers this score to indicate that the property was in satisfactory physical condition. (4) What are HUD’s procedures for monitoring watch-list properties? | What GAO Found
In 1997, Congress established the mark-to-market program to help preserve the availability and affordability of low-income rental housing while also reducing the cost to the federal government of rental assistance provided to low-income households. The mark-to-market program was developed for multifamily properties that are both insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and aided through the project-based Section 8 program. Under the mark-to-market program, at the time of the assisted properties' section 8 contract renewal, HUD resets rents to prevailing market levels and restructures a property's mortgage debt, if necessary, to permit a positive cash flow. This process is designed to ensure that properties whose rents are reduced to market level still have sufficient income to meet the mortgage payments and operating expenses on the property. The Office of Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring (OMHAR) was established within HUD to administer the mark-to-market program. OMHAR places federally assisted, FHA-insured properties on the watch list when their rents have been reduced to market level under the mark-to-market program but their mortgages have not been restructured. Two-hundred and eleven properties have been placed on the watch list, for one of three reasons: (1) the property owners elected not to enter into or complete the mortgage restructuring process; (2) OMHAR determined that the property was not financially viable for restructuring; or (3) the property owners were disqualified from the mortgage restructuring process because of certain actions by the owner, such as financial or managerial improprieties. Eighty-seven percent of OMHAR's watch list properties received HUD inspections that indicated they were in satisfactory physical condition, but some of these inspections occurred before the properties were placed in the watch list. The timing of HUD's inspection cycle depends on the results of each property's most recent inspection. As a result, a watch list property that received a high score on its previous physical inspection may not be reinspected for up to 3 years from the last inspection. While OMHAR believes that all properties on the watch list are potentially at financial risk, HUD's Financial Assessment Subsystem--which contains information on property owners' audited annual financial statements--indicates that 62 percent of the watch list properties show signs of potential financial risk. HUD established guidance for monitoring the watch list properties 10 months ago, but it is too early to assess how effective the monitoring will be. |
gao_GAO-17-246T | gao_GAO-17-246T_0 | Background
U.S. Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria
The U.S. government has engaged in multiple efforts in Afghanistan since declaring a global war on terrorism in 2001 that targeted al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent extremists. Force management levels and similar caps have been a factor in military operations for a long time— dating at least to the Vietnam War, during which troop ceilings were used to manage the number of deployed U.S. forces. The executive branch used force management levels to shape the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Actions DOD Has Taken to Maximize Military Capabilities While Operating under Force Management Levels in Ongoing Operations
Military officials planning for and executing operations under force management levels have taken various actions to maximize military capabilities deployed to countries under those limits. Among the actions DOD has taken to accomplish these goals in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is that of increasing its reliance on: (1) partner nation security forces; (2) U.S. and Coalition airpower; (3) special operations forces; and (4) contractor and temporary duty personnel. Increased Engagement with Partner Nation Security Forces
One of the tools DOD has used to maximize the number of mission- focused personnel under a force management level to achieve its objectives is to increase engagement with partner nation security forces through a range of security cooperation efforts. As a result, this can create complications for U.S. planners in terms of allocating capabilities and resources within the force management levels. In addition, in 2011 we reported on challenges DOD has faced when supplying advise and assist teams, such as in providing the necessary field grade officers and specialized capabilities. We also found that splitting up brigade combat teams to source these advisor teams had an effect on the readiness and training of those brigades. We made three recommendations to the department to ensure that the activities of individual advisor teams are more clearly linked to command goals and to enhance the ability of advisor teams to prepare for and execute their mission. DOD concurred with our recommendations and has implemented two of them. U.S. and Coalition Airpower
With a limited U.S. footprint under the current force management levels in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, DOD has relied on U.S. and coalition airpower to provide support to partner ground forces in lieu of U.S. ground combat capabilities. Additionally, since U.S. operations related to ISIS began in August 2014, coalition members have flown nearly 44,000 sorties and dropped more than 57,000 munitions. While effective, according to senior DOD officials, this reliance on air power is not without its costs or challenges. For example, according to the Secretary of Defense in February 2016, the accelerating intensity of the U.S. air campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria has been depleting U.S. stocks of GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided munitions. Similarly, airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems have proved critical to commanders to support military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Increased Pace of U.S. Special Operations Deployments
In a force management level-constrained environment, DOD has increased the use of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), who are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive environments. The Commander’s statements are consistent with our prior work, which has found that a high pace of deployments for SOF can affect readiness, retention, and morale. DOD concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations and has implemented them. Increased Use of Contractors and Personnel on Temporary Duty
In a force management level-constrained environment, DOD relies on contractors to support a wide range of military operations and free up uniformed personnel to directly support mission needs. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, contractors played a critical role in supporting U.S. troops with the number of contractor personnel sometimes exceeding the number of deployed military personnel. We made four recommendations to improve oversight of operational contract support. DOD concurred with our recommendations and implemented three of them. We made one recommendation that DOD develop guidance related to costs of overseas operations. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and it remains open. Special Operations Forces
Special Operations Forces: Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency of Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has engaged in multiple efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria since declaring a global war on terrorism in 2001. Currently, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, U.S. forces are deployed under force management levels set by the administration. Force management levels and similar caps limit the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to a given region and have been a factor in military operations at least since the Vietnam War. Force management levels were also used to shape the drawdowns of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In June 2016, the President announced that the force management level for Afghanistan is 9,800. According to DOD, in September 2016 the United States authorized additional troops for Iraq and Syria, for a total of 5,262.
Today's testimony discusses some of the actions DOD has taken to maximize military capabilities while operating under force management levels in ongoing operations.
In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work related to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria since 2001.
What GAO Found
Military officials planning for and executing operations under force management levels have taken various actions to maximize military capabilities deployed to countries under those limits, as discussed below:
Increased Engagement with Partner Nation Security Forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its engagement with partner nations through advise-and-assist missions that rely on partner nation security forces to conduct operations. While this action helps leverage U.S. resources, it can create complications for U.S. planners in terms of allocating capabilities and resources. In 2011, GAO reported that the Army and Marine Corps have faced challenges in providing the necessary field grade officers and specialized capabilities for advisor teams, as well as challenges regarding the effect on the readiness and training of brigades whose combat teams have been split up to source advisor teams. GAO made three recommendations related to advisor teams. DOD concurred and implemented two recommendations relating to improving the ability of advisor teams to prepare for and execute their mission.
Reliance on Airpower. DOD has relied on U.S. and coalition airpower to provide support to partner nation ground forces in lieu of U.S. ground combat capabilities. For example, since U.S. operations related to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began in August 2014, coalition members have dropped more than 57,000 munitions. Air-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems have also proved critical to commanders by providing them timely and accurate information. While effective, this reliance on air power is not without its costs or challenges. For example, the Secretary of Defense stated in February 2016 that the intensity of the U.S. air campaign against ISIS has been depleting U.S. stocks of certain weapons.
Increased Pace of U.S. Special Operations Deployments. DOD has increased its use of U.S. Special Operations Forces to increase its operational reach and maximize its capabilities under force management levels. However, the increased use of U.S. Special Operations Forces in operations has resulted in a high pace of deployments which can affect readiness, retention, and morale. GAO made 10 recommendations to DOD related to U.S. Special Operations Forces. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has implemented 7 recommendations relating to security force assistance activities and readiness of U.S. Special Operations Forces.
Increased Use of Contractors and Personnel on Temporary Duty. DOD relies on contractors to support a wide range of military operations and free up uniformed personnel to directly support mission needs. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq contractor personnel played a critical role in supporting U.S. troops and sometimes exceeded the number of deployed military personnel. However, the increased use of contractors and temporary personnel to provide support during operations has its challenges, including oversight of contractors in deployed environments. GAO made four recommendations to improve oversight of operational contract support. DOD concurred with all four, and has implemented three of them. GAO also made a recommendation that DOD develop guidance relating to costs of overseas operations, with which DOD partially concurred and which remains open.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made 18 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. DOD has implemented 12 of them. Continued attention is needed to ensure that some recommendations are addressed, such as improving visibility in total Special Operations funding to determine whether opportunities exist to balance deployments across the joint force. |
gao_AIMD-97-146 | gao_AIMD-97-146_0 | Background and Methodology
In this report, we use the term “mission fragmentation” to refer to those circumstances in which more than one federal agency (or more than one bureau within an agency) is involved in the same broad area of national need. Mission Fragmentation Is Widespread
Whether approached from a governmentwide perspective or on the basis of individual programs, our work has documented mission fragmentation and program overlap. With its emphasis on defining agency missions, goals and objectives, and strategies to achieve those goals and objectives—and its requirement for involvement of the Congress and other agency and external stakeholders—the Results Act provides a statute-based environment to begin such an assessment. Results Act Holds Potential to Address Mission Fragmentation
The Results Act will present the Congress and the administration with a new opportunity to address mission fragmentation and program overlap. As we noted in our recent assessment of the status of Results Act implementation, the act’s emphasis on results implies that federal programs contributing to the same or similar outcomes should be closely coordinated, consolidated, or streamlined, as appropriate, to ensure that goals are consistent and that program efforts are mutually reinforcing.To implement the act, agencies will need to undertake three key steps: define mission and desired outcomes, measure performance, and use performance information. For example, as missions and desired outcomes are determined, instances of fragmentation and overlap can be identified and appropriate responses can be defined; as performance measures are developed, the extent to which agency goals are complementary and the need for common performance measures to allow for cross-agency evaluations can be considered; and as continued budget pressures prompt decisionmakers to weigh trade-offs inherent in resource allocation and restructuring decisions, the Results Act can provide the framework to integrate and compare performance of related programs to better inform choices among competing budgetary claims. However, the persistent theme from this body of work is that although results-based performance information would help federal managers improve their programs, little information is collected. Moreover, this consultation will also reinforce earlier strategic planning consultations intended to clarify and harmonize missions. Building a Sustained Focus on Fragmentation and Overlap
Past efforts to deal with crosscutting federal activities suggest that even within the statutory framework of the Results Act, success will take time and will require sustained attention in both the executive branch and the Congress. These developments serve to emphasize a fundamental issue: the need for specific institutions and processes to sustain and nurture a focus on mission fragmentation and program overlap. 6, 1997)
The Department of Labor has taken some action to address fragmentation issues described by GAO, but these actions have not been enough to solve the problems. Insufficient information exists on the accomplishments of the federal programs. 1, 1988)
GAO provided an overview of the drug problem and the federal response. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO described the challenge of multiple and overlapping federal programs within the framework of the Government Performance and Results Act, focusing on specific ways in which the Results Act can focus attention on these management challenges and help to develop strategies to harmonize federal responses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's work has documented the widespread existence of fragmentation and overlap from both the broad perspective of federal missions and from the more specific viewpoint of individual federal programs; (2) GAO's work has shown that as the federal government has responded over time to new needs and problems, many federal agencies have been given responsibilities for addressing the same or similar national issues; but GAO's work also suggests that some issues will necessarily involve more than one federal agency or more than one approach; (3) taken as a whole, this body of work indicates that fragmentation and overlap will present a particular and persistent challenge to the successful implementation of the Results Act; (4) but at the same time, the Results Act should offer a new and structured framework to address crosscutting issues; (5) each of its key stages--defining missions and desired outcomes, measuring performance, and using performance information--offers a new opportunity to address fragmentation and overlap; (6) for example, the Results Act is intended to foster a dialogue on strategic goals involving the Congress as well as agency and external stakeholders; (7) this dialogue should help to identify agencies and programs addressing similar missions and associated performance implications; (8) the act's emphasis on results-based performance measures should lead to more explicit discussions of contributions and accomplishments within crosscutting programs and encourage related programs to develop common performance measures; (9) if the Results Act is successfully implemented, performance information should become available to clarify the consequences of fragmentation and the implications of alternative policy and service delivery options, which, in turn, can affect future decisions concerning department and agency missions and the allocation of resources among those missions; (10) emphasizing missions, goals, and objectives, as envisioned by the Results Act, should facilitate a broader recognition of the nature and extent of fragmentation and overlap; and (11) however, past efforts to deal with crosscutting federal activities and recent developments in both the executive branch and the Congress underscore the need for specific institutions and processes to sustain and nurture a focus on these issues. |
gao_GAO-02-798 | gao_GAO-02-798_0 | The recommendations included three key areas: selecting alternatives to traditional contracting arrangements used for management and operation of its sites, increasing competition to improve performance, and developing and using performance-based contracting tools. DOE Has Made Progress in Implementing Contract Reforms, but Challenges Remain
Since 1996, the department has made progress in implementing three key contract reform initiatives—developing alternative contracting approaches, increasing competition, and converting to performance-based contracts, although DOE continues to address challenges in implementing these initiatives. Over the 8 years since the contract reform initiative was introduced, DOE has primarily gauged its progress by monitoring implementation of the reforms and reviewing individual contracts rather than by developing objective measures to determine whether the reforms have resulted in improved contractor performance. DOE has had problems with cost and schedule performance on its contract for the Mound site in Ohio. DOE faces a fundamental challenge to ensuring the effectiveness of its contract reform initiative—developing an approach to managing the initiative that is more consistent with the best practices of high-performing organizations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of DOE’s contract reform initiative, as well as other management improvement initiatives, we recommend that the department develop an approach to implementing its initiatives that incorporates best practices including the key elements of (1) clearly defined goals, (2) an implementation strategy that sets milestones and establishes responsibility, (3) results-oriented outcome measures, and (4) a mechanism that uses results-oriented data to evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s initiatives and to take corrective actions as needed. | What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE), the largest civilian contracting agency in the federal government, relies primarily on contractors to operate its sites and carry out its diverse missions, such as maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile, cleaning up radioactive and hazardous wastes, and performing research. Although federal law generally requires federal agencies to use competition in selecting a contractor, until the mid-1990s, DOE contracts for the management and operation of its sites generally fit within an exception that allowed for the use of noncompetitive procedures. Since 1996, DOE has made progress toward implementing contract reform initiative in three key areas--developing alternative contracting approaches, increasing competition, and using performance-based contracts. However, DOE continues to encounter challenges in implementing these initiatives. Although DOE has made strides in implementing contract reform initiatives, it is difficult to determine whether contractors' performance has improved because objective performance information is scarce. Over the past 8 years, DOE has primarily gauged progress by measuring its implementation of the reforms, such as the number of contracts competed each year, and by reviewing individual contract performance incentives. DOE faces a fundamental challenge to ensuring the effectiveness of its contract reform initiatives--developing an approach to managing its initiatives and sustaining improvements that would incorporate the best management practices of high-performing organizations. These practices include four key elements: (1) clearly defined goals; (2) an implementation strategy that sets milestones and establishes responsibility; (3) results-oriented outcome measures, established early in the process; and (4) systematic use of results-oriented data to evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative and make additional changes where warranted. |
gao_GAO-05-85 | gao_GAO-05-85_0 | SGR System Designed to Adjust Fee Updates to Bring Actual Spending for Physician Services in Line with Spending Targets
The SGR system is designed to impose fiscal discipline and to moderate spending for physician services by adjusting annual fee updates to bring spending in line with targets. Various Concerns Raised about SGR System and Its Components
Physician groups are dissatisfied with SGR as a system to update physician fees and have raised various concerns about its key components. The groups’ concerns with specific SGR system components center on the following issues: the fairness of including Medicare-covered outpatient drugs in the calculation of physician service expenditures; the appropriateness of tying allowable volume and intensity increases to the average growth in real GDP per capita; and the completeness, accuracy, and transparency of the method used to account for spending increases due to changes in laws and regulations. Variable Growth in Provision of Physician Services and Certain SGR System Design Elements Reduce Stability and Predictability of Physician Fee Updates
Fee updates under the SGR system have varied widely within an allowed range, principally because of annual fluctuations in the growth of the volume and intensity of services that physicians provide to beneficiaries. Two of the SGR system’s design characteristics—the cumulative nature of spending targets and the use of estimated data elements in the spending target—also serve to reduce the stability and predictability of updates. 2.) Uncertainty in Estimates of Underlying SGR System Data Elements Decreases Stability and Predictability of Physician Fee Updates
The stability of fee updates under the SGR system depends, in part, on CMS’s ability to accurately estimate current spending and annual changes in the four factors that determine the sustainable growth rate: input prices, FFS enrollment, the 10-year moving average of real GDP per capita, and expenditures due to changes in laws and regulations. Alternatives for Updating Physician Fees Would Eliminate Spending Targets or Revise Current SGR System
The projected sustained period of declining physician fees and the potential for beneficiaries’ access to physician services to be disrupted have heightened interest in alternatives for the current SGR system. In general, potential alternatives we identified cluster around two approaches. The other approach would retain spending targets but modify the current SGR system to address perceived shortcomings. These modifications could include one or more of the following options: removing the Part B prescription drug expenditures that are currently counted in the SGR system; resetting the targets and not requiring the system to recoup previous excess spending; using annual, rather than cumulative, targets; raising the allowance for increased spending due to volume and intensity growth; and permitting some flexibility in setting the volume and intensity allowance. If policymakers believe that the resulting negative fee updates are inappropriately low, one solution is to use actual spending from a recent year as a basis for setting future SGR system targets. The extent to which spending growth would be moderated would depend upon the efficacy of separate efforts to address growth in volume and intensity. Therefore, the choice between the two approaches under consideration may hinge on whether primary importance should be given to stable fee increases or to the need for fiscal discipline within the Medicare program. In discussing the draft report with these groups, their overall reaction was that the report was a good analysis of the problems with the SGR system; however, they raised a number of concerns about the draft report. The bulk of their comments focused on OACT’s estimates of aggregate spending on physician services, the SGR system’s use of MEI as a measure of input price inflation for physician services, and the draft’s discussion of physicians’ concerns about the SGR system. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) averted additional fee reductions projected for 2004 and 2005 by specifying an update to physician fees of no less than 1.5 percent for those 2 years. The fee increases will result in additional aggregate spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns were raised about the current system Medicare uses to determine annual changes to physician fees--the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system--when fees were reduced by 5.4 percent in 2002. Subsequent administrative and legislative actions modified or overrode the SGR system, resulting in fee increases for 2003, 2004, and 2005. However, projected fee reductions for 2006-2012 have raised new concerns about the SGR system. Policymakers are considering whether to eliminate spending targets or modify them. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required that GAO study SGR and potential alternatives to the system. This report examines (1) how the SGR system is designed to control spending for physician services, (2) what concerns have been raised about the SGR system and its components, (3) what affects the stability and predictability of physician fee updates under the SGR system, and (4) what alternatives to the current SGR system exist. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and interviewed officials and organizations representing physicians. On the basis of this information, GAO identified potential alternatives to the SGR system and requested illustrative simulations of fee updates and spending on physician services from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
What GAO Found
To moderate Medicare spending for physician services, the SGR system sets spending targets and adjusts physician fees based on the extent to which actual spending aligns with specified targets. If growth in the number of services provided to each beneficiary--referred to as volume--and in the average complexity and costliness of services--referred to as intensity--is high enough to cause spending to exceed the SGR target, fee updates are set lower than inflation in the cost of operating a medical practice. A wide enough gap between spending and the target results in fee reductions. Physician groups are dissatisfied with SGR as a system to update physician fees. For example, they question the fairness of including rapidly growing spending for physician-administered drugs in the SGR system's definition of physician services expenditures. The groups also contend that the allowance for growth in volume and intensity is too low and lacks the flexibility to allow for factors outside physicians' control. Fee updates under the SGR system have varied widely within an allowed range largely because of annual fluctuations in the growth of the volume and intensity of services that physicians provide to beneficiaries. Certain system design features, such as the use of cumulative spending targets and the need to estimate data, also reduce the stability and predictability of updates. However, MMA's revision of the allowance for growth in volume and intensity of services from an annual change to a 10-year moving average will help to make future updates more stable and predictable. Possible alternatives to the SGR system cluster around the two broad approaches under consideration: (1) end the use of spending targets and separate fee updates from explicit efforts to moderate spending growth or (2) retain spending targets but modify the current SGR system to address perceived shortcomings. CMS projects that either of the two approaches will result in higher aggregate spending, thereby increasing the difficulty of addressing Medicare's long-run financial challenges. The first approach emphasizes stable fee updates, while the second approach automatically adjusts fee updates if spending growth deviates from a predetermined target. While seeking to pay physicians appropriately, it is important to consider how modifications or alterations to the SGR system would affect the long-term sustainability and affordability of the Medicare program. In this context, the choice between the two approaches may hinge on whether primary consideration should be given to stable fee increases or to the need for fiscal discipline within the Medicare program. CMS agreed with the concluding observations in the draft report. Groups representing physicians commented that overall, the draft report offered a good analysis of problems with the SGR system, but did not fully reflect their concerns. We modified the draft as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-567 | gao_GAO-01-567_0 | During 1994 and 1995, the program also offered financial incentives to military personnel and school districts to participate in the program. Program Placed Military Personnel in Teaching, but Numbers May Be Understated
According to TTT records, 3,821 of the 13,756 people accepted into the program were hired as teachers from fiscal years 1994 through 2000. Of those participants hired as teachers, over 90 percent remained in teaching past the first year. Of these participants, 3,821, or 28 percent, became teachers. More than 85 percent of the TTT teachers were hired in states with TTT offices. When the stipends and incentive grants ended after 1995, it became difficult to track the number of people using the program’s resources because they were less inclined to complete application forms and respond to surveys that tracked program retention. TTT Teachers Taught in Areas Where Teacher Shortages Existed
According to TTT program records and NCEI survey data, a higher percentage of TTT teachers overall taught math, science, special education, and vocational education and taught in inner city schools and high schools than all teachers nationwide. Several Factors Could Have Affected Program Participation
Several factors may have affected—both positively and negatively—the number of military personnel applying to the TTT program and the number hired as teachers. Stipends. Incentive grants. Reduction in supply of applicants. We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Roderick R. Paige, Secretary of the Department of Education, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to a shortage of math and science teachers and reductions in U.S. military personnel, Congress created the Troops to Teachers (TTT) program in 1992. Until 1995, the program, which was run by the Defense Department, offered stipends to program participants and incentive grants to school districts to hire TTT teachers. Congress transferred the program from DOD to the Department of Education in 1999. This report reviews the program from its beginning in January 1994 until its transfer to Education.
What GAO Found
GAO found that 13,756 former military personnel applied to the program and were accepted. Of these, 3,821 were hired as teachers from 1994 through 2000; more than 90 percent of those applicants hired as teachers remained in teaching after the first year. However, these participation figures most likely represent the minimum number of former military personnel who used the program's services and became teachers because the figures include only those persons who formally applied to the TTT program and who completed follow-up surveys. Compared with all teachers nationwide, a higher percentage of TTT teachers overall taught math, science, special education, and vocational education and taught in inner city schools and high schools. Factors such as stipends, incentive grants, economic conditions, and state initiatives may have influenced the number of people who applied to the program and became teachers. |
gao_GAO-02-657 | gao_GAO-02-657_0 | USDA’s food assistance programs serve one in six Americans each year. Slightly over half of the recipients are children, and about 20 percent are elderly or disabled. Americans’ Consumption of Fruits and Vegetables Has Increased Somewhat Under Federal Policy, Guidance, and Education Programs for the General Public
Under current federal policy, guidance, and nutrition education programs, the consumption of fruits and vegetables by the general public as a whole has increased somewhat, yet most Americans consume fruits and vegetables below recommended levels. Moreover, the April 2002 announcement by HHS and USDA to expand 5 A Day may further encourage Americans to consume the recommended 5 to 9 daily servings. Increasing fruit and vegetable consumption is not a primary focus, yet it is part of USDA’s nutrition education efforts under these programs. Some of these efforts—such as expanding nutrition education—would require additional federal resources, while others—such as emphasizing an evaluation of nutrition education efforts, expanding DOD Fresh, promoting salad bars in schools, and expanding farmers’ markets for WIC and the elderly—may only require redirecting existing federal resources. To ensure that federal nutrition education/intervention and food assistance programs promote federal goals and guidelines on the consumption of fruits and vegetables, we further recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture include in the department’s strategic and performance plans, strategies and targets supporting the Healthy People 2010 objectives for fruit and vegetable consumption, the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the National Institutes of Health, CDC, and other relevant agencies to include in their performance plans, strategies and targets for supporting the Healthy People 2010 objectives for fruit and vegetable consumption, and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services consider the actions that experts and others have identified to increase the consumption of fruits and vegetables and, for those deemed most promising, assess the merits, feasibility, and costs to determine whether the actions should be implemented. | What GAO Found
Fruits and vegetables are a critical source of nutrients and other substances that help protect against chronic diseases. Yet fewer than one in four Americans consumes the 5 to 9 daily servings of fruits and vegetables recommended by the federal Dietary Guidelines for Americans. Fruit and vegetable consumption by the general public as a whole has increased by about half a serving under key federal nutritional policy, guidance, and educational programs, as shown by the national consumption data compiled by federal agencies. But key federal food assistance programs have had mixed effects on fruit and vegetables consumption, as shown by national consumption data. However, increasing fruit and vegetable consumption is not a primary focus of these programs, which are intended to reduce hunger and support agriculture. A number of actions the federal government could take to encourage more Americans to consume the recommended daily servings have been identified. These include expanding nutrition education efforts, such as the 5 A Day Program; modifying the special supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children to allow participants to choose from more of those fruits and vegetables; expanding the use of the Department of Defense Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Project in schools; and expanding farmers' market programs for food assistance participants. These options could require additional resources or redirecting resources from other programs. |
gao_GAO-12-355 | gao_GAO-12-355_0 | Background
Health systems may use a variety of financial incentive programs to encourage improvements in the quality and efficiency of health care delivery. explicit goals of quality improvement rather than efficiency improvement, these programs can improve quality and efficiency by rewarding physicians for adhering to clinical protocols. Studies have found that these self-referrals encouraged overutilization and increased health costs. OIG is responsible for enforcing the Stark law’s civil monetary penalties. Certain Financial Incentive Programs Are Permitted under Federal Fraud and Abuse Laws, Regulations, and Guidance, but Stakeholders Reported Challenges in Designing and Implementing Programs within This Framework
Certain financial incentive programs are permitted within the framework of federal fraud and abuse laws through various Stark law and anti-kickback statute exceptions and safe harbors, respectively or because they do not implicate one or more of the laws in the first instance. OIG has interpreted the CMP law to prohibit hospitals from rewarding the reduction or limitation of services, but permits certain financial incentive programs through its advisory opinion process. However, stakeholders we spoke with reported that the laws, regulations, and agency guidance have created challenges for financial incentive program design and implementation, and some health systems have terminated or refrained from implementing these programs. exception. Stakeholders Reported That OIG Interpretation of CMP Law Diminished Ability to Reward Any Service Reduction or Limitation, Including Services Not Medically Necessary
In addition to the Stark law and anti-kickback statute, hospitals must comply with the CMP law, which OIG interpreted in a 1999 Special Advisory Bulletin (SAB) as prohibiting payments from hospitals to physicians to induce a reduction or limitation in Medicare services for hospital patients, even if the services are not medically necessary.violation of the CMP law may result if the hospital knows that the payment may influence the physician to reduce or limit services, even if the payment is not tied to a specific patient or to an actual diminution in care. On this basis, OIG has indicated that it would not subject specific arrangements approved in advisory opinions to sanctions. HHS Has Approved Otherwise Prohibited Financial Incentive Programs That Incorporate Safeguards, under Demonstration Project and Other Authorities
HHS has permitted implementation of certain financial incentive programs that otherwise might not be permitted under federal fraud and abuse laws, but it has required safeguards to protect program and patient integrity. CMS has conducted these programs through authorized demonstration projects, the Medicare Shared Savings Program, and the Innovation Center. CMS has conducted demonstration projects to test financial incentive programs that include safeguards to protect program and patient integrity. According to CMS and OIG, the waiver for the distribution of shared savings within the ACO is premised, in part, on recognition that an award of shared savings necessarily reflects the collective achievement by the ACO and its constituent parts of the quality, efficiency, and cost reduction goals of the Medicare Shared Savings Program. The federal fraud and abuse laws discussed in this report apply variously to financial relationships among hospitals, physicians, and health plans, among other entities. There are no exceptions and safe harbors specifically for financial incentive programs, and the Stark law’s “no risk” requirement for new exceptions, makes it difficult for CMS to craft an exception that allows for innovative, effective programs while ensuring that the Medicare program and patients face no risk from abuses. As such, the constraints of existing exceptions and safe harbors make it difficult to design and implement a comprehensive program for all participating physicians and patient populations. Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which is a permanent program, CMS and OIG will waive fraud and abuse laws for financial incentive programs under certain circumstances, but there may be limits on health systems’ ability to participate. Our work suggests that stakeholders’ concerns may hinder implementation of financial incentive programs to improve quality and efficiency on a broad scale. Different stakeholders—government agencies and health care providers—will likely continue to have differing perspectives about the optimal balance between innovative approaches to improve quality and lower costs and retaining appropriate patient and program safeguards. In its written comments, HHS sought to clarify the Department’s position on CMS’s use of its authorities to permit certain financial incentive programs—using regulatory exceptions and waivers—that the Department did not believe we had clearly described in the draft. We modified the draft to reflect the agency’s position on this issue. Medicare: Private Sector Initiatives to Bundle Hospital and Physician Payments for an Episode of Care. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has long expressed concern that increases in Medicare spending are unsustainable and do not necessarily enhance health care quality. Traditional Medicare provider payment systems reward the volume of services instead of the quality or efficiency of care by paying physicians for each service provided. Some health systems, which can be hospitals, physicians, health plans, or a combination, use financial incentive programs to reward physicians for improving quality and efficiency with the goal of better outcomes for patients and savings for hospitals and payers. Federal laws that protect patients and the integrity of federal programs, including Medicare, limit health systems ability to implement financial incentive programs. These fraud and abuse laws include the physician self-referral law, or Stark law; the anti-kickback statute; and the Civil Monetary Penalties (CMP) law. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Justice oversee and enforce these laws.
GAO examined how federal fraud and abuse laws affect the implementation of financial incentive programs, stakeholders perspectives on their ability to implement these programs, and alternative approaches through which HHS has approved implementation of these programs. GAO analyzed relevant laws and agency guidance and documentation; and interviewed agency officials, legal experts, and provider stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Certain financial incentive programs are permitted within the framework of federal fraud and abuse laws, but stakeholders GAO spoke with reported that the laws, regulations, and agency guidance have created challenges for program design and implementation. The Stark law and anti-kickback statute, which restrict financial relationships among providers, have statutory and regulatory exceptions and safe harbors, respectively, that permit financial incentive programs that meet specific criteria. However, there are no exceptions or safe harbors specifically for financial incentive programs intended to improve quality and efficiency, and legal experts reported that the constraints of existing exceptions and safe harbors make it difficult to design and implement a comprehensive program for all participating physicians and patient populations. The CMP law prohibits hospitals from paying physicians to reduce or limit services, and OIG has interpreted the law to apply to the reduction or limitation of any services, whether or not those services are medically necessary. The CMP law does not include statutory exceptions to this prohibition, and OIG does not have the authority to create exceptions through regulation. Through its advisory opinion process, OIG, however, has indicated that it would not impose sanctions for specific financial incentive programs that otherwise violated the CMP law but presented a low risk of fraud and abuse. Legal experts stated that innovative arrangements are difficult to structure and that the advisory opinion process is burdensome.
Through alternative approaches, HHS has approved implementation of otherwise prohibited financial incentive programs that incorporate safeguards, under its statutory authority to conduct demonstrations and other initiatives. Specifically, CMS has conducted demonstration projects to test financial incentive programs that reward quality and efficiency. These demonstration projects included safeguards, such as linking payments to quality measures, to protect program and patient integrity. CMS has incorporated safeguards into the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which allows eligible providers to participate as accountable care organizations to share savings with the Medicare program. As specifically authorized for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, CMS and OIG will waive fraud and abuse laws for, among other things, the distribution of shared savings in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, subject to certain requirements. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within CMS is also implementing programs to test financial incentives.
GAOs work suggests that stakeholders concerns may hinder implementation of financial incentive programs to improve quality and efficiency on a broad scale. Stakeholdersgovernment agencies and health care providerslikely will continue to have different perspectives about the optimal balance between innovative approaches to improve quality and lower costs and retaining appropriate patient safeguards. HHS reviewed a draft of this report and in its written comments, clarified its position on CMSs authorities to create exceptions and issue waivers to permit certain financial incentive programs, noting that its authority to issue waivers is broader than its authority to create Stark exceptions. We modified the draft to reflect the Departments position. |
gao_GAO-09-370T | gao_GAO-09-370T_0 | Background
FDA’s responsibilities related to medical devices include premarket and postmarket oversight—spanning, for example, both premarket review of devices and postmarket surveillance (the collection and analysis of data on marketed devices). Inspections of Device Manufacturing Establishments
Finally, as part of both premarket and postmarket oversight of medical devices, FDA is responsible for inspecting certain foreign and domestic establishments to ensure they meet required manufacturing standards. FDA Has Not Ensured That All Class III Devices Are Approved through the Most Stringent Premarket Review Process
Although Congress envisioned that all class III devices would eventually be approved through the more stringent PMA process, we found that this was not always the case. In January 2009, we reported that in fiscal years 2003 through 2007, FDA reviewed all submissions for class I and II devices through the 510(k) process, and reviewed submissions for some types of class III devices through the 510(k) process and others through the PMA process. Given that more than 3 decades have passed since Congress envisioned that all class III devices would eventually be required to undergo premarket review through the more stringent PMA process, we believe it is imperative that FDA take immediate steps to address the remaining class III device types that may still enter the market through the less stringent 510(k) process by requiring PMAs for or reclassifying them. However, FDA did not specify a time frame for how quickly it will review the submitted information, determine whether to reclassify the device types, and require PMAs for those that remain in class III. FDA Faces Challenges in Postmarket Surveillance
In our recent high-risk report, we noted that FDA’s monitoring of postmarket safety of approved products, including medical devices, has been questioned by numerous groups. In 2008, we reported that the number of adverse event reports associated with all devices increased substantially from about 77,000 reports in 2000 to about 320,000 reports in 2006. We and FDA have identified shortcomings in FDA’s postmarket surveillances. In 2006, FDA reported that the agency’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health’s ability to understand the risks of adverse events related to the use of medical devices—whether used in the in the home of a patient, in a hospital, in a laboratory, or in the office of a private practitioner—is limited both by a lack of informative, validated adverse event reports and by a lack of quality epidemiologic information. The volume of submitted reports exceeded the center’s ability to consistently enter or review the data in a routine manner. In 2008, FDA officials told us that while they have a number of strategies to prioritize their reviews, they still cannot review all the reports they receive. In January 2008, we testified that FDA has not met a statutory requirement to inspect certain domestic manufacturing establishments every 2 years. FDA officials estimated that the agency has inspected these establishments every 3 years (for establishments manufacturing class III devices) or every 5 years (for establishments manufacturing class II devices). There is no comparable requirement to inspect foreign establishments, and agency officials estimate that these establishments have been inspected every 6 years (for class III devices) or 27 years (for class II devices). FDA has taken some steps to address shortcomings related to inspections of foreign establishments, including changes to its registration database to improve the accuracy of the count of establishments and initiatives to address unique challenges related to inspections of foreign manufacturers, but we have not evaluated whether these changes will improve FDA’s inspection program. Taken together, these shortcomings in both premarket and postmarket activities raise serious concerns about FDA’s regulation of medical devices. Medical Devices: FDA Should Take Steps to Ensure That High-Risk Device Types Are Approved through the Most Stringent Premarket Review Process. GAO-09-190. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans depend on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to provide assurance that medical devices sold in the United States are safe and effective. FDA classifies medical device types into three classes, with class I including those with the lowest risk to patients (such as forceps) and class III including those with the greatest risk (such as pacemakers). FDA's responsibilities include premarket and postmarket oversight--spanning, for example, both premarket review of devices and postmarket surveillance (the collection and analysis of data on marketed devices). These responsibilities apply to all devices marketed in the United States, regardless of whether they are manufactured domestically or overseas. In 2009, GAO added FDA's oversight of medical products, including devices, to its list of high-risk areas warranting attention by Congress and the executive branch. GAO was asked to testify on recent work related to FDA's responsibilities for medical devices, including premarket review, postmarket surveillance, and inspection of manufacturing establishments. This statement is based on a recent GAO report, Medical Devices: FDA Should Take Steps to Ensure That High-Risk Device Types Are Approved through the Most Stringent Premarket Review Process ( GAO-09-190 , January 15, 2009) and on other GAO reports and testimonies related to FDA oversight.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FDA does not review all class III devices through its most stringent premarket review process. Unless exempt by regulation, new devices must clear FDA premarket review through either the 510(k) premarket notification process, which is used to determine if a new device is substantially equivalent to another legally marketed device, or through the more stringent premarket approval (PMA) process, which requires the manufacturer to supply evidence providing reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. In 1976, Congress envisioned that FDA would eventually approve all class III devices through the more stringent PMA process, but this process remains incomplete. GAO found that in fiscal years 2003 through 2007, FDA cleared 228 submissions representing 24 types of class III devices through the 510(k) process. GAO recommended in its January 2009 report that FDA expeditiously take steps to issue regulations requiring PMAs for or reclassifying class III device types currently allowed to enter the market via the 510(k) process. In response, in April 2009, FDA required manufacturers to submit information on the safety and effectiveness of these types of devices. However, FDA did not specify a time frame for how quickly it will reclassify them or require PMAs for those device types that remain in class III. FDA also faces challenges in postmarket surveillance of medical devices. In 2008, GAO reported that the number of adverse event reports associated with medical devices increased substantially from 2000 to 2006. Both GAO and FDA, however, have identified shortcomings in FDA's postmarket oversight. For example, in 2006 FDA reported that the agency's ability to understand the risks related to the use of medical devices is limited by the fact that the volume of submitted reports exceeded FDA's ability to consistently enter or review the reports in a routine manner. In 2008, FDA officials told us that while they have a number of strategies to prioritize their reviews of adverse event reports, they still cannot review all the reports they receive. Finally, GAO has found that FDA has not conducted required inspections of manufacturing establishments, another key FDA responsibility for medical devices marketed in the United States. In 2008, GAO reported that FDA has not met a statutory requirement to inspect certain domestic manufacturing establishments every 2 years. Instead, FDA officials estimated that the agency has inspected domestic establishments every 3 years (for class III devices) or 5 years (for class II devices). There is no comparable requirement to inspect foreign establishments, and FDA officials estimate that they have been inspected every 6 years (for class III devices) or 27 years (for class II devices). GAO reported that FDA has taken some steps to address shortcomings related to inspections of foreign establishments, but GAO has not evaluated whether these changes will improve FDA's inspection program. Taken together, these shortcomings in both premarket and postmarket activities raise serious concerns about FDA's regulation of medical devices. |
gao_NSIAD-99-54 | gao_NSIAD-99-54_0 | Navy Policies and Procedures for Allocating Ship Maintenance Work in the Norfolk Area
The Navy’s allocation of ship maintenance workload in the Norfolk, Virginia, area is guided by legislative requirements and established Navy policy objectives, such as (1) retaining a certain level of public sector capability, (2) allowing sailors to remain at their home ports when shorter repairs are being done, and (3) achieving economic and efficient public depot maintenance operations. Obligations for Ship Maintenance and Repair Work in the Norfolk Area
In terms of reported obligations for ship maintenance work in the Norfolk area during fiscal years 1994 through 1998, the largest amount of ship maintenance funding went to the private shipyards and repair companies.Among the private sector activities, Newport News received the largest portion of the obligated funds. Movement of Funds Had Relatively Little Effect on the Atlantic Fleet’s Ship Depot Maintenance Program
During fiscal years 1994 through 1998, the Navy transferred or reprogrammed appropriated funds into and out of its ship depot maintenance program. While Newport News received the largest portion of that private funding, obligations to other smaller shipyards and repair companies have fluctuated from year to year. The greatest change occurred in fiscal year 1998, when these smaller companies received less than in other years and less than the Navy initially scheduled. This was largely because the conventional workload that traditionally goes to these companies is declining, scheduled maintenance and operational requirements changed during fiscal year 1998, and four conventional maintenance projects originally scheduled to go to the private sector were reassigned to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard to stabilize and achieve more efficient operations at the public shipyard. Lastly, while the Navy did reprogram ship depot maintenance funds to meet other priorities, the Atlantic Fleet’s ship depot maintenance program was not adversely affected because it received a slight increase over the amount budgeted during fiscal years 1994 through 1998. We did not verify the validity of the Navy’s ship maintenance and repair requirements in the Norfolk area. To identify the extent to which ship maintenance workloads in the Norfolk area were affected by the migration of funding from the ship depot maintenance program since fiscal year 1994, we examined a variety of Navy budget documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's declining ship maintenance workload, focusing on: (1) the Navy's policies and procedures for allocating ship maintenance work to public and private facilities in the Norfolk area; (2) ship maintenance and modernization funding obligated to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and private ship repair companies during the fiscal years (FY) 1994 through 1998; and (3) the extent to which the Atlantic Fleet's ship maintenance program has been affected by the movement of funds out of the ship depot maintenance program since FY 1994.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy's allocation of ship maintenance workload in the Norfolk, Virginia area, is guided by legislative requirements and established policy objectives, such as retaining a certain level of public sector capability, allowing sailors to remain at their home ports when shorter repairs are being done, and achieving economic and efficient public depot maintenance operations; (2) during FY 1994 through FY 1998, private shipyards and repair companies in the Norfolk, Virginia, area received proportionately more funding for ship maintenance work than the Navy's Norfolk Naval Shipyard; (3) among the private sector activities, Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company has received the largest portion of ship maintenance funding in the Norfolk area; (4) funding obligated to other smaller shipyards and repair companies has fluctuated from year to year, with the greatest change occurring in FY 1998 when these companies received proportionately much less of the annual ship maintenance funding than in other years and also received less than initially scheduled by the Navy; (5) this was largely because: (a) the conventional workload that traditionally goes to these companies is declining; (b) scheduled maintenance and operational requirements changed during FY 1998; and (c) four conventional maintenance projects originally scheduled to go to the private sector were reassigned to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard to stabilize and achieve more economical and efficient operations at that public shipyard; (6) the Navy did move appropriated funds from its ship depot maintenance account during FY 1994 through FY 1998; (7) however, the Atlantic Fleet received a slight increase over the amount budgeted for its ship depot maintenance program during this period; and (8) consequently, the movement of ship depot maintenance funds did not reduce the amount of funds provided to the public and private sectors in the Norfolk, Virginia, area. |
gao_GAO-04-971 | gao_GAO-04-971_0 | Federal Agencies Address Mobility Issues Mainly through 15 Programs That Help Make Transportation Available, Accessible, and Affordable
Five federal departments administer 15 programs that are key in addressing mobility issues of transportation-disadvantaged seniors. Some of these programs specifically target seniors, such as HHS’s Grants for Supportive Services and Senior Centers (Title III-B). 2). Local entities can use funds from a variety of federal programs to provide transportation services to seniors. Finally, the U.S. However, these agencies do not provide guidance for assessing need for most of these programs. Other service providers we interviewed told us that the federal programs did not provide assistance (other than funding) or guidance on implementing practices to enhance transportation-disadvantaged seniors’ mobility, so they had to look to other state and regional transit agencies or other local transportation service providers to provide guidance or technical assistance. Some of the local providers said that federal guidance on how to apply for funding and comply with reporting procedures is limited. Experts and Stakeholders Suggested Strategies for Overcoming Mobility Obstacles
Through a review of the literature and interviews with experts on senior transportation and aging, representatives of pertinent professional associations and advocacy groups, local officials, and transportation service providers, we identified several obstacles to addressing transportation-disadvantaged seniors’ mobility needs and potential strategies that the federal government and other government levels, as appropriate, can consider taking to better address those needs and enhance the cost-effectiveness of the services delivered. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether current programs are reducing unmet needs and improving transportation-disadvantaged seniors’ mobility and access to services. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help enhance transportation-disadvantaged seniors’ mobility by improving available information and guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator, Administration on Aging, to take the following four actions: To improve the value and consistency of information obtained from area agencies on aging on the extent to which transportation-disadvantaged seniors’ mobility needs are being met, the Administrator should develop guidance for assessing such needs by doing the following: Expand the scope of work in the administration’s planned evaluation of the Grants for Supportive Services and Senior Centers (Title III-B) program to include gathering and analyzing information on (1) definitions and measures of need; (2) the range of methodologies that area agencies on aging use for assessing seniors’ need for services, including transportation, and unmet needs; (3) leading practices identified in the needs assessments methodologies used by area agencies on aging; and (4) the kinds of guidance that area agencies on aging want from the administration and the states to help them perform their required needs assessments. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
The scope of this report is limited to a review of the mobility needs of transportation-disadvantaged seniors, who we define as those who cannot drive or have limited their driving and who have an income constraint, disability, or medical condition that limits their ability to travel. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. population is aging, and access to transportation, via automobile or other modes, is critical to helping individuals remain independent as they age. Various federal programs provide funding for transportation services for "transportation-disadvantaged" seniors--those who cannot drive or have limited their driving and who have an income constraint, disability, or medical condition that limits their ability to travel. For those transportation-disadvantaged seniors, GAO was asked to identify (1) federal programs that address their mobility issues, (2) the extent to which these programs meet their mobility needs, (3) program practices that enhance their mobility and the cost-effectiveness of service delivery, and (4) obstacles to addressing their mobility needs and strategies for overcoming those obstacles.
