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gao_GAO-17-161 | gao_GAO-17-161_0 | Also, for some discretionary grants, EPA negotiates work plans, which include estimated time frames and dollar amounts for activities under the grant. EPA awards these grants for a variety of activities, such as environmental research, training, providing education programs, and cleaning up brownfields. EPA Manages Competition for Its Discretionary Grants through a Process Established by Its Competition Policy and Implemented by Program and Regional Offices
EPA manages competition for its discretionary grants through a process established by its competition policy and implemented by its program and regional offices, which fund activities related to their own programmatic focuses. Under the competition policy, program and regional offices are to advertise discretionary grant opportunities through announcements on Grants.gov and other methods as appropriate; evaluate all applications against eligibility criteria and all eligible applications against evaluation criteria; and award grants. According to the competition policy and the Uniform Guidance, all announcements must include the following eight sections: 1. funding opportunity description, including the programmatic and technical description with authorizing statutes and regulations and clear examples of eligible activities; 2. award information, including information about the expected number of awards and award amounts; 3. eligibility information, including information identifying the applicants eligible to compete for awards and specific eligibility criteria; 4. application and submission information, including a description of the required content and format of the application and instructions on how to apply; 5. application review information, including specific ranking and evaluation criteria and the relative importance assigned to them, such as relative points, weights, percentages, or other means used to distinguish them; 6. award administration information, including notice to applicants of EPA’s disputes procedures and other pertinent administrative information; 7. agency contacts, including a point of contact for answering questions about the announcement; and 8. other information, including any additional information that may be helpful to applicants. EPA Provided Nearly $1.5 Billion in Discretionary Grant Dollars to a Variety of Grantees from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015 and Competitively Awarded at Least 90 Percent of New Awards Subject to Its Competition Policy
From fiscal years 2013 through 2015, EPA provided nearly $1.5 billion in discretionary grant dollars to about 2,000 unique grantees, including state governments, nonprofits, Indian tribes, state universities, and local governments, according to our analysis of EPA data. Of this total, $579 million was for new awards subject to the competition policy, and according to EPA, the agency met its annual performance target to competitively award at least 90 percent of these dollars or awards. More specifically, approximately $282 million was for exemptions from competition, which are new awards that are not subject to the competition policy, and about $632 million was for amendments to awards that may or may not have been subject to the competition policy. Three of these websites are government-wide. Further, although CFDA.gov has a search field for grant types and “discretionary grant” is a second-tier grant type that users can choose to search for, EPA does not flag discretionary grants in the information it submits for CFDA.gov. Under federal standards for internal control, agencies are to communicate complete and accurate information internally and externally to achieve the entity’s objectives. These officials expect the new system to be fully operational in 2018. In addition to these steps, by having clear guidance on identifying discretionary grants generally—such as how to flag categorical grants with discretionary aspects and how to reconcile inconsistencies among EPA’s two definitions of discretionary grants— staff might be able to better identify all discretionary grants in the internal grants management system, especially discretionary grant programs developed in the future. However, the information EPA makes publicly available is neither easy to identify nor complete. Until recently, EPA did not have complete information about which of its grants are discretionary because staff were not consistently distinguishing discretionary grants in EPA’s internal grants management system. In addition, our review of EPA’s unofficial reports on grant competitions— the only publicly available source of information about the number of applications received for discretionary grant competition opportunities— found that they are not current and they contain limited information. Although EPA is updating its internal grants management system with capabilities to collect and report more timely and complete information about discretionary grants, the agency has no plans to use the system to improve the timeliness and quality of the grants information it makes publicly available on its website. To better enable Congress and other decision makers to monitor EPA’s management of discretionary grants, the EPA Administrator should direct the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Administration and Resources Management to direct the Director of OGD to determine how to make more complete information on EPA’s discretionary grants publicly available, such as by posting timely and complete reports on its website. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examine (1) how EPA manages competition for its discretionary grants, (2) how much in discretionary grants EPA provided from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 and to what types of grantees, and how much of that was competitively awarded, and (3) what information EPA makes publicly available on discretionary grants. To examine what information EPA makes publicly available on discretionary grants, we reviewed relevant statutes and regulations, EPA’s competition policy, and EPA’s procedures and guidance for making information publicly available on grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA annually awards hundreds of discretionary grants, totaling about $500 million. EPA has the discretion to determine grantees and amounts for these grants, which fund a range of activities, from environmental research to wetlands restoration. EPA awards and manages discretionary grants at 10 headquarters program offices and 10 regional offices. Past reviews by GAO and EPA's Inspector General found that EPA has faced challenges managing such grants, including procuring insufficient competition for them and providing incomplete public information about them. GAO was asked to review EPA's management of discretionary grants.
This report examines (1) how EPA manages competition for discretionary grants, (2) how much in discretionary grants EPA provided from fiscal years 2013 through 2015 and to what types of grantees, and (3) the information EPA makes publicly available on discretionary grants. GAO reviewed EPA's competition policy and guidance, examined internal evaluations of grant applications for competitions that were selected partly because they accounted for large portions of discretionary grant dollars, analyzed EPA data as well as information EPA made available on public websites, and interviewed EPA officials.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) manages competition for its discretionary grants through a process established by its competition policy and implemented by its program and regional offices. Under the policy, offices are to advertise discretionary grant opportunities on Grants.gov—a website for federal grant announcements—and may also advertise using other methods, such as trade journals and e-mail lists. The announcements must describe eligibility and evaluation criteria, and the process may be customized to assess (1) all applications against eligibility criteria and (2) eligible applications for merit against evaluation criteria. Under the policy, EPA established a Grants Competition Advocate, a senior official who provides guidance to and oversight of the offices. EPA officials said this position has been key to improving competition for discretionary grants.
From fiscal years 2013 through 2015, EPA provided nearly $1.5 billion in discretionary grants to about 2,000 unique grantees, with state governments, nonprofits, and Indian tribes receiving the largest shares, according to GAO's analysis of EPA data. Of the $1.5 billion, $579 million was for new grants subject to the competition policy, and according to EPA, the agency met its performance target to competitively award at least 90 percent of these new grant dollars or awards annually. Some discretionary grants are not subject to the competition policy for several reasons—for example because they are available by law only to Indian tribes. Of the remaining approximately $920 million, $282 million was for new grants not subject to the competition policy, and about $632 million was for amendments to existing grants, such as for added work.
Publicly available information from EPA about its discretionary grants is neither easy to identify nor complete. For example, different information about the grants, such as dollar amounts, is available at four federal websites; but three of these websites do not have a way to search all the grants, and the fourth cannot identify the grants because EPA does not flag them in its submissions to the website. EPA officials plan to better flag these grants in the future; however, to obtain complete information, users would still have to search several websites containing different parts of this information. Also, GAO found that the unofficial reports EPA makes publicly available on the number of applications received for its grant competitions contain limited information. Moreover, these reports are not current because EPA relies on manual processes to collect the information from its offices, which can cause reporting delays. Further, GAO found that although EPA's internal grants management system has a field for tracking grant types, a lack of clarity in EPA's guidance may contribute to EPA staff's inconsistent use of this field. Consequently, EPA cannot easily identify discretionary grants in its system or collect complete and accurate information on them. EPA is transitioning to a new system that is expected to be operational in 2018 and to provide the capability to collect more timely and complete information. However, EPA officials said they do not have plans to use the new system to improve their publicly available reports, which is inconsistent with effective internal and external communication suggested by federal internal control standards. More complete information could help Congress and other decision makers better monitor EPA's management of discretionary grants.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA develop clear guidance for tracking grants and determine how to make more complete information on discretionary grants publicly available. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-624 | gao_GAO-12-624_0 | In fiscal year 2011, RHS paid $1.08 billion in subsidies to provide rental assistance to more than 270,000 households residing in 13,211 different properties. RHS Has Identified and Reduced Certain Types of Payment Errors, but Its Reported Error Rate May Understate the Magnitude of the Problem
RHS’s improper payments audits have identified rental assistance payments that were improper because of incorrectly calculated subsidy amounts and incomplete tenant file documentation. RHS Has Identified Improper Payments Caused by Two Types of Errors
Since 2005, RHS has conducted an annual improper payments audit that identifies sources of payment errors and estimates the magnitude of improper payments in RHS’s rental assistance program. RHS Reported That Its Estimated Error Rate Declined from Fiscal Years 2007 through 2010
RHS reported a decline in its estimated gross error rate (gross improper payments divided by program outlays) from 3.95 percent in fiscal year 2007 to 1.48 percent in fiscal year 2010, the most recent year for which RHS has an estimate. RHS’s Estimates of Improper Payments May Be Understated for Several Reasons
RHS’s estimated error rate may be understated because its improper payments audit does not examine some types of errors, excludes improper payments of less than $100 from its error rate estimates, and does not count all payments to tenants with undated certifications as improper. Two sources of such data are the Department of Health and Human Services’s (HHS) National Directory of New Hires (New Hires database) and the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) data on Social Security and Supplemental Security Income benefits as follows:
New Hires database. SSA benefits data. In 2005, USDA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recommended that RHS draft legislation that would give RHS access to federal income and benefits databases, including those maintained by SSA.However, RHS officials told us they had been focused on getting statutory access to the New Hires database and had not worked on developing legislation for accessing SSA benefits data. However, RHS did not submit the change to OMB for review. RHS Uses Required Statistical Methods for Estimating Improper Payments but Has Not Fully Met Reporting, Reduction, and Recovery Requirements
RHS has complied with requirements for using statistically valid methods to estimate improper payments and has implemented a number of corrective actions to help address the causes of payment errors. With respect to the accountability issue, OMB guidance requires agencies to describe the steps they have taken and plan to take to hold agency managers accountable for reducing and recovering improper payments. HUD took several years to develop and implement a data matching system and provides guidance, training, and technical assistance to system users. Data Matching Has Helped HUD to Identify and Reduce Improper Payments Due to Unreported Tenant Income
HUD uses data matching to help identify and reduce improper rental assistance payments caused by unreported tenant income, also referred to as income reporting error. According to HUD, HUD staff audit program administrators quarterly to confirm that they have stopped making payments on behalf of deceased individuals. By matching tenant information to these data sources, HUD has been able to identify, and take actions to reduce and recover, substantial amounts of improper payments caused by unreported income and payments to deceased tenants. Although adopting the $100 threshold was a major change from RHS’s previous method, RHS did not submit the change to OMB, which is responsible for approving agency methodologies for estimation. As a result, RHS lacks assurance that its current approach is appropriate. RHS has not fully implemented steps to hold agency managers accountable for reducing and recovering improper payments and has not reported on these accountability steps in USDA’s PAR. As a result, RHS is not fully complying with OMB guidance and may be limiting the effectiveness of its actions to address payment errors. In its written comments, USDA said it generally agreed with the recommendations in our report, but it did not comment on specific recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which the Rural Housing Service (RHS) has examined the sources and magnitude of improper rental assistance payments; (2) the extent to which RHS has complied with applicable requirements and guidance for estimating, reporting, reducing, and recovering improper payments; and (3) potential lessons RHS could learn from the Department of Housing and Development’s (HUD) efforts that have helped to identify and reduce improper rental assistance payments. We also interviewed RHS and OMB officials about RHS’s efforts to comply with improper payments requirements and guidance. To assess RHS’s use of required or recommended techniques to reduce and recover improper payments, we reviewed guidance contained in OMB Circular A-123, a 2010 presidential memorandum on ensuring payment accuracy through a “Do Not Pay List,” and provisions in IPIA, as amended by the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). | Why GAO Did This Study
RHS, an agency within USDA, paid property owners about $1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to help more than 270,000 low-income rural tenants afford rental housing. Each year, some of RHSs rental subsidy payments are improperthat is, too high or too low. Federal requirements regarding improper payments are set forth in statute and in OMB guidance. GAO was asked to review (1) the extent to which RHS has examined the sources and magnitude of improper rental assistance payments, (2) RHSs compliance with requirements and guidance concerning improper payments, and (3) potential lessons RHS could learn from HUD efforts to identify and reduce improper rental assistance payments. To do this work, GAO analyzed agency data and documents; reviewed statutes and guidance; and interviewed RHS, HUD, and OMB officials.
What GAO Found
The Rural Housing Service (RHS) has identified improper rental assistance payments caused by certain sources of errors, but its reported error rate (total amount improperly paid divided by program outlays) may understate the magnitude of the problem. RHS has identified improper payments resulting from inaccurate calculations of tenant subsidies and incomplete supporting documents. From fiscal years 2007 through 2010, RHS reduced its reported error rate from 3.95 percent (representing $35 million in errors) to 1.48 percent (representing $15 million in errors). However, these figures may be understated because RHS has not estimated improper payments due to unreported tenant income, and it lacks the authority to match tenant data to federal income data for this purpose. These data include the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) New Hires database and the Social Security Administrations (SSA) data on benefits payments. RHS has proposed legislation to gain access to the HHS data but not the SSA data. Additionally, RHS has not recently estimated payment processing errors and has not strictly adhered to procedures for classifying payments as improper. Further, in 2008, RHS began excluding improper payments of less than $100 from its estimated error rates. However, it did not submit this change to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is responsible for approving agency methodologies for estimation. As a result, RHS lacks assurance that its approach is appropriate.
RHS uses required statistical methods for estimating improper payments but has not fully met requirements for reporting on, reducing, and recovering such payments. Consistent with the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended, and OMB guidance, RHS examines a statistically valid sample of payments and generates estimates with an acceptable level of precision. RHS also has reported required information, such as actions to address payment errors. However, RHS did not fully comply with the requirement to implement and report steps for holding agency managers accountable for reducing improper payments. In addition, although OMB cites data matching as a way to reduce payment errors, RHS has not used data already available from SSA to detect payments made on behalf of deceased tenants. Further, RHS has yet to institute a recovery audit program in accordance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, although it plans to do so sometime in 2012. These shortcomings negatively affect the integrity of RHSs subsidy payments.
The Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) use of data matching to reduce improper payments in its rental assistance programs illustrates the potential benefits and challenges of this technique for RHS. HUD developed a web-based system that allows authorized HUD staff and program administrators (e.g., public housing agencies) to match tenant information to HHSs New Hires database and SSA benefits data. According to HUD, the system has helped to reduce income reporting errors and has contributed to a more than threefold decline in total improper payments from fiscal years 2000 through 2010. Negotiating a data-sharing agreement with one agency and fully implementing the data matching system took several years. Additionally, HUD provides extensive guidance, training, and technical assistance to program administrators to help ensure effective use of the system.
What GAO Recommends
To help reduce improper payments caused by unreported tenant income, GAO suggests that Congress should consider authorizing RHS access to HHSs New Hires database and recommends that RHS develop proposed legislation to gain access to SSA benefits data. GAO also recommends that USDA submit RHSs method for estimating improper payments to OMB for review and that RHS take steps to consistently apply procedures for classifying payments as improper, examine improper payments made on behalf of deceased tenants or caused by payment processing errors, and hold agency managers accountable for reducing improper payments. USDA said it generally agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-118 | gao_GAO-15-118_0 | Administrative Costs
Administrative activities such as managing finances and facilities, ensuring quality, and reporting project status are essential to the operation of grant programs. Programs have different missions, priorities, services, and clients, and jurisdiction for the programs are spread among numerous congressional committees; therefore federal agencies’ definitions of allowable (or prohibited) administrative costs vary from program to program. Agencies Reviewed Have Mechanisms in Place to Collect Data on Federal Grant Administrative Costs, but These Data May Not Reflect Actual Cost of Administration
Although grant-making agencies are not required to track grant administrative cost data specifically, all six of the grant programs we reviewed collect grant administrative cost data in some form. Each of the grant programs we reviewed had mechanisms in place to capture the administrative costs charged to their grant programs, via either a computerized system or paper reporting.collection system varied, as follows: However, each program’s data
HHS’s On-Line Data Collection System used for the CCDF grant and HUD’s Integrated Disbursement & Information System used for both HOME and CDBG are computerized data collection systems available to the grantee and agency that capture grant program budgetary information and actual post-award expenditure reporting. Officials for all of the selected programs reported that they use these systems to review their grantees’ costs for appropriateness. The six programs we reviewed track grant expenses in different ways, which can make it challenging to identify aggregate administrative costs. For some of these programs, administrative costs and program costs may be included in the same line items and program officials told us that separating these costs would be labor intensive. Grant recipients of all the programs we reviewed told us that since administrative costs are not always reimbursed by their federal grants they must cover some administrative expenses themselves. We found examples of grantees absorbing part of the costs to administer a grant. Another CCDF state grantee told us that he relies on state appropriations to cover the majority of administrative costs, and therefore his organization’s federally reported administrative costs remain well under the cap set by the program. The variation in administrative cost caps—the limit to the amount of the grant that may be charged as administrative costs to the federal government— presents challenges to comparing costs across programs. As a result of this variation, the administrative costs of some programs may appear more expensive than others. As we have previously concluded, because there are differences in which activities are defined as administrative costs for financial reporting purposes, a program with high administrative spending is not necessarily less efficient than a program with low Programs with higher administrative cost caps administrative spending.may be assumed—incorrectly—to have higher administrative costs; so it is important to have an understanding of individual caps in place before any cross program comparisons are made. For example, the salary of an enrollment specialist at Head Start, who enrolls children in the program, is considered a program- related cost. However, the salary of similar position as an intake specialist for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, who determines the eligibility and benefit level for participants, may be an administrative cost in some states where the program is administered. However, comparisons of costs may be more appropriate when comparing programs that fulfill similar missions or provide similar services. Comparisons of costs may be appropriate when reviewing programs that fulfill similar missions or provide similar service. However, comparisons of administrative costs across grant programs that provide different services should be made with caution. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which selected federal agencies and grantees have mechanisms and guidance in place to distinguish between administrative and program costs and to facilitate the availability of these data to Congress and the public; and (2) the extent to which there are challenges that hinder the comparability of grant administrative cost data. Although the results of our review are not generalizable to other grant programs in other agencies, they are indicative of the wide variation associated with the mechanisms and guidance for tracking grant administrative costs and the utility of these costs for program management. Costs for administration are limited to 26 percent of total direct costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends billions of dollars on various grants to achieve diverse purposes. The total cost of a grant includes both program costs that directly support the grant's mission and services and administrative costs to run the program. These administrative activities, such as managing finances, are essential. It is important for agencies to track the cost of these activities to provide accountability for efficient use of federal resources.
GAO was asked to review how costs associated with the administration of grants are tracked and the availability of this information. GAO examined (1) the extent to which selected federal agencies and grantees have mechanisms and guidance in place to distinguish between administrative and program costs and to facilitate the availability of these data to Congress and the public; and (2) the extent to which there are challenges that hinder the comparability of grant administrative cost data. For this review GAO selected six grant programs—three in HHS and three in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Agencies and grant programs were selected in part based on obligation amounts and grant types. GAO reviewed each program's statutes, regulations, guidance, and grant documents, as applicable, and interviewed agency officials. Although GAO's findings are not generalizable, they are indicative of the wide variation associated with the mechanisms and guidance for tracking grant administrative costs.
GAO received and incorporated, as appropriate, technical comments from HHS. HUD did not provide comments.
What GAO Found
All six of the grant programs GAO reviewed had mechanisms in place to capture the administrative costs charged to their grant programs, either via a computerized system or paper reporting. All the programs reported that they reviewed their grantees' costs for appropriateness. Two of the programs make administrative cost data available online. The programs GAO reviewed track administrative costs in different ways. For some programs administrative and program costs are reported separately, while for others they are included in the same line items. Administrative costs reported to the federal government may understate the actual cost to administer a grant program. GAO found examples of grantees absorbing part of the costs to administer a grant. Some primary grant recipients stated that when such costs were not reimbursed by the federal grant, they would cover those expenses themselves. Another grantee said he relies on state appropriations to cover the majority of administrative costs.
GAO identified two factors that hinder the comparability of administrative cost data in the programs it reviewed. First, is the existence of cost caps. These caps limit the amount of the grant that may be charged as administrative costs, and thereby affect what is reported to the federal government as administrative costs. For the programs GAO reviewed caps ranged from 5 to 26 percent, with one program having no cap. This variation can make some programs look more administratively expensive than others. Second, differences in what is defined as an administrative cost can present an even greater challenge to comparing costs across programs. Programs have different missions, priorities, services, and clients; as a result definitions of administrative costs vary from program to program. Therefore, different programs may treat similar costs differently. A cost that may be classified as administrative in one program may be considered a direct program delivery cost by another. For example, the salary of an employee who enrolls participants in one Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) program is considered a program cost but an employee who holds a similar position determining the eligibility of participants in another HHS program may be considered an administrative cost depending on the state where it is administered. This variation in definitions means that a program with high administrative costs may not be less efficient than a program with low administrative costs.
Given these issues, it is challenging to collect comparable information for different grant programs. Any use of information on administrative costs needs to recognize these concerns particularly when comparing programs with different types of objectives, projects, or services. Comparisons of costs may be appropriate when reviewing programs that fulfill similar missions or provide similar services. However, comparisons across different types of grant programs should be made with caution. |
gao_GAO-02-544T | gao_GAO-02-544T_0 | Nationally, spending from all public and private sources for long-term care for all ages totaled about $137 billion in 2000, accounting for nearly 12 percent of all health care expenditures. Federal spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are expected to surge—nearly doubling by 2035—as people live longer and spend more time in retirement. Over the longer term, the increase in the number of elderly will add considerably to the strain on federal and state budgets as governments struggle to finance increased Medicaid spending. The positive benefits of the decreased prevalence of disability, however, will be overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of aged baby boomers. Without fundamental financing changes, Medicaid can be expected to remain one of the largest funding sources for long-term care services for aging baby boomers, with Medicaid expenditures for long-term care for the elderly reaching as high as $132 billion by 2050. As I noted previously, this increasing burden will strain both federal and state governments. | What GAO Found
As more and more of the baby boomers enter retirement age, spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security is expected to absorb correspondingly larger shares of federal revenue and crowd out other spending. The aging of the baby boomers will also increase the demand for long-term care and contribute to federal and state budget burdens. The number of disabled elderly who cannot perform daily living activities without assistance is expected to double in the future. Long-term care spending from public and private sources--about $137 billion for persons of all ages in 2000--will rise dramatically as the baby boomers age. Without fundamental financing changes, Medicaid--which pays more than one-third of long-term care expenditures for the elderly--can be expected to remain one of the largest funding sources, straining both federal and state governments. |
gao_GAO-11-626T | gao_GAO-11-626T_0 | Principles for a More Transparent and Effective Budget Process
Before turning to enforcement in particular, I will discuss some broad principles of budget process since it is the framework within which enforcement mechanisms exist. No process can force choices Congress and the President are unwilling to make. Having an agreed-upon goal justifies and frames the choices that must be made. A budget process can facilitate or hamper substantive decisions, but it cannot replace them. While no process can substitute for making the difficult choices, it can help structure the debate. The budget structure can make clear information necessary for important decisions or the structure can make some information harder to find. The process can highlight trade-offs and set rules for action. In our past work, we have identified four broad principles or criteria for a budget process that can help Congress consider the design and structure of future budget enforcement mechanisms. A process should 1. provide information about the long-term effect of decisions, both macro—linking fiscal policy to the long-term economic outlook—and micro—providing recognition of the long-term spending implications of government commitments 2. provide information and be structured to focus on important trade-offs such as the trade-off between investment and consumption spending. 3. provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs between the different policy tools of government (such as tax provisions, grants, and credit programs), and 4. be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent, using clear, consistent definitions. First, selecting the appropriate time horizon in which the budgetary impact of policy decisions should be measured is not just an abstract question for analysts. If the time horizon is too short, Congress may have insufficient information about the potential cost of a program. In addition, too short a time horizon may create incentives to artificially shift costs into the future rather than find a sustainable solution. At the same time, we need to also understand the longer- term effects of policy decisions. As the first agency to do long-term simulations for the federal budget as a whole, we are well aware of the fact that the further out estimates go, the less certain are the numbers. This concern has led us to propose improved recognition of the government’s long-term “fiscal exposures”—which may not be explicit liabilities. Second, the structure and rules can determine the nature of the trade-offs surfaced during the budget process. Consumption may be favored over investment because the initial cost of an infrastructure project looks high in comparison to support for consumption. Distinguishing between support for current consumption and investing in economic growth in the budget would help eliminate a perceived bias against investments requiring large up-front spending. The third principle focuses on the method through which the federal government provides support for any federal goal or objective. The budget and budget process should provide the information necessary to permit looking across federal agencies and policy tools—which means across committee jurisdictions—to make an informed choice. For federal insurance programs, however, the budget offers a misleading picture about the nature and size of the government’s exposure. Lastly, and perhaps of most interest given the focus of this hearing, the budget process should be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent. Finally, the process should be transparent, that is, understandable to those outside the process. Moving forward this is a major gap: it is the underlying structure of the budget that is driving the long-term fiscal imbalance. By design they limit trade-offs and so constrain both Congress and the President. While changing our long-term fiscal path requires looking down the road, we should start now. Conclusion
The budget process is the source of a great deal of frustration. To change the fiscal path requires hard decisions about what government will and will not do and how it will be funded. A process may facilitate the debate, but it cannot make the decision. | Why GAO Did This Study
As Congress considers the role and design of appropriate budget enforcement mechanisms in changing the government's fiscal path, this testimony outlines some elements that could facilitate debate and contribute to efforts to place the government on a more sustainable long-term fiscal path. Budgeting is the process by which we as a nation resolve the large number of often conflicting objectives that citizens seek to achieve through government action. The budget determines the fiscal policy stance of the government--that is, the relationship between spending and revenues. And it is through the budget process that Congress and the President reach agreement about the areas in which the federal government will be involved and in what way. Because these decisions are so important, we expect a great deal from our budget and budget process. We want the budget to be clear and understandable. We want the process to be simple--or at least not too complex. But at the same time we want a process that presents Congress and the American people with a framework to understand the significant choices and the information necessary to make the best-informed decisions about federal tax and spending policy. This is not easy. Since our first simulations in 1992, we have continued to report on the nature and drivers of the long-term imbalance and on mechanisms to help address the challenge. Focusing on the long term does not mean ignoring the near term. While concerns about the strength of the economy may argue for phasing in policy changes over time, the longer action to change the government's long-term fiscal path is delayed, the greater the risk that the eventual changes will be more disruptive and more destabilizing. Starting on the path to sustainability now offers many advantages. Our increased awareness of the dangers presented by the long-term fiscal outlook leads to a focus on enforcement provisions within the budget process that can facilitate the debate and contribute to efforts to put the government on a more sustainable long-term fiscal path.
What GAO Found
The budget process is the framework within which enforcement mechanisms exist. No process can force choices Congress and the President are unwilling to make. Having an agreed-upon goal justifies and frames the choices that must be made. A budget process can facilitate or hamper substantive decisions, but it cannot replace them. While no process can substitute for making the difficult choices, it can help structure the debate. The budget structure can make clear information necessary for important decisions or the structure can make some information harder to find. The process can highlight trade-offs and set rules for action. In our past work, we have identified four broad principles or criteria for a budget process that can help Congress consider the design and structure of future budget enforcement mechanisms. A process should 1. provide information about the long-term effect of decisions, both macro--linking fiscal policy to the long-term economic outlook--and micro--providing recognition of the long-term spending implications of government commitments, 2. provide information and be structured to focus on important trade-offs such as the trade-off between investment and consumption spending, 3. provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs between the different policy tools of government (such as tax provisions, grants, and credit programs), and 4. be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent, using clear, consistent definitions. First, selecting the appropriate time horizon in which the budgetary impact of policy decisions should be measured is not just an abstract question for analysts. If the time horizon is too short, Congress may have insufficient information about the potential cost of a program. In addition, too short a time horizon may create incentives to artificially shift costs into the future rather than find a sustainable solution. Second, the structure and rules can determine the nature of the trade-offs surfaced during the budget process. Consumption may be favored over investment because the initial cost of an infrastructure project looks high in comparison to support for consumption. Distinguishing between support for current consumption and investing in economic growth in the budget would help eliminate a perceived bias against investments requiring large up-front spending. The third principle focuses on the method through which the federal government provides support for any federal goal or objective. The budget and budget process should provide the information necessary to permit looking across federal agencies and policy tools--which means across committee jurisdictions--to make an informed choice. Lastly, the budget process should be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent. |
gao_GAO-09-650T | gao_GAO-09-650T_0 | Problems in Resolving Discrimination Complaints Persist
The credibility of USDA’s efforts to correct long-standing problems in resolving customer and employee discrimination complaints has been undermined by faulty reporting of complaint data, including disparities we found when comparing various ASCR sources of data. When ASCR was created in 2003, there was an existing backlog of complaints that had not been adjudicated. In July 2007, ASCR reported that it had reduced its backlog of 690 complaints and held the complaint inventory to manageable levels through fiscal year 2005. However, the data ASCR reported lack credibility because they were inconsistent with other complaint data it reported a month earlier to a congressional subcommittee. The backlog later surged to 885 complaints, according to ASCR data. In addition, some steps that ASCR took to speed up its investigations and decisions on complaints in 2004 may have adversely affected the quality of its work. ASCR’s former Director, Office of Adjudication and Compliance, stated that this increased pace led to many “summary” decisions on employees’ complaints that did not resolve questions of fact, with the result that many decisions were appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Reports on Minority Participation Are Unreliable and of Limited Usefulness
As required by the 2002 farm bill, ASCR has published three annual reports on the participation rate of socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers in USDA programs. According to these officials, USDA also plans to seek, at a later time, authority to collect such data on participants in all USDA programs. Strategic Planning Is Limited and Lacks Needed Components
In light of USDA’s history of civil rights problems, better strategic planning is vital. In particular, we found that the interests of ASCR’s stakeholders—including representatives of community-based organizations and minority interest groups—are not explicitly reflected in its strategic plan. For example, we found that ASCR’s stakeholders are interested in improvements in (1) USDA’s methods of delivering farm programs to facilitate access by underserved producers; (2) the county committee system, so that stakeholders are better represented in local decisions; and (3) the diversity of USDA employees who work with minority producers. In addition, ASCR’s strategic plan does not link to the plans of other USDA agencies or the department and does not discuss the potential for linkages to be developed. ASCR could also better measure performance to gauge progress, and it has not yet started to use performance information for identifying USDA performance gaps. For example, ASCR measures USDA efforts to ensure USDA customers have equal and timely access to programs by reporting on the numbers of participants at USDA workshops rather than measuring the results of its outreach efforts on access to benefits and services. Moreover, the strategic plan does not make linkages between levels of funding and ASCR’s anticipated results; without such a discussion, it is not possible to determine whether ASCR has the resources needed to achieve its strategic goal of, for example, strengthening partnerships with historically black land-grant universities through scholarships provided by USDA. To help ensure access to and equitable participation in USDA’s programs and services, the 2008 Farm Bill provided for establishing the Office of Advocacy and Outreach and charged it with, among other things, establishing and monitoring USDA’s goals and objectives to increase participation in USDA programs by small, beginning, and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. Unless USDA addresses several fundamental concerns about resolving discrimination complaints—including the lack of credible data on the numbers, status, and management of complaints; the lack of specified time frames and management controls for resolving complaints; questions about the quality of complaint investigations; and concerns about the integrity of final decision preparation—the credibility of USDA efforts to resolve discrimination complaints will be in doubt. In addition, unless USDA obtains accurate data on minority participation in USDA programs, its reports on improving minority participation in USDA programs will not be reliable or useful. Specifically, raising the public profile for transparency and accountability through means such as a statutory performance agreement between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, a civil rights oversight board, and an ombudsman for addressing customers’ and employees’ civil rights concerns would appear to be helpful steps because they have proven to be effective in raising the performance of other federal agencies. Backlogs of discrimination complaints need to be addressed. USDA’s Office of General Counsel continues to be involved in complaint cases. Related GAO Products
U.S. Department of Agriculture: Recommendations and Options to Address Management Deficiencies in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, there have been allegations of discrimination in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs and workforce. Reports and congressional testimony by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a former Secretary of Agriculture, USDA's Office of Inspector General, GAO, and others have described weaknesses in USDA's programs--in particular, in resolving complaints of discrimination and in providing minorities access to programs. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 authorized the creation of the position of Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (ASCR), giving USDA an executive that could provide leadership for resolving these long-standing problems. This testimony focuses on USDA's efforts to (1) resolve discrimination complaints, (2) report on minority participation in USDA programs, and (3) strategically plan its efforts. This testimony is based on new and prior work, including analysis of ASCR's strategic plan; discrimination complaint management; and about 120 interviews with officials of USDA and other federal agencies, as well as 20 USDA stakeholder groups. USDA officials reviewed the facts upon which this statement is based, and we incorporated their additions and clarifications as appropriate. GAO plans a future report with recommendations.
What GAO Found
ASCR's difficulties in resolving discrimination complaints persist--ASCR has not achieved its goal of preventing future backlogs of complaints. At a basic level, the credibility of USDA's efforts has been and continues to be undermined by ASCR's faulty reporting of data on discrimination complaints and disparities in ASCR's data. Even such basic information as the number of complaints is subject to wide variation in ASCR's reports to the public and the Congress. Moreover, ASCR's public claim in July 2007 that it had successfully reduced a backlog of about 690 discrimination complaints in fiscal year 2004 and held its caseload to manageable levels, drew a questionable portrait of progress. By July 2007, ASCR officials were well aware they had not succeeded in preventing future backlogs--they had another backlog on hand, and this time the backlog had surged to an even higher level of 885 complaints. In fact, ASCR officials were in the midst of planning to hire additional attorneys to address that backlog of complaints including some ASCR was holding dating from the early 2000s that it had not resolved. In addition, some steps ASCR had taken may have actually been counter-productive and affected the quality of its work. For example, an ASCR official stated that some employees' complaints had been addressed without resolving basic questions of fact, raising concerns about the integrity of the practice. Importantly, ASCR does not have a plan to correct these many problems. USDA has published three annual reports--for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005--on the participation of minority farmers and ranchers in USDA programs, as required by law. USDA's reports are intended to reveal the gains or losses that these farmers have experienced in their participation in USDA programs. However, USDA considers the data it has reported to be unreliable because they are based on USDA employees' visual observations about participant's race and ethnicity, which may or may not be correct, especially for ethnicity. USDA needs the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to collect more reliable data. ASCR started to seek OMB's approval in 2004, but as of May 2008 had not followed through to obtain approval. ASCR staff will meet again on this matter in May 2008. GAO found that ASCR's strategic planning is limited and does not address key steps needed to achieve the Office's mission of ensuring USDA provides fair and equitable services to all customers and upholds the civil rights of its employees. For example, a key step in strategic planning is to discuss the perspectives of stakeholders. ASCR's strategic planning does not address the diversity of USDA's field staff even though ASCR's stakeholders told GAO that such diversity would facilitate interaction with minority and underserved farmers. Also, ASCR could better measure performance to gauge its progress in achieving its mission. For example, it counts the number of participants in training workshops as part of its outreach efforts rather than access to farm program benefits and services. Finally, ASCR's strategic planning does not link levels of funding with anticipated results or discuss the potential for using performance information for identifying USDA's performance gaps. |
gao_GAO-10-805 | gao_GAO-10-805_0 | 1). Nonprime Loan Performance Deteriorated through the End of 2009 and Varied by Market Segment, Product Type, Cohort Year, and Location
The Worsening Performance of Nonprime Loans Was Reflected in Increases in Serious Delinquencies
As of December 31, 2009, 63 percent of the 14.50 million nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007 (the last year in which substantial numbers of nonprime mortgages were made) was no longer active. 2). 3). By comparison, the number of active nonprime loans in the foreclosure process grew in the first two quarters of the year, held almost steady in the third quarter, and declined in the last quarter of 2009. In addition, among all nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007, the cumulative percentage that had completed the foreclosure process increased from 10 percent at the end of 2008 to 13 percent at the end of 2009. However, Alt-A loans accounted for 55 percent (152,000) of the 277,000 year-over-year increase in the number of seriously delinquent loans. As we stated in a previous report, serious delinquency rates were higher for certain adjustable-rate products common in the subprime and Alt-A market segments than they were for fixed-rate products or the market as a whole. House Price Changes and Certain Loan and Borrower Characteristics Were Associated with Default Rates
House price changes and loan and borrower characteristics, such as loan amount, combined LTV (CLTV) ratio, and borrower credit score, were among the variables that we found influenced the likelihood of default on nonprime loans originated from 2004 through 2006, the peak years of nonprime mortgage lending. In addition, nonprime loans that lacked full documentation of borrower income and assets were associated with increased default probabilities, and the influence of borrowers’ reported income varied by product type, loan purpose, and the level of documentation. For purchase loans in particular, borrower race and ethnicity were associated with the probability of default. However, these associations should be interpreted with caution because we lack data on factors—such as borrower wealth, first-time homebuyer status, and employment status—that may influence default rates and that may also be associated with race and ethnicity. We found that documentation of borrower income and assets influenced the probability of default of nonprime loans originated from 2004 through 2006. 12). Existing sources of data on nonprime mortgages contain a range of information to support these different uses. While these data sources currently offer some similar data elements, the sources vary in their coverage of loan, property, and borrower attributes. RealtyTrac offers data on the number of properties in some stage of the foreclosure process but not data on all active loans. First, the data sources generally lack information on certain attributes that could help inform policy decisions or regulatory efforts to mitigate risk, including the following: Loan attributes: Although three of the five nonprime data sources provide information on the initial interest rates of the mortgages (and, in some cases, how those interest rates can change over the life of the loan), they do not provide information on other mortgage costs, such as points and fees paid at loan closing. For example, first-time homebuyers are not directly identified in any of the nonprime data sources, limiting the ability of analysts to compare the marginal effect of prior homeownership experience on default probabilities. Ongoing Federal Efforts May Address Some Constraints in Mortgage Data Sources
Ongoing federal efforts could provide data on the entire mortgage market that potentially would not have some of the constraints that we identified in the existing sources of mortgage data. First, officials from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) and Freddie Mac are collaborating on a pilot project to develop a publicly available National Mortgage Database (NMDB). The persistently weak performance of nonprime mortgages suggests that loan performance problems in the nonprime market will not be resolved quickly, and underscores the importance of federal efforts to assist distressed borrowers and prevent a recurrence of the aggressive lending practices that helped precipitate the foreclosure crisis. The CoreLogic LP database provides extensive information about the characteristics and performance of securitized nonprime mortgages. | Why GAO Did This Study
The surge in mortgage foreclosures that began in late 2006 and continues today was initially driven by deterioration in the performance of nonprime (subprime and Alt-A) loans. Nonprime mortgage originations increased dramatically from 2000 through 2006, rising from about 12 percent ($125 billion) of all mortgage originations to about 34 percent ($1 trillion). The nonprime market contracted sharply in mid-2007, partly in response to increasing defaults and foreclosures for these loans. This report (1) provides information on the performance of nonprime loans through December 31, 2009; (2) examines how loan and borrower characteristics and economic conditions influenced the likelihood of default (including foreclosure) of nonprime loans; and (3) describes the features and limitations of primary sources of data on nonprime loan performance and borrower characteristics, and discusses federal government efforts to improve the availability or use of such data. To do this work, GAO analyzed a proprietary database of securitized nonprime loans and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, and reviewed information on mortgage data sources maintained by private firms and the federal government.
What GAO Found
The number of active nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007 that were seriously delinquent (90 or more days late or in the foreclosure process) increased from 1.1 million at the end of 2008 to 1.4 million at the end of 2009. Serious delinquency rates were higher for certain adjustable-rate products common in the subprime and Alt-A market segments than they were for fixed-rate products. The number of nonprime loans that were 90 or more days late grew throughout 2009, accounting for most of the overall growth in the number of serious delinquencies. By comparison, the number of active loans in the foreclosure process grew in the first half of the year, and then began to decline somewhat. Additionally, 475,000 nonprime mortgages completed the foreclosure process during 2009. The persistently weak performance of nonprime loans suggests that problems in the nonprime market will not be resolved quickly, and underscores the importance of federal efforts to assist distressed borrowers and prevent a recurrence of the aggressive lending practices that helped precipitate the foreclosure crisis. In addition to performance differences between mortgage products, GAO found across product types that house price changes, loan amount, the ratio of the amount of the loan to the value of the home, and borrower credit score were among the variables that influenced the likelihood of default on nonprime loans originated from 2004 through 2006. In addition, loans that lacked full documentation of borrower income and assets were associated with increased default probabilities, and the influence of borrowers' reported income varied with the level of documentation. GAO found that borrower race and ethnicity were associated with the probability of default, particularly for loans used to purchase rather than to refinance a home. However, these associations should be interpreted with caution because GAO lacks data on factors that may influence default rates and that may also be associated with race and ethnicity, such as borrower wealth and first-time homebuyer status. Existing sources of data on nonprime mortgages contain a range of information to support different uses. While these data sources offer some similar elements, they vary in their coverage of loan, property, and borrower attributes. The data sources generally lack information on certain attributes that could help inform policy decisions or regulatory efforts to mitigate risk. For example, first-time homebuyers are not identified in any of the data sources, limiting the ability of analysts to compare the marginal effect of prior homeownership experience on default probabilities. In addition, most of the data sources do not cover the entire nonprime mortgage market. Ongoing federal efforts have the potential to provide data that may not have some of the constraints of the existing sources. For example, officials from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Freddie Mac are collaborating on a pilot project to develop a publicly available National Mortgage Database, which would compile data on a representative sample of outstanding mortgages and provide more comprehensive data than are currently available.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-04-902R | gao_GAO-04-902R_0 | Results in
The United States, along with its coalition partners and various international organizations and donors, have committed billions of dollars to the reconstruction of Iraq in the face of an unstable security situation and other challenges. This enclosure describes (1) the sources and amounts of funds that have been made available for the reconstruction of Iraq, and (2) the amounts of U.S. and Iraqi funds that have been obligated and disbursed as of April 30, 2004,and the uses to which those funds have been applied. Of the funding available for the reconstruction effort, about $24 billion had been obligated as of the end of April 2004. About $4 billion of the $4.5 billion in U.S. funds appropriated in 2003 and about $4.2 billion of the $19.6 billion in U.S. funds appropriated in 2004 have been obligated. Seized assets refer to former regime assets seized within Iraq. Funding Pledged or Made Available for Iraq
The reconstruction of Iraq has been supported from multiple sources of funds. Congress has appropriated about $24 billion of the approximately $58 billion provided to date for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This fund, established by the CPA in May 2003 and noted by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, was created to benefit the Iraqi people and facilitate the reconstruction of their country. 28, 2004). U.S. and Iraqi Funds Obligated and Disbursed
Overall, about $24 billion in U.S. and Iraqi funds has been obligated for the reconstruction effort in Iraq as of April 30, 2004. 3. What are the roles and responsibilities of the CPA Inspector General with the transfer of power to the Iraqis? To what extent has the unstable security environment affected the U.S. government’s ability to provide adequate oversight of the reconstruction effort, including the auditing of contracts and funding expended? The assessment also notes that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) estimates that an additional $20 billion will be needed from 2004 through 2007 to rebuild other critical sectors (e.g., security and oil) outside the scope of the U.N./World Bank assessment. An Iraqi-led process, endorsed by the Iraqi Governing Council and put into effect by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, is responsible for coordinating all international assistance for rebuilding and reforming institutions in Iraq. In May 2004, the CPA began to decrease personnel in anticipation of the transition of authority to the Iraqis and the dissolution of the CPA at the end of June 2004. Several elements of the CPA were identified to continue the U.S. effort in Iraq after the transition. A May 11, 2004, National Security Presidential Directive stated that the U.S. Mission in Baghdad and its temporarily established Iraq Reconstruction Management Office will assume those authorities and responsibilities that will continue after the termination of the CPA. For example, U.S. officials from the CPA and the State Department stated that, due to the independent recruiting of staff by some detailees in Baghdad, agency personnel authorities were unaware of personnel who went to Iraq after the initial deployment in March 2003. According to a CPA official, this budget imposed a funding limit on CPA’s ability to hire personnel under the 3161 authority. One week earlier, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command had predicted that the situation in Iraq will become more violent after the transfer of power as the country moves toward elections for a new government, which are currently scheduled to be held by January 2005. Further, the Secretary of Defense said in early May 2004 that there will be uncertainty in Iraq and increased attacks against the coalition, Iraqis, and the United States during the period leading up to the elections. The increase in attacks has had a negative impact on the presence and operations of international military and civilian personnel in Iraq. It has led to an increase in U.S. force levels and to a decrease in freedom of movement for international civilians working to rebuild Iraq and assist in its political transition. United States and United Kingdom Increased Troop Levels as Other Coalition Members Reduced Them As a result of the increase in violence during April 2004, the United States and the United Kingdom decided to increase their overall force levels in the country. In addition, according to a CPA official, as the security situation worsened during 2003, the CPA abandoned plans to fully staff offices throughout Iraq to assist in Iraq’s political transition and reconstruction and instead established a much smaller field presence. Our review of selected electricity projects showed that the security situation delayed the implementation of key projects, thereby contributing to the CPA not meeting its objective of providing 6,000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity to the Iraqi people by its original goal of June 1, 2004. As of late May 2004, the United Nations had not allowed most of its international personnel to return to Iraq. According to a U.N. assessment, the lack of security may lead to major disturbances that could undermine the administration of the elections, alter the established timetable, and compromise the overall credibility of the process. By mid-April 2004, the multinational force had begun to consider how it could provide security, logistical, and other support for the elections, but the United Nations and others had not yet developed a specific plan for important tasks such as the registration of political parties, voters, and candidates or the number and locations of polling sites. Although the multinational force is beginning to address these problems, it is unclear what impact April’s security collapse will have on the plans for transitioning Iraq’s security to Iraqi security forces or the extent to which these forces will be capable of providing security during the Iraqi election process. What arrangements have been made to facilitate coordination between the multinational force and the interim Iraqi government? What level of support does the multinational force expect Iraqi security forces to provide during Iraq’s upcoming election process, and what options and contingency plans are being explored? A large but unknown number of militias are operating outside the control of the central government in Iraq. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security and foreign policy priority. According to the President, the United States intends to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom and has a vital national interest in the success of free institutions in Iraq. As of April 30, 2004, billions of dollars in grants, loans, assets, and revenues from various sources have been made available or pledged to the reconstruction of Iraq. The United States, along with its coalition partners and various international organizations and donors, has embarked on a significant effort to rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and decades of neglect by the former regime. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, was the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States and the United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq. Specifically, the CPA wasresponsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the reconstruction effort. On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government, and the CPA officially dissolved. To pave the way for this transfer, the CPA helped the Iraq Governing Council develop the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period in March 2004. The transitional law provides a framework for governance of Iraq while a permanent government is formed. In June 2004, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 provided international support to advance this process, stating that, by June 30, CPA will cease to exist and Iraq will reassert full sovereignty. Resolution 1546 also endorsed the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi interim government; endorsed a timetable for elections and the drafting of an Iraqi constitution; and decided that the United Nations, at the Iraq government's request, would play a leading role in establishing a permanent government. Resolution 1546 further noted the presence of the multinational force in Iraq and authorized it to take all necessary measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq, in accordance with letters annexed to the resolution. Such letters provide, in part, that the multinational force and the Iraqi government will work in partnership to reach agreement on security and olicy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations. Resolution 1546 stated that the Security Council will review the mandate of the multinational force in 12 months or earlier if requested by the government of Iraq and that it will terminate the mandate if requested by the government of Iraq. As part of our broad effort to monitor Iraq reconstruction, which we undertook at the request of Congress, this report provides information on the status of the issues we have been monitoring, as well as key questions that will assist Congres in its oversight responsibilities. Specifically, this report focuses on issues associated with (1) resources, (2) security, (3) governance, and (4) essential services. For the essential services issue, we focused on the Army Corps of Engineers' Restore Iraqi Electricity project, a major component of the U.S. assistance effort to rebuild the power sector.
What GAO Found
As of the end of April 2004, about $58 billion in grants, loans, assets, and revenues from various sources had been made available or pledged to the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. Resource needs are expected to continue after the transfer of power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government. Of the funds available, the United States obligated about $8 billion of the available $24 billion in U.S. funds. The CPA obligated about $15.5 billion of the nearly $21 billion in available Iraqi funds. The international community pledged nearly $14 billion. In December 2003, the CPA put into effect an Iraqi-led process to coordinate reconstruction efforts. An October 2003 U.N./World Bank assessment noted that Iraq's ability to absorb resources as the country gains sovereignty and decision-making authority will be one of the most significant challenges to reconstruction. The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against the coalition and coalition partners. The increase in attacks has had a negative impact on military operations and the work of international civilian organizations in Iraq. As part of the effort to provide stability, the coalition plans to transfer security responsibilities from the multinational force to Iraqi security forces and to dissolve Iraqi militias operating outside the central government's control. During the escalation of violence that occurred during April 2004, these security forces collapsed in several locations. However, key elements of the CPA's transition and reintegration process remain to be finalized. With U.S. and others' assistance, Iraqis have taken control of government institutions at the national and subnational levels. National ministries are providing some services to citizens as their facilities are being rebuilt, reforms are being introduced, and their staffs trained. According to the head of the now-dissolved CPA, all ministries were under Iraqi authority as of the transfer of power on June 28, 2004. However, the security situation hinders the ability of the ministries to provide needed services and maintain daily operations. To reform the rule of law, ongoing efforts have begun to establish a functioning independent judiciary, although courts are not at their pre-war capacity. However, efforts to rebuild Iraq's judicial system and restore the rule of law face multiple challenges. U.S. officials said that rehabilitating and reforming Iraq's judicial system will likely take years. The Coalition considers reconstruction of the power sector critical to reviving Iraq's economy, supporting essential infrastructure, improving daily well-being, and gaining local support for the coalition presence in Iraq. The CPA set a goal of 6,000 megawatts of generating capacity by June 30, 2004, in anticipation of the higher demand for power during the summer months. As part of the overall effort to achieve this goal, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has undertaken $1.4 billion in work under the Restore Iraqi Electricity (RIE) program. As of late May, the Corps anticipated that 59 of the 66 RIE projects expected to help meet the goal would be completed by June 30. However, electrical service in the country as a whole has not shown a marked improvement over the immediate postwar levels of May 2003 and has worsened in some governorates. RIE contractors report numerous instances of project delays due to difficulties in getting employees and materials safely to project sites. Further, the security environment continues to affect the cost of rebuilding the power sector. |
gao_T-RCED-98-167 | gao_T-RCED-98-167_0 | Nature and Extent of Fraud and Abuse
Fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp Program generally occurs in the form of either overpayments to food stamp recipients or trafficking. Overpayments occur when ineligible persons are provided food stamps, as well as when eligible persons are provided more than they are entitled to receive. In 1996, the latest year for which data are available, the states overpaid recipients an estimated $1.5 billion, or 7 percent of the approximately $22 billion in food stamps issued. It should also be noted that recipient and caseworker errors can result in underpayments. According to FNS’ data, food stamp recipients were underpaid by about $518 million in fiscal year 1996. Federal regulations prohibit prisoners from participating in the Food Stamp Program. Regarding trafficking—the second main area of fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp Program—a 1995 FNS study estimated that up to $815 million,or about 4 percent of the food stamps issued, was exchanged for cash by authorized retailers during fiscal year 1993. Data on the extent to which food stamps are exchanged between individuals prior to reaching authorized retailers are unavailable. In our March 1998 report on food stamp trafficking, conducted at your request, Mr. Chairman, we found that retail store owners and retail store clerks share almost equal responsibility for the food stamp trafficking problem. Large Number of Participants and Administrative Processes Make Program Susceptible to Fraud and Abuse
The Food Stamp Program is inherently susceptible to some level of fraud and abuse because of the sheer number of program participants (about 23 million in fiscal year 1997), the basic approach used to determine a household’s eligibility and benefit amount, and the process used to authorize and monitor a sufficient number of retailers to accept food stamps. Federal and state officials agree that food stamps have essentially become a second currency exchanged by some recipients for cash or non-food items. While these efforts have been useful in reducing fraud and abuse, we believe that FNS could achieve even greater success by taking a leading role in promoting the use and sharing of automated information by state agencies. FNS can further expand on its recent successes in reducing overpayments by actively encouraging the states to identify ways to use computerized information to verify information provided by applicants and to encourage states to share their techniques and information with each other. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp Program, focusing on the: (1) nature and extent of the problem; (2) reasons it often goes undetected; and (3) ways computerized information can be used to identify and reduce it.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp Program generally occurs in the form of either overpayments to food stamp recipients or trafficking; (2) overpayments occur when ineligible persons are provided food stamps, as well as when eligible persons are provided more than they are entitled to receive; (3) overpayments are caused by inadvertent and intentional errors made by recipients and errors made by state caseworkers; (4) the latest available information indicates that overpayments in 1996 totalled about $1.5 billion, or about 7 percent of the food stamp benefits issued that year; (5) errors also result in underpayments; in fiscal year 1996, such underpayments totalled about $518 million; (6) with regard to trafficking, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimated that in 1993 about $815 million in food stamps, approximately 4 percent of the food stamps issued, were traded for cash at retail stores; (7) no one knows the extent of trafficking between individuals before the food stamps are redeemed at authorized retailers; (8) participation in the Food Stamp Program by ineligible recipients occurs, and often goes undetected, because the information used to determine a household's eligibility and benefit amount for the program is not always accurate; (9) state agencies that administer the program determine household membership on the basis of unverified information provided by food stamp applicants; (10) food stamp trafficking takes place when recipients collaborate with unscrupulous retailers to convert food stamp benefits to cash or other non-food items; (11) these retailers make a profit by giving the recipients a discounted cash payment for the stamps, then redeeming the stamps at full face value to the government; (12) while USDA has reduced the overpayment rate in recent years, further reductions could result if food stamp rolls were matched against computerized information held by various sources; (13) computer matching provides a cost-effective mechanism to accurately and independently identify ineligible participants; (14) some states already conduct data matching programs; (15) by taking a leading role in promoting the use and sharing of information among federal and state agencies, USDA can enhance the states' effectiveness in identifying ineligible participants and reducing overpayments; and (16) in addition, the congressionally mandated use of electronic benefit transfers, while not the answer to eliminating all fraud, has the potential to reduce trafficking by providing an electronic trail of transactions. |
gao_GAO-15-294 | gao_GAO-15-294_0 | Entry documents can be provided several days after a shipment’s arrival in the United States and after a shipment leaves the port. A targeting unit may be responsible for targeting shipments arriving at one port or multiple ports in its region. CBP partially concurred with the recommendations but did not implement them. Less than 1 Percent of Arriving Maritime Shipments from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013 Were High Risk, but CBP Does Not Have Accurate Data on Their Disposition Percentage of High-Risk Shipments Is Very Low and CBP Has Examined the Vast Majority
We determined that less than 1 percent of the maritime shipments arriving in the United States from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were high risk; however, CBP does not have accurate data on the number and disposition of each high-risk shipment because of various factors. CBP is taking steps to improve its data on the disposition of high-risk shipments. In particular, CBP’s data overstate the number of high-risk shipments, including those not examined/not waived. CBP Targeting Units Are Not Consistently Applying and Documenting Reasons for Waiving Examinations of High- Risk Shipments
When determining the disposition of high-risk shipments, CBP’s targeting units are inconsistently applying criteria to make some waiver decisions and are also incorrectly documenting the reasons for waivers. On the basis of our review of CBP policy and visits to selected targeting units, we determined that CBP has not established uniform definitions for standard exception waiver categories; some CBP officials were unaware of existing waiver guidance for articulable reason waivers; and some CBP targeters across the targeting units we visited were inconsistently and inaccurately recording waiver reasons in ATS. As a result, CBP cannot accurately determine the extent to which standard exception waivers are used consistently or whether waivers issued for articulable reasons are being used judiciously, as required by policy. Because of the lack of CBP-wide definitions for the standard exception categories, CBP targeters may be holding some shipments for examinations that should be waived. Defining standard exception waiver categories and disseminating those definitions in policy would better allow targeting units and targeters to consistently apply criteria when making and recording waiver decisions, and could help ensure that CBP is examining shipments as intended. Updating and disseminating guidance in policy on how to record articulable reason waivers will help ensure that they are correctly recorded. Given that the sample size is generally the same for all port directors regardless of the number of shipments their ports receive, on the basis of our analysis, the sample does not provide CBP with an efficient estimate of compliance at the national level. Further, CBP’s method for calculating the compliance rate does not accurately reflect compliance nationwide because it does not calculate the rate based on the number of shipments sampled. To enhance oversight of the disposition of high-risk shipments— examinations and waivers—we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP direct OFO to take two actions: develop an enhanced methodology for selecting shipment samples used for self-inspection to increase the likelihood that any potential deficiencies will be identified so that corrective actions can be taken to reduce errors in the future, and develop a better national estimate of compliance with maritime cargo targeting policies by calculating the compliance rate based on individual shipments rather than worksheets. Because DHS deemed the details of this recommendation and its response as sensitive security information, they are not included in this public version of the report. Appendix I: Description of CBP’s Layered Security Strategy for Maritime Cargo Shipments
This appendix describes the core programs related to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) strategy for ensuring the security of maritime cargo. More specifically, our objectives were to examine (1) the number of maritime shipments arriving in the United States from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 that CBP determined to be high risk and the extent to which CBP has accurate data on the disposition of each of those high-risk shipments, (2) the extent to which CBP is consistently applying standards and documenting reasons for waiving examinations of high-risk shipments, and (3) the extent to which CBP ensures that its policies on the disposition of high-risk shipments are being followed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. economy is dependent on a secure global supply chain. In fiscal year 2013, approximately 12 million maritime cargo shipments arrived in the United States. Within the federal government, CBP is responsible for administering cargo security, to include identifying “high-risk” maritime cargo shipments with the potential to contain terrorist contraband. GAO was asked to review CBP's disposition of such shipments.
This report discusses (1) how many maritime shipments CBP determined to be high risk and the extent to which CBP has accurate data on the disposition of such shipments, (2) the extent to which CBP consistently applies criteria and documents reasons for waiving examinations, and (3) the extent to which CBP ensures its policies on the disposition of high-risk shipments are being followed.
GAO analyzed CBP data on maritime shipments arriving in the United States during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. GAO also visited four CBP targeting units selected on the basis of the percentage of maritime shipments they waived, among other factors.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, less than 1 percent of maritime shipments arriving in the United States were identified as high risk by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but CBP does not have accurate data on their disposition (i.e., outcomes). CBP officials (targeters) are generally required to hold high-risk shipments for examination unless evidence shows that an examination can be waived per CBP policy. In particular, targeters at Advance Targeting Units (targeting units)—responsible for reviewing shipments arriving at ports within their respective regions—can waive an examination if they determine through research that (1) the shipment falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (2) they can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk (articulable reason), such as an error in the shipment's data. GAO found that CBP examined the vast majority of high-risk shipments, but CBP's disposition data are not accurate because of various factors—such as the inclusion of shipments that were never sent to the United States—and that the data overstate the number of high-risk shipments. On the basis of GAO's analyses and findings, CBP is taking steps to correct its data.
When determining the disposition of high-risk shipments, CBP's targeting units are inconsistently applying criteria to make waiver decisions and are incorrectly documenting the reasons for some waivers. CBP policy lacks definitions for standard exception waivers. As a result, targeters are inconsistently applying and recording standard exception waivers. Because of these inconsistencies, some targeting units may be unnecessarily holding shipments for examination, while others may be waiving shipments that should be examined. Developing definitions for standard exceptions could help ensure that CBP examines shipments as intended. Further, some targeters at targeting units GAO visited were unaware of the guidance on articulable reason waivers and were incorrectly documenting these waivers. As a result, CBP cannot accurately determine the extent to which articulable waivers are being issued and used judiciously per CBP policy. Updating and disseminating guidance in policy could help ensure targeters correctly document such waivers.