What GAO Found
Five federal departments--including the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--administer 15 programs that are key to addressing the mobility issues of transportation-disadvantaged seniors. These programs help make transportation available, affordable, and accessible to seniors, such as by providing transit passes or reimbursement for mileage. National data indicate that some types of needs are not being met, including those for trips (1) to multiple destinations or for purposes that involve carrying packages; (2) to life-enhancing activities, such as cultural events; and (3) in rural and suburban areas. However, there are limited data available to assess the extent of unmet needs. HHS's Administration on Aging is required by law to provide guidance to states on how to assess seniors' need for services, but officials said the administration has not done so because it has focused on providing other types of guidance. As a result, the local agencies on aging we interviewed--which are ultimately responsible for performing such needs assessments--used inconsistent methods to assess seniors' mobility needs. The Administration on Aging plans to conduct an evaluation of one of its major programs and thus has an opportunity to improve its understanding of seniors' needs and provide guidance to local agencies on performing needs assessments. Local transportation service providers have implemented a variety of practices--including increasing service efficiency, improving customer service, and leveraging available funds--that enhance mobility and the cost-effective delivery of services. Federal programs provide funding and some technical assistance for these practices, but several service providers we interviewed said that the implementation of such practices was impeded by limited federal guidance and information on successful practices. Senior mobility experts and stakeholders identified several obstacles to addressing transportation-disadvantaged seniors' mobility needs, potential strategies that federal and other government entities can consider taking to better meet these needs, and trade-offs associated with those strategies. |
gao_GAO-04-739 | gao_GAO-04-739_0 | For fiscal year 2003, VA reported that it collected third-party payments of $804 million, a 6 percent increase over the $760 million collected in 2002 and a 49 percent increase over the $540 million collected in fiscal year 2001. At the three medical centers we visited, we found continuing weaknesses in the billings and collections processes that impair VA’s ability to maximize the amount of dollars paid by third-party insurance companies. For example, medical centers did not always bill insurance companies in a timely manner. According to medical center officials, timeliness of billing is affected by, among other things, (1) VA’s ability to verify and update a patient’s third-party insurance information, (2) whether physicians and other health care providers properly document the patient’s treatment so a bill can be coded appropriately, (3) the extent of manual intervention to process the bill, and (4) workload. However, the Plan has not been fully implemented. Therefore, it is too early to determine the extent to which it will address operational problems and increase collections. Promptly invoicing insurance companies for care provided is a sound business practice and should result in improved cash flow for VA. Officials at each of the three medical centers cited verifying and updating patients’ third-party insurance information as a continuing impediment to billing third-party insurance companies in a timely manner. These two factors could negatively affect third-party collections. Medical center officials at the three sites we visited told us that staff shortages and a heavy workload contributed to noncompliance with follow-up procedures. The Handbook describes procedures for following up on partial payments from insurance companies. VA Initiatives Are Under Way to Address Operational Problems
VA’s current Revenue Action Plan includes 16 actions designed to increase collections by improving and standardizing the collections processes. Several of these actions are aimed at reducing billing times and backlogs, many of which have already been implemented. Specifically, medical centers are updating and verifying patients’ insurance information and improving health care provider documentation. In addition, hiring contractors to code and bill old cases is reducing backlogs. In addition to actions already taken, VA’s Plan has several other initiatives under way for improving billing times and increasing collections. The remittance advice, which will be attached to VA health care claims, will enable secondary insurance companies to determine the correct amount to reimburse VA. Further, VA believes it will be able to more accurately reflect the amount of its outstanding receivables and be in a strengthened position to follow up on partial payments, which it deems incorrect. Although the Plan provides another step forward in potentially improving operations and increasing collections, it is still in progress and many of the actions are not scheduled for implementation until at least fiscal year 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the face of growing demand for veterans' health care, GAO and the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (OIG) have raised concerns about the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) ability to maximize its third-party collections to supplement its medical care appropriation. GAO has testified that inadequate patient intake procedures, insufficient documentation by physicians, a shortage of qualified billing coders, and insufficient automation diminished VA's collections. In turn, the OIG reported that VA missed opportunities to bill, had billing backlogs, and did inadequate follow-up on bills. While VA has made improvements in these areas, GAO was asked to review internal control activities over third-party billings and collections at selected medical centers to assess whether they were designed and implemented effectively.
What GAO Found
VA has continued to take actions to reduce billing times and increase third-party collections. Collections of third-party payments have increased from $540 million in fiscal year 2001 to $804 million in fiscal year 2003. However, at the three medical centers visited, GAO found continuing weaknesses in the billings and collections processes that impair VA's ability to maximize the amount of dollars paid by third-party insurance companies. For example, the three medical centers did not always bill insurance companies in a timely manner. Medical center officials stated that inability to verify and update patients' third-party insurance, inadequate documentation to support billings, manual processes and workload continued to affect billing timeliness. The detailed audit work at the three facilities GAO visited also revealed inconsistent compliance with follow-up procedures for collections. For example, collections were not always pursued in a timely manner and partial payments were accepted as payments in full, particularly for Medicare secondary insurance companies, rather than pursuing additional collections. VA's current Revenue Action Plan (Plan) includes 16 actions designed to increase collections by improving and standardizing collections processes. Several of these actions are aimed at reducing billing times and backlogs. Specifically, medical centers are updating and verifying patients' insurance information and improving health care provider documentation. Further, hiring contractors to code and bill old cases is reducing backlogs. In addition to actions taken, VA has several other initiatives underway. For example, VA is taking action to enable Medicare secondary insurance companies to determine the correct reimbursement amount, which will strengthen VA's position to follow up on partial payments that it deems incorrect. Although implementation of the Plan could improve VA's operations and increase collections, many of its actions will not be completed until at least fiscal year 2005. As a result, it is too early to determine the extent to which actions in the Plan will address operational problems and increase collections. |
gao_GAO-08-731 | gao_GAO-08-731_0 | Indian tribes are sovereign governments that generally are exempt from federal income taxation, but individual Indians are not exempt from income taxes. Amount of IRD Use and Its Effect on Reservation Economic Development Cannot Be Determined with Available Data
In 2005, we reported that information on tax expenditures, such as IRD, was needed to evaluate their effectiveness as a means of accomplishing federal objectives and to ensure that they are achieving their intended purpose. A wide variety of data could be useful for determining whether IRD is stimulating economic development on Indian reservations, but three essential pieces of information include which taxpayers claim IRD, how much they invest in IRD properties, and on which reservations they have placed IRD properties. The identity of IRD claimants also could be used to determine whether IRD overlaps other programs designed to assist Indians in a way that affects the incentive to invest on Indian reservations. Although IRD properties have unique recovery periods compared to other depreciation recovery periods and Form 4562 does provide space for taxpayers to report the recovery period, depreciation deduction, and basis by property class, this information is insufficient to determine whether the depreciation is IRD in all cases. These taxpayers may have recorded that the property with a 3-year recovery period simply because the name of the property class is “3-year property.”
IRS does not collect the other essential information to assess the effectiveness of IRD in promoting economic development on reservations. It also is impossible to distinguish between the effect on economic growth of IRD investment and other kinds of investment that may occur on reservations, such as the growth of gaming facilities. For example, Schedule E requires those renting properties to list the location of each rental property that they claim and the low income housing tax credit form (Form 8609) also requires taxpayers to list the address of each claimed property. For example, we were able to analyze the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) partly because its overseeing agency, the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, collected data on NMTC investors and on the location, type and size of the investment. Nevertheless, without these data on taxpayers’ use of IRD no valid assessment can be made on the effect of the IRD provision. The model may be able to identify taxpayers who likely are noncompliant overall in claiming depreciation deductions, but it could not do so for IRD itself, because, as we found, it is impossible to accurately identify each taxpayer who uses IRD with existing data. Although an IRS manager said that IRS would not collect data when the available data are sufficient to enforce IRD, some other IRS officials involved with audits said that additional, more accurate information on items taxpayers use to calculate their deductions would be helpful. IRD Offers Greater Potential for Tax Savings Than Regular Depreciation, Especially for Long- Term Investments
A taxpayer who depreciates property under the IRD schedule will be able to make larger deductions in the near term than under the GDS schedule for the same property, and the advantage of using IRD grows as property- class recovery periods become longer. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Given the lack of information on IRD users and where property claimed under IRD is placed in service, Congress should consider requiring IRS to collect information identifying which taxpayers use IRD and the reservation and/or address where they have placed the property into service. The updated directions also should include an example of how to fill out Form 4562 properly. Further calculations included 30 percent bonus depreciation and 50 percent bonus depreciation for both regular depreciation and accelerated depreciation. We chose a basis value of $50,000 to determine the present value for all the types of depreciation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indians lag behind other Americans on many key economic indicators, such as median household income. To improve such conditions, Congress in 1993 created Indian reservation depreciation (IRD), a tax expenditure offering accelerated depreciation for property invested on Indian reservations. GAO was asked to (1) describe which taxpayers claimed IRD, (2) analyze the effect of IRD on the economic development of reservations, and (3) describe the tax benefits offered by IRD. GAO used the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Statistics of Income data to try to identify IRD users and measure IRD's effects; however, the data were unreliable for those purposes. GAO also calculated examples of potential IRD tax benefits for different property classes.
What GAO Found
Available data are insufficient to identify users of the Indian reservation depreciation (IRD) provision. Although IRD is to be calculated using unique recovery periods, this and other information that taxpayers report are not sufficient to infer from the tax returns which taxpayers are using IRD, in part because taxpayers appear to have reported IRD in combination with other depreciation on their tax forms. In some instances, taxpayers also appear to have made mistakes filling out Form 4562, listing recovery periods inconsistent with IRD when the deduction and basis amounts they reported suggest IRD was in fact used. Data are also insufficient to determine whether IRD increases economic development on Indian reservations. Taxpayers are not required to identify the reservation on which the depreciated property is located. This location data is critical for determining the effects of IRD on the economic development of reservations. Such a determination requires linking IRD investment to economic indicators on specific reservations and controlling for the influence of other economic trends, such as the growth of gaming facilities on these reservations. The lack of data on IRD also may affect how well the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforces IRD compliance with the tax law. IRS does not track compliance issues related to IRD and could fail to detect taxpayers who claim IRD deductions but do not in fact have property on a reservation. IRS officials said getting additional information could be costly to obtain, but auditors told us it would be useful. In fact, IRS collects data on some other tax expenditures that allow closer examination of compliance and use. For example, the low-income housing tax credit requires taxpayers to list the address for the property they are claiming, and New Markets Tax Credits users report identifying information for the Department of the Treasury. Tax benefits can accrue to taxpayers who use the IRD schedule because they can achieve higher depreciation deductions, in present value terms, than a taxpayer who claims a depreciation deduction under the usual schedule for the same type of property over the entire life of the property. For example, on a $50,000 property, the savings range from about 1 percent savings over the normal schedule to 22 percent savings, depending on the type of property depreciated. The greatest potential tax savings come from IRD claimed for property with the longest recovery periods. Additional bonus depreciation, when available, however, may decrease the incentive to use IRD. |
gao_GAO-16-537 | gao_GAO-16-537_0 | DOD’s Enacted Funding for O&M Base Generally Increased Each Fiscal Year since 2009 But Was Less Than DOD Had Planned, and Congress Made Additional O&M Funding Available
DOD’s enacted funding for O&M base has generally increased each year since fiscal year 2009, with the exception of fiscal year 2013. DOD Has Realigned $146.9 Billion of O&M Funding since Fiscal Year 2009
Our analysis of DOD data for the military services’ and defense-wide agencies’ O&M accounts—from fiscal years 2009 through 2015—found that DOD realigned $146.9 billion by transfers between O&M base, O&M OCO, and other appropriations accounts and reprogrammings within O&M accounts. We estimated that after the department used its authorities to transfer funds, DOD’s base obligations subsequent to fiscal year 2009 were greater than amounts enacted by Congress for O&M base funding by an annual average of 5.6 percent. DOD Reported Obligations to Congress on O&M OCO but Not O&M Base Obligations
DOD has reported its O&M OCO obligations to Congress, but it has not reported its O&M base obligations. Instead, DOD has reported a combination of O&M base and OCO obligations in its O&M base budget justification materials and execution reports. Congressional budget justification materials and O&M execution reports are key documents that help Congress make appropriations decisions, conduct oversight, and provide control over funds. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report accompanying a bill for DOD’s fiscal year 2015 appropriations stated that the committee does not have a clear understanding of enduring activities funded by the OCO budget. According to OUSD Comptroller officials, DOD components track obligations by base and OCO appropriation, but DOD’s Financial Management Regulation—issued by the OUSD Comptroller—does not require the department to report to Congress on O&M base obligations at the levels of information presented by account in its base budget justification materials and execution reports. Until DOD revises its guidance to require reporting of O&M base obligations at the level of information presented for each account in its budget justification materials and execution reports, Congress will not have complete information to better understand DOD’s full funding needs for its O&M base programs and activities and to oversee the O&M budget. Conclusions
Although operation and maintenance accounts are the largest category of DOD’s appropriations, DOD does not report O&M base obligations to Congress separately from O&M OCO obligations in its budget justification materials and O&M execution reports. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that Congress will have more complete information on DOD’s full funding needs for its O&M base budget and to conduct oversight of DOD’s use of OCO funds to support base programs and activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the OUSD Comptroller to revise its guidance on preparing budget justification materials and execution reports for Congress to require the addition of O&M obligations used for base programs and activities at the level of information presented for each account. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Senate Report 114-49 accompanying a proposed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, includes a provision for GAO to evaluate the effects of budgetary constraints on DOD’s available base funding within the O&M appropriations accounts. This report: (1) identifies the trends in enacted and planned funding for DOD’s O&M base appropriations since fiscal year 2009; (2) describes the amount of O&M funding DOD has transferred or reprogrammed, and the effect of this realignment on O&M base obligations; and (3) evaluates the extent to which DOD reported to Congress its O&M obligations for its base and OCO budgets. | Why GAO Did This Study
O&M is DOD's largest category of appropriations and constitutes about 43 percent of the President's total request for DOD of $582.7 billion in fiscal year 2017. The President requested $251 billion for DOD's total O&M funding, which included approximately $206 billion for O&M base and $45 billion for O&M OCO.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to review the effects of budgetary constraints on DOD's base funding within its O&M appropriations accounts. This report (1) identifies the trends in enacted funding for DOD's O&M base appropriations accounts since fiscal year 2009; (2) describes how much O&M funding DOD has transferred or reprogrammed, and the effect of this realignment on base obligations; and (3) evaluates the extent to which DOD reported to Congress its O&M obligations for its base and OCO budgets. GAO analyzed DOD's O&M budget justification materials and execution reports since 2009 and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Congress enacted funding for the Department of Defense's (DOD) Operation and Maintenance (O&M) into multiple base appropriations accounts, which are used to pay for day-to-day programs and activities. This enacted funding generally has increased each year since fiscal year 2009, with the exception of fiscal year 2013, when sequestration reduced funding for O&M base.
GAO found that DOD used its authorities to realign about $146.9 billion of its funding from fiscal years 2009 through 2015 (that is, moving funds through transfers from one account to another, and reprogrammings within an account). During GAO's review, the effects of such realignments on base obligations were not readily apparent because DOD did not report its O&M base obligations to Congress separately from its O&M overseas contingency operations (OCO) obligations used to support war-related programs and activities. GAO estimated O&M base obligations since fiscal year 2009 and found that DOD's realignment of funds led to its O&M base obligations exceeding O&M base enacted amounts in each fiscal year and by an annual average of 5.6 percent (see figure).
DOD reported to Congress a combination of O&M base and O&M OCO obligations in its budget justification materials and execution reports, but it did not separately report its O&M base obligations by account for each of its multiple O&M base appropriations. These materials and reports are key documents that help Congress appropriate, conduct oversight of, and provide control over funds. The Senate Appropriations Committee has expressed concern in its report accompanying a bill for DOD's fiscal year 2015 appropriations that it does not have a clear understanding of OCO funding used to support DOD's day-to-day programs and activities. The services track O&M obligations by base and OCO appropriations for OCO reporting purposes, but DOD's financial management regulations do not require it to congressionally report O&M base obligations separately for each account in its budget justification materials and execution reports. By revising its guidance to require congressional reporting on O&M base obligations for each account in these materials and reports, DOD could provide complete information to assist Congress in better understanding and overseeing DOD's full funding needs for O&M base.
What GAO Recommends
To assist Congress in its oversight of the O&M budget, GAO recommends that DOD revise its guidance on preparing budget materials and execution reports to require the addition of O&M base obligations for each account. DOD did not concur, citing the inability of its current financial systems to easily distinguish base obligations. GAO believes the recommendation is valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_RCED-97-5 | gao_RCED-97-5_0 | Goals of U.S. Safety Assistance Have Remained the Same, but Scope of DOE’s Program Has Expanded
The goals of the U.S. safety assistance program have remained the same since its inception—encouraging the shutdown of the highest-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors and reducing the risk of accidents. However, none of these reactors have been closed, and one has been restarted. Many factors complicate U.S. and western nations’ efforts to obtain early closure of the highest-risk reactors, including (1) a lack of consensus, particularly among Russian nuclear safety experts, about the safety of their reactors; (2) concerns about the social and economic well-being of workers who would be displaced if reactors were closed; (3) a commitment to expanding nuclear power, particularly in Russia, to meet future energy needs; and (4) the need to obtain financing to support the development of replacement energy. DOE has developed a short- to mid-term plan that provides an overview of the program’s objectives, performance measurements and ongoing projects. U.S. Nuclear Safety Assistance Program Has Received $208 Million
DOE and NRC have received $208 million for their programs in the Newly Independent States and countries of central and eastern Europe. Other program-related expenditures were for labor, travel, overhead, and other costs. Status of 13 DOE and NRC Safety Projects in Russia and Ukraine
Of the 13 safety projects we reviewed, 11 have been delayed in their implementation and one has been completed. It Is Too Early to Assess the Impact of Selected Projects on Improved Safety
It is too soon to assess the extent to which the projects we reviewed are improving safety in Russia and Ukraine because most of these projects have not been completed. DOE’s and NRC’s Nuclear Safety Assistance Costs
This appendix provides detailed information on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) planned and actual costs for the U.S. nuclear safety assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. Also included in this amount is $38.8 million in safety-related equipment and products. Rosenergoatom requested that the United States pay for the testing. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had obligated $6.5 million and had spent about $5 million on the project. 1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) changes in the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program's goals since its inception; (2) the costs associated with the program; (3) the status of 13 safety projects implemented by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and (4) the way in which the agencies assess the effect of the projects on improving safety.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program's goals to reduce the risk of accidents and encourage the shutdown of the highest-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors have not changed; (2) despite U.S. efforts to close these reactors, none of the highest-risk reactors have been closed and one in Armenia has been restarted; (3) DOE plans to increase its assistance to RBMK reactors to improve their safety while they continue operations; (4) reasons for not shutting down these reactors include the slow pace of the operating countries' economic reforms, concerns about displaced workers' social and economic well-being, and the need for financing for developing replacement energy sources; (5) DOE believes the nuclear safety assistance program should continue another 10 years and is developing a long-term plan that addresses how additional funds should be spent; (6) as of March 1996, DOE and NRC had received $208 million for their programs and had spent $89 million on nuclear safety equipment and products and other expenditures including program-related labor, travel, and overhead; (7) 11 of the 13 DOE and NRC safety projects reviewed have experienced delays, including untimely equipment deliveries due to customs problems and required equipment testing in Russia; (8) some projects have resulted in the installation of fire safety equipment and other safety-related hardware at nuclear powerplants and the development of safety-related training programs in Ukraine; and (9) it is too early to assess the extent to which these projects have improved nuclear reactor safety, and it is difficult to quantify the impact of the assistance provided. |
gao_AIMD-95-7 | gao_AIMD-95-7_0 | Scope and Methodology
To measure DOD’s progress in resolving problem disbursements and evaluate DOD’s criteria for identifying and reporting on disbursements that could not be properly matched to obligations, we met with the DFAS officials responsible for identifying the universe of transactions to discuss and assess how they determined if all disbursements not properly matched with obligations were included and correctly reported. DOD Has Made Some Progress in Reducing Problem Disbursement Transactions
DOD reported that it had reduced its problem disbursements from the benchmark figure of $19.1 billion to $9.7 billion—a $9.4 billion reduction—as of June 30, 1994. We found that $3.6 billion of the reported reduction was for problem disbursements that the Navy reclassified as negative ULOs—which still must be resolved. DOD Team Did Not Initially Identify the Full Extent of Disbursement Problems
Compounding DOD’s disbursement problem is the fact that the June 1993 benchmark, which is used to measure and report DOD’s progress, did not include all types of problem transactions. Using the revised criteria, our analysis showed that DOD’s records contained at least $24.8 billion in problem disbursement transactions as of June 30, 1994. Therefore, to achieve this purpose, DOD would need to properly match disbursements with obligations associated with those accounts. To do this, DOD must maintain current and accurate records of disbursements attributable to both the canceled “M” accounts and any subsequent canceled accounts in order to justify using current appropriations to make payments attributable to these previously closed accounts. In March 1994, the DOD Comptroller issued guidance aimed at reducing disbursements made in excess of recorded obligations. However, the disbursement problem will not be adequately resolved until (1) weaknesses in control procedures that allow problem disbursements to occur are corrected and (2) improvements are made to DOD’s contract pay and accounting systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to properly match disbursements with corresponding obligations, focusing on: (1) DOD progress in resolving its disbursement problems; (2) DOD criteria for identifying and reporting improperly matched disbursements; and (3) systemic control weaknesses that prevent DOD from resolving disbursement problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of June 30, 1994, DOD reduced its $19.1 billion of reported problem disbursements by $9.4 billion; (2) the $3.6 billion that DOD reclassified as negative unliquidated obligations still need to be resolved; (3) the DOD $19.1-billion benchmark for problem disbursements was understated because DOD criteria for identifying and reporting disbursements did not include all types of problem disbursements; (4) as of June 30, 1994, DOD records contained at least $24.8 billion in problem disbursements, including $5 billion in unreconciled "M" account balances; (5) DOD plans to revise its benchmark figure to reflect its disbursement problems more accurately, but it has not set a date for reporting the revised data; (6) DOD needs to maintain current and accurate disbursement records to justify using current appropriations to pay for obligations from closed accounts; (7) in March 1994, the DOD Inspector General issued guidance to stop DOD from disbursing funds in excess of recorded obligations and account balances; (8) DOD initiatives to resolve its disbursement problems include identifying the extent of the problem and improving its contract pay and accounting systems; and (9) DOD needs to emphasize and enforce sound accounting principles and internal controls to properly match disbursements with obligations. |
gao_GAO-12-664 | gao_GAO-12-664_0 | 5 U.S.C. Socially Responsible Investment
SRI—investment made on the basis of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria—is a global phenomenon and is growing in popularity in the United States. Officials Identified Several Challenges to SRI Adoption and Said the Long-term Economic Benefits of SRI Were Unknown
Challenges
Officials at TSP and the other public retirement plans that had considered adding an SRI option associated a number of common challenges with the implementation of SRI. While none of the plan officials that we contacted had plans that were identical to TSP in terms of its federal scope or participant demographics, many of them shared similar challenges and concerns with TSP. As shown in figure 3, participant demand, SRI screening criteria, and costs were the most common challenges identified by public retirement plans. Benefits
Officials at some of the nine public plans we contacted that offered an SRI option cited some short-term benefits associated with SRI but said that the long-term benefits were unknown. Adding an SRI Index Fund Would Not Have Improved Past TSP Portfolio Performance in Most Allocation Scenarios
When compared to the past performance of the TSP stock portfolio (the C, S, and I Funds), the addition of a hypothetical SRI index fund tracking the best-performing U.S.-based SRI stock index would not have both increased returns and lowered volatility in any allocation scenario we tested. Specifically, over the last 20 years, if TSP had included such an SRI index fund (SRI Fund) in its existing stock portfolio, it could have resulted in (1) lower returns and lower volatility, (2) lower returns and higher volatility, or (3) higher returns and higher volatility, based on our analysis of evenly distributed portfolio allocations containing the SRI Fund against the TSP stock portfolio alone (a C, S, and I Funds combination). For example, as shown in figure 4, adding the SRI Fund to the existing TSP stock funds (an SRI, C, S, and I Funds combination) would have resulted in lower returns and lower volatility; substituting the SRI Fund for the C Fund (an SRI, S, and I Funds combination) would have resulted in lower returns and higher volatility; and substituting the SRI Fund for the I Fund (an SRI, C, and S Funds combination) would have resulted in higher returns and higher volatility.based on past performance, this result does not guarantee or imply that Because this analysis is strictly the addition of an SRI index would have the same effect on future TSP stock fund portfolio performance. The managers of the SRI index explained the difference in the index’s performance over the last 20 years in comparison with the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (the C Fund index) was a result of having different sector weightings than the overall market to align with the fund’s SRI strategy. SRI Mutual Fund Performance Varied by Asset Class, but Had Similar Costs to Non-SRI Mutual Funds
After Controlling for Fund Size and Strategy, SRI Bond Mutual Funds and SRI Stock Mutual Funds Outperformed Their Non- SRI Counterparts
Looking more broadly at SRI mutual funds, the most common form of SRI in the United States, we found that the comparative performance of SRI and non-SRI mutual funds over the last 15 years varied by asset class. While TSP participants cannot currently invest in mutual funds through TSP, the Board is authorized to offer a mutual fund window if it determines that it is in the best interests of participants. SRI and Non-SRI Mutual Funds Had Similar Costs
In fiscal year 2010, the costs of SRI institutional grade mutual funds were similar to their non-SRI counterparts. We note that the Board has the authority to open a mutual fund window for participants to invest in mutual funds managed outside TSP. Agency Comments
We provided a copy of this draft report to the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, the Department of Labor, and the Department of the Treasury for review and comment. None of the agencies provided formal comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Socially responsible investmentinvestment made on the basis of environmental, social, religious, or corporate governance criteria in U.S.-based mutual funds exceeded $300 billion in value in 2010. TSPa $308 billion retirement plan with more than 4.5 million participantscurrently offers five distinct low-cost investment options, and is authorized to offer a service that enables direct participant investment in mutual funds outside TSP. GAO was asked to consider the value of adding an SRI option to TSP. GAO examined: (1) What challenges might TSP face in adopting an SRI option? (2) How would the addition of an index fund tracking an SRI index have affected past TSP stock portfolio performance? (3) How do the performance and costs of SRI mutual funds compare to those of non-SRI mutual funds?
To analyze the challenges surrounding SRI, GAO interviewed federal officials, SRI experts, and representatives of public retirement plans that had considered SRI adoption. To examine the impact of adding an SRI fund to the existing TSP funds, GAO analyzed monthly benchmark return data. To examine mutual fund performance trends and costs, GAO analyzed historical summary data on US-based mutual funds.
GAO provided a copy of this draft report to the Board, the Department of Labor, and the Department of the Treasury for review and comment. None of the agencies provided formal comments on the report.
What GAO Found
Officials at the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and the other public retirement plans that had considered socially responsible investment (SRI) associated a number of common challenges with SRI adoption. While none of these plans were identical to TSP in scope or demographics, many plan officials shared similar challenges and concerns with TSP. For example, they identified participant demand, SRI screening criteria, and costs as the most common challenges. Officials at public retirement plans that had adopted SRI cited some short-term benefits of SRI, such as providing participants an opportunity to invest in accordance with their values, but said that the long-term benefits were unknown.
When compared to the past performance of the TSP stock portfolio, the addition of a hypothetical SRI index fund tracking the best-performing U.S.-based SRI stock index would not have both increased returns and lowered volatility in any allocation scenario that GAO tested. Specifically, over the last 20 years, if TSP had included such an SRI index fund in its existing stock portfolio, it could have resulted in (1) lower returns and lower volatility, (2) lower returns and higher volatility, or (3) higher returns and higher volatility, based on GAOs analysis of evenly distributed portfolio allocations. The managers of the SRI index explained the difference in the indexs performance over the last 20 years was a result of having different sector weightings than the overall market to align with the funds SRI strategy. Moreover, the addition of this SRI fund would have resulted in overlap with the TSP stock portfolio, and would not have provided a substantial opportunity for additional portfolio diversification.
Looking more broadly at SRI mutual fundsthe most common form of SRI in the United StatesGAO found the comparative performance of SRI and non-SRI mutual funds to vary by asset class while costs were nearly the same. Regarding performance, SRI bond mutual funds had better risk-adjusted performance than their non-SRI counterparts over the last 15 years, while SRI stock and balanced funds did not. However, after controlling for various factors such as fund size, SRI stock mutual funds had better estimated performance as well. Regarding costs, in fiscal year 2010, the costs of SRI institutional grade mutual funds were similar to their non-SRI counterparts. Although TSP participants cannot currently invest in mutual funds through TSP, the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (Board) is authorized to offer a mutual fund window if it determines that it is in the best interests of participants.
What GAO Recommends
This report contains no recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-1010T | gao_GAO-01-1010T_0 | Medicare’s Long-Term Financial Future Looks Worse
As I have stated in other testimony, Medicare as currently structured is fiscally unsustainable. While many people have focused on the improvement in the HI trust fund’s shorter-range solvency status, the real news is that we now have a more realistic view of Medicare’s long-term financial condition and the outlook is much bleaker. Looked at this way, Medicare—more precisely, Medicare’s Hospital Insurance trust fund—is described as solvent through 2029. New Estimates Increase Urgency of Reform Efforts
These figures reflect a worsening of the long-term outlook. Under the old assumption (the Trustees’ 2000 best estimate intermediate assumptions), total Medicare spending consumed 5 percent of GDP by 2063. When viewed from the perspective of the federal budget and the economy, the growth in health care spending will become increasingly unsustainable over the longer term. HI is only the first layer in this figure. 7.) Our long-term simulations illustrate that, absent entitlement reform, large and persistent deficits will return. Medicare’s Bleak Financial Outlook Drives Need for Meaningful Program and Management Reform
Despite common agreement that, without reform, future program costs will consume growing shares of the federal budget, there is also a mounting consensus that Medicare’s benefit package should be expanded to cover prescription drugs, which will add billions to the program’s cost. Today, Medicare beneficiaries tend to need and use more drugs than other Americans. Specifically, these proposals would move Medicare towards a model in which health plans compete on the basis of benefits offered and costs to the government and beneficiaries, making the price of health care more transparent. Our look at health care spending projections shows that, with respect to Medicare reform, small implementation problems can have huge consequences. In addition, CMS recently reorganized its structure to be more responsive to its customers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the short-term outlook of Medicare's hospital insurance trust fund improved in the last year, Medicare's long-term prospects have worsened. The Medicare Trustee's latest projections, released in March, use more realistic assumptions about health care spending in the years ahead. These latest projections call into question the program's long-term financial health. The Congressional Budget Office also increased its long-term estimates of Medicare spending. The slowdown in Medicare spending growth in recent years appears to have ended. In the first eight months of fiscal year 2001, Medicare spending was 7.5 percent higher than a year earlier. This testimony discusses several fundamental challenges to Medicare reform.
What GAO Found
Without meaningful entitlement reform, GAO's long-term budget simulations show that an aging population and rising health care spending will eventually drive the country back into deficit and debt. The addition of a prescription drug benefits would boost spending projections even further. Properly structured reform to promote competition among health plans could make Medicare beneficiaries more cost conscious. The continued importance of traditional Medicare underscores the need to base adjustments to provider payments on hard evidence rather than on anecdotal information. Similarly, reforms in the management of the Medicare program should ensure that adequate resources accompany increased expectations about performance and accountability. Ultimately, broader health care reforms will be needed to balance health care spending with other societal priorities. |
gao_GAO-06-293 | gao_GAO-06-293_0 | In contrast, on January 13, 2004, OCC issued the two preemption rules on the extent to which the National Bank Act preempts the application of state and local laws to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. According to the 2004 Report of the Ombudsman, CAG carries out its mission by providing services to three constituent groups: (1) customers of national banks—by providing a venue to resolve complaints, (2) OCC bank supervisors—by alerting supervisory staff of emerging problems that may result in the development of policy guidance or enforcement action, and (3) national bank managers—by providing a comprehensive analysis of complaint volumes and trends. OCC’s Handling of Consumer Complaints Is Similar to That of Other Regulators
OCC’s process for handling and resolving consumer complaints is similar to that of the other three federal bank regulators. Unlike two of the federal regulators, OCC lacks a process for collecting feedback from consumers it assists. The regulators define their role as a neutral arbiter between consumers and the banks they regulate when processing complaints. OCC aims to resolve complaints within 60 days. Therefore, by including both inquiries and complaints in determining whether it met its timeliness goals, OCC overstated its performance, as measured by the percentage of complaints resolved within the target time frame. CAG’s Consumer Complaint Data Inform OCC’s Bank Supervisory Activities
According to the 2004 Report of the Ombudsman, CAG’s role includes providing information to OCC examiners and the banks to “elevate” the issues raised by consumers and make them visible to OCC staff involved in supervision. OCC also uses consumer complaint data collected by CAG to formulate guidance for national banks. Despite OCC Efforts, State Officials and Consumer Advocates Still Have Concerns About OCC’s Commitment and Capacity to Address Consumer Complaints
Many of the state officials and advocates with whom we spoke continue to be concerned that OCC does not have the necessary commitment or capacity to provide consumers with sufficient protection against violations of laws. Some officials were unaware of CAG’s process for handling consumer complaints; however, OCC recently took steps to publicize its customer assistance function. While State Officials and Advocates We Contacted Remain Concerned About OCC’s Commitment to Consumer Protection, Some Were Unaware of Its Consumer Protection Efforts
As we previously reported, OCC received close to 3,000 letters commenting on the banking activities rule, with the majority of commenters opposed to the rule and citing concerns about weakened consumer protections. Conclusions
Overall, OCC’s consumer complaint handling operations appear to be in- line with practices of other regulators, with OCC handling a larger volume of complaints than the other bank regulators, likely reflecting its position as the supervisor of banks that account for the majority of the nation’s bank assets. A significant portion of OCC’s and other regulators’ work involves providing or clarifying information for bank customers who have questions and/or have misunderstood a bank product or service. Given that the former Comptroller has acknowledged that OCC and state officials “have a mutual interest in ensuring that consumers are protected from illegal, predatory, unfair, or deceptive practices,” it is essential that OCC undertakes outreach to key state partners—regulators and consumer advocates—in a manner that effectively and efficiently informs the public, and especially customers of national banks, about what CAG does and how state officials and OCC can work together to protect consumers. Scope and Methodology
To describe how the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) handles consumer complaints and to compare how its process compares with that of other bank regulators, we interviewed officials in OCC’s Customer Assistance Group (CAG), as well as their relevant counterparts at the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)--the federal regulator of national banks--issued rules concerning the extent to which federal law preempts state and local banking laws. Some state officials and consumer groups expressed concerns about a perceived loss of consumer protection. GAO identified (1) how OCC's complaint process compares with that of other federal bank regulators, (2) how complaint information informs OCC's supervision of national banks, and (3) issues that consumer advocates and state officials have raised about OCC's consumer protection efforts and OCC's responses to the issues.