CBP has efforts in place, such as self-inspections, to provide oversight of its policies on the disposition (whether examined or waived) of high-risk shipments; however, these efforts are not sufficient. For example, the limited sample size of shipments used in self-inspections does not provide CBP with the best estimate of compliance at the national level. In addition, CBP's method for calculating the compliance rate does not accurately reflect compliance because it is not based on the number of shipments sampled. Developing an enhanced methodology for selecting sample shipments, and changing the method for calculating compliance, could improve CBP's estimate of compliance and its ability to identify and correct deficiencies.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2014. It does not include details that CBP deemed sensitive security information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that CBP define standard exception waiver categories and disseminate policy on documenting articulable reason waivers. Further, CBP should enhance its methodology for selecting shipments for self-inspections and change the way it calculates the compliance rate. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-120T | gao_GAO-04-120T_0 | Background
The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that the government may not take private property for public use without just compensation. The President issued this EO on March 15, 1988. Such actions may include rules and regulations that propose or implement licensing, permitting, or other conditions, requirements or limitations on private property use. The EO also requires the U.S. Attorney General to issue general guidelines to help agencies evaluate the takings implications of their proposed actions, and, as necessary, update these guidelines to reflect fundamental changes in takings case law resulting from Supreme Court decisions. Justice Has Not Updated Its 1988 Guidelines, but Has Issued Supplemental Guidelines for Three of Four Agencies
Agency officials and other experts differ on the need to update the Attorney General’s guidelines to reflect changes in regulatory takings case law since 1988. In contrast, officials at Interior and Agriculture said that it would be helpful if Justice updated the summary of key takings cases contained in an appendix to the guidelines to reflect significant developments in this case law over the past 15 years. For example, legal experts concerned with the protection of private property rights said that there had been significant developments in regulatory takings case law since 1988. The Attorney General has issued supplemental guidelines required by the EO for three of the four agencies—the Corps, EPA, and Interior. The Attorney General has not issued supplemental guidelines for Agriculture because Justice and Agriculture could not agree on how to assess the potential takings implications of the latter agency’s actions related to grazing and special use permits covering applicants’ use of public lands. Implementation of Key Provisions by the Four Agencies Has Changed Over the Life of the Executive Order
Although the EO’s requirements have not been amended or revoked since 1988, the four agencies’ implementation of some of its key provisions has changed over time in response to subsequent OMB guidance. For example, the agencies no longer prepare annual compilations of just compensation awards or account for these awards in their budget documents because OMB guidance issued in 1994 advised agencies that such information was no longer required. According to OMB, this information is not needed because the number and amount of these awards are small and the awards were not paid from the agencies’ appropriations but are paid from the Department of the Treasury’s Judgment Fund. Other provisions of the EO have been implemented. Officials at each of the four agencies said that they fully consider the potential takings implications of their planned regulatory actions, but again provided us with limited documentary evidence to support this claim. Agencies provided us a few written examples of takings implication assessments. Agency officials said that these assessments are not always documented in writing, and, with the passage of time, any assessments that were put in writing may no longer be on file. Few Awards of Just Compensation Were Made Against the Four Agencies for Takings Cases Concluded during Fiscal Years 2000 through 2002
According to Justice data, 44 regulatory takings cases against the four agencies were concluded during fiscal years 2000 through 2002. Fourteen of these 44 cases resulted in government payments. In addition to the cases concluded during fiscal years 2000 through 2002, Justice reported that an additional 54 regulatory takings cases involving the four agencies were still pending resolution at the end of fiscal year 2002. The EO’s requirements for assessing the takings implications of planned regulatory actions applied to only 3 of these 14 cases. For the other 11 cases, the associated regulatory action either predated the EO’s issuance or the matter at hand was otherwise excluded from the EO’s provisions. Based on evidence made available to us, the relevant agency assessed the takings potential of its action in only one of the three cases subject to the EO’s requirements. This case concluded with a settlement of $3 million for the plaintiff. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year federal agencies issue numerous proposed or final rules or take other regulatory actions that may potentially affect the use of private property. Some of these actions may result in the property owner being owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In 1988 the President issued Executive Order 12630 on property rights to ensure that government actions affecting the use of private property are undertaken on a well-reasoned basis with due regard for the potential financial impacts imposed on the government. This testimony is based on our recent report on the compliance of the Department of Justice and four agencies--the Department of Agriculture, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of the Interior--with the executive order. (Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Executive Order on Government Actions Affecting Private Property Use, GAO-03-1015 , Sept.19,2003). Specifically, GAO examined the extent to which (1)Justice has updated its guidelines for the order to reflect changes in case law and issued supplemental guidelines for the four agencies, (2) the four agencies have complied with the specific provisions of the executive order, and (3) just compensation awards have been assessed against the four agencies in recent years.
What GAO Found
Justice has not updated the guidelines that it issued in 1988 pursuant to the executive order, but has issued supplemental guidelines for three of the four agencies. The executive order provides that Justice should update the guidelines, as necessary, to reflect fundamental changes in takings case law resulting from Supreme Court decisions. While Justice and some other agency officials said that the changes in the case law since 1988 have not been significant enough to warrant a revision, other agency officials and some legal experts said that significant changes have occurred and that it would be helpful if a case law summary in an appendix to the guidelines was updated. Justice issued supplemental guidelines for three agencies, but not for Agriculture because the two agencies were unable to resolve issues such as how to assess the takings implications of denying or limiting permits that allow ranchers to graze livestock on federal lands managed by Agriculture. Although the executive order's requirements have not been amended or revoked since 1988, the four agencies' implementation of some of these requirements has changed over time as a result of subsequent guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, the agencies no longer prepare annual compilations of just compensation awards or account for these awards in their budget documents because OMB issued guidance in 1994 advising agencies that this information was no longer required. According to OMB, this information is not needed because the number and amount of these awards are small and the awards are paid from the Department of the Treasury's Judgment Fund, rather than from the agencies' appropriations. Regarding other requirements, agency officials said that they fully consider the potential takings implications of their regulatory actions, but provided us with limited documentary evidence to support this claim. The agencies provided us with a few examples of takings implications assessments stating that such assessments were not always documented in writing or retained on file. In addition, our review of the agencies' rulemakings for selected years that made reference to the executive order revealed that relatively few specified that an assessment was done and few anticipated significant takings implications. According to Justice, property owners or others brought 44 regulatory takings lawsuits against the four agencies that were concluded during fiscal years 2000 through 2002, and of these, 14 cases resulted in just compensation awards or settlement payments totaling about $36.5 million. The executive order's requirement for assessing the takings implications of planned actions applied to only three of these cases. The actions associated with the other 11 cases either predated the order's issuance or were otherwise excluded from the order's provisions. The relevant agency assessed the takings potential of its action in only one of the three cases subject to the order's requirements. According to Justice, at the end of fiscal year 2002, 54 additional lawsuits involving the four agencies were pending resolution. |
gao_GAO-08-806 | gao_GAO-08-806_0 | According to Defense, CSF is critical to ensure Pakistan’s continued support of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The United States eventually reimbursed Pakistan $300 million. Defense Did Not Consistently Apply Its Existing Guidance, and Additional Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Accountability over CSF to Pakistan
We found that Defense did not consistently apply existing CSF guidance and that certain deficiencies existed in their oversight procedures. For example, the Comptroller generally performed a comparison of total claimed costs to the estimated U.S. cost to provide the same services; however, there was not enough information in the Pakistani claims to determine that the claimed amount and the estimated U.S. cost included the same expenses or that the claimed costs were valid. Defense guidance developed by the Comptroller calls for obtaining sufficient information to validate Pakistani claims to determine that costs were incurred, reasonable, and appropriate. For example, Defense reimbursed Pakistan over $2 billion for claims from January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining detailed documentation that would allow a third party to recalculate the costs. As a result, Defense may have paid costs that were (1) not incremental, (2) not based on actual activity, or (3) potentially duplicative. We also found that additional oversight controls were needed. Currency Conversions Were Not Verified
CSF guidance does not require Defense to identify or evaluate the exchange rates used for claims presented in U.S. dollars. ODRP Began Playing a Larger Role in the CSF Oversight Process in Late 2006; However, ODRP’s Continued Oversight Is Not Assured
Defense’s 2003 guidance did not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have direct access to Pakistani officials and information. As such, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistani CSF claims until September 2006, when, without any formal guidance or directive to do so, ODRP began an effort to validate Pakistani military support and expenses. This increased verification effort contributed to an increase in the amount of disallowals and deferrals of the Pakistani government’s CSF claims from an average of a little over 2 percent from January 2004 through August 2006, an average of 6 percent from September 2006 through February 2007, and 22 percent for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008. ODRP Initiated Verification of Pakistani Support and Costs; Contributed to Increases in the Amount of Claims Deferred or Disallowed
In late 2006, without any formal guidance or directive to do so from CENTCOM or the Comptroller, ODRP began an effort to verify that Pakistani military support was provided and costs were actually incurred as claimed in the military’s requests for reimbursement. The amount disallowed or deferred for March through June 2007 represents a significant increase in CSF oversight by Defense. However, as of May 2008, Defense had not formalized any new guidance on ODRP’s verification responsibilities. While we recognize that CSF is used to support 27 countries in fighting terrorism, the fact that Pakistan receives 81 percent of these funds indicates that Defense should provide oversight procedures that reflect the role Pakistan plays as both the major recipient of CSF and its role in supporting U.S. national security objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, we recognize that Defense may not be able to fully verify all Pakistani claims without having the ability to access the Pakistani government’s records and make site visits or conduct spot checks. Our review therefore focused on the extent to which Defense has applied its own guidance to validate reimbursements and on Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan’s (ODRP) role in this process. Because this report led to new CSF oversight guidance in December 2003, our assessment of Defense’s oversight controls focused on 42 monthly reimbursement claims submitted by the Pakistani government from January 2004 to June 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has reimbursed Pakistan, a key ally in the global war on terror, about $5.56 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for its efforts to combat terrorism along its border with Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides CSF to 27 coalition partners for costs incurred in direct support of U.S. military operations. Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSF, receiving 81 percent of CSF reimbursements as of May 2008. This report focuses on (1) the extent to which Defense has consistently applied its guidance to validate the reimbursements claimed by Pakistan and (2) how the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan's (ODRP) role has changed over time. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed CSF oversight procedures, examined CSF documents, and interviewed Defense officials in Washington, D.C., U.S. Central Command in Florida, and Pakistan.
What GAO Found
Defense Comptroller issued new guidance in 2003 to enhance CSF oversight. The guidance calls for, among other things, CSF reimbursement claims to contain quantifiable information that indicates the incremental nature of support (i.e., above and beyond normal operations), validation that the support or service was provided, and copies of invoices or documentation supporting how the costs were calculated. While Defense generally conducted macro-level analytical reviews called for in its guidance, such as determining whether the cost is less than that which would be incurred by the United States for the same service, for a large number of reimbursement claims Defense did not obtain detailed documentation to verify that claimed costs were valid, actually incurred, or correctly calculated. GAO found that Defense did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance. For example, as of May 2008, Defense paid over $2 billion in Pakistani reimbursement claims for military activities covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining sufficient information that would enable a third party to recalculate these costs. Furthermore, Defense may have reimbursed costs that (1) were not incremental, (2) were not based on actual activity, or (3) were potentially duplicative. GAO also found that additional oversight controls were needed. For example, there is no guidance for Defense to verify currency conversion rates used by Pakistan, which if performed would enhance Defense's ability to monitor for potential overbillings. Defense's guidance does not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have access to Pakistani officials and information. As such, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistan CSF claims from January 2004 through August 2006. Beginning in September 2006, without any formal guidance or directive to do so from U.S. Central Command or the Defense Comptroller, ODRP began an effort to validate Pakistani military support and expenses. This increased verification effort on the part of ODRP contributed to an increase in the amount of Pakistani government CSF claims disallowed and deferred. Prior to ODRP's increased verification efforts, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for January 2004 through August 2006 was a little over 2 percent. In comparison, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for September 2006 through February 2007 was 6 percent and for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008, was approximately 22 percent. However, ODRP's continued oversight activity is not assured, as Defense had not developed formal guidance delineating how and to what degree ODRP should attempt to verify Pakistani claims for reimbursement. GAO recognizes that Defense may not be able to fully verify every Pakistani claim without the ability to access Pakistani records or do onsite monitoring. However, such ability would enhance CSF oversight. |
gao_GAO-04-701T | gao_GAO-04-701T_0 | Contractors operate each site for DOE. DOE’s Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies, such as the DBT, to guide the department’s safeguards and security programs. Because of these risks, DOE has long employed risk-based security practices. The key component of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security practices is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. Development of the New DBT Took Almost 2 Years Because of Delays in Developing the Postulated Threat and DOE’s Lengthy Review and Comment Process
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized that the then current DBT, issued in April 1999 and based on a 1998 intelligence community assessment, was obsolete. According to DOE and DOD officials, this delay resulted from other demands placed on the intelligence community after September 11, 2001, as well as from sharp debates among the organizations developing the Postulated Threat over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the resources needed to meet these threats. As a result, during the time it took DOE to develop the new DBT, its sites were only required to defend against the terrorist group defined in the 1999 DBT, which, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, DOE officials realized was obsolete. The May 2003 DBT Identifies a Larger Terrorist Threat, but in Most Cases is Less Than the Terrorist Threat Identified by the Postulated Threat
While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist group than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the terrorist threat identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated Threat. Finally, the department’s criteria for determining the severity of radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage may be insufficient. For chemical sabotage standards, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to industry standards. However, we reported March 2003 year that such standards currently do not exist. DOE Has Been Slow to Resolve a Number of Significant Issues That May Affect the Ability of its Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT
While DOE issued the final DBT in May 2003, it has only recently resolved a number of significant issues that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion and is still addressing other issues. Second, DOE also only recently provided additional DBT implementation guidance. Some sites may be able to move more quickly and meet the department’s deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. As a result, DOE needs to take a series of actions to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level as quickly as possible. | Why GAO Did This Study
A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing nuclear weapons or the material used in nuclear weapons could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete, resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO (1) identified why DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT, (2) analyzed the higher threat in the new DBT, and (3) identified remaining issues that need to be resolved in order for DOE to meet the threat contained in the new DBT.
What GAO Found
DOE took a series of actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While each of these has been important, in and of themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure that all of DOE's sites are adequately prepared to defend themselves against the higher terrorist threat present in the post September 11, 2001 world. Specifically, GAO found that DOE took almost 2 years to develop a new DBT because of (1) delays in developing an intelligence community assessment--known as the Postulated Threat--of the terrorist threat to nuclear weapon facilities, (2) DOE's lengthy comment and review process for developing policy, and (3) sharp debates within DOE and other government organizations over the size and capabilities of future terrorist threats and the availability of resources to meet these threats. While the May 2003 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat than did the previous DBT, the threat identified in the new DBT, in most cases, is less than the threat identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat, on which the DBT has been traditionally based. The new DBT identifies new possible terrorist acts such as radiological, chemical, or biological sabotage. However, the criteria that DOE has selected for determining when facilities may need to be protected against these forms of sabotage may not be sufficient. For example, for chemical sabotage, the 2003 DBT requires sites to protect to "industry standards;" however, such standards currently do not exist. DOE has been slow to resolve a number of significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans, and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to meet the requirements of the new DBT by the end of fiscal year 2006 is probably not realistic for some sites. |
gao_GAO-07-1054 | gao_GAO-07-1054_0 | Over the last 3 centuries, about half of this presettlement, or “native,” grassland was converted to other uses, and almost all the native grassland has been converted in some states, such as Iowa and Minnesota. While there is no comprehensive and current source of information on the extent of native grassland conversions to cropland or the amount of farm program payments made in relation to this newly converted cropland, available sources provide some information on conversions and related costs. Nationwide, total private grassland declined by almost 25 million acres from 1982 through 2003. Specifically: NRCS’s National Resources Inventory (NRI). For example, some of the decline in rangeland was due to conversions to non-cropland uses, such as developed land. Table 3 shows the net crop insurance payments received by producers in the 16 South Dakota counties with the highest rates of conversions in 2005 and 2006 in comparison with the net payments received by producers in the state’s other counties. According to USDA officials, a possible reason for the relatively high crop insurance and disaster assistance payments in South Dakota counties with the highest conversion rates is that these counties are in areas that are more prone to drought and crop losses than other major crop-producing counties. Farm Program Payments, Rising Crop Prices, and the Adoption of New Farming Technologies Provide Incentives to Expand Crop Production on Native Grasslands
Federal farm program payments are an important factor in producers’ decisions to convert native grassland to cropland, but rising crop prices and advances in crop production technology are also important factors in these conversions. For example, a study by USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) found that increased crop insurance subsidies in the mid-1990s encouraged producers to expand crop production in the contiguous 48 states by an estimated 2.5 million acres, with most of the land coming from pastureland and other grassland. From 1982 through 1997, 1.69 million acres of cropland in South Dakota were enrolled in CRP—with almost all of this acreage planted in grasses—at a total government cost of about $633 million. However, during the same period, 1.82 million acres of grassland in South Dakota were converted to cropland. Sodbuster Has Had Little Impact on Native Grassland Conversions
Sodbuster has had little impact in limiting the conversion of native grassland to cropland, in part because much of the native grassland converted in recent years is not highly erodible and therefore not subject to Sodbuster. Existing policy—referring to the current conservation compliance provisions, including Sodbuster—is effectively controlling soil erosion on highly erodible land. Available data suggest that USDA’s programs that increase the profitability of cropping and its programs that encourage conservation of rural land may be working at cross purposes with one another. In addition, USDA said certain types of coverage, such as prevented planting coverage, are not available for any written agreement approved for newly converted land. Specifically, we determined (1) the extent of grassland conversions to cropland and the cost of farm program payments related to these newly converted cropland acres, (2) the relative importance of farm program payments versus other factors in producers’ decisions to convert grassland to cropland, and (3) any impact the Sodbuster provision has had on limiting grassland conversions. To determine the relative importance of the availability of farm program payments in producers’ decisions to convert grassland to cropland, we identified and reviewed studies that directly examined the economic incentives of farm program payments on a producer’s decision to convert grasslands to cropland, as well as related studies that examine the effects of farm program payments on farm profitability and risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's remaining grassland has several important benefits, such as providing land for grazing and wildlife habitat for many at-risk species. However, over the past 3 centuries about half of the grassland has been converted to other uses, principally cropland. In addition to losing important grassland values, such conversions may result in increased spending on federal farm programs, such as crop insurance, especially in marginal areas. GAO examined (1) the extent of grassland conversions to cropland and the cost of farm program payments for these newly converted cropland acres; (2) the relative importance of farm program payments versus other factors in producers' decisions to convert grassland to cropland; and (3) any impact the Sodbuster conservation provision--which places soil erosion standards on certain converted land--has had on limiting grassland conversions.
What GAO Found
No comprehensive and current source of information exists on the conversion of grassland to cropland or on the resulting farm program payments for newly converted land. However, the data that are available show a decline in private grassland nationwide, continuing conversion of native grassland to cropland in some areas of the country, and that certain farm program payments made to producers in South Dakota counties with relatively high rates of conversion were significantly higher than payments in other counties. According to USDA's National Resources Inventory, the nation's privately owned grassland decreased by almost 25 million acres between 1982 and 2003. While some conversions are attributable to development and other land uses, the leading type of conversion has been to cropland. Our analysis of South Dakota counties found that between 1997 and 2006, the average annual net crop insurance payment per acre for the 16 counties with the highest rates of conversion was nearly twice as high as the average payment for all other counties in the state. Farm program payments are an important factor in producers' decisions on whether to convert grassland to cropland. Certainly other factors, including rising crop prices--largely spurred by increased ethanol demand--and the emergence of genetically modified crops and new farming techniques that make cropping on heretofore unsuitable land possible are also important in producers' decisions. Specifically, our analysis found that farm program payments are an important factor in conversions. Several economic studies have reached the same conclusion. For example, a 2006 USDA study found that increases in crop insurance subsidies motivated producers to expand cropland in the contiguous 48 states by an estimated 2.5 million acres in the mid-1990s. Moreover, farm program payments and conservation programs may be working at cross purposes with one another. For example, from 1982 to 1997, 1.69 million acres of cropland in South Dakota were enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program, while during the same period, 1.82 million acres of grassland in South Dakota were converted to cropland. The Sodbuster conservation provision has had little impact on conversions. For certain cropland converted from native grassland and classified as highly erodible, Sodbuster requires that producers apply a soil conservation system that does not allow a substantial increase in erosion as a condition to receiving certain farm program payments. However, much of the native grassland converted in recent years is not highly erodible and therefore is not subject to Sodbuster. In addition, according to county-level USDA officials, the cost of controlling soil erosion relative to potential profits from cultivating the land provides little disincentive to conversion. USDA has proposed legislation to make newly converted native grassland ineligible for program benefits. |
gao_GAO-04-1077T | gao_GAO-04-1077T_0 | In addition, only the 1970, 1990, and 2000 Censuses used counts of federally affiliated personnel for purposes of apportioning Congress. Nevertheless, in recent years, the Bureau’s policy of excluding private citizens from the census has been questioned. Cost-Effectiveness Would be Problematic
The initial results of the overseas census test suggest that counting Americans abroad on a global basis would require enormous resources and still not yield data that are comparable in quality to the stateside count. Moreover, the Bureau’s experience during the 2000 Census suggests that securing a higher return rate on an overseas census would be an enormous challenge and may not be feasible. Replicating this level of effort on a worldwide basis would be impractical, and still would not produce a complete count. Unit Costs Were High
Because the overseas test had such low participation levels, the unit cost of each response was high—roughly $1,450 for each returned questionnaire, based on the $7.8 million the Bureau spent preparing for, implementing, and evaluating the 2004 overseas test. The difficulties included grappling with country-specific issues and overseeing the contractor responsible for raising public awareness of the census at the three test sites. The design of the overseas test—a voluntary survey that relies heavily on marketing to secure a complete count—lacks these building blocks largely because they are impractical to perform in other countries. By contrast, participation in the overseas test was optional. A complete and accurate address list: The cornerstone of a successful census is a quality address list. Ability to follow up with non-respondents: Because participation in the decennial census is mandatory, the Bureau sends enumerators to those households that do not return their questionnaires. U.S. citizens only? For certain purposes, such as apportioning Congress, the Bureau would need to assign overseas Americans to a particular state. Securing a successful count of Americans in Vienna, Virginia, is challenging enough; a complete count of Americans in Vienna, Austria, and in scores of other countries around the globe, would only add to the difficulties facing the Bureau as it looks toward the next national head count. Successfully counting the nation’s population is a near-daunting task. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has typically excluded from the census private citizens residing abroad, but included overseas members of the military, federal civilian employees, and their dependents (in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, these individuals were included in the numbers used for apportioning Congress). The Bureau recently tested the practicality of counting all overseas Americans. GAO was asked to testify on the test's initial results. Our statement is based on our published reports, one of which is being released at today's hearing.
What GAO Found
The test results suggest that counting all American citizens overseas as part of the census would require enormous resources, but still not yield data at the level of quality needed for purposes of congressional apportionment. Participation in the test was poor, with just 5,390 questionnaires returned from the three test sites. Moreover, as the Bureau's experience during the 2000 Census shows, securing better participation in a global count might not be practical. The Bureau spent $374 million on a months-long publicity campaign that consisted of television and other advertising that helped produce a 72-percent return rate. Replicating the same level of effort on a worldwide basis would be difficult, and still would not produce a complete count. Further, the low participation levels in the test made the unit cost of each response relatively high at around $1,450. The test results highlighted other obstacles to a cost-effective count including the resources needed to address country-specific problems and the difficulties associated with managing a complex operation from thousands of miles away. The approach used to count the overseas population in the 2004 test--a voluntary survey that largely relies on marketing to secure a complete count, lacks the basic building blocks of a successful census such as a complete and accurate address list and the ability to follow-up with nonrespondents. As the Bureau already faces the near-daunting task of securing a successful stateside count in 2010, having to simultaneously count Americans abroad would only add to the challenges it faces. |
gao_GAO-08-914T | gao_GAO-08-914T_0 | To protect the over one million federal employees and about 9,000 GSA facilities from the risk of terrorist and criminal attacks, in fiscal year 2007, FPS had about 1,100 employees, of which 541, or almost 50 percent, were inspectors. FPS’s Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational Challenges and the Steps It Has Taken May Not Fully Resolve Them
FPS faces several operational challenges, including decreasing staff levels, which has led to reductions in the law enforcement services that FPS provides. While FPS has taken steps to address these challenges, it has not fully resolved them. The decrease in FPS’s duty hours has also jeopardized police officer and inspector safety, as well as building security. However, ensuring the quality and timeliness of them is an area in which FPS continues to face challenges. Similarly, one regional supervisor stated that, in the course of reviewing a BSA for an address he had personally visited, he realized that the inspector completing the BSA falsified information and had not actually visited the site because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. FPS Has Taken Some Actions To Resolve Operational Challenges But Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges
According to FPS, it has a number of ongoing efforts that are designed to address some of its longstanding challenges. For example, the approach does not emphasize law enforcement responsibilities, such as proactive patrol. FPS’s Actions to Address Budgetary Challenges Have Had Adverse Implications
FPS funds its operations through the collection of security fees charged to tenant agencies for security services. However, until recently these fees have not been sufficient to cover its projected operational costs. Because of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year FPS’s collections were sufficient to cover its costs. FPS also projects that collections will cover its costs in fiscal year 2008. FPS’s Basic Security Fee Does Not Account for Risk and Raises Questions about Equity
FPS’s primary means of funding its operations is the fee it charges tenant agencies for basic security services, as shown in figure 4. The basic security fee does not include contract guard services. In fiscal year 2008, FPS charged 62 cents per square foot for basic security and has been authorized to increase the rate to 66 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2009. Many of these buildings rarely receive services from FPS staff and rely mostly on local police for law enforcement services. Several stakeholders have raised questions about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of the cost of providing security at GSA facilities. FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance
To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA facilities, FPS has identified some output measures, such as determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an incident and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to evaluate the results and the net effect of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. FPS is also limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities, in part, because it does not have a data management system that will allow it to provide complete and accurate information on its security program. Without a reliable data management system, it is difficult for FPS and others to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities or for FPS to accurately track and monitor incident response time, effectiveness of security countermeasures, and whether BSAs are completed on time. In the report we issued last week, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS to develop and implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing resources; clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies in regards to responding to incidents at GSA facilities; improve FPS’s use of the fee-base dsystem by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing security services to tenant agencies; assess whether FPS’s current use of a fee-based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency; and develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring its performance including the collection and analysis of data. This concludes our testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for providing physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 General Services Administration (GSA) facilities. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. GAO was asked to provide information and analysis on challenges FPS faces including ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to protect GSA facilities and the over one million federal employees as well as members of the public that work in and visit them each year. GAO discusses (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. This testimony is based on our recently issued report (GAO-08-683) to this Subcommittee.
What GAO Found
FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission and the actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. FPS's staff has decreased by about 20 percent from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. FPS has also decreased or eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many FPS locations. Moreover, FPS has not resolved longstanding challenges, such as improving the oversight of its contract guard program, maintaining security countermeasures, and ensuring the quality and timeliness of building security assessments (BSA). For example, one regional supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for an address he personally visited he realized that the inspector completing the BSA had falsified the information because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. To address some of these operational challenges, FPS is currently changing to an inspector based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors. However, these actions may not fully resolve the challenges FPS faces, in part because the approach does not emphasize law enforcement responsibilities. Until recently, the security fees FPS charged to agencies have not been sufficient to cover its costs and the actions it has taken to address the shortfalls have had adverse implications. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transferred emergency supplemental funding to FPS. FPS restricted hiring and limited training and overtime. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible for FPS's high attrition rates. FPS was authorized to increase the basic security fee four times since it transferred to DHS in 2003, currently charging tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services. Because of these actions, FPS's collections in fiscal year 2007 were sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does not account for the risk faced by buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Stakeholders also expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of its security costs. FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its output measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS does not have measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program outcomes and results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measures. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions. |
gao_GAO-11-677T | gao_GAO-11-677T_0 | JSF Restructuring Improves Program, but Affordability Is Challenged by Rising Costs and Delays
DOD has substantially restructured the JSF program over the past 15 months, taking positive actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences—higher development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Near-term procurement quantities were reduced by 246 aircraft through 2016; the annual rate of increase in production was lowered; and the start of full-rate production moved to 2018, a 5-year slip from the current baseline. To address technical problems and test deficiencies for the Marine Corps’ STOVL variant, the department significantly scaled back its procurement quantities and directed a 2-year period for evaluating and engineering technical solutions to inform future decisions on this variant. Annual funding levels more than double and quantities more than triple during this period. Also, the estimated average unit procurement price for the JSF has about doubled since program start and current forecasts indicate that life-cycle costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it replaces. Going forward, the JSF will require unprecedented demands for funding in a period of more austere defense budgets where it will have to annually compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the discretionary federal dollar. It had mixed success, achieving 6 goals and making varying degrees of progress on the other 6. Although still hampered by the late delivery of test aircraft to testing sites, the development flight test program significantly ramped up operations in 2010, accomplishing 3 times as many test flights as the previous 3 years combined. Program Has Still Not Fully Demonstrated a Stable Design and Mature Manufacturing Processes as It Enters Its Fifth Year of Production
After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to gain adequate knowledge to ensure its design is stable and the manufacturing process is ready for greater levels of annual production. Specifically, the program has not yet stabilized aircraft designs—engineering changes continue at higher than expected rates long after critical design reviews and well into procurement. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Also, manufacturing cost increases and delays in delivering test and production aircraft indicate a need for substantial improvements in factory throughput and performance of the global supply chain. Testing Has Been Slow and Has Not Demonstrated That the Aircraft Will Work in Its Intended Environment
Since the first flight in December 2006, only about 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Furthermore, only a small portion of the extensive network of ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development—essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality—is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase. However, only 3 of 32 labs and models have been fully accredited to date. Concluding Remarks
The JSF program is at a critical juncture—9 years in development and 4 years in limited production–but still early in flight testing to verify aircraft design and performance. We determine that the cost estimate is not reliable and that a new cost estimate and schedule risk assessment is needed. In February 2010, the department announced a major restructuring of the JSF program, including reduced procurement and a planned move to fixed-price contracts. Because of additional costs and schedule delays the program’s ability to meet warfighter requirements on time is at risk. Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. Tactical Aircraft: F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The estimated total investment cost is currently about $385 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. Because of a history of relatively poor cost and schedule outcomes, defense leadership over the past 15 months has directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program that is continuing. This testimony draws substantially from our extensive body of work on the JSF including our April 2011 report, the latest annual review mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 244 (2009). This testimony discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to restructure the JSF program, taking positive, substantial actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences--higher up-front development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Total development funding is now estimated at $56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year schedule slip from the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets. The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals and progressing in varying degrees on the rest. Successes included the first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a partial release of software capabilities. The short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant had significant technical problems and deficient flight test performance. DOD directed a 2-year period to evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions. After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected. Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20 recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates. Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply chain are needed. Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. About 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development--essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality--is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase. |
gao_GAO-01-912T | gao_GAO-01-912T_0 | RNs make up the largest group of health care providers, and are 77 percent of the nurse workforce. In an additional effort to contain costs in the early 1990s, acute care facilities restructured and redesigned staffing patterns, introducing more non-RN caregivers and reducing the number of RNs on staff. Recent studies have identified a relationship between the level of nurse staffing and the quality of patient care. Job Dissatisfaction, Demographic Changes, and Declining Interest in The Nursing Profession Contribute to Recruitment and Retention Problems
Job dissatisfaction is reported to be high among nurses. A recent Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals (FNHP) survey found that half of the currently employed RNs who were surveyed had considered leaving the patient-care field for reasons other than retirement over the past 2 years. Demand for Nurses Will Continue to Grow As the Supply Dwindles
A serious nurse shortage is expected in the future, as pressures are exerted on both demand and supply. | What GAO Found
Health care providers' difficulties in recruiting and retaining nurses may worsen as the demand for nurses rises with the aging of the population. Demographic changes are widening the gap between the numbers of people needing care and available caregivers. Moreover, the current high levels of job dissatisfaction among nurses because of management decisions to restructure health care delivery and staffing may play a crucial role in the extent of future nurse shortages. Efforts to improve the workplace environment may reduce the likelihood that nurses will leave or consider leaving the profession. More data on the exact scope and nature of the problem are needed to help plan and target corrective measures. Providers, states, and the federal government have the opportunity to collect and analyze critical information on changes in the supply of and demand for nurses. |
gao_GAO-15-27 | gao_GAO-15-27_0 | Over Half of Grantees Could Track Some Individuals from Early Education into the Workforce, but Data Are Generally Limited
Over Half of Grantees Have the Ability to Match Some Individual Records from Early Education to Workforce
After analyzing data from DQC’s 2013 survey, we determined that over half of grantees have the ability to match data—reliably connect the same record in two or more databases—for some individuals from early As shown in figure 1, individuals can education and into the workforce.take different paths to move from early education into the workforce: (1) via K-12 or (2) via K-12 and postsecondary. Regardless, as the match rate—that is, the percent of unique student records reliably connected between databases—increases, the number of grantees able to match data between sectors decreases. Our analysis of the DQC survey data also shows that more grantees match data among the education sectors than between the education and workforce sectors, though—as was the case with matching data from early education to workforce—the number of grantees that match data For example, 43 decreases as the match rate increases (see table 4).grantees reported matching data between the K-12 and early education sectors, and 31 grantees reported matching data between the K-12 and workforce sectors at least to some degree; however, the number of grantees that reported matching data between these same sectors drops to 37 and 9, respectively, at a match rate of 95 percent or more. For example, only 6 of 31 grantees reported that they were able to match data on all seven programs between the K-12 and workforce sectors, which include unemployment insurance wage records, unemployment benefit claims data, Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) adult or dislocated worker program, WIA youth program, adult basic and secondary education, Wagner-Peyser Act employment services, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). For example, officials in Washington said they used their initial SLDS and WDQI grants to focus on building their K-12 data system and workforce systems, respectively. Longitudinal Data Analysis Has Informed State and Local Policy Making and Helped States Shape Their Research Agendas
Grantees Reported Using Some Longitudinal Data to Inform Decision and Policy Making
According to our analysis of the DQC survey data and our interviews with selected states, SLDS and WDQI grantees use longitudinal data to examine education outcomes and to inform policy decisions. They also help guide school-, district-, and state-level improvement efforts. Also, 29 grantees responded to the DQC survey that they produce early warning reports, which identify students who are most likely to be at risk of academic failure or dropping out of school. While many grantees reported on the DQC survey that they use longitudinal data to analyze outcomes for students and workers and to make policy decisions, officials from all five grantee states we interviewed told us that these analyses are limited because they are still developing their longitudinal data systems. Each provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine: (1) the extent to which Statewide Longitudinal Data Systems (SLDS) and Workforce Data Quality Initiative (WDQI) grantees match individual student and worker records and share data between the education and workforce sectors; and (2) how grantees are using longitudinal data to help improve education and workforce outcomes. To answer our objectives, we analyzed state-level data from a 2013 survey conducted by the Data Quality Campaign (DQC), a nonprofit organization that works with state officials and others to support the effective use of data to improve student achievement. In addition to our analysis of DQC survey data we conducted interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of five grantees as well as relevant federal agencies and nonprofit organizations. We selected these grantees based on factors including the differing levels of progress they have made in establishing data linkages and the federal funding they have received from the SLDS and WDQI programs. based on individual student data. College and career readiness reports
Reports designed to identify students who are on track for readiness or success in college or careers. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2006 through 2013, the Departments of Education and Labor provided over $640 million in grants to states through the SLDS and WDQI grant programs. These grants support states' efforts to create longitudinal data systems that follow individuals through their education and into the workforce. Analyzing data in these systems may help states improve outcomes for students and workers.
GAO was asked to review the status of grantees' longitudinal data systems. This report examines (1) the extent to which SLDS and WDQI grantees match individual student and worker records and share data between the education and workforce sectors and (2) how grantees are using longitudinal data to help improve education and workforce outcomes. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed data from a 2013 survey conducted by the DQC. This survey collected information from states on data linkages among education and workforce programs and on how states use longitudinal data. In addition, GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of five grantees, which were selected based on the progress they have made in matching data and on the funding they have received from the SLDS and WDQI programs. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Education and the Department of Labor, and incorporated them as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Over half of 48 grantee states that received a Statewide Longitudinal Data Systems (SLDS) or Workforce Data Quality Initiative (WDQI) grant have the ability to match data on individuals from early education into the workforce, based on GAO's analysis of 2013 Data Quality Campaign (DQC) survey data. The DQC is a nonprofit organization that supports the effective use of data to improve student achievement. In its survey, DQC collected self-reported information from states on their ability to match, or connect the same individual record, between the (1) K-12 and early education, postsecondary, and workforce sectors and between the (2) postsecondary and workforce sectors. However, as the match rate—that is, the percent of unique individual records reliably connected between databases—increases, the number of grantees able to match data decreases. GAO found that more grantees reported being able to match data among the education sectors than between the education and workforce sectors. Further, most grantees reported that they are not able to match data comprehensively. For example, only 6 of 31 grantees reported that they match K-12 data to all seven possible workforce programs covered by the DQC survey, which include adult basic and secondary education as well as unemployment insurance wage records. State officials cited several challenges to matching data, including state restrictions on the use of a Social Security number. Specifically, officials in three of five grantee states GAO spoke with said state law or agency policy prohibit collecting a Social Security number in K-12 data, which can make it more difficult to directly match individuals' K-12 and workforce records.
According to GAO analysis of the DQC survey data, grantees use some longitudinal data to inform policy decisions and to shape research agendas. All 48 grantees reported analyzing aggregate-level data to help guide school-, district-, and state-level improvement efforts. For example, 27 grantees said they analyze data on college and career readiness to help schools determine whether students are on track for success in college or in the workforce. Grantees also reported using longitudinal data to analyze outcomes for individual students. For example, 29 grantees reported that they produce early warning reports that identify students who are most likely to be at risk of academic failure or dropping out of school. Data from the DQC survey also show that 39 grantees reported developing a research agenda in conjunction with their longitudinal data systems. |
gao_GAO-06-368 | gao_GAO-06-368_0 | GAO has documented these problems for decades. Those changes include numerous executive branch initiatives and legislative actions as well as roughly 11 revisions to DOD’s acquisition policy between 1971 and 2005. Despite these efforts, defense acquisition programs in the past 3 decades continued to routinely experience cost overruns, schedule slips, and performance shortfalls. Figure 1 illustrates the continued problem of development cost overruns. If properly implemented and enforced this approach could help DOD’s decision makers gain the confidence they need to make significant and sound investment decisions for major weapon systems. Of the 23 major programs we assessed, 10 have already reported estimated development cost growth greater than 30 percent or expected delays of at least 1 year in delivery of an initial operational capability to the warfighter. The programs listed in table 2 will not achieve the return on investment that DOD anticipated when they began development. DOD Is Not Effectively Implementing the Policy’s Knowledge- Based, Evolutionary Approach
DOD is not effectively implementing the knowledge-based process and evolutionary approach emphasized in its acquisition policy. While the policy outlines a specific knowledge-based process of concept refinement and technology development to help ensure a sound business case is developed before committing to a new development program, almost 80 percent of the programs we reviewed were permitted to bypass this process. Programs Continue Past Design Reviews before Design Maturity is Demonstrated
In addition to emphasizing the importance of capturing technology knowledge before starting system development, DOD’s policy also highlights the importance of demonstrating design maturity before moving from the integration phase of system development into system demonstration and initial manufacturing. Evolutionary Acquisition Is Not Being Used
Despite the revised policy’s guidance that capabilities should be developed and delivered in individually defined and separately managed increments, a majority of major weapon acquisition programs we assessed continue to be structured to achieve revolutionary increases in capability within one development program. Conclusions
Failing to consistently implement the knowledge-based process and evolutionary principles emphasized in the revised acquisition policy— coupled with a lack of specific criteria for making key investment decisions—are keeping DOD on its historical path of poor cost and schedule outcomes. Most programs are incurring the same scope of cost overruns and schedule delays as programs managed under prior DOD policies. However, in order for this initiative to be effective DOD must establish and enforce specific criteria at key decision points. However, without enforceable criteria, defense officials are challenged to determine whether adequate knowledge has been obtained for investing taxpayer dollars. At a minimum those controls should require program officials to demonstrate that they have achieved a level of knowledge that meets or exceeds the following criteria at each respective decision point: Program start (Milestone B): Start of product development Demonstrate technologies to high readiness levels Ensure that requirements for the product are informed by the systems- Establish cost and schedule estimates for product on the basis of knowledge from preliminary design using system engineering tools Conduct decision review for program start Design readiness review: Beginning of system demonstration Complete 90 percent of design drawings Complete subsystem and system design reviews Demonstrate with prototype that design meets requirements Obtain stakeholders’ concurrence that drawings are complete and Complete the failure modes and effects analysis Identify key system characteristics Identify critical manufacturing processes Establish reliability targets and growth plan on the basis of demonstrated reliability rates of components and subsystems Conduct decision review to enter system demonstration Production commitment (Milestone C): Initiation of low-rate production Demonstrate manufacturing processes Build production-representative prototypes Test production-representative prototypes to achieve reliability goal Test production-representative prototypes to demonstrate product in Collect statistical process control data Demonstrate that critical processes are capable and in statistical Conduct decision review to begin production Furthermore, to ensure that major decisions are transparent and that program officials and decision makers are held accountable, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require decision makers to include written rationale for each major decision in acquisition decision documentation. Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD’s Environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is planning to invest $1.3 trillion between 2005 and 2009 in researching, developing, and procuring major weapon systems. How DOD manages this investment has been a matter of congressional concern for years. Numerous programs have been marked by cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced performance. Over the past 3 decades, DOD's acquisition environment has undergone many changes aimed at curbing cost, schedule, and other problems. In order to determine if the policy DOD put in place is achieving its intended goals, we assessed the outcomes of major weapons development programs initiated under the revised policy. Additionally, we assessed whether the policy's knowledge-based, evolutionary principles are being effectively implemented, and whether effective controls and specific criteria are in place and being used to make sound investment decisions.
What GAO Found
Changes made in DOD's acquisition policy over the past 5 years have not eliminated cost and schedule problems for major weapons development programs. Of the 23 major programs we assessed, 10 are already expecting development cost overruns greater than 30 percent or have delayed the delivery of initial operational capability to the warfighter by at least 1 year. The overall impact of these costly conditions is a reduction in the value of DOD's defense dollars and a lower return on investment. Poor execution of the revised acquisition policy is a major cause of DOD's continued problems. DOD frequently bypasses key steps of the knowledge-based process outlined in the policy, falls short of attaining key knowledge, and continues to pursue revolutionary--rather than evolutionary or incremental--advances in capability. Nearly 80 percent of the programs GAO reviewed did not fully follow the knowledge-based process to develop a sound business case before committing to system development. Most of the programs we reviewed started system development with immature technologies, and half of the programs that have held design reviews did so before achieving a high level of design maturity. These practices increase the likelihood that problems will be discovered late in development when they are more costly to address. Furthermore, DOD's continued pursuit of revolutionary leaps in capability also runs counter to the policy's guidance. DOD has not closed all of the gaps in the policy that GAO identified nearly 3 years ago, particularly with regard to adding controls and criteria. Effective controls require decision makers to measure progress against specific criteria and ensure that managers capture key knowledge before moving to the next acquisition phase. However, DOD's policy continues to allow managers to approach major investment decisions with many unknowns. Without effective controls that require program officials to satisfy specific criteria, it is difficult to hold decision makers or program managers accountable to cost and schedule targets. In this environment, decision-making transparency is crucial, but DOD is lacking in this area as well. |
gao_HEHS-97-161 | gao_HEHS-97-161_0 | The law requires the District of Columbia Board of Education to do the following: calculate by October 15 of each year the number of students enrolled in the District’s public schools and students whose tuition in other schools is paid by DCPS funds, including students with special needs and nonresident students, in the following categories by grade level if applicable: kindergarten through grade 12, preschool and prekindergarten, adult students, and students in nongrade level programs; calculate the amount of fees and tuition assessed and collected from nonresident students in these categories; prepare by October 15 and submit to the Authority, the Comptroller General of the United States, appropriate congressional committees, and others an annual report summarizing those counts; and arrange with the Authority to provide for the conduct of an independent audit of the count. Enrollment and residency verification take place when a student enters the school system. DCPS’ Enrollment Count Process in School Year 1996-97 Remained Centered in the Local Schools
DCPS’ process for enrolling, verifying residency of, and tracking students remained centered in the local school in school year 1996-97, while central office staff monitored portions of the process. Figure 1 shows the enrollment count process for school year 1996-97. School Year 1996-97 Enrollment Process Changes Did Not Ensure Accuracy
DCPS’ new student enrollment card was intended to document that students had met the 1-day attendance requirement for inclusion in the official enrollment count. Furthermore, even though the District of Columbia Auditor has suggested that students unable to document their residency be excluded from the official enrollment count, whether they pay tuition or not, DCPS included these students in its enrollment count for school year 1996-97. Limiting access to the student database has also helped to reduce errors. In addition, schools did not collect all required proofs of residency. System for Pupil Accounting Did Not Ensure an Accurate Count
The foundation of the pupil accounting system—SIS—lacked adequate safeguards to ensure that students were accurately tracked when they transferred from one school to another. Furthermore, some schools did not follow attendance rules, affecting later counts and projections. SIS Process for Transferring Students Allowed More Than One School to Include a Student in Its Active Enrollment
The student transfer process may have allowed a single student to be enrolled in at least two schools simultaneously. These districts rely on a variety of automatic edits and procedures in their student database systems to prevent such errors and serve as ongoing checks and balances on the schools. DCPS, the Board of Trustees, and the Authority Have Not Complied With the District of Columbia School Reform Act
The District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995 imposed enrollment count reporting and audit requirements upon DCPS, the District of Columbia Board of Education—all of the responsibilities of which have been delegated to the Board of Trustees—and the Authority. The U.S. Department of Education, in commenting on our draft report, noted that its Office of Inspector General had no role in preparing DCPS’ enrollment count for school year 1996-97 but provided some clarifications about correspondence between it and DCPS regarding an audit of the count. Scope and Methodology
We designed our study to gather information about DCPS’ enrollment count process for school year 1996-97 and the process used by other selected urban school districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the enrollment count process that the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) used in school year 1996-97, focusing on: (1) whether the process appeared sufficient to produce an accurate count; (2) enrollment count processes used by some other urban school systems; and (3) the role of the Department of Education's Inspector General in preparing DCPS' official enrollment count for school year 1996-97.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) even though DCPS changed parts of its enrollment count process in school year 1996-97 to address criticisms, the process remains flawed; (2) some of these changes increased complexity and work effort but did little to improve the count's credibility; (3) errors remained in the Student Information System (SIS), but DCPS had only limited mechanisms for correcting these errors; (4) problems also persisted in the critical area of residency verification; (5) in school year 1996-97, schools did not always verify student residency as required by DCPS' own procedures; (6) proofs of residency, when actually obtained, often fell short of DCPS' standards; (7) Central Office staff did not consistently track failures to verify residency; (8) school staff and parents rarely suffered sanctions for failure to comply with the residency verification requirements; (9) the pupil accounting system failed to adequately track students; (10) SIS allowed more than one school to count a single student when the student transferred from one school to another; (11) schools did not always follow attendance rules, and SIS lacked the capability to track implementation of the rules; (12) some attendance rules, if implemented, could have allowed counting of nonattending students; (13) other school districts report that they use several approaches to control errors and to increase the accuracy of their enrollment counts; (14) these include using centralized enrollment and pupil accounting centers and a variety of automated student information system edits and procedures designed to prevent or disallow pupil accounting errors before they occur; (15) the recently enacted District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995 requires the enrollment count process to produce enrollment numbers for nonresidents and students with special needs; (16) DCPS (acting on behalf of the District of Columbia Board of Education) and the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority are not in compliance with requirements of this new law; (17) the Department of Education helped DCPS develop its request for proposals for the independent audit of the enrollment count for school year 1996-97, but it had no role in preparing DCPS' official enrollment count for school year 1996-97; and (18) the Authority subsequently decided, however, that auditing the count for school year 1996-97 would be counterproductive. |
gao_GAO-14-819 | gao_GAO-14-819_0 | Among USDA’s 34 agencies and offices, 11 conduct contracting, with 3 of these agencies—Departmental Management, the Food and Nutrition Service, and the Forest Service—accounting for about 70 percent of USDA’s total obligations for professional service contracts in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Contract Type
The Federal Acquisition Regulation and OMB guidance direct federal agencies to use performance-based contracts—that is, contracts with measurable performance standards and a method of assessing a contractor’s performance against those performance standards—to the maximum extent practicable when acquiring services. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation notes a preference for firm-fixed-price contracts rather than other payment arrangements such as contracts that reimburse contractors for expenses. Agencies Did Not Use Preferred Contract Types for the Majority of Contract Obligations When Procuring Professional Services
For the majority of funds obligated to professional service contracts in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, USDA’s Departmental Management, Food and Nutrition Service, and Forest Service did not select contract types that are preferred by regulations, agency policies, and OMB guidance. However, in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, according to agency data, about two-thirds of the dollars ($783 million) obligated for professional service contracts awarded by the three agencies in our review were for contracts that were not performance- based, firm-fixed-price contracts. The three agencies collectively increased the percentage of obligated dollars for performance-based, firm-fixed-price contracts from about 16 percent to about 53 percent from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, with the Food and Nutrition Service making the most significant gains. Agencies’ Oversight of Selected Professional Service Contracts Did Not Consistently Follow Regulations, Policies, and Guidance, and Agencies Did Not Consistently Assess Contractor Performance as Required
USDA’s Departmental Management, Food and Nutrition Service, and Forest Service did not consistently follow federal regulations, agency policies and guidance, and OMB guidance in overseeing selected professional service contracts. The Federal Acquisition Regulation directs that contracts include a quality assurance surveillance plan as necessary to ensure that the contractors’ service meets contract requirements and that such plans should be prepared in conjunction with a contract’s statement of work. Officials from the three agencies in our review held varying views on the need for such plans. In addition, according to Food and Nutrition Service headquarters officials, the agency is planning to make quality assurance surveillance plans a requirement for all contracts by fiscal year 2015. As part of this effort, according to these officials, the agency is developing guidance and has held training for staff on the use of quality assurance surveillance plans. In addition, the agency plans to track compliance in an internal system. Departmental Management and the Forest Service, however, do not have similar mechanisms planned or in place to help ensure that a quality assurance surveillance plan is included in contracts as necessary to ensure the integrity of the service provided. Without such mechanisms, the agencies may not be able to fully assess the quality and timeliness of the services they receive. In addition, the Forest Service has developed a specific written strategy for meeting OMB’s compliance targets for contractor assessments. Without such a strategy, it is unclear how, when, or whether Departmental Management and the Food and Nutrition Service will increase their contractor assessment compliance to the extent laid out in those targets. In addition, while OMB has cited the importance of completing contractor performance assessments and has established targets for doing so, neither Departmental Management nor the Food and Nutrition Service has developed strategies to meet OMB targets. Without such strategies, these agencies may continue to fall short of OMB’s goals, and the government may continue to have limited contractor performance information when making future contracting decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the oversight of contracts for professional services and help ensure that federal contracting officials have complete and timely information about the performance of contractors, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture take the following two actions:
Direct the Head of Contracting Activity for Departmental Management and the Chief of the Forest Service to put mechanisms in place to help ensure that quality assurance surveillance plans are included in contracts as necessary. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Departmental Management, Food and Nutrition Service, and Forest Service (1) used contract types preferred in federal regulations, agency policies and guidance, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance when procuring professional services, and (2) followed federal regulations, agency policies and guidance, and OMB guidance in overseeing these contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
USDA obligated nearly $1.8 billion for professional service contracts in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. OMB has raised concerns about such contracts, reporting that agencies are twice as likely to use higher-risk contract types when buying such services as when buying other services or goods.
GAO was asked to review aspects of USDA's contracting for professional services. This report assesses the extent to which selected USDA agencies (1) used contract types preferred in federal regulations, agency policies and guidance, and OMB guidance when procuring professional services, and (2) followed federal regulations, agency policies and guidance, and OMB guidance in overseeing these contracts. GAO reviewed three USDA agencies that accounted for about 70 percent of USDA's obligations for professional service contracts in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. GAO analyzed federal contracting data from fiscal years 2009 through 2013; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 15 contracts, which were selected based on dollar value and contract type, among other criteria; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Departmental Management, Food and Nutrition Service, and Forest Service did not select contract types preferred by federal regulations, agency policies, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, for about two-thirds (about $783 million) of the funds obligated to contracts for professional, administrative, and management support services (professional services) in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The Federal Acquisition Regulation and OMB guidance direct federal agencies to use performance-based contracts to the maximum extent practicable when acquiring services—that is, contracts with measurable performance standards and a method of assessing contractor performance against those standards. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation notes a preference for firm-fixed-price contracts that minimize risk rather than other payment arrangements such as contracts that reimburse contractors for expenses. Officials from each agency said that, starting in 2009, their agencies began placing greater emphasis on using performance-based, firm-fixed-price contracts, including, for example, requiring written justification for contracts that are not performance-based. The three agencies collectively increased their use of performance-based, firm-fixed-price contracts from about 16 percent of obligations for professional service contracts in fiscal year 2009 to about 53 percent in fiscal year 2013.
The three USDA agencies did not consistently follow regulations, policies, and guidance in overseeing the 15 professional service contracts GAO reviewed, and did not consistently assess contractor performance as required. For example, 12 of the 15 professional service contracts GAO reviewed did not include quality assurance surveillance plans to guide oversight of the contracts. The Federal Acquisition Regulation directs that such plans be prepared as necessary to ensure contract requirements are met. Food and Nutrition Service officials told GAO the agency is planning to make quality assurance surveillance plans a requirement for all contracts by fiscal year 2015, with compliance tracked in an internal system. As part of this effort, the agency has held training for staff on the use of such plans. Departmental Management and the Forest Service, however, do not have similar mechanisms planned or in place to help ensure that such plans are included in contracts as necessary, in part because this has not been a priority in the past. Without such mechanisms, the agencies may not be able to fully assess the quality and timeliness of the services they receive. In addition, the agencies did not consistently assess contractor performance as directed by federal regulation and guidance. OMB has established government-wide performance targets for completing these assessments, but the three agencies in GAO's review fell short of these targets in fiscal year 2013. Agency officials told GAO that contractor assessments had not been completed for all contracts in part because the agencies had not emphasized the importance of doing so. The Forest Service has developed a specific written strategy for meeting OMB's targets for contractor assessments, but neither Departmental Management nor the Food and Nutrition Service has done so. Without such strategies, it is unclear how, when, or whether Departmental Management and the Food and Nutrition Service will meet OMB's targets, and thus the government may continue to have limited contractor performance information when making future contracting decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Departmental Management and the Forest Service establish mechanisms to help ensure inclusion of quality assurance surveillance plans in contracts as necessary, and that Departmental Management and the Food and Nutrition Service develop strategies for meeting OMB's targets for contractor assessments. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-373 | gao_GAO-05-373_0 | Figure 1 shows before and after photos of a site that was thinned to reduce the risk of fire. Most Woody Biomass Utilization Activities Are Implemented by the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, and the Interior, and Include Grants, Research, and Education
Most of the federal government’s woody biomass utilization efforts are being undertaken by USDA, DOE, and Interior. Research and Development
Forest Service researchers are conducting research into a variety of woody biomass issues. The Forest Service also conducts extensive research into uses for woody biomass, primarily at its Forest Products Laboratory. Formal coordination between agencies occurs through both the Woody Biomass Utilization Group and the Biomass Research and Development Board, although most agency officials we spoke with emphasized informal communication—through telephone discussions, e-mails, participation in conferences, and other means—rather than these groups as the primary vehicle for interagency coordination. To coordinate internal activities, both DOE and Interior have formal mechanisms—DOE coordinates its activities through the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), while both Interior and BLM have appointed officials to lead their woody biomass efforts; further, Interior’s woody biomass policy and BLM’s woody biomass strategy guide these organizations’ efforts. In contrast, the Forest Service—the USDA agency with the most woody biomass activities—has not assigned responsibility for coordinating its woody biomass activities, potentially leading to fragmentation of effort and diluting the impact of these activities. Most Officials Cited Economic Obstacles to Woody Biomass Utilization, and While Agencies Generally Targeted These Obstacles, Some Officials Believe Additional Steps beyond the Agencies’ Authority Are Needed
Agency officials cited two principal obstacles to increasing the use of woody biomass: the difficulty in using woody biomass cost-effectively— particularly the obstacles posed by the high cost of harvesting and transporting woody biomass—and the lack of a reliable supply of the material. Many officials, however, told us that their agencies are limited in their ability to fully address these obstacles and that additional steps—such as subsidies and tax credits—beyond the agencies’ authority to implement are needed. Federal agencies are targeting their activities toward overcoming this and other obstacles—for example, by providing technical assistance and grant funds to businesses facing economic challenges in using woody biomass. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) which federal agencies are involved in efforts to promote the use of woody biomass, and the actions they are undertaking; (2) how these federal agencies coordinate their activities related to woody biomass; and (3) what these agencies see as the primary obstacles to increasing the use of woody biomass and the extent to which they are addressing these obstacles. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Bureau of Land Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
In an effort to reduce the risk of wildland fires, many federal land managers--including the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)--are placing greater emphasis on thinning forests and rangelands to help reduce the buildup of potentially hazardous fuels. These thinning efforts generate considerable quantities of woody material, including many smaller trees, limbs, and brush--referred to as woody biomass--that currently have little or no commercial value. GAO was asked to determine (1) which federal agencies are involved in efforts to promote the use of woody biomass, and actions they are undertaking; (2) how these agencies are coordinating their activities; and (3) what agencies see as obstacles to increasing the use of woody biomass, and the extent to which they are addressing these obstacles.
What GAO Found
Most woody biomass utilization activities are implemented by the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy (DOE), and the Interior, and include awarding grants to businesses, schools, Indian tribes, and others; conducting research; and providing education. Most of USDA's woody biomass utilization activities are undertaken by the Forest Service and include grants for woody biomass utilization, research into the use of woody biomass in wood products, and education on potential uses for woody biomass. DOE's woody biomass activities focus on research into using the material for renewable energy, while Interior's efforts consist primarily of education and outreach. Other agencies also provide technical assistance or fund research activities. Federal agencies coordinate their woody biomass activities through formal and informal mechanisms. Although the agencies have established two interagency groups to coordinate their activities, most officials we spoke with emphasized informal communication--through e-mails, participation in conferences, and other means--as the primary vehicle for interagency coordination. To coordinate activities within their agencies, DOE and Interior have formal mechanisms--DOE coordinates its activities through its Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, while Interior and BLM have appointed officials to oversee, and have issued guidance on, their woody biomass activities. In contrast, while the Forest Service recently issued a woody biomass policy, it has not assigned responsibility for overseeing and coordinating its various woody biomass activities, potentially leading to fragmented efforts and diluting the impact of these activities. The obstacles to using woody biomass cited most often by agency officials were the difficulty of using woody biomass cost-effectively and the lack of a reliable supply of the material; agency activities generally are targeted toward addressing these obstacles. Some officials told us their agencies are limited in their ability to address these obstacles and that incentives--such as subsidies and tax credits--beyond the agencies' authority are needed. However, others disagreed with this approach for a variety of reasons. |
gao_GAO-12-265 | gao_GAO-12-265_0 | In addition, as debt instruments municipal securities are generally considered less risky than equity securities. Broker-dealers may also use broker’s brokers and electronic trading platforms to trade in the secondary market. As we have seen, FINRA and federal banking regulators enforce MSRB rules for broker-dealers under their respective jurisdictions. Municipal Securities Are Priced in an Opaque Market That Favors Better- Informed Participants
Because of the heterogeneity of the issuers and the securities they issue, the large number of securities outstanding, and the infrequency with which these securities trade, the municipal securities market does not maintain reliable tradable quotes on all outstanding municipal securities.Consequently, broker-dealers we spoke with said they use a variety of information to determine the prices at which they are willing to buy and sell securities. However, unlike post-trade information, pretrade price information is not centralized, not publicly available, and not as available to broker- dealers (and to other market participants) as post-trade price information. Individual Investors Generally Have Less Information and Expertise to Assess Prices than Institutional Investors
Various factors could contribute to the differences in prices that individual investors receive relative to institutional investors. SEC, MSRB, and Market Participants Are Considering Ways to Improve Pretrade Price Transparency
SEC and MSRB have ongoing studies examining the municipal security market. It is also intended to assist MSRB in evaluating whether pricing and liquidity in the market could be improved with higher levels of pretrade price transparency. SEC’s OCIE provides oversight of MSRB and FINRA’s regulatory activities. In 2010, OCIE began transitioning to a risk-based SRO inspection approach in conjunction with a comprehensive assessment of OCIE’s structure and functions. OCIE staff only recently began a new inspection of FINRA that will encompass its fixed- income surveillance program, including the municipal trade reporting and markup reviews. OCIE staff said that staffing constraints had prevented them from starting another inspection sooner to review FINRA’s fixed-income surveillance program and MSRB. Without collecting information on an ongoing basis that provides insight into the effectiveness of SRO regulatory programs, OCIE may not be able to identify anomalies or changes in the operations that warrant more immediate inspections. For example, OCIE’s last inspection of FINRA’s fixed-income surveillance program predated the recent financial crisis and ensuing volatility in the municipal securities markets. Although OCIE obtained some information on FINRA’s examination program through its district office inspections and broker-dealer examinations, its lack of a structured mechanism for monitoring the quality of FINRA’s fixed-income surveillance during that time means that OCIE will not have a full picture of how effective FINRA was in surveilling for and detecting violations of MSRB rules until it finishes its 2011 inspection—more than 3 years after the financial crisis began and more than 6 years since its last inspection. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve SEC’s ability to monitor the operations and effectiveness of SRO regulatory programs related to municipal securities trading between inspections and to help identify areas of high risk, we recommend that the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission direct OCIE to take steps to gather and analyze information on the SROs’ fixed-income regulatory programs on an ongoing basis and use it to inform their risk- based inspection approach. SEC further noted that even if the vacant positions were filled, OCIE’s Market Oversight group would continue to be understaffed relative to the number and complexity of entities that it examines and that it would need additional resources to conduct more frequent inspections of FINRA and MSRB’s fixed-income programs or to do interim monitoring of FINRA’s fixed income surveillance program. Pursuant to the Dodd- Frank Act, CFTC Has Issued Rules Regulating Swap Dealers’ Transactions with Municipal Issuers
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) created a comprehensive framework to provide oversight over the previously unregulated over-the counter derivatives market. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To analyze how institutional and individual investors trade municipal securities in the secondary market and the factors affecting the prices institutional and individual investors receive, we obtained data on all municipal securities trades that broker-dealers reported to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s (MSRB) Real-Time Transaction Reporting System (RTRS) from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2010. We reviewed studies that analyzed pricing in the municipal securities market. In addition, we attended or viewed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) field hearings on the state of the municipal securities market, reviewed industry literature, and interviewed members of trade organizations representing institutional investors, broker-dealers (including broker’s brokers), and individual investors; academics; SEC Office of Municipal Securities Market officials; MSRB officials and independent municipal market research and advisory firms. We also reviewed documentation describing RegWeb, the web portal MSRB makes available to federal regulators to analyze and query RTRS data for regulatory purposes; the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) policies and procedures for electronically surveilling RTRS data for potential violations of MSRB pricing and trade reporting rules; and FINRA and federal banking regulators’ (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or OCC; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or FDIC; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or the Federal Reserve) examination procedures for assessing broker-dealer compliance with these rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
Municipal securities are debt instruments that state and local governments typically issue to finance diverse projects. Individual investors, through direct purchases or investment funds, own 75 percent of the estimated $3.7 trillion in municipal securities in the U.S. market. In the secondary market, where these securities are bought and sold after issuance, trading largely occurs in over-the-counter markets that are less liquid and less transparent than the exchange-traded equity securities market. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act required GAO to review several aspects of the municipal securities market, including the mechanisms for trading, price discovery, and price transparency. This report examines (1) municipal security trading in the secondary market and the factors that affect the prices investors receive, and (2) the Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) and self-regulatory organizations (SRO) enforcement of rules on fair pricing and timely reporting. For this work, GAO analyzed trade data, reviewed federal regulators programs for enforcing trading rules, and interviewed market participants and federal regulators.
What GAO Found
In the secondary market for municipal securities, both institutional and individual investors trade through brokers, dealers, and banks (broker-dealers). However, GAO analysis of trade data showed that institutional investors generally trade at more favorable prices than individual investors. Broker-dealers said these differences generally reflected the higher average transaction costs associated with trading individual investors smaller blocks of securities. Market participants added that institutional investors have more resources, including networks of broker-dealers, and the expertise to independently assess prices. In recent years, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB)an SRO that writes rules regulating the broker-dealers that trade municipal securitieshas required timely and public posting of trade prices in an effort to make post-trade price information more widely available. However, unlike the equities market, the relatively illiquid municipal market lacks centrally posted and continuous quotes, and other sources of pretrade price information are not centralized or publicly available to individual investors. In 2010, SEC began a review of the municipal securities market, in part to examine pretrade price information. MSRB has also begun a study that includes a review of the market structure to determine whether access to additional pretrade price information could improve pricing and liquidity. Both SEC and MSRB plan to complete these studies in 2012.
Several regulators share responsibility for overseeing the municipal securities market. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)an SRO that regulates 98 percent of the broker-dealers that trade municipal securitiesand federal banking regulators enforce broker-dealer compliance with MSRB rules under their respective jurisdictions through electronic surveillances of trade data and routine examinations. SEC evaluates the quality of FINRA and MSRBs municipal regulatory programs through its SRO inspection program, which has recently evolved to a risk-based approach. SEC last inspected MSRB and FINRAs fixed-income surveillance program, which encompass municipal securities trading, in 2005. SEC staff said that staffing constraints have prevented them from conducting inspections of these SROs sooner, although they have recently begun a new inspection of FINRAs fixed-income surveillance program. SECs limited monitoring of FINRA and MSRB between inspections may not be sufficient to support its new risk-based inspection approach. For example, SECs last inspection of FINRAs fixed-income surveillance program predated the financial crisisand its ensuing volatility in the municipal marketbut SEC had collected limited information since its last inspection that would help it assess the quality of FINRAs broker-dealer oversight. SEC currently receives periodic reports from FINRA that provide statistical information on its regulatory activities related to municipal securities trading. According to SEC staff, while they might be able to use the reports to identify significant deviations in FINRAs efforts, they cannot use them solely to determine the effectiveness of FINRAs municipal securities program. Without ongoing collection and analysis of information to assess the effectiveness of SROs regulatory programs, SEC may be unable to identify and act on regulatory problems in a timely manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SEC collect and analyze information on SROs fixed-income regulatory programs on an ongoing basis to better inform its risk-based inspection approach. SEC agreed, but noted it would need additional resources to conduct more frequent oversight of the SROs. Such ongoing monitoring, however, could help SEC better leverage its resources for inspections. |
gao_GAO-06-423 | gao_GAO-06-423_0 | Background
“Offshoring” generally refers to an organization’s replacement of goods and services produced domestically with imports from foreign sources. U.S. Firms Continue to Offshore Increasingly Complex Semiconductor Manufacturing Activities and Software Services
The U.S. semiconductor industry has foreign operations in several locations, notably in Taiwan and China. U.S. semiconductor firms first offshored labor- intensive assembly operations in the 1960s, then wafer fabrication, and more recently, higher value-added activities, such as advanced fabrication and design. The offshoring of software services largely began in the 1990s in preparation for the year 2000 transition. Much like semiconductor products, the types of software services that firms have offshored have become progressively more complex as firms expanded their offshore operations to customized applications requiring highly skilled workers. U.S. Firms Offshored Software Services in the Mid-1990s and Increasingly Offshore More Complex Activities
The software services industry was one of the first services industries to offshore significant activities as U.S. firms recruited foreign software programmers, particularly in India. Many firms in semiconductor manufacturing and software services use offshoring in their business models to increase their global competitiveness by lowering costs and gaining access to foreign markets. First, the essential advance in IT—the introduction of Internet communications—made it possible to trade some services that were previously not tradable. The Availability of Human Capital Was Key to the Expansion of Offshoring in Both Semiconductor Manufacturing and Software Services
The availability of high-quality workers overseas has been an essential component of the increased use of offshoring for firms in the semiconductor manufacturing and software services sectors. Foreign Government Policies Have Made Foreign Investment Attractive for Semiconductor Firms and Left the Software Services Industry Relatively Unregulated
Foreign government policies contributed to the development of dynamic semiconductor and software services sectors with opportunities for U.S. firms to offshore. India pursued policies that sought to support state-owned enterprises. The United States Continues to Be a Global Leader in the Development of Semiconductors and Software at the Most Advanced Levels
While offshore suppliers are playing a larger and more sophisticated role as the industries globalize, the U.S. semiconductor and software industries have remained technological leaders in the most advanced research and development (R&D) and design work, and the United States remains one of the largest producers globally of products in both industries. U.S. production and employment data show that the industry has generally rebounded after declining during the 2001 recession. A third factor that fosters innovation is a country’s investment in research and development. The United States is an integral part of this dynamic world economy—in which it will be important for U.S. businesses and policymakers to keep alert to technological changes, to anticipate competitor countries’ strategies, and to preserve and enhance the elements of the innovation environment that helped make the United States a model. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
This report discusses (1) the development of offshoring in semiconductor manufacturing and software services over time, (2) the factors enabling the expansion of offshoring in these industries, and (3) the development of these industries in the United States as they have become more global. Employment statistics from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) show a similar pattern for U.S.-based companies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much attention has focused on offshoring of information technology (IT) services overseas. "Offshoring" of services generally refers to an organization's purchase from other countries of services such as software programming that it previously produced or purchased domestically. IT manufacturing, notably semiconductor manufacturing, has a longer history of offshoring of manufacturing operations. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO addressed the following questions: (1) How has offshoring in semiconductor manufacturing and software services developed over time? (2)What factors enabled the expansion of offshoring in these industries? (3) As these industries have become more global, what have been the trends in their U.S.-based activities?
What GAO Found
The U.S. semiconductor industry began offshoring labor-intensive manufacturing operations in the 1960s, followed in the 1970s and 1980s by increasingly complex operations, including wafer fabrication and some research and development (R&D) and design work. Semiconductor assembly and testing was the first to move to Asia, followed by fabrication and, more recently, by some design operations. Software services offshoring began in the 1990s after Internet communications made it possible to trade services such as software programming and software design. The year 2000 changeover hastened this offshoring trend related to software services because programmers knowledgeable in the appropriate programming languages were available, primarily in India. In the 2000s, firms further expanded their offshoring operations, based on the low-cost and high-quality work from the offshored services undertaken in the late 1990s. Although a lower labor cost was initially a key factor that attracted firms to offshore locations, other factors such as technological advances, available skilled workers, and foreign government policy, also played roles. Technological advances helped firms in the semiconductor industry improve their management of global supply chains and logistics. Regarding software services, technological advances opened the way to trade in programming and other software services. Foreign government policies in Taiwan and China created favorable investment conditions for U.S. semiconductor firms. India changed its emphasis from state-owned enterprises in the 1970s to an environment more amenable to private enterprise by the mid-1980s. Although its restrictions on foreign investment constrained the software services industry's overall development, India established software technology parks in 1990 to give domestic firms preferential access to the infrastructure essential for offshored operations. Although offshoring continues to grow in both the semiconductor manufacturing and software services industries, the United States remains one of the largest and most advanced producers of semiconductors and software services. U.S. production data show that both industries have largely rebounded from the 2001 recession. Employment data show a mixed picture, with semiconductor employment remaining flat and software employment mostly recovering. The United States has global trade surpluses in the semiconductors and software services sectors, although production is increasingly shifting to Asia. Both U.S. industries have become global, sourcing components from many locations overseas. U.S. firms have offshored increasingly complex products, essentially moving up the value chain. The ability of the United States to compete depends on research and development investment, innovative academic environments attracting top-quality students, and a competitive business environment. It will be important for U.S. businesses and policymakers to keep alert to technological changes and competitor countries' strategies while enhancing the elements of the innovation environment in the United States. |
gao_GAO-03-266 | gao_GAO-03-266_0 | Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, among other things, we interviewed DOJ’s Criminal Division, Justice Management Division, FBI, and EOUSA officials; reviewed FBI’s and EOUSA’s policies and guidance for classifying cases; researched terrorism definitions in the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations; compared FBI and EOUSA conviction data for fiscal years 1997 through 2002; and reviewed conviction data included in DOJ’s Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 Performance Reports and similar data the 94 USAO districts had reported to EOUSA for fiscal year 2002. The FBI classified a case as terrorism-related based on the overall violation being investigated. DOJ Used the FBI’s Terrorism-Related Statistics in Its 2000 Performance Report but Has Since Switched to Reporting EOUSA Statistics
In its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report provided to the Congress, DOJ used the FBI’s number of terrorism-related investigations and convictions. In response to concerns raised by the Philadelphia Inquirer article and to avoid any misinterpretation of DOJ’s statistics, beginning with the Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Report, DOJ switched from using the FBI’s statistics to using the statistics reported by EOUSA, according to DOJ officials. We found documentation to support the FBI’s terrorism-related classifications for all 28 convictions. DOJ Lacks Internal Controls to Ensure Reliability of EOUSA Terrorism-Related Statistics
Federal internal control standards require agencies to implement adequate controls over information processing. However, during the course of our engagement, we discovered that DOJ does not have sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place to ensure the accuracy and reliability of terrorism-related conviction statistics included in its annual performance reports. These 132 cases did not result in terrorism-related convictions. Without reliable terrorism-related conviction data, DOJ and the Congress’s ability to accurately assess terrorism-related performance outcomes of our criminal justice system and the results of efforts to combat terrorism will be limited. In addition, these discrepancies identify the need for improvements in management oversight and internal controls to better ensure the accuracy of USAO terrorism-related performance data. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the accuracy and reliability of terrorism-related conviction statistics reported by DOJ in its annual performance reports, we recommend that the Attorney General, in accordance with federal internal control standards, implement a formal system to oversee and validate the accuracy of case classification and conviction data entered in LIONS by the various USAO districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides Congress and the public with an annual performance report. These reports serve as an important measure of DOJ's progress related to its strategic goals and objectives, including statistics on its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report. We were asked to review the accuracy of DOJ's terrorism-related conviction statistics. Among other objectives, in this report we (1) identify how DOJ develops its terrorism-related conviction statistics and (2) assess whether DOJ has sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place to ensure the accuracy of terrorism-related statistics included in its annual performance reports.
What GAO Found
Beginning in fiscal year 2001, DOJ switched from using the FBI's terrorism-related conviction statistics to using those of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) for its annual performance report. This change was in response to concerns raised by a newspaper article's allegation that DOJ had inflated terrorism statistics in its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance report. It was also part of an effort to report conviction statistics that would be less likely to be misinterpreted, according to DOJ officials. The FBI historically classified more convictions than EOUSA as terrorism-related because it used a different classification system and included convictions obtained in international, federal, and state courts. EOUSA only included federal convictions. Our review of a sample of cases investigated and classified by the FBI as terrorism-related, including U.S. Attorney Office (USAO) cases covered by the article, found documentation to support the terrorism-related classification for these cases. As for the accuracy and reliability of EOUSA's terrorism-related statistics included in its annual performance reports, we found that DOJ does not have sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place, as required by federal internal control standards, to ensure the accuracy and reliability of its terrorism-related conviction statistics. At least 132 of the 288 USAO cases (about 46 percent) were misclassified as resulting in terrorism-related convictions in fiscal year 2002. Without the implementation of adequate management oversight and internal controls to ensure accurate and reliable terrorism-related performance outcomes of the U.S. criminal justice system will be limited. |
gao_AIMD-95-182 | gao_AIMD-95-182_0 | VA plans to implement DSS at 161 of its hospitals. Private sector hospitals already use decision support systems to achieve these objectives. DSS also has the capability to “roll-up” information to the corporate level. Correcting these problems will not be easy because VA’s culture has not traditionally focused on the cost-effectiveness of hospital operations. Our review showed that some clinical data provided to DSS from DHCP and other clinical feeder systems are incomplete or inaccurate. We also suggested that VHA consider selecting a small number of sites to pilot the use of DSS by management before the system is implemented throughout VA. By piloting DSS at selected sites, VHA can (1) document the kinds of benefits that have been gained from using the system and (2) identify the problems that have occurred at the pilot test sites requiring top management’s attention and resolution. A comprehensive, proactive DSS strategy that establishes business goals, leadership, and accountability would provide a framework within which management could improve health care delivery and cost recovery. Recommendations
To increase the likelihood of DSS’ success, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to develop a comprehensive business strategy to identify the specific business goals (for example, reduction of cost in a specific area by a specific percentage), performance measures, and key decisions that DSS will be required to support; give high priority, by allocating appropriate resources, to establishing a complete, consistent, and accurate DSS information infrastructure; and identify data that are needed to support decision-making and ensure that these data are complete, accurate, consistent, and reconciled monthly. Lastly, the VHA Chief Financial Officer did not agree that DSS should not be implemented beyond the 38 sites already begun until (1) defined business goals and a supporting information infrastructure are in place and (2) VA has demonstrated its ability to use DSS effectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) efforts to implement a medical decision support system, focusing on: (1) the kinds of benefits that such a system can provide the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA); (2) whether VA is pursuing the comprehensive business strategy needed to achieve these benefits; and (3) whether VA is establishing an adequate information infrastructure for the Decision Support System (DSS).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DSS has the potential to be an effective tool for improving the quality and cost-effectiveness of VHA health care operations; (2) VA has not formulated business goals or a comprehensive implementation strategy to clearly define how it will use DSS-generated information or prioritize its limited resources to implement DSS; (3) VA also has not established the information infrastructure needed to support DSS; (4) some of the data provided to DSS from other VA information systems are incomplete and inaccurate, limiting VA ability to make sound business decisions; and (5) sustaining top management leadership and commitment within VHA is critical to the successful implementation and use of DSS. |
gao_GAO-15-723T | gao_GAO-15-723T_0 | Project Delays and Cost Increases for Outpatient Leases Mostly Occurred in the Planning Stages Prior to VA Entering into the Lease Agreement
Project Delays
Our April 2014 report noted that VA has experienced substantial delays in executing new outpatient-clinic lease projects; nearly all of the delays occurred in the planning stages prior to entering into a lease agreement with the developer. Specifically, we found that 39 of the 41 outpatient- clinic projects for which a prospectus was submitted experienced schedule delays, ranging from 6 months to 13.3 years, with an average delay of 3.3 years, while 2 projects experienced schedule time decreases. VA provided cost data for its outpatient-clinic lease projects in January 2014. Such increases in rent have long- term implications for VA, The causes of the total cost increase can be attributed primarily to increases in the projects’ awarded first-year rent due to the schedule delays and changes to the design or scope of a project that we discussed previously. VA Has Taken Some Actions to Improve Its Leasing-Management Practices for Outpatient Clinics; However, Its Guidance Could Be Improved
Our April 2014 report found that VA has made some progress in addressing issues with its major medical-facilities leasing program. Specifically, in April 2012, VA formed a high level council, the Construction Review Council, to oversee the department’s capital asset program, including leasing. Based on the findings of the council and our work for the April 2012 report on VA’s major leased outpatient clinics, VA is planning the following improvements to the major medical-facilities- leasing program: requiring detailed design requirements earlier in the design process to help avoid the delays, scope changes, and cost increases. However, these improvements were in the early stages, and their success will depend on how quickly and effectively VA implements them. VA issued a guidance memorandum in January 2014 directing that beginning with fiscal year 2016, VA should develop detailed space and design requirements before submitting the prospectus to Congress:
Developing a process for handling scope changes. In August 2013, VA approved a new concept to better address scope changes to both major construction and congressionally authorized lease projects. According to VA officials, among other improvements, this process ensures a systematic review of the impact of any ad-hoc changes to projects in scope, schedule, and cost;
Plans to provide Congress with clearer information on the limitations associated with costs of proposed projects. VA’s 2014 budget submission did not clarify that its estimates for future lease projects included only one year’s rent, which does not reflect the total costs over the life of the leases, costs that VA states cannot be accurately determined in early estimates. VA officials clarified this estimate beginning with VA’s 2015 budget submission. However, we also found that while VA has updated and refined some guidance for specific aspects of lease projects—including design guidance for the construction of outpatient clinics—to better support VA’s leasing staff and prevent project delays, it has not updated its VHA guidance for clinic leasing (used by staff involved with projects) since 2004. As of November 2013, VHA’s leasing program has a long-term liability of $5.5 billion, but its guidance on outpatient clinics is a decade old and no longer relevant. In our April 2014 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs update VHA’s guidance for leasing outpatient clinics to better reflect the roles and responsibilities of all VA staff involved in leasing projects. In October 2014, VA reported that it had revised its clinic leasing guidance in response to GAO’s recommendation and that its leasing authority was now under the General Services Administration (GSA) and the handbook was undergoing further revisions to incorporate GSA leasing processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the nation's largest health-care delivery systems. To help meet the changing medical needs of the veteran population, VA has increasingly leased medical facilities to provide health care to veterans. In April 2014, GAO reported that VHA's leasing program had long-term liability of $5.5 billion and was growing.
This statement discusses VA outpatient clinic lease issues, specifically, (1) the extent to which schedule and costs changed for selected VA outpatient clinics' leased projects since they were first submitted to Congress and factors contributing to the changes and (2) actions VA has taken to improve its leasing practices for outpatient clinics and any opportunities for VA to improve its project management. It is based on GAO's April 2014 report ( GAO-14-300 ) along with selected updates conducted in August and October 2014 to obtain information from VA on actions it has taken to address GAO's prior recommendation. For that report, GAO reviewed all 41 major medical leases that were associated with outpatient clinic projects for which a prospectus had been submitted to Congress, as required by law.
What GAO Found
In its April 2014 report, GAO found that schedules were delayed and costs increased for the majority of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) leased outpatient projects reviewed. As of January 2014, GAO found that 39 of the 41 projects reviewed—with a contract value of about $2.5 billion—experienced schedule delays, ranging from 6 months to 13.3 years, with an average delay of 3.3 years. The large majority of delays occurred prior to entering into a lease agreement, in part due to VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA): 1) providing project requirements late or changing them or 2) using outdated guidance. Costs also increased for all 31 lease projects for which VA had complete cost data, primarily due to delays and changes to the scope of a project. For example, first-year rents increased a total of $34.5 million—an annual cost which will extend for 20 years (the life of these leases).
GAO's report also found that VA had taken some actions to address problems managing clinic-leased projects. First, it established the Construction Review Council in April 2012 to oversee the department's capital asset programs, including the leasing program. Second, consistent with the council's findings and previous GAO work, VA was planning the following improvements:
Requiring detailed design requirements earlier in the facility-leasing process . VA issued a guidance memorandum in January 2014 directing that beginning with fiscal year 2016, VA should develop detailed space and design requirements before submitting the prospectus to Congress.
Developing a process for handling scope changes. In August 2013, VA approved a new concept to better address scope changes to both major construction and congressionally authorized lease projects. According to VA officials, among other improvements, this process ensures a systematic review of the impact of any ad-hoc changes to projects in scope, schedule, and cost.
Plans to provide Congress with clearer information on the limitations associated with costs of proposed projects. VA's 2014 budget submission did not clarify that its estimates for future lease projects included only one year's rent, which does not reflect the total costs over the life of the leases, costs that VA states cannot be accurately determined in early estimates. VA officials clarified this estimate beginning with VA's 2015 budget submission.
However, these improvements were in the early stages, and their success will depend on how quickly and effectively VA implements them.
Finally, GAO reported that VA was also taking steps to refine and update guidance on some aspects of the leasing process, for example the VA's design guides, but VHA has not updated the overall guidance for clinic leasing (used by staff involved with projects) since 2004. In October 2014, VA reported that it was in the process of revising its clinic leasing guidance in response to GAO's recommendation and that its leasing authority was now under the General Services Administration (GSA) and the handbook was undergoing further revisions to incorporate GSA leasing processes.
What GAO Recommends
In its April 2014 report, GAO recommended that VA update VHA's guidance for the leasing of outpatient clinics. VA concurred with GAO's recommendation and is taking actions to implement the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-742 | gao_GAO-13-742_0 | For example, TSA has an approved interchange agreement from OPM to allow permanent TSA employees to apply and be selected for vacancies in competitive service agencies. DHS Recruiting and Hiring Roles and Responsibilities
Within DHS, OCHCO is responsible for ensuring that DHS has the programs, policies, processes, and resources to recruit, hire, train, and retain its overall workforce. CRC is chaired by D&I and has representatives from all of DHS’s components. For example, USCIS’s sole MCO is the immigration services officer (ISO) position, while one of TSA’s five MCOs is its transportation security officer (TSO). DHS and Selected Components Are Implementing Recruiting and Hiring Strategies to Fill Mission-Critical Occupations
DHS has developed and taken steps to implement a coordinated recruiting and outreach strategy and address resource constraints. In addition, the four components we selected for review have various efforts under way to develop and implement their own targeted recruiting and hiring strategies. Components reported that they have generally been successful in filling MCOs. Specifically, in 2011, D&I—through the CRC—developed the CROS to better coordinate and link component recruiting and outreach efforts to hiring for DHS mission and workforce needs (for all positions, including MCOs), and leverage resources as well as reduce recruiting costs, among other things. The CROS provides a high-level strategy that supports DHS’s goal from its Workforce Strategy for Fiscal Years 2011- 2016 to “recruit a highly qualified and diverse workforce.” It is designed to, among other things, guide outreach and recruitment efforts across DHS, leverage all outreach and recruiting resources, and integrate recruiting and outreach plans across DHS. D&I Is Taking Steps to Assess Implementation of the CROS, but Could Improve Tracking of Recruiting Costs
D&I has established performance measures to assess progress in implementing the goals and objectives of the CROS, and plans to develop performance targets in future iterations of the CROS to better track component performance. While these measures are aligned with and cover key aspects of performance related to the goals and objectives outlined in the CROS, they do not include performance targets to track long-term, short-term, or interim component progress toward achieving the goals of the CROS over the period the strategy covers (2012–2017). D&I has developed a database for components to use to track recruiting and outreach efforts and costs, but it does not require that all components use this database or enter data in a consistent manner. As a result, D&I does not have the information required to accurately assess component performance for this objective. D&I officials said that since many components have their own systems for tracking the costs associated with recruiting outreach activities (e.g., events attended, occupations for which they are recruiting, and number of attendees), they do not want the components to duplicate efforts by having them enter the same type of information in the DHS shared database. D&I officials acknowledged that obtaining comprehensive and consistent cost information from all components in a manner that will ensure consistent and complete reporting of such data would be a worthwhile endeavor, but officials have not determined whether and how they will do so. As a result, D&I does not have a baseline of all recruiting costs from which to measure ongoing cost savings, making it difficult to determine how well department resources are being leveraged through component coordination or assess the extent to which they are achieving the second goal of the CROS of optimizing outreach and recruiting resources department-wide. Conclusions
As DHS faces increasingly complex national security challenges, it is important that it effectively recruit and hire employees with the appropriate skills to meet its mission requirements. While DHS and selected components are implementing strategies to fill MCOs, and generally report that they are able to fill MCO positions, DHS could better assess its efforts to implement the CROS and achieve recruiting cost savings by requiring all components to provide recruiting cost information in a consistent manner. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS has comprehensive data to help track recruiting costs and coordinated efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct OCHCO to take the following action: require all components to provide D&I with recruiting cost information in a consistent manner to allow better tracking of overall recruiting costs and use this information to assess the extent to which recruiting costs are being reduced by components as a result of increased coordination and leveraging resources as called for in the CROS. If fully implemented, DHS’s planned actions will address the intent of this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
With more than 240,000 employees doing diverse jobs, DHS's workforce supports the department's multiple missions to prevent terrorism and enhance security and ensure resilience from disasters, amongst others. Given these missions, it is important that DHS effectively recruit and hire employees with the appropriate skills. Within DHS, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) is responsible for human capital policy development and implementation. GAO has previously reported on DHS's challenges in attracting and retaining a qualified workforce. GAO was asked to assess DHS's recruiting and hiring strategies. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS and four selected components have implemented recruiting and hiring strategies to fill MCOs, and (2) DHS has assessed these efforts. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed recruiting strategies and data on MCO hiring and losses, and interviewed officials from OCHCO and the four DHS components selected for this review based on their varieties of MCOs and recruiting strategies. Information from these components cannot be generalized to all of DHS, but provides insights.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and selected components are implementing strategies to fill mission-critical occupations (MCO), which are those occupations most critical to an agency's mission. In 2011, the Office of Diversity and Inclusion (D&I)--which coordinates component recruiting efforts--developed the Coordinated Recruiting and Outreach Strategy (CROS). Through the CROS, D&I intends to better coordinate and link component recruiting and outreach efforts to hiring for DHS mission and workforce needs (for all positions, including MCOs), and to leverage resources as well as reduce recruiting costs, among other things. D&I has begun to implement the CROS through various means, including requiring components to develop their own outreach and recruiting plans that align with the CROS. However, D&I has been limited in its ability to implement some elements of the CROS--such as recruiter training--because of budget constraints, according to D&I officials. The components selected for GAO's review--the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Secret Service (USSS)--have also implemented various strategies to recruit and hire MCOs. In addition, these four components have generally been able to address hiring needs for MCOs. For example, USSS data show that vacancy rates were generally below 3 percent for MCO positions during fiscal years 2010 through 2012. Still, some officials have reported experiencing challenges attracting qualified candidates because of factors such as financial constraints and regional competition, among other things. For example, TSA has been challenged in filling certain positions in some areas where competition for other jobs makes it difficult to attract qualified candidates.
D&I is taking steps to assess implementation of the CROS, but could improve efforts to track recruiting costs. D&I assesses progress in implementing the CROS by tracking and monitoring component performance for six measures, such as compliance with data-tracking requirements. These measures are aligned with the two overarching goals of the CROS; however, they do not include targets to measure DHS's progress in achieving the goals over the period the strategy covers (2012-2017). D&I officials stated that they are gathering baseline data on these measures and plan to use these data to help develop targets in the future. In addition, three of the CROS's six annual measures are associated with its goal of recruiting a highly qualified workforce. However, DHS does not require components to report the information needed to accurately assess component performance for one of these measures--which calls for standardized data tracking of recruiting and outreach activities. D&I has developed a database for components to use to track recruiting efforts and costs, but it does not require that all components use this tool or provide data to DHS in a consistent manner. D&I officials said that since some components have their own tracking systems, they do not want the tracking systems to duplicate efforts. D&I acknowledges the importance of obtaining comprehensive and consistent cost information from components, but has not determined whether and how it will do so. As a result, D&I does not know the total amount of money being spent on recruiting and outreach throughout DHS, nor is it able to fully track component recruiting costs--and therefore cannot measure the results of the second goal in the CROS of optimizing outreach and recruiting resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS require all components to provide recruiting cost information in a consistent manner. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_AIMD-97-149 | gao_AIMD-97-149_0 | We also reviewed DOD’s Year 2000 Management Plan, Department of the Army and Army Materiel Command (AMC) Year 2000 guidance, and private industry Year 2000 guidance. To determine the status of LSSC’s Year 2000 project and the appropriateness of its strategy and actions for ensuring successful completion, we interviewed LSSC’s Year 2000 Project Manager, Project Officer, and Focal Point who are responsible for project management, direction, and reporting. The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. Because CCSS is the Army’s wholesale logistics system, a loss of CCSS operational support to AMC and other DOD agencies poses a serious threat to overall mission capability. The five phases are consistent with those prescribed by DOD in its Year 2000 Management Plan. Also, the Year 2000 project team prepared a project charter and schedule, secured contractor support to assist with assessment tasks, and began to determine the date impact on CCSS program code. Nevertheless, despite LSSC’s and AMC’s position that a contingency plan is not needed for CCSS because the system is not being replaced prior to the year 2000, the system still risks unanticipated operational failure. Without a contingency plan that identifies specific actions to be taken if CCSS fails at the year 2000, the procurement of weapon systems and their spare parts, accounting for the sale of Army equipment and services to allies, and the financial management of $9 billion of inventory could be disrupted. As a result, the Army could be unable to efficiently and effectively equip and sustain its forces around the world. However, LSSC has yet to resolve several critical problems associated with the assessment phase to ensure that (1) systems are adequately tested, (2) contingency plans are developed, and (3) interface partners are fully aware of LSSC’s Year 2000 plans. Immediately assess the impact of competing workload and staffing demands on the CCSS Year 2000 project. Ensure that LSSC has the capability to complete the testing of all CCSS subsystems and programs. Specifically, LSSC should (1) determine test requirements, (2) identify the testing staff needed, (3) finalize Year 2000 test plans describing how the testing staff will be acquired and scheduled for developing Year 2000 compliant test scenarios and data, and (4) revise the Year 2000 test schedule to assure that enough time is available to meet Army-mandated deadlines for Year 2000 implementation. After completion of these projects, LSSC plans to resume its efforts to achieve a CMM level 2 maturity. As our report states, we have recommended that information technology organizations be at least a CMM level 2 to successfully manage large-scale projects such as the Year 2000 project. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the status of the Logistics Systems Support Command's (LSSC) efforts to correct Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS) Year 2000 systems problems; and (2) the appropriateness of LSSC's strategy and actions for ensuring that CCSS Year 2000 issues will be successfully addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Year 2000 problem is one of the most comprehensive and complex information management projects ever faced by LSSC; (2) if not successfully completed, the procurement of weapon systems and their spare parts, accounting for the sales of Army equipment and services to allies, and the financial management of $9 billion of inventory could be disrupted; (3) as a result, it could be extremely difficult to efficiently and effectively equip and sustain the Army's forces around the world; (4) LSSC has completed several actions to address the CCSS Year 2000 problem; (5) a Year 2000 project manager and management staff have been designated, a project manager charter and schedule were developed, and supplementary contractor support was acquired to assist with assessment tasks; (6) regularly scheduled quarterly meetings are held by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) headquarters to report LSSC Year 2000 status; (7) these steps are compatible with the Department of Defense's (DOD) suggested approach and consistent with those found in GAO's five-phased approach for planning, managing, and evaluating Year 2000 projects; (8) although LSSC commenced its Year 2000 project over a year ago, there are several issues facing LSSC that, if not completely addressed, may result in the failure of CCSS to successfully operate at the year 2000; (9) LSSC has yet to completely address: (a) competing workload priorities and staffing issues; (b) the appropriate mix and scheduling of needed testing data and expertise as well as the development of test plans; (c) the scope and substance of written interface agreements with system interface partners to ensure that CCSS subsystems will be capable of exchanging data at the year 2000; and (d) contingency plan development to help assure that Army missions will be accomplished if CCSS is not fully available to users by the year 2000; (10) LSSC's risk of failure is increased because the agency has not attained the level of software development and maintenance maturity that would provide the foundation needed for successful management of large-scale projects such as the Year 2000 initiative; and (11) because CCSS is used to support military readiness, these critical elements must be resolved and aggressively pursued to enable LSSC to achieve a Year 2000 compliant environment prior to the year 2000. |
gao_GAO-16-396 | gao_GAO-16-396_0 | Awareness. Lead Generation. DOD Has Coordinated Some Advertising Activities among Its Components, but Has Not Developed a Formal Process for Coordination
DOD Has Taken Steps to Coordinate Some Advertising Activities
DOD has taken steps to coordinate some advertising activities among the military service components. For example, DOD established the JAMRS office in 2002 to create a centralized program for joint market research and communication. In the absence of a formal process for coordination, we found examples of possible unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation within DOD’s advertising activities. Three Advertising Programs within the Air Force. Officials could not provide any further rationale for requiring separate programs or for why further efforts for consolidation were not pursued. DOD Has Generally Followed Commercial Best Practices for Assessing the Effectiveness of Advertising, but Components Vary in Their Ability to Determine Whether Their Activities Are Generating Recruitment Leads
With some exceptions, DOD—through its military service components and together with their contracted advertising agencies—generally follows commercial best practices that we identified for assessing the effectiveness of advertising, shown in table 1. As a result, the responsibility for measuring the performance of locally executed lead generation advertising activities is carried out, in part, at the local level, and some components do not obtain or measure the performance data needed to assess the effectiveness of these activities. The Army National Guard does not routinely require state units to provide headquarters with performance data related to advertising, including lead generation. Without processes in place to facilitate the measurement and monitoring of advertising performance across all levels—especially at the local level—the military service components may be unable to ensure advertising dollars are used efficiently to help meet stated recruiting goals could result in inefficient use of advertising dollars. In the Absence of Policy, DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Oversight of Its Components’ Advertising Activities
DOD does not have comprehensive oversight of the military service components’ advertising activities, as it does not have a policy that defines its oversight role as well as procedures to guide the components’ respective advertising activities. DOD’s Components Oversee Their Own Programs, Which May Have Led to Negative Effects in Some Instances
As there is no department-wide policy that defines DOD’s role in overseeing advertising activities or the procedures that should be followed when the components carry out their advertising activities, the department’s advertising activities are overseen at the military service level and in some cases, within a service’s individual active, reserve, or guard components. Digital Advertising. As such, in our discussions with service officials responsible for carrying out local level advertising, we observed discrepancies in how the guidance was being interpreted. Conclusions
Advertising activities provide information and seek to influence the beliefs and understanding of potential recruits about each military service, and the services conduct advertising to help meet their recruitment goals. Lastly, the absence of a department-wide policy that clearly defines DOD oversight of and procedures to guide the advertising activities has allowed for activities of questionable appropriateness to occur in some instances. DOD concurred with our first recommendation that the department develop a formal process for coordination on crosscutting issues to facilitate better leveraging of resources. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) (1) has coordinated its advertising activities among the military service components, (2) has followed commercial best practices to assess the effectiveness of advertising activities, and (3) has oversight of the components ‘advertising activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its efforts to meet yearly recruitment goals for the military, DOD requested almost $575 million in fiscal year 2017 to conduct advertising intended to increase awareness of military service and ultimately generate leads for potential recruits.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's advertising activities. This report examines the extent to which DOD (1) has coordinated advertising activities among the military service components, (2) has followed commercial best practices to assess the effectiveness of advertising activities, and (3) has oversight of its components' advertising activities.
GAO identified best practices for assessing the effectiveness of advertising in consultation with advertising industry experts and reviewed DOD and service policies and the most recent version of each military service components' advertising plans, from fiscal years 2014-16.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to coordinate some advertising activities among the military service components, but it has not developed a formal process for coordination. DOD conducts joint market research and service officials responsible for advertising at times share some information about lessons learned. However, there is no formal process for addressing inefficiencies and to ensure information sharing among the services. GAO found examples of possible unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation that may result from the absence of coordination. For example, the Air Force has three advertising programs that contract with three advertising agencies, but officials could not provide a rationale for requiring separate programs. In the absence of a formal process for coordination, the services may be missing opportunities to effectively leverage advertising resources.
While DOD has generally followed commercial best practices GAO identified to assess the effectiveness of advertising, DOD's components vary in their ability to determine whether their activities are generating leads for potential recruits. For example, while the Marine Corps has developed a framework to assess the effectiveness of its advertising including leads generated from advertising activities at the local level, Army officials stated they do not have reliable data to evaluate whether locally executed advertising activities are generating leads, and the Army National Guard does not require state units to report on the performance of their advertising activities. Without fully measuring advertising performance, especially at the local levels, DOD may be unable to ensure advertising dollars are used efficiently to help meet recruiting goals.
DOD does not have comprehensive oversight of the components' advertising activities; instead, DOD's components oversee their own programs. However, examples identified by GAO and others of some components paying sport teams to provide recognition ceremonies for servicemembers—a practice later deemed unacceptable by DOD—suggest that the absence of DOD oversight may have contributed to some activities of questionable appropriateness. Further, GAO observed discrepancies in how recent sports advertising guidance was being interpreted and in service officials' understanding of regulations that direct digital advertising. Without a department-wide policy that clearly defines its oversight role, DOD lacks reasonable assurance that advertising is carried out in an appropriate manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a formal process for coordination among its components on crosscutting advertising issues; ensure that the components fully measure the performance of advertising activities; and issue department-wide policy that, among other things, defines DOD's oversight role in advertising. DOD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-116 | gao_GAO-01-116_0 | Conclusions
Several DOD components have SPI programs that are aligned closely to the best practices embodied in the SEI IDEALSM model and thus provide excellent examples of SPI. However, such programs are lacking in other parts of the department. Where they exist, these programs are being credited with producing higher quality software and systems products faster and at less expense, whether managed in a centralized or decentralized fashion. OSD has an important leadership role to play in expanding SPI across the department. In particular, it can seize opportunities to build upon and leverage the existing base of SPI programs within DOD’s components and help ensure that all of its components realize the strategic value (i.e., benefits that exceed costs) that both private and public-sector organizations, including some DOD components, attribute to these programs. While OSD is faced with making funding choices among competing leadership initiatives, such as its efforts to conduct software acquisition maturity assessments and collect software metrics, these are some of the very tasks that are embedded within an effective SPI program. Thus, by ensuring that DOD components have effective SPI programs, OSD can leverage programs to indirectly accomplish its other high-priority initiatives as well. | What GAO Found
Several Department of Defense (DOD) components have software and systems process improvement (SPI) programs that are aligned closely to the best practices embodied in the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) IDEAL model and thus provide excellent examples of SPI. Elsewhere in DOD, however, such programs are lacking. Where they do exist, these programs are being credited with producing higher quality software and systems products faster and at less expense, whether managed in a centralized or decentralized fashion. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has an important leadership role to play in expanding SPI across the department. In particular, it can seize opportunities to build upon and leverage the existing base of SPI programs within DOD's components and help ensure that all of its components realize the strategic value (i.e., benefits that exceed costs) that both private and public-sector organizations, including some DOD components, attribute to these programs. Although OSD faces funding choices among competing leadership initiatives, such as its efforts to conduct software acquisition maturity assessments and collect software metrics, these are some of the very tasks that are embedded within an effective SPI program. Thus, by ensuring that DOD components have effective SPI programs, OSD can leverage programs to indirectly accomplish its other high-priority initiatives as well. |
gao_GAO-02-808 | gao_GAO-02-808_0 | The United Kingdom and Taiwan followed this process in 2001 and 1997, respectively. According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the United States would cause our trading partners to prohibit U.S. exports of live animals and animal products. In the United Kingdom, according to government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses to the tourism industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the losses sustained by the food and agriculture sector. USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and Other Animal Diseases
Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has the lead responsibility for protecting the nation’s livestock from foreign animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United States as well as those thought to have been eradicated. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U.S. processes to obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks are adequate and timely, (2) U.S. measures for preventing FMD from entering the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and effectively to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur. USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks, but Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved
USDA relies on a wide variety of sources to obtain information on outbreaks of FMD overseas. Nevertheless, the United States remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak because of the nature of the virus, the many pathways by which it can come into the country, and the growing magnitude and volume of both legal and illegal passengers and cargo entering the country. By helping other nations eradicate or control these outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural pests and diseases reaching U.S. borders. USDA has staff located in Mexico working with the Mexico-United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases. When FMD strikes other nations—as it did recently, for example, in Argentina and the United Kingdom—the United States may assist in controlling and eradicating the disease. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures described below. APHIS officials inspect farm equipment at U.S. ports of entry to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. United States Remains Vulnerable to FMD
The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, and some USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy condition of U.S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of U.S. measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. International mail. The main geographical spread of the disease occurred before any suspicion that the disease was present in the country. The persons able to access this information. | What GAO Found
The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal disease can cause to a nation's economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered more than 4 million animals and sustained losses of $5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years. Following the outbreak, the country was generally barred from participating in the international trade of live animals and animal products that could transmit the virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and others with this information, but it lacks adequate processes for sharing this information with the Customs Service. The United States receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed abroad, international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign governments. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and regions in which they are stationed, which ensures that the United States has timely access to information on foreign FMD outbreaks. However, USDA's processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S. livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face several challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, although USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease response plans. |
gao_GAO-05-1014T | gao_GAO-05-1014T_0 | As we have previously reported, these ongoing and planned IT programs and projects are part of the FBI’s systems modernization program. In place of the Virtual Case File project, the FBI launched its Sentinel program in early 2005 to develop what the bureau describes as its next-generation electronic information management system. It has centralized IT responsibility and authority under the CIO, and it is establishing and beginning to implement management capabilities in the areas of enterprise architecture, IT investment management, systems development and acquisition, and IT human capital. Before it can effectively leverage technology to transform itself, the FBI will have to build on these capabilities and effectively implement them on its system investments. In summary, we found that the FBI is now managing its enterprise architecture program in accordance with many best practices, but it has yet to adopt others. Examples of best practices that the bureau has implemented include the following: ● the bureau has established a program office that is responsible for the development of the architecture; it has issued a written and approved policy governing architecture development; and it has ongoing efforts to complete a target architecture. The FBI’s progress over the last 3 years to define and refine an IT investment approach has been slow. Using cost and other criteria, these assessments are designed to determine which systems can be better used, replaced, outsourced, or retired. CIO officials told us that they recently began implementing parts of the life cycle management directive across all projects. For other key practices, procedures have been drafted but require further development. However, the bureau has yet to create an integrated plan of action that is based on a comprehensive analysis of the human capital roles and responsibilities needed to support the IT functions established under the CIO office’s reorganization. According to the CIO, he is in the process of hiring a contractor with human capital expertise to help identify gaps between existing skills and abilities and those that will be needed to successful modernize the bureau’s IT. Success of New IT Investments, Like Sentinel, Will Depend on How Well the FBI Implements its New IT Management Approaches
The success of the FBI in using IT to support its transformation efforts and in achieving its mission goals and outcomes will depend on how well it actually implements and institutionalizes the IT management structures, processes, and controls that have been or are currently being put in place. Included in these 18 investments is Sentinel, the FBI’s program to deliver an automated case management and information sharing capability; this is the successor to the Virtual Case File, the failed component of the Trilogy program. As an FBI flagship program, Sentinel can serve as a barometer of how well the FBI defines and implements its new IT management approaches and capabilities, particularly with regard to a system that is to rely extensively on commercially available components (software and hardware). Another very important area particularly relevant to Sentinel is ensuring that the project’s plans explicitly provide the necessary time and resources for (1) integrating the commercial components with the FBI’s existing systems and (2) preparing users for the impact that the business processes embedded in the COTS products will have on how the users will be expected to do their jobs, including potentially new roles and responsibilities. In light of the importance of these and other areas, we have just initiated a review of Sentinel at the request of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee; as part of this review, we plan to address many of these keys to project success. In closing, the FBI has made important progress, particularly in the last 12 months under the new CIO’s leadership, in establishing certain IT management and control capabilities that our research and evaluations show are key to exploiting technology to enable transformation. Nowhere will this be more crucial than on the Sentinel program. Because of the FBI’s stated approach to building Sentinel, it will be particularly important for the bureau to ensure that it follows the kind of acquisition management practices that our work has shown to be critical for commercial component-based systems to be successful. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is in the process of modernizing its information technology (IT) systems. Replacing much of its 1980s-based technology with modern system applications and supporting technical infrastructure, this modernization is intended to enable the FBI to take an integrated, agencywide approach to performing its critical missions, such as federal crime investigation and terrorism prevention. At the request of the Congress, GAO has conducted a series of reviews of the FBI's modernization management. GAO was requested to testify on the bureau's progress to date in several areas of IT management. In addition, GAO discusses the importance of these areas for maximizing the prospects for success of the bureau's ongoing and future IT system investments, including the FBI's flagship Sentinel program; this program replaces the bureau's failed Virtual Case File project and aims to acquire and deploy a modern investigative case management system. In this testimony, GAO relied extensively on its previous work on the FBI's management of its IT processes, human capital, and tools, and it obtained updates on these efforts through reviews of documentation and interviews with responsible FBI officials, including the Chief Information Officer (CIO).
What GAO Found
Over the last 18 months, the FBI has made important progress in establishing IT management controls and capabilities that GAO's research and experience show are key to exploiting technology to enable transformation. These include centralizing IT responsibility and authority under the CIO and establishing and beginning to implement management capabilities in the areas of enterprise architecture, IT investment management, systems development and acquisition life cycle management, and IT human capital. The FBI has developed an initial version of its enterprise architecture and is managing its architecture activities in accordance with many key practices, but it has yet to adopt others (such as ensuring that the program office has staff with appropriate architecture expertise). The FBI is in the process of defining and implementing investment management policies and procedures. For example, it is performing assessments of existing systems to determine if any can be better used, replaced, outsourced, or retired, but these assessments have yet to be completed. The bureau has issued an agencywide standard life cycle management directive, but it has yet to fully implement this directive on all projects. Also, certain key practices, such as acquisition management, require further development. The FBI has taken various steps to bolster its IT workforce, but it has yet to create an integrated plan based on a comprehensive analysis of existing and needed knowledge, skills, and abilities. According to the CIO, he intends to hire a contractor to perform this and develop an implementation plan. The CIO also intends to establish a management structure to carry out the plan. The challenge now for the FBI is to build on these foundational capabilities and implement them effectively on the program and project investments it has under way and planned, none of which is more important than the Sentinel program. The success of this program will depend on how well the FBI defines and implements its new IT management approaches and capabilities, particularly those associated with acquiring a system made up of commercial components, which Sentinel is to be. In this regard, it will be crucial for the FBI, among other things, to understand and control Sentinel requirements in the context of (1) its enterprise architecture, (2) the capabilities and interoperability of commercially available products, and the (3) bureau's human capital and financial resource constraints. It will also be important for the FBI to prepare users for the impact of the new system on how they do their jobs. To the extent that the FBI does not take these steps, it will introduce program risks that could lead to problems similar to those that contributed to the failure of the Virtual Case File project. |
gao_GAO-05-432T | gao_GAO-05-432T_0 | Preliminary Observations on the Proposed DOD National Security Personnel System Regulations
DOD and OPM’s proposed NSPS regulations would establish a new human resources management system within DOD that governs basic pay, staffing, classification, performance management, labor relations, adverse actions, and employee appeals. We believe that many of the basic principles underlying the proposed DOD regulations are generally consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management. However, the experiences of high-performing organizations suggest that DOD should require the use of core competencies as a central feature of its performance management effort. Providing Adequate Safeguards to Ensure Fairness and Guard Against Abuse
Although DOD’s proposed regulations provide for some safeguards to ensure fairness and guard against abuse, additional safeguards should be developed. For an endeavor as critical as DOD’s new human resources management system, such a leadership position would serve to elevate attention to overcome an organization’s natural resistance to change, marshal the resources needed to implement change, and build and maintain the organizationwide commitment to new ways of doing business; integrate various management responsibilities into the new system so they are no longer “stove-piped” and fit into other organizational transformation efforts in a comprehensive, ongoing, and integrated manner; and institutionalize accountability for the system so that the implementation of this critical human capital initiative can be sustained. DOD acknowledges that a comprehensive outreach and communications strategy is essential for designing and implementing its new human resources management system, but the proposed regulations do not identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development, and implementation of NSPS. However, DOD’s proposed regulations do provide for continuing collaboration with employee representatives. According to DOD, almost two-thirds of its 700,000 civilian employees are represented by 41 different labor unions, including over 1,500 separate bargaining units. Similar to DHS’s final regulations, DOD’s proposed regulations about the collaboration process, among other things, would permit the Secretary of Defense to determine (1) the number of employee representatives allowed to engage in the collaboration process, and (2) the extent to which employee representatives are given an opportunity to discuss their views with and submit written comments to DOD officials. The active involvement of employees and employee representatives will be critical to the success of NSPS. GAO strongly supports the need for government transformation and the concept of modernizing federal human capital policies both within DOD and for the federal government at large. The human capital authorities being considered for DOD have far-reaching implications for the way DOD is managed as well as significant precedent-setting implications for the rest of the federal government. This testimony provides GAO’s observations on DOD human capital reform proposals and the need for governmentwide reform. In GAO’s view, the relevant sections of the House’s version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and the proposal that is being considered as part of this hearing contain a number of important improvements over the initial DOD legislative proposal. Moving forward, GAO believes it would be preferable to employ a governmentwide approach to address human capital issues and the need for certain flexibilities that have broad-based application and serious potential implications for the civil service system, in general, and the Office of Personnel Management, in particular. More than 50 percent of the workforce will be eligible to retire by 2005. This could also serve to severely set back the legitimate need to move to a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. Do DOD and other agencies have the institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of any new authorities? This institutional infrastructure includes, at a minimum, a human capital planning process that integrates the agency’s human capital policies, strategies, and programs with its program goals and mission, and desired outcomes; the capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital system; and, importantly, a set of adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure the fair, effective, and credible implementation of a new system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) new human resources management system--the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)--will have far-reaching implications for the management of the department and for civil service reform across the federal government. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 gave DOD significant authorities to redesign the rules, regulations, and processes that govern the way that more than 700,000 defense civilian employees are hired, compensated, promoted, and disciplined. In addition, NSPS could serve as a model for governmentwide transformation in human capital management. However, if not properly designed and effectively implemented, it could severely impede progress toward a more performance- and results-based system for the federal government as a whole. On February 14, 2005, the Secretary of Defense and Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) released for public comment the proposed NSPS regulations. This testimony (1) provides GAO's preliminary observations on selected provisions of the proposed regulations, (2) discusses the challenges DOD faces in implementing the new system, and (3) suggests a governmentwide framework to advance human capital reform.
What GAO Found
Given DOD's massive size and its geographically and culturally diverse workforce, NSPS represents a huge undertaking for DOD. DOD's initial process to design NSPS was problematic; however, after a strategic reassessment, DOD adjusted its approach to reflect a more cautious, deliberate process that involved more stakeholders, including OPM. Many of the principles underlying the proposed NSPS regulations are generally consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management. For instance, the proposed regulations provide for (1) elements of a flexible and contemporary human resources management system--such as pay bands and pay for performance; (2) DOD to rightsize its workforce when implementing reduction-in-force orders by giving greater priority to employee performance in its retention decisions; and (3) continuing collaboration with employee representatives. (It should be noted that 10 federal labor unions have filed suit alleging that DOD failed to abide by the statutory requirements to include employee representatives in the development of DOD's new labor relations system authorized as part of NSPS.) GAO has three primary areas of concern: the proposed regulations do not (1) define the details of the implementation of the system, including such issues as adequate safeguards to help ensure fairness and guard against abuse; (2) require, as GAO believes they should, the use of core competencies to communicate to employees what is expected of them on the job; and (3) identify a process for the continuing involvement of employees in the planning, development, and implementation of NSPS. Going forward, GAO believes that (1) the development of the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management, who would act as DOD's Chief Management Officer, is essential to elevate, integrate, and institutionalize responsibility for the success of DOD's overall business transformation efforts, including its new human resources management system; (2) DOD would benefit if it develops a comprehensive communications strategy that provides for ongoing, meaningful two-way communication that creates shared expectations among employees, employee representatives, and stakeholders; and (3) DOD must ensure that it has the institutional infrastructure in place to make effective use of its new authorities before they are operationalized. GAO strongly supports the concept of modernizing federal human capital policies, including providing reasonable flexibility. There is general recognition that the federal government needs a framework to guide human capital reform. Such a framework would consist of a set of values, principles, processes, and safeguards that would provide consistency across the federal government but be adaptable to agencies' diverse missions, cultures, and workforces. |
gao_GAO-04-856 | gao_GAO-04-856_0 | Using the information we obtained, we built a simple qualitative model to explain the conditions under which a tax haven company may have a tax cost advantage in competing for federal contracts relative to other companies whose headquarters are not located in tax haven countries. We matched contractor data (name and taxpayer identification numbers) from the GSA’s FPDS for 2000 and 2001 to tax and location data from the IRS’s SOI corporation file. In this matched database, we analyzed information about large corporations, those with at least $10 million in assets. There Are Conditions under Which Tax Haven Contractors May Have a Tax Cost Advantage
Contractors, including tax haven contractors, that have a lower marginal tax rate on the income from a contract than other contractors would have a tax cost advantage when competing for a contract. Furthermore, there is some evidence that a tax haven contractor may be able to shift income between the U.S. subsidiary and its tax haven parent in order to reduce U.S. taxable income. A contractor that pays less tax on additional income from a contract gains a tax cost advantage compared to companies that pay higher tax. One way to gain a tax cost advantage is by offsetting income earned on the contract with losses from other activities. The contractors with a tax cost advantage are not necessarily the successful competitors because the tax cost savings may not be reflected in actual bid prices or price proposals, and prices or costs are only one of several factors involved in awarding contracts. Whether a contractor with zero tax liability has a tax cost advantage when competing for a particular contract depends on the tax liabilities of the other competitors. Taxable Income
Tax haven contractors may be more likely to have lower tax costs than other contractors because they may be able to shift U.S. source income to their tax haven parents, reducing U.S. taxable income. Tax Haven Contractors Were More Likely to Have a Tax Cost Advantage Than Domestic Contractors
Using tax liability as an indicator of ability to offset contract income, we determined that large tax haven contractors were more likely to have a tax cost advantage than large domestic contractors in both 2000 and 2001. As table 2 shows, in 2000, 56 percent of the 39 tax haven contractors reported no tax liability, while 34 percent of the 3,253 domestic contractors reported no tax liability. In 2001, 66 percent of the 50 tax haven contractors and 46 percent of the 3,524 domestic contractors reported no tax liability. In this sense, tax liability is an indicator of the ability to offset income from the contract. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government was involved in about 8.6 million contract actions, including new contract awards, worth over $250 billion in fiscal year 2002. Some of these contracts were awarded to tax haven contractors, that is, U.S. subsidiaries of corporate parents located in tax haven countries. Concerns have been raised that these contractors may have an unfair cost advantage when competing for federal contracts because they are better able to lower their U.S. tax liability by shifting income to the tax haven parent. GAO's objectives in this study were to (1) determine the conditions under which companies with tax haven parents have a tax cost advantage when competing for federal contracts and (2) estimate the number of companies that could have such an advantage. GAO matched federal contractor data with tax and location data for all large corporations, those with at least $10 million in assets, in 2000 and 2001, in order to identify those companies that could have an advantage.
What GAO Found
There are conditions under which a tax haven contractor may have a tax cost advantage (lower tax on additional income from a contract) when competing for a federal contract. The extent of the advantage depends on the relative tax liabilities of the tax haven contractor and its competitors. One way for a contractor to gain a tax cost advantage is by reducing its U.S. taxable income from other sources to less than zero and by using its losses to offset some or all of the additional income from a contract, resulting in less tax on the contract income. A company would thereby gain an advantage relative to those competitors with positive income from other sources and may be able to offer a lower price or cost for the contract. While some domestic corporations may also have a tax cost advantage, tax haven contractors may be better able to reduce U.S. taxable income to less than zero because of opportunities to shift income to their tax haven parents. Whether a contractor has a tax cost advantage in competing for a particular contract depends on the tax liabilities of other competitors. Also, the contractors with a tax cost advantage are not necessarily the successful competitors because the tax cost savings may not be reflected in actual prices, and prices may be only one of several factors involved in awarding contracts. Using tax liability as an indicator of ability to offset contract income, GAO found that large tax haven contractors in both 2000 and 2001 were more likely to have a tax cost advantage than large domestic contractors. In 2000, 56 percent of the 39 large tax haven contractors reported no tax liability, while 34 percent of the 3,253 large domestic contractors reported no tax liability. In 2001, 66 percent of large tax haven contractors and 46 percent of large domestic contractors reported no tax liability. |
gao_GAO-11-369 | gao_GAO-11-369_0 | In addition, some refugees participate in the Matching Grant program, which is only partially funded by ORR. Of the refugees who received cash assistance from ORR in fiscal year 2009, just over 30 percent of them participated in the privately administered Matching Grant program, while most of the remaining percent participated in ORR’s other assistance programs. 2.) ORR is authorized to fully reimburse program providers for the cash and medical assistance they provide to refugees enrolled in the Publicly Administered, Wilson/Fish, and Public Private Partnership programs,even if the costs of serving all eligible refugees exceed ORR’s annual appropriation in a given fiscal year. Design Elements Differentiate ORR’s Programs, and Program Placement Depends on Refugees’ Readiness to Work and Other Factors
Several Design Elements Differentiate ORR’s Four Assistance Programs
The Matching Grant program features several design elements that distinguish it from assistance offered through the Publicly Administered, Wilson/Fish, and Public Private Partnership programs. However, refugees enrolled in ORR’s other programs have their cash assistance reduced or terminated as a result of their employment earnings. These approaches varied within and among programs and examples we observed included providers integrating their refugee services, providing intensive case management, and offering employment incentives: Service integration: Some providers we visited used a single government or voluntary agency to provide cash assistance, employment counseling and case management to refugees, often in one location, while other providers referred refugees to multiple agencies for different services. In addition, as funding for Matching Grant programs is based on the performance of voluntary agencies in helping refugees achieve employment-related outcomes, voluntary agency staff have an incentive to select refugees to participate in the program who they think are most likely to be successful in finding a job. Refugees’ Employment Outcomes Have Declined Recently, and Little Is Known about the Effectiveness of Programs’ Approaches
Refugees’ Employment Declined in Recent Years
Overall, fewer refugees found jobs within their first months in the United States in fiscal year 2009 than they did in fiscal year 2007. Before the economic recession, in fiscal year 2007, ORR’s performance data show that between 59 percent and 65 percent of all refugees receiving cash assistance from ORR’s four assistance programs entered employment within 4 to 8 months of coming to the United States. By fiscal year 2009, these rates decreased somewhat to between 67 percent and 80 percent. The Matching Grant 4-to-6-month assistance program, with its own set of employment measures, performed well on some but not all of its measures in fiscal year 2009. One study published in 1999 (based on data from 1992 through 1994) compared a Wilson/Fish and a Publicly Administered program in San Diego and concluded that the Wilson/Fish program with integrated services, personal and flexible system of service delivery, and intensive support services helped refugees find employment more quickly than the Publicly Administered program that provided services through multiple agencies and case workers, but we found no other studies that were published recently and have reliably assessed the effectiveness of the various approaches used by refugee assistance programs. Difficulties in Projecting Certain Program Costs Have Contributed to Fluctuations in ORR’s Unobligated Balances
ORR considers a broad range of factors when estimating its program costs, and these estimates for fiscal years 1999 through 2009 have generally tracked actual program obligations in most but not all years. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2009, ORR’s estimates were, on average, within 6 percent of the agency’s actual obligations. Despite its efforts to consider various factors when estimating program costs, ORR has faced difficulties in estimating specific variables, such as the number of refugees that will enter the country in a given year and the share of those refugees who will be eligible for ORR assistance programs, according to officials. 8.) In total, from fiscal years 2006 to 2009, ORR’s unobligated balances grew from $17 million to over $83 million. From fiscal years 1999 to 2005, ORR used prior years’ unexpired and unobligated funds to allow it to obligate more than it was appropriated in those years. From fiscal years 2006 to 2009, however, ORR obligated less than it was appropriated and thus was able to accumulate balances again. State and voluntary agencies that administer ORR’s programs vary in how they provide assistance, and little is known about the effectiveness of the approaches they use to help refugees become self-sufficient—an overall goal of all of ORR’s programs. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services identify effective approaches that state and voluntary agencies can use to help refugees become employed and self-sufficient. We also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. To describe how ORR estimates program costs and how estimates affect its unobligated balances, we interviewed officials from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), and ORR to determine how ORR formulates its budget. Refugee Resettlement: Federal Support to the States Has Declined. Refugee Programs: Status of Early Employment Demonstration Projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2009, the United States resettled close to 70,000 refugees fleeing persecution in their homelands. To assist in their transition to the United States and help them attain employment, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) provides temporary cash, medical, and other assistance through four different assistance programs. The economic downturn and an increase in refugee arrivals posed challenges to ORR's efforts to assist refugees and estimate program costs, resulting in fluctuating unobligated balances. Congress required GAO to examine (1) differences in ORR's refugee assistance programs and factors program providers consider when placing refugees in a particular program; (2) refugee employment outcomes and the effectiveness of different approaches to providing assistance; and (3) how ORR estimates program costs and how its estimates have affected the agency's unobligated balances. GAO met with federal and state officials, voluntary agency staff, and refugees; reviewed selected case files; analyzed ORR performance data for fiscal years 2007 through 2009; and reviewed and analyzed relevant federal laws, regulations, and budget documents.