What GAO Found
Overall, OCC's process for handling consumer complaints--carried out primarily by its Customer Assistance Group (CAG)--is similar to that of the other three federal bank regulators. However, unlike two of them, OCC lacks a mechanism to gather feedback from consumers it assists that could help it and the banks improve service to consumers. All of the regulators resolve the majority of complaints by providing or clarifying information for bank customers; less frequently, the regulators investigate and determine that a bank or customer erred. OCC annually handles more complaints than the other regulators, likely reflecting its position as the supervisor of banks with the majority of the nation's bank assets. OCC's complaint volume has not increased appreciably since it issued the preemption rules. OCC, in accordance with federal requirements for agencies to measure how they are fulfilling goals related to serving the public, measures the percentage of complaints it resolves within 60 days, a target other federal bank regulators also use. In reporting its performance, however, OCC includes data on its response to consumers' inquiries, which typically take less time, thereby overstating its performance on timeliness of responses to complaints. OCC's bank examiners use consumer complaint information collected by CAG to plan or adjust examinations. CAG staff and examiners communicate regularly regarding specific complaints or complaint volume and coordinate these efforts to provide consistent messages when discussing consumer-related issues with bank officials. In addition, complaint data inform OCC policy guidance to banks, often addressing potential compliance and safety and soundness risks banks face. CAG also provides feedback to banks, focusing on complaint trends and potential risks that may impact the banks' compliance with consumer protection laws or other issues. Many of the state officials and consumer advocates GAO contacted during visits to four states, as well as some representatives of national organizations, nevertheless remain concerned about OCC's commitment and capacity to address consumer complaints--especially given their perception that the rules effectively ended protections provided by state laws and processes. Specific concerns these officials cited include an inability to obtain information on complaint outcomes, the fact that OCC handles complaints from a single location, and the adequacy of CAG's resources. OCC has taken actions addressing some of these concerns. The agency views itself as a neutral arbiter and continues to provide an avenue for consumers to file complaints related to national banks. OCC recently hired additional CAG staff and has begun working with a third-party vendor to expand telephone service from 7 to 12 hours a day. GAO noted that some officials and advocates contacted were unaware of OCC's process for handling consumer complaints and the assistance it can provide. |
gao_GGD-95-65 | gao_GGD-95-65_0 | The former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the former Chairman of its Subcommittee on Regulation and Government Information asked us to (1) evaluate the performance of four prominent federal statistical agencies using guidelines developed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and (2) provide information on the role of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to coordinate and oversee the statistical activities of the agencies that constitute the federal statistical system. Specifically, we examined whether the four agencies (1) had clearly defined and well-accepted missions, (2) cooperated with data users, (3) had established procedures for the fair treatment of data providers, (4) were open about the data provided to users, (5) widely disseminated the data, (6) coordinated with other statistical agencies, and (7) had a strong measure of independence. The Four Agencies Generally Followed Selected Guidelines, With Some Exceptions
The four agencies adhered to five of the seven selected guidelines with only minor exceptions. However, we found that the agencies did not or could not meet all aspects of the other two guidelines, which involved the agencies’ coordination with other statistical agencies and their measure of independence. The NAS guideline on data sharing does not distinguish between data on businesses and data on individuals. Each agency had a clear and well-defined mission and procedures designed to enhance cooperation with data users. It is also important that the efforts of these agencies be coordinated in order to avoid duplication and to ensure that the limited funding available for statistical activities is used as effectively and efficiently as possible. Statistical Policy Branch officials told us that resources for federal statistical activities could be allocated more effectively if a strengthened process were instituted for reviewing statistical agency budgets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the performance of the Bureaus of the Census, Economic Analysis, and Labor Statistics, and the National Center for Health Statistics based on selected National Academy of Sciences (NAS) guidelines. GAO also provided information on the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) role in coordinating and overseeing the statistical activities of the 72 agencies that constitute the federal statistical system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the four agencies adhered, with only minor exceptions, to five of the seven selected NAS guidelines; (2) the NAS guidelines emphasize the importance of a statistical agency maintaining the credibility of its data and that it be perceived as free from political interference and policy advocacy; (3) coordination and sharing between federal, state, and local statistical agencies increased their effectiveness and efficiency; (4) in general, each agency had a clearly defined and well-accepted mission statement, cooperated with data users, treated data providers fairly, openly described to users all aspects of its data, and widely disseminated its data; (5) the agencies did not fully adhere to the guideline on protecting their independence from political influence because they did not always sufficiently communicate their procedures to data users; (6) the agencies could not fully coordinate with other statistical agencies because of statute limitations to protect data providers' confidentiality; (7) OMB oversight and coordination of agencies' statistical activities is limited by a lack of staff resources; and (8) OMB is revising its formal process for reviewing statistical agencies' budgets in order to allocate its resources for coordination more effectively. |
gao_GAO-02-434 | gao_GAO-02-434_0 | Federal funding for drug court programs has also continued to increase. As a result, DOJ cannot provide Congress, drug court program stakeholders, and others with reliable information on the performance and impact of federally funded drug court programs. These factors included (1) inability of DOJ to readily identify the universe of DCPO-funded drug court programs, including those subject to DCPO’s data collection reporting requirements; (2) inability of DOJ to accurately determine the number of drug court programs that responded to DCPO’s semiannual data collection survey; (3) inefficiencies in the administration of DCPO’s semiannual data collection effort; (4) the elimination of post-program impact questions from the scope of DCPO’s data collection survey effort; and (5) the insufficient use of the Drug Court Clearinghouse. However, various administrative and research factors hampered DOJ’s ability to complete the NIJ-sponsored national impact evaluation, which was originally to be completed by June 30, 2001. This effort was to be undertaken in two phases and to include the collection of post-program outcome data. Conclusions
Despite a significant increase in the number of drug court programs funded by DCPO since 1997 that are required to collect and maintain performance and outcome data, DOJ continues to lack vital information on the overall impact of federally funded drug court programs. | What GAO Found
In exchange for the possibility of dismissed charges or reduced sentences, defendants with substance abuse problems agree to be assigned to drug court programs. In drug courts, judges generally preside over the proceedings; monitor the progress of defendants; and prescribe sanctions and rewards in collaboration with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and treatment providers. Most decisions about drug court operations are left to local jurisdictions. Although programs funded by the Drug Court Program Office (DCPO) must collect and provide performance measurement and outcome data, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not effectively managed this effort because of (1) its inability to readily identify the universe of DCPO-funded drug court programs, including those subject to DCPO's data collection reporting requirements; (2) its inability to accurately determine the number of drug court programs responding to DCPO's semiannual data collection survey; (3) inefficiencies in the administration of DCPO's semiannual data collection effort; (4) the elimination of post-program impact questions from the data collection survey effort; and (5) the lack of use of the Drug Court Clearinghouse. Various administrative and research factors have also hampered DOJ's ability to complete the two-phase National Institute of Justice-sponsored national impact evaluation study. As a result, DOJ continues to lack vital information needed to determine the overall impact of federally funded programs and to assess whether drug court programs use federal funds effectively. |
gao_T-RCED-97-94 | gao_T-RCED-97-94_0 | In response to continually growing losses and a widening gap between operating deficits and federal operating subsidies, Amtrak developed its Strategic Business Plan. This plan (which has been revised several times) was designed to increase revenues and control cost growth and, at the same time, eliminate Amtrak’s need for federal operating subsidies by 2002. However, the relative gap between total revenues and expenses has not significantly closed, and passenger revenues (adjusted for inflation)—which Amtrak has been relying on to help close the gap—have generally declined over the past several years (see apps. At the end of fiscal year 1994, the gap between Amtrak’s operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $75 million. It is important to note that Amtrak’s increased debt levels could limit the use of federal operating support to cover future operating deficits. For example, many of the productivity improvements (such as reducing the size of train crews) that Amtrak had planned in fiscal year 1996 were not achieved. We reported in June 1996 that Amtrak will need billions of dollars to address its capital needs, such as bringing the Northeast Corridor up to a state of good repair. A significant capital investment will also be required for other projects as well. For example, additional capital assistance will be required to introduce high-speed rail service between New York and Boston. It is likely that as Amtrak assumes increased debt (including capital lease obligations) to acquire equipment and as the number of cars in Amtrak’s fleet that exceed their useful life increases, even less of Amtrak’s future capital grants will be available to meet capital investment needs. Achieving Operating Self-Sufficiency by 2002 Will Be Difficult
Amtrak’s ability to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2002 will be difficult given the environment within which it operates. Amtrak is relying heavily on capital investment to support its goal of eliminating federal operating subsidies. In addition, providing funds from a dedicated source—such as the federal Highway Trust Fund—may not give Amtrak as much money as it expects. Amtrak is also subject to the competitive and economic environment within which it operates. Such trade-offs in the future could limit further increases in Amtrak’s yield and ultimately revenue growth. Finally, Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions necessary to further reduce costs. During fiscal year 1995, Amtrak was successful in reducing and eliminating some routes and services. Although the business plans have helped reduce net losses, Amtrak continues to face significant challenges in accomplishing this goal, and it is likely Amtrak will continue to require federal financial support—both operating and capital—well into the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed preliminary information from its ongoing work looking at Amtrak's progress in achieving operating self sufficiency, focusing on: (1) Amtrak's financial condition and progress toward self-sufficiency; (2) Amtrak's need for, and use of, capital funds; and (3) some of the factors that will play a role in Amtrak's future viability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak's financial condition is still very precarious and heavily dependent on federal operating and capital funds; (2) in response to its deteriorating financial condition, in 1995 and 1996 Amtrak developed strategic business plans designed to increase revenues and reduce cost growth; (3) however, GAO has found that, in the past 2 years, passenger revenues, adjusted for inflation, have generally declined, and in fiscal year (FY) 1996, the gap between operating deficits and federal operating subsidies began to grow again to levels exceeding that of FY 1994, when the continuation of Amtrak's nationwide passenger rail service was severely threatened; (4) at the end of FY 1996, the gap between the operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $82 million; (5) capital investment continues to play a critical role in supporting Amtrak's business plans and ultimately in maintaining Amtrak's viability; (6) such investment will not only help Amtrak retain revenues by improving the quality of its service but will be important in facilitating the revenue growth predicted in the business plans; (7) in 1995 and 1996, GAO reported that Amtrak faced significant capital investment needs to, among other things, bring its equipment and facilities systemwide and its tracks in the Northeast Corridor into a state of good repair and to introduce high-speed rail service between Washington and Boston; (8) Amtrak will need billions of dollars in capital investment for these and other projects; (9) it will be difficult for Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency by 2002 given the environment within which it operates; (10) Amtrak is relying heavily on capital investment to support its business plans, which envision a significant increase in capital funding support--possibly from a dedicated funding source, such as the Highway Trust Fund; (11) while such a source may offer the potential for steady, reliable funding, the current budget environment may limit the amount of funds actually made available to Amtrak; (12) Amtrak is also relying greatly on revenue growth and cost containment to achieve its goal of eliminating federal operating support; and (13) the economic and competitive environment within which Amtrak operates may limit revenue growth, and Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions necessary, such as route and service adjustments, to reduce costs. |
gao_GAO-09-659 | gao_GAO-09-659_0 | In reviewing proposed mergers, FTC follows guidelines that it developed jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for predicting the effects of mergers on competition. We recommended that FTC undertake more regular retrospective reviews of past petroleum industry mergers and develop risk-based guidelines to determine when to conduct them. Some Petroleum Industry Mergers Were Associated with Small Increases and Decreases in Wholesale Gasoline Prices
We studied the effects of seven petroleum industry mergers that occurred since 2000 on wholesale gasoline prices and found three that were associated with small changes in wholesale gasoline prices. As shown in table 1, the seven mergers we analyzed ranged widely in the number of cities with wholesale terminals that were affected by the merger. By contrast, the model suggests that the 2001 merger of Phillips and Conoco, including oil reserves, as well as refining and marketing, was associated with a decrease in branded wholesale gasoline prices of approximately 1.64 cents per gallon and a decrease of 1.14 cents per gallon for unbranded gasoline. Nonetheless, our model provides an indicator of the impact that petroleum industry mergers can have on wholesale gasoline prices. Analysis Suggests Less Concentrated Markets Were Associated with Lower Wholesale Gasoline Prices
We also used our model to analyze market concentration and found that less concentrated wholesale gasoline markets—i.e., wholesale terminals with more sellers—were significantly associated with lower gasoline prices at terminals located in 78 cities across the United States. For example, we estimated that prices were about 8 cents per gallon lower at terminals with, for example, 14 sellers compared with prices at terminals that had only 9 sellers. We also measured the concentration of groups of refineries that supplied gasoline to sellers at wholesale terminals in these cities and similarly found that prices were lower if a terminal was supplied by a less concentrated group of refineries. Measures of market concentration often take into account both the number of firms in a market and the market share of each firm, and one such measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI, gives proportionally greater weight to firms with larger market shares. We found that the terminals with more sellers and therefore lower levels of concentration would be expected to have lower wholesale gasoline prices (see table 2). In general, our findings were consistent with the idea that markets with more sellers or more refiners supplying those sellers are likely to be more competitive, resulting in lower prices. This included conducting tests for missing and out-of-range values and checking for completeness and accuracy of the data. We estimated the model using the logarithm of pri variable. In addition, for both of these measures, we estimated the price effects under another set of statistical assumptions, and found and reported in the draft these similar, though smaller, price effects. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, GAO reported that 1,088 oil industry mergers occurred between 2000 and 2007. Given the potential for price effects, GAO recommended that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the agency with the authority to maintain petroleum industry competition, undertake more regular retrospective reviews of past petroleum industry mergers, and FTC said it would consider this recommendation. GAO was asked to conduct such a review of its own to determine how mergers and market concentration--a measure of the number and market shares of firms in a market--affected wholesale gasoline prices since 2000. GAO examined the effects of mergers and market concentration using an economic model that ruled out the effects of many other factors. GAO consulted with a number of experts and used both public and private data in developing the model. GAO tested the model under a variety of assumptions to address some of its limitations. GAO also interviewed petroleum market participants.
What GAO Found
GAO examined seven mergers that occurred since 2000--ranging in value and geography and for which there was available gasoline pricing data-and found three that were associated with statistically significant increases or decreases in wholesale gasoline prices. Specifically, GAO found that the mergers of Valero Energy with Ultramar Diamond Shamrock and Valero Energy with Premcor, which both involved the acquisition of refineries, were associated with estimated average price increases of about 1 cent per gallon each. In addition, GAO found that the merger of Phillips Petroleum with Conoco, which primarily involved the acquisition of oil exploration and production assets, was associated with an estimated average decrease in wholesale gasoline prices across cities affected by the merger of nearly 2 cents per gallon. This analysis provides an indicator of the impact that petroleum industry mergers can have on wholesale gasoline prices. Additional analysis would be needed to explain the price effects that GAO estimated. GAO used two separate measures of market concentration, one which measured the number of sellers at wholesale gasoline terminals and another which measured the market share of refiners supplying gasoline to those sellers, and found that less concentrated markets were statistically significantly associated with lower gasoline prices. For example, for wholesale terminals with more sellers--i.e., terminals that were less concentrated--GAO estimated that prices were about 8 cents per gallon lower at terminals with 14 sellers than at terminals that had only 9 sellers. This result is consistent with the idea that markets with more sellers are likely to be more competitive, resulting in lower prices. Using the second measure of concentration, GAO similarly found a statistically significant association between prices and the level of refinery concentration, with less concentrated groups of refineries associated with lower prices. |
gao_GAO-03-329 | gao_GAO-03-329_0 | Among the efforts DOD has underway to improve interoperability is the migration to a family of overarching ground-surface systems, based on the best systems already deployed and future systems. DCGS will not only connect individual systems but also enable these systems to merge intelligence information from multiple sources. They are involved in a wide range of military operations and installed on a broad array of equipment. Currently, ground-surface-based systems process intelligence data and then disseminate processed data to select users. DOD is also developing an overarching test plan called the Capstone Test and Evaluation Master Plan, which will define standards, test processes, test resources, and responsibilities of the services for demonstrating that the systems can work together and an operational concept for processing intelligence information. DOD’s Process for Certifying Intelligence Systems As Interoperable Is Not Working Effectively
DOD has a process in place to test and certify that systems are interoperable, but it is not working effectively for ground-surface-based intelligence processing systems. In fact, at the time of our review, only 2 of 26 DCGS systems have been certified as being interoperable. The certification process is important because it considers such things as whether systems can work with systems belonging to other military services without unacceptable workarounds or special interfaces, whether they are using standard data formats, and whether they conform to broader architectures designed to facilitate interoperability across DOD. DOD relies on the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC, part of the Defense Information Systems Agency) to certify systems. Because 21 systems that have not been certified have already been fielded, there is greater risk that the systems cannot share data as quickly as needed. Conclusions
Making its intelligence systems interoperable and enhancing their capability is a critical first step in DOD’s effort to drive down time needed to identify and hit targets and otherwise enhance joint military operations. But DOD has been slow to plan for this initiative and it has not addressed important questions such as how and when systems will be pared down and modified as well as how the initiative will be funded. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that an effective Distributed Common Ground-Surface System is adequately planned and funded, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence to expand the planning efforts for DCGS to include a migration plan or road map that at a minimum lays out (1) current system capabilities and desired capabilities; (2) specific initiatives, programs, projects and schedules to get DOD and the services to their goal; (3) measures to gauge success in implementing the migration plan as well as the enterprise architecture; and (4) mechanisms for ensuring that the plan is followed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Making sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability) has been a key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral to its goals for enhancing joint operations. Given the importance of being able to share intelligence data quickly, we were asked to assess DOD's initiative to develop a common ground-surface-based intelligence system and to particularly examine (1) whether DOD has adequately planned this initiative and (2) whether its process for testing and certifying the interoperability of new systems is working effectively.
What GAO Found
DOD relies on a broad array of intelligence systems to study the battlefield and identify and hit enemy targets. These systems include reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, and ground-surface stations that receive, analyze, and disseminate intelligence data. At times, these systems are not interoperable--either for technical reasons (such as incompatible data formats) and/or operational reasons. Such problems can considerably slow down the time to identify and analyze a potential target and decide whether to attack it. One multibillion-dollar initiative DOD has underway to address this problem is to pare down the number of ground-surface systems that process intelligence data and upgrade them to enhance their functionality and ensure that they can work with other DOD systems. The eventual goal is an overarching family of interconnected systems, known as the Distributed Common Ground-Surface System (DCGS). To date, planning for this initiative has been slow and incomplete. DOD is developing an architecture, or blueprint, for the new systems as well as an overarching test plan and an operational concept. Although DCGS was started in 1998, DOD has not yet formally identified which systems are going to be involved in DCGS; what the time frames will be for making selections and modifications, conducting interoperability tests, and integrating systems into the overarching system; how transitions will be funded; and how the progress of the initiative will be tracked. Moreover, DOD's process for testing and certifying that systems will be interoperable is not working effectively. In fact, only 2 of 26 DCGS systems have been certified as interoperable. Because 21 of the systems that have not been certified have already been fielded, DOD has a greater risk that the new systems will not be able to share intelligence data as quickly as needed. Certifications are important because they consider such things as whether a system can work with systems belonging to other military services without unacceptable workarounds and whether individual systems conform to broader architectures designed to facilitate interoperability across DOD. |
gao_T-RCED-98-139 | gao_T-RCED-98-139_0 | Disaster assistance involves aid provided both before and after disasters and it involves many federal agencies besides FEMA, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Departments of Agriculture, Transportation, the Interior, Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development. Federal Disaster Assistance Costs Have Grown in Recent Years
For a number of reasons, including a sequence of unusually large and costly disasters, federal disaster assistance costs have increased in recent years. According to data compiled for the Senate Task Force, postdisaster recovery accounted for by far the largest portion of federal disaster assistance (in constant 1993 dollars)—about $87 billion, almost three-quarters of the $119.7 billion total federal disaster assistance from fiscal years 1977 through 1993. Disaster mitigation accounted for the second-largest category of federal disaster assistance obligations—about $27 billion, or 22 percent. In both cases, FEMA accounted for the majority of the costs. Factors Underlying Increasing Costs
The occurrence of large disaster assistance costs in the 1990’s has been attributed to a number of factors. For several of these large disasters, the federal government has borne a larger-than-usual share of the costs. Approaches for Lowering Federal Disaster Assistance Costs
Approaches for lowering federal disaster assistance costs include (1) establishing more explicit and/or stringent criteria for providing federal disaster assistance, (2) emphasizing hazard mitigation through various incentives, and (3) relying more on insurance. The extent to which the implementation of these approaches would lower the costs of federal disaster assistance is unknown. More explicit criteria for disaster declarations could provide a number of potential benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed several approaches for lowering the costs of federal disaster assistance, focusing on: (1) the components and magnitude of federal disaster assistance costs; and (2) approaches that could potentially lower those costs in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal disaster assistance costs billions of dollars annually; (2) according to data compiled for the Senate Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, federal agencies obligated about $119.7 billion (in constant 1993 dollars) for disaster assistance during fiscal years (FY) 1977 through 1993, the majority of which was for post-disaster assistance; (3) the Federal Emergency Management Agency accounted for about 22 percent of this amount, with the remainder spread across many federal agencies, including the Small Business Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Agriculture; (4) the federal government provided assistance for an average of nearly 37 disasters or emergencies annually from FY 1977 through FY 1997; (5) the growth in disaster assistance costs in the 1990s has been attributed to a number of factors, including: (a) a sequence of unusually large and costly disasters, for which the federal government has occasionally borne a larger-than-usual share of the costs; (b) a general increase per year in the number of presidential disaster declarations; and (c) a gradual expansion of eligibility for assistance, through legislation and administrative decisions; (6) approaches for lowering federal disaster assistance costs include: (a) establishing more explicit or stringent criteria for providing federal disaster assistance; (b) emphasizing hazard mitigation through various incentives, and (c) relying more on insurance; (7) within these approaches, specific proposals vary; and (8) the extent to which implementation of these proposals would lower the costs of federal disaster assistance is unknown. |
gao_GAO-09-428T | gao_GAO-09-428T_0 | Background
The Toxic Substances Control Act was enacted in 1976 to provide EPA with the authority, upon making certain determinations, to collect information about the hazards posed by chemical substances and to take action to control unreasonable risks by either preventing dangerous chemicals from making their way into use or placing restrictions on those already in commerce. This structure places the burden on EPA to demonstrate a need for data on a chemical’s toxicity rather than on a company to demonstrate that a chemical is safe. As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the risks of the roughly 80,000 industrial chemicals in use. However, EPA officials told us that it is time-consuming, costly, and inefficient for the agency to use TSCA’s two-step process of (1) issuing rules under TSCA (which can take months or years to develop) to obtain exposure data or available test data that the chemical industry does not voluntarily provide to EPA and then (2) issuing additional rules requiring companies to perform specific tests necessary to ensure the safety of the chemicals tested. We continue to believe that providing EPA with more authority to obtain test data from companies would enhance the effectiveness of TSCA. In contrast with TSCA’s provisions for obtaining information on chemicals, we found that REACH, the legislation through which the European Union has recently revised its chemical control policy, requires chemical companies to develop more information than TSCA on the effects of chemicals on human health and the environment. Regarding new chemicals, TSCA generally requires chemical companies to notify EPA of their intent to manufacture or import new chemicals and to provide any available test data. TSCA’s Regulatory Framework Impedes EPA’s Efforts to Control Toxic Chemicals
While TSCA authorizes EPA to issue regulations that may, among other things, ban existing toxic chemicals or place limits on their production or use, the statutory requirements EPA must meet to do so present a legal threshold that has proven to be difficult for EPA. In addition, before regulating a chemical under section 6, the EPA Administrator must consider and publish a statement regarding the effects of the chemical on human health and the magnitude of human exposure to the chemical; the effects of the chemical on the environment and the magnitude of the environment’s exposure to the chemical; the benefits of the chemical for various uses and the availability of substitutes for those uses; and the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health. EPA has had difficulty demonstrating that harmful chemicals pose an unreasonable risk and consequently should be banned or have limits placed on their production or use. In fact, since Congress passed TSCA nearly 33 years ago, EPA has issued regulations under the act to ban or limit or restrict the production or use of only five existing chemicals or chemical classes. Significantly, in 1991, EPA’s 1989 regulation broadly banning asbestos was largely vacated by a federal appeals court decision that cited EPA’s failure to meet statutory requirements. Asbestos, which refers to several minerals that typically separate into very tiny fibers, is a known human carcinogen that can cause lung cancer and other diseases if inhaled. Potential changes to TSCA include reducing the evidentiary burden that EPA must meet to take regulatory action under the act by amending the (1) unreasonable risk standard that EPA must meet to regulate existing chemicals under section 6 of TSCA, (2) standard for judicial review that currently requires a court to hold a TSCA rule unlawful and set it aside unless it is supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record, and (3) requirement that EPA choose the least burdensome regulatory requirement. We have previously recommended that the Congress amend TSCA to reduce the evidentiary burden that EPA must meet. For example, REACH is based on the principle that chemical companies have the responsibility to demonstrate that the chemicals they place in the market, distribute, or use do not adversely affect human health or the environment, while TSCA generally requires EPA to demonstrate that chemicals pose risks to human health or the environment prior to controlling risks related to their production, distribution, or use. While EPA may suspect that some chemical companies’ confidentiality claims are unwarranted, the agency does not have data on the number of inappropriate claims. According to EPA, about 95 percent of premanufacture notices contain some information that chemical companies claim as confidential. While both TSCA and REACH have provisions to protect information claimed by chemical companies as confidential, REACH requires greater public disclosure of certain information, such as basic chemical properties. In previous reports, we recommended that the Congress consider providing EPA additional authorities under TSCA to improve its ability to make more chemical information publicly available. For example, in our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Congress consider amending TSCA to authorize EPA to share with the states and foreign governments the confidential business information that chemical companies provide to EPA, subject to regulations to be established by EPA in consultation with the chemical industry and other interested parties that would set forth the procedures to be followed by all recipients of the information in order to protect the information from unauthorized disclosures. Related GAO Products
High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in 1976, authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to obtain information on the risks of industrial chemicals and to control those that EPA determines pose an unreasonable risk. However, EPA does not have sufficient chemical assessment information to determine whether it should establish controls to limit public exposure to many chemicals that may pose substantial health risks. In reports on TSCA, GAO has recommended statutory changes to, among other things, provide EPA with additional authorities to obtain health and safety information from the chemical industry and to shift more of the burden to chemical companies for demonstrating the safety of their chemicals. The most important recommendations aimed at providing EPA with the information needed to support its assessments of industrial chemicals have not been implemented--a key factor leading GAO in January 2009 to add transforming EPA's process for assessing and controlling toxic chemicals to its list of high-risk areas warranting attention by Congress and the executive branch. This testimony, which is based on prior GAO work, addresses EPA's implementation of TSCA and options for (1) obtaining information on the risks posed by chemicals to human health and the environment, (2) controlling these risks, and (3) publicly disclosing information provided by chemical companies under TSCA.
What GAO Found
TSCA generally places the burden of obtaining data on existing chemicals on EPA, rather than on the companies that produce the chemicals. For example, the act requires EPA to demonstrate certain health or environmental risks before it can require companies to further test their chemicals. As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the risks of the roughly 80,000 industrial chemicals in use. Moreover, TSCA does not require chemical companies to test the approximately 700 new chemicals introduced into commerce annually for their toxicity, and companies generally do not voluntarily perform such testing. Further, the procedures EPA must follow in obtaining test data from companies can take years to complete. In contrast, the European Union's chemical control legislation generally places the burden on companies to provide health effects data on the chemicals they produce. Giving EPA more authority to obtain data from the companies producing chemicals, as GAO has in the past recommended that Congress consider, remains a viable option for improving the effectiveness of TSCA. While TSCA authorizes EPA to issue regulations that may, among other things, ban existing toxic chemicals or place limits on their production or use, the statutory requirements EPA must meet present a legal threshold that has proven difficult for EPA and discourages the agency from using these authorities. For example, EPA must demonstrate "unreasonable risk," which EPA believes requires it to conduct extensive cost-benefit analyses to ban or limit chemical production. Since 1976, EPA has issued regulations to control only five existing chemicals determined to present an unreasonable risk. Further, its 1989 regulation phasing out most uses of asbestos was vacated by a federal appeals court in 1991 because it was not based on "substantial evidence." In contrast, the European Union and a number of other countries have largely banned asbestos, a known human carcinogen that can cause lung cancer and other diseases. GAO has previously recommended that Congress amend TSCA to reduce the evidentiary burden EPA must meet to control toxic substances and continues to believe such change warrants consideration. EPA has a limited ability to provide the public with information on chemical production and risk because of TSCA's prohibitions on the disclosure of confidential business information. About 95 percent of the notices companies have provided to EPA on new chemicals contain some information claimed as confidential. Evaluating the appropriateness of confidentiality claims is time- and resource-intensive, and EPA does not challenge most claims. State environmental agencies and others have said that information claimed as confidential would help them in such activities as developing contingency plans to alert emergency response personnel to the presence of highly toxic substances at manufacturing facilities. The European Union's chemical control legislation generally provides greater public access to the chemical information it receives, and GAO has previously recommended that Congress consider providing EPA additional authorities to make more chemical information publicly available. |
gao_GAO-12-473T | gao_GAO-12-473T_0 | With a $10.5 billion budget in fiscal year 2011—nearly 40 percent of DOE’s total budget—NNSA is responsible for providing the United States with safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing and maintaining core competencies in nuclear weapons science, technology, and engineering. NNSA Does Not Have Reliable Enterprise- Wide Management Information on Program Budgets and Costs
As we have reported since 1999, NNSA has not had reliable enterprise- wide budget and cost data, which potentially increases risk to NNSA’s programs. In June 2010, we reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities’ facilities and infrastructure. We reported in February 2011 that NNSA lacked complete data on (1) the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, (2) cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, (3) shared-use facilities within the nuclear security enterprise, and (4) critical human capital skills in its M&O contractor workforce that are needed to maintain the Stockpile Stewardship Program. As a result, NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and will lack information that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings opportunities. NNSA Needs to Make Further Improvements to Its Management of Major Projects and Contracts
A basic tenet of effective management is the ability to complete projects on time and within budget. However, for more than a decade and in numerous reports, we have found that NNSA has continued to experience significant cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, principally because of ineffective oversight and poor contractor management. Specifically: In August 2000, we found that poor management and oversight of the National Ignition Facility construction project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had increased the facility’s cost by $1 billion and delayed its scheduled completion date by 6 years. We have issued several reports on the technical issues, cost increases, and schedule delays associated with NNSA’s efforts to extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In the case of the W76 nuclear warhead, NNSA experienced a 1-year delay and an unexpected cost increase of nearly $70 million as a result of its ineffective management of one the highest risks of the program— the manufacture of a key material known as Fogbank, which NNSA did not have the knowledge, expertise, or facilities to manufacture. NNSA’s Oversight of Safety and Security in the Nuclear Security Enterprise Has Been Questioned
Another underlying reason for the creation of NNSA was a series of security issues at the national laboratories. Work carried out at NNSA’s sites may involve plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which are extremely hazardous. Accidents and nuclear safety violations also contributed to the temporary shutdown of facilities at both Los Alamos and Livermore in 2004 and 2005. Nevertheless, our prior work has shown that ineffective NNSA oversight of its contractors has contributed to many of the safety and security problems across the nuclear security enterprise and that NNSA faces challenges in sustaining improvements to safety and security performance. Over the past decade, we have made numerous recommendations to DOE and NNSA to improve their management and oversight practices. DOE and NNSA have acted on many of these recommendations, and we will continue to monitor progress being made in these areas. NNSA is now proposing to spend decades and tens of billions of dollars to modernize the nuclear security enterprise, largely by replacing or refurbishing aging and decaying facilities at its sites across the United States. Given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major projects, we believe that careful federal oversight will be critical to ensure this time and money are spent in as an effective and efficient manner as possible. With regard to the concerns that DOE’s and NNSA’s oversight of the laboratories’ activities have been excessive and that safety and security requirements are overly prescriptive and burdensome, we agree that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors’ activities is not an efficient use of scarce federal resources. Nevertheless, in our view, the problems we continue to identify in the nuclear security enterprise are not caused by excessive oversight, but instead result from ineffective oversight. Given the critical nature of the work the nuclear security enterprise performs and the high-hazard operations it conducts—often involving extremely hazardous materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, that must be stored under high security to protect them from theft—careful oversight and stringent safety and security requirements will always be required at these sites It is also important in an era of scarce resources that DOE and NNSA ensure that the work conducted by the nuclear security enterprise is primarily focused on its principal mission—ensuring the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for managing its contractors nuclear weapon- and nonproliferation-related national security activities in laboratories and other facilities, collectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. GAO designated DOEs management of its contracts as an area at high risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Progress has been made, but GAO continues to identify problems across the nuclear security enterprise, from projects cost and schedule overruns to inadequate oversight of safety and security at NNSAs sites. Laboratory and other officials have raised concerns that federal oversight of the laboratories activities has been excessive. With NNSA proposing to spend tens of billions of dollars to modernize the nuclear security enterprise, it is important to ensure scarce resources are spent in an effective and efficient manner.
This testimony addresses (1) NNSAs ability to produce budget and cost data necessary to make informed management decisions, (2) improving NNSAs project and contract management, and (3) DOEs and NNSAs safety and security oversight. It is based on prior GAO reports issued from August 2000 to January 2012.
DOE and NNSA continue to act on the numerous recommendations GAO has made in improving budget and cost data, project and contract management, and safety and security oversight. GAO will continue to monitor DOEs and NNSAs implementation of these recommendations.
What GAO Found
NNSA has successfully ensured that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable in the absence of underground nuclear testing, accomplishing this complicated task by using state-of-the-art facilities as well as the skills of top scientists. Nevertheless, NNSA does not have reliable enterprise-wide management information on program budgets and costs, which potentially increases risk to NNSAs programs. For example, in June 2010, GAO reported that NNSA could not identify the total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities facilities and infrastructure. In addition, in February 2011, GAO reported that NNSA lacks complete data on, among other things, the condition and value of its existing infrastructure, cost estimates and completion dates for planned capital improvement projects, and critical human capital skills in its contractor workforce that are needed for its programs. As a result, NNSA does not have a sound basis for making decisions on how to most effectively manage its portfolio of projects and other programs and lacks information that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings opportunities. NNSA recognizes that its ability to make informed decisions is hampered and is taking steps to improve its budget and cost data.
For more than a decade and in numerous reports, GAO found that NNSA has continued to experience significant cost and schedule overruns on its major projects. For example, in 2000 and 2009, respectively, GAO reported that NNSAs efforts to extend the operational lives of nuclear weapons in the stockpile have experienced cost increases and schedule delays, such as a $300 million cost increase and 2-year delay in the refurbishment of one warhead and a nearly $70 million increase and 1-year delay in the refurbishment of another warhead. NNSAs construction projects have also experienced cost overruns. For example, GAO reported that the cost to construct a modern Uranium Processing Facility at NNSAs Y-12 National Security Complex experienced a nearly seven-fold cost increase from between $600 million and $1.1 billion in 2004 to between $4.2 billion and $6.5 billion in 2011. Given NNSAs record of weak management of major projects, GAO believes careful federal oversight of NNSAs modernization of the nuclear security enterprise will be critical to ensure that resources are spent in as an effective and efficient manner as possible.
NNSAs oversight of safety and security in the nuclear security enterprise has also been questioned. As work carried out at NNSAs sites involves dangerous nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, stringent safety procedures and security requirements must be observed. GAO reported in 2008 on numerous safety and security problems across NNSAs sites, contributing, among other things, to the temporary shutdown of facilities at both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Ineffective NNSA oversight of its contractors activities contributed to many of these incidents as well as relatively lax laboratory attitudes toward safety procedures. In many cases, NNSA has made improvements to resolve these safety and security concerns, but better oversight is needed to ensure that improvements are fully implemented and sustained. GAO agrees that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors activities are not an efficient use of scarce federal resources, but that NNSAs problems are not caused by excessive oversight but instead result from ineffective departmental oversight. |
gao_GAO-04-590 | gao_GAO-04-590_0 | The four federal agencies responsible for administering the majority of these lands are the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. Prior to September 11, 368 Border Patrol agents were stationed along the nation’s border with Canada. This situation creates challenges for land management law enforcement officers responsible for protecting employees, visitors, and natural resources—all of which face dangers from illegal border traffic. Increased Illegal Activity on Federal Lands in Arizona
Officials from the five land management agencies and the Border Patrol told us that illegal border traffic, including drug smuggling and illegal alien crossings, on federal borderlands in Arizona has been increasing by some measures since the mid to late 1990s. Agencies Attribute Increased Illegal Activity on Federal Lands in Arizona to Border Patrol’s Strategy
According to land management agency and Border Patrol officials, the increased drug trafficking and illegal immigration on federal lands in Arizona, and the challenges they present for law enforcement, are a consequence of the Border Patrol’s increased enforcement efforts to deter illegal entry along other parts of the Arizona border. 2). In Washington, Federal Lands Have Been Less Affected by Border Patrol Strategy, but Officials Are Concerned that Illegal Activity Will Increase
Overall, evidence suggests federal lands on the Canadian border have not been affected by the Border Patrol’s strategy to the extent they have in Arizona, where the Border Patrol has deployed much higher concentrations of resources. Land Management Agencies Say Law Enforcement Resources for Borderlands Have Not Kept Pace with Illegal Activity
Land management agencies have received varying levels of law enforcement staffing and resource increases to address the effects of illegal border-related activity. The administration’s fiscal year 2005 budget request does not include funds for this project. As a result of limited coordination, land management agency and Border Patrol officials told us that threats may not be fully assessed, limited funds may not be efficiently used, and deployment of personnel and other resources may be inefficient or negatively affect other agencies. However, as of May 2004, the Border Patrol strategic plan and implementation plan were not yet issued. Despite these examples of coordination, land management agency officials also told us about instances where coordination efforts could be improved at the field level. Coordinating the development of plans for infrastructure and technology improvements to be placed on or near federal lands. Specifically, this report discusses law enforcement challenges land management agencies face along the international borders in Arizona and Washington, the resources federal land management agencies and tribal nations have received to address border-related law enforcement challenges on federally managed lands, and how the Border Patrol and federal land management agencies coordinate their law enforcement efforts along the Mexican and Canadian borders and steps taken to meet joint challenges. We interviewed representatives from the Office of Management and Budget to obtain their views on various budget issues. 1). | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the mid-1990s--and especially since September 11--the government has focused attention and resources on preventing illegal aliens, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists from entering the United States across its land borders with Mexico and Canada. The Border Patrol is responsible for protecting the nation's borders. However, a significant portion of the borderlands are federal or tribal lands managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Forest Service. Realizing the importance of coordinating federal law enforcement efforts, GAO agreed to assess: (1) border-related law enforcement challenges for land management agencies in Arizona and Washington, (2) resources land management agencies have received to address these challenges, and (3) how the Border Patrol and land management agencies coordinate border-related law enforcement efforts.