What GAO Found
ORR supports several approaches to providing cash, medical assistance, and social services to refugees through its Matching Grant, Publicly Administered, Wilson/Fish, and Public Private Partnership programs. The Matching Grant program, which is administered and partially funded by private voluntary organizations, features several design elements that set it apart from ORR's other programs. For example, voluntary organizations select refugees for the Matching Grant program and those who participate have 4 to 6 months to find employment before their cash assistance ends. Most states also offer one of ORR's other programs: these programs enroll any eligible refugee, and participants have up to 8 months to find a job before their assistance ends. Three of ORR's programs--the Wilson/Fish, Public Private Partnership, and Matching Grant--were designed to give providers flexibility in developing innovative approaches to help refugees find employment and become self-sufficient. GAO observed providers using a number of different approaches, including offering refugees cash incentives for early employment, and these approaches varied within and among programs. Voluntary agencies told GAO that they consider several factors, such as the refugee's English language and employability skills, in deciding whether to enroll a refugee in the Matching Grant program or another ORR assistance program. ORR's four assistance programs showed some success in helping refugees obtain employment in fiscal year 2009, but the percentage of program participants who obtained employment declined in recent years and little is known about which approaches are most effective in improving the economic status of refugees. In fiscal year 2007, between 59 percent and 65 percent of refugees receiving cash assistance from ORR programs entered employment within 4 to 8 months. By fiscal year 2009, these rates decreased to between 31 percent and 52 percent, depending on the program. Little is known about the effectiveness of the different approaches providers use to improve employment outcomes for refugees, such as intensive case management and employment incentives, in part because of differences in the way programs are structured and the populations they serve and in part because of differences in the way program performance is measured. ORR's estimates of program costs have generally tracked actual obligations but challenges in estimating specific variables such as the number of eligible refugees and the cost of serving them have contributed to fluctuations in unobligated balances between fiscal years 1999 and 2009. ORR has a 3-year period in which to obligate its annual appropriations. From fiscal years 1999 to 2005, ORR used unexpired and unobligated prior year funds to obligate more than it was appropriated for those years, in part because of higher-than-expected increases in refugee arrivals and medical costs. As a result, its unobligated balances were reduced in most of these years and were gone by fiscal year 2005. However, from fiscal years 2006 to 2009, ORR obligated less than it was appropriated, which allowed the agency to carry over funds from one year to the next. As a result, its unobligated balances grew from $17 million in fiscal year 2006 to over $83 million in fiscal year 2009.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Health and Human Services identify effective approaches that state and voluntary agencies can use to help refugees become employed and self-sufficient. |
gao_GAO-10-91 | gao_GAO-10-91_0 | While the Executive Order does not prescribe specific approaches to language access services, it does require federal agencies to prepare plans (referred to as LEP plans) outlining the steps they will take to ensure that eligible LEP persons can access their programs and activities. The Executive Order required agencies to develop and implement their LEP plans by December 11, 2000. Of our three selected agencies, only IRS has posted its completed recipient guidance. As shown in figure 1, IRS has addressed all the elements of an effective LEP Plan while FEMA has addressed half the elements, and SBA has met one element. Because the Executive Order makes agencies responsible for determining their need to complete recipient guidance and an LEP plan, we could not determine which agencies still needed to complete either the recipient guidance or the LEP plan; if an agency decides it is not required to complete a recipient guidance or LEP plan, they do not need to report this decision to DOJ. By increasing the transparency of these LEP plans, agencies could obtain additional feedback from stakeholders on potential improvements to their efforts for serving LEP persons. Building on its past and current efforts, DOJ could encourage the Federal Interagency Working Group on LEP to share additional practices and resources for use across federal agencies, such as exploring a shared services approach for leveraging translation and interpretation services. Additionally, in cases when an agency has determined that it is not required to draft recipient guidance or an LEP plan, the Assistant Attorney General should request agencies to report the results of this determination to DOJ. Develop mechanisms to monitor and evaluate services provided to LEP persons. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review agencies’ progress in improving access to federal programs and services and how specific federal agencies were meeting the Executive Order’s requirements, we (1) determined which executive branch agencies have completed their recipient guidance and Limited English Proficiency (LEP) plans; (2) assessed the extent to which Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Small Business Administration (SBA) have implemented the Executive Order consistent with Department of Justice’s (DOJ) guidance, and (3) reviewed DOJ’s and the selected agencies’ efforts to enhance collaboration to improve access to federal programs and services for LEP populations, as well as other potential collaboration opportunities. To assess how specific federal agencies have implemented the Executive Order, this review, we considered federal agencies based on the amount and significance of agency interaction with LEP populations, the types of services provided, agency size, agency mission, the status of each agency’s LEP plan and/or recipient guidance, and the diversity of LEP populations served. To review the extent to which these three agencies implemented Executive Order 13166 consistent with DOJ’s guidance, we reviewed and analyzed the Executive Order, DOJ’s guidance, the agencies’ LEP plans and recipient guidance, and agencies’ language access plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Executive Order 13166 (August 11, 2000) directs each federal agency to improve access to federal programs and services for persons with limited English proficiency (LEP). Using guidance issued by DOJ, agencies are generally required to develop recipient guidance and/or an LEP plan outlining steps for ensuring that LEP persons can access federal services and programs. As requested, GAO (1) determined which agencies have completed their recipient guidance and LEP plan, (2) assessed the extent to which the selected agencies have implemented the Executive Order consistent with DOJ's guidance, and (3) examined DOJ's and the three selected agencies' efforts to enhance collaboration. GAO analyzed the Executive Order and agencies' recipient guidance and plans posted on LEP.gov; selected the IRS, FEMA, and SBA for this review because of the amount and significance of their interaction with LEP persons; and reviewed documentation of agencies' collaborative efforts to provide access to federal services.
What GAO Found
As of February 2010, 22 agencies have completed their recipient guidance. Additionally, DOJ has reported receiving LEP plans from 58 federal agencies. However, the total number of agencies required to complete recipient guidance and an LEP plan cannot be determined because the Executive Order makes agencies responsible for determining the need for guidance and a plan based on their interaction with LEP persons and does not require agencies to report on the results of their determination. Consequently, some agencies may determine that drafting a recipient guidance or an LEP plan is not necessary. Further, although the Executive Order requires agencies to make recipient guidance public, the same requirement does not exist for plans. DOJ's guidance contains four elements for improving access to federal programs and services by LEP persons. IRS has fully addressed each of these elements, while FEMA and SBA have made less progress, as shown in the table below. IRS has centralized its language access services within one office, overseen by an agencywide executive council. Additionally, IRS regularly identifies the LEP populations it serves, administers a variety of targeted language access services, and monitors these services for potential improvements. FEMA has demonstrated agency commitment, identified LEP populations, and delivered services during disasters, but it lacks a structured approach to monitor these services. While SBA is continuing to draft its LEP plan, the agency does not conduct a needs assessment, and provides limited monitoring of services to LEP populations. Among the three agencies GAO reviewed, FEMA collaborates with SBA and IRS to provide LEP persons a centralized location for receiving assistance during a declared disaster. Additionally, these agencies (along with 21 other federal agencies), participate in an Interagency Working Group on LEP issues. GAO identified a potential shared services approach agencies could use for translation and interpretive services. |
gao_GAO-09-136 | gao_GAO-09-136_0 | IRS has demanding responsibilities in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation’s tax laws, and relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. IRS Demonstrated Progress in Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
Although IRS has continued to make progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses at three data centers and an additional facility, many deficiencies remain. For example, it has implemented controls for unauthenticated network access and user IDs on the mainframe; further limited access to its mainframe environment by limiting access to system management utility functions and mainframe console commands; taken several measures to protect information traversing its network, such as installing a secure communication service for encryption; taken steps to improve its auditing and monitoring capability by retaining audit logs of security-relevant events for its administrative accounting system and ensuring that audit logs were being created for such events on its procurement system; removed authority for unrestricted physical access to the computer room and tape library from individuals who did not need it to perform their job; improved controls over physical access proximity cards; enhanced periodic reviews of mainframe configurations; improved the disposal of removable media; improved patching of critical vulnerabilities, as well as the timeliness of applying patches at certain facilities; and updated contingency plans to document critical business processes. 1). For example, IRS continues to, among other things, allow sensitive information, including user IDs and passwords for mission-critical applications, to be readily available to any user on IRS’s internal network; use passwords that are not complex enough to avoid being guessed or grant excessive electronic access to individuals; inconsistently apply patches; and not remove separated employees’ access in a timely manner for one of its systems. According to IRS officials, they are continuing to address the uncorrected weaknesses, and subsequent to our site visits, they had completed corrective actions for some of the weaknesses. A key reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. Furthermore, these weaknesses continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IRS’s systems and contributed to IRS’s material weakness in information security during the fiscal year 2008 financial statement audit. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. In addition, IRS did not restrict access to sensitive personally identifiable information. IRS did not always effectively monitor its systems. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential to determining what controls are required. Until IRS takes these steps, financial and taxpayer information are at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction, and the agency’s management decisions may be based on unreliable or inaccurate financial information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems were effective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies extensively on computerized systems to carry out its demanding responsibilities to collect taxes (about $2.7 trillion in fiscal years 2008 and 2007), process tax returns, and enforce the nation's tax laws. Effective information security controls are essential to protect financial and taxpayer information from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audits of IRS's fiscal years 2008 and 2007 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of IRS's actions to correct previously reported weaknesses and (2) whether controls were effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies and procedures and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials.
What GAO Found
IRS has continued to make progress in correcting previously reported information security weaknesses. It has corrected or mitigated 49 of the 115 weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved during its last audit. For example, the agency (1) implemented controls for unauthenticated network access and user IDs on the mainframe, (2) encrypted sensitive data going across its network, (3) improved the patching of critical vulnerabilities, and (4) updated contingency plans to document critical business processes. However, most of the previously identified weaknesses remain unresolved. For example, IRS continues to, among other things, allow sensitive information, including IDs and passwords for mission-critical applications, to be readily available to any user on its internal network, and grant excessive access to individuals who do not need it. According to IRS officials, they are continuing to address the uncorrected weaknesses and, subsequent to GAO site visits, had completed additional corrective actions. Despite IRS's progress, information security control weaknesses continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. IRS did not consistently implement controls that were intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its systems and information. For example, IRS did not always (1) enforce strong password management for properly identifying and authenticating users; (2) authorize user access, including access to personally identifiable information, to permit only the access needed to perform job functions; (3) encrypt certain sensitive data; (4) effectively monitor changes on its mainframe; and (5) physically protect its computer resources. A key reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are appropriately designed and operating effectively. Specifically, IRS did not annually review risk assessments for certain systems, comprehensively test for certain controls, or always validate the effectiveness of remedial actions. Until these weaknesses are corrected, the agency remains particularly vulnerable to insider threats and IRS is at increased risk of unauthorized access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and taxpayer information, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services. |
gao_GAO-08-781 | gao_GAO-08-781_0 | The preparer must depend on the information provided by the taxpayer. IRS, California, and Oregon Differ Significantly in How Each Regulates Paid Tax Preparers
Only a few Internal Revenue Code provisions apply to all paid preparers and only a small portion of paid preparers—enrolled agents—have any federal registration, testing, or fee requirements. Oregon requires paid preparers who are not already licensed by the state as CPAs or attorneys, or working for a CPA, to obtain a state license to prepare tax returns. Table 2 provides an overview comparison of the California and Oregon requirements with the Maryland requirements and the pending legislation in the other states. Oregon’s Regulatory Regime May Lead to More Accurate Federal Tax Returns
When controlling for other factors likely to affect tax return accuracy, our analysis of IRS data showed that tax year 2001 federal tax returns filed in Oregon were more likely to be accurate than returns in the rest of the country, which is consistent with but not sufficient to prove that Oregon’s regulatory regime improves tax return accuracy. In Oregon, the average return required approximately $250 less of a change in tax liability than the average return in the rest of the country. With about 1.56 million individual tax filers in Oregon in 2001, this translates into over $390 million more in income taxes paid in Oregon than would have been paid if Oregon returns were prepared at the level of accuracy seen on similar returns in the rest of the country. Although the differences we observed in the states’ regulatory programs and in how likely California and Oregon returns were to be accurate compared to the rest of the country are consistent with the Oregon regime leading to some improved federal tax return accuracy, the analysis cannot rule out that the regime did not have such an effect. Costs and Benefits of the California and Oregon Programs Provide Some Guidance for a National Program
Both California and Oregon support their programs almost entirely through fees, with state program costs averaging about $29 and $123 per year, respectively, per registered paid preparer. As noted previously, California’s program primarily requires unenrolled preparers to register with the state and meet minimum education requirements. We conservatively estimated the total costs associated with Oregon’s regulation to be about $6 million in 2007. This estimate is conservative because it counts preparer education time and expense for all licensees, including enrolled agents, who have continuing education requirements under that program, and employees of tax preparation chains that require similar education for all of their preparers. A California tax preparer association representative said that the costs to obtain and maintain CRTP status are fairly low and likely do not have much of an impact on prices consumers pay, and that the requirements to become a paid preparer are not so great that the number of paid preparers in the state is being held lower than it would be without any regulation. Program administrators and paid preparer community representatives in California and Oregon also told us education requirements likely reduce the number of incompetent paid preparers and have led to a more professional tax preparation industry. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) How do IRS, California, Oregon, and other states regulate paid preparers? (2) Using available IRS data, how does the accuracy of federal tax returns in California and Oregon compare to that of returns in the rest of the country, after accounting for other factors that might influence accuracy? (3) What are the state-level costs and benefits of the paid preparer programs in California and Oregon and what insights do they provide for possible benefits if Congress were to enact national paid preparer registration or licensing requirements? To answer the second objective, we analyzed data from IRS’s National Research Program (NRP). Departing Alien Income Tax Return, were less likely to be accurate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of taxpayers use paid tax return preparers and many of these paid preparers are not subject to any qualification requirements. Paid preparers in California and Oregon are exceptions in that these states have set paid preparer qualification standards. Additionally, two bills before Congress would require national paid preparer regulations. To help Congress better understand the potential costs and revenue effects of regulating paid preparers, GAO was asked to study (1) how IRS, California, Oregon, and other states regulate paid preparers, (2) how the accuracy of federal tax returns from California and Oregon compare to other returns, and (3) state-level costs and benefits of the California and Oregon programs and insights they provide for a possible national program. GAO analyzed IRS research data on tax return accuracy; interviewed IRS officials, state administrators, and preparer community representatives; and reviewed relevant documents.
What GAO Found
No federal registration, education, or testing requirements apply to all paid preparers before they can prepare tax returns. California and Oregon have requirements that preparers must meet before preparing returns in those states. California paid preparers who are not attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents (or employed by one of these types of tax practitioners) must complete an education requirement, obtain a bond, pay a fee, and register. In following years, they must complete continuing education requirements, and renew their registration. Oregon has similar, but more stringent requirements. Oregon has a two-tiered licensing system, with an education requirement and examination for Licensed Tax Preparers and work experience and a second examination for Licensed Tax Consultants. Oregon exempts certified public accountants and their employees, as well as attorneys, from these requirements. Oregon requires enrolled agents to take a shorter version of the consultant examination. Fifty-four percent of Oregon applicants passed the state's basic examination. Recently, Maryland enacted legislation to regulate paid preparers and at least three other states have similar pending legislation. According to GAO's analysis of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) tax year 2001 National Research Program data, Oregon returns were more likely to be accurate while California returns were less likely to be accurate compared to the rest of the country after controlling for other factors likely to affect accuracy. In dollar terms, the average Oregon return required approximately $250 less of a change in tax liability than the average return in the rest of the country. For Oregon's 1.56 million individual tax filers, this equates to over $390 million more in federal income taxes paid in Oregon than would have been paid if the returns were as accurate as similar returns in the rest of the country. These results are consistent with, but do not prove, that Oregon's regulations lead to some increased tax return accuracy. GAO's analysis could not account for all factors that might affect the accuracy of these tax returns. Because some states without preparer regulation also had tax returns that, on average, were more accurate than the national average, some portion of the increased accuracy of Oregon returns likely is due to other factors. The California and Oregon programs' costs varied with differences in the programs' scope. Both programs' administrative costs are funded primarily from program fees. California's costs were about $29 per preparer and Oregon's about $123. GAO estimates that the total annual cost of the ongoing Oregon program, including state costs and the cost to preparers for their time and expense in acquiring required education, likely is about $6 million. Officials in both states believe program benefits like reducing the number of incompetent preparers outweigh costs, although neither state had data on benefits. IRS officials said that a national program's costs likely would depend on the program's objectives and features. |
gao_GAO-17-616 | gao_GAO-17-616_0 | Background
GPRAMA established a set of requirements to annually examine potentially unnecessary plans and reports based on OMB guidance, and for agencies to develop proposals to eliminate or modify them as appropriate. These requirements are also included in OMB’s Circular A-11 guidance to agencies, along with additional directions for agencies to follow when implementing the law. OMB and Agencies Developed Hundreds of Proposals for Report Elimination or Modification
Agencies Proposed to Eliminate or Modify Hundreds of Reporting Requirements
Since the passage of GPRAMA, OMB has publicly posted 788 report modification proposals, which includes 523 new proposals and 265 proposals that were published a second time in 2016. These were published in three lists (2012, 2014, and 2016) on Performance.gov. OMB staff told us that they implemented the process every other year due to timing constraints and because reporting requirements are relatively static and do not change as frequently as other information used in the annual budget process. OMB staff told us that they decided to publish the proposals online rather than in the budget because the website hosts many related GPRAMA resources and OMB staff determined it would be the most appropriate location for this content. Nonetheless, they pointed to the April 2017 OMB memorandum that specifically states, “in accordance with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, agencies should also include with their [fiscal year] 2019 Budget submission a list of statutorily required reports they believe should be eliminated or modified by Congress.” OMB staff told us that while they prefer posting the report modification proposals on Performance.gov, they will, at a minimum, begin referencing proposals in future President’s budgets. However, as a result of OMB instructing agencies to update their previously submitted report modification proposals rather than analyzing their complete list of reports, agencies may not have reviewed a comprehensive list of their reports, as required by GPRAMA, when they developed proposals in fiscal year 2015. OMB staff acknowledged that their email instructions could have contributed to missed opportunities. In 2014, Congress acted on agencies’ report modification proposals by eliminating more than 30 reporting requirements that agencies’ determined were unnecessary. Specifically, we found that OMB did not implement the report modification process on an annual basis as required by GPRAMA. However, by implementing the report modification process on an annual basis, OMB would be positioned to include new report modification proposals in the President’s annual budgets, and agencies would be given additional opportunities to propose eliminating or modifying reports that may be unnecessary. OMB has also published agencies’ proposals on Performance.gov, rather than in the President’s annual budget as GPRAMA requires. However, publishing or referencing the proposals in the President’s annual budget may increase their visibility and usefulness to congressional decision makers and other stakeholders involved in developing and using reports for Congress. Although OMB staff told us the email instructions were not a substitute for Circular A-11 guidance, agencies may have missed opportunities to identify new proposals by following OMB’s email instructions. Specifically, OMB’s email instructions to agencies should request that agencies annually compile a list of all plans and reports they produce for Congress, analyze the list to identify those that are outdated or duplicative, consult and document relevant interactions with congressional committees, and provide a total count of plans and reports and their list of outdated and duplicative reports to OMB. This report (1) reviews the information included in agencies’ report modification proposals, and identifies the number of proposals published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), (2) assesses the extent to which OMB and agencies are implementing GPRAMA requirements regarding the elimination or modification of unnecessary plans and reports, and (3) describes how selected federal agencies determined which plans and reports are outdated or duplicative. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government produces thousands of plans and reports each year to meet the informational needs of Congress. GPRAMA established a process to eliminate or modify reports that may be outdated or duplicative.
GAO was asked to examine OMB and agencies' implementation of GPRAMA provisions to identify unnecessary reports and develop proposals to eliminate or modify them as appropriate. GAO's objectives were to (1) review agencies' report modification proposals, (2) assess the extent to which OMB and agencies implemented related GPRAMA requirements, and (3) describe how selected federal agencies determined which plans and reports are outdated or duplicative.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agencies report modification proposals, relevant laws, OMB guidance, and agency documents. GAO interviewed staff from Congress, OMB, and six selected agencies. Agencies were selected based on the number of proposals they published. GAO reviewed selected agencies' complete list of reports and internal guidance, and analyzed the contents of their report modification proposals.
What GAO Found
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to coordinate an annual review of agencies' plans and reports for Congress and publish proposals to eliminate or modify reports that may be outdated or duplicative. Since the passage of GPRAMA, OMB posted three lists of proposals (in 2012, 2014, and 2016) on Performance.gov. These lists contained a total of 523 new proposals. In 2014, Congress acted on agencies' report modification proposals by eliminating 51 reporting requirements, including 34 that were identified through this process.
As shown in the figure, GAO found that OMB did not implement the report modification process on an annual basis, as required by GPRAMA. OMB staff said that they implemented the report modification process every other year because reporting requirements are relatively static. OMB staff said, in future years, they plan to implement the process annually as required.
GAO also found that OMB is publishing agencies' proposals on Performance.gov, rather than in the President's annual budget as GPRAMA requires. OMB staff said that they published the proposals online rather than in the budget because the website hosts many GPRAMA resources. However, publishing or referencing the proposals in the President's annual budget, in addition to posting them on Performance.gov, may increase their visibility and usefulness to congressional decision makers and others. GAO also found that OMB's email instructions to agencies did not align with GPRAMA and Circular A-11 directives for agencies to review a complete list of reports, which could have resulted in a missed opportunity to identify additional report modification proposals. OMB staff stated that their email instructions are not a substitute for A-11 guidance, but also acknowledged that the instructions could have led to missed opportunities.
Selected agencies told GAO they periodically review or update their report modification proposals. Specifically, selected agencies said they involved relevant subject matter experts when developing proposals, and followed OMB instructions to submit their proposals, and consulted with Congress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB submit or reference report modification proposals with the President's annual budget, and ensure that email instructions to agencies align with GPRAMA and Circular A-11 guidance. OMB staff agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-365T | gao_GAO-12-365T_0 | DHS Has Updated Its Strategy for Addressing Its High- Risk Designation
Since January 2011, DHS has continued to update and strengthen its strategy for how the department plans to address our high-risk designation and resolve its management challenges. In January 2011, DHS provided us with its initial Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, which summarized the department’s preliminary plans for addressing the high-risk area. The January 2011 strategy, which DHS later updated in June 2011 and December 2011, was generally responsive to the actions and outcomes we identified for the department to address this high-risk area. Specifically, in our March 2011 written response to DHS’s January 2011 update, we stated that the strategy generally identified multiple, specific actions and target completion time frames consistent with the outcomes we identified; designated senior officials to be responsible for implementing most actions; and included scorecards to depict, at a high level, the department’s views of its progress in addressing each high-risk area and a framework for monitoring implementation of corrective actions through, among other things, quarterly meetings between DHS and us. The update demonstrated the department’s continued leadership commitment to address the high-risk designation and represented continued progress. For example:
DHS identified 10 root causes that cut across the four management functions and management integration. However, elements of the update could be strengthened or clarified to better address our high-risk criteria and the actions and outcomes we previously identified, including (1) better defining the root causes of its management problems; (2) clarifying the resources available to implement corrective actions; (3) consistently reporting the progress of its corrective actions; and (4) more clearly and consistently reporting the progress of its key management initiatives. For example:
DHS updated its initiatives—removing two initiatives from the management integration area and adding four new initiatives, including human resources information technology, management health assessment, strategic sourcing, and acquisition workforce development;
DHS included, for the first time, ratings of the department’s progress addressing the 31 high-risk outcomes; and
DHS enhanced its reporting and rating methodology for its key management initiatives. Establish measures and report on progress for all initiatives. Stabilize its methodology for measuring progress. By strengthening these four aspects, we believe the December 2011 strategy, if implemented and sustained, provides a path for DHS to address our high-risk designation. DHS Has Made Progress, but More Work Remains to Achieve High-Risk Outcomes
DHS has made progress addressing management challenges and achieving high-risk outcomes in some key areas. Specifically, in 2010 and 2011, the DHS CIO conducted program and portfolio reviews of hundreds of IT investments and systems. We also reported in February 2012 that DHS had initiated a Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program in May 2011 to build its senior leadership pipeline within the department—consolidating what had been four individual leadership programs into a single DHS-wide program—and lowered its senior leadership vacancy rates from a peak of 25 percent in 2006 to 10 percent at the end of fiscal year 2011.In February 2011, we reported that the department put in place common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management functions, such as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies.commitment by identifying roles and responsibilities at the departmental level for the key management initiatives it has included in the December 2011 strategy. DHS has also demonstrated top leadership In its December 2011 strategy, DHS presented detailed plans to address a number of management challenges. However, in many instances, DHS has considerable work ahead to fully implement these plans and address these challenges. For example, in June 2010 we reported that over half of the programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, such as mission need statements outlining the specific functional capabilities required to accomplish DHS’s mission and objectives; operational requirements; and acquisition program baselines. For example, as we reported in 2011, DHS faces challenges fully defining key system investment and acquisition management policies and procedures for IT. Due to material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, DHS was unable to provide assurance that internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of September 30, 2011. DHS continues to face challenges implementing some of its key human capital initiatives and functions. DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in integrating its management functions within and across the department and its components and take additional actions to further and more effectively integrate the department. We will continue to monitor and assess DHS’s implementation and transformation efforts through our ongoing and planned work, including the 2013 high-risk update that we expect to issue in early 2013. Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, GAO has designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk because, among other things, DHS had to combine 22 agencies, while ensuring no serious consequences for U.S. national and economic security. This high-risk area includes challenges in DHSs management functionsfinancial management, human capital, IT, and acquisitions; the effect of those challenges on implementing DHSs missions; and integrating the functions. In November 2000, GAO published criteria for removing areas from its high-risk list. In September 2010, GAO identified 31 actions and outcomes critical to addressing this high-risk area. This testimony addresses DHSs progress in (1) developing a strategy for addressing its high-risk designation and (2) achieving outcomes critical to addressing this high-risk area. This statement is based on GAO products issued from June 2007 through February 2012, including selected updates. It also includes preliminary observations from GAOs ongoing work reviewing DHSs IT governance, for which GAO reviewed documents on IT governance and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has updated and strengthened its strategy for how it plans to address GAOs high-risk designation and resolve the departments management challenges. In January 2011, DHS provided GAO with its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, which summarized the departments preliminary plans for addressing the high-risk area. GAO found that this strategy, which was later updated in June and December 2011, was generally responsive to the actions and outcomes needed to address GAOs high-risk designation. For example, the January 2011 strategy generally identified multiple, specific actions and target completion time frames consistent with the outcomes GAO identified. However, the strategy did not address the root causes of problems, among other things. In its June 2011 strategy, DHS, among other things, identified 10 root causes that cut across the management areas and their integration. GAO identified ways the strategy could be strengthened, including consistently reporting the progress of its initiatives and corrective actions. In its most recent update, DHS better positioned itself to address its management challenges. For example, for the first time, DHS included ratings of the departments progress addressing its high-risk outcomes. However, GAO believes that DHS could more consistently report on available resources and corrective actions, establish measures and report on progress made for all initiatives, and stabilize its methodology for measuring progress. These changes, if implemented and sustained, provide a path for DHS to address GAOs high-risk designation.
DHS has made progress, but has considerable work ahead to achieve actions and outcomes critical to addressing this high-risk area. Among other accomplishments, DHS realigned its acquisition management functions within a new office to assess the health of major acquisitions and investments; conducted program and portfolio reviews of hundreds of information technology (IT) investments; and reduced the number of material weaknesses in internal controls. DHS also demonstrated top leadership commitment by identifying roles and responsibilities for its key management initiatives. However, DHS has more work ahead to fully implement its plans and address its management challenges. For example, in June 2010 GAO reported that over half of the programs reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of essential planning documents. In addition, DHS faces challenges fully defining key system investment and acquisition management policies and procedures. Further, as of September 30, 2011, due to material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting, DHS was unable to provide assurance that these internal controls were operating effectively. In September 2011 we reported that DHS also continues to face challenges implementing some key human capital initiatives, such as its workforce strategy. DHS also needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in integrating its management functions within and across the department and its components, including making progress with its model for managing investments across components and management functions. GAO will continue to assess DHSs efforts to address its high-risk designation and will report its findings on the departments progress in the high-risk update that it expects to issue in early 2013.
What GAO Recommends
This testimony contains no new recommendations. GAO has made over 100 recommendations to DHS since 2003 to strengthen the departments management and integration efforts. DHS has implemented many of these recommendations and is in the process of implementing others. |
gao_GAO-15-9 | gao_GAO-15-9_0 | In response, OPM reported that a total of 23,965 federal employees used approximately 2.2 million hours during the 6- month sample period. Official time rates indicate the number of official time hours expended per BU employee and allow for meaningful comparison of official time usage over time. For seven agencies, declines in official time charges per BU employee ranged from about 30 minutes or less at several agencies to 2- 1/2 fewer hours per BU employee at one agency. We found that half of the agencies reported using more official time hours in fiscal year 2013 than in fiscal year 2006 (see figure 1 for the interactive graphic, which represents each individual agency’s official time rate and hours reported for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2013). Agencies Reported Relatively Small Numbers of Employees Charged Official Time in Fiscal Year 2013
In total for fiscal year 2013, the 10 selected agencies reported that less than 2 percent of BU employees from the 10 agencies charged official time hours. NSF and SSA reported no employees charged 100 percent of their duty time to official time in fiscal year 2013. Cross-Checking OPM’s Cost Estimate Can Yield a More Reliable Estimate
OPM has historically estimated annual official time costs by using a simple computation—multiplying each agency’s average salary (as reported in EHRI) for BU employees covered by official time activities by the agency’s total reported official time hours. We computed our own cost estimate for the 6 of our 10 selected agencies who report data through EHRI using an alternative methodology that used actual salary data of BU employees who charged official time and multiplied this amount by the We agency total reported official time hours used for each employee.found that our cost estimate for the 6 agencies yielded an estimate that was about $5 million more than the estimate using OPM’s methodology ($61 million versus $56 million, or a difference of about 9 percent). Further, cost estimates using GAO’s methodology at 4 of the 6 agencies were higher by 15 percent or more than the estimates using OPM’s methodology (see table 6). As a result, OPM’s cost estimate for government-wide use of official time could be higher or lower if this methodology were applied to all reporting agencies rather than the 6 agencies used here. OPM officials said reporting on official time is not a priority at this time and they have used the same methodology for preparing its estimate since fiscal year 2002. While OPM Reports on Its Own Initiative, It May Be Missing an Opportunity to Improve Official Time Reporting
According to OPM, the agency issues reports on agency use of official time on its own initiative to assist agencies with ensuring accountability in labor-management relations. OPM prepares for reporting on official time data by asking agencies to verify data that the agencies have previously provided to OPM through the EHRI database. OPM asks agencies to verify information such as number of hours used in each of the four categories of official time use and total hours. OPM does not follow up with individual agencies who submitted revised usage data to (1) determine the source of the differences, or (2) identify steps for improvements to future reporting through EHRI. Moreover, OPM’s guidelines instruct the agency on the importance of pursuing high-quality data and reliable information on program costs. The use of alternative cost estimation methodologies may result in a more representative estimate of actual costs. By not following up with agencies on data differences, OPM may be missing an opportunity to improve data quality on agency reporting through EHRI and enable a less labor intensive and more efficient process. OPM partially concurred with our first recommendation that the agency should consider other approaches to developing its cost estimate. OPM stated that it will work with agencies to identify opportunities which they may wish to consider in order to increase the efficiency of data collection and reporting of official time through EHRI. Specifically, this report (1) describes the extent to which 10 selected agencies reported using official time; (2) assesses the extent to which OPM’s cost estimate for official time aligns with leading cost estimation practices; (3) examines OPM reporting on official time; and (4) determines the extent to which selected agencies vary in their approach for managing official time and related internal control practices, and describes reported benefits. We selected the 10 agencies using the following factors: (1) the number of bargaining unit (BU) employees, (2) agency size, (3) rate of official time use, (4) the number of BUs and unions represented at the agency, and (5) the amount of reported agency salary costs associated with official time (see table 10 for agencies and data on selected criteria). | Why GAO Did This Study
Official time is time spent by federal employees performing certain union representational activities, such as negotiations and handling grievances. Employees on official time are treated as if they are in a duty status and are paid accordingly. OPM's estimated total payroll costs, salary and benefits, for fiscal year 2012 official time hours was over $156 million and covered more than 1.2 million employees. GAO was asked to review federal rules relating to the use of official time.
This report (1) describes the extent of official time use by 10 selected agencies; (2) assesses OPM's cost estimate for official time; and (3) examines OPM's reporting on official time. GAO obtained usage data from agencies and OPM's annual reports. For this study, GAO selected 10 agencies (National Science Foundation, Railroad Retirement Board, Social Security Administration, and the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Labor, Treasury, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs) representing 47 percent of BU employees covered by OPM's report. GAO's selection was based on factors such as agency size, number of BU employees, and official time rate.
What GAO Found
The ten agencies GAO reviewed reported using 2.5 million official time hours in fiscal year 2013 compared to about 2 million hours in fiscal year 2006. Although the total number of hours charged increased by 25 percent, 7 of the 10 selected agencies reported lower official time rates in fiscal year 2013 as compared to fiscal year 2006. Three agencies reported increased official time rates over the same period. Official time rates indicate the number of official time hours expended per bargaining unit (BU) employee and allow for meaningful comparisons over time. Declines in official time rates per BU employee ranged from about 30 minutes or less at several agencies to 2-1/2 fewer hours per BU employee at one agency. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) attributed changes in the number of hours, in part, to changes in the number of BU employees and the amount of collective bargaining negotiations. In total for fiscal year 2013, the 10 selected agencies reported that less than 2 percent of employees charged official time. During the same year, eight of the 10 agencies reported having employees who charged 100 percent of their duty time to official time; a total of 386 employees combined. Two agencies reported having no employees who charged 100 percent official time in fiscal year 2013.
OPM has historically estimated annual official time costs by using a simple computation—multiplying each agency's average salary as reported in its Enterprise Human Resources Integration (EHRI) database for BU employees covered by official time activities by the agency's total reported official time hours. GAO computed its own cost estimate using an alternative methodology that used actual salary data of BU employees who in fact charged official time and multiplied this amount by the agency total reported official time hours used for each individual. GAO computed a cost estimate for the 6 of our 10 selected agencies that report through EHRI. GAO found that its cost estimate for these 6 agencies yielded an estimate that was about $5 million more than the estimate using OPM's methodology ($61 million versus $56 million, or a difference of about 9 percent). Further, cost estimates using GAO's methodology at 4 of the 6 agencies were higher by 15 percent or more than the estimates using OPM's methodology. A government-wide cost estimate could be higher or lower if this methodology was applied to all agencies. OPM said reporting on official time is not a priority at this time and they have used the same methodology for preparing its cost estimate since fiscal year 2002. Use of other methodologies may result in a more representative estimate of actual cost.
OPM issues reports on official time to assist agencies with ensuring accountability in labor-management relations. It reports on official time usage government-wide. OPM asks agencies to verify data that OPM obtains through its EHRI database. According to OPM, at least half of the about 50 agencies that report official time data through EHRI report differences with the EHRI data and provide revised official time data to OPM. While OPM reports the corrected data, it does not follow-up with agencies to determine the source of data differences. Its guidelines state the importance of pursuing high quality data, reliable data on program costs. By not following up with agencies on data differences, OPM may be missing an opportunity to improve data quality on agency reporting through EHRI and enable a less labor intensive and more efficient process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that OPM (1) consider other approaches to developing its cost estimate and (2) work with agencies to identify opportunities to increase efficiency of data collection and reporting through EHRI. OPM partially concurred but raised questions about implementation costs and limits to its authority. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-09-260 | gao_GAO-09-260_0 | The scale and performance of FOIA processing vary across the department. DHS Has Taken Several Key Steps to Enhance Its FOIA Program
In response to Executive Order 13392, DHS and its major components have taken steps to enhance the department’s program. DHS developed an improvement plan that included goals focused on eliminating its backlog of overdue requests, implementing enhanced training requirements, and deploying advanced technology. In addition, the DHS Privacy Office initiated several actions to ensure policy compliance and provide oversight of individual components, such as developing a departmentwide handbook, completing file reviews at each component, monitoring monthly data processing statistics, and instituting training for affected employees. USSS reported a 23 percent reduction in its backlog of overdue requests since September 2006, reducing the number of overdue requests by 170. Opportunities Exist for DHS to Further Improve FOIA Processing within Its Components
DHS components and other federal agencies have identified key practices they have adopted to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of their request-processing operations. These key practices include internal monitoring and oversight to help reduce component backlogs, specialized training within components, providing requesters with online access to information concerning the status of their requests, releasing records in an electronic format, and the use of electronic redaction. Likewise, within DHS, three of the seven major DHS components have reported implementing mechanisms for monitoring the processing of information requests. Providing Request Status Information Online Could Enhance Staff Productivity and Customer Service at DHS Components
Based on experience at a major DHS component, providing requesters with online access to information concerning the status of their requests can contribute to improved customer service and staff productivity. DOJ has used electronic dissemination to improve the efficiency of its processing. By consistently implementing these practices across all major departmental components, DHS is likely to be able to further reduce its backlog, increase efficiency, improve customer service, and respond to FOIA requests in a more timely fashion. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the department’s FOIA program, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following five actions: Direct the FOIA Officers at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, and United States Coast Guard to consider establishing monitoring and oversight mechanisms to help reduce the backlog of overdue requests. Our specific objectives were to determine (1) what key steps DHS has taken to improve its FOIA program, and (2) what opportunities, if any, exist to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of FOIA operations across the department. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires federal agencies to generally provide the public with access to government information. In December 2005, the President issued Executive Order 13392, to improve agencies' FOIA processing. The order required each agency to review its operations and develop plans for improvement. Since its establishment, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has accounted for a major and increasing portion of pending FOIA requests governmentwide. While it has reported achieving a notable reduction since 2006, DHS still possesses the largest backlog of overdue requests in the government. GAO was asked to determine (1) what key steps DHS has taken to enhance its FOIA program, and (2) what opportunities exist to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of FOIA operations across the department. To do this, GAO reviewed DHS's improvement plan; examined policies, procedures, and other documentation; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken steps to enhance its FOIA program. DHS developed an improvement plan that focused on eliminating its backlog of overdue requests, implementing enhanced training requirements, and deploying more advanced technology. Further, the DHS Privacy Office has initiated actions to ensure policy compliance and provide oversight of FOIA operations throughout the department's component agencies, including developing a departmentwide handbook, monitoring monthly data processing statistics, and instituting relevant training for employees. As a result, DHS has reported reducing its backlog by about 24 percent since implementing its plan. However, opportunities exist for DHS to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of FOIA processing across the department. Specifically, implementation of the following practices could facilitate the processing of information requests at a number of its major components: (1) Internal monitoring and oversight. Establishing mechanisms for monitoring and oversight of processing efficiency may help reduce the backlog of open requests. (2) Component-specific training. Component-specific training could enhance the efficiency of processing within component agencies. (3) Online status-checking services. Providing requesters with online access to information concerning the status of their requests could contribute to better customer service and higher staff productivity. (4) Electronic dissemination of records. Releasing records in an electronic format could provide cost savings and increase efficiency. (5) Electronic redaction. By adopting electronic redaction more broadly, DHS may be able to reduce the staff time otherwise spent manually redacting records, while also improving the consistency of its responses to requests. By implementing these practices--which are already being used by certain DHS components and other agencies--across major DHS components, the department could further reduce its backlog, increase efficiency, improve customer service, and respond to information requests in a more timely fashion |
gao_NSIAD-97-49 | gao_NSIAD-97-49_0 | Provide quality service 2. Provide best value moving services to the government. MTMC’s proposal also detailed DOD’s movement and storage requirements, shipment origins (all areas of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida) and destinations (13 regions in the contiguous 48 states and 5 regions in Europe), categories of shipments (household goods and unaccompanied baggage) that would and would not be handled under the pilot test, minimum contractor personnel requirements, specific tasks that were to be performed, length of the contract (1 year plus an unspecified number of option years), the way offerors should specify price for each traffic channel (expressed as a discount percentage using the commercial rate tariff for domestic shipments and a fixed dollar and cents per hundredweight rate for international shipments), the accessorial services DOD would be requiring, contractor’s liability and loss and damage claims procedures (full value protection based on certain minimum declared valuations subject to an overall cap), contractor’s required quality assurance procedures (use of a customer survey), certain performance standards for shipment pickup and delivery, and the invoicing and payment process. Assessment of Proposals: Equal Extent
Both proposals are likely to equally achieve 4 of the 10 goals of the program. Assessment of Proposals: Greater and Lesser Extent
MTMC’s proposal meets 5 of the 10 goals for reengineering the personal property program to a greater extent than the industry plan. The goals are providing quality service (goal 1), providing best value (goal 10), simplifying the system (goal 7), adopting corporate business practices (goal 5), and ensuring capacity to meet DOD’s needs (goal 8). Therefore, we believe MTMC’s proposal would achieve the goal of quality service and best value to a greater extent than the industry proposal. Award would be made only to responsible offerors whose offers conformed to the solicitation and represented the best overall value to the government, price and other evaluation criteria considered. Consequently, MTMC would not have opportunity to assess a prospective contractor’s plan to improve the quality prior to contract award and would limit MTMC’s ability to assess the trade-offs between price and technical factors. This could lead to more stability and provide leverage leading to cost efficiencies for both the carriers and DOD. Industry’s proposal specifically excludes relocation company participation unless such companies are licensed carriers or forwarders. Matter for Congressional Consideration
We support moving forward with the pilot test of a reengineered personal property program because it will provide the necessary data to ultimately design an improved system. In addition, it is important that performance standards be developed and data gathered in a way that enables measurable results of the program, particularly as they relate to quality of service and small business participation. If the Congress still has concerns about the impact on small business, piloting both proposals is an option. However, doing this would likely place an additional administrative and costly burden on MTMC and could delay implementation of the program. Thus, they believe that MTMC’s proposal represents a joint DOD/industry proposal. Overall, we continue to believe that MTMC’s proposal provides a greater opportunity than the industry proposal to achieve the program goals and that the pilot should not be delayed any further. Background on the Military Traffic Management Command’s Pilot Test Initiative to Reengineer DOD’s Personal Property Program
Department of Defense’s Reengineering Initiative
On June 21, 1994, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, directed the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Army component of the U.S. Transportation Command and program manager for the Department of Defense (DOD) Personal Property Shipment and Storage Program, to reengineer the personal property program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Military Traffic Management Command's (MTMC) and the moving industry's proposals for reengineering the Department of Defense's (DOD) personal property program, focusing on the extent to which each proposal met DOD/industry goals for a reengineered personal property program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) GAO's assessment shows that MTMC's proposal meets the goals for reengineering the personal property program to a greater extent than the industry plan; (2) both proposals are likely to equally achieve several of the 10 goals of the program, but overall, MTMC's proposal appears more likely to achieve the program goals to a greater extent; (3) MTMC's approach to providing quality service would give DOD the opportunity to assess a prospective contractor's plan to improve the quality of the service prior to contract awards; (4) this would enable MTMC to determine best value to the government by assessing the trade-off between price and technical factors; that is, award would be made only to responsible offerors whose proposals represent the best overall value to the government in terms of: (a) the offeror's proposed approach to performing the work; (b) past performance; (c) subcontracting plan; and (d) price, which would be one evaluation criterion and would not provide the primary basis for award; (5) GAO believes determining best value is an essential element of providing higher quality service to servicemembers; (6) the industry's proposal, which provides for selecting contractors initially on price, then quality after the carrier or forwarder has already handled DOD traffic, does not provide for assessment of quality up front using the criteria MTMC has proposed to use; (7) MTMC's approach to simplifying the system and adopting corporate business practices would enable DOD to dramatically reduce the number of contractors it must use, which would simplify contractor selection and could lead to more stability and provide leverage leading to cost efficiencies for both contractors and DOD; (8) the industry's proposal, though it changes the existing program to some extent, still retains a process in which DOD has to distribute traffic to many different carriers and forwarders; (9) overall, GAO believes that MTMC's proposal provides a greater opportunity than the industry proposal to achieve the program goals; (10) GAO supports moving forward with the pilot test without further delay, since a pilot test is essential to gathering the necessary data to ultimately design the reengineered personal property program; (11) in addition, it is important that performance standards be developed and data gathered in such a way to ensure measurable results of the pilot, particularly as it relates to quality of service and small business participation; and (12) if the Congress still has concerns about the impact on small business, piloting both proposals is an option; however, doing this would likely place an additional administrative and costly burden on MTMC and could delay implementation of the program. |
gao_GAO-06-647 | gao_GAO-06-647_0 | Specifically, agencies were required to determine, for each of their high risk projects, whether the project was meeting one or more of four performance evaluation criteria: (1) establishing baselines with clear cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) maintaining the project’s cost and schedule variances within 10 percent; (3) assigning a qualified project manager; and (4) avoiding duplication by leveraging inter-agency and governmentwide investments. Federal Agencies Identified 226 Projects as High Risk
In response to OMB’s August 2005 memorandum, as of March 2006, the 24 CFO agencies identified 226 IT projects as high risk, totaling about $6.4 billion and representing about 10 percent of the President’s total IT budget request for fiscal year 2007. About 70 percent of the projects identified were reported as high risk because their delay or failure would impact the agency’s essential business functions. The majority of the agencies reported that their high risk projects did not have performance shortfalls in any of the four areas identified by OMB. Processes Exist to Identify and Oversee High Risk Projects, but Opportunities Exist to Improve These Processes
Although agencies, with OMB’s assistance, generally identified their high risk projects by evaluating their IT portfolio against the four criteria specified by OMB, the criteria were not always consistently applied. In addition, OMB did not define a process for updating the list. OMB staff perform their oversight of high risk projects by reviewing the quarterly performance reports, but they do not have a single aggregate list to analyze projects and for tracking progress on a governmentwide basis. For projects without shortfalls, officials stated that while the memorandum does not direct agencies to submit these reports, agencies communicate the status of these projects to the appropriate officials. High Risk and Management Watch List Projects Identified Using Different Criteria
The high risk projects and Management Watch List projects are identified using different sets of criteria. Nevertheless, both types of projects require close attention because of their importance in supporting critical functions and the likelihood that performance problems associated with them could potentially result in billions of taxpayers’ dollars being wasted if they are not detected early. As a result, projects that appear to be high risk were not always identified as such. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) provide a summary of high risk projects that identifies by agency the number of high risk projects, their proposed budget for fiscal year 2007, agency reasons for the high risk designation, and reported performance shortfalls; (2) determine how high risk projects were identified and updated and what processes and procedures have been established to effectively oversee them; and (3) determine the relationship between the high risk list and OMB’s Management Watch List. Corrective actions not reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum directing agencies to identify high risk information technology (IT) projects and provide quarterly reports on those with performance shortfalls--projects that did not meet criteria established by OMB. GAO was asked to (1) provide a summary identifying by agency the number of high risk projects, their proposed budget for fiscal year 2007, agency reasons for the high risk designation, and reported performance shortfalls; (2) determine how high risk projects were identified and updated and what processes and procedures have been established to effectively oversee them; and (3) determine the relationship between the high risk list and OMB's Management Watch List--those projects that OMB determines need improvements associated with key aspects of their budget justifications.
What GAO Found
In response to OMB's August 2005 memorandum, the 24 major agencies identified 226 IT projects as high risk, totaling about $6.4 billion in funding requested for fiscal year 2007. Agencies identified most projects as high risk because their delay or failure would impact the essential business functions of the agency. In addition, agencies reported that about 35 percent of the high risk projects--or 79 investments--had a performance shortfall, meaning the project did not meet one or more of these four criteria: establishing clear baselines, maintaining cost and schedule variances within 10 percent, assigning a qualified project manager, and avoiding duplication with other investments. Although agencies, with OMB's assistance, generally evaluated their IT portfolio against the criteria specified by OMB to identify their high risk projects, the criteria were not always consistently applied. Accordingly, GAO identified several projects that appeared to meet OMB's definition for high risk but were not determined by agencies to be high risk. In addition, OMB does not define a process for updating high risk projects. As a result, agencies had inconsistent updating procedures. Regarding oversight of these projects, agencies either established special procedures or used their existing investment management processes. OMB staff stated that they review the projects' performance and corrective actions planned. However, OMB has not compiled the projects into a single aggregate list, which would serve as a tool to analyze and track the projects on a governmentwide basis. High risk projects and Management Watch List projects are identified using different criteria. The former is meant to track the management and performance of projects, while the latter focuses on an agency's project planning. Both sets of projects require attention because of their importance in supporting critical functions and the likelihood that their performance problems could potentially result in billions of taxpayers' dollars being wasted if the problems are not detected early. |
gao_GAO-14-378 | gao_GAO-14-378_0 | MIPPA requires CMS to oversee the accrediting organizations and authorizes CMS to modify the list of selected accrediting organizations, if necessary. Federal regulations specify that CMS may conduct “validation audits” of accredited ADI suppliers and provide for the withdrawal of CMS approval of an accrediting organization at any time if CMS determines that the organization no longer adequately ensures that ADI suppliers meet or exceed Medicare requirements. According to CMS officials, five full-time staff are budgeted to oversee and develop standards for the ADI accreditation requirement.report was issued in May 2013, CMS has begun to gather input from stakeholders on the development of national standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers, which it intends to develop by the end of 2014. CMS implemented additional changes to Medicare payment policy to help ensure appropriate payment for ADI services, which had the effect of reducing Medicare payment for certain imaging services. Effect of Accreditation Requirement on Access to Advanced Diagnostic Imaging in Office Settings Is Unclear in Context of Other Policy Changes
We found that the number of ADI services provided to Medicare beneficiaries in the office setting—an indicator of access to those services—began declining before and continued declining after the accreditation requirement went into effect on January 1, 2012 (see fig. In particular, the rate of decline from 2009 to 2010 was similar to the rate from 2011 to 2012 for the CT; MRI; and NM, including PET, services in our analysis. These results suggest that the overall decline was driven, at least in part, by factors other than accreditation. The percentage decline in the number of ADI services provided in the office setting was generally similar in both urban and rural areas during the period we studied, although we found that substantially more services were provided in urban areas than in rural areas (see fig. The effect of accreditation on access—as illustrated by our analysis of the trends in ADI services in the office setting—is unclear in the context of recent policy and payment changes as well as other factors affecting the use of imaging services. In addition, CMS implemented a 25 percent payment reduction for the professional component of certain CT and MRI services under the MPPR, effective January 1, 2012—the same date the accreditation requirement went into effect. These policies may have had a spillover effect on Medicare, thus contributing to the decline in ADI services provided to Medicare beneficiaries from 2009 to 2012. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review to the Department of Health and Human Services, and the agency stated that it had no comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) required that beginning January 1, 2012, suppliers that produce the images for Medicare-covered ADI services in office settings, such as physician offices, be accredited by an organization approved by CMS. MIPPA mandated that GAO issue two reports on the effect of the accreditation requirement. The first report, issued in 2013, assessed CMS's standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers and its oversight of the accreditation requirement.
In this report, GAO examined the effect the accreditation requirement may have had on beneficiary access to ADI services provided in the office setting. To do this, GAO examined trends in the use of the three ADI modalities—CT; MRI; and NM, including PET—provided to Medicare beneficiaries from 2009 through 2012 that were subject to the ADI accreditation requirement. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, representatives of the Intersocietal Accreditation Commission and the American College of Radiology—the two CMS-approved accrediting organizations that accounted for about 99 percent of all accredited suppliers as of January 2013; and 19 accredited ADI suppliers that reflected a range of geographic areas, imaging services provided, and accrediting organizations used. In addition, GAO reviewed relevant literature to understand the context of any observed changes in ADI services throughout the period studied.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the number of advanced diagnostic imaging (ADI) services provided to Medicare beneficiaries in the office setting—an indicator of access to those services—began declining before and continued declining after the accreditation requirement went into effect on January 1, 2012. In particular, the rate of decline from 2009 to 2010 was similar to the rate from 2011 to 2012 for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI); computed tomography (CT); and nuclear medicine (NM), including positron emission tomography (PET) services. These results suggest that the overall decline was driven, at least in part, by factors other than accreditation. The percentage decline in the number of ADI services provided in the office setting was generally similar in both urban and rural areas during the period GAO studied.
The effect of accreditation on access is unclear in the context of recent policy and payment changes implemented by Medicare and private payers. For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) reduced Medicare payment for certain CT and MRI services, which could have contributed to the decline in the number of these services. Officials from CMS, representatives from the accrediting organizations, and accredited ADI suppliers GAO interviewed suggested that any effect of the accreditation requirement on access was likely limited.
The Department of Health and Human Services stated that it had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_GAO-12-567T | gao_GAO-12-567T_0 | Background
Section 550 of the DHS appropriations act for fiscal year 2007 requires DHS to issue regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for the security of facilities that the Secretary determines to present high levels of security risk, among other things. The CFATS rule was published in April 2007 and Appendix A to the rule, published in November 2007, listed 322 chemicals of interest and the screening threshold quantities for each.implementing DHS’s CFATS rule, including assessing potential risks and identifying high-risk chemical facilities, promoting effective security planning, and ensuring that final high-risk facilities meet the applicable risk-based performance standards though site security plans approved by DHS. From fiscal years 2007 through 2012, DHS dedicated about $442 million to the CFATS program. Senior ISCD Leaders Developed the ISCD Memorandum to Highlight Various Challenges Hindering CFATS Implementation
ISCD’s Memorandum Based Largely on Observations of Senior ISCD Managers
Our review of the ISCD memorandum and discussions with ISCD officials showed that the memorandum was developed during the latter part of 2011 and was developed primarily based on discussions with ISCD staff and the observations of the ISCD former Director in consultation with the former Deputy Director. ISCD Management Was Concerned That Challenges Place the CFATS Program at Risk
The ISCD memorandum discussed numerous challenges that, according to the former Director, pose a risk to the program. In addition, the memorandum provided a detailed discussion of the issues or problems facing ISCD, grouped into three categories: (1) human capital management, such as poor staffing decisions; (2) mission issues, such as the lack of an established inspection process; and (3) administrative issues, such as a lack of infrastructure and support, both within ISCD and on the part of NPPD and IP. ISCD Has Begun to Take Various Actions Intended to Address Challenges Identified
ISCD’s Action Plan Included Time Frames and Appears to be Helping Address Some Legacy Issues
ISCD is using an action plan to track its progress addressing the challenges identified in the memorandum, and, according to senior division officials, the plan may be helping them address some legacy issues that staff were attempting to deal with before the memorandum was developed. They said that they agreed that actions being taken in the plan were needed to resolve challenges facing ISCD. ISCD’s June 2012 Plan Update Showed 38 Action Items Completed
Our analysis of the June 2012 version of the ISCD action plan showed that 40 percent of the items in the plan (38 of 94) had been completed. The remaining 60 percent (56 of 94) were in progress. For the remaining 56 items that were in progress as of June 2012, 40 involved human capital management and administrative issues. Action Plan Performance Measures Could Help Gauge Progress
ISCD, through its action plan, appears to be heading in the right direction towards addressing the challenges identified, but it is too early to tell if the action plan is having the desired effect because (1) the division had only recently completed some action items and continues to work on completing more than half of the others, some of which entail long-term changes, and (2) ISCD had not yet developed an approach for measuring the results of its efforts. The agency concurred with our recommendation and developed a new action item (number 95) intended to develop metrics for measuring, where practical, results of efforts to implement action plan items, including processes for periodic monitoring and indicators for corrective actions. ISCD Officials Stated That Almost Half of the Action Items Required Collaboration with or Action by NPPD or IP
According to ISCD officials, almost half of the action items included in the June 2012 action plan either require ISCD to collaborate with NPPD and IP or require NPPD and IP to take action to address the challenges identified in the ISCD memorandum. NPPD, IP, and ISCD officials have been working together to identify solutions to the challenges the memorandum identified and to close pertinent action items. This includes collaborating with NPPD officials representing the NPPD human capital, facilities, and employee and labor relations offices, among others, and with IP’s Directorate of Management Office. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements
For information about this statement please contact Cathleen A. Berrick, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
The events of September 11, 2001, triggered a national re-examination of the security of facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals in quantities that, in the event of a terrorist attack, could put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious injury or death. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS program to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD, a division of IP, manages the program. A November 2011 internal ISCD memorandum, prepared by ISCD senior managers, expressed concerns about the management of the program. This statement addresses (1) how the memorandum was developed and any challenges identified, (2) what actions are being taken in response to any challenges identified, and (3) the extent to which ISCDs proposed solutions require collaboration with NPPD or IP. GAOs comments are based on recently completed work analyzing the memorandum and related actions. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, DHSs internal memorandum and action plans, and related documents, and interviewed DHS officials.
In a July 2012 report, GAO recommended that ISCD explore opportunities to develop measures, where practical, to determine where actual performance deviates from expected results. ISCD concurred and has taken action to address the recommendation.
What GAO Found
The November 2011 memorandum that discussed the management of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program was prepared based primarily on the observations of the former Director of the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), a division of the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The memorandum was intended to highlight various challenges that have hindered ISCD efforts to implement the CFATS program. According to the former Director, the challenges facing ISCD included not having a fully developed direction and plan for implementing the program, hiring staff without establishing need, and inconsistent ISCD leadershipfactors that the Director believed place the CFATS program at risk. These challenges centered on three main areas: (1) human capital issues, including problems hiring, training, and managing ISCD staff; (2) mission issues, including problems reviewing facility plans to mitigate security vulnerabilities; and (3) administrative issues, including concerns about NPPD and IP not supporting ISCDs management and administrative functions.
ISCD has begun to take various actions intended to address the issues identified in the ISCD memorandum and has developed a 94-item action plan to track its progress. According to ISCD managers, the plan appears to be a catalyst for addressing some of the long-standing issues the memorandum identified. As of June 2012, ISCD reported that 40 percent (38 of 94) of the items in the plan had been completed. These include directing ISCD managers to meet with staff to involve them in addressing challenges, clarifying priorities, and changing ISCDs culture; and developing a proposal to establish a quality control function over compliance activities. The remaining 60 percent (56 of 94) that were in progress include those requiring longer-term effortsi.e., streamlining the process for reviewing facility security plans and developing facility inspection processes; those requiring completion of other items in the plan; or those awaiting action by others, such as approvals by ISCD leadership. ISCD appears to be heading in the right direction, but it is too early to tell if corrective actions are having their desired effect because ISCD is in the early stages of implementing them and has not yet established performance measures to assess results.