What GAO Found
Illegal border activities, including alien border crossings and drug smuggling, on federal and tribal lands in Arizona have been increasing since the mid-to late-1990s, creating law enforcement challenges for land management agencies. This situation poses dangers to law enforcement officers, visitors, and employees and damages fragile natural resources. Rising illegal activity on these federal lands results from the Border Patrol's strategy to deter illegal entry by concentrating resources in populated areas--thus shifting illegal traffic to more remote federal lands, where Border Patrol has placed fewer resources. Although the problem is less acute along the Canadian border, land management agency officials in Washington are concerned that as the Border Patrol increases resources in populated areas, more illegal traffic will shift to remote federal lands. Officials from the five land management agencies believe their resource levels have not kept pace with increases in illegal border activities on their lands. Agencies have sought more federal funds to address these problems and have received varying levels of law enforcement staffing and resource increases. According to Office of Management and Budget representatives, agency funding is mission-driven. Thus, land management agencies' proposals for certain border projects have not been included in the administration's fiscal year 2005 budget because they were considered to be more in keeping with the border security mission of the Border Patrol. At the national level, interagency coordination of strategic plans and activities among Border Patrol and land management agencies is minimal regarding the Mexican and Canadian borders. Thus, limited funds may not be used most efficiently, and the impact of one agency's actions on another agency may not be considered. As of May 2004, the Border Patrol had not issued detailed plans to ensure that interagency coordination occurs, nor had it coordinated with land management officials regarding funding for infrastructure and technology improvements. Some coordination had occurred at the field level, as officials from the various agencies had begun meeting to improve operations and to share threat assessments in Arizona. |
gao_GAO-12-627 | gao_GAO-12-627_0 | Background
The MIG has taken three different approaches since establishing the NMAP—test audits, Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) audits, and collaborative audits. Working with the MIG and the states, the contractor audited 27 providers. States provided the initial audit targets based on their own analysis of Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) data. NMAP Contractor Expenditures
From June 2007 through February 2012, payments to the contractors for On an annual test, MSIS, and collaborative audits totaled $102 million.basis, these contractor payments account for more than 40 percent of all of the MIG’s expenditures on Medicaid program integrity activities. The Majority of the MIG’s NMAP Audits Were MSIS Audits, Which Were Less Effective than Other Audit Approaches
The MSIS audits were less effective in identifying potential overpayments than test and collaborative audits. As of February 2012, a small fraction of the 1,550 MSIS audits identified $7.4 million in potential overpayments. In contrast, 26 test audits and 6 collaborative audits together identified $12.5 million in potential overpayments (see fig. 4.) MIG’s Redesign of the NMAP Has Potential Advantages, but MIG Has Not Been Transparent about Key Details of the Program’s Redesign
MIG’s redesigned NMAP focuses on collaborative audits, which may enhance state Medicaid program integrity activities, and it also intends to continue using MSIS data in some audits. CMS has not reported to Congress key details about the changes it is making to the NMAP, including the rationale for the redesign of the program, but it plans to discuss these changes in its upcoming 2012 strategic plan. Generally, collaborative audits allow states to augment their own program integrity audit capacity by leveraging MIG’s and its contractors’ resources. CMS Has Not Reported Key Details of Its NMAP Redesign to Congress
In its 2010 annual report to Congress on the Medicaid Integrity Program, CMS announced that it was redesigning the NMAP in an effort to enhance MIG programs and assist states with their program integrity priorities, but it did not provide key details regarding the changes. However, MIG officials told us that they do not plan to discuss the effectiveness of the use of funds for MSIS audits, or explain how the MIG will monitor and evaluate the redesign. At this time, the MIG is preparing a new comprehensive plan for Congress that outlines the components of the NMAP redesign. Transparent communications and a well- articulated strategy to monitor and continuously improve NMAP are essential components of any plan seeking to demonstrate that the MIG can effectively manage the program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To effectively redirect the NMAP toward more productive outcomes and to improve reporting under the DRA, the CMS Administrator should ensure that the MIG’s planned update of its comprehensive plan (1) quantifies the NMAP’s expenditures and audit outcomes; (2) addresses any program improvements; and (3) outlines plans for effectively monitoring the NMAP program, including how to validate and use any lessons learned or feedback from the states to continuously improve the audits; future annual reports to Congress clearly address the strengths and weaknesses of the audit program and its effectiveness; and use of NMAP contractors supports and expands states’ own program integrity audits, engages additional states that are willing to participate in collaborative audits, and explicitly considers state burden when conducting audit activities. HHS partially concurred with our first recommendation and fully concurred with the other two recommendations. Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Needs to Ensure More Widespread Use. Status of Fiscal Year 2010 Federal Improper Payments Reporting. Medicaid: Thousands of Medicaid Providers Abuse the Federal Tax System. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, the joint federal-state health care financing program for certain low-income individuals, has the second-highest estimated improper payments of any federal program. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 expanded the federal role in Medicaid program integrity, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that oversees Medicaid, established the MIG, which designed the NMAP. Since the NMAPs inception, the MIG has used three different audit approaches: test, MSIS, and collaborative. This report focuses on (1) the effectiveness of the MIGs implementation of NMAP, and (2) the MIGs efforts to redesign the NMAP. To do this work, GAO analyzed MIG data, reviewed its contractors reports, and interviewed MIG officials, contractor representatives, and state program integrity officials.
What GAO Found
Compared to the initial test audits and the more recent collaborative audits, the majority of the Medicaid Integrity Groups (MIG) audits conducted under the National Medicaid Audit Program (NMAP) were less effective because they used Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) data. MSIS is an extract of states claims data and is missing key elements, such as provider names, that are necessary for auditing. Since fiscal year 2008, 4 percent of the 1,550 MSIS audits identified $7.4 million in potential overpayments, 69 percent did not identify overpayments, and the remaining 27 percent were ongoing. In contrast, 26 test audits and 6 collaborative auditswhich used states more robust Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) claims data and allowed states to select the audit targetstogether identified more than $12 million in potential overpayments. Furthermore, the median amount of the potential overpayment for MSIS audits was relatively small compared to test and collaborative audits.
The MIG reported that it is redesigning the NMAP, but has not provided Congress with key details about the changes it is making to the program, including the rationale for the change to collaborative audits, new analytical roles for its contractors, and its plans for addressing problems with the MSIS audits. Early results showed that this collaborative approach may enhance state program integrity activities by allowing states to leverage the MIGs resources to augment their own program integrity capacity. However, the lack of a published plan detailing how the MIG will monitor and evaluate NMAP raises concerns about the MIGs ability to effectively manage the program. Given that NMAP has accounted for more than 40 percent of MIG expenditures, transparent communications and a strategy to monitor and continuously improve NMAP are essential components of any plan seeking to demonstrate the MIGs effective stewardship of the resources provided by Congress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the CMS Administrator ensure that the MIGs (1) update of its comprehensive plan provide key details about the NMAP, including its expenditures and audit outcomes, program improvements, and plans for effectively monitoring the program; (2) future annual reports to Congress clearly address the strengths and weaknesses of the audit program and its effectiveness; and (3) use of NMAP contractors supports and expands states own program integrity efforts through collaborative audits. HHS partially concurred with GAOs first recommendation commenting that CMSs annual report to Congress was a more appropriate vehicle for reporting NMAP results than its comprehensive plan. HHS concurred with the other two recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-469 | gao_GAO-17-469_0 | Although SEC Strengthened Its Controls, Information Security Deficiencies Placed Financial Data at Risk
During GAO’s fiscal year 2016 audit, SEC had demonstrated considerable progress in improving information security by implementing 47 of the 58 recommendations we had made in prior audits that had not been implemented by the conclusion of the fiscal year 2015 audit. In addition, 15 deficiencies identified during the fiscal year 2016 audit limited the effectiveness of SEC’s controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems. For example, the commission did not consistently control logical access to its financial and general support systems. It also used unsupported software to process financial data. These deficiencies existed, in part, because the commission did not fully implement key elements of its information security program. The newly identified deficiencies resulted in 2 recommendations to SEC to more fully implement aspects of its information security program and 13 recommendations to enhance access controls and other security controls over its financial systems. Cumulatively, the deficiencies decreased assurance about the reliability of the data processed by key SEC financial systems. While not individually or collectively constituting a material weakness or significant deficiency, these deficiencies warrant SEC management’s attention. Until SEC mitigates these deficiencies, its financial and support systems and the information they contain will continue to be at unnecessary risk of compromise. Nevertheless, SEC had not fully mitigated 11 of the 58 previously reported deficiencies affecting its financial and general support systems. Although SEC had issued policies and implemented controls based on those policies, it did not consistently: (1) protect its network boundaries from possible intrusions; (2) identify and authenticate users; (3) authorize access to resources; (4) audit and monitor actions taken on the commission’s systems and network; and (5) encrypt sensitive information while in transmission. SEC improved several configuration management controls for its financial information systems. In particular, SEC did not always update system security plans or fully implement its continuous monitoring capability. Further, deficiencies exist in part because SEC did not maintain up-to- date network diagrams and asset inventories in the system security plans for GSS and a key financial system to accurately and completely reflect the current operating environment, and it also did not fully implement and continuously monitor GSS and the key financial system’s secure configurations. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Pursuant to statutory authority, GAO assesses the effectiveness of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of SEC’s information security controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its key financial systems and information. To assess information systems controls, we identified and reviewed SEC information systems control policies and procedures, conducted tests of controls, and held interviews with key security representatives and management officials concerning whether information security controls were in place, adequately designed, and operating effectively. This work was performed to support our opinion on SEC’s internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
SEC enforces securities laws, issues rules and regulations that provide protection for investors, and helps to ensure that securities markets are fair and honest. SEC uses computerized information systems to collect, process, and store sensitive information, including financial data. Having effective information security controls in place is essential to protecting these systems and the information they contain.
Pursuant to statutory authority, GAO assesses the effectiveness of SEC's internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. As part of its audit of SEC's fiscal years 2016 and 2015 financial statements, GAO assessed whether controls were effective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of key financial systems and information. To do this, GAO examined SEC's information security policies and procedures, tested controls, and interviewed key officials on whether controls were in place, adequately designed, and operating effectively.
What GAO Found
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) improved the security controls over its key financial systems and information. In particular, as of September 2016, the commission had resolved 47 of the 58 recommendations we had previously made that had not been implemented by the conclusion of the FY 2015 audit. However, SEC had not fully implemented 11 recommendations that included consistently protecting its network boundaries from possible intrusions, identifying and authenticating users, authorizing access to resources, auditing and monitoring actions taken on its systems and network, or encrypting sensitive information while in transmission.
In addition, 15 newly identified control deficiencies limited the effectiveness of SEC's controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems. For example, the commission did not consistently control logical access to its financial and general support systems. In addition, although the commission enhanced its configuration management controls, it used unsupported software to process financial data. Further, SEC did not adequately segregate incompatible duties for one of its personnel. These weaknesses existed, in part, because SEC did not fully implement key elements of its information security program. For example, SEC did not maintain up-to-date network diagrams and asset inventories in its system security plans for its general support system and its key financial system application to accurately and completely reflect the current operating environment. The commission also did not fully implement and continuously monitor those systems' security configurations. Twenty-six information security control recommendations related to 26 deficiencies found in SEC's financial and general support systems remained unresolved as of September 30, 2016. (See table.)
Cumulatively, the deficiencies decreased assurance about the reliability of the data processed by key SEC financial systems. While not individually or collectively constituting a material weakness or significant deficiency, these deficiencies warrant SEC management's attention. Until SEC mitigates these deficiencies, its financial and support systems and the information they contain will continue to be at unnecessary risk of compromise.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to the 11 prior recommendations that have not been fully implemented, GAO recommends that SEC take 13 actions to address newly identified control deficiencies and 2 actions to more fully implement its information security program. In commenting on a draft of this report, SEC concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-307 | gao_GAO-01-307_0 | Background
DOD relies increasingly on globally networked computer systems to manage the information it uses to perform operational missions and daily management functions. DIAP was established to meet DOD’s need for “integrated, comprehensive, and consistent Defense-wide IA practice,” and to develop DOD into “a model practitioner of IA” for the nation. Conclusions
While DIAP has addressed issues related to DOD’s departmental IA goals, established new IA policy, improved communication across the department, and initiated mechanisms for monitoring IA efforts throughout DOD, many IA issues remain on which it has not taken action or only begun to work. Given the high priority that DOD puts on IA, we believe the DIAP should have made progress on more of its implementation plan objectives by this time and gone further with the ones it has begun to address. Top- level DOD management has not carried out oversight commensurate with the program’s high-priority role nor has DIAP received the resources that were judged necessary by DOD when the program was initiated. DOD continues to face significant personnel, technical, and operational challenges in implementing an effective departmentwide IA program— something it cannot afford to ignore. A stronger management framework for DIAP consisting of adequate funding and oversight would establish the foundation needed to make greater progress in addressing such challenges. | What GAO Found
The components, military services, and agencies of the Department of Defense (DOD) share many risks in their use of globally networked computer systems to perform operational missions. Many reports of vulnerabilities, organized intrusions, and theft related to department systems and networks have underscored weaknesses in DOD systems. In January 1998, DOD responded to these risks by announcing its plans for a Defense-wide Information Assurance Program to promote integrated, comprehensive, and consistent information assurance (IA) practices across the department. Although the program has addressed issues related to DOD's departmental IA goals, established new IA policy, improved communication across the department, and introduced mechanisms for monitoring IA efforts throughout DOD, many IA issues remain unaddressed. Given the high priority that DOD puts on IA, GAO believes the the program should have made progress on more of its implementation plan objectives by this time and gone further with the ones it has begun to address. Top-level DOD management has not carried out oversight commensurate with the program's high-priority role and the program has not received the resources that were judged necessary by DOD when the program was initiated. DOD continues to face significant personnel, technical, and operational challenges in implementing an effective departmentwide IA program--something it cannot afford to ignore. A stronger management framework for the program consisting of adequate funding and oversight would establish the foundation needed to make greater progress in addressing such challenges. |
gao_GAO-02-847T | gao_GAO-02-847T_0 | The act required the Comptroller General to convene a panel of experts to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial activities for the federal government from government to contactor personnel. Steps Taken to Ensure a Representative Panel and a Fair and Balanced Process
In establishing the Panel, a number of steps were taken to ensure representation from all major stakeholders as well as to ensure a fair and balanced process. To ensure a broad array of views on the Panel, we used a Federal Register notice to seek suggestions on the Panel’s composition. Principles, Findings, and Recommendations
As the Panel began its work, it recognized the need for a set of principles that would provide a framework for sourcing decisions. Those principles, as they were debated and fleshed out, provided an important vehicle for assessing what does or does not work in the current A-76 process, and provided a framework for identifying needed changes in the process. Savings result regardless of whether the public or the private sector wins the cost comparison. Implementation Strategy
Many of the Panel’s recommendations can be accomplished administratively under existing law, and the Panel recommended that they be implemented as soon as practical. The Panel also recognized that some of its recommendations could require changes in statutes or regulations and that making the necessary changes would take some time. Any legislative changes should be approached in a comprehensive and considered manner rather than a piecemeal fashion in order for a reasonable balance to be achieved. | What GAO Found
The Commercial Activities Panel is a congressionally mandated panel to study and make recommendations for improving the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial activities from government to contractor personnel. The growing controversy surrounding competitions, under the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76 to determine whether the government should obtain commercially available goods and services from the public or private sectors, led to the establishment of this Panel. In establishing the Panel, several steps were taken to ensure representation from all major stakeholders as well as to ensure a fair and balanced process. To ensure a broad range of views on the Panel, a Federal Register notice was used to seek suggestions for the Panel's composition. As the Panel began its work, it recognized the need for a set of principles for sourcing decisions. These principles provide for an assessment of what does or does not work in the current A-76 process and provide a framework for identifying needed changes. Many of the Panel's recommendations can be accomplished administratively under existing law, and the Panel recommends that they be implemented as soon as practical. The Panel also recognizes that some of the recommendations would require changes in statutes or regulations that could take some time. Any legislative changes should be comprehensive and considered to achieve a reasonable balance. |
gao_GAO-15-188 | gao_GAO-15-188_0 | DOD Does Not Have Reliable Data on ACAT II and III Programs and Component Actions to Improve Data Do Not Fully Address Limitations
DOD components could not provide sufficiently reliable data for us to accurately determine the number, total cost, or performance of DOD’s current ACAT II and III programs. For example, the components have not established systematic processes to perform data quality tests on PEO-submitted data and assess the results to help identify problems, such as basic math errors or missing data, for further review. These types of tests and assessments can be an important step in determining whether data can be used for its intended purposes. Cost and schedule data for these reports are pulled from DOD’s web-based DAMIR system. ACAT II and III Program Performance Most Frequently Affected by Requirements Changes and Testing Issues
Thirteen of the 15 ACAT II or III programs we reviewed in-depth had exceeded the cost or schedule targets in their original APBs. These programs cited changing requirements, testing issues, quantity changes, and flaws in original cost estimates, among other factors, as the reasons for cost and schedule growth. We have previously reported that similar factors affect the performance of DOD’s MDAPs. While tailoring documentation and reporting requirements for “smaller” programs can be a reasonable approach to help prioritize limited oversight resources, if DOD and its components are to effectively manage their investment dollars, they must be able to account for how they are spending their money and how well they are spending it on the full range of acquisition programs. Having timely and reliable data on smaller acquisition programs is also critical for providing effective oversight and bringing the right oversight resources to bear, when needed, to make sure troubled smaller programs do not grow into major ones. DOD components have taken and continue to take steps to improve the reliability of ACAT II and III program data, but they do not fully address the limitations we identified—missing data, widespread data entry issues and inconsistent reporting—or the causes of these issues, including: the lack of a common definition of a current acquisition program; insufficient data reliability testing; and inconsistent compliance with requirements for acquisition program baselines and reporting on ACAT II and III programs that may become major programs due to cost growth. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to take the following actions: establish guidelines on what constitutes a “current” ACAT II or III program for reporting purposes; the types of programs, if any, that do not require ACAT designations; and whether the rules for identifying current MDAPs would be appropriate for ACAT II and III programs; and determine what metrics should be used and what data should be collected on ACAT II and III programs to measure cost and schedule performance; and whether the use of DAMIR and the MDAP selected acquisition report format may be appropriate for collecting data on ACAT II and III programs. However, as discussed below, it is unclear whether the actions that DOD plans to take will fully address the issues we raised in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which information is available on the number of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) current acquisition category (ACAT) II and III programs, their total estimated acquisition cost, and cost and schedule performance; (2) the factors affecting the cost and schedule performance of selected ACAT II and III programs; and (3) the number of current ACAT II and III programs that are likely to become major defense acquisition programs (MDAP). To address our second objective, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 15 programs from the data provided by DOD in response to our DCI. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD requested $168 billion in fiscal year 2014 to develop, test, and acquire weapon systems and other products and equipment. About 40 percent of that total is for major defense acquisition programs or ACAT I programs. DOD also invests in other, non-major ACAT II and III programs that are generally less costly at the individual program level. These programs typically have fewer reporting requirements and are overseen at lower organizational levels than ACAT I programs, although they may have annual funding needs that are just as significant.
GAO was asked to examine ACAT II and III programs. This report addresses, among other issues, (1) the extent to which information is available on the number, cost, and performance of ACAT II and III programs and (2) factors that affected the performance of selected ACAT II and III programs. GAO collected program and cost data on current ACAT II and III programs from five DOD components. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of 15 programs based on program cost and other criteria and reviewed documentation and interviewed officials about program performance.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) could not provide sufficiently reliable data for GAO to determine the number, total cost, or performance of DOD's current acquisition category (ACAT) II and III programs. These non-major programs range from a multibillion dollar aircraft radar modernization program to soldier clothing and protective equipment programs in the tens of millions of dollars. GAO found that the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of DOD's data on these programs were undermined by widespread data entry issues, missing data, and inconsistent identification of current ACAT II and III programs. See the figure below for selected data reliability issues GAO identified.
DOD components are taking steps to improve ACAT II and III data, but these steps do not fully address the problems GAO identified. For example, the components have not established systematic processes to perform data quality tests and assess the results to help identify problems for further review. These types of tests and assessments can be an important step in determining whether data can be used for its intended purposes. Additionally, DOD lacks metrics to assess ACAT II and III cost and schedule performance trends across programs and in some cases was missing baseline cost and schedule data to measure performance. Having timely and reliable cost, schedule, and performance data on smaller acquisition programs is critical to ensuring that DOD and its components can account for how they are spending their money and how well they are spending it. Reliable data are also essential for effective oversight and bringing the right oversight resources to bear when programs approach the cost threshold to become a major defense acquisition program due to cost growth.
Thirteen of the 15 ACAT II or III programs GAO reviewed in-depth had exceeded their original cost or schedule targets. Program officials from ACAT II and III programs GAO reviewed cited changing performance requirements, testing issues, quantity changes, and flaws in original cost estimates, among other factors, as the reasons for cost and schedule growth. GAO has previously found that similar factors affect the performance of major acquisition programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish guidelines on what constitutes a current ACAT II and III program, take steps to improve data reliability, and determine how to measure cost and schedule performance. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations and described actions it plans to take. However, as discussed in the report, DOD's planned actions may not fully address the issues that GAO identified. |
gao_RCED-97-33 | gao_RCED-97-33_0 | In addition to the act’s specific requirements, Energy’s guidelines provided that extended medical insurance should be offered to all separated contractor employees. Similar Types of Benefits Offered, but Amounts Varied Among Locations
The workforce restructuring plans generally included similar types of separation payments and other benefits. Some enhanced retirement programs included an additional incentive payment. As shown in table 1, the total average cost of benefits provided to the 23,782 separated employees was $25,619. Benefits Exceeded Amounts That Would Have Been Awarded Under Existing Contracts
Section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 authorized benefits such as educational and relocation assistance that exceeded those that would have been provided under existing contracts at the facilities. In contrast, federal employees who are involuntarily terminated through a reduction in force receive only severance pay based on years of service and an additional 10 percent of basic severance for each year an employee is over age 40; the maximum lifetime benefit is 1 year’s annual salary. Similar Benefits Were Generally Provided to Cold War and Post-Cold War Workers at Defense and Nondefense Facilities
Although the act referred only to workforce restructuring at defense nuclear facilities, the Secretary of Energy determined that in the interests of fairness, the planning process included in the act would apply to all workforce restructuring. In practice, most plans made little or no distinction in the benefits offered to those employees who worked during and after the Cold War. Efforts to Retain Critical Skills Have Improved
The limited data available for the early years of restructuring showed problems in retaining workers with critically needed skills. Since these early efforts, Energy has taken steps to improve its ability to retain critically needed skills. According to preliminary data reported for all facilities for fiscal years 1995 and 1996, about 2 percent of separated employees have had to be rehired or have their positions backfilled by someone with similar skills. Energy Provides Limited Oversight of Plan Implementation
After Energy approves the workforce restructuring plans, it provides little oversight or monitoring of how contractors implement those plans. While similar types of benefits were offered at most facilities, the formulas used to calculate severance pay combined with the differences in length of service and base salaries among the facilities resulted in a wide range for the value of these benefits. Scope and Methodology
To determine the types and amounts of benefits provided to separated employees as well as to determine what distinctions Energy made in determining who should receive these benefits, we relied primarily on data provided by the agency’s Office of Worker and Community Transition. The data for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 were obtained from the first report on workforce restructuring efforts. To determine the extent to which the contractors at Energy’s facilities had to rehire or replace workers, and to determine the steps that the agency has taken to oversee the implementation of the plans, we interviewed the officials responsible for restructuring at the four facilities we visited and officials in the Office of Worker and Community Transition. Four plans provided relocation assistance only to employees hired before 9/27/91. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) workforce restructuring plans, focusing on the: (1) types and amounts of benefits provided to separated employees; (2) distinctions DOE made in determining who should receive these benefits; (3) extent to which the contractors at DOE's facilities have to rehire workers or replace them with others having similar skills, because the downsizing was not targeted sufficiently to retain critically needed skills; and (4) steps DOE has taken to oversee the implementation of the plans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 23,800 contractor employees separated since 1993 under DOE's workforce restructuring plans have received an average of $25,600 in benefits; (2) about 88 percent of the costs were for enhanced retirement incentives or severance pay; (3) although similar benefits were offered at most facilities, the value of these benefits varied considerably among locations, reflecting the considerable discretion given to each facility in determining how best to reduce its workforce; (4) more than half of the workforce restructuring plans provided more generous severance pay than would have normally been provided by the contractors under existing contracts, and almost all plans provided other benefits not normally provided by the contractors, such as extended medical insurance; (5) the benefits provided under the plans exceeded those that would have been provided to federal employees in a reduction in force; (6) DOE's guidelines provide that the consideration of specific benefits for contractor employees should take into account both available funding and whether the employee was hired prior to the end of the Cold War, but most plans made no distinction in the benefits provided to employees hired during the Cold War and those hired after the Cold War ended; (7) the preliminary data for fiscal years (FY) 1995 and 1996 suggest that DOE's facilities have improved their ability to retain critically needed skills during downsizing; (8) early restructuring at some facilities resulted in subsequent hiring to fill vacated critical skill positions; (9) while data are not available on the number of critical skill positions that were refilled during FY 1993 and 1994, DOE's preliminary data for FY 1995 and 1996 indicate that about 2 percent of the positions vacated had to be refilled; (10) DOE provides limited oversight over how contractors implement workforce restructuring plans; (11) according to DOE officials, once the workforce restructuring plans are approved, the responsibility for implementation is left with the contractors and little monitoring is done by DOE program personnel; and (12) reviews by DOE's Office of Inspector General and others of DOE's early restructuring efforts have identified problems with the awarding of benefits. |
gao_GAO-07-682T | gao_GAO-07-682T_0 | For oil and gas, production royalties are paid either in value or in kind. Billions of Dollars of Royalty Revenue Will be Foregone Because of Problems Associated with Royalty Relief
As Assistant Secretary Allred of Interior recently testified before the Congress, the absence of price thresholds in leases issued in 1998 and 1999 has already cost the government almost $1 billion and MMS has estimated a range of potential future foregone revenue for these leases of between $6.4 billion and $9.8 billion. However, because there is considerable uncertainty about future oil and natural gas prices and production levels, actual foregone royalties could end up being higher or lower than MMS’s estimates. MMS is currently negotiating with oil and gas companies to apply price thresholds to future production from the 1998 and 1999 leases. However, the results of the negotiation have been mixed so far—as of late February 2007, only 6 of 45 companies have agreed to terms, and a current legal challenge to Interior’s authority to set price thresholds on any DWRRA leases may further deter or complicate a negotiated settlement. In addition to forgone royalty revenues from leases issued in 1998 and 1999, royalty revenues on leases issued under DWRRA in 1996, 1997, and 2000 are also threatened pending the outcome of a legal challenge regarding price thresholds. This information includes the administrative costs of the RIK program and the revenue impacts of all sales. We found that MMS lacked this information largely because it had not developed information systems to rapidly and efficiently collect this information. Specifically, to further the development of management controls for MMS’s RIK program, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior instruct the appropriate managers within MMS to identify and acquire key information needed to monitor and evaluate performance prior to expanding the RIK program. We acknowledge the agency’s efforts and, within the context of the program’s scope at the time of our report, consider our recommendations implemented by the agency. Noting this issue, we are undertaking work for the Congress. Specifically, we have several ongoing reviews assessing, among other things, MMS’s ability to quantify and compare administrative costs and revenues of the RIK and royalties in value programs; the effectiveness of the systems used to collect, account for, and disburse royalties; and the accuracy of royalty revenue collection, including evaluating whether the value of RIK payments equal or exceed the value of royalties that would have been received in value for oil and gas as required by statute. MMS Does Not Collect the Data Necessary to Assess Whether Geothermal Royalties Remain Constant as Required by Law
In a 2006 report on geothermal royalties, we found that MMS had erroneous and missing historical geothermal electricity revenue data and did not collect sufficient data from royalty payors to accurately asses whether MMS was collecting the amount of royalties required by statute. Specifically, about 40 percent of the royalty revenue data for royalty payors was either missing or erroneous in the projects we reviewed. In addition, MMS did not have sufficient historical gross revenue data for geothermal electricity sales. MMS is charged with collecting and distributing royalties collected from the development of geothermal resources used to generate electricity. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included provisions that significantly changed how geothermal royalties are calculated but also instructed the Secretary of the Interior to seek to maintain the same level of royalties over the next ten years that would have been collected prior to the Act’s passage. In order to compare royalties collected under the provisions of the Act with what would have been collected under the old system would require historical data on gross revenues from geothermal electricity sales as well as accurate royalty data on those sales. In our report we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct MMS to correct these deficiencies and the agency agreed with our findings and recommendations. We will continue to monitor the agency’s efforts to address these shortcomings. Our work on this issue is continuing on multiple levels, including comparing the value of royalties taken in kind to the value of royalties taken as cash, reviewing the diligence of resource development, and evaluating the accuracy of the agency’s cost, revenue, and production data. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior's Minerals Management Service (MMS) is charged with collecting and administering royalties paid by companies developing fossil and renewable energy resources on federal lands and within federal waters. To promote development of oil and natural gas, fossil resources vital to meeting the nation's energy needs, the federal government at times has provided "royalty relief" waiving or reducing the royalties that companies must pay. In these cases, relief is typically applicable only if prices remain below certain threshold levels. Oil and gas royalties can be taken at MMS's discretion either "in value" as cash or "in kind" as a share of the product itself. Additionally, MMS also collects royalties on the development of geothermal energy resources--a renewable source of heat and electricity--on federal lands. This statement provides (1) an update of our work regarding the fiscal impacts of royalty relief for leases issued under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995; (2) a description of our recent work on the administration of the royalties in kind program, as well as ongoing work on related issues; and (3) information on the challenges to collecting geothermal royalties identified in our recent work. To address these issues we relied on recent GAO reports on oil, gas, and geothermal royalty collection systems. We are also reviewing key MMS estimates and data.
What GAO Found
The absence of price thresholds in oil and gas leases issued by MMS in 1998 and 1999 has already cost the government about $1 billion and the agency has recently estimated that future foregone royalties would be $6.4 billion to $9.8 billion over the lives of the leases. Precise estimates of the actual foregone royalties, however, are not possible at this time because future projections are sensitive to price and production levels, both of which are subject to change. MMS is currently negotiating with oil and gas companies to apply price thresholds to future production from these leases, with mixed results--only 6 of the 45 companies involved have agreed to terms. Moreover, a pending legal challenge to Interior's authority to include price thresholds on any leases issued under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act could, if successful, cost the government billions more in refunded and foregone revenue. In our most recent review of the royalty in kind (RIK) program, conducted in 2004, we found that MMS was unable to determine whether the revenues received from its sales of oil taken in kind were equivalent to receiving royalties in value, largely because it had not developed systems to rapidly and efficiently collect this information. We made recommendations that the agency has implemented that have improved the administration of the program as it existed at the time of our report. However, the continued expansion of the program raises a new question about the adequacy of the agency's overall management practices and internal controls to meet the increasing demands placed on the RIK program. Accordingly, we are undertaking follow-on reviews assessing, among other things, the agency's ability to quantify and compare administrative costs and revenues of the RIK and royalties in value programs and the extent to which the revenues collected under the RIK program are equal to or greater than what would have been received had they been taken in value. In a 2006 report on geothermal royalties, we found that missing and erroneous historical data, as well as insufficient data on electricity sales, meant that MMS is unable to accurately determine whether it was collecting royalties as directed by statute. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included provisions that significantly changed how geothermal royalties are calculated but also directed Interior to maintain the same level of royalties over the next ten years that would have been collected prior to the Act's passage. We found that making this determination requires historical data on sales of electricity produced from geothermal resources as well as accurate royalty data. However, MMS did not have sufficient historical gross revenue data with which to establish a baseline for past royalties paid as a percentage of electricity revenues. Further, about 40 percent of MMS's royalty data was either missing or erroneous for the projects we reviewed. We recommended that MMS correct these deficiencies and the agency agreed. We are continuing to monitor the agency's efforts. |
gao_NSIAD-00-164 | gao_NSIAD-00-164_0 | Reduced Requirements and Army Actions Should Ease the Strain on Army Civil Affairs Personnel
The Army does not have enough active-duty civil affairs capability to meet current requirements. The Navy and the Marine Corps each have four land-based squadrons; however, these squadrons together are not enough to cover all peacetime requirements without exceeding the Navy and the Marine Corps’ goals on the maximum number of days personnel should be deployed each year. The deployment goal is to have twice the time at home station as time deployed. Shortage of Trained Crews Affects Ability to Meet Theater Commanders’ AWACS Requirements
The Air Force could meet current needs for AWACS aircraft and crews in contingency operations and other peacetime missions such as drug interdiction without exceeding its 120-day annual deployment goal if all 40 of its staffed crews were fully trained and available for worldwide deployments.AWACS aircraft provide airspace surveillance and battlefield management of all aircraft flying in an assigned area. A number of factors have contributed to the other crews not being fully trained. Shortage of U-2 Pilots Presents Challenges in Meeting Theater Commanders’ Needs
The high demand for U-2 pilots relative to the number of pilots has contributed to historically high deployment rates for its pilots—175 days on average in 1999. However, the Air Force acknowledges that it faces challenges in overcoming historical pilot shortages, and continued careful management of the use of these aircraft will be needed. The Air Force had only 40 of its 54 authorized pilots fully trained as of January 2000. However, due to its part-time nature this latter unit will be able to cover only about 30 days of the rotation. Past Strain Has Been Eliminated
F-16CJ squadrons, particularly those stationed in the United States, have been among the most utilized fighter squadrons for the past few years. There are currently nine active- duty F-16CJ squadrons. Recommendations
To alleviate some of the strain on the military forces and assets used in contingency operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the following:
The Secretary of the Army to carefully scrutinize the actions taken to ready the 49th Armored Division to deploy to Bosnia before deciding whether to expand the use of National Guard forces to cover the mission in Kosovo. Our efforts were primarily focused on current operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia. GAO’s Comments
1. Our point is that with the large number of Army divisions affected by operations in the Balkans at any one time—four active and one National Guard division in June 2000—this disruption to wartime training and availability was a key reason the Army chose to involve National Guard divisions in the rotations. 2. DOD concurs with the report’s treatment of the status of active and reserve component units. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the services' ability to continuously meet the challenges posed by contingency operations, focusing on six military assets that have been heavily used in contingency operations in a series of case studies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the military assets GAO examined in the case studies continue to be in high demand relative to their numbers; (2) this has resulted in deployments in excess of deployment goals; (3) to ease the strain on these assets, the Department of Defense and the military services are taking a number of actions, which are described below along with GAO's assessment of them; (4) four of the Army's 10 active divisions and 1 of its 8 National Guard divisions were being affected by operations in the Balkans as of January 2000; (5) the Army has begun to use National Guard divisions to relieve the strain on active divisions and allow them to focus on their primary mission of being prepared for major war; (6) however, preparing the first Guard division that deployed to Bosnia required considerable effort, including the conversion of substantial numbers of Guard personnel to full-time status; (7) the Army does not have enough active-duty civil affairs capability to meet current requirements with its one 208-person active-duty unit, and until recently, there were concerns about having enough reserve civil affairs personnel to meet requirements in the Balkans; (8) the Navy and the Marine Corps each have four land-based EA-6B squadrons; (9) however, these squadrons together are unable to meet all requirements without exceeding their deployment goal of having twice as much at home station as the amount of time deployed; (10) the Air Force could meet current requirements for Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and crews without exceeding its 120-day annual deployment goal if all 40 of its staffed crews were fully trained and available for worldwide deployments; (11) however, only 27 of its 40 crews are fully trained, and increasing this supply is problematic because of inadequate simulator training capabilities; (12) the Air Force has only 40 of its 54 authorized U-2 pilots fully trained; (13) this shortage of fully trained pilots has led to historically high deployment rates; (14) the Air Force has relayed certain requirements to attract and keep its U-2 pilots, however challenges remain and continued careful management of the use of these aircraft will be needed; (15) F-16CJ squadrons, particularly those stationed in the United States, have been one of the most utilized fighter squadrons for the past few years; and (16) however due to its part-time nature, the F-16CJ reserve component squadron unit will be able to cover only about 30 days of the rotation between it and the older squadron of less capable aircraft. |
gao_GAO-04-39 | gao_GAO-04-39_0 | Background
Strategic human capital management is a pervasive challenge facing the federal government. Comparing these models, NAPA and IPMA found that the following four steps are generally common to strategic workforce planning efforts: examining future organizational, environmental, and other issues that may affect the agency’s ability to attain its strategic goals; determining skills and competencies needed in the future workforce to meet the organization’s goals and identifying gaps in skills and competencies that an organization needs to address; selecting and implementing human capital strategies that are targeted toward addressing these gaps and issues; and evaluating the success of the human capital strategies. Principle 1: Involve Top Management, Employees, and Other Stakeholders in Developing, Communicating, and Implementing the Strategic Workforce Plan
Planning, developing, and implementing workforce planning strategies, such as those that involve reshaping the current workforce through early separations, managed attrition, or increased hiring, can cause significant changes in how an agency implements its policies and programs. Principle 2: Determine the Critical Skills and Competencies That Will Be Needed to Achieve the Future Programmatic Results
It is essential that agencies determine the skills and competencies that are critical to successfully achieving their missions and goals. 3 for information on NHGRI’s approach for determining critical skills and competencies needed to achieve its strategic goals.) Principle 4: Build the Capability Needed to Address Administrative, Educational, and Other Requirements Important to Supporting Workforce Strategies
In a December 2002 report, we identified key practices that agencies need to employ to effectively take advantage of existing and new human capital authorities. Principle 5: Monitor and Evaluate the Agency’s Progress toward Its Human Capital Goals and the Contribution That Human Capital Results Have Made toward Achieving Programmatic Goals
High-performing organizations recognize the fundamental importance of measuring both the outcomes of human capital strategies and how these outcomes have helped the organizations accomplish their missions and programmatic goals. We also met with officials from organizations with governmentwide responsibilities for or expertise in workforce planning, such as the Office of Personnel Management and the National Academy of Public Administration, to identify additional guidance available and to obtain their recommendations of federal agencies engaged in effective workforce planning. Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges. GAO-03-2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is in a period of profound transition and faces an array of challenges and opportunities to enhance performance, ensure accountability, and position the nation for the future. Effective results-oriented management of the government's most valued resource--its people--is at the heart of this transition. This report is part of a large body of GAO work examining issues in strategic human capital management. Based on GAO's reports and testimonies, review of studies by leading workforce planning organizations, and interviews with officials from the Office of Personnel Management and other federal agencies, this report describes the key principles of strategic workforce planning and provides illustrative examples of these principles drawn from selected agencies' strategic workforce planning experiences.