According to ISCD officials, almost half of the action items included in the June 2012 action plan require ISCD collaboration with or action by NPPD and IP. The ISCD memorandum stated that IP and NPPD did not provide the support needed to manage the CFATS program when the program was first under development. ISCD, IP, and NPPD officials confirmed that IP and NPPD are now providing needed support and stated that the action plan prompted them to work together to address the various human capital and administrative issues identified. |
gao_GAO-04-125T | gao_GAO-04-125T_0 | At that time, the Spokane tribe, as well as the Colville tribes, were pursuing other avenues for compensation of water power values. Under the settlement with the Colville tribe, Bonneville has made annual payments since 1996 that have ranged from about $14 million to $21 million. Using this rule, we estimate that a settlement with Spokane that is equivalent to 40 percent of the Colville settlement would lead to an increase in rates of less than 20 cents per month per household for a typical household relying solely on power from Bonneville, or a 0.5 percent increase in rates over current levels. Although the magnitude of the rate increase necessary to fund a settlement with the Spokane tribe would be small, it comes at a time when Bonneville’s customers have recently faced large rate increases. On October 1, 2003, Bonneville raised its rates a further 2.2 percent. Therefore, because the bulk of Bonneville’s obligations in any settlement similar to the Colville settlement will occur in the future, Bonneville’s current financial difficulties should not unduly influence current discussions about how to compensate the Spokane tribe. A Reasonable Case Can Be Made for Adopting the Colville Model in Allocating Any Costs Associated with a Settlement for the Spokane Tribe
A reasonable case can be made for having Bonneville and the U.S. Treasury allocate any costs for the Spokane tribe’s claims along the lines agreed to for the Colville tribes. Under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, licenses for the development of privately owned hydropower projects should include a “reasonable annual charge” for the use of Indian lands.Originally, the Grand Coulee site was licensed, and the Spokane tribe expected to receive annual payments for its lands used for the project. However, the license was cancelled when the federal government took over the project (federalized the project). This settlement was a compromise to split the costs between Bonneville and the U.S. Treasury. Bonneville is primarily paying the recurring annual payments, and the U.S. Treasury’s Judgment Fund provided the one-time lump sum payment in settlement of the past annual payments—$53 million. Nevertheless, since Bonneville collects the annual revenues for the electricity generated by the dam, it could be argued that Bonneville should make annual payments to the Spokane tribe out of those revenues, as it does for the Colville tribes; the U.S. Treasury would then pay a lump sum to settle any claims for past years. 1753, and previous House and Senate settlement proposals introduced in the 106th and 107th Congresses directed the settlement costs to be split between Bonneville and the U.S. Treasury. In conclusion, since the Spokane tribe missed its opportunity to file claims with the Indian Claims Commission for its fisheries and water power values, it is unlikely that the tribe’s claims and any associated settlement or final resolution will move forward in any meaningful way without some form of congressional intervention. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Grand Coulee Dam was constructed on the Columbia River in northeastern Washington State from 1933 to 1942. The reservoir behind the dam covers land on the Colville Reservation along the Columbia River and land on the adjacent Spokane Reservation along both the Columbia and Spokane rivers. Under a 1940 act, the federal government paid $63,000 and $4,700 to the Colville and Spokane tribes, respectively, for the land used for the dam and reservoir. Subsequently, the Colville tribes pursued additional claims for their lost fisheries and for "water power values" and in 1994 were awarded a lump sum payment of $53 million and, beginning in 1996, annual payments that have ranged between $14 million to $21 million. The Spokane tribe is currently pursuing similar claims. S. 1438, introduced in July 2003, is a proposed legislative settlement for the Spokane tribe's claims. While settlement proposals introduced in the 106th and 107th Congresses directed the settlement costs to be split between Bonneville and the Treasury, S. 1438 provides that the settlement be paid entirely from the Treasury. This statement for the record addresses the (1) impact of a settlement on Bonneville if the costs were split between Bonneville and the Treasury and (2) possible allocation of these costs between Bonneville and the Treasury.
What GAO Found
A settlement with the Spokane tribe along the lines provided to the Colville tribes would likely necessitate a small increase in Bonneville's rates for power. While the rate increase would amount to less than 20 cents per month per household, it comes at a time when (1) Bonneville's customers have already absorbed rate increases, including those announced on October 1, 2003, of over 40 percent and (2) the economy of the northwestern region, Bonneville's primary service area, is experiencing difficulties. However, the bulk of Bonneville's obligations in any settlement similar to the Colville settlement will occur in the future, when the conditions causing Bonneville's current financial difficulties--such as costly long-term contracts to purchase power from other suppliers--will probably have abated. Therefore, Bonneville's current financial difficulties should not unduly influence current discussions about how to compensate the Spokane tribe. A reasonable case can be made to settle the Spokane tribe's case along the lines of the Colville settlement--a one-time payment from the U.S. Treasury for past lost payments for water power values and annual payments primarily from Bonneville. Bonneville continues to earn revenues from the Spokane Reservation lands used to generate hydropower. However, unlike the Colville tribes, the Spokane tribe does not benefit from these revenues. Spokane does not benefit because it missed its filing opportunity before the Indian Claims Commission. At that time, it was pursuing other avenues to win payments for the value of its land for hydropower. These efforts would ultimately fail. Without congressional action, it seems unlikely that a settlement for the Spokane tribe will occur. |
gao_GAO-17-77 | gao_GAO-17-77_0 | Progressively more detailed descriptions of the system design are established in what systems engineering literature refers to as configuration baselines. Four Factors Frame the Challenge Posed by Requirements, and Detailed Systems Engineering Is Key to Knowing Whether and How the Challenge Can Be Met
Our analysis of nine selected DOD programs, supported by our previous work examining best practices for product development, identified four key factors that provide insight into the challenge posed by a system’s top-level capability requirements and the related risk. Systems engineering is the primary means for determining whether and how the challenge posed by a program’s requirements can be met with available resources. It is a disciplined learning process that translates capability requirements into specific design features and thus identifies key risks to be resolved. Our prior best practices work has indicated that if detailed systems engineering is done before the start of product development, the program can resolve these risks through trade-offs and additional investments, ensuring that risks have been sufficiently retired or that they are clearly understood and adequately resourced if they are being carried forward. This practice was also emphasized by Congress in the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, which required programs to hold a preliminary design review or obtain a waiver prior to starting a development program. Our analysis of development cost and schedule data for the nine case studies shows that, as of December 2015, about half of the programs had reported relatively good development cost and schedule outcomes, while the others had experienced significant cost and schedule growth (see table 2). Finally, the three programs in our sample that began development with challenging requirements and had done little systems engineering generally reported poor outcomes. The Air Force planned an incremental acquisition approach focused on integrating mature military technologies onto a commercial aircraft derivative design. With all of the detailed systems engineering done before development started, risks were understood. P-8A Increment I experienced some cost and schedule growth. When development began, DOD planned to achieve full capability using a single-step acquisition approach and the F-35’s critical technologies were immature. A particular challenge for Congress is the fact that committees must often consider requests to authorize and fund a new program well ahead of the start of product development—the point at which key business case information would be presented. The nine case studies we examined for this report suggest that understanding the dynamic between program requirements, risks, and the requisite systems engineering analysis can facilitate early oversight. Specifically, when the top-level requirements for what could be a new major weapon system are initially identified in a draft Capability Development Document, the challenge those requirements pose and how it relates to the four factors we identified—acquisition approach, technology status, design maturity, and system interdependence—can be observed. While congressional insight at the time of the funding decision is limited, DOD policy directs program managers to provide certain documents to DOD decision makers that when taken together could provide a picture of a proposed program’s risk factors and systems engineering status. However, it is not clear whether Congress is given the same information DOD decision makers are given when DOD submits its budget request for funding to begin a new program. The case studies in this report illustrate a strong relationship between requirements, systems engineering, and program outcomes. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To enhance program oversight and provide more robust input to budget deliberations, Congress should consider requiring DOD to report on each major acquisition program’s systems engineering status in the department’s annual budget request, beginning with the budget requesting funds to start development. In its comments, DOD agreed that early systems engineering reduces risk and establishes a solid foundation for program success. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report (1) identifies a framework for assessing the challenges and risks associated with program requirements and the extent of systems engineering done before product development begins; (2) illustrates the relationship between systems engineering and program outcomes; and (3) assesses implications for program management and oversight. To assess the relationship between systems engineering and program outcomes, we analyzed requirements, cost, and schedule documentation for each of our case study programs, and then met with relevant program officials and prime contractors to obtain relevant program documents, data, and historical information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cost and schedule growth in DOD major defense acquisition programs persist, and some acquisition reform proponents believe such growth is due to unplanned changes in program requirements (commonly referred to as "requirements creep"). GAO found in June 2015 that cost and schedule growth are often more directly related to a lack of systems engineering, which, if done, would reduce risk by introducing discipline and rigor into the process of defining and understanding a program's initial requirements.
House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102 contained a provision for GAO to review the DOD requirements process. This report (1) identifies a framework for assessing the challenge posed by weapon system requirements and the extent of systems engineering done before product development begins; (2) illustrates the relationship between systems engineering and program outcomes; and (3) assesses implications for program oversight. GAO analyzed a non-generalizable sample of nine case studies. GAO assessed the extent to which systems engineering was conducted before development by reviewing program requirements and analyzing cost and schedule documentation for each case study. GAO also reviewed prior GAO work and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of nine case studies identified four factors that frame the challenge posed by a given weapon system's requirements: acquisition approach, technology status, design maturity, and system interdependency. Systems engineering is the primary means for determining whether and how that challenge can be met. It is a disciplined learning process that translates requirements into specific design features and thus identifies key risks to be resolved. GAO's prior best practices work has found that if detailed systems engineering is done early, a program can resolve such risks through trade-offs and additional investments before a program starts. A key point in systems engineering where this match can be assessed is the preliminary design. As shown below, establishing a preliminary design through early detailed systems engineering portends better program outcomes than doing so after program start.
GAO's analysis of selected Department of Defense (DOD) programs illustrates the relationship among the four factors, systems engineering, and program outcomes. Programs with modest requirements and early detailed systems engineering had better outcomes. For example, the Small Diameter Bomb Increment I program, which delivered within cost and schedule estimates, had an incremental approach, mature technologies, a derivative design, and detailed systems engineering before development began. Programs that began with more challenging requirements and insufficient systems engineering reported worse outcomes. For example, the F-35 Lightning II, which has encountered significant cost and schedule problems, began development with a single-step approach, a highly complex design, immature technologies, and little systems engineering.
Understanding the dynamic between a program's requirements, risks, and the requisite systems engineering effort has important implications for oversight. A particular challenge is that Congress often must consider requests to authorize and fund a new program in advance of the start of product development, when the business case would be better established. DOD policy requires that DOD decision makers have information about a proposed program's risk factors and systems engineering status, in a systems engineering plan, at the start of a new program. However, it is not clear whether Congress also has this information at that time. A systems engineering plan could provide more robust information to Congress when considering a budget request to start a new program. In commenting on a draft of this report DOD disagreed.
What GAO Recommends
To support oversight and inform budget decisions, Congress should consider requiring DOD to report on systems engineering status of each major acquisition program in the department's annual budget request. |
gao_GAO-16-465T | gao_GAO-16-465T_0 | CBP Has Deployed Resources to Secure the Southwest Border, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Measure Their Effectiveness
Border Patrol Scheduled Agents Differently across Sectors and Enforcement Activities, and Took Steps to Improve Data Measuring Overall Effectiveness
In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol’s evolving approach for deploying agents along the southwest border. Our analysis showed that in most southwest border sectors less than half of Border Patrol’s apprehensions and seizures were made within five miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. However, our analysis also showed that Border Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the border since the prior fiscal year. Further, we reported that Border Patrol sectors and stations tracked changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were being deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol headquarters. Since that time, DHS has reported the effectiveness rate in its Fiscal Year 2015- 2017 Annual Performance Report as a performance measure and method to publicly report results of its border security efforts on the southwest border. CBP Has Not Yet Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the Contributions of its Deployed Surveillance Technologies and Fencing
In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its management of the Plan and its various programs. CBP had identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. In November 2014, CBP officials stated that baselines for each performance measure were to be developed, at which time the agency was to begin using the data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology assets deployed under the Plan. Moreover, CBP plans to establish a tool by the end of fiscal year 2016 that explains the qualitative and quantitative impacts of technology and tactical infrastructure on situational awareness in specific areas of the border environment. While these are positive steps, until CBP completes its efforts to address our recommendation and fully develop and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan, it will not be able to fully assess its progress in implementing the Plan and determine when mission benefits have been fully realized. In September 2009, we recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and other infrastructure to border security. DHS concurred with our recommendation, and in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the Fiscal Year 2012- 2016 Strategic Plan
In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol’s efforts to develop performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border. Specifically, citing a need to establish a new border security goal and measure that reflected a more quantitative methodology as well as the department’s evolving vision for border control, DHS established the interim performance goal and measure of the number of apprehensions between the land border ports of entry until a new border control goal and measure could be developed. We testified in May 2012 that the interim goal and measure provided information on activity levels, but did not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore, until new goals and measures could be developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency was in the process of identifying performance goals and measures that could be linked to the new risk assessment tools that would show progress and status in securing the border between ports of entry, and determine needed resources, but had not established milestones and time frames for developing and implementing goals and measures because the agency’s time frames for implementing key elements of the plan were subject to change. We recommended in our December 2012 report that Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for developing a (1) performance goal, or goals, for border security between the ports of entry that defines how border security is to be measured and (2) performance measure, or measures—linked to a performance goal or goals—for assessing progress made in securing the border between ports of entry and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan, GAO-12-106R. | Why GAO Did This Study
The southwest border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, with DHS apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants, and making over 14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015. DHS has employed a variety of resources to help secure the border, including personnel, technology—such as cameras and sensors, tactical infrastructure—such as fencing and roads, and air and marine assets.
This statement discusses (1) DHS efforts to deploy resources on the southwest border and measure the effectiveness of these resources in securing the border, and (2) DHS efforts to develop performance goals and measures for achieving situational awareness and border security. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from September 2009 through May 2015, with selected updates through February 2016 on DHS enforcement efforts and actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the updates, GAO interviewed agency officials and reviewed related documentation.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has taken action to deploy various resources—including agents and technology—along the southwest border and assess those resources' contributions to border security. For example, in December 2012, GAO reported that CBP's Border Patrol scheduled agents for deployment differently across southwest border locations, and although in most locations less than half of Border Patrol apprehensions were made within five miles of the border in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the border since the prior fiscal year. GAO also reported in December 2012, that Border Patrol tracked changes in the effectiveness rate for response to illegal activity across border locations to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were deployed and used effectively, and took steps to improve the data quality issues that had precluded comparing performance results across locations at the time of GAO's review. For example, Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 for collecting and reporting data with a more standardized and consistent approach. DHS has reported the effectiveness rate as a performance measure in its Fiscal Year 2015-2017 Annual Performance Report.
Further, in March 2014, GAO reported that CBP had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that CBP could strengthen its management and assessment of the plan's programs. GAO reported that while CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies to be deployed under the plan, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics to identify the technologies' individual and collective contribution, as GAO had recommended in 2011. GAO also reported in 2014 that CBP officials stated that baselines for each performance measure would be developed and that by the end of fiscal year 2016, CBP would establish a tool to explain the impact of technology and infrastructure on situational awareness in the border environment. CBP should complete these actions in order to fully assess its progress in implementing the plan and determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.
In December 2012, GAO reported on Border Patrol's efforts to develop performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and informing the identification and allocation of border security resources. GAO reported that DHS had transitioned from a goal and measure related to the capability to detect, respond to, and address cross-border illegal activity to an interim performance goal and measure of apprehensions between the land border ports of entry beginning fiscal year 2011. GAO reported that this interim goal and measure did not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, limiting DHS and congressional oversight and accountability. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation that CBP develop milestones and time frames for the development of border security goals and measures and Border Patrol works to define a new overarching performance goal for achieving a low-risk border and develop associated performance measures. CBP should complete these actions in order to fully assess its capabilities and progress to secure the border.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made recommendations for DHS to, among other things, (1) strengthen its management of technology plans and programs and (2) establish milestones and time frames for the development of border security goals and measures. DHS generally agreed and has actions underway to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-943T | gao_GAO-03-943T_0 | New Circular Provides an Improved Foundation for Competitive Sourcing Decisions
Following a yearlong study, the Commercial Activities Panel in April 2002 reported its findings on competitive sourcing in the federal government. Chief among these was a recommendation that public- private competitions be conducted using the framework of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). As I noted previously, the new A-76 Circular is generally consistent with the Commercial Activities Panel’s sourcing principles and recommendations and, as such, provides an improved foundation for competitive sourcing decisions in the federal government. In particular, the new Circular permits: greater reliance on procedures contained in the FAR, which should result in a more transparent, simpler, and consistently applied competitive process, and source selection decisions based on tradeoffs between technical factors and cost. The new Circular also suggests potential use of alternatives to the competitive sourcing process, such as public-private and public-public partnerships and high-performing organizations. If effectively implemented, the new Circular should result in increased savings, improved performance, and greater accountability, regardless of the service provider selected. However, this competitive sourcing initiative is a major change in the way government agencies operate, and successful implementation of the Circular’s provisions will require that adequate support be made available to federal agencies and employees, especially if the time frames called for in the new Circular are to be achieved. Ultimate Success of Competitive Sourcing Will Depend on How It Is Implemented
Implementing the new Circular A-76 will likely be challenging for many agencies. GAO’s past work on the competitive sourcing program at the Department of Defense (DOD)— as well as agencies’ efforts governmentwide to improve acquisition, human capital, and information technology management—has identified practices that have either advanced these efforts or hindered them. The lessons learned from these experiences—especially those that demonstrate best competitive sourcing practices—could prove invaluable to agencies as they implement the provisions in the new Circular. A major challenge agencies will face will be meeting a 12-month limit for completing the standard competition process in the new Circular. This provision is intended to respond to complaints from all sides about the length of time taken to conduct A-76 cost comparisons—complaints that the Panel repeatedly heard in the course of its review. Even so, our studies of DOD competitive sourcing activities have found that competitions can take much longer than the time frames outlined in the new Circular. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In May 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a new Circular A-76--which sets forth the government's competitive sourcing process. Determining whether to obtain services in-house or through commercial contracts is an important economic and strategic decision for agencies, and the use of A-76 is expected to grow throughout the federal government. In the past, however, the A-76 process has been difficult to implement, and the impact on the morale of the federal workforce has been profound. Moreover, there have been concerns in both the public and private sectors about the timeliness and fairness of the process and the extent to which there is a "level playing field" for conducting public-private competitions. It was against this backdrop that the Congress enacted legislation mandating a study of the government's competitive sourcing process, which was carried out by the Commercial Activities Panel, which was chaired by the Comptroller General of the United States. This testimony focuses on how the new Circular addresses the Panel's recommendations with regard to providing a better foundation for competitive sourcing decisions, and the challenges agencies may face in implementing the new A-76.
What GAO Found
Overall, the new Circular is consistent with the principles and recommendations that the Commercial Activities Panel reported in April 2002, and should provide an improved foundation for competitive sourcing decisions in the federal government. In particular, the new Circular permits greater reliance on procedures in the Federal Acquisition Regulation--which should result in a more transparent and consistently applied competitive process--as well as source selection decisions based on tradeoffs between technical factors and cost. The new Circular also suggests potential use of alternatives to the competitive sourcing process, such as public-private and public-public partnerships and high-performing organizations. The new Circular should result in increased savings, improved performance, and greater accountability. However, this initiative is a major change in the way the government operates, and implementing the new Circular A-76 will likely be challenging for many agencies. A major challenge agencies will face will be meeting a 12-month limit for completing the standard competition process. This provision aims to respond to complaints about the length of time taken to conduct A-76 cost comparisons. However, GAO studies of competitive sourcing at the Department of Defense (DOD) have found that competitions can take much longer than 12 months. Other provisions in the new Circular may also prove burdensome in implementation. Lessons learned by DOD and other agencies as they initiate efforts to improve acquisition, human capital, and information technology management could prove invaluable as agencies implement the new A-76 provisions--especially those that demonstrate best competitive sourcing practices. Successful implementation of the Circular's provisions will also likely require additional financial and technical support and incentives. |
gao_GAO-09-834 | gao_GAO-09-834_0 | IPAWS is defined by FEMA as a “system of systems,” which is intended to eventually integrate existing and new alert systems, including EAS. Nonetheless, as we previously reported, EAS exhibits longstanding weaknesses that continue to limit its effectiveness. In particular, the reliability of the national-level relay system—which would be critical if the President were to issue a national-level alert— remains questionable due to a lack of redundancy among key broadcasters, gaps in coverage, insufficient testing of the relay system, and inadequate training of personnel. FEMA has several projects under way to address some of these weaknesses, but little progress has been made and EAS remains effectively unchanged since our last report, issued in March 2007. Further, effective public alerting via EAS is also hindered by its limited ability to target alert messages to specific geographic locations. Therefore, as state and local governments are forging ahead with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled and many of its functional goals have yet to reach operational capacity. Furthermore, FEMA does not report on IPAWS spending or progress in achieving goals, which limits transparency and accountability for program results. FEMA Has Begun Some Projects, but Has Yet to Integrate Alert Systems or Adopt New Technologies and Standards
Although IPAWS has existed since 2004 with the original objective of modernizing and integrating public alert and emergency warning systems across federal, state, and local governments, national-level alert system capabilities remain unchanged and have yet to be integrated. Shifting Program Vision and Lack of Continuity in Planning Have Adversely Affected Efforts to Modernize and Integrate Alerts
FEMA’s efforts to create an integrated and modernized alert and warning system have been affected by (1) shifting program vision, (2) a lack of continuity in planning and program direction, (3) a lack of collection or organization of program information from which to make management decisions, and (4) staff turnover. The current implementation plan, completed in June 2009, does not adequately satisfy the project management and planning practices essential for effective program execution. FEMA Faces Coordination Issues and Technical Challenges in Implementing IPAWS
FEMA faces coordination issues in successfully implementing IPAWS. FEMA also faces technical challenges related to integrating state and local systems; adopting standards; and the development of geo-targeted, risk-based, multilingual, and disabled population alerting capabilities. While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination, FEMA’s efforts to date have been insufficient, according to many stakeholders we contacted. For example, broadcaster associations and local government officials were unaware of IPAWS program goals and milestones. Developing and implementing tailored alerting: geo-targeted and risk- based alerting, alerts for individuals with disabilities, and multilingual alerts. However, the current CAP Profile under consideration does not address multiple languages or special needs. To help ensure system dependability, as IPAWS is developed and deployed, establish and implement a plan to verify (1) the dependability and effectiveness of systems used to disseminate alerts, and (2) that IPAWS participants have the training and technical skills to make use of IPAWS infrastructure and to issue effective public alerts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to provide information on issues relating to public alert and warning, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Integrated Public Alert and Warning program (IPAWS); specifically, (1) the operational capability of the nation’s current EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA’s efforts to modernize and integrate alert and warning systems, and (3) the issues and challenges involved in implementing an integrated public alert and warning system. Additionally, this report does not contain all of the results from the survey. We also conducted interviews with officials from state participants in FEMA’s IPAWS pilot programs and state emergency managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
A comprehensive system to alert the American people in times of hazard allows people to take action to save lives. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for the current Emergency Alert System (EAS) and the development of the new Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS). In this requested report, GAO examined (1) the current status of EAS, (2) the progress made by FEMA in implementing an integrated alert and warning system, and (3) the challenges involved in implementing an integrated alert and warning system. GAO conducted a survey of states, reviewed FEMA and other documentation, and interviewed industry stakeholders and officials from federal agencies responsible for public alerting.
What GAO Found
As the primary national-level public warning system, EAS is an important alert tool, but it exhibits longstanding weaknesses that limit its effectiveness. EAS allows state and local officials limited ability to produce public alerts via television and radio. Weaknesses with EAS include lack of reliability of the message distribution system; gaps in coverage; insufficient testing; and inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS provides little capability to alert specific geographic areas. EAS does not ensure message delivery for individuals with hearing and vision disabilities, and non-English speakers. FEMA has projects under way to address some of these weaknesses with EAS. However, to date, little progress has been made and EAS remains largely unchanged since GAO's previous review, completed in March 2007. As a result, EAS does not fulfill the need for a reliable, comprehensive alert system. Initiated in 2004, FEMA's IPAWS program is intended to integrate new and existing alert capabilities, including EAS, into a comprehensive "system of systems." However, national-level alert capabilities have remained unchanged and new technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS efforts have been affected by shifting program goals, lack of continuity in planning, staff turnover, and poorly organized program information from which to make management decisions. The vision of IPAWS has changed twice over the course of the program and strategic goals and milestones are not clearly defined, as IPAWS operated without an implementation plan from early 2007 through June 2009. Consequently, as state and local governments are forging ahead with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled and many of the functional goals of IPAWS, such as geo-targeting of messages and dissemination through redundant pathways to multiple devices, have yet to reach operational capacity. FEMA conducted a series of pilot projects without systematically assessing outcomes or lessons learned and without substantially advancing alert and warning systems. FEMA does not periodically report on IPAWS progress, therefore, program transparency and accountability are lacking. FEMA faces coordination issues and technical challenges in developing and implementing IPAWS. Effective public warning depends on the cooperation of stakeholders, such as emergency managers and the telecommunications industry, yet many stakeholders GAO contacted knew little about IPAWS and expressed the need for better coordination with FEMA. FEMA has taken steps to improve its coordination efforts, but the scope of stakeholder involvement is limited. FEMA also faces technical challenges related to systems integration, standards development, the development of geo-targeted and multilingual alerts, and alerts for individuals with disabilities. For example, the standard intended to facilitate integration of systems is still under development and is not widely used. As a result of these coordination and technical hurdles, integration with state and local systems will likely be a significant challenge due to potential incompatibility, and FEMA does not yet have logistical plans to integrate these systems. |
gao_GAO-11-68 | gao_GAO-11-68_0 | Figure 2 provides an overview of CBP’s process for reviewing, approving, and paying prime contractor invoices under the original SBInet program. Controls over Prime Contractor Payments for SBI Technology Component Need Improvement
Under the original SBInet program, CBP took actions intended to establish internal controls over contractor payments. These procedures were based on requirements in the FAR. We identified the need to improve CBP’s controls in two important areas. Specifically, we identified the need to improve CBP’s preventative controls over payments to the SBInet program contractor with respect to requiring invoices with sufficiently detailed data supporting billed costs to facilitate effective invoice review and specific, sufficiently detailed, risk-based invoice review procedures to enable full, effective, and documented reviews prior to making payments. Because CBP’s preventative controls were not fully effective, the agency will continue to (1) be impaired in its ability to provide assurance that the estimated $780 million already paid the prime contractor under the original SBInet program was proper and allowable, in the correct amount, and only for goods and services provided and (2) rely heavily on detective controls (primarily contract closeout audits) for assurance concerning the propriety of SBInet program disbursements. However, CBP’s policies and procedures did not require the invoices to include any additional supporting detail. SBI’s Prime Contractor Reported That It Met Two of Its Six Small Business Subcontracting Goals
SBI’s prime contractor reported to CBP that it met two of its six small business subcontracting goals that were identified in the prime contractor’s subcontracting plan for the reporting period ended March 31, 2010. Consequently, the SBI prime contractor reported that this steel purchase reduced the subcontract award dollars available such that it was unable meet all of its small business contract award goals for the SBI program. Additionally, the SBI prime contractor also established an overall small business goal of awarding 40 percent of the total SBI program contract dollars to small businesses, which included, but was not limited to socio-economic small business goals. As shown in table 1, as of March 31, 2010, the SBI contractor reported that it met subcontracting participation goals for the HUBZone and Veteran- Owned small business categories. Given our findings on the design of prime contractor payment controls under the original SBInet program, prompt action to complete closeout audits related to payments to the prime contractor under the original SBInet program contract and task orders is imperative. Because preventative controls are generally more cost-efficient and effective than detective controls, timely actions to strengthen controls in this area are particularly important with respect to the remaining $80 million in original SBInet program funds not yet disbursed. Further, our findings concerning the design of CBP’s controls over payments to the prime contractor under the recently ended SBInet program serve as “lessons learned” to be considered in designing and implementing controls as part of the newly announced technology portfolio approach. With respect to the new technology portfolio approach: Document the consideration and incorporation as appropriate, of lessons learned based on our findings on the design of controls over payments to the original SBInet contractor in designing and implementing contract provisions and related policies and procedures for reviewing and approving prime contractor invoices. For the three recommendations with which it concurred in principle, DHS expressed concerns with respect to the cost-effectiveness or appropriateness of the recommended actions. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated a multibillion-dollar contract to secure part of the nation's borders, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). At that time, SBI was to include a single solution technology component; SBInet. DHS assigned the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) responsibility for overseeing the SBI contract, including SBInet. In January 2011, DHS announced that it was ending SBInet, and replacing it with a new technology portfolio. GAO was asked to (1) assess CBP's controls over payments to the prime contractor under the original SBInet program, and (2) provide information about the SBI program prime contractor's reporting against small business subcontracting goals. GAO assessed CBP controls against federal standards for internal control and relevant federal regulatory provisions, and summarized data on contractor performance against small business contracting goals.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of CBP's controls over payments to the prime contractor under the original SBInet program identified the need to improve controls in two critical areas. Specifically, GAO found that CBP's design of controls for SBInet contractor payments did not (1) require invoices with sufficiently detailed data supporting billed costs to facilitate effective invoice reviews or (2) provide for sufficiently detailed, risk-based invoice review procedures to enable effective invoice reviews prior to making payments. Although CBP's established procedures were based on the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), GAO identified numerous instances of CBP contracting officers lacking detailed support in the SBInet contractor invoices they received for review. Because CBP's preventative controls were not fully effective, the agency will continue to (1) be impaired in providing assurance that the reported $780 million it already paid to the contractor under the original SBInet program was allowable under the contract, in the correct amount, and only for goods and services provided, and (2) rely heavily on detective controls (such as timely, effective contract closeout audits) for all SBInet funds disbursed. Further, timely action to improve CBP's preventative controls is critical for the estimated $80 million in original SBInet program funds yet to be disbursed. Also, in light of the recent DHS announcement that it is replacing the originally conceived SBInet program with a new technology portfoliobased approach, GAO's findings concerning weaknesses in CBP's design of controls over payments to the prime contractor under the recently ended SBInet program can serve as "lessons learned" to be considered in designing and implementing controls as part of the newly announced portfolio-based approach to providing technological support to border security. With respect to performance against small business contracting goals, the prime contractor reported that it met two of the six small business subcontracting goals for the overall SBI program. Specifically, it reported that it met subcontracting participation goals for Historically Underutilized Business Zone and Veteran-Owned small business categories, but was unable to meet the other four small business goals because a large steel purchase significantly reduced the subcontract dollars available for small businesses to participate in the SBI contract.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes five recommendations to improve CBP controls over prime contractor payments under the SBInet and the successor technology portfolio, including actions to strengthen invoice review procedures, provide more detailed support, and to better focus closeout audits. DHS concurred in principle with all recommendations, but for some, DHS also commented on the cost-effectiveness or others' role in implementation. GAO addresses these comments in the report. |
gao_GGD-99-124 | gao_GGD-99-124_0 | Our objectives were to (1) identify challenges the Advocate faces in managing program resources, (2) identify potential effects of workload fluctuations on program operations, (3) determine what information was available for advocacy efforts, and (4) assess the adequacy of performance measures IRS used to gauge program effectiveness. Resource Management Issues Present Challenges for the Advocate
We identified several resource management issues within the Advocate’s Office and PRP that could affect how efficiently and effectively taxpayers are helped by PRP. Specifically, (1) the Advocate’s Office did not know how many staff were working in PRP or the costs associated with that staffing; (2) the Advocate’s Office had to rely on resources provided by IRS’ operating functions, such as Customer Service, Collections, and Examination; (3) some Advocate Office and PRP staff reported that they lacked training that Advocate Office officials considered necessary; and (4) the Advocate’s Office faced obstacles, such as limited advancement opportunities, in acquiring and keeping qualified staff. However, it is too soon to tell how these changes will affect program operations. This should give the Advocate’s Office more control over PRP resources. Handling Workload Fluctuations Poses a Challenge as the Advocate’s Office Restructures
According to local advocates, dealing with workload fluctuations— especially increased workloads—poses a challenge for them as Advocate’s Office and PRP operations are restructured. However, the Advocate told us that he was committed to helping any taxpayer who contacts the office. We understand why the Advocate’s Office might not want to turn away any taxpayers seeking help. However, if the Advocate’s Office accepts cases that could be handled elsewhere in IRS, PRP could be overburdened, potentially reducing its ability to help taxpayers who have nowhere else to go to resolve their problems. Advocacy is key to the success of the Advocate’s Office because the improvements it generates could reduce the number of taxpayers who ultimately require help from PRP. In addition, because of limitations in the kind of information available to and compiled by the Advocate’s Office, there was little assurance that the time being spent on advocacy was being used most effectively. The Advocate’s Office Lacked Adequate Measures of Effectiveness
IRS lacked adequate measures of the effectiveness of the Advocate’s Office and PRP. The set of measures used by the Advocate’s Office during our review (1) provided descriptive information about program activities, such as the average amount of time it takes to close a PRP case, rather than information needed to assess effectiveness; (2) did not provide complete data; or (3) were not based on consistent data collection. Measures of effectiveness are important because they provide data to improve program performance, increase accountability, and support decisionmaking. Recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
To better ensure that the Advocate’s Office effectively uses the resources available for advocacy and thus enhances its ability to prevent the recurrence of taxpayer problems and ultimately reduce the number of taxpayers who need help from PRP, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct appropriate officials to define the requirements for and to develop a system that captures the kind of information needed to identify and prioritize potential advocacy projects and provide feedback to staff on ongoing and completed projects. 6. Prior IRS function(s)? 10. 11. 12. 14. 5. 7. 8. Years in PRP? 9. 13. 15. IRS Initiatives Place Demands on Program Resources
IRS officials said that part of the PRP workload increase can be attributed to an IRS initiative known as Problem Solving Days, which is the responsibility of the National Taxpayer Advocate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Office of the National Taxpayer Advocate and the Problem Resolution Program (PRP) that it administers, focusing on: (1) challenges the Taxpayer Advocate faces in managing program resources; (2) the potential effects of workload fluctuations on program operations; (3) information available to help the Advocate determine the causes of taxpayer problems and prevent their recurrence; and (4) the adequacy of performance measures the IRS uses to gauge program effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there are various management and operational challenges facing IRS, the Advocate's Office, and PRP; (2) how these challenges are addressed could affect how efficiently and effectively taxpayers are helped by PRP; (3) the Advocate's Office faced resource management challenges because it lacked direct control over most PRP resources; (4) planned changes to the Advocate's Office and PRP, such as placing PRP resources under the control of the Advocate's Office, could mitigate some of these issues; (5) however, it is too early to evaluate the impact of these changes; (6) IRS faces challenges as it restructures the Advocate's Office to better handle variations in PRP's workload; (7) according to Advocate Office officials, in the past, because PRP operations depended on IRS functional units for resources, any fluctuations in PRP's workload were handled by adjusting the number of functional staff assigned to work PRP cases; (8) however, the Advocate's Office is moving away from a structure that relies on other IRS units for staffing, which may make it more difficult for the Advocate's Office to handle workload fluctuations, especially workload increases; (9) the Advocate told GAO that he was committed to helping any taxpayer who contacts the office; (10) while it is understandable why the Advocate's Office might not want to turn away anyone seeking help, accepting cases that could be handled elsewhere in IRS could overburden PRP; (11) the demands on the Advocate's Office to resolve individual taxpayer problems has left little time for staff to spend identifying the causes of recurring taxpayer problems and recommending solutions; (12) also, limitations in the kind of information available provided little assurance that the time being spent was being used most effectively; (13) these efforts on recurring problems, called advocacy, are key to the success of the Advocate's Office because the improvements they generate can reduce the number of taxpayers who ultimately require help from PRP; (14) IRS lacked adequate measures of the effectiveness of the Advocate's Office and PRP; (15) measures of effectiveness should cover the full range of Advocate Office operations so they can be used to improve program performance, increase accountability, and support decisionmaking; and (16) the set of measures used by the Advocate's Office during GAO's review focused on descriptive program events instead of program outcomes, did not provide complete data, or were not based on consistent data collection. |
gao_GAO-08-1113 | gao_GAO-08-1113_0 | and ranges. Specifically, MDA’s flight test program has been restructured to reflect target deficiencies and availability. At the same time, the unit cost of targets has grown exponentially, from $4.5 to $8.5 million from 2002 to 2006 to current estimates of $32 to $65 million for the targets planned from 2008 to 2010. Many factors contribute to this cost growth, including increased complexity of targets to better reflect an evolving threat and late changes to target requirements on contract. Several Factors Contribute to Problems with Targets
Difficulties with target availability are traceable to (1) supplier base and problems incorporating requirements into the contracts and establishing program baselines for existing targets and (2) the lack of a sound business case for FTF development. It is also unclear whether MDA evaluated all alternatives before committing to a lead systems integrator and the FTF. MDA Is Undertaking A Series of Initiatives To Address Problems with Targets Development, but Challenges Remain
MDA recently began implementing a series of management initiatives to improve the targets program, such as establishing technical, cost, and schedule baselines for all missions in the 2-year integrated master test plan. The new program director and staff have also begun drafting long- term target capability requirements, and developing and implementing a new cost model for targets. In addition, plans have been made to improve risk management by (1) considering program-wide issues, and (2) including programmatic risks, cost and schedule in the risk assessments. Overall, the success of the flight test program depends on the success of FTF. The difficulties with executing FTF are due, at least in part, to the fact that a sound business case was not established before proceeding with the program and the attendant contracting strategy. Because of the importance of an ample supply of reliable targets to the success of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, we continue to believe that the Secretary of Defense needs to ensure that MDA takes a fresh look at alternatives when it establishes a revised acquisition strategy and business case. We focused our review on the following three objectives: (1) Is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) meeting the need for reliable and timely targets for the flight test program? (3) What are the prospects for resolution of any problems identified? Recurring Target Unit Costs Growing
Factors Affecting Target Cost Growth
increasing complexity of targets (including existing targets) late changes to target requirements on contract schedule delays shift to Lead Systems Integrator – higher labor rates, additional oversight of subcontractors Cost increases associated with recent target failures and anomalies are only partially estimated.~$87 M cost increase associated with FTG-03 failure ~$80 M associated with target availability and affordability Unknown cost implications for Radar Data Collection “anomalies”
Cost of Flexible Target Family Unclear; Cost
MDA has estimated some cost for FTF, but total nonrecurring development remains unclear because some cost figures include the purchase of test assets. Flight test costs. Objective 2: Causes of Problems
We could not identify an original approved FTF acquisition strategy. THAAD flight test program extended. GMD flight test objectives delayed. We also analyzed program directives and acquisition policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is likely to spend $460 million annually on missiles used as targets for flight tests. Executing these tests depends on the quality and availability of targets. Congress asked GAO to assess (1) if MDA is providing reliable targets; (2) the causes of any deficiencies; and (3) if resolutions exist for any problems identified. To do this, GAO analyzed acquisition policies and procedures; flight test data; and budget, program execution, and acquisition materials; and interviewed MDA and DOD officials.
What GAO Found
MDA has difficulty in both supplying targets for missile defense testing as well as in developing a new family of short, medium and long-range targets. The number of target failures and anomalies (failing to achieve one or more non-critical mission objective or partially achieving a critical mission objective) during flight tests has increased since 2006, contributing to delays in flight tests and modification of flight test objectives. In addition, the average unit cost of targets has grown significantly, from $4.5 million to $8.5 million from 2002 to 2006 to current estimates of $32 million to $65 million for the targets planned from 2008 to 2010. Many factors contribute to this cost growth, including increased complexity of targets to better reflect an evolving threat and late changes to target requirements on contract. MDA's difficulty in supplying existing targets is driven by diminishing sources for components, unanticipated costs, and problems incorporating requirements into contracts and establishing program baselines. MDA has also encountered problems developing the new family of targets, an effort currently estimated to cost at least $1 billion. The problems are due, at least in part, to the fact that a sound business case was not established before proceeding with the program and the attendant contracting strategy. The decision to pursue this new family of targets was made without a formal cost analysis and it is unclear whether MDA evaluated all alternatives before making this commitment. GAO also could not identify an original approved acquisition strategy for the new family of targets. Consequently, developmental problems have arisen in the new family of targets, leading to cost growth, delayed flight tests, and deferral of several key capabilities. MDA is taking a series of actions to address these problems, such as: (1) establishing technical, cost, and schedule baselines for all missions in the 2-year integrated master test plan; (2) drafting long-term target capability requirements; (3) developing a new cost model for targets; (4) making plans to improve risk management by considering program-wide issues, and including programmatic risks, cost and schedule in risk assessments. However, the prospects for resolution of the target acquisition problems are unclear and the overall success of the Ballistic Missile Defense System flight test program depends on the success of a new family of targets under development. |
gao_GAO-06-84 | gao_GAO-06-84_0 | Sound management practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, including resource commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one; and (3) establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress. However, other actions taken by the Navy do not fully incorporate these practices. Sound management practices, such as those noted above, were not fully used by the Navy because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the Fleet Response Plan in response to the Chief of Naval Operations’ desires. However, without an overall management plan containing all of these elements to guide the implementation of such a major change, it may be difficult for the Navy and Congress to determine the extent to which the Fleet Response Plan is achieving the desired results, measure its overall progress, or determine the resources needed to implement the plan. Navy Has Not Fully Tested and Evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or Developed Lessons Learned
The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its implementation and success over time. The methodical testing, exercising, and evaluation of new doctrines and concepts is an established practice throughout the military to gain insight into how systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy, which impairs the Navy’s ability to validate the plan and evaluate its success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan tests or as an analytical tool to evaluate the progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the Navy’s ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet. Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group while it was in surge status in October 2004. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate successful implementation of the Fleet Response Plan and enhance readiness and ensure the Navy can determine whether the plan has been successful in increasing readiness and is able to identify and correct performance weaknesses and trends across the fleet, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: Direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop a comprehensive overarching management plan based on sound management practices that will clearly define goals, measures, guidance, and resources needed for implementation of the Fleet Response Plan, to include the following elements: establishing or revising Fleet Response Plan goals that identify what Fleet Response Plan results are to be expected and milestones for achieving these results, developing implementing guidance and performance measures based on these goals, identifying the costs and resources needed to achieve each performance goal, and communicating this information throughout the Navy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy has been transforming itself to better meet 21st century needs. Since 2000, the Congress has appropriated about $50 billion annually for the Navy to operate and maintain its forces and support around 376,000 military personnel. In recognizing that the Navy faces affordability issues in sustaining readiness within its historical share of the defense budget, the Chief of Naval Operations announced a concept called the Fleet Response Plan to enhance its deployment readiness status. The Fleet Response Plan is designed to more rapidly prepare and sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. GAO evaluated the extent to which the Navy has (1) employed a sound management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan and (2) tested and evaluated the effectiveness of the plan and shared results to improve implementation.
What GAO Found
In establishing the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has embraced a major change in the way it manages its forces. However, the Navy's management approach in implementing the Fleet Response Plan has not fully incorporated sound management practices needed to guide and assess implementation. These practices include (1) establishing a coherent mission and strategic goals, including resource commitments; (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline; and (3) establishing a communication strategy. While the Navy has taken a number of positive actions to implement the plan, it has not provided readiness goals for units other than carrier strike groups; resource and maintenance goals; performance measures and timelines; or a communications strategy. Sound management practices were not fully developed because senior leaders wanted to quickly implement the plan in response to changes in the security environment. However, without an overall management plan containing all of these elements, it may be difficult for the Navy to determine whether its efforts to improve the fleet's readiness are achieving the desired results, adequately measuring overall progress, or identifying what resources are needed to implement the Fleet Response Plan. The Navy has not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan or developed lessons learned to identify the effectiveness of its implementation and success over time. Systematic testing and evaluation of new concepts is an established practice to gain insight into how systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. However, instead of methodically conducting realistic tests to evaluate the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy has tried to demonstrate the viability of the plan by relying on loosely linked events that were not part of an overall test and evaluation strategy. This approach could impair the Navy's ability to validate the plan and evaluate its success over time. In addition, the Navy has not used its lessons learned system to share the results of its Fleet Response Plan events or as an analytical tool to evaluate the progress of the plan and improve implementation, which limits the Navy's ability to identify and correct weaknesses across the fleet. |
gao_GAO-11-445 | gao_GAO-11-445_0 | Respondents Reported Basic Information Needed to Assess Value Available for About Half of Selected Interventions
About half of the respondents to our questionnaire reported basic information on the effect of their intervention on both quality of care and costs—the two types of data needed to determine whether or to what extent a particular intervention enhanced the value of health care. Overall, the vast majority of our respondents reported at least some information on the observed effect of their intervention on quality of care. Relatively fewer—though still over half—of our respondents reported at least some information on the effect of their intervention on costs. The ability of policymakers to identify interventions that substantially improve quality and reduce costs depends on the availability of basic information on the size of the effect of an intervention on both quality of care and costs. The Strength of Evidence on the Effect of Interventions Can Be Assessed along Three Dimensions
Policymakers and others can assess the strength and limitations of available evidence from studies on the effect of health care interventions on quality of care and costs along three dimensions. One, the credibility of evidence on the effect of health care interventions on quality of care and costs depends primarily on whether those studies apply rigorous study designs. Two, the applicability of the results of studies to a broader population depends on the extent to which the study population is representative of that larger population. Finally, the capacity of health care interventions for widespread replication can be examined in terms of the consistency of results obtained by each intervention across diverse organizations. The methodological experts we consulted uniformly emphasized the primacy of study design in determining the credibility of evidence on the effect of health care interventions on quality of care and costs. However, for a substantially larger number of the 127 interventions, the studies we identified employed the types of study designs that do not isolate the effect of the intervention from other factors. Leadership Support and Other Factors Reported As Important for Both Implementation and Replication of Interventions
Respondents to our questionnaire reported, generally by large margins, that leadership support as well as other factors, such as organizational culture and staff resources, significantly facilitated implementation. However, respondents were more divided when asked about the reported effect that health IT had on implementation, and most respondents reported that financial incentives were not a factor in the implementation of their intervention. A majority of respondents reported that each of these factors, with the exception of financial incentives, was expected to be either very or somewhat important if one were to attempt to replicate their intervention as widely as possible. Concluding Observations
Our work suggests that progress in achieving greater value in health care in the U.S. will depend, in part, on the availability of information regarding the effect of different interventions on quality of care and costs and on how policymakers and others assess and use that information. Such information can guide the choices of policymakers among multiple interventions vying for support, but those decisions will have a sounder basis if the information meets certain criteria regarding its content and strength of evidence. Agency Comments
We requested comments from the Department of Health and Human Services, but none were provided. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the availability of information on the effect of selected health care interventions on quality of care and costs as well as factors that can facilitate the implementation and replication of these interventions, we studied a diverse set of specific interventions that seek to enhance the value of health care through making changes in the way care is delivered. The intervention targeted a population or problem that was relevant to the U.S. health care system. The intervention was implemented in at least one health care setting. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. has devoted an increasing proportion of its economy and federal budget to the provision of health care services, but high levels of spending do not guarantee good care. Policymakers, health practitioners, and others have implemented numerous health care interventions that make discrete changes in the organization of health care services in order to enhance the value of health care--that is, improve the quality of care while reducing costs. Examples include programs to reduce bloodstream infections and to coordinate patient care following hospital discharges. This report (1) examines the availability of evidence on the effect of selected interventions on quality of care and costs; (2) identifies key dimensions for assessing the strength of such evidence; and (3) examines factors that can facilitate the implementation and replication of health care interventions. GAO identified a broad and diverse set of health care interventions using published and unpublished sources. For 127 of those interventions, GAO analyzed responses to a questionnaire that it sent to persons knowledgeable about available information on the effect of that particular intervention on quality of care and costs. GAO's questionnaire also asked respondents to assess the relative importance of seven factors in the implementation and potential replication of the health care intervention. In addition, GAO consulted the methodological literature and experts on assessing evidence on the effects of health care interventions.
What GAO Found
About half of the respondents to our questionnaire reported some information on the effect of an intervention on both quality of care and costs--the two types of data needed to determine whether or to what extent a particular intervention enhanced the value of health care. Overall, the vast majority of our respondents reported at least some information on the observed effect of the intervention on quality of care. Relatively fewer--though still over half--of our respondents reported at least some information on the effect of the intervention on costs. Whether or not policymakers can rely on information that indicates an intervention enhances value depends on the strength of the underlying evidence about quality and cost effects. From studies on the effect of health care interventions on quality of care and costs, policymakers and others can assess the strength and limitations of available evidence along three dimensions. One, the credibility of evidence on the effect of health care interventions on quality of care and costs depends primarily on whether those studies apply rigorous study designs. Two, the applicability of the results of studies to a broader population depends on the extent to which the study population is representative of that larger population. Finally, the capacity of health care interventions for widespread replication can be examined in terms of the consistency of results obtained by each intervention across diverse health care organizational contexts. Respondents reported, generally by large margins, that leadership support as well as other factors, such as organizational culture and staff resources, significantly facilitated implementation. However, respondents were more divided when asked about the reported effect that health IT had on implementation, and most respondents reported that financial incentives were not a factor in the implementation of the intervention. A majority of respondents reported that each of these factors, with the exception of financial incentives, would be either very or somewhat important if one were to attempt to replicate the intervention as widely as possible. Progress in achieving greater value in the U.S. health care system will depend, in part, on the availability of information regarding the effect of interventions on quality of care and costs and on how policymakers and others assess and use that information. Information can guide the choices of policymakers among multiple interventions vying for support, but those decisions will have a sounder basis if the information meets certain criteria regarding its content and strength of evidence. At least some information on both cost and quality effects was available for about half of the interventions GAO examined. However, for many interventions the credibility of this information was put into question by widespread reliance on studies that did not incorporate rigorous designs that could isolate the effect of an intervention from other factors. We requested comments from the Department of Health and Human Services, but none were provided. |
gao_GAO-02-525 | gao_GAO-02-525_0 | Non-CONUS combat units have the most difficulty meeting their training requirements for (1) maneuver operations, (2) live ordnance practice, and (3) night and low altitude flying. These include (1) requiring workarounds—adjustments to the training events—that sometimes breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat, (2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often, and (3) in some instances preventing training from being accomplished. However, the adverse effects of training constraints are often not being captured in readiness reporting. Service and Command Coordination Is Insufficient When Pursuing Training Alternatives
U.S. military commands and services are taking a variety of actions to address constraints, including (1) negotiating with host governments to lessen restrictions on existing training areas; (2) seeking to work with other countries to create additional training opportunities, such as expanding bilateral exercises to include training that can no longer be conducted at home station; and (3) using technology to create, among other things, transportable training systems designed for training outside the usual training areas. | What GAO Found
Rigorous, realistic training is key to military readiness. All U.S. military forces conduct frequent training exercises to hone and maintain their war-fighting skills. Combat units stationed outside the continental United States are able to meet many of their training requirements but face constraints in such areas as (1) maneuver operations, (2) live ordnance practice, and (3) night and low altitude flying. Training constraints cause adverse effects, including (1) requiring workarounds that can breed bad habits affecting combat performance; (2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often; and (3) preventing training from being accomplished. To address these concerns, military commands and services are negotiating with host governments to lessen restrictions on existing training areas, but such actions are often done at an individual-service level and sometimes create unforeseen problems for other services and for existing training capabilities. |
gao_T-GGD-98-185 | gao_T-GGD-98-185_0 | Federal Housing Finance Board: Actions Needed to Improve Regulatory Oversight
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Federal Housing Finance Board’s (FHFB) regulatory oversight of the nation’s third largest government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), the Federal Home Loan Bank System (System). The specific objectives of our review were to evaluate (1) FHFB’s annual safety and soundness and mission compliance examinations of the Federal Home Loan Banks (Banks), (2) other aspects of FHFB’s oversight, and (3) the status of FHFB’s involvement in System business. First, FHFB did not ensure that all parts of the annual examinations we reviewed met their internal standards for assessing safety and soundness. Second, weaknesses exist in FHFB’s off-site monitoring and supervisory enforcement programs. Third, FHFB does not have policies or procedures, outside of its reviews of the special affordable housing and community investment programs, to determine whether or the extent to which Banks are supporting their public mission of housing finance. only regulator that remains involved in the business of the System it regulates. However, FHFB continues to function as a promoter and coordinator for the System. Most notably, examiners did not always fully assess critical elements of Bank operations—such as internal controls, board of director and management oversight, and the reliability of internal audits—that FHFB, other financial regulators, and we have identified as vital in evaluating an institution’s risk-management capabilities. While examiners generally assessed management of interest-rate and credit risk, the critical elements just mentioned should be reviewed during every on-site examination to ensure that operations risk is being adequately managed. We encourage FHFB to continue its efforts to develop a regulatory framework for a mission compliance oversight program. Weaknesses Exist in Other Areas of FHFB’s Regulatory Oversight Program
We found additional weaknesses in FHFB’s off-site monitoring and enforcement programs that raise concerns about its regulatory effectiveness. We remain concerned, as we have noted in the past, that combining the roles of oversight and involvement in System business may undermine the independence necessary for FHFB to be an effective safety and soundness and mission regulator. We recognize that the responsibility for FHFB’s involvement in System business is, in part, due to statutory authorities carried over from FHFB’s predecessor, the Bank Board. Thus, we continue to support our 1994 and 1997 positions that a single housing GSE regulator be created to oversee the safety and soundness and mission compliance oversight of the housing GSEs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Federal Housing Finance Board's (FHFB) regulatory oversight of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, focusing on: (1) FHFB's annual safety and soundness and mission compliance examinations of the Federal Home Loan Banks; (2) other aspects of FHFB's oversight; and (3) the status of FHFB's involvement in System business.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FHFB's examination function did not ensure that annual examinations met FHFB's internal examination standards, including adequate documentation for work performed; (2) the examinations included reviews of interest-rate and credit risk, two of the primary types of risk faced by the Banks; (3) however, the examinations did not fully assess other areas that FHFB and others have identified as vital in evaluating an institution's risk management capabilities, such as management and board of directors oversight, internal control systems, and internal audit function; (4) weaknesses existed in FHFB's off-site monitoring and supervisory enforcement programs; (5) FHFB lacks a coordinated off-site monitoring system, which is an important part of effective safety and soundness oversight, because it can provide an early warning of potential problems; (6) FHFB also lacks an enforcement program that clearly articulates policies and procedures for taking corrective action; (7) the situation is further aggravated because the statute grants only general authority to enforce the statute and make orders; (8) the only authority delineated in the statute is the authority to remove or suspend Bank employees, directors, officers, or agents for cause; (9) FHFB does not have policies or procedures, outside of its reviews of the special affordable housing and community investment programs, to determine whether or the extent to which Banks are supporting housing finance; (10) FHFB recognized this omission and has begun to take steps to establish such a program, but no final actions have been taken to establish a regulatory framework to ensure mission compliance; (11) FHFB continues to be involved in System business; (12) many of the authorities that involve FHFB in System business are specified in statute or are carryover regulations from its predecessor agency; (13) FHFB began to devolve many of the functions in 1994, but it still plays a role in coordination and promotion of Banks; (14) GAO continues to believe that such involvement in the System's business functions may undermine FHFB's independence and lead to questions about its objectivity; and (15) GAO supports its position that a single housing regulator be created to oversee the safety and soundness and mission compliance of the housing government-sponsored enterprises. |
gao_GAO-15-105 | gao_GAO-15-105_0 | SSBCI provides direct support to participants for use in programs designed to increase access to credit for small businesses. As of June 30, 2014, total qualified small business lending for SBLF participants increased by $13.5 billion over an aggregate baseline of $33 billion. Three participants had used 1 percent or less of their allocations. Treasury Has Enhanced Performance Measures and Evaluation but Has Not Effectively Communicated or Updated Its SBLF Evaluation
Treasury has taken steps to enhance performance measures and evaluation, consistent with our prior recommendations. This rigorous approach estimated the impact of the program and is a significant improvement over its previous comparison assessments of the SBLF program which did not attempt to isolate impact. In addition, Treasury has not updated the results of its impact evaluation. For SSBCI, Treasury developed some new performance measures and also developed targets for some of its measures. In addition, officials stated they reached out to and received input from internal agency subject-matter experts and experts from OMB on the design of the planned SSBCI evaluation and have reached out to congressional staff for feedback on its proposed design. In other words, when controlling for observable variables, the evaluation estimates that 23 percentage points of the increase in small business lending among SBLF banks is attributable to the program. Previous assessments, however, did not adequately address observable differences between SBLF and non-SBLF banks and did not attempt to isolate the impact of the program. In its earliest approach to assess SBLF, Treasury has compared lending among SBLF banks to small and medium-sized banks, which suggested that SBLF banks increased business lending by 45 percentage points more than non-SBLF banks as of September 30, 2013 (see fig. Consistent with our previous recommendation that Treasury set targets for selected performance measures related to monitoring program performance, Treasury established a target for its performance measure related to the amount of private-sector leverage. Officials explained that they used the stated program objectives in the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 to establish the additional measures and select the measures for which they established targets. In response to our prior recommendations, Treasury conducted a rigorous impact evaluation, which is a distinct improvement over other analyses using comparisons because it uses statistical methods to compare SBLF banks to a carefully selected control group of banks that did not participate in the program but are as similar as possible to the participating SBLF banks along a broad set of characteristics. However, because Treasury presents its impact evaluation in appendixes in its Lending Growth Reports rather than in the body, users of Treasury’s lending reports may rely on less rigorous analyses to inform their conclusions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that Congress and stakeholders can easily access the best information available to inform their conclusions about the effectiveness of SBLF as a capital investment tool, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury take the following two actions: (1) make the results of its SBLF impact evaluation more prominent, such as by discussing the results in the executive summary and body of future Lending Growth Reports, and (2) update the results of its impact evaluation in future reports, taking into consideration the costs and benefits of doing so to determine the appropriate frequency of the updates. Treasury provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III. SSBCI Program Status
To examine the status of SSBCI, we analyzed Treasury program data on participants’ allocation amounts and program types, and whether participants developed new programs to participate in SSBCI or expanded existing programs with SSBCI funds. We selected participants based on the following criteria: (1) the percentage of SSBCI funds participants had used as of March 31, 2014; (2) the percentage of SSBCI funds transferred to participants; (3) the percent of SSBCI funds recycled by participants; (4) the number of programs participants implemented and whether the programs were new or existing; (5) the number of program modifications; and (6) geographic dispersion. Treasury’s Efforts to Enhance Performance Measures and Evaluations
To assess the extent to which Treasury’s efforts enhance performance measures and evaluations for SBLF and SSBCI, we interviewed agency officials on the activities they conducted to implement recommendations from our 2012 and 2013 reports and collected information related to these activities. Appendix II: Summary of Treasury’s Efforts to Measure and Evaluate the Performance of the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) and State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI)
Appendix II: Summary of Treasury’s Efforts to Measure and Evaluate the Performance of the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) and State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI)
Treasury has undertaken several efforts to measure and evaluate the performance of SBLF and SSBCI, as shown in table 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 established the SBLF and SSBCI programs within Treasury to enhance credit opportunities for small businesses. SBLF aims to stimulate job growth by encouraging community banks and community development loan funds with assets of $10 billion or less to increase their small business lending. SSBCI provides direct funding to participants for programs that expand access to capital to small businesses.
The act mandates that GAO conduct an audit of both programs annually. GAO's prior audits examined program implementation, monitoring of performance and compliance, and usage of program funds. This fourth report examines (1) the status of SBLF and SSBCI and (2) the extent to which Treasury has enhanced efforts to measure and evaluate program performance. GAO analyzed the most recently available financial and performance information and interviewed officials from Treasury, nine states, one municipality, and trade associations. GAO selected the states and municipality based on usage of SSBCI funds, unique program characteristics, number of programs, and geographic dispersion, among other things.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) and State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) have continued to support small business lending. According to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), as of June 30, 2014, SBLF participants had increased their qualified small business lending by $13.5 billion over their aggregate 2010 baseline, and SSBCI participants had used 60 percent of the $1.5 billion in allocated funds.
In response to prior GAO recommendations, Treasury has taken steps to enhance performance measurement and program evaluation for SBLF and SSBCI but has not effectively communicated or updated its SBLF evaluation.
SBLF. Treasury conducted an impact evaluation, using statistical methods to compare lending among SBLF banks to a control group of non-SBLF banks that are as similar as possible to participating SBLF banks. This rigorous approach is a significant improvement over Treasury's previous analyses because it is designed to isolate the impact of the program and provides greater confidence that any differences observed between SBLF and non-SBLF banks are attributable to the program rather than to other factors. Treasury's impact evaluation estimated that 23 percentage points of the increase in small business lending among SBLF banks is attributable to the program. Although Treasury's previous, less rigorous analyses suggested that SBLF banks increased lending by as much as 45 percentage points more than non-SBLF banks, these analyses did not attempt to isolate the impact of SBLF from other factors. Treasury published its impact evaluation in appendixes in its three most recent Lending Growth Reports . However, it did not discuss the results of the evaluation in the summary or body of the reports and has not utilized the control group to update the results. Relevant resources on program evaluations indicate that the most rigorous evidence should be presented most prominently. Because Treasury has not effectively presented or updated its impact evaluation results, stakeholders may not benefit from the most rigorous and recent information on the effect of SBLF.
SSBCI. Treasury established targets for selected measures to monitor program performance and has taken steps to enhance the design of its planned program evaluation. Treasury established a target for one of its existing performance measures and also developed new performance measures and targets. For example, Treasury established a target for its existing performance measure on the amount of private-sector funds leveraged using SSBCI funds and created a new performance measure and target related to the amount of funds disbursed to states. To select and establish the new performance measures and targets, agency officials stated that they used the program objectives stated in the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 and information from participants' annual 2013 reports. Treasury officials stated they have obtained input from experts on the design of their SSBCI program evaluation and have begun to reach out to congressional staff for feedback on the proposed design.
What GAO Recommends
Treasury should make the results of its SBLF impact evaluation more prominent and update its estimate of the impact of SBLF in future reports. In its written comments, Treasury agreed to implement both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-155 | gao_GAO-16-155_0 | IRS has other specialized processes for reporting specific types of tax noncompliance, such as identity theft and misconduct by a tax return preparer. In fiscal year 2015, IRS received over 87,000 information referrals, as shown in figure 1. During fiscal years 2013 and 2014, IRS revised the information referral instructions for the public to help clarify the other specific forms to use to report directly to IRS’s specialized referral programs, which IRS officials said has contributed to the reduced volume in information referrals. IRS does not have an organizational structure for the information referral process with clear leadership responsible for defining objectives in measureable terms to ensure that the objectives of the information referral process aligns with IRS’s mission of fair and equitable application of the tax laws and addressing the tax gap. Without clear leadership and responsibility for defining program objectives and measuring outcomes resulting from information referrals about tax noncompliance by individuals and businesses, IRS does not know the costs of the information referral process or how effectively that process is contributing to the agency’s mission and addressing the tax gap. IRS has incomplete documentation of procedures for screening and routing information referrals to other IRS units for further action. Multiple and uncoordinated forms and instructions can confuse the public trying to submit information to IRS. Routing between referral programs results in delays and added costs for re-screening. Although IRS has guidelines for screening and routing the information referrals, it does not have an organizational structure for the Form 3949-A information referral process that identifies responsibility for defining program objectives and an appropriate line of reporting for measuring results. Without a coordination mechanism, IRS may be missing opportunities to leverage resources and address challenges from the multiple referral programs. Ensure that the IRM has internal controls for processing information establishing, documenting, and implementing procedures for maintaining and communicating the information referral screening and routing guidelines to ICT and IRS units receiving information referrals as well as procedures for ICT screening and routing operations; establishing, documenting, and implementing supervisory review and segregation of duties for inventory management reporting procedures; establishing, documenting, and implementing ongoing monitoring of information referrals retained for destruction, including a mechanism for tracking the reasons referrals were retained prior to destruction; and establishing, documenting, and implementing procedures for each IRS operating unit receiving information referrals to provide feedback on the number and types of referrals misrouted and on their disposition, and a mechanism to analyze patterns of misroute errors. Establish a coordination mechanism to facilitate communication and information sharing across IRS referral programs on crosscutting tax issues and ways to improve efficiency in the mechanisms for public reporting of possible tax violations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
You asked us to assess the overall effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) information referral process. This report (1) describes IRS’s process for screening and routing Form 3949-A information referrals and for prioritizing information referrals within the IRS audit workload; (2) assesses the controls for the information referral screening and routing process; and (3) evaluates the coordination between the information referral process, the Whistleblower Office, and other IRS referral programs. For the second objective, we reviewed existing internal controls for the information referral screening process and assessed whether the procedures aligned with relevant Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We reviewed the IRS web page on reporting tax noncompliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reports by the public of suspected underreporting of taxes or other tax violations can help IRS detect millions of dollars in taxes that would otherwise go uncollected. Productive referrals can help address the net $385 billion tax gap—the difference between the amount of taxes paid voluntarily on time and the amount owed. IRS received about 87,000 information referrals in fiscal year 2015.
GAO was asked to assess the overall effectiveness of the information referral process. This report (1) describes IRS's process for screening and routing information referrals; (2) assesses the controls for the information referral screening and routing process; and (3) evaluates the coordination between the information referral process, the Whistleblower Office, and other IRS referral programs. GAO reviewed IRS guidance, processes, and controls for the information referral process, assessed whether IRS's processes followed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
Information referrals from the public alleging tax noncompliance must be submitted on paper forms by mail to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These referrals are manually screened by clerical staff and routed by mail to units across IRS for further action, as shown in the figure.
Ineffective internal controls undercut IRS management of the information referral process. IRS does not have an organizational structure for information referrals with clear leadership for defining objectives and outcomes for measuring cost-effectiveness and results. Without clear leadership, IRS does not know how effectively it is leveraging information referrals to address the tax gap. IRS has incomplete documentation of procedures for the information referral process, increasing the risk of delays and added costs in routing the information for further action. Although one-quarter of the information referrals in fiscal year 2015 were sent for destruction after screening, IRS has not documented procedures for supervisory review of those referrals prior to destruction. Without procedures to address these control deficiencies, IRS is compromised in its ability to know how effectively it is leveraging tax noncompliance information reported by the public.
Fragmentation and overlap across IRS's general information referral process and eight specialized referral programs, such as for reporting identity theft and misconduct by return preparers, can confuse the public trying to report tax noncompliance to IRS. Yet coordination between referral programs is limited, and IRS does not have a mechanism for sharing information on crosscutting issues and collaborating to improve the efficiency of operations across the mix of referral programs. As a result, IRS may be missing opportunities to leverage resources and reduce the burden on the public trying to report possible noncompliance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that IRS establish an organizational structure that identifies responsibility for defining objectives and for measuring results for information referrals; document procedures for the information referral process; and establish a coordination mechanism across IRS referral programs. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-873 | gao_GAO-05-873_0 | The FAR generally requires agencies to conduct full and open competition for contracts. CMS’s Contracting Reform Plan Does Not Fully Address Three Critical Implementation Areas
While CMS’s contracting reform plan provides detailed information in some areas, it does not comprehensively address (1) contracting reform risks and how the agency plans to mitigate them; (2) the intended approach for implementing certain aspects of MAC contracting, including details on how CMS will monitor MACs’ performance; and (3) coordination of contracting reform activities with other complex initiatives that CMS is implementing. Each of these risks has the potential to disrupt claims administration services, resulting in delayed or improper payments to providers. The Report to Congress—one of the documents in CMS’s contracting reform plan—briefly noted that the anticipated implementation schedule “will require substantial risk management and schedule precision to minimize possible operational disruption.” CMS’s proposed implementation schedule calls for all work to be transferred to MACs by July 2009—more than 2 years ahead of the MMA’s time frame. Although CMS has regularly managed the transitions of claims administration contractors’ workloads and functions and has much experience in doing so, recent transitions have affected only about 10 percent of the claims for Part A and Part B in any year. Furthermore, the MAC transitions will be more complex than past contractor transitions because both Part A and Part B workloads will be transferred from multiple contractors to a single MAC in a new jurisdiction. These changes mean, for example, that under the initial A/B MAC contract that is awarded—one that involves less than 3 percent of the national workload in a six-state jurisdiction—CMS will simultaneously transfer as many as nine separate segments of current contractors’ workload to the new MAC. Interrupting providers’ cash flow by failing to pay them can create significant problems in their operations. Plan’s Cost and Savings Estimates Do Not Provide a Reasonable Basis for Decision Making
CMS’s plan includes estimated costs and savings for Medicare as a result of contracting reform, but the estimates are too uncertain to provide a reasonable basis for making implementation decisions. Cost Estimates Depend on Uncertain Outcomes
In its plan, CMS estimated that the costs to implement contracting reform from 2006 to 2011 would total about $666 million. Therefore, whether contracting reform will actually achieve the $1.4 billion savings is highly uncertain. Potential savings from improved fraud detection are also impossible to quantify, based on current information. The agency has opted to transfer the entire current contractor workload to MACs 2 years ahead of the MMA time frame, in the hope of garnering savings to Medicare as quickly as possible. The accelerated schedule raises concerns for a number of reasons. We believe that by accelerating its implementation schedule to transfer the entire Medicare claims processing workload to MACs by July 2009, CMS is assuming an unnecessary risk. Appendix I: Documents CMS Officials Have Identified as Constituting the Agency’s Plan for Implementing Contracting Reform
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has designated its report, entitled Report to Congress: Medicare Contracting Reform: A Blueprint for a Better Medicare, and the documents underlying this report as its plan for implementing Medicare fee-for-service contracting reform. § 1395kk-1). We developed evaluation criteria to assess the extent to which CMS’s plan provides an appropriate framework to implement Medicare contracting reform. To assess the extent to which the plan’s cost and savings estimates were sound enough to support decision making on implementation, we reviewed CMS’s estimates for administrative costs and savings, savings to the Medicare trust funds, and supporting documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) significantly reformed contracting for the administration of claims for Part A, Medicare's hospital insurance, and Part B, which covers outpatient services such as physicians' care. The MMA required the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicare--to conduct full and open competition for all of its claims administration contracts and to transfer the work to Medicare administrative contractors (MAC) by October 2011. The MMA required the Secretary of HHS to submit a report to the Congress and GAO on the plan for implementing Medicare contracting reform and for GAO to evaluate the plan. To address this mandate, GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) the plan provides an appropriate framework for implementing Medicare contracting reform and (2) the plan's cost and savings estimates are sound enough to support decisions on implementation.
What GAO Found
CMS's plan provides an appropriate framework to implement contracting reform in some critical areas but not in others. For example, the plan indicates the rationale for reform but lacks a detailed schedule to coordinate reform activities with other major initiatives CMS intends to implement at the MACs during the same period. Further, CMS's plan does not comprehensively detail steps to address potential risks during the transitions of the claims workload from the current contractors, such as failing to pay providers or paying them improperly. These transitions will be complex to manage because they require moving multiple claims workloads from current contractors to a single MAC with new jurisdictional lines. As many as nine separate segments of current contractors' workload will be moved to the first A/B MAC. CMS has accelerated its schedule to transfer the current contractor claims workload to MACs by 2009, more than 2 years ahead of the MMA's time frame. This schedule leaves little time for CMS to adjust for any problems encountered. CMS's estimates of costs and savings are too uncertain to support decisions on contracting reform implementation. First, CMS's internal cost estimate for a 6-year implementation period of about $666 million is based on reasonable data but questionable assumptions about contract awards. Second, its estimate of $1.4 billion in savings from reductions in improper payment by MACs depends on questionable evidence and assumptions that were never validated by knowledgeable CMS staff. However, the $1.4 billion estimate prompted CMS to accelerate its implementation schedule to accrue savings as rapidly as possible. While it is reasonable to assume that contracting reform will result in savings, the actual amount could differ greatly from the estimate. Basing an accelerated implementation schedule on uncertain savings raises concerns that CMS has unnecessarily created additional challenges to effectively managing the risk of these transitions. |
gao_GAO-01-552 | gao_GAO-01-552_0 | I for more information on the 34 countries of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.) The final negotiation period will be chaired jointly by the United States and Brazil. Summoning Political Will to Conclude an FTAA
A number of participants told us that the FTAA could be successfully concluded if the key Western Hemisphere leaders demonstrate that they have the political will to conclude the agreement. These decisions will set the pace, goals, and structure for the next phase of negotiations, since the ministers typically set out the agenda for the next phase of the process at the ministerial meeting. Scope and Methodology
To meet our objectives of (1) discussing what progress has been made in the free trade negotiations to date, (2) identifying the challenges that must be overcome to complete a free trade agreement, and (3) discussing the importance of the April meetings of trade ministers and national leaders of the participating countries, we reviewed FTAA and executive branch documents and related literature and economic literature, and held discussions with lead U.S. government negotiators for each of the FTAA negotiating groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
The negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would eliminate tariffs and create common trade and investment rules within the 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere, are among the most significant ongoing multilateral trade negotiations for the United States. Two meetings held in April 2001 offer opportunities to inject momentum and set an ambitious pace for the next, more difficult phase of the negotiations. Because of the significance of the FTAA initiative, this report (1) discusses the progress that has been made in the free trade negotiations so far, (2) identifies the challenges that must be overcome to complete a free trade agreement, and (3) discusses the importance of the April meetings of trade ministers and national leaders of participating countries.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the FTAA negotiations have met the goals and deadlines set by trade ministers. Significant challenges remain, including market access concessions and doubts that key Western Hemisphere leaders will have the political will to embrace the agreement. The April meetings of trade ministers will serve as a transition from the initial proposal phase to the substantive negotiations phase. |
gao_GAO-16-383 | gao_GAO-16-383_0 | Background
Since 1997, DOD has been required to prepare annual audited department-wide financial statements. However, our prior work has shown that long-standing and pervasive financial management weaknesses have precluded DOD from being auditable. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 required that DOD develop and maintain the FIAR Plan. The FIAR Plan must include specific actions DOD plans to take to help correct deficiencies that impair DOD’s ability to prepare timely, reliable, and complete financial management information and ensure that its financial statements are validated as ready for audit by September 30, 2017. 1. The military services have asserted that some individually large-value and high-visibility equipment (such as ships, submarines, and aircraft) are ready for audit. However, they have also reported that they have not completed validation of the accountability over certain key classes of PP&E and therefore have not yet asserted audit readiness for such assets, including land, government-furnished equipment, and IUS. Moreover, the Marine Corps (a component of the Navy) has not yet asserted audit readiness for any of its PP&E. While the military services have set target dates for asserting audit readiness for its PP&E, almost all of the target dates have been delayed, in some cases by multiple years, increasing the risk that DOD may not complete audit readiness efforts by the target date of September 30, 2017. Additionally, DOD has acknowledged a set of control deficiencies, identified as “dealbreakers,” that it reports are so severe that they could prevent the services from demonstrating audit readiness or succeeding in audits. DOD’s Plans for Valuing PP&E Are in the Early Stages of Development
In addition to establishing accountability for all of the department’s PP&E, DOD and the military services must, under current accounting standards, record asset values using an appropriate method of valuation—such as historical cost—for its PP&E to be considered audit ready. For example, DOD estimates that it needs to value over 440,000 real property assets along with individual pieces of equipment that may number in the several hundreds of thousands of items located at multiple installations around the world. 2. Further, DOD and the services have identified challenges in developing and implementing valuation methodologies for existing assets, while continuing to remedy systems and develop procedures to properly account for the actual costs of newly acquired assets for each major category of PP&E. Conclusions
DOD is responsible for over 70 percent of the federal government’s reported PP&E, but DOD cannot accurately account for its PP&E assets. DOD’s inability to perform basic financial and accountability functions is highlighted by its inability to prepare auditable financial statements—one measure of good financial management. Congress has required DOD to take steps to be ready for full financial audit by September 30, 2017, and has mandated that DOD report on its status and progress through the semiannual FIAR Plan Status Report. Although DOD’s Status Reports have shown that several categories of PP&E are ready for audit, its reporting does not provide clear visibility for Congress and other decision makers regarding the extent to which DOD has addressed underlying deficiencies in internal controls. However, the reports do not provide adequate visibility over actions taken and progress made toward correcting the dealbreakers. Without sufficient information about the status of improvements in internal control, including information about dealbreakers, DOD, congressional committees, and other decision makers do not have a complete status of audit readiness or improvements that still need to be made. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making two recommendations to help provide better visibility of DOD’s financial management status for decision makers and to improve oversight of DOD’s audit readiness efforts to strengthen internal controls and improve financial practices and processes. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), while developing other formatting changes to be made in future reports, expand the semiannual FIAR Plan Status Report to include the extent to which assertions of audit readiness have been made without assurance that related controls are effective and the details of remediation activities taken and planned to correct the known internal control deficiencies and the details of military services’ actions taken and progress made toward correcting the control deficiencies underlying the reported dealbreakers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Senate report accompanying S.2410, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision for GAO to conduct a review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans to achieve audit readiness with respect to its Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E). The objectives of our review were to determine the reported status of DOD’s and the military services’—the departments of the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), and Air Force—(1) assertions of audit readiness for PP&E asset accountability in accordance with the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance and (2) plans for valuing PP&E assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1997, DOD has been required to prepare audited financial statements. However, long-standing and pervasive financial management weaknesses have precluded DOD from being auditable. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated that DOD develop and maintain a plan that among other things, describes the actions needed to ensure that its consolidated financial statements are audit ready by September 30, 2017.
The Senate report accompanying the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's plans to achieve audit readiness with respect to its PP&E. This report addresses the reported status of DOD's and the military services' (1) audit readiness assertions for PP&E asset accountability and (2) plans for valuing PP&E assets. GAO reviewed the FIAR Plan Status Reports and Guidance, documentation of assertions of audit readiness, and federal accounting standards and proposed changes, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD), reporting about $630 billion total Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) net of accumulated depreciation as of September 30, 2015, is responsible for over 70 percent of the U.S. government's reported PP&E. However, as GAO and others have previously reported—and made recommendations to address—DOD's accountability over and ability to value its PP&E assets has for years been challenged by poorly designed internal controls, processes, and systems. These challenges are highlighted by DOD's inability to prepare auditable financial statements.
The military services have asserted audit readiness regarding PP&E accountability for some categories of PP&E. However, they have not yet asserted audit readiness for certain key categories of PP&E, including land, government-furnished equipment, and internal-use software. In addition, the Marine Corps (a component of the Navy) has not yet asserted audit readiness for any of its PP&E. While the services have set target dates for asserting audit readiness for these remaining assets, almost all of the target dates have been delayed in some cases by multiple years, increasing the risk that DOD may not complete audit readiness efforts by the target date of September 30, 2017.
DOD reports its audit readiness status and progress in its semiannual Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan Status Report. However, the Status Report does not provide clear visibility for Congress and other decision makers regarding the extent to which DOD has addressed deficiencies in the related internal controls. For example, the military services have asserted audit readiness regarding PP&E accountability for some individually large-value and high-visibility equipment, such as ships and aircraft. However, the Status Report does not reflect that the services have often asserted audit readiness without evaluating or correcting the underlying internal control deficiencies. Similarly, DOD identified a number of deficiencies, referred to as dealbreakers, that it reports to be so severe that they could prevent the services from demonstrating audit readiness or succeeding in audits—such as the inability to produce a complete list of items the services own. However, DOD's Status Report does not provide adequate visibility over actions taken and progress made toward correcting those dealbreakers. Without greater visibility of DOD's audit readiness status and progress in its FIAR Plan Status Report, Congress and other decision makers may not have sufficient information to assess DOD's current audit readiness status and the improvements that still need to be made.
Regarding valuation, DOD is in the early stages of developing specific methodologies and procedures to value its existing PP&E assets. DOD estimates that it needs to value over 440,000 real property assets and several hundred thousand individual pieces of equipment. Proposed changes to federal accounting standards would provide DOD more options for estimating the value of its existing assets. However, DOD reported that previously identified systems and control deficiencies impair its ability to properly account for the actual costs of newly acquired assets, and identified fixing such deficiencies as a priority in the FIAR Plan.
What GAO Recommends
To help provide better visibility of DOD's financial management status and efforts, GAO recommends that DOD expand its semiannual FIAR Plan Status Report to include (1) audit assertions that have been made without correcting internal control deficiencies along with actions and plans to remediate the deficiencies and (2) details of military services' actions taken and progress made toward correcting the underlying deficiencies for reported dealbreakers. DOD agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-669 | gao_GAO-06-669_0 | Instead of requiring EPA to develop ambient standards for air toxics as it does for the six criteria pollutants, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 listed the air toxics to be controlled and directed EPA to control them by, among other things, (1) developing technology-based emissions limits (MACT standards) for major stationary sources, such as incinerators and chemical plants; (2) regulating emissions from smaller sources, such as dry cleaners and gas stations; and (3) evaluating the need for and feasibility of regulations from mobile sources, such as cars, and regulating these sources based on this evaluation. EPA Has Made Limited Progress in Addressing the Clean Air Act’s Requirements for Air Toxics and Faces Significant Implementation Challenges
EPA has completed issuing emissions standards for major stationary sources but issued most of these standards late and has made limited progress toward completing the remaining air toxics requirements. Furthermore, the agency lacks a program implementation strategy. As a result of the limited progress in implementing these requirements, EPA has not reduced human health risks from air toxics to the extent and in the time frames envisioned in the act. Additionally, several officials said that other regulatory and voluntary programs limit emissions of air toxics as a side benefit. For example, some stakeholders said that the problems with limited resources stemmed from the program’s low priority. Available Information on Costs and Benefits Is Not Sufficient to Measure the Program’s Effectiveness
The information available on the costs and benefits of EPA’s air toxics program is not sufficiently comprehensive to measure the overall effectiveness of the program. We also evaluated two other potential indicators of the program’s effectiveness—data on levels of air toxics in the ambient air and information on the degree of compliance with clean air regulations—to determine their usefulness as indicators of the program’s effectiveness. While EPA may have been driven by certain deadlines in the act, some state and local officials said that the agency has chosen to focus on certain large stationary sources even though EPA’s data suggest that emissions from small stationary sources and mobile sources may pose greater risks. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of EPA’s air toxics program and enhance its ability to reduce risks of cancer and other adverse health effects, we recommend that the EPA Administrator require the Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation to develop an air toxics program improvement plan that incorporates the following five issues: provides a detailed schedule for completing its mandated air toxics activities and identifies the staffing and funding resources needed to meet the schedule and address the health risk assessment needs; prioritizes activities within the air toxics program, placing the highest priority on those actions that have the greatest potential to address health risks, to the extent permitted by the Clean Air Act; establishes a process and timelines for meeting the act’s requirements to periodically review and update the list of air toxics; outlines an approach and timelines for improving the agency’s ability to measure the program’s costs and benefits; and describes how the agency plans to improve its air toxics emissions inventory, including a discussion of the statutory authority for, and the merits of, requiring states and emissions sources to submit standardized emissions data. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to assess (1) EPA’s progress toward implementing the air toxics program and any implementation challenges the agency faces, (2) what available information indicates about the costs and benefits of EPA’s efforts to control air toxics, and (3) the program design and management practices of state and local air toxics programs that could potentially help EPA enhance the effectiveness of the federal program. More complete information on costs and benefits would help the agency, Congress, and the public understand the effects of the air toxics program and enable the agency to compare the net benefits of the air toxics program with those achieved under other clean air programs on which the agency has placed a higher priority. This suggests that EPA has substantial opportunities to further address air toxics risks from mobile sources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) most recent data indicate that 95 percent of all Americans face an increased likelihood of developing cancer as a result of breathing air toxics--pollutants such as benzene and asbestos that may cause cancer or other serious health problems. Sources of air toxics include large industrial facilities, smaller facilities such as dry cleaners, and cars and trucks. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required EPA to regulate 190 pollutants from these sources through a multifaceted regulatory program. While EPA issues federal standards, state and local agencies generally administer these standards, and some develop their own rules to complement the federal standards. In this context, GAO was asked to assess (1) EPA's progress and challenges in implementing the air toxics program, (2) available information on the program's costs and benefits, and (3) practices of state and local air toxics programs.
What GAO Found
While EPA has made some progress in implementing its air toxics program mandated by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, most of its regulatory actions were completed late and major aspects of the program have still not been addressed. Most of EPA's progress relates to issuing emissions standards for large stationary sources, although EPA completed these standards about 4 years behind schedule. However, many of the unmet requirements pertain to limiting emissions from small stationary and mobile sources, which collectively account for most emissions of air toxics. The agency faces continuing implementation challenges stemming from the program's low priority relative to other programs and related funding constraints. To this end, the agency lacks a comprehensive strategy for completing the unmet requirements or estimates of resources necessary to do so. Senior EPA officials said the program's agenda is largely set by external stakeholders who file litigation when the agency misses deadlines. As a result of EPA's limited progress, the agency has not addressed health risks from air toxics to the extent or in the time frames envisioned in the Clean Air Act. Senior EPA officials said that issuing standards for large stationary sources had addressed the greatest risks from air toxics and that other clean air programs also control air toxics as a side benefit. However, EPA does not have reliable data on the degree of risk reduction achieved through its regulations. Furthermore, the data that are available suggest that the agency has substantial opportunities to reduce emissions from mobile and small stationary sources. Available information on EPA's efforts to control air toxics is not sufficiently comprehensive to measure the program's total costs and benefits. Specifically, EPA has not comprehensively estimated the national economic costs of all air toxics standards and lacks the data necessary to assess the benefits of these standards, such as decreased incidence of cancer. Information on these impacts would help the agency assess the overall net benefits (total benefits minus total costs) of the air toxics program and compare these effects with those generated by higher-priority clean air programs, such as those intended to address smog. Data on other indicators of the program's effectiveness, such as changes in emissions, concentrations of air toxics in the (ambient) outdoor air, and data on compliance with air toxics standards are also limited and inconclusive. The state and local programs we reviewed use practices that could potentially help EPA enhance the effectiveness of its air toxics program. For example, several state programs have systematic approaches for identifying and prioritizing new pollutants that could inform EPA's efforts to meet the act's requirement to review and update the list of regulated pollutants. |
gao_GAO-06-600T | gao_GAO-06-600T_0 | Cash Donation Management Policies, Procedures, and Plans Were Not in Place
In the absence of international cash donation management policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage the cash donations flowing to the U.S. government from other countries for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. In October 2005, $66 million of the $126 million donated had been accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act and used for a Hurricane Katrina relief grant. As of March 16, 2006, the other $60 million from international donations remained undistributed. We were told that the NSC-led interagency working group did not transfer the funds to FEMA because it wanted to retain the flexibility to spend the donated funds on a wider range of assistance than is permitted under the Stafford Act. By September 21, 2005, about $115 million in foreign cash donations had been received. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, while the NSC-led interagency working group reviewed various proposals on the use of the remaining $60 million, DOS held the funds in an account at the U.S. Treasury that did not earn interest. The Administration’s report, The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, released on February 23, 2006, recognized that there was no pre-established plan for handling international donations and that implementation of the procedures developed was a slow and often frustrating process. If the goal is to maintain both purchasing power and flexibility, then among the options to consider are seeking statutory authority for DOS to record funds in a Treasury account that can pay interest similar to donations accepted under the Stafford Act pending decisions on how the funds would be used, or to allow DOS to deposit the funds in an existing Treasury account of another agency that can pay interest pending decisions on how the funds would be used. Lack of Guidance Regarding the Accountability for International In-Kind Assistance
In the absence of guidance, we found a lack of accountability in the management of the in-kind assistance. Specifically, FEMA did not have a process in place that confirmed that the in-kind assistance sent to distribution sites was received. Also, the ad hoc procedures created to manage foreign military donations allowed for confusion about which agency—FEMA or DOD— should accept and be responsible for oversight of such donations. Without these controls in place to ensure accountability for the assistance, FEMA does not know if all or part of these donations were received at FEMA distribution sites. Inadequate Guidance, Information, and Coordination Resulted in the Arrival of Food and Medical Items That Could Not Be Used
We noted that the guidance the agencies created did not include policies and procedures to help ensure that food and medical supplies that the U.S. government agreed to receive and came into the United States met U.S. standards. The lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination with regulatory agencies before agreeing to receive them, resulted in food and medical items, such as MREs and medical supplies, that came into the United States even though they did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the United States. Policies and Procedures Were Lacking in the Oversight of Foreign Military Donations
In the absence of policies and procedures, DOS, FEMA, and DOD created ad hoc policies and procedures to manage the receipt and distribution of foreign military goods and services. In closing, since the U.S. government had never before received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance, we recognize that DOS, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD created ad hoc procedures to manage the receipt, acceptance, and distribution of the assistance as best they could. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to Hurricane Katrina, countries and organizations donated to the United States government cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military assistance. The National Response Plan establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for accepting the assistance and coordinating its distribution. GAO's testimony covers (1) the amount and use of internationally donated cash and (2) the extent to which federal agencies with responsibilities for international in-kind assistance offered to the United States had policies and procedures to ensure the appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of that assistance.
What GAO Found
Because the U.S. government had not received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance before, ad hoc procedures were developed to accept, receive and distribute the cash and in-kind assistance. Understandably, not all procedures would be in place at the outset to provide a higher level of accountability. The Administration recognized the need for improvement in its recent report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. GAO was able to track the cash donations received to designated U.S. Treasury accounts or disbursed. In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage $126 million in foreign cash donations to the U.S. government for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As cash donations arrived, a National Security Council (NSC)-led interagency working group was convened to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told GAO they had identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that use of those donated funds, once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of possible uses available if the funds were held and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds were spent on a FEMA case management grant, and as of March 16, 2006, $60 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at the Treasury that did not pay interest. Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. According to DOS, an additional $400 million in international cash donations are likely to arrive. It is important that cash management policies and spending plan options are considered and in place to deal with the forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is maintained for relief and reconstruction. FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and militaries. In-kind donations included food and clothing. FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures. However, in the distribution of the assistance to FEMA sites, GAO found that no agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations. Also, lack of procedures, inadequate information up front about the donations, and insufficient coordination resulted in the U.S. government agreeing to receive food and medical items that were unsuitable for use in the United States and storage costs of about $80,000. The procedures also allowed confusion about which agency was to accept and provide oversight of foreign military donations. DOD's lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD oversight. |
gao_GAO-13-392 | gao_GAO-13-392_0 | Pass- through grants are first awarded to prime recipients, such as states, local governments, or other entities, and then awarded to subrecipients. Both Government- wide Policies and Specific Program Policies Govern Distribution of Pass- Through Grant Funds
All federal grant programs are subject to a common foundation of governing rules and government-wide requirements, and two are particularly relevant to entities that pass funds on to subrecipients. The Cash Management Improvement Act (CMIA) governs the exchange of funds between the federal government and the states, and is applicable to timeliness in the grant disbursement process, while OMB’s Circular No. A-133 provides general guidance on the roles and responsibilities of the federal awarding agencies and primary recipients of government funds regarding audit requirements of grantees and The circular sets forth guidance implementing the Single subrecipients. Federal Agencies Vary In Certain Pass-Through Grant Management Requirements
In addition to government-wide requirements, program-specific requirements—found in a grant program’s authorizing legislation, appropriation, or implementing regulations—can provide specific requirements for individual grant programs related to disbursement of funds. For example, as with the three programs we reviewed, the authorizing legislation may contain statutory limits on the amount of administrative funds that states and local governments are allowed to withhold from the grant awards for their own administrative expenses. Federal Monitoring Efforts Include Methods to Identify Issues of Distributing Funds to Subrecipients
As part of program monitoring procedures to help ensure states comply with federal requirements and agency regulations, federal agencies oversee aspects of pass-through grants related to the administrative funds states withhold and the timeliness of reimbursement practices. States have some flexibility in determining whether a grant will be distributed on a reimbursement basis or through a cash advance. For the selected programs and states we reviewed, we found that states worked within the federal requirements of their grant programs and reimbursed the subrecipients within the time allowed in their grant agreements. Subrecipients in Focus Groups Reported Minimal Issues with Timeliness of Federal Funds’ Reimbursement and Administrative Funds that States Withheld
Subrecipients in our focus groups did not report instances in which federal requirements related to reimbursement timeliness or administrative funds withheld were not followed, and therefore were not impacted by these requirements not being met; however, they did identify other grant management issues. Each agency provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to report on (1) government-wide and select agencies’ requirements and oversight related to the timeliness of federal grant funds from states to subrecipients and the portion of funds states may withhold for their own administration, (2) select states’ practices in disbursing federal grant funds to subrecipients and the extent to which select federal granting agencies have identified compliance issues with these requirements, and (3) the views of subrecipients on the impact of selected states’ practices in disbursing grant funds. To determine the government-wide and select agencies’ requirements governing the timeliness of federal grant funds from states to subrecipients and the portion of funds states may withhold for their own administration, we identified Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) circulars related to grants management and reviewed these circulars to determine the extent that they related to pass-through grants. We selected three federal pass-through grant programs to illustrate how federal agencies manage pass-through grant programs, including requirements for distribution and monitoring practices. We reviewed monitoring reports for select states’ administration of the selected programs. However, they provide insights and examples related to pass- through grants management. At these focus groups, we discussed how federal and state management of pass-through grants positively impacted their organizations as well as suggestions for improvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Grant programs in which states are awarded federal grants but then pass funds on to subrecipients--entities within states' jurisdiction--are referred to as "pass-through grants." These relationships pose challenges for the management of grant programs, as the multiple levels add complexity to the flow of funds, administration, and oversight.
As requested, GAO examined management and oversight of pass-through grants. This report addresses (1) requirements and oversight related to the timeliness of federal grant funds from states to subrecipients and the portion states may withhold for their administration, (2) select states' practices in disbursing federal grant funds to subrecipients and the extent to which select federal granting agencies have identified compliance issues with these requirements, and (3) the views of subrecipients on the impact of selected states' practices in disbursing grant funds. To conduct this study, GAO selected states and programs based on characteristics affecting pass-through grants management. GAO reviewed documentation on government-wide regulations and selected federal pass-through grant programs; reviewed monitoring reports and audits of state pass-through entities; and interviewed federal and state officials, as well as subrecipients and others with relevant expertise. Findings cannot be generalized to all states and programs, but our work provides insights related to pass-through grants management.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. OMB and selected federal granting agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
As pass-through grant funds flow to subrecipients, they are subject to government-wide and program-specific policies, two of which are particularly relevant to disbursement issues for states as they pass funds on to subrecipients. Pass-through grants are typically first awarded to states, local governments, or other entities and then further awarded to subrecipients. The Cash Management Improvement Act governs the exchange of funds between the federal government and the states and is applicable to timeliness in the grant disbursement process. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular No. A-133, Audits of States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations , provides general guidance on the roles and responsibilities of the federal awarding agencies and primary recipients of government funds regarding audit requirements of grantees. Specific program policies can provide additional requirements for individual grant programs related to disbursement of funds. For example, as with the programs we reviewed, authorizing legislation may contain statutory limits on the amount of funds that states and local governments can withhold from the grant awards for their own administrative expenses. To ensure states comply with federal requirements and agency regulations for disbursing federal grant funds, federal agencies monitor aspects of pass-through grants related to administrative costs that states withhold and timeliness of reimbursement. According to their monitoring procedures, selected federal agencies also review the results of states' "single audits"--annual audits performed on many recipients of federal funds.
Selected states' pass-through grant disbursement practices varied for the three programs GAO reviewed, but generally complied with federal requirements. For example, states had some flexibility in determining whether a grant would be distributed on a reimbursement basis or through a cash advance. For the programs and states GAO reviewed, GAO found that states generally worked within the federal parameters of their grant programs and reimbursed the subrecipients within the time allowed in their grant agreements.
Subrecipients in GAO focus groups reported minimal issues with timeliness of federal funds' reimbursement and administrative funds that states withheld. In addition, these subrecipients did not report instances in which federal requirements related to reimbursement timeliness or administrative funds withheld were not followed and therefore were not impacted by these requirements not being met. |
gao_HEHS-96-23 | gao_HEHS-96-23_0 | OCR’s principal activity is the resolution of discrimination complaints. In analyzing how these 13 cases were investigated and resolved, we found that OCR generally followed its established policies and procedures. During this period, OCR resolved complaints and completed compliance reviews in less than 180 days on average. For compliance reviews, only cases involving class actions (cases affecting groups of students) and multiple title VI issues (one complaint alleging multiple issues, namely race and national origin) took more time, on average, to complete than Asian-American cases. At the same time, Asian-Americans filed a higher percentage of complaints involving admissions issues than other minority groups; these complaints resulted in benefits to the complainant or changes by the postsecondary schools in a higher percentage of cases than for other minority groups. (Of the 28, only 2 were administrative closures—1 Hispanic case and 1 class action case.) OCR Has Implemented Changes to Improve Operations
During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, OCR implemented several administrative changes to (1) improve its operations overall and (2) revise the planning and conduct of complaint investigations and compliance reviews as well as the documentation required in the official files. It is too soon, however, to determine whether the changes implemented and planned will significantly improve the timeliness, documentation, and quality of OCR’s operations over the long term. Plans to Improve Use of Staff
OCR has developed plans to redeploy staff to improve productivity. She also asked us to qualify parts of our report to show that OCR cases involving Asian-Americans did not always take the most time to resolve or complete and to highlight that generally for Asian-American cases, OCR found more violations which led to remedial action by postsecondary schools and benefits to the complainants. To determine the timeliness and outcomes of OCR’s complaint investigations and compliance reviews for Asian-Americans as compared with other minority groups, we obtained data tapes and printed reports from OCR covering fiscal years 1988 through 1995. We also provide information on our review of the other cases that were administratively closed and whether OCR followed its policies and procedures with regard to time frames. OCR exceeded its established time frames for this case. 3. 7.) 5. 6. 7. 3.) 4.) 11.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights' (OCR) handling of discrimination cases involving Asian-Americans who applied to or were enrolled in postsecondary schools, focusing on: (1) whether OCR followed established policies and procedures in conducting complaint investigations; (2) a comparison of the timeliness and outcomes of complaint investigations and compliance reviews for fiscal years 1988 through 1995 involving Asian-Americans and other minority groups; (3) whether recent OCR administrative changes improved its performance and resolution of complaint investigations and compliance reviews.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) OCR generally followed its established policies and procedures in the 13 cases reviewed, but 7 of the 11 resolved cases exceeded OCR time frames for resolution and OCR official case files did not adequately reflect headquarters actions; (2) although its staffing levels and other resources remained stable while discrimination complaints increased, OCR averaged less than 180 days in revolving most of its general workload; (3) OCR usually took more time on average to resolve Asian-American cases than other minority cases; (4) the longer resolution periods for Asian-American cases were partially due to the high percentage of cases involving admission issues and greater number of violations per case, which took longer and more resources to resolve; (5) the resolution of Asian-American cases resulted in more corrective actions and changes made by postsecondary schools; (6) OCR has initiated administrative changes to improve its performance and resolution of complaints and compliance reviews which include setting priorities, revising procedures to respond more flexibly to complaints and reduce unnecessary documentation, increasing its use of personal computers and networks to track cases, and redeploying staff to improve productivity; and (7) although OCR has reduced its case backlog, it is too soon tell if these administrative changes will significantly improve OCR handling of complaint investigations and compliance reviews over the long term. |
gao_GAO-05-762 | gao_GAO-05-762_0 | Selected Agencies’ Use of the SLR Program Largely Depended on Their Unique Recruitment and Retention Needs
DOS, DOJ, and SEC used the SLR program more extensively and primarily as a broad-based tool to retain more recently hired employees in specific positions that require knowledge or skills critical to the agency. At this time, SSA, EEOC, and SBA were satisfied with their efforts using other recruitment and retention tools and have not needed to use the program. DOE uses the SLR program on a case-by-case basis determined by factors such as labor market conditions that may affect recruiting efforts. Agency officials also said that since DOT views the program as an expensive benefit and because the agency is now operating with a lower budget, they will use the program sparingly. The agencies operating their programs centrally used the SLR program primarily as a broad-based retention tool, while the agencies running decentralized programs used student loan repayments on a case-by-case basis. Agencies also varied the amount of the loan repayment, depending on the results they needed to achieve. Agency Officials Suggested Ways to Make the SLR Program More Efficient and Effective, but Agencies Do Not Yet Have Processes to Assess the Long-term Impact of Their Programs
Officials from agencies using the program agreed that certain changes, such as more automation of the application and loan repayment processes and consolidation of some other program activities, would help to improve the program’s administration. Agency Officials Also Suggested Ways to Make the Program More Effective
Agency officials identified several program characteristics they believe impede the program. Agency Officials Say They Plan to Assess the Program’s Impact but Need More Data to Determine Long-term Effects
Agencies using the program had not yet established processes to measure the extent to which the SLR program was helping them to meet their recruitment and retention needs. Agency officials did report that based on anecdotal evidence, they believe the program helps to make their agency more attractive to potential job candidates and helps them retain high quality employees. We also recognize that OPM and the CHCO Council could help to facilitate this coordination. OPM has taken a number of steps to provide agencies with information and guidance on the SLR program. Conclusions
Federal agencies have a large degree of discretion in structuring SLR programs to meet their unique needs, and the SLR program shows promise as an effective tool for attracting and retaining the talent needed to sustain the federal workforce. If the program continues to grow, making it easier to administer will help ensure agencies make maximum use of available funds to recruit and retain key talent, so critical in a time of fiscal constraints. This, in turn, could provide a consistent set of governmentwide indicators that would allow OPM to assess, and report to Congress on, the program’s overall results achieved. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to identify why selected executive branch agencies are using or not using the student loan repayment (SLR) program, how agencies are implementing the SLR program, and what results and suggestions agency officials could provide about the program and how they view the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) role in facilitating the program’s use. The agency selection process was not designed to be representative of the use of the SLR program in the federal government as a whole, but rather to provide illustrative examples of why and how agencies decided to use the program or chose not to use it. These agencies varied in their mission and size. | Why GAO Did This Study
As federal workers retire in greater numbers, agencies will need to recruit and retain a new wave of talented individuals. Agencies need to determine if the federal student loan repayment (SLR) program is one of the best ways to make maximum use of available funds to attract and keep this key talent. GAO was asked to identify (1) why agencies use or are not using the program; (2) how agencies are implementing the SLR program; and (3) what results and suggestions agency officials could provide about the program and how they view the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) role in facilitating its use. Ten agencies were selected to provide illustrative examples of why and how agencies decided to use or chose not to use the program.
What GAO Found
The largest users among GAO's 10 selected executive branch agencies primarily employed their SLR programs as broad-based retention tools aimed at keeping more recently hired employees with the knowledge and skills critical to their agencies. Officials at these agencies said the program also has an indirect positive effect on their recruitment efforts because job candidates are aware of the benefit and find the incentive attractive. Other agencies used the program as a recruitment and retention tool on a case-by-case basis, offering repayments to highly qualified individuals in occupations where the labor market is competitive. Agencies not using the program reported no real need to do so at this time because they are not facing significant recruitment and retention challenges. Agencies have a large degree of discretion in structuring their SLR programs, and they were tailoring program aspects to meet their unique needs. Those using their programs as broad-based retention tools operated them centrally, while those making loan repayments on a case-by-case basis had decentralized programs operated by their component units. Agencies also varied in the size of their loan repayments depending on the results they were trying to achieve. Although agencies believe it is a useful tool, officials described the program as time consuming and cumbersome to operate. They suggested that more automation and consolidation of program activities would make the program more efficient and easier to operate. Officials also suggested ways to make the program more effective. Since the SLR program is relatively new, agencies did not yet have comprehensive data to assess the program's impact, although they will need to establish a baseline of measures now for future assessments of the program. Currently, anecdotal evidence indicates that employees value the program, and agency officials believe the incentive will become more attractive to agencies once administrative problems are reduced. OPM has taken a number of steps to provide agencies with information and guidance on implementing the program. Human capital officials recognized OPM's efforts, but felt they could use more assistance on the technical aspects of operating the program, more coordination in sharing lessons learned in implementing it, and help consolidating some of the program processes. OPM and the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Council have an important role in assisting agencies with implementing their SLR programs. They may also be able to help agencies assess their own program results as well as develop a common set of metrics to provide information to Congress on the impact of the SLR program governmentwide. |
gao_GAO-08-313 | gao_GAO-08-313_0 | To assist youth transitioning to adulthood, direct services are provided at the local level with the support of federal, state, local, and private funding sources. Local Programs We Reviewed Differed in Their Funding Sources and Program Structure, yet Shared Some Characteristics
The 39 local programs we reviewed received funding from a range of government and private sources, and differed in their program structure, yet shared some specific characteristics. For example, some were community-based organizations that provided services on a daily basis, some were charter schools, and some offered residential living. All of the programs we reviewed were created to meet the needs of local youth, such as addressing youth homelessness and high school dropout rates. Most of these programs were well established, with many providing services to youth for at least 10 years. Directors of the 39 Local Programs Cited Similar Key Elements in Reconnecting Youth to Educational and Employment Goals
While varying types of programs serve disconnected youth, directors of the 39 local programs we reviewed identified similar key elements of their programs that assist them in reconnecting youth to educational and employment goals. Specific Program Design Components Help Programs to Engage and Retain Young People
Program directors incorporated a variety of specific design components to help engage and retain youth, such as experiential learning opportunities, engagement in civic activities, self-paced curricula and flexible schedules, and financial and nonfinancial incentives. Directors We Interviewed Cited Service Gaps, Funding Constraints, and Federal Grant Management Challenges That Hindered Their Efforts; Federal Coordination Efforts Under Way May Help Address Some of These Issues
Program directors reported challenges addressing some of the issues faced by youth in their programs as well as gaps in certain services, such as housing and employment opportunities for youth. Most directors reported that funding constraints from federal and other sources challenge program stability and efforts to serve more youth. Performance Contracts Associated with Some Federal Funding May Have Unintended Consequences
Many of the 15 local program directors who received WIA Youth funding reported that meeting the performance goals for which they were held accountable within short-term contracts discouraged them from working with low-skilled youth who may need increased time and assistance to reach specified outcomes, such as employment or educational gains. Labor has taken some steps to address this problem. However, it has not provided technical assistance more broadly on this issue. Labor officials said they have not yet established a time frame for developing and issuing guidance on this. For example, among the large workforce programs, workforce investment boards often award 1-year WIA contracts to local programs, and YouthBuild is now a 3-year grant. (HHS)
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) the characteristics of programs that provide services to disconnected youth, (2) the key elements of locally operated programs that program directors attribute to their success in reconnecting youth to education and employment, and (3) the challenges that are involved in implementing and operating these programs and how federal agencies are helping to address these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
While most young people successfully transition to adulthood, a significant number of youth are disconnected from school and employment. These youth are more likely than others to engage in crime, become incarcerated, and rely on public systems of support. Several federal agencies oversee a number of programs and grants that assist local programs in serving this population at the local level. GAO reviewed the following: (1) characteristics of locally operated programs that serve disconnected youth, (2) the key elements of locally operated programs to which directors attribute their success in reconnecting youth to education and employment, and (3) challenges involved in operating these programs and how federal agencies are helping to address these challenges. GAO interviewed officials from four federal agencies, experts, and directors of 39 local programs identified by agencies and experts as helping youth meet educational and employment goals.
What GAO Found
The 39 local programs GAO reviewed differed in their funding sources and program structure, yet shared some characteristics, such as years of experience serving youth. These programs received funding from multiple sources: federal, state, local, and private, although most relied on some federal funds. They were structured differently--for example, some were community-based organizations that provided services on a daily basis, some were charter schools, and some offered residential living. Most of the programs were created to address local concerns such as youth homelessness or dropout rates, and many had at least 10 years of experience serving youth. Program directors GAO interviewed attributed their success in reconnecting youth to education and employment to several key elements of their programs. These included effective staff and leadership; a holistic approach to serving youth that addresses the youth's multiple needs; specific program design components, such as experiential learning opportunities and self-paced curricula; and a focus on empowering youth. Many of the 39 local program directors reported common challenges in operating their programs--the complex circumstances of their participants, service gaps, funding constraints, and management of federal grants--that increased federal coordination efforts under way may help address. Most of the 15 directors that relied on Labor's Workforce Investment Act Youth funds reported that meeting performance goals within 1-year time frames that workforce investment boards often write into contracts hinders their ability to serve youth with great challenges, who may need more time to obtain skills. Labor officials reported that they intend for workforce investment boards to develop longer-term contracts to help programs serve hard-to-employ youth. Labor has provided limited technical assistance and is considering issuing guidance on this issue, but has not established a time frame to do so. Federal agencies have recently intensified their coordination efforts, which may help local programs faced with challenges managing across multiple federal grants. |
gao_GAO-15-471 | gao_GAO-15-471_0 | Registrants Vary in Extent of Interaction with DEA and Awareness of DEA Resources, and While Generally Satisfied, Some Want Additional Information Registrants Interact with DEA through Several Methods, but to Different Extents, and Many Are Not Aware of DEA Conferences and Resources
Results from our generalizable surveys of DEA registrants show that the extent of registrants’ interaction with DEA varies. Our survey results also show that many registrants are not aware of DEA conferences and resources. However, some distributors, individual pharmacies, and chain pharmacy corporate offices reported that they want additional guidance from, and communication with, DEA. Distributors that communicated with DEA field offices about their roles and responsibilities under the CSA were particularly satisfied—we estimate that 92 percent of distributors found the field office staff very or moderately helpful. For example, most of the individual pharmacies and chain pharmacy corporate offices that reported attending one of DEA’s PDACs found them very or moderately helpful. Some Pharmacies Want Improved Guidance and More Communication from DEA
Responses to our surveys also show that some pharmacies want updated or clearer guidance, as well as more communication and information, from DEA. However, DEA officials indicated that they do not believe there is a need for additional guidance for or communication with pharmacy registrants, and that the current methods by which the agency helps pharmacy registrants understand their CSA roles and responsibilities are sufficient. While some national associations did not comment directly on their satisfaction with how they interact with DEA, more than half of those that did indicated that they were generally satisfied with those interactions, though others wanted better communication with the agency. Additionally, officials from half of the national associations Satisfaction with DEA interactions. Of the national associations and state agencies we interviewed that offered a perspective on this issue, most (13 of 17) reported that DEA enforcement actions have helped to decrease abuse and diversion of prescription drugs. Many Registrants Have Changed Certain Business Practices as a Result of DEA Enforcement Actions and Reported These Changes Have Limited Legitimate Access
On the basis of our generalizable surveys, we found that over half of registrants have made changes to certain business practices that they attribute in part to either DEA enforcement actions or the business climate these actions may have created. For example, we estimate that over half of distributors placed stricter thresholds, or limits, on the quantities of controlled substances that their customers (e.g., pharmacies and practitioners) could order, and that most of these distributors were influenced to a great or moderate extent by DEA’s enforcement actions. Many individual pharmacies and chain pharmacy corporate offices reported that these stricter thresholds have limited, to a great or moderate extent, their ability to supply drugs to those with a legitimate need. DEA faces a significant challenge in simultaneously ensuring the availability of controlled substances for legitimate use while limiting their availability for diversion and abuse. Therefore, adequate DEA communication with and guidance for its registrants are essential to help ensure that registrants take actions that prevent abuse and diversion but do not unnecessarily diminish patients’ access to controlled substances for legitimate use because of their uncertainty about how to appropriately meet their CSA roles and responsibilities. While many of the registrants, state government agencies, and national associations that have interacted with DEA were generally satisfied with these interactions, some of these stakeholders said they needed improved communication and guidance regarding registrants’ roles and responsibilities for preventing abuse and diversion under the CSA. In its comments, DEA stated that it describes the actions that it plans to take to implement our three recommendations. However, we identified additional actions DEA should take to fully implement our recommendations. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) how and to what extent selected registrants interact with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) related to their responsibilities for preventing prescription drug abuse and diversion under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and registrants’ perspectives on those interactions, (2) how selected state agencies and national associations interact with DEA related to reducing prescription drug abuse and diversion, and their perspectives on those interactions, and (3) stakeholders’ perspectives about how DEA enforcement actions have affected abuse and diversion of prescription drugs and access to those drugs for legitimate medical needs. 2014 Surveys of Distributors, Individual Pharmacies, Chain Pharmacy Corporate Offices, and Practitioners
To address the first and third objectives, we surveyed samples of practitioners, distributors, and pharmacies that were registered with the DEA to prescribe, administer, or handle controlled substances about their interactions with DEA and perspectives on DEA enforcement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DEA administers and enforces the CSA as it pertains to ensuring the availability of controlled substances, including certain prescription drugs, for legitimate use while limiting their availability for abuse and diversion. The CSA requires those handling controlled substances to register with DEA.
GAO was asked to review registrants' and others' interactions with DEA. This report examines (1) to what extent registrants interact with DEA about their CSA responsibilities, and registrants' perspectives on those interactions, (2) how state agencies and national associations interact with DEA, and their perspectives on those interactions, and (3) stakeholders' perspectives on how DEA enforcement actions have affected prescription drug abuse and diversion and access to those drugs for legitimate needs. GAO administered nationally representative web-based surveys to DEA-registered distributors, individual pharmacies, chain pharmacy corporate offices, and practitioners. GAO also interviewed officials from DEA, 26 national associations and other nonprofits, and 16 government agencies in four states representing varying geographic regions and overdose death rates.
What GAO Found
GAO's four nationally representative surveys of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) registrants showed that these registrants vary in the extent of their interaction with DEA related to their roles and responsibilities for preventing prescription drug abuse and diversion under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Specifically, GAO found that distributors and chain pharmacy corporate offices interacted with DEA more often than individual pharmacies or health care practitioners. The surveys also showed that many registrants are not aware of various DEA resources. For example, GAO estimates that 70 percent of practitioners are not aware of DEA's Practitioner's Manual. Of those registrants that have interacted with DEA, most were generally satisfied with those interactions. For example, 92 percent of distributors that communicated with DEA field office staff found them “very” or “moderately” helpful. However, some distributors, individual pharmacies, and chain pharmacy corporate offices want improved guidance from, and additional communication with, DEA about their CSA roles and responsibilities. For example, 36 of 55 distributors commented that more communication or information from, or interactions with, DEA would be helpful. DEA officials indicated that they do not believe there is a need for more registrant guidance or communication. Federal internal control standards call for adequate communication with stakeholders. Without more registrant awareness of DEA resources and adequate guidance and communication from DEA, registrants may not fully understand or meet their CSA roles and responsibilities.
Officials GAO interviewed from 14 of 16 state government agencies and 24 of 26 national associations said that they interact with DEA through various methods. Thirteen of 14 state agencies and 10 of 17 national associations that commented about their satisfaction with DEA interactions said that they were generally satisfied; however, some associations wanted improved DEA communication. Because the additional communication that four associations want relates to their members' CSA roles and responsibilities, improved DEA communication with and guidance for registrants may address some of the associations' concerns.
Among those offering a perspective, between 31 and 38 percent of registrants GAO surveyed and 13 of 17 state agencies and national associations GAO interviewed believe that DEA enforcement actions have helped decrease prescription drug abuse and diversion. GAO's survey results also showed that over half of DEA registrants have changed certain business practices as a result of DEA enforcement actions or the business climate these actions may have created. For example, GAO estimates that over half of distributors placed stricter limits on the quantities of controlled substances that their customers (e.g., pharmacies) could order, and that most of these distributors (84 percent) were influenced to a “great” or “moderate extent” by DEA's enforcement actions. Many individual pharmacies (52 of 84) and chain pharmacy corporate offices (18 of 29) reported that these stricter limits have limited, to a “great” or “moderate extent,” their ability to supply drugs to those with legitimate needs. While DEA officials said they generally did not believe that enforcement actions have negatively affected access, better communication and guidance from DEA could help registrants make business decisions that balance ensuring access for patients with legitimate needs with controlling abuse and diversion.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DEA take three actions to improve communication with and guidance for registrants about their CSA roles and responsibilities. DEA described actions that it planned to take to implement GAO's recommendations; however, GAO identified additional actions DEA should take to fully implement the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-590T | gao_GAO-11-590T_0 | And, according to current DOD estimates, costs for two programs— Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High—are expected to significantly increase in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. As figure 4 shows, in several cases, DOD has increased the number of satellites. Some Acquisition Programs Appear to Have Overcome Problems, but Other Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns
DOD had long-standing difficulties on nearly every space acquisition program, struggling for years with cost and schedule growth, technical or design problems, as well as oversight and management weaknesses. However, to its credit, it continues to make progress on several of its high- risk space programs, and is expecting to deliver significant advances in capability as a result. While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other space acquisition programs face challenges that could further increase cost and delay delivery targets. Delays in the MUOS program have resulted in critical potential capability gaps for military and other government users. Results of GAO Space-Related Reviews over the Past Year
Over the past year, we have completed reviews of sustaining and upgrading GPS capabilities and commercializing space technologies under the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR), and we have ongoing reviews of (1) DOD space situational awareness (SSA) acquisition efforts, (2) parts quality for DOD, MDA, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and (3) a new acquisition strategy being developed for the EELV program. These reviews, discussed further below, underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD space community as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and deliver modernized capabilities. Our reviews of GPS and space situational awareness, for instance, have highlighted the need for more focused coordination and leadership for space activities that touch a wide range of government, international, and industry stakeholders; while our review of the SBIR program highlighted the substantial barriers and challenges small business must overcome to gain entry into the government space arena. DOD Has Taken and Is Taking Actions to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition Problems
DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions it has been taking address root causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are successful and they need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and support space activities. For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin, requirements are defined early in the process and are stable throughout, and system design remains stable. Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline management and oversight of the national security space enterprise. However, more changes to processes, policies, and support may be needed—along with sustained leadership and attention—to help ensure that these reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs. This has hampered DOD’s ability to synchronize delivery of space, ground, and user assets for space programs. While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been made—including revalidating the role of the Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD Executive Agent for Space, disestablishing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and the National Security Space Office, and aligning Air Force space system acquisition responsibility into a single Air Force acquisition office—and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how effective these changes will be in streamlining management and oversight of space system acquisitions. Finally, adequate workforce capacity is essential for the front-end planning activities now required by acquisition reform initiatives for new weapon programs to be successful. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite decades of significant investment, most of the Department of Defense's (DOD) large space acquisition programs have collectively experienced billions of dollars in cost increases, stretched schedules, and increased technical risks. Significant schedule delays of as much as 9 years have resulted in potential capability gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist, with other space acquisition programs still facing challenges in meeting their targets and aligning the delivery of assets with appropriate ground and user systems. To address cost increases, DOD reduced the number of satellites it would buy, reduced satellite capabilities, or terminated major space system acquisitions. Broad actions have also been taken to prevent their occurrence in new programs, including better management of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors and resolution of technical and other obstacles to DOD's ability to deliver capability. This testimony will focus on the (1) status of space system acquisitions, (2) results of GAO's space-related reviews over the past year and the challenges they signify, (3) efforts DOD has taken to address causes of problems and increase credibility and success in its space system acquisitions as well as efforts currently underway, and (4) what remains to be done.