What GAO Found
Strategic workforce planning addresses two critical needs: (1) aligning an organization's human capital program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals and (2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. While agencies' approaches to workforce planning will vary, GAO identified five key principles that strategic workforce planning should address irrespective of the context in which the planning is done: (1) involve top management, employees, and other stakeholders in developing, communicating, and implementing the strategic workforce plan, (2) determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results, (3) develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies, (4) build the capability needed to address administrative, educational, and other requirements important to support workforce planning strategies, and (5) monitor and evaluate the agency's progress toward its human capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have made toward achieving programmatic results. |
gao_HEHS-95-40 | gao_HEHS-95-40_0 | The Congress partly addressed the plans’ unfunded liability with the District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act of 1979, which changed the District’s payments to the plans to a modified pay-as-you-go basis and authorized annual federal payments to the plans of about $52.1 million. The House bill and the District’s act would eliminate the unfunded liability in the year 2035, mainly by increasing the obligations of the federal government, active plan participants, and retirees, and by placing the District’s contributions on an actuarial basis. Specifically, he asked us to provide the history and current status of the plans’ unfunded pension liability and the number of plan participants before Home Rule, including a comparison of the plans’ unfunded liability with other state and local plans, and an analysis of the District’s funding formula under the proposed legislation and alternative federal funding methods. The report also pointed out that, under the District’s funding formula, in 2005 the unfunded liability would be $8 billion and that the District’s required contribution would be $795 million—about 85 percent of the payroll for the three plans. Proposed Legislation Would Eliminate the Unfunded Liability
The District government deliberated the issue of the three plans’ unfunded liability and enacted legislation to eliminate it. Both bills included provisions for increasing the federal government’s and employees’ obligations and placing the District’s contributions on an actuarial basis. 3.2). Using this approach, the District’s contributions would be slightly lower than current costs in the first few years, then increase in step with payroll. As table 3.1 shows, for example, the 1996 payment is $32.7 million more than the actuarially determined amount. A more equitable federal funding method, which shifts less of the burden to the future, would be a constant annual payment, as under current law (see further discussion in ch. 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the District of Columbia's pension plans for certain employees, focusing on: (1) the history and status of the plans' unfunded pension liability and the number of plan participants prior to Home Rule; (2) a comparison of the plans' unfunded liability with other state and local plans; and (3) the District's funding formula under the proposed legislation and alternative federal funding methods.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the District's pension plans were originally funded on a pay-as-you-go basis with no accrual of monies for future liabilities; (2) even when the plans were put on an actuarial basis, the District's contributions to the pension funds were lower than needed to eliminate the unfunded liabilities; (3) the District's pension plans are not as well funded as some comparable state and local plans; (4) the proposed legislation would eliminate the plans' unfunded liability in 2035 by increasing federal payments, decreasing benefits and cost-of-living adjustments, and placing the District's contributions on an actuarial basis; (5) under the proposed funding method, the federal government would assume about $1 billion of the District's obligations, most of which would be paid in future budget years because of the 5-percent annual increase in the federal payments; (6) the District's contributions for the first 3 years would be at the required minimum and would be higher than the actuarially determined amounts; (7) a constant federal payment of about $102.1 million would shift less of the contribution burden to future federal budgets and taxpayers and would help eliminate the unfunded liability; and (8) options to lower annual federal payments would eliminate the unfunded liability but increase the District's contributions. |
gao_GAO-04-703 | gao_GAO-04-703_0 | Another use for GIS is in the tracking and responding to natural disasters such as hurricanes. Among other things, the circular requires that agencies prepare geographic information strategies, use FGDC data standards, and coordinate and work in partnership with federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. Although Steps Have Been Taken to Coordinate Geospatial Activities, Redundant Investments Remain
OMB, individual federal agencies, and cross-government committees and initiatives such as the Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) and the Geospatial One-Stop project have each taken actions to coordinate the government’s geospatial investments. However, these efforts have not been fully successful in reducing redundancies in geospatial investments for several reasons. First, a complete and up-to-date strategic plan has not been in place. Second, federal agencies have not always fully complied with OMB direction to coordinate their investments. As a result of shortcomings in all three of these domains, federal agencies are independently acquiring and maintaining potentially duplicative and costly data sets and systems. None of OMB’s major oversight processes—the annual review process associated with development of the federal budget, the FEA effort, and the FGDC-administered Circular A-16 reporting process—have been effective tools to help OMB identify major redundancies in federal GIS investments. Without better-coordinated activities, federal agencies are likely to continue to duplicate data collection. Until these shortcomings are addressed, cost savings from eliminating duplicative geospatial investments will not materialize. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the extent to which the federal government is coordinating the sharing of geospatial assets, including through oversight measures in place at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in order to identify and reduce redundancies in federal geospatial data and systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
From homeland security to tracking outbreaks of disease, to investigating the space shuttle disaster to responding to natural disasters, the collection, maintenance, and use of location-based (geospatial) information has become critical to many federal agencies' abilities to achieve their goals. Local governments and the private sector also rely on such data to support essential functions. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the federal government is coordinating the sharing of geospatial assets, including through oversight measures in place at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in order to identify and reduce redundancies in geospatial data and systems.
What GAO Found
OMB, individual federal agencies, and cross-government committees and initiatives such as the Federal Geographic Data Committee and the Geospatial One-Stop project have taken actions to coordinate the government's geospatial investments across agencies and with state and local governments. However, these efforts have not been fully successful in reducing redundancies in geospatial investments for several reasons. First, a complete and up-to-date strategic plan for doing so has not been in place. Second, agencies have not consistently complied with OMB guidance that seeks to identify and reduce duplication. Finally, OMB's oversight of federal geospatial activities has not been effective because its methods--the annual budget review process, the federal enterprise architecture effort, and the Federal Geographic Data Committee's reporting process--are insufficiently developed and have not produced consistent and complete information. As a result of these shortcomings, federal agencies are still independently acquiring and maintaining potentially duplicative and costly data sets and systems. Until these problems are resolved, duplicative geospatial investments are likely to persist. |
gao_GAO-06-958 | gao_GAO-06-958_0 | Formulation of President’s Budget Request for VA Medical Programs Informed by Comparing Cost of Projected Demand and Anticipated Resources
The formulation of the President’s budget requests for VA medical programs for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 was informed by VA’s comparison of its estimation of the cost of projected demand and anticipated resources. Estimated costs for medical care exceeded anticipated resources in both fiscal years 2005 and 2006, and, in formulating the budget, VA addressed the difference with cost-saving policy proposals and estimated savings from management efficiencies. VA Estimated Costs of Medical Programs Based on Projected Demand for Medical Care
VA used an actuarial model to project demand and costs for about 86 percent of its medical programs budget estimate for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. VA used a separate estimation approach, rather than an actuarial model, to project long-term care demand and costs, which accounted for about 10 percent of the funds requested for medical programs for each of the fiscal years 2005 and 2006. VA Closely Monitored Budget Execution and Identified Problems, but Did Not Report Them in a Timely and Sufficiently Informative Manner
Anticipating challenges in managing its medical care programs within available resources, VA closely monitored its medical programs budget execution from the beginning of fiscal year 2005. VA officials told us that in the middle of fiscal year 2005, it became clear that demand for health care services was increasing rapidly—confirming what they had anticipated at the beginning of the fiscal year—and that spending would have to be carefully controlled to manage within its fiscal year 2005 budget for the remainder of the year. In July 2005, the President submitted a budget amendment adding $1.977 billion to his fiscal year 2006 request for VA Medical Services appropriations. VA’s Reporting of Budget Execution Progress and Problems to Congress Could Have Been More Timely and Informative
Despite VA’s identification of potential fiscal year 2005 budget challenges as early as October 2004, Congress did not learn of these challenges until April 2005, when VA reported to Congress that it intended to use funds allocated for equipment and nonrecurring maintenance to fund patient care. We also found that these three quarterly reports did not include information identified in the conference report that would be useful for congressional oversight. Unrealistic Assumptions, Estimation Errors, and Insufficient Data Contributed to VA’s Requests for Additional Funding
The requests for additional funding for VA medical programs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 were caused, in part, by unrealistic assumptions, errors in estimation, and insufficient data in its budget formulation process. Moreover, insufficient data in VA’s initial budget projections contributed to the additional funding requests. For example, VA underestimated the cost of serving veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because estimates for fiscal year 2005 were based on data that largely predated the Iraq conflict and because VA did not have sufficient data for fiscal year 2006 due to challenges in obtaining data needed to identify these veterans from DOD, according to VA officials. Unrealistic Assumptions and Errors in Estimating the Effect of Nursing Home Policies Contributed to Requests for Additional Funding
An unrealistic assumption about the expected time frame in which VA could implement a fiscal year 2005 proposed nursing home cost-saving policy contained in the President’s budget request—a reduction in nursing home patient workload in VA-operated nursing homes—contributed to $226 million of the request for supplemental funding for that fiscal year, VA officials said. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, we examined: (1) how the President’s budget requests for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical programs were formulated, (2) how VA monitored and reported to Congress on its budget execution, and (3) which key factors in the budget formulation process contributed to the requests for additional funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimates it will serve 5.4 million patients in fiscal year 2006. Medical services for these patients are funded with appropriations, after consideration by Congress of the President's budget request. VA formulates the medical programs portion of that request. VA is also responsible for budget execution--using appropriations and monitoring their use for providing care. For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the President requested additional funding for VA medical programs, beyond what had been originally requested. GAO was asked to examine for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (1) how the President's budget requests for VA medical programs were formulated, (2) how VA monitored and reported to Congress on its budget execution, and (3) which key factors in the budget formulation process contributed to requests for additional funding. To do this, GAO analyzed budget documents and interviewed VA and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials.
What GAO Found
The formulation of the President's budget requests for VA medical programs for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 was informed by VA's comparison of its cost estimate of projected demand for medical services to its anticipated resources. VA projected about 86 percent of its costs using an actuarial model that estimated veterans' demand for health care. To project the costs of long-term care (about 10 percent of the funds for VA medical programs in each of these years) and the remaining medical care costs (about 4 percent), separate estimation approaches were used that did not rely upon an actuarial model but used other methods instead. The agency anticipated resources based on prior year appropriations, guidance from OMB, and other factors. For both fiscal years, VA officials told GAO that projected costs--calculated from the actuarial model and other approaches--exceeded anticipated resources and that they addressed the difference in budget requests for those years with cost-saving policy proposals and management efficiencies. Although VA staff closely monitored budget execution and identified problems for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, VA did not report this information to Congress in a sufficiently informative manner. VA closely monitored the fiscal year 2005 budget as early as October 2004, anticipating challenges managing within its resources. However, Congress did not learn of these challenges until April 2005. VA initially planned to manage within its budget for fiscal year 2005 by delaying some spending on equipment and nonrecurring maintenance and drawing on funds it had planned to carry over into 2006. Instead, the President requested additional funds from Congress for both fiscal years 2005 (a $975 million supplemental appropriation in June 2005) and 2006 (a budget amendment of $1.977 billion in July 2005). Congress included in the 2006 appropriations act a requirement for VA to submit quarterly reports regarding the medical programs budget status during this fiscal year. These reports have not included some of the measures that would be useful for congressional oversight, such as patient workload measures to capture costs and the time required for new patients to be scheduled for their first primary care appointment. Unrealistic assumptions, errors in estimation, and insufficient data were key factors in VA's budget formulation process that contributed to the requests for additional funding for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Unrealistic assumptions about how quickly cost savings could be realized from proposed nursing home policy changes contributed to the additional requests, as did computation errors measuring the estimated effect of one of these changes. Insufficient data in VA's initial budget projections also contributed to the additional funding requests. For example, VA underestimated the cost of serving veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because estimates for fiscal year 2005 were based on data that largely predated the Iraq conflict and because according to VA, the agency had challenges for fiscal year 2006 in obtaining data from the Department of Defense. |
gao_GAO-01-935 | gao_GAO-01-935_0 | Background
The PARIS interstate match program was initiated to help state public assistance agencies share information with one another. Its primary objective is to identify individuals or families who may be receiving or having duplicate payments improperly made on their behalf in more than one state. In this voluntary project, the participating states agree to share eligibility data on individuals who are receiving TANF, Food Stamps, Medicaid, or benefits from other state assistance programs. Depending on the state, the same staff in local offices may determine eligibility and benefit levels for all three programs. PARIS: A Potentially Cost-Beneficial Means of Controlling Improper Payments
PARIS coordinators in most of the 16 participating states and the District of Columbia told us they believe the interstate match is effective in identifying improper TANF, Medicaid, and Food Stamps benefit payments in more than one state. This is important because even when two states do not share a border, improper payments can still be made, whether due to error or deliberate deception, such as fraud and abuse. These factors, which could also apply to any participating state, include differences in the extent to which state and local officials follow up on (or fail to pursue) match hits and take action to cut off benefits where appropriate; the methods and assumptions states use to estimate their savings; the proportion of match hits that are valid in that they are found to reflect actual improper benefits being paid in more than one state (a higher proportion of valid match hits will generally yield more program savings than a lower rate, and is more likely to be cost-beneficial);the estimated number of months of avoided benefit payments; the size of the recipient population and the monthly benefits provided in each state under the TANF, Medicaid, and Food Stamp programs; how long it takes local office staff or fraud investigators to follow up on match hits; the salary costs of state and local staff involved with PARIS; and the cost to create an automated list of recipients at the state level to be sent to DMDC. Our analysis suggests that PARIS, as it currently operates, could help save both federal and state program funds. First, only one-third of the states are participating in the matches, and a large portion of the public assistance population is not covered by the matching. Second, the project has some problems with coordination and communication among project participants. As a result, the public assistance records of the other 34 states were not being shared with participating states. PARIS Identifies Duplicate Benefits After They Are Provided
The PARIS project was designed to identify duplicate benefits after they have been provided, not to prevent the duplicate benefits from occurring in the first place. | What GAO Found
Public assistance programs make millions of dollars in improper payments every year. Some of these improper payments occur because state and local agencies that run the programs lack adequate, timely information to determine recipients' eligibility for assistance. This inability to share information can result in both federal and state tax dollars being needlessly spent on benefits for the same individuals and families in more than one state. In 1997, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) began a project to help states share eligibility information with one another. The public assistance reporting information system (PARIS) interstate match helps states share information on public assistance programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamps, to identify individuals or families who may be receiving benefit payments in more than one state simultaneously. Officials in almost all of the 16 states and the District of Columbia that participated in PARIS said that the project has helped identify improper TANF, Medicaid, or Food Stamp payments. Despite its successes, the project has several limitations. First, the opportunity to detect improper duplicate payments is not as great as it could be because only one-third of the states participate. Second, participating states do not have adequate protocols or guidelines to facilitate critical interstate communication. As a result, some states have reported critical problems, such as difficulty determining whether an individual identified in a match is actually receiving benefits in another state. Third, state administrators for the TANF, Medicaid, and Food Stamp programs have not always placed adequate priority on using PARIS matches to identify recipients who are living in other states. As a result, individuals may continue to receive or have benefits paid on their behalf in more than one state even after they were identified through the matching process. Finally, because the PARIS match is only designed to identify people after they are already on the rolls, it does not enable the states to prevent improper payments from being made in the first place. |
gao_GAO-14-64 | gao_GAO-14-64_0 | OMB’s Dashboard Is Intended to Provide Visibility into the Performance of Federal IT Investments
In June 2009, OMB deployed a public Web site to further improve the transparency and oversight of agencies’ IT investments. As a result, the ratings were based on outdated information. It disagreed with our recommendation to improve how it reflects current performance in cost and schedule ratings, but more recently made changes to Dashboard calculations to address this while also noting challenges in comprehensively evaluating cost and schedule data for these investments. CIOs at Selected Agencies’ Rated Majority of IT Investments as Low or Moderately Low Risk
As of August 2013, CIOs at the eight selected agencies rated 198 of their 244 major investments listed on the Dashboard as low risk or moderately low risk. Of the remaining 46 investments, 41 were rated medium risk, and 5 were rated high risk or moderately high risk. Additionally, the total number of investments that the eight agencies reported on the Dashboard has varied over time, which impacts the number of investments receiving CIO ratings (see fig. For example, as part of the most recent budget process, Energy officials reported several of Energy’s supercomputer investments as facilities rather than IT, thus removing those investments from the Dashboard and accounting for a portion of the recent decrease in investments. Most CIO Ratings Are Consistent with Reported Investment Risk
Of the 80 selected investments at the eight agencies we reviewed, 53 of the CIO ratings were consistent with the risks portrayed in the supporting investment performance documents, 20 were partially consistent, and 7 VA investments were inconsistent. Specifically, Justice downgraded its Law Enforcement Wireless Communications investment from major to non-major as part of its annual budget process in July 2012, but the Dashboard did not reflect the change until April 2013. Of the eight investments receiving a red rating in 2012, the agencies reviewed seven using tools such as TechStat sessions,investment review boards, and other high-level reviews. Each of these resulted in action items intended to improve performance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that the Dashboard provides meaningful ratings and reliable investment data, we are recommending that the Director of OMB direct the Federal CIO to make accessible regularly updated portions of the public version of the Dashboard (such as CIO ratings) independent of the annual budget process. OMB believes that the existing guidance is appropriate and does not have plans to review it. First, OMB noted that up-to-date Dashboard information is available to the agencies and OMB during the budget development period, who use it as a tool for investment oversight and decision making. Specifically, Commerce stated that although it is no longer reporting publicly on its satellite ground system investments through the Dashboard, neither the department CIO nor OMB has relinquished its oversight role. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this engagement were to (1) characterize the Chief Information Officer (CIO) ratings for selected federal agencies’ information technology (IT) investments as reported on the Dashboard over time, (2) determine the extent to which selected agencies’ CIO ratings are consistent with reported investment risk, and (3) determine the extent to which selected agencies are addressing at-risk investments. We presented our results to each agency and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and solicited their input, explanations for the results, and additional corroborating documentation, where appropriate. To accomplish the second objective, we selected the top 10 major investments at each of the eight selected agencies (for a total of 80 investments), with the highest reported IT spending in fiscal year 2012. of investment risk and performance (such as cost and schedule variances), which could impact the success of the associated investment. We reviewed the processes used to address these investments and interviewed relevant officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
OMB launched the Dashboard in June 2009 as a public Web site that reports performance for major IT investments--on which the federal government plans to invest over $38 billion in fiscal year 2014. The Dashboard is to provide transparency for these investments and to facilitate public monitoring of them. After its launch, OMB began using it to identify at-risk investments.
This report (1) characterizes the CIO ratings for selected federal agencies' IT investments as reported on the Dashboard over time, (2) determines the extent to which selected agencies' CIO ratings are consistent with investment risk, and (3) determines the extent to which selected agencies are addressing at-risk investments. GAO selected the eight agencies with the most reported major IT spending in fiscal year 2012 (excluding those GAO recently reviewed) and selected 10 investments at each agency. GAO reviewed the investments' documentation, compared it to the CIO ratings, and reviewed processes used for the highest-risk investments. GAO also interviewed appropriate officials.
What GAO Found
As of August 2013, the Chief Information Officers (CIO) at the eight selected agencies rated 198 of their 244 major information technology (IT) investments listed on the Federal IT Dashboard (Dashboard) as low risk or moderately low risk, 41 as medium risk, and 5 as high risk or moderately high risk. However, the total number of investments reported by these agencies has varied over time, which impacts the number of investments receiving CIO ratings. For example, Energy reclassified several of its supercomputer investments from IT to facilities and Commerce decided to reclassify its satellite ground system investments. Both decisions resulted in the removal of the investments from the Dashboard, even though the investments were clearly IT. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not update the public version of the Dashboard as the President's budget request is being created. As a result, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the past 24 months, and so was not available as a tool for investment oversight and decision making.
Of the 80 investments reviewed, 53 of the CIO ratings were consistent with the investment risk, 20 were partially consistent, and 7 were inconsistent. While two agencies' CIO ratings were entirely consistent, other agencies' ratings were inconsistent for a variety of reasons, including delays in updating the Dashboard and how investment performance was tracked. For example, the Department of Justice downgraded an investment in July 2012, but the Dashboard was not updated to reflect this until April 2013. Further, the Social Security Administration resets investment cost and schedule performance baselines annually, an approach that increases the risk of undetected cost or schedule variances that will impact investment success.
Of the eight investments that were at highest risk in 2012, seven were reviewed by their agencies using tools such as TechStat sessions--evidence-based reviews intended to improve investment performance and other high-level reviews. Each of these resulted in action items intended to improve performance. The final investment was scheduled to have a TechStat, but instead, according to department officials, a decision was made to modify its program cost and schedule commitments to better reflect the investment's actual performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB make Dashboard information available independent of the budget process, and that agencies appropriately categorize IT investments and address identified weaknesses. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed. Six agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments and two others did not agree, believing their categorizations were appropriate. GAO continues to believe its recommendations remain valid, as discussed. |
gao_HEHS-97-25 | gao_HEHS-97-25_0 | As of July 1996, almost 10,000 facilities had been accredited and had received an FDA certificate to that effect. FDA, which has contracted with virtually all states and territories to conduct inspections, began its first annual inspections of the nation’s mammography facilities in January 1995. FDA’s field offices are responsible for following up on inspection violations and enforcing facility compliance. 1). Another measure of facilities’ improvement in compliance is the extent of repeat violations, that is, violations identified in the first year’s inspection that are identified again when the facility is reinspected the following year. These differences may have resulted in inconsistent reporting of violations; moreover, these inconsistencies make it difficult to determine the full effect of the inspection process. We identified a need for FDA to clarify the procedures it requires for a major equipment test that evaluates image quality and to follow up when test results suggest problems with the quality of the images being produced. Issues in Evaluating Phantom Image Test Results
One of the most important aspects of the inspection process is testing mammography equipment by evaluating what is called a “phantom image.” In this procedure, the inspector uses the facility’s mammography equipment to take an X-ray image of a plastic block containing 16 test objects. FDA’s procedures allow facilities with serious phantom image failures to continue performing mammograms while FDA investigates and the facility corrects problems. At the time of our review, FDA did not have a follow-up system in place for reviewing the actual mammograms (called “clinical images”) of facilities with serious phantom image violations to ensure that they were not producing poor mammograms. FDA’s Monitoring and Enforcement Process Does Not Ensure Timely Correction of Deficiencies
Although FDA has made progress in bringing facilities into compliance with mammography standards, it lacks procedures to enforce timely correction of all deficiencies found during inspections. One major problem involves the need to develop criteria for defining conditions constituting a serious risk to human health and determining when severe sanctions are warranted. FDA is developing such an information system. Our reviews at three of FDA’s field offices showed that these interim systems were inadequate. To determine whether field offices were sending out warning letters in a timely manner and whether facilities were correcting their deficiencies within required time frames, at our request, FDA headquarters in April 1996 sent all of its field offices a list of all level 1 and level 2 violations cited in their jurisdictions and asked them to compile data on facility response times for corrective actions. Field offices had difficulty responding with complete information. Establishing this comprehensive inspection program has been a substantial effort on FDA’s part and, as mammography facilities move into their second year of inspections, violations of mammography standards are declining. First, to ensure an accurate picture of how many problems were found and how well the inspection program was working, violations would need to be more consistently recorded. Strengthening procedures for assessing image quality and protecting patients. Comments From the Food and Drug Administration and Our Evaluation
The following are GAO’s additional comments on the letter received from the Food and Drug Administration dated November 18, 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) program for implementing the requirements of the Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, focusing on: (1) the extent to which facilities are complying with the new mammography standards; (2) whether FDA's procedures for evaluating image quality at mammography facilities are adequate; and (3) whether FDA's monitoring and enforcement process ensures timely correction of mammography deficiencies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) GAO's work points to growing compliance by facilities with FDA's mammography standards; (2) FDA's first annual inspection began in January 1995, and by mid-1996, over 9,000 facilities had been inspected, and approximately 1,500 of these had undergone two rounds of inspections; (3) the first time these 1,500 facilities were evaluated, 26 percent had significant violations, but the second-year inspection revealed that this figure had dropped to about 10 percent; (4) the percentage of facilities with less significant deviations from quality standards had decreased; (5) while these results are positive, GAO did note some differences in how inspectors are conducting inspections that, left unaddressed, could lead to inconsistent reporting of violations, thereby limiting FDA's ability to determine the full effect of the inspection process and to identify the extent of repeat violations; (6) GAO's review of FDA's actions during the first 18 months of its inspection program showed a need for management attention to two additional aspects of the inspection program; (7) FDA's inspection procedures for an important test of mammography equipment were inadequate; (8) the way this test, called the phantom image test, was conducted was open to variability, which could have resulted in differing assessments of how well the equipment functioned; (9) in those instances in which test results showed serious problems with the phantom image quality, FDA's procedures allowed facilities to continue taking mammograms without follow-up to evaluate whether their quality was actually acceptable; (10) without such follow-up review, women are not fully protected from getting poor mammograms from facilities with potentially severe quality problems; (11) at the time of GAO's review, FDA also lacked procedures to ensure that all violations of standards were both corrected and corrected in a timely manner; (12) FDA's program lacked criteria for defining conditions constituting a serious risk to human health, which could delay enforcement of compliance and notification to women who may have received substandard mammograms; (13) for facilities with less severe but persistent violations, FDA's follow-up efforts could not always ensure corrective action was taken; and (14) delays in completing a management information system have kept FDA's compliance staff from having complete, up-to-date information about the compliance status of all mammography facilities. |
gao_GAO-15-352 | gao_GAO-15-352_0 | 1). In addition, nondepository CDFIs are not supervised by a prudential federal or state regulator unlike other FHLBank members. Stock purchases. Financial condition requirements. Stock-purchase requirements. (We discuss these and other changes later in this report.) As of December 31, 2014, 30 of the 522 nondepository CDFIs were FHLBank members, and 6 of the 12 FHLBanks had membership rates of less than 5 percent for the nondepository CDFIs in their districts. (This is also sometimes the case for other nondepository members such as insurance companies.) Collateral Requirements for Nondepository CDFIs Are Comparable to Those for Higher-Risk Institutions
The collateral requirements—specifically, the pledge method and haircuts—applicable to nondepository CDFIs seeking advances are comparable to those generally imposed on depository members categorized as higher risk and, in some cases, to those imposed on insurance companies. Lack of Eligible Collateral Viewed as Primary Challenge to Obtaining Advances and Steep Haircuts Viewed as Disincentives
Officials from most of the nondepository CDFIs we interviewed cited access to low interest-rate advances from the FHLBanks as the primary benefit of membership, and some FHLBanks and nondepository CDFIs officials cited collateral requirements as challenges or disincentives to obtaining advances. For example, officials from FHLBank-Chicago stated that most nondepository CDFIs possessed assets, such as small business loans, that did not qualify based on statute and regulation as eligible collateral. Less Than Half of Nondepository CDFI Members Have Borrowed from FHLBanks
From October 2010 to September 2014, less than half of the nondepository CDFI members obtained advances from the FHLBanks. However, two FHLBanks provided 57 advances to four nondepository CDFIs that accounted for almost 98 percent of the total advance amount. Efforts to Facilitate Nondepository CDFI Participation in the FHLBank System Include Education and Outreach
FHFA and the FHLBanks have undertaken several efforts to help educate nondepository CDFIs about and promote membership in the FHLBank System. FHFA officials told us that they have continued to encourage the FHLBanks to facilitate broader nondepository CDFI membership and access to advances. Agency and Third Party Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to FHFA and the 12 FHLBanks for their review and comment. FHFA and four FHLBanks (Chicago, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Topeka) provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to discuss (1) how nondepository community development financial institutions (CDFI) differ from other members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System, in particular depository members; (2) the membership and collateral requirements for nondepository CDFIs and challenges posed by these requirements; and (3) Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) oversight of FHLBanks in relation to nondepository CDFIs and efforts by FHFA and FHLBanks to increase participation of nondepository CDFIs in the FHLBank System. To describe differences between nondepository CDFIs and other members of the FHLBank System, we reviewed relevant sections of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) and FHFA’s final rule on nondepository CDFI membership in the FHLBank System. To develop the purposive, nonrandom sample of 10 nondepository FHLBank member CDFIs to interview, we selected a nondepository CDFI from each of the 10 FHLBanks that had a nondepository CDFI member as of March 31, 2014 (the most recent data available when we began our work and selected members to interview). We also selected a purposive, nonrandom sample of 12 nondepository CDFIs that were not members of the FHLBank System, one from each of the 12 FHLBank districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) made nondepository CDFIs eligible for membership in the FHLBank System. The System includes 12 regional FHLBanks that make loans, known as advances, to their members at favorable rates. GAO was asked to review the FHLBanks' implementation of HERA provisions relating to nondepository CDFIs. Among other things, this report discusses (1) challenges posed by membership and collateral requirements for nondepository CDFIs, and (2) FHFA and FHLBank efforts to facilitate broader nondepository CDFI participation in the System.
GAO analyzed data on membership rates as of December 2014 and advances obtained as of September 2014; reviewed requirements for gaining membership and obtaining advances; and interviewed FHLBank and FHFA officials and a sample of nondepository CDFIs based on selected criteria, including geography and asset size. Specifically, GAO interviewed 10 nondepository CDFIs that were members (one from each FHLBank district with a nondepository CDFI member when GAO began work) and 12 that were not members (one from each of the 12 districts).
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to FHFA and the 12 FHLBanks for comment. FHFA and four FHLBanks provided technical comments that were incorporated into the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Collateral requirements rather than membership requirements discouraged some nondepository community development financial institutions (CDFI)—loan or venture capital funds—from seeking membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System. CDFIs are financial institutions that provide credit and financial services to underserved communities. Less than 6 percent of nondepository CDFIs (30 of 522) were members of the System as of December 2014 (see figure). Requirements for membership (such as stock purchase amounts) can vary where regulation gives FHLBanks discretion, but nondepository CDFIs GAO interviewed generally stated these requirements did not present a challenge. In addition, most FHLBanks imposed collateral requirements on nondepository CDFIs—such as haircuts (discounts on the value of collateral)—comparable with those for depository members categorized as higher risk. (This was sometimes also the case for other nondepository members such as insurance companies.) FHLBank officials stated nondepository CDFIs have different risks compared with depository members (for example, nondepository CDFIs are not supervised by a prudential federal or state regulator as are other FHLBank members). To address these risks, they imposed more restrictive requirements. Some of the nondepository CDFIs GAO interviewed cited limited availability of eligible collateral and steep haircuts as challenges for obtaining advances and therefore a disincentive to seeking membership. Less than half of the nondepository CDFIs that were members as of September 2014 had borrowed from the FHLBanks; the cumulative advances from October 2010 to September 2014 totaled about $307 million (less than 1 percent of the total advances outstanding as of December 2014). Two FHLBanks made the majority of the advances.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees the System, and FHLBanks have facilitated efforts to broaden nondepository CDFI participation in the System by educating about and promoting membership to nondepository CDFIs. For example, FHFA officials told us that they encouraged the FHLBanks to hold a conference to discuss nondepository CDFI membership. Officials from 10 FHLBanks also stated that they had solicited applications from CDFIs. In late 2014, several FHLBanks amended stock purchase and collateral requirements to better accommodate nondepository CDFI membership and access to advances. |
gao_GAO-15-464 | gao_GAO-15-464_0 | VA generally considers “substantially gainful employment” to be employment above the federal poverty guidelines— $11,490 for an individual with no dependents in 2013. The Number of Older TDIU Beneficiaries Has Increased
The number of older beneficiaries (age 65 and older) increased for each of the 5 years we examined and by fiscal year 2013, they represented the majority (54 percent) of the TDIU population, as shown in figure 4. By 2013, 180,043 beneficiaries fell within this age group, representing a 73 percent increase from fiscal year 2009. Of these older beneficiaries, 56,578 were 75 years of age and older in fiscal year 2013 while 10,567 were 90 years of age and older. The number of younger beneficiaries (under 40 years of age) increased by 56 percent from fiscal year 2009 through 2013, although they made up a small proportion (5 percent) of the overall TDIU population in fiscal year 2013. VBA’s Guidance, Quality Assurance Approach, and Income Verification Procedures Do Not Ensure That TDIU Decisions Are Well Supported
VBA Has Provided Incomplete Guidance on How to Determine a Veteran’s Unemployability
VBA provides guidance to rating specialists to help them determine if veterans meet the eligibility requirements for TDIU benefits. Another rating specialist denied benefits for a veteran who was a retired dentist. However, because all three conditions related to the veteran’s quality of vision, the rating specialist noted in the file her difficulty separating the effect of the service-connected disability from the non-service-connected glaucoma and macular degeneration due to the man’s age. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should assess performance using control activities, such as quality assurance checks, and that performance information should provide agency officials with information on the extent to which claims decisions are complete, accurate, and consistent. VBA Does Not Verify Self- Reported Income Eligibility Information
While VBA requires TDIU claimants and beneficiaries to provide information on their employment earnings, VBA places the benefits at risk of being awarded to ineligible veterans by not using third-party data sources to independently verify self-reported earnings. Options for Revising TDIU Eligibility Requirements
We Identified Seven Options That Have Been Proposed by Others to Revise TDIU Eligibility Requirements and the Benefit Structure
Based on a review of literature, we identified a number of options proposed by others for revising the TDIU benefit: six focused on revising eligibility requirements and one that would change the benefit structure. Based on interviews with selected experts and representatives of veterans service organizations (VSO), we identified a range of potential strengths and challenges associated with each option. When discussing the potential strengths and challenges of each option, the experts and VSO representatives commonly mentioned the equity of the proposed change, an increase or decrease of VA’s management and administration efforts and cost, and the effect on veterans. Could reduce the total amount of benefits paid out by VA since some beneficiaries would receive reduced benefit payments as they earn income beyond the maximum income. Advisory Committee Recommended Revisions to TDIU, but VA Has Not Taken Action
In 2012, the Advisory Committee on Disability Compensation made recommendations to VA regarding potential revisions to the TDIU benefit, and while VA concurred with those recommendations, it has yet to take actions in response to them. As a consequence, the committee recommended that the agency (1) study whether age should be considered when deciding if a veteran is unemployable and (2) require a vocational assessment for all TDIU applicants. We heard about the subjectivity and challenges in the claims decision-making process throughout our visits to VBA regional offices, which elevate the need to use a thorough process to ensure that rating specialists are bringing reasonably consistent judgments to benefit decisions—which for some individual veterans, could result in 50 or more years of benefits. In addition, VA does not use available third-party earnings data to verify veterans’ self-attested employment history and income information. 2. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report: (1) examines age-related trends in the population of Total Disability Individual Unemployability (TDIU) beneficiaries and benefit payments, (2)assesses how the Department of Veteran Affairs’ (VA) procedures position the agency to ensure that TDIU benefit decisions are supported, and (3) describes suggested options for redesigning TDIU benefits and eligibility requirements. For example, the data provided by VA did not include information such as when a new beneficiary began receiving TDIU benefits or data on how much each beneficiary received in monthly disability payments for the full fiscal year—both of which would affect how much VA paid in benefits for the fiscal year. These approaches include:
Special accuracy reviews: VBA periodically conducts special reviews of claims decisions to assess the accuracy in processing specific types of claims. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA generally provides Individual Unemployability benefits to disabled veterans of any age who are unable to maintain employment with earnings above the federal poverty guidelines due to service-connected disabilities. Because the population of veterans who receive these supplemental benefits has been growing, GAO was asked to review VA's management of these benefits.
This report (1) examines age-related trends in the population of Individual Unemployability beneficiaries and benefit payments; (2) assesses the procedures used for benefit decision-making; and (3) describes suggested options for revising the benefit. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2009 through 2013 data provided by VA—the most recent years available; reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, and program policies; visited six regional offices selected for their differing accuracy rates, workload, and geography; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of claims; and spoke with rating specialists, experts, and VSO representatives.
What GAO Found
The number of older veterans receiving Individual Unemployability benefits, a disability supplement, has been increasing, as has the total amount of benefit payments. In fiscal year 2013, 330,000 veterans received this benefit, which the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides to disabled veterans of any age who are unemployable because of service-connected disabilities. From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the most recent data available, there was a 22 percent increase in the number of veterans receiving these benefits, and a 73 percent increase in the subgroup of beneficiaries aged 65 and older. Moreover, among new beneficiaries in 2013, about 2,800 veterans were 75 and older, of which more than 400 were 90 and older. These trends have given rise to questions about what constitutes “unemployability.” Only a small proportion, 4 to 6 percent, of beneficiaries had benefits discontinued during these years—about 70 percent of which were due to the death of the beneficiary. During the 5-year study period, disability payments to those receiving Individual Unemployability—the base payment plus the supplement—increased by 30 percent (to $11 billion in fiscal year 2013). For that year, GAO estimated $5.2 billion for the supplement alone.
VA's procedures do not ensure that Individual Unemployability benefit decisions are well-supported. For example, contrary to federal internal control standards, the guidance on determining unemployability is incomplete for ensuring consistency. In discussion groups with GAO, VA's rating specialists said they disagreed on the factors they need to consider when determining unemployability, weighed the same factors differently, and had difficulty separating allowable from non-allowable factors. Some specialists said these challenges create the risk that two raters could examine the same evidence and reach an opposite decision to approve or deny a claim. Also, VA's quality assurance approach primarily checks the procedural accuracy of decisions and does not ensure a comprehensive assessment of whether decisions are complete, accurate, and consistent. In addition, VA does not independently verify self-reported earnings information supplied by applicants and beneficiaries, although the agency has access to Internal Revenue Service data for this purpose. VA officials said they are waiting for a data system, expected in 2016, to conduct verifications. However, by postponing verification of self-reported earnings, the benefit is at risk of being awarded to ineligible veterans.
Based on a review of literature, GAO identified various options for revising eligibility requirements and the structure of the Individual Unemployability benefit. Six options focus on eligibility requirements, such as considering additional criteria when determining unemployability and applying an age cap of 65. The seventh option would change the benefit structure by reducing payments as beneficiaries earn income in excess of the poverty threshold. Experts and representatives of veterans service organizations (VSO) that GAO interviewed identified the potential strengths of each option (such as improved decision accuracy) and potential challenges (such as increased need for fiscal and administrative resources). In addition, VA's advisory committee recommended in 2012 that the agency study age and require vocational assessments when weighing veterans' unemployability; VA agreed to study both, but has not yet taken action.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA issue updated guidance to determine eligibility; identify a comprehensive quality assurance approach to assess benefit decisions; verify veterans' self-reported income; and move forward on studies suggested by its advisory committee. VA concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-625 | gao_GAO-10-625_0 | The Recovery Act provided up to 100 percent federal funding available for expenditure until 2017 and exempted projects from having to be included in a state rail plan; however, it did require, by incorporating the programs and the requirements of PRIIA, that the funds be competitively awarded and that the Department of Transportation develop a strategic plan to use these funds. Amtrak’s trains are generally limited to top speeds of 79 miles per hour off the Northeast Corridor and up to 150 miles per hour on the corridor. 1.) States Developed Services by Generating Support, Securing Funding, Obtaining Equipment, and Managing Services
Officials from states that initiated or improved intercity passenger rail services in the recent past told us that their ability to start or upgrade their services largely hinged on their ability to resolve a number of issues. Second, states acquired equipment for their services through collaborative and cost-saving approaches. The activities that helped states initiate and improve their services will be important for states seeking to initiate or improve services in the future— including developing conventional passenger rail, higher speed passenger rail, and high speed rail. Public and Political Support and Funding Provided a Foundation for States to Develop Passenger Rail Services
State officials favoring investment in intercity passenger rail services secured funding to initiate or expand such services by achieving public and political support and by using innovative approaches for funding both capital and operating costs. States Managed Services by Building Consensus with Stakeholders, Borrowing Expertise, and Developing State Capacity
States developed a variety of planning processes and approaches to stakeholder involvement as a way to build consensus among freight railroads, Amtrak, and other states. Industry Stakeholders View Federal Leadership as Important in Creating a Robust Intercity Passenger Rail Market
Rail industry stakeholders, such as passenger rail operators, freight rail right-of-way owners, passenger rail car manufacturers, and general contractors are optimistic that they can meet increased public investment in intercity passenger rail, but they are looking for federal leadership and funding to create a structure for developing high speed rail. Additionally, stakeholders said that a stable federal funding stream would encourage firms to enter and invest in the intercity passenger rail marketplace. However, even after guidance is given on the application of federal laws and states advertise contracts, it could take several years to provide the necessary infrastructure such as new passenger rail cars, potentially making it difficult to spend Recovery Act high speed rail funds by September 30, 2017, as required by law. 2.) Among other things, recent legislation required FRA to draft a preliminary national rail plan and quickly develop a strategic vision for high speed rail while creating a new federal program to distribute and oversee a large increase in federal funds. Development of a National Rail Plan Consistent with State Rail Plans Could Increase the Accountability and Transparency of Federal High Speed Rail Funds
FRA’s Preliminary National Rail Plan recognizes the importance of these state rail plans and anticipates coordinating its National Rail Plan with them into an “efficient national system…meeting both regional and national goals.” However, FRA officials stated that as the agency is developing its capacity and processes to manage this new intercity passenger rail program, some states are further behind in developing their capacity and processes to apply for passenger rail funds. As a result, Congress specifically exempted projects funded with Recovery Act funds and fiscal year 2010 appropriations from this requirement to speed their distribution and use. The strategic vision outlined FRA’s proposed strategy to implement the act’s funding for high speed rail corridors; however, it did not define the goals, roles of stakeholders, or objectives for federal involvement in high speed intercity passenger rail. FRA is planning to address these principles in its grant oversight approach. In particular, some states do not have a state rail plan that identifies the states’ strategies, priorities, and possible public benefits of public investment in rail transportation. The department did not express an overall view on the draft report. It did provide technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated. We reviewed federal laws including the Recovery Act and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 to describe FRA’s new responsibilities regarding passenger rail investment. We also interviewed FRA officials responsible for passenger rail development to determine how FRA is planning to oversee the use of Recovery Act and other federal funds for intercity passenger rail investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) and subsequent appropriations have dramatically increased federal funds available for high speed intercity passenger rail from $120 million in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 combined to $10.5 billion available in fiscal year 2010. Other issues, such as developing industry capacity to supply rail equipment and fostering multiyear public support for such systems must be resolved. As part of its efforts to assess Recovery Act initiatives, GAO reviewed (1) how states started or improved passenger rail services in the recent past, (2) rail industry plans to accommodate the increased passenger rail investments, and (3) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) plans to oversee the use of federal intercity passenger rail funds. GAO reviewed federal legislation; interviewed state, industry and federal officials; and reviewed selected literature. GAO is not making any recommendations. The Department of Transportation did not express an overall opinion on a draft of this report. It did provide technical and clarifying comments, which GAO incorporated.