What GAO Found
Over the past two decades, DOD has had difficulties with nearly every space acquisition program, with years of cost and schedule growth, technical and design problems, and oversight and management weaknesses. However, to its credit, DOD continues to make progress on several of its programs--such as the Space Based Infrared System High and Advanced Extremely High Frequency programs--and is expecting to deliver significant advances in capability as a result. But other programs continue to be susceptible to cost and schedule challenges. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA program's total cost has increased by about 10 percent over its original estimate, and delays in the Mobile User Objective System continue the risk of a capability gap in ultra high frequency satellite communications. In 2010, GAO assessed DOD's efforts to (1) upgrade and sustain GPS capabilities and (2) commercialize or incorporate into its space acquisition program the space technologies developed by small businesses. These reviews underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD space community as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and deliver modernized capabilities--for instance, the need for more focused coordination and leadership for space activities--and highlight the substantial barriers and challenges that small businesses must overcome to gain entry into the government space arena. DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions it has been taking address root causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are successful. For example, DOD is working to ensure that critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin and requirements are defined early in the process and are stable throughout. Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline management and oversight of the national security space enterprise. While DOD actions to date have been good, more changes to processes, policies, and support may be needed--along with sustained leadership and attention--to help ensure that these reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs. While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been made and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how effective they will be in streamlining management and oversight of space system acquisitions. Finally, while space system acquisition workforce capacity is essential if new weapon programs are to be successful, DOD continues to face gaps in technical and programmatic expertise for space. |
gao_GAO-01-811 | gao_GAO-01-811_0 | The landscape changed dramatically in June 1999, however, when the Supreme Court ruled in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank that states could claim immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when sued in federal court for infringement. Our analysis of published case law and surveys of the states identified 58 lawsuits since January 1985 alleging infringement or unauthorized use of intellectual property by state entities. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
We did not identify any infringement lawsuits in which state defendants had voluntarily waived their immunity in federal court. No Proven State Cause of Action for Patents and Copyrights
Because patent and copyright infringement suits must be brought in federal court, an intellectual property owner wishing to bring a suit in state court for the unauthorized use of intellectual property—regardless of whether the defendant is a state—would have to bring the case under some cause of action other than infringement. Relatively few accusations of infringement against states appear to have been made in the past, and there is no way to ascertain whether the states will be less diligent now that they know they cannot be sued for damages in federal court. If the Congress does consider legislation, it may want to clarify that states are subject to federal intellectual property law and, as such, are still capable of committing infringement. Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which states have been accused of intellectual property infringement, (2) identify the alternatives or remedies available to protect intellectual property owners against state infringement after the Florida Prepaid ruling, and (3) obtain the views of the intellectual property community on what states should and could do, if anything, to protect the rights of intellectual property owners against infringement. | What GAO Found
Intellectual property--which includes federally granted patents, trademarks, and copyrights--is often owned or used by state governmental entities, such as public institutions of higher education. Until recently, state entities that made unauthorized use of, or "infringed," the intellectual property of others were subject to lawsuits in federal court. In 1999, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states were not subject to such suits, striking down a federal law that would have taken away a state's right to claim immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when sued in federal court for patent infringement. Some intellectual property owners are concerned that they no longer have adequate remedies if a state commits infringement. Although the precise number is difficult to determine, few accusations of intellectual property infringement appear to have been made against the states through either lawsuits or matters handled out of court. GAO identified 58 lawsuits that had been active since January 1985 in either a state or federal court in which a state was a defendant in an action involving the unauthorized use of intellectual property. Intellectual property owners appear to have few proven alternatives or remedies against state infringement available if they cannot sue the states for damages in federal court. States are not likely to waive their immunity voluntarily, and, in some cases, their own laws may prohibit them from doing so. The intellectual property community is divided on what, if anything, states should and could do to protect the rights of intellectual property owners against state infringement. |
gao_NSIAD-98-125 | gao_NSIAD-98-125_0 | Background
The reports of sexual misconduct at Aberdeen Proving Grounds led the Secretary of Defense to establish the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues and to ask the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services to meet with trainees and trainers. Visits lasted 1 to 4 days depending on the numbers of participants in the various activities. Methodology
The Army’s Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment used four methods to collect data: individual interviews, focus groups, surveys, and observations. Members of field teams conducted individual interviews with 808 military and civilian Army leaders and personnel in Army support groups. The study took 8 months to complete and obtained information from over 32,000 Army personnel. Use of Multiple Methodologies and Extensive Documentation Allowed Making Conclusions and Recommendations
The panel’s methodology supported making conclusions and recommendations. Participants in the trainer focus groups were trainers for at least 1 year. Problems With the Methodology Limit the Usefulness of the Report
The value of the information included in the Committee’s report for making conclusions and recommendations is limited because the Committee did not follow recommended focus group methodology. However, the fact that the same questions were not asked of each similar focus group, along with the number of questions, size of the groups, and length of the sessions may have combined to limit full discussion. In addition, the focus groups’ discussions were not systematically recorded. As a result, the extent to which the recommendations are supported by the Committee’s work cannot be assessed. Methodology
DACOWITS used focus groups as its primary means of data gathering. Overall, they solicited the opinions of over 1,200 trainees, trainers, and supervisors in the Army, the Navy, the Marines, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard in focus group discussions at 12 gender-integrated training schools at 9 installations. The individual installation visit reports support the opinions and perceptions that appear in the report to the Secretary of Defense. The literature suggests that focus groups should be no larger than 12 participants. DACOWITS did not document the individual focus groups as recommended by focus group literature. While the installation reports document the work performed and the issues surfaced during the training installation visits, they do not capture enough information about the discussions in each focus group to be really useful. Also, in accordance with the limitations of the methodology, the DACOWITS report made no conclusions or recommendations on military training. A report should clearly state what the purpose of the study was, what its scope was, how the data were collected and analyzed, and what, if any, significant limitations exist on the data or the use of the data. In the Marine Corps men and women live, eat, and train separately. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed three studies on gender-related issues affecting initial entry training in the Department of Defense (DOD), focusing on: (1) how the groups conducted their work; (2) how well the work supported making conclusions and recommendations; (3) the availability of documentation supporting the report; and (4) the extent to which the final report described the study methodology and disclosed limitations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual harassment used four methods to collect data: individual interviews, focus groups, surveys, and observations; (2) during its 8 months of work, the panel visited 59 installations worldwide, conducted interviews with 808 military and civilian Army personnel, ran focus groups with over 8,000 soldiers and civilians, and surveyed 22,952 individuals; (3) the use of multiple methods of data gathering, the rigor with which the various methods were conducted, and the publication of the data in the report provides ample support for making conclusions and recommendations; (4) the Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues used focus groups as its primary method of data gathering; (5) although FAC conducted over 300 focus groups and individual interviews, their value for making conclusions and recommendations is limited because the Committee did not: (a) systematically collect the same information from all groups; (b) document the information generated in each of the interviews and focus groups; or (c) explain how what was heard in the interviews and focus groups led to their conclusions and recommendations; (6) in addition, the length of the focus group sessions, the number of participants, and the number of questions addressed may not have provided adequate time for full participation of the respondents on all issues; (7) given these limitations, the extent to which the Committee's work supports its conclusions and recommendations cannot be determined; (8) the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) also used focus groups of trainees, trainers, and supervisors in the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to identify what issues concerned women and men at training installations; (9) members of the DACOWITS held focus group discussions at 12 schools at 9 installations in the United States and prepared a summary report of the results at each installation; (10) the DACOWITS Chair used these to prepare a report to the Secretary of Defense that accurately reflected the opinions and perceptions cited in the individual installation reports; (11) the DACOWITS focus groups were: (a) larger than recommended in the literature; (b) were sometimes not long enough to allow meaningful participation; and (c) were not recorded or documented on a group-by-group basis; and (12) the DACOWITS report summarized the opinion and perception data obtained from focus groups; and (13) it made no conclusions or recommendations on military training based on that information. |
gao_GAO-02-897 | gao_GAO-02-897_0 | HHS named the combined set of funds the CCDF. States must spend at least 4 percent of their CCDF funds—of discretionary, mandatory and matching, but not of state MOE funds—for a given fiscal year on activities intended to improve the quality and availability of child care. 3.) Thirty of the 42 responding states reported providing funding to assist child care providers in meeting state licensing standards, such as California’s provision of funding to assist child care providers with health and safety standards and a variety of training requirements. 5.) Few States Have Evaluated the Effectiveness of State Quality Improvement Initiatives
While few states have evaluated the effectiveness of state quality improvement initiatives on children’s development, some studies provide useful findings about them. The research on child care quality does not evaluate initiatives as actually implemented by states, but a few studies, using rigorous methods, show that some of the attributes of child care quality that these initiatives address, such as caregiver qualifications, affect children’s social, emotional and cognitive development. The act identifies expenditures on these two activities as appropriate uses of set-aside funds but does not cite them as examples of child care quality and availability improvement activities. The regulations state that activities to improve the quality of child care may include, but are not limited to, the following: Improving resource and referral programs Making grants or loans to providers to assist in meeting child care standards Improving compliance with and enforcement of state and local licensing requirements Providing training and technical assistance to providers in health and safety, nutrition, child abuse detection and prevention, and care of children with special needs Improving salaries and compensation for staff who provide child care services. Mothers and Young Children Move through Welfare Reform. A report prepared for the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services. Child Care: States Increased Spending on Low-Income Families. Welfare Reform: Implications of Increased Work Participation for Child Care. | What GAO Found
The demand for child care has increased dramatically in the past several decades as the number of mothers who work outside the home has grown. Welfare reform has further increased this demand. To support low-income parents moving into the workforce, welfare reform established the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). In fiscal year 2000, states spent $5.3 billion in CCDF funds to subsidize child care for low-income families. Out of concern for the quality of care that the CCDF funds, welfare reform legislation also required states to set aside at least 4 percent of the total grant to improve the quality and availability of child care. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations provide examples of allowable activities, such as providing child care providers with financial incentives for meeting state and local standards, improving the compensation of child care staff, and offering resource and referral services. However, the regulations do not limit states' use of funds to these activities; rather, the fund's block grant structure allows states considerable flexibility in choosing appropriate quality and availability improvements to pursue. Using primarily the four percent quality set-aside, states reported undertaking a variety of child care quality improvement initiatives, such as training caregivers, raising the compensation of caregivers, referring parents to child care providers, and efforts to enhance the safety of child care facilities. Although few states have evaluated the effects of their quality improvement initiatives on children's development, some studies provide useful findings about them. The research on child care quality does not evaluate initiatives as actually implemented by states, but a few studies, using rigorous methods, show that some of the attributes of child care quality that these initiatives address, such as caregiver qualifications, affect children's social, emotional and cognitive development. |
gao_GAO-09-210T | gao_GAO-09-210T_0 | The State and Local Government Sector Faces Increasing Fiscal Challenges
Fiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. To provide Congress and the public with a broader perspective on our nation’s fiscal outlook, we developed a fiscal model of the state and local sector. This model enables us to simulate fiscal outcomes for the entire state and local government sector in the aggregate for several decades into the future. This model complements GAO’s long-term fiscal simulations of federal deficits and debt levels under varying policy assumptions. We first published the findings from our state and local fiscal model in 2007. Our model shows that the state and local government sector faces growing fiscal challenges. We recently updated the model to incorporate current data available as of August 2008. Rapidly Rising Health Costs Drive Long- term State and Local Sector Fiscal Difficulties
Growth in health-related costs serves as the primary driver of the fiscal challenges facing the state and local sector over the long term. The projected rise in health- related costs is the root of the long-term fiscal difficulties these simulations suggest will occur. Sales taxes of the sector are expected to experience a slight decline as a percentage of GDP in the coming years, reflecting trends in the sector’s tax base. Considerations for Targeting Supplemental Funds to States through the Medicaid Program during Economic Downturns
The outlook presented by our state and local model is exacerbated by current economic conditions. During economic downturns, states can experience difficulties financing programs such as Medicaid. Economic downturns result in rising unemployment, which can lead to increases in the number of individuals who are eligible for Medicaid coverage, and in declining tax revenues, which can lead to less available revenue with which to fund coverage of additional enrollees. Such a supplemental assistance strategy would leave the existing Medicaid formula unchanged and add a new, separate assistance formula that would operate only during times of economic downturn and use variables and a distribution mechanism that differ from those used for calculating matching rates. Using data from the past three recessions, we simulated the provision of such targeted supplemental assistance to states. To determine the amount of supplemental federal assistance needed to help states address increased Medicaid expenditures during a downturn, we relied on research that estimated a relationship between changes in unemployment and changes in Medicaid spending. Considerations involved in such a strategy include: Timing assistance so that it is delivered as soon as it is needed, Targeting assistance according to the extent of each state’s downturn, Temporarily increasing federal funding so that it turns off when states’ economic circumstances sufficiently improve, and Triggering so the starting and ending points of assistance respond to indicators of states’ economic distress. Any potential legislative response would need to be considered within the context of broader health care and fiscal challenges—including continually rising health care costs, a growing elderly population, and Medicare and Medicaid’s increasing share of the federal budget. Conclusions
The federal government depends on states and localities to provide critical services including health care for low-income populations. States and localities depend on the federal government to help fund these services. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to provide its views on projected trends in health care costs and their effect on the long-term outlook for state and local governments in the context of the current economic environment. This statement addresses three key points: (1) the state and local government sector's long-term fiscal challenges; (2) rapidly rising health care costs which drive the sector's long-term fiscal difficulties, and (3) the considerations involved in targeting supplemental funds to states through the Medicaid program during economic downturns. To provide Congress and the public with a broader perspective on our nation's fiscal outlook, GAO previously developed a fiscal model of the state and local sector. This model enables GAO to simulate fiscal outcomes for the sector in the aggregate for several decades into the future. GAO first published the findings from the state and local fiscal model in 2007. This statement includes August 2008 data to update the simulations. This Committee and others also asked GAO to analyze strategies to help states address increased Medicaid expenditures during economic downturns. GAO simulated the provision of such supplemental assistance to states. As we previously reported, the simulation model adjusts the amount of funding states would receive based on changes in unemployment and spending on Medicaid services.
What GAO Found
Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem. Growth in health-related spending also drives the fiscal challenges facing state and local governments. The magnitude of these challenges presents long-term sustainability challenges for all levels of government. The current financial sector turmoil and broader economic conditions add to fiscal and budgetary challenges for these governments as they attempt to remain in balance. States and localities are facing increased demand for services during a period of declining revenues and reduced access to capital. In the midst of these challenges, the federal government continues to rely on this sector for delivery of services such as Medicaid, the joint federal-state health care financing program for certain categories of low-income individuals. Our model shows that in the aggregate the state and local government sector faces growing fiscal challenges. Incorporation of August 2008 data shows that the position of the sector has worsened since our January 2008 report. The long-term outlook presented by our state and local model is exacerbated by current economic conditions. During economic downturns, states can experience difficulties financing programs such as Medicaid. Downturns result in rising unemployment, which can increase the number of individuals eligible for Medicaid, and declining tax revenues, which can decrease revenue available to fund coverage of additional enrollees. GAO's simulation model to help states respond to these circumstances is based on assumptions under which the existing Medicaid formula would remain unchanged and add a new, separate assistance formula that would operate only during times of economic downturn. Considerations involved in such a strategy could include: (1) timing assistance so that it is delivered as soon as it is needed, (2) targeting assistance according to the extent of each state's downturn, (3) temporarily increasing federal funding so that it turns off when states' economic circumstances sufficiently improve, and (4) triggering so the starting and ending points of assistance respond to indicators of economic distress. |
gao_HEHS-97-7 | gao_HEHS-97-7_0 | In anticipation of national health care reform, VA determined that it needed to expand its ability to provide outpatient care, especially for veterans who are geographically distant from VA hospitals. Initially, VA hospitals must finance access points within their existing budgets; this generally will require reallocating resources among other activities and services with no net change in their respective budgets. Over time, however, VA hospitals may incur significant cost increases to provide care to veterans who would otherwise not have used VA’s facilities. The veterans are now using the clinic because it is more accessible. Mission-Related Implications of Establishing Access Points
VA’s new access points represent a proactive effort to transition from a hospital-based delivery system to an integrated network of VA-operated hospitals and non-VA primary care providers. To date, VA has not developed a strategic plan for its access points initiative, relying instead on VISN directors to develop their own goals and objectives. We also recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary to require VA hospitals to establish their access points in a manner that focuses on (1) the equalization of access for current users of the VA health care system on the basis of the designated time or distance standard and (2) the enrollment of any new users of the system in accordance with statutory priorities for VA care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to establish health care access points to provide outpatient care for veterans who are geographically distant from VA hospitals.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the new access points represent a proactive effort to transition from a direct delivery system to an integrated network of VA-operated hospitals and VA and non-VA outpatient providers; (2) VA ignored statutory limitations in its legal authority to provide primary care to veterans, but legislation has been enacted which expands VA authority to contract for the provision of such care and veterans' eligibility to receive such services; (3) VA hospitals must finance access points within their existing budgets, which will generally require reallocating resources among current activities and services; (4) although access points should in time allow VA hospitals to serve current users more efficiently, the efficiencies may not generate enough savings to offset the increased costs associated with caring for increased numbers of veterans who may use the new clinics; and (5) because VA has not developed a strategic plan for expanding veterans' access to its medical care system, it is difficult to accurately gauge the number of access points VA will need or the effect they will have on the VA mission. |
gao_NSIAD-96-86 | gao_NSIAD-96-86_0 | As a result, the net savings decreased from $385 million to $258 million. Even though the 1993 analysis continued to show a net savings by implementing the program, it did not include all program costs. Repair Turn Around Times for Engine and Avionics Items
The decision as to whether a TLM-designated item is repaired on base or sent to a depot depends on the extent of maintenance required. The Air Force has established repair turn around time standards for TLM items. In turn, this level of increase could overwhelm the depots’ repair capabilities and result in increased repair turn around times for avionics items. If this occurs, the number of engines to be repaired will be reduced and the maintenance focus will shift to meeting the repair turn around time or the Air Force will have to buy additional stocks for the base level. Use of TLM to Support Deployed Forces
When Air Force units deploy overseas, they will not take intermediate maintenance capability with them for the TLM avionics items and engines. Airlift priorities and assignments are controlled by the theater commander. U.S. Central Command officials told us that airlift has not been specifically dedicated for returning unserviceable items from the theater of operation to the United States and for resupplying units in the theater with needed spare parts. Recommendations
In view of the unresolved TLM issues and the fact that the program has not fully achieved its intended objectives and has not been fully implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to continue to periodically reassess the cost efficiency and effectiveness of items already in the program as well as those planned for the program to determine whether the avionics items and engines are the most appropriate TLM candidates. To facilitate the reassessment, the Secretary of the Air Force should develop a revised cost and savings analysis that reflects (1) the facilities and minor construction costs incurred to ready depots for TLM and (2) the fact that the anticipated workload at the depots has not materialized; an assessment of the depots’ ability to meet the repair turn around times prescribed by the Air Force standard when the current inventory of engines is reduced and TLM is fully implemented; and an action plan, in concert with wartime theater commanders, that assesses the availability of airlift in the early stages of a conflict to fully support the added airlift requirements of TLM. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Air Force's implementation of the Two Level Maintenance (TLM) program, which is its plan to facilitate downsizing by transferring some repairs from many individual bases to centralized depots, focusing on whether the program: (1) has achieved the expected results; (2) has reduced repair turnaround time; and (3) will be an effective maintenance program for supporting deployed forces.
What GAO Found
GAO found that; (1) the TLM program is not achieving the full extent of the intended benefits; (2) between the time of the Air Force's first cost and savings analysis in 1992 and the second analysis in 1993, the estimated costs to implement TLM had increased and the expected net savings had decreased--from $385 million to $258 million; (3) in addition, all program costs have not been included in the cost/savings analyses; (4) for avionics items, the repair turn around time under TLM generally met the Air Force's established repair turn around standard; (5) for engines, however, the repair turn around times are exceeding the standard by as many as 87 days; (6) for example, the repair turn around time standard for the TF30-111 engine, used on the F-111 aircraft, is 41 days, but as of August 1995, its average repair turn around time was 128 days; (7) the use of TLM to support deployed forces in times of conflict will add to the airlift burden; (8) because the deployed forces will not have in-country intermediate maintenance capability, the forces will be dependent on airlift for their spare and repair parts; (9) however, airlift priorities are controlled by the theater commander not the Air Force; (10) as a result, a theater commander could decide that the need for combat power in the early stages of the conflict has a higher priority than return of unserviceable items to depot repair facilities and movement of items from the depots to the theater of operation; and (11) the need for early sustainment airlift to support TLM is an issue that has not been fully resolved and is one that could affect sustainment of the deployed forces. |
gao_GAO-07-948T | gao_GAO-07-948T_0 | DHS Faces Challenges in Establishing an Integrated Acquisition Function
The structure of DHS’s acquisition function creates ambiguity about who is accountable for acquisition decisions. A common theme in our work on DHS’s acquisition management has been the department’s struggle from the outset to provide adequate support for its mission components and resources for departmentwide oversight. DHS, however, relies on dual accountability and collaboration between the CPO and the heads of DHS’s components. However, we have reported that the directive may not achieve its goal of creating an integrated acquisition organization because it creates unclear working relationships between the CPO and the heads of DHS components. In 2006, DHS reported significant progress in providing staff for the component contracting offices, though much work remained to fill the positions with qualified, trained acquisition professionals. In 2005, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security provide the CPO with sufficient resources to effectively oversee the department’s acquisitions. Accordingly, in December 2005, the CPO established a departmentwide acquisition oversight program, designed to provide comprehensive insight into each component’s acquisition programs and disseminate successful acquisition management approaches throughout DHS. DHS Investment Review Process Needs Improvement
In 2003, DHS put in place an investment review process to help protect its major, complex investments. In March 2005, we reported that in establishing this process, DHS has adopted a number of acquisition best practices that, if applied consistently, could help increase the chance for successful outcomes. However, we noted that incorporating additional program reviews and knowledge deliverables into the process could better position DHS to make well-informed decisions on its major, complex investments. Concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of the review process for large investments at DHS. DHS Reliance on Contracting For Critical Services Requires Enhanced Management Attention
To quickly get the department up and running and to obtain necessary expertise, DHS has relied extensively on other agencies’ and its own contracts for a broad range of mission-related services and complex acquisitions. The growing complexity of contracting for technically difficult and sophisticated services increases challenges in terms of setting appropriate requirements and effectively monitoring contractor performance. With the increased reliance on contractors comes the need for an appropriate level of oversight and management attention to its contracting for services and major systems. Conclusion
Since DHS was established in 2003, it has been challenged to integrate 22 separate federal agencies and organizations with multiple missions, values, and cultures into one cabinet-level department. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated $15.6 billion to support its broad and complex acquisition portfolio. Since it was tasked with integrating 22 separate federal agencies and organizations into one cabinet-level department, DHS has been working to create an integrated acquisition organization while addressing its ongoing mission requirements and responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. Due to the enormity of this challenge, GAO designated the establishment of the department and its transformation as high-risk in January 2003. This testimony discusses DHS's (1) challenges to creating an integrated acquisition function; (2) investment review process; and (3) reliance on contracting for critical needs. This testimony is based primarily on prior GAO reports and testimonies.
What GAO Found
The structure of DHS's acquisition function creates ambiguity about who is accountable for acquisition decisions because it depends on a system of dual accountability and collaboration between the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) and the component heads. Further, a common theme in GAO's work on acquisition management has been DHS's struggle to provide adequate support for its mission components and resources for departmentwide oversight. In 2006, DHS reported significant progress in staffing for the components and the CPO, though much work remained to fill the positions. In addition, DHS has established an acquisition oversight program, designed to provide the CPO comprehensive insight into each component's acquisition programs and disseminate successful acquisition management approaches departmentwide. However, GAO continues to be concerned that the CPO may not have sufficient authority to effectively oversee the department's acquisitions. In 2003, DHS put in place an investment review process to help protect its major complex investments. In 2005, GAO reported that this process adopted many acquisition best practices that, if applied consistently, could help increase the chances for successful outcomes. However, GAO noted that incorporating additional program reviews and knowledge deliverables into the process could better position DHS to make well-informed decisions. Concerns have been raised about how the investment review process has been used to oversee its largest acquisitions, and DHS plans to revise the process. DHS has contracted extensively for a broad range of services and complex acquisitions. The growing complexity of contracting for technically difficult and sophisticated services increases challenges in terms of setting appropriate requirements and effectively monitoring contractor performance. However, DHS has been challenged to provide the appropriate level of oversight and management attention to its contracting for services and major systems. |
gao_NSIAD-99-19 | gao_NSIAD-99-19_0 | Increased SFOR Support for Dayton’s Civil Aspects
With the increased international emphasis on implementing the Dayton Agreement, beginning in mid-1997 SFOR increased its support for the civilian components of the peace operation. SFOR’s mission will remain the same, but overall SFOR force levels are expected to decrease by November 1998. The new Multinational Specialized Unit began operations in late August 1998 but with force levels far below operational requirements due to the lack of force commitments from troop contributing countries. This assessment—based on troop-to-task analyses for various mission options—showed that (a) if the SFOR follow-on force were to continue SFOR’s current mission, the United States would have to maintain its current force levels of about 8,500 troops and its current force structure in Bosnia, particularly its combat capability that included three U.S. combat battalions and two aviation task forces; and (b) if security conditions in Bosnia substantially improved and SFOR’s mission were to be reduced to providing restricted support for civil implementation, the United States could withdraw one of the three U.S. combat battalions from Bosnia and thereby reduce the number of U.S. troops there to 6,900. NATO plans to continue the practice of reviewing SFOR operations at least every 6 months to determine whether changes in conditions in Bosnia would allow changes to SFOR’s tasks and force structure. Multinational Specialized Unit
According to NATO officials and documents, the Multinational Specialized Unit—which has been described as a paramilitary, constabulary, or gendarmerie-type unit—will assist in dealing with civil disturbances associated with the return of refugees and displaced persons and the installation of elected officials. According to SACEUR, the Multinational Specialized Unit is not a replacement for SFOR’s combat battalions either in the near or long term; it will leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR combat units. Development of NATO’s Transition Strategy
As outlined in NATO documents, NATO’s strategy for transitioning NATO-led forces out of Bosnia consists of (1) reducing the size, role, and profile of the SFOR follow-on force as conditions in Bosnia improve; and (2) progressively transferring responsibilities to Bosnia’s institutions, other civil authorities, the United Nations, the High Representative, OSCE, and other international organizations as appropriate. According to DOD officials, the drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before NATO’s next 6-month review of SFOR operations. According to SACEUR, in determining when and by how much to draw down forces, NATO will look at such things as the level of cooperation and security conditions in particular geographic areas in Bosnia and the way in which NATO troops contribute to the accomplishment of each one of the executive branch “benchmarks.”
According to DOD officials, the operation plan for the SFOR follow-on force directs SFOR to develop drawdown criteria in conjunction with the peace operation’s principal civilian organizations. Recent Events and SFOR’s Next 6-Month Review
Although NATO has not yet finalized its drawdown criteria, DOD, State, and NATO have recognized that the results of the September 1998 elections, along with other changes in Bosnia’s political and security conditions, will play a large role in NATO’s upcoming decision on whether conditions would allow a further reduction in SFOR force levels. The peace operation’s military component consists of a NATO-led military force. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. We did not intend for our report to leave the impression that NATO allies are not fully supportive of force requirements for the SFOR mission; rather, we had intended to describe the U.S. military and NATO/SFOR planning processes for the SFOR follow-on force and to illustrate how operational requirements for the force appeared to be driven by the planned reduction in U.S. forces in Bosnia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military force in Bosnia, known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR), focusing on: (1) how SFOR's operations in Bosnia have changed since mid-1997, particularly its support for the operation's civil aspects, and whether any such changes have exceeded SFOR's defined mission; (2) the mission and force structure of the post-June 1998 SFOR follow-on force, including the decisionmaking sequence for U.S. participation in the force and the status of developing the force's new Multinational Specialized Unit; and (3) NATO's transition strategy for removing NATO-led forces.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the increased emphasis on implementing the Dayton Agreement that began in mid-1997 included an intensified effort by SFOR to support the agreement's civil provisions, but the force continued to employ most of its resources to control the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb militaries; (2) the mission and force structure of the SFOR follow-on force will remain largely the same as prior to June 1998; (3) SFOR levels in Bosnia increased from about 31,700 troops in August 1998 to about 36,100 troops at the time of the September elections in Bosnia but are expected to decrease again by November 1998; (4) in light of SFOR's need to deal with civil disturbances, NATO established a new Multinational Specialized Unit, a paramilitary- or gendarmerie-type unit, within SFOR; (5) as of September 1998, only part of the specialized unit was operational because countries have not yet committed sufficient resources to the unit; (6) this new unit will not replace U.S. or other SFOR combat units; (7) after considering several military analyses and a range of factors, the executive branch decided in January 1998 to reduce the U.S. troop level for the SFOR follow-on force from about 8,500 troops in Bosnia to about 6,900 troops; (8) after the drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military identified ways to reduce U.S. force levels; (9) NATO then lowered operational requirements for the follow-on force; (10) NATO will continue its practice of reviewing SFOR operations every 6 months to determine whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced; (11) NATO has developed a transition strategy for an eventual disengagement from Bosnia; (12) NATO has not fully developed specific criteria for determining when conditions would allow SFOR combat units to draw down and withdraw, but was in the process of doing so; (13) the NATO transition strategy consists largely of turning over various activities to local authorities or the peace operation's civilian organizations as conditions permit; (14) the transition strategy calls for the Multinational Specialized Unit to leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR's combat units; (15) according to Department of Defense and NATO officials, specific drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before NATO's next 6-month review of SFOR operations; and (16) during this review, NATO will assess changes to the security and political conditions in Bosnia, including the results of the September 1998 elections, and determine whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced. |
gao_GAO-01-753T | gao_GAO-01-753T_0 | Consequently, purchases for services now account for about 43 percent of federal contracting expenses—the largest single spending category. The growth in services has largely been driven by the government's increased purchases of two types of services: information technology services, which increased from $3.7 billion in fiscal year 1990 to about $13.4 billion in fiscal year 2000; and professional, administrative, and management support services, which rose from $12.3 billion in fiscal year 1990 to $21.1 billion in fiscal year 2000. Challenges Faced by the Government In Acquiring Services
While we have seen the environment change considerably, what we have not seen is a significant improvement in federal agencies' management of service contracts. Put simply, the poor management of service contracts undermines the government's ability to obtain good value for the money spent. This contributed to our decision to designate contract management a high-risk area for the Departments of Defense and Energy, the two largest purchasers within the federal government. Some Efforts are Underway to Address Service Contracting Challenges
Congress and the administration are taking steps to address some of these contract management and human capital challenges, in particular by emphasizing the increased use of performance-based service contracts and by stressing the importance of integrating strategic human capital management into agency planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies spend billions of tax dollars each year to buy services--from clerical support to information technology assistance to the management of national laboratories. The federal government spent more than $87 billion in services--a 24 percent increase in real terms from fiscal year 1990. Some service procurements are not being done efficiently, putting taxpayer dollars at risk. In particular, agencies are not clearly defining their requirements, fully considering alternative solutions, performing vigorous price analyses, and adequately overseeing contractor performance. This testimony (1) describes service contracting trends and the changing acquisition environment, (2) discusses the challenges confronting the government in acquiring services, and (3) highlights some efforts underway to address these challenges.
What GAO Found
GAO found that purchases of services now account for about 43 percent of federal contracting expenses--the largest single spending category. The growth of services has been driven largely by the government's increased purchases of information technology services and professional, administrative, and management support services. Poor contract management has undermined the government's ability to obtain good value for the money and continues to be a major problem for the two biggest service purchasers-the Departments of Defense and Energy. Performance-based service contracts and the integration of strategic human capital management into agency planning are two ways to address some of the contract management and human capital challenges. |
gao_GAO-06-446 | gao_GAO-06-446_0 | At that time it was anticipated that the EA-6B would remain in the inventory until at least 2015. The AoA report, published in 2002, concluded that an EA-6B replacement would be needed in 2009 to meet the services needs. Changes in Operational Concept and Upgrades Extend Operational Viability of the EA-6B, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet Identified Requirements
The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy’s requirement for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be required to support all of DOD’s electronic attack requirements. As a result, EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy’s suppression of enemy air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps through 2025 as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted with ICAP III electronics suites. If the Navy is required to support all services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate the EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the ICAP III upgrade. According to program documents, the ICAP II tactical jamming system, currently installed on most EA-6B aircraft, is limited in its ability to conduct numerous critical functions. Currently 14 EA-6B aircraft have been funded to receive the ICAP III upgrade, because of funding reductions, development test results, and the decision in 2003 to replace the EA-6B with the EA- 18G. While the program is currently on cost and schedule according to program officials, our analysis shows that the program is not fully following the knowledge-based approach inherent in best practices and DOD’s acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost growth and schedule delays. In addition, the Navy plans to procure a large percentage of the total EA-18G aircraft during low-rate initial production based on limited knowledge of the aircraft’s ability to perform the electronic attack mission. We have reported that at the start of system development none of the program’s five critical technologies were fully mature, and as recently as our March 2005 report this had not changed. The design of the EA-18G appears stable because almost all of its design drawings are complete. The EA-18G development schedule is based on a premise--EA-6B inventory will not be sufficient beyond 2009-- that is no longer valid for assessing the Navy’s future needs. To determine whether the acquisition management approach to the Navy’s airborne electronic attack core component, the EA-18G, is knowledge- based and can help forestall future risks, we reviewed pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing the status of the EA-18G development effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
The EA-6B has conducted airborne electronic attack for all services since 1996. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) completed an analysis of alternatives for the EA-6B that concluded the inventory would be insufficient to meet the DOD's needs beyond 2009. Since then, the services have embarked on separate acquisition efforts to develop airborne electronic attack assets. In 2003, the Navy started development of the EA-18G aircraft to replace the EA-6B. This report was done under the Comptroller General's authority and assesses if (1) DOD's 2002 conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient beyond 2009 remains valid for assessing the Navy's future needs, and (2) the acquisition approach used to develop the EA-18G is knowledge-based and might mitigate future risks.
What GAO Found
EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy's suppression of enemy air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps through 2025--as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted with upgraded electronics suites. The conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy's requirement for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be required to support all of DOD's electronic attack requirements. However, insufficient quantities of upgraded jamming systems means that the majority of the EA-6B fleet is equipped with the older jamming system that is limited in its ability to conduct numerous critical functions. If the Navy is required to support all services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate its EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the Improved Capability (ICAP) III upgrade. The risk of cost growth and schedule delays in the EA-18G program is increasing because the program is not following a knowledge-based approach to acquisition. None of its five critical technologies were fully mature as the system development phase began, and that is still the case today. Of particular concern is the ALQ-218 receiver, placed in the harsh wingtip environment on the EA-18G and not the more benign setting of the EA-6B's tail, for which it was developed. While the EA-18G's design appears stable, and almost all its design drawings are complete, that may change once the aircraft is flight-tested. Production of the EA-18G is also risky: One-third of the total buy will be procured as low-rate initial production aircraft based on limited demonstrated functionality. |
gao_GGD-97-29 | gao_GGD-97-29_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the primary causes for SCRIPS performance problems in 1995; (2) assess whether those problems were corrected as of September 30, 1996; and (3) provide a status report on IRS’ future plans for SCRIPS. However, as shown in table 1, SCRIPS did not meet IRS’ volume expectations for the three other document types scheduled for processing in 1995—information returns, Form 1040EZ, and Form 941 (IRS did not expect to start processing Form 1040PC on SCRIPS until 1996). Because of performance problems, two of the five service centers stopped using SCRIPS to process Forms 1040EZ in 1995. Instead, they reverted to manual data entry, which required using more staff resources than planned, thus increasing processing costs. Hardware problems contributed to SCRIPS’ performance deficiencies in 1995. Software problems also occurred. According to IRS officials, those problems were corrected before the 1996 filing season. In addition, the processing rates for SCRIPS (i.e., the number of documents processed per hour) improved for two document types—Form 1040EZ and FTD coupons. Despite these improvements, the system, as of September 30, 1996, (1) was not processing all the forms that the October 1994 business case said it would process, (2) was expected to cost more than original estimates, and (3) was not expected to provide the estimated labor savings that were cited in the October 1994 business case. SCRIPS Performance Improved in 1996
According to service center officials, SCRIPS performed “significantly better” in 1996 than it did in 1995 because the system experienced significantly less downtime than in 1995. Many of these enhancements were implemented late in the 1996 filing season, after most of the Forms 1040EZ and information returns had been processed. The results of the test were not available when we completed our audit work. According to IRS’ post-implementation review report, previous cost estimates for SCRIPS have ranged from $133 million to $209 million. In July 1995, IRS decided to terminate all software programming for the 1040PC because of SCRIPS’ instability, a lack of system capacity, and a number of software application problems. In addition to funding constraints, decisions on the use of SCRIPS beyond fiscal year 1997 for Forms 941, according to IRS officials, will hinge on: (1) the results of the September 1996 test of SCRIPS, which we discussed earlier; and (2) Investment Review Board actions on recommendations made by a paper processing task team. We recognize that IRS is now completely reliant on SCRIPS for processing paper FTD coupons. Recommendation to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
We recommend that before deciding to increase the percentage of Forms 1040EZ or information returns that SCRIPS processes or using SCRIPS to process other tax forms, such as Forms 941, the Commissioner (1) do a cost-benefit analysis that includes examining the costs and benefits of alternative ways for processing those forms, such as those developed by the paper processing task team; and (2) if the analysis shows that it is cost-effective to have SCRIPS process Forms 941, ensure that IRS tests SCRIPS’ ability to process the existing software applications along with any new software applications that may be added using peak volumes or volumes simulating peak workload conditions to ensure that SCRIPS can meet performance expectations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the performance of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Service Center Recognition/Image Processing System (SCRIPS) in 1996, focusing on: (1) the primary causes for performance problems that occurred in 1995; (2) whether SCRIPS performance improved in 1996 as of September 30, 1996; and (3) the status of IRS future plans for SCRIPS.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SCRIPS experienced significant performance problems in 1995; (2) two problems were system downtime and slow processing rates; (3) because of performance problems, two of the five centers stopped processing Forms 1040EZ on SCRIPS and reverted to using manual data entry; (4) SCRIPS performance deficiencies in 1995 stemmed primarily from both hardware and software problems; (5) although IRS had expected that SCRIPS would be processing five document types, forms 1040EZ, 941, and 1040PC, federal tax deposit (FTD) coupons, and information returns, IRS postponed plans to process forms 941 and 1040PC on SCRIPS; (6) of the three remaining document types, the Cincinnati test certified the software application only for FTD coupons, therefore, the software applications for information returns and Form 1040EZ were not thoroughly tested before they were put into production, (7) to improve the performance of SCRIPS for 1996, IRS made hardware and software modifications, some of which were made before the start of the 1996 filing season; (8) as a result of some of these enhancements and more staff familiarity with SCRIPS, according to IRS officials in all five SCRIPS service centers, SCRIPS performed significantly better during the 1996 filing season than it did in 1995; (9) in addition to a slower processing rate for information returns, SCRIPS is not processing all the forms that it was expected to process in 1996, is expected to cost more than originally estimated, and is expected to provide lower labor cost savings than IRS originally anticipated; (10) the latest cost estimate for SCRIPS is $288 million, considerably more than previous cost estimates, which, according to IRS' post-implementation review report on SCRIPS, ranged from $133 million to $209 million; (11) July 1995, IRS decided to terminate all software programming for the 1040PC because of SCRIPS' instability, lack of system capacity, and a number of software application problems; (12) IRS has also decided not to use SCRIPS to process Forms 941 beyond fiscal year (FY) 1997; and (13) in addition to funding constraints, according to IRS officials, a decision on using SCRIPS for Forms 941 will depend on the results of a September 1996 capacity test of SCRIPS, which were not available when GAO completed its audit work, and decisions by IRS' Investment Review Board. |
gao_GAO-12-212T | gao_GAO-12-212T_0 | Background
The FECA program covers over 2.7 million civilian federal and postal employees in more than 70 agencies, providing wage-loss compensation and payments for medical treatment to employees injured while performing their federal duties. Every year, employing agencies reimburse OWCP for the amounts paid to their employees in FECA compensation during the previous year. Certain government corporations and USPS also make payments to Labor for program administrative fees. OWCP is the central point where FECA claims are processed and eligibility and benefit decisions are made. The elements include evidence that the claim was filed within FECA’s statutory time requirements, that the employee was, at the time of injury disease, or death, an employee of the United States, and that the employee was injured while on duty, and that the condition resulted from the work-related injury. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government also outlines key control practices that are integral parts of an effective control environment. Promising Practices
We have identified several promising practices that employing agencies and Labor have implemented that may help to reduce fraudulent FECA claims. Agencies with full time staff may be able to dedicate resources to training them in fraud prevention, which is a positive practice noted in GAO’s fraud-prevention framework. Similar to the periodic reviews previously discussed, these controls fall within the monitoring component of GAO’s fraud-prevention framework and could help to validate claimants’ self-reported income and medical-condition information. The USPS IG reported that since October 2008 it identified and facilitated terminating benefits for 476 claimants who were committing workers’ compensation fraud, and recovered over $83 million in medical and disability judgments. A recent Labor IG testimony cited numerous Labor IG investigations that have been conducted over the years focusing on FECA claimants who work while continuing to receive benefits, and on medical or other service providers who bill the program for services not rendered. Potential Vulnerabilities
Our preliminary observations also identified potential vulnerabilities in the FECA program fraud-prevention controls that could increase the risk of claimants receiving benefits they are not entitled to. We found that management of the FECA program could be affected by limited access to necessary data. For example, Labor does not have authority to compare private or public wage data with FECA wage-loss compensation information to identify potential fraud. Specific potential vulnerabilities identified in the area included the following: Program officials at Labor and the employing agencies do not have access to payroll information included in the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) and federal employee payroll data, which could help reduce duplicate payments by identifying unreported income. The CA-1032 form contains information on a claimant’s income and dependent status, which is useful when employing agencies review claims files for continued eligibility. Labor agreed with the findings of this report. Our preliminary observations found that FECA program regulations allow claimants to select their own physician, and also requires examination by a physician employed or selected by the government only when a second opinion is deemed necessary by the government. Officials at multiple employing agencies covered in our work to date stated that they faced difficulties successfully investigating and prosecuting fraud. According to these officials, many of their strong allegations of fraud and abuse fall below this amount when estimating the cost of fraud that has already occurred. GAO’s Plans to Further Assess Controls and Perform Data Analysis as Part of Ongoing Work
We plan to follow up on these promising practices and potential weaknesses as part of our ongoing review of FECA fraud-prevention controls. In addition to our fraud-prevention work in the FECA program, we are conducting two other program-related engagements. Those engagements focus largely on issues related to retirement-age FECA beneficiaries. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony provides information on fraud-prevention controls for the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program. According to the Department of Labor (Labor), in fiscal year 2010 about 251,000 federal and postal employees and their survivors received wage- loss compensation, medical and vocational rehabilitation services, and death benefits through FECA. Administered by Labor, the FECA program provides benefits to federal employees who sustained injuries or illnesses while performing their federal duties. Employees must submit claims to their employing agency, which are then reviewed by Labor. For those claims that are approved, employing agencies reimburse Labor for payments made to their employees, while Labor bears most of the program's administrative costs. Wage-loss benefits for eligible workers-- including those who are at, or older than, retirement age--with total disabilities are generally 66.67 percent of the worker's salary (with no spouse or dependent) or 75 percent for a worker with a spouse or dependent. FECA wage loss compensation benefits are tax free and not subject to time or age limits. Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) estimated that future actuarial liabilities for governmentwide FECA compensation payments to those receiving benefits as of fiscal year 2011 would total nearly $30 billion (this amount does not include any costs for workers added to the FECA rolls in future years). In 2010, the United States Postal Service (USPS) Office of Inspector General reported that USPS alone had more than $12 billion of the $30 billion in estimated actuarial FECA liabilities. In April 2011, the USPS Inspector General (IG) testified that USPS had removed 476 claimants from the program based on disability fraud since October 2008 and recovered more than $83 million in judgments. Given the significant projected outlays of the governmentwide FECA program and prior USPS IG findings of fraud, this statement provides preliminary observations on our ongoing work examining FECA fraud-prevention controls and discusses related prior work conducted by us and other federal agencies. We will continue to review the identified issues and report on our findings at a later date...
What GAO Found
Our work to this point has identified several promising practices that could help to reduce the risk of fraud within the FECA program. The promising practices link back to fraud-prevention concepts contained in GAO's Fraud Prevention Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and include agencies' use of full-time staff dedicated to the FECA program, periodic reviews of claimants' continued eligibility, data analysis for potential fraud indicators, and effective use of investigative resources. These promising practices have already resulted in successful investigations and prosecutions of FECA-related fraud at some agencies, and could help to further enhance the program's fraud- prevention controls. However, our preliminary work has also identified several potential vulnerabilities in the program's design and controls that could increase the risk for fraud. Specifically, we found that limited access to necessary data is potentially reducing agencies' ability to effectively monitor claims and wage-loss information. In addition, agencies' reliance on self-reported data related to wages and dependent status, lack of a physician selected by the government throughout the process, and difficulties associated with successful investigations and prosecutions all potentially reduce the program's ability to prevent and detect fraudulent activity. Labor and employing agencies generally agreed with the preliminary findings presented in this statement and provided technical comments, which were incorporated into this statement. We plan to follow up on the promising practices and potential vulnerabilities as part of our ongoing work. |
gao_GAO-13-846T | gao_GAO-13-846T_0 | Sound Acquisition Management Policy Has Not Been Implemented Consistently and Many Programs Have Performed Poorly
DHS acquisition policy reflects many key program management practices intended to mitigate the risks of cost growth and schedule slips. However, we previously found that the department did not implement the policy consistently. A knowledge-based approach to capability development allows developers to be reasonably certain, at critical points in the acquisition life cycle, that their products are likely to meet established cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Over the past several years, our work has emphasized the importance of obtaining key knowledge at critical points in major system acquisitions and, based on this work, we have identified eight key practice areas for program management. For example, we reported that DHS had only approved 4 of 66 major programs’ required documents in accordance with the policy. These baselines are critical tools for managing acquisition programs, as they are the agreement between program-, component-, and department-level officials, establishing how systems will perform, when they will be Officials from half of the eight delivered, and what they will cost.components’ acquisition offices we spoke with, as well as PARM officials, noted that DHS’s culture had emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions more than sound acquisition management practices. We also reported that DHS’s lack of reliable performance data not only hindered its internal acquisition management efforts, but also limited congressional oversight. We made five recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security at that time, identifying specific actions DHS should take to mitigate the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and strengthen the department’s investment management activities. DHS concurred with all five recommendations, and is taking steps to address them, most notably through policy updates. Since that time, we have continued to assess DHS’s acquisition management activities and the reliability of the department’s performance data. We currently have a review underway for this subcommittee assessing the extent to which DHS is executing effective executive oversight and governance (including the quality of the data used) of a major effort to modernize an information technology system, TECS. According to DHS officials, its efforts to implement the department’s acquisition policy were complicated by the large number of programs initiated before the department was created, including 11 programs that PARM officials told us in 2012 had been fielded and were in the sustainment phase when MD 102 was signed.work, we found that, in May 2013, the USM waived the acquisition documentation requirements for 42 major acquisition programs that he identified as having been already fielded for operational use when MD 102 was issued in 2008. In a memo implementing the waiver, the USM explained that it would be cost prohibitive and inefficient to recreate documentation for previous acquisition phases. We plan to obtain more information on this decision and its effect on the department’s management of its major acquisitions. Most DHS Major Acquisition Programs Have Experienced Cost Overruns or Schedule Delays
In September 2012, we reported that most of DHS’s major acquisition programs cost more than expected, took longer to deploy than planned, or delivered less capability than promised. DHS’s Chief Financial Officer recently issued a memo stating that DHS faced a 30 percent gap between funding requirements for major acquisition programs and available resources. DHS has efforts underway to develop a more disciplined and strategic portfolio management approach, but the department has not yet developed key portfolio management policies and processes that could help the department address its affordability issues, and DHS’s primary portfolio management initiative may not be fully implemented for several years. That is, the department may have to pay more than expected for less capability than promised, and this could ultimately hinder DHS’s day-to-day operations.DHS’s Chief Financial Officer issued an internal memo in December 2012, shortly after our report was issued, stating that the aggregate 5- year funding requirements for major acquisitions would likely exceed available resources by approximately 30 percent. DHS Policy and Process Initiatives Are Intended to Improve Portfolio Management Efforts and Help Address Affordability Issues
In September 2012, we reported that DHS largely made investment decisions on a program-by-program and component-by-component basis. DHS did not have a process to systematically prioritize its major investments to ensure that the department’s acquisition portfolio was consistent with anticipated resource constraints. In our work at DOD, we have found this approach hinders efforts to achieve a balanced mix of programs that are affordable and feasible and that provide the greatest return on investment. In addition to private and public sector practices, which we discuss above, our prior work at DOD has identified an oversight body similar to the CRC’s expected function. In September 2012, we reported that the CRC is one of several new councils and offices that DHS would establish as part of its Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM), which is intended to improve portfolio management at DHS through the identification of priorities and capability gaps. DHS explained that the IILCM would ensure that mission needs drive investment decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has highlighted DHS acquisition management issues on its high-risk list, and over the past several years, GAO's work has identified significant shortcomings in the department's ability to manage an expanding portfolio of major acquisitions. It is important for DHS to address these shortcomings because the department invests extensively in acquisition programs to help it execute its many critical missions. DHS is acquiring systems to help secure the border, increase marine safety, enhance cyber security, and execute a wide variety of other operations. In 2011, DHS reported to Congress that it planned to ultimately invest $167 billion in its major acquisition programs. In fiscal year 2013 alone, DHS reported it was investing more than $9.6 billion.
This statement discusses (1) DHS's acquisition policy and how it has been implemented; and (2) DHS's mechanisms for managing emerging affordability issues. The statement is based on GAO's prior work on DHS acquisition management and leading commercial companies' knowledge-based approach to managing their large investments. It also reflects observations from ongoing work for this subcommittee. For that work, GAO is reviewing key documentation, and interviewing headquarters and component level acquisition and financial management officials.
What GAO Found
GAO has previously established that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) acquisition policy reflects many sound program management practices intended to mitigate the risks of cost growth and schedule slips. The policy largely reflects the knowledge-based approach used by leading commercial firms, which do not pursue major investments without demonstrating, at critical milestones, that their products are likely to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives. DHS policy requires that important acquisition documents be in place and approved before programs are executed. For example, one key document is an acquisition program baseline, which outlines a program's expected cost, schedule, and the capabilities to be delivered to the end user. However, in September 2012, GAO found that the department did not implement the policy consistently, and that only 4 of 66 programs had all of the required documents approved in accordance with DHS's policy. GAO made five recommendations, which DHS concurred with, identifying actions DHS should take to mitigate the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and strengthen management activities. Further, GAO reported that the lack of reliable performance data hindered DHS and congressional oversight of the department's major programs. Officials explained that DHS's culture had emphasized the need to rapidly execute missions more than sound acquisition management practices. GAO also reported that most of the department's major programs cost more than expected, took longer to deploy than planned, or delivered less capability than promised. DHS has taken steps to improve acquisition management, but as part of its ongoing work, GAO found that DHS recently waived documentation requirements for 42 programs fielded for operational use since 2008. DHS explained it would be cost prohibitive and inefficient to recreate documentation for previous acquisition phases. GAO plans to obtain more information on this decision and its effect on the management of DHS's major acquisitions. DHS's July 2013 status assessment indicated that, as of the end of fiscal year 2012, many major programs still face cost and schedule shortfalls. DHS expects to provide another update in the near future.
In December 2012, DHS's Chief Financial Officer reported that the department faced a 30 percent gap between expected funding requirements for major acquisition programs and available resources. DHS has efforts underway to develop a more disciplined and strategic approach to managing its portfolio of major investments, but the department has not yet developed certain policies and processes that could help address its affordability issues. In September 2012, GAO reported that DHS largely made investment decisions on a program-by-program and component-by-component basis and did not have a process to systematically prioritize its major investments. In GAO's work at the Department of Defense, it has found this approach hinders efforts to achieve a balanced mix of programs that are affordable and feasible and that provide the greatest return on investment. DHS's proposed Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model (IILCM) is intended to improve portfolio management by ensuring mission needs drive investment decisions. For example, a high-level oversight body would identify potential trade-offs among DHS's component agencies. GAO has recommended such an oversight body for several years. Full implementation of the IILCM may be several years away. GAO will continue to assess the department's progress in its ongoing work.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. It has made numerous recommendations in its prior work to strengthen acquisition management, and DHS is taking steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-15-323 | gao_GAO-15-323_0 | Premium costs are not included in the AV computation. In Five States, Coverage in Selected CHIP Plans and QHPs Was Generally Comparable, Although the CHIP Plans More Commonly Covered Dental and Certain Enabling Services and Had Fewer Coverage Limits
We determined that coverage in the selected CHIP plans and QHPs in our five states was generally comparable in that it included some level of coverage for nearly all the services we reviewed. Notable exceptions were certain enabling services and pediatric dental services, which were more frequently covered by the selected CHIP plans. For consumers who purchased the selected QHP in New York or the selected SADP in the other four states, we determined that pediatric dental coverage available was generally comparable to what was available in their state’s selected CHIP plan, with the exception of Utah, where the selected CHIP plan was more generous than the selected SADP. For services where coverage limits were sometimes imposed on QHPs and CHIP plans, our review found that the limits on CHIP plans were at times less restrictive. For example, the selected QHP in Utah limited home- and community-based health care services to 60 visits per year while the selected CHIP plan in the state did not impose any limits on these services. In addition, for pediatric dental services, coverage limits in the selected QHP and SADPs were generally similar to those in the selected CHIP plan; however, when there were differences, CHIP was generally more generous. For services we reviewed where the plans imposed copayments or coinsurance, the amount was typically less in a state’s selected CHIP plan compared to its selected QHP, even considering PPACA provisions aimed at reducing cost-sharing amounts for certain low income consumers who purchased QHPs. IV for a detailed list of cost-sharing for Our review of premiums for selected CHIP plans and QHPs also suggests that premiums were always less in the CHIP plans than in the QHPs we reviewed, even with the application of the premium tax credit to defray the cost of QHP premiums. For example, according to CHIP officials, annual CHIP premiums in 2014 for an individual varied by income level and ranged from $0 for the lowest income CHIP enrollees in Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, and New York, to $720 for enrollees between 351 and 400 percent of the FPL in New York, with most enrollees across the five selected states paying less than $200 per year.annual premiums for a single child only enrolled in selected QHPs ranged from $1,111 to $1,776 in our five states before the application of the premium tax credit. For example, in Illinois, the premium for the selected CHIP plan for an individual with an income at 150 percent of the FPL was $0 and was $1,254 for the selected QHP, which was reduced to $944 after the premium tax credit was applied. Finally, all selected CHIP plans and QHPs limited the total potential costs to consumers by imposing out-of-pocket maximum costs, and these maximum costs were typically less in the CHIP plans we reviewed. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for comment to HHS. HHS officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other interested parties. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Coverage for Selected Services in CHIP Plans and Qualified Health Plans (QHP) GAO Reviewed in Five States
Testing (screening and/or exam) The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) allows exchanges in each state to make available coverage of pediatric dental services as an embedded benefit in a QHP or through a stand- alone dental plan (SADP), which consumers may purchase separately. Routine transportation is covered for CHIP children greater than 142 and up to 209 percent of the federal poverty level only. Appendix III: Coverage, Coverage Limits, and Cost-Sharing for Selected Dental Services in CHIP Plans, QHPs, and SADPs
Tables 3 through 12 provide information on coverage, coverage limits, and cost-sharing—deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance—for selected dental services in State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) plans we reviewed in five states: Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, New York, and Utah; a qualified health plan (QHP) in New York; and stand- alone dental plans (SADP) in Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, and Utah. For selected QHPs, these variations reflect the cost-sharing subsidies that are available to certain enrollees. Children’s Health Insurance: Information on Coverage of Services, Costs to Consumers, and Access to Care in CHIP and Other Sources of Insurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal funds appropriated to states for CHIP—the jointly financed health insurance program for certain low-income children—are expected to be exhausted soon after the end of fiscal year 2015 unless Congress acts to appropriate new funds. Beginning in October 2015, any state with insufficient CHIP funding must establish procedures to ensure that children who are not covered by CHIP are screened for Medicaid eligibility. If ineligible, children may be enrolled into a private qualified health plan—or QHP—that has been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) as comparable to CHIP, if such a QHP is available.
GAO was asked to examine coverage and costs to consumers in selected CHIP plans and private QHPs in selected states. GAO reviewed (1) coverage and (2) costs to consumers for one CHIP plan, one QHP, and, where applicable, one SADP in each of five states—Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, New York, and Utah. State selection was based on variation in location, program size, and design; CHIP plan selection was based on high enrollment; and QHP selection was based on low plan premiums. GAO obtained CHIP and QHP premium data from state officials and federal and state websites. GAO also obtained documents from and spoke to federal officials, including from HHS's Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, state officials, including from CHIP and insurance departments, and issuers of QHPs.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
In five selected states, GAO determined that coverage of services in the selected State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) plans was generally comparable to that of the selected private qualified health plans (QHP), with some differences. In particular, the plans were generally comparable in that most covered the services GAO reviewed with the notable exceptions of pediatric dental and certain enabling services such as translation and transportation services, which were covered more frequently by the CHIP plans. For example, only the selected QHP in New York covered pediatric dental services; the QHPs in the other four states did not include pediatric dental services, although some officials indicated this would change for 2015 offerings. In those four states, stand-alone dental plans (SADP) could be purchased separately. Selected CHIP plans and QHPs were also similar in terms of the services on which they imposed day, visit, or dollar limits, although the five selected CHIP plans generally imposed fewer limits than the selected QHPs. For services where coverage limits were sometimes imposed on QHPs and CHIP plans, GAO's review found that the limits on CHIP plans were at times less restrictive. For example, the selected QHP in Utah limited home- and community-based health care services to 60 visits per year while the selected CHIP plan did not impose any limits. In addition, for pediatric dental services, coverage limits in the selected SADPs were generally similar to those in the selected CHIP plan; however, when there were differences, CHIP was generally more generous.
Consumers' costs for these services—defined as deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and premiums—were almost always less in the five states' selected CHIP plans when compared to their respective QHPs, despite the application of subsidies authorized under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that reduce these costs in the QHPs. Specifically, when cost-sharing applied, the amount was typically less for CHIP plans, even considering PPACA provisions aimed at reducing cost-sharing amounts for certain low income consumers who purchased QHPs. For example, an office visit to a specialist in Colorado would cost a CHIP enrollee a $2 to $10 copayment per visit, depending on their income, compared to the lowest available copayment of $25 per visit in the selected Colorado QHP. GAO's review of premium data further suggests that selected CHIP premiums were always lower than selected QHP premiums, even when considering the application of PPACA subsidies that help to defray the cost to certain consumers. For example, the 2014 annual premium for the selected Illinois CHIP plan for an individual at 150 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) was $0. By comparison, the 2014 annual premium for the selected Illinois QHP was $1,254, which was reduced to $944 for an individual at 150 percent of the FPL, after considering federal subsidies to offset the cost of coverage. Finally, all selected CHIP plans and QHPs GAO reviewed limited out-of-pocket maximum costs, and these maximum costs were typically less in the CHIP plans. |
gao_GAO-07-156 | gao_GAO-07-156_0 | Background
TAS is an independent office within IRS created to assist taxpayers in resolving problems with IRS, identify areas in which taxpayers have problems in dealing with IRS, and propose administrative and legislative changes to mitigate such problems. For example, although CI was the largest issue in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, it accounted for only 14 percent of cases in fiscal year 2005 and 8 percent in fiscal year 2006. For example, the National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2007 Objectives Report to Congress states that “The impact of the IRS’s substantial increases in enforcement activities is evident in the corresponding increase in TAS Taxpayer Delinquent Investigation, Levy, and Automated Underreporter case receipts.” Data from TAS and IRS are consistent with this argument, showing a correlation between increases in TAS’s caseload and increases in IRS’s overall enforcement activities since fiscal year 2004. However, our analysis of TAS data does not support this. Furthermore, the changes made by TAS in January 2006 did not significantly affect TAS’s caseload given that the two added criteria resulted in just over 500 of the approximately 244,000 cases received in fiscal year 2006. However, its employee satisfaction survey suffers from a declining response rate and TAS does not measure some important dimensions of performance such as cost per case. TAS would also need to adjust the number of cases closed for the complexity of the cases and the quality of the work. TAS Is Piloting Process to Measure the Effectiveness of Systemic Advocacy
TAS is piloting a process to analyze a few systemic issues in depth to assess progress in correcting underlying problems, but does not have a process for measuring systemic advocacy effectiveness more broadly. TAS sent the recommendations included in the 2004 and 2005 annual reports to IRS. Without measures of case advocacy efficiency and cost, TAS management lacks information potentially useful for managing its case advocacy staff and prioritizing its systemic advocacy efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the National Taxpayer Advocate improve TAS case advocacy performance measures with the addition of a true measure of efficiency that incorporates case complexity and quality and a cost measure; supplement the detailed information on specific systemic advocacy issues currently being developed with a broad measure of the effectiveness of systemic advocacy; and improve TAS reporting by (1) describing actions taken in response to TAS legislative recommendations, (2) describing actions taken by IRS to address the most serious problems encountered by taxpayers, and (3) making it clear that the most serious problems included in the annual report to Congress are at least 20 of the most serious problems but not necessarily all of the top problems faced by taxpayers. To address this objective, we reviewed the case advocacy process; TAS’s case acceptance criteria, changes made to the criteria by TAS, and TAS guidance for applying the criteria; the legal requirements for TAS’s case acceptance criteria; TAS documents that included discussions of why their caseload was increasing, and the fiscal years 2002–5 National Taxpayer Advocate’s annual reports to Congress, hereafter referred to as the annual report. Our second objective was to determine how well TAS conducted its case advocacy activities in terms of measures such as customer satisfaction and quality. Our third objective was to determine how well TAS measures and reports its systemic advocacy efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) to assist taxpayers in resolving problems with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to propose changes to IRS's practices to mitigate problems affecting taxpayers in general. TAS uses case advocacy and systemic advocacy, respectively, to address these two goals. GAO was asked to address (1) why TAS's caseload has increased since 2004, (2) how well TAS conducted its case advocacy activities in terms of measures such as customer satisfaction and quality, and (3) how well TAS measures and reports its systemic advocacy efforts. GAO interviewed TAS and IRS managers and other staff, reviewed TAS and IRS documents, and analyzed TAS and IRS data.