What GAO Found
State successes to initiate or improve intercity passenger rail services in the recent past (the last 15 years), hinged largely on their abilities to build public and political support, secure funding, obtain equipment, and manage their services. Public and political support and funding provided a foundation for these services. States acquired equipment by using collaborative and cost-saving approaches. Further, states managed their rail services by building consensus with stakeholders, borrowing expertise, and developing state capacity. All of these activities will be important for states that seek to initiate or improve services in the future, including developing conventional passenger rail (operating at speeds up to 79 miles per hour), higher speed passenger rail (operating at speeds up to 150 miles per hour), and even high speed rail services (operating at speeds of 150 miles per hour or more). Rail industry stakeholders are optimistic that they can meet increased public investment in intercity passenger rail; however, they are looking for (1) federal leadership in setting safety standards for high speed rail and in promoting interstate cooperation for service across state lines, among other things, and (2) stable funding to create a structure for developing a passenger rail marketplace. Additionally, stakeholders said that a stable federal funding stream would encourage firms to enter and invest in the intercity passenger rail marketplace. However, even with strong federal leadership and funding it could take several years to provide the necessary infrastructure, such as for building new passenger rail cars, potentially making it difficult to spend some Recovery Act high speed rail funds by 2017, as required by law. As a result of Recovery Act funding and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, FRA has had to develop a rail program and an oversight approach. Among other things, FRA had to quickly draft a preliminary national rail plan and a high speed rail strategic vision, as well as develop a program to distribute Recovery Act funds. As a result, FRA officials stated that they concentrated their efforts on meeting these requirements and they are currently designing their oversight program. FRA is in its early stages of setting up agreements with its state grantees and hiring both FRA and contractor personnel to oversee how the federal funds are used. FRA is planning to release another version of its national rail plan in September 2010 which it expects to discuss issues such as the roles of federal, state, and local governments in rail transportation and public and private funding sources. The strategic vision did not define the goals, stakeholder roles, or objectives for federal involvement in high speed intercity passenger rail and the preliminary national rail plan did not have any recommendations for future action. While states will be the recipients of Recovery Act funds, many states do not have state rail plans that would establish strategies and priorities, capital investments, and public benefits of rail investments in the state. To try to stimulate the economy quickly, Congress exempted projects funded by the Recovery Act and recent appropriations from being in state rail plans. |
gao_GAO-11-315 | gao_GAO-11-315_0 | Primary Guidance Governing Visa Security Program Operations
Since the establishment of the Visa Security Program, ICE and State have issued four primary forms of guidance governing VSP operations overseas: (1) a 2003 memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning implementation of the Homeland Security Act; (2) a 2004 MOU on administrative aspects of assigning personnel overseas; (3) a 2008 cable directing State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) officers, VSP agents, and the senior consular officer at each post to develop standard operating procedures; and (4) a 2011 MOU delineating the roles and responsibilities of VSP agents, consular officers, and diplomatic security officers in daily operations of VSP at posts overseas. Although ICE upgraded the VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures, hampering ICE’s efforts to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not produced reports identifying the progress made toward achieving VSP objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities prior to 2010 were limited by inconsistencies. ICE Unable to Accurately Assess the Value of the VSP
From 2003 to 2010, ICE did not maintain comprehensive data on its identified performance measures to fully assess progress toward VSP objectives. ICE’s 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, issued in 2007, identified three primary mission objectives to enhance national security and public safety: 1. identify and counteract threats before they reach the United States, 2. identify not-yet-known threats to homeland security, and 3. maximize the law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process. However, ICE does not track these activities systematically and cannot evaluate the comprehensive effort of these activities. ICE has presented some anecdotal examples of VSP participation in the visa process. First, limited guidance from headquarters regarding VSP operations has led to confusion and inconsistency among posts. Consular officers at this post stated they did not understand the VSP’s mission. VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions in addition to their visa security workload, such as conducting nonconsular investigations, serving as ICE’s official presence in the region, and performing the duties of DHS attachés. Furthermore, the VSP tracking system does not collect data on the time VSP agents spend on visa security activities. Both the VSP agent and Consul General at this post recommended that all VSP agents receive language training. According to ICE officials, ICE’s ability to provide language training for VSP agents is limited by budgetary constraints. Furthermore, ICE has not fully addressed remaining visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection and that the expansion plan represents an effort to address visa risk, ICE has not expanded the VSP to some high-risk posts. For example, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified by ICE and State are not covered by VSP. The expansion of the VSP may be limited by a number of factors—including budget limitations and objections from State officials at some posts—and ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. ICE’s plan identified 14 posts for expansion in 2009 and 2010, but ICE did not establish VSP units at 9 of these 14 posts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Visa Security Program enhances the security of the visa process at posts overseas, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: 1. ensure that the VSP tracking system collects reliable data on all performance measures, to allow ICE to accurately evaluate VSP performance and report to Congress on progress toward the VSP mission objectives; 2. issue guidance requiring VSP agents to provide training for consular officers as mandated by section 428 of the Homeland Security Act; 3. develop a mechanism to track the amount of time spent by VSP agents on visa security activities and other investigations, in order to determine appropriate staffing levels and resource needs for VSP operations at posts overseas to ensure visa security operations are not limited; and 4. develop a plan to provide VSP coverage at high-risk posts where the possibility of deploying agents may be limited. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the ability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to measure the objectives and performance of the Visa Security Program (VSP), we reviewed VSP mission objectives and performance measures identified in Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) 5- year expansion plan. We reviewed data from the VSP tracking system, used to collect information on daily VSP activities, and compared the data collected from the system with the measures and mission objectives identified in the expansion plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas.
What GAO Found
ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance. |
gao_GAO-12-29 | gao_GAO-12-29_0 | IHS’s Ability to Collect and Preserve Medical Forensic Evidence Varies by Hospital
IHS has limited information on the ability of IHS and tribally operated hospitals to collect and preserve medical forensic evidence in cases of sexual assault and domestic violence, as needed for criminal prosecution—that is, on the hospitals’ ability to offer medical forensic services. We also found that the services available at a hospital generally developed without direction from IHS headquarters and have fluctuated over time. In addition, the utility of such evidence in any subsequent criminal prosecution depends on hospital staff’s properly securing and storing physical evidence, which may in turn depend largely on coordinating with law enforcement agencies. Of the 34 hospitals categorized as remote, 22 hospitals reported that they are able to perform medical forensic exams for adults, children, or both; 12 of the 34 hospitals reported referring victims to other facilities. Local medical providers chose to provide such exams in response to an unmet need for such services in their area, not because IHS headquarters directed them to do so. IHS and Tribal Hospitals Face Several Challenges in Standardizing and Sustaining the Provision of Medical Forensic Services
Since enactment of the Indian Health Care Improvement Reauthorization and Extension Act of 2009 (on March 23, 2010) and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (on July 29, 2010), IHS has made significant progress in developing policies and procedures regarding medical forensic services for victims of sexual abuse, as the acts required. The new policy, issued in March 2011, is an important and sound first step in what is planned to be a continuing effort to provide a standardized level of medical forensic services. These challenges include systemic issues—such as overcoming long travel distances and developing staffing models that overcome problems with staff burnout, high turnover, and compensation—so that standardized medical forensic services can be provided over the long term. In general, our work confirmed that IHS is aware of the challenges that it faces and either has initiatives under way to address them or is trying to formulate such initiatives. Establishing Plans to Help Ensure That Hospitals Consistently Implement and Follow the March 2011 Sexual Assault Policy
Now that its initial sexual assault policy is in place, IHS faces the challenge of ensuring that its hospitals consistently implement the policy and follow its guidelines. Developing Policies on Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse
IHS’s March 2011 sexual assault policy instructs IHS hospitals to provide a standardized response to adult and adolescent victims of sexual assault. Factors besides Medical Forensic Evidence also Contribute to Decisions to Prosecute Cases of Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence
Decisions to prosecute sexual assault or domestic violence cases are based on the totality of evidence collected, one piece of which is medical forensic evidence collected by IHS and tribally operated hospitals. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials said they consider several factors—including medical forensic evidence collected by hospitals. In some cases, medical forensic evidence may be a crucial factor; in others, however, it may not be relevant or available. Some victims in small reservations or isolated villages may refuse to cooperate or may retract their initial statement, for example, because of pressure exerted on them by family or community members who may depend on the alleged perpetrator for necessities such as food or fuel. As a result, the victim may be unavailable to testify. Additionally, according to several prosecutors with whom we spoke, the availability to testify of medical providers who performed the associated medical forensic exams at IHS or tribally operated hospitals is an important factor because such testimony can help demonstrate that an assault occurred or help otherwise support a victim’s account of an assault. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve or expand medical forensic exams and related activities for the 28 IHS operated hospitals, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Director of the Indian Health Service to take the following five actions: Develop an implementation plan for the March 2011 IHS sexual assault policy (Indian Health Manual, chapter 3.29)—and monitor its progress—to clarify how the agency will support its hospitals and staff in fulfilling the policy, in particular, that the hospitals or staff: obtain training and certification in providing forensic medical obtain equipment like cameras needed to collect evidence; provide medical forensic exams on site or at a referral facility within 2 hours of a patient’s arrival; and collaborate with law enforcement agencies, prosecution, and other stakeholders identified in the policy with the objective of creating sexual assault response teams and obtaining regular feedback from such stakeholders on evidence collection and preservation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the ability of Indian Health Service (IHS) and tribally operated hospitals to collect and preserve medical forensic evidence for use in criminal prosecution in sexual assault and domestic violence cases; (2) what challenges, if any, these hospitals face in collecting and preserving such evidence, particularly in remote Indian reservations and Alaska Native villages; and (3) what factors besides medical forensic evidence collected by these hospitals contribute to a decision to prosecute such cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Justice Department has reported that Indians are at least twice as likely to be raped or sexually assaulted as all other races in the United States. Indians living in remote areas may be days away from health care facilities providing medical forensic exams, which collect evidence related to an assault for use in criminal prosecution. The principal health care provider for Indians, which operates or funds tribes to operate 45 hospitals, is the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service (IHS). In response to a Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 mandate, GAO examined (1) the ability of IHS and tribally operated hospitals to collect and preserve medical forensic evidence involving cases of sexual assault and domestic violence, as needed for criminal prosecution; (2) what challenges, if any, these hospitals face in collecting and preserving such evidence; and (3) what factors besides medical forensic evidence contribute to a decision to prosecute such cases. GAO surveyed all 45 IHS and tribally operated hospitals and interviewed IHS and law enforcement officials and prosecutors..
What GAO Found
GAO's survey of IHS and tribally operated hospitals showed that the ability of these hospitals to collect and preserve medical forensic evidence in cases of sexual assault and domestic violence--that is, to offer medical forensic services--varies from hospital to hospital. Of the 45 hospitals, 26 reported that they are typically able to perform medical forensic exams on site for victims of sexual assault on site, while 19 reported that they choose to refer sexual assault victims to other facilities. The hospitals that provided services began to do so generally in response to an unmet need, not because of direction from IHS headquarters, according to hospital officials. Partly as a result, levels of available services have fluctuated over time. GAO found that the utility of medical forensic evidence in any subsequent criminal prosecution depends on hospital staff's properly preserving an evidentiary chain of custody, which depends largely on coordinating with law enforcement agencies. IHS has made significant progress since 2010 in developing required policies and procedures on medical forensic services for victims of sexual assault; nevertheless, challenges in standardizing and sustaining the provision of such services remain. In March 2011, IHS took a sound first step in what is planned to be an ongoing effort to standardize medical forensic services by issuing its first agencywide policy on how hospitals should respond to adult and adolescent victims of sexual assault. Remaining challenges include systemic issues such as overcoming long travel distances between Indian reservations or Alaska Native villages and IHS or tribal hospitals and developing staffing models that overcome problems with staff burnout, high turnover, and compensation, so that standardized medical forensic services can be provided over the long term. In addition, other challenges include establishing plans to help ensure that IHS hospitals consistently implement and follow the March 2011 policy, such as with training guidelines, and developing policies on how IHS hospitals should respond to domestic violence incidents and sexual abuse involving children who have not yet reached adolescence--neither of which is included in the March 2011 policy. GAO found that IHS is aware of these challenges and has initiatives under way or under consideration to address them. Decisions to prosecute sexual assault or domestic violence cases are based on the totality of evidence, one piece of which is medical forensic evidence collected by hospitals. In some cases, medical forensic evidence may be a crucial factor; in other cases, however, it may not be relevant or available. Law enforcement officers and prosecutors said that they also consider several other factors when deciding to refer or accept a case for prosecution. For example, some victims in small reservations or isolated villages may refuse to cooperate or may retract their initial statements because of pressure from community members who may depend on the alleged perpetrator for necessities. As a result, the victim may be unavailable to testify. Several prosecutors also told us that the availability to testify of the providers who perform medical forensic exams is an important factor, because such testimony can help demonstrate that an assault occurred or otherwise support a victim's account. IHS's March 2011 policy, however, does not clearly and comprehensively articulate the agency's processes for responding to subpoenas or requests for employee testimony.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations aimed at improving IHS's response to sexual assault and domestic violence, including to develop an implementation and monitoring plan for its new sexual assault policy and to modify sections of the policy regarding required training and subpoenas or requests to testify. The Department of Health and Human Services and the state of Alaska generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-325 | gao_GAO-13-325_0 | For example, under FAR part 6, justifications must include, at a minimum, 12 elements.these required elements include: a description of the supplies or services required to meet the agency’s needs and their estimated value; identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition; a determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the government will be fair and reasonable; a description of market research conducted, if any; and a statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisitions for the supplies or services required. Since fiscal year 2008 the competition rate has declined 5.5 percentage points, from 62.6 percent in fiscal year 2008 to 57.1 percent in fiscal year 2012 (see figure 1). We also found that the competition rate for all contract obligations varied by DOD component in fiscal year 2012. Based on our analysis of FPDS-NG data in fiscal year 2012 the majority of DOD’s noncompetitive contracts and task orders on single award contracts were coded under the “only one responsible source” exception. Multiple Factors Affect DOD’s Competition Rate, but They Are Not Always Considered When Setting Competition Goals
There are a number of factors that affect DOD’s competition rate. For example, reliance on an original equipment manufacturer throughout the life cycle of a program and budget uncertainty are long-standing challenges impacting DOD’s ability to compete. Noncompetitive purchases that DOD makes on behalf of foreign governments affect DOD’s competition rate as well. DOD does not systematically identify, track, and consider the specific factors that are affecting competition when setting its annual competition goals. The Better Buying Power initiative also added a new requirement that a competitive strategy be presented at each milestone for defense acquisition programs. For example, in its fiscal year 2011 competition report, the Air Force noted that it expected a significant impact to its fiscal year 2012 competition rate as the result of an anticipated $10 billion FMS award. Some justifications in our sample provided clear descriptions of sole-source environments where only one source was available to meet the government’s needs, and others included detailed descriptions of planned actions that could help improve competition in the future. However, other justifications provided limited insight into the reasons for the noncompetitive award or did not fully describe actions that the agency could take to increase future competition. The new rules attempt to ensure adequate solicitation time (i.e., resolicitation rule), ensure that contract requirements are not unnecessarily restrictive (i.e., program office consultation rule), and verify that offers received are fair and reasonable (i.e., cost/price analysis rule). Our analysis of 35 one-offer awards determined that 10 of these awards were incorrectly coded in FDPS-NG by contracting officers. Furthermore, we believe DOD cannot use the data to accurately calculate the amount obligated on one-offer awards during fiscal year 2012. The remaining 4 awards received multiple offers, but the contracting officer incorrectly coded them as receiving one offer. The one-offer requirement is intended to be a means to achieve this goal. Without reliable data, DOD cannot accurately measure the impact of the new requirement. While the justifications and approvals for noncompetitive awards that we reviewed generally met FAR requirements, they varied in the level of insight that they provided into the reasons for noncompetitive awards. Without this information, DOD may be missing opportunities to gain a richer understanding of why past acquisitions were not competitive and to apply those lessons to effectively facilitate competition for future acquisitions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better inform DOD’s efforts to enhance competition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: identify and track the specific factors that affect the competition rate, such as foreign military sales, and consider this information when setting annual competition goals for each DOD component; develop guidance that could enable DOD components to apply lessons learned from past procurements to increase competition for the same good and services in the future; and develop an action plan for DOD components to collect reliable data on competitive procurements for which only one offer is received, so that the department can determine the effect of its new requirement on one-offer contracts. In written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this review were to examine (1) trends in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of noncompetitive awards; (2) factors influencing DOD’s competition rate; (3) the extent to which justifications for exceptions to competitive procedures provided insight into the reasons for noncompetitive awards; and (4) the impact of DOD’s new requirement on contracts awarded using competitive procedures but for which only one offer was received. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to examine the trends in DOD’s use of noncompetitive awards and the factors influencing DOD’s competition rate, including the number of awards, dollar amount obligated, and the percentage of contracts awarded competitively overall and by component. To gain insight into how DOD sets competition goals, we reviewed DOD policy and spoke with DOD officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition is the cornerstone of a sound acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best return on investment for taxpayers. In fiscal year 2012, DOD obligated $359 billion through contracts and task orders, of which 57 percent was competed. DOD also obligates billions of dollars annually on contracts that are awarded competitively, but for which the government received only one offer. DOD implemented the Better Buying Power initiative in 2010, in an effort to increase competition.
The conference report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to report on DODs non-competitive and one-offer contracts. GAO examined (1) trends in DODs use of noncompetitive awards; (2) factors influencing DODs competition rate; (3) the extent to which justifications provided insight into the reasons for noncompetitive awards; and (4) the impact of DODs new requirement for competitive solicitations that only elicit one offer. GAO analyzed federal procurement data for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, reviewed DOD policy and competition reports, examined nongeneralizable samples of awards, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defenses (DOD) competition rate for all contract obligations declined over the past five fiscal years, from 62.6 percent in fiscal year 2008 to 57.1 percent in fiscal year 2012. GAO also found that the competition rate in fiscal year 2012 varied by specific DOD component with the Air Force having the lowest at 37.1 percent and the Defense Logistics Agency the highest at 83.3 percent. The majority of the noncompetitive awards cited the availability of only one responsible source to meet the governments needs as the reason for using noncompetitive procedures.
A number of factors affect DODs competition rate, but these factors are not always considered when setting DODs annual competition goals. For example, reliance on an original equipment manufacturer throughout the life cycle of a program has been a long-standing challenge for DOD competition, and budget uncertainty can also hinder DODs ability to compete. Noncompetitive purchases that DOD makes on behalf of foreign governments can also affect DODs competition rate. DOD does not systematically consider these and other factors when setting its annual competition goals. For example, it sets competition goals for individual DOD components by simply adding two percentage points to the rate achieved in the previous year. Without identifying and tracking the specific factors affecting competition DOD cannot set meaningful goals for improving competition or accurately gauge its progress toward achieving them.
Many of the noncompetitive justifications GAO reviewed included the required elements as defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation; however, the level of insight into the reasons for noncompetitive awards varied. For example, some justifications included clear descriptions of market environments where only one source was available to meet the governments needs or described planned actions that could help improve competition in the future. However, other justifications provided limited insight into the reasons for the noncompetitive award or did not fully describe actions that the agency could take to increase future competition. Without this information, DOD may be missing opportunities to gain a fuller understanding of why past acquisitions were not competitive and may be unable to apply those lessons to effectively facilitate competition for future acquisitions.
In 2010, DOD introduced a new requirement that applies to competitive awards that elicit only one offer (one-offer awards); however, the impact of the requirement is unknown because of unreliable data. To address the risk associated with one-offer awards, the requirement established rules that were intended to help ensure adequate solicitation time, ensure that contract requirements are not unnecessarily restrictive, and verify that offers received are fair and reasonable. However, GAOs analysis of 35 one-offer awards determined that contracting officers had incorrectly coded 10 of these awards in the procurement database that DOD relies on to measure the impact of its new requirement. Six of the 10 awards were noncompetitive awards and the remaining 4 had received multiple offers. As a result, GAO determined that DODs data cannot be used to accurately calculate the amount obligated on one-offer awards during fiscal year 2012. Without reliable data, DOD cannot accurately measure the impact of its new requirement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD identify, track, and consider the specific factors that affect competition when setting competition goals; develop guidance to apply lessons learned from past procurements to help achieve competition in the future; and collect reliable data on one-offer awards. DOD concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-841 | gao_GAO-09-841_0 | Navy ERP is one such system investment. FOC is now planned for fiscal year 2013, and the estimated life-cycle cost is about $2.4 billion (a 31 percent increase over the original estimate). Prior GAO Reviews of DOD Business System Investments Have Identified IT Management Weaknesses
We have previously reported that DOD has not effectively managed key aspects of a number of business system investments, including Navy ERP. We made recommendations to address these areas, including having the IV&V agent report directly to program oversight bodies, as well as the program manager. In addition, each event. Test Results Were Documented and Reported, but Key Information about Changes to the Status of Reported Defects Was Not Always Recorded
According to industry guidance, effective system testing includes capturing, analyzing, resolving, and disclosing to decision makers the status of problems found during testing (i.e., test defects). This addition is a positive step because without an effective information system access audit tool, the probability of test defect status errors or unauthorized changes is increased. To its credit, the Navy ERP program has formally documented a change control process. Further, it has defined roles and responsibilities and a related decision-making structure for reviewing and approving system changes. Specifically, our review of a random sample of 60 change requests and minutes of related board meetings held between May 2006 and April 20 showed that the change requests were captured and tracked using an automated tool, and they were reviewed and approved by the designated decision-making authorities and boards, in accordance with the program documented process. According to program officials, the cost and schedule impacts of each change were discussed at control board meetings. Because performance of the system development and management role ma contractor potentially unable to render impartial assistance to the government in performing the IV&V function, the contractor has an inherent conflict of interest relative to meeting cost and schedule commitments and disclosing the results of verification and validation reviews that may affect its ability to do so. As we have previously reported, the IV&V function should report the issues or weaknesses that increase the risks associated with the project to program oversight officials, as well as to program management, to better ensure that the verification and validation results are objective and that the officials responsible for making program investment decisions are fully informed . Beyond the IV&V function’s lack of independence, the program office h not ensured that the subcontractor has produced the range of deliv that were contractually required and defined in the IV&V plan. However, the IV&V contractor has largely not delivered these products. The first planned assessment was delivered to the program in March 2009 he program’s configuration and provides recommendations for improving t management process, such as using the automated tool to produce certain reports and enhancing training to understand how the tool is use Further, program officials stated that they have also recently begun requiring the contractor to provide formal quarterly reports, the first of which was de of this quarterly report shows that it provides recommendations for improving the program’s risk management process and organizational change management strategy. Our review Notwithstanding the recent steps that the program office has taken, nevertheless lacks an independent perspective on the program’s products and management processes. The Navy ERP program office has largely implemented a range of effective controls associated with system testing and change control, including acting quickly to address issues with the audit log for its test manage tool, but more can be done to ensure that the cost and sched proposed changes are explicitly documented and considered when decisions are reached. Moreover, while the program office has contract for IV&V activities, it has not ensured that the contractor is indepen the products and processes that it is to review and has not held the contractor accountable for producing the full range of IV&V deliverables required under the contract. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the management of Navy ERP’s change control process, recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, through the appropriate chain of command, to (1) revise the Navy ERP procedures for controlling system changes to explicitly require that a proposed change’s life-cycle cost impact be estimated and considered in making change request decisions and (2) capture the cost and schedule impacts of each proposed change in the Navy ERP automated change c ontrol tracking tool. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) system testing is being effectively managed, (2) system changes are being effectively con and (3) independent verification and validation (IV&V) activities a effectively managed for the Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long been challenged in effectively implementing key acquisition management controls on its thousands of business system investments. For this and other reasons, GAO has designated DOD's business systems modernization efforts as high-risk since 1995. One major business system investment is the Navy's Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. Initiated in 2003, it is to standardize the Navy's business processes, such as acquisition and financial management. It is being delivered in increments, the first of which is to cost about $2.4 billion over its 20-year useful life and be fully deployed by fiscal year 2013. To date, the program has experienced about $570 million in cost overruns and a 2-year schedule delay. GAO was asked to determine whether (1) system testing is being effectively managed, (2) system changes are being effectively controlled, and (3) independent verification and validation (IV&V) activities are being effectively managed. To do this, GAO analyzed relevant program documentation, traced random samples of test defects and change requests, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Navy has largely implemented effective controls on Navy ERP associated with system testing and change control. For example, it has established a well-defined structure for managing tests, including providing for a logical sequence of test events, adequately planning key test events, and documenting and reporting test results. In addition, it has documented, and is largely following, its change request review and approval process, which reflects key aspects of relevant guidance, such as having defined roles and responsibilities and a hierarchy of control boards. However, important aspects of test management and change control have not been fully implemented. Specifically, the program's tool for auditing defect management did not always record key data about changes made to the status of identified defects. To its credit, the program office recently took steps to address this, thereby reducing the risk of defect status errors or unauthorized changes. Also, while the program office's change review and approval procedures include important steps, such as considering the impact of a change, and program officials told GAO that cost and schedule impacts of a change are discussed at control board meetings, GAO's analysis of 60 randomly selected change requests showed no evidence that cost and schedule impacts were in fact considered. Without such key information, decision-making authorities lack an adequate basis for making informed investment decisions, which could result in cost overruns and schedule delays. The Navy has not effectively managed its IV&V activities, which are designed to obtain an unbiased position on whether product and process standards are being met. In particular, the Navy has not ensured that the IV&V contractor is independent of the products and processes that it is reviewing. Specifically, the same contractor responsible for performing IV&V of Navy ERP products (e.g., system releases) is also responsible for ensuring that system releases are delivered within cost and schedule constraints. Because performance of this system development and management role makes the contractor potentially unable to render impartial assistance to the government in performing the IV&V function, there is an inherent conflict of interest. In addition, the IV&V agent reports directly and solely to the program manager and not to program oversight officials. As GAO has previously reported, the IV&V agent should report the findings and associated risks to program oversight officials, as well as program management, in order to better ensure that the IV&V results are objective and that the officials responsible for making program investment decisions are fully informed. Furthermore, the contractor has largely not produced the range of IV&V deliverables that were contractually required between 2006 and 2008. To its credit, the program office recently began requiring the contractor to provide assessment reports, as required under the contract, as well as formal quarterly reports; the contractor delivered the results of the first planned assessment in March 2009. Notwithstanding the recent steps that the program office has taken, it nevertheless lacks an independent perspective on the program's products and management processes |
gao_GAO-17-388 | gao_GAO-17-388_0 | Until OMB improves its oversight of the information in agencies’ strategic plans, and agencies complete the missing elements, they may be challenged in fully implementing the data center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA. In response, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) launched the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) in 2010 to reduce the growing number of centers. In addition, the law includes a provision for GAO to annually review and verify the quality and completeness of agency federal data center inventories and strategies for consolidation. Our objectives for this study were to (1) review agencies’ data center closures to date and plans for further closures, (2) evaluate agencies’ progress in achieving data center consolidation savings and describe plans for future savings, and (3) evaluate the extent to which agencies’ annual strategic plans for data center consolidation and optimization are complete. To identify future planned savings, we totaled the agencies’ projected savings and avoidances from fiscal years 2016 through 2018, as reported in their DCOI strategic plans. The 24 agencies participating in DCOI have collectively made progress on their data center closure efforts. Specifically, as of August 2016, the agencies had identified a total of 9,995 data centers, of which they reported closing 4,388. The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Interior, and Treasury accounted for 84 percent of these closures. When accounting for additional closures expected in fiscal year 2019, agencies have reported that they plan to close a total of 5,597 centers. In total, 18 of the 24 agencies reported achieving an estimated $2.3 billion in cost savings and avoidances from their data center consolidation and optimization efforts from the start of fiscal year 2012 through August 2016. The Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Treasury accounted for approximately $2.0 billion (or 87 percent) of the total. This is about $3.6 billion less than the approximately $4.0 billion in fiscal year 2016 through 2018 planned savings that agencies reported to us in November 2015. This reduction in planned savings reflects 7 agencies reporting less planned cost savings and avoidances in their DCOI strategic plans compared to the savings amounts previously reported to us in November 2015, as well as the absence of cost savings information for 4 agencies that had not submitted their strategic plan. Of the 20 agencies that submitted their DCOI strategic plan as of December 2016, only 1—the National Science Foundation—had addressed all five elements required by the OMB memorandum implementing FITARA, while the remaining 19 either partially met or did not meet the requirements. We also identified inconsistencies in the reporting of historical cost savings by 11 agencies across OMB’s two reporting mechanisms—the DCOI strategic plans and the quarterly data submissions. Specifically, of the 24 agencies, 9 consistently reported savings information in their DCOI strategic plan and their August 2016 quarterly reports to OMB, 11 agencies did not report consistent information, and 4 agencies did not submit their DCOI strategic plan. These inconsistencies resulted in a discrepancy totaling approximately $1.5 billion between the two sources. These inconsistencies were due, in part, to incomplete data in agencies’ DCOI strategic plans. Further, until OMB improves its oversight of agencies’ reporting of cost savings and agencies ensure that their savings information is consistent across all reporting mechanisms, the likelihood of further reporting errors is increased. To better ensure that federal data center optimization efforts improve governmental efficiency and achieve cost savings, we are recommending that the Director of OMB direct the Federal CIO to provide the necessary oversight to (1) ensure that agencies complete their DCOI strategic plan in accordance with OMB’s guidance implementing FITARA and (2) ensure that agency reporting of achieved data center consolidation and optimization cost savings and avoidances is consistent across all reporting mechanisms, including quarterly data submissions and agency DCOI strategic plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2014, IT acquisition reform legislation was enacted that included a series of provisions related to ongoing federal data center consolidation efforts. The legislation required covered agencies to develop data center consolidation strategic plans and report cost savings to OMB. It also included a provision for GAO to annually review agencies' data center inventories and strategies. OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) subsequently launched DCOI to build on prior data center consolidation efforts and improve federal data centers' performance.
GAO reviewed agencies' data center closure plans and consolidation savings progress and plans; and evaluated the extent to which agencies' annual consolidation strategic plans are complete. To do so, GAO assessed DCOI agencies' data center inventories, reviewed agencies' reported cost savings documentation, and evaluated their data center optimization strategic plans. GAO also updated its assessments in April 2017 in response to agency comments on its draft report.
What GAO Found
The 24 agencies participating in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) have made progress on their data center closure efforts. As of August 2016, the agencies collectively had identified a total of 9,995 data centers, of which they reported having closed 4,388 and having plans to close a total of 5,597 through fiscal year 2019. The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Interior, and Treasury accounted for 84 percent of the completed closures.
In addition, 18 of the 24 agencies reported achieving about $2.3 billion collectively in cost savings and avoidances from their data center consolidation and optimization efforts from fiscal year 2012 through August 2016. The Departments of Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Treasury accounted for approximately $2.0 billion (or 87 percent) of the total. Further, 23 agencies reported about $656 million collectively in planned savings for fiscal years 2016 through 2018. This is about $3.3 billion less than the estimated $4.0 billion in planned savings for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 that agencies reported to GAO in November 2015. (See figure.)
This reduction in planned savings is the result of eight agencies reporting less in planned cost savings and avoidances in their annual DCOI strategic plans, which are required by December 2014 information technology (IT) acquisition reform legislation, as compared to the savings these agencies previously reported to GAO in November 2015. The reduction also does not include cost savings information for one agency that had not submitted its strategic plan in time for our review. GAO has previously recommended that agencies fully report these savings.
Additionally, as of April 2017, 23 of the 24 agencies had submitted a strategic plan. Of the 23 plans, only 7 included all required information. The remaining plans either partially met or did not meet the requirements. Until agencies submit plans that address all required elements, they may be challenged in implementing the data center consolidation and optimization provisions of the legislation. GAO also identified inconsistencies in how 11 agencies reported historical cost savings in their DCOI strategic plans, as compared to a separate required quarterly report to OMB. These inconsistencies, due in part to weaknesses in OMB's oversight of agencies' savings information and their DCOI strategic plan, resulted in a reporting discrepancy of approximately $1.5 billion between the two sources. Until OMB improves its oversight of agencies' reporting of cost savings, and until agencies address inconsistencies in their reporting, the likelihood of further reporting errors is increased.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMB ensure that agencies complete their DCOI strategic plans and report achieved data center cost savings consistently across all reporting mechanisms. GAO is also recommending that 17 agencies complete their DCOI strategic plans and that 11 agencies ensure the amounts of achieved cost savings are consistent across reporting mechanisms. Twelve agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations, 2 disagreed, and 11 did not state whether they agreed or disagreed, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-13-228 | gao_GAO-13-228_0 | Accurate and timely intelligence. Practices that Promote Successful Data-Driven Performance Reviews at the Federal Level
Agency Leaders Use Data- Driven Reviews as a Leadership Strategy to Drive Performance Improvement
Our analysis confirmed that to be successful, data-driven reviews should be used as a leadership strategy to drive performance improvement. This was consistent with what we found at DOE, SBA, and Treasury. Agency Staff Have Skills to Analyze and Clearly Communicate Complex Data for Decision Making
Our analysis indicated that agencies need staff with the skills to assess performance data for coverage and quality and to identify key trends, areas of strong or weak performance, and possible causal factors. Participants Engage in Rigorous and Sustained Follow-up on Issues Identified During Reviews
Rigorous and sustained follow-up on issues identified during the meetings is also critical to ensure the success of the reviews as a performance improvement tool. DOE, SBA, and Treasury Officials Attributed Improvements in Performance and Decision Making to Quarterly Performance Reviews, although Some Reported Minimal Impact
Reviews Fostered Intra- agency Collaboration and Problem Solving to Improve Performance
DOE, SBA, and Treasury officials said their quarterly performance reviews allowed different functional management groups and program areas within each agency to share information and ideas for performance improvement. Furthermore, the majority of PIOs we surveyed indicated that there was little to no involvement in the reviews from external officials who could contribute to achieving agency goals. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better leverage agency quarterly performance reviews as a mechanism to manage performance toward agency priority and other agency-level performance goals, we are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget—working with the Performance Improvement Council and other relevant groups—identify and share promising practices to help agencies extend their quarterly performance reviews to include, as relevant, representatives from outside organizations that contribute to achieving their agency performance goals. OMB staff generally concurred with the recommendation in our report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As part of our mandate to review the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), our reporting objectives were to (1) identify practices that can promote successful data-driven reviews at the federal level and examine how these reviews are being implemented at selected agencies and across the government, and (2) examine the impact of quarterly data-driven performance reviews on selected agencies’ progress toward high priority and other performance goals. We refined these practices with additional information obtained from practitioners at the local, state, and federal level who shared their experiences and lessons learned. To evaluate how effectively selected agencies are applying the practices of data-driven reviews in their GPRAMA-mandated quarterly performance reviews, and the effectiveness of these reviews toward achieving agency priority and other performance goals, we chose three agencies— Department of Energy (DOE), Small Business Administration (SBA), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury). Government Performance: Strategies for Building a Results-Oriented and Collaborative Culture in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given the federal government's central role in addressing many of the American public's most pressing concerns, it is critical that government performance is managed effectively. GAO's previous work has shown that many federal agencies have struggled to adopt effective performance management practices. Congress took steps to improve federal performance management with the passage of the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), which included a provision for agency leaders to conduct quarterly, data-driven performance reviews. As part of GAO's mandate to review GPRAMA implementation, this report (1) identifies practices that can promote successful data-driven performance reviews at the federal level and examines how they are being implemented at selected agencies and across the government, and (2) examines the impact of quarterly datadriven performance reviews on selected agencies' progress toward high priority and other performance goals. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed academic and policy literature; information from practitioners at the local, state, and federal level; and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. GAO surveyed performance improvement officers at 24 federal agencies and examined review implementation at three agencies--DOE, SBA, and Treasury.
What GAO Found
GAO identified nine leading practices to promote successful data-driven performance reviews--referred to as quarterly performance reviews--at the federal level.
Agency leaders use data-driven reviews as a leadership strategy to drive performance improvement.
Key players attend reviews to facilitate problem solving.
Reviews ensure alignment between agency goals, program activities, and resources.
Agency leaders hold managers accountable for diagnosing performance problems and identifying strategies for improvement.
Agency has capacity to collect accurate, useful, and timely performance data.
Agency staff have skills to analyze and clearly communicate complex data for decision making.
Rigorous preparations enable meaningful performance discussions.
Reviews are conducted on a frequent and regularly scheduled basis.
Participants engage in rigorous and sustained follow-up on issues identified during reviews.
Most officials GAO interviewed at the Department of Energy (DOE), Small Business Administration (SBA), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) attributed improvements in performance and decision making to the reviews. DOE, SBA, and Treasury officials said their reviews allowed different functional management groups and program areas within their agencies to collaborate and identify strategies which led to performance improvements. GAO's survey of performance improvement officers indicated that there was little to no involvement in the reviews from other agencies that could help achieve agency goals. This was also true at DOE, SBA, and Treasury, where officials expressed concerns about including outsiders in their reviews and described other means of coordinating with them. However, OMB guidance--along with a leading practice GAO identified--indicates that including key players from other agencies can lead to more effective collaboration and goal achievement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB identify and share practices to use the reviews for interagency collaboration, when relevant, to achieve agency goals. OMB staff generally agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-452 | gao_GAO-05-452_0 | issues with states’ implementation of the BIPA PPS. First, some states’ BIPA PPS payment rates may be inappropriate because the states did not include all Medicaid-covered FQHC and RHC services in the rates. States implementing an alternative methodology generally used either cost-based reimbursement or a PPS with features that differed slightly from the BIPA PPS. While a few states had yet to completely implement their BIPA PPS as of June 1, 2004, it took the remaining states an average of 15 to 16 months to complete implementation of their methodologies. We found two issues with some states’ BIPA PPSs. Of the states using the BIPA PPS, more than a third reported that they did not include all Medicaid-covered FQHC and RHC services in their BIPA PPS payment rates and over half had either not defined procedures for adjusting FQHCs’ and RHCs’ BIPA PPS rates for a change in scope of services, an adjustment required by BIPA, or not specified what would constitute such a change. Second, as of June 1, 2004, over 3 years after the passage of BIPA, over half of states using the BIPA PPS had either not defined procedures for adjusting payment rates for a change in scope of services or not specified what would constitute such a change; states are required by BIPA to adjust BIPA PPS rates for a change in scope of services. Evidence to Date Is Insufficient about the Need to Rebase or Refine the BIPA PPS
Sufficient evidence is not available to determine whether there is a need to rebase or refine the BIPA PPS. Other indexes often used to reflect medical care inflation, however, have a similar shortcoming. The ability to determine the need for rebasing or refining is further complicated by an increasing lack of comprehensive and current cost data because many states no longer require all FQHCs and RHCs to submit Medicaid cost reports. Like the MEI, four other indexes commonly used to reflect changes in medical care inflation do not reflect the services typically provided by FQHCs and RHCs. Analysis of Rates from Selected States Provided Inconclusive Evidence on the Need to Rebase or Refine the BIPA PPS
Our comparison of cost-based and BIPA PPS rates for FQHCs and RHCs from selected states provided inconclusive evidence concerning the need to rebase or refine the BIPA PPS. However, the extent of the difference between cost-based and PPS rates varied considerably both within and among the states reviewed (see fig. CMS Guidance and Oversight Did Not Ensure Consistent State Compliance with BIPA
CMS guidance to states and regional offices and its oversight of states’ implementation of the new BIPA-mandated payment requirements for FQHCs and RHCs did not ensure consistent state compliance with the law. As a result of this limited oversight, CMS was unaware of several compliance issues we identified regarding payment to FQHCs and RHCs. In addition, CMS guidance did not address certain BIPA requirements such as how rates were to be adjusted for a change in scope of services. On the basis of our recommendations that CMS better ensure consistent state compliance with the BIPA-mandated Medicaid payment requirements for FQHCs and RHCs, CMS said that it would take the following actions: request that SPAs clearly identify whether states intended to implement a BIPA PPS or an alternative methodology, contact states to ascertain which Medicaid services they are excluding from the BIPA PPS rate determination and assist each state in complying with BIPA requirements for determining the BIPA PPS rate or in establishing alternative payment methodologies, and remind states that BIPA requires that alternative payment methodologies pay at least as much as the BIPA PPS rate. We followed this approach since the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) required states using an alternative payment methodology to ensure that their methodology resulted in payment no lower than payment under the BIPA PPS. We selected states for the targeted review if, according to their responses to our survey, they met the following four criteria for both FQHCs and RHCs: implemented cost-based reimbursement as their alternative payment methodology, required FQHCs and RHCs to submit cost reports and the state audited them, had at least 1 year of audited cost reports following the implementation of their alternative payment methodologies, and determined what the FQHCs’ and RHCs’ payments would have been if the state had implemented the BIPA PPS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) established a prospective payment system (PPS) for Medicaid payments to Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHC) and Rural Health Clinics (RHC), giving providers a financial incentive to operate efficiently. BIPA requires that BIPA PPS rates be adjusted for inflation and changes in scope of services. States also may use an alternative methodology if it pays no less than the BIPA PPS rate. In response to a BIPA mandate, GAO reviewed states' implementation of the new payment requirements, the need to rebase or refine the BIPA PPS, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) oversight of states' implementation. GAO surveyed the states about their payment methodologies, did a targeted review in four states, and reviewed indexes used to reflect medical care inflation.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of states' implementation of Medicaid's new payment system--the BIPA PPS and alternative methodologies--for FQHCs and RHCs identified certain issues regarding the appropriateness of some states' methodologies. Most states used the BIPA PPS and about half of states used an alternative methodology--generally cost-based reimbursement or a PPS with features slightly different from those required for the BIPA PPS--to pay at least some of their FQHCs, RHCs, or both. States took an average of slightly more than a year from the legislation's January 1, 2001, effective date to implement their BIPA PPS, and a few states had not completed implementation as of June 1, 2004. GAO identified three significant issues with states' new Medicaid payment systems. First, some states' BIPA PPS payment rates may be inappropriate because they did not include all Medicaid-covered FQHC and RHC services in the rates as required by law. Second, as of June 1, 2004, over half the states using the BIPA PPS had not determined how they would make the required adjustment to BIPA PPS rates for a change in scope of services. Third, some states did not ensure that their alternative methodologies resulted in payments no lower than what the FQHCs and RHCs would have received under the BIPA PPS. Evidence to date is insufficient to determine the need to rebase or refine the BIPA PPS. Concerns exist that the statutorily specified annual inflation index used to adjust the BIPA PPS is inappropriate because it not only increases more slowly than do many FQHCs' and RHCs' costs but also does not reflect the services these providers deliver. Other indexes GAO reviewed had a similar shortcoming. GAO's analysis determined that no inflation index has been developed that reflects the services typically provided by FQHCs and RHCs. Because many states no longer require FQHCs and RHCs to submit cost reports, comprehensive and current Medicaid cost data are no longer available to help inform an evaluation of the need to rebase or refine the BIPA PPS. Although GAO's comparison of cost-based and BIPA PPS rates from four states showed that cost-based rates generally exceeded BIPA PPS rates, not all factors contributing to the higher rates are known. Differences between cost-based and BIPA PPS rates varied widely within and among the states reviewed, which also limited the ability to draw conclusions about the need to rebase or refine rates. CMS guidance and oversight regarding the new BIPA payment requirements were inadequate to ensure consistent state compliance with the law. CMS guidance did not fully address certain requirements, and as states developed their new payment systems, they lacked important information clarifying the new requirements. As a result, uncertainties exist regarding how states were to implement some BIPA requirements, such as how to adjust BIPA PPS rates to account for a change in scope of services. CMS has conducted limited oversight of states' implementation and therefore was unaware of compliance issues with some states' payment systems. |
gao_NSIAD-98-58 | gao_NSIAD-98-58_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to concerns of the Chairman and former Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, about the cost of recruiting and training personnel who do not complete their initial military obligations, we reviewed the services’ recruiting efforts to (1) screen, select, and train recruiters; (2) screen, select, and prepare recruits for basic training; and (3) measure and reward recruiter performance. However, we found that only the Air Force’s screening process has measurable criteria to evaluate the communication and interpersonal skills of prospective recruiters. All Marine Corps recruiters are required to write to their recruits and the recruits’ families while the recruits are in basic training. Recommendations
For the services to meet DOD’s strategic goal of recruiting and retaining well-qualified military personnel, optimize recruiting command efficiency by identifying personnel who are likely to succeed as recruiters, and increase recruits’ chances of graduating from basic training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the services to use experienced field recruiters to personally interview all prospective recruiters and evaluate their potential to effectively communicate with applicants, parents, teachers, and others in the civilian community; jointly explore the feasibility of developing or procuring assessment tests that can aid in the selection of recruiters; and instruct officials at the service recruiting schools to emphasize the retention portion of DOD’s long-term strategic goal by having drill instructors meet with students at the schools and having the recruiters in training meet with separating recruits and those being held back due to poor physical conditioning. However, only the Marines Corps conducts regular physical fitness training for its recruits in the DEP and requires them to take a physical fitness test before reporting to basic training. However, only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical training for DEP members and requires all recruits to take a physical fitness test before leaving for basic training. However, only the Marine Corps and the Navy use recruits’ basic training graduation rates as key criteria when evaluating recruiters for awards. The Army and the Air Force measure recruiter performance primarily by the number of recruits who enlist or the number who report to basic training rather than the number who graduate and become productive servicemembers. The Navy awards recruiters points when one of their recruits enlists at a MEPS. Despite the successes of the service recruiting commands, only 42 percent of the recruiters who responded to DOD’s survey said that they had made their goal 9 or more months out of the previous 12. They would still be considered successful. To enhance recruiters’ working conditions and the services’ ability to attract qualified candidates for recruiting duty, we also recommend that the Secretary of Defense encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative to the services’ current systems of monthly goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the military services' recruiting processes, focusing on the recruiter incentive systems that the military services use to optimize the performance of military recruiters and ensure that only fully qualified applicants are enlisted.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) could enhance the success of its recruiters if the services strengthened key aspects of their systems for selecting and training recruiters; (2) only the Air Force requires personnel experienced in recruiting to interview candidates for recruiting positions and uses selection tests to screen interviewees for recruiting duty; (3) while recruiters from each service receive practical training to improve their ability to recruit and enlist personnel, Marine Corps and Navy training also emphasize the importance of retaining recruits once enlisted and require recruiters to focus on retention as well as recruiting; (4) the services have taken steps to improve their delayed entry programs, such as increasing the amount of contact between recruiters and recruits; (5) although all the services give recruits in the delayed entry programs access to their physical fitness facilities and encourage the recruits to become or stay physically fit, only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical training for recruits who are waiting to go to basic training; (6) although recruits who are physically fit are more likely to complete basic training, only the Marine Corps requires all recruits to take a physical fitness test before reporting to basic training; (7) achieving monthly goals has been the key measure of recruiter performance; (8) only the Marine Corps and the Navy consider retention in measuring and rewarding recruiter performance; (9) specifically, they consider the number of recruits completing basic training when evaluating the success of recruiters; the Army and the Air Force consider primarily the number of recruits enlisted or the number reporting to the basic training; (10) DOD's 1996 survey of service recruiters showed that the number of hours that recruiters work reached its highest point since 1989; (11) despite this effort, less than one-half of the recruiters achieved their goals in 9 or more months of a 12-month period; (12) the recruiters GAO interviewed were concerned about the difficulties they face in meeting monthly goals and the long hours they must devote to their jobs; and (13) establishing quarterly floating goals could ease the burden on recruiters and still provide an incentive to meet recruitment goals. |
gao_GAO-06-5 | gao_GAO-06-5_0 | Background
Defining Offshoring
Offshoring generally refers to a company’s purchases from abroad (imports) of goods or services that were previously produced domestically. This diversity of views reflects several factors: the fact that services offshoring is a relatively recent development in international trade whose impact is not yet fully known; the limitations of currently available data about the extent of offshoring and its impacts; and different theoretical expectations about the likely impact of expanded trade in services on the U.S. economy. Potential Impacts on the Average U.S. Standard of Living
Traditional economic theory on international trade predicts that offshoring is likely to be beneficial for the average U.S. standard of living in the long run; however, some economists have argued that offshoring could harm U.S. living standards. Traditional Economic Theory Predicts that Offshoring Will Benefit Average U.S. There is disagreement about the expected direction of any structural changes in the labor market due to offshoring, the expected magnitude of job displacement due to offshoring, and the implications of this displacement for those workers who are directly affected by it. Potential Impacts on the Distribution of Income
Some economists have expressed concern that offshoring could accelerate income inequality in the U.S.; however, others argue that changes in the income distribution are driven primarily by factors unrelated to offshoring, and still others point out that offshoring could potentially decrease income inequality. A Wide Range of Policies Have Been Proposed to Address Concerns about Offshoring’s Potential Impacts
Offshoring observers have proposed a broad range of policies in response to offshoring, representing a variety of different ideas about how public policies could address the concerns raised by offshoring. We have categorized these proposals into four types on the basis of concerns they seek to address: (1) improving U.S. global competitiveness, (2) addressing effects on the U.S. workforce, (3) addressing security concerns, and (4) reducing the extent of offshoring. Some analysts have proposed policies in more than one of these areas. Additional Research in Key Areas May Help Advance the Offshoring Debate
Determining appropriate policy responses to the offshoring phenomenon is challenging for several reasons. Nevertheless, there are some key areas where further research might help to provide more information about the impacts and policy implications of services offshoring. These areas include impacts of offshoring on various sectors of the U.S. economy, and especially the sectors that are emerging as new sources of comparative advantage; impacts of offshoring on the workforce, such as numbers of workers displaced and their reemployment experiences; impacts of offshoring on the U.S. income distribution, including trends in wage levels of jobs moving offshore; and any increased security-related risks posed by offshoring and the extent to which these are mitigated by current practices and laws. We have highlighted some key areas where further research might help advance the debate about the impacts and policy implications of offshoring. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce, Labor, Treasury, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives in this study were to: (1) describe experts’ views about the potential effects of services offshoring on the U.S. economy, workforce, national security, and consumer privacy; (2) describe the types of policies that have been proposed in response to offshoring; and (3) discuss areas where further research could advance the debate on offshoring. “Understanding the Offshoring Challenge.” Policy Report. Job Loss: Causes and Policy Implications. Defense Security Service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much attention has focused on the "offshoring" of services to lower-wage locations abroad. Offshoring generally refers to an organization's purchase of goods or services from abroad that were previously produced domestically. Extensive public debate has arisen about both the potential benefits of services offshoring, such as lower consumer prices and higher U.S. productivity, as well as the potential costs, such as increased job displacement for selected U.S. workers. In response to widespread congressional interest, GAO conducted work under the Comptroller General's authority to help policy makers better understand the potential impacts and policy implications of services offshoring. This report: (1) provides an overview of experts' views on the potential impacts of services offshoring, (2) describes the types of policies that have been proposed in response to offshoring, and (3) highlights some key areas where additional research might help advance the debate about offshoring. In its comments, the Department of Commerce generally agreed with the findings of this report. Commerce, Treasury, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative also provided technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Analysts of the offshoring phenomenon have expressed a range of views about the likely impacts of offshoring on four broad areas. The differing views reflect several factors: the fact that services offshoring is a relatively recent development whose impact is not fully known, the limitations of available data on offshoring, and different theoretical expectations about how services offshoring will impact the U.S. economy. The average U.S. standard of living: Traditional economic theory generally predicts that offshoring will benefit U.S. living standards in the long run. However, some economists have argued that offshoring could harm U.S. long-term living standards under certain scenarios, such as if offshoring undermines U.S. technological leadership. Employment and job loss: While economic theory generally predicts that offshoring will have little effect on overall U.S. employment levels in the long-run, there is widespread recognition that pockets of workers will lose jobs due to offshoring, though there is disagreement about the expected magnitude of job loss and implications for displaced workers. Distribution of income: Some economists maintain that offshoring could increase income inequality in the U.S., while others argue that changes in the income distribution are driven primarily by factors other than offshoring, such as technological change. Security and consumer privacy: Experts express varying degrees of concern about the impact of services offshoring on the security of our national defense system and critical infrastructure--such as utilities and communication networks--as well as the privacy and security of consumers' financial and medical information. A wide range of policies has been proposed in response to concerns about offshoring and its potential effects. These proposals can be categorized into four areas by the concerns they seek to address: (1) improving U.S. global competitiveness, (2) addressing effects on the U.S. workforce, (3) addressing security concerns, and (4) reducing the extent of offshoring. Some analysts have recommended policies in more than one area. Determining appropriate policy responses to the offshoring phenomenon is challenging due to the limited state of knowledge about the extent and impacts of offshoring. Nonetheless, there are some key areas where additional research might help advance the debate, such as trends in the wages and skill levels of jobs being offshored, reemployment experiences of workers displaced by offshoring, and the extent to which current laws and practices in different sectors of the economy mitigate any increased security-related risks posed by offshoring. In the face of limited federal data, researchers have begun using a variety of approaches to examine such areas. |
gao_GAO-06-314 | gao_GAO-06-314_0 | However, some projects incorrectly counted new construction items as deferred maintenance. To further refine its cost estimate and to develop more comprehensive deferred maintenance lists, BIA plans to hire experts in engineering and irrigation to periodically conduct thorough condition assessments of all 16 irrigation projects to identify deferred maintenance needs and costs. Shortcomings in BIA’s Management of Some Irrigation Projects Undermine Effective Decisionmaking
BIA’s management of some of its irrigation projects has serious shortcomings that undermine effective decisionmaking about project operations and maintenance. Under BIA’s organizational structure, in many cases, officials with the authority to oversee project managers’ decisionmaking lack the technical expertise needed to do so effectively, while the staff who do have the expertise lack the necessary authority. In addition, despite federal regulations that require BIA to consult with project stakeholders in setting project priorities, BIA has not consistently provided the information or opportunities necessary for stakeholders— both Indian and non-Indian water users—to participate in decisionmaking about project operations and maintenance. Long-Term Direction of BIA’s Irrigation Program Depends on Resolution of a Number of Larger Issues
The long-term direction of BIA’s irrigation program depends on the resolution of several larger issues. Of most importance, BIA does not know the extent to which its irrigation projects are capable of financially sustaining themselves, which hinders its ability to address long-standing concerns regarding inadequate funding. Information on financial sustainability, along with accurate deferred maintenance information, are both critical pieces of information needed to have a debate on the long-term direction of BIA’s irrigation program. Once this information is available, the Congress and interested parties will be able to address how the deferred maintenance will be funded and whether entities other than BIA could more appropriately manage some or all of the projects. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to address several issues concerning the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) management of its 16 irrigation projects. Specifically, we were asked to examine (1) BIA’s estimated deferred maintenance cost for its 16 irrigation projects; (2) what shortcomings, if any, exist in BIA’s current management of its irrigation projects; and (3) any issues that need to be addressed to determine the long-term direction of BIA’s irrigation program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) manages 16 irrigation projects on Indian reservations in the western United States. These projects, which were generally constructed in the late 1800s and early 1900s, include water storage facilities and delivery structures for agricultural purposes. Serious concerns have arisen about their maintenance and management. GAO was asked to examine (1) BIA's estimated deferred maintenance cost for its 16 irrigation projects, (2) what shortcomings, if any, exist in BIA's current management of its irrigation projects, and (3) any issues that need to be addressed to determine the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program.
What GAO Found
BIA estimated the cost for deferred maintenance at its 16 irrigation projects at about $850 million for 2005, although the agency is in the midst of refining this estimate. BIA acknowledges that this estimate is a work in progress, in part, because some projects incorrectly counted new construction items as deferred maintenance. To further refine its estimate, BIA plans to hire engineering and irrigation experts to conduct thorough condition assessments of all 16 irrigation projects to correctly identify deferred maintenance needs and costs. BIA's management of some of its irrigation projects has serious shortcomings that undermine effective decisionmaking about project operations and maintenance. First, under BIA's organizational structure, officials with the authority to oversee irrigation project managers generally lack the technical expertise needed to do so effectively, while the staff that have the expertise lack the necessary authority. Second, despite federal regulations that require BIA to consult with project stakeholders in setting project priorities, BIA has not consistently provided project stakeholders with the necessary information or opportunities to participate in project decisionmaking. The long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program depends on the resolution of several larger issues. Of most importance, BIA does not know to what extent its irrigation projects are capable of financially sustaining themselves, which hinders its ability to address long-standing concerns regarding inadequate funding. Information on financial sustainability, along with accurate deferred maintenance information, are two critical pieces of information that are needed to have a debate on the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program. Once this information is available, the Congress and interested parties will be able to address how the deferred maintenance will be funded and whether entities other than BIA could more appropriately manage some or all of the projects. |
gao_GAO-08-877 | gao_GAO-08-877_0 | Background
Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and communication capabilities. Investment in Key Tactical Radio Systems Has Shifted Dramatically in Both Size and Composition
Over the past 5 years, investments in key tactical radios systems have exceeded planned investments by more than double and shifted dramatically in scope. At the same time, investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. Not only did spending between fiscal years 2003 and 2007 increase significantly, from about $3.2 billion to about $8.3 billion, it shifted away from procuring JTRS to procuring tens of thousands of additional legacy radios. In 2003, DOD and the services planned to spend approximately $3 billion on JTRS over the next 5 years—$1 billion for research and development, and $2 billion to procure the first JTRS radios. In actuality, DOD and the services invested over twice as much as planned to develop JTRS capabilities—about $2.5 billion—while no JTRS networking radios were produced during this time. Legacy radio spending, on the other hand, ballooned to approximately $5.7 billion, about 24 times what was planned. Of this, the Army spent approximately $4.1 billion, including $2.3 billion on SINCGARS radios and $1.8 billion on handheld and manpack radios. First, cost, schedule, and performance problems delayed development of JTRS capabilities by several years. The demand was driven by a desire to equip deploying units with modern radios and a change in concept of operations that calls for more radios per unit. Several other users depending on JTRS have had to invest in legacy radio systems to meet their needs because of the delays with the program. DOD, however, does not yet have a strategy for guiding the services’ acquisition of tactical radios over the next several years. According to the services, the legacy radios purchased in the past several years provide effective communications capabilities to meet current operational demands. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s ability to plan for and manage the development and fielding of tactical radios across the department, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making sound investment decisions for tactical radios that: is based on operational architectures that define the communications and networking functions needed on the battlefield, assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in the near- and long-term, sets bounds for the funding that will be committed to address these needs, lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering capabilities to the warfighter, and identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and delays with JTRS. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio systems changed over the last 5 years, we compared the services’ fiscal year 2003 to 2007 tactical radio procurement plans to actual procurements. ; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations , Directorate for Communication Networks, Arlington, Va.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.; Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.; Army Aviation, Arlington, Va.; Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Arlington, Va.; Office of the Army’s Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Rosslyn, Va.; and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Va.
To determine what challenges will confront the services as they plan tactical radio investments to provide future capabilities, we obtained and analyzed briefings from JTRS program managers, reviewed the JTRS Board of Directors quarterly reports for the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2008, the 2003 JTRS joint migration plan, as well as service migration plans for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; reviewed the services’ estimates for future JTRS procurements and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the National Security Agency; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff (G-8); and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Directorate for Air Warfare. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years--about as much as was spent producing Virginia Class submarines ($10.8 billion) in the same period. Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on superior information and communication capabilities. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) to deliver the breakthroughs in this area. At the same time as it is developing JTRS, DOD wants to ensure that current forces are equipped with sufficient legacy radios. To address Subcommittee concerns regarding DOD's approach to meeting current and future radio needs, GAO examined this subject. In response, this report addresses (1) how planned investments in key tactical radio systems changed over the last 5 years, (2) why these changes occurred, and (3) the challenges ahead. To assess these topics, GAO's work included reviewing 2003 through 2007 budget requests, legacy radio procurements, and the status of the JTRS program; and interviewing officials from DOD organizations.
What GAO Found
Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when JTRS first began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007. However, as shown below, actual investments more than doubled and shifted to producing thousands more legacy radios. Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands for more radios to equip current forces. JTRS has encountered significant cost, schedule, and performance problems, causing some users to buy more legacy radios instead. Moreover, the military services' demand for tactical radios soared because of combat operations, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern radios, and to add more radios per combat unit. Supplemental funding of $5.5 billion paid for most of these legacy radios. Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter, including: (1) overcoming technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and security architecture issues to complete JTRS development; (2) managing investments within defined fiscal constraints. A legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its more capable JTRS replacement is estimated to cost up to 10 times more; and (3) phasing in JTRS without prematurely retiring a relatively young inventory of legacy radios. DOD does not have a strategy to meet these challenges and thus runs the risk of having its future communications capabilities decided ad hoc. |
gao_NSIAD-96-192 | gao_NSIAD-96-192_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Budget Committee requested that we evaluate the basis for DOD’s bomber force structure requirements, assess Air Force’s progress to implement its new conventional concept of operations for using bombers, and determine the cost to keep the bombers in the force and enhance their conventional capabilities. 3.1). The Air Force has not yet demonstrated that the B-2 can meet some of its most important operational requirements. The total cost to modernize DOD’s heavy bomber force is likely to exceed $7 billion by 2008. Option 1: Retire DOD’s B-1B Force
As discussed in chapter 2, DOD’s principal studies of bomber requirements have significant limitations in their methodology and in some cases include questionable assumptions that may overstate DOD’s need for bombers in conventional conflicts. The decision to assign B-1B bombers to the Air National Guard was supported by cost model comparisons and cost-benefit analyses. Conclusions
Considering the extensive and improving ground-attack capabilities of U.S. forces, the numerous other options that DOD has to attack most targets that the B-1B is likely to be assigned in future conflicts, and DOD’s awareness that it may need to reduce the number of systems currently planned to ensure a stable, modernized force for the future, we believe that retiring the B-1B force is an option that merits consideration in the context of DOD’s ongoing assessment of its future airpower needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the: (1) basis for the Department of Defense's (DOD) bomber force requirements; (2) Air Force's progress in implementing the new conventional concept of operations for using bombers; and (3) costs to keep bombers in the force and enhance their conventional capabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD based its decision to retain and upgrade 187 bombers on three studies that had significant limitations in their methodology, used questionable assumptions, and failed to examine less costly alternatives; (2) service commanders in chief, who expected to use fewer aircraft than recommended by the three studies, did not express concern that a smaller number of bombers would adversely affect their abilities in future conflicts; (3) the Air Force's bomber modernization program has experienced testing delays, has yet to demonstrate that bombers meet some of the most important mission requirements, and has not fully detailed bomber upgrades; (4) the total cost to modernize DOD's heavy bomber force is likely to exceed $7 billion by 2008; and (5) options that would help DOD to reduce bomber costs while maintaining extensive conventional ground-attack capability include retiring the B-1B force, retiring the 27 B-1B in the reconstitution reserve, placing additional B-1B in the Air National Guard, and consolidating basing for active B-1B. |
gao_GAO-05-777 | gao_GAO-05-777_0 | Officials said that they developed this estimate prior to completing the three assessments previously described and that at the time they developed this estimate, there was a lack of published information about how much it cost to develop or operate paper or electronic rulemaking systems. They primarily used their professional judgment, information about costs for developing and operating EPA’s paper and electronic rulemaking systems, and information provided by OMB about the number of rulemaking entities to develop the estimate. Agency officials we spoke with noted that representatives of all agencies are free to participate on the Executive Committee, the Advisory Board, or any working group. Work Conducted Mostly Consistent with Key Practices but Written Agreements Did Not Include Performance Measures
While managing the development of the centralized e-Rulemaking system, e-Rulemaking officials have, for the most part, followed key practices for successfully managing a project. The first agencies began migrating to the centralized e-Rulemaking system in May 2005 and the public is scheduled to have access to the system in September 2005. While all agencies will eventually migrate to the centralized system, the schedule for doing so may change, due in part to funding issues. Officials Have Process for Approving Changes to the System Based on Agency and Public Input as More Agencies Migrate to It
In May 2005, the agencies included in phase I of the migration schedule— EPA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service within the Department of Agriculture, a portion of the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Archives and Records Administration—began migrating to the centralized e- Rulemaking system. For example, one agency said that their system tracks hearings as well as regulatory dockets. Using two cost and risk models and comparing the three designs to industry best practices was a sound approach to use in order to select which design should be implemented. In addition, because there was a lack of published information about the costs to develop or operate either a paper or electronic rulemaking system, e-Rulemaking officials used their professional judgment and own experiences to estimate how much the centralized e-Rulemaking system could save the federal government. Recommendation
E-Rulemaking officials established a governance structure that allowed it to successfully collaborate with other agencies about how to develop and implement the centralized e-Rulemaking system and used most of the key practices included in this report for managing an initiative. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees the e- Rulemaking initiative, it named the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) managing partner for the initiative. We also reviewed a contractor’s analysis of the capabilities of current e-Rulemaking systems, a contractor’s summary of assessments of the three identified alternative designs including analyses of operational risks and security vulnerabilities, and documentation related to the basis for e-Rulemaking officials’ and the e- Rulemaking Initiative Executive Committee’s recommendation about which design alternative to implement. To acquire agency views on the collaboration that has occurred, we randomly selected 12 of the 27 agencies that serve on the e-Rulemaking Initiative Advisory Board and interviewed officials from those agencies about their experiences with the collaboration efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The E-Government Act of 2002 requires regulatory agencies, to the extent practicable, to ensure there is a Web site the public can use to comment on the numerous proposed regulations that affect them. To accomplish this, the Office of Management and Budget named the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the managing partner for developing a governmentwide e-Rulemaking system that the public can use for these purposes. Issues GAO was asked to address include: (1) EPA's basis for selecting a centralized system, (2) how EPA collaborated with other agencies and agency views of that collaboration, and (3) whether EPA used key management practices when developing the system.
What GAO Found
E-Rulemaking officials and the e-Rulemaking Initiative Executive Committee considered three alternative designs and chose to implement a centralized e-Rulemaking system based on cost savings, risks, and security. Officials relied on an analysis of the three alternatives using two cost and risk assessment models and a comparison of the alternatives to industry best practices. Prior to completing this analysis, officials estimated the centralized approach would save about $94 million over 3 years. They said when they developed this estimate, there was a lack of published information about costs related to paper or electronic rulemaking systems. They used their professional judgment and information about costs for developing and operating EPA's paper and electronic systems, among other things, to develop the estimate. E-Rulemaking officials extensively collaborated with rulemaking agencies and most officials at the agencies we contacted thought the collaboration was effective. E-Rulemaking officials created a governance structure that included an executive committee, advisory board, and individual work groups that discussed how to develop the e-Rulemaking system. We contacted 14 of the 27 agencies serving on the advisory board and most felt their suggestions affected the system development process. Agency officials offered several examples to support their views, such as how their recommendations for changes to the system's design were incorporated. While managing the development of the centralized system, e-Rulemaking officials followed all but a few of the key practices for successfully managing an initiative. For example, officials did not have written agreements with participating agencies that included system performance measures. The first agencies began migrating to the centralized system in May 2005 with the public scheduled to have access in September 2005. Eventually, all rulemaking agencies will migrate to the centralized system; however, the schedule is tentative due in part to funding issues. As agencies migrate, e-Rulemaking officials are planning changes to the system including adding capabilities that exist in electronic systems operated by some agencies. |
gao_GAO-09-238 | gao_GAO-09-238_0 | Payees are responsible for reporting payments they received from payers on the appropriate lines of their tax returns. Without an estimate of payers’ 1099-MISC noncompliance, IRS does not know to what extent such noncompliance allows payees to underreport their income without being detected. Although IRS Does Not Know the Extent of 1099- MISC Payer Noncompliance, Available Evidence Points to the Possibility of a Significant Problem
Our analysis of 1099-MISC submission patterns by small businesses as well as past studies of federal, state and local government agencies suggests that payer noncompliance with 1099-MISC reporting requirements may be potentially significant. However, if even a small proportion of the almost 46 million small businesses that did not submit 1099-MISCs in 2005 improperly failed to report as required, there could be millions of missing 1099-MISC information reports. At this time, IRS has not studied the extent to which payers failed to submit 1099- MISCs, but the future NRP results could be useful for this purpose. For perspective, payers reported $6 trillion in 1099-MISC payments for tax year 2006, so a one percent increase in reported payments could result in an additional $60 billion reported to payees and IRS. Some options to change 1099-MISC reporting requirements require legislative action, and other options would be costly for IRS to implement. IRS Aims to Improve AUR Efficiency but Lacks a Systematic Process for Learning about the Causes of Mismatches
Adopting strategies, discussed above, to promote voluntary compliance with 1099-MISC reporting requirements and to better monitor payer noncompliance would likely increase the number of 1099-MISCs IRS receives from payers. Additionally, IRS does not routinely collect data on the screen-out process, so IRS does not have information on the nature and cause of recurring 1099-MISC discrepancies. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To simplify the burden that the corporate exemption places on payers to distinguish payees’ business status and also provide greater information reporting, Congress should consider requiring payers to report payments to corporations on the form 1099 MISC, as we previously suggested and as proposed in the Bush Administration’s budget. To help payers better understand their 1099-MISC reporting responsibilities, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue add a general reminder to Publication 535 Business Expenses to highlight 1099-MISC reporting responsibilities; assess whether adding a checkbox to business tax returns, inquiring whether all 1099-MISCs have been submitted, to serve as a reminder to payers would help increase 1099-MISC payer compliance; and include a chart on the Form 1099-MISC as well as business income tax instructions for distinguishing reportable from non-reportable payments and for calculating whether reportable payments reached the 1099-MISC reporting threshold. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) what IRS knows about 1099-MISC reporting noncompliance by payers; (2) how IRS detects and pursues 1099-MISC reporting noncompliance by payers; (3) what impediments payers encounter in preparing and submitting accurate 1099- MISC forms and what options could help IRS address these impediments; and (4) what opportunities exist to enhance IRS’s use of 1099-MISC information to both detect payee noncompliance and promote voluntary compliance. While we could not isolate which businesses were required to submit a 1099-MISC but did not, we determined the data were sufficiently reliable to show how many small businesses submitted 1099-MISCs to IRS. Tax Administration: Costs and Uses of Third Party Information Returns. Tax Administration: Federal Agencies Should Report Service Payments to Corporations. GAO/GGD-92-130. | Why GAO Did This Study
Third party payers, often businesses, reported $6 trillion in miscellaneous income payments to IRS in tax year 2006 on Form 1099- MISC information returns. Payees are to report this income on their tax returns. Even a small share of payers failing to submit 1099-MISCs could result in billions of dollars of unreported payments. IRS data suggest that payees are more likely to report income on their tax returns if IRS receives payers' information returns. GAO was asked to examine 1099- MISC reporting including the extent to which payers fail to submit 1099-MISCs; impediments to payers to submitting1099-MISCs; and whether IRS could better use the 1099-MISCs it currently receives. GAO reviewed IRS documents and compliance data and interviewed officials from IRS, its advisory groups, and others who advise 1099-MISC payers.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not know to what extent payers fail to submit required 1099-MISCs, but various sources point to the possibility of a significant problem. For tax year 2005, 8 percent of the approximately 50 million small businesses with assets under $10 million submitted 1099-MISCs, but IRS does not know how many of the other 92 percent were required to report payments but did not. Many business payments, such as payments to corporations, are not subject to 1099-MISC reporting. If even a small share of the businesses that did not submit a 1099-MISC should have, millions of 1099- MISCs could be missing with significant amounts of unpaid taxes by payees. GAO's prior work in 2003 found significant 1099-MISC payer noncompliance by some federal agencies. IRS could mitigate costs for research on payer noncompliance by building on its existing research programs. Payers face a variety of impediments that may contribute to 1099-MISC noncompliance, including complex reporting requirements and an inconvenient submission process. For example, certain payments to unincorporated persons or businesses are subject to 1099-MISC reporting, but payments to corporations generally are not, requiring payers to determine the status of their payees. GAO in the past determined that the benefits in terms of increased tax revenue and improved taxpayer compliance justify eliminating this distinction. IRS agrees, and the Bush Administration's proposal to do so would have required legislative action. Other options to remind payers about their reporting obligations include adding a tax return checkbox asking if payers submitted required 1099-MISCs and adding a chart to help payers navigate the detailed instructions for the Form 1099-MISC. IRS matches what the payees report on their tax returns to what payers report on 1099-MISCs to detect payees underreporting income and taxes. But IRS does not pursue all mismatches its computers detect. If IRS were to increase payer compliance with 1099-MISC requirements, the number of mismatches would likely increase. However, IRS does not systematically collect information on the causes of mismatches or whether they could be prevented. |
gao_GAO-03-43 | gao_GAO-03-43_0 | Because the multilateral export control regimes are only one of several policy tools that national governments use to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons, it is difficult to attribute accomplishments exclusively to the regimes. 1). However, officials of the Australia Group Secretariat disagreed with this assertion. Instead, each regime member determines which countries are of concern to it when implementing its national export controls. However, the regimes do not have their own means to monitor and enforce members’ adherence to regime commitments. According to the Department of State, in the most clear and serious example of a violation of regime nonproliferation commitments, Russia shipped nuclear fuel to the Tarapur power reactors in India in January 2001. A key function of each regime is sharing information related to proliferation. Yet the regimes often lack even the basic information that would allow them to assess whether their actions were working as intended. The regimes cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by proliferators to acquire sensitive technology without more complete and timely reporting of licensing information and without more information on when and how members adopt and implement agreed-upon controls. However, the consensus-based and voluntary nature of these regimes poses organizational and political obstacles to implementing needed reforms. While the regimes have adapted to changing threats or conditions in the past, their continued ability to do so may determine whether the regimes remain viable in curbing proliferation in the future. To ensure that the United States is reporting all relevant information to the multilateral export control regimes, as expected, we recommend that the Secretary of State report U.S. denials of all export licenses for items controlled by a multilateral export control regime at the time the exporter is informed of the U.S. government’s intent to deny an export license. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. The regimes aim to restrict trade in these technologies to keep them from proliferating states or terrorists. The United States seeks to improve the effectiveness of these regimes. GAO was asked to (1) assess weaknesses of the four regimes and (2) identify obstacles faced in trying to strengthen them.
What GAO Found
GAO found weaknesses that impede the ability of the multilateral export control regimes to achieve their nonproliferation goals. A key function of each regime is to share information related to proliferation. Yet the regimes often lack even basic information that would allow them to assess whether their actions are having their intended results. The regimes cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by countries of concern to acquire sensitive technology without more complete and timely reporting of licensing information and without information on when and how members adopt and implement agreed-upon export controls. For example, GAO confirmed that at least one member, the United States, has not reported its denial of 27 export licenses for items controlled by the Australia Group. Several obstacles limit the options available to the United States in strengthening the effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes. The requirement to achieve consensus in each regime allows even one member to block action in adopting needed reforms. Because the regimes are voluntary in nature, they cannot enforce members' compliance with regime commitments. For example, Russia exported nuclear fuel to India in a clear violation of its commitments, threatening the viability of one regime. The regimes have adapted to changing threats in the past. Their continued ability to do so will determine whether they remain viable in curbing proliferation in the future. |
gao_GAO-03-322 | gao_GAO-03-322_0 | One of the mission areas is border and transportation security. Twelve Federal Watch Lists Are Maintained by Nine Agencies
Nine federal agencies, which prior to the establishment of DHS spanned five different cabinet-level departments, currently maintain 12 terrorist and criminal watch lists. Specifically, while federal agencies report that they are generally sharing watch list data with each other, they also report that sharing with organizations outside of the federal government is limited. Further, these systems would have to be connected to each other via a telecommunications network or networks. However, two agencies supported efforts to consolidate these lists. Since then, the DHS Chief Information Officer told us that DHS has assumed responsibility for these efforts. To date, the federal watch list environment has been characterized by a proliferation of systems, among which information sharing is occurring in some cases but not in others. To determine and implement the appropriate level of watch list consolidation and standardization, we further recommend that this collaborative effort include 1. updating the watch list information provided in this report, as needed, and using this information to develop an architectural understanding of our nation’s current or “as is” watch list environment; 2. defining the requirements of our nation’s target or “to be” watch list architectural environment, including requirements that address any agency-unique needs that can be justified, such as national security issues and civil liberty protections; 3. basing the target architecture on achievement of the mission goals and objectives contained in the President’s homeland security strategy and on congressional direction, as well as on opportunities to leverage state and local government and private-sector information sources; 4. developing a near-term strategy for implementing the target architecture that provides for the integration of existing watch lists, as well as a longer-term strategy that provides for migrating to a more consolidated and standardized set of watch lists; 5. ensuring that these strategies provide for defining and adopting more standard policies and procedures for watch list sharing and addressing any legal issues affecting, and cultural barriers to, greater watch list sharing; and 6. developing and implementing the strategies within the context of the ongoing enterprise architecture efforts of each of the collaborating departments and agencies. We will also send copies to the Directors of the Offices of Homeland Security and Management and Budget, and the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury. An additional GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) federal databases and systems that contain watch lists, the agencies that maintain and use these watch lists in protecting our nation’s borders, and the kinds of data these watch lists contain; (2) whether federal agencies’ sharing of watch list data is governed by policies and procedures; (3) whether watch lists are (a) being exchanged among federal agencies and between federal agencies and state, local, and private organizations and (b) supported by common system architectures (system hardware, software, and data characteristics); and (4) whether opportunities exist for consolidating watch lists. 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist and criminal watch list systems--sometimes referred to as watchout, lookout, target, or tip-off systems--are important tools in controlling and protecting our nation's borders. The events of September 11, 2001, and other incidents since then, have highlighted the need to share these watch lists. In light of the importance of border security, GAO was asked to identify federal databases and systems that contain watch lists, the agencies that maintain and use them in protecting our nation's borders, the kind of data they contain, whether federal agencies are sharing information from these lists with each other and with state and local governments and private organizations, the structural characteristics of those lists that are automated, and whether opportunities exist to consolidate these watch lists.