What GAO Found
The number of individual taxpayer cases opened by TAS increased substantially in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and our analysis of TAS and IRS data shows that these increases correlated with increases in IRS enforcement activities both overall and in some specific IRS enforcement programs. For example, changes in the number of tax refunds frozen by IRS coincided with changes in the number of frozen refund cases at TAS. While TAS made changes after fiscal year 2004 to its guidance for accepting new taxpayer cases, this did not notably influence TAS's caseload increase in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. For example, TAS created two additional case acceptance criteria in fiscal year 2006 that resulted in a little more than 500 of the approximately 244,000 cases received that year. TAS measures customer satisfaction and found that the taxpayers TAS serves remained satisfied from fiscal years 2002 to 2006. TAS also measures the quality of its case advocacy and found that this improved from 2002 to 2004 and stayed about the same in 2005 and 2006. While these case advocacy measures are sound, there is important missing information in that TAS does not have meaningful measures of case advocacy efficiency or cost. A meaningful measure of efficiency would consider the ratio of cases closed to the time spent on them and take into account case complexity and the quality of the work, and unit cost information is needed to fully understand this information. TAS is developing the means to capture time per case, the key component of unit cost, and case complexity. TAS currently does not measure the effectiveness of its systemic advocacy efforts. TAS is piloting a program to study systemic advocacy effectiveness in a few areas, but not broadly. Also, it is difficult to determine what actions were taken to address systemic issues raised in the annual report to Congress, TAS's primary method for providing information to Congress and the public about its systemic advocacy efforts. For example, the report describes serious problems faced by the taxpayers but does not include the status of addressing those issues. |
gao_GAO-03-1061 | gao_GAO-03-1061_0 | The facility was slated to revert to the German government in 2000. Renovation of the facility is scheduled from September 2003 to March 2005. According to State’s business plan to purchase the facility, the Creekbed project had four fundamental objectives. Furthermore, the House Conference Report for the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution 2003 stated that the conferees support “the Department ’s effort to initiate a consolidation, streamlining and regionalization of country and multi- regional staffing in Frankfurt, Germany.” The report also said, “The success of this initiative will be measured largely by the staffing reductions made possible at less secure locations throughout Germany, Europe, Eurasia, Africa and the Near East.”
State Indicated It Has Renewed Efforts to Identify Staff for Relocation from Posts Outside Germany
State indicated it has renewed its efforts to identify staff from posts outside Germany who could be relocated to the new Frankfurt regional center. State’s earlier efforts were prematurely halted in August/September 2002 because staffing planners mistakenly interpreted space planning estimates as indicating the regional center would be fully occupied. State also indicated that it would pursue a rigorous rightsizing and regionalization strategy in staffing the Frankfurt facility. Resistance from Some Agencies Is Expected
Although substantial space exists for relocating staff from other posts, State documents indicate that the department may encounter some resistance among agencies identified to relocate. They, too, agreed that there was additional space. More importantly, it will require a strong and continual commitment by State to the broader objective of rightsizing the U.S. overseas presence. In our view, State’s comments are inconsistent with its (1) stated expectations that the Frankfurt project will achieve the department’s key rightsizing and regionalization goals and (2) plans to conduct a full assessment of staffing options for the Frankfurt regional center. Appendix I: Comments from the Office of Management and Budget
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State | Why GAO Did This Study
The State Department plans to spend at least $80 million to purchase and renovate a multibuilding facility in Frankfurt, Germany. The facility, known as Creekbed, is scheduled to open in mid-2005. The project is a key rightsizing initiative under the President's Management Agenda to reassess and reconfigure the staffing of the U.S. overseas presence. Creekbed is expected to achieve the department's major rightsizing and regionalization goals. The Office of Management and Budget expects the project to serve as a model for developing other regional centers. GAO was asked to determine whether State fully examined the potential for relocating regional staff from outside Germany to Creekbed.
What GAO Found
The Department of State indicated it is currently renewing earlier efforts to relocate staff from outside Germany to the new Frankfurt regional center. State said it would pursue a rigorous rightsizing and regionalization strategy in staffing the Frankfurt facility. State prematurely stopped its earlier efforts to relocate regional staff from other posts in August/September 2002 because staffing planners interpreted space planning estimates as indicating that the regional center would be fully occupied. However, according to GAO analysis, the facility was not full and significant additional space existed. After touring the facility and studying staffing requirements and space allocated for specific agencies, GAO found there was space available for additional staff. Successfully staffing the Frankfurt regional facility has the potential to optimize its use and achieve broader regionalization objectives. |
gao_GAO-08-320 | gao_GAO-08-320_0 | The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
The Exon-Florio amendment authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies if they are determined to pose a threat to national security. Foreign Investment Laws, Policies, and Processes Address National Security Concerns
As is the case in the United States, each of the countries we reviewed has enacted laws and instituted policies regulating foreign investment—often to address national security concerns. Restrictions range from requiring approval of investments in a narrowly defined defense sector to broad restrictions on the basis of economic security and cultural policy. Recent and proposed changes in the countries’ laws and policies have more explicitly identified national security as an area of concern, in some cases as the result of controversial investments. The two countries without a review process, the Netherlands and the UAE, restrict entry into certain sectors or restrict the extent of ownership allowed in a sector. Foreign Investment Review Implementation Has Many Similarities in Different Countries
While there are many unique characteristics to the systems employed by the 10 countries to regulate foreign investment, in many ways the systems are similar to each other, and in several ways similar to the CFIUS process in the United States. Eight of the 10 countries use a formal review process to approve or deny a transaction. Generally, this review is conducted by a government economic body with input from government security bodies, and national security is a primary factor or one of several factors considered in evaluating transactions. Although the concepts of national security vary from country to country, all countries share similar concerns about national security-related issues. These concerns include, for example, their defense industrial base, and more recently, investments in energy sectors and investments of state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds; the latter because of concerns that political rather than economic motivation may be behind the investment. For example, a country may place national citizenship requirements on company board members. Unlike the U.S. system, most countries’ reviews are mandatory if the investment reaches certain dollar thresholds or if the buyer will obtain a controlling or blocking share in the acquired company. Finally, unlike in the U.S. process, five countries allow review process decisions to be challenged in court or through administrative means. In addition to the formal mechanisms, there are unofficial factors that may influence investment in each of the 10 countries. Entities within the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also expressed concerns about foreign government-controlled investments, but the governments do not currently have plans to revise their foreign investment policies to address those concerns. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report expands and updates a 1996 GAO report that compared the laws and processes governing foreign investment in Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Under FINSA, CFIUS and the President must consider, as appropriate, the following additional factors:the potential national security-related effects on U. S. critical infrastructure, including major energy assets; the potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical technologies; whether the transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction; as appropriate, and particularly with respect to transactions requiring an investigation, a review of the current assessment of the acquiring country’s adherence to nonproliferation regimes; the relationship of the acquiring country with the United States, specifically on its record on cooperating in counterterrorism efforts; and the potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military applications, including an analysis of national export control laws and regulations; the long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and material; and the potential effects of the transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any country identified by the Secretary of Defense as posing a potential regional military threat to the interests of the United States. Additional Foreign Investment Laws and Policies
Other Chinese laws, regulations, and opinions also regulate foreign investment. Some sectors have additional restrictions and approvals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies can pose a significant challenge for the U.S. government because of the need to balance the benefits of foreign investment with national security concerns. The Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that may harm national security. To better understand how other countries deal with similar challenges, GAO was asked to identify how other countries address the issues that Exon-Florio is intended to address. Specifically, this report describes selected countries' (1) laws and policies enacted to regulate foreign investment to protect their national security interests and (2) implementation of those laws and policies. This report updates a 1996 GAO report that describes how four major foreign investors in the United States--France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom--monitored foreign investment in their own countries to protect national security interests. It also examines foreign investment in six additional countries: Canada, China, India, the Netherlands, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). GAO reviewed selected laws and regulations and interviewed foreign government officials and others concerning their implementation and any planned changes to their foreign investment laws, regulations, and policies.
What GAO Found
As is the case in the United States, the countries we reviewed have enacted laws and instituted policies regulating foreign investment, often to address national security concerns. However, each of the 10 countries has its own concept of national security that influences which particular investments may be restricted. As a result of the differing concepts, restrictions range from requiring approval of investments in a narrowly defined defense sector to broad restrictions on the basis of economic security and cultural policy. In addition, some countries have recently made changes to their laws and policies to more explicitly identify national security as an area of concern, in some cases as the result of controversial investments. Several countries have also introduced lists of strategic sectors in which foreign investment requires government review and approval. While there are many unique characteristics of the systems employed by the 10 countries to regulate foreign investment, in many ways the systems are similar to each other, and to the U.S. process under Exon-Florio. Eight countries use a formal review process--usually conducted by a government economic body with input from government security bodies--to review a transaction. Generally, national security is a primary factor or one of several factors considered in evaluating transactions. While the concepts of national security vary from country to country, all countries share concerns about a core set of issues. These include, for example, the defense industrial base, and more recently, investment in the energy sector and investment by state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds. Most countries have established time frames for the review and can place conditions on transactions prior to approval. For example, a country may place national citizenship requirements on company board members. However, unlike the voluntary notification under Exon-Florio, most countries' reviews are mandatory if the investment reaches certain dollar thresholds or if the buyer will obtain a controlling or blocking share in the acquired company. Further, unlike the United States, five countries allow decisions to be appealed through administrative means or in court. Two countries do not have a formal review process. The Netherlands restricts entry into certain sectors such as public utilities, and the UAE restricts the extent of ownership allowed in all sectors without a review. In addition to the formal mechanisms, there are unofficial factors that may influence investment in each of the 10 countries. For example, in some countries an informal government preapproval for sensitive transactions may be needed. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of the Treasury emphasized the United States' commitment to an open investment policy. |
gao_GAO-08-953 | gao_GAO-08-953_0 | In certain wholesale markets, core banks often compete with U.S. investment firms. U.S.-based core banks also compete with foreign-based banks in foreign markets and in U.S. markets where foreign-based banks are very active. Core Banks Compete with Other Core and Non-core Banks
Core banking organizations—those that meet the requirements in terms of asset size and foreign exposure for mandatory adoption of the Basel II advanced approaches—have adopted a variety of business models, but all compete with some other core banks. In this capacity, core U.S.-based banks compete with foreign-based banks, with investment firms, and with asset management firms that do not own depository institutions and are not subject to regulatory capital requirements. Differences in Capital Requirements Have the Potential to Create Competitive Disparities
Because holding capital is costly for banks, differences in regulatory capital requirements could influence costs, prices, and profitability for banks competing under different capital frameworks. New U.S. Capital Rules Have Reduced Some Competitive Concerns about Basel II
The new U.S. capital rules address some competitive concerns of banks; however, other concerns remain. Other factors, such as the leverage requirement, may reduce differences in capital for banks competing in the United States. U.S. Final Rule on the Advanced Approaches Addresses Some Competitive Concerns Raised by Banks, but the Leverage Ratio Continues to Be a Concern
Although regulators have harmonized some aspects of the advanced approaches final rule with the New Basel Accord, concerns remain about remaining differences in the final rule and other issues such as the leverage requirement that could have competitive effects. Proposed Standardized Approach May Reduce Competitive Concerns of Non-core Banks, as May Other Factors
As discussed earlier, because non-core banks compete with core banks in some markets, non-core banks were concerned that core banks would be able to hold less capital than non-core banks were holding under Basel I for the same assets. Bank Regulators Have Taken Limited Actions to Address Additional Competitive Effects of Basel II Implementation on U.S. Banking Organizations
Many factors have affected the pace of Basel II implementation in the United States, and while the gradual implementation is allowing regulators to consider changes in the rules and reassess banks’ risk-management systems, regulators have not yet addressed some areas of uncertainty that could have competitive implications. The final rule provides regulators with considerable flexibility and leaves open questions about which banks will be exempted from the advanced approaches. Regulators also have not fully developed plans for a required study of the impacts of Basel II implementation. Lack of development or specificity in criteria, scope, methodology, and timing will affect the quality and extent of information that regulators would use to help address competitive and other effects and make future changes in the rules. Finally, the uncertainty over which banking institutions ultimately will have to adopt the advanced approaches continues because the advanced approaches rule says all core banks will be required to adopt detailed implementation plans for the complex advanced approaches by October 1, 2008, and the proposed standardized approach rule, which will not be finalized by that time, contains a question about whether and to what extent core banks should be allowed to use the simpler proposed standardized approach. As delineated in the advanced approaches rule, the study will measure the changes in capital and portfolios held by the core banks and will look at the differences in required capital for these banks if they were under the standardized approach rule or Basel I—necessary steps for evaluating the competitive impact of Basel II—but it does not explicitly describe components needed to determine if there are material deficiencies in the rule or for regulators to reach agreement on whether banks should be permitted to fully implement the advanced approaches. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to discuss (1) the nature of the competitive environment in which U.S. banking organizations compete, (2) the extent to which different capital requirements may have competitive impacts on U.S. banking organizations internationally and domestically, and (3) actions regulators could take to address competitive effects and other potential negative effects of the new capital rules during implementation. In addition, we interviewed officials from all of the core banks and other banks, both foreign and domestic, with operations in the United States. Risk-Based Capital: Regulatory and Industry Approaches to Capital and Risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
Basel II, the new risk-based capital framework based on an international accord, is being adopted by individual countries. It includes standardized and advanced approaches to estimating capital requirements. In the United States, bank regulators have finalized an advanced approaches rule that will be required for some of the largest, most internationally active banks (core banks) and proposed an optional standardized approach rule for non-core banks that will also have the option to remain on existing capital rules. In light of possible competitive effects of the capital rules, GAO was asked to examine (1) the markets in which banks compete, (2) how new capital rules address U.S. banks' competitive concerns, and (3) actions regulators are taking to address competitive and other potential negative effects during implementation. Among other things, GAO analyzed data on bank products and services and the final and proposed capital rules; interviewed U.S. and foreign bank regulators, officials from U.S. and foreign banks; and computed capital requirements under varying capital rules.
What GAO Found
Large and internationally active U.S.-based banks (core banks) that will adopt the Basel II advanced approaches compete among themselves and in some markets with U.S.-based non-core banks, investment firms, and foreign-based banks. Non-core banks compete with core banks in retail markets, but in wholesale markets core banks often compete with investment firms and foreign-based banks. Because holding capital is costly for banks, differences in regulatory capital requirements could influence costs, prices, and profitability for banks competing under different capital requirements. The new U.S. capital rules addressed some earlier competitive concerns of banks; however, other concerns remain. By better aligning the advanced approaches rule with the international accord and proposing an optional standardized approach rule, U.S. regulators reduced some competitive concerns for both core and non-core banks. For example, the U.S. wholesale definition of default for the advanced approaches is now similar to the accord's. Core banks continue to be concerned about the leverage requirement (a simple capital to assets calculation), which they believe places them at a competitive disadvantage relative to firms not subject to a similar requirement. Foreign regulators have been working with U.S. regulators to coordinate Basel II implementation for U.S. banks with foreign operations. The proposed standardized approach addresses some concerns non-core banks raised by providing a more risk sensitive approach to calculating regulatory requirements. But other factors likely will reduce differences in capital for banks competing in the United States; for example, the leverage requirement establishes a floor that may exceed the capital required under the advanced and standardized approaches. Many factors have affected the pace of Basel II implementation in the United States and, while the gradual implementation is allowing regulators to consider changes in the rules and reassess banks' risk-management systems, regulators have not yet taken action to address areas of uncertainty that could have competitive implications. For example, the final rule provides regulators with considerable flexibility and leaves open questions such as which banks may be exempted from the advanced approaches. Although the rule provides that core banks can apply for exemptions and regulators should consider these in light of some broad categories, such as asset size or portfolio mix, the rule does not further define the criteria for exemptions. Some industry participants we spoke with said that uncertainties about the implementation of the advanced approaches have been a problem for them. Moreover, regulators have not fully developed plans for a required study of the impacts of Basel II before full implementation. Lack of specificity in criteria, scope, methodology, and timing will affect the quality and extent of information that regulators will have to help assess competitive and other impacts, determine whether there are any material deficiencies requiring future changes in the rules, and determine whether to permit core banks to fully implement Basel II. |
gao_GAO-16-569 | gao_GAO-16-569_0 | Soon after the death of a servicemember, the casualty assistance process begins by notifying the next of kin of the death. Once the survivor no longer needs the assistance provided by casualty assistance officers, the survivor may choose to receive assistance from the long-term assistance programs, which are available to provide support throughout a survivor’s lifetime. In addition to the support provided by the casualty assistance officers and the long-term assistance programs, the Gold Star Advocate Program is available at any point in the casualty assistance process to provide survivors with support and address issues that are raised by survivors regarding casualty assistance and the receipt of benefits. DOD and the Coast Guard Have Taken Steps to Implement the Gold Star Advocate Program, but Have Not Established It in Policy or Determined Outreach Goals or Metrics
DOD and the Coast Guard have taken steps to implement the Gold Star Advocate Program, in that they have designated Gold Star Advocates who have received, addressed, and reported a variety of issues raised by survivors. However, neither DOD nor the Coast Guard has developed policies to manage the program, including Gold Star Advocate Program roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Additionally, DOD and the Coast Guard have conducted outreach to survivors for the program, but they have not determined goals and metrics for outreach. According to DOD officials, few issues have risen to the level of the Gold Star Advocate Program because survivor issues are generally resolved by casualty assistance officers and the long-term assistance programs. However, while the Gold Star Advocate Program is available to serve survivors of all servicemembers who died while on active duty, its direct outreach methods are primarily directed toward the survivors of servicemembers who have died since the program was implemented. If OUSD(P&R), DOD’s military services, and the Coast Guard do not develop goals, such as to increase awareness of the Gold Star Advocate Program, and metrics to assess their outreach for the program, some survivors may remain unaware of the casualty assistance available to them, and consequently the program may not be able to provide support to all survivors who need it. DOD Has Developed a Training Program That Is Consistent with Some Attributes of an Effective Training Program but May Not Have the Indicators Needed to Evaluate Its Effect
DOD has planned, designed, and implemented training to cover the duties required of casualty assistance officers that is consistent with some attributes of an effective training program, including providing survivors with information on their benefits and entitlements and other forms of casualty assistance. For example, the survey conducted between October 2014 and March 2015 resulted in a survivor response rate of 10 percent. With such a low response rate, DOD has acknowledged that results should be interpreted cautiously. Regarding DOD’s casualty assistance officer training program, without improved indicators for evaluating the effect of casualty assistance officer training on program performance, DOD may not have the information needed to improve the quality of casualty assistance provided to survivors. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for review and comment. We obtained data on the number of servicemembers who died while on active duty and the number of surviving dependents from the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Coast Guard, from January 2002 through November 2015. For our first objective, to determine the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard have implemented the Gold Star Advocate Program, we compared DOD and Coast Guard policies on casualty matters and the meeting minutes of DOD’s Casualty Advisory Board, the panel responsible for developing and recommending casualty-related policy and guidance, with the statutory requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, section 633, for the Gold Star Advocate Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
From January 2002 through November 2015, 17,911 servicemembers died while on active duty, leaving approximately 24,000 surviving dependents. The military services' casualty assistance programs guide these survivors through the casualty assistance process following the death of a servicemember.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision that GAO review the Gold Star Advocate Program and the training provided for casualty assistance officers. This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD and the Coast Guard have implemented the Gold Star Advocate Program and conducted outreach to survivors; and (2) DOD has developed a training program for casualty assistance officers consistent with attributes of an effective training program.
GAO analyzed statutes, DOD and Coast Guard policies on casualty matters, and DOD's military services' casualty assistance guidance and training materials. GAO interviewed officials involved in the Gold Star Advocate Program at DOD, its military services, and the Coast Guard—which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard took steps to implement the Gold Star Advocate Program in 2014 by designating Gold Star Advocates who have received, addressed, and reported a variety of issues raised by survivors, and they conducted some outreach to survivors for the program, but they have not established policies to manage the program. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required the designation of personnel to provide support to survivors of servicemembers who died while on active duty. Known as Gold Star Advocates, these personnel are available at any point in the casualty assistance process. If a survivor is not satisfied with the casualty assistance he or she has received, the survivor may contact a Gold Star Advocate. According to DOD officials, few issues have risen to the level of the program's attention because survivor issues are generally resolved by casualty assistance officers—who serve as liaison between the survivor and the service branch following the death of a servicemember, and assist with funeral arrangements and the application and receipt of benefits and entitlements—and long-term assistance programs, which are available to provide support throughout a survivor's lifetime.
However, while steps have been taken to implement the program, neither DOD nor the Coast Guard has established policies for the program, including roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Additionally, although DOD and the Coast Guard have conducted some outreach for the program, they have not developed goals and metrics for outreach, without which some survivors may remain unaware of the casualty assistance available to them. While the program is available to serve survivors of all servicemembers who died while on active duty, its outreach methods are primarily directed toward survivors of servicemembers who have died since the program was implemented in 2014.
DOD and its military services have developed a casualty assistance officer training program that addresses the duties required of casualty assistance officers that is consistent with some attributes of an effective training program, but DOD and its military services may not have the indicators needed to evaluate the effect of that training on casualty assistance program performance. For example, DOD administers a web-based survey to survivors regarding the quality of casualty assistance they received, but the survey has roughly a 10 percent response rate. With such a low response rate, DOD acknowledged that results should be interpreted cautiously. Without improved indicators for evaluating the effect of casualty assistance officer training, DOD may not have the information needed to improve the quality of casualty assistance provided to survivors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and the Coast Guard develop interim policies for the Gold Star Advocate Program and determine goals and metrics for its outreach; and that DOD develop additional indicators for better evaluating its training. DOD and DHS on behalf of the Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-527 | gao_GAO-14-527_0 | One part of the ONDCP strategy to disrupt the illicit drug market focuses interdiction efforts on seizing cocaine and other illicit drugs in the transit zone that are bound for the United States (arrival zone) from South America (source zone). As the southernmost points of entry into the United States and the only U.S. territories within the transit zone, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are key entry points for illicit drugs being smuggled into the United States. Federal Agencies’ Roles in Maritime Drug Interdiction Operations
JIATF-S relies on DHS (Coast Guard and CBP) and the Department of Defense (Navy) to provide vessels and aircraft for conducting drug interdiction operations in the transit zone. The Coast Guard’s Resource Deployments for Transit Zone Drug Interdiction Operations Have Varied in Recent Years
Overall, from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the amount of resources the Coast Guard provided to JIATF-S—including vessels, aircraft, and LEDETs—varied. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of the Coast Guard’s aging major cutter fleet; delays in the delivery of new, more capable replacement cutters; and budget constraints, including sequestration, as key factors affecting the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its resource deployment and drug interdiction mission performance targets. The Coast Guard’s Resource Deployments to JIATF-S Varied during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013
Vessels Deployed to JIATF-S
The Coast Guard’s deployment of vessels to JIATF-S to carry out drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in 2013. The Coast Guard Has Generally Not Met Its Drug Interdiction Mission Performance Targets because of Various Factors
Drug Interdiction Mission Performance Targets
The Coast Guard has generally not met targets for its primary drug interdiction performance measure—removal rate for cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the maritime transit zone. According to Coast Guard data, since establishing performance targets for this measure in fiscal year 2009, the Coast Guard met its target in 1 year—fiscal year 2013.Coast Guard reported a cocaine removal rate of 15.3 percent in the transit zone, exceeding its performance target rate of 14.1 percent. The Coast Guard Has Supported Counter- drug Efforts in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands with Increased Asset Deployments
The Coast Guard Supports DHS Efforts to Combat Drug Smuggling in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
The Coast Guard is supporting a DHS-wide effort to combat the growing level of violence associated with drug trafficking in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, these vessels and aircraft, in general, had previously been allocated for alien migrant interdiction operations. The Coast Guard Has Deployed More Resources for Drug Interdiction in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in Recent Years Vessel Deployments Have Increased
According to Coast Guard data, the total amount of vessel hours in support of drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility more than tripled in recent years—from 2,051 hours in fiscal year 2009 to 6,839 hours in fiscal year 2013. According to Coast Guard officials, the number of vessel Figure 8 shows the total vessel hours (major cutter and patrol boat hours) the Coast Guard reported for conducting drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, as well as, the relative share of the vessel hours provided by Sector San Juan and other Coast Guard locations. For example, according to CCDB data provided by the Coast Guard, the estimated noncommercial maritime primary flow of cocaine toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands more than doubled, from 7.1 metric tons in fiscal year 2012 to 14.9 metric tons in fiscal year 2013.and secondary noncommercial maritime drug flow toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DHS, the Department of Justice, ONDCP, and JIATF-S for review and comment. We received technical comments that we have incorporated, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
One part of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is to disrupt the flow of cocaine through the transit zone. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the only U.S. territories located geographically within the transit zone, have served as entry points for cocaine destined for the continental United States. In recent years, federal and local government agencies have cited growing levels of violent crime in these territories and attribute this violence to illicit drug trafficking. Within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction and a key provider of resources to support drug interdiction operations in the transit zone and the two territories.
GAO was asked to examine the Coast Guard's drug interdiction efforts in the transit zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This report addresses (1) trends in the Coast Guard's deployment of resources in the transit zone and the extent to which the Coast Guard met its performance targets; and (2) actions taken by the Coast Guard to combat drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and trends in vessel and aircraft deployments. GAO analyzed Coast Guard data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on drug interdiction resource deployments and mission performance, and interviewed Coast Guard and DHS officials involved in drug interdiction operations.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the “transit zone”—the area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United States—during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 days—a 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure—the removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zone—once, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets.
In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increased—from about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-713 | gao_GAO-16-713_0 | These agreements establish obligations governing how nuclear material and equipment subject to the agreements are to be used. In addition, the United States has an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the safeguard of nuclear material, which requires the United States to maintain a system of accounting and control over certain nuclear material. 1). 2). NRC licensees told us they generally conducted exchanges to meet customer demand for material with obligations from certain countries and to avoid the need to physically transport uranium. Exchanges Typically Involved Commercial Nuclear Facilities, and Numbers of Exchanges Have Decreased in Recent Years
According to NMMSS data, there were 817 exchanges of foreign obligated nuclear material in the United States from October 1, 2003, through November 30, 2015. Of the 817 obligation exchanges, 802 (98 percent) were conducted by NRC-licensed commercial nuclear facilities; 14 were conducted by DOE contractors; and 1 was conducted by an NRC licensee that conducts work both for commercial purposes and for DOE. The remaining 1 percent involved facilities exchanging obligated material for obligated material. They stated that obligation exchanges allowed them to avoid the high transportation costs and safety risks associated with physically shipping nuclear material. DOE and NRC Have Procedures for Accurate Tracking and Reporting of Obligation Exchanges, but Conditions Exist That May Affect Agencies’ Abilities to Use NMMSS to Demonstrate Compliance With Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
DOE and NRC have three procedures designed to ensure accurate tracking and reporting of transaction data in NMMSS, including data on obligation exchanges. Foreign partners provide advance notification, as well as a confirmation of shipment, to the U.S. government when shipping nuclear material to the United States. We tested elements of these procedures and analyzed certain NMMSS data and found the data to be generally accurate with little evidence of inaccuracies or other problems with NMMSS data on obligation exchanges. Agencies Have Not Documented the Conditions under Which Facilities May Carry Negative Obligation Balances
Nuclear cooperation agreements and the administrative arrangements that we reviewed do not address whether or to what extent facilities may carry negative obligation balances but while DOE officials told us that the practice is not prohibited, DOE and NRC have not documented the conditions under which it is allowed. Negative obligation balances occur when a facility conducts an obligation exchange without having enough of a given nuclear material in inventory—similar to writing a check for an amount that is not currently in one’s checking account, with the assumption that enough funds will be deposited in time to cover the cashing of the check. Specifically, DOE and NRC officials said that they discourage this practice through informational presentations that they provide to NRC licensees and DOE contractors at trainings and conferences. NMMSS Does Not Have a Capability to Alert DOE When the Inventory of Unobligated LEU Is Particularly Low
NMMSS does not have a capability to alert DOE when the inventory of unobligated LEU is low, placing facilities with negative obligation balances at risk of not being able to reconcile them. Federal standards for internal control state that management should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results. Nevertheless, while the U.S. national security inventory of unobligated LEU could be used to correct any future negative obligation balances, if the decline in this U.S. inventory of unobligated LEU continues, and if it is possible to carry a negative obligation balance beyond reconciliation, there is a risk that, at some point in the future, a facility may conduct an exchange for nuclear material that it cannot fulfill—essentially bouncing a check. Without DOE and NRC developing an early-warning monitoring capability in NMMSS to alert senior DOE officials when the inventory of unobligated LEU becomes low, DOE cannot know when supplies of unobligated LEU are no longer available to correct negative obligation balances, thereby putting the U.S. government at risk of noncompliance with its nuclear cooperation agreements. Conclusions
Under terms of its nuclear cooperation agreements, the United States must account for foreign obligated nuclear material, and NMMSS has been designated as the system to track and report on that material as it enters, leaves, and moves within the country. Without such an early- warning monitoring capability in NMMSS to alert senior DOE officials when the inventory of unobligated LEU is particularly low, facilities carrying negative balances could put the U.S. government in the position of potential non-compliance with its nuclear cooperation agreements. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States must generally account for nuclear material it has obtained under nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign partners. The agreements generally impose certain conditions, including that the material be used for peaceful purposes. Material subject to such conditions is called “obligated.” The United States relies on NMMSS to track obligated material and to help demonstrate U.S. compliance with agreements. Material not subject to agreement conditions is called “unobligated.” Some forms of uranium, such as LEU, are used to maintain the nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, but the U.S. inventory of unobligated LEU is declining.
GAO was asked to review the practice of obligation exchanges and the reliability of certain NMMSS data. This report examines (1) the number of obligation exchanges in the United States since 2003, and the reasons for them, and (2) how DOE and NRC ensure such exchanges are accurately tracked and reported through NMMSS. GAO analyzed NMMSS data and agency documents and interviewed agency officials, DOE contractors, and NRC licensees, among other steps.
What GAO Found
In the United States, from October 1, 2003, through November 30, 2015, there were 817 exchanges of nuclear material that carried obligations to foreign partners under nuclear cooperation agreements. These exchanges allowed the obligated nuclear material to be transferred between U.S. facilities without physically moving it. For example, if a facility had a certain amount of obligated nuclear material and another facility had at least the same amount and type of unobligated material (which is not subject to the same conditions as obligated material), the facilities could exchange the obligations on their material so that each facility had a portion of both types of material without physically moving it.
Numbers of exchanges. Of the 817 exchanges, 802 were conducted by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-licensed facilities—private companies and other entities involved in commercially producing nuclear energy. Of the remaining exchanges, 14 were conducted by contractors that run Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories and weapons-production sites, and 1 by an NRC licensee that does both commercial and DOE work.
Reasons for exchanges. NRC licensees said they conducted exchanges primarily to meet their utility customer demand, as well as to avoid the high costs and safety risks associated with physically transporting nuclear material. DOE contractors said they conducted exchanges primarily to avoid physically moving nuclear material stored at a specific site.
DOE and NRC have procedures to ensure accurate tracking and reporting of data on obligation exchanges through the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). GAO tested elements of these procedures and generally found them to be reliable. But, GAO identified two issues that may impact the agencies' ability to effectively monitor nuclear material inventories.
First, some facilities have carried negative obligation balances for extended periods. A negative obligation balance occurs when a facility conducts an exchange without having enough of a given material in its physical inventory to cover the exchange. In certain circumstances, negative balances may place the United States at risk of noncompliance with nuclear agreements. Negative balances have occurred because DOE and NRC have not addressed this issue in documented guidance on when facilities may carry such balances, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards.
Second, while unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) could be used to correct any future negative obligation balances, the U.S. inventory of it is declining and NMMSS does not have an early-warning monitoring capability to alert DOE when the inventory is particularly low. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should establish activities to monitor internal control systems and evaluate the results, but DOE officials said that the LEU inventory is currently sufficient and no early warning capability is needed. Without developing such a capability in NMMSS, DOE officials cannot know when the inventory of unobligated LEU becomes so low that supplies may not be available to correct negative obligation balances, thereby putting the United States at risk of not complying with its nuclear agreements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE and NRC (1) clarify in guidance when facilities may carry negative obligation balances and (2) develop an early-warning monitoring capability in NMMSS to alert DOE when the inventory of unobligated LEU is particularly low. DOE and NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations but stated that they have ongoing efforts that may address GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1056T | gao_GAO-08-1056T_0 | According to available VHA data, VHA used record estimated obligations of over $6.9 billion for mission-related goods and services. As shown in figure 1, about $3.8 billion (55.1 percent) was for fee-based medical and dental services for veterans, and another $1.4 billion (20.4 percent) was for drugs, medicines, and hospital supplies. The remainder was for, among other things, state veterans homes, transportation of veterans to and from medical centers for treatment, and miscellaneous obligations to logistical support and facility maintenance for VHA medical centers nationwide. VHA officials stated that miscellaneous obligations facilitate the payment for contracted goods and services when the quantities and delivery dates are not known. Deficiencies in Design of Controls over Miscellaneous Obligations Increase the Risk of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Our preliminary observations on VA policies and procedures indicate they were not designed to provide adequate controls over the use of miscellaneous obligations. According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency management is responsible for developing detailed policies and procedures for internal control suitable for their agency’s operations and ensuring that they provide for adequate monitoring by management, segregation of duties, and supporting documentation for the need to acquire specific goods in the quantities purchased. Collectively, these control design flaws increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (including employees converting government assets to their own use without detection). We reviewed the new guidance and found that while it offered some improvement, it did not fully address the specific control design flaws we identified. Such an analysis is essential to help ensure that the design of policies and procedures comply with all applicable federal appropriations law and internal control standards. We reviewed 42 miscellaneous obligations at the three case study locations and developed illustrative, more detailed information on the extent and nature of these control design flaws. In May 2008, VHA management finalized the interim guidance. According to VA officials, these policies have not been subject to any legal review. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In order to determine how VHA used miscellaneous obligations during fiscal year 2007, we obtained and analyzed a copy of VHA’s Integrated Funds Distribution, Control Point Activity, Accounting and Procurement (IFCAP) database of miscellaneous obligations for that year. To determine whether VHA’s polices and procedures are designed to provide adequate controls over the use of miscellaneous obligations, we first reviewed VHA’s policies and procedures governing the use of miscellaneous obligations at VA. We recently provided our draft report to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for review and comment. Following this testimony, we plan to issue a report, which will incorporate VA’s comments as appropriate and include recommendations for improving internal controls over miscellaneous obligations. Appendix II: Background
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for providing federal benefits to veterans. VA Policies and Procedures Concerning the Use of Miscellaneous Obligations
VA has used “Estimated Miscellaneous Obligation or Change in Obligation” (VA Form 4-1358) to record estimated obligations for goods and services for over 60 years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has been using miscellaneous obligations for over 60 years to record estimates of obligations to be incurred at a later time. The large percentage of procurements recorded as miscellaneous obligations in fiscal year 2007 raised questions about whether proper controls were in place over the authorization and use of billions of dollars. GAO's testimony provides preliminary findings related to (1) how VHA used miscellaneous obligations during fiscal year 2007, and (2) whether the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) policies and procedures were designed to provide adequate controls over their authorization and use. GAO recently provided its related draft report to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for review and comment and plans to issue its final report as a follow-up to this testimony. GAO obtained and analyzed available VHA data on miscellaneous obligations, reviewed VA policies and procedures, and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 42 miscellaneous obligations at three case study locations. GAO's related draft report includes four recommendations to strengthen internal controls governing the authorization and use of miscellaneous obligations, in compliance with applicable federal appropriations law and internal control standards.
What GAO Found
VHA recorded over $6.9 billion of miscellaneous obligations for the procurement of mission-related goods and services in fiscal year 2007. According to VHA officials, miscellaneous obligations were used to facilitate the payment for goods and services when the quantities and delivery dates are not known. According to VHA data, almost $3.8 billion (55.1 percent) of VHA's miscellaneous obligations was for fee-based medical services for veterans and another $1.4 billion (20.4 percent) was for drugs and medicines. The remainder funded, among other things, state homes for the care of disabled veterans, transportation of veterans to and from medical centers for treatment, and logistical support and facility maintenance for VHA medical centers nationwide. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that agency management is responsible for developing detailed policies and procedures for internal control suitable for their agency's operations. However, based on GAO's preliminary results, VA policies and procedures were not designed to provide adequate controls over the authorization and use of miscellaneous obligations with respect to oversight by contracting officials, segregation of duties, and supporting documentation for the obligation of funds. Collectively, these control design flaws increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (including employees converting government assets to their own use without detection). These control design flaws were confirmed in the case studies at Pittsburgh, Cheyenne, and Kansas City. In May 2008, VA issued revised guidance concerning required procedures for authorizing and using miscellaneous obligations. GAO reviewed the revised guidance and found that while it offered some improvement, it did not fully address the specific control design flaws GAO identified. Furthermore, according to VA officials, VA's policies governing miscellaneous obligations have not been subject to legal review by VA's Office of General Counsel. Such a review is essential in ensuring that the policies and procedures comply with applicable federal appropriations law and internal control standards. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-323 | gao_T-AIMD-00-323_0 | to the Congress and the administration. Efforts to continue to build the foundation for generating accurate financial information through lasting financial management reform are essential. The Department of Education did not receive such an opinion because of its financial management weaknesses. Report on the Financial Statements
While Education’s financial staff and its contractors worked very hard to prepare Education’s fiscal year 1999 financial statements before the March 1, 2000, deadline, and the auditors’ opinion on the financial statements improved over that of fiscal year 1998, serious internal control and financial management systems weaknesses continued to plague the agency. To the extent that Education was able to improve the opinion it received on its financial statements for fiscal year 1999, it was generally the result of (1) time-consuming manual procedures, (2) various automated tools to “work around” the system’s inability to close the books and generate financial statements, and (3) reliance on external consultants to assist in the preparation of additional reconciliations and the financial statements. This approach does not produce the timely and reliable financial and performance information Education needs for decision-making on an ongoing basis, which is the desired result of the CFO Act. This report is significant for highlighting the agency’s internal control weaknesses that increase its risk of mismanagement that can sometimes result in waste, fraud, and abuse. financial reporting process, (2) inadequate reconciliations of financial accounting records, and (3) inadequate controls over information systems. Potential for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Error! A report issued by the Department’s Inspector General in Februaryemphasizes the need for the Department to focus on addressing its computer security vulnerabilities. In response to the IG’s February report, Education’s Chief Information Officer has developed a corrective action plan to address these weaknesses. In addition, vulnerabilities in the Department’s student financial assistance programs have led us since 1990 to designate this a high-risk areafor waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. It is also important to recognize that several of the financial management issues that have been raised in reports emanating from reviews of Education’s financial statements directly or indirectly affect Education’s ability to meet its obligations to its loan and grant recipients and responsibilities under law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed financial management at the Department of Education, focusing on: (1) Eduction's current financial management status as evidenced by its fiscal year (FY) 1999 financial audit results and the corrective actions it has taken to resolve weaknesses identified in that audit; and (2) the relationship between the audit findings and the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Eduction's financial activity is important to the federal government because Education is the primary agency responsible for overseeing the more than $75 billion annual federal investment in support of educational programs for U.S. citizens and eligible noncitizens; (2) Education is also responsible for collecting about $175 billion owed by students; (3) in FY 1999, more than 8.1 million students received over $53 billion in federal student financial aid through programs administered by Education; (4) Education's stewardship over these assets has been under question as the agency has experienced persistent financial management weaknesses; (5) beginning with its first agencywide financial audit effort in FY 1995, Education's auditors have each year reported largely the same serious internal control weaknesses, which have affected Education's ability to provide reliable financial information to decision makers both inside and outside the agency; (6) to the extent that Education was able to improve on its financial statements for FY 1999, it was generally the result of: (a) time-consuming manual procedures; (b) various automated tools to "work around" the system's inability to close the books and generate financial statements; and (c) reliance on external consultants to assist in the preparation of additional reconciliations and the financial statements; (7) this approach does not produce the timely and reliable financial and performance information Education needs for decision making on an ongoing basis, which is the desired result of the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990; (8) Education continues to have serious internal control and system deficiencies that hinder its ability to achieve lasting financial management improvements; (9) the internal control weaknesses need to be addressed to reduce the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse; (10) some of the vulnerabilities identified in the audit report include weaknesses in the financial reporting process, inadequate reconciliations of financial accounting records, information systems weaknesses, and property management weaknesses; (11) in response to the Inspector General's report, Education has developed a corrective action plan to address these weaknesses; and (12) vulnerabilities in Education's student financial assistance programs have led GAO since 1990 to designate this a high-risk area for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. |
gao_GAO-03-1138T | gao_GAO-03-1138T_0 | Frequently, skilled hackers develop exploitation tools and post them on Internet hacking sites. Successful attacks on unpatched software vulnerabilities have caused billions of dollars in damage. Collaborative Response to Two Recent Software Vulnerabilities
Recently, two critical vulnerabilities were discovered in widely used commercial software products. The federal government and the private- sector security community took steps, described below in chronological order, to collaboratively respond to the threat of potential attacks against these vulnerabilities. Common Practices for Effective Patch Management
Effective patch management practices have been identified in security- related literature from several groups, including NIST, Microsoft, patch management software vendors, and other computer-security experts. Dedicated resources and clearly assigned responsibilities. Risk assessment. When a vulnerability is discovered and a related patch and/or alternative workaround is released, the entity should consider the importance of the system to operations, the criticality of the vulnerability, and the risk of applying the patch. Federal Efforts to Address Software Vulnerabilities
The federal government has taken several steps to address security vulnerabilities that affect federal agency systems, including efforts to improve patch management. The federal government offers PADC to federal civilian agencies at no cost. At present, the government is considering broadening the scope of these services and capabilities, along with the number of users. Services and Tools Also Provide Means for Improving Patch Management
Several services and automated tools are available to assist entities in performing the patch management function, including tools designed to be stand-alone patch management systems. Additional Steps That Can Be Taken
In addition to implementing effective patch management practices, several additional steps can be considered when addressing software vulnerabilities, including: deploying other technologies, such as antivirus software, firewalls, and other network security tools to provide additional defenses against attacks; employing more rigorous engineering practices in designing, implementing, and testing software products to reduce the number of potential vulnerabilities; improving tools to more effectively and efficiently manage patching; researching and developing technologies to prevent, detect, and recover from attacks as well as identify their perpetrators, such as more sophisticated firewalls to keep serious attackers out, better intrusion- detection systems that can distinguish serious attacks from nuisance probes and scans, systems that can isolate compromised areas and reconfigure while continuing to operate, and techniques to identify individuals responsible for specific incidents; and ensuring effective, tested contingency planning processes and procedures. In summary, it is clear from the increasing number of reported attacks on information systems that both federal and private-sector operations and assets are at considerable—and growing—risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
Attacks on computer systems--in government and the private sector--are increasing at an alarming rate, placing both federal and private-sector operations and assets at considerable risk. By exploiting software vulnerabilities, hackers can cause significant damage. While patches, or software fixes, for these vulnerabilities are often well publicized and available, they are frequently not quickly or correctly applied. The federal government recently awarded a contract for a government-wide patch notification service designed to provide agencies with information to support effective patching. Forty-one agencies now subscribe to this service. At the request of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, GAO reviewed (1) two recent software vulnerabilities and related responses; (2) effective patch management practices, related federal efforts, and other available tools; and (3) additional steps that can be taken to better protect sensitive information systems from software vulnerabilities.
What GAO Found
The increase in reported information systems vulnerabilities has been staggering, especially in the past 3 years. Automated attacks are successfully exploiting such software vulnerabilities, as increasingly sophisticated hacking tools become more readily available and easier to use. The response to two recent critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Corporation and Cisco Systems, Inc., products illustrates the collaborative efforts between federal entities and the information security community to combat potential attacks. Patch management is one means of dealing with these increasing vulnerabilities to cybersecurity. Critical elements to the patch management process include management support, standardized policies, dedicated resources, risk assessment, and testing. In addition to working with software vendors and security research groups to develop patches or temporary solutions, the federal government has taken a number of other steps to address software vulnerabilities. For example, offered without charge to federal agencies, the federal patch notification service provides subscribers with information on trusted, authenticated patches available for their technologies. At present, the government is considering broadening the scope of these services and capabilities, along with the number of users. Other specific tools also exist that can assist in performing patch management. In addition to implementing effective patch management practices, several additional steps can be taken when addressing software vulnerabilities. Such steps include stronger software engineering practices and continuing research and development into new approaches toward computer security. |
gao_GAO-15-322 | gao_GAO-15-322_0 | Federal matching funds are available to states for different types of payments that states make. Many states also make other supplemental payments that are not required under federal law. 1.) 2.) In two states with reliable data, Illinois and New York, our estimates of average daily payments made to government and private hospitals showed inconclusive trends, but also identified that a small number of government hospitals were receiving high payments that warrant oversight. For example, some selected hospitals in each of these states received Medicaid payments in excess of total operating costs. A Comprehensive Assessment of Medicaid Payments to Individual Hospitals in Selected States Was Precluded by Inaccurate and Incomplete Data
Our assessment of Medicaid payments to individual hospitals in three selected states—California, Illinois, and New York—was hampered by inaccurate and incomplete state data on Medicaid payments and CMS claims data on Medicaid payments and days of service. States must capture and report payment data to CMS, but the data needed to compare payments by individual provider and provider ownership are not specifically required. Illinois Government and Private Hospitals’ Average Daily Inpatient Medicaid Payments Were Comparable in 2011, but Individual Hospitals’ Daily Payments Varied Widely, and One Government Hospital Received Payments That Exceeded Its Total Operating Costs
For inpatient services provided by 193 hospitals in Illinois in state fiscal year 2011, government hospitals’ and private hospitals’ average daily payments were comparable. When comparing the Medicaid inpatient payments—regular and UPL supplemental payments—to the costs of providing those services, estimated using cost reports prepared by hospitals, for hospitals with the highest daily payments, we found that six of the seven selected hospitals had total Medicaid inpatient payments that exceeded those hospitals’ total The three local government hospitals costs of providing these services.and three private hospitals had Medicaid inpatient hospital payments that exceeded costs, ranging from about $273,000 to about $18 million over costs. In addition, for the selected hospitals in Illinois, we also compared Medicaid payments and other supplemental payments to the hospitals’ total operating costs for all services and all patients and found that one of the local government hospitals received Medicaid payments that exceeded the hospital’s total operating costs. For example, the local government hospitals’ daily payments ranged from $198 to $9,176, compared to $144 to $3,413 for private hospitals.difficult to draw conclusions about payment differences by hospital ownership, but helped in identifying individual hospitals with significantly higher daily payments compared to other hospitals. The agency does not collect provider- specific payment and ownership information and lacks a policy and standard process for determining whether Medicaid payments to individual providers are economical and efficient. As a result, excessive state payments to individual providers may not be identified or examined by CMS. Information Needed to Oversee Medicaid Payments to Government and Private Providers Is Lacking
CMS does not collect sufficient information on payments to enable it to assess payments for individual providers, which would allow the agency to ensure that payments are appropriately spent for Medicaid purposes. CMS’s Oversight of Medicaid Payments to Individual Providers Is Limited Because CMS Lacks a Policy and Process for Assessing Whether Payments to Individual Providers Are Economical and Efficient
CMS cannot ensure that Medicaid payments to individual providers are economical and efficient because the agency does not have a standard policy delineating criteria for when payments made to individual providers are economical or efficient, nor does it have a process to identify payments to individual providers that appear questionable. Further, our analysis showing the wide ranges in hospitals’ average daily payments, and high payments over costs to certain government and private hospitals, raises further questions about federal oversight of states’ payments to individual institutional providers, both government and private. To ensure the appropriateness of Medicaid payments to providers in New York, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following fourth action: expedite the formal determination of the appropriateness of New York’s payment arrangements and ensure future payments to local government hospitals are consistent with all Medicaid requirements. Methodology for Comparing Medicaid Payments by Provider Ownership in Selected States
To determine how, in selected states, state Medicaid payments to government hospitals compare to state Medicaid payments to private hospitals, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of three states— California, Illinois, and New York. GAO-11-318SP. GAO-10-69. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, states pay health care providers and receive federal matching funds for their payments. States may have incentives to make excessive Medicaid payments to certain institutional providers such as hospitals operated by local governments. Medicaid payments are not limited to providers' costs, but federal law requires they be economical and efficient. Large payments that exceed costs raise questions as to whether the payments are for Medicaid purposes.
GAO was asked to review state Medicaid payments to government providers compared to private, that is, for-profit and non-profit providers. GAO examined (1) in selected states, how state Medicaid payments to government hospitals compare to those made to private hospitals, and, for selected hospitals, to their Medicaid costs and total hospital operating costs; and (2) CMS oversight. GAO assessed hospital payments by ownership for three states selected in part based on size and geographic diversity, reviewed laws, regulations, guidance, and other documents, and interviewed CMS and state officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's assessment of Medicaid payments to government and private hospitals in three selected states was hampered by inaccurate and incomplete data on payments. States must capture but are not required to report all payments they make to individual institutional providers, nor are states required to report ownership information. For example, large supplemental payments states often make to hospitals are not reported by hospital. GAO assessed data for hospitals in two of three selected states, Illinois and New York; the third state, California, did not have accurate or complete payment data that would allow an assessment of total payments made to individual hospitals. In the two states, GAO's estimates of average daily payments—total payments adjusted for differences in patient health, divided by patient days—made to government and private hospitals showed inconclusive trends, but also identified that a small number of government hospitals were receiving high payments that warrant oversight.
In Illinois, average daily payments for inpatient services were comparable for government and private hospitals, but these averages masked wide variations in daily payments for both types of hospitals. Daily payments ranged from less than $600 to almost $10,000 for local government hospitals and from $750 to over $11,000 for private hospitals. For seven hospitals with high daily payments, GAO examined how payments compared to each hospital's costs of providing Medicaid services as reported by the hospital in cost reports and found that six of the seven hospitals' Medicaid payments exceeded their Medicaid costs.
In New York, average daily payments were higher for government hospitals than private hospitals, but as with Illinois these averages masked wide variations, with daily payments ranging from about $200 to over $9,000 for local government hospitals and from less than $200 to $3,400 for private hospitals. Four of nine selected government and private hospitals with high daily payments had Medicaid payments that exceeded Medicaid costs: two were local government hospitals that, all together, received payments exceeding their costs by nearly $400 million.
One selected hospital in Illinois and two in New York had Medicaid payments that exceeded the local government hospitals' total operating costs, including costs associated with all services provided to all patients they served.
Oversight of Medicaid payments to individual hospitals and other institutional providers, which is the responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), is limited in part by insufficient information on payments and also by the lack of a policy and process for assessing payments to individual providers. CMS does not collect provider-specific payment and ownership information. CMS also lacks a policy and standard process for determining whether Medicaid payments to individual providers are economical and efficient. Excessive state payments to individual providers may not be identified or examined by CMS. For example, CMS's oversight mechanisms did not identify large overpayments to two New York hospitals until they were identified by GAO. CMS began reviewing the appropriateness of these payments during the course of GAO's review.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take steps to ensure states report provider-specific payment data, establish criteria for assessing payments to individual providers, develop a process to identify and review payments to individual providers, and expedite its review of the appropriateness of New York's hospital payments. HHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-80 | gao_HEHS-96-80_0 | But these treatments have not been as successful for cocaine users, who have demonstrated high relapse and dropout rates. Three Cognitive/Behavioral Treatments Appear Effective in Outpatient Settings
Early research indicates relapse prevention, community reinforcement/contingency management, and neurobehavioral therapy are potentially promising cocaine-addiction treatment approaches for promoting extended periods of client abstinence and treatment retention in outpatient treatment settings. Neurobehavioral retention rates also proved favorable. But recent animal research has demonstrated the positive effects of a new immunization procedure in protecting rats against the stimulant effects of cocaine. To date, however, few well-designed evaluation studies have assessed the utility of acupuncture treatment. But the limited research findings are somewhat favorable. However, according to cocaine treatment experts, additional research is needed before standard, generalizable cocaine treatment strategies can be formulated for cocaine addicts of varying demographic and clinical groups. Methodology
To determine the extent to which cocaine therapies have proven successful, we identified studies with current reportable data on two outcome variables: drug abstinence and treatment retention. Cocaine Outcomes by Treatment Setting
In addition to the study of particular treatment approaches (such as relapse prevention, community reinforcement/contingency management, and neurobehavioral therapy), researchers are also beginning to examine the results of cocaine treatment in different types of settings (that is, outpatient, inpatient, day-hospital, and therapeutic communities). Methadone Maintenance: Some Treatment Programs Are Not Effective; Greater Federal Oversight Needed. 2, No. 1-4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which federally funded cocaine treatment therapies have proven successful and additional research initiatives that are needed to increase knowledge of cocaine treatment effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) cocaine treatment research is still in its early stages; (2) preliminary study results have shown that relapse prevention, community reinforcement and contingency management, and neurobehavioral therapy may produce prolonged periods of abstinence among cocaine users; (3) relapse prevention programs have the highest abstinence rates, followed by community reinforcement and neurobehavioral programs; (4) community reinforcement programs have the highest retention rates, followed by relapse prevention and neurobehavioral programs; (5) pharmacological agents have not proven to be consistently effective in preventing cocaine use, and none have been submitted for Food and Drug Administration approval; (6) animal researchers have demonstrated the positive effects of a new immunization procedure in blocking the stimulant effects of cocaine; (7) few researchers have assessed the effectiveness of acupuncture treatment, but some research findings are favorable; and (8) experts believe that more rigorous treatment evaluation studies that focus on important treatment components, appropriate treatment intensities and durations, and clients' readiness and motivation for treatment are needed before standard cocaine treatment protocols can be formulated. |
gao_GAO-15-94 | gao_GAO-15-94_0 | Background
Established as a national program in the mid 1970s, the WIC program is intended to improve the health status of low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children by providing supplemental foods and nutrition education. 1). In Recent Years, USDA Has Further Aligned Formula Amounts with Current Nutrition Science and Infants’ Nutritional Needs
In the past decade, USDA has taken steps to better tailor WIC food packages containing formula to the nutritional needs of participating infants. Among other changes, the revised regulations reduced the amount of formula provided to partially breastfed infants of all ages, delayed when partially breastfed infants may begin receiving formula, and reduced the amount of formula provided to older fully formula-fed infants. 2). 3). The National Extent of Online Sales of WIC Infant Formula Is Unknown, but Some Participants Attempt Them
USDA does not have data that can be used to determine the national extent of online sales of WIC formula; however, officials in 5 of the 12 states we spoke to said that they have found WIC formula offered for sale online by some participants. Consistent with these state accounts, our own monitoring of a popular e- commerce website for 30 days in four large metropolitan areas found few posts in which individuals explicitly stated they were attempting to sell WIC-provided formula. 2016.”
Through our monitoring efforts, and through interviews with USDA and state and local WIC officials, we identified a number of key challenges associated with distinguishing between WIC-obtained formula sales and other sales:
Each state’s specific WIC-contracted formula brand is typically available for purchase at retail stores by WIC participants and non- WIC participants alike, without an indicator on the packaging that some were provided through WIC. Individuals posting formula for sale online are able to remain relatively anonymous, so WIC staff may not have sufficient information to link the online advertisement with a WIC participant. According to USDA, state, and local WIC officials, because of these challenges, the return on investment for monitoring online sales of WIC infant formula is low. However, because the use of the Internet as a marketplace has substantially increased in recent years and the national extent of online sales of WIC food benefits is unknown, USDA and the states have insufficient information to assess the benefits of broadening their oversight efforts to include this participant violation, as discussed in more detail later in this report. USDA Has Provided Limited Assistance to States for Preventing and Addressing Online Sales
USDA has taken steps aimed at clarifying that the online sale of WIC benefits is a participant violation. In our review of rights and responsibilities statements from 25 states’ WIC policy and procedure manuals, we found that 7 did not require local agency staff to inform participants that selling WIC benefits is against program rules. Both USDA officials and officials we spoke with from two states noted that some WIC participants do not know that selling food benefits is a program violation. In addition, we found that states vary in the ways they identify attempted sales of WIC formula through monitoring efforts. Without general information on monitoring techniques—such as promising search terms or online sites where states may want to focus their efforts—some states may be missing opportunities to better target their limited resources. 42 U.S.C. area. However, it is clear that some participants are selling WIC formula online, inappropriately using program resources. However, USDA has not required state agencies to inform participants of this prohibition, and some states are not requiring local staff to do so. Monitoring online classified advertisements for attempted sales of WIC formula is another way to ensure program integrity. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that WIC participants are aware of the prohibition against selling WIC formula, and to assist states’ efforts to prevent and address online formula sales, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of FNS to take the following three actions: Instruct state agencies to include in the rights and responsibilities statement that participants are not allowed to sell WIC food benefits, including online. We reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) guidance to determine requirements related to the provision of formula to infants receiving WIC, as well as to identify federal, state, and local roles related to preventing and addressing online sales of WIC formula. To determine the role USDA regulations and guidance play in preventing and addressing online sales of WIC formula, we reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 25 states’ WIC policy and procedure manuals to determine how consistent states’ policies and procedures are in preventing and addressing online formula sales. Specifically, the formula type and volume of formula container advertised for sale were equivalent to a type and volume of formula provided to WIC participants in the state in which the posting was made, and the amount of formula advertised for sale represented approximately 85 percent or more of the maximum amount of formula authorized for fully formula-fed infant WIC participants each month, averaged across all ages. Similarly, the other team used both an automated and a manual approach to monitor the e-commerce website but found the manual approach to be more effective—as measured by more postings indicative of potential sales of these benefits—than the automated Our monitoring was conducted to provide some information approach.on the extent to which WIC participants may have attempted to sell WIC formula in four metropolitan areas over 30 days. | Why GAO Did This Study
WIC provides supplemental foods and assistance to low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children. Approximately half of U.S. infants born each year receive WIC benefits, and infant formula is a key component of the food package many receive. Recent news reports suggest that some participants have attempted to sell WIC formula online, and the Internet has substantially increased as a marketplace in recent years. GAO was asked to provide information about online sales of WIC formula.
GAO assessed: (1) how USDA determines the amount of formula to provide to participants, (2) what is known about the extent to which participants sell WIC formula online, and (3) steps USDA has taken to prevent and address the online sale of WIC formula. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and USDA guidance; monitored advertisements to sell formula on one e-commerce website in four metropolitan areas; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of policy manuals from 25 states that as a group serve about two-thirds of WIC participants, and that were selected for their varied WIC caseloads and geography; and interviewed USDA and state and local WIC officials.
What GAO Found
In recent years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has more closely aligned the amount of formula it authorizes states to provide through the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) with current nutrition science and the nutritional needs of participating infants. These changes were also made, in part, to encourage and support breastfeeding. Specifically, the agency issued revised regulations in 2007, finalized in 2014, that reduced the amount of formula authorized for partially breastfed infants and delayed the age when these infants may begin receiving formula. The regulations also reduced the amount of formula authorized for older fully formula-fed infants because they added infant fruits and vegetables for the first time.
USDA has not conducted any nationwide studies on the extent of online sales of WIC formula by program participants, but information gathered from state WIC officials and GAO's own limited monitoring suggest that some WIC formula is offered for sale online, though program rules prohibit such sales. In 30 days of monitoring one online classifieds website in four large metropolitan areas, GAO found 2 posts in which individuals attempted to sell formula specifically identified as WIC—among 2,726 that advertised infant formula generally. A larger number, 346 posts, advertised formula matching the brand, type, container volume, and amount provided to WIC participants, but did not indicate the source of the formula. Because WIC participants purchase the same brands and types from stores as non-WIC customers, monitoring attempted online sales of WIC formula can present a challenge. State officials GAO spoke with cited other challenges to monitoring online sales, such as the fact that individuals posting formula for sale online are able to remain relatively anonymous, and their posts may contain insufficient information to allow staff to identify them as WIC participants.
USDA has taken steps to clarify that attempting to sell WIC formula online is a participant violation but has provided limited assistance to states in preventing and addressing these sales. For example, USDA has not specifically directed states to instruct participants that selling WIC formula is against program rules, which could lead to participants making these sales unknowingly and using program resources inappropriately. GAO's review of 25 state policy and procedure manuals found 7 that did not require local agency staff to inform participants of the prohibition. Further, although states are responsible for controlling participant violations—including sales of WIC benefits—USDA is responsible for determining compliance with the WIC statute and regulations. However, because the department has not required states to describe their procedures for controlling these violations, USDA is unable to both oversee and assess state efforts to ensure program integrity in this area. The department is also unable to assist states' efforts because it has not assessed the national extent of these sales or techniques for addressing them. Through interviews with 19 state and local WIC agency officials from 12 states, GAO found that states vary in their approaches and the amount of resources devoted to monitoring attempted WIC formula sales. In addition, due to monitoring challenges, some officials expressed concerns about the return on investment for these efforts. Without information on cost-effective monitoring techniques—such as promising search terms or online sites where states may want to focus their efforts—some states may be missing opportunities to better target their limited resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA require state agencies to inform WIC participants that selling WIC formula is against program rules and describe in their state plans how they identify attempted sales. GAO also recommends that USDA assess online sales, including techniques states can use to monitor them. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
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