What GAO Found
Generally, the federal government's approach to using watch lists in performing its border security mission is decentralized and nonstandard, largely because these lists were developed in response to individual agencies' unique missions, including their respective legal, cultural, and systems environments. Specifically, nine federal agencies--which prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spanned the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury--develop and maintain 12 watch lists. These lists include overlapping but not identical sets of data, and different policies and procedures govern whether and how these data are shared with others. As a general rule, this sharing is more likely to occur among federal agencies than between federal agencies and either state and local government agencies or private entities. Further, the extent to which such sharing is accomplished electronically is constrained by fundamental differences in the watch lists' systems architecture (that is, the hardware, software, network, and data characteristics of the systems). Two agencies identified opportunities to standardize and consolidate these lists, which GAO believes would improve information sharing. The President's homeland security strategy further recognizes the need to address the proliferation of these lists. While the Office of Homeland Security was reportedly pursuing consolidation as part of an effort to develop a border and transportation security blueprint, referred to as an enterprise architecture, the DHS Chief Information Officer told us that the department had recently taken responsibility for the blueprint. However, we were not provided enough information to evaluate these efforts. |
gao_GAO-09-822 | gao_GAO-09-822_0 | Over the years, voice and data networks have evolved separately, with voice networks relying on circuit-switching methods while data networks largely use packet-switching techniques. Organization and Responsibilities of the National Communications System
As part of the creation of DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, NCS was transferred to DHS from the Department of Defense. 2, or ESF-2), under the National Response Framework. NCS Provides Priority Calling Services for NS/EP Personnel and Has Designed Mechanisms to Manage Access to These Services
In order to overcome network congestion, NCS has implemented priority calling programs to provide NS/EP personnel within all levels of government, as well as the private and non-profit sectors, with communications services during incidents of national security or emergency that can overwhelm the telecommunications network. The two primary programs NCS provides to deliver priority calling are the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). Despite the outreach efforts NCS has undertaken to increase participation in its priority calling programs, WPS fees are a barrier to participation in the program, according to NCS. NCS Has Designed Procedures and Controls to Limit Access to Authorized Subscribers
Federal internal control standards state that documented policies and procedures to control access to agency resources and records to authorized individuals are essential to accountability and safeguarding assets, and NCS has developed and implemented policies and procedures to help ensure that access to its programs is limited to authorized subscribers. State and local governments as well as private and nonprofit organizations bear all of the costs related to the usage of the GETS and WPS programs. However, methods for implementation and evaluation of its related satellite pilot were unclear and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. NCS Launched the Satellite Pilot Program without Clear Methods for Implementation and Evaluation and Has Since Terminated the Pilot
In December 2007, NCS launched a satellite pilot program to provide an alternative means to support NS/EP communications to help circumvent network congestion or outages in the PSTN. NCS Has Implemented Strategic Planning Efforts, but These Could Be Strengthened by Incorporating Key Planning and Performance Measurement Practices
NCS has been developing its strategic plan since 2007, and although officials have stated that a strategic plan could help inform their efforts, it has not been finalized. While NCS’s performance measures generally link to overall goals and objectives, NCS’s performance measures focus exclusively on its priority calling programs, and NCS does not have measures to assess the performance of its other two primary responsibilities—serving as the ESF- 2 coordinator and the lead federal agency for critical infrastructure protection for the communications sector. Furthermore, the baseline upon which each annual average cost goal is determined is the number of GETS and WPS subscribers. As NCS undertakes a variety of new initiatives and attempts to strengthen existing programs, finalizing its strategic plan will also help strengthen NCS’s ability to efficiently and effectively allocate resources, inform key stakeholders, and provide agency and congressional decision makers the ability to assess NCS’s programs and initiatives. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that NCS management has sufficient information needed to assess and improve NCS’s programs and new initiatives and to effectively support budget decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the Manager of the NCS to take the following three actions: Develop program plans for the NS/EP NGN initiative that outline an acquisition approach based on available technologies, realistic cost estimates, and that include mitigation plans to address identified challenges and risks. We also interviewed NCS officials to obtain information on the agency’s role in ensuring continuity of communications, the types of priority communications capabilities it provides to the national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) community—specifically through the GETS, WPS, and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) programs—as well as the types of challenges, if any, the agency may face in providing these services. To determine what challenges can affect NCS’s delivery of its priority communications programs, we interviewed relevant NCS officials who have responsibilities for these programs. We compared this information with our previous work on pilot program planning and technology acquisition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Government functions and effective disaster response and management rely on the ability of national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) personnel to communicate. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Communications System (NCS), is responsible for ensuring continuity of NS/EP communications when network congestion or damage occurs. As requested, GAO assessed the (1) priority communication programs NCS provides, how it enlists subscribers, and to what extent NCS controls access to these programs; (2) challenges that can affect delivery of these programs; and (3) extent to which NCS plans for and evaluates its services. GAO reviewed NCS program documents, such as annual reports and access control procedures and data on program subscribers. GAO also interviewed officials from NCS and select state and local government entities. GAO compared NCS performance measures to federal best practices.
What GAO Found
NCS has two programs to provide NS/EP personnel with priority calling service when telephone networks are congested or damaged--the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). NCS has undertaken several efforts, such as outreach at industry conferences, to increase participation in and control access to these programs. According to NCS, though outreach efforts have helped to increase overall enrollment, it is working to further address possible cost barriers to participation in WPS, such as discussing options with wireless carriers to help defray costs. In addition, NCS has implemented policies and procedures to ensure that access to its priority programs are limited to authorized users. GAO's review of select GETS and WPS subscriber data revealed that, of the 85 records we examined, NCS generally followed its policies and procedures to limit GETS and WPS access to authorized subscribers. NCS is taking steps to address inherent challenges in the communications environment--such as network congestion. For example, NCS initiated a satellite pilot program to allow NS/EP officials to circumvent severely damaged or congested traditional telephone networks. However, methods for implementation and evaluation of the pilot were unclear and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. NCS is also working to provide priority voice and data NS/EP communications as part of the evolving telecommunications networks, but it has not finalized an acquisition approach based on available technologies, costs, or plans to mitigate technological and other challenges to deliver such capabilities. The lack of this information has led to congressional restrictions on NCS's funding. As NCS attempts to ensure that GETS and WPS services can operate in these evolving networks, an acquisition approach that includes this information will provide NCS officials and Congress with essential information to most effectively allocate resources and guide decision making. Although DHS agreed with GAO's June 2008 recommendation to complete the NCS strategic plan, NCS has not finalized its strategic plan which has been under development since 2007. Furthermore, existing performance measures do not cover all of its core responsibilities, as suggested by best practices, and certain performance measures could be strengthened. For example, NCS does not have a measure to gauge its performance in two of its key federal roles--critical infrastructure protection for communications under DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan as well as coordinating communications issues under the National Response Framework. Furthermore, NCS does not use prior years' enrollment levels to help determine increases, if any, to be made to future year's goals for user enrollment. Fully and accurately measuring performance is critical to ensuring the agency and key stakeholders--such as Congress--base program and resource decisions on actual performance. |
gao_GAO-07-926T | gao_GAO-07-926T_0 | Institutions eligible for funding under Titles III and V include Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Tribal Colleges, Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian Institutions, and other undergraduate institutions of higher education that serve low-income students. Grantees Reported a Range of Uses and Benefits for Title III and Title V Grants but Cited Some Implementation Challenges
In their grant performance reports, the six grantees we recently reviewed most commonly reported using Title III and Title V grant funds to strengthen academic quality; improve support for students and student success; and improve institutional management and reported a range of benefits. However, our review of grant files found that institutions experienced challenges, such as staffing problems, which sometimes resulted in implementation delays. Sinte Gleska, a tribal college in South Dakota, used part of its Title III grant to fund the school’s distance learning department. In addition, the school is able to offer its students access to academic and research resources otherwise not available in its rural isolated location. For example, one grantee reported delays in implementing its management information system due to the turn-over of experienced staff. As a result of these implementation challenges, grantees sometimes need additional time to complete planned activities. Education Has Developed New Objectives, Strategies, and Performance Measures that Focus on Program Outcomes, but Challenges Remain
Education has established a series of new objectives, strategies, and performance measures that are focused on key student outcomes for Title III and Title V programs. When we reported on Education’s strategic planning efforts in our 2004 report, it measured its progress in achieving objectives by measuring outputs, such as the percentage of institutional goals that grantees had related to academic quality that were met or exceeded. Specifically, Education needs to better link its strategies for improving administrative and fiscal stability with its objectives to increase or maintain enrollment, persistence, and graduation rates because it is unclear how these strategies impact Education’s chosen outcome measures. In fact, GAO and other federal agencies have previously found Education faces challenges in measuring institutional progress in areas such as administrative and fiscal stability. To address part of this problem, Education is conducting a study of the financial health of low-income and minority serving institutions supported by Title III and Title V funds to determine, among other things, the major factors influencing financial health and whether the data Education collects on institutions can be used to measure fiscal stability. Education Has Made Some Changes Designed to Better Target Monitoring and Assistance, but Its Efforts Remain Limited
Education made changes designed to better target monitoring and assistance in response to recommendations we made in our 2004 report; however, additional work is needed to ensure the effectiveness of these efforts. Education also plans to automate and integrate the risk-based plan with their electronic monitoring system. Because efforts are ongoing, Education has limited ability to systematically track grantee performance and fiscal information. While Education provides technical assistance through program conferences, workshops, and routine interaction between program officers and grantees, Education’s ability to target assistance remains limited, in that its feedback mechanisms may not encourage open communication. Education officials told us that they primarily rely on grantee feedback transmitted in annual performance reports and communication between program officers and grantees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Institutions that may receive funding under Titles III and V include Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Tribal Colleges, Hispanic Serving Institutions, Alaska Native Serving Institutions, Native Hawaiian Serving Institutions, and other postsecondary institutions that serve low-income students. In fiscal year 2006, these programs provided $448 million in funding for over 500 grantees, nearly double fiscal year 1999 funding of $230 million. GAO examined these programs to determine (1) how institutions used their Title III and Title V grants and the benefits they received from using these grant funds, (2) what objectives and strategies the Department of Education (Education) has developed for Title III and Title V programs, and (3) to what extent Education monitors and provides assistance to these institutions. This testimony updates a September 2004 report on these programs (GAO-04-961). To update our work, GAO reviewed Education policy and planning documents, and program materials and grantee performance reports; interviewed Education officials; and analyzed Education data on grantee characteristics.
What GAO Found
In their performance reports, the six grantees we reviewed most commonly reported using Title III and Title V grant funds to strengthen academic quality; improve support for students and student success; and improve institutional management and reported a wide range of benefits. For example, Sinte Gleska, a tribal college in South Dakota, used part of its Title III grant to fund the school's distance learning department, to provide students access to academic and research resources otherwise not available in its rural isolated location. Our review of grant files found that institutions experienced challenges, such as staffing problems, which sometimes resulted in implementation delays. For example, one grantee reported delays in implementing its management information system due to the turn over of experienced staff. As a result of these implementation challenges, grantees sometimes need additional time to complete planned activities. Although Education has established outcome based objectives and performance measures, it needs to take steps to align some strategies and objectives, and develop additional performance measures. Education has established an overall strategy to improve the academic, administrative, and fiscal stability of grantees, along with objectives and performance measures focused on student outcomes, such as graduation rates. In 2004, we reported that Education's strategic planning efforts in were focused on program outputs that did not assess programmatic impacts, such as the percentage of goals that grantees met or exceeded, rather than outcomes. While Education has made progress in developing outcome based measures, we found insufficient links between its strategies for improving administrative and fiscal stability with its student outcome objective. To address challenges in measuring institutional progress in areas such as administrative and fiscal stability, Education is conducting a study of the financial health of low income and minority serving institutions supported by Title III and Title V. Education has made changes to better target monitoring and assistance in response to recommendations GAO made in 2004, however, additional study is needed to determine the effectiveness of these efforts. For example, Education uses risk indicators designed to better target grantees that may require site visits. While Education implemented an electronic monitoring system, it lacks the ability to systematically track grantee performance as designed. While Education provides technical assistance through various methods, its ability to target assistance remains limited in that its feedback mechanisms may not encourage open communication. Specifically, Education relies on grantee performance reports that are tied to funding decisions to solicit feedback. |
gao_GAO-03-171T | gao_GAO-03-171T_0 | All major U.S. airlines except Southwest reported losses during those years. Many Carriers Face Deep Financial Losses
Many major U.S. passenger airlines are experiencing their second consecutive year of record financial losses. For 2002, some Wall Street analysts have projected that U.S. airline industry losses will total about $7 billion, but this projection may worsen in the event of additional armed conflict, particularly if this results in decreasing travel demand and rising fuel prices. First, many carriers have trimmed costs through staff furloughs. According to the Congressional Research Service, carriers have reduced their workforces by at least 100,000 employees since last September. We are highlighting three of these issues: the effect of airlines’ current financial situation, including new business costs, on industry health and competition; the impact of reductions in service on federal programs designed to protect service to small communities, and international developments that may further affect the domestic industry. How will the carriers’ reactions to current financial pressures affect the industry’s competitive landscape? How will future international developments affect established agreements between the US and EU member states? There are a number of international issues that will influence the domestic aviation industry’s attempts to recover from financial losses. This could raise uncertainties over the status of “open skies” agreements that the United States has signed with individual European Union nations. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the economic state of the airline industry.
What GAO Found
Many, but not all, major U.S. passenger airlines are experiencing their second consecutive year of record financial losses. In 2001, the U.S. commercial passenger airline industry reported losses in excess of $6 billion. For 2002, some Wall Street analysts recently projected that U.S. airline industry losses will approach $7 billion, and noted that the prospects for recovery during 2003 are diminishing. Carriers have taken many actions to lower their costs and restructure their operations. Since September 2001, carriers have furloughed 100,000 staff, renegotiated labor contracts, and streamlined their fleets by retiring older, costlier aircraft. Carriers have reduced capacity by operating fewer flights or smaller aircraft. In some cases, carriers eliminated all service to communities. As the aviation industry continues its attempts to recover, Congress will be confronted with a need for increased oversight of a number of public policy issues. First, airlines' reactions to financial pressures will affect the domestic industry's competitive landscape. Second, airlines' reductions in service will likely place additional pressure on federal programs supporting air service to small communities, where travel options are already limited. Finally, although domestic travel has been the focus of recent concern, there are numerous international developments--especially regarding the European Union (EU)--that may affect established international "open skies" agreements between the United States and EU member states. |
gao_GAO-03-810 | gao_GAO-03-810_0 | Increasingly, retirees will—on average—need to balance income and expenditures over a longer period of time than in the past. Nearly Half of DB Plans Make Lump Sums Available and Just Over a Third of DC Plans Make Annuities Available
DB plans are more likely than DC plans to make annuities available at retirement, while DC plans are more likely than DB plans to make lump sums available. 2). Also, 32 percent of all private sector workers who participated in DC plans had a lump sum, an annuity and an installment payout option available at retirement. A funding provider for defined contribution plans, which used to only offer annuity payouts at retirement, expanded the payout options it makes available to retiring participants in response to participants’ desire for more options and control in managing their pension and retirement savings plan assets. Plans Provide Participants with Notices about Benefit Payout Options, but Information on Managing Assets during Retirement Is Not Widely Available
Plan sponsors we spoke with indicated that they provide retiring participants with applicable notices about benefit payout options available under the plan. While plan sponsors we spoke with provided some additional information on saving for retirement, they generally did not provide information on considerations relevant to managing pension and retirement savings plan assets at and during retirement. Although we found that about 60 percent of retirees received annuities, over time an increasing percentage of more recent retirees chose to directly roll over their lump sum benefits into an IRA or to defer their receipt by leaving them in the plan. The growing trend towards payouts other than annuities may reflect, at least in part, the continuing trend in coverage towards DC plans. However, few retirees use their pension benefits or other assets to purchase individual life annuities. Range of Actions Available to Help Retiring Participants Preserve Their Pension Assets
Pension experts identified a range of actions that could help retiring participants preserve their pension and retirement savings plan assets. For example, they noted that participants need to be aware of various risks that may affect how participants manage and draw down their pension assets to provide income during retirement. Our analysis shows that recent experience with retiring participants who have a choice of payout options indicates that these retirees increasingly choose to directly roll over their lump sum benefits into an IRA or defer the receipt of benefits. Almost all of the respondents from our expert panel rated information on the financial risks individuals face in retirement (96 percent) and the risk of outliving one’s assets in retirement (91 percent) as very or extremely effective in helping retiring participants make decisions about how to manage pension assets. Determining Benefit Payouts Plan Participants Receive at Retirement
We analyzed HRS data to determine the benefit payouts pension plan participants receive at retirement. Household decisions about retirement income. 1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decisions that retiring workers make about how and when to draw down their pension plan assets determine in part whether they will have pension income that lasts throughout retirement. Individuals will need pension and other retirement income to sustain them over a longer period of time than in the past. Moreover, the continuing trend towards pension plans with individual accounts has increased participants' responsibility for managing their pension assets during retirement. As such, our objectives were to determine: (1) what benefit payout options and accompanying information pension plans make available to participants at retirement, (2) what benefit payouts plan participants receive at retirement, and (3) the actions available to help retiring participants preserve their pension and retirement savings plan assets.
What GAO Found
Defined benefit (DB) plans make annuities available to all participants at retirement, while defined contribution (DC) plans make lump sums available to almost all participants. Recent data also show that about half of private sector workers who participated in DB plans had a lump sum option at retirement, and over a third of their counterparts in DC plans had an annuity option. Plan sponsors GAO spoke with provide retiring participants with applicable notices about their benefit payout options available under the plan. Additional information provided by plan sponsors GAO spoke with primarily focused on saving for retirement. Risks that can affect retirement income, or other considerations relevant to managing pension assets at and during retirement were generally not discussed. According to GAO's analysis, while 60 percent of recent retirees received annuities, an increasing percentage from 1992 to 2000 directly rolled over lump sum benefits into an individual retirement account or deferred their receipt by leaving these assets in the plan, a trend in part explained by the shift toward retirees with DC plan benefits. Additionally, GAO found that a growing percentage of those retirees who reported having a choice of benefit payouts chose to directly roll over their lump sum benefits or leave benefits in the plan rather than receive annuities. Actions available to help retiring participants preserve their pension and retirement savings plan assets range from options that would encourage the receipt of annuities to providing information to help participants make better decisions about managing their pension assets at and during retirement. According to an expert panel GAO used as part of this study, retirees need to be aware of the risk of outliving one's assets in retirement and the financial risks individuals face in retirement. Over 90 percent of GAO's panelists rated providing information on such risks as very or extremely effective in helping retiring participants make decisions about managing their pension assets. |
gao_GAO-14-216 | gao_GAO-14-216_0 | Several factors contributed to JPME research institution growth, including increases in reimbursable funding from outside offices sponsoring JPME research, the creation of new research institutions, and the realignment of institutions at some JPME colleges and universities. Number, Funding, and Size of JPME Research Institutions Grew from 2007 through 2011, Then Declined
JPME research institutions, particularly at NDU, experienced considerable growth in number, funding, and size in terms of staffing levels from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, but have declined over the past 2 years. For example, total staffing levels at Air University’s research institutions increased from 19 to 97. DOD Is Limited in Its Ability to Assess the Performance of JPME Research Institutions
The extent to which DOD can assess the performance of JPME research institutions is limited by the lack of a comprehensive framework to systematically assess their performance in meeting PME and other departmental goals and objectives. However, best practices state that achieving results in government requires a comprehensive framework that includes measurable goals and objectives and metrics for assess progress, consistent with the framework identified in the Government Performance and Results Act. Further, while there are mechanisms in place for overseeing JPME colleges and universities, such as the Joint Staff’s JPME accreditation process, these are focused on the quality of academic programs and not on the research institutions’ performance. There is no DOD-wide guidance that addresses the intended role of the research institutions in supporting PME or other departmental goals or assigns responsibilities for conducting reviews of them, leaving the department without a basis to assess the institutions’ stated mission and actual performance against planned or expected results. DOD Does Not Formally Coordinate Studies and Analysis Research Requests Performed by JPME and Other DOD- Funded Research Institutions, Although Some Conduct Work in Similar Topic Areas
DOD does not formally coordinate requests for studies and analysis research conducted by JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations, even though many of these organizations have missions to conduct work in similar topic areas. However, DOD relies on a variety of separate processes to manage research requests that can be conducted at either JPME research institutions or other DOD-funded research organizations. Specifically, offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments have their own separate internal processes to request such research. Because there is no requirement for them to do so, these offices do not have mechanisms in place to participate in one another’s processes, thereby limiting opportunities to share information on DOD-wide priorities and collective research efforts, and to identify any areas of potentially similar research. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the performance of JPME research institutions, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the military departments for their respective PME and JPME colleges and universities to take the following three actions: define the role of JPME research institutions to provide a basis for assign responsibilities for conducting performance reviews of JPME establish a framework that includes measurable goals and objectives linked with metrics to assess the performance of JPME research institutions. To improve the coordination of requests for studies and analysis research within the department and to reduce the risk of potential overlap in research activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish and implement a departmental mechanism that requires leadership from the military services and departmental offices responsible for managing requests for studies and analysis research to coordinate their annual research requests and ongoing research efforts. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that we review the work performed by joint professional military education (JPME) research institutions in support of professional military education In this report, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) broader mission.we (1) describe how JPME research institutions have changed in number, funding, and size, and the factors that contributed to any changes; (2) evaluate the extent to which DOD is assessing the performance of JPME research institutions in meeting professional military education and other departmental goals and objectives; and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD coordinates research requests for JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations. Specifically, best practices state that organizations involved in similar missions should coordinate and share information to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's colleges and universities that provide JPME, including their research institutions, are intended to develop military personnel throughout their careers by broadening them intellectually and fostering collaboration across the military services. JPME research institutions generally provide studies and analysis research that can support academic programs or inform DOD policymakers.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 mandated GAO to review JPME research institutions. GAO's report (1) describes how JPME research institutions have changed in number, funding, and size; (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD assesses JPME research institution performance; and (3) evaluates the extent to which DOD coordinates the research requests of these and other DOD-funded research organizations. GAO identified and examined the 20 JPME research institutions that conduct research as their primary mission and have dedicated personnel. GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed officials on changes at the 20 institutions and how they are overseen, as well as the processes to coordinate their research activities and those of 14 other DOD-funded research organizations GAO determined conduct research activities.
What GAO Found
Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) research institutions, particularly at the National Defense University, experienced growth in number, funding, and size in terms of staffing levels from fiscal year (FY) 2007 through FY 2011, but the number of institutions as well as funding and staffing levels declined over the past 2 years. For example, total funding for JPME research institutions increased from $30.8 million in FY 2007 to $47.7 million in FY 2011, but subsequently decreased to $40.6 million in FY 2013. GAO identified several factors that contributed to these institutions' growth, including increases in funding provided by outside organizations for research and the creation of new research institutions. Department of Defense (DOD) officials reported that DOD-wide budget reductions, including the effects of sequestration, contributed to decreases in the number, size, and funding for JPME research institutions.
The extent to which DOD can assess the performance of JPME research institutions is limited by the lack of a comprehensive framework to systematically assess their performance in meeting professional military education and other departmental goals and objectives. JPME colleges and universities have not consistently established measurable goals or objectives linked with performance metrics for their associated research institutions. Best practices state that achieving results in government requires a framework with measurable goals and objectives and metrics to assess progress. Further, oversight mechanisms for the colleges and universities, such as accreditation processes, focus on the quality of JPME academic programs and not on the research institutions' performance. There is no DOD-wide guidance that addresses the intended role of the research institutions in supporting JPME or other departmental goals, or assigns responsibilities for conducting reviews of them, leaving the department without a basis to assess the institutions' stated mission and actual performance against planned or expected results. Therefore, DOD does not have a basis to assess the institutions' missions and performance against expected results, as called for by best practices. Without measurable goals and objectives linked with performance metrics, and clear guidance on their intended roles and assignment of oversight responsibilities, DOD cannot ensure JPME research institutions are effectively accomplishing their missions.
DOD has not established mechanisms to coordinate requests for research conducted by JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations because there is no requirement to do so. Although many of these organizations have missions to conduct research in similar topic areas, DOD uses a variety of processes to request studies and analysis research. Specifically, offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments each have their own separate internal processes to manage research requests and do not participate in one another's processes. Best practices on managing for results state that organizations involved in similar missions should coordinate and share information to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. At a time of constrained budgets, fragmentation in DOD's approach to managing its research requests across the department exposes DOD to the risk of potential overlap of studies and analysis research.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take actions to define the role of JPME research institutions, assign responsibilities for assessing performance, and establish a mechanism to coordinate studies and analysis research requests. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-583 | gao_GAO-16-583_0 | In response to congressional interest and media coverage regarding inadequate and substandard care for Army soldiers recovering from serious medical conditions at the former Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the Army in 2007 developed its Army Medical Action Plan. The Army Has Not Assessed the Effectiveness of the Triad of Care Model despite the Change in the Composition of Diagnoses among WTU Soldiers
The Army has not assessed the effectiveness of the Triad of Care model, the core structure of the WTU program and consisting of a team of three key staff that provide medical case management. Despite this change, the Army has not assessed its approach for managing soldiers’ medical care. The five WTUs we visited reported having taken ad-hoc measures to help meet the increase in behavioral health needs in the absence of such an assessment. Composition of Diagnoses among WTU Soldiers Has Changed Significantly
The Army established the Triad of Care model at a time when WTU soldiers’ diagnoses were primarily for physical conditions. Specifically, in 2008, the first full year of the WTU program, about 36 percent of the 12,228 WTU soldiers had a behavioral health diagnosis, while in 2015, over half of the 2,628 soldiers, about 52 percent, had such a diagnosis. The Warrior Transition Command Has Not Assessed Whether Army- wide Changes to the Triad of Care Model Are Needed to Respond to the Change in the Composition of Diagnoses
While the Army conducts reviews and inspections of the WTU program and WTUs, it has not assessed the effectiveness of the Triad of Care model, in light of the change in the composition of diagnoses. Assessing the Triad of Care model in light of changes in, for example, the prevalence of behavioral health conditions would position the Army to better determine how to meet WTU soldiers’ medical needs. The Army Faces Challenges in Overseeing the Selection of Certain WTU Staff, in Evaluating Their Training, and in Adjusting Staff Levels if Needed
The Army has established selection processes and updated its selection criteria to require additional information about potential squad leaders and platoon sergeants for its WTUs, but the Army is not monitoring full adherence to policy, specifically the requirement to interview candidates for these positions. In addition, the Army has not developed a plan that explains how to meet any potential increases in demand for staff, if needed, at the WTUs. Candidates for these positions are drawn from a mix of Army occupations, such as infantry or transportation corps, and the selection process, including interviews, is intended to ensure the suitability of the staff selected for the position. The Army Has Made Efforts to Improve Training, but Does Not Incorporate a Key Post- Training Assessment
The Army Medical Department Center and School has made efforts to make improve WTU training for squad leaders and platoon sergeants, but the program does not incorporate a post-training assessment of the application of training to the work environment. Without information that could be obtained from conducting post-training assessments, the Army Medical Department Center and School may miss a valuable opportunity to improve its programs by incorporating useful information concerning the practical application of training. A key planning consideration in the decision to inactivate 11 WTUs by August 2016 was the Army’s ability to reverse these changes in the event that the demand for the Army’s WTU program was to increase. However, they stated that they have not yet taken steps to address this issue. The Army Does Not Track Instances in Which Commanders Have Made Exceptions to WTU Admittance Criteria and Has Not Analyzed Proposed Changes to Criteria for the Reserve Component
The Army has implemented a structured process for reviewing the eligibility of soldiers to be admitted to WTUs, but it does not track instances in which Commanders have made exceptions to these criteria for active-duty soldiers. However, by not tracking this information, the Army does not know how frequently such exceptions are made and cannot ensure the best use of resources. The Army Has Not Yet Examined the Costs and Benefits of Expanding a WTU-Alternative Program for Army Reserve Soldiers
The Army is planning to expand an alternative WTU program to the Army Reserve, but it has not yet examined the costs and benefits of this expansion. Exercise oversight responsibility to track full adherence to selection processes for squad leaders and platoon sergeants, including the requirement to conduct interviews for these positions. Develop plans to adjust staff levels, if needed, to accommodate a potential future surge in demand. To help ensure the best use of resources for managing the medical care of soldiers recovering from serious medical conditions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Chief of the Army Reserve, in conjunction with the Army Surgeon General, to take the following action:
Develop an analysis that compares the costs and benefits of maintaining the current system of Community Care Units with the costs and benefits of expanding the Reserve Component Managed Care program. We also discussed the Army’s ability to adjust WTU staff levels with officials from the Warrior Transition Command. 5). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army established its WTU program in 2007 after congressional interest and media coverage about substandard care for soldiers at the former Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The program is to coordinate care for soldiers recovering from serious physical and behavioral health conditions. As the WTU soldier population has declined, the Army has reduced its WTUs--from 45 in 2008 to a planned total of 14 by August 2016.
The House Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to review the WTU program. GAO evaluated, among other things, the extent to which the Army has (1) assessed the effectiveness of the Triad of Care model; (2) established processes to oversee the selection of WTU personnel, assess their training, and adjust staff levels; and (3) assessed adherence to WTU admittance criteria and the impact of any changes to them. GAO conducted site visits to 5 WTUs, based on a mix of active and reserve component soldiers and other variables.
What GAO Found
The Army has not assessed the effectiveness of the Triad of Care model, the core structure of the Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) program, consisting of a team of three key staff that provide medical case management. The Army established the Triad of Care model at a time when WTU soldiers' diagnoses were primarily for physical conditions. Since then, the composition of diagnoses has changed significantly. Specifically, in 2008, about 36 percent of the 12,228 soldiers who entered the WTUs had a behavioral health diagnosis. In 2015, however, over half of the 2,628 soldiers who entered the WTUs, about 52 percent, had such a diagnosis. Despite the change in the composition of diagnoses, the Army has not assessed its approach for managing soldiers' care. Officials from the five WTUs that GAO visited stated that they have added social workers to the Triad as an ad-hoc measure to provide better case management and certain types of behavioral health services. These local adaptations represent efforts to meet an immediate medical need and support the need for analysis of whether the Triad model should change. Assessing the Triad in light of the changes in WTU soldiers' diagnoses would position the Army to better determine how to meet WTU soldiers' medical needs.
The Army faces challenges in its oversight of the selection of squad leaders and platoon sergeants to staff WTUs, in the evaluation of staff training, and in the ability to adjust future staff levels if needed. Specifically, the Army has established selection processes and updated its selection criteria for these WTU personnel, but it is not exercising oversight responsibility to track full adherence to these policies, specifically the Army's requirement to interview candidates for these positions. Candidates for these positions are drawn from a mix of Army occupations, and the selection process, including interviews, is intended to ensure the suitability of the staff selected for these sensitive positions. While the Army has taken steps to improve its training program for squad leaders and platoon sergeants, the program does not incorporate a post-training assessment of the application of training to the work environment. Without information that could be obtained from such assessments, the Army may miss an opportunity to incorporate information concerning the practical application of training. In addition, the Army has not developed plans for how it would increase WTU staff levels, if needed, to support any potential future increase in demand. The ability to reverse the decision to inactivate 11 WTUs by August 2016 was a key planning consideration for the Army. However, without a plan to address staff level changes, the Army lacks assurance that it can select, train, and assign staff to its WTUs in a timely manner.
While the Army has implemented a process for reviewing the eligibility of soldiers to be admitted to WTUs, it does not track instances in which Commanders have made exceptions to these criteria. By not tracking this information, the Army does not know how frequently such exceptions are made and cannot ensure the best use of resources. In addition, the Army is planning to expand a WTU-alternative program to the Army Reserve, but has not examined the costs and benefits of such an expansion. Without comparing the costs and benefits of program expansion with the current system, the Army could incur significant costs without clearly articulated benefits.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's recommendations include that the Army assess the Triad of Care model's effectiveness; track adherence to selection processes for WTU staff; assess the application of their training; develop plans to ensure the ability to adjust staff levels, if needed; track exceptions to WTU admittance criteria; and compare the costs and benefits of expanding a WTU-alternative program for Army Reserve soldiers. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-96-49 | gao_RCED-96-49_0 | Domestic producers pay an assessment when they sell their raw cotton. Despite these concerns, quotas and tariffs have not prevented cotton imports from sharing in the growth in the U.S. market. Cotton imports have grown even faster than U.S. consumption, increasing from 1.5 billion pounds in 1984 to about 3.8 billion pounds in 1994, an average annual growth rate of about 10 percent. Officials concluded that the cotton import assessment complies with the principle of national treatment because the assessment imposed on importers is the same as the assessment imposed on domestic cotton producers and the assessment is mandatory for both importers and producers. USDA Has Established an Administrative Framework for Assessing Imported Cotton Products
USDA has carried out the activities specified in the 1990 legislation to assess imported cotton products. For example, USDA held a referendum on whether to assess imports and eliminate refunds of assessments. USDA also established equivalent assessment rates for imported cotton products; issued relevant orders and regulations governing the program’s operations; established procedures for exempting imports containing U.S. cotton; and provided for the representation of cotton importers on the Cotton Board. Furthermore, this assessment is in accordance with U.S. international trade agreements, according to USDA and USTR officials. An example of how the assessment is calculated follows: One bale = 500 pounds One kilogram = 2.2046 pounds One pound = 0.453597 kilograms The $1-per-bale assessment is converted to kilograms: A 500-pound bale = 226.8 kilograms (500 x 0.453597) The $1-per-bale assessment = $0.002000 per pound (1/500) or $0.004409 per kilogram (1/226.8)
The supplemental assessment of 5/10 of 1 percent of the value of the cotton is converted to kilograms: Average price received = $0.683 per pound or $1.5057 per kilogram (0.683 x 2.2046) 5/10 of 1 percent of the average price in kilograms = $0.007529 per kilogram (1.5057 x 0.005)
Calculation of the Assessment on a Shipment of Imported Cotton
USDA Actions to Implement the Administrative Framework Outlined in the 1990 Amendments
The Cotton Research and Promotion Act Amendments of 1990 set forth administrative implementing procedures for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to extend the research and promotion program to cotton imports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO assessed the: (1) growth in the U.S. market for cotton and cotton products; (2) extent to which import restrictions have affected importers' ability to take advantage of any growth in the U.S. market; and (3) relevant U.S. international trade obligations and the compliance factors for imported cotton and cotton products.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the cotton import assessment has not affected the growth rate of cotton imports; (2) the volume of imported cotton products has increased from 1.5 billion pounds in 1984 to 3.8 billion pounds in 1994; (3) the assessment is in compliance with U.S. trade obligations and is based on the principle of national treatment; (4) the Department of Agriculture (USDA) established an administrative framework for assessing cotton products, held a referendum for cotton producers and importers on whether to assess imports, set an assessment rate equivalent to domestic producer rates, and established collection procedures for cotton products with the Customs Service; (5) cotton importers frequently pay duplicative assessments on cotton products containing U.S. cotton because they have difficulty meeting the exemption criteria; and (6) producers and importers disagree on the management and oversight functions of the Cotton Board. |
gao_AIMD-00-91 | gao_AIMD-00-91_0 | The cost of the 2000 Census has already far surpassed that of the 1990 Census in real terms. The scale and complexity of the Bureau’s task is enormous. Achieving the Bureau’s Mail Response Rate Objective Will Be Difficult
The Bureau is anticipating a mail response rate of 61 percent; however, achieving this level of public participation will be a formidable task. The mail response rate has declined with each decennial census since the Bureau first initiated a national mailout/mailback approach in 1970. To help boost public participation in the census, the Bureau has instituted an outreach and promotion campaign that is as ambitious as it is diverse. At the national level, the Bureau hired a consortium of private-sector advertising agencies, led by Young & Rubicam, to develop an extensive paid advertising program for the 2000 Census. At the local level, the Bureau has secured partnerships with local governments, community groups, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations to promote the census at the grassroots level. The Bureau will be challenged to complete nonresponse follow-up on schedule without compromising data quality, and to adequately staff nonresponse follow-up operations. The Bureau Faces Formidable Challenges in Conducting Data Capture Operations
In addition to the uncertainties and risks surrounding the outreach and promotion program and nonresponse follow-up operation, the Bureau also faces formidable challenges in performing critical data capture operations. The Bureau and its DCS 2000 development contractor shared our concerns about the delivery of promised DCS 2000 capabilities on time, and in response, they were employing measures to minimize risks and to expedite the completion of DCS 2000. Data Capture Center Operations
the Bureau’s progress in getting its data capture processes fully operational. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its recent reports regarding the operational uncertainties of the status of the 2000 Census, focusing on: (1) achieving the Bureau of the Census' mail response rate objective; (2) collecting accurate and timely data from nonrespondents; and (3) conducting data capture operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Bureau is anticipating a mail response rate of 61 percent, however, achieving this level of public participation will be a formidable task; (2) the mail response rate has declined with each decennial census since the Bureau first initiated a national mailout/mailback approach in 1970 ; (3) to help boost public participation in the census, the Bureau has instituted an outreach and promotion campaign that is as ambitious as it is diverse; (4) at the national level, the Bureau hired a consortium of private-sector advertising agencies to develop an extensive paid advertising program for the 2000 census; (5) at the local level, the Bureau has secured partnerships with local governments, community groups, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations to promote the census at the grassroots level; (6) to count those individuals who do not mail their census questionnaires, the Bureau conducts a nationwide field follow-up operation in which temporary employees called enumerators visit and collect census information from each nonresponding housing unit; (7) however, past experience has shown that following up with nonrespondents is one of the most error-prone and costly of all census operations; (8) the Bureau will be challenged to complete nonresponse follow-up operations; (9) the Bureau faces formidable challenges in performing critical data capture operations; (10) the Bureau faces a huge challenge in delivering promised Data Capture System (DCS) capabilities on time, primarily because much remained to be done within the very short time remaining before data capture operations were to begin; (11) the Bureau and its contractor shared GAO's concerns and, in response, they were employing measures to minimize risks and to expedite the completion of DCS 2000; and (12) the Bureau will conduct a final operational test to assess the centers' ability to process a workload equivalent to that expected during actual data capture operations. |
gao_HEHS-96-170 | gao_HEHS-96-170_0 | Under SSA’s redesign plan, the DCM—a single decisionmaker located at either an SSA or a DDS office—would be solely responsible for processing the initial disability claim and making the decision, thereby assuming functions currently performed by at least three federal and state workers. The DCM would also serve as a single, personal point of contact for claimants. Recognizing the complexity of the DCM position responsibilities, the redesign plan calls for implementing several new support features that SSA considers critical to the DCM position: (1) SSA plans to develop a simplified decision methodology that would provide a less complex, more structured approach for DCMs to use when deciding claims. As part of the redesign plan, SSA expects to team its claims representatives and DDS disability examiners so they can process claims in a coordinated manner. Work Group Established to Define Parameters of DCM Test
To develop parameters for conducting and evaluating the DCM test, SSA assembled a work group consisting of representatives from SSA and DDS management, claims representatives and disability examiners, and federal and state union members. However, the testing proposed by the DCM work group may leave untested an important feature of the position. Concerns About the DCM Position
Concerns have been raised about the DCM position since the DPRT first proposed it in 1994. These concerns include the complexity of the responsibilities, compromises to safety and internal controls, salary differential between federal and state employees, and structure of field operations. Uncertainties Exist About Availability of DCM Staff
SSA expects to recruit the approximately 11,000 DCMs, which it estimates will be needed, from its current staff of federal claims representatives and state disability examiners. However, some of these staff may be unwilling or lack the necessary skills to assume DCM responsibilities. In addition, SSA has not yet developed plans for providing technical and clerical support staff for the DCM position. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) establishment of the disability claim manager (DCM) position, focusing on: (1) SSA efforts to test and implement the position; (2) major concerns about the position; and (3) SSA efforts to staff the position.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as envisioned by SSA, DCMs would be solely responsible for processing and approving initial disability claims, assume functions currently performed by at least three federal and state workers, and serve as a single, personal point of contact for claimants; (2) SSA has several initiatives under way to team claims representatives and disability examiners so that they can coordinate claims processing functions and prepare for transition to the DCM position; (3) although it has not yet implemented other initiatives and support features that are critical to the DCM position, SSA has decided to proceed with plans to test the DCM position; (4) a three-phase testing plan proposed by an SSA work group of management representatives, claims representatives, disability examiners, and federal and state union members may leave some important DCM features untested and does not have the support of all work group members; (5) concerns raised about the DCM position include the complexity of DCM responsibilities, compromises to safety and controls, salary differential between federal and state workers, and impact on field operations; and (6) SSA expects to recruit DCMs from its current staff of federal claims examiners and state disability examiners, but some staff may be unwilling or lack the necessary skills, and SSA has not developed a plan for providing technical and clerical support for DCMs. |
